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
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August 5, 1974

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Cover-Up Continues

Impeachment Vote: Will Nixon Be (Deleted)?



Greek Masses Rejoice Over Collapse of Junta

Alan Jones

The Economic Impasse of British Imperialism

Argentina

28 PST Members Seized by Police

The investigation of the murder of Arturo Mor Roig, former minister of the interior, and of David Kraiselburd, editor of the La Plata daily *El Día*, "has led up to yesterday to the death of six persons, the arrest of about thirty, and the wounding of several without the authorities having yet indicated how any of them were involved in the two deeds, no doubt because of the secrecy of the indictment," according to the July 21 issue of *La Opinión*.

Mor Roig was assassinated on July 15 in San Justo, a suburb of Buenos Aires. Kraiselburd was shot on July 17 when the police closed in on the house in which he was being held captive. He had been kidnapped June 25 for undisclosed reasons.

In the resulting witch-hunt, twenty-eight members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—a sympathizing group of the Fourth International) were seized by the police in a raid on the local headquarters of the party.

The press was informed of the police raid and the arrests by Benito Llambí, the minister of the interior.

Shortly after Llambí's disclosure to the press, Alfredo Nocetti Fasolino, the federal judge in charge of the case, ordered the release of the twenty-eight members of the PST "for lack of evidence."

This is the first time that such a large number of members of the PST have been seized by the police. The arrests took place during a wave of attacks mounted by ultrarightist groups against the PST.

Four members of the PST have been butchered in cold blood, others have been wounded, and various local headquarters have been raided and sacked.

Summer Schedule

This is the last issue of *Intercontinental Press* before our summer break. We will resume our regular weekly publication schedule with the issue dated September 9.

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The Impeachment Vote: Will Nixon Be (Deleted)?

By Allen Myers

"Only a miracle is going to save the President," Thomas O'Neill, the House Democratic leader told a *New York Times* reporter July 24. "He's had it." O'Neill went on to predict that the House of Representatives would impeach Nixon by a "minimum of 60 votes" and perhaps by a margin of as much as 100.

By July 27, when the House Judiciary Committee voted overwhelmingly to recommend an article of impeachment accusing Nixon of participation in the Watergate cover-up, there were few persons outside Nixon's immediate entourage willing to dispute O'Neill's prediction. The committee's vote—21 Democrats and 6 Republicans in favor, 11 Republicans against—was more than sufficient to dispel Nixon's attempts to portray the impeachment effort as a "partisan" Democratic party plot against him. (The vote on other articles, charging Nixon with abuse of his powers and failure to comply with committee subpoenas, may be even more lopsided, since Republican Robert McClory, who opposed the cover-up article, has indicated that he will vote in favor of impeachment on these charges. The committee was to begin debating these articles July 29.)

Analyzing the likely House vote in the July 28 *New York Times*, R. W. Apple Jr. reported: "Whereas Republican liberals were saying two weeks ago that there would be no more than 25 proimpeachment votes from their party, mostly drawn from the ranks of the liberal Wednesday group, they now believe that as many as 45 or 50 are possible.

"Thus, with a 248-to-187 Democratic margin in the House, a majority of 80 votes for impeachment—even without any sort of 'tidal wave' effect—is expected."

Nixon evidently still hopes to be acquitted in a Senate trial, where a two-thirds majority is needed for conviction. But while Nixon still has considerable resources at his disposal, and weeks in which to use them, the odds are against his survival in office.

Shortly before the House Judiciary Committee opened its public debate on the evening of July 24, indications were that the prolonged debate in ruling-class circles over how to deal with the Watergate scandal had come to an end. The majority feel that it is better to push ahead with impeachment rather than run the risks in-


a unanimous decision would probably be announced in order to "make it harder for the President to ignore or disobey the decision."

These two events were sufficient to produce a noticeable shift in the attitude of Congress toward impeachment. When public debate opened that night, it was already clear that a substantial bipartisan majority of the committee would recommend impeachment.

Republican Tom Railsback of Illinois took on the job of expounding what would be the weightiest argument, from the viewpoint of the ruling class, for removing Nixon. After reciting some of the voluminous evidence of Nixon's involvement in the Watergate cover-up, Railsback concluded: "I received all kinds of mail. Some of my people say that the country cannot afford, that we cannot afford, to impeach a president. Let me say to—many of these are good supporters and friends—let me say to them, I've spoken to countless others including many, many young people and if the young people in this country think that we're not going to handle this thing fairly, if we're not going to really try to get to the truth, you're going to see the most frustrated people, the most turned-off people, the most disillusioned people, and it's going to make the period of L. B. J. in 1968-1967—it's going to make it look tame. So I hope that we just keep our eyes on trying to get to the truth."

Railsback and the ruling-class circles for which he speaks have good reason to recall with trepidation the years 1967 and 1968. It is true that Watergate and what it has exposed about the nature of capitalist government in the United States have not produced a mass movement in the streets like the movement against the Vietnam war. But Watergate has helped enormously to puncture the illusions of many Americans in the honesty of "their" government.

For more than two years, Congress has been able to avoid doing any-



NIXON: In need of a "miracle."

involved in further delay. On July 23, conservative Lawrence Hogan of Maryland became the first Republican on the committee to announce that he would vote for impeachment. The next morning, in a unanimous 8-to-0 decision (one justice disqualified himself), the Supreme Court shot down Nixon's claim to blanket "executive privilege" and ordered him to turn over sixty-four tape-recorded White House conversations subpoenaed by Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski.

While it had been widely expected that a majority of the court would rule in favor of Jaworski, the unanimity appeared expressly designed to cut off Nixon's options. *Newsw eek* magazine had earlier reported that the court originally divided 6-to-2 but that

thing about Nixon's involvement in the Watergate crimes. But now the public belief in Nixon's guilt is so widespread that a congressional vote to "acquit" him would not overcome that belief. On the contrary, such a vote would be more likely to convict Congress of complicity in the cover-up.

In fact, some sections of the ruling-class press have shown signs of fear that viewers watching the televised proceedings might begin to ask why it took Congress so long to notice the evidence. This would seem to explain, for example, a particularly oily editorial that appeared in the July 27 *New York Times*.

"... it is worth noting," the editors noted, "in this season of cynicism about the political process, particularly among young Americans, that several of the more junior members of the House Judiciary Committee have given a moving demonstration of the sincerity and idealism welling up in a new political generation.

"No one watching the pained intensity of Wayne Owens of Utah, the deep passion of Barbara C. Jordan of Texas, the articulate enthusiasm of Edward Mezvinsky of Iowa, could harbor any doubt of the potential for statesmanship being nurtured in the Congress of the United States, waiting to emerge onto the national scene."

The editors went on to assert—more hopefully than factually, one suspects—that "it is these new faces that are giving the wider public particular encouragement that politics need not be the dirty business it has seemed to be in recent years."

It is doubtful that the television performances reviewed so enthusiastically by the editors of the *New York Times* will really overcome the "cynicism" (read "realism") about capitalist politics engendered by Watergate. Sacrificing Nixon cannot restore the pre-Watergate situation. The most the ruling class can realistically hope for is to slow or halt temporarily the spreading disillusionment with capitalist politics.

The relatively small prospective gain is one of the reasons the rulers of the United States have hesitated so long in dealing with Nixon. And this situation also makes it advantageous to limit the charges against him as much as possible.

The search for "truth" proclaimed by Railsback was as sincere as Nixon's

protestations of innocence. The chief activity of the House Judiciary Committee has been to reduce the charges against Nixon to the minimum the public is thought likely to accept: the Watergate cover-up, the use of the federal bureaucracy to advance his own political interests, perhaps contempt of Congress. Nixon's more serious crimes—the genocidal aggression against the peoples of Indochina; aid to conspiracies against foreign governments, as in Chile; provocations, frame-ups, and even murder against the antiwar, socialist, and nationalist movements in the United States—are regarded as virtues, not "impeachable offenses," by the ruling class.


The hypocrisy of the ruling-class proimpeachment forces gave Nixon's defenders the opportunity to score a few debater's points even though they could not influence the outcome of the judiciary committee vote. For example, Republican Henry P. Smith III of New York said during the opening-night debate that the only charge on which he might conceivably vote for impeachment was the 1969-70 secret bombing of Cambodia. Smith knew very well that there was no chance of the House impeaching Nixon on that charge, or even of the committee recommending that it do so. He was only suggesting, as openly

as he dared to do on national television, that impeaching Nixon for crimes not approved by the ruling class might limit the ability of future presidents to commit the crimes the ruling class knows are indispensable to the defense of its interests.

Other charges for which there is abundant evidence of Nixon's guilt seem to have been quietly laid aside in part because they are frequently committed by members of Congress as well as by presidents. Nixon's sale of favorable rulings to ITT and large dairy cooperatives in exchange for campaign contributions, if pressed to a vote in the full House, would probably result in a defense of "you do the same thing yourself"—a defense that could easily be documented in many cases.

"The House Judiciary Committee's staff," the *Washington Post* observed in a July 26 editorial, "in its summary of the evidence and its proposed articles of impeachment, has gone very lightly indeed on the milk case. No doubt some members of Congress are embarrassed because they too have taken funds from [a dairy cooperative]. But congressmen and senators have, from time to time, been prosecuted and convicted for bribery. Will the President he held to the same salutary rule?"

The *Post* editors must have written



MacNelly in the Richmond News Leader

with tongue in cheek. The very occasional trial of a member of Congress for bribery is regarded in Washington not as a "salutary rule" but as an unfortunate though necessary exception when a capitalist politician is careless enough to get caught in the act. At present, the prevailing view in Congress appears to be that Watergate overshadows the bribery cases in the public consciousness, making it possible to ignore them.

But even though the cover-up of these crimes may be continued, they are likely to have an effect on the final outcome of the case of Richard Nixon. It will have occurred even to those sectors of the ruling class most fearful of removing Nixon that a vote by the Senate to whitewash his Watergate crimes will do little or nothing to eliminate the danger of the bribery cases suddenly exploding into a scandal of Watergate dimensions.

The House of Representatives is ex-

pected to vote on the articles of impeachment recommended by the judiciary committee near the end of August. If a bill of impeachment is voted, Nixon's trial in the Senate would probably begin within a few weeks.

It is not possible to predict with certainty whether Nixon will be able to muster the thirty-four votes needed to block his conviction by the Senate. But at this point his fortunes are so low that some observers are predicting that he will not even try.

Writing in the July 27 *New York Times*, William V. Shannon argued, "Contrary to the conventional wisdom on the subject, the prospects for conviction in the Senate have always been better than for impeachment in the House." In Shannon's view, "progressive Republicans," who would be more likely to vote against Nixon, are relatively stronger in the Senate than in the House. And Nixon's support

among southern Democrats, he added, is dwindling rapidly.

"Mr. Nixon can count votes as well as anyone else," Shannon concluded. "He knows, too, that while the Senate trial is being held in October, the Watergate cover-up trial of his former aides will also be under way. At that trial, additional information damaging to himself is likely to be forthcoming from the 64 tapes that the Supreme Court has now ordered him to make available.

"If the vote against him in the House in late August goes much above 250, Mr. Nixon may decide not to stick around for Senate trial or for the release of those tapes. Instead, hating the press to the last, he may choose late Saturday afternoon of Labor Day weekend when almost no reporters are at work as the time to drop his letter of resignation in the mail and slip away to Mr. Abplanalp's island in the Bahamas." □

Can Caramanlis 'Save' the Situation?

Greek Masses Rejoice Over Collapse of the Junta

By Gerry Foley

"In view of the exceptional circumstances the country is experiencing, the Greek armed forces have decided to return power to a political government." With that brief announcement July 23, the junta retired from the center of the stage to the wings.

"The face of Athens was transformed immediately," Eric Rouleau reported in the July 25 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*. "Motorists gave the signal for the carnival that followed. The chorus of voices spreading the news swelled, spread, submerged the city, which responded with an unrestrained joy. The bells of the churches began to peal. Flags waved in the windows of cars and trucks and from the balconies of buildings. Pedestrians were running everywhere. They were laughing uproariously. They congratulated themselves and shook each other's hands; they held each other in long embraces. Tears flowed down the cheeks of exhausted faces. . . .

"Tens of thousands of demonstrators, mostly youths, high-school and university students, as well as work-

ers, shouted their hatred and their thirst for vengeance. Some of them—here a worker in overalls, there a young woman in a spring outfit—were lifted up on shoulders of their comrades to address the crowd. Speaking emphatically and gesturing, they started up slogans that were repeated in chorus: 'The SA [Stratiotike Astinomia—military police] are SS.' General Ioannides, known as 'the torturer,' was the head of the military police. Other slogans were 'Hang the junta!' 'Put the generals in front of a firing squad!' 'Death to Ioannides!'"

From the start of the Cyprus crisis, Washington seemed determined to defend the junta as long as it could. This became impossible, however, after the Turkish invasion of the strife-torn island.

It soon became obvious that if the junta plunged the country into a war with Turkey, a social explosion might soon be triggered in Greece that would topple not only the junta but the capitalist system itself.

Whether or not the generals were pressured by Washington to resign, as

some have speculated, they seemed anxious to bring in a relief team. They phoned to Constantine Caramanlis in exile in Paris and told him to pack his bags and get on a plane for Athens—but fast.

"They told him that they had no other solution. They were desperate. They said the military could not handle the job any more." One of Caramanlis's aides told this to Alvin Shuster, a correspondent of the *New York Times* (July 25).

Shuster also reported rumors that a backstage coup by General Ioannis Davos had forced the junta to resign. Excerpts of a July 21 declaration by 200 officers of the Third Army Corps calling on the junta to turn power over to Caramanlis were published in the July 25 *Le Monde*.

While Davos's move was probably a factor in leading the junta to retreat, the decisive force was pressure from the Greek people.

"Today, angry crowds were seeking out supporters of the former military government," a July 24 dispatch

in the *Washington Post* reported. "Youths attacked members of the security police and the military police, which formed the basis for Ioannides' power.

"Shouting 'dirty fascists,' one band of youths was seen kicking and beating a jeep-load of military police, who were eventually rescued by regular policemen."

In the July 25 *Le Monde*, Rouleau wrote: "The compact and majestic human wave converged on Constitution Square before moving on to other rallying points in the capital, notably Omonia Square. It ran up against buses placed across the street and rows of police, who contained it before slowly pushing it back. 'Hands off,' the crowd roared at the forces of order, who have rarely showed so much restraint and tact. Uniformed and plainclothes police, with frozen smiles on their faces, pretended not to hear the insults."

The fall of the junta, Rouleau indicated, released a vast explosion of hatred against the Pentagon and the State Department for conspiring with the military junta.

As for Washington, although it seemed reconciled to accepting a certain "democratic opening" in Greece and taking the political risks that were involved, it obviously hoped that the junta's quick designation of a relief team would save the situation.

When he was asked in the U.S. Senate if the military was still ruling behind the façade of the new civilian government, Secretary of State Kissinger said, "Our impression" is that with the return to civilian authority in Greece, "the army will not play as dominant a role as it has in recent years."

After a breakfast meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kissinger told reporters that the figures in the new Greek government are "old friends of ours."

Caramanlis presided from 1955 to 1963 over a regime based on a crushing defeat of the Greek workers and poor peasants in pitched battles. He ruled through parliamentary forms while maintaining a severe repression against the left and the labor movement. Caramanlis himself has been cleaned up, rather like Nixon at the start of his first term as president. It is largely forgotten now that the previous Caramanlis regime collapsed primarily because of a spreading scan-

dal over the fixing of the 1961 elections.

Because of the junta's strong-arm methods of rule, even conservative bourgeois figures such as Evangelos Averoff and Caramanlis can claim to have suffered at the hands of the dictatorship. In the climate of anti-parliamentary military rule, some bourgeois figures, such as Giorgios Mavros, a member of the liberal *Enosis tou Kentrou* (Center Union) and



CARAMANLIS: Another opportunity for former strong man.

the foreign minister of the new government, spoke out in defense of the students and workers who demonstrated in the streets in November 1973 against the junta's repression.

Excluded from government by an iron-fisted military clique, such bourgeois figures had to associate themselves with the fight against the dictatorship to retain some political credibility. They hoped the struggle of the students and workers would force the military to retreat and resort to the services of the bourgeois compromisers and parliamentarians.

However, Caramanlis is taking the reins of government in very different conditions from those that prevailed when he headed the regime of capitalist consolidation in the 1950s. Now the repressors of the workers and the masses are in retreat instead of advancing, and their retreat even has a certain appearance of headlong flight.

Caramanlis, the bourgeois strong man who locked the prison doors on the victims of the civil war and the following repression, has now had to open the gates of the junta's concentration camps.

Furthermore, Caramanlis's political authority seems weak, at least among the more class-conscious sectors of the Greek masses, and so it is doubtful that he will be able to hold them back for very long by promises alone.

"Many slogans reiterated the same theme," Rouleau wrote in the July 25 *Le Monde*. "'We don't want another junta in place of the last one!' 'We demand a government representative of all parties!' 'Workers, peasants, students—all united!' 'Bread, education, freedom!' [the slogan of the November rebellion] 'Fascism must die tonight.'"

The masses that mobilized in the demonstrations, therefore, did not seem, whatever their illusions about parliamentary democracy or popular-front coalitions, to be ready to rely on Caramanlis as a savior. "Surprisingly," Rouleau wrote, "the crowd did not chant his [Caramanlis's] name, nor that of any of the politicians gathered around him" [on his return to Athens].

All the Athenian bourgeois papers, however, portrayed the "Greek Eisenhower" as the hero of the occasion. The conservative *Vradyni*, which reappeared after being shut down some months by the junta, carried a giant headline in its July 24 issue: "A CARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT." Its pictorial coverage focused on groups carrying the old parliamentary strong man's picture and the Greek national flag.

The chauvinist daily *Apogevmatini* ran a cartoon in its July 24 issue showing Caramanlis cleaning up an accumulated mess. In the same issue, it ran a picture of a group of Greek soldiers in association with a story headlined "Turkish Barbarities Condemned." The picture was headed "Ready for the Highest Duty."

The caption read: "Those who rush to answer 'present' to the call of the fatherland are being immortalized with smiles on their lips. Wearing the honored uniform of Greek soldiers, they are showing their determination to give their lives for the fatherland."

Other papers suggested that now after a "democratic" government had been restored, there could be greater

"national unity" of all Greeks against the Turks.

The bourgeoisie thus seemed hopeful that the "democratic" regime could accomplish what the junta could not, that is, mobilize the Greek people for war against Turkey. This illustrates the danger for the Greek left of permitting the Caramanlis government to consolidate itself. Caramanlis will try to use the present Turkish offensive to establish a bourgeois regime of "national union" based on reactionary chauvinism.

If Caramanlis can establish a strong government, it is certain that there will be a relatively quick return to repression. All the reactionary social forces that created the military dictatorship, as well as the entire apparatus that maintained it for seven years, remain intact.

"The military still have their fingers on the trigger," Gaetano Scardocchia wrote in the July 26 Milan daily *Corriere della Sera*. "They have retired into the shadows, but they have not been arrested. The contest between the Praetorians and the politicians remains to be played out."

The new government, moreover, was obviously not offering any more political freedoms than it was compelled to. Averoff, the new defense minister, told Scardocchia, "We will respect reasonable public demonstrations, but we will intervene if these are aimed at provoking disorder."

Some of the bourgeois journals in various countries speculated that the experience of the military dictatorship would "chasten" the Greek people and make them less inclined to engage in the sort of militant mobilizations that preceded the fall of the last parliamentary government. *Le Monde* wrote in its July 25 editorial that the country had gained "maturity" through its adversity and that this "should facilitate the return to a new democracy."

However, the Greek people are not likely to place their confidence in the very political figures who created the situation that led to the coup and who later proved unable to combat the military dictatorship. They know, furthermore, that what really destroyed the junta was the action of the heroic students and workers who rose up in November 1973. The Turkish attacks only gave the coup de grace to a regime that was already clearly dying.

Caramanlis would have a poor

chance of making his "national front" work without the help of the very forces he persecuted in the 1950s. It is on the standing of these forces among the Greek workers that the success of his regime is likely to depend.

"The Communist party (which has a political line very close to that of the Italian CP) issued a communiqué today," Scardocchia reported in the July 25 *Corriere della Sera*, "in which it called for the formation of a 'real government of national unity' and observed that in order to solve its grave political and economic problems, Greece needs a 'union of all popular forces.'"

Both factions of the Greek Communist party have called for a "Portuguese solution" in Greece.

The example of Portugal is also very much on the minds of bourgeois observers. In an editorial July 26, for example, the Boston daily *Christian Science Monitor* tried to compare the situation in Greece with what it considered to be the sometimes disturbing process in Portugal. Some aspects of the change in Greece seemed more promising from this bourgeois journal's point of view: "Unlike Portugal, where all political activity had been suppressed for so long, Greece had political parties and politicians ready to go into action once the lid kept on them by the colonels was removed."

The only problem, the editorial continued, was that these politicians had been "widely discredited" by the crisis that led to the coup on April 21, 1967. In fact, the very experience of parliamentary rule in Greece could make the liberalization there even more potentially explosive than in Portugal. Like their counterparts at the other end of the Mediterranean, the Greek capitalists were forced to retire a dictatorial regime because of their desperate need to find a more effective means of rule. But the change in Portugal did not take place as a direct consequence of mass action. In Greece, the spectacular November insurrection doomed the regime.

In Portugal, the Communist party was persecuted for almost its entire history and was known to the masses for its victimization by the dictatorial regime. In Greece, the Communist party has been a mass organization and major political force for decades. The

masses have passed through repeated experiences of Stalinist betrayals. And last November the great street demonstrations essentially bypassed the two factions of the Communist party.

If the repressive forces have not yet suffered the kind of blows they did in Portugal, mass mobilizations such as the one that followed the junta's resignation can rout them in a matter of days if they are not given time to regain their morale and their confidence.

The very fact that the fall of the dictatorship in Athens has come so quickly on the heels of the collapse of the oldest reactionary dictatorship in the Mediterranean area will increase the confidence of the Greek masses and make them more determined to destroy the whole apparatus of repression root and branch. Moreover, in view of the continuing mass struggles of the Italian workers and permanent unrest in Spain as the fascist regime decays, the whole of southern Europe is in a ferment that makes possible great advances.

The fact that Ankara is still trying to take advantage of the present weakness of its old bourgeois rival creates immediate problems for the workers movement in Greece. But this pressure also weakens the position of the Greek ruling class vis-à-vis its own masses, as Washington and London have recognized. That is why they have been warning Ankara to practice restraint. Moreover, the Turkish regime itself may have weakened its own position by its adventure.

"The one good guy to suffer in the crisis," columnist Joseph Kraft wrote in the July 25 *Washington Post*, "is the Turkish prime minister, Bulent Ecevit. The invasion force the Turks sent to Cyprus immediately after Makarios was forced out did not score a military success.

"Though the invasion was launched under pressure of the Turkish armed forces, it is possible that Mr. Ecevit will have to pay the price for the inglorious adventure."

A revolutionary mass mobilization in Greece could set off an explosive radicalization throughout southern Europe, including Turkey. This is the one force, moreover, that could save both the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus from a genocidal conflict in which only the competing bourgeois regimes in Greece and Turkey and their imperialist masters could gain. □

Upsurge of Labor Struggles in Barcelona

By Judy White

A strike that began at the Elsa glassworks in the industrial belt southwest of Barcelona in early May won the active support of thousands of workers in the Bajo Llobregat section of the city July 3.

At fourteen companies on that day, two-hour work stoppages took place in solidarity with the Elsa workers' demands on wages, fringe benefits, and for the reinstatement of fellow-workers who had been fired in the course of a struggle dating back to December 1972.

By July 4, the work stoppages had become a general strike, involving 20,000 workers. The strike lasted four days and shut down large sections of industry, stores, and banks. Street confrontations took place between workers and police, and twenty persons were arrested. The strike began to spread to the center of Barcelona.

Background on the struggle was provided by the July 13 *Mundo*, a Spanish liberal weekly:

In December 1972, Elsa workers tried to renegotiate their contract, demanding an across-the-board raise of 1,000 pesetas. (They were earning 8,000 pesetas [US\$140] a month.) When the company turned down their demand, the workers decided not to work overtime.

A series of provocations by the bosses ensued: They took court action against union leaders and reorganized shifts to make two, and later three, Sundays a month part of the regular workweek. At one point they even agreed to the raise if employees would work three Sundays a month.

The fight continued up to May 1974, when the bosses escalated their offensive by bringing in the police on two occasions to forcibly remove workers from the factory.

A new maneuver by the company occurred May 20. On that day 518 workers received notices that they had been fired. Two days later, many of the same workers got a second notice stating that the company was "willing to forgive them" if they would come back to work forfeiting their seniority.

On July 3, reported the July 20 *Mundo*, a challenge to the legality of the firings was to go to court.

At an assembly involving more than 6,000 workers from the area, a vote was taken not to go through with the trial. Elsa union representatives explained the reasons:

— Article 103 of the labor code (under which the matter would be decided) was rigged in favor of the bosses, since it recognized the company's power over hiring and firing of individuals in the plant.

— Elsa workers wanted to resolve the fundamental issues; the court procedure was designed only to patch up the situation.

The Trade-Union Council (the official corporatist "union" body) responded the very same day, stating that the decision not to submit to the court's arbitration was tantamount to "the workers voluntarily quitting." The council added that such a decision would lead to the loss of all rights on the job, unemployment insurance, and health-care benefits.

These are the circumstances leading to the general strike in Bajo Llobregat.

The Liga Comunista (LC—Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain) described the framework in which such struggles are taking place: "Big capital and the dictatorship have to accelerate the imposition—one after another—of a series of measures directed against the masses. . . ."

The March issue of *Combate*, the LC's newspaper, added, "In addition to pointing to the energy crisis and worldwide inflation to justify the stepping-up of labor exploitation, the capitalists and their government cited 'some wage increases exceeding increases in productivity' as a principal cause of the inflation."

Prime Minister Arias Navarro has accompanied the wage freeze with a new repressive education law and wide-ranging, systematic repression.

The repression has been directed most severely against the working

class. Between January and March, reported *Combate*, "The firings numbered in the thousands. In the province of Barcelona alone more than 700 workers lost their jobs and over 5,000 were penalized. . . ."

"The courts back up the bosses in their efforts to cut across the workers' combativity. Whether they rule a firing legal or illegal, they subsequently give the company a free hand to fire those involved. . . ."

The Arias government has also employed selective repression against elements of the vanguard, "devoting special attention and steps to the work of breaking up the organizations and parties of the workers movement."

That these measures have been ineffective is demonstrated by the current labor struggles in Barcelona and by a recent victory in a Pamplona auto workers' strike.

On July 12, *Mundo* reported, work resumed at Elsa after the bosses agreed to recognize all on-the-job rights rescinded during the long course of the struggle; grant special pay for those who consent to work Sundays; give wage increases that will be applied retroactively up to a total of 40 million pesetas; and establish an aid fund for all employees who are working, unless absenteeism at the plant reaches 7 percent, in which case this provision will be inoperative.

In addition, negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement to go into effect in January 1975 are to be opened, and all fired workers except two will be reinstated. Legal proceedings against the workers are to be dropped.

Labor problems for Spain's ruling class may be even more difficult in the period ahead, as the writer for *Mundo* pointed out in his July 20 article:

"If the strike at Elsa has finished and the one at Solvay [another plant involved in the Bajo Llobregat conflict] appears to be almost settled as we go to press, negotiations over the contract for the region's metalworkers continue 'hot.'"

He Should Have Worn a Sword

A reserve officer who was dropped from the U.S. navy's promotion list after he streaked through the ballroom of a New York hotel is suing the navy. He argues that since he was off duty when he streaked, it's none of the navy's business.

Iranian Students Association Expels 30

By Parviz Foroughi

The Iranian Students Association in the United States (ISA-US) held its twenty-second annual convention in Los Angeles June 29-July 7. The convention was attended by 76 delegates from local chapters of the ISA and more than 300 Iranian students. ISA-US is a member of the World Confederation of Iranian Students, and two of its secretaries attended.

A positive step taken by the convention was the reaffirmation of the ISA's opposition to the shah's military intervention in Dhofar. The general consensus was for continued efforts to expose the shah's aggression. However, no concrete action was projected.

In an extremely backward step, the convention, at the insistence of the ISA leadership, expelled more than thirty activists. This undemocratic move was occasioned by differences of opinion between the leadership and the expelled students on questions ranging from defense policy to the role of the national bourgeoisie in revolution and the nature of Stalinism.

Among those expelled are Babak Zahraie and Bahram Atai, who two years ago were the target of deportation efforts by the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service because of their activity in the movement against U. S. aggression in Vietnam and the struggle to defend political prisoners in Iran. An extensive defense campaign involving large numbers of students and professors forced the government to back down.

Those expelled included four students from New York and about thirty from universities in Texas. The ISA declared them all to be an "anti-Confederation group."

Those who were expelled were not informed before the convention that the leadership intended to bring charges against them. Even during the convention, it was not made clear on exactly what basis they were being expelled. Individuals reflecting the viewpoints of different factions in the ISA leadership—which consists of different Maoist groups as well as bour-

geois nationalists—spoke in favor of the expulsions, but each presented a different charge.

Some of the leaders condemned the group for having a "humanistic approach" in their defense policy and for having included in their defense effort prisoners of the shah who were not revolutionists, or even those who had recanted. These ISA leaders argued that calling for the freedom of such prisoners was going against the Confederation.

They also charged that the defense policy of the group was devoid of "anti-imperialist" slogans. Other leaders condemned the group for having participated in the defense of political prisoners through organizations other than the Confederation.

During the day-long "trial," the leadership of the ISA also brought forward charges based on questions of a historical and theoretical nature. One example was the charge that "certain members of the group" do not recognize Mossadegh (a bourgeois-nationalist prime minister whose government was toppled by a CIA-engineered coup in 1953) as the leader of anti-imperialist struggles in Iran. It was also charged that members of the "group" had "insulted" Ho Chi Minh.

Seven minutes each was allotted to six members of the "group" to defend themselves. In general, the six discussed the importance of a broad defense of *all* the shah's political prisoners and the need for the organization to work seriously toward that end. As for the differences in political views, the six explained that the solution to such questions did not lie in expulsion but rather in a democratic discussion that would provide a political education for all. They also pointed to the constitution of the Confederation and argued that the charges were unconstitutional.

The Confederation's democratic struggle against the dictatorial regime of the shah has played an important role abroad. As a result, it has come under attack from the regime, which

imprisons any known member. With the cooperation of its allies, the Iranian government continues its harassment against members of the Confederation living abroad, threatening to refuse to renew students' passports.

In a situation like this, the expulsions are a serious blow to the achievement of the tasks before the Confederation, for it is clear that the problems the Confederation faces cannot be solved by such bureaucratic methods. What is necessary is *unity in action* of all forces opposed to the shah's regime. This cannot be brought about except by a conscious effort to mobilize the maximum number of forces in defense of political prisoners and democratic rights in Iran, and in opposition to the shah's aggression against the people of Dhofar. But unfortunately the leadership of the ISA-US has ignored this fundamental fact and instead has championed the fight for excluding the activists.

The turn in Peking's relations with Tehran, and the Chinese Maoist leadership's presentation of the shah as an "anti-imperialist leader," has confronted Maoist supporters of different shadings in the ISA with the need to choose between the interests of the Iranian student movement and those of the Chinese bureaucracy. Despite the threatening atmosphere, many students have begun to question Mao's political support of the shah and his endorsement of the shah's aggression in the Arab-Persian Gulf. (See, for example, *Peking Review*, June 22, 1973.)

Instead of allowing such discussion to be carried out in a democratic atmosphere, the leadership of the Confederation is trying to avoid it by means of expulsions. The irresponsibility of the ISA leadership toward its central duty of consistent struggle for the release of political prisoners threatens to divert the Iranian student movement into a blind alley. The different political groupings in the leadership have turned the ISA into a battlefield of factional disputes over whose program is going to replace the ISA constitution.

During the first two days of the convention, a fierce faction fight took place between different groups around whether the slogan of "overthrowing the regime" should be added to the statutes. The debate was abstract and inconclusive, but leading groups went

so far as to threaten each other with expulsion.

After the vote to expel Atai, Zahraie, and the others was taken, a group of students, including the representative of the Iranian students from Boston, protested the measure. Later a number of discussions between those expelled and other students attending the convention took place outside the convention hall. The expelled activists have decided to appeal their expulsion at the congress of the World Confederation, which is to take place in Europe this fall.

The variety of literature being circulated outside the convention hall indicated the rising interest of Iranian

students in political questions. Three books in particular were the topic of debate and discussion: *Stalin*, published by Mazdak (a compilation of short articles, including a Persian translation of Lenin's Testament); Trotsky's *Permanent Revolution*, published by Fanus (available for the first time in Persian); and a collection of speeches and articles by Stalin, published by the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages.

In addition, a group of students outside the convention hall handed out literature on the case of Dr. Shariati, a prominent theologian and intellectual who was imprisoned by the shah in September 1973. □

men were arrested for supporting the PAIGC [Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde — African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands].

On July 9 a show of force was used to disperse an anticolonial demonstration.

Fines have been imposed on the dailies *A Capital* and *República* for reporting on that demonstration.

Vega Simão—minister of education under Caetano—was named Portugal's representative to the United Nations.

And, finally, there was Spínola's speech to the National Riflemen's Corps (part of the navy). Given during the cabinet crisis on July 11, the speech had a markedly rightist tone:

"I recall the Africa of ancient days the sailors brought us to. Leaving their ships, they went inland to the African bush with artillery, cavalry, and infantry, writing shining pages that a nation could be proud of into world history of that time. . . .

"That is what I want to say to you with an aching heart, in this moment of disorientation and inverted values, values I have seen seriously challenged so many times by confusing heroes with traitors and forgetting the history of our elders and the blood generously shed by our brothers in defense of the homeland. . . .

"As you stood firm in Guinea, I am certain that you will not retreat now, since this time it is the motherland that is being challenged."

It was a shame for him that the sailors did not greet him with a patriotic hymn. Instead they sang "Grândola Vila Morena," a song inspired by the popular uprisings that led to the take-over of National Guard barracks, and which had become the symbol of April 25.

Policy of the Communist Party

The Communist party dedicated itself to acting as attorney for the medium and small-sized enterprises that were left abandoned with the fall of Caetano.

In this capacity it proposes the nationalization of the banks (which, it seems, is going to be carried out) because the banks grant loans only to the big consortiums they are linked to. It also pleads for the subsidiza-

Caused by the Impatience of the Right

First Crisis of Portuguese Cabinet

By Hugo Blanco

[The following is a translation of "Primera Crisis del Gabinete en Portugal," which appears elsewhere in this issue.]

* * *

Lisbon

The bourgeois regime in Lisbon entered a period of relative stability after the mass upsurge that was unleashed April 25 had been contained by the Communist party.

But the impatience of the right wing has produced certain changes in the political situation. Although they are not deep, the changes presage more important political events, since the structural crisis of Portuguese capitalism is sharpening during a difficult conjunctural crisis. Political interests connected to those problems are aggravating the contradictions.

The strongest capitalist sectors, supporters of the coup, were not seriously affected by the wage increases and other gains made by the workers. But the way the gains were obtained did affect them. "A climate of uncertainty" was created by the mass mobilizations, causing the "withdrawal of investments" and a "failure of confidence." In addition, these sectors are

worried that "wage increases are not reflected in increased consumption." They want people "not to hold on to their money, but to spend it in order to raise consumption so that this would be reflected in increased production and a dynamic economic life."

That is why the rightist ex-Prime Minister Palma Carlos demanded more power, fundamentally more repressive power—he lacked freedom of action within the coalition cabinet:

"I cannot make concessions with the situation we find ourselves in: there is disorder in the streets, social indiscipline, agitation in the newspapers, and the invasion of public buildings by government functionaries. It happened right here two or three days ago, and some ministers could not get out until 11 p.m. All this creates a climate of indiscipline entirely contrary to my temperament and to my ideas of what democracy is."

In recent weeks, since the passage of the law censoring the press, there have been other signs of the right-wing offensive:

On June 25-26 national guardsmen Marvão and Anjos were arrested for refusing to use force against [striking] postal workers.

On July 6 three national guards-

tion of the construction and tourist industries and of other medium-sized or small enterprises that are in crisis.

In addition, it asks for "speedy development of relations with the USSR and other socialist countries."

Until the CP reached a point at which its own position was in danger because of the right-wing offensive, the axis of its policy had been to brake the mass movement. Then it made one of its about-faces, which we are so accustomed to internationally. Now it says that "the main danger comes from the right." It defends and even encourages the workers' protests against "unjustified" firings. It promotes the clean-up (purge of Caetanoist officials) in the countryside, though in a bureaucratic way. Through the National Union of Portuguese Students—an attempt to form a student center—it promotes campaigns of "literacy and political awareness in the countryside."

Prime Minister Resigns

In addition to the economic reasons given, the impatience of the right wing had political motives, the time factor being one of the important ones.

As more time passes, Spínola's prestige declines more, and the masses begin to differentiate among the different sectors that were in favor of the coup.

It is because of this that Palma Carlos posed his three points:

— To move up the election for president of the Republic.

— To postpone the legislative elections until 1976 and draft a provisional constitution that would hold sway until then.

— To strengthen the powers of the prime minister (that is, his own powers).


The Council of State (made up of members of the junta, the Armed Forces Movement, and various "personalities") totally rejected the first two points and partially accepted the last, but in such a way as to "turn over more powers but not turn over power," according to Palma Carlos. It is reported that the vote was 15 to 3.

As a result, the prime minister resigned and four others followed him: Defense Minister Lieutenant Colonel Mario Firmino Miguel, Minister of Economic Coordination Vasco Vieira de Almeida, Interior Minister Malgahães Mota, and Sá Carneiro, min-

ister without portfolio and adjunct to the prime minister. The last two are members of the Partido Popular Democrático [Popular Democratic party].

Later the whole cabinet was "forgiven." It was said that Firmino Miguel would be the next prime minister. But the person finally chosen was Colonel Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves, chief representative of the Armed Forces Movement on the Council of State and a member of the movement's coordinating committee.

As of this writing, the composition of the new cabinet is not known. But it appears that it is going to have al-



SPÍNOLA: "As you stood firm in Guinea . . . you will not retreat now."

most the same relationship of forces as the prior cabinet, with the addition of some military figures.

Results of Crisis

For several days, since before the resignation of the prime minister, there were rumors of a rightist coup headed by Spínola. But a turn that sharp did not occur. The program of the Armed Forces Movement received a vote of confidence. We have to remember that this is the "captains' movement" that carried out the April 25 coup and that it was persons considered to represent this group who would play the most important role in the new cabinet. Another gain of this movement was the

promotion of Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho to brigadier and his being named as second in command of the recently formed Comando Operacional do Continente [COPCON—Continental Operational Command] and commander of the Lisbon military region.

Otelo Saraiva is the "April 25 commander," who conducted the military operations the day Caetano turned power over to Spínola so that power "would not be left hanging in mid-air." Spínola responded that he was not leading any coup and that he [Spínola] would have to get in touch with the heads of the Armed Forces Movement to ask them if they would authorize it.

During the inaugural ceremony July 13, Spínola no longer spoke of "inverted values, values I have seen seriously challenged so many times," as he did July 11. This time he said that the ceremony represented "a new era of military life in a new climate, in light of new concepts of values."

The brilliant brigadier said that he was happy not because it was his triumph but because it was a triumph of his comrades in the movement. He added:

"We hope the luck that has accompanied us up to now will continue until the final victory, which will be within a year." He was referring to the elections.

COPCON was created by decree of the Council of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to the decree, its purpose is "to intervene directly, in support of civilian authorities and at their command, to maintain and reestablish order." The commander is the head of the Joint Chiefs of the Armed Forces. Nonetheless, Otelo Saraiva, the second in command, interprets the decree as an "application of operational control at the national level, and simultaneously, a force for intervention destined to impose by force compliance with the program of the Armed Forces Movement against possible reactionary maneuvers."

Undoubtedly, COPCON will be an instrument of a Bonapartist policy, which could be used against the conspiratorial and obstructionist right wing and against the most combative sectors of the workers. But at the same time, it seems very clear that the formation of such a body represents one more step in the reconstruction of the repressive forces. □

The Antimilitarist Battle in France's Armed Forces

By Dick Fidler

"The army probably hasn't seen such a rank-and-file protest movement since the Algerian war," a young infantry officer told *Le Monde*. He spoke in confidential tones, the Paris daily reported in its July 9 issue, "for the hierarchy is maintaining the greatest secrecy about the affair."

"The affair" is the spreading support among enlisted men in France's armed forces for a petition demanding recognition of their basic democratic rights. In the two months that it has been circulating among the ranks, the petition has been signed by more than 1,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Attempts by the military authorities to suppress the movement through arresting or otherwise harassing rank-and-file activists have aroused significant protests from the French labor movement and other sectors of the civilian population.

The petition originated in an appeal signed by 100 soldiers that was made public in the closing days of the presidential election, just before the second round of voting on May 19. The full text was published in the May 16 issue of *Le Quotidien Rouge*, the daily newspaper published during the election campaign by the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire (FCR—Revolutionary Communist Front), the French Trotskyist organization.

The "Appeal of the One Hundred" demanded that the presidential candidates declare where they stood on a series of demands, such as free choice of draft induction date up to the age of twenty-five; payment of wages equal to the legal minimum wage; the right of volunteers, and those who choose to sign up for longer terms, to renegotiate their service contracts; abolition of hazing and all attempts to impose arbitrary "discipline" on the ranks; and an end to postings abroad.

The appeal also demanded official recognition of the right of soldiers to read whatever they want to, to express their opinions, and to wear civilian clothes outside hours of service.

It called for an end to surveillance of mail and personal affairs, and for

the abolition of military tribunals and all special military sanctions as well as prisons and special camps under the jurisdiction of the military apparatus.

Although largely unnoticed by the mass media at the time, the Appeal of the One Hundred began to circulate in the ranks of the army, the navy, and the air force. It soon picked up momentum. "Somewhat improvised at first," *Le Monde* reported, "the movement won a response that was unexpected even among its promoters—militants of the far left grouped around the Comité de Défense des Appelés [CDA—Committee to Defend the Conscripts]."

Moreover, its supporters are not limited to those who have signed. "Many soldiers and noncommissioned officers (even the occasional officer) say they agree with its contents, although they don't want to take the risk of signing it."

The disciplinary regime facing recruits within the French armed forces is reputed to be among the worst of those enforced in the West European countries. Soliders are frequently jailed and beaten merely for having had copies of left-wing newspapers in their possession. The French officer corps developed its methods, of course, in the brutal wars of colonial aggression in Indochina and Algeria.

Le Monde described the reaction at the Auvours military camp, near Le Mans, where "more than three hundred soldiers in the regiment—one in three—have signed the appeal.

"Life is particularly difficult at Auvours," one of the soldiers stated. "The atmosphere is often very tense. There are frequent incidents. . . ."

"One of the conscripts said that for several months he and some friends had been part of a small 'study group' that had determined to publicize the living conditions of the ranks. . . . 'We had even decided to raise some demands with the commanding officer. Then the Appeal of the One Hundred appeared. We postponed our action in order to get the support of

as many conscripts as possible for this manifesto, and to get them to understand its importance.' This recruit and his friends, members of the Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne [JOC—Christian Worker Youth], think that it would be simplistic and falsely reassuring for the army to characterize the present unrest in the ranks as 'gauchiste' [ultraleft agitation]."

To date, the petition has circulated in some thirty garrisons in France and among French units stationed in West Germany.

"This document should win the support of a majority of the conscripts," Alain Krivine, a leader of the French Trotskyists and the FCR's candidate in the presidential election, told *Le Monde*. "The necessity of the demands it presents will be obvious to anyone who has done military service."

Krivine made the issue of soldiers' rights a central one in his election campaign this spring. The FCR's election program (see *Intercontinental Press*, May 6, p. 571) included such demands as: "Recognition of union and political rights for soldiers, including the right to refuse any order that is contrary to the interests of the workers"; "immediate recall of officers who bully the soldiers or take anti-working-class measures"; and "abolition of all special jurisdiction for the army."

Krivine's campaign brought an angry response from the minister of the army himself. In an April 30 television address, the Trotskyist candidate had appealed to conscripts to "refuse to be treated as second-class citizens. If Mitterrand is elected, we must remain vigilant toward the reactionary officers who will dream of returning to the past. . . . Make them know clearly that in no case will you agree to march against the people." Robert Galley, the minister of the army, promptly called a press conference to denounce Krivine's remarks as "an open appeal for riot and insubordination" in the armed forces, accusing him of "attempting to under-

mine the discipline of the army of the Republic."

A pamphlet published last year by *Rouge*, entitled *Où Va le Mouvement Antimilitariste?* (Where is the Antimilitarist Movement Going?), stated that the antimilitarist struggle is becoming an increasingly important part of the class struggle in France, and described this sector as of "central importance" in the activity of revolutionists.

The French armed forces have a strength of 575,000 men, of which 275,000 are conscripts, obliged to spend one year in the "national service."

In the spring of 1973, hundreds of thousands of French student youth took to the streets in massive mobilizations protesting the Debré Law, which had gone into effect in January of that year. The law eliminated draft deferments for students, forcing them to enter military service before the age of twenty-two. Many youth participated in protests later that year against the government's explosion of nuclear bombs in the South Pacific.

Antimilitarist agitation is not confined to students. Since 1970, for instance, the peasants of Larzac, in the south of France, have been mobilizing in opposition to the expropriation of valuable agricultural land for the extension of a military base in the region. One such demonstration last year drew an estimated 100,000 participants.

Moreover, the pamphlet noted, an incident in which many soldiers had resisted the government's use of the military to break a strike by garbage collectors illustrated the sympathy toward workers struggles that exists in the ranks of the conscript army.

Another factor warranting increased attention to antimilitarist work, the pamphlet argued, is the evolution of the army's role in France. Since 1968, the French military command has put increasing emphasis on preparing for repressive actions against "internal subversion."

In October 1973, *Le Monde* published documents showing that the regime was making intensive efforts to gather information on "the enemy within"—the various revolutionary and left-wing parties and workers organizations. And the Ligue Communiste, the French section of the Fourth International prior to its banning by the Pompidou government in June

1973, had earlier published two secret documents circulating among the army high command. One analyzed the various "far-left" organizations and their work among the ranks of the armed forces, the other dealt with the deployment of troops for "crowd control," and the use of other means of "domestic peace-keeping."

The first of these documents described the Ligue Communiste as "the 'far-left' group with the most developed structure throughout France. Dynamic and aggressive . . . the Ligue has for some months [this was written in 1970] been leading a violent antimilitarist campaign. . . ."

Finally, as Krivine indicated during the recent election campaign, the French Trotskyists hold that a victory of the Union of the Left (for instance, in the next legislative elections) would pose very sharply the danger of a military coup to overthrow the legally elected government and smash the workers organizations. They maintain that "henceforth, given the present level of the class struggle, what could be called the 'strategic battle for the ranks' is engaged between the revolutionists and the regime. At stake is the army's attitude in a period of civil war, and therefore, to a large degree, the question of victory or defeat for the revolution." (*Où Va le Mouvement Antimilitariste?*, p. 7.)

The FCR and *Rouge* are especially active inside the Comité de Défense des Appelés, which they see as a vehicle to unite revolutionists and unaligned independent elements—both within and outside the armed forces—on an "explicitly anticapitalist, offensive basis."

Another organization is the Comité Antimilitariste (CAM—Antimilitarist Committee), which is influenced particularly by members of *Révolution!*, an ultraleft group originating in a split from the Ligue Communiste. The FCR calls for fusion of the CDA and CAM, and encourages common activities between the two organizations.

Supporters of *Rouge* and the FCR also play a leading role in what they term "clandestine revolutionary groups" in the ranks of the armed forces, in particular, the Front des Soldats, Marins et Aviateurs Révolutionnaires (FSMAR—Revolutionary Soldiers', Sailors', and Airmen's Front). Organized on a "rigorous programmatic and organizational base,"

the FSMAR is a smaller, cadre-type organization that works strictly within the ranks.

The military authorities have responded to the increasing agitation for soldiers' rights in two ways: (1) with demagogic propaganda that France's military forces are "at the service of the nation" (Minister of the Army Robert Galley has put it a bit more directly: "The army is the last bulwark of liberal society"); (2) within the armed forces, combining small concessions, such as a slight lessening of discipline, with stepped-up attempts to isolate and repress antimilitarist activists, using such methods as hazings, sudden transfers to "disciplinary" and other units, and even courts-martial.

In the view of the French Trotskyists, the biggest problem facing the movement has been that struggles by soldiers in defense of their rights have remained isolated, sporadic, and uneven, facilitating the hierarchy's efforts to suppress them.

The current campaign in support of the Appeal of the One Hundred, however, has opened up new possibilities to overcome these difficulties. The petition itself is not "antimilitarist," the FCR says, because it does not explicitly question the role of the army as the mainstay of the bourgeois order. However, the July 5 issue of *Rouge* noted that the response to the petition indicated that possibilities now exist for taking antimilitarist work as such into the trade unions.

For example, at the recent congress of the post-office section of the CFDT (Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor) the delegates adopted a motion calling for the union to maintain contact with young members after they are called up for military service. Following the congress, the Paris section of the union published a pamphlet aimed at young recruits, entitled *Postal Worker or Soldier, You Remain a Worker!*

The pamphlet explains the role of the army as an instrument of the ruling class designed to protect its imperialist interests. It reprints many of the demands of the current petition, adding a couple of its own: payment of full trade-union wages during the period of military service and provisions for draft postponement as demanded by the anti-Debré Law movement.

Rouge has published several resolutions of local trade unions expressing solidarity with the Appeal of the One Hundred and with soldiers victimized by the brass for having signed it.

One of the major obstacles to the growth of solidarity with the soldiers' struggles among the civilian population, however, has been the reluctance of the mass workers parties—in the first place, the French Communist party—to throw their full support behind the campaign.

The Communist party does no anti-militarist work and has failed even to defend its own members when they were victimized for refusing to follow army orders to break strikes. Instead, the CP praises the "unshakable loyalty of the officers," as does the Union of the Left in its program. The Union of the Left does not even call for France's withdrawal from NATO.

While not actually supporting the Appeal of the One Hundred, however, the CP leadership has been forced by the attendant publicity to endorse its demands. ("All who desire democratic change will today be with the sons of France in the army who are demanding that their most elementary rights be satisfied," wrote CP leader Paul Laurent in the July 7 issue of the party's daily, *L'Humanité*.) And in some areas, the local sections of the CP, particularly the Communist Youth, have defended the current petition campaign.

"The scope of this protest movement seems to have inspired prudence among the military hierarchy," the July 9 *Le Monde* commented, "even though it is difficult for them to allow such violence to basic principles of military discipline. How to react? The margin of maneuver is narrow. Should they make some examples? In the Thirty-ninth Infantry Regiment stationed at Rouen, five conscripts were transferred to other regiments. The left parties and trade unions in the city protested strongly—in a common petition—against these 'completely unjustified sanctions.'

"The military authorities would no doubt rather avoid such demonstrations of support, which only help increase the audience of the 'Appeal of the One Hundred.'"

Le Monde thought the response to the petition underscored the need for changes in the military structure.

". . . some youth are challenging the way national service operates. This campaign underscores indirectly the

lack of adaptability of the institution, the need for reforms, and even more, the necessity for a public debate."

The newspaper seemed particularly uneasy over the fact that army life is not living up to its professed purpose of "preparing each Frenchman to defend his country." Faced with the growing boredom and malaise among recruits, many officers have relaxed discipline, with disastrous consequences for the condition of the troops. *Le Monde* cited a private's account of how his company, on field maneuvers in Brittany, was so exhausted after a forced march of eighty kilometers (fifty miles), that the soldiers could scarcely get out of the way of cars coming in the opposite direction. "I think the army is not really capable of making good soldiers out of us."

Behind the current protest movement, *Le Monde* sees what it describes as "the heritage of May 1968. At that time, the army was to all intents and

purposes spared. But since the demonstrations of high-school and university students against the Debré Law in 1973, antimilitarism has increased. . . ." Without saying so directly, *Le Monde* seemed to be asking, How reliable will the ranks be in the event of a "new May"?

But the future development of the movement inside the armed forces depends very much on the further development of solidarity actions within the civilian population, the June 21 issue of *Rouge* explained. The soldiers' committees within the army are still very weak and lacking in strong national coordination. The CDA, *Rouge* said, has a special role to play in the next period, "when its central tasks are no longer fundamentally shaped by the need to develop anti-militarist consciousness among youth, but by the need to get the ball rolling in the labor movement, against the army of civil war." □

'He's as Rich as Mikhalkov'

How the Soviet Bureaucrats Live

If you are an ordinary Soviet citizen, you are legally entitled to thirty square feet of living space. In practical terms, this amounts to an apartment of two small rooms for a family of three.

If you are a high Soviet bureaucrat, chances are you live in five or six big, high-ceilinged rooms in a stately old building in central Moscow. That is, unless you're really near the top. Then you might live next door to Premier Aleksei Kosygin in a modern block of buildings at the crest of Lenin Hills, overlooking all Moscow.

In a dispatch from Moscow in the June 22 *Washington Post*, correspondent Robert G. Kaiser described in some detail how the Soviet bureaucracy lives. It is apparent from his report that a large comfortable apartment in crowded, housing-short Moscow is only a small part of the total package.

For the bureaucrats, he wrote, "housing in the countryside seems to be more important than Moscow apartments. The villages of Zhukova, Borvikha and Uspensko east of Mos-

cow are dotted with the huge dachas of the very important—two-story houses of stone or wood with large grounds, all surrounded by high fences. Driveways and side roads in these villages are invariably marked with the European 'do not enter' sign, a white brick on a red disc.

"Members of the Politburo [of the Soviet Communist party] have dachas in this area, and additional residences in more remote parts of the country. Many are said to have hunting lodges. Most, and probably all, have beach houses on the Black Sea. Lesser officials are also accorded this plum."

Luxury food items at bargain-basement prices seems to be another staple of bureaucratic high living. "For food," Kaiser wrote, "the most privileged few pay a flat amount each month—50 to 70 rubles, according to educated guesses—to their special store. In return, they can take as much as they need of any food product, including caviar, good cuts of meat and many other products not sold in ordinary shops. This store is open only to the most senior officials. Others

have access to more ordinary special shops which sell rare products on a more commercial basis."

Outside Moscow the system works somewhat differently, but the end result is the same—special treatment for the bureaucrats at the expense of the masses.

"The system [of bureaucratic privilege] is established in provincial capitals, as well as in Moscow," Kaiser wrote. "In Armenia, according to an Armenian scientist, the local 'closed distributor' hands out special products before big holidays on the basis of written allocations. For instance, a top party official might get a piece of paper entitling him to buy as much caviar as he liked (at a modest price), while a lesser official's document would permit him to buy just 300

grams."

But special food and housing are only the beginning. If you are a bureaucrat, "Clothes can be bought in special shops, or made by special tailors. Theater tickets are sold at special box offices, as are train and plane tickets. Medical care is provided in special clinics and hospitals. The Kremlin Hospital on the Rublyovskoe Highway on the edge of Moscow is said to be the best in the country. It has drugs and equipment never seen in standard hospitals."

These privileges, Kaiser wrote, "are by no means reserved for the uppermost crust. They are available to thousands of officials—members of the Party Central Committee's staff, important bureaucrats in Moscow's dozens of ministries, top scientists and

entertainers, regional party officials and many more."

Writers who toe the official line do particularly well. Kaiser cites Sergei Mikhalkov, an official of the Writers Union, as one example: "An editor at a publishing house who needs influential support to get a certain book published knows that if she can get Mikhalkov to sign a favorable review, the book will sail through all barriers. His credentials as an orthodox representative of the cultural hierarchy are impeccable and his support for a project all but assures its success.

"Mikhalkov's own success is considerable. Describing someone who is extremely rich by Soviet standards, members of the Moscow intelligentsia will sometimes say: 'He's as rich as Mikhalkov.'" □

'Capitalist Roaders' Still to Be Uprooted

The Big-Character Posters on the Walls of China

By Peter Green

The big-character wall posters that were such a feature of the 1966-69 Cultural Revolution have proliferated anew on the streets of China's cities in recent months. Although neither so extensive nor so frenzied as the campaign during the Cultural Revolution, the current poster campaign once again has all the earmarks of having been instigated by the dominant Maoist wing of the bureaucracy.

The poster campaign developed throughout China in response to an editorial in the February 2 *People's Daily*, the official paper of the Chinese Communist party published in Peking. According to Chinese newspapers and radio broadcasts, this editorial launched the "mass political struggle to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius" on a nationwide basis on instructions from Mao and the Central Committee of the Communist party.

The Tenth Congress of the party in August 1973 posthumously denounced Lin and expelled him from the party (see *Intercontinental Press*, September 17, 1973), and the first attack on Confucius occurred two weeks prior to that. But up until Feb-

ruary, the campaign against Lin and Confucius had been muted.

The February 2 editorial changed all that. The campaign was not merely an abstract theoretical question, the *People's Daily* said, but "a serious class struggle and a thoroughgoing revolution in the realm of ideology in China. It is a war declared on feudalism, capitalism, and revisionism, and a heavy blow to imperialism, revisionism, and reaction. It is a matter of prime importance for the whole party, the whole army, and the entire Chinese people. . . ."

The editorial concluded, "We must act in the revolutionary spirit of daring to go against the tide and storm in our advance and, under the leadership of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, carry the struggle to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius through to the end."

In response to this call, study meetings, exhibitions, and mass rallies were held, and big-character wall posters began to appear. The February 5 *New York Times* reported that posters were sighted in Shanghai and Peking, although in Peking they

were generally kept from the gaze of foreigners. A February 22 Reuters report from Canton described the development of the campaign there:

"Streets in the city center are festooned with slogans written in bold black and red characters on colored paper. Some slogans, with characters up to two feet high, are strung across the streets."

John Burns reported in the February 28 *Christian Science Monitor* that every village and town along the rail route from Peking to Canton had its poster displays. The campaign was even more extensive in Wuhan than in Canton. The station walls there, he wrote, "are plastered over with an extravagant display that leaves hardly any of the masonry uncovered," and a four-story building nearby "has one entire facade covered with posters."

The themes of the posters in the first stage of the campaign were restricted to criticism of the reactionary ideology of Confucius and its use by Lin Piao in his alleged plot to "usurp party leadership and state power and restore capitalism."

The next stage, however, saw at-

tacks on some factory managers who had not heeded the February 2 call diligently enough. Posters accused them of dragging their feet on the campaign to criticize Lin and Confucius, and attacked as "economism" any attempt to use production as an excuse to downplay "the ideological work of the masses." Such attacks were reported from Shanghai as well as from Yunnan, Kirin, Liaoning, and Szechwan provinces.

The poster campaign went a step further with local party and military leaders in some provinces being denounced by name. The March 29 *New York Times* quoted "reliable witnesses" who reported wall posters in Taiyuan, capital of Shansi province, "calling for the removal of Hsieh Chen-hua, first party secretary and military commander of the province, and Tsao Chung-nan, deputy political commissar of the province." Also reported have been poster attacks on Tseng Ssu-yu, the commander of the Shantung Military Region; Han Hsien-chu of the Lanchow Military Region; and Li Teh-sheng, commander of the Shengyang Military Region in Manchuria. Li, one of the five deputy chairmen of the party, is the most prominent official to be attacked to date. Posters denouncing him were reported first in Anhwei and then in more than a dozen other provinces.

The May 16 *Christian Science Monitor* reported that in five other provinces—Kirin, Fukien, Honan, Shantung, and the Sinkiang autonomous region—local leaders were attacked for a variety of "serious mistakes," but were not named outright. In Hunan, Shensi, and Kwangtung, the report stated, radio stations had denounced local "sworn followers" of Lin Piao, but it was not clear whether those under attack were still in public life.

Posters Flower in Peking

The next stage in the campaign began on June 13, when big-character wall posters attacking the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee appeared openly on the streets of Peking. According to a Reuters report of that date, the posters accused the committee of trying to rehabilitate the reputations of former Chief of State Liu Shao-chi and former Mayor Peng Chen, both of whom were ousted

during the Cultural Revolution.

A report from Hong Kong by H. D. S. Greenway in the June 15 *Washington Post* stated:

"Previously, the display of critical wall posters in the capital was strictly curtailed. They were allowed only in certain areas, usually behind the walls of compounds, and foreigners were discouraged from photographing or even reading them. All that has changed now, and according to reports reaching here, the Chinese have even set aside parking areas for foreign diplomats and journalists who wish to see the posters."

The campaign developed further with attacks on individual leaders in Peking. *Le Monde* of June 26 reported:

"Two high-ranking Chinese individuals have been taken to task by name in a new series of posters that appeared the morning of June 25 on the walls of Peking. They are Chia Ting, vice-president of the capital's Revolutionary Committee, and Ti Fu-tsai, a member of the Cultural Group of the State Council. The authors of the posters—a group of workers from the Peking locomotive factory—accuse these two individuals of having 'plotted' with Chen Po-ta, former secretary of Mao Tsetung and a member of the Political Bureau's Standing Committee, prior to the August 1970 session of the Central Committee in Lushan."

Some of the wall posters in the current campaign have reported violence and bloodshed in certain provinces.

"According to new wall posters that appeared on Peking's walls on Monday, June 24," the June 25 *Le Monde* said, "more than 200 people have been killed in the course of incidents that occurred in Kiangsi province in southeast China. . . . The June 19 clash, in which it is reported that 'projectiles,' 'clubs' and 'iron bars' were used, took place in the provincial capital, Nanchang. . . ."

"The posters are signed by workers from Kiangsi province, who report that families have been decimated and cite the case of a 71-year-old woman who was killed. They also report that several persons have been arrested. The June 19 incident, the authors state, was stirred up by 'rightist elements' who, armed with cudgels, commandeered several trucks for use as propaganda vehicles."

According to an earlier account by

Agence France-Presse, cited in the April 17 *Washington Post*, visitors in Canton saw posters there saying that about thirty persons had been executed by firing squad for having opposed the campaign against Lin and Confucius.

Accounts of jailings and mistreatment in prison have also appeared in the posters. A Reuters dispatch in the June 28 *New York Times* mentioned one poster written by "a woman who said she had been beaten and had her arm twisted during a stay in jail lasting 329 hours."

Another poster, signed by Chong Jun-de, a member of a people's commune in Kirin province, tells how he was arrested in Peking on May 26 for having put up big-character wall posters. He was imprisoned in the capital for ninety-nine hours, during which he was subjected to a severe disciplinary measure called "the position of the boat."

The June 26 *Washington Post* reported that "he was then transferred to a prison in his own province of Kirin, and stayed inside for 16 days.

"He ends his account: 'And now will I be arrested again for having put up these posters?'

"Insisting that his behavior [was in accord with the] teachings of Chairman Mao, he said he had the courage 'to go against the tide.'"

Case of the Golden Monkey

The July 2 *Christian Science Monitor* quoted the following accusation as an example of the charges being leveled in recent wall posters.

"Our party is a party with internal factions. Though led by Chairman Mao, it includes representatives of the United States, Chiang Kai-shek, the Soviet revisionists, and the bourgeois and landlord class."

This poster was signed by "Golden Monkey," supposedly a pseudonym for a worker in the Peking Number 2 machine factory. An ancient Chinese legend celebrates the feats of a golden monkey with magical powers to right wrongs. Commentators such as Joseph Lelyveld in the July 20 *New York Times* have also regarded the pseudonym as a reference to a line in a 1961 poem by Mao, but they miss the deeper significance of the allusion.

It was actually used by Mao at the very moment he launched his attack

on Peng Chen and the Peking Committee of the party during the Cultural Revolution. Mao told a group of his followers that the moment had arrived for Sun Wu-kung, the legendary "monkey king," to raise his "golden cudgel" against Peng Chen's "imperial court." Mao then called for Peng's dismissal. The obvious inference, which would be grasped by most Chinese observers, is that "Golden Monkey" claims Mao's authority and support.

"Golden Monkey" has authored some of the more audacious posters that have appeared. One series attacking the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee was pasted up along with many others opposite the committee's offices on Eternal Revolution Street in the capital. *Le Monde* reported them in its June 26 issue:

"In particular, these posters ask why do certain leading bodies have a 'two-faced' attitude? Why have former leaders, who followed the capitalist road, been reinstated in their positions, and sometimes even in more important posts than they occupied in the past? Why have the priorities 'profit' and 'production' taken precedence over the principle of 'politics in command'? Among other things, the 'Golden Monkey' accuses 'a high leader of the party,' who is not named, of having come to his factory several times to 'persecute' the 'revolutionary rebels.'"

Paste Up and Tear Down

In the most recent development in

the poster campaign, many of the posters have been ripped down. "Persons operating under the cover of darkness," John Burns wrote in the July 5 *Christian Science Monitor*, "have torn down more than half the protests pasted on the slate-gray walls opposite the offices of the city's Revolutionary Committee."

The posters that were removed apparently dealt with the situation in the provinces and vented personal grievances against the bureaucracy. Many remained, however, that attacked "unnamed persons in the top echelon of the Revolutionary Committee for a grab bag of rightist errors, including attempts to rehabilitate the principal villains of the 1966-69 Cultural Revolution," Burns said.

"Coming as it did between midnight and dawn Wednesday, when armed soldiers keep a close eye on the few people who pass down the street, the action was almost certainly not spontaneous. But who ordered it and why remained a mystery."

"Golden Monkey" is one of the poster-writers who has suffered in the latest purge of posters. The July 9 *Le Monde* reported that the poster campaign continued unabated, but that "Golden Monkey" had been "exposed" in a series of wall posters drafted by "representatives of the masses."

"The latter," *Le Monde* stated, "are a group of workers belonging to the same factory as 'Golden Monkey' — or his true name, according to the poster, Chen Chia-hou — and they accuse him

of being a 'counterrevolutionary' element, coming from a family that had exploited the people and whose members, before liberation—1949—had been either reactionary capitalist bankers or large landholders. Chen Chia-hou is accused, among other things, of having violated the CPC Central Committee directives on the conduct of the campaign against Lin Piao and Confucius."

However, "Golden Monkey" struck back with a new poster on July 19, charging that "capitalist roaders" were still in power in the Municipal Revolutionary Committee in Peking, according to the July 20 *New York Times*. "The Municipal Committee needs a revolution," demanded the new poster, charging that the committee was negating "newly instituted rules and regulations," presumably the most recent guidelines on the conduct of the campaign.

Maoists in Command

In spite of some wall posters possibly voicing individual grievances or representing a counterattack by those in the line of fire, the general thrust of the current poster campaign through its ups and downs and different stages has been carefully directed by the dominant Maoist section of the bureaucracy. It is an integral part of their overall campaign to criticize Lin Piao, Confucius, "and other swindlers."

Their real targets were pointed out in previous issues of *Intercontinental Press*. (See articles by Les Evans in the May 6 and May 27 issues.) The attack is aimed at high officers in the People's Liberation Army who were close to Lin Piao and at the discontented among the more than 8 million youth who have been sent to the countryside since the Cultural Revolution.

Although the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign did not develop in earnest until February, it had certainly been in the planning stage for some time. The main themes, including the broad outlines of the poster campaign itself, were prefigured in the report to the Tenth Congress last August by Wang Hung-wen, the Shanghai party leader who emerged from the congress as the Number 3 man in the Communist party.

H. D. S. Greenway reported in the June 15 *Washington Post* that some



Crowd in Peking gathers to study display of wall posters.

August 5, 1974

of the posters have accused the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee of trying to suppress Wang's report.

"Instead," Greenway wrote, "the revolutionary committee stressed the report of Comrade XX, posters say. The comrade is not named, but the only other report given at the congress was by Chou En-lai." Leaving aside the question of whether Chou is actually under attack, Wang's report can be seen as having served to launch the poster campaign.

Wang reported on the new constitution the congress adopted. Under point five, he first reaffirmed that "we must strengthen the party's centralized leadership. . . ." He stressed that "it is laid down in the articles that state organs, the People's Liberation Army and revolutionary mass organizations 'must all accept the party's centralized leadership'" and also that "the entire party is subordinate to the Central Committee."

". . . a party committee's leadership," he said, "must not be replaced by a 'joint conference' of several sectors." In what could be a reference to groups with power bases in the provinces, he added, "The party committee . . . must unite people 'from all corners of the country' and not practice mountain-stronghold sectionalism."

After pointing out that unity must be "on the basis of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line," Wang continued:

"Now, I would like to discuss with special emphasis the question of accepting criticism and supervision from the masses. . . . They have the right to exercise revolutionary supervision over cadres of all ranks of our party and state organs. This concept has taken deeper root throughout the party, thanks to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. However, there are still a small number of cadres, especially some leading cadres, who will not tolerate differing views of the masses inside or outside the party. They even suppress criticism and retaliate, and it is quite serious in some individual cases. . . . We must have faith in the masses, rely on them, constantly use the weapons of arousing the masses to air their views freely, write big-character posters and hold great debates. . . ."

The press communiqué issued after the congress hailed it as "a congress of unity, a congress of victory and a congress full of vigor."

Unity is certainly a theme of the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. The message is clear—neither any deviation from the dominant Maoist line nor any challenge to the firm control of the ruling Maoist wing of the bureaucracy will be tolerated.

Peach Mountain Opera

The poster attacks on party leaders in Shansi province and in Peking followed the extensive denunciation by the party leadership of the opera *Going Up to Peach Mountain Three Times*. The attack first appeared in the February 28 *People's Daily*.

The criticism also appears in the March issue of *Red Flag*, the party's theoretical journal. The March 8 *Washington Post* further reported that "nearly half the provinces of China have made mention of the offending opera in local radio broadcasts."

The article launching the attack charged that "the Shansi opera . . . written collectively by the Writing Group of the Cultural Bureau of Shansi Province, is a very poisonous weed that negates the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and tries to reverse the verdict on the renegade Liu Shao-chi's counterrevolutionary revisionist line."

The author of the review, Chu Lan, claimed that the opera was a thinly disguised rewrite of a previous opera, *Going Down to Peach Garden Three Times*. This opera appeared in January 1966, and according to Chu Lan, was part of a campaign in Shansi province by Liu Shao-chi and his wife, Wang Kuang-mei, "to counter Chairman Mao's revolutionary line" and to "glorify" themselves on the stage. "The name of the opera has been altered," the article stated, ". . . but the theme, the plot, and the relations among the central characters remain unchanged."

The article compared this opera and the opera *Hai Jui Dismissed From Office*, which was also described as "a poisonous weed" during the opening rounds of the Cultural Revolution in 1965.

"In the early 1960s," the reviewer wrote, "someone served up the opera *Hai Jui Dismissed From Office*, which tried to reverse the verdict on Peng Teh-huai; and now this opera tries to reverse the verdict on Liu Shao-chi."

The opera was performed in Peking in January at the North China Theatrical Festival, which was sponsored by the Cultural Group of the State Council. It would appear that groupings in the party with bases in both Shansi and Peking are under attack by the Mao leadership. The fact that the opera could be produced at all in Shansi, and then performed in Peking, is an indication of their strength.

When the poster campaign was stepped up in mid-June through the displays in Peking, there were reports that this was a result of directives from the Central Committee. Similarly, the ripping down of some of the posters at the beginning of July occurred soon after the appearance of a widely circulated editorial in the July 1 *People's Daily*.

The editorial stipulated that "whether in the east, west, south, north, or center of our country it is the party that exercises leadership in everything. The current movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius must be conducted under the centralized leadership of party committees."

The editorial was headed "The Party Exercises Leadership in Everything," and it repeated that theme throughout. It commemorated the fifty-third anniversary of the founding of the Communist party of China and was reprinted in full on the front page of all Peking papers.

The party leadership is apparently wary lest the current campaign get out of hand. They are sensitive to the danger they run if the Chinese workers, students, and peasants take for good coin the exhortation that the masses "air their views freely" and "criticize and supervise."

"Mass criticism" is nothing more than one of the weapons the bureaucrats cynically use against their opponents in the party. There is nothing democratic about it, of course. The very themes of this campaign are authoritarian—against any form of reconciliation; a stress on centralism, with no deviation permitted from Mao's line; pressure for a speedup in the factories.

The "freedom of criticism" of the Maoists means freedom of accusation—the organized stirring up of informers against their opponents in the party. Undoubtedly, the Maoists supply the dirt as well, having access to

comprehensive dossiers on all party members. The accusations of corruption and the accounts of repression and brutality that have surfaced in the wall posters logically prompt a question: Isn't it likely that such disclosures of corruption and privilege hold for all sections of the bureaucracy? Naturally, any posters attempting to respond with counteraccusations would be quickly removed.

The targets of this fraudulent "mass criticism" are those mentioned in Wang's report as "some leading cadres." A May 7 Hsinhua dispatch reprinted part of a recent article from the *People's Daily* hinting at the existence of a list of opponents. The article quoted Mao on the need to "guard against revisionism, and especially its emergence in the Central Committee of our party."

'A Handful of Class Enemies'

No members of the Central Committee were named, but the article warned: "At home, a handful of class enemies attack the Cultural Revolution both overtly and covertly. They are a handful of present-day devotees of Confucius who have extreme hatred for social change and progress. They are revisionist restorationists, opposed to the Cultural Revolution, and the most decadent and reactionary social force—a bourgeois force for restoration. . . ."

"Investigation into their personal records reveals that some were backbone elements of the Kuomintang and its youth organization; some were landlords, local tyrants, reactionary bureaucrats, reactionary capitalists or their offspring; some were unreformed bourgeois rightists; some were renegades, special agents and unrepentant capitalist-roaders who were winkled out during the Cultural Revolution, and some were lackeys of imperialism or social-imperialism."

Some of the possible victims have already been indicated. The poster attacks on Han Hsien-chu in Fukien province could have been prompted because of his previous links with Lin Piao.

"The current issue of Hung Chi, the party's ideological journal," according to the April 15 *New York Times*, "assails a pamphlet that was published in the coastal province of Fukien three years ago when he was the commander there.

"The pamphlet was lavish in its praise of Lin Piao. . . . How is it, asks the party journal, that the 'big poisonous weed' of this pamphlet wasn't severely criticized after Mr. Lin's downfall? Obviously, there was a conspiracy and 'now is the time to repudiate it thoroughly,' Hung Chi says."

Similarly, the poster attacks on Li Teh-sheng could be a result of the fact that he was director of the army's General Political Department—in charge of all military propaganda—when that pamphlet was produced.

Leo Goodstadt, writing in the July 1 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, reported that the *Kiangsi Daily* has polemicized against cadres who were reluctant to throw themselves wholeheartedly into the movement against Lin and Confucius. He linked the polemic with the recently reported violent incidents there.

"Why did Kiangsi emerge as the first to wash its dirty linen in public?" Goodstadt asked. "The explanation seems to lie in the special difficulties created for the province by its military command. It took almost half a year after Lin Piao's death to get rid of his chief military supporters in Kiangsi. As a result, considerable confusion still seems to prevail in both the provincial Party and government structures, with considerable jockeying for position by military figures anxious to build a firm political base."

Taking the Youth in Hand

The deportation of youth to the countryside continues. According to a May 4 Hsinhua dispatch, "Nearly 400,000 educated young people in China have gone to settle in the countryside since the beginning of this year to accept re-education by the poor and lower-middle peasants."

However, an interesting side of this phenomenon has been revealed by the current campaign—the necessity for close supervision by party cadres of these rebel youth. The same Hsinhua dispatch reports, "A large number of cadres have been sent to the countryside to help local party organizations educate young city people. Shanghai has sent more than 2,000 cadres to villages in Anhwei, Kiangsi, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Heilungkiang."

A June 27 Hsinhua report tells how 8,000 young people have been suc-

cessfully "settled" and "re-educated" on the outskirts of Chuchou, a city in Hunan province. Success was achieved in this task because "the Chuchou municipal committee of the Chinese Communist party raised its consciousness of the struggle between the two lines during the great movement to criticize Lin Piao and rectify the style of work." The report stated that "factories send cadres to take charge of the young people's study, work and life."


Beginning in June, the Chinese press began to put great emphasis on the necessity to "train a contingent of theoretical workers in struggle." The June 6 Hsinhua, for example, carried a report of a meeting in Peking "to exchange experience in training worker-peasant Marxist theorists" that was attended by 13,000 persons. Organized by the Peking municipal committee of the party, the meeting "called on the party organizations to train a mighty contingent of Marxist theorists under the guidance of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line."

The purpose of such "contingents of full-time and spare-time Marxist theorists" can be easily envisaged. They are to serve as irregular troops in the service of the regime to keep the "educated young people" in check and to carry out the Maoists' campaign against their opponents in the party apparatus.

The function of the Mao Tsetung Thought propaganda teams during the Cultural Revolution was explained in an article by Liu Hsi-chang, vice-chairman of the Peking Municipal Trade Union Council. As summarized in a June 22 Hsinhua dispatch, he said: "Peking workers, along with men of the People's Liberation Army, organized Mao Tsetung Thought propaganda teams during the Cultural Revolution to station in places where intellectuals are predominant in number. They thus mounted the political stage of struggle-criticism-transformation in the superstructure."

The "contingents of Marxist theoretical workers" will have the same function. With the further unfolding of the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign, these "contingents" might also find a more active role in "winkling out" the opponents of the Maoists still holding prominent posts in the party, the army, and the government apparatus. □

AROUND THE WORLD



South Korean Catholics Protest Arrest of Bishop

More than 2,000 Catholics staged a protest mass in Seoul July 25, calling for "the release of those suffering from injustice" and for "the restoration of democracy." The protest followed the arrest of Bishop Daniel Chi Hak Soun on July 23. On that day the bishop passed out a statement criticizing President Park Chung Hee in defiance of an emergency decree banning all such actions.

On July 24, a closed court-martial in Seoul sentenced five persons to death for allegedly being part of a North Korean espionage ring. Three others were sentenced to life imprisonment and twenty-four persons received prison terms ranging from one to fifteen years.

Demonstrations protesting the South Korean repression took place in New York, Tokyo, London, and three cities in Australia July 19. About 1,200 persons marched in Tokyo, staging a sit-in in front of the South Korean Embassy. U. S. military personnel stationed in Japan sent a message to the rally in defense of the Korean dissidents.

Heaviest Vietnam Casualties Since Cease-Fire Agreements

After heavy fighting, South Vietnam's liberation forces have seized Da Trach base, twenty-five miles southwest of Da Nang, and Fire Base 5, northeast of Kontum. They have also brought under their control a large agricultural area near Da Trach, including six villages with a total population of 10,000.

According to the Saigon regime, the fighting left 380 dead on the liberation forces side and 106 dead and 265 wounded from the Saigon government's forces. These are the heaviest casualties recorded in a single twenty-four-hour period since the cease-fire agreements were signed eighteen months ago.

India Imposes Wage Freeze

The Indian government on July 6 enacted an ordinance that in actuality imposes a partial wage freeze on all government and private-industry employees. The law stipulates that all wage increases for one year will be impounded in a compulsory "savings" account and then re-

paid in five annual installments, along with interest. The measure also applies to 50 percent of all increases in cost-of-living allowances over the next two years.

New Delhi claimed that the measure was designed to fight inflation by removing 5 percent of all money from circulation. But while some government officials have estimated that prices will rise an additional 15 to 20 percent over the next year, interest on the enforced savings will amount to only 11 percent.

Ethiopian Premier Resigns

Ethiopian Premier Endalkachew Makonnen resigned July 22 and was reportedly arrested the following day. A July 23 radio broadcast by the armed forces committee, which effectively controls all key installations in the capital and has arrested more than sixty top government officials and landlords, said that Makonnen had attempted to create dissension within the armed forces movement. Michael Imru, a relative of Emperor Haile Selassie, was appointed to succeed Makonnen as premier.

France's 55th A-Bomb Test

France exploded another nuclear bomb in the atmosphere July 17 at Mururoa in the South Pacific. This is the fifty-fifth French bomb test since they started testing in 1960 in the Sahara. Australian Defense Minister Donald Willesee and New Zealand Prime Minister Norman Kirk made the announcement about the explosion and criticized the French government's actions, but there was no official response from Paris.

Portuguese Troops in Mozambique Refuse to Fight Guerrillas

After two separate incidents in which several thousand colonialist troops in Mozambique refused to go into battle against the African guerrillas, personnel at the military hospital in Lourenco Marques issued a communique stating that they would not go to northern Mozambique, where most of the fighting has occurred.

They also announced their refusal to fight against the guerrillas of Frelimo (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique—Mozambique Liberation Front), "whom

we regard as the only true representatives of Mozambique." The communique was prominently displayed on the front window of the university students' headquarters July 19, along with portraits of guerrilla leaders from Guinea-Bissau.

Sakharov Appeals for Crimean Tatar

Six Soviet dissidents, including physicist Andrei Sakharov, have appealed to United Nations General Secretary Kurt Waldheim and the International Red Cross to intervene in the case of Mustafa Dzhemilev, an imprisoned Crimean Tatar who has been on a hunger strike since June 22. Dzhemilev has been active in the struggle for the right of the Tatars to return to their homeland in the Crimea, from which they had been deported by Stalin during World War II.

Iran to Lend Britain \$1,200 Million

Among the measures announced July 22 to prop up Britain's economy is a loan of \$1,200 million from the government of Iran. The money, which is to be borrowed in installments over three years, will be used to help finance Britain's trade deficit.

Chile Junta Pays Off Anaconda

The Anaconda Company announced July 24 that it had reached a settlement with the Chilean junta over the expropriation of two Anaconda mining subsidiaries in 1971. Under terms of the agreement, the junta is to pay the company \$65 million in cash immediately, plus an additional \$188 million in ten-year promissory notes.

Last March, the Pinochet junta agreed to pay another U. S. company, the Cerro Corporation, \$41.8 million in compensation for a Cerro copper mine, also seized in 1971.

Leprosy Widespread in Bangladesh

At least 200,000 persons have died of leprosy in Bangladesh in the last year, according to a recent report by Health Minister Aboul Mahnan to the Bangladesh parliament. Only seven hospitals in this country, whose population numbers 75 million, have facilities for treating the disease.

Also feared is an epidemic of small-

pox. More than 20,000 persons in eastern India have already died of this disease. Hardest hit have been the states of Bihar, West Bengal, and Assam, all of which border Bangladesh.

According to the World Health Organization, incidence of smallpox has increased 70 percent worldwide since the beginning of the year. India accounts for 87 percent of the known cases.

Shah Reported Irked at Being Called a 'Nut'

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is planning a trip to Iran to appease the shah, who is reportedly unhappy at having been called a "nut" by Treasury Secretary William Simon. Although Simon later sought to clarify the matter by claiming he had been misquoted, and that he had actually said the shah is "a nut about weapons," this only compounded the problem, since the shah views himself as a major military strategist. Moreover, other U. S. officials have been pressing the shah to continue buying large quantities of U. S. arms, partially to offset the increased price of Iranian oil.

French Prisoners Revolt

Inmates destroyed Nimes prison in southwestern France in a revolt that began July 20 and ended the following day. Extensive damage from fires that broke out during the riot left the prison unusable. The day before, inmates revolted at the 166-year-old prison at Clairvaux, about eighty-five miles southeast of Paris. Most of the prison buildings were destroyed by fire in the course of the fourteen-hour riot, forcing authorities to transfer most prisoners to other jails.

Mounting Unrest in New Caledonia

Special police used tear gas to break up a demonstration in New Caledonia's capital, Noumea, on July 14. Forty-two demonstrators were detained by the police and charges were brought against four-teen young Melanesians.

The demonstration was provoked by police closing down refreshment stalls during the Bastille Day celebrations in a working-class district. Between 400 and 500 people clashed with the police and marched on the nearby commercial center, overturning cars and breaking windows.

Although the immediate issue had been police harassment, behind the current unrest of New Caledonian youth are the deeper issues of inflation and self-government.

The spiraling inflation has forced the unions to take a tougher stand, and they are demanding retroactive pay increases. The main unions, whose membership numbers about 8,000, have reportedly

scheduled an indefinite general strike if the arbitration board doesn't meet their demands before the end of July. The July 18 *Le Monde* observed that "the union leaders seem to have trouble in holding back their members this time."

The Territorial Assembly, which has no real power, passed a motion June 12 calling for self-government. Then in a communique published July 15, the representatives of the three parties in the assembly favoring self-government—the Caledonian Union, the Multiracial Union, and the Caledonian People's Front—announced they were sending the French government "a joint draft program for self-government." The representatives favoring close territorial ties with France had previously had a slight majority in the assembly.

Franco Cedes Powers to Juan Carlos

On July 19, Generalissimo Francisco Franco, hospitalized by phlebitis and thrombosis, "temporarily" delegated his powers as dictator of Spain to Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon.

Named by Franco five years ago as his successor, Juan Carlos is the pretender to the Spanish throne, which has been vacant since Alfonso XIII was driven into exile in 1931.

On July 23, fourteen days after the caudillo, 81, was hospitalized, it was announced that he had recovered completely and could soon resume "normal life."

Spanish CP Proposes Government of 'National Reconciliation'

The Spanish Communist party responded to Franco's illness and the transfer of power to Juan Carlos with a call for "a provisional democratic government of national reconciliation," in which it declared its readiness to participate.

At a news conference in Paris July 22, Santiago Carrillo, general secretary of the Spanish CP, made public a declaration of the party's Central Committee. The statement said that the provisional government should be "formed by forces of the left and the right, which would assure equilibrium and civic peace internally . . . until the country has provided itself with a legal framework and new democratic rules of functioning that are agreeable to the vast majority."

The program of such a government, according to the CP, would include a general amnesty; freedom of press and association; "regional freedoms, including the much-needed recognition of the existence of the Catalan, Basque, and Galician nationalities"; a "popular consultation" to determine democratically the form of the state; and "an authentic opening toward Europe and the world."

Carrillo explained, in answer to a re-

porter's question, that the Spanish CP favored Spain's entry into the Common Market.

Carrillo objected strongly to the transfer of powers to Juan Carlos as "the continuation of Francoism without Franco." But what if Juan Carlos himself were to call on the Communists to join the government, he was asked. This is highly improbable, Carrillo replied. However, if Juan Carlos were to "consult the people" on his position, and "if the people were to declare freely for a democratic constitutional monarchy, we will play the game."

Reiterating statements made previously by CP leaders, Carrillo hailed General Diez Alegria, the former chief of the Spanish general staff recently dismissed by Franco. "He was one of the most capable men in the Spanish military," Carrillo said. "He wanted to make the army more than a police force."

Carrillo also lauded the Roman Catholic church for "playing a positive role in Spain today."

Chilean Gorillas in Action

The Chilean military junta has ruled that the two greatest classics of Spanish literature—*Don Quijote* and *Poema del Mio Cid*—will no longer be taught in public high schools. The official reason given for the ban is that Chilean youth would already have read these works in elementary school.

Morgentaler Sentenced

Dr. Henry Morgentaler, a Montreal physician convicted of performing an illegal abortion, was sentenced July 25 to eighteen months imprisonment. In addition to the jail term, Chief Justice J. K. Hugessen of Quebec's Court of Queen's Bench imposed a three-year probationary period during which Dr. Morgentaler is forbidden to perform an abortion except in an approved hospital.

Morgentaler's acknowledgement that he has performed 5,000 to 6,000 abortions, demonstrating his opposition to Canada's restrictive abortion law, had "forced the authorities to prosecute him vigorously, and the courts to punish him more severely" than might otherwise be the case, the judge said.

Morgentaler remains free on bail pending the outcome of an appeal of his conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada, now set for October 1.

Contraceptives Illegal in Ireland

The lower house of the Irish parliament on July 16 defeated a bill that would have legalized the sale of contraceptives to married couples. The vote was 75 to 61.

Independence Postponed Until 1975

By Sol Salby

[On July 8, Michael Somare, head of the coalition administration in Papua-New Guinea (Niugini), announced postponement of the country's formal independence from Australia. The date, previously set for December 1, has now been pushed back to some time "in the first half of 1975." The following article was written before Somare's announcement. It appeared in the July 8 issue of *Direct Action*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Sydney.]

* * *

Papua New Guinea's formal independence appears to have been postponed as a result of serious disagreements about the country's future constitution. A report from the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) has already resulted in splits in all political parties, ejection of ministers from party meetings, and a challenge to the leadership of the Chief Minister, Michael Somare.

Somare and his deputy, Dr Guise, have opposed some of the major recommendations of the CPC. They have submitted a last-minute minority report on the subject.

The differences appear at first glance to be insignificant, and by and large they are inconsequential. They revolve around two major issues.

The first of these issues is the question of citizenship. The CPC has proposed a complicated system essentially granting citizen's rights only to indigenous people. The minority report tends to give more rights to other people, particularly Australian expatriates. Clearly the people of Papua New Guinea should have the right to determine who will have PNG citizenship.

Australian expatriates who have come to the country to exploit the indigenous people should have no rights as colonialists. However, the position of people of Malay or Chinese descent or with only one indigenous grandparent is different. Most of them have

no right of residence in Australia, or for that matter any other country.

The CPC report recommends that they should be given Australian citizenship on independence day and be able to apply for PNG citizenship three years later. Whether the Australian Government will grant rights to these people remains to be seen.

Apart from the issue of citizenship, strong differences have emerged on the way the government ought to be run. It appears as if the committee has opted for a system which will try and preserve some of the features of tribal society. Apparently the committee has reasoned that a system retaining some of the traditional features of tribal society will have better chances of survival and will make capitalism more stable in the country.

Thus, the committee has recommended in its report that PNG should have no head of state; executive power is to reside in the National Executive Council. A provision for 19 regional governments, each with its own Premier and ministers, has also been made.

Other recommendations adapt the parliamentary machinery to the local conditions. The emphasis is once again on committees and collective responsibility rather than a Cabinet system and party political line.

Somare has proposed a system resembling so-called Westminster-type democracy. This includes a head of state and a Cabinet based on a majority representation in Parliament.

But real differences were few. The CPC report, which is supposed to be the more "progressive" and which pretends to be the more democratic and nationalist, has some patently reactionary features. It calls for a ban on political participation by public servants, one of the better-educated groups and potentially a very politically active section of the working class in Papua New Guinea.

For all their pretences about spreading the power over a large number of people, the leading lights of the CPC, John Kaputin and Father John Mo-

mis, have included emergency powers for the National Executive Council. In other words, the police and the army can be used against so-called civil disorder.

According to the June 28 *Papua New Guinea Post-Courier*, "the report recommended that the Defence Force should have four basic functions," including "the provision of assistance to the civil authorities of Papua New Guinea in the circumstances of a State of Emergency." The *Post-Courier* added: "The report says the Police Force should be larger and should be adequately equipped for the communications, transport and other logistic requirements of its extended role.

"The great majority of disturbances should be dealt with by the police," the report says. "Urban rioting and intertribal fighting will almost always come within this category. But there could be disturbances that are of such intensity or which are so widespread that the police are unable to cope and the authority of the Government is seriously challenged."

The differences and arguments in all of Papua New Guinea's political parties already indicate the Government's inability to solve even the most trivial problems. But the country is already facing some major problems. Inflation is higher than in Australia, prices of imported goods (which include most manufactured goods) are the same as in Australia, while the minimum wage in Port Moresby is \$13.80 a week.

But Papua New Guinea's biggest problem isn't inflation. It is the lack of real independence—its economic dependence on Australia and other capitalist countries. One of the ways this lack of independence is going to show is in the specific oppression of certain national and tribal groups.

Separatist tendencies are already evident in Bougainville and among the Papuan population. The pressure of the Papuan separatist movement, led at the moment by House of Assembly member Josephine Abaijah, has already forced many Papuan MPs to organise a separate caucus. They have stated that their only difference with Abaijah, who has been leading mass demonstrations for lower prices, higher wages, and Papuan independence, is one of method.

The problems already evident in New Guinea may prompt the Australian Government to try and re-

main in Papua New Guinea after Somare's planned independence date of December 1974. This is something which must be resolutely opposed by the entire labor movement. The Australian labor movement has in the

past traditionally ignored PNG. It must now take up the demand for the immediate independence of the country and the immediate withdrawal of all troops and military personnel from New Guinea. □

workers and the fact that because these workers are "foreigners," they have no rights whatsoever (thus facilitating the future use of such measures against the entire working class—if it accepts these mechanisms of the capitalist system).

Under blackmail from the xenophobic current, the bourgeoisie found itself politically compelled to adopt restrictive measures that, in a period of economic upswing, would run counter to their interests. Restrictions on the "importation" of immigrant workers increase the pressure for higher wages, given the fact that certain branches of industry are not working to full capacity.

To meet the third xenophobic campaign [the National Action referendum] and to prepare to fight the fourth (Schwarzenbach's), which is much more insidious and has a real chance of succeeding, the Federal Council passed new, even more draconian measures at the end of May. Their aim was to prevent a "new increase in the total foreign population, both active and inactive." Immigrant workers in categories not previously subject to limitations come under this measure, including workers in health care, education, and agriculture.

These measures have been dictated by pressure from the xenophobic movement and by the fear that a breakthrough by National Action and the Republicans would destroy the equilibrium of a system in which the traditional parties have hegemony. In part, they contradict the immediate interests of capital. But they must also be viewed in light of the new economic and social context.

These measures have not been taken in a period of long-term growth of the capitalist system, but at the beginning of a long period of decline. The councilors of the federal government foresee a period of slower growth in the demand for labor. In addition, the process of rationalization and automation must be stepped up even more. Still, it is important not to overestimate the effects of this process on the demand for labor, for above and beyond the steps toward automation, there is still a significant need for unskilled, i.e., immigrant, labor.

The restrictions in health care will be used to justify other cutbacks, for example, allocations for the construction of hospitals, old-age homes, etc.

Switzerland

Revolutionists Call For United Campaign to Defend Rights of Immigrant Workers

[On July 9, the Swiss government announced an administrative measure limiting to 20,500 the number of new foreign workers to be allowed to enter Switzerland during the next twelve months. This represents a decrease of more than 50 percent from the 45,000 admitted in 1973. At present, foreign workers and their families number slightly more than 1 million of Switzerland's population of 6.5 million.

[One apparent motive behind the government's move is the desire to outflank National Action, a racist anti-immigration group that has collected the 50,000 signatures necessary to hold a public referendum on the question. The referendum, scheduled to be voted on in October, calls for reducing the number of foreign workers to 720,000.

[A compromise proposal has been put forward by the Catholic Workers Movement and the unions associated with it. Their referendum calls for granting certain political rights to immigrant workers while "stabilizing" their number by issuing fewer entry permits.

[An earlier anti-immigration referendum, proposed in 1970 by right-wing political leader James Schwarzenbach, received 46 percent of the vote and gained majorities in seven of Switzerland's twenty-two cantons.

[The following article, which appeared in the July 12 issue of *La Brèche*, newspaper of the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire (Swiss section of the Fourth International), was written just before the government announced the new restrictions. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

A third, a fourth drive against

foreign workers! A third, a fourth capitulation by the labor movement!

Faced with soaring inflation, the attack on purchasing power, the cutbacks in social-welfare budgets (hospital care, the educational system), and the introduction of the swindle of the century (the three pillars of the "social security" system), the working class, which is deeply divided, may have more difficulty in finding a way to fight back. Yet there can be no doubt that any concession to the antiforeigner movement will result in decreasing the political power of the working class as a whole.

The bosses are not opposed to these divisions, and for good reason: Dividing the workers is one of the aims of their immigration policy. Nonetheless, the mass response evoked by the xenophobic current makes them uneasy. It could lead to limitations on the number of immigrant workers, which would in turn eliminate the advantages the bosses gain from using these workers. Xenophobia—and its consequent division and weakening of the working class—is useful to the capitalists so long as it does not take on features that contradict the very purposes immigration serves for them:

— Increasing the value of available capital (see, for example, the industrial development of Switzerland since 1947–48);

— Halting the push toward higher wages;

— Avoiding the costs of training;

— Paying minimal wages to immigrant workers, who are employed in all sectors of the economy and comprise the great majority in such branches as construction, textiles, and shoe manufacturing;

— Dividing and weakening the labor movement;

— Having Swiss workers accept the superexploitation of broad layers of

They will also serve as an excuse for mounting an attack on wages in the social-services sector. This is a point meriting serious reflection by a labor movement that is making concessions to the xenophobes!

The new ordinance scheduled to replace the July 6, 1973, decree on "policy toward foreign labor" must therefore be viewed both in the context of a rise of the xenophobic current and in that of a conjunctural situation characterized by a management attack on wages. In this sense, it differs from the measures taken in the 1960s.

A Useless Compromise!

This context also enables us to understand the reactions of the "big parties" and the USS [Union Syndicale Suisse—Swiss Trade-Union Confederation] to the referendum initiative of the "Labor Association for a More Humane Policy Toward Foreigners" (launched by the Catholic Workers Movement).

This initiative is being presented as a compromise between those who call for stabilization of the number of immigrant workers and those "good souls" who recognize that "immigrant workers are, after all, human beings." This compromise will find no takers. There are not many good souls left in the Socialist party or the USS; they have been stained by the sins of xenophobia. Proof of this is the draft of the counterreferendum initiative launched by the "socialist" daily *Berner Tagwacht*, an initiative whose differences with the proposal put forward by National Action are about as great as those between a conservative and a Christian-socialist conservative in Haut-Valais. None!

As for the Radicals, in line with the bosses' immigration policy, they see no reason why they should back a referendum like the one put forward by the Catholic Workers—an initiative that, while not increasing the number of exploitable workers, would increase the number of immigrants, given the arrival of their families.

The immigrant worker has no right to exist except insofar as he serves as a means for increasing the value of capital. Fine-sounding humanist rhetoric is all right with the Radicals—so long as the priority of the real function of immigrant labor is clearly understood. Otherwise, statements

about the poor people who are "a special category of humanity" are merely of use for opposing the excesses of National Action.

The Catholic Workers' proposal just doesn't hold water. How can it hope to be taken as a *governmental* alternative—as it has been presented to the xenophobes by various journalists—when at the same time it is presented as an instrument for the defense of immigrant workers? A compromise has to be accepted by both sides.

As for the labor movement, it has once again shown how deeply it has been penetrated by xenophobia, how ready it is to swallow the repressive policy of regulation, division, and superexploitation of immigrant workers. Exclusive defense of an aristocratic layer of Swiss workers leads to a crystallization of the divisions within the working class as a whole. For in reality, the decision of the labor movement not to support the Catholic Workers' initiative stems from a *totally reactionary* point of view, as is proved by the *Berner Tagwacht* counterproposal.

A Response

In view of the campaign that will begin in September in preparation for the October referendum on the National Action initiative, the revolutionists' campaign is more important than ever. It should *seek unity* around specific objectives, in addition to the campaign mounted by each organization in its own name. It should *put forward a clear alternative to the policy of the traditional labor movement and a reply to the racist campaign of the xenophobes as well as to the "humanist" pretensions of the exploiters.*

The struggle must be taken up on a number of levels:

—A systematic educational campaign denouncing the xenophobes' arguments and the purpose of their campaign must be a decisive element in our counterpropaganda.

—In trade-union organizations, the struggle against reactionary and xenophobic positions, and the proposal of concrete, unifying anti-xenophobic initiatives should take high priority in the activity of revolutionists who are trade-union militants.

We must also carry out a struggle against the policy of "social integration" (read: acceptance of "Swiss

values," "labor peace," etc.) by counterposing "*class integration*," meaning *the integration of workers into the fighting apparatus of the working class as a whole*. The example of the *united struggle* of Swiss and immigrant workers at Bürger & Jacobi enables us to demonstrate the power such organizational unity represents for the struggle of all workers.

The campaign for "class integration" also requires a struggle for trade-union democracy in order to assure immigrant workers not only the right to participate effectively in trade-union organizations, but also the right to establish their own organizations, so that both may raise demands concerning the working class as a whole. By the same token, stressing these unifying demands (equal pay for equal work, recognition of acquired qualifications, across-the-board pay increases, etc.) will forge the first links in the unification of decisive sectors of the working class.

Furthermore, we must denounce any and all policies that limit and regulate the flow of immigrant labor, even if we have to swim against the tide in the labor movement itself. Such policies lead in only one direction: an increase in repressive statutes and laws, and the establishment of separate categories that result in hardening the divisions within the working class.

Immigration is a tendency particular to the capitalist system, somewhat akin to the concentration of capital. There is no point in denouncing the bourgeoisie's policy of taking restrictive measures; the politics of capitalism are not fought by calling on the capitalists to establish categories and divisions within the working class. Just as the workers' movement is not opposed to mechanization but rather to the use the capitalists make of machines, we do not fight immigration but rather the use capitalists make of immigrants.

To carry out this struggle, the working class must be united, for what is really at issue is our refusal to accept the attack on our buying power and our deep-rooted opposition to the capitalists' "social welfare" policy (housing, the struggle against layoffs, etc.). This requires the unity of all workers and wage earners. Without this unity, the working class as a whole will be paralyzed when faced with the bosses' attacks. In conse-

quence, the demands for "the free flow of immigrant labor" and "the same

political and trade-union rights for all who work in Switzerland" become one

of the most important elements in this united struggle. □

Inflation-Deflation: Two Evils Bringing on a Third

The Ripening Conditions for Worldwide Depression

By Dick Roberts

[This is the second of two articles on the crisis of "explosive inflation" that world capitalism is now undergoing.]

As prices rose the world over, U.S. capitalism reaped unprecedented benefits. Holdings in five of the seven major international petroleum corporations, a commanding position in vitally needed world food exports, global monopolization of raw materials—all contributed to record-breaking profits for American corporations in 1973-74. This was a central objective of the escalated offensive in world trade and finance signaled by President Nixon's "New Economic Policy" in 1971.

Furthermore, it is clear that one of the important causes of inflation lies precisely in the double devaluation of the dollar decided on by the Nixon administration. By May 1973 the Federal Reserve Board could calculate the following appreciations of foreign currencies against the dollar as compared to April 1971:

Australia	up 26.3%
Belgium-Luxembourg	up 27.7%
Britain	up 6.4%
Canada	up 0.8%
France	up 25.0%
Germany	up 31.6%
Italy	up 6.2%
Japan	up 36.2%

Although in the spring of 1973 the dollar was being buffeted by a new wave of selling in international markets, Federal Reserve Board member Dewey Daane testified in congressional hearings May 30 that "the outlook for the U.S. international payments position, and hence for the dollar, is considerably better now than it has been for some time.

"The outlook has been greatly improved by the exchange rate realignments of 1970-71 and early 1973.

Altogether, the U.S. dollar has been effectively devalued against all other currencies by about 17 percent since mid-1970, and by substantially more than that against our strongest competitors. This is a very large adjustment, which greatly improves the international competitiveness of U.S. goods."

The devaluations in December 1971 and February 1973 succeeded in cheapening the prices of U.S. goods relative to those of Washington's major overseas rivals. U.S. exports once again were able to rise above imports. Concentration on the export trade greatly increased. *Business Week* magazine reported July 6, "U.S. exports of goods and services, as a percentage of GNP, have almost doubled—to nearly 8% in the last 10 years. For merchandise alone—excluding services, which are less mobile—exports now account for 12% of U.S. goods production."

The increasing export trade mounted on two devaluations of the dollar is a key cause of the rapid U.S. inflation that erupted in 1973.

Dollar devaluation both directly and indirectly contributed to higher prices in the United States. Its direct contribution comes from raising the prices of foreign goods in the U.S. market, after all, one of the main reasons for the devaluation to begin with.

The appreciation of foreign currencies against the dollar automatically raises the price of foreign goods in the U.S. market. A Japanese businessman complained to *Business Week* (July 6), "The rising cost of wages and materials . . . coupled with the revaluation of the yen, have already cost Toyota and Nissan their price advantage in the U.S. auto market, and by 1975 the electronics industry will be in the same fix."

But this is actually doubly inflationary. It not only means that cheaper cars are no longer available to U.S. consumers from abroad. *It allows American corporations to raise their prices on cars.*

When the edge is taken off foreign competition, and especially (as shown by the complaint of the Japanese executive) when capitalist rivals are hit even harder by inflation than companies in the United States, the "barriers" to price rises topple. Since "price controls" were officially lifted in April 1974, U.S. auto prices have been zooming upward.

A second important industry in which this effect is visible is steel. Foreign competition had in some cases formerly caused U.S. firms to actually cut steel prices; today they are jacking up prices to unprecedented levels. Between April and July 1974 the U.S. Steel Corporation raised its prices 23 percent.

Auto industry figures in June 1974 recorded the impact on foreign competition as a recession in the U.S. economy began to undermine car sales:

"Sales by the four United States auto makers were estimated at 765,147 last month, a decline of 21.2 per cent from 971,304 in May of last year.

"Sales of imports were off an even sharper 32.7 per cent, to 115,000 from 171,000 in May, 1973. The market share of the imports was down to 13.1 per cent, a new low for the year, which started off with imports capturing 18.6 per cent of January sales." (*New York Times*, June 5.)

Thus devaluations—far from "only influencing foreign trade," as the commentators pretend—have an important inflationary effect on domestic prices (and this is precisely because domestic prices are inextricably linked

to world prices through foreign trade).

Shortages

A second important factor in the present inflation—the appearance of shortages in the U.S. economy—is also inseparable from the effects of devaluation. It has been asked, How can there be shortages in the United States, particularly when the central problem of world capitalism is generalized *overproduction*, with its consequent global struggle to find markets for goods and investment?

Yet this contradictory phenomenon is a consequence of the very character of monopoly rule. Monopolists deliberately curtail production to keep prices up. The United States witnessed the remarkable phenomenon of the oil firms virtually halting refinery building over a period of years, with all the consequent price rises and profit-gouging effects of the "energy crisis."

Under the impact of intensified world competition, it is likely that such occurrences will become more general. A country that has higher inflation rates and higher profits will suck goods and investments out of other countries. This can result in shortages—and consequently in driving the prices up where the shortages occur. Inflation breeds further inflation.

Here the question of tempo is also vitally important. The generalized saturation of markets that came as the postwar expansion of European and Japanese capitalism reached its peak does not preclude the continuation of business cycles within this overall context. The years 1970 and 1971 saw recessions in most advanced capitalist countries, but the selling off of inventories, dampening of wage increases, and government deficit spending paved the way for a new world upswing.

In fact 1972-73 saw a simultaneous rise of the economies of all the major powers, and this in itself sharpened inflationary tendencies. That is because prices always tend to rise more rapidly on the upswing side of a business cycle. As production is expanding and more and more workers are hired, demand tends to run ahead of supply, pulling up prices. When this occurred on a global scale in the last two years, the result was a massive upsurge of demand, intensifying world

trade. In the words of *Business Week* (July 6), "Buyers all over the world have been scrambling for supplies of everything from sugar to machine tools, irrespective of national boundaries."

But this happened when two dollar devaluations had greatly cheapened U.S. goods. The result, as U.S. exports soared, was sudden major shortages in the American economy and drastic price increases.

In the May issue of *Fortune* magazine, Lewis Beman vividly described the long "pre-NEP" (Nixon's "New Economic Policy") period of stagnating investment under the blows of world competition. In that "era of lagging profits," Beman wrote, "sinking stock prices, and record-breaking interest rates, the capital-budgeting exercise had taken on a new character. Beleaguered by complaining shareholders and anxious investment bankers, managers have been torn between the natural urge to conquer new markets and the even more primitive instinct for self-preservation.

"Living in this new environment, businessmen have understandably behaved more like managers and less like entrepreneurs. They have gravitated toward what might be called *managerial* investments—in which financial results can be calibrated down to the nearest basis point and justified to the most conservative of bankers. They have shied away from *entrepreneurial* investments—in which the commitment is substantial, the costs uncertain, the payout lengthy, and the risk of loss agonizingly real."

Under world conditions of saturated markets, investment is retarded because a big new investment *might not* find markets for its products. But the devaluation of the dollar, combined with a rising world demand that was fueled by deficits—especially in the United States itself—radically altered the situation. Beman writes: "The overvalued dollar had repressed the growth of many producers: directly, by creating new competition for them in the U.S. market, and indirectly, by eroding the overseas markets of their manufacturing customers. It took the double devaluation of the dollar—which raised the price of foreign goods by as much as 50 percent—to reverse these devastating trends. But when the reversal finally took place, basic manufacturers in the U.S. suddenly found that they had the lowest prices

in the world. And they also had the longest list of customers."

In March 1974 the list of industries with long backlogs of orders included steel, zinc, forgings, castings, motors, electronic components, fuels, lumber, bearings, engines, valves, paper, resins, benzene, caustic soda, soda ash, waxes. It was "by far the worst shortage situation since the 1920's," one steel executive told Beman. It was also the opportunity for unprecedented price and profit rises.

This phenomenon was most apparent to Americans, of course, in the food industry, where the sudden upsurge of exports helped to create shortages driving agricultural prices to record highs beginning in the spring of 1973. It has been estimated that from November 1972 to August 1973, 64 percent of the increase in U.S. wholesale prices resulted directly or indirectly from the increase in agricultural prices.

'Keynesianism' Stymied

The foregoing effects of devaluation and sharpened trade warfare do not in and of themselves completely explain inflation. For inflation to take place there must be not only an increased demand and monopoly conditions whereby price increases can be imposed on markets, there must also be an increase of the money supply to fuel the new higher-priced purchases. But the world money supply is growing on an unprecedented scale—and it is this phenomenon that is sowing doubts about the ability of governments to bring the inflationary crisis under control.

The whole essence of "Keynesian" policies is to *inflate* economies in order to keep up purchasing power. This was thought to be the lesson of the depression of the 1930s. "The unseen hand could fumble, and if nothing was done about it, the Marxian prophecy of total collapse might come to pass," *Business Week* said June 29. "The remedy Keynes suggested—aggressive government spending—became the almost universal prescription for economic policymakers."

New York Times economic expert Leonard Silk, previously of the Brookings Institution "think tank," wrote on June 26: "Among the casualties of the present inflation, economic stagnation, soaring interest rates and slumping stock and bond markets are

major elements of modern economic theory." Silk pointed out the weakness of the three main schools: *Fiscal doctrine* advocates cutting taxes or increasing expenditures in order to create full employment; *monetary theory* advocates that the Federal Reserve expand the money supply in order to assure steady growth; the "third major economic doctrine. . . was the idea that *floating exchange rates*, free to move up or down in relation to changing national balance-of-payments surpluses or deficits, would restore equilibrium to the world monetary system.

"Floating exchange rates would also liberate national economic policy from external pressures—for instance pressure to deflate the economy and accept higher unemployment to support too high a fixed currency rate. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

The result of this policy in relation to the United States has already been examined. Floating the U.S. dollar, in effect allowing it to be devalued twice, stabilized the dollar at the cost of rampant inflation. ". . . all three of these doctrines," Silk observed, "far from being symmetrical as advertised, have proved to be highly asymmetrical—that is, biased toward inflation."

Moreover, it is not only the United States that prefers "moderate inflation" to the politically even more unpopular regimen of high unemployment. In 1971-73 every capitalist power incurred inflation-producing budget deficits for all three of the years except France. In 1972 France ran a budget surplus.

Simultaneous economic expansion was accompanied by an even more rapid expansion of the money supply, resulting in a global expansion of the inflation rate. Keynesianism "works" on a national scale if the surplus purchasing power pumped into one country can, to some extent, be absorbed elsewhere in the world system. This was an important aspect of the U.S. economy within the context of the postwar world. Continuous U.S. deficits, above all to support the military machine, were not acutely inflationary as long as world capitalism was generally expanding.

Today, nations are following parallel inflationary policies, and inflation is rapidly "exported" from one country to another. Wherever the inflation rate is highest, high prices draw goods toward that country, pulling up prices

elsewhere. Moreover, the resulting increase in world trade tends to draw the movement of world economies into closer synchronization.

This is especially reinforced by the large size of the U.S. economy relative to the world economy, so that the movement of the U.S. economy tends to pull that of the others toward it. If 1972-73 saw a parallel rise of the economies of the major powers, the threat in 1974 is already of a second international recession in the postwar period, barely two years after the first, with the danger of its being far graver.

The phenomenon of world inflation—whether it results from domestic budgetary policies aimed at artificially expanding purchasing power, or from manipulations in international exchange rates, again aimed at an artificial expansion of markets—expresses the inability of the capitalist system to thrive without continuous expansion of productive investment. Credit is expanded, and paper money is pumped into the world system to make up for the slack. This is a risky business.

Liquidity Crisis

"Credit inflation" is especially dangerous when, as is the case today, the world economy is beginning to turn toward recession. So far in 1974, the *New York Times* reported June 30, "there has been a slowing of the growth rate in Western Europe, with some countries (Britain in particular) teetering on the brink of recession. . . ."

"Real output, after making allowance for price increases, actually declined in the United States by 6 per cent in the first quarter, while the inflation rate is running over 10 per cent."

A "liquidity crisis" inevitably occurs as a capitalist economy turns toward downswing. The threat is of this occurring internationally.

As corporations begin to find their sales declining, they are forced to borrow to finance swollen inventories of overproduced goods. Moreover, especially in the United States at present, the beginning of an economic downturn has been accompanied by an *upsurge of capital spending*.

This historically unusual event undoubtedly corresponds to the newfound conviction of U.S. capital that it can, with sufficient cudgel in world affairs, continue to maintain its superiority in world markets. If two devaluations of the dollar brought the

profit bonanza they did—why not more protectionism if and when necessary? A McGraw-Hill survey of business investment plans for 1974-77, published May 3, found a "notable 19% increase [in 1974] over 1973 spending. . . . Capacity is expected to grow 16% between the end of 1974 and 1977." It is more than likely that these figures will be sharply revised in a downward direction before 1977.

Nevertheless, the concurrence of heavy corporate demand for funds to finance inventories and for investment funds, riding on top of a 10 percent annual inflation rate, is driving interest rates to their highest levels in American history. Abroad, with even greater inflation rates, the interest rates are all the higher. In mid-1974, overseas inflation rates included 19 percent in France, 20 percent in Singapore, 26 percent in Japan, and 35 percent in Brazil.

The widely varying inflation rates have already led the prestigious "Committee of 20," representing the leading central bankers of the capitalist world, to abandon attempts to build a successor to Bretton Woods, after two years of meetings. Any form of fixed currency exchange rates is inconceivable under the tension created by divergent inflationary trends. Floating rates, continuously modifying in the give and take of exacerbated world competition, are the order of the day.

'The Loans Are Eternal'

In this explosive situation, an international credit collapse becomes increasingly possible. All of the world's major banks are ever more deeply interlinked in the global expansion of credit. The bankruptcy of another enterprise quickly influences the rest, since they are all up to their chins in the same game—each has lent funds to others.

The collapses in June and July of the U.S. Franklin National Bank and of I.D. Herstatt in West Germany were symbolic. "Herstatt," *Business Week* reported July 6, "lost an estimated \$200-million in foreign exchange dealings and was forced to close. . . . The Herstatt failure is proving costly for other banks that dealt with it, and it threw the financial markets of Europe into a panic. The rate on one-month Eurodollars jumped from 12.9% to 14.3% in a single day, and the foreign exchange

markets on the Continent were nearly paralyzed."

Equally significant, however, were the paths followed to salvage these wrecks. In the United States, the Federal Reserve Board issued more than \$1,000 million in credits to Franklin. A consortium of world banks promised to back up the Herstatt failure. Thus the only answer to such problems is to expand the credit bubble even more.

On a state scale this takes on all the more importance. As government deficits expand, as state powers increasingly tap capital markets for funds, the problem can reach truly intolerable proportions. *Business Week* declared: "Eurobankers are already edgy about the billions they have lent to governments that may be pushed to bankruptcy by oil bills. . . ."

"Italy is a real problem. The Italians, who face a \$12-billion [\$12,000 million] trade deficit this year, have already borrowed heavily in Euro-currency markets. Now, says Vice-President David Devlin of First National City Bank: 'Italy can't borrow any more even with a government guarantee.'"

So far as the "Arab oil billions" are concerned, the real problem is rarely mentioned. After all, of what possible harm can it be to have up to \$100,000 million in investment funds available to pour into the world economy? *The problem is precisely the absence of long-term investment potentials. It is the clearest indication in international finance of the end of the long-term expansion.*

Business Week (July 6) expressed it in these terms: "The main channel for recycled wealth is the vast Euro-dollar market, which has probably handled at least \$15-billion [\$15,000 million] in oil money since the price went up. But the money is going to only a relative handful of institutions, chiefly the London branches of giant U.S. banks, and it is coming in only for very short periods. And short-term deposits are a pain because borrowers want the money for long periods. Says one banker ruefully: 'The money is in overnight, the loans are eternal.'"

They are words that could easily presage a banking collapse on the order of the 1930s. On one side corporations — and governments! — want long loans; on the other side, banks want sufficiently high interest rates to

cushion the risk. At some point the demands can diverge too widely.

Deflation

With parallel "Keynesian" policies of leading capitalist governments overinflating national economies, there are indications of a further parallel turn of these governments toward the "classical" solution of *deflation*. Government spending must be cut. Taxes must be raised. Workers must be laid off in sufficient numbers to dampen their wage demands, ultimately decreasing the level of wage increases, and opening to the respective powers needed room for maneuver in world competition.

This is perhaps the main source of embarrassment to bourgeois economics. For example, in a recent book, *The New Economics One Decade Older*, Professor James Tobin of Yale University, a veteran presidential economic adviser, blames politicians. No leaders of either the Democrats or Republicans, claims Tobin, has ever dared to admit to the people that price stability and full employment are incompatible goals under capitalism. But it is hardly an exaggeration to say that this unsurpassable contradiction of capitalism is not featured prominently in economics textbooks either.

Whatever their private and public second thoughts, the leaders of world capitalism are simultaneously moving toward international deflation, just as their economies simultaneously surged upward two years ago. This was the price world bankers demanded to come to Italy's rescue. In the United States the Federal Reserve is following stringent tight-money policies that can only end in a further sharp curtailment of production.

But this is the danger. When workers are being laid off on an international scale, when purchasing power is falling across the globe, the result could be a worldwide depression.

In a recent widely noted article, the London *Economist* reported from a Paris meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that the countries "prescribed a large dose of exactly the wrong deflationary medicine for a world that is sliding alarmingly quickly towards a slump."

The Economist continued:

"Forty-five years after 1929, with

the forward prospect for world demand rather more deflationary than it seemed to be in 1929-30, it is almost inconceivable that the majority of the 24 leading countries of the world should be intent on following a more anti-Keynesian policy than it did then. But this is what is happening."

The Economist wants even further inflation. It is an easy recommendation for the City of London to make with the Labour party in power. Yet it is precisely the sharp intensification of inflation in Britain, the deep cuts into the standard of living of workers, and their upsurge of militancy on the picket lines that brought the new Labour government into power to begin with. Only with the utmost cynicism can *The Economist* suggest policies to other governments that would be catastrophic to their own.

Go It Alone Over the Brink

But the dilemma is inescapable. As the crisis of world imperialism deepens, there are no alternatives for each government but inflationary or recessionary policies or both, with governments skirting closer to disaster on both sides. Inflation spreads like fire from one country to the next; deflation threatens to bring about a worldwide economic slowdown. Both of them lead to sharpening class battles that cut away still further the competitive abilities of rival powers.

And here is the crux of the matter:

No matter how far-flung their multinational investments, and no matter how much world capitalism increasingly comes to depend on expanded world trade, in the last analysis capitalisms are national. The basis of power of the competing ruling classes lies in their own states and in the control over "their own" workers that the repressive governmental apparatus makes possible.

The editors of the *New York Times* said July 2, "The real question is whether there is or can be a common Western purpose at all. Or whether, in dealing with the explosive energy and petro-dollar crisis, go-it-alone policies will be followed that could destroy the benefits of three decades of politico-economic cooperation, endanger the common defense structure and set off a worldwide depression."

But what else is international competition except "go-it-alone"? Every

ingredient of the world crisis expresses *national needs*. Currencies are devalued in order to carve out bigger world markets. (The European Common Market can no longer even maintain a common EEC float.) Governments run deficits to shore up their own economies. The meaning of outright protectionism, as most recently in the case of Italy, is obvious.

On a small scale, as in the example of backing the loans of I. D. Herstatt, or even bailing out Italy on a short-run basis, international capitalism can unite to protect specific interests. But

it is utopian to believe that this can take place on a much wider scale.

Lenin stressed that the fundamental problem for imperialism is the contradiction between the expansive needs of capital on an international scale and national boundaries. This is the essence of the present inflationary-recessionary world crisis.

A further series of protectionist measures in world trade and parallel deflationary policies on a world scale, if carried too far, would lead just where they led in the 1930s—to drastic production cutbacks and massive

unemployment.

The imperialist governments will not plunge blindly into this catastrophe. They turned to the ideas of Keynes because they believed, with good reason, that capitalism could not survive another international depression. Nevertheless, the end of the long-term boom and the intensification of world competition have released forces that can no longer be contained within the safe limits envisioned by Lord Keynes. Rising unemployment and explosive inflation have become the inescapable "solutions." □

No Relief in Sight

The Economic Impasse of British Imperialism

By Alan Jones

London

In February of this year the British miners strike forced the Tory government of Heath to call, and lose, a general election. At that time, this event was generally seen by the left throughout the world as an important victory for the working class. What is not so generally understood however is that in fact the miners strike and its surrounding events and aftermath were more than simply an important tactical defeat for the ruling class. They represented a *strategic* defeat for British capitalism and have provided the catalyst to unhinge and destabilize the whole economic, social and political situation in Britain. Britain has now joined the ranks of countries in Europe where even temporary restorations of political equilibrium are unlikely. As the outcome and nature of the struggles which are going to occur in the coming months and years in Britain are likely to have an impact not only on the relation of forces in that country but on the situation in the whole of Europe, it is important that the left understands the underlying economic dynamics and dimensions of this crisis and the complete impasse which British capitalism now finds itself in.

The Crisis of Bourgeois Strategy

The failure and fall of the last Tory government was not just a defeat for the Tory party, it was a profound defeat for the whole British ruling class. The Heath administration never was, for the ruling class, just 'another' Tory government. In its origins it was a government which embodied a definite bourgeois strategy, a definite project, for attempting to bring British capitalism not merely out of a general economic crisis but in particular out of the *specific* relation of that economic malaise to the historical crisis of the whole of British capitalist society.

The bases of the specific nature of the British capital-

ist crisis are to be found in a particular pattern of historical development, starting with the very early development of British capitalism, which has led both to the extreme proletarianization of the country and to a position where historically the dominant sections of the ruling class have derived, to a degree unequalled in any other major capitalist power, their profits not from the exploitation of the *British* working class but directly or indirectly from the exploitation of the labouring masses of *other* countries. This situation is reflected in a pattern of foreign investment which in accumulated bulk exceeds quantitatively, even today, proportionately to the size of the country's economy, even that of the United States and is *qualitatively* higher than that of West Germany, France or Japan.¹ This is in turn com-

1. In the years 1870-1913 Sweezy and Magdoff calculate, on the basis of Cairncross's figures, that the foreign investment of British capitalism was equivalent to over \$24 billion in terms of modern dollars. Return on foreign investment was over \$40 billion in the same terms. (Sweezy and Magdoff, *The Dynamics of U. S. Capitalism*, p. 33.) But even more amazing than the size, which is vast when considered in terms of the far smaller economy of that period, is the fact that by 1870 annual British capital investment abroad *exceeded* net capital formation at home and in 1911-13 capital investment abroad was probably *double* that in Britain. (Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire*, p. 192.)

Even as late as 1968, on a far smaller Gross National Product (GNP) than its main imperialist rivals, apart from the United States, Britain still invested over twice as much abroad (\$890 million) as West Germany (\$390 million) and four times as much as Japan (\$220 million). (Rowthorn, "Imperialism in the Seventies—Unity or Rivalry?" *New Left Review*, No. 69, p. 42.) This compares to a rate of home investment which,

plemented by a pattern of "invisible" exports (insurance, banking, shipping for foreign nations, etc.) which is far greater in proportion to the size of the economy than any other major imperialism² and to a pattern of trade which has been oriented towards sectors of the world economy, first the Empire and then the Sterling Area, where, for historical and/or political reasons, British capitalism had a privileged position as a seller and where competition on the same technological level was very weak.³ Rarely has the word "imperialism" had such direct importance in analysing any major economy as it has in the case of British capitalism.

This pattern of insertion in the world economy has had profound historical implications for the whole social and political structure of Britain. Firstly, it has given the bourgeoisie a huge "buffer" against the need to sharply increase the rate of exploitation of the British proletariat. Secondly, it has allowed the bourgeoisie to make, when under working-class pressure and without creating economic ruin, the great economic concessions to the British working class which are reflected in the great organizational strength, and political backwardness, of the British working class. Thirdly, it allowed the bourgeoisie to avoid having to resort to fascist or military solutions between the two imperialist world wars, and thereby allowed it to maintain the enormously strong ideological weapon of 300 years of uninterrupted parliamentary regimes. Fourthly, however, and this is where the crisis within the bourgeoisie becomes very important, this situation of the British economy has meant that the decisive sections of the home-based British industrial bourgeoisie, in particular of the new industries created in the twentieth century, have not historically been the dominant fraction within the ruling class.⁴ Economic pre-eminence was in the hands of finance capital, symbolized and organized in the City of London, and government was in the hands

of the remnants of the landowning sections of the ruling class—these latter two forming the dominant section of the main party of the ruling class, the Tory party, with home-based industrial capital playing a subsidiary role, and with the policy of the whole being dominated by the needs of finance capital.

This relation of forces within the ruling class meant that the policy of the British state was not in general directed towards the interests of the home-based technologically advanced industrial bourgeoisie but to the needs of the foreign operations of British capital. This was shown in dozens of ways—the return to the gold standard after the first world war with the disastrous consequences of a high exchange rate for the British domestic economy; the maintenance after 1945 of absurdly inflated exchange rates which kept the maximum value available for foreign investment but which crippled exports; the maintenance of military forces vastly beyond Britain's financial capacity in East Asia, the Arab Gulf, etc.; the concomitant foreign policy alignment not with European capital but with the United States, the only possible military protector of British investments and operations abroad; the decision not to enter the European Economic Community (EEC—Common Market) at its inception because of its effects on the financial operations of the City and the export and import patterns of British trade, etc.

The historical reasons for the crisis of this economic orientation are well known. They are in particular:

1. This foreign economic orientation was gained, as noted, at the expense of the development of the British economy itself. From the 1860s onwards, the British economy was weakening compared to its rivals. The final nail was driven into its coffin when, unlike its German and Japanese rivals, it missed the benefits of the enormous increase in the rate of exploitation made possible by a totalitarian regime.

2. British imperialism, precisely because of its weakening home base, did not have the political or military capacity to defend its markets against the encroachments of rival imperialisms. Starting with the rise of German imperialism, and ending with the concessions Britain was forced to make to the United States to gain leasehold during the war, the old political defence of the system of trade and investment began to crumble.

3. After 1945 British imperialism could no longer economically afford to sustain a foreign military system which, with the exception of the United States, far exceeded that of any other capitalist power.

4. Those sections of the world economy towards which British imperialism was oriented were, after 1945, the most stagnant sectors of the world economy.

The net outcome of these developments was that by the early 1960s it was clear to all that the old pattern of British economic development was no longer viable.⁵

5. Take for example foreign investment. The pattern we have discussed above still exists, as shown by the fact that the value of British foreign investment was still 80% that of exports in 1971, compared to 18% for Japan and West Germany (*Financial Times*, April 25, 1974), nevertheless, returns as a proportion of GNP had fallen from 10% in 1914 to only about 2% even by

as a percentage of GNP, is twice as high in Japan (30-35%) as in Britain (16-18%) and which is two-thirds higher in West Germany (23-27%) than in Britain. ("Survey on Japan," *The Economist*, March 31, 1973.) The situation on accumulated foreign investment is still more striking even in relation to the United States. In 1971, accumulated stocks of West German capital abroad were worth 4% of GNP. For the United States the figure was 8.2%. For Britain, however, it was 16.7%. (*Financial Times*, April 25, 1974.)

2. In the whole period from 1796, when records start, to 1973 there have been only nine years in which the Balance of Trade (relation of visible exports to visible imports) was in Britain's favour. In 73 years in the twentieth century there have been 69 deficits. In invisible trade, however, Britain is the greatest "exporter" per head in the world. (Manser, *Britain in Balance*, p. 23.)

3. As late as 1955, for example, trade with the Sterling Area represented 45% of British exports compared to only 15% with the countries that became the EEC. (Prest and Coppock, eds., *The British Economy*.)

4. The ideological effects of this economic, social and political situation have been analysed in a series of articles by Anderson and Nairn in *New Left Review*, and a brilliant sketch is given in Trotsky's "Through What Stage Are We Passing?"

On every major index—rate of profit,⁶ rate of investment,⁷ rate of growth of productivity,⁸ rate of growth of the economy⁹—the position of British imperialism was and is unrelievedly bad. The crisis of the foreign orientation meant that it was no longer capable of compensating for the domestic deficiencies.

But two enormous barriers stood in the way of British imperialism reorienting its policy in the necessary way, i.e., towards integration into the EEC. Firstly, the British economy was so run-down that it was incapable of competing adequately with its rivals in the EEC.¹⁰ Secondly, such a reorientation would shake up, and have to overcome, the whole social and political pattern based on the old economic structure. In particular it would mean:

1. Shifting dominance within the ruling class and the Tory party from the old finance-capital-landowning nexus to the representatives and interests of big industrial, technologically advanced, British-based capital.

2. In foreign policy, shifting from the old alliance with the United States to an alliance with European capital.

3. Within the economy carrying through an unprecedented series of mergers and rationalizations and greatly increasing the rate of exploitation.

The key to this whole process, which in many ways

Average Annual Rate of Growth of Productivity in Manufacturing

	1950-70	1965-70*
Belgium	3.84	5.68
France	5.64	7.84
Germany	4.72	6.28
Italy	6.88	4.78 (6.43)**
Netherlands	5.0	7.76
USA	3.16	1.56
UK	2.6	3.44

* The latest observation is mostly first quarter, 1970.

** 1965, first quarter to 1969, second quarter (OECD).

1960. (Cited by Kidron, "Imperialism Highest Stage but One," *International Socialism*, No. 61.)

6. The latest survey of statistical material on profits (Burgess and Webb, *Lloyd's Bank Review*, April 1974) comes up with the following conclusions: (a) On profit share in the GNP, they conclude, "The company sector series . . . suggest a secular decline in the post-tax share of profits in the national income since the 1950s; from over 12 per cent to hardly 10 per cent at the beginning of the 1970s. . . . The observed post-tax position ranges between a near maintenance and a small decline in the profit shares until the middle 1960s with a marked fall taking place since then." (b) On profit rates they conclude that "company gross trading profits, after allowing for stock appreciation and capital consumption, equalled about 15 per cent of net capital stock at replacement cost in the late 1950s but had fallen to less than 8 per cent in the early 1970s."

7. See table on investment as a percentage of GNP.

8. See table on rate of growth of productivity.

is analogous to, but much more profound than, the type of restructuring which French capitalism carried through under de Gaulle, is of course the ability of the bourgeoisie to bring about a qualitative shift in the relation of forces between the ruling class and the working class.

On some of these fronts the bourgeoisie has made progress, generally of an empirical stumbling sort, during the last ten years. The big series of economic mergers in the mid and late 1960s, symbolized in the coming into existence of British Leyland and GEC-AEI-English Electric, strengthened, concentrated and gave more cohesion to, the industrial bourgeoisie.¹¹ The success of Heath in being elected to the leadership of the Tory party put an end to the political dominance of the old landowning clique of the Salisbury-Baldwin-Churchill-MacMillan-Home line. In foreign policy, an attempt at a decisive break was made by the Heath-Pompidou agreements and the entry of Britain into the EEC. The

Investment as a Percentage of GNP

	Range From 1960 to 1972
Japan	30-35%
Germany	23-27%
France	20-26%
Britain	16-18%
U.S. (excludes government expenditure on machinery and equipment)	17-18%

("Survey on Japan," *The Economist*, March 31, 1973.)

9. See table on rate of growth of Gross National Product.

10. In the years between the mid-1950s and 1970s, Britain's pattern of trade was of necessity, in view of the world market changes, transformed. For example in 1955, 22% of British exports went to the developing countries of the Sterling Area and only 15% to the countries which formed the EEC. By 1971, only 13% of exports went to the developing countries of the Sterling Area and 21% went to the EEC. In 1955, 45% of British exports went to the Sterling Area as a whole and only 41% went to Western Europe and North America. In 1971, only 29% of British exports went to the Sterling Area and 56% to Western Europe and North America. (Prest and Coppock, *The British Economy*, p. 119.) But in the new markets Britain couldn't compete against its main rivals. To take just one example: Between 1963 and 1973 the West German share of British imports increased from 4.3% to 8.5%, while the British share of the German market fell from 4.7% to 3.5%. (*Financial Times*, April 23, 1974.)

11. This was accompanied by an ideological offensive that concentrated on building up new bourgeois "cult" figures (e.g., Lord Stokes of Leyland Motors, Arnold Weinstock of GEC). A whole series of books stressed the need to break with "amateurism" (associated with the old ruling class) and develop "professionalism" (associated with industrial capital). The buildup of Heath himself, the first "grammar school" Tory leader, fitted perfectly into this.

Rates of Growth of GNP for Seven European Countries

	Denmark %	Germany %	Italy %	Netherlands %	Norway %	Sweden %	UK %
1870-1913	3.1	3.1 ¹	1.4	2.2 ²	2.6 ²	3.1	2.3
1913-1957	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.5	2.8	2.4	1.6
1913-1929	2.1	0.5	1.8	3.3	2.8	1.6	1.3
1929-1938	2.2	2.5	1.6	0.1	3.0	2.0	2.2
1938-1957	2.3	2.9	2.3	3.1	2.8	3.3	1.6
1924-1929	2.7	3.5 ³	2.6	4.2	4.2	4.3	2.9
1951-1957	2.7	7.5	5.4	5.2	3.6	3.8	2.5

1. 1871-1913

2. 1900-1913

3. 1925-1929

Figures adjusted to exclude the effect of changes in national boundaries.

Source: "Economic Growth in Western Europe 1870-1959" by Angus Maddison, *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*, March 1959.

Cited by Lomax, "What Attitude to Growth," *National Westminster Bank Review*, February 1974.

devaluations of the pound and the tolerance of very high rates of inflation are an expression of the dominance of the exporting industrial bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the old, dominant finance capital. While the task of changing the relation of forces within the ruling class is not completely finished—finance capital succeeded, for example, in thwarting the creation by amalgamation of an industrial-based merchant bank by the Slater-Walker group—nevertheless, real progress has been made on this front by the industrial bourgeoisie.

The political impact of this changed situation within the ruling class can be seen both inside and outside the Tory party. In the early 1960s something approaching half the Tory party was opposed to entry into the EEC, while now only a tiny minority retains its opposition—although here this is helped by the fact that the City of London has had to abandon its dreams of ruling the world money market and has concentrated on ruling the finances of Europe instead. The change is registered in the fact that the last Tory government was prepared to continue the policy of expanding the economy long after all sections of the financial bourgeoisie were calling for it to be halted so as to check the rate of inflation. It is registered in the fact that the Tories, who until the Heath government had never once in their history devalued the pound, were able to float Sterling without any significant resistance. Likewise in the abandonment of the British farmers to the tender mercies of the EEC. It is shown even in the fact that the sexual scandals of the old dominant section of the Tory party, in the Profumo affair, could, in the early 1960s, shake the party to its foundations, while now equally bad scandals against British public bourgeois morality, in the Lambton-Jellico affair, are regarded as the aberrations of a relatively isolated clique.¹² But if the bourgeoisie has made progress in re-equilibrating itself internally, nevertheless this whole operation, and even the cementing

of the new relation of forces within the ruling class, depends on success in qualitatively altering the relation of forces between the bourgeoisie and the working class. Unless the historically very low rate of surplus value extracted from the British working class can be increased, then no amount of "technical" adjustments will allow the British bourgeoisie to compete successfully in the harsh world of the 1970s style of interimperialist competition.

The Failures of Bourgeois Political Strategy

The first major attempt to overcome the impasse in which the British industrial bourgeoisie found itself was stimulated by the economic recession of 1962-63. The Tory government, finding itself under pressure from industrial capital, made relatively fumbling attempts at a political turn by "de-colonizing" Africa, by abolishing Retail Price Maintenance, by setting up the National Economic Development Council and the National Incomes Commission, and by opening negotiations for entry into the EEC. But these moves were not sufficiently radical for the needs of the situation and the main strategy adopted vis-à-vis the working class, integration of the trade unions, was a very difficult one for a Tory government to carry out. In any case the internal relation of forces of the Tory party greatly favoured the old politically dominant sections of the ruling class. In the leadership crisis following the illness of MacMillan, the old governing clique—while it could not impose one of its own dominant members—succeeded in thwarting Butler, the candidate of the industrial bourgeoisie; and a buffoon, Home, became Tory leader.

Faced with this situation, decisive sections of the industrial bourgeoisie, in a relatively bold political turn, moved to support a Labour government.¹³ Such a government, it was hoped, could achieve three things: Firstly,

12. A good account of the further ramifications of this process can be found in "The Heath Government; a New Course for British Capitalism" by Robin Blackburn in *New Left Review*, No. 70.

13. In the 1964 election, Labour was supported by, among others, Stokes—the head of Leyland Motors; Lord Kearnton—the head of Courtaulds; and *The Economist* magazine; i. e., by representatives of the most dynamic and central sectors of British industrial capital.

it could break the dominance of the old governing sections of the ruling class; secondly, through state intervention it could help the process of the rationalization of the economy; thirdly, and most importantly, it was hoped it could—because of its links with the trade unions—hold back the working class and create the conditions for a powerful increase in the rate of exploitation. Wilson duly seized this "opportunity" to fuse working-class discontent with ruling-class interests; and, once safely elected in 1964, proceeded onto the path of establishing a new Department of Economic Affairs, which was supposed to overrule the traditional mandarins of the Treasury and the Bank of England, put forward the National Plan, set up the Royal Commission on the Trade Unions, support productivity bargaining, and so on.

At first Wilson appeared supremely successful in his integrationist strategy; in April 1965 only the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) opposed the prices and incomes policy when the Trades Union Congress (TUC) discussed it. But in fact right from the beginning the strains were evident. For Wilson really to have shifted to total subordination to the needs of the industrial bourgeoisie, with all that this entailed (early devaluation and rise in food costs, a hard incomes policy, antiunion laws, etc.), would have meant a crisis within the Labour party involving a more or less complete rupture with its traditional base and the consequent danger of decline of the Labour party into simply a splinter bourgeois party. Wilson received a taste of what this would mean with the resignation of Cousins from the Cabinet after the July 1966 deflationary measures; and Wilson, for reasons of bureaucratic survival, could not contemplate the consequences of the process. For him, this is what the "lessons of Ramsey MacDonald" always meant. (MacDonald, serving as prime minister in 1931, broke with the core of the Labour party.) In the final analysis, the alliance of Labour and the bourgeoisie broke up because the relation of forces between the trade-union bureaucracy and the masses, as determined by the relation of forces between the classes, did not permit the trade-union bureaucracy to really integrate the working class. The bureaucrats found themselves outflanked by unofficial strikes, forced to the left against their will, or replaced by bureaucrats standing further to the "left." It was this pressure which also finally put an end to Labour's attempt to introduce the "In Place of Strife" antiunion proposals. From then on the floodgates were open and in 1968-69 a massive strike wave began to unfold.

The dropping of "In Place of Strife" was the final straw which broke any significant section of the ruling class from support of the Labour government. The ruling class judged, correctly, that the dropping of "In Place of Strife" signified that there was no possibility of integrating the unions until the relation of forces between the classes had been altered. From 1969 onwards the ruling class turned fundamentally to a policy of confrontation.

Meanwhile the Tory party, disliking intensely being isolated from sections of the ruling class, had been undergoing a series of internal struggles during the mid and late 1960s which led to the dumping of Home and the emergence of Heath, a clear representative of industrial capitalism, as leader. He understood the necessary

changes which had to be made to secure the dominance of his particular section of the ruling class; and he turned to a resolute pro-European, "anti-American" foreign stance, brought the symbols of the new dominant sections of the ruling class, Peter Walker and John Davies, into the inner circles of the Tory party, and, most importantly, turned resolutely, even aggressively, in a famous "Selsdon Park" Tory leadership meeting, from integration of the unions to confrontation with them. In the first year and a half of the Heath government, this turn was extended logically. Attention was focused on entry into the EEC and on the passing of the Industrial Relations Act. Unemployment was allowed to soar to over a million persons. Not once were the trade-union leaders invited to discuss with Heath. A policy of confrontation with successive unions was embarked upon. Although the dockers and then the municipal workers broke through the Tory strategy, Heath claimed his first victim when the power workers were defeated in the winter of 1970. Then, in the spring of 1971, the post office workers were smashed. Heath's policy of "n-1," that is, that each major pay settlement must be one percent lower than the preceding one, appeared to succeed. Despite his continual frustrations in the North of Ireland, in the spring and early summer of 1971 Heath appeared to be master of all he surveyed.

But the whole situation of the Tory's was in fact illusory. Not one really strong section of the working class had been taken on and defeated. Once the "heavy battalions" started to move into struggle, things began to take a very different turn. First, in 1971, the Ford workers slugged the company to defeat. Then the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) work-in took place. Finally, starting with the Plessey occupation in the summer of 1971, a whole series of factory occupations against redundancy [layoffs] started. Trade-union membership, for the first time in a period of high unemployment, was rising. The danger for the government was obvious. Given any movement of the economy out of recession the unions would go on the offensive.¹⁴ To prevent this, the Tories had to defeat a "core" section of the working class. The one they decided on was the miners.¹⁵

In the event, the miners strike was a disaster which exposed the whole weakness of the position of Tory government and the ruling class. Not only was the government smashed into submission, but with the use of flying pickets and other advanced forms of organization, a qualitative development in the methods of working-class struggle began. From the miners strike on, things started to go decisively wrong for Heath. During the spring and summer of 1972, the working class scored victory after victory—in a railway drivers strike, in a building workers strike,

14. As *The Banker*, November 1971, put it: "More demand, faster growth, and less unemployment would surely intensify the militant pressure for an ever growing share of wages in the national income."

15. This was a perfectly conscious choice. The *City of London Newspaper* reported on February 1, 1972: "Months before the coal strike started, ministers were saying in private that the government would establish their 'anti-inflation' policy through a resounding victory over the miners."

in the strike to free five imprisoned dockers leaders. In two cases—the rail drivers and the "Freeing of the Five"—the Industrial Relations Act was successfully defied. In the only cases where the employers were victorious—in the docks strike and in the Manchester engineering occupations—this was not primarily due to the power of the employers but to extreme sabotage by the union bureaucracy.

After a spell of indecision, Heath drew more or less the correct conclusions from the debacle. The bourgeoisie was able to use a world and British economic upturn in 1972 to give concessions to the working class and bring about a relative restabilization of the situation. Heath turned to a new policy of preparing a confrontation, *but within the clothing and rhetoric of integration*. The trade-union leaders were invited in for endless discussions. The role of trade unions in "the nation" was stressed. All the rhetoric of "lame duck" industries being allowed to go bankrupt was dropped. A thousand million pounds was pumped into the mining industry. Meanwhile, a new confrontation was prepared, but this time in the form of an incomes policy. In the late autumn of 1972, Heath felt strong enough to pounce; and he imposed a wage freeze—Phase One of the Incomes Policy. The combination of concessions and political manoeuvres succeeded. The wage freeze was not broken. Further success was gained with Phase Two in the spring of 1973. The miners and Ford workers did not struggle and the health workers and gas workers were defeated. But this was a deceptive victory. The key sections of the working class were not defeated. They merely lacked perspective.

During the spring and summer of 1973 the storm clouds were mounting. Despite partial setbacks in the spring, the number of strikes continued to mount. Attempts by the bourgeoisie to capitalize on the spring successes by an offensive in the factories failed, and only against relatively isolated groups—in the trial of building workers at Shrewsbury and on the question of racism—did the ruling class gain important victories. The summer union conferences showed a particularly militant mood. Finally, despite the 1972-73 boom, the underlying economic crisis began surfacing.

By November 1973, the time the working class, and in particular the miners, were entering into struggle against Phase Three, the ruling class and the government basically had only three options.

The first option was to capitulate to the strongest section of the working class, the miners, and hope to hold back the rest of the working class. But the ruling class and the Tory government correctly assessed that in the given relation of class forces this could not be achieved. Glasgow firemen, power station engineers, and train drivers were already in struggle against the Incomes Policy. Although in November-December, large sections of the working class were not directly involved in the struggle, nevertheless the bourgeoisie calculated that this passivity was only *apparent* and that very large sections of working-class militants were acting on the assumption that if they could help the miners to create a hole in the incomes policy wall then they could follow through the breach later—which is in fact precisely what is occurring this summer. In other words, the miners dispute could in no sense be seen as a sectoral struggle which could be handled in isolation but on the contrary was a locus

around which the total relation of class forces was lining up. This was even consciously understood in quite important sections of the working class and among almost all the bourgeoisie. For this reason, until it became clear that the price of even trying to defeat the miners—with no certainty of success—would be ruinous, no significant section of the ruling class favoured capitulation to the miners. In particular, all reports indicate that the economic departments of the state remained on a hard line throughout the crisis and it was those ministers closest to the economic departments of the state machine, notably Chancellor of the Exchequer Barber, who took the hardest line against the "special case" throughout the crisis and remained on that line even when individual sections of the bourgeoisie were beginning to crack.

The second option open to the ruling class was to attempt to break any miners strike by repression. This however was a very dangerous option. Already in 1972 the miners had shown tremendous combativity, with tens of thousands of workers involved in picketing, several fights with the police, and finally the traumatic experience of Saltley where a solidarity strike of 40,000 engineering workers and a picket of 10,000 miners and engineers broke the back of bourgeois attempts to repress the miners. Even against the miners alone it was not certain that a policy of repression could have won. But precisely the alignment of class forces round the miners strike made massive repression an exceedingly dangerous option—one in which Saltleys could have developed not in the fifth week of the strike but in the second or third. Throughout the run-up leading to the strike, pledges of support flooded in to the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) from every conceivable trade-union body—from the Scottish TUC to individual unions such as the Transport Workers and the Train Drivers down to hundreds of individual union branches and shop stewards committees. Any attempt at savage repression of the miners could have led to a serious move towards a general strike. Certain sections of the bourgeoisie favoured such a risky confrontation, for example, *The Economist*; and most appeared to have weighed it as a serious option, the *Times* and *Telegraph*, for example, doing calculations on whether the army could be relied upon, how strong the police were, etc., while the antipicket squads of the police were placed on a nationally centralized footing. But in the event, the bourgeoisie, almost certainly correctly, decided that the risks in a policy of repression were too great.

The third option open to the government and the ruling class, the one the impossibility of the other two options forced on it, was to attempt to use their political strength to defeat the organizational and social strength of the working class. The trade-union bureaucracy were continually subjected to manoeuvres and political attacks by the government. The government achieved notable political successes. But these political offensives broke against the rock of the organizational strength of the miners and the support they received from other sections of the working class. Once the miners strike was actually called for, with an 81 percent vote for a strike, the bourgeoisie and the government were defeated. Left with no way out but the last gamble of an election, which in the given relation of forces created by the miners strug-

gle was almost certain to, and did, end in a defeat for the Tories' project, the Heath government fell. The colossal organizational strength of the British working class, despite the utter bankruptcy of its leadership and the deep reformism which still exists within the working class, had succeeded in defeating the most severe political attack to be launched against it for decades.

Prospects for Bourgeois Economic Crisis

The first reaction of the ruling-class parties to the electoral defeat was chaotic. The Tory party tried to cling to power through fudging up an alliance with the Liberals. But fear of working-class fury stopped this. The ruling class in general came to the conclusion that, in the given relation of forces, the only way to restabilize the situation temporarily was to allow Labour into office.¹⁶ But reluctant acquiescence is one thing. Believing it will solve anything is another. From February onward the basic economic and political situation of the ruling class has deteriorated. The historical crisis of British capitalism has now become a burning conjunctural actuality. Indeed the economic situation has now become so depressing that apparently sections of the ruling class are not even prepared to discuss it! The Treasury, in an absolutely unprecedented move, this year refused to publish its projections for the development of the economy in 1975.¹⁷ But other bourgeois prophets have been more forthright. Apart from a few doyens of finance capital who appear to see deflation and collapse of investment as acceptable, provided it stabilizes the exchange rate (for example, Anthony Harris in the *Financial Times*), all the representatives of industrial capital are more or less unreservedly gloomy. The National Institute of Economic and Social Research summed up its view in its March report: "It is not often that a government finds itself confronted with the possibility of a simultaneous failure to achieve all four of its main policy objectives—of adequate economic growth, full employment, a satisfactory balance of payments and reasonably stable prices." *The Economist*, apart from "consoling" itself with the prediction of a world economic slump, has concluded that "A year from now Britain is likely to be suffering either 1 1/2 million unemployed or 20% inflation or persistent industrial breakdown or even all three together." (*The Economist*, April 20, 1974.) The stock market, despite some recent small upturns, has fallen in value by nearly 50% since the high point of May 1972, and in only four days after Labour's budget, £3,000 million was knocked off share values. Perhaps most significantly of all, predictions of

16. *The Economist* probably summed up the vote well: "In one of the gravest crises in its peacetime history, Britain appeared to have cast an indecisive vote for indecision." (*The Economist*, March 2, 1974.) But it called for a minority Labour government to be formed.

17. The *Financial Times* commented on this: "Instead of looking ahead to the first half of 1975 to give a full year's estimate in line with the normal practice, the official figures stop, suspiciously, at the end of 1974. The reason for this is, unfortunately, more likely to be the content of the full year's forecast than any scepticism about crystal ball gazing as such." (April 4, 1974.)

industrial investment are plummeting.¹⁸

These economic forebodings are completely justified. Every major index shows that the economic condition of British imperialism is now very grave indeed.

● The rate of inflation is now at over 15% and has been rising all year with many rises still in the pipeline.¹⁹ Any concessions Labour makes to try to make the "social contract" stick will only succeed in stoking up inflation still further, and *The Economist* calculated "the budget will probably add 2 1/2% to the 15-20% price rises already to be expected in 1974-75." (*The Economist*, April 9, 1974.) *The Financial Times* commented gloomily in its survey of economic prospects for the year: "Virtually nothing . . . can be done to stop the coming inflation." (*Financial Times*, December 31, 1973.)

● Even before the oil crisis, the British balance of trade and payments was deteriorating rapidly. As recently as last November the *Sunday Times* could refer to "October's heart stopping £298 m trade deficit." (*Sunday Times*, November 18, 1973.) Now such a deficit would be regarded as an excellent monthly figure. March's trade deficit was £453 million—that is, equivalent to an annual rate of nearly £5,500 million. The balance of payments deficit for March was £371 million—equivalent to an annual rate of nearly £4,500 million. (*Financial Times*, April 20, 1974.) The import of these figures can be judged by the fact that merely ten years ago when the Tory government allowed the balance of payments deficit to rise to £800 million this was generally regarded as disastrous.²⁰

18. The latest Department of Industry survey indicated only a rise of 5% in investments this year compared to earlier projections of 12-14%. The Confederation of British Industry goes further and predicts a fall in investment. Just how disastrous this will be can be judged from the fact that investment fell in 1971 and 1972 and only rose slightly in 1973. (*Financial Times*, June 4, 1974.)

19. The price index, compared to a year ago, was up 12% in January, 13.2% in February, and 13.5% in March. This is 6.1% up since the beginning of Phase Three of the government's "counter inflation" incomes policy last November. Food prices were up 18.1% as compared with prices in March a year ago. (*Evening Standard*, April 19, 1974.) In the first three months of the year, output prices of manufacturing goods were rising at a rate equivalent to 36%, and the materials price was up 62% in a year. This is on top of an index of output price increases of 18.5% last year. The decision to increase the price of petrol by 5p. will itself add 0.7% to the price index. (*Evening Standard*, April 19, 1974.)

20. The cause of British imperialism's chronic balance of payments deficit has, in fact, very little to do with the oil crisis and everything to do with British capitalism's totally noncompetitive situation in relation to its main rivals.

As we noted earlier, in the ten years 1963-73, when there was no "energy crisis," the West German share of the British import market increased from 4.3% to 8.5%, while the British share of the German market fell from 4.7% to 3.5%. (*Financial Times*, April 23, 1974.)

The underlying situation, even excluding oil, can also be seen by examining the 1973 figures, i.e., for the

This crisis in the British balance of payments cannot possibly be dealt with by technical means designed to overcome the oil deficits. To get any order into the situation at all, massive deflation of the economy will have to be undertaken. Although the bourgeoisie expects some improvement in the situation later in the year this will not at all represent a strengthening of the competitive position of the British economy but simply its state of acute deflation.²¹ Economists of the London School of Business studies, writing in the *Sunday Times*, predicted: "The turnaround in the U. K. Balance of Payments next year will result largely from the depressed state of the U. K. economy, curbing the growth of imports, and from an improvement in the terms of trade." (*Sunday Times*, April 21, 1974.) The implications of this are very obvious. As the *Financial Times* put it: "From our present horrendous deficit the haul back will be much steeper than that of 1969-70." (*Financial Times*, December 12, 1973.) And that climb back from 1969-70 led to a collapse in investment, one million unemployed, and two years of effective nil growth in the economy!

● Growth: The collapse of profits and the deflation necessary to bring order into the balance of payments is bringing the expansion of the economy to a grinding halt—and even putting it into reverse.²² Output was al-

period before the "oil crisis" got really under way. In the key manufacturing sector, despite increases in exports, for most of 1973 most industries had smaller surpluses in value terms than in 1972. In the first ten months of the year, trade surpluses in manufactured goods declined from £2,000 million to £1,500 million, while the deficit on fuels and raw materials rose from £3,000 million to just over £4,000 million. (*Financial Times*, November 30, 1973.)

This situation is made still worse by the effects of the three-day week. Sir Michael Clapham, president of the Confederation of British Industry, noted in March that "the trade balance is likely to get worse before it gets better simply because the full effects of three day working and the December oil crisis have still to show up in our export and import figures." (*Financial Times*, March 6, 1974.)

21. For example, in the first three months of this year exports were up 12% and nonpetroleum imports up only 5%, while there was an improvement in the nonoil deficit from an equivalent annual rate of £2,900 million in October-December last year to the region of £2,250 million in the first quarter of 1974. (*Financial Times*, April 20, 1974.) But this improvement was entirely accounted for by the decline in production which took place in the same period (see footnotes 23, 24, 25). It is in this context that the expected improvement in the balance of payments later in this year and next from one of £3,500-£4,000 million to £1,300-£1,800 million must be judged. (*Sunday Times*, April 21, 1974.)

22. The economy is in fact now so inherently stagnant that any attempt to get it to grow inevitably produces crisis effects. As the *Sunday Times* Business News put it, "The Treasury let everything go—the exchange rate, wage inflation, a credit explosion—to get the economy moving in the first place." (*Sunday Times*, November 18, 1973.) Indeed, the inflationary pressures which the state had to give to the economy to get it moving were

ready slowing down rapidly before the energy crisis, the miners strike, and the three-day week.²³ Output in the next year will obviously fall. The only question is by how much. The most likely projection seems to be between 2-5%.²⁴ However, the recession is going to be far worse in certain key sectors—notably auto, machine tools, and construction.²⁵

truly phenomenal. *The Times* summarized them as follows: "In the last three years for which Mr Barber has been responsible (1971-72, 72-73, 73-74) total public expenditure has risen by £9,835m while revenue has risen by less than £6,000m. In terms of constant purchasing power, government spending is now running almost £5,000m above the level inherited by Mr Barber and revenue has risen by barely £1,000m. A small budget surplus of 1970-71 gave way to deficits (as reflected in the central government borrowing requirement of £515m in 1971-72, of £1,824m in 1972-73 and of £3,996m in 1973-74. Over the period of Mr Barber's Chancellorship the money supply (on the broader M3 definition) virtually doubled from £17,000m in June 1970 to more than £33,000m by the middle of last month." (*The Times*, February 25, 1974.) It is this situation which has produced something like panic in sections of the bourgeoisie and the economic apparatus of the state. As the *Sunday Times* reported, "Privately, officials admit that they do not know how the monetary structure they unleashed now works." (November 18, 1973.)

23. Under the Tory government's projections for Phase Three of its incomes policy, output was supposed to increase by 5% in a year. But by October-November 1973 the index of production of all industry fell by 0.5%, with manufacturing output rising by only 0.5%. Between July-August 1973 and September-November 1973, production was only expanding at a rate equivalent to an annual increase of 1%. (*Sunday Times*, November 18, 1974.) On top of this came the losses due to the three-day week. These are impossible to calculate exactly. The *Financial Times* on December 14 predicted a 2-3% decrease of annual output for every month lost in three-day working. This was, however, based on a fall in output of 33% a month, whereas in actual fact the fall was 20%. On February 11 the same paper estimated the fall so far to be equivalent to 2.5% of annual output. Industry Secretary Wedgwood-Benn said in the House of Commons on March 25 that manufacturing output alone had fallen by about 20%, equivalent to £1 billion, in the first three months of the year, but that this was a very rough estimate. Later estimates give lower figures.

24. This is the general estimate. The most recent one, by economists of the London School of Business studies, is slightly more optimistic in the short run, predicting a fall of only 1.5% this year, but is even more pessimistic in the long run—seeing production only going up by 1% in the two years until the end of 1975.

25. The decline in auto is particularly serious, as 10% of British industrial production is tied up directly or indirectly in motor manufacturing. Sales of cars in particular slumped precipitously as a result of the oil crisis and the general economic depression. In January car sales were down to only 64% of their level a year previously, and many manufacturers reached only 50%

● Unemployment: Under these conditions a rapid rise in unemployment—starting in the summer—is inevitable. In mid-March unemployment on a seasonally adjusted basis stood at 546,000, that is 2.4%, with vacancies at 298,000 and unemployment rising at a rate of 3,900 a month. But the rate was rising and in the summer persons leaving school will be added. Most projections are now that there will be 800,000 to 1 million unemployed by the end of the year with the total rising to 1 to 1.5 million unemployed next year. (*Financial Times*, April 23, 1974; *Sunday Times*, April 21, 1974.) Apart from the general increase in unemployment and the effects in the particular industries already noted, this rate of unemployment is going to have catastrophic consequences in depressed areas such as Scotland. Here over 500,000 people have left in the last ten years and the number of available jobs has still fallen by 56,000. Unemployment

of their sales a year previously. (*Financial Times*, February 12, 1974.) Recovery was not rapid either. Car sales in March were still 26% below that of March 1973. (*Financial Times*, April 22, 1974.)

This slump has particularly hit the biggest car firm in Britain and the model of capitalist mergers—British Leyland—which accounts for nearly 40% of car sales. The company lost £100 million worth of production during the twelve weeks of the three-day week—and then lost £6 million a week in production through its attempt to victimize a leading shop steward at its massive Cowley assembly plant. (*Financial Times*, April 22, 1974.) There are persistent rumours that this firm is going bankrupt and/or is about to be nationalized. These have been denied by Chairman Lord Stokes, but even he warned shareholders to expect "a heavy loss" for the first six months of the 1973-74 financial year. As he said in his shareholders report, "No engineering company of the magnitude of yours with its heavy fixed costs can operate in the region of 60% capacity without losing money." British Leyland was "working hard to get back to full production but in many instances the supply lines have become exhausted"; and "if the threatened overtime ban in the engineering industry is implemented, it could have disastrous results which are bound to have repercussions throughout the motor industry." (*The Times*, March 26, 1974.) Certainly if British Leyland does go broke the scale of the disaster cannot be exaggerated. Something like 3-4% of industrial production is tied up directly or indirectly with this firm, and 300,000 to 400,000 workers depend on it for their jobs.

The construction industry is also undergoing a very sharp downturn, with particularly severe effects on house building. Building orders were down 35% in January this year compared to a year ago, with 100,000 building workers likely to be laid off by the autumn. (*The Economist*, March 30, 1974.) The number of houses completed in Britain in 1973, at 293,000, was the lowest for 14 years and the number of houses started was, with the exception of the disaster year of 1970, the lowest for 11 years. (*Financial Times*, February 1, 1974.)

Machine tools took a terrible hammering in the depression of 1969-71 and are only just now recovering. A death-blow is likely to be delivered by a new economic downturn.

in Scotland as a whole is already 4.7%. In 1960 in the key industrial area of West Central Scotland there were six men after every available job. Now already there are eighteen. As James Dollan, Vice-President of the Scottish Trades Union Congress, said at the recent congress of the organization, "The tragedy is that in every period of increased unemployment we are left in Scotland with an even larger core of men and women who are never likely to work again." (*Financial Times*, April 18, 1974.)

Under these economic conditions it is not surprising that no significant section of the ruling class has any confidence in the ability of the Labour government and its "social contract" to keep the working class economically under control. Indeed a recent survey by the research firm Business Decisions Ltd. indicated that two-thirds of the firms polled thought the social contract would have no effect on current pay claims and none thought it would prevent further acceleration of claims. (*The Times*, April 22, 1974.)

But if the bourgeoisie has rarely been so united in its disbelief that a particular policy will work, it is also acutely aware of the change in the relation of forces created by the miners victory and by the fall of Heath. It is scared of a massive working-class response on the electoral plane, or still worse in direct action, if attempts are made to remove the Labour government. This is what, for example, the *Financial Times* says, in the language of the bourgeoisie, when it talks of "The dangers of trying to bring down a minority government while it is still in its honeymoon period with the electors." (*Financial Times*, April 3, 1974.)

What is more, while the ruling class wants to get rid of the Labour government, there does not seem to be any credible alternative which it can put together at present. A Liberal party-Tory party coalition would result in the electoral annihilation of the Liberals at the next election. A simple Tory government might lead to a strong working-class response—and in any case Heath has shown no ability to make serious inroads into the organized strength of the working class. A grand coalition of Tories and Labour is almost completely excluded because of the pressure of the masses on the Labour party. An openly right-wing Labour government for a few years could lead to working-class demoralization and a huge electoral victory for the Tories—but this depends on the Labour bureaucrats agreeing to commit political suicide. The Bonapartist manoeuvrings of Powell are too dangerous at present for the ruling class to see in them a solution at present.

The only real perspective is therefore a definite period of bourgeois political instability in a period of rapidly mounting economic crisis. On the short-term, governmental instability posed by the fall of Heath, *The Economist*, in commenting on the engineers strike against the National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC), summed up what is undoubtedly an increasing view amongst the bourgeoisie:

"Mr Wilson's government has had the first of what will be its many confrontations with the question 'who rules Britain' and . . . Mr Foot and a donor with £65,000 more money than constitutional sense have persuaded Mr Hugh Scanlon to accept their assurance that, so far as can be made legally possible, four left wing

trade union leaders meeting in Peckham do. The question and the trouble will therefore recur.

"This raises the gravest questions of where Britain is going constitutionally, but nobody likes to ask these questions. . . . Industrially, it is inviting a lot of strikes next winter. The unions have been shown that even an illegal strike against the rule of law brings the government and anonymous capitalist peacemakers hastening to bear gifts: so it will be even harder next winter for moderate leaders to resist militant demands. . . .

"Politically, this coming groundswell of strikes reinforces the danger to Mr Wilson that Labour . . . will find itself losing the next election after all; but its fall would not do the nation much good because the chastened Conservatives—reading how the country reacted to confrontation—now have little or no intention of resisting trade union dictation either. The militants would continue with their plans for disruption at exactly the same pace against the Conservatives as against Labour, while saying that the return of wicked Tories had caused them to heat

their actions up." (*The Economist*, May 11, 1974.)

The Economist probably underestimates the temporary effect on the working class of the Labour government. But the sour, cynical, and despairing note reflects a real fear.

The effects of British capitalism's economic crisis now extend far beyond questions of government. The *Financial Times* summed up the position perfectly when it said in its projection for 1974, "The economic successes needed to restore confidence in many of our institutions (notably Parliament and the City), to 'sell' the EEC to a sceptical public and to ease the tensions in British public life have simply failed to materialise. And the troubles we hoped they would help to cure have actually become worse in consequence." (*Financial Times*, December 31, 1973.) The miners, when they brought down the Heath government, did not just produce a defeat for the incomes policy or a crisis of government. They helped drive a stake right through the heart of the strategy of the bourgeoisie.

July 6, 1974

Washington's Vanishing Control

A New Leap in the Nuclear Armaments Race

By Ernest Harsch

[*Second of two articles.*]

The development of the technology required to produce the first atomic bomb took billions of dollars and a number of years of intense effort. The training of scientists and technicians in a field that was uncharted except in broad theory, the development of new materials, and the working out of enormously difficult techniques demanded a mobilization of forces that put even a power as industrially advanced as the United States to the test.

In the first years after it had the bomb, Washington jealously attempted to keep this new knowledge secret. It was the key to conquest of the world!

Moscow acquired its atomic bomb by duplicating much of the same research that Washington had conducted. When Washington's monopoly on nuclear weapons was thus broken, the "secret" was likewise disclosed. Much of the information on the technology was finally declassified, making it available to scientists in other countries and to power companies in the United States, which began to conduct their own research

into nuclear reactors. There are now thousands of scientists and engineers around the world who know how to make a simple nuclear bomb.

Today it is no longer necessary for a country to invest vast sums into research; they can bypass many of the early stages of nuclear development. In an article in the June 1970 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* surveying the history of atomic weapons, Ralph E. Lapp pointed out that the Chinese nuclear scientists skipped an extensive phase of research and development of fission reactions and moved quickly into the field of thermonuclear reactions and weapons. Thus Peking, in its sixth nuclear test, exploded a hydrogen bomb on June 17, 1967—less than three years after its first fission bomb. It took Washington more than seven years, from July 1945 to November 1952, to accomplish the same feat.

According to an article in the July 14 *New York Times* by Paul L. Leventhal, the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission conducted a secret study to determine whether two physics graduates with doctorate degrees could design an atomic bomb from current

literature that was publicly available. They succeeded in designing a fission bomb that would have exploded, according to the AEC experts, with a force within 10 percent of that predicted by the students.

Concomitantly with the spread of nuclear technology to large parts of the world, the use of nuclear power reactors has been increasing outside the United States. Sold by Westinghouse, General Electric, and other companies, these reactors bring more plutonium into world circulation and increase the ease of weapons proliferation.¹

Speaking at the Tenth International Pugwash Symposium² in June

1. The increased use of nuclear reactors without safe methods of disposing of the radioactive wastes also presents an acute ecological danger. Plutonium is the most poisonous substance known; one thirty-millionth of an ounce, swallowed or inhaled, can cause death. It has a radioactive half-life of 23,640 years and retains its toxicity for at least 100,000 years. Uranium-235, which is used as fuel in fission reactors, has a half-life of 710 million years.

2. The Pugwash Symposium on the "Im-

1970, Bernard T. Feld, a professor of physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and one of the scientists who worked on the first atomic bomb, declared, "It is now contemplated that by 1985 or 1990 approximately 50 percent of all power will be derived from nuclear power sources. It is, indeed, expected that the main source of power for most of the developing nations will come from this source."

Bombs on the Cheap

The greater availability of nuclear technology and materials has driven the costs of nuclear development down considerably, bringing nuclear energy within the reach of relatively underdeveloped countries like India.

A report in the May 1946 *Congressional Digest* outlined the costs of the U. S. nuclear energy program up to the time of the first bomb. The costs for research and the construction of a gaseous-diffusion plant to separate the U-235 from natural uranium, construction of an electromagnetic plant, metallurgical laboratories, a plutonium purification plant, and the Los Alamos research center were admitted to amount to \$1,924 million. (With the value of the U. S. dollar being cut in half since then by inflation, the costs in 1974 terms would be about twice that amount.)

The expenses for India's nuclear program were significantly less. From 1969 to 1974, New Delhi spent \$173 million for "research, design, and development" through its Department of Atomic Energy. The projection for the next five years is \$315 million.

When the Canadian government announced it was cutting off nuclear aid to India, it claimed that New Delhi had spent "tens or hundreds of millions of dollars" for the nuclear device that it exploded. The Canadian estimate was grossly exaggerated.

Writing in the January 1970 *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, George Quester reported: "The 1968 Report of the U. N. Secretary General generally estimated the cost of a moderate

pace of New Technology on the Arms Race" was part of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. The first conference was held in 1957 in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, after Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein, and others issued a call to scientists around the world to discuss the dangers of nuclear warfare.

program, intended to produce ten Nagasaki-sized [20 kiloton] bombs yearly, at less than 2 million dollars per warhead. It has even been suggested that this warhead estimation exaggerates the costs for an Indian project, now that streams of plutonium are circulating within the system, with a separation plant in operation."

The actual cost may even have been less than the UN estimate. According to a report in the May 25 *Bombay Economic and Political Weekly*, the costs of New Delhi's first nuclear device were in the range of 6.5 million rupees (US\$832,000) to 10 million rupees (US\$1,280,000). If New Delhi were planning a series of tests, the report continued, the costs per test would drop even more.

When U. S. Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger was with the Rand Corporation in 1967, he wrote an article on nuclear proliferation that appeared in the autumn 1967 issue of the *Yale Review*. In it he estimated that a "limited" nuclear capacity for regional purposes, including atomic warheads, a delivery system, and the related industries, would cost about \$200 million per year.

Leonard Benton, a British nuclear weapons specialist, estimated that a "modest" thermonuclear (hydrogen bomb) capacity would cost about \$300 million per year.

The Iranian regime, which has already spent thousands of millions of dollars on "conventional" weapons, could conceivably afford such a regional nuclear capacity without much undue strain.

The development of new techniques will make it even easier for a small state to obtain atomic weapons. For instance, a gaseous-diffusion plant, which separates U-235 from natural uranium, is enormous in size and complexity, costing about \$2,000 million.

As John McPhee noted in *The Curve of Binding Energy*: "The complexity of gaseous diffusion has importantly helped to confine the spread of nuclear weapons. Anybody could get hold of uranium, but it was another matter to get hold of a gaseous-diffusion plant. The development of other methods of isotopic separation has weakened that barricade, and there is a possibility now that it has broken down altogether."

One of the new methods, which uses centrifuges to separate the lighter U-235 from the heavier U-238, is rela-

tively inexpensive and compact. In addition, a centrifuge plant designed for the production of low-enriched uranium for nuclear reactors can easily be converted to the production of the highly enriched uranium used in weapons.

The new breeder reactors, which are scheduled to begin production on a broad scale within a decade, actually produce more plutonium than they consume. The U. S. Atomic Energy Commission estimates that by the end of the century, 2,000 new reactors will be in operation, most of them breeder reactors. That many reactors would produce more than 2 million pounds of plutonium per year.

Another "advance" in the development of nuclear technology is the research conducted into the laser-triggering of thermonuclear reactions. In a thermonuclear bomb, tremendous amounts of heat are used to fuse two isotopes of hydrogen, releasing far more energy than the splitting of uranium atoms. In the hydrogen bombs used today, this heat is produced by a fission reaction. Laser-triggering can conceivably produce enough heat by itself to fuse the hydrogen, thus making both uranium and plutonium unnecessary to set off the explosion.

P. L. Olgaard, speaking at the Pugwash Symposium, said: "Research projects exist today which are directed towards the use of laser-triggered thermonuclear reactions for peaceful power production, and the techniques used here are very similar to those used in weapon development."

'Disruption of Nuclear Strategies'

The gradual spread of nuclear weapons and the even greater proliferation to come undoubtedly disturb the U. S. ruling class. In his *Yale Review* article, Schlesinger pointed out the dangers that proliferation might hold for the status quo.

"From the American standpoint," he wrote, "nuclear spread could lead to the disruption of nuclear strategies, to the political unsettlement of Europe, to the diversion of resources with a corresponding decrease in military security in Europe and along the Chinese periphery, to instability in third areas of the world which we would prefer to be serene, and finally, to an added risk, however minimal, of

a small-scale attack on the United States. . . . Our continuing efforts to impose stability on unsettled areas would entail additional risks if any of these countries acquired regional [nuclear] capabilities."

He went on to discuss the necessity of trying to control the spread of nuclear technology and materials. "A policy of denying the equipment and facilities that could be used in weapons programs may be feasible for these less advanced states," he said.

Schlesinger's suggestion was not a new one. Nor would it have much more chance of success than the first time it was proposed in 1946 under the name of the Baruch Plan. That plan called for the formation of an International Atomic Development Authority attached to the Security Council of the United Nations, but in actuality under the exclusive control of U. S. and British imperialism. The plan proposed that this body maintain ownership over all nuclear raw materials or at least maintain control over them; have exclusive powers over the construction and operation of reactors, power plants, and nuclear stockpiles; and have the right to "inspect" facilities at any time and impose penalties up to and including the use of armed force for any violations.

In December 1946 the Baruch Plan was blocked in the United Nations Security Council by the Soviet delegation,³ and subsequent schemes did not give Washington the kind of control it would have liked. The International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today, while applying "inspection" provisions similar to those under the Baruch Plan, relies by and large on voluntary cooperation.

In 1963, Washington and Moscow signed a partial test-ban treaty that prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, and underwater. Neither Paris nor Peking signed the treaty and have continued to set off explosions in the air. The ban did not apply to tests underground; and, since the conclusion of the treaty, Washington has conducted 255 underground nuclear tests.

At their summit meeting in Moscow in July, Nixon and Brezhnev agreed on a partial ban on underground nuclear tests. But since neither side wished to cease tests entirely, only explosions above 150 kilotons were prohibited—effective in March 1976. This gives both sides ample time to finish any tests they still plan and does not apply at all to "peaceful" nuclear tests above the threshold mark.

In 1968, Washington and Moscow signed the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, pledging each side to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. As the May 19 *New York Times* noted: "India was opposed to that treaty and never signed it. New Delhi viewed the treaty as a one-way bargain for the nuclear superpowers. Her principal objection to the pact is that it does not prevent the nuclear powers from further developing their nuclear arsenals."

No Genuine Safeguards

The IAEA nonproliferation "safeguards" attached to the nuclear facilities sold by Washington, Moscow, and London may make it more difficult for a regime to obtain weapons-grade nuclear materials (if it does not already have other sources) but not impossible.

Inspection usually takes place during refueling when the fuel rods are taken out of the reactor to a chemical reprocessing plant for separation of the plutonium. As John W. Finney reported in the July 5 *New York Times*, "Even with the best of control procedures, a small fraction of the plutonium could probably not be accounted for at the end of the chemical separation process, and if large quan-

ties of plutonium are being processed, even a fraction of the unaccounted material could be significant."

Such small amounts of clandestinely diverted plutonium would not be very useful in the actual production of nuclear weapons; but they could be fruitfully used in nuclear research, giving a regime extra time to develop its technology before it decided to push more openly for nuclear weapons.

But even if diversion of plutonium were discovered by the inspectors, the IAEA is virtually powerless to penalize the offending regime beyond the point of calling for an embargo on nuclear supplies to it.

The effectiveness of "safeguards" is also dependent on the political situation within a country. "Arms control officials note," Finney continued, "that adherence to the nonproliferation treaty is not necessarily a guarantee that some nation, perhaps after a coup or change of government, would not renounce it and attempt to use the fissionable materials in its possession to manufacture weapons. . . ."

"Officials also point out that abrogation of a treaty would be a provocative act, risking military or economic reprisals by other nations."

Whether Washington attempted to intervene militarily against a state that began building nuclear weapons would probably depend on the specific instance: whether it saw that state as a threat to its interests, whether the political climate within the United States made it possible, and whether such an act might draw the active opposition of another nuclear power, such as Moscow or Peking.

But however Washington attempts to handle the specific instances of proliferation, the overall situation has been long out of its control and will continue to get more and more out of its control as the use of nuclear energy and plutonium skyrockets in the next decade.

A New Imponderable

The emergence of even several new states with regional nuclear capabilities could greatly alter the relationships between those countries and the established nuclear powers, not to mention the countries having no nuclear weapons. The ability of one semi-colonial regime to completely obliterate another introduces a new imponderable into world politics.

3. The Baruch Plan was also a crude attempt by Wall Street to breach the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade and reintroduce private ownership into a sector of the Soviet economy. This was pointed out by M. Malik, the Soviet delegate to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, more than two years later. Speaking at the May 25, 1949, meeting of the commission, he said: "The proposal to set up an agency which would own and manage all undertakings in any way, even remotely, connected with the production of atomic energy is, as the authors of the Baruch Plan must have known, contrary to article 5 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which states that the socialist system of economy and socialist ownership of the means of production constitute the economic foundation of the Soviet State or, in other words, the basis of the economic sovereignty of the peoples of the Soviet Union." (Official Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, May 25, 1949.)

As Mason Willrich noted in the March 1967 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*: "Even if we achieve both a nonproliferation treaty and international safeguards on civil nuclear industry, the spread of power reactors and plutonium production capacity around the world will create new conditions in the game of nuclear power politics. Moreover, the game will be open to a new group of players."

The most immediate effect of the moves toward nuclear proliferation, even before more regimes develop nuclear weapons systems, will be to escalate the regional "conventional" arms races. Islamabad, for instance, whether it is successful in obtaining nuclear aid and "protection" or not, will most likely attempt to strengthen its present military apparatus before New Delhi is capable of launching nuclear warheads against it. The Arab regimes, in the face of Israel's small but growing nuclear strength, will undoubtedly do likewise.

The major suppliers of these "conventional" weapons, as in the case of nuclear technology, will be Washington and Moscow, and to a lesser degree, the other established nuclear powers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in a 1971 report entitled "The Arms Trade With the Third World," Moscow and Washington "accounted for about two-thirds of total deliveries" of "major weapons" to the underdeveloped countries between 1950 and 1970. The combined figure for Washington, Moscow, Paris, and London in 1969 stood at 95 percent.

In an article in the spring 1972 issue of *Foreign Policy*, Colin S. Gray, the executive secretary of the Strategic Studies Commission of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, pointed out that most experts on the arms trade believe that a buyers' market is rapidly developing internationally; that is, if a regime is unable to obtain its weapons from the major powers, many other states are now willing to supply them. As more and more countries acquire nuclear facilities and weapons, that will also apply to nuclear technology.

The ability of international capital to control any aspect of the arms race, either conventional or nuclear, is almost nil. As long as it has interests to protect, against revolution or capitalist competition, it will continue to

churn out weapons on a grand scale. The production and sale of weapons to other countries, in fact, is an important item in capitalist trade.

A similar profit motive plays a significant role in the spread of nuclear technology. The sale of French nuclear reactors to Tehran will go a long way toward easing Paris's balance of payments deficit.

The spread of nuclear weapons to other countries; the development of regional strike capabilities by such powers as the Indian, Israeli, South African, and Iranian regimes; the proliferation of fingers on the nuclear trigger—all increase the chances of nuclear war breaking out in some part of the world. Such "local" nuclear conflicts could quite easily draw in the nuclear superpowers and engulf the globe in a third world war.

But the ultimate responsibility for a worldwide arms race and a nuclear holocaust rests with Washington,

which, in its determination to defend and expand its economic interests around the world, has set the pace for weapons proliferation.

In the June 1974 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, the first issue after New Delhi's nuclear explosion, Samuel H. Day Jr. indicated where the real danger of a third world war lies:

"India, regrettably, has added to the world's risk; but if nuclear holocaust comes it is not likely to descend from Indian warheads or from nuclear tipped missiles of other new club members who may be tempted to follow her lead. A greater threat still comes from the proliferating weaponry of the older members of the nuclear club. These weapons, deployed by the tens of thousands around the world by the five established nuclear powers, chiefly the United States and the Soviet Union, are still growing daily in quantity and quality." □

¿Puede Caramanlis 'Salvar' la Situación en Grecia?

Alegría de las Masas por la Caída de la Junta

Por Gerry Foley

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Greek Masses Rejoice Over Collapse of the Junta", que aparece en este mismo número de *Intercontinental Press*].

* * *

"En vista de las circunstancias excepcionales por las que atraviesa el país, las fuerzas armadas griegas han decidido regresar el poder a un gobierno político". Con este breve anuncio, el 23 de julio la Junta se retiró del centro de la escena a los bastidores.

"Atenas se transformó inmediatamente", informó Eric Rouleau en el diario parisino *Le Monde* el 25 de julio. "Los automovilistas dieron la señal para que comenzara el carnaval. Los coros de voces que gritaban las noticias abotagaron, desplegaron, sumergieron la ciudad, que respondió con irresistible felicidad. Las campanas de las iglesias comenzaron a doblar. Las banderas se agitaban en las ventanillas de los

automóviles y autobuses, y en los balcones de los edificios. Los peatones corrian por todas partes. Se reían a carcajadas. Se felicitaban unos a otros y se daban la mano; se abrazaban largamente. En las caras exhaustas, las lágrimas escurrían por las mejillas. . .

"Decenas de miles de manifestantes, en su mayoría jóvenes, así como trabajadores, gritaban su odio y su sed de venganza. Algunos de ellos—aquí un obrero en traje de trabajo, allá una joven con vestido de primavera—eran cargados en hombros por sus compañeros para que hablaran a la multitud. Hablando entusiastamente y gesticulando, comenzaban a gritar consignas que luego coreaba la multitud: 'La SA [Stratiotike Astinomia—policía militar] es la SS'. El General Ioannides, conocido como 'el torturador', era el jefe de la policía militar. Otras consignas eran: '¡Cuelguen a la Junta!' '¡Fusilen a los generales!' '¡Muera Ioannides!'"

Desde que comenzó la crisis de Chipre, Washington estaba decidido a

defender a la Junta hasta donde pudiera. Esto resultó imposible, sin embargo, después de que Turquía invadió la disputada isla. Pronto resultó evidente que si la Junta lanzaba el país a una guerra contra Turquía, se detonaría rápidamente una explosión social en Grecia, que podría derribar no sólo a la Junta, sino al mismo sistema capitalista.

Aunque los generales hayan o no sido presionados por Washington para que renunciaran, como algunos especulan, estaban ansiosos por conseguir quien los relevara. Llamaron por teléfono a Constantine Caramanlis, que estaba exilado en París, y le dijeron que empacara y tomara un avión para Atenas—pero rápido. "Le dijeron que no tenían otra solución. Estaban desesperados. Decían que los militares ya no podían con el trabajo", dijo uno de los ayudantes de Caramanlis a Alvin Shuster, corresponsal del *New York Times* (25 de julio).

Shuster también informaba sobre rumores de que un golpe de estado tras bambalinas del General Ioannis Davos había obligado a la Junta a renunciar. *Le Monde* publicó el 25 de julio extractos de una declaración con fecha 21 de julio firmada por 200 oficiales del Tercer Cuerpo de Ejército, en la que se llamaba a la Junta a que diera el poder a Caramanlis.

Si bien la maniobra de Davos fue probablemente un factor para que la Junta se retirara, la fuerza motriz decisiva fue la presión del pueblo griego.

"Hoy, una multitud furiosa buscaba a los que habían apoyado al anterior gobierno militar", informó el 24 de julio el *Washington Post*. "Algunos jóvenes atacaron a miembros de la policía de seguridad y de la policía militar, que constituyeron la base del poder de Ioannides.

"Al grito de 'cochinos fascistas' una banda de jóvenes fue vista pateando y golpeando un jeep lleno de policías militares, que tuvieron que ser rescatados por policías regulares".

El 25 de julio en *Le Monde*, Rouleau escribió: "La compacta y majestuosa ola humana convergió en la Plaza de la Constitución antes de avanzar a los otros puntos de reunión en la capital, principalmente la plaza Omonia. Se estrelló contra autobuses que estaban atravesados en las calles e hileras de policías que la contenían antes de hacerla retroceder lentamente.

'Quitense', gritaba la multitud a las fuerzas del orden, que rara vez habían mostrado tanta restricción y tacto. Policías uniformados y de civil, con heladas sonrisas, pretendían no escuchar los insultos".

La caída del gobierno militar, señalaba Rouleau, produjo una explosión de odio contra el Pentágono y el Departamento de Estado por haber conspirado con la Junta.

En cuanto a Washington, si bien parecía conformarse con tener que aceptar una cierta "apertura democrática" en Grecia y con correr los riesgos políticos que ésta implicaba, esperaba, obviamente, que la rápida designación de un relevo para la Junta salvaría la situación.

Cuando se le preguntó en el Senado de los Estados Unidos si los militares seguían dominando tras la caída del nuevo gobierno civil, el Secretario de Estado Kissinger dijo: "Tenemos la impresión de que con el regreso a la autoridad civil en Grecia, el ejército no jugará un papel tan dominante como en años recientes".

Después de una reunión-desayuno que tuvo con los miembros del Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado, Kissinger dijo a los reporteros que las figuras del nuevo gobierno griego son "nuestros viejos amigos".

Caramanlis presidió de 1955 a 1963 un régimen que se basó en la aplastante derrota que sufrieron los trabajadores y campesinos pobres griegos en batallas campales. Mantuvo su dominio a través de fórmulas parlamentarias, al mismo tiempo que llevaba a cabo una severa represión contra la izquierda y el movimiento obrero. El historial del mismo Caramanlis ha sido limpiado, algo parecido a Nixon durante su primer periodo como presidente. Casi todos han olvidado que el régimen anterior que encabezó Caramanlis se derrumbó principalmente a causa de un creciente escándalo sobre juegos sucios en las elecciones de 1961.

Debido a los violentos métodos de control de la Junta, incluso figuras burguesas conservadoras como Evangelos Averoff y Caramanlis pueden decir que sufrieron bajo la dictadura. En el clima de control militar anti-parlamentario, algunas figuras burguesas, como Giorgios Mavros, miembro de la liberal Enosis tou Kentrou [Unión del Centro] y ministro de relaciones exteriores del

nuevo gobierno, salió en defensa de los obreros y estudiantes que manifestaban en las calles en noviembre de 1973 y protestó contra la represión ejercida por la Junta.

Excluidas del gobierno por una camarilla militar de puño de hierro, figuras burguesas como éstas tuvieron que identificarse con la lucha contra la dictadura para mantener alguna credibilidad política. Esperaban que la lucha de estudiantes y obreros forzaría a los militares a retirarse y a recurrir a los servicios de los negociadores y parlamentarios burgueses.

Sin embargo, Caramanlis ha tomado las riendas del gobierno en condiciones muy diferentes de las que prevalecían cuando encabezó el régimen de la consolidación capitalista en la década de los 50. Ahora, los que reprimieron a los obreros y a las masas están a la retirada y no a la ofensiva, y su retirada tiene la apariencia de un vuelo temerario.

Caramanlis, el caudillo burgués que cerró las puertas de las prisiones a las víctimas de la guerra civil y de la represión que la siguió, ha tenido que abrir ahora las puertas de los campos de concentración de la Junta.

Más aún, la autoridad política de Caramanlis parece ser débil, al menos entre los sectores con más conciencia de clase de las masas griegas, y por tanto es muy dudoso que pueda controlarlas por mucho tiempo con puras promesas.

"Muchas consignas repetían el mismo tema", escribió Rouleau en *Le Monde* el 25 de julio. "¡No queremos otra Junta a cambio de la vieja! ¡Exigimos un nuevo gobierno que represente a todos los partidos! ¡Obreros, campesinos, estudiantes—todos unidos! ¡Pan, educación y libertad! [la consigna de la rebelión de noviembre] ¡El fascismo debe morir hoy!""

Las masas que se movilizaron en las manifestaciones, por lo tanto, no parecían estar dispuestas a considerar realmente a Caramanlis como su salvador, no importa cuáles sean sus ilusiones en la democracia parlamentaria o en las coaliciones frentepopulistas. "Sorprendentemente", escribió Rouleau, "la multitud no coreaba su nombre [de Caramanlis], ni el de ninguno de los políticos que están a su alrededor".

Todos los periódicos burgueses de Atenas, sin embargo, retrataban al "Eisenhower griego" como el héroe del

momento. El periódico conservador *Vradyni*, que reapareció después de que hace algunos meses fue cerrado por la Junta, tenía el siguiente titular gigante en su edición del 24 de julio: "UN GOBIERNO DE CARAMANLIS". Su reportaje fotográfico se centraba en los grupos que llevaban el retrato del antiguo caudillo parlamentario y la bandera nacional griega.

El diario chovinista *Apogevmatini* publicó el 24 de julio una caricatura en la que se mostraba a Caramanlis limpiando la suciedad acumulada. En ese mismo periódico, había una fotografía de un grupo de soldados griegos ilustrando un artículo titulado "Condenan las Atrocidades Turcas". El titular de la fotografía era "Dispuestos para el Supremo Deber".

El pie de la fotografía decía: "Los que corren a decir 'presente' al llamado de la patria son inmortalizados con sonrisas en los labios. Portando el honrado uniforme de los soldados griegos, muestran su determinación de dar la vida por la patria".

Otros periódicos sugerían que ahora que ha sido restaurado un gobierno "democrático", habría mayor "unidad nacional" de todos los griegos contra los turcos.

La burguesía, por tanto, parecía tener esperanzas de que el régimen "democrático" pudiera lograr lo que la Junta no pudo: movilizar al pueblo griego para la guerra contra Turquía. Esto ilustra el peligro que corre la izquierda griega si permite que se consolide Caramanlis. Este tratará de utilizar la ofensiva turca para establecer un régimen burgués de "unión nacional" basado en el chovinismo reaccionario.

Si Caramanlis puede establecer un gobierno fuerte, es seguro que habrá un retorno a la represión relativamente rápido. Todas las fuerzas sociales reaccionarias que crearon la dictadura militar, así como todo el aparato que la mantuvo durante siete años, siguen intactas.

"Los militares todavía tienen el dedo en el gatillo", escribió Gaetano Scardocchia en el diario de Milán *Corriere della Sera* el 26 de julio. "Se han retirado hacia la oscuridad, pero no han sido arrestados. La competencia entre los pretorianos y los políticos continúa todavía".

El nuevo gobierno, lo que es más, obviamente no está ofreciendo más libertades políticas que las que se le están arrancando. Averoff dijo a Scardocchia: "Respetaremos las manifestaciones públicas razonables, pero intervendremos si éstas tienen el objeto de provocar desórdenes".

Algunos periódicos burgueses de varios países han especulado que la experiencia de la dictadura militar podría "reprimir" al pueblo griego y hacerlo menos inclinado a participar en movilizaciones militantes como las que precedieron a la caída del último gobierno parlamentario. El 25 de julio, *Le Monde* escribió en su editorial que el país "había madurado" en la adversidad y que esto "debería facilitar el regreso a la democracia".

Sin embargo, no es muy probable que el pueblo griego deposite su confianza en los mismos políticos que crearon la situación que llevó al golpe de estado y que después demostraron ser incapaces de combatir la dictadura militar. Sabe, lo que es más, que lo que realmente destruyó a la Junta fue la acción de los heroicos estudiantes y obreros que se alzaron en noviembre de 1973. Los ataques turcos sólo dieron el golpe de gracia a un régimen de por sí agonizante.

Hay muy pocas probabilidades de que Caramanlis pueda hacer que funcione este "frente nacional" si no cuenta con la ayuda de las mismas fuerzas a las que persiguió el gobierno griego en la década de los 50. Es muy probable que el éxito de su régimen dependa de la posición que tengan estas fuerzas entre los trabajadores griegos.

"El Partido Comunista (que tiene una línea política muy cercana a la del PC italiano) lanzó un comunicado hoy", informó Scardocchia en *Corriere della Sera* el 26 de julio, "en el que llamaba a la formación de un 'verdadero gobierno de unidad nacional' y observaba que para resolver sus graves problemas políticos y económicos, Grecia necesita la 'unión de todas las fuerzas populares'".

Ambas fracciones del Partido Comunista de Grecia han llamado a una "solución portuguesa" en Grecia.

El ejemplo de Portugal está también muy presente en las mentes de los observadores burgueses. En un editorial del 26 de julio, por ejemplo, el diario bostoniano *Christian Science Monitor* trataba de comparar

la situación en Grecia con el proceso, que consideraba que a veces resulta perturbador, de Portugal. Algunos aspectos del cambio en Grecia parecían más prometedores, desde el punto de vista de este periódico burgués: "A diferencia de Portugal, donde toda la actividad política había estado suprimida por mucho tiempo, Grecia tenía partidos y personajes políticos que estaban preparados para entrar en acción una vez que desaparecieran las trabas que les imponían los coroneles".

El único problema, continuaba el editorial, era que estos políticos estaban "ampliamente desacreditados" por la crisis que condujo al golpe del 21 de abril de 1967. De hecho, la misma experiencia del régimen parlamentario en Grecia podría hacer que el proceso de liberalización resultara todavía más explosivo que en Portugal. Como su contraparte del otro lado del Mediterráneo, los capitalistas griegos se vieron forzados a retirar el régimen dictatorial por la urgente necesidad que tenían de encontrar nuevos medios para ejercer su control. Pero el cambio en Portugal no ocurrió como consecuencia directa de acciones de masas. En Grecia, la espectacular insurrección de noviembre condenó al régimen.

En Portugal, el Partido Comunista ha sido perseguido casi toda su existencia, y era conocido por las masas por la victimización de que era objeto por parte del régimen dictatorial. En Grecia, el Partido Comunista ha sido una organización de masas y una de las principales fuerzas políticas durante décadas. Las masas han pasado por varias experiencias de traiciones stalinistas. Y en noviembre pasado las grandes manifestaciones callejeras sobrepasaron esencialmente a las dos fracciones del Partido Comunista.

Si las fuerzas represivas no han sufrido todavía golpes como los que recibieron en Portugal, las movilizaciones de masas, como la que siguió a la renuncia de la Junta, pueden ponerlas en ese camino en cuestión de días, si no se les da tiempo para recuperar la moral y la confianza.

El hecho mismo de que la caída de la dictadura en Atenas haya seguido en tan poco tiempo al derrumbe de la dictadura reaccionaria más antigua de la región mediterránea, aumentará la confianza de las masas griegas

y les dará más decisión para erradicar todo el aparato de represión. Lo que es más, en vista de la lucha de los trabajadores italianos que sigue en pie y el descontento permanente que hay en España conforme decae el régimen fascista, todo el sur de Europa parece estar en un fermento que hace posibles grandes avances.

El hecho de que Ankara esté tratando de aprovechar la presente debilidad de su viejo rival burgués, crea problemas inmediatos al movimiento obrero griego. Pero esta presión también debilita la posición de la clase dominante griega con respecto a las masas, como lo han reconocido Washington y Londres. Es por esto que han estado advirtiendo a Ankara que debe refrenarse. Más aún, el régimen turco puede debilitar su propia posición con esta aventura.

"El chico bueno que sufre a causa de la crisis", escribió el columnista

del *Washington Post* Joseph Kraft el 25 de julio, "es el primer ministro turco Bulent Ecevit. La fuerza invasora que enviaron los turcos a Chipre inmediatamente después de que Makarios había sido obligado a abandonar la isla, no obtuvo un éxito militar.

"Aunque la invasión fue lanzada bajo la presión de las fuerzas armadas turcas, es posible que el Sr. Ecevit tenga que pagar el precio de esta poco gloriosa aventura".

Una movilización revolucionaria de masas en Grecia crearía una radicalización explosiva en todo el sur de Europa, incluida Turquía. Esta es la única fuerza, lo que es más, que podría salvar a las comunidades griega y turca de Chipre de un conflicto del que sólo saldrán beneficiados los contendientes regimenes burgueses de Grecia y Turquía y sus amos imperialistas. □

Causada por la Impaciencia de la Derecha

Primera Crisis del Gabinete en Portugal

Por Hugo Blanco

Lisboa

El régimen burgués de Portugal había entrado en un período de relativa estabilidad, después de que el ascenso de masas desencadenado el 25 de abril hubo sido contenido por el Partido Comunista.

El apresuramiento de la derecha ha producido ciertos cambios en la situación política que, aunque no son profundos, nos sirven para preveer el advenimiento de acontecimientos políticos más importantes, pues la crisis estructural del capitalismo portugués se agudiza en una crisis coyuntural difícil de resolver. Hay intereses políticos conectados con esos problemas, que agravan las contradicciones:

Los sectores más fuertes del capitalismo, que apoyaron el golpe, no se sintieron muy afectados por los aumentos salariales y por algunas conquistas más obtenidas por los trabajadores. Pero sí les afectaba la forma cómo eran obtenidas esas conquistas: "por el clima de inseguridad" producido por las movilizaciones de masas, que causa "retraimiento de las

inversiones", "desconfianza". Además, les preocupaba que "los aumentos de salarios no se reflejan en una elevación del consumo", desean "que las personas no guarden el dinero en la gaveta, que consuman, gasten, para crear aumentos de consumo que se reflejen en aumentos de producción, en la dinamización de la vida económica".

Por eso el derechista ex-primer ministro Palma Carlos exigía más poder, fundamentalmente más poder represivo, ya que no tenía libertad de acción en el gabinete de coalición: "Yo no puedo transigir con la situación en que nos encontramos: desórdenes en las calles, indisciplina social, perturbaciones en los periódicos, funcionarios públicos que invaden edificios públicos como éste, donde hace dos o tres días algunos ministros no pudieron salir sino hasta las once de la noche. Todo esto es un clima de indisciplina, enteramente contradictorio con mi temperamento, con mis ideas de lo que es la democracia".

En las últimas semanas, después de la promulgación de la ley de pren-

sa, el avance de la derecha tuvo otras manifestaciones:

Los días 25 y 26 de julio fueron arrestados los milicianos Marvão y Anjos por rehusarse a reprimir a los trabajadores postales.

El día 6 de julio fueron arrestados tres milicianos por apoyar al PAIGC [Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde].

El 9 de julio se impidió una manifestación anticolonial con despliegue armado.

Se han impuesto multas a los diarios *A Capital* y *República* por informar acerca de esa manifestación.

El nombramiento de Vega Simão (ministro de educación en la época de Caetano) como representante ante la ONU.

Y, por último, el discurso de Spínola al Cuerpo de Fusileros del Continente (miembros de la Armada). Ese discurso pronunciado durante la crisis del gabinete, el día 11 de julio, tuvo un tono marcadamente derechista: "Recuerdo aquí el Africa de antaño, donde nos llevaron los marineros. Fueron ellos quienes, dejando sus navios, se internaron en los matorrales africanos con la artillería, la caballería y la infantería, escribiendo en la historia del mundo de entonces las más brillantes páginas de que se puede enorgullecer una Patria . . . Es lo que me ocurre decir con el corazón sangrante, en este momento de desorientación y de inversión de valores; valores que tantas veces he visto gravemente cuestionados, confundándose héroes con traidores y olvidándose de la historia, de nuestros mayores, de la sangre generosamente derramada por nuestros hermanos de armas en la defensa de la Patria . . .

"Estoy seguro de que, tal como en los matorrales de Guinea, no volveréis la cara, pues esta vez es la Madre Patria la que está siendo cuestionada".

Lástima para él que los marinos no lo recibieron con un himno patriótico, sino con los sones de "Grandola Vila Morena", canción inspirada en los levantamientos populares que tomaron puestos de la Guardia Nacional, y que se convirtió en el símbolo del 25 de abril.

POLITICA DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA

El PC se dió a la tarea de jugar el papel de abogado de las empre-

sas medianas y pequeñas que habían quedado desamparadas con la caída de Caetano.

Para esto propone la nacionalización de los bancos (que, al parecer, si se va a efectuar) porque éstos sólo conceden préstamos a los grandes consorcios a los cuales están ligados. También aboga por la subvención a la industria de la construcción, a la industria turística y a otras empresas medianas o pequeñas que están en crisis.

Además, pide "un rápido desarrollo de las relaciones con la URSS y otros países socialistas".

El eje de su política había sido frenar el movimiento de masas, hasta que llegó un punto en que su propia seguridad estaba en peligro ante el avance de la derecha. Entonces dió uno de los virajes a los que nos tiene tan acostumbrados a nivel mundial: ahora dice que "el peligro principal viene de la derecha". Defiende y hasta impulsa las reclamaciones de los trabajadores contra los despidos "sin causa justificada". Impulsa el saneamiento (cambio de las autoridades caetanistas) en el campo, aunque en forma burocrática. Mediante la Unión Nacional de Estudiantes Portugueses — intento de centro estudiantil — promueve campañas de "alfabetización y concientización en el campo".

RENUNCIA EL PRIMER MINISTRO

Además de las razones económicas señaladas, el apresuramiento de la derecha se debió a razones políticas en las que también es importante el factor tiempo: cuanto más pasa el tiempo, más va declinando el prestigio de la figura de Spínola, y las masas comienzan a diferenciar entre los distintos sectores que estuvieron a favor del golpe.

De ahí surgen "los tres puntos de Palma Carlos":

— Adelantar la elección del Presidente de la República.

— Posponer las elecciones legislativas hasta 1976 y que se cree una constitución provisoria que rija hasta entonces.

— Reforzar los poderes del Primer Ministro (o sea él).

El Consejo de Estado (formado por miembros de la Junta, miembros del Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas

y "personalidades") rechazó totalmente los dos primeros puntos y aceptó sólo parcialmente el tercero; pero en una forma que, según Palma Carlos, "da más poderes pero no da el Poder". Se dice que la votación fue de 15 contra 3.

Ante este resultado, el Primer Ministro renunció y luego se solidarizaron con él otros cuatro: el Ministro de Defensa, teniente coronel Mario Firmino Miguel; el de Coordinación Económica, Vasco Vieira de Almei-



SPINOLA

da; el de Administración Interna, Magalhães Mota, y Sá Carneiro, Ministro sin cartera adjunto al Primer Ministro. Los dos últimos son del Partido Popular Democrático.

Luego fue "exonerado" todo el gabinete, se habló de que Firmino Miguel sería el próximo Primer Ministro. Pero quien fue elegido finalmente fue el coronel Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves, miembro del Consejo de Estado que encabeza la lista de los siete representantes del Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas y que forma parte de la comisión coordinadora de ese movimiento.

Hasta este momento no se conoce la composición del nuevo gabinete; pero, al parecer, va a tener casi el mismo equilibrio de fuerzas que el anterior con el agregado de algunos militares.

EL RESULTADO

Durante varios días, desde antes de la renuncia del Primer Ministro,

habían corrido rumores de que se daría un golpe de estado de derecha encabezado por Spínola. Pero no se produjo un viraje tan brutal.

El programa del Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas se reafirmó. Recordemos que éste es el "movimiento de los capitanes" que hizo el golpe del 25 de abril, y que fueron personas consideradas como representantes de este grupo quienes tomaron la preponderancia en el nuevo gabinete. Otro logro de este movimiento fue el ascenso a Brigadier del Mayor Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho y su nombramiento como jefe del recientemente creado Comando Operacional del Continente y Comandante de la Región Militar de Lisboa.

Otelo Saraiva es "el comandante del 25 de abril", el que condujo las operaciones militares de ese día en que Caetano entregó el poder a Spínola para que "no quedara en la calle", a lo que Spínola contestó que él no comandaba ningún golpe y que tendría que entrar en contacto con los jefes del MFA para preguntarles si ellos lo autorizaban.

Durante la ceremonia de ascenso, el día 13 de julio, Spínola ya no habló de "la inversión de valores", de "los valores que tantas veces he visto gravemente cuestionados", como lo había hecho el día 11 de julio. Esta vez dijo que la ceremonia representaba "una nueva era de vivencia militar en clima renovado, a la luz de nuevos conceptos de selección de valores".

El flamante brigadier dijo que se alegraba porque no era un triunfo de él, sino de sus camaradas del Movimiento, y agregó: "Esperamos que la suerte nos acompañe como hasta ahora, hasta la victoria total que se verificará dentro de un año" (cuando se celebren las elecciones).

El Comando Operacional del Continente (COPCON) fue creado por un decreto de ley del Consejo de Jefes de Estado Mayor, según el cual tiene como misión "intervenir directamente para mantener y restablecer el orden, en apoyo de las autoridades civiles y a su pedido". El comandante es el Jefe de Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas Armadas.

Sin embargo, Otelo Saraiva, el segundo jefe, lo interpreta como "instancia de control operacional a nivel nacional y, simultáneamente, fuerza de intervención destinada a exigir por

la fuerza el cumplimiento del Programa del MFA contra eventuales maniobras reaccionarias".

Será sin duda un instrumento de una política bonapartista que podría ser aprovechado tanto contra la dere-

cha conspiradora y obstruccionista, como contra los sectores obreros más combativos. Pero, al mismo tiempo, está bien claro que la formación de ese cuerpo representa un paso más en la reconstrucción de fuerzas represivas. □

Después del Secuestro de Figueroa

La Guerrilla Sacude Guerrero, México

[A fines de mayo fue secuestrado en el estado de Guerrero (situado en la costa sudoccidental de México) el senador Rubén Figueroa, de 74 años de edad, uno de los políticos clave del Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI—partido que controla el gobierno en México) en ese estado.

[Dos días después de su desaparición, su partido lo nominó candidato a gobernador de Guerrero, lo que equivale a garantizar que sería el futuro gobernante de la entidad.

[Figueroa ha sido durante mucho tiempo presidente de la federación de propietarios de camiones de carga, y él mismo posee varias flotillas.

[El Partido de los Pobres y su Brigada Campesina de Ajusticiamiento, dirigidos por Lucio Cabañas, dicen ser los responsables del secuestro.

[Cabañas, de 34 años de edad, fue por algún tiempo profesor de escuela en Guerrero, y ha participado en las luchas campesinas de ese estado desde los primeros años de la década del 60. Desde 1967, después de un choque violento con las autoridades locales, ha estado en la clandestinidad y luchando en las guerrillas que operan en la Sierra Madre del Sur.

[Participó también en el movimiento guerrillero que encabezaba Genaro Vázquez Rojas, a quien la policía reportó "muerto en un accidente automovilístico", en 1972.

[Aparentemente, el secuestro se produjo cuando Rubén Figueroa acudió a una cita que él había solicitado a Lucio Cabañas, para negociar una "tregua" con las guerrillas. Cabañas había puesto como condición para que se pudiera realizar la entrevista, que se retiraran de la Sierra el ejército y la policía secreta, que patrullan permanentemente esa área. Esta condición no fue cumplida.

[Cuando se supo la noticia del se-

questró, el gobierno de Luis Echeverría declaró que "el pueblo y el gobierno no negocian con criminales", y ordenó al ejército que "rescate" al senador. Según informes aparecidos en la prensa norteamericana, cerca de 16,000 soldados—casi una tercera parte del ejército mexicano—han sido movilizadas en esa área.

[La prensa informa también que durante esta operación el ejército ha invadido diferentes "rancherías" (poblaciones campesinas) y detiene a cualquier persona que porta un arma de fuego, lo que permite suponer que los arrestos han sido numerosos.

[El artículo que reproducimos a continuación fue publicado el 30 de junio en *Bandera Roja*, órgano del Grupo Comunista Internacionalista, una organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional en México].

* * *

La hora que vive el país se define como la hora de Guerrero, la de Lucio Cabañas. Pocas veces después de 1968 y del 10 de junio de 1971, un acontecimiento ha impactado tanto y tan profundamente como el relacionado con el secuestro del senador y candidato a gobernador Rubén Figueroa.

Los matices, los pormenores no se conocen todavía. Pero el hecho ha sido tan aleccionador en muchos aspectos que existen ya algunos temas más o menos aclarados. Con relación a la respuesta del poder, es posible, desde ahora, constatar las divergencias, a veces transformadas en auténticas pugnas a la luz del día. Sin duda, Guerrero representa para el gobierno federal una situación muy peligrosa que comienza a quemarle las manos.

En las cumbres, la respuesta pri-

meramente dada, la correspondiente al secretario de Gobernación, sólo puede considerarse como gorila en el más amplio y preciso sentido de la palabra. Basta comparar la apreciación del propio senador Figueroa, emitida hace unas semanas, sobre Lucio Cabañas con los conceptos ("felonía, inmoralidad", etc.) de Moya Palencia en el Palacio Nacional, para constatar la diferencia entre el aperturismo y el gorilismo desenmascarado. De ninguna forma debe asombrar el estilo de Moya. Recuérdese a Díaz Ordaz [Presidente de México en 1968]. Y en el propio régimen de la "apertura" Echeverría no ha dejado de usar los métodos típicos de la oligarquía gobernante, aunque, hay que reconocerlo, con una sofisticación mayor y engañadora. Sin embargo, no deja de resultar sorprendente el hecho que el estira y afloja futurista entre los diversos ministros-líderes de tendencias y facciones en el poder, sea tan rudo y abierto. Días después, nada menos que Cuenca Díaz, el secretario de "Defensa" Nacional, se encarga de poner en su lugar de subordinado al general en jefe de las tropas de Guerrero. Evidentemente que su incapacidad para detener a Lucio Cabañas la conocían sus superiores. Si de algo debe alardear sería de su tosudez en la persecución de guerrilleros que ha significado que en el estado se viven escenas como las de Vietnam: arrasamiento de territorios, eliminación de poblaciones enteras por el desplazamiento masivo, etc. Pero este general expresa su frustración echándole la culpa a un curso aperturista que en Guerrero está lejos de haberse manifestado en forma más plena. Sin embargo, el hecho de que exista tal resentimiento entre los generales en "acción" es un índice preocupante sobre los vientos que soplan en el ejército. Los centuriones se sienten inconformes, y en su estrechez culpan de sus limitaciones a "políticos".

Esta frustración de los centuriones es una levadura que descompone el tradicional arreglo entre las relaciones de fuerza de los grupos en el poder. Las zancadillas y los golpes bajos han abundado, como clara señal de degradación de las condiciones del dominio bonapartista. El guante populista aperturista, cada vez más deja ver la garra sin más.

Avanzado está ya el grado de descomposición bonapartista. Moya

ha recibido golpes duros cuando, después de su postura tan tajantemente policiaca, sacó demasiado a relucir su dureza. La CNC [Confederación Nacional Campesina], el rector de la Universidad de Guerrero y, ante todo, el poderoso núcleo alrededor de *Excelsior*, contraatacaron fuerte. Desplegaron y propagandizaron las condiciones de subdesarrollo extremo del estado, que propicia el surgimiento de las luchas como las de Cabañas y elogiaron los logros del aperturismo en materia de carreteras y otros rubros. Se anotaron unos puntos. Pero la respuesta no se hizo esperar. Israel Noguera [Gobernador de Guerrero] organizó una manifestación de "desagravio" que después del trabajo de los activistas se le volteó. Conocemos bien el procedimiento usado por los activistas, pues fue exactamente el que permitió que en agosto de 1968, una manifestación parecida organizada por Corona del Rosal [Regente del Distrito Federal en 1968], se volteara contra Díaz Ordaz: llevar la palabra revolucionaria a las masas acarreadas. El saldo fue la brutal agresión a la Universidad de Guerrero.

Responde la "apertura" alarmada por los excesos de los duros. *Excelsior* llega a editorializar las siguientes líneas: "la incompetencia general que ha habido para manejar un asunto tan delicado como el de la *pacificación* de Guerrero, puede asumir condiciones todavía más inquietantes y más turbadoras, si se deja la acción en manos de policías irresponsables" (14 de junio, subrayado nuestro). El más lúcido órgano periodista de la burguesía mexicana reconoce que en Guerrero se vive, por lo menos, en los embriones de la guerra civil; que hay que "pacificar" como en Vietnam, al estado sureño.

Hasta la fecha de este escrito, la izquierda no se había manifestado a excepción del PCM. ¿Qué decir ante la lamentable declaración de la Comisión Ejecutiva del CC que incluye, de entrada, las siguientes líneas: "todo parece indicar que se trata de un acuerdo entre ambos para emprender *negociaciones*"? (subrayado nuestro). "Esta actitud (de conciliación de Figueroa) corresponde a las exigencias de la realidad política que vive el país, y debe ser convertida en comportamiento general del gobierno ante todas las fuerzas políticas". Defini-

tivamente, el león cree que todos son de su condición. El grupo dirigente del PCM que tantas maromas ha dado para hacer valer una pretendida renovación de su pasado reformista y conciliador con la burguesía y su gobierno (cuando apoyó incondicionalmente a Cárdenas, Avila Camacho y Alemán [ex-presidentes de México], cuando, después que Alemán se le volteó, apoyó a Lombardo Toledano [uno de los principales voceros de la "coexistencia pacífica" en México] y, cuando, en su último gran despliegue de gran maniobreo oportunista, creyó encontrar a finales de los cincuenta una palanca de "negociaciones con el gobierno" en el movimiento sindical de esos años, pierde totalmente la moderación y se desenmascara de repente. Básicamente la tradición stalinista de las componendas y la conciliación con el gobierno burgués en que se educó la dirección de Martínez Verdugo [dirigente del PCM], subyace en esta política, crudamente teorizada con la concepción utópica que considera que en México es posible a estas alturas, instaurar una democracia burguesa. Esta idea está plasmada en las frases finales del comunicado: "es ahora la ocasión para acceder a la exigencia de plenos derechos políticos a todos los grupos y corrientes que actúan en la vida política nacional, incluidos aquellos que plantean soluciones más radicales y quienes siguen la táctica guerrillera" (iiii). Esto es equivalente a un llamado a que Cabañas deponga ya las armas, a que entre, con toda la izquierda, a un cuadro de oposición legal y parlamentaria al régimen corrupto, decadente y en plena crisis del bonapartismo mexicano.

No es posible decir cuál será el resultado concreto que a la postre signifique este acontecimiento en el contexto de la pugna interburguesa, si forzará al gorilismo tipo Moya Palencia a avanzar con más decisión, o si los tímidos ministros aperturistas se harán mas valientes. Lo que sí es posible decir es que la acción de los revolucionarios de Guerrero es un golpe más apropiado a la hipocresía aperturista. La sociedad mexicana ha sido trabajada profundamente por un sentimiento político que es cada vez más desfavorable a las formas tradicionales de la manipulación de masas usadas por el gobierno. El "nacionalismo revolucio-

nario" de Echeverría, la "alianza popular" pregonada por sus ministros aperturistas, la "unidad nacional" proclamada por el partido oficial y las promesas democratizadoras de Reyes Heróles [Presidente del PRI], todo ello se vuelve una burbuja en el Estado en que la expoliación y la degradación se han acumulado explosivamente desde 1960, cuando el pueblo de Guerrero tumbó a Caballero Aburto.

¿Cuál unidad nacional en Guerrero? ¿Entre el *jet set* acapulqueño y los habitantes de La Laja y demás colonias proletarias? ¿Entre los coopereros y los representantes mexicanos de la Procter and Gamble, de la Anderson and Clayton y demás multinacionales? ¿Entre el campesino de Tierra Caliente y el grupo de potentados capitalistas como el propio Figueroa? ¿Es que es posible la unidad entre los ejidatarios de la costa chica y los oligarcas políticos convertidos en magnates de la explotación forestal como los hijos de Melchos Ortega (Maderas, Papanoa), como el yerno de Díaz Ordaz (Industria Forestal del Poniente) o como el ex-director y gangster de la Facultad de Derecho, Fernando Ojesto (Director del Complejo Forestal "Vicente Guerrero")?

Con su acción simple y desprovista de toda demagogia, el Partido de los Pobres que encabeza Lucio Cabañas ha puesto el dedo en la llaga: en Guerrero no hay lugar para la "unidad nacional". La conciliación de clases no conduce sino a la abyección y sumisión, tal y como sucedió en Guerrero durante décadas. Genaro Vázquez primero, Lucio Cabañas y sus compañeros después, anunciando la *revolución pobrista* que forjan en la sierra, son los heroicos representantes de la generación revolucionaria guerrerense que unida a la que está surgiendo en los demás estados y a la vanguardia marxista revolucionaria que ya ha consolidado el embrión del partido revolucionario, acabarán con la causa fundamental de los males del pueblo mexicano: el sistema capitalista explotador y su dependencia con el imperialismo. □

P.S. En su último número, *Oposición* [revista del PCM] confirma nuestro análisis, de la posición conciliadora de la dirección comunista. Esta se hace eco de los argumentos sobre la "provocación en que cayó Lucio Cabañas", sobre "los métodos no revoluciona-

rios" que supuestamente éste ha utilizado. No es necesario la especulación, la dirección del PCM no resiste

ni siquiera el inicio de la hora de los hornos en México. Ya lo sabemos, lo hemos dicho desde que el GCI

surgió en 1969 y antes lo habían manifestado los otros grupos trotskistas.

El PC Español Trata de Copiar al PC Portugués

Los Stalinistas Alaban a la Iglesia y al Ejército

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Spanish Stalinists Hail Church, Army", que apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 22 de julio].

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La entrada del Partido Comunista Portugués en el gobierno de "salvación nacional" ha suscitado esperanzas entre los dirigentes del PC español de que puedan jugar ellos un papel similar en su propio país.

Este fue el tema de un acto realizado en Ginebra, Suiza, el 23 de junio, al que asistieron miles de emigrados españoles. En el acto político combinado con festival popular, convocado por el PC español y su contraparte suiza, el Parti Suisse du Travail [PST—Partido Laborista Suizo], se presentaron los dirigentes del PCE Dolores Ibarruri ("La Pasionaria" de la guerra civil) y Santiago Carrillo. La audiencia, en su mayoría trabajadores emigrados, venía de muchas ciudades de Europa Occidental. Incluso, algunos trabajadores venían de Madrid, Barcelona y el país vasco. Se calcula que en este acto participaron alrededor de 20,000 personas.

Una pancarta gigante con la leyenda "Por un Gobierno Provisional de Coalición Amplia" flotaba sobre la plataforma que se encontraba en una pista de patinar, informó el corresponsal especial de *Le Monde* Marcel Niedergang el 25 de junio en ese diario parisino. "Y las consignas que se escuchaban en la sala no llamaban a la revolución, sino pedían 'libertad, amnistía y democracia'".

Los presentes coreaban entusiastamente consignas como "Pronto estaremos en Madrid".

Una consigna que era especialmente popular seguía el modelo de las consignas de la coalición de la Unidad Popular, avivada por los acontecimientos de Portugal: "España unida jamás será vencida".

El gobierno suizo había prohibido que Ibarruri y Carrillo hablaran en el acto. Pero los organizadores superaron esta prohibición gravando sus discursos y transmitiéndolos por altavoces, mientras los dirigentes del PC permanecían sentados en silencio en la plataforma. Entonces, para el gran alborozo de la multitud, los dos se alejaron del programa fijado y hablaron brevemente, Ibarruri leyó las dos últimas páginas de su texto. "Elogios a la Iglesia, respeto a las fuerzas armadas: éstos dos temas fueron abordados ampliamente en Ginebra" por los dirigentes stalinistas, informó Niedergang.

Ibarruri, presidente del partido, elogió a la "Iglesia renovada, con una jerarquía progresista y miles de sacerdotes que, con su conducta, están reconciliando al pueblo con la Iglesia". Cuando alguien le preguntó si "el comunismo español ya no es ateo", ella contestó: "Hemos cambiado porque el mundo ha cambiado. La Iglesia en España era reaccionaria. Pero lo que yo sé hoy es que las primeras reuniones de las Comisiones Obreras se realizaron en conventos. Tenemos que ver las cosas como son y sacar las conclusiones. . ."

Y añadió: "El ejército ha producido Francos y Pinochets, pero también ha producido a Spínola, los capitanes portugueses y los militares peruanos".

Carrillo, secretario general del PC español, dedicó cuando menos la tercera parte de su discurso al problema de las fuerzas armadas, informó Niedergang. Ensalzó al General Diez Alegria, que recientemente fue despedido por Franco de su cargo de presidente del Estado Mayor español, refiriéndose a él como "un militar moderno, que no está acostumbrado al ruido de los sables y las espuelas, y que tiene el buen gusto de no amenazar a los españoles con el espantajo de la guerra civil. . ."

Afirmando que el régimen actual ofende a las fuerzas armadas españo-

las, Carrillo dijo que los militares "deben tener una técnica y los medios que les permitan jugar el papel que la nación debe darles en su propio interés". El dirigente stalinista dijo que esperaba el día en que los niños españoles "pusieran claveles rojos en el cañón de los fusiles".

Sin embargo, dijo, no estaba llamando a que los capitanes se alzasen, como sucedió en Portugal. Consideraba que el cambio político se daría a través de la presión conjugada de todas las fuerzas, tanto de la izquierda como de la derecha, que están a favor de un retorno a la libertad y a la democracia. Para lograr esto, él e Ibarruri llamaron al "diálogo" y a un "vasto reagrupamiento nacional" en España.

El corresponsal de *Le Monde* resumió sus discursos de la siguiente manera:

"Consideran que la brecha entre la derecha y la izquierda carece de significado en la España actual, que es radicalmente diferente de la que salió, quebrantada y agotada, de la guerra civil. La verdadera línea de división se encuentra ahora, según ellos, entre los políticos ultraizquierdistas, que se aferran a los principios formulados durante y después de la guerra civil, y quienes, ya sea dentro del régimen franquista o fuera del sistema, desean para su país un régimen más moderno, más liberal y de acuerdo a las condiciones de la Europa del Mercado Común. . ."

Cuando se le preguntó qué tan pronto sería derrocada la actual dictadura, Carrillo contestó: "No soy profeta, pero mucho más pronto de lo que ustedes piensan. En todo caso, en menos de algunos años".

El día siguiente al acto del 23 de junio, el gobierno federal de la "democrática" Suiza expulsó "por tiempo indefinido" a los dos dirigentes del PC, en base a que habían "contravenido" la prohibición del gobierno de que hablaran en público. □