

Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

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Behind War Moves in Eastern Mediterranean

HANDS OFF CYPRUS!

What India Proved--

Anyone Can Join the 'Nuclear Club'

Cuba

Castro Experimenta con las Elecciones

Tanaka Rivals Resign From Cabinet

The unexpected setback suffered by Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic party in the July 7 elections for the upper house of parliament has widened the factional divisions within the already splintered party.

On July 12, Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki resigned from the cabinet, criticizing the party's open dependence on huge subsidies from major corporations during the election campaign. He advocated "political reform" that was not spelled out.

"The people," Miki told a news conference, "have rendered their judgment on the Liberal Democratic party and the party must accept this fact unreservedly. We must strike while the iron is hot."

Miki's resignation marked a major defection from the coalition of factions that elected Kakuei Tanaka party president—and hence prime minister—in July 1972. Tanaka, who was opposed by Takeo Fukuda, had the support of his own faction and three others led by Miki, Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, and Minister of International Trade and Industry Yasuhiro Nakasone.

Fukuda himself resigned as finance minister July 16. Another member of his faction, Shigeru Hori, joined him in leaving the cabinet.

Fukuda's withdrawal was widely viewed as the beginning of his campaign against Tanaka for the presidency of the party when elections are held in July 1975—or sooner if Tanaka can be forced to resign.

For the moment, at least, Tanaka is thought still to have the upper hand over his chief rival. Although the party as a whole lost seats in the July 7 elections, Tanaka's faction gained strength in the parliament. □

Summer Schedule

The next issue of *Intercontinental Press*, dated August 5, will be the last before our summer break. We will resume our regular schedule with the issue dated September 9.

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Behind War Moves in Eastern Mediterranean

By Gerry Foley

"'It was just stupid,' said a young waiter as he left for military service. 'Any other Government would have figured out some way to avoid it.'"

As this statement, reported by *New York Times* correspondent Alvin Shuster, indicated, the hundreds of thousands of Greeks called into the armed forces felt no enthusiasm about having to pay the price for the Athens junta's adventure in Cyprus. On July 20, the day of the mobilization, Shuster cabled from the Greek capital:

"There was no sense of rallying around the flag. Rather, the mood was fear and uncertainty and, in many cases, anger, that the rulers had allowed the dispute with Turkey to reach this point."

The crisis touched off July 15 by the coup of the Greek Cypriote National Guard, led by officers of the Athens junta's army, had "terrified" the people of Greece, *Le Monde* correspondent Marc Marceau cabled on the day of the putsch.

The big press of the imperialist bourgeoisies voiced alarm over the danger to the intricate balancing game centered on the unfortunate little island.

"Once again it has become starkly clear how dangerous it is to encourage dictatorial regimes that, because of their bankruptcy in domestic politics, may launch foreign adventures that will put their protectors in a difficult position," the editors of *Le Monde* wrote July 17. The warning was obviously directed at Washington. But it was also applicable to the French bourgeoisie, which recently sold the junta large amounts of military equipment, apparently trying to take advantage of some secret squabble between Washington and Athens.

The colonels, gravely weakened by the November 1973 uprising in several cities and by a profound erosion of their regime, tried in the first part of this year to gain a little more freedom of maneuver. They needed both a more "independent" image and some assurance against any inclination in

Washington to look around for more promising local figures to represent the interests of the Pentagon and the State Department.

The voice of the more cautious elements in the U.S. ruling class, the *New York Times*, expressed obvious fright at the turn of events in the eastern Mediterranean. Its editors wrote July 16:

"Clearly the first goal of American, allied and United Nations diplomacy must be to prevent war between Greece and Turkey. Unless that can be headed off, the whole volatile eastern Mediterranean could blow up. . . .

"Once the immediate crisis is passed there may be time for serious rethinking on the part of the State Department and especially the Pentagon about the wisdom of propping up with economic assistance and modern military hardware a regime in Athens that has buried freedom, tortured its citizens and now has committed aggression against another country.

"What happened on Cyprus yesterday dramatizes the bankruptcy of a cynical United States policy toward Greece. After that tragedy it should be more difficult for American policymakers to argue that the tyranny in Greece is strictly a problem for the Greeks to resolve."

As for the more adventurous sections of the U.S. ruling class, they could remind the "nervous Nellies" of the *New York Times* that one of its own featured columnists, C.L. Sulzberger, played a significant role in preparing the way for the 1967 coup that established the military regime in Greece in the first place. He raised the alarm that the elected government of the country was dangerously "demagogic" and indicated that an army take-over would be justified.

So, now it was hardly gentlemanly, it might be argued, for the *New York Times* to denounce the regime rooted in this coup as "the squalid military dictatorship in Greece," or to refer to its main figure in these terms: "Gen-

eral Ioannides and his faceless henchmen consciously and deliberately condoned aggression against another country in direct violation of the pledge that they reaffirmed only last month in NATO's Atlantic Declaration."

Some of the *New York Times* denunciations did have a hypocritical ring.

"It is almost beyond belief that the Greek officers would attempt to install as President of Cyprus one Nikos Sampson, confessed murderer, professional bully boy and fanatical supporter of Enosis (union with Greece)." According to the *New York Times*, enosis was an unrealistic objective. But how much more realistic were its implicit claims that being a "murderer" and "professional bully boy" could disqualify anyone from ruling a state in the U.S. orbit? Such criteria would eliminate many if not most of Washington's staunchest allies.

Certainly the most sophisticated voice of American imperialism could not expect the policymakers to take such objections seriously. But the fears voiced in the *New York Times* editorials seemed real enough. As the events proceeded, they proved all too well justified. And if the American rulers had no reason to look down their nose at Nikos Sampson, they might well have had reason to regard him as unreliable.

When this leader of the nationalist irregulars, a tough, small-business man with a rather piratical reputation, assumed the presidency of Cyprus directly, it may well have been a sign that the process was getting out of control.

In a dispatch July 19 from Washington, *New York Times* correspondent Leslie H. Gelb reported leaks about a cable from the U.S. ambassador in Athens, Henry J. Tasca, detailing the junta's management of the coup.

"The officials who told of this cable maintained that the Greek junta had tried to manage the situation from

Athens but soon found that events were out of its control. Nikos Georgiades Sampson, the rebel President of Cyprus, was not the Greek junta's choice, these officials asserted."

Apparently the junta, like Washington, had some problems with its local representatives in the area.

Instability of Greek Junta

The underlying cause for the flare-up in the eastern Mediterranean seemed to be the steady weakening of the Greek dictatorship. It has become increasingly apparent to all observers that the totally discredited regime, which barely survived the November 1973 uprisings, has neither perspectives nor unity. With the desperation and anger of the Greek people mounting, spurred on by the highest rate of inflation in Europe, and with nothing coming from the government but more repression, tyrannical threats, and the muffled rumbling of warring military cliques, a climate of instability was created that favored all kinds of adventures.

The Greek junta evidently feared that some of its more "respectable" rivals would get encouragement from elements in U.S. ruling circles. This seems to be the most likely explanation for the more "independent" and "nationalistic" course they followed after the November uprisings. This is the way Steven V. Roberts described the process in the May 27 *New York Times*:

"Another important element is nationalism. According to well-informed sources, the Greek rulers feel their country should be able to 'go it alone' and not rely so heavily on her traditional allies. The Government has embarked on an ambitious modernization of its military equipment, and recently approached Washington with a shopping list 'almost as long as the Israelis,' as one American put it.

"Part of this feeling is an extreme sensitivity to criticism. Attacks by American Congressmen have the Greeks 'climbing the walls,' said one diplomat. When Ioannis Zigidis, a former Greek politician [and bourgeois opponent of the junta], testified in Washington, he was denounced here for 'offending the national pride' of Greece."

In this situation, the existence of a Cypriote government not under their control, especially one headed by a

"respectable" conservative strongman, seems to have become intolerable to the military dictators in Athens. Makarios had to be removed at all cost.

Makarios's neutralist popular-front regime had been an irritant to the junta for years. It issued an ultimatum in 1972 demanding that the archbishop include right-wing nationalist supporters of the junta in his cabinet. A year later, it teledirected a move against him by the synod of the Cypriote church.

In an article in the October 29, 1972, issue of the *London Observer*, Charles



MAKARIOS

Foley indicated the junta's objections to Makarios:

"One of Papadopoulos's [the dictator ousted by the coup within the coup that came in the wake of the November uprisings] familiars told a mutual friend: 'Under this man Makarios, Cyprus is a focus of opposition in the Greek world. His people abuse and insult us—they even talk of welcoming a Greek government-in-exile and 'bringing back democracy to the mainland.'"

"With the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, Makarios insists on strict neutrality. But Papadopoulos says: 'The Americans agree with us that Makarios must go. The day after we're rid of him, we'll see that Cyprus joins NATO.'"

But Papadopoulos's project to get rid of Makarios did not necessarily include enosis. When the colonels presented the archbishop with their ultimatum to include General Grivas's representatives in the cabinet, Makarios asked how they proposed to overcome Ankara's objections. "Payotakis replied: 'Once Grivas's men are in the Cabinet, we'll shut them up.'"

The Role of Makarios

However, the demagogic archbishop was able to rally mass support, apparently on a platform of peace and resistance to the dictatorship. Secondly, he proved to be reliably conservative and no less dedicated to maintaining the old chauvinist hatreds than the junta itself. In articles written in the censored Athens paper *To Vima* and reprinted in the Cypriote paper *Eleftheria* in February 1973, Manousos Ploumidis seemed to present Makarios's case to the Greek bourgeoisie.

"Makarios has an enormous majority, really unprecedented in a democratic country. This majority, moreover, is not homogeneous. It is made up of the most diverse political currents whose only common bond is their confidence in him."

As for the accusation that Makarios was trying to undermine the "Greek patriotism" of the majority on the island, Ploumidis wrote: "Anyone who saw the crowd that assembled in the great rally in Nicosia to listen to Makarios with such eloquent silence and to sing the national hymn could not fail to see that Greece and the Greek spirit is as alive in Cyprus as in Athens."

As for the charge that Makarios was encouraging communism by dealing with the Cypriote Communist party, Ploumidis answered: "The Cypriot Communists are a strange bunch. It is not only as they say in Cyprus: 'Our Communists are different from those in Greece and other countries. Ours go to church.' . . ."

"The opposition claims that Makarios is influenced by the CP, but he says, on the other hand, that he is influencing and leading the CP in a policy that is contributing to the solution of the Cypriot problem."

One of the main props of the Makarios regime was the Communist party, AKEL [Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou tis Kiprou—the Re-

construction Party of the Working People of Cyprus], the largest and best organized party on the island. In particular, the labor movement has been completely controlled by AKEL.

A Cypriote correspondent of *Intercontinental Press* has described the effects of the arrangement between Makarios and AKEL. (See "Cyprus Regime Reports Anti-Makarios Plot," *IP*, April 16, 1973, p. 424.) The trade-union movement, including the Communist party, was under the thumb of Makarios, he wrote, and subordinated the interests of the workers to the "national bloc." The "leaders don't fight because they say the main struggle is against imperialism and the only proper leader is Makarios. . . . If there is any disagreement with the point of view of the leadership, a witchhunt is launched against the dissenters, who are called Trotskyists, fascists, and reactionaries."

However, although the Makarios regime had certain advantages for all of the powers with interests in Cyprus, all of them—except the Kremlin—regarded these as mixed blessings. For the Turks, Makarios was a Greek nationalist. For the junta, he was a figure around which the Greek bourgeois opposition might rally. And for the United States, he was an "unreliable" independent operator, whose position depended on maintaining an alliance with the Communist party and hence with the Soviet Union.

Makarios's position became more unstable as the junta's isolation deepened. Rumors of plots and counterplots also complicated the relations between the bourgeois leaders of the two communities on Cyprus. In the July 12 issue of the *Christian Science Monitor*, correspondent John K. Cooley quoted the Turkish vice-president of Cyprus, Raouf Denktash, as saying:

"We feel Archbishop Makarios is playing for time. He is counting on a new coup in Athens to overthrow the junta. The new Greek government might be headed by (former Greek Prime Minister) Constantine Caramanlis and King Constantine (both in exile in Western Europe). Makarios would then try to claim credit for this change.

"We have information that Caramanlis and his supporters are planning to gather here and establish a kind of informal exiles' committee, which they may not call a government-in-exile. All information we have indicates that

the military in Athens will try to assassinate Makarios before this happens."

"During the resulting inter-Greek fighting here, Athens would ask the Greek officers of the (Greek Cypriot) National Guard to 'restore order.' They would carefully avoid harming the Turks, and would not start agitation for enosis . . . until later. The Athens plan would thus be a kind of coup by stages."

'Open Letter' to the Junta

These speculations followed the publication July 6 of an open letter to the junta from Makarios. In it, the wily cleric accused the Athens dictatorship of ordering the Greek officers of the Cypriote National Guard to prepare a coup against him. He announced his dislike of "military government" in terms unusual in Cyprus, where criticism of the junta has been tightly controlled by official and unofficial means. Moreover, he addressed General Gizikis only as the president "of the Greek government" and not of "the Greek republic," thereby triggering speculation that he was refusing to recognize the junta's abolition of the monarchy. He demanded withdrawal of the 650 Greek officers of the National Guard, although at the same time he asked for 100 more officers to be sent in as "instructors."

It was obviously a decisive confrontation. If Makarios could assert his authority over the main armed force on Cyprus, he would be in position to play a strong independent role, a development which the Athens regime could hardly tolerate. On the other hand, if he did not put an end to the junta's control of the National Guard, a "state within a state," he called it, the Athens regime might find it in their interest to assassinate or overthrow him at any time.

In the period leading up to this showdown on Cyprus, the weakness of the Athens junta also encouraged Ankara to move to gain some advantages. Among other things, such victories would strengthen the rather precarious base of Turkish Premier Balent Ecevit's own government.

Enclaves of Greeks and Turks

Chauvinism is still an exceptionally strong force in Turkey, where there

is little experience of war on the home territory and there is a strong feeling that the losses of the old Turkish possessions were ascribable to the betrayals of leaders bought off by foreign powers. As an instance of the chauvinism, the only left party in the country was banned a few years ago for simply recognizing the existence of the Kurdish minority, which local nationalists call "the Mountain Turks." Government-sponsored anti-Greek riots have been a feature of Turkish political life for decades.

Thus, in April Ankara drew back from accepting a united independent Cypriote state and began pushing again for its old solution of partition under the new name of "federation." It is hard to believe that Ankara's pressure on Greece over the Cyprus question is motivated by concern for the Turkish Cypriote minority. This group is not large in absolute numbers, perhaps 130,000. The Turkish minority already in the Greek state is larger.

After the two nationalities have lived together for centuries, it is obviously a hard job to liquidate all intermixture of populations. Since most of the intermixture was eliminated by the holocaust of the Greco-Turkish war of 1920-22, the last small pockets of Greeks in Turkey and Turks in Greece hardly constitute a major issue. Certainly, such small minorities pose no threat to the sovereignty of the national majorities. The best way to protect them is to oppose the old chauvinist hatred.

New irredentist wars, however, can only revive this hysteria and renew the practice of genocidal slaughter of "alien populations" that is an unfortunate tradition of the area. Turkey cannot reasonably hope to drive 500,000 Greeks out of Cyprus in the present situation. And if the Ankara regime does not promote exaggerated hopes among the Turkish Cypriote bourgeois leaders, the Greeks have no reason to want to drive 130,000 Turks out either.

Partition of Cyprus can only deepen the communal antagonisms, since it inevitably involves driving tens of thousands of persons from their homes. Obviously, moreover, on a small island such as Cyprus, partition is not going to stop conflicts from developing; it may even make them more intense. Nor will it make the

area necessarily any less of a focus of conflict.

Oil in the Aegean

Aside from offering a chance for antiforeign rabble-rousing, the Cyprus question may have some geopolitical importance for the Turkish bourgeoisie. The Greco-Turkish wars created an anomaly. The Turks drove the Greeks almost completely off the land mass of Asia Minor. But the offshore islands remained in Greek hands. Thus, Turkey is surrounded by thousands of Greek islands, many only a few miles from its coast. Cyprus completes the circle.

Ankara's interest in asserting a claim over the waters off Asia Minor has been increased considerably, moreover, by the discovery of oil under the Aegean. Many observers attributed the heating up of the Greco-Turkish dispute over Cyprus to this factor. "... most analysts here think that Cyprus is a secondary issue for the moment," Steven V. Roberts cabled from Athens April 15, "and that Mr. Ecevit stirred things up mainly to strengthen his bargaining position on oil.

"As one diplomat said: 'Cyprus is an old problem, and even though Greece and Turkey almost went to war over it in 1967, it does not involve their direct interests. But oil does.'"

Oil was discovered off the island of Thasos, near Western Thrace, where there is a large Turkish minority. The find touched off a wave of prospecting in the eastern Aegean that raised some intricate boundary questions.

"The problem," Roberts wrote, "is that in the eastern Aegean the 'shelf' of such Greek islands as Mytilene, Chios and Samothrace overlaps the Turkish shelf."

The internal politics of both countries complicated things further:

"Many diplomats feel there is a lot of posturing on both sides. The Governments in Athens and Ankara are both new—Greece is ruled by a military group that staged a coup last November; Mr. Ecevit formed a shaky coalition in January—and the surest cure for domestic disunity is the threat of foreign attack.

"Meanwhile, Turkey has granted concessions for several dozen exploratory drilling sites, including some that

encircle the Greek islands outside the six-mile territorial limit.

"As a result both sides are brandishing their American-made jet planes. Reconnaissance flights have increased along with levels of rhetoric, and speeches and editorials are filled with vows to defend the motherland. Turks have demonstrated against the Greek Consulate in Istanbul. Greek papers have published rules for blacking out headlights in case of attack."

The question was made still more explosive, Roberts indicated, by the immediate political usefulness of the oil find. It is virtually the only thing to which the Athens junta can point as offering hope to the Greek people that things will improve. "While the discovery there is still being evaluated, the Greek press is already hailing the start of a 'new era' of economic independence for this poor country, where gasoline costs more than \$2 a gallon and the balance of payments is chronically in deficit."

Another factor in the conflict was Ankara's speculation that it could win U.S. backing for its claims in view of its stability as an ally in contrast to the present Athens junta or any foreseeable Greek government. Geoffrey Godsell, the overseas news editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*, a daily that usually is a faithful mirror of State Department briefings, wrote July 16: "The Turkish Government not only is concerned about what would happen to the Turkish-Cypriot minority but also believes that Cyprus—only 40 miles off Turkey's southern coast—is more likely to pass eventually under outright Communist control if run by Athens than if the island had remained independent under Archbishop Makarios. This is because of Turkey's concept of inherent long-term Greek political instability."

White House Involvement

The tangle of violent plotting within a general context of servility toward a cynical and manipulative paramount power, U.S. imperialism, was reminiscent of the worst periods of Byzantine decadence. Like the emperors of those days, the U.S. imperialists had less clear immediate interests than those of its cutthroat underlings. The State Department probably had several options. But its general interest was to maintain its as-

serendancy over all the contending parties and not allow any one of them to deal a deathblow to the other and thus cut down on its pawns. At the same time, it could not entirely avoid being drawn into the conflict among its lackeys nor assure that a brawl might not get out of hand.

It is possible, even likely, that Washington gave the go-ahead for the July 15 operation against Makarios. On a strategic island like Cyprus, U.S. intelligence could hardly have been unaware of an impending military coup. The National Guard mounted a massive armored assault on the presidential palace. Washington must have known about it long enough in advance to warn the junta to pull back, if Washington had wanted.

The U.S. government's reaction to the ouster of Makarios also indicates that Nixon and Kissinger would not have been unhappy to see him done in. Unnamed officials were quick to leak to the press that Makarios, who had demonstrated his overwhelming popular support in previous confrontations, was a lost cause.

"Makarios does not have adequate support on the island at this time," David Binder quoted an American official as saying in a July 18 dispatch to the *New York Times*. "Others," Binder wrote, "said the Archbishop could not be reinstated short of an invasion of Cyprus or an overthrow of the military Government in Greece."

An unsigned dispatch in the previous issue of the *New York Times* quoted more unequivocal expressions by sources in the U.S. government:

"High American officials said that Secretary of State Kissinger had rejected the appeals of departmental specialists on Greek-Turkish-Cypriote affairs that the United States stand by President Makarios and assert that Greek forces had intervened illegally on the island.

"For years, the officials said, the Nixon Administration has viewed Archbishop Makarios as the 'Castro of the Mediterranean,' who turned too readily toward Communist states for assistance."

The report indicated that restoring Makarios was associated in U. S. government circles with supporting an overthrow of the junta in Greece:

"Advocates of President Makarios in the State Department had reportedly hoped for an American declaration in

his behalf, as a lever to topple the military leadership of Brig. Gen. Demetrios Ioannides in Athens. 'It was a great opportunity to disavow the Athens junta,' an official said, 'but Kissinger was adamant and would not intervene.'"

As for the essential issue in the confrontation between Makarios and the junta, it seemed that the United States shared the position of the Greek dictatorship, defending it in a typically hypocritical way:


"The American argument," Alvin Shuster wrote in the July 20 *New York Times*, "is that pulling out all the Greek officers would leave an un-



Turkish troops boarded ships at Mersin (1) and came ashore at Kokkina (2) and Larnaca (3). Paratroopers were dropped near Nicosia (4).

charge and give the new Cyprus government an appearance of legitimacy."

This formula would preserve the essential status quo on Cyprus, while removing the one figure who was strong enough to play an independent role and be a potentially dangerous enemy to the Athens junta. In this connection, it is interesting that in statements to the press, unnamed U. S. officials interpreted the coup in Cyprus as a move against Makarios personally, one that had no wider political significance. Thus, one supposes, if the putschists had not been so clumsy as to let Makarios slip out of the palace and if Nikos Sampson had



controlled force of 10,000 Greek Cypriote soldiers in the National Guard who would be a serious threat to the minority Turks." The evident fact was that an independent Cyprus would be a fiction as long as Greek officers remained in command of the principal armed forces on the island. That was obviously the way the United States wanted it.

The outline of Washington's aims in the Cypriote crisis seemed to be given in another leak reported by Binder in his July 18 dispatch.

"Top officials of the State Department believe that it would be impossible for Archbishop Makarios to be reinstated as President of Cyprus. At the same time the United States feels that Nikos Giorgiades Sampson, who overthrew the Makarios Government, is unacceptable as a successor."

The solution the United States seemed to want was laid out by Alvin Shuster in a July 19 dispatch from Athens:

"In the view of American and British officials, the elevation to the presidency of Mr. [Glaukos] Clerides, who is constitutionally next in line of succession, would help ease the crisis, convince the Turks that moderates were in

been less pushy, the entire affair might have gone very satisfactorily from Washington's point of view.

The Turkish Thrust

However, once Makarios made his escape and fighting broke out between the two factions of the Greek Cypriote bourgeois leadership, Ankara apparently saw an opening. Both the "legitimacy" and the stability of the new government were clearly in doubt. The opportunity was as un hoped for as it was unlikely soon to be repeated. Almost immediately, Ankara moved toward a bold thrust.

On July 18 it extended its territorial waters to include a wide area of the Aegean Sea over which Greece claimed sovereignty. That was the first move in Ankara's aggression. The second was the invasion of Cyprus in the night of July 19-20.

The double-talk of Premier Ecevit in announcing the invasion could hardly have been improved on by Nixon himself:

"We are not going for war but to bring peace to the island," he said, "not only to the Turks but to the Greeks as well."

The effect of the invasion was, of course, to pose a deadly danger of genocidal war. Nothing could be more likely to unite the Greeks behind the putschist regime. With the island's tradition of communal strife, or permanent latent civil war, the incursion in force of the "big brothers" of one community was almost certain to be seen as a signal for pogroms.

From the moment of the invasion, moreover, the Turkish Cypriote enclaves would be viewed, at best, as enemy areas and, at worst, as hostages by the Greek forces. Up until then, however, they had strong political reasons for leaving the Turkish areas alone.

From the fragmentary and unreliable reports from Cyprus in the first days of the fighting, the danger of genocidal slaughter in the worst traditions of the area is only too real.

The Greek Cypriote communiqués, for example, stressed victories over the local Turkish communities.

"It is announced that the Greek armed forces have broken through the defense lines of the Turkish Cypriote enclave of Nicosia. The Turkish sector of Nicosia has been cut off."

"Our forces have captured Turkish pockets of resistance at Kevideran, Angoleni, and Yalia, on the west coast. Other neighboring Turkish pockets of resistance are expected to fall any minute. The inhabitants of these areas have already abandoned their villages."

U. S. radio and television correspondents claimed that the Greek Cypriote commanders admitted they were carrying out reprisals against the Turkish community and were seizing hostages. On the other hand, the Greek leaders in Cyprus and Athens complained that Turkish armed forces were blanketing Hellenic communities with napalm. The reports of independent observers tended to confirm these latter claims.

This is how Associated Press reporter Holger Jensen described the start of the Turkish "peace mission" in a dispatch July 21 from Nicosia:

"The shelling and bombing seemed indiscriminate, with no regard for civilian areas or casualties. Bodies littered roadsides beside wrecked civilian vehicles as well as trucks and armored personnel carriers of the Greek Cypriote National Guard. . . ."

"Entire mountainsides were engulfed in flames from forest fires started by

bombs and napalm."

But the casualties in Cyprus will be small compared to those that will result if the present fighting touches off a war between Greece and Turkey. It may be that such a war could not last long in the face of U. S. opposition. (Unnamed officials reportedly stressed the limited supply of spare parts and ammunition available to the two sides from Washington.) But this cannot be taken for granted, and in any case even a short war could produce great human losses.

Detente Offers No Assurances

One thing is certain, whatever the outcome of this crisis: There will be no progress toward peace in the eastern Mediterranean as long as the Greek and Turkish workers do not break with their imperialist and national bourgeois manipulators. If the deal between Washington and Moscow makes an immediate clash between the two superpowers unlikely, it is clear that the detente has not assured world peace. In fact, it has allowed new conflicts to develop that can pave the way for even more explosive collisions in the future.

In the days of the cold war, for instance, a Turkish bourgeois government would hardly have indulged in such an adventure as moving militarily against Greece. Now the possibility of a war between Washington's two satellites introduces a new explosive factor in a region where both the Soviet bureaucracy and the U. S. imperialists believe their vital national interests are at stake.

As for the Greek masses, they are witnessing an impressive demonstration of how little "security" the junta can offer. The best the defenders of the military regime can say is that it is better than the "old turmoil" or better than the civil war that might result from trying to overthrow it. Now it is obvious that continuation in power of this kind of gangster regime means a constant danger of piratical adventures that can bring enormous disasters on the Greek people. If the losses of the civil war are a frightening memory, they are nothing compared to the losses of the last Greco-Turkish war.

Nor would the restoration of Makarios offer any hope of peace. While he did win a certain room for maneuver and some relative indepen-

dence, he was always essentially tied to Greek bourgeois forces. It was he who brought the 650 Greek officers to Cyprus in the first place. He called for them after the 1963 communal crisis. Even in demanding their removal, he called on Athens to send 100 replacements. Moreover, in the long run, U. S. imperialism will not tolerate in this area any element it does not firmly control. And no bourgeois politician can resist such a force when it decides to put on the heat. The entire current crisis has shown that the Makarios government was a deadly trap for the Cypriote people.

The Only Real Solution

The only power that can offer any hope for eventual peace in the area, as this crisis has shown very clearly, is a force genuinely independent of imperialism and the rival bourgeois interests, a party really representing the Greek and Turkish workers and poor masses who are the principal losers in the present conflict.

A heroic example of proletarian internationalism was set in the eastern Mediterranean by the Greek Communist party before it became Stalinized. It was the first political force firmly to oppose the chauvinist poison in the region, even in the most difficult conditions during the Greco-Turkish war of 1920-22 when millions of Greeks were driven from their homes in Asia Minor by nationalist Turks.

How far the present Greek CP has come from these traditions is indicated by its opportunist line of trying to build a "patriotic, democratic" front against the junta by, among other things, accusing it of failing to defend the national interests adequately against the Turks.

Such a party has nothing to offer a Greek people terrified of being thrown into a catastrophic war. Nor can the Greek people hope for anything from a Communist party that subordinated itself completely to a bourgeois nationalist figure like Makarios.

The need for a party that can revive the traditions of the young Greek Communist party, the party of Pantelis Pouliopoulos, the founder of Greek Trotskyism, has never been clearer.

The Greek workers, who are politically more advanced than their

Turkish brothers and sisters, can set the example by overthrowing the generals, who constitute a standing menace to both nations, and setting up their own government.

The Turkish left is still relatively weak, in a position similar to that of the Greek movement in 1920. But if any nucleus can raise its voice against the chauvinist frenzy of the moment, as the Greek Communist party did in 1920-22, it will immeasurably strengthen revolutionists in Greece and thereby the chances for ending the cycle of genocidal war in the area.

None of the peoples directly involved can gain by a war. This elementary truth has seldom been clearer. Greece is more advanced than Turkey, but it has a fourth the population of its neighbor and little basis for a war industry or for building a military machine.

Even if it is able to defeat Greece militarily, Turkey is still a backward country and will remain subject to imperialist domination no matter how badly it mauls its small neighbor.

As for the Cypriotes of both communities, they have nothing to hope for from a Greek-Turkish war but a new round in an endless civil war in which they will remain the pawns of outside forces that are utterly indifferent to their fate.

No intervention by any of the regimes that have helped to create the present disaster on Cyprus can bring any real benefit to any section of the Cypriote population. Complete freedom to determine their own destiny is the first thing the Cypriote workers and masses need to begin to solve the problems that the power conflict in the eastern Mediterranean has created for them.

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Frelimo Troops Capture Northern Town

Troops of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo—Mozambique Liberation Front) captured the town of Morrumbala in the northern part of the country July 12. Morrumbala is located in Zambezia district, not far from the Malawi border.

Several days earlier, Frelimo leader Samora Machel had announced that the liberation fighters would open a new front in Zambezia.

The continuation of the fighting in Mozambique appears to be accompanied by a growing war-weariness among Portuguese colonial troops, who had hoped that the April 25 coup in Lisbon would bring a quick end to the war. In a July 12 dispatch to the *Washington Post* from Cape Town, South Africa, Peter Younghusband wrote:

"Portuguese military informants tell about soldiers meeting guerrillas informally in the Niassa district adjoining Rhodesia in the past week—having drinks and playing soccer with them.

"At the strategic town of Vila Gouveia, on the way to Tete from the Beira-Umtali road, an entire battalion refused to go into action, unofficial military sources said.

"The battalion sent an officer, a sergeant and a conscript to the regional military headquarters in Beira to pass on the message that they did not wish to fight and wanted peace negotiations speeded up so that they could return to Portugal."

There are indications that the Spínola government, increasingly unable to rely on its own troops in Mozambique, has been clandestinely involved to some extent in aiding the sudden appearance of a new, right-wing guerrilla group opposed to Frelimo. The new organization presumably could pose as a rival for power, providing a pretext for Lisbon to set itself up as arbitrator between the two groups.

In a July 14 dispatch from Beira, Agence France-Presse reported that the new group had been sighted not far from Vila Pery. It is believed to be led by Jorge Jardim, a businessman from Beira.

"A military communiqué from Lourenço Marques," AFP reported, "confirmed that insurgent forces had been sighted and that troops in the Vila Pery area had been placed on the alert.

"The communiqué did not specifically identify these forces, but implied that they might be linked to a movement instigated by Jardim, whose arrest had been ordered by Portuguese authorities on June 17 after he escaped from Portugal. . . ."

CP Loses Labor Ministry

Spínola Names New Portuguese Cabinet

President António de Spínola swore in the new Portuguese government July 18. Representatives of the military were named to seven of the sixteen cabinet posts, including the key ministries of interior, labor, defense, and information. The new premier, Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves, is a leading member of the Armed Forces Movement (AFM), the group of officers who led the April 25 coup.

Spínola's civilian government had been unable to survive the continuing strikes and work stoppages. It fell July 11 following the resignations of former Premier Adelino da Palma Carlos and four other bourgeois ministers. The new government, Spínola said July 17, would enforce greater "social and civic discipline."

Although the Communist party had stressed its willingness to serve in the new cabinet, former CP Labor Minister Avelino Gonçalves was replaced by an air force captain. The only other CP representative in the previous cabinet, party General Secretary Alvaro Cunhal, remains minister without portfolio.

According to a dispatch from Lisbon in the July 19 *Washington Post*, Avelino Gonçalves was dropped after the bourgeois Popular Democratic par-

After the April 25 coup, Jardim went to Lisbon, where he took refuge in the Malawi Embassy.

"A month ago," according to AFP, "Jardim, heavily disguised, slipped out of the embassy and drove across the Portuguese border to Spain, where he was seen at the Ritz Hotel in Madrid.

"At the time, he sent a telegram to the newspaper *Noticias de Beira*, in which he had an interest, saying he was upset at the manner in which matters were being handled with Frelimo by the new military leaders."

The news agency said that Jardim is believed to command about 1,000 "crack paratroopers—mainly Frelimo deserters—who were loyal to him personally under the previous government." □

ty "threatened to walk out unless Communist Party representation was reduced from two to one ministry."

Apart from the loss of the labor ministry, it would seem that the CP has little to complain about in regard to the new cabinet. According to a report in the July 17 *Christian Science Monitor*, during negotiations over the new government the CP issued a statement "paying tribute to Colonel Gonçalves and saying it was ready to serve in the new Cabinet. It said it supported inclusion in the Cabinet of other officers from the AFM. A cabinet so composed, the Communist statement commented, would be better placed to end Portugal's colonial wars in Africa, solve the most urgent economic problems, and continue democratic policies."

Socialist party representation in the new cabinet was reduced from four ministries to three. Foreign Minister Mario Soares and Overseas Territories Minister António Almeida Santos—the two government officials chiefly responsible for negotiating with the African liberation organizations—retained their posts, as did SP Justice Minister Francisco Salgado Zenha. The SP information minister was replaced by a military representative. □

Cairo Assures Investors of Safety, Profits

By Michael Baumann

President Anwar Sadat's "open door" policy toward imperialist investment has so far met with one formidable obstacle: Foreign capitalists have remained skeptical of the worth of Egyptian guarantees for the safety of their investments.

Hundreds of business executives and entrepreneurs from the United States, Japan, and Western Europe have come to Cairo to discuss projects during the last few months, but few contracts have been signed and very little actual cash has been committed.

U.S. Treasury Secretary William Simon's July 14-16 trip to Egypt was apparently aimed at helping to bring this wait-and-see period to a close. In addition to extracting further concessions to imperialist investment, he made clear Washington's intention to stand behind those ventures backed by U.S. capital.

Cairo's major concession concerned the right of foreign investors to take home the profits they made in Egypt. The new investment law, passed by the National Assembly a few days before Simon's arrival, had left this important matter somewhat vague.

According to a report in the July 15 *New York Times*, the law's "provisions dealing with the repatriation of profits are interpreted by foreign specialists to mean that a company can reconvert profits stemming from exports but not those made on sales in Egypt." Since it is in the Egyptian market that profits will probably come the quickest, this is a matter of no small concern to potential investors.

By the end of the first day of Simon's visit, Cairo had given way on that point. Deputy Premier Abdel Aziz Hegazi assured Simon that interpretation of the law would be flexible enough to permit foreign companies to export a satisfactory proportion of their profits. The issue, he said, could be decided on a case-by-case basis.

There seemed to be little else foreign capitalists could find fault with in the new law. According to a report in the July 10 *Christian Science Monitor*, the legislation "frees foreign com-

panies from a rule requiring 51 percent Egyptian ownership; from taxes on machinery imports; from mandatory worker participation on boards of directors; and from government-set wages [the current minimum wage is \$20.50 a month], social security, and profit sharing rules."

The law does stipulate, however, that only Arab investors may go into real estate, a highly profitable but non-productive area of the economy. This provision reflects the basic intention of the law, which is aimed at securing capital from the Arab oil states and technology from the West.

Despite all the publicity surrounding the new investment law, there is not much in it that is different from a law on free zones adopted in 1971. What has changed is the general political climate. Egypt's military disengagement with Israel on the Sinai border, its agreement to rely on U.S. diplomacy to regain the Israeli-occupied territory, and its shift away from Moscow are the real factors that have combined to produce a climate much more congenial to imperialist investment.

A second major development signaling the new relationship between Cairo and Washington came on the third day of Simon's visit, with the July 16 signing of an ironclad investment-guarantee treaty.

According to a report in the July 17 *Times*, the treaty "stipulates that, if an American company operating in Egypt fails to get satisfaction on a claim arising from a dispute with the Egyptian authorities, it can transfer the claim to the United States Government, which will then negotiate it with the Egyptians." It can be expected that claims negotiated by Washington will receive a full hearing in Egyptian ruling circles.

The third and most publicized development was the announcement, also on July 16, that four of the largest U.S. banks had been granted permission to open offices in Egypt. They are the Chase Manhattan Bank, First National City Bank, American Ex-

press Company, and Bank of America.

The decision to allow these U.S. banks to open Egyptian offices represents a sharp reversal of the process of Egyptianization of the economy set in motion by Nasser in 1957, shortly after the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Legislation passed at that time required all banks and insurance companies to become Egyptian corporations, owned by Egyptian capital. Additional legislation passed four years later nationalized all the banks and insurance companies.

Each of the four U.S. banks received permission to open offices in the new, duty-free industrial and commercial zones to be established in rebuilt cities along the banks of the Suez Canal. Two of the banks, Chase Manhattan and Bank of America, have also been granted permission to open commercial banks in Cairo in partnership with existing nationalized banks. While the banks in the duty-free zones will be limited to dealing in foreign currency, the two in Cairo will be able to penetrate the Egyptian economy directly, operating like any other Egyptian bank.

In order to assure that the momentum established by these moves is maintained, the U.S. Commerce Department has set up a special organization—the Action Group for the Near East—to assist U.S. businesses in exploiting the investment opportunities awaiting them in Cairo.

In addition, Washington has offered to put a number of its "financial specialists" at the service of the Egyptian Finance Ministry. Should the offer be accepted, it can be expected that the U.S. experts would certainly not stand in the way of steering lucrative contracts toward U.S.-based companies.

The next few months will show whether the new moves have been sufficient to attract the hoped-for influx of investment. If they prove to be inadequate, further concessions will be in order. □

What Was the Context?

A U.S. banking industry publication quoted Treasury Secretary William E. Simon as saying that he would not visit Iran on his tour of the Middle East because, among other things, "the shah is a nut." A Treasury Department spokesman responded that the quotation attributed to Simon was "incorrect and out of context."

New Zealand Unions in Massive Protests

By George Fyson

Wellington

Twenty months after its landslide victory at the polls in December 1972, the New Zealand Labour government found itself in a major clash with the trade-union movement. Tens of thousands of workers across the country came out in strikes and protest marches following the arrest of Bill Andersen, secretary of the Northern Drivers Union, on July 1. Andersen's union had defied a court injunction calling on it to lift its ban on fuel deliveries to an Auckland ferry company that was involved in a dispute with the Seamen's Union.

In Auckland, where the arrest took place, the response of workers was immediate. Drivers walked off the job, followed by boilermakers, bus drivers, paper workers, seamen, and many others. By the end of the following day, radio reports quoted a figure of 50,000 Auckland workers out in protest. Many unions were having difficulty holding stop-work meetings because all available halls had been booked by other unions.

Meanwhile unions in other cities were taking action. In Christchurch the day after Andersen's arrest, shipping was halted and all local meat works and the fertiliser works were closed down. Seamen and brewery workers also stopped work. That night, the Canterbury Trades Council called a 24-hour general strike for the following day, which was partially successful. It stopped buses, rubbish collections, port activity, hotels, and a number of other industries.

Within two days of Andersen's jailing, the country was described by the *NZ Herald's* industrial reporters as being "on the brink of a general strike situation." The jailing was seen as a direct attack on fundamental trade-union rights, and every hour that Andersen spent in jail saw wider layers of the trade-union movement coming into action. The leaders of the NZ Federation of Labour [FOL], which incorporates most unions in the private sector, announced their endorsement of all the actions that were

being taken by unions across the country. They had little choice but to support what was going on before their eyes. As an official at the Auckland Trades Hall put it: "It's getting out of the hands of the officials. The rank and file are taking over."

FOL Works Out Compromise

However, at the same time as the FOL secretary was proclaiming support for the protests, the president, Tom Skinner, was in Auckland busily working out a compromise that would take the steam out of the upsurge. Skinner came up with a formula that was agreed to by Andersen, who met with Skinner in jail. This was then endorsed by Minister of Labour Hugh Watt and by the owner of the ferry involved in the original dispute.

Their proposal was put to the mass meeting of Auckland drivers on July 3. It stated that because of the forthcoming negotiations between the government and the ferry-owner for public purchase of the hydrofoil ferry involved in the dispute, the drivers would lift their ban on fuel sales to the ferry company, provided that the hydrofoil not be used until the sale took place.

Skinner rammed this proposal through the meeting, putting it in the following terms: "If you want Bill to stay in jail, vote against the proposal." In the circumstances, alternatives could not be seriously considered, and although some doubts were raised from the floor of the meeting, no other proposals came forward and Skinner's resolution was adopted almost unanimously.

Following this the drivers marched to the Supreme Court, to witness Bill Andersen's release. They were joined by other unionists and several hundred students, making a crowd of over 4,000. While the union secretary's release at this point had been pre-arranged, those present clearly felt the power of their actions, which had brought this about.

Thus, as a result of hasty action by the minister of labour and FOL president, the dispute ended in less than three days. On the recommendation of the Northern Drivers Union leadership, the Auckland drivers took no further protest action.

However, the arrest of one union leader was not the only issue at stake: A clash on the question of employers taking court injunctions against unions had been brewing for several months, and in fact the Federation of Labour and Labour Party national conferences earlier this year both passed resolutions calling on the government to amend the legislation that allows employers to do this. In characteristic fashion, the Labour party leadership was ignoring a left-wing conference decision, but this time the trade unions clearly saw the law as unjust and were united against it.

Actions Continue

In Wellington, the Trades Council moved more slowly than in Auckland and Christchurch; by the time their meeting was held, Andersen was out of jail. Seeing the fight over court injunctions still in front of them, the Wellington unionists passed a motion calling for a local 24-hour stoppage on July 5, plus a mass march on parliament the same day.

While Trades Council and FOL leaders insisted that the strike and march were aimed only at the employers, everyone else recognised that it clearly was against the government, which has the power to make and change laws. Government leaders began making threatening noises. Prime Minister Kirk said that he had "had a gutsfull" of militant union action, and raised the possibility of de-registering unions and even of declaring a state of emergency. Newspapers reported that the Cabinet was "dusting off" the emergency regulations last used in 1951, when the National party smashed the watersiders' union after a six-month lockout. The Wellington Trades Council leaders were summoned to a meeting with Labour Minister Hugh Watt, who failed to persuade them to call off the march, though he was able to get them to alter its focus a little. It was now set to end in a rally outside the Employers Federation building, a few hundred yards up the road from par-

liament.

The next day saw stoppages by drivers, boilermakers, hotel workers, watersiders, seamen, and others. Wellington's two daily newspapers did not appear that day, because of strike action by journalists and printers.

Over 3,000 workers, supported by a contingent of university and teachers-college students, went on the march. They carried union banners and placards with such slogans as "Labour government must end anti-union legislation"; "Take the dagger out, Kirk"; "We didn't vote you in to bash unions." At times marchers took up the chant "One, two, three, four, Down with anti-union laws."

At the rally, Trades Council and FOL speakers made militant-sounding speeches about the need to put a stop to the use of injunctions against unions. However, when one unionist pointed out that they should be demonstrating outside parliament on this issue, his remarks were greeted with applause, showing clearly what a delicate operation the top union leaders were faced with, in trying to deflect the anti-government sentiment.

Labour Government Exposed

In the wake of the dispute, the Labour government promised to "have a look" at the legislation that allows employers to take out injunctions against unions, but it remains to be seen precisely what action it will take on this. At the moment it is weighing up the relative pressures from either side. On the one hand are the capitalists, the press, and the National party politicians, who are screaming about the need to uphold "law and order" and not to give in to the pressure of the dangerous militant unionists. On the other is the trade-union movement, which has demonstrated by its vote at FOL and Labour party conferences, and by the mighty protest that greeted Andersen's jailing, that the use of injunctions against unions will not be tolerated.

By its failure to side with the unions and by its extreme threats, especially those of Norman Kirk (who in the midst of the dispute assailed the leaders of the previous National government for failing to do a proper job of smashing the Seamen's Union in 1971), the Labour government has

exposed itself as a staunch defender of capitalist interests. Because of its unwillingness to defend the trade-union movement, upon which the Labour party is based, right-wingers are taking advantage of the confusion, with the assistance of the anti-union news media. Recent opinion polls have shown a drop in support for Labour, some of which has gone to the National party.

As it moves towards election year 1975, the Labour party leadership is faced with a major dilemma: how to accommodate to the mounting pressures from both sides.

Elected on a wave of enthusiasm, the new Labour government, by a number of moves, convinced many people that it had a different approach—particularly in the area of foreign policy. The last troops were withdrawn from Vietnam, the government pressured the NZ Rugby Union to cancel a tour by South Africa's Springboks, and it sent a New Zealand navy frigate as a show of protest against French nuclear testing in the Pacific. For the first half of its three-year term, Labour enjoyed a good deal of confidence, and the number of people involved in radical protest activity dropped dramatically in com-

parison with the last years of National party rule.

But more recently things have been changing. Several government actions have sparked protests, some of which have been concerned with entirely new issues and have involved groups of workers who have never before taken action.

Pensioners have been on demonstrations to demand a decent old-age benefit in place of the present starvation allowance. Kindergarten student-teachers and dental nurses have made gains by marching on parliament after continually being rebuffed in negotiations. Pacific islanders and others reacted strongly against the midnight arrests and deportation of Tongan migrant workers who had overstayed their miserable three-month entry permits.

People are beginning to see more clearly the meaning of some of Labour's other policies. Despite Kirk's noises about a "new independent foreign policy" for New Zealand, the government remains in the anti-communist SEATO and ANZUS alliances and continues to support the reactionary regime in Malaysia. NZ troops remain in Malaysia and Singapore.

In June Kirk launched a personal



Angry unionists in July 5 Wellington march demanded end to use of injunctions against striking workers.

smear attack against a leader of the Wellington Tenants Protection Association, a group that had been involved in squatting in unused state flats. He also aroused the anger of the Homosexual Law Reform Society, which had been patiently lobbying MPs since Labour took office and which had been told that a reform measure was likely to be introduced at some stage. Kirk put his foot down on this issue in the Labour parliamentary caucus, and pressurised those Labour MPs who favoured reform into accepting the fact that no such reform will be proposed by a Labour MP. Some National party MPs are now considering themselves introducing a private member's bill for reform of the anti-homosexual laws.

The Labour government's backtracking on this issue has dimmed the hopes of those seeking a reform of the abortion laws, which, like the anti-gay laws, have prompted rising protest over the past two or three years.

Norman Kirk also reduced his credibility with many people earlier this year by his threatening remarks against radio talk-back shows, some of which are hosted by radical or liberal announcers and are very popular at present.

The government's ability to keep the unions in line, with the help of a cooperative union leadership, was demonstrated by the FOL's acceptance of a freeze on wages, which was instituted in August 1973 and renewed in April this year. However, the reaction to the government's anti-union stance over injunctions proves that this hold over the unions is by no means total.

The months from now to the elections scheduled for late 1975 are likely to see the government further alienating its working-class and other supporters, who want to see some genuine social change. In this context new issues and new audiences will be opening up for revolutionary socialists to advance a clear alternative to the reformist misleaders now occupying the Treasury benches. □

Discipline First, and the Rest Follows

The Dominican government recently advertised in the *New York Times*, urging U.S. investors "to take advantage of the abundant, willing, industrious, disciplined and eager-to-learn labor pool—at about the lowest cost level in the world today."

Ex-President on Trial for 'Subversion'

The witch-hunt unleashed earlier this year by South Korean President Park Chung Hee struck its most prominent victim July 16 with the opening of the trial of Yun Po Sun, a former president of the country.

Yun, who is 77 years old, is accused of having given the equivalent of \$1,000 to student demonstrators protesting government repression. Kim Chi Ha, South Korea's best-known young poet, and thirteen others were sentenced to death after being convicted on a similar charge July 13. On July 20, five of the death sentences, including Kim's, were commuted to life imprisonment.

On July 15, Kang Shin Ok, the lawyer who defended Kim in court, was himself arrested, reportedly because he had denounced the death sentence imposed on his client.

On July 16, three more prominent Koreans were brought before special courts-martial on charges of aiding the demonstrators. They are Park Hyong Kyu, a Presbyterian minister; Kim Dong Gil, a professor of American studies at Yonsei University in Seoul; and Kim Chan Kook, dean of the theological seminary at Yonsei.

On July 18, South Korean authorities arrested Kim Young Sam, vice-president of the New Democratic party (NDP), the major opposition party. Kim had scheduled a news conference that morning at which he planned to call for a halt to the sweeping emergency decrees imposed by Park earlier this year. In this case, the arrest was apparently intended as a warning, for Kim was released later in the day.

The new arrests are part of a lengthening series of detentions, secret trials, and convictions aimed at suppressing opposition to Park. Most of the arrests are based on an April 3 decree making it a crime punishable by death for anyone "to advocate, instigate, propagate, broadcast, report, publish, or otherwise communicate to others such act or acts as are prohibited" by earlier emergency measures.

At least 253 persons are known to have been arrested on charges of violating the decree. Ninety-one have so

far been convicted, and about 100 more are expected to be brought to trial soon.

The trials are held in secret. Foreign correspondents are barred from attending, and the tightly controlled South Korean press does not report the proceedings. Only the defendant's lawyer and a close family member are allowed to attend.

Among the cases known to have been decided recently are the following:

Fifty-three Koreans and two Japanese were found guilty in a mass trial ending July 13. Fourteen of the defendants, including Kim Chi Ha, were sentenced to death, and fifteen were sentenced to life imprisonment. According to a report in the July 17 *New York Times*, "Relatives of some of the defendants, who were largely students, said they had been severely tortured during interrogation."

Chang Jun Ha, the publisher of a leading South Korean scholarly journal, was sentenced to fifteen years in prison last February for protesting the Park regime and calling for a reduction in its dictatorial powers.

In eight other known trials during February and March, thirty-five Koreans were given terms ranging from one to seventeen years in prison. Those jailed included members of the NDP, medical students, and students at Ewha Women's University.

In addition, Kim Dae Jung, an opposition political leader kidnapped by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in Japan last August, is currently before the civil courts. He is appealing a conviction on charges of having violated South Korean election laws in 1967 and 1971.

A protest of the trials signed by prominent U.S. academic and religious figures and a number of Korean residents of the United States was presented to Washington July 14. Among the signers were Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. ambassador to Japan, and Professor John K. Fairbank, chairman of East Asian studies at Harvard University.

In Hong Kong, a committee has

been formed to launch an international campaign of solidarity with the South Korean students. The group has called for worldwide protests

against the Park regime July 22 and has scheduled a demonstration in front of the South Korean Consulate in Hong Kong for that day. □

Argentina

Bonus Won't Compensate for Inflation

[The bourgeois press around the world has made much of one of Maria Estela Martínez de Perón's first actions on taking office as president of Argentina. On July 8 she granted each Argentine worker a bonus equivalent to a full month's pay instead of the half month's pay they normally receive at the end of June. (Since Perón's first term in office more than twenty years ago, Argentine workers have received an annual bonus of one month's pay—half at the end of June, half at the end of December.)

[Demands that the full bonus be paid at the end of June had for some weeks been the focus of labor's challenge to the oppressive economic policies of the Peronists. Even top labor bureaucrats were forced to give lip service to the demand, though they have been willing partners, together with representatives of the regime and big business, in the Gran Paritaria (the Great Parity Commission), which was created for the purpose of reaching class-collaborationist agreements among the higher-ups on such questions.

[However, the true meaning of "la señora Presidente's" concession in granting the bonus was spelled out by the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International) in the July 10 issue of their weekly, *Avanzada Socialista*. The following translation of that article is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The cost of living during the last two months has undergone a significant rise. Official statistics reveal that the increase during the month of June was 3.9 percent, while in May it had reached 4.7 percent. Even taking into account that such statistics express only part of the reality (they are

based on official prices, not on those that really must be paid; they are figured on controlled rents, not considering rents after the control regulations were repealed; etc.), the reports of the secretary of commerce have been converted into a public confession of the inflation that robs us of part of our wages each month, even though the ruling class is not lowering our take-home pay outright.

At the same time, these reports are proof of the pressing need for an immediate readjustment of wages and pensions—not to improve the standard of living or to "break the Social Pact," but simply to prevent our falling below the miserable subsistence level at which we have been living for many years.

All indications permit us to project climbing indexes of inflation in the coming months, or, at the very best, a leveling-off of the trend. (This month, for example, prices will reflect the completed transfer of higher costs of imported goods.) Assuming that wages remain frozen and that this

projection, which is in consonance with the aim of the Social Pact, bears up, the rate of inflation will have easily passed 40 percent, exceeding the average rate of 30.5 percent for the period 1955–72.

In spite of such indicators, the government required several weeks of long debates and agitated consultation to decide on paying the [additional] half bonus in July. This government has been capable of authorizing price increases with the stroke of a pen, by the unilateral decision of the secretary of commerce. But to grant the half bonus, it had to convoke the Gran Paritaria, consult specialists, negotiate massive credits, and approve the step at a meeting of the national cabinet. All that to achieve the equivalent of an 8 percent raise in monthly income between now and the end of the year, while the current pace of inflation is such that the increase will be absorbed in only two months.

But there is more to it than that: Since the businessmen claimed that they did not have the wherewithal to finance such a "spectacular" raise, the government will grant them credit, the interest rates on which, added to the famous bonus, will result in a 12 percent increase in wage costs (*El Economista*, June 28, 1974). And, since the government has also guaranteed the "profitability" of the enterprises, this increase will definitely be transferred to prices through the use of well-known accounting tricks.

The real financial situation of the enterprises has been revealed by those

Decline in the Purchasing Power of Argentine Workers

The *Avanzada Socialista* article was accompanied by a chart showing the drop in buying power of Argentine workers over the past twenty-six years. The editors explained that they chose 1948, one of the periods when the working class enjoyed its highest standard of living; December 1972, one of the final months of the military dictatorship, marked by a dramatic fall in real wages; and July 1974. The chart shows the quantity of various foods that one hour's labor by an industrial worker could purchase in each of these years.

	Purchasing Power of One Hour's Wages		
	1948	1972	1974
Beef (in kilograms)	1.760	0.543	0.507
Milk (in liters)	7.000	3.800	3.805
Fish (in kilograms)	2.141	0.760	0.710
Lard (in kilograms)	0.526	0.330	0.353
Eggs (by the dozen)	1.000	1.085	0.950
Cheese (in kilograms)	0.582	0.542	0.380

unions that have carried out important wage struggles in past months, winning raises of up to 100,000 pesos [US\$100] per month. To strengthen the capitalists, both the government and the bureaucracy sanction or threaten unions demanding raises (in the cases of the spaghetti producers and printers), or the workers in single factories (the Bagley case).

According to official policy, there is only one "undertaking" that does not deserve an adjustment of its "low profitability": the undertaking of the worker, manager of the only mer-

chandise he has to offer on the capitalist market—his labor power, for which he receives a perpetually falling real wage. In addition, the worker is the only "manager" who cannot request credit to compensate for bankruptcy, nor hire accountants to falsify his books, nor cheat on weights, nor lower the quality of his "product."

In short, the half bonus cannot substitute for an immediate wage readjustment. The working class needs an increase in income every month, because prices rise more often than once a year. □

Firings, Inflation, Shortages Continue

No Improvement Seen in Chilean Economy

Approximately 350,000 Chilean workers—15 percent of the active work force—are currently unemployed; Edgardo Rojas, vice-president of the Chilean CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores—United Federation of Workers), told *Le Monde* in an interview on the economic situation in his country. Along with Rojas, six leaders of Chilean leftist parties participated in the discussion, a summary of which appeared in the paper's July 12 edition.

The dismissal of additional tens of thousands of civil servants has been announced, Rojas continued, referring to one of Pinochet's "austerity measures"—a cutback of 20 percent in the number of public employees. Undoubtedly, workers in the social-service and education sectors will be hardest hit, since the military has made it clear it is opposed to such programs.

Those already fired were primarily members and sympathizers of organizations that supported the former Unidad Popular government.

Juan Vega, leader of the MAPU-OC (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria-Obrero y Campesino—Workers and Farmers Movement for United People's Action) and former Chilean ambassador to Cuba, referred in the interview to another aspect of the economic crisis:

"The minimum wage is 18,000 escudos [US\$22.50 per month]. But a kilogram of bread costs 240 escudos. A family of five that eats two kilograms of bread daily thus spends

close to 15,000 escudos a month for this one food alone."

The Chilean junta is scheduled to raise wages 20 percent in July to compensate for inflation, but it is obvious that the increase is totally inadequate to meet even basic needs.

Rojas pointed out that a sharp reduction in the purchasing power of the population has occurred despite the fact that the workweek has been increased from forty-four to forty-eight hours.

Another problem was raised by Edgardo Enríquez of the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) at the *Le Monde* round table: shortages of sugar, cooking oil, cigarettes, and detergents.

Socialist party leader Carlos Altamirano added that, except in copper, production in all spheres, especially semidurable consumer goods, is scheduled to be cut.

Turning to yet another element in the situation, Eduardo Aquevedo of the MAPU stated, "The leaders of the junta have in mind a model: a boom à la Brazil."

To achieve that, Altamirano interjected, the junta must obtain foreign investment. And despite all efforts of the Pinochet regime, this has not been forthcoming in the necessary amount.

In view of these extreme economic difficulties, Pinochet's appointment of a new cabinet July 10 was closely watched. However, the faces in the cabinet remained the same—except for

those added to fill a few additional posts. Pointedly missing was former Foreign Minister Admiral Ismael Huerta, rumored to be in disfavor for causing the junta bad publicity in a recent dispute over granting safe conduct to seventy-one exiles who remained stranded in the Mexican Embassy in Santiago.

All the posts were filled by military men except in the area of the economy, where three civilians were appointed. Fernando Leniz and Jorge Cavas remain in charge; economist Raúl Saez was added to the cabinet later.

Pinochet's decision to maintain the status quo in almost all respects in his cabinet may be due in part to a dilemma he faces in implementing his economic objectives. In order to obtain the massive economic aid that would enable him to carry out a "boom à la Brazil," he must convince the imperialist powers of the stability of his regime. Thus, his reappointments to economic posts in his cabinet are designed to reassure investors that he intends to continue his hard line on bread-and-butter questions.

But the other side of the Pinochet regime's image continues to cause scandals that even the imperialists find difficult to overlook—the continued gross denials of human and democratic rights that are public knowledge the world over.

As Vega explained to *Le Monde*: "The military wants to improve its international image to obtain credits. . . . But if it lifts the lid on civil liberties, it gives the resistance the opportunity to begin a new resurgence."

Unlikely Story of the Month

Herbert Kalmbach, who was Nixon's personal attorney until the Watergate scandal developed, was reported to be hurt by the president's failure to send him "some word of sympathy or encouragement" before Kalmbach began serving a six-month prison term July 1. Kalmbach was sentenced after pleading guilty to two counts of illegally soliciting campaign funds for Nixon in the 1972 campaign.

An acquaintance explained Kalmbach's attitude to a *New York Times* reporter: "Herb Kalmbach is as honorable a man as you'll ever know and he feels that he is going to prison because he innocently sought, perhaps naively and with insufficient regard for his own position, to protect the President from being falsely accused of the wrongdoing of others."

Hearings Begin for Corvalán, UP Officials



LUIS CORVALAN

Pretrial hearings for Luis Corvalán, general secretary of the Chilean Communist party, have begun in Santiago, according to the July 12 Paris daily *Le Monde*. Also in pretrial hearings are other supporters of the Unidad Popular regime. Although *Le Monde* did not name them, presumably they are part of the same group of forty top functionaries of the Allende government who had been scheduled to go on trial with Corvalán. (See *Intercontinental Press*, June 24, p. 833.)

The June 28 issue of *Chile, Informativo Internacional* of Buenos Aires reported that two of this group of defendants—Daniel Vergara, Communist party leader and undersecretary of the interior in the Allende government, and Osvaldo Puccio, private secretary to Allende—had been hospitalized: Vergara undergoing intensive care because of a "partial paralysis of the face," according to the Chilean bourgeois press; Puccio suffering a "slight cardiac occlusion." This is the second hospitalization for both of them since their arrest in September, but each time they have been returned to prison to await trial.

An Agence France-Presse dispatch in the July 5 *Le Monde* reported that

100 leftist activists were released from a military camp in the north of Chile. Also reported released as of July 3 was Jirón Vargas, former personal physician to Salvador Allende. However, Vargas—and most likely the 100 leftists—remains under house arrest, as do the majority of Chileans who have passed through Chief of State Pinochet's jails in the ten months since the military coup.

Evidence that parole and house ar-

rest have become postimprisonment norms was revealed in a lengthy report by Montréal attorneys Bernard S. Mergler and Georges A. Lebel, based on a week-long trip they made to Chile in mid-June.

Meanwhile, the Pinochet junta continues its efforts to obtain extradition of citizens who have fled the country. *Chile, Informativo Internacional* reported sixteen extradition petitions in process for various political and industrial leaders and the rejection by Argentine authorities of the extradition requested for Jaime Flores and Nancy Barrionuevo, who had worked as functionaries at the nationalized Cerrillos Copper Company before the coup. □

U.S. Immigration Service Accused

Officials Seen Suppressing New Scandal

Evidence of widespread corruption in the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is being studiously ignored by both Congress and the Justice Department, according to a report in the July 15 *New York Times*. The article, by Denny Walsh, quotes "well-placed Government sources" as saying that blackmail information accumulated by high INS officials is behind the failure to investigate charges of corruption.

Much of the information so far available focuses on Norman D. Summers, who spent twenty years as an INS officer in posts on the Mexican border. Walsh reported that "according to agents of three Federal agencies and Justice Department documents in the possession of The New York Times, Mr. Summers was called upon by his superiors in the immigration service to use his connections in Mexico to help 'compromise' United States officials visiting the Mexican border."

"The agents said, and the documents show, that Mr. Summers has told the Justice Department and Congressional investigators of being involved in numerous instances in which officials were 'entertained' in ways that would 'compromise' them."

Summers at one point offered to provide evidence and testimony on corruption in the INS in exchange for immunity for himself. This offer

was refused, and he was indicted in April 1973 on thirteen counts of misconduct in his office. But on July 3 of this year, after Summers "met with a high-ranking immigration officer on whom he has documentation implicating the officer in repeated criminal conduct," the Justice Department dismissed twelve of the thirteen counts against him.

Walsh's sources explained that Summers has documented evidence against top INS officials. These officials in turn have "a record of all the favors, some illegal and many irregular, that they have done for members of Congress and the executive branch." Because of this chain, the sources said, a subcommittee of the House of Representatives that is supposed to be investigating the INS has been ordered "not to proceed to the point of embarrassing members of Congress."

In practice, that means not proceeding very far at all. Among the "embarrassing" details that could come out, according to Walsh's sources, is the fact that the INS is involved in "supplying [to Congressional and government officials] illegal aliens as household domestics."

The much touted "post-Watergate morality," it seems, is not strong enough to abolish slavery in the United States. □

Young Workers Increasingly Dissatisfied

The radicalization that began with student youth in the United States has had a profound impact on the political attitudes of most nonstudent youth, according to a survey conducted in the spring of 1973 and released in May of this year. Carried out by the Daniel Yankelovich research organization and funded by various ruling-class agencies, the survey was based on 3,522 interviews with both college and noncollege youth from 16 to 25 years old.

The survey opens by stating: "These first few years of the decade of the 1970's point to vast changes in the complexion and outlook of an entire generation of young people. Indeed, so startling are the shifts in values and beliefs between the late 1960's when our youth studies were first launched and the present time that social historians of the future should have little difficulty in identifying the end of one era and the beginning of a new one."

This shift in social attitudes is attributed to the impact of the Vietnam War and "the diffusion of a set of new values that incubated on the nation's campuses in the 1960's and have now spread out to the entire present youth generation."

Among the findings included in the survey are the following:

"... more than six out of ten young adults today believe that the society is democratic in name only. They believe that 'special interests' run the political machinery of the nation, with little true participation by the mass of American citizens.

"Four out of five are critical of the nation's foreign policy, and predict that involvements similar to Vietnam are inevitable. . . .

"More than 90 per cent of all young people hold that business is too concerned with its own profits, and insufficiently concerned with serving the public."

In 1969, about 24% of noncollege youth believed that "big business needs reform or elimination." This figure jumped to 45% by 1973. (For college students it went from 37% to 54%.)

Similarly, in 1969 about 44% of the noncollege youth in the sample thought that "political parties need reform or elimination," while in 1973, about 64% thought so.

Among Black, Chicano, and Puerto Rican youth, "the prevailing view is that this is a sick society (55%) and not democratic (76%). They are disheartened by what they feel is rampant racism."

On the question of women's liberation, the findings show that "a majority of young people today believe that women should receive equal pay for equal work, that women should be free to take the initiative in matters of sex, that men and women share the same essential human nature. . . ."

Opposition to abortion by noncol-

Manx Nationalist Party Registers Growth

[The following article is from the June 21 issue of *Welsh Nation*, the English-language weekly organ of Plaid Cymru, the Welsh Nationalist party. The Isle of Man—or Mann—which lies between Ireland and Scotland, is named after the Gaelic god of the sea, Manannan Mac Lir. It was the center of the Norse kingdom of the Hebrides; its legislature, the Tynwald, dates from the old Norse *Thing*. Laws are still formally promulgated in Manx, a Celtic language closely related to Scottish Gaelic. Manx is also used by the nationalists for symbolic purposes. The Tynwald has certain local government powers but the nationalists demand greater autonomy.]

* * *

Mec Vannin [Children of the Isle of Man], the Manx Nationalist party, have been steadily gaining in support in recent months, progress that was marked particularly by their successes in local elections and in good attendances at functions they have organised.

Mec Vannin is now the largest political party in Mann.

This development is not all that spectacular, perhaps: the remarkable stagnation of political life in Mann in the last couple of generations plus the associated view that no true Manxman was interested in political parties has left a vacuum

lege youth dropped from 64% in 1969 to 48% in 1973; disapproval of homosexual relations declined from 72% to 47% in the same period.

On the attitudes of young workers toward their jobs, the survey comments: "They want interesting and challenging work but they assume that their employers cannot—or will not—provide it. By their own say-so, they are inclined to take 'less crap' than older workers. They are not as automatically loyal to the organization as their fathers, and they are far more cognizant of their own needs and rights. . . . They want more freedom and opportunity and will struggle to achieve it."

The survey then warns its ruling-class sponsors about this shifting attitude of young workers: "That the majority of noncollege youth face the prospect of growing difficulties with their jobs must be a matter of serious concern to the society. These young people, after all, represent the great bulk of the new labor force." □

which any group of reasonably determined people could begin to fill.

Mec Vannin's recent growth, nevertheless, remains significant.

Recently there were local elections to appoint members to the Board of Education (central and local government in Mann operates through boards).

Mec Vannin gained seats in two out of the three elections, topping the poll in one case. Two thousand five hundred and thirty-five votes out of a total of 6,557 [the population of the Isle of Man is about 50,000] were for Mec Vannin candidates.


It seems very likely the party will win seats at the next general election for Tynwald. This prospect has alarmed many people in Mann, among them the leader writer of the determinedly anti-Nationalist *Isle of Man Weekly Times*.

This writer headed a recent outburst "Beware of the Nationalists" and takes Mec Vannin to task for attacking merchant banks and their activities in Mann.

A lurid picture is painted of the "ruin" which will follow if Mec Vannin is voted into power. A regular feature of attacks on Mec Vannin has been the allegation that the party has no coherent politics.

The party has replied in a news sheet that recent legislation recommended in Tynwald has been inspired by nationalist pressure. An example of this is the proposed Landlord-Tenant Protection Bill. □

AROUND THE WORLD



Army Takes Over Asmara

The Ethiopian army on July 17 took control of Asmara, the country's second largest city, and arrested the mayor and the governor of Eritrea province. A radio broadcast from Asmara reported that the army had imposed a curfew and stationed guards at key installations and government buildings.

The armed forces committee, the directing body of the rebel army, already controls Addis Ababa. Following the arrest of sixty high officials in recent weeks, the committee effectively controls the national government. On July 15 the defense minister, Lieutenant General Abebe Abye, was added to the list of those detained. He was the first member of Premier Endalkachew Makonnen's cabinet to be arrested.

Associated Press reported that "political observers in the capital" believe the troops may have taken over in Asmara "as a precaution against a surprise attack by the guerrillas of the Eritrean Liberation Front." The army had already intervened there July 12 to tear down posters favorable to the Front.

No U.S. Police Equipment for Kremlin Bureaucrats

The Nixon administration on July 19 announced new regulations designed to prevent the sale of "law enforcement" equipment to the Soviet Union. Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent said that specific licenses would be required for sales by U.S. companies to the Soviet Union of "any instruments and equipment particularly useful in crime control and detection."

Two weeks earlier, a member of Congress had complained that a number of U.S. companies were planning to display such equipment at a Moscow trade fair in August. A number of members said that items such as voice-identification devices and lie detectors would be used by the Kremlin's political police against dissidents, a valid enough point despite the motives of those who raised it.

In announcing the new regulations, Dent said that the U.S. government was concerned "with the potential uses to which

such equipment could be put, and had a continuing interest in the welfare of persons who seek to exercise their fundamental rights." He did not indicate, however, that Nixon plans to ban the use of such equipment in the United States.

Turkish Amnesty Extended

The Turkish government began releasing the first of thousands of political prisoners July 13. An estimated 5,700 prisoners are being held.

An amnesty bill passed in May specifically excluded political prisoners, but the Constitutional Court ruled at the beginning of July that this exclusion violated the constitution.

Exxon Profits Rise Again

Exxon, the world's largest oil corporation, reported July 19 that earnings in the second quarter of 1974 were \$850 million, a 66.7 percent increase over the second quarter of 1973. Earnings in the first quarter of this year were up 39 percent over 1973. The company's earnings for all of 1973 were 59 percent above 1972.

The figures, representing only profits paid out to shareholders, amount to only about one-third of the corporation's total profits. Reinvested profits for the second quarter totaled \$1,600 million, compared with \$1,103 million last year.

Israel Reports Decline in Tourism, Immigration

The climate of insecurity in Israel has been reflected in sharp declines in tourism and immigration. According to a report in the July 9 *Jerusalem Post*, the chairman of the Israel Hotels Association told reporters that the tourism industry was undergoing a grave crisis. "Instead of an annual growth of 15 per cent upon which the industry was based," the *Post* reported, "there has been a drop of 30 per cent since 1972." Some 600,000 tourists visited Israel last year, about one-fifth the number who went to nearby Greece.

Former Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir announced July 5 that immigration to

Israel had dropped by about 30 percent this year. Chief among the reasons he cited for the decline were "security problems," housing, and the difficulty of absorbing new immigrants into Israeli society. Emigration from Israel, on the other hand, may be expected to increase. A public opinion poll published in the Hebrew daily *Haaretz* in March showed that one out of five Israeli youths is considering leaving the country.

Paris Explodes Two More Bombs

The French government exploded two more nuclear bombs in its current test series on July 6 and 8. Both explosions occurred in the Tuamotu Archipelago, 800 miles southeast of Tahiti. New Zealand Prime Minister Norman Kirk told a press conference July 8 that the first test in the series, on June 17, had produced radioactive fallout "both here and in the territories around us."

U.S., East Germany Open Talks

A U.S. State Department spokesman announced July 12 that negotiations concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations with East Germany would begin July 15. "The United States and the German Democratic Republic," the spokesman said, "have agreed to commence substantive negotiations on questions connected with the establishment of diplomatic relations."

The United States and Canada are the only NATO countries that have not yet recognized the East German government.

Portuguese Fishermen on Strike

More than 200 Portuguese fishermen are on strike in St. John's, Newfoundland, on the east coast of Canada, to back demands for higher pay. They work for the White Fleet, which has not granted pay increases since the officers' coup that overthrew the Caetano dictatorship.

The fishermen are part of a fleet of about 4,000 Portuguese who fish the Grand Banks off Newfoundland every year. They normally replenish supplies in St. John's. The striking fishermen have remained in the Portuguese Fishermen's

Centre for more than two weeks, demanding a higher percentage of their catch value, a higher guaranteed minimum income, and a \$500 lump-sum payment for work done since the officers' revolt.

The striking fishermen reportedly gave a cold reception to a union official who flew from Lisbon to try to persuade them to return to work during negotiations.

Bukovsky Transfer Was Punishment for Hunger Strike in Camp

The New York-based Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners has provided additional information about the transfer of dissident Vladimir Bukovsky from a Perm labor camp to Vladimir prison. Bukovsky was transferred on May 27 as punishment for participating in a hunger strike in solidarity with Yevhen Pronyuk.

Pronyuk, a former associate of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Science Institute of Philosophy, was arrested in the mass roundup of Ukrainian dissidents in 1972 and sentenced to seven years imprisonment and five years exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." He was sent to the same labor camp in which Bukovsky was confined.

In May of this year Pronyuk fell ill but was forced by the camp administration to continue working. When the administration forbade a visit by his wife, a massive hunger strike in support of Pronyuk was begun in the camp. Bukovsky was among those who participated, even though he had only recently finished another hunger strike and is in poor health.

Troops Fire on Angolan Demonstrators

Colonialist troops fired on two demonstrations in Luanda July 15. First reports said that nearly 20 persons were killed and 15 wounded. Other accounts put the number of dead at 12 and of wounded at 60.

Elsewhere in the Angolan capital the same day, some 30,000 persons attended the funeral of four persons killed the previous week in two nights of fighting between Africans and white settlers.

Brezhnev Calls for Meeting of World Communist Parties

Soviet CP leader Leonid Brezhnev called publicly July 20 for a world meeting of Communist parties. The Soviet bureaucrats have been pushing for such a gathering for some time as a weapon in their quarrel with Peking. Moscow has recently obtained formal endorsement for the project from the Bulgarian and Hungarian parties.

Brezhnev made his remarks in a speech

in Katowice, Poland. "Internationalism," he said, "is one of the most important and noble qualities of the working class, and we are glad to see that working-class solidarity keeps growing on a world scale. It is not fortuitous that many Communist and workers' parties now stress the need for preparing and holding new international meetings that will help assess together the course of events, find the most effective ways and means of struggle for common goals, for peace and security of the peoples under new conditions. We agree with this and we believe that the time for such meetings has come."

Shikhanovich Reported Freed

Soviet dissident Yuri Shikhanovich is reported to have been released from a mental hospital where he had been confined since last November. Shikhanovich, a mathematician, was accused of circulating "anti-Soviet propaganda." Prior to his confinement in the mental hospital, he had been held incommunicado by the police for fourteen months.

London Ends Force-Feeding of Political Prisoners

British Home Secretary Roy Jenkins told Parliament July 17 that the government will no longer order the force-feeding of hunger strikers in British jails. Force-feeding of striking Irish political prisoners earlier this year aroused widespread protest.

Jenkins made it clear, however, that the new policy did not indicate any intention to comply with legitimate demands of striking prisoners. A prisoner who refuses food, he said, will be "plainly and categorically warned that the consequent and inevitable deterioration in his health may be allowed to continue without medical intervention unless he specifically requests it."

Brainwashing in Philippines

Some 350 political prisoners of the Marcos dictatorship are being subjected to manipulation by psychiatrists and psychologists to change their "attitudes," according to an agency of the Catholic church in the Philippines. In a document released July 18, the National Secretariat of Social Action quoted Brigadier General Cicero Campos, the officer in charge of the program, as saying: "Call it what you may, call it brainwashing or whatnot, but simply we have to change the attitude of these persons, and that is not a simple job to do."

The document also quoted Campos as saying that there were around 5,000 per-

sons under arrest as of March 15. About 93 percent were described as "criminal elements," while the remainder were subject to "rehabilitation" in the psychiatric program.

Ex-Minister Slain in Buenos Aires

Former Argentine Minister of the Interior Arturo Mor Roig was assassinated July 15 in Buenos Aires. He had become one of the most hated symbols of the military dictatorship, which came to an end in May 1973 with the election of the Peronists to office. As minister of the interior, Mor Roig was responsible for countless atrocities against jailed trade unionists, students, and revolutionists who opposed the regime. It was during his term that the Trelew massacre of thirteen defenseless political prisoners took place inside Rawson Prison.

Iraqi Army Reported Gaining Over Kurdish Rebels

Kurdish rebels are reported to have been driven back into the mountains by the Iraqi army, which has now thrown almost all of its 90,000 men into the battle. Leaders of the Kurdish guerrillas declare they can hold out indefinitely in their mountain strongholds.

In addition to the ground attacks, the Iraqi central government has continued its daily bombing raids on Kurdish villages. According to a July 17 report by a correspondent for the *London Observer*, the raids have paralyzed normal life in the villages, forcing large numbers of civilians to seek shelter in caves. More than 20,000 Kurdish women and children have fled across the border to Iran to escape the bombings.

Shah Buys Share of Krupp

The Iranian government and the Krupp industrial empire in West Germany announced July 17 that Iran was purchasing a 25.04 percent interest in Krupp's steelworks division. The agreement also included a provision for the shah to name a member of the supervisory board of the parent Krupp corporation. In addition, the two sides will establish a joint investment company in Zurich, which will handle all of Krupp's foreign investments and future joint investments agreed upon by Krupp and the shah. The Swiss corporation will have an initial capitalization of 10 million Swiss francs (about US\$3 million).

Financial terms of the agreement were not disclosed, but unofficial estimates were that the shah's regime would pay Krupp \$75 million.

The 'Explosive Inflation' They Failed to Foresee

By Dick Roberts

[This is the first of a series of two articles.]

The capitalist world is undergoing its worst inflation in history. Stock markets are down in most major capitalist countries. Despite decades of claiming that the 1930s "can never happen again," today a number of experts believe that precisely this possibility once again faces world capitalism.

By the second week of July, the stock market in New York had fallen to its lowest level since 1970. Wall Street has lost more paper values in this stock slide than it did in 1929. Of course, it started with more money to lose.

Even worse hit is the London Stock Exchange, down 30 percent since January 1, to a fifteen-year low. The Paris Bourse fell 19.4 percent in the same period. Stock declines have been registered in West Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, Canada, and Australia. Only in Spain, Japan, and Sweden have markets advanced in the first half of 1974.

To a large extent these declines are caused by high interest rates. Interest rates on bonds have soared to record highs, thus drawing money out of stock markets. But these high interest rates are merely a reflection of the more fundamental problem — seemingly uncontrollable world inflation.

The 24-nation Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) declared after a recent meeting in Paris that as of May, consumer prices were rising simultaneously in the major industrialized countries by more than 1 percent per month, for the sixth consecutive month.

Real wages are declining across the globe; in many underdeveloped countries with large populations, food shortages — exacerbated by spiraling feed grain and fertilizer prices — have reached crisis proportions.

A new tone of concern is appearing in the press. *Business Week* magazine, one of the soberer voices of New York

finance, published a special issue on the crisis of the world capitalist economy July 6. It warns of "social unrest" abroad.

"Plainly . . . every country faces a time limit," says *Business Week*. "Inflation must be brought under control fairly quickly or the very fabric of European society will begin to unravel. The signs of strain are most visible in Italy where still another governmental failure could bring the Communists closer to power than they have come in any Western European government. The worry in France is that workers and students will stage a repetition of their 1968 uprising."

When it comes to the question of explaining the world inflationary crisis, the bourgeois press expresses bewilderment. *Business Week* complained June 29: "Economists will remember 1974 for many things: for the squeeze on energy, for the breath-taking rise in prices, and perhaps for events yet to come. But mainly they will remember 1974 as the year the forecasters blew it."

For without exception, the major financial newspapers, and the corporate and academic sources they draw upon, "failed utterly to foresee the explosive inflation" — in other words, they missed the most important economic fact about 1974.

The prevailing tone in the capitalist press is that the "inflation came out of nowhere," that its causes are "too complex," that another depression is possible and even unavoidable.

'Kondratiev Cycles'?

An article with an extreme viewpoint that received widespread commentary appeared in the June 27 *New York Review of Books*.

British historian Geoffrey Barraclough believes that "The Coming Depression" is an inevitable result of long-term cycles in the capitalist economy. "We stand at the end of an era, of a fifty-year period of history, of the age of neocapitalism. We are entering

a period of radical readjustment, which is bound, before it ends, to breed misery and widespread suffering; it will be a traumatic experience, as long as it lasts. . . ."

"What seems certain is that some solution to the problem of uncontrolled inflation will have to be found, if the fabric of society is not to be torn apart. . . ."

In order to explain the cataclysm and, in effect, to remove it from its actual causes in the capitalist world, Barraclough revives the theories of the Russian economist Nikolai Kondratiev. Kondratiev headed the Business Research Institute in Moscow after the 1917 revolution until he was exiled to Siberia in 1930 by the Stalin regime.

Kondratiev believed that he had located a "50-year cycle" in the world economy which saw 25-year periods of upturn and 25-year periods of downturn. The shorter *business cycles* take place within Kondratiev's overall rising or falling frameworks.¹

Although Kondratiev did not make claims for his discovery beyond the

1. Kondratiev's three waves were as follows: First long wave, rising from the end of the 1780s or the 1790s until 1810-17 and declining until 1844-51. Second long wave, rising from 1844-51 until 1870-75 and declining until 1890-96. Third long wave, rising from 1890-96 until 1914-20. "The decline probably begins in the years 1914-20," Kondratiev said.

James B. Shuman and David Rosenau attempt to popularize Kondratiev's theory in *The Kondratieff Wave: The Future of America Until 1984 and Beyond* (New York: World Publishing, 1972), and it is this book that drew Barraclough's attention to Kondratiev. Shuman and Rosenau appear to believe that a new wave began in World War II, rose until about 1970 and is now in its decline. They believe the wave to be somehow inherent in capitalism without root causes. They write, "There seems to be no rational basis for the upswing of the long wave any more than there is for the downswing." (See Delta Book edition, p. 76.)

empirical data, he tended to imbue the "long wave" with powers of its own. "We believe ourselves justified," Kondratiev wrote, "in saying that the long waves, if existent at all, are a very important and essential factor in economic development, a factor the effects of which can be found in all the principal fields of social and economic life."²

Barracrough writes, "Kondratieff . . . forces us to view it [the current world situation] in historical perspective, not as the unhappy outcome of a series of historical accidents caused by a glut of foot-loose Eurodollars, the greed of Arab sheiks, the costs of the Vietnam war, or the machinations of overmighty multinational corporations (though all these and other things enter in), but rather as a particular phase in a recurrent phenomenon, which has its parallels in the past. . . ."

"Finally, if we accept the Kondratieff cycle, it conveys the frightening warning that we are only at the beginning of the 'lean years' and that we must suppose that things will get worse before they get better."

Long-term rising and falling trends of the world capitalist economy are a matter of historical record. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw an explosive expansion of European and American capitalism based on world conquest—Britain and France in the Far East, Arab East, and Africa; America in the Caribbean and Pacific, etc. This "division of world markets," as Lenin emphasized, directly paved the way to World War I.

The first world war was followed by years of almost uninterrupted economic crisis, within which the boom of the 1920s shortly gave way to the world disaster of the 1930s. Only the rebuilding of the imperialist military machines for a new round of terrible onslaught, in order again to "redivide" world markets, revived the economies.

Unlike the aftermath of the first world war, the aftermath of the second saw a new upswing of world capitalism. Above all, the United States, as the military and economic victor of the war, spread its investments inter-

nationally. The Bretton Woods monetary conference in 1944 based world trade and finance on the dollar. U. S. armies policed the underdeveloped world to make it safe for "democracy." Within this long-term upswing, the American boom from 1961 to 1969 was the biggest and longest in history.

The trouble with the Kondratieff-Barracrough explanation, however, is that it *removes* these long-term trends from history, by attributing the upswings and downswings to something inherent in the cycle rather than in the real world within which the cycle takes place. This approach, bordering on the metaphysical, was criticized by the Bolsheviks at the time, though they naturally did not punish Kondratieff as Stalin was later to do.

Trotsky wrote in 1923, "The periodic recurrence of minor [business] cycles is conditioned by the internal dynamics of capitalist forces, and manifests itself always and everywhere once the market comes into existence. As regards the large segments of the capitalist curve of development (fifty years) which Professor Kondratieff incautiously proposes to designate also as cycles, their character and duration are determined not by the internal interplay of capitalist forces but by those external conditions through whose channel capitalist development flows. The acquisition by capitalism of new countries and continents, the discovery of new natural resources, and, in the wake of these, such major facts of 'superstructural' order as wars and revolutions, determine the character and the replacement of ascending, stagnating, or declining epochs of capitalist development."³

Trotsky's criticism of Kondratieff indicates the question we should ask: What external conditions of world capitalism have brought about its stagnation in the 1970s?

World Competition

Barracrough would like to avoid this question. He recognizes that after World War II, U. S. rulers pursued policies aimed at expanding U. S. business abroad, and that the decisions taken at the Bretton Woods conference

3. See "The Curve of Capitalist Development" in Leon Trotsky, *Problems of Everyday Life and Other Writings on Culture and Science* (New York: Monad Press, 1973).

were designed to advance this aim. But, says Barracrough, "Considering the small part that foreign trade played (and still plays) in the United States economy, this obsession with foreign markets is easier to explain on psychological than on rational grounds."

To Barracrough, Dean Acheson, in 1944 an undersecretary of state, was merely "expressing a prevalent view" when he declared: "You don't have a problem of production. The United States has unlimited creative energy. The important thing is markets. . . . My contention is that we cannot have full employment and prosperity in the United States without the foreign markets."

Barracrough's argument is frequently repeated: Exports constitute only a small fraction of Gross National Product (for a long time they hovered around 4 percent of GNP). Consequently foreign markets are relatively unimportant.

This argument ignores the inherent necessity of capitalism to expand. As they became multinational corporations, for example, the Big Three U. S. auto trusts—General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler—swallowed more than 200 American auto competitors. Today GM sells one-third of the motor vehicles produced in the capitalist world.

Is this an irrational quirk to be explained only by peculiar attributes of three generations of GM top management? On the contrary, it flows from the laws of capitalist competition. A corporation that does not continue to expand its markets, or at least to defend them from competitors who are expanding, goes under. Monopoly, and ultimately *multinational monopoly*, reflect the competitive pressures of an increasingly international capitalist market.

The GNP percentage argument:

1. Overlooks the fact that a small percentage of GNP nevertheless can represent a large and crucial percentage of the markets of the individual industries actually involved. U. S. agricultural exports usually represent about 20 percent of total U. S. exports, and consequently they are less than 1 percent of U. S. GNP. Nevertheless, figures for 1970 (the year is intentionally chosen to precede the U. S.-USSR wheat-trade pact and the recent upsurge of U. S.

2. Nikolai D. Kondratieff, "The Long Waves in Economic Life," *The Review of Economic Statistics*, vol. XVII, no. 6, November 1935, pp. 105-115.

agricultural exports) showed that the United States exported 39 percent of its wheat, 15 percent of its corn (maize), 38 percent of its soybeans, and 71 percent of its rice.

Tell the New Orleans rice brokers that their preoccupation with foreign trade is "psychological"! Clearly these industries would go under without foreign markets. The preoccupation with foreign markets is (and has been for a century) an important determinant of U.S. foreign policy. It plays no small part in the cruel famine now affecting underdeveloped countries, as will be discussed in more detail below.

2. Overlooks the fact that the import-export trade, even when it is a fraction of a given industry, is crucial in the determination of the prices and profits of that industry. Foreign automobiles account for less than 20 percent of the U. S. auto market, but it is competition with foreign auto producers that forces the Big Three to build smaller and cheaper cars.

Less known is the case of steel. For a number of years the U. S. steel industry called the shots in world steel production and pricing. Toward the latter half of the 1960s, however, the formation of giant steel trusts in Japan and Europe seriously eroded this position. *Business Week* magazine complained December 14, 1968: "At least since World War II, purchasing agents have had a pretty easy time of it predicting price trends in steel: They were bound to be up. Certainly, the 1950s' bludgeon tactics of across-the-

board boosts in steel prices faded in the 1960s. But the upward trend did not alter. Now, though, the old order is changing, and early last month, Bethlehem Steel Corp., the No. 2 producer, slashed hot-rolled carbon sheets by \$25 a ton to 'meet domestic competition.'

"Steel executives couldn't recall a more drastic price cut since the rampant competition of the early 1930s, nor could they recall a more direct challenge to the industry's leader, U. S. Steel Corp." The heightened U. S. competition was a direct product of heightened world competition and the world glut of steel markets.

3. Overlooks, by emphasizing exports of goods, the equally crucial necessity of monopoly capitalism to export capital. For monopoly must restrict production in order to keep up prices. The resulting "surplus capital" must find markets.

Since World War II, U.S. industry has sent tens of billions of dollars abroad to build the foreign subsidiary corporations of U.S. multinationals. Many of the U.S. giants do more foreign business than they do domestic business. Exxon sells more oil in Europe than in the United States—and given the recent energy squeeze, it need hardly be added, at much greater monopoly profits. *The overseas sales of U.S. corporations constitute a "Gross National Product" that is the third largest in the world after the United States and Soviet*

Union.

Dean Acheson, not Professor Baraclough, accurately stated the needs and aspirations of U.S. imperialism for foreign markets.

Furthermore, it is precisely in the arena of international competition that we must locate the conditions that force world capitalism to its inflationary-recessionary crisis.

The markets that were opened up to U.S. (and foreign) goods and capital following World War II were not unlimited. The most significant factor was the rebuilding of Europe and Japan from the ashes of destruction. While the United States suffered frequent recessions following the war (it is now in its sixth postwar recession), for roughly fifteen years, into the mid-1960s, Europe and Japan sustained almost uninterrupted economic growth. These rising overseas economies cushioned the downturns in the United States.

A point was inevitably reached at which the rate of industrial expansion slowed down. Among the advanced capitalist countries, this was seen first in Europe and then in Japan.


"Europe's postwar economic boom that blended explosive growth, full employment, moderate inflation, and political stability is over," *Business Week* stated July 6. "Most European economies have slowed sharply, but the rate of inflation keeps going higher. Unemployment is up all over Europe and there is hardly a stable government in sight. . . .

"Japan's 'economic miracle' has skidded to a grinding halt, the victim of the oil crisis and soaring raw materials prices. Confronted by the highest inflation rate of any major industrial country, slackening consumer demand, and the slowest GNP growth in two decades, the nation is at an agonizing turning point in its industrial — and social — development."

Business Week, of course, but also commentators like Professor Baraclough, leave out the key role that U.S. policies have played in deepening the world crisis and touching off the recent round of inflation that threatens to bring down businesses and banks on the scale of the 1930s.

U.S. Imperialist Offensive

President Nixon's declaration of a "New Economic Policy," August 15,



"New York Times" map pictures rate of inflation in capitalist countries.

1971, marked a "turning point within a turning point" of world capitalist development. The signs of stagnation and deepening crisis were already on the horizon.

In 1964-65 the British Labour party, under Harold Wilson's leadership, imposed an "austerity" program on the workers, and by November 1967, the devaluation of the pound further signaled that the once mighty British imperialism would be among the first casualties of a new world capitalist crisis. Massive workers' struggles in France in 1968, in Italy since 1969, and on a broad scale in Britain since 1971, all reflected the stagnating standard of living in Europe, the beginning of the erosion of real wages, and the fact that the working class would not willingly accept the costs of a new round of capitalist contradictions.

In the United States real wages were essentially frozen beginning in 1965 under the impact of war-primed inflation. (They turned upward briefly in 1971-72, only to be hit all the harder by the food-price inflation that erupted in the spring of 1973.)

Within the context of increasingly "saturated" and inflationary national markets, world trade becomes even more critical. Multinational monopoly is forced to scan the globe for the "best buy" and the "highest-paying customer."

As inflation racked the United States in the late 1960s, billions of dollars worth of foreign goods poured into the American market; higher-priced U.S. goods found it increasingly difficult to meet competition in foreign markets; the inflated dollar grew weaker and weaker, periodically upsetting the international monetary system. To add further injury to American capitalism, workers struck the mightiest of all U.S. industries in late 1970 and showed signs that the pattern set at General Motors might be repeated elsewhere in the land.

This was the background to Richard Nixon's 1971 proclamation. In essence, his "New Economic Policy" signaled that U.S. imperialism would take the high road of trade and financial warfare on an international scale and, at home, use every instrument of the government to keep workers and wages in line. It is now possible to make initial estimates of the impact of Nixon's "New Economic Policy." For

one thing, it is increasingly clear that the inflation sweeping world capitalism today is intimately connected to the sharp escalation of U.S. economic warfare initiated on August 15, 1971.

Oil

The world energy crisis most clearly disclosed the aggressive policies of U.S. corporations in the intensified struggle for markets. Whether the decision to raise oil prices in the winter of 1973 was initially made in New York or in the Arab East is a moot point. What is clear, however, is that Washington made no move to resist the rise of world oil prices and that U.S. imperialism benefited from this development.

The major oil corporations worked in concert with Arab regimes as the crisis deepened.

Higher oil prices became one of the main generators of spiraling world prices generally. From synthetic fabrics to fertilizer, a host of essential commodities directly require petroleum or petroleum by-products.

Some efforts have been made to present the United States as a country that will suffer along with everybody else because of higher oil-import prices. These, it is true, have been helpful to the oil trusts in driving up domestic gasoline and heating fuel prices. But so far as the ebb and flow of U.S. profits is concerned, U.S. capital has much to gain from the energy squeeze. The main factors were explained by Dewey Daane, a member of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, in Congressional testimony May 30, 1973, *five months before* the October War and its consequences.

"It should be noted, first," said Daane, "that not all of the increase in U.S. payments for oil imports will constitute a net drain on the U.S. current account balance. There will be substantial offsets in the form of increased U.S. exports to those oil-producing countries that do have sizable populations and development needs. There will be further offsets in the form of increasing earnings by U.S. petroleum companies engaged in foreign operations, and a reduced need for U.S. financing of the future expansion of the industry.

"Second, those oil-exporting countries that do add very substantially to

their foreign assets over the decade will be seeking secure and profitable investment outlets for these funds. It seems likely that a substantial portion will be invested in the United States. . . .

"Third, other industrial countries in Europe and Japan will also be increasing their oil imports. They are, and will remain, much more dependent than this country on rising oil imports. . . ."⁴

Nor will the nationalizations of the holdings of the oil trusts have a significant effect on profits. For these corporations still control the world markets where oil is consumed. "Few informed people dispute the oil industry's ability to survive and many even predict a fair amount of prosperity well into the future," wrote William D. Smith in the July 7 *New York Times*.

In his article, Smith quoted John Lichtblau, head of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, as commenting, "By 1985 the companies will still be the major transporters, refiners and marketers of oil in the world."

The impact of high oil prices in Europe and Japan has been far more serious than in the United States. Western Europe, it is estimated, faces a balance of payments deficit that will reach at least \$20,000 million in 1974, mostly because of the higher price of oil. This does not tell the whole story, however, because West Germany is expected to reap a balance of payments surplus of around \$6,000 million, so that the real impact on France, Italy and Britain, the hardest hit countries, is greater. In Japan, the cost of foreign oil, which accounts for 80 percent of Japan's energy needs, *quadrupled*.

The British National Economic Development Office made a grim assessment:

"● Demand for automobiles will be reduced because the cost of running a car will be 40 per cent greater in 1977 than in 1973.

"● Demand for clothing will decline because of permanently increased costs of fabrics produced from synthetic

4. *The International Financial Crisis*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Resources of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, May 30; and June 1 and 5, 1973.

fibers, most of which are made from petroleum products.

"● Consumers will reduce their spending for major electrical appliances, such as refrigerators and washing machines."

Food

No less profit-gouging than the policies of the oil monopolists—and surely with an even more disastrous consequence for the famine-stricken populations of the underdeveloped world—are the policies of the U.S. food trusts. Huge shares of U.S. farm produce, as has already been shown, are exported. These exports comprise an even larger share of world food exports, so that the pricing policies underlie world prices in food trade.

"Food is power," U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz told *New York Times* correspondent William Robbins, as Butz stressed "the diplomatic leverage that world dependence on American grain provides." (*New York Times*, July 5.)

The statistics of the International Monetary Fund (June 1974) are equally eloquent.

● The United States exports 45 percent of world corn exports (the second largest exporter is Thailand with 5 percent). The wholesale price per bushel has risen from \$1.37 in 1966 to \$3.01 in March 1974, a rise of 220 percent.

● The United States exports 27 percent of world rice exports (with Thailand again second at 11 percent). Rice sold for \$8.30 per 100 pounds in New Orleans in 1967. The April 1974 price was \$30, 361 percent higher.

● The United States accounts for 94 percent of world soybean exports; prices have risen from \$2.72 per bushel in 1967 to \$6.34 in March 1974, up 233 percent.

● U.S. wheat exports comprise 32 percent of world wheat exports (followed by Canada with 21 percent and Australia with 12 percent). Wheat in Kansas City rose from \$1.79 a bushel in 1966 to \$5.82 a bushel in February 1974, up 325 percent.

These fantastic price leaps have paralleled a huge increase in the volume of U.S. exports, beginning in 1972, so that the recent profit increases are even greater. The *Commodity Trade Statistics* published by the United Nations on wheat, for example, show that U.S. exports in-

creased from 21.3 million metric tons in 1972 to an annual rate of 32 million tons in January–March 1973, a 50 percent rise in volume. In prices, the increase was from \$1,400 million for 1972 to an annual rate of \$2,400 million in the first three months of 1973, a 78 percent increase.

Significantly, these trade statistics show that as famine-stricken underdeveloped countries were forced to purchase more wheat, the U.S. prices rose even further in proportion.

Thus, U.S. wheat exports to "developing countries" (a UN term) increased from 6.3 million metric tons in 1972 to an annual rate of 12.3 million metric tons in the first three months of 1973, a 94 percent increase. But the dollar price rose from \$402 million to \$1,100 million, an increase of 181 percent!

A U.S. expert on "overseas development" recently told the *New York Times* (July 6 issue) that "for the 30 or 40 poorest countries—those with annual per capita incomes of not much more than \$100—food import costs are too high. They have gone up too fast for them, primarily the grains which have to be imported by a large number of developing countries." The Washington official, Lester R. Brown of the Overseas Development Council, believed that 388 million people in the capitalist world were "fed insufficiently" in 1970, a figure which has most certainly increased with the droughts of the past two years.

The situation is likely to become exacerbated as fertilizer prices are driven up and grain production is even more severely limited in underdeveloped countries.

Worth noting, moreover, is a recent development in the U.S. beef trade. This summer, prices began to fall back in agricultural livestock. Cattlemen sought U.S. import controls in order to keep beef prices up. Such controls have not so far been applied because 1974 beef imports have not yet been great, although the Agriculture Department has been pressuring foreign countries to limit their beef exports to the U.S. and has been asking Canada to import more U.S. beef.

This example illustrates the "upward ratcheting" effect in world prices. So long as world demand for U.S. beef drove beef prices up in the United States, Washington sought free international trade conditions in order to

keep the profits pouring in. When prices began to fall, however, protectionist moves were immediately initiated to prevent a return of prices to their old level.

Raw Materials

The hypocrisy bound up in the concept that raw-materials producer nations are somehow responsible for world inflation is limitless. All that one has to forget in this regard is the fact that the major imperialist powers control the marketing of raw materials—so that even when nationalizations are undertaken, profits are not seriously threatened. *But most of world raw materials continue to be owned by the major imperialist monopolies, above all by U.S. firms.* The inflation of the prices of other raw materials besides petroleum has provided a profit bonanza for the monopolists involved.

In the reports for the first quarter of 1974, *Business Week* magazine listed metals as the most profitable U.S. sector, with an industry-wide average increase of 94 percent from the first quarter of 1973. Fuel stood second with an 82 percent increase. Among the corporations reporting were Phelps Dodge (copper and brass), up 41 percent; Kennecott Copper, up 42 percent; American Metal Climax (coal, potash, iron, copper, zinc, lead, molybdenum), up 59 percent; Anaconda (copper), up 98 percent; Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical, up 147 percent; American Smelting and Refining (copper, gold, silver, lead) up 101 percent; Reynolds Metals (aluminum), up 454 percent.

Interestingly, the rise in copper prices has been so great that Anaconda reports its 1973 sales of \$1,300 million almost equaled the 1969 sales of \$1,400 million, before its lucrative Chuquicamata and El Salvador "properties" were nationalized in Chile.

The multinational copper trust held in 1973:

Anaconda Canada Limited; 75 percent ownership of the open-pit Caribou mine in New Brunswick; and Anaconda Electronics Ltd., Vancouver, B.C.

"A larger investment in Mexico," according to its 1973 annual report, "than in any other nation outside the United States," with 49 percent ownership or less of: Compañía Minera de Cananea, Cobre de Mexico, Con-

dumex, Nacional de Cobre, and Swecomex.

Anaconda Australia, Inc.

Anaconda B.V., Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Fios e Cabos Plásticos do Brasil and S.A. Marvin (brass and copper

products), both in Rio de Janeiro.

Anaconda's multinational holdings are typical. A similar pattern exists for the other corporations except that in some cases (molybdenum and bauxite, for example) the sources are almost entirely outside of the United

States.

The drain of profits continues from the underdeveloped world. It is not these countries that profit from the inflation of raw materials prices—yet they do have to pay for inflated food prices. □

Key Questions Facing Irish Revolutionists

In Wake of Loyalist Strike, What Perspective?

[The following article appeared in the July issue of *The Plough*, the newspaper of the Revolutionary Marxist Group, the Irish section of the Fourth International. For background material, see "Anatomy of Loyalist Strike in Ireland" in the July 22 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, p. 992.]

* * *

In the wake of the Loyalist strike, the available evidence indicates a continuing passivity of the Catholic population. The news media and the hack politicians are jubilant at the fact that there has been no marked flow of support for the republicans.

But this passivity gives a false picture of the real trends in the Catholic community. From the abolition of Stormont [the old Northern Irish parliament, which was suspended in March 1972] to the Assembly elections [the first elections for seats in the new "power sharing" regional assembly were held in June 1973], there was a visible swing by the minority [the Catholic, or nationalist-minded population] away from revolutionary politics. Even at that, the Assembly elections showed that the Republican Movement still had a strong base in the ghettos. With only the Officials participating, they got nearly 10 per cent of the total Catholic vote.

The months following the elections, as the SDLP [Social Democratic and Labor party, the bourgeois nationalists] accommodated more and more to the Faulknerites [the ruling faction of the pro-imperialist Unionist party], witnessed the rebirth of street politics. The PHRC [Political Hostages Release Committee], which united prisoners' relatives and dependents, community groups, and some political

organizations (the Provos, People's Democracy, and the Revolutionary Marxist Group being the most important), launched numerous campaigns and played a vital role in this process.

The campaigns of the PHRC provided an almost weekly and at times even daily focus for the most combative sections of the Catholic community to mobilize on an almost permanent basis. This preserved and strengthened the militant morale of the minority as a whole. By the time of the Westminster elections [the elections to the British parliament on February 28], the grip of the SDLP on the political consciousness of the Catholic community had weakened significantly. The election results revealed that the anti-imperialist forces had up to 30 per cent of the Catholic electorate behind them.

It is true that during the Loyalist strike, which was placed on the agenda following their [the right-wing Unionists] success in the Westminster elections, the Catholic ghettos seemed to remain relatively quiescent. But the actual situation needs to be carefully assessed. The logical response of the Catholic working class to the Loyalist show of strength would have been to break the strike. This was impossible, as Catholic workers have little or no presence in the most decisive industries, and the rate of unemployment in the ghettos is truly massive. As the strike gained momentum, the most that could be expected initially was a frustrated anger and resentment. And the prostituted news media made no attempt to conceal the widespread existence of this.

But the spontaneous reaction gave way to united and conscious endeavour with the formation of the Emergency Co-ordinating Centre. The

significance of the Co-ordinating Centre is seen not only from the hysterical reaction of the SDLP-controlled Central Citizens Defence Committee, which described the Emergency Co-ordinating Centre as "non-elected thugs" and likened it to the Ulster Workers' Council, but more importantly in the fact that it brought the Provos and Officials together in a meaningful way for practically the first time since the Republican Movement split. This more than anything else shows that the ordinary Catholic workers are beginning to take a renewed active interest in the political struggle. Of themselves the Provos and Officials would never have joined hands. Sectarian shibboleths would have prevented this. But under the pressure of the ordinary people who are once again looking for strong and united leadership, they were forced into common action.

The problem for socialists and republicans now is to find the correct way to develop this new growth of militancy. Special consideration must be given to the task of extending this process beyond the vanguard in the militant ghettos to the broader mass of Catholic workers. Establishing a link between the radicalized sectors and the rest of the Catholic population is a key task in the next period. Without this it will be impossible to oust the SDLP in as decisive a manner as the Nationalist Party was previously crushed. Given the absence of a strong political tradition on the revolutionary side, as long as the SDLP retains any substantial support it will be able not only to prevent a united response to British imperialism and the Loyalists, but will also be able to dictate the terms of reference within which the vanguard will

be forced to act.

Taking this into consideration and despite the urgent requirements of the objective situation, it is essential to avoid the error of substituting the level of consciousness of the vanguard sectors for the consciousness of the Catholic community as a whole. What is understood by the people of Ballymurphy, the Ardoyne, the Bogside, etc., is not yet apparent to other sectors of the Catholic population who have not been so closely involved in the struggle. What tasks the people of the beleaguered ghettos are ready to accomplish today, the rest of the minority is not yet ready to even contemplate.

Any genuinely massive campaign against the tyrannical, sectarian, and undemocratic role of British imperialism must therefore base itself on the experience not only of the militant ghettos but also of broader layers of the Catholic population. The defeatist attitude of "the people have betrayed the revolution—we must fight on regardless" will have to be dropped. While maintaining their political principles and continuing to fight on all fronts, revolutionaries must be prepared to co-operate with every force to accomplish the next immediate step forward in the struggle.

To do this, two things will be necessary. Firstly, it will be essential to build a very broad-based movement capable of including even forces which are not expressly anti-imperialist. This should be done, not as a concession to these forces but with the aim of drawing them into the fight so that they can be outflanked in struggle. In co-operating with such forces in the past, both wings of the Republican Movement have forgotten that this is the task of revolutionaries when working with reformists. As a result, such formations as the SDLP have been able to outflank them.

Secondly, following from the above, all co-operation should be around specific issues and not based on a general political programme. In the past (in NICRA [Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association], in the Officials' proposed NLF [National Liberation Front], and the Provos' ICRA [Irish Civil Rights Association]), this has been ignored. In drawing up a political programme which would attract reformist and bourgeois elements, it was necessary to water down the revo-

lutionary programme so that in reality the political programme of the mass movement was nothing else than the programme of the reformists. Naturally they benefitted from the activity of the mass movement built around such a programme, while the revolutionary politics of the Officials and Provos remained relatively unknown.

Sunbathing, Tennis, and Marijuana Help

How Watergate Convicts Endure Prison

When inmates of the prison in Attica, New York, rebelled in September 1971, their demands were fairly simple. As the *New York Times* commented in an editorial at the time, "Their basic demands are no more radical than decent food, good medical care, adequate recreational opportunities, better rehabilitation programs. These are things that ought to have been provided long ago."

Nevertheless, the prisoners were shot down in cold blood, and most of the reforms they demanded have still not been granted. The obstacle to a peaceful conclusion of the rebellion was the refusal of the government to promise that the prisoners would not be punished for their uprising. Multimillionaire Nelson Rockefeller, then the governor of New York state, insisted this was a question of principle and that granting amnesty to the prisoners "would undermine the very essence of our free society—the fair and impartial application of the law."

Rockefeller, with his own presidential ambitions, never got a job in the Nixon administration, and he has therefore missed the opportunity recently obtained by many Nixon aides to view the question of prison reform from the other side of the walls.

On the other hand, these aides' experiences may not provide such an education in the "fair and impartial application of the law" as might be expected at first glance. In its July 15 issue, *Newsweek* magazine described the two federal prisons in which most of the convicted Watergate criminals have been assigned to serve their sentences.

The two institutions are located at Allenwood, Pennsylvania, and Lompoc, California, and are known as "minimum security" prisons. Virtually all their inmates are "white collar" criminals: businessmen caught cheating on taxes, politicians who dipped their hands into the public till more often than is the norm, perjured White House aides, etc.

Apparently concerned that the *News-*

The prospects of building a mass movement uniting the entire Catholic community around definite demands such as the withdrawal of British troops, the ending of internment, etc., are now very good. Provided political sectarianism and kowtowing before reformism are avoided, this will be the beginning of the end for imperialism in Ireland. □

week reporter would leap to conclusions, Watergate conspirator Jeb Stuart Magruder, who is confined at Allenwood, offered the assurance that "this is no country club." Probably not. Guests of country clubs pay to become members, while those at Allenwood are entertained at the public expense.

Magruder, the magazine reported, "spends afternoons giving tennis lessons and playing on the prison's indoor and ruttid outdoor courts. He can receive daily visits from friends and relatives on Allenwood's attractive outdoor patio, outfitted with beach furniture and overlooking the scenic Allegheny Mountains." If



Lompoc prison inmate suffering "psychological deprivation of freedom."

there is ever a rebellion at Allenwood, a chief demand of the prisoners would undoubtedly be for the resurfacing of that rutted tennis court.

Lompoc is "more comfortable yet," according to *Newsweek*: "Set in the verdant, rolling hills of southern California's Santa Ynez Valley, Lompoc looks more like a college campus than a prison. Its relatively few unarmed guards are clad in sky-blue blazers and double-knit gray slacks, and there are neither walls nor fences around it. Behind the main building are a sandy nine-hole golf course and driving range, a tennis court, two handball courts and a quarter-mile jogging

track." Other facilities include an area known as "Hippie Park," where residents can sunbathe and smoke marijuana.

Inmates do not spend the entire day playing golf or relaxing in the sun, however. According to *Newsweek*, "long working days" are the norm at both Lompoc and Allenwood: "Work begins around 8 a.m. and continues, with a break for lunch, into midafternoon." The "long working day" would thus seem to last for as much as six, or perhaps even seven hours.

"The psychological deprivation of freedom is the rough thing" about the Allenwood prison, Magruder told *Newsweek*.

And there are even greater hardships. Magruder "is working on rounding out a bridge foursome with his neighbor Dolan. Charles Colson, who is due to arrive at Allenwood shortly, plays the game, but Dolan for one was sorry to hear that [Herbert] Kalmbach would be going to Lompoc. 'I had hoped we'd have a fourth.'"

Magruder's lawyers are evidently not doing a sufficient job of protecting their client: Certainly the Supreme Court would rule that the lack of a fourth player for bridge constitutes the "cruel and unusual punishment" forbidden by the Constitution. □

What India Proved

Anyone Can Join the 'Nuclear Club'

By Ernest Harsch

[First of two articles.]

Even before the world's first nuclear explosion—on July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New Mexico—scientists working on the development of nuclear energy warned of the grave danger posed to humanity by using this new knowledge for purposes of warfare.

When physicists and other scientists working at the Chicago laboratories of the government-sponsored Manhattan Project, which was set up to develop a nuclear bomb, learned of the plans to use the bomb against Japan, they submitted a secret memorandum to Secretary of War Henry Stimson. Entitled the Franck Report, the memorandum warned against dropping the bombs on Japanese cities, stating that such a move would set a precedent for the use of nuclear weapons. The scientists proposed instead that Washington call on all countries to renounce the use of atomic technology for warfare.

The Franck Report was rejected, and on August 6, 1945, President Truman ordered that an A-bomb (uranium-235) be dropped on Hiroshima, wiping out an estimated 75,000 civilians. Three days later, this was followed by the detonation of a plutonium bomb over Nagasaki.

With this opening of the age of nuclear energy, Washington made clear its intention of dominating the world. It could use the "secret" of the atomic

bomb, it thought, to intimidate—or destroy—any other state, with the Soviet Union first on its list.

While most government representatives held that no other country was capable of developing nuclear weapons for years, there were some in Washington who realized that it would not be long before the U. S. monopoly on atomic weapons would be broken.

One such figure, Senator James McMahon, warned that proliferation of nuclear weapons represented a genuine danger. As cited in the February 1947 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*,¹ McMahon declared, "The clock ticks on and with every tick we are losing a part of our capital of monopoly. When many nations have atomic bombs, peace will be precarious indeed, and the opportunity of achieving agreement for international control may become well-nigh impossible. . . ."

The senator's prediction was borne out two years later, in 1949, when Moscow exploded its first atomic device. London followed in 1952, Paris in 1960, and Peking in 1964, bringing to five the number of countries with

their own nuclear weapons.

Washington, however, would not admit that the two workers states had the capacity to develop their own nuclear technology. Moscow, it was claimed, had stolen the design for the atomic bomb from the United States. At the height of the cold war and the McCarthyite witch-hunt, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were framed up and executed on charges of having given Moscow the "secret" of the atomic bomb. In actuality, Moscow had begun its own nuclear research program in 1943.

Similar charges were bandied about after Peking exploded its first bomb. The Chinese were not thought capable of figuring out the difficult process of separating uranium-235 (which is used in fission bombs) from natural uranium. According to John McPhee in *The Curve of Binding Energy* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1974), there was speculation that Chinese agents had stolen the U-235 from a nuclear-fuel plant in Pennsylvania. A U.S. spy plane, however, later took photographs of a uranium separation plant at Langchow, in Kansu province.

Ten years after Peking's first test of an atomic bomb, the Indian regime exploded a nuclear device on May 18, 1974, becoming the sixth country to do so. The Indian blast, however, set a precedent, since India was the first

1. *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* was founded by Albert Einstein and other scientists who were concerned about the dangers of nuclear war and the impact of nuclear technology on society. The first issue appeared in December 1945.

semicolonial country to demonstrate its capacity to develop nuclear weapons.

The Indian explosion also set an example for other underdeveloped countries, showing how easy and inexpensive it had become to make a nuclear bomb. Even before the debris of the explosion settled, it became clear that other regimes were considering developing their own nuclear weapons and joining the "nuclear club."

India Splits the Atom

The May 18 blast, according to India's Atomic Energy Commission, was "a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment" in the 10- to 15-kiloton² range (about the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima). The fission reaction was detonated with an implosion device, a far more sophisticated technique than that used in the first U. S. test. Indian government officials pointed out that their underground test was not a violation of the 1963 treaty that bans nuclear tests in the air, in space, or under water.

The editors of the *New York Times* responded, in their May 20 issue, with hypocritical indignation, castigating New Delhi for developing a nuclear explosive while it "failed to solve the country's fundamental problems of food and population" and lamenting the fact that "such great talent and resources have been squandered on the vanity of power. . . ." Such eloquence has rarely been used by the editors of the *New York Times* to denounce the hundreds of nuclear tests conducted by the Pentagon.

The revolting hypocrisy of the stand taken by the *New York Times* can easily be demonstrated:

1. Have poverty and hunger been eliminated in the world's richest country? If not, why did America's ruling families give top priority to the production of nuclear armaments?

2. The only real solution to India's "fundamental problems of food and population" is a socialist revolution, the expropriation of capitalist property, and the establishment of a planned economy. This is well known to the knowledgeable editors of the *New York Times*, but they are vio-

2. One kiloton equals the explosive force of 1,000 tons of TNT; a megaton, 1 million tons.



Pablo Picasso drew portraits of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, framed and executed on charge of stealing "secret" of atom bomb.

lently opposed to the masses of India taking that road.

3. From the fundamental viewpoint of the *New York Times*, the Indian bourgeoisie ought to be praised for setting out to build an arsenal of nuclear weapons. After all, they were faithfully aping Wall Street in putting the military defense of the capitalist profit system above everything else, including the danger of a nuclear holocaust.

4. Finally, the representatives of American capitalism forfeited any moral basis for protesting the potential consequences of India's joining the "nuclear club," in view of the fact that Washington set the precedent for using the bomb as an instrument of war.

The Canadian imperialists added their invective. Taking a page from Washington's book of slanders, they claimed that New Delhi had obtained the plutonium for its explosive device from one of the nuclear reactors that had been supplied to India by the Canadian government. This charge was repeated in most of the media accounts in the United States. As with Washington's fables about the first Soviet and Chinese explosions, the implication was that New Delhi was incapable of developing its own sources of plutonium and had to secretly divert some from a foreign reactor.

Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp thereupon an-

nounced May 22 that the Canadian government was suspending its aid to India's nuclear energy program. Since 1956 Ottawa has supplied about \$96.5 million in "aid," mostly in the form of long-term loans for reactors and other nuclear equipment.

The plutonium used in the Indian nuclear device actually came from the plutonium plant at the Trombay nuclear research center near Bombay. As the Hong Kong weekly *Far Eastern Economic Review* pointed out in its May 27 issue, "The Trombay plutonium plant is an important landmark in India's nuclear development as it was constructed entirely by Indians. At the time it was built (in early 1964), only four other countries—the US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union—had operating fuel reprocessing plants."

Work Begun in 1944

The Indian government sought to justify its test by claiming that nuclear explosives would be used for such "peaceful purposes" as mining and earth moving. The official statement released on May 18 stated, "India has no intention of producing nuclear weapons and reiterates its strong opposition to military uses of nuclear explosions." Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sought to reassure everyone by claiming that the explosion was "nothing to get excited about."

The government's contentions to the contrary, New Delhi has been working on the development of nuclear weapons for some years. In 1972, K. Subrahmanyam, the director of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, an officially sponsored "think tank" on strategic policies, anticipated New Delhi's justifications for the explosion of a nuclear device: "Some may be tempted to quote official statements of the Indian government which have taken the stand that India does not propose to go in for nuclear weapons systems, but will attempt to develop only peaceful nuclear explosions. That is what the government is expected to say."

And as the May 25 issue of the *Calcutta Statesman Weekly* noted, "Whatever the declared policy may be, production of actual weapons is just another step forward should a political decision be taken to that effect."

Among the principal political events that prompted New Delhi to consider developing nuclear weapons was its war with China in 1962 and the subsequent construction by Peking of atomic and hydrogen weapons and a sophisticated missile system capable of firing nuclear warheads as far as the Indian Ocean.

Although research in the field of nuclear energy had been conducted by New Delhi for more than a decade, several Indian government officials said the final decision to develop a nuclear explosive was made in 1971, during the Bangladesh struggle for independence from Pakistan and New Delhi's subsequent war against the Pakistani forces.

New Delhi began laying the groundwork for its nuclear program in 1944, and it was a member of one of India's two wealthiest ruling-class families that set up the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. With rich deposits of uranium and monazite,³ with foreign assistance in the form of loans and technological aid, and with the training that Indian scientists received abroad, the Indian government built a strong base for its nuclear program.

Besides the research reactor at

Trombay, India has two functioning atomic power reactors, one at Tarapur, north of Bombay, and one at Rana Pratap Sagar in the Rajasthan desert. According to a report by *New York Times* correspondent Victor K. McElheny in the May 23 issue, these three reactors produce enough plutonium⁴ to build about fifty bombs per year. Writing in the May 25 issue of the *Bombay Economic and Political Weekly*, R. S. Ganapathy reported that New Delhi already had a stockpile of 100 to 150 kilograms of plutonium from the Trombay research reactor alone. One other power reactor is under construction in Kalpakkam in Tamil Nadu state; this project is wholly Indian, with almost 80 percent of the components coming from Indian industries.

While the development of nuclear weapons by New Delhi has been proved to be technically feasible, the construction of a delivery system to carry the nuclear warheads to their targets requires considerably more effort and expenditure. Again, however, the Indian regime has been taking the necessary steps for a number of years to build a capable delivery system.

Submarines, Too

As part of its infant space program, New Delhi has launched small rockets and has announced that it will begin developing a small space-launcher. While such rockets would be inadequate for the delivery of warheads, the technology acquired during the research will be invaluable for the future development of a nuclear missile system.

New Delhi's current military budget is about \$2,000 million per year. It already has Soviet-supplied surface-to-surface missiles (the Sukhoi-7), and French-supplied bombers, which, according to military experts, are capable of carrying atomic weapons.

"Indian strategists are contemplating," wrote Denzil Peiris in the June 3 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "the development of a nuclear-powered

submarine and a fleet of at least 20-25 ocean-going submarines. The rationale here is that the submarine is increasingly becoming the main instrument of controlling the seas. It is also needed for surveillance of the seas for pre-empting action by hostile forces. Fast missile deploying ships (provided with medium-range surface-to-surface missiles) are also in the pipeline. One suggestion is a 10-year plan of naval equipment expansion costing Rs 10,000 million (US\$1,219.5 million). The air force has not been forgotten. It is envisaged that Rs 5,000 million will be spent by the end of the 1970s for expansion and sophisticated weaponry."

But even with the construction of a delivery system capable of carrying nuclear warheads, New Delhi would be no match for any of the established nuclear powers, at least in the near future. It would take New Delhi many years and enormous expenditures even to approach the power of the Chinese nuclear capacity.

The major value for the Indian ruling class of having nuclear weapons in its arsenal—besides the diplomatic standing this would generate—would be consolidation of New Delhi's military position on the Indian subcontinent and beyond, particularly in southern and southeastern Asia.

Pakistan Joins the Race

The May 18 explosion in the Rajasthan desert did more than add another country to the "nuclear club." It set off a chain reaction of activity among the other aspirants to that coveted status.

The first response came from the Pakistani regime in Islamabad, which understood immediately the implications of the nuclear blast less than 100 miles from its border. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto proclaimed in a May 19 statement, "Given the brutal fact of the May 18 explosion, Pakistan cannot be expected to rest on technicalities and protocol. . . . We are taking steps to secure political insurance against India's use of a nuclear threat."

Bhutto held a series of meetings with Pakistan's top nuclear scientists only hours after the May 18 explosion. Munir Ahmed, the chairman of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, stated in an interview May 21,

3. The monazite deposits in southern India are among the largest and richest in thorium in the world. Thorium is an important element in the sophisticated breeder reactors that New Delhi is planning to build.

4. Plutonium-239 is produced from the uranium fuel in fission reactors and can be separated from the fuel wastes. Only about 8 kilograms of plutonium were needed in the Indian explosion.

"Our priorities are based on national requirements which take into account Indian intentions. We need nuclear energy for our economic development — indeed for our very survival." According to a report by Salamat Ali in the May 27 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, the Pakistani regime has been on the United Nations' list of near-nuclear powers for several years.

Substantial uranium deposits have already been discovered in Punjab province and other areas of Pakistan. Unlike India, however, Islamabad's nuclear program began only in 1965, when it received a small research reactor from Washington. A Canadian-built power reactor went into operation in 1972, and a second reactor is scheduled to be completed in 1979. Theodore Taylor, a physicist and former designer of nuclear weapons for the U.S. government, said that with "a major national effort" Islamabad could build a plutonium separation plant within a year.

But though the Pakistani regime may be capable of exploding a nuclear device in the near future, it does not have the industrial base that India has to sustain the construction of an "adequate" nuclear weapons system. Its chemical, electronics, and steel industries are below the levels of those attained by India.

Consequently, the Pakistani ruling class has had to look abroad for possible nuclear alliances. At a news conference in Lahore on May 19, Bhutto said that he would seek to obtain a "nuclear umbrella" from the five major nuclear powers. Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmed was instructed to raise the request with U.S. officials in Washington at a forthcoming meeting of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The foreign secretary was dispatched to London, Paris, and Peking to proselytize for an "umbrella." Bhutto said that he would himself raise the question with the Kremlin on his next visit to Moscow.

Peking, which has had military and economic ties with Islamabad for years, has thus far been the only major nuclear power to lend the Pakistani regime some support. When the Pakistani delegate attacked New Delhi at the United Nations on June 7, the Chinese representative, Chou Nan, said that Peking supported Islamabad's "position of opposing nuclear

threat and nuclear blackmail." Whether Peking is willing to support Islamabad to the extent of supplying it with nuclear aid remains to be seen.

Peking did, however, remind New Delhi of the Chinese nuclear strength when it exploded a thermonuclear device in the atmosphere on June 17. According to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the explosion was in the "intermediate range," between 200 kilotons and 1 megaton—much larger than the Indian blast.

Israel's Nuclear Nest Eggs

The most ominous development in the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been the admission by informed sources in the United States that the Israeli regime already has a few small nuclear warheads. A June 17 dispatch from Jerusalem by *New York Times* correspondent Terence Smith reported, "United States intelligence has long operated on the assumption that Israel herself has at least the capacity to assemble nuclear weapons and perhaps to accumulate a stockpile."

C. L. Sulzberger, a columnist for the *New York Times*, who has very good sources of information, went further. Writing in the June 30 issue, he said, "It is a certainty that Israel (despite denials) already possesses a small stockpile of nuclear weapons. These come from plutonium made in a research reactor supplied by France at Dimona, near Beersheba."

The reactor at Dimona, according to the *New York Times* of June 26, "is capable of producing enough plutonium for about one bomb per year." Tel Aviv has one other reactor at the U.S.-financed nuclear research center at Nahal Soreq. Tel Aviv and Washington first concluded an agreement to "cooperate" in the area of nuclear research in 1955.

During President Nixon's recent whirlwind tour of the Arab East, a communiqué was released in Jerusalem June 17 stating that the U.S. and Israeli regimes would negotiate a new agreement on cooperation in the field of "nuclear energy, technology, and the supply of [nuclear] fuel from the United States under agreed safeguards."

'Safeguards' Clamped on Egypt

A similar agreement was reached

between Washington and Cairo three days earlier, on June 14, when Nixon promised to supply Egypt with nuclear technology "under safeguard conditions." The offer was part of Washington's scheme to lure the Arab states away from Moscow's influence and to bring them more under Washington's sway.

Part of the agreement included the provision that Washington start sales of nuclear fuel to Egypt at the end of June. As Henry Tanner noted in the June 15 *New York Times*, "Egypt has two small nuclear reactors obtained from the Soviet Union. Now the Sadat Government will be free of dependence on Soviet nuclear fuel."

The so-called safeguards attached to the two agreements with Cairo and Tel Aviv, required by the International Atomic Energy Agency (a body that serves Washington's interests), include such measures as auditing supplies of fuel and plutonium, installing mechanical devices on nuclear reactors to prevent them from being secretly tampered with, and the "inspection" of reactors and facilities by officials of the IAEA. The "safeguards" are supposedly designed to prevent diversions of plutonium or enriched uranium for military purposes.

At a news conference in Washington July 9, Fred C. Iklé, the director of the U.S. arms control agency, stated that Washington would seek to apply even stricter "safeguards" to the provision of nuclear technology to Egypt and Israel. It would be stipulated that the spent atomic fuel elements be processed outside of the two countries—to prevent the regimes from using the plutonium to produce atomic weapons.

Such a restriction on U.S. technology to Egypt and Israel could only aid Tel Aviv, since it already has nuclear weapons and access to unrestricted plutonium, while Cairo does not. (Since the French government did not sign the test-ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty, it has not required "safeguards" on the reactors it sells, such as the one at Dimona. Moscow, however, has a consistent policy of attaching "safeguards," and the reactors it supplied to Egypt were no exception.)

But if Cairo is determined to develop its own nuclear weapons, and needs outside help to do so, there are other sources of aid besides Moscow

and Washington. French nuclear reactors are still available without "safeguards," and New Delhi has showed its willingness to provide nuclear technology to Arab countries (perhaps in exchange for oil deals). Bernard Weinraub reported in the May 22 *New York Times* that several Egyptian scientists were working at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center in Trombay, India.

To Round Out Shah's Arsenal

It appears that the shah of Iran may also be considering adding atomic warheads to his rapidly expanding arsenal. An interview with the shah, published in the June 23 issue of the French business weekly *Les Informations*, quoted him as saying in reply to a question about whether the Iranian regime intended to obtain nuclear weapons: "Without any doubt, and sooner than one would think." The Tehran regime denied the shah's remark the following day, although the French reporter who interviewed him insisted that the shah had made the statement.

But whatever Tehran's public posture, it took a giant stride toward becoming a nuclear power on June 27 when it signed an agreement with Paris to buy five 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactors worth \$1,100 million. The total ten-year industrial package amounted to \$4,000 million. Included in the nuclear deal were the training of Iranian scientists and technicians and the establishment of a nuclear research center in Iran.

According to a report by John K. Cooley in the June 25 *Christian Science Monitor*, Tehran began its nuclear research in 1958 and has been receiving U.S. assistance since the beginning of this year.

With the vast revenues Tehran is receiving from its oil sales, the development of a sophisticated delivery system and the necessary related industries is within its reach. Out of a population of 32 million, Iran has a total combined military and police force of about 300,000. In 1973 alone, Tehran spent \$3,000 million on arms. Its air force includes Phantom jets and F-5 fighter bombers, and it is planning to buy the new F-14A fighter bombers from the United States once they are built. (The F-14A, the most sophisticated of U.S.

warplanes, is capable of carrying nuclear weapons.) The Iranian regime has also been negotiating the purchase of the Franco-British Martel missiles (which are television-guided and air-to-surface).

A 'First' for Argentina?

The Argentine regime, which may be another aspiring candidate to the nuclear club, sent the former president of the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission, Rear Admiral Oscar Armando Quihillalt, to Tehran in May to act as an adviser to the Iranian nuclear program.

A similar collaborative arrangement was made between Buenos Aires and New Delhi. The Indian minister for foreign affairs, Surendra Pal Singh, arrived in Argentina on May 27 and signed an agreement with the Argentine government to cooperate in the development of "peaceful" nuclear technology.

During Singh's visit, an official Argentine news agency, *Télam*, published an article entitled, "Argentina can build the atomic bomb." According to the June 25 issue of the Buenos Aires weekly *Panorama*, the *Télam* article stated, "In 1968, top nuclear scientists had already placed the country on a par with India, among countries with the potential capacity to produce a nuclear bomb." The May 31 issue of *Mayoria*, a Peronist daily, carried a front-page photograph of a mushroom cloud accompanied by the headline, "Argentina and the atomic bomb: the first attempt in Spanish-speaking America." The article began, "Argentina is on the threshold of atomic power."

Argentina already has a plutonium purification plant at Atucha and has begun construction of the Rio III nuclear power plant with Canadian assistance. Argentina has large deposits of uranium, and according to Carlos Varsavsky, a former president of the Argentine Society of Physics, it can develop its own plutonium separation technology without foreign assistance.

Six-Month Job for Japan

The Indian explosion may also have strengthened the opposition within Japan to the ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which Tokyo signed in 1968. According to

a May 30 dispatch by Akio Yamakawa from the Tokyo New Asia News, Director of the Science and Technology Agency Kinji Moriyama, who is the leading proponent of nuclear arms for Japan, has so far successfully blocked the ratification of the treaty.

Japan has the largest nuclear power capacity of any of the countries that have not yet developed nuclear weapons. Technologically, Tokyo has the ability to produce a large nuclear bomb in less than six months if it chooses to do so. With its rocket technology and vast industrial base, the construction of a delivery system would also be a relatively simple matter.

Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Tokyo is now under the "protection" of Washington's "nuclear umbrella." But while some officials in Washington have hinted that Tokyo should acquire nuclear weapons, U.S. imperialism at present is more interested in keeping the military power of its capitalist rival subordinate to its own. A nuclear Japan would not only be a threat to Asian countries; it could seriously jeopardize U.S. imperialism's hold in that part of the world.

Applicants by the Dozen

These countries, however, are not the only ones that can conceivably develop nuclear weapons. In an article published in the July 5 *New York Times*, John W. Finney wrote, "With the accelerating spread of nuclear technology, perhaps two dozen nations could acquire atomic weapons over the next decade. . . ."

Other countries considered within immediate reach of nuclear weapons are West Germany, Brazil, and South Korea. On July 11, Dr. Louw Alberts, vice-president of South Africa's Atomic Energy Board, proclaimed that his country was also capable of producing an atomic bomb. "May I say that our nuclear program is more advanced than that of India," he said.

Finney outlined the list of countries, besides those already mentioned, that could acquire nuclear weapons within ten years: Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, Colombia, Indonesia, Libya, Venezuela, Spain, Portugal, Bangladesh, Algeria, Chile, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea. □

El Mercado Común en Crisis

Por Ernest Mandel

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Le Marché Commun en Crise", por Ernest Mandel, que apareció el 20 de junio en la edición francesa de *Inprecor*, publicación quincenal del Secretariado Unificado de la Cuarta Internacional. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*].

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El Mercado Común atraviesa una vez más por una grave crisis, sin duda la más grave desde su creación, que se expresa en el fracaso de la "flotación común" de las monedas de los nueve países miembros de la Comunidad Económica Europea (CEE), por la decisión del gobierno británico de renegociar las condiciones de la adhesión de Gran Bretaña y por la decisión de Italia y Dinamarca de suspender la libertad de importaciones de productos provenientes del Mercado Común. Ya antes, esta crisis se había expresado de la manera más dramática por la incapacidad de los gobiernos miembros del Mercado Común para elaborar una posición de conjunto frente a la "crisis del petróleo" y para negociar de común acuerdo con los países exportadores de petróleo.

LA VERDADERA NATURALEZA DEL MERCADO COMUN

Para comprender los orígenes de esta crisis, hay que entender, en primer lugar, la verdadera naturaleza del Mercado Común. Es un *fenómeno transitorio e híbrido* de integración económica internacional entre nueve países imperialistas (al principio eran seis países). Estos países decidieron permitir una circulación ilimitada de mercancías y de capitales en sus fronteras. Pero no han creado ni un estado burgués común, ni un gobierno común, ni una moneda común.

Las instituciones con las que han dotado al Mercado Común son pseudo-estatales, coronadas por una "comisión" que tiene un poder solamente

consultivo, salvo en el terreno estrictamente limitado de la circulación de mercancías y de capitales. El verdadero poder lo detenta el "consejo de ministros", pero tampoco éste puede imponer en la práctica decisiones a los gobiernos que no quieran aplicarlas.

La naturaleza transitoria e híbrida del Mercado Común corresponde a la naturaleza transitoria e híbrida del fenómeno económico que debe expresarse en el plano político institucional: la internacionalización progresiva de la propiedad del gran capital. Desde hace veinte años se viene produciendo manifiestamente una *interpenetración de los capitales europeos*, que es cada vez más amplia. Se han creado grupos industriales (Dunlop-Pirelli, Agfa-Gevaert), que ya no son propiedad de una burguesía "nacional", sino de burguesías de diversas nacionalidades europeas, en que ninguna fracción "nacional" juegue en ellas el papel hegemónico.

Pero si es verdad que se está produciendo esta interpenetración de capitales europeos, también es cierto que está lejos de alcanzar un punto de no-retorno. En algunos casos ha fracasado, como por ejemplo en el caso de Fiat-Citroën en la industria automotriz. Este nuevo super-trust europeo se disolvió. En otros casos esta interpenetración ha tomado la forma de una absorción de firmas por un solo capital "nacional" hegemónico (por ejemplo, la absorción de la compañía francesa de productos farmacéuticos Roussel-Uclaf por el trust alemán Hoechst Farben). En la mayoría de las ramas industriales los trusts monopólicos "nacionales" siguen actuando en base a la cooperación internacional entre firmas europeas, más bien que en base a una verdadera fusión de intereses.

La internacionalización de los capitales dentro del Mercado Común ha comenzado a sobrepasar, por lo tanto, la fase de los trusts monopólicos "nacionales". Las compañías multinacionales, norteamericanas, europeas y ja-

ponesas, han adquirido un poder incuestionable. Pero la internacionalización de los capitales no ha alcanzado todavía el punto en el que los grupos capitalistas centrados en el estado burgués "nacional" pierden toda influencia y toda capacidad para actuar. *No se ha decidido todavía la lucha entre los grupos que reclaman un estado burgués a escala europea, y los grupos que se aferran al estado burgués nacional.* Este es el trasfondo indispensable para comprender la crisis actual del Mercado Común.

Siempre hemos predicho que las contradicciones fundamentales del Mercado Común—institución supranacional sin verdadero poder estatal, en una época en la que el estado ha llegado a ser un instrumento indispensable no solamente para mantener el poder político y social del capital, sino también para su valorización y su reproducción ampliada—estallarían en el momento en que se produjera una recesión económica generalizada en la Europa capitalista. Precisamente cuando se produce una seria recesión económica es decisiva la intervención del estado burgués para salvar el régimen.

En esos momentos, el gran capital de cada uno de los países del Mercado Común se enfrenta a una alternativa precisa: o bien crea un verdadero super-estado europeo, capaz de aplicar una política anti-crisis a escala internacional; o bien lleva a cabo una política anti-crisis a escala nacional. En los dos casos hay que sobrepasar el Mercado Común.

En el primer caso, es reemplazado por un estado capitalista federal que incluya a todos los países capitalistas dispuestos a dar ese salto, con una moneda común, un gobierno común, una política común de obras públicas y de empleo, un presupuesto común y un fisco común.

En el segundo caso, se disgrega bajo los golpes de un retorno masivo al proteccionismo por parte de todos (o de la mayor parte) de los estados burgueses "nacionales" de Europa Occidental.

Es obvio que los trusts multinacionales europeos reclamen, en el caso de una recesión económica seria, un super-estado a escala europea, por la simple razón de que su interés por "luchar contra la recesión" sólo puede ser servido eficazmente a esa escala.

Esto se aplica también a los trusts que ya se han internacionalizado desde el punto de vista de la propiedad del capital, así como a los que están controlados todavía por la burguesía de una sola nación, pero cuyo radio de acción supera una base "nacional" por ser ésta demasiado pequeña, incluso a nivel de la producción. El trust electrónico Philips, para tomar este ejemplo, no podría ser protegido contra los efectos de una crisis económica grave con medidas que tomara sólo el gobierno de Holanda, que se aplicaran únicamente en su territorio. Para Philips, una política "anti-recesión" sería eficaz solamente si la adoptan los nueve países del Mercado Común en su conjunto.

También es evidente, sin embargo, que ante la ausencia de un verdadero gobierno y de un verdadero poder estatal a escala de los nueve países miembros del Mercado Común (o de la mayor parte de ellos), mientras más severa sea una recesión económica, más la burguesía de cada país se verá obligada a actuar contra la recesión en el plano puramente nacional. Se enfrentaría en realidad, con la opción de elegir entre la acción "nacional" o la inacción, es decir, ninguna acción. No se puede pensar que una burguesía nacional presencie pasivamente como se agrava una recesión económica y como aumenta el desempleo, dadas las relaciones de fuerza que existen hoy día entre el capital y el trabajo en Europa Occidental. En estas condiciones el que la burguesía permaneciera pasiva significaría provocar una crisis social y revolucionaria de una gravedad sin precedentes para la supervivencia del régimen capitalista.

Por esto siempre hemos pronosticado que el Mercado Común no resistiría la prueba de una recesión económica grave, si no lograba el transcurso hacia la creación de un verdadero gobierno europeo.

La justeza de nuestro análisis ha sido confirmada por los acontecimientos de los últimos seis meses.

En estos momentos, la mayoría de los países imperialistas atraviesa por una recesión económica. Ya es grave en los Estados Unidos (caída del producto nacional bruto en 6% en el lapso de cinco meses), ha comenzado en Gran Bretaña, Italia y Japón. Alemania Occidental está al borde de la recesión. Francia es el único de los

grandes países imperialistas que no ha sido tocado.

El desempleo aumenta en todos los países imperialistas. Es probable que durante el invierno de 1974-75 se supere ampliamente el punto más alto de desempleo que se había visto en los países imperialistas después de la guerra—10 millones de personas sin trabajo, en el invierno de 1970. Es probable que para este año el número total de desempleados en el conjunto de los países imperialistas se aproxime a los 15 millones.

En estas condiciones, dada la ausencia de un verdadero gobierno con poder estatal real a escala del Mercado Común, es inevitable que la burguesía se repliegue hacia medidas anti-recesionistas a escala nacional; es decir, hacia medidas proteccionistas. Esto es lo que ocurrió en forma espectacular en Italia y Dinamarca. Los gobiernos de estos países han impuesto limitaciones de facto no sólo a las importaciones en general, sino también a las importaciones de productos de los otros países miembros del Mercado Común.

En ocasiones se ha afirmado que esta crisis es "excepcional", que no representa más que un "accidente en el camino", causado tan sólo por la "crisis del petróleo", de la que se dice que ha provocado déficits importantes de la balanza de pagos en varios países imperialistas (especialmente Gran Bretaña, Italia y Francia).

Este argumento es incompleto y sólo aparentemente correcto. El déficit de la balanza de pagos de algunos países de la CEE ha sido totalmente "compensado" con el superávit no menos espectacular de la balanza de pagos de Alemania Occidental. Los países del Benelux, igualmente, gozan (todavía) de un superávit también importante. La verdadera naturaleza de la "crisis de la balanza de pagos" aparece, entonces, bajo un aspecto muy particular. Los gobiernos italiano, danés y británico se ven obligados a tomar medidas proteccionistas porque los países con gran superávit se niegan a depositar en común el total, o una parte, de las reservas de divisas de los países miembros del Mercado Común. Evidentemente, tal "depósito común" es inconcebible sin una moneda común; una política económica, monetaria y fiscal común; una política común del empleo; esto es, sin un gobierno común y sin un

"super estado" común.

EL GRAN CAPITAL DE ALEMANIA OCCIDENTAL ANTE OPCIONES DOLOROSAS

La naturaleza del dilema a que se enfrenta el gran capital europeo es especialmente sorprendente en el país más estable y próspero del mundo imperialista actual, el imperialismo de Alemania Occidental. De todas las grandes potencias imperialistas, este país tiene la tasa de inflación más baja, la más rápida expansión de sus exportaciones, el superávit más importante de la balanza de pagos, la tasa de desempleo más baja (aunque ha aumentado gravemente con respecto a la situación de los años 1970-1972). Cuando Helmut Schmidt sucedió a Willy Brandt en el cargo de canciller socialdemócrata, la mayoría de los observadores enfatizó la vocación "atlántica" del nuevo jefe de gobierno, contraponiéndola a la inclinación "europea" de su antecesor. Algunas semanas bastaron para que, en ocasión del encuentro Schmidt-Giscard d'Estaing, en París, se viera claramente que este diagnóstico se había quedado atrás.

El gran capital alemán se encuentra atrapado entre dos males, y le es difícil determinar cuál es el mayor y cuál es el menor. Si opta por la "reanimación del Mercado Común", esto significa que tendrá que absorber, de hecho, los déficits de la balanza de pagos y los efectos de la inflación acelerada de tres de sus socios más importantes: Francia, Italia y Gran Bretaña. Para lograr la salud y la consolidación del Mercado Común habría que pagar poniendo en práctica una vieja consigna de la burguesía francesa de la época de Poincaré y Clemenceau: "que paguen los cochinos alemanes", aunque esta vez no existe ninguna fuerza militar o política que respalde esta reivindicación.

En caso de que Helmut Schmidt no quiera pagar la cuenta, como dijo entre bastidores el mismo día de su investidura como canciller, las consecuencias no serán menos desastrosas para Bonn. Entonces existiría el peligro de que las medidas proteccionistas se extendieran de Italia y Dinamarca a Francia, Gran Bretaña e incluso a otros países. El efecto acumulativo de estas medidas y de las medidas de regurgitación que provocarían, ases-

tarian un golpe decisivo al único pilar de la "prosperidad" del capitalismo alemán occidental: el gran aumento de las exportaciones (en el mercado interno, las ventas para el consumo ya han sufrido un repliegue).

De esta manera, los socios de la República Federal Alemana lograrán con toda seguridad "exportar" la recesión a Alemania Occidental, si ésta no exporta sus divisas hacia sus vecinos. La recesión crearía una crisis social grave, y la presión para absorberla, al abrir ampliamente la válvula de la inflación del crédito, se haría irresistible. Pero aumentar la inflación para aminorar la crisis significaría el déficit de la balanza de pagos y la desaparición de las divisas. He ahí el dilema.

EL PAPEL DEL ESTADO EN LA CONCURRENCIA INTER-IMPERIALISTA

En algunas ocasiones se ha culpado a este análisis de hacer concesiones al mito kautskiano del "ultra-imperialismo". Cuando afirmamos que varias potencias imperialistas europeas podrían "fusionarse pacíficamente", sin que ninguna absorbiera por la fuerza a las otras, como trató de hacerlo el imperialismo alemán durante la primera y la segunda guerras mundiales, y como intentaron los imperialismos francés y británico inmediatamente después de las dos guerras, ¿no estamos postulando, quizás, que se puede dar un transcrecimiento pacífico de las contradicciones inter-imperialistas, en lugar de su exacerbación? ¿No es ésta la característica principal de la teoría de Kautsky, contra la cual Lenin polemizó encarnizadamente al final de su obra sobre el imperialismo?

En realidad, con este argumento nuestros adversarios demuestran un esquematismo formalista y hueco, que raya en el sofisma y se sitúa a mil leguas de una comprensión dialéctica de la realidad objetiva. Lo que Lenin contrapuso a la teoría de Kautsky, fue la tesis de que las contradicciones inter-imperialistas, tomadas en su conjunto, se profundizarían en vez de atenuarse, pero no sostuvo que se profundizarían las contradicciones entre cada una de las potencias imperialistas individuales. Creemos que la tesis de Lenin sigue siendo absolutamente correcta y que corresponde a los acontecimientos. Las contra-

dicciones inter-imperialistas se agravan en vez de atenuarse, lo que niega formalmente, dicho sea de paso, no solamente la teoría del ultra-imperialismo, sino también la teoría del super-imperialismo norteamericano, del que se dice que aplastaría a todos sus competidores reduciéndoles al estado de meros y simples satélites.

Lenin nunca planteó la tesis de que la concurrencia inter-imperialista ope-



HELMUT SCHMIDT

ría necesariamente entre un número inamovible de potencias imperialistas. Lenin mismo presenció la desaparición de dos grandes potencias imperialistas: la Rusia zarista, derrocada por la revolución de octubre, y Austria-Hungría, desmantelada por la derrota de 1918. Afirmar que es imposible que se dé una fusión entre un cierto número de potencias imperialistas "dada la acentuación de la concurrencia inter-imperialista", esperar de vista que esta fusión quede ser provocada precisamente por la

propia acentuación de la competencia.

Tomemos el reciente ejemplo de la "crisis del petróleo". Provocó que todos los grandes trusts del mundo se lanzaran no sólo sobre las fuentes de petróleo y uranio, sino también de todas las materias primas llamadas raras. La forma en que los gobiernos de los diferentes países imperialistas han maniobrado y siguen maniobrando para facilitar la tarea a "sus" trusts, confirma admirablemente, una vez más, la justeza de la teoría leninista del imperialismo y del estado. Pero es evidente que mientras más fuerte es un estado política, militar y financieramente, más puede facilitar a "sus" trusts el acceso a las fuentes de materias primas. Ahora bien, si es cierto que el estado alemán es financieramente poderoso y que los estados francés, británico e italiano lo son medianamente, si se les toma por separado son débiles políticamente y casi inexistentes militarmente. El estado japonés también es débil militarmente, pero compensa esta debilidad, al menos en parte, con una gran concentración de poder político y la consecuente capacidad para maniobrar y tomar decisiones rápidas.

El resultado no se ha hecho esperar. En la carrera por encontrar materias primas raras—de octubre de 1973 a abril de 1974—, los trusts norteamericanos y japoneses han ganado puntos importantes a expensas de los trusts europeos. El primer resultado de la "crisis del petróleo" fue la modificación de la relación de fuerzas a favor de los trusts norteamericanos y japoneses, a expensas de los trusts europeos.

Ahora se puede comprender la verdadera importancia de la discusión teórica. El "revisionismo" no está de nuestra parte, sino de la de quienes se oponen a nuestra tesis sobre la interpenetración de los capitales europeos. Porque lo que suponen implícitamente es, en realidad, que los grandes trusts europeos no pueden (o peor aún, no quieren) defender sus intereses en la lucha de concurrencia inter-imperialista, con la ayuda de instrumentos estatales que estén a la altura de esta lucha. ¿Y no es ésta la teoría del alineamiento de estos trusts en base a los intereses norteamericanos; es decir, la tesis del ultra-imperialismo (o de su variante "super-imperia-

lista")?

Nosotros afirmamos, por el contrario, que las contradicciones y los conflictos inter-imperialistas se agravan y se exacerban entre los trusts norteamericanos, japoneses y europeos. Es por esto que, a largo plazo, existe la tendencia a la interpenetración de los capitales europeos y a la creación de un super-estado imperialista en Europa. Estas son *las armas indispensables para que los trusts europeos conserven la posibilidad de vencer en esta lucha de competencia exacerbada*.

Seguindo este razonamiento, no hacemos absolutamente ninguna concesión al mito de la "territorialidad". Son, en cambio, los que polemizan con nosotros quienes operan con la abstracción de los "trusts establecidos en territorio francés, alemán occidental, etc.", olvidando que entre los trusts norteamericanos y los trusts europeos han surgido irreconciliables contradicciones de intereses y que el estado burgués no puede ser, ni es, neutral, así como tampoco es un "árbitro" que está por encima del conflicto.

O bien defiende los intereses de los trusts europeos, aunque sea con poca eficacia (es decir, los intereses de Philips, Siemens, ICI, Hoechst Bayer, Péchiney, Saint-Gobain, Fiat, Royal-Dutch, British Petroleum, Thyssen, Daimler-Benz, etc., y los de todos los capitales financieros que los sustentan), y entonces se plantea la cuestión de saber *cuál* instrumento estatal es *el arma más eficaz* en esta concurrencia inter-imperialista agravada. Obien se niega que estos grupos quieran o puedan dotarse de un estado que los defienda contra el imperialismo norteamericano (este tipo de argumentos son extremadamente débiles y no se apoyan en ninguna prueba demostrable empíricamente), y entonces se vuelve, querámoslo o no, a la tesis kautskiana del ultra-imperialismo, que unifica a todos los trusts y aplasta a todos los que se le oponen.

CONTINUA LA INTERPENETRACION DE LOS CAPITALES EUROPEOS

Para apreciar el futuro del Mercado Común, hay que desprenderse de cualquier impresionismo superficial y miope. Hay que comprender las tendencias a largo plazo, tanto en el

plano económico y social como en el plano político, así como las contradicciones que éstas contienen. Así como ayer fue incorrecto afirmar, a la ligera, que la integración económica de la Europa capitalista había llegado a ser "irreversible", así hoy sería incorrecto sacar precipitadamente la conclusión inversa de que el Mercado Común se está descomponiendo o de que ya falleció.

A pesar del fracaso de la unión Fiat-Citroën (que plantea la cuestión de una fusión Citroën-Renault or Citroën-Ford, ya que parece ser que el más débil de los trusts europeos del automóvil no puede soportar en forma autónoma la crisis actual de la industria automotriz internacional); a pesar de la crisis de las instituciones de la CEE, la interpenetración de los capitales europeos sigue su curso. Ante la pasividad de los gobiernos burgueses y el desorden de las instituciones "comunitarias", el gran capital financiero europeo no deja de actuar, y prácticamente todas sus acciones van en el sentido de lograr una interpenetración de los capitales europeos cada vez mayor.

La "crisis de energéticos" hizo surgir una nueva sociedad financiera europea, que se agregó a los numerosos grupos financieros-bancarios comunes creados durante el último decenio. El Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, la Société Générale, la Schweizerische Kreditanstalt, el Midland Bank, el Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank, la Société Générale de Banque de Bélgica, formaron la *Finerg*, que tiene por objeto financiar los grandes proyectos de inversiones en el terreno de la energía: creación de centrales nucleares, perforaciones para prospección de petróleo en el Mar del Norte, investigación de nuevas fuentes de energía, etc. Este proyecto confirma una vez más la lógica económica a largo plazo que rige la interpenetración de los capitales europeos: la creciente impotencia de los trusts "nacionales", aún los más fuertes, para conseguir el capital y los medios materiales necesarios para iniciar proyectos tecnológicos de vanguardia, sin los cuales perderían irremisiblemente la carrera de la concurrencia con el imperialismo norteamericano y con el imperialismo japonés.

En las negociaciones con los países semi-coloniales, así como con los estados obreros burocratizados, los

grandes trusts monopólicos europeos reclaman a grandes voces un apoyo gubernamental "europeo" que les permita lograr los arreglos de su preferencia. Si la diplomacia norteamericana consiguió para los Rockefeller y Cía., un regreso espectacular al mercado egipcio, la diplomacia europea ha ganado puntos indiscutibles en la Unión Soviética, en Maghreb (aceros y automóviles a cambio de gas natural), en Africa y en el Brasil.

Por lo tanto, el problema está lejos de resolverse. El futuro del Mercado Común depende ahora más que nunca del resultado de una batalla entre fuerzas económicas, sociales y políticas vivas; es decir, de ciertas relaciones de fuerza, y no de alguna fatalidad o del funcionamiento de una "ley de hierro".

LOS INTERESES DE LOS OBREROS NO SON LOS DEL CAPITAL

En esta pelea en torno a intereses reales y materiales, la clase obrera y el movimiento obrero deben conservar sobre todo su autonomía política y no identificarse con ninguno de los grupos burgueses en disputa. Actualmente, el "interés nacional" y el "ideal europeo" no son más que caretas con las que se disfrazan diversos grupos capitalistas, que tratan de que los trabajadores abandonen la defensa resuelta de sus propios intereses contra los del gran capital.

Los que se oponen a la interpenetración de los capitales europeos y a la creación de un "super-estado" europeo en nombre de la defensa de la "soberanía nacional" de los estados burgueses existentes, se identifican con intereses capitalistas conservadores y retrógrados, que tratarán de salvarse (especialmente por medio de una política de austeridad, de deflación y de proteccionismo) reduciendo el poder de compra y el nivel de vida de la clase obrera. Los que preconizan la "respuesta europea" al "desafío norteamericano", y que piden que se forme un "estado europeo" para "ganarle la partida a las multinacionales", lo que contraponen en realidad a los objetivos de las multinacionales norteamericanas es el fortalecimiento de las multinacionales europeas. La clase obrera no tiene ningún interés en fortalecer a su propio enemigo de clase, ni debe suponer que los super-trusts europeos serán más "liberales"

y más "reformistas" de lo que son ahora los super-trusts "nacionales".

La crisis del Mercado Común expresa, a su manera, la incompatibilidad creciente entre la expansión de las fuerzas productivas y la supervivencia del estado nacional burgués. A esta contradicción nosotros oponemos una sola solución histórica: los Estados Unidos Socialistas de Europa.

Para llegar a los Estados Unidos Socialistas de Europa, hay que preparar a la clase obrera para que pueda aprovechar cada debilitamiento decisivo de su propia burguesía, cada crisis pre-revolucionaria aguda, con el objetivo de luchar por la conquista del poder. Todavía es posible la revolución socialista a escala de un solo país. Incluso, por el momento, sólo es posible a esta escala, dado el desarrollo desigual de las relaciones de fuerza entre las clases y la

naturaleza todavía nacional del aparato del estado y de la represión.

Pero, al mismo tiempo, la creciente internacionalización del capital (de la "patronal" en el sentido más inmediato del término), impone a los trabajadores y a las organizaciones obreras europeas una tarea mayor de cooperación conjunta, de alianzas y acciones comunes a escala europea, incluso en torno a las reivindicaciones más inmediatas, como las negociaciones salariales. Así va desarrollándose poco a poco una lucha de clases internacional, de acuerdo a la organización internacional del capital. Los revolucionarios no sólo deben participar activamente en esa lucha de clases internacional. Deben ser sus promotores más lúcidos, más enérgicos y más emprendedores; multiplicando las iniciativas de contactos y de colaboraciones a nivel de dele-

gados de fábricas y de militantes sindicales combativos que trabajen en empresas que pertenezcan al mismo trust multinacional o a la misma rama industrial, en diferentes países europeos.

La combinación de ambos fenómenos—crisis revolucionarias que estallan primero a nivel nacional y las luchas obreras que se van extendiendo poco a poco a escala internacional—genera una dinámica de interacción progresiva de las crisis revolucionarias a escala europea, que tendrá una calidad superior a la de los periodos de 1917—1920, 1934—38 o 1944—47. Por esto, el programa de los Estados Unidos Socialistas de Europa es no sólo necesario, sino que se puede realizar en la práctica, y cada vez resulta más creíble para la vanguardia amplia, primero, y para las masas trabajadoras en su conjunto, en seguida. □

¿Aplicación de las Normas Leninistas de Democracia?

Cuba Prueba Proyecto Electoral en Matanzas

Por Dick Fidler

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Cubans Test Electoral 'Pilot Project' in Matanzas", que apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 22 de julio].

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El 30 de junio los ciudadanos de Matanzas, provincia situada al oriente de La Habana, fueron a las urnas para elegir a los funcionarios del gobierno local. Esta fue la primera elección en base al sufragio universal que se realiza en Cuba desde el triunfo de las fuerzas armadas revolucionarias, en 1959.

Los dirigentes cubanos presentaron las elecciones de Matanzas como un proyecto piloto para que más adelante se lleven a cabo elecciones parecidas en otras provincias.

A los candidatos que triunfan se les denomina "delegados a los Organos de Poder Popular" (OPP). Según las autoridades cubanas, estos órganos introducirán un elemento formalizado de control popular sobre el gobierno local, que hasta ahora ha sido administrado directamente desde La Habana.

Una noticia de Reuters desde La Habana, que apareció el 30 de junio en el *New York Times*, informaba que "se realizarán elecciones posteriores para los 'comités ejecutivos regionales', que agrupan a los delegados de varios distritos electorales. Después, un comité ejecutivo se encargará de gobernar toda la provincia".

Las autoridades cubanas dicen que se escogió la provincia de Matanzas para comenzar con lo que ellos llaman "el proceso general de institucionalización" de la revolución, porque es la más pequeña de las seis provincias cubanas, con una población de alrededor de medio millón de personas, y porque se considera que representa una sección intermedia de la economía y de la sociedad cubanas. Aproximadamente el 30% de su población obrera trabaja en la agricultura, 20% en la industria, 15% en la construcción y el transporte y 35% en los servicios.

Un comunicado de Prensa Latina, que apareció el 27 de junio en el periódico argentino *La Opinión*, alababa a los OPPs como "el embrión de una verdadera democracia popu-

lar y revolucionaria", y afirmaba que "contribuirán en no poca medida a hacer que el pueblo se sienta realmente cada vez más identificado con el poder estatal".

Sin embargo, los informes oficiales son muy poco claros sobre la medida exacta de la amplitud y el contenido de la autoridad de los "Organos de Poder Popular". Un artículo publicado el 28 de mayo en *Granma*, el órgano oficial del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, los describía como "los máximos órganos de poder estatal en la instancia de dirección del país en que se constituirán: municipio, región, provincia y nación". Decía que "el poder popular existirá en los municipios, regiones y provincia, durante la experiencia que se hará en Matanzas. Posteriormente, cuando el sistema se extienda a todo el país, existirá el Poder Popular Nacional". *Granma* delineaba la relación que habrá entre los organismos elegidos y el aparato estatal:

"Los Organos de Poder Popular, conjuntamente con los organismos centrales de la administración del Estado, dirigen las unidades de produc-

ción o servicios de importancia local (municipal, regional y provincial). Estas unidades se subordinan administrativamente a los órganos del Poder Popular, y normativa y metodológicamente así como en determinados aspectos del proceso de planificación y en el manejo de personal técnico y especializado a los organismos centrales de la administración del Estado. También, aunque no las dirijan directamente, los órganos de Poder Popular se interesarán por la marcha de aquellas unidades de producción o de servicios cuyas características o importancia hacen que se subordinen directamente a la administración de los organismos centrales del Estado".

Los Organos de Poder Popular, decía *Granma*, "no significan el establecimiento de un aparato administrativo más. . ."

". . . a diferencia de los aparatos administrativos locales actuales, entre los que no existe ningún órgano con autoridad global sobre las diversas dependencias administrativas existentes en un mismo nivel de dirección, dirigen todas las actividades económicas o sociales de importancia local que tienen en su jurisdicción y tienen autoridad total o parcialmente, sobre las direcciones administrativas que la las ejecutan".

Según *Granma*, los delegados electos "responderán ante sus electores por la autoridad que de ellos reciben y están obligados a rendir cuentas periódicamente de sus actividades ante ellos". "Pueden ser revocados en cualquier momento por sus electores, cuando no cumplan adecuadamente con sus responsabilidades". Más aún, "los delegados no son profesionales como tales delegados, sino que desempeñan las actividades que como delegados del Poder Popular les corresponde, después de haber cumplido sus obligaciones laborales habituales".

Granma no describía cómo funcionaría en la práctica este proceso de rendir cuentas y de remover a los delegados en caso necesario.

Los delegados a los Organos del Poder Popular son electos por sufragio universal y secreto. El Consejo de Ministros corrigió la Constitución de 1940 para que tuvieran derecho a votar todos los cubanos que hubieran cumplido dieciséis años, así como los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas. (Según la antigua Constitución, las fuerzas armadas y las personas menores de veinte años no tenían de-

recho al voto).

Quedan excluidos de votar o participar de alguna forma en las elecciones los que participaron en las sucias elecciones realizadas por Batista el 3 de noviembre de 1958, sólo dos meses antes del triunfo de la Revolución. También quedan excluidos, según *Granma*, "los que sirvieron activa y directamente en las directivas y aparatos sindicales mujalistas" [los sindicatos corruptos de antes de la revolución], y "los sancionados por practicar o predicar, con cualquier pretexto, el incumplimiento de los deberes relativos a la defensa de la patria y el respeto debido a sus símbolos".

Los delegados son elegidos sobre la base de la representación territorial. Hay un delegado por cada circunscripción o zona electoral. Una circunscripción urbana cuenta con 1,000 votantes, aproximadamente; mientras que las zonas electorales rurales tienen menos votantes. Cada Organó de Poder Popular municipal o seccional tiene cuando menos veinte delegados, que representan otras tantas circunscripciones.

Granma remontó los orígenes del Poder Popular a los discursos del Primer Ministro Fidel Castro en 1970, donde "planteó la necesidad de fortalecer a todas las organizaciones y organismos que conforman el sistema de la dictadura del proletariado en nuestro país: el Partido, las organizaciones de masas y el aparato estatal". En un discurso en conmemoración del décimo aniversario de la fundación de la Federación de Mujeres Cubanas, dado el 23 de agosto de 1970, Castro dijo: ". . . tenemos infinitud de problemas en el país, en la cuadra, en las ciudades, en el campo. Que nosotros vamos creando los mecanismos que pongan en manos de las masas el nivel de decisión, acerca de muchos de esos problemas y que nosotros logramos de manera inteligente, de manera eficiente, llevarlos consecuentemente adelante a este desarrollo; para hacer que no se trate simplemente con confianza en sus organizaciones políticas, en sus dirigentes, en la disposición a realizar tareas, sino que el proceso revolucionario sea— como aspiraba Lenin— una formidable escuela de gobierno donde millones de personas aprendan a asumir responsabilidades y a resolver problemas de gobierno".

El experimento electoral de Matan-

zas fue anunciado por primera vez en un discurso del Comandante de División Raúl Castro, segundo secretario del Partido Comunista de Cuba, en un acto de masas celebrado el 2 de enero pasado, en el decimoquinto aniversario de la revolución. Los Organos de Poder Popular, que existirían a todos los niveles de dirección, según dijo Raúl, "deben servir para incorporar a las masas a los asuntos de la dirección estatal y administrativa, para que el pueblo forme parte directa e institucionalmente del Estado y se sienta más identificado con éste, de manera que revista aún más el carácter de un Estado de los Trabajadores, de una verdadera democracia popular y revolucionaria".

Raúl Castro vinculó el desarrollo de estos órganos con la lucha contra la burocracia. "Estamos convencidos de que en la medida en que las masas participen en los asuntos del Estado, se hará más efectiva la lucha contra toda manifestación de burocratismo, estarán mejor atendidas las necesidades de la población y de la comunidad y el Estado revolucionario será más fuerte, más democrático y más sólido".

Raúl Castro mencionó también que el primer congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba está programado para 1975, y que durante 1974, "se continuará trabajando en la elaboración de un Proyecto de Constitución o Ley Fundamental ajustada a las condiciones de construcción del socialismo".

El 1 de junio, *Direct From Cuba*, publicación de Prensa Latina, informó que "el poder popular estará dirigido por el Partido Comunista de Cuba, que en meses recientes ha estado acelerando el proceso general de institucionalización del país". La revista explicaba que el Consejo de Ministros había creado una comisión "para organizar, regular y dirigir . . . la creación de asambleas y comités ejecutivos municipales, regionales y provinciales". Esta comisión está encabezada por Blas Roca, miembro del Secretariado del PC; el vicepresidente es Julián Rizo, primer secretario del comité provincial del Partido Comunista de Cuba en Matanzas.

A pesar de que el Partido Comunista está encargado del proceso, se prohibió que hubiera un solo candidato para cada puesto, según *Granma*. Más de 4,000 candidatos compitieron por las 1,024 circunscripciones que había

en toda la provincia; hubo cuandome nos dos candidatos para cada puesto. Los candidatos fueron seleccionados por voto secreto en una serie de elecciones preliminares, que se realizaron en mayo.

NOMINACION DE LOS CANDIDATOS

El 23 de mayo, *Granma* describía una reunión típica para seleccionar a los candidatos. Era una reunión de los residentes de la Base Campesina de Ciro Redondo para elegir a los candidatos que representarían a su región en el Consejo Municipal del Poder Popular. Cuando se pasó lista se vió que estaba presente el 92% de las personas que podían votar.

El presidente de la reunión, Antonio Rodríguez, describió las características que debían tener los posibles candidatos. "Debe ser revolucionario, trabajador, buen vecino, un genuino representante de las virtudes mostradas por nuestro pueblo en estos años de trabajo y esfuerzo por construir una nueva sociedad".

Se hicieron tres nominaciones. Las tres fueron aceptadas. *Granma* informaba sobre los siguientes puntos del orden del día:

Según el orden de las nominaciones, los presentes argumentaron en favor y en contra de los candidatos, mencionando sus puntos buenos y sus puntos malos.

"Luego se tomó la votación. El Presidente contó los votos a favor, los votos en contra y las abstenciones.

"Luego informó sobre el resultado de la votación: Arelio Ramos, 25 votos a favor, Antonio Rodríguez, 13 y Juan González, 1. Cinco abstenciones".

El 30 de junio, de la misma manera que sus conciudadanos en toda la provincia de Matanzas, los residentes de la zona (que incluye varias comunidades como la Base Campesina Ciro Redondo) votaron para elegir al delegado que los representará en el consejo regional. Escogieron a su delegado entre candidatos de diferentes comunidades de la zona.

"A los nominados candidatos a delegados por la circunscripción, se les confecciona una biografía, que unida a su fotografía, se dará a conocer a los núcleos familiares para que los electores los conozcan y puedan elegir al que los representará en la asam-

blea municipal del Poder Popular".

A juzgar por éste y otros informes que han aparecido en la prensa cubana, en ninguna parte se seleccionó a los candidatos sobre la base de la adhesión a un programa particular, una lista de proposiciones o una plataforma. No se ha mencionado que participe otro partido más que el Partido Comunista.

Esto puede haber causado algunas dificultades a muchos votantes en las elecciones de Matanzas, al tener que



FIDEL CASTRO

elegir entre varios candidatos que competían por el mismo puesto. Comentando los resultados de las elecciones del 30 de junio, Fidel Castro dijo que varias votaciones habían sido tan cerradas que se necesitaría una segunda vuelta para decidir quién era el triunfador.

El experimento electoral en Matanzas no tiene nada en común con las sucias "elecciones" que caracterizaban a la política cubana antes de la revolución. El 11 de junio *Granma* ofrece un ejemplo de cómo eran esas "elecciones", en una entrevista con los residentes de la Ciénaga Zapata, área de la provincia de Matanzas que está junto a la Bahía de Cochinos. Esta era una de las partes más sub-

desarrolladas de Cuba antes de la revolución, y que ahora ha sido beneficiada por un amplio plan de desarrollo, que incluye construcción de casas, electrificación y emplear en cosas útiles a la población.

Bajo el antiguo régimen, explicaron los residentes de Zapata, era compulsorio votar y se castigaba a quien no lo hacía. Algunos dijeron que tenían que caminar entre los senderos de la jungla durante dos o tres días, sólo para tomar el tren que los llevara al lugar de registro. Las listas de las personas con derecho a voto eran generalmente falsas.

Esas elecciones tenían un sólo objetivo: dar una falsa cubierta de "legitimidad" a uno de los regímenes más brutales y tiránicos del hemisferio occidental.

Pero ahora Cuba es un estado obrero, en el que todos los medios de producción importantes han sido nacionalizados; el comercio exterior se maneja exclusivamente a través de las instituciones estatales y se ha instituido una planificación económica centralizada y a largo plazo. La dominación imperialista y el poder económico de la burguesía cubana han sido aplastados. Los partidos burgueses están prohibidos. Por lo tanto, la cuestión importante para evaluar el papel y la efectividad del proceso electoral experimental no es comparar las elecciones de Matanzas en 1974 con la "democracia" del antiguo régimen, sino más bien evaluar estas elecciones y el proceso de "institucionalización" en su conjunto en base a las normas de la democracia proletaria en un estado obrero.

Un modelo apropiado es la república soviética de los primeros años. En tiempos de Lenin las instituciones básicas de gobierno eran los "soviets" o consejos obreros, en los que estaban representadas, de acuerdo al apoyo con que contaran entre los trabajadores, todas las tendencias y fracciones de la clase obrera.

SIGNIFICADO DE LA DEMOCRACIA PROLETARIA

Una descripción valiosa de como funcionaba este sistema se puede encontrar en el libro de Victor Serge, *El Año Uno de la Revolución Rusa*. Serge informa, por ejemplo, que el Ejecutivo Pan-ruso que fue electo en el Tercer Congreso de los Soviets,

realizado en enero de 1918, estaba compuesto por 160 comunistas, 125 socialistas revolucionarios, 7 socialistas revolucionarios de derecha, 7 socialistas revolucionarios maximalistas, 3 anarquistas-comunistas, 2 mencheviques y 2 mencheviques internacionalistas.

Se permitía que partidos políticos que no eran los bolcheviques (o comunistas) funcionaran libremente, siempre y cuando no participaran en actos abiertamente contra-revolucionarios. Serge relata que los anarquistas, acérrimos oponentes de los bolcheviques, publicaban un diario en Moscú, llamado *Anarquía*. Los anarquistas tenían contingentes armados, la Guardia Negra, en los que participaban miles de hombres. Incluso después de que los soviets los desarmaron (después de que realizaron una serie de provocaciones armadas por las que aceptaban la responsabilidad), no hubo ninguna represión seria de ningún tipo contra los anarquistas. Su diario reapareció con el encabezado "¡Abajo el Absolutismo!" Mantuvieron sus organizaciones y sus clubes.

En lo que se refiere al partido bolchevique, estaba caracterizado por la más amplia democracia interna. Las tendencias y fracciones minoritarias recibían representación en el Comité Central. Por ejemplo, escribe Serge que en el Séptimo Congreso del Partido, en marzo de 1918, el partido casi se escindió por una aguda discusión sobre si se debía firmar el tratado de paz bajo las onerosas condiciones impuestas por los imperialistas alemanes. Pero cuando se terminó el congreso, la oposición recibió representación en el Comité Central, así como en el comité encargado de revisar el programa.

Por algún tiempo en 1918 la fracción "Comunista de Izquierda" publicó un diario, en el que escribían muchos miembros destacados del partido, entre los que estaban Bujarin, Radek y Uritsky.

En la dirección del partido, informa Serge, los problemas más importantes se resolvían mediante una votación, y frecuentemente por una pequeña mayoría (por ejemplo, 7 contra 6); sin embargo, la minoría se sometía sin ceder sobre sus ideas. Cuando estaba en minoría, Lenin esperaba pacientemente que los acontecimientos le dieran la razón y se

guía agitando en favor de su política sin romper una sola vez la disciplina.

El que el partido practicara la democracia interna aumentaba enormemente su habilidad para combatir a la burguesía y para dirigir la reconstrucción socialista del país. Al asegurar que las diferencias se discutían a fondo, los bolcheviques minimizaban la posibilidad de cometer un serio error y reducían el precio que tenían que pagar cuando cometían uno. Su partido estaba formado por dirigentes de la clase obrera con una mente crítica, capaces de tomar iniciativas en la acción.

Los dirigentes cubanos están conscientes de que sus procedimientos electorales deben medirse en base a las normas de la democracia proletaria. Por esta razón dicen que las elecciones de Matanzas— a diferencia de las elecciones de la democracia burguesa, que no ofrecían ninguna alternativa real a los votantes— están diseñadas para aumentar el control de las masas sobre la economía y la administración del estado. Y es absolutamente cierto, como lo declararon en sus discursos Fidel Castro y Raúl Castro, que la clave para resolver muchos de los problemas que tiene Cuba actualmente está en fortalecer las formas de control democrático de las masas sobre los individuos que ejercen el poder gubernamental.

FIDEL CASTRO SOBRE LA DEMOCRACIA OBRERA

En dos de sus principales discursos hace cuatro años, Fidel Castro se refirió a la necesidad de crear órganos representativos que tomaran decisiones. Dirigiéndose a un acto de masas celebrado el 26 de julio de 1970, justo después de que se había fracasado en lograr la meta de los diez millones de toneladas de azúcar, Fidel sugirió dos posibles caminos para enfrentar el problema de la ineficacia de la administración: el establecimiento de comités obreros que regularan la distribución de mercancías y servicios fuera de las fábricas y la creación de alguna forma de representación obrera en el control de la producción misma. (Ver *Intercontinental Press*, 7 de septiembre de 1970, p. 715).

Un mes después, el 23 de agosto, en su discurso a la Federación de

Mujeres Cubanas, al que *Granma* se refirió recientemente como la fuente de inspiración original de los Organos de Poder Popular, Castro sugirió que ese control sobre la administración de la economía debería ejercerse a través de organizaciones de masas parecidas a las organizaciones obreras masivas ya existentes, como la federación de mujeres, los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución, los sindicatos y las organizaciones campesinas. (Ver *Intercontinental Press*, 28 de septiembre de 1970, p. 789).

En este discurso, Fidel sugirió también que dentro del marco del apoyo a la revolución, la dirección cubana estaba dispuesta a tolerar, e incluso a impulsar, la manifestación de puntos de vista minoritarios. Refiriéndose al descontento popular que había descrito en su discurso del 26 de julio, Castro dijo: "Cuando nosotros hablamos de descontento o de inconformidad, hablamos de descontento dentro de la Revolución, no contra la Revolución; para mejorar la Revolución, no para destruir la Revolución; ¡para hacer más fuerte la Revolución y no para liquidar la Revolución! Esa es la diferencia, la radical diferencia que hay entre el proceso revolucionario y los descontentos fuera de los procesos revolucionarios".

Reconocer el derecho a disentir, implica el reconocimiento del derecho a formar tendencias dentro del partido, e incluso a formar otros partidos, dentro del marco del apoyo a la revolución. Sin el derecho a formar tendencias, la "consulta" y la "discusión" significan muy poca cosa; las organizaciones de masas, e incluso las elecciones, se convierten en meros vehículos para movilizar a las masas en plebiscitos.

El procedimiento adoptado en las elecciones experimentales en Matanzas parecería indicar que los cubanos han optado por modelar su maquinaria formal para tomar decisiones de acuerdo a las prácticas actuales de la Unión Soviética y otros estados obreros deformados, y no de acuerdo al modelo leninista de democracia soviética.

Es cierto que las provisiones formales del experimento de Matanzas contienen muchos rasgos democráticos— como la posibilidad de cambiar a los representantes y de exigirles cuentas; la extensión del derecho de voto a los jóvenes y a las fuerzas armadas y la insistencia en que se

presenten varios candidatos en cada circunscripción. Más aún, al explicar estos rasgos, la dirección cubana invoca el concepto profundamente comunista—expresado por Lenin en *El Estado y la Revolución*—de que las funciones del gobierno deben "estar al alcance de toda persona que sepa leer y escribir".

Pero quince años después del derrocamiento de Batista, y trece años después de que se convirtió en un estado obrero, Cuba carece todavía de consejos obreros democráticamente electos. Y su vida política está restringida a un solo partido que, después de unos doce años de existencia formal, no ha tenido todavía un congreso de fundación. Dentro de este partido tampoco existen provisiones para que se formen tendencias o se dé una discusión programática interna.

Estas condiciones no sólo inhiben el funcionamiento eficaz de la economía, sino que alimentan la tendencia hacia las deformaciones burocráticas que emanan de la desequilibrada economía que heredó Cuba del régimen semi-colonial, del aislamiento de la revolución cubana, del bloqueo del imperialismo norteamericano y de la presión que ejerce Moscú para que los dirigentes cubanos se orienten hacia la "coexistencia pacífica".

Las elecciones sobre la base de la representación geográfica están basadas en la forma burguesa de la democracia y pueden encubrir eventualmente la destrucción de la democracia proletaria. Esta es el razonamiento que estaba subyacente cuando la Unión Soviética adoptó la constitución revisada, en 1936, después de que Stalin hubo consolidado su control contra-revolucionario sobre la dirección, liquidando a toda la oposición. León Trotsky, en su estudio clásico sobre el proceso de la degeneración burocrática de la Unión Soviética, *La Revolución Traicionada*, describió el rasgo característico de esa constitución como "la substitución del sistema electoral soviético, fundado en los grupos de clase y de producción, por el sistema de la democracia burguesa, basado en el llamado 'sufragio universal, igual y directo' de la población atomizada".

Para justificar la revisión de la constitución soviética, Stalin cocinó una teoría complicada y autocontradictoria—y totalmente falsa—según la cual las clases habían sido abolidas

en la Unión Soviética, y los obreros se habían disuelto en el "pueblo" nacional. Uno de los fraudes más flagrantes de Stalin fue el decreto del voto secreto. El voto secreto representó una importante conquista de los trabajadores durante el ascenso del capitalismo, ya que los protegía contra represalias tomadas por los patrones en caso de que votaran contra los deseos de éstos. Pero en una sociedad donde los puntos de vista disidentes pueden manifestarse abiertamente, sin el temor de represalias económicas o de represión política, no es necesario que exista el voto secreto. El voto secreto de la constitución de Stalin, decía Trotsky, era la admisión encubierta de que los trabajadores sentían la necesidad de contar con alguna protección contra la burocracia.

CONTROL DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA

El control que ejerce el Partido Comunista de Cuba sobre la elección de Matanzas no presagia nada bueno para que este experimento se traduzca en una expansión de la democracia proletaria. El 14 de junio *Granma* definió el "sistema de la dictadura del proletariado" en Cuba como compuesto "por el Partido Comunista, la fuerza dirigente y rectora del sistema; la UJC [Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas], las organizaciones de masas: CTC [Central de Trabajadores Cubanos], ANAP [Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños], CDR [Comités de Defensa de la Revolución] y FMC [Federación de Mujeres Cubanas], y otras organizaciones e instituciones sociales; por los medios de divulgación, y por el instrumento principal de la dictadura: el Estado revolucionario que hasta ahora ha tenido un carácter provisional en cuanto a su estructura y a su forma y que consta actualmente de los órganos de gobierno o administración, órganos de justicia y órganos de defensa".

Granma sostenía "no existen relaciones de subordinación orgánica entre los Poderes Populares y las organizaciones políticas de masas". Seguía diciendo que los OPPs "se orientan y guían por las directivas generales sobre las cuestiones fundamentales de desarrollo económico, político, cultural y social del país que haya dado el Partido. Esas directivas

son dadas por los organismos superiores del Partido: su Congreso, su Comité Central y su Buró Político.

"El Partido", continuaba *Granma*, "también dirigirá a los órganos de Poder Popular mediante el apoyo y ayuda que, a través de su aparato, le ofrece a los órganos estatales en el desenvolvimiento de sus actividades; y a través de los militantes del Partido que trabajan en el Estado y que, cualesquiera sean los lugares donde se hallen y el cargo que ocupen, están obligados a cumplir y aplicar las decisiones del Partido y a tratar de convencer a los no militantes de la justeza de esas decisiones y de la necesidad de cumplirlas".

La tarea de las "organizaciones de masas", explicaba *Granma*, "es constituir un extraordinario apoyo para el trabajo de los órganos de Poder Popular".

Por lo tanto, la jerarquía de autoridad parece ser la siguiente: el Partido Comunista guía la línea política de los delegados a los Organos de Poder Popular, que administran los diversos niveles del aparato estatal, con el apoyo de las "organizaciones de masas".

La medida de democracia con que funciona el sistema, entonces, depende en mucho de la amplitud de la democracia dentro del partido. Y en este sentido el PC cubano no aplica las normas de un partido de tipo leninista. Como el partido carece de provisiones para formar tendencias o para la discusión interna de la política, los miembros no tienen ninguna forma de iniciar una política o de ejercer control sobre ésta. Esto se hace, indica *Granma*, a través de "directivas" de los más altos peldaños de la dirección del partido. Estos procedimientos no pueden sino hacer que el partido sea más vulnerable a las influencias burocráticas en la administración del estado, poniéndolo en peligro de caer bajo el control de los carreristas y oportunistas contra-revolucionarios.

Los dirigentes revolucionarios cubanos deben ser los primeros en tener claro este peligro. En 1962 Fidel Castro se vió obligado a tomar la medida extraordinaria de denunciar públicamente como "sectarios" a muchos "viejos militantes marxistas"—refiriéndose a los antiguos miembros del PSP, el partido stalinista de Cuba— porque habían tratado de encajonar

al partido con maniobras stalinistas. "Estábamos organizando, o creando, o fabricando una camisa de fuerza, un yugo, compañeros", dijo Castro. "No estábamos promoviendo una asociación libre de revolucionarios, sino un ejército de revolucionarios domesticados y amaestrados". (Discurso del 26 de marzo de 1962).

El blanco principal del ataque de Castro era Aníbal Escalante, un viejo stalinista que se había convertido en secretario de organización del nuevo partido. Después del discurso de Fidel, Escalante y los que lo apoyaban fueron sacados de sus puestos en una purga generalizada, y se reorganizó el partido a través de un reclutamiento a gran escala de "obreros ejemplares", elegidos por sus compañeros de trabajo en las fábricas y oficinas.

FALTA ANALISIS DEL STALINISMO

Por el tiempo del ataque contra Escalante, Castro y otros dirigentes cubanos tendían a considerar que el origen del problema se encontraba en diversos factores secundarios—rasgos individuales de personalidad, el "aislamiento" del PSP bajo los regímenes represivos anteriores, etc.

Más adelante, los cubanos dieron muestras de estar desarrollando una comprensión más profunda del problema de la burocracia. Los discursos de Fidel Castro y Raúl Castro, así como los editoriales de *Granma*, por ejemplo, vinculaban el fenómeno del mal manejo burocrático y de la arbitrariedad con la insuficiente integración de los trabajadores en el proceso de tomar decisiones.

Pero un programa para combatir a la burocracia, tenía que construirse en torno a una concepción clara de la estructura democrática socialista que permita la más libre expresión de los puntos de vista disidentes dentro del contexto del apoyo general a la revolución. Sin un programa consciente para luchar contra las deformaciones burocráticas—no sólo como problema administrativo, sino como problema *social y político*—es muy posible que el partido sucumba a las poderosas presiones de los elementos que favorecen la colaboración de clases. Estas presiones son enormes, debido a que el país depende económicamente de la burocracia soviética quiera darle créditos a largo plazo,

así como otro tipo de ayuda.

Por esto resulta particularmente ominoso el hecho de que Blas Roca, que era el dirigente principal del PC cubano en tiempos de Batista, esté a cargo del proceso electoral en Matanzas. Y difícilmente se puede creer que sea una coincidencia el que la prensa cubana haya lanzado recientemente una serie de ataques contra el "trotskismo". Estos desarrollos no se pueden disociar de un notable giro por parte de la dirección cubana hacia la línea moscovita de "coexistencia pacífica".

Estos desarrollos confirman los peligros implícitos en la incapacidad de la dirección cubana para desarrollar una comprensión teórica redondeada del stalinismo y de las razones de la degeneración burocrática de la Unión Soviética.

Una grave manifestación de este acercamiento a los puntos de vista stalinistas es la concepción del partido monolítico, que se aplicó en los procedimientos electorales de Matanzas.

Durante mucho tiempo, los stalinistas han sostenido que la dictadura del partido en la Unión Soviética es sinónimo de la dictadura de la clase obrera. El argumento de Raúl Castro de que la tarea de los Organos de Poder Popular es hacer que el "pueblo", las masas trabajadoras, "formen parte del estado . . . se identifiquen más con él", sigue esta lógica.

Pero la democracia soviética no tiene el objetivo de *integrar* a los trabajadores al estado, sino de darles el *control* del estado. El estado es producto de los antagonismos de clase. Un estado obrero es el instrumento por medio del cual el proletariado, una vez que ha conquistado el poder político, procede a aplastar el poder económico de la burguesía a través de las expropiaciones y de la creación de una economía socialista planificada.

Debido a que el estado obrero refleja el grado de desarrollo económico y cultural de una sociedad dada, está sujeto—particularmente en un país atrasado—al peligro de las deformaciones burocráticas. La tarea que tienen en esos estados los partidos obreros y otras organizaciones como los sindicatos, es combatir esas deformaciones defendiendo los intereses de clase del proletariado. Esto sólo lo pue-

den lograr con una lucha constante por desarrollar la conciencia de clase de los trabajadores—lo que a su vez requiere que haya la máxima democracia posible en el régimen interno del partido y en las organizaciones de masas. Esto significa el derecho a organizar dentro del partido tendencias o fracciones sobre bases principistas, o a organizar un nuevo partido proletario. Lo que está en juego es el derecho de las minorías proletarias a luchar por ganar a la mayoría del partido a sus puntos de vista.

De manera similar, es falso decir que un solo partido puede expresar los intereses de toda una clase social. Como Trotsky señaló, el dinamismo de la conciencia social quedaría "excluido de la historia, en interés del orden administrativo. En realidad, las clases son heterogéneas, desgarradas por antagonismos interiores, y sólo llegan a sus fines comunes por la lucha de las tendencias, de los grupos y de los partidos. Se puede conceder con algunas reservas que un partido es una 'fracción de clase'. Pero como una clase está compuesta de numerosas fracciones—unas miran hacia adelante y otras hacia atrás—, una misma clase puede formar varios partidos. Por la misma razón, un partido puede apoyarse sobre fracciones de diversas clases. No se encontrará en toda la historia política un solo partido representante de una clase única, a menos de que se consienta en tomar por realidad a una ficción policiaca". (*La Revolución Traicionada*).

Es cierto, desde luego, que después del periodo inicial, el único partido legal en la república Soviética ha sido el Partido Comunista. Pero, como explicaba Trotsky, "La supresión de los partidos de oposición* fue una medida

*Por el decreto del 14 de junio de 1918, el Comité Ejecutivo Central Pan-ruso de los Soviets excluyó de sus filas tanto a los socialistas revolucionarios de derecha, como a los mencheviques, por su asociación con "conocidos contra-revolucionarios" que trataban de "organizar ataques armados contra los obreros y campesinos". Recomendó que todos los Soviets excluyeran a estos partidos. En julio de 1918, después de las provocaciones de los socialistas revolucionarios de izquierda, entre las que se encontraban el asesinato del embajador alemán,

provisional, dictada por las necesidades de la guerra civil, del bloqueo, de la intervención extranjera y del hambre". Y añadía, "Pero el partido gobernante, que en ese momento era la organización auténtica de la vanguardia del proletariado, vivía intensamente. La lucha de los grupos y de las fracciones en su seno, substituía, en cierta medida, a la lucha de los partidos".

Sería un grave error sacar la conclusión de que lo que son sólo tendencias en Cuba se han convertido ya en características terminadas. Los cubanos están tanteando el camino, dudando, conforme van trazando el curso de su revolución. La dirección cubana sigue siendo la dirección del único PC en el mundo que reconoce abiertamente la necesidad de dar a

Count Mirbach, e intentos de insurrección en Moscú y otros centros provinciales, fue arrestada la mayoría de los delegados socialistas revolucionarios de izquierda al Quinto Congreso Pan-ruso de los Soviets. El Congreso aprobó una resolución: "Mientras que ciertas secciones del partido socialista de izquierda se asocien con el intento de comprometer a Rusia en la guerra . . . estas organizaciones no tienen cabida en los Soviets de Diputados Obreros y Soldados".

Sin embargo, el Sexto Congreso Pan-ruso de los Soviets, que se reunió la víspera del primer aniversario de la revolución, aprobó de inmediato una "amnistía", ordenando que fueran liberados todos los que hubieran sido "detenidos por los órganos para combatir la contra-revolución", a menos de que se presentaran en su contra cargos concretos de actividades contra-revolucionarias en un plazo que no debería exceder dos semanas después de su arresto. De hecho, los mencheviques y los socialistas revolucionarios de izquierda continuaron reuniéndose durante 1919 y 1920. Fueron readmitidos en los Soviets. Todavía en agosto de 1920 los mencheviques tuvieron una conferencia partidaria abierta en Moscú, de la que informó la prensa soviética.

En 1921, fueron suprimidos estos partidos de oposición, ya que se habían pasado definitivamente al lado de la contra-revolución. (Datos tomados de: E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. I, pp. 170-184).

las masas más voz en el proceso de la toma de decisiones. En ningún momento han cerrado definitivamente la puerta a la legitimización de la expresión y organización de los puntos de vista disidentes dentro de la revolución.

Mientras tanto, los partidarios de la

revolución cubana no deben pasar por alto algunas corrientes que causan preocupación y que se han manifestado en los desarrollos actuales, y deben presentar sus sugerencias sobre cómo se pueden resolver estos problemas, para fortalecer la revolución cubana. □

Hungría

Mujeres Demandan Derecho al Aborto

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Women Petition for Abortion", que apareció el 22 de julio en *Intercontinental Press*].

* * *

El lunes 17 de julio, Zsuzsa Körösi se enfrentará en Budapest a un comité universitario de disciplina. La intención evidente es expulsarla de la universidad. Se le acusa de organizar y juntar firmas para una campaña "que contradice la política demográfica de Hungría".

Después de 1956, Hungría tenía una ley sobre el aborto que hacía posible que casi toda mujer pudiera conseguir un aborto hasta el tercer mes del embarazo. En el verano del 1973 aumentaron los artículos en la prensa húngara que atacaban esta ley y exigían que se limitara el derecho al aborto.

En agosto de 1973, un grupo de mujeres jóvenes presentó una petición en la que exigían a los miembros del parlamento que defendieran la ley sobre el aborto. Fue firmada por cerca de 1,500 personas, entre las que había miembros del partido y personas que no eran miembros, así como unas cincuenta personalidades destacadas, representantes de la vida cultural y científica de Hungría.

Pero en octubre de 1973 el régimen publicó un decreto que niega a la mayoría de las mujeres el derecho de interrumpir un embarazo que no quieren. Se exceptúa a las mujeres solteras, a las mujeres mayores de 35 años, a las mujeres que no tienen casa y a las mujeres que ya tienen tres o más hijos. Desde ese entonces las organizaciones del partido han disciplinado severamente a los miembros del partido que firmaron la petición. □

Informe Sobre Torturas en Cárceles Israelíes

Exigen Libertad de Prisioneros Arabes

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Protest Demands Release of Jailed Arabs", que apareció el 22 de julio en *Intercontinental Press*].

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El 8 de julio cerca de cien personas, la mayoría mujeres árabes, realizaron una manifestación en Jerusalén, pidiendo que las autoridades israelíes liberaran a sus familiares que esta-

ban encarcelados, o bien que se les juzgara. Según la agencia de noticias Reuters, noventa y cinco árabes han sido arrestados en los últimos meses "por razones de seguridad". La Liga Israelí de Derechos Humanos dice que el número de arrestados llega a 150, e informa que la mayoría de los arrestos ocurrieron en la segunda mitad de abril.

Los arrestados no han sido acusados de ningún crimen. Están bajo "de-

tención administrativa", de acuerdo a la legislación represiva que fue aprobada durante la ocupación de Palestina por los ingleses. Esas leyes, mantenidas por el "democrático" Israel, permiten a las autoridades sentenciar a los "sospechosos" a condenas de tres a seis meses, con el poder de renovar las sentencias sin permitirles confrontar a sus acusadores en la corte.

Felicia Langer, una licenciada israelí que frecuentemente defiende activistas palestinos, llamó el 7 de julio a realizar una protesta internacional contra la reciente ola de arrestos. Ella informó que muchos de los arrestados habían sido "torturados horriblemente" y manifestó que temía por sus vidas. Se mostró especialmente preocupada por el caso de Suleiman Al-

Najab, supuesto dirigente del Partido Comunista de Jordania, quien ha estado bajo arresto desde el 30 de abril. *Zu Haderech*, publicación del Partido Comunista de Israel pro-Moscú (Rakah), dió el 15 de junio el informe sobre como trataban las autoridades israelíes a Suleiman:

"Sufrió la tortura 'Flaka'. ¿Qué es esto? Un hombre es puesto en una silla a la que se le amarran los pies; luego se pone la silla de tal forma que las patas queden en posición paralela al suelo; entonces le pegan al hombre en las plantas de los pies con un palo. Se coloca su cabeza cerca de una pared, para que cuando le peguen en las plantas de los pies su cabeza golpee contra la pared. Después de pegarle en las plantas de los

pies lo obligan a caminar por el pasillo, empujándolo todo el tiempo . . .

"Suleiman Al-Najab, sufrió también otra tortura. Lo amarraron desnudo a una silla, con las manos esposadas por detrás. Uno de los torturadores se paraba encima de las esposas, echando encima todo su peso. Esto hacía que todo el cuerpo de Suleiman se levantara, para disminuir la presión de las esposas sobre sus manos. Entonces los otros torturadores lo golpeaban en los órganos genitales.

"Este sistema de golpear los órganos genitales hasta que sangreen y de aplastar los testículos ha llegado a ser una forma de tortura común en las cárceles de la ocupación israelí". □

BOOKS

Solzhenitsyn's Assault on Stalinism ...and on the October Revolution

Reviewed by Ernest Mandel

[The following review appeared in the May 9 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly publication of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

The Gulag Archipelago testifies to a threefold tragedy. First, the tragedy of the Stalinist purges that struck at millions of Soviet citizens, among them the majority of the old cadres of the Bolshevik party, who were innocent of the crimes they were charged with. Second, the tragedy of a present-day generation of rebel intellectuals in the Soviet Union whose experience with Stalinism has led them to reject Leninism and Marxism and who are thus incapable of understanding the causes of Stalinist repression, the present reality of the Soviet Union, or the solutions required by the crisis of Soviet society. And third, the personal tragedy of a writer of exceptional talent who, because of his inability to understand

the origins and character of the evil he is confronted with, has come to reactionary conclusions that to some extent even adopt the theories with which Stalin and his executioners jus-

The Gulag Archipelago, by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. New York: Harper & Row, 1974. 660 pp. \$1.95.

tified their crimes in the past—the same theories that are used to justify the repression that is once again striking political oppositionists in the USSR.

Stalin's World of Concentration Camps

The first subject of *The Gulag Archipelago* is the world of forced labor camps created by Stalin and the GPU. During Stalin's reign the inmates of these camps numbered in the millions, the overwhelming majority of them



deported, if not executed, in obvious violation of Soviet legality. They were railroaded to the camps by a whole range of monstrous arbitrary procedures: torture, total suppression of all the rights guaranteed by the Soviet constitution, use of secret decrees that themselves violated the constitution and the penal code.

Solzhenitsyn has assembled a mass of testimony about the conditions under which the great Stalinist purges took place. He especially denounces the direct responsibility for these crimes borne by the team around Stalin. Not just the Berias and Yezhovs, but also the Kaganoviches and the Molotovs, the men whose complicity accounts for the reluctance of so many bureaucratic dignitaries to press ahead after the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party with the plan of bringing all Stalin's crimes to light.

Solzhenitsyn recounts in detail the condemnations and deportations of

whole categories of citizens: all the personnel of the East China railway, all the Korean communist refugees in the USSR, most of the old fighters of the Austrian Schutzbund, most of the former members of the Lettish Red Guard, who had played such an important role in the victory of the October Revolution and the creation of the Red Army.

To be sure, those (in the West!) who have been able to read Leon Trotsky's books *The Revolution Betrayed* and *The Crimes of Stalin* or the book on the Soviet labor camps by the Mensheviks Dallin and Nikolayevsky will not learn anything basically new from *The Gulag Archipelago*. But they will appreciate the series of vignettes through which the great novelist Solzhenitsyn sketches the personalities he met in prison and in the camps: the old revolutionary worker Anatoly Ilyich Fastenko; chief technician S—vs, prototype of the careerist bureaucrat; M.P. Yakobovich, the old Menshevik, later a Bolshevik and victim of the first witch-hunt trial (the dry run for the future Moscow trials); M.D. Ryumin, the vice-minister of state security who in the realm of depravity surpassed even the sinister Abakumov, Stalin's right-hand man, and who seems to have been the organizer of the "doctors' plot," which was intended to set off a massive new purge that was just barely averted by the death of the tyrant. These unforgettable sketches, which join those of *The First Circle* and *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, are no doubt the most valuable part of *The Gulag Archipelago*.

The book also contains details on the tortures used by the GPU to extract confessions from the accused. Here Solzhenitsyn generally confirms Trotsky's conclusion that lack of a political outlook independent of Stalinism (that is, the political capitulation of Stalin's unfortunate victims before the bureaucratic dictatorship) was the real basis of the confessions.

One of the rare sensational revelations of *The Gulag Archipelago* is that there were some trials that turned out badly for the bureaucracy, trials in which the accused retracted their confessions and turned the accusations not only against the torturers themselves, but also against Stalin's policies, which were often responsible for the "crimes" the prisoners were ac-

cused of. Such was the case in the trial of the Communist leaders in the small village of Kadyj in the district of Ivanov.

The general impression that comes out of this important part of *The Gulag Archipelago* is a thorough condemnation of institutionalized repression as a system of government, for that was the objective character of the Stalinist purges. A regime based neither on the political support of the laboring masses nor on the satisfaction of their material needs must resort to terror, which becomes the main state institution. That is the most striking aspect of the Stalinist world of concentration camps, and not the supposed "economic" contribution that prison labor is said to have made to the industrialization of the USSR.

Those who blindly denied the reality of that terror or who still deny it today do not contribute one iota to "defending the cause of communism." On the contrary, they cover up foul crimes *against* communism and *against* the Soviet working class, crimes that are all the more pernicious in that they have discredited and continue to discredit the cause of communism in the eyes of a not inconsiderable section of the world proletariat.

Did Stalin Only Continue What Lenin and Trotsky Had Started?

If there were nothing in *The Gulag Archipelago* except denunciation of Stalin's crimes sprinkled with a few observations on the old theme that "Leninism is at bottom responsible for the crimes of Stalin," it would be enough merely to defend Solzhenitsyn against the bureaucracy's repression while regretting his ideological confusion.

But the reality is otherwise. In *The Gulag Archipelago*, Solzhenitsyn systematically attempts to demonstrate with facts and figures that institutionalized terror began at the time of the October Revolution. This is the second central theme of the book, and it is scarcely less developed than the first one. Presented with a mass of evidence and in the impassioned language of an author whose literary talent need not be demonstrated, an author who presents himself to millions of readers adorned with the halo of a victim of contemptible persecution, this theme will have a deep influence on

the people of the capitalist countries as well as those of the bureaucratized workers states.

The dialectical interplay between Solzhenitsyn and the Soviet bureaucracy on this point immediately asserts itself as fundamentally counterrevolutionary. Incapable of answering Solzhenitsyn's arguments, the Kremlin bolsters the credibility of the novelist's thesis by heaping slanders and lies upon him and by expelling him from his country, thus facilitating his efforts to drag Bolshevism, Marxism, and the workers' movement through the mud. And the circle is closed when the Kremlin uses Solzhenitsyn's reactionary ideology to "prove" that the opposition in the USSR is counterrevolutionary and that, after all, freedom of expression has to be "controlled" in order to avoid the appearance of "two, three, many Solzhenitsyns"—with or without talent.

It would take a long book to refute in detail Solzhenitsyn's slanders of the October Revolution. We hope that a revolutionary Marxist militant will write such a book. That would confirm once again who are the real heirs and continuators of Bolshevism. Here we can deal only with the most essential points.

First, let's look at the facts. Here the moralist Solzhenitsyn begins with an enormous fraud. In dozens of pages he lays out a detailed description of the red terror. *But not a word about the white terror that came first and that led to the Bolsheviks' response!*

Not a word about the generosity of the revolutionists in October, November, and December, 1917, when they freed most, if not all, of their prisoners; like General Kaledin, for example, who quickly responded by unleashing a wave of terror and assassinations against the proletariat in power! Not a word about the thousands of communists, commissars, and soldiers traitorously murdered throughout a country put to the torch and drowned in blood with the aim of reestablishing the rule of the landlords and capitalists. Not a word about the armed attacks on Bolshevik leaders—not imaginary attacks, like the ones the victims of the Moscow trials were accused of, but real ones, like the assassination of Volodarsky and the attempted assassination of Lenin! Not a word about the intervention of foreign armies, about the

invasion of Soviet territory on seven different fronts! Solzhenitsyn the "moralist" and "nationalist" is singularly reduced in stature by presenting such a one-sided analysis.

And further on the level of facts: Solzhenitsyn tries to prove too much, and he winds up proving nothing. In trying to draw a parallel between the "absence of law and legality" during the early years of the revolution and a similar absence under Stalin, Solzhenitsyn cites a series of court speeches by the Bolshevik Commissar of Justice Krylenko. But what does this "evidence" prove? That under Lenin and Trotsky, there were no confessions ex-

cut by a Communist cell that wanted to remove him because he was so apolitical. He was driven to suicide. Solzhenitsyn waxes indignant about the corrupt, ignoble, Communist plotters in this factory. It's not until you read to the end of Solzhenitsyn's account that you find out that the trial he is talking about was organized by the Soviet state to defend Oldenberger, a trial organized against the Communist cell that had persecuted him, a trial that ended by sentencing his persecutors, a trial that proved that the workers in the plant had been able to freely elect Oldenberger to the Soviet against the unanimous pressure of the Communist cell.

The second trial involved a Tolstoyan, a determined opponent of bearing arms who was condemned to death at the height of the civil war for conscientious objection. That trial ended in an even more dramatic fashion. The soldiers assigned to guard the condemned man justifiably considered the verdict monstrous. So they organized a general assembly in the barracks and sent a motion to the city soviet demanding that the verdict be overturned. And they won!

So we have workers who can elect an apolitical technician to the soviet despite the opposition of a Communist cell composed of members who were at best ultrasectionaries and at worst totally corrupted careerists. We have soldiers who revolt against the verdict of a court, organize a general assembly, interfere in the "great affairs of state," and save the life of their prisoner. Solzhenitsyn—without realizing it—is describing the real difference between an era of revolution and an era of counterrevolution. Let him cite similar examples from the Stalin era to prove that basically it was the same under Lenin and under Stalin!

No Leninist worthy of the name would be so obstinate as to deny today that the Soviet regime made mistakes both in matters of repression and in political decisions. And how could it be otherwise with leaders who had the formidable honor of being the first in history to construct a state in the service of the workers and all the exploited on the scale of a vast country in face of bloody and ferocious attacks from powerful enemies, and who had to do it without being able to rely on precedents, instead

developing their theories as they went along?

Today we know it was a mistake to step up the repression when the civil war was over, that it was a mistake to suppress all the other Soviet parties in 1921 and thereby institutionalize one-party rule, and that it was a mistake to ban factions within this party. All these measures were conceived at the time as temporary and taken in response to immediate difficulties. They were characterized by an overestimation of the immediate danger posed by the counterrevolution, which actually had been beaten and dispersed, and by an underestimation of the demoralizing consequences they would have for the consciousness and activity of the proletariat in a political climate characterized more and more by administrative repression and less and less by the conscious participation of the masses. These measures facilitated the political expropriation of the proletariat, the strangulation of internal democracy in the Bolshevik party, and the establishment of the bureaucracy's dictatorship. But all this could not have been known with certainty at the time. We know it today. And the Fourth International has drawn all the necessary programmatic conclusions.

But those who denounce the Bolsheviks today have to look at what real alternatives existed at the time. They have to take account of the terrible responsibility of the German Social Democracy (that is, Menshevism), which, by drowning the German revolution in blood, paved the way first for Stalin and then for Hitler. They have to consider the fate that awaited the workers and peasants in Germany, where the revolution was not defended mercilessly and effectively. The thousands of victims of Horthy's white terror in Hungary—to cite just one example—would have been nothing compared to the hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants who would have been massacred in Russia had the white terror been victorious. That rather seems to speak in favor of the justice of the Bolsheviks.

The Scapegoat of Ideology

Solzhenitsyn is on even weaker ground when he moves from the realm of facts to the realm of ideology. In



KOLCHAK: White general sent against Soviet state by British imperialists.

tracted under torture, that the accused were able to defend themselves freely—and not without chance of success—that these trials were hardly witch-hunt trials, but rather revolutionary ones, doubtlessly sometimes based on circumstantial and insufficient evidence, as is always the case in a revolutionary period, but a thousand miles removed from the caricatures of justice staged by Stalin.

Two trials cited by Solzhenitsyn himself perfectly illustrate the basic difference between the Bolshevik revolution and the Stalinist counterrevolution.

V.V. Oldenberger, an old apolitical engineer who was chief technician of the Moscow waterworks, was perse-

seeking an explanation for the Stalinist terror, all he manages to come up with is an attack on ideology, or rather contemporary ideological fanaticism. Under twentieth century conditions, he claims, inquisitionists, conquistadors, colonizers, fascists, jacobins, and—obviously—Marxists would all be transformed into the murderers of millions of their contemporaries.

The first thing that is striking about this little list is that it is, to say the least, incomplete. Why has Solzhenitsyn forgotten religious fanaticism? Religious wars have "caused" the death of millions of people throughout history. And what about nationalism and the ideology of "defense of the fatherland" in the imperialist countries, which in the first world war alone "caused" more deaths than the entire Stalinist terror? Is Solzhenitsyn's forgetfulness perhaps a result of the fact that he is an advocate of these two ideologies, religion and nationalism?

What is also striking is the extremely superficial character of Solzhenitsyn's explanation. Why has the same "ideology" produced murderous fanaticism in some epochs and liberal and peaceful tolerance in others? Is it really for "ideological" reasons? Or is it rather because definite and tangible material interests were at work?

Solzhenitsyn likes to "count up" the victims of the Stalinist purges and compare the total to the tally rung up by czarist and fascist repression. But these "quantitative" comparisons can be extended. What "ideology" was it that "fanaticized" the semi-illiterate book-burners in Chile, who in the space of a few days killed 20,000 people and imprisoned 40,000 others? These are figures that on the scale of the USSR would amount to 600,000 murdered and 1.2 million deported! In the space of a few days! Stalin would be green with envy. Were the book-burners motivated by "ideological fanaticism" or by the desire to defend private property and the eternal values of "free enterprise" and capitalist exploitation?

And what about the famous "crusade" that Franco organized in 1936 to "reconquer" the country that had "fallen into the hands of the reds"—a crusade that resulted in the murder of more than a million Spaniards by "nationalist troops"? On the scale of the USSR that would be the equivalent

of 9 million dead, if we were to play Solzhenitsyn's numbers game. Was it really some sort of "ideology" that could have provoked such a frightful massacre? Wasn't it rather an attempt—at any price, even the price of rivers of blood—to prevent the establishment of a workers and poor peasants regime on the Iberian peninsula?

It is only Marxism that can explain and account for the succession of pe-



STALIN

riods of barbarism and civilization throughout human history. When a class is firmly in power, sure of itself and its future, when its strength is increasing and social contradictions are temporarily easing, then it can afford the luxury of ruling through relatively peaceful and civilized means. (Except for moments when its power is suddenly challenged; then we have the massacres of the Communards by the Versailles, even in the nineteenth century, so "civilized" and peaceful in comparison to our own "barbaric" epoch.) But when a ruling class is in decline, when its power is crumbling, when its regime is torn by deeper and deeper contradictions, then barbarism comes to the surface again and the reality of class domination appears in its bloodiest form.

Our epoch is the epoch of the death agony of the capitalist system. The longer this death agony is prolonged, the more features of barbarism, bloody

repression, and contempt for human life will proliferate. In this historic sense, Stalin is a product of capitalism, just as much as Hitler, Auschwitz, Hiroshima, and the bombing and defoliation of Vietnam. He is not the product of Soviet society or the October Revolution.

In a narrower and more immediate sense, Stalinist terror is the product of the victory of political counterrevolution in the Soviet Union. The fact that Stalin had to exterminate a whole generation of revolutionists who had led the October Revolution and erected the Soviet state is in itself sufficient to refute the identity Solzhenitsyn arbitrarily establishes between the executioner and his victims. This political counterrevolution in turn represents definite material and social interests: those of a privileged bureaucratic layer that while basing itself on the new property relations created by the socialist revolution, defends its own monopoly of economic and political control as well as the immense advantages that it draws from the prevailing conditions of prolonged scarcity.

By rejecting Marxism, Solzhenitsyn and those who think like him render themselves incapable of explaining the events that have so deeply affected them. Trotsky was fond of quoting Spinoza: "Do not laugh, do not cry, but understand." Solzhenitsyn laughs bitterly and cries a great deal. But he doesn't understand very much.

Moralistic Politics Caught in Its Own Trap

The contradictions in Solzhenitsyn's thought—consequences of his rejection of Marxism—come through in the most striking fashion when the moralist is forced to abandon even the most elementary moral considerations when dealing with the Marxists of our epoch, especially Trotsky and the Trotskyists. In order to justify his claim that Stalin was the continuator and not the gravedigger of Bolshevism, Solzhenitsyn tries to demonstrate that all the Bolsheviks aided Stalin, capitulated before him, collaborated in his crimes, and were accomplices in his frame-up trials.

Beginning from the correct observation that those who *politically capitulated* before Stalin were logically led to act in this way (because, as

Solzhenitsyn puts it, "politics without moral foundation leads inevitably to covering up any crime"), Solzhenitsyn concludes that *all* communists were politically defenseless against Stalin and collaborated in the terror of the 1930s and 1940s. He even goes so far as to say that Trotsky himself would have confessed to anything the GPU required had he fallen into Stalin's hands. This because Trotsky also lacked an "independent outlook" and an ideology really independent of Stalinism! Besides, he supposedly had no experience with physical and mental tortures, which would have made him able to resist the GPU.

There is not the slightest evidence to support such allegations. They represent only a dredged-up version, scarcely even amended or edited, of Stalinist slanders of Trotskyism.

To claim that no communist tendency had an ideological basis independent of Stalinist terror and that all communists therefore were fated to capitulate before the terror is to sweep away the fifteen years of determined battle waged against the Soviet bureaucracy first by the Left Opposition and later by the movement for the Fourth International, a battle that was waged on a coherent theoretical and political basis that has been brilliantly confirmed by history. It is to insult the memory of thousands of militants—Trotskyists and others—who refused to capitulate, refused to become accomplices in the parodies of justice, and who paid with their lives for their loyalty to their principles, demonstrating courage and strength of character unparalleled in history.

To say that Leon Trotsky did not prove his capacity to stand up to personal trials is to forget that he continued his struggle against Stalinism in spite of the GPU's assassination of his children, his secretaries, and his closest co-workers, to forget that he continued this opposition without faltering after a first assassination attempt by the GPU, knowing that at any moment he was likely to be assassinated by Stalin's agents.

To claim, as Solzhenitsyn does, that Trotskyists in the labor camps behaved in a sectarian manner and were incapable of waging hunger strikes for prolonged periods in order to win a series of demands is to insult the memory of the heroes, who numbered more

than a thousand, who launched an *eighteen-week-long* hunger strike around a five-point program defending the rights of all political prisoners just at the height of the Stalinist terror.

It is easy to understand why Solzhenitsyn, a determined opponent of revolutionary Marxism, would follow in Stalin's footsteps in wanting to erase from history the decisive contribution Trotskyism made to the struggle against the dictatorship of the Soviet bureaucracy. That is only an attempt to break down any continuity between the October Revolution and the present political tasks posed in the Soviet Union. But the immoral methods that Solzhenitsyn has to use to try to prove his point once again illustrate the dead end of any political outlook that claims to be based on absolute moral precepts, a dead end that leads the advocates of such outlooks to trample on their own principles.

Historical Justification of the October Revolution

Solzhenitsyn tries to reduce all Soviet reality to the Stalinist and post-Stalinist terror. This reality is supposed to have resulted from a revolution that should never have taken place: "Russia was not ripe for revolution," he writes.

But what was it ripe for? For czarist barbarism? For eternal famine, poverty, and illiteracy? By challenging the legitimacy of the October Revolution—and the legitimacy of revolution in all relatively underdeveloped countries as well—Solzhenitsyn reveals yet another contradiction in moralistic politics. Should we weep only for the dead assassinated by terror? What about the deaths caused by inhuman socioeconomic regimes, the tens of millions who died of hunger during the great famines in India and prerevolutionary China? Is this any less deplorable? Are those deaths merely products of blind fate before which we must powerlessly bow?

The results of the October Revolution cannot be reduced to the misdeeds of the bureaucracy and its terrorist repression. There are other results of the October Revolution too: the transformation in just a few decades of a vast backward country into the world's second industrial power, a country in which illiteracy has

been eradicated, in which the number of doctors and the number of new books published (including translations!) is among the highest in the world, in which the infant mortality rate is lower than it is in Britain. Those who fight against arbitrary police repression in the USSR by claiming that it is the inevitable result of the October socialist revolution cannot help but overlook this other aspect of Soviet reality, which has exactly created the material basis for a flowering of real Soviet democracy if the power of the bureaucracy is overthrown.

Neither Marx, Lenin, nor Trotsky ever believed it would be possible to build a real socialist, classless society in one country alone, still less an economically underdeveloped country. The imperialist epoch is especially characterized by a twofold phenomenon: On the one hand the international domination of capital restricts and distorts the development of the backward countries, and on the other hand revolutionary movements themselves tend more and more to become international. Solzhenitsyn regrets this and calls upon the Soviet leaders (!) to abandon "communist messianism," something from which they have hardly suffered. But the slightest bit of moral feeling for the misery in the world today and the catastrophes that threaten humanity leads instead to the conclusion that it is necessary to redouble efforts to bring about the victory of the world socialist revolution, which would incidentally also contribute to the elimination of arbitrary police repression in the bureaucratized workers states, that is, to the victory of the political revolution in these countries.

The Dilemma of the Intellectual Opposition in the USSR

Like the work of any great novelist, *The Gulag Archipelago* reflects not only a social situation as a whole, but also the thought of a particular social layer. Solzhenitsyn represents the wing of the opposition intelligentsia in the Soviet Union that has reacted to the crimes of Stalin by breaking with Lenin and Marx. The importance and breadth of this layer, even among Soviet youth, must not be underestimated. Its very existence constitutes yet another condemnation of the po-

litical regime that rules in the USSR.

Here is a society that calls itself socialist, that claims to have eradicated "antagonistic social contradictions," that represents itself as the "most united society in the world," in which generations of intellectuals born after the revolution are developing in a manner ever more hostile to Marxism! This development can only be encouraged by an "ideological struggle" waged against it by the falsifiers of Marxism whose "arguments" in the end come down to suppression of writings, deportations, banishments, or internment of oppositionists in insane asylums!

But—an irony of history!—trenchant enemies of Stalinism like Solzhenitsyn and his friends, people who reject Leninism on the grounds that it was responsible for Stalinism, remain to a large extent prisoners of Stalinist ideology. In large measure they move in the universe of myths with which Stalin excused and justified his crimes.

These myths are reflected not only in the anti-Trotskyist slanders taken directly from the recipe book of the General Secretary. They are also reflected in the way this wing of the intellectual opposition approaches the problems of present-day Soviet society and their solution. For there is yet a third theme in *The Gulag Archipelago*, one that is less obvious and explicit than the two we have been discussing, but is no less integral to Solzhenitsyn's thought. That theme is *the inability of the working class to manage the state and the economy*. It must be stated clearly: This theme reflects an intellectual arrogance common to technocrats and bureaucrats.

It is in a passage devoted to the 1930 trial of the members of the so-called Industrial party that this notion of Solzhenitsyn's comes through most clearly. In this passage we read that it was logical for the technicians to try to impose discipline in the workplace! That it is logical that those who "are capable of rationally organizing their activity" should stand at the head of society! That it is logical that politics should be partially determined by the exigencies of technology!

The whole technocratic credo, as well as the rejection of direct workers' power and of soviet power that it implies, has been and remains one of the ideological bases of Stalinism.

It is no accident that the same notion is found among Solzhenitsyn and his friends. What unites them with the bureaucracy is that both share a refusal to accept the possibility of workers exercising power; they share the same basic isolation from the life-style, thought, aspirations, and ideals of the working class.

In this sense, after all is said and done, Solzhenitsyn remains an ideo-



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logical prisoner of the bureaucracy, an advocate, at bottom, of an authoritarian political regime—but one without excessive repression. His is the voice of an enlightened authoritarianism that rejects soviet democracy as fundamentally evil and utopian. His political action is oriented not toward the masses but toward individual protest and "open letters" to the Kremlin.

Once one understands the social character of Solzhenitsyn's work, one cannot but agree with the position taken both by the new Leninists in the USSR and by the revolutionary Marxists in the capitalist countries: to support the movement for democratic rights in the USSR. One would have to completely misconstrue the sociopolitical relationship of forces in the Soviet Union to believe that currents like Solzhenitsyn's, cut off from the

living forces of the proletariat that represents the absolute majority of the active population, could seriously threaten the economic foundations of society and initiate a movement for the restoration of capitalism.

What encourages the rebirth of anti-worker, antirationalist, anti-Marxist, and Slavophile tendencies is the repressive and conformist lead weight that bears down on Soviet society and fosters political and ideological cynicism among the masses.

The best antidote to these reactionary ideologies—and in the long run, the *only* effective antidote—is the rebirth of critical political consciousness among the masses, which will win them to Marxism. All those who encourage such a rebirth are working toward defending and strengthening the socioeconomic foundations of the USSR. All those who perpetuate the absence of public political debate and differentiation can only encourage obscurantism and hostility to Marxism, which appears as a state religion.

In the Soviet intellectual opposition there are many wings and tendencies, united only by the common struggle against Stalin's crimes and for the real reconquest of civil rights that are formally guaranteed; that is, for an application of the Soviet constitution. The left wing of this opposition, of which Major General Pyotr Grigorenko is the most stirring symbol, is composed of surviving old Bolsheviks, militant Leninists who by their exemplary courage are defending and rehabilitating Leninism in the eyes of Soviet youth. What a windfall it is for the Kremlin to be able to denounce the antisocialist ideology of Solzhenitsyn (while of course not daring to publish his books in the USSR)! And how much more thankless is the bureaucracy's job in suppressing oppositionists who claim allegiance to Marx and Lenin!

At a time when the international bourgeoisie wants to concentrate attention on *The Gulag Archipelago* in order to divert attention from its own crimes and to whip up hostility to communism, we must redouble our efforts to free Grigorenko, Yakhimovich, and their comrades from the torturers and to defend the rights not only of the Solzhenitsyns but also of the Marxist and Leninist oppositionists to freely speak, discuss, publish, and organize in the USSR! □