


Portugal

Behind the Fall of Spínola's Provisional Government



Cuba

Fidel Castro Experiments With Elections

Argentina

Balance Sheet on Thirty Years of Peronism

E.U.A.

Sindicatos Exigen Aumento de Salarios

Women Petition for Abortion

[The following is a June 26 dispatch from Informationsdienst zur Verbreitung unterbliebener Nachrichten (Information Service for the Dissemination of Overlooked News) in Frankfurt. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

On Monday, July 17, Zsuzsa Körösi will face a university disciplinary committee in Budapest. The evident intention is to expel her from the university. She is accused of having organized and collected signatures for a campaign "contradicting the demographic policy of Hungary."

After 1956, Hungary had an abortion law that made it possible for virtually every woman to obtain an abortion through the third month of pregnancy. In the summer of 1973, there was an increase of articles in the Hungarian press attacking the law and urging limitations on the right to abortion.

In August 1973, a number of young women put together a petition that urged members of parliament to defend the existing abortion law. It was signed by about 1,500 persons, among them party members and non-members, and some fifty public personalities, representatives of Hungary's cultural and scientific life.

But in October 1973 the regime published a decree law that denies most women the right to interrupt an unwanted pregnancy. Exceptions are unmarried women, women over 35, women lacking housing, and women who already have three or more children. Since then party organizations have severely disciplined party members who signed the petition. □

Summer Schedule

The last issue of *Intercontinental Press* before our summer break will be the issue dated August 5. We will resume our regular schedule with the issue dated September 9.

In This Issue

FEATURES	990	On the Situation in Latin America (Interview With Hugo Blanco)
HUNGARY	962	Women Petition for Abortion
PORTUGAL	963	Behind the Fall of the Provisional Government—by Gerry Foley
	967	Police Agents Held in Murder of Delgado
ARAB EAST	965	Israeli Commandos Raid Lebanese Coast
	965	Maalot Inquiry Points Finger at Dayan
	966	Protest Demands Release of Jailed Arabs
	967	Zionists Deliberately Leveled Quneitra
U. S. A.	968	Committee Reports Pile Up Evidence Against Nixon—by Allen Myers
CANADA	971	Why Liberals Won Election—by Dick Fidler
ETHIOPIA	973	Army Rebels Announce Curbs on Cabinet
JAPAN	974	Elections Deal Setback to Tanaka's Party
INDIA	974	Gandhi Continues Antilabor Offensive —by Sharad Jhaveri
SPAIN	975	Stalinists Hail Church, Army
CUBA	978	Test Electoral "Pilot Project" in Matanzas —by Dick Fidler
ARGENTINA	984	Peronism's Thirty-Year Career
	986	Why Workers Need Their Own Party
	988	Interviews With Peron—by Nahuel Moreno
	989	A Dialogue With Peron in Madrid
IRELAND	992	Anatomy of Loyalist Strike
CHILE	994	MIR Leader Describes Situation
AROUND the WORLD	976	
DOCUMENTS	1004	"Institutionalization" and Rightist Threat
	1006	Program of the PAIGC
	1008	"Perspective" Reviews "Disaster in Chile"
DRAWINGS	961	Antonio de Spinola; 966, Moshe Dayan; 969, John Mitchell; 971, Pierre Trudeau; 973, Haile Selassie; 984, Ricardo Balbin; 987, Lopez Rega; 992, Brian Faulkner; 996, Henry Kissinger; 1003, Wilbur Mills—by Copain
EN ESPAÑOL:		
VIETNAM	995	Papel de Moscu, Pekin en los Acuerdos —por Dick Roberts
ARGENTINA	997	Treinta Anos de Peronismo
	999	Ahora Mas que Nunca, un Partido Obrero
	1001	Un Dialogo con Peron
	1002	El PST No Firmo "Declaracion de los 8"
E. U. A.	1003	Sindicatos Exigen Aumento de Salarios —por Andy Rose

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.
CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.
EDITORIAL STAFF: Michael Baumann, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Allen Myers, Judy White.
BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.
ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.
TECHNICAL STAFF: Art Gursch, James M. Morgan, Ruth Schein.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors

which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemenee, 75004, Paris, France.

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Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

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Behind Fall of Portugal's Provisional Government

By Gerry Foley

"It was not possible to compromise when we found ourselves in a situation where there was disorder in the streets, social indiscipline, agitation in the newspapers and the invasion of public buildings by Government functionaries."

This is the explanation former Portuguese Premier Adelino da Palma Carlos gave for his resignation July 9, a move that resulted in the fall of the provisional government established on May 16.

Da Palma added, according to a July 11 dispatch from Lisbon to the *New York Times*:

"All this constitutes a climate of indiscipline entirely contrary to my temperament and to my ideas of what democracy is."

The resignation of the premier was followed by that of the other "moderates" in the cabinet—Francisco Sá Carneiro, the deputy premier; Magalhães Mota, minister of the interior; Lieutenant Colonel Mario Firmino Miguel, minister of defense; and Vasco Vieira de Almeida, minister of economic coordination. The withdrawal of the bourgeois ministers left virtually no one in the government but military officers and representatives of the Communist and Socialist parties.

Parallel with the resignation of the "moderates," the regime sharply escalated its attack on the democratic liberties seized by the people in the wake of the April 25 coup. "For the first time since members of the armed forces became popular heroes by toppling a half-century dictatorship, they opposed an extreme left-wing street demonstration with guns," *New York Times* correspondent Henry Giniger reported from the Portuguese capital July 9. "Paratroopers and marines in battle dress ringed one of Lisbon's principal squares this afternoon and prevented a demonstration in protest against the arrest of some officers as dissidents."

The "dissidents" were probably the two officers who let it be known that

they would not obey orders to impose military discipline on postal workers participating in the late June strike.

Both the daily *República*, which is published by Socialist Minister of Information Raúl Rego and which generally reflects the views of the Socialist party, and *A Capital*, the most factual of the evening papers, were fined the week before for reporting a demonstration in support of these two officers. Obviously the problem of shoring up arbitrary authority in the armed forces was part of the motivation in the junta's decision to cut back the democratic freedoms the people won after April 25.

But despite the tightening of authority, especially since the junta succeeded, with the help of the Communist party, in breaking the postal strike, Spínola does not seem as yet to have restored bourgeois discipline completely in the armed forces. According to Giniger in his July 9 dispatch, "a young paratrooper lieutenant dramatically illustrated the conflict within the military by telling newsmen that he did not approve of his orders to stop the demonstration. . . ."

On July 11, the head of the junta, General Spínola, formally dismissed the rest of the provisional government. This move also coincided with a military show of force.

"Today, in his general's uniform and carrying a swagger stick, the monocled chief of state rode out to marine barracks outside Lisbon," a July 11 dispatch to the *New York Times* reported, "and while 2,000 marines stood respectfully in a hot sun he recalled their branch's patriotism in the critical moments of the country's history."

There are some indications that tensions had developed between the "moderates" and the Communist party on the eve of the July 9 crisis. According to Giniger's dispatch on the day the "moderates" resigned, the Communist

party took a friendly attitude toward the demonstration of civil servants that da Palma cited as an example of intolerable anarchy. This is the way the *New York Times* correspondent described the incident:

"Last evening [July 8] the Government's prestige and the social and economic program it had announced last week suffered a major blow when thousands of civil servants appeared on the streets and demonstrated against the measures and the increased pay for Government functionaries.

"The demonstrators were in the lowest-paid categories of the civil services and had received proportionately the lowest increases. Mr. Carneiro and Mr. Vieira de Almeida had to promise the crowd that they would review the measures before it agreed to disperse. But the civil servants resumed their demonstration today while the Cabinet met.

"They were encouraged by the Communist party, even though it had two ministers in the government."

In the first phase of the new regime, the Communist party was the main political prop of the junta. Its cadres canalized the massive May Day marches into demonstrations of support for "the armed forces." It used all its influence in the labor movement to break the momentum of the strike wave unleashed by the fall of the police state. It denounced worker militants and demonstrators against the colonial war as provocateurs and accomplices of the fascists. And in particular, it mobilized strong political pressure to break the postal strike in late June, which was the first nationwide labor struggle since the coup and the strongest challenge to the junta's crackdown.

However, in the days that followed the defeat of the postal strike, the Communist party seems to have become worried by the rapidly escalating repression. It had mobilized 3,000 of

its members and supporters outside the Lisbon central post office to chant that the strikers were "sabotaging democracy." But immediately after the strike was broken, the junta brought out new repressive legislation restoring government censorship of the press.

In an editorial June 28, the Communist party weekly *Avante* said: "An institutionalization of our democratic freedoms is inevitable. It can only confirm the situation that exists de facto, legally recognizing that these rights are an established and definitive reality. This is the institutionalization the people hope for and demand.

"But at the same time tendencies are manifesting themselves that run counter to this hope. These are tendencies to make institutionalization mean regulation, not the official establishment of democratic freedoms but the legal limitation of these freedoms; not the consolidation of the democratic freedoms that have been achieved, but a restriction of these freedoms, which in some cases may even compromise them."

The Portuguese Communist party's strategy of "consolidating" the gains of the post-April period is similar to the one their Chilean comrades followed in the last period of the Allende government. It is based on the belief that the bourgeoisie will accept advanced reforms in stages, as long as the workers do not appear to be threatening its fundamental positions or demanding "too much" at once.

This evolutionary and reformist concept is totally utopian, as the Chilean events demonstrated and as the process in Portugal is also demonstrating at a much more rapid rate. Like all reformist conceptions, it views the class struggle as static, a game of countervailing pressures, and reduces the cutthroat drives of capitalist economics to fuzzy abstractions.

The exceptionally broad measure of democracy that existed in Portugal in the first weeks after the April coup was the result precisely of the collapse of the bourgeois repressive apparatus. It was inevitable that once it had "consolidated" its position, the bourgeois government would move as quickly as possible to restore this apparatus, without which capitalism cannot function or maintain itself.

The very climate of freedom

generated by the fall of the Salazarist regime and the hope for a different kind of life that it aroused in the Portuguese masses demand that the junta crack down hard, as soon as it can, to bring the people back to the "reality" of capitalist society, to reconcile them to harder work and less pay.

Far from "consolidating" the gains of the post-April period, the Communist party's strategy of holding back the struggles of the workers and the impoverished masses simply opened the way for the bourgeois counterattack. And after this offensive had gotten under way, the belated "militant" turn of the CP only accelerated it.

In the first weeks after the coup, in the absence of any strong bourgeois-liberal or Social Democratic formation, the Communist party was the only political force that could exercise a restraining influence on the workers. It was the essential political prop of the new regime.

However, in the nature of things the gratitude of the Portuguese bourgeoisie was rather limited.

"Moderates here have watched with growing alarm as the Communist party has spread out over the country either directly or behind the facade of other groups," Giniger wrote from Lisbon July 14. "The party is described now as having 3,000 full-time employes and is said to be spending millions of dollars in funds from abroad."

Thus, even if the Communist party has in fact played the role of a moderate party, it can never really be trusted by the bourgeoisie both because it has ultimately to depend on working-class support and because of its ties to the Soviet Union. Its very success, as in the case of the Indonesian and Chilean CPs, can lead to disaster when the bourgeoisie finds it necessary to reestablish its direct control over society, since a party built on the basis of reformism is in no position to counter a decisive attack from the one class that cannot be deceived about the realities of capitalist rule.

There can hardly be any doubt that the fall of the first provisional government represents an important new step in the bourgeois crackdown in Portugal. In his first press conference,

Colonel Vasco de Gonçalves, the new premier appointed July 13, described the program of his government this way, according to a dispatch from Giniger in the July 14 *New York Times*:

"Colonel Gonçalves said that among the important tasks of the new government was formulation of new laws on the press, labor unions and an electoral system. The press law is expected to contain restrictions on newspapers and broadcasting stations, which are now considered to be in leftist hands. The labor law is expected to impose limits on the right to strike, while the electoral law is expected to bar small political groups, notably on the extreme left, from participating in elections, which are scheduled for next year."

The new government has a more pronounced Bonapartist character, tougher but still retaining a certain reformist luster. It is dominated by military officers advertised as "above politics." Gonçalves himself is touted as a representative of the Armed Forces Movement of liberal officers. In all, it seems the ideal instrument for carrying out a further stage of the crackdown.

The Communist party, moreover, despite its brief and halfhearted show of militancy, seems ready to accept a reduced position in the new cabinet. "Cunhal, whose personal prestige remains intact, continues to support his party's participation in a coalition government," Marcel Niedergang wrote in the July 13 *Le Monde*. "He was given a private audience of more than an hour on Thursday [July 11] by General Spínola, who knows how to judge his enemies and his collaborators. In fact, the general secretary of the PCP [Partido Comunista Português] is far from thinking that in the present circumstances a Peruvian-type formula [a reformist military dictatorship] would be a bad solution for Portugal."

In view of its basic political line, the Communist party has little choice but to try to follow the regime to the right. *Avante* told its readers—in advance of the present crackdown: "Either democratization continues with the present coalition or we run the risk of having a new dictatorship, more violent and more repressive." □

Israeli Commandos Raid Lebanese Coast

Israel launched a new terror raid into Lebanon July 8 as Zionist commandos hit three ports and two small fishing villages south of Beirut. Lebanese Defense Ministry spokesmen reported that twenty-one fishing boats were destroyed in the attacks. Timed charges continued to explode for several hours after Israeli forces withdrew from the area.

The commandos left Arabic-language leaflets at the sites they attacked. According to a July 10 dispatch from Beirut by *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent John K. Cooley, the leaflets "called on the fishermen to stop the guerrillas from using their boats and harbors for attacks on Israel like that against the coastal resort town of Nahariya last month.

"'You have the choice between peace or trouble,' the leaflet said. 'The same terrorists who caused great damage to the inhabitants of southern Lebanon now plan to bring you disaster.'"

The leaflets would have made sense if by "terrorists" the Israelis meant their own military forces. It was clear to all concerned, however, that they did not. The Israeli propaganda campaign is aimed at turning the Palestinians—the victims of Israeli aggression—into the criminals.

Major General Benyamin Peled, commander of the Israeli air force, took this twisted logic one step further. The day before the most recent raids, he announced that any attempt by the Palestinians to defend the camps or other populated areas would be considered a further provocation.

"If they set up an air-defense system, we'll tackle it," Peled told reporters in Tel Aviv. "If we have to tackle it and they place the system in areas where there are people we do not want to hurt, they will be hurt too."

The Lebanese government has also opposed allowing the refugee camps to be equipped with an effective anti-aircraft system. The Lebanese army, which has in the past been used to suppress the Palestinians, does not have sophisticated missiles of the type necessary to bring down Israeli jets. It does not want the Palestinians to

have them either.

Instead, the Beirut government has adopted a ten-year plan, budgeted at \$1,000 million, to increase the effectiveness of its army. But since this is less than one-third of the amount Israel spends on arms *each year* (not to mention handouts from Washington), it is clear that the real purpose of this measure is to enable the Beirut regime to exercise greater control over the Palestinians. It is in no way aimed at standing up to the threat from Israel.

On the diplomatic front, preparations continue for the Geneva talks. At issue is whether the Palestinians will attend and, if so, under what conditions. Four of the talks' sponsors—the Soviet Union, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan—have called for Palestinian participation.

Broad sections of the Palestinian leadership have made clear that they are willing to take part in the talks provided that they receive certain assurances in advance. In essence, they are demanding guarantees that a Palestinian ministate in the West Bank and Gaza Strip emerge from the con-

ference.

Until recently, both Washington and Israel have, in public at least, flatly refused to negotiate anything at all with the Palestinians. Their position has been that if a Palestinian delegation does eventually participate in the Geneva talks, it would have to be as a part of the Jordanian delegation, not as an independent entity.

There are now indications that this position is beginning to change. On July 11, an unnamed "senior State Department official" told reporters in Washington that "high-level contacts" were expected soon between U.S. officials and leaders of the resistance organizations.

The following day, Israeli Information Minister Aharon Yariv raised for the first time the possibility of negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the umbrella organization coordinating resistance activities.

Although both statements represent a departure from previous positions, they were hedged with enough conditions to assure their rejection by the Palestinians. It is likely, therefore, that their real purpose was simple to prepare public opinion, particularly in Israel, for the possibility of a sudden shift in diplomatic postures in the event that this becomes necessary for achieving an agreement acceptable to the imperialists. □

Cites 'Communications Breakdown'

Maalot Inquiry Points Finger at Dayan

The official inquiry ordered by the Israeli government into the Maalot incident puts major blame on former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and army Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur, the two top officials on the scene.

The report, made public in a censored version July 10, in effect charges them with failing to communicate the conditions set by Palestinian guerrillas for the release of some 65 hostages held in a Maalot school building.

The government originally claimed that it had ordered troops to assault the building because the guerrillas never made their demands clear.

Twenty-four of the hostages and all three guerrillas were killed or fatally wounded in the attack.

The findings of the investigation conducted by General Amos Horev give a somewhat different account of the "communications difficulties" that led to the attack. A July 10 dispatch in the *New York Times* gave the following account of the Horev commission's report:

"An Israeli commission that investigated the killing of students at Maalot on May 15 said today that the Cabinet had not been able to debate the Arab guerrillas' demands because it did not get them.

"It suggested that Moshe Dayan, then Defense Minister, and Lieut. Gen. Mordechai Gur, the chief of staff, who were at the scene, had been responsible for this breakdown in communications. . . .

"At the time there were reports that letters containing the precise guerrilla demands had been carried out of the school by two hostages who were freed, but that the texts themselves had never reached the Israeli Cabinet. . . .

"Yitzhak Rabin, who succeeded Mrs. Meir as Premier, told Parliament to-



DAYAN: Neglected to pass on message from Palestinian guerrillas.

day that he had asked Mr. Dayan and General Gur about the matter and that they had said they regarded the contents of the letter as identical to what the terrorists were saying through loudspeakers."

It is difficult to see how they determined this, for they also claimed they had never viewed the actual letters but had merely been notified by subordinates of their existence.

"English versions of the letter," the *Times* report continued, "addressed to the French and Rumanian ambassadors and the representative of the International Red Cross, were also brought out of the school, and these apparently did not reach their addressees either."

The findings of the Horev commission appear to be admirably suited

to the needs of Israeli authorities. The vague charge that Dayan and Gur are responsible for a "breakdown in communications" not only lets them off the hook but also whitewashes the other leading members of the Meir government, most of whom occupy posts in the new Rabin cabinet.

There are, however, at least two difficulties that stand in the way of having the report accepted even by Israeli public opinion. First, the story about unnamed subordinates failing to deliver the letters at a time when everyone claimed to be "confused" about the guerrillas' demands is unlikely to inspire much belief.

Second, the report does nothing to counter the widely publicized statement by the French ambassador, Jean Herly, that his embassy informed the Israeli Foreign Ministry of the guerrillas' demands more than three hours before the shootout.

There is no reason to doubt that Dayan and Gur did what they could to sabotage the negotiations and create a pretext for storming the school. But in view of Herly's statement, there is also no reason to doubt that other government officials served as their willing accomplices—deliberately ignoring the guerrillas' demands. □

Report Widespread Torture in Israeli Prisons

Protest Demands Release of Jailed Arabs

About 100 persons, mostly Arab women, demonstrated in Jerusalem July 8, demanding that Israeli authorities either release their jailed relatives or bring them to trial. According to the Reuters news agency, ninety-five Arabs have been arrested in the last few months "for security reasons." The Israeli League for Human Rights puts the figure at 150, and reports that most of the arrests took place in the second half of April.

Those arrested have not been charged with any crime. They are being held in "administrative detention" under repressive legislation passed during the British occupation of Palestine. These laws, retained on the books by "democratic" Israel, enable authorities to sentence "suspects" to renewable three- to six-month terms without ever allowing them to face their accusers in court.

Felicia Langer, an Israeli attorney who frequently defends jailed Palestinian activists, called July 7 for an international campaign of protest against the recent wave of arrests. She reported that many of those imprisoned had been "horribly tortured" and expressed fear for their lives. She cited particular concern for the case of Suleiman Al-Najab, a reported leader of the Jordanian Communist party

who has been under arrest since April 30. The June 15 issue of *Zu Haderech*, publication of the pro-Moscow Israeli Communist party (Rakah), gave the following account of his treatment by Israeli authorities:

"He underwent the 'Flaka' torture. How is this done? A man is placed in a chair, his hands and feet are tied to the chair, and then the chair is laid down on the floor, with the legs of the chair parallel to the floor; they then hit the man on the soles of his feet with a stick. His head is placed near a wall so that when he is hit on the soles of the feet, his head hits the wall. After he is hit on the soles of his feet, they force him to walk through the corridor, pushing him all the time. . . .

"Suleiman Al-Najab went through another kind of torture [as well]. They tied him naked to a chair, his hands handcuffed in back. One of the team of torturers would step with all his weight on the handcuffs. This would cause his whole body to rise up in order to lessen the pressure of the handcuffs on his hands. Then the other torturers would beat his genitals.

"This system of beating the genitals until they bleed and of crushing the testicles has become a common form of torture in the prisons of the Israeli occupation." □

Zionists Deliberately Levelled Quneitra

On June 10, 1967, Israeli troops entered Quneitra without firing a shot; its 55,000 inhabitants had already fled. A few weeks ago, Quneitra was reportedly still undamaged.

Today this once flourishing city, the former capital of the Syrian Golan Heights district, is no more than a pile of rubble. The Soviet ambassador to Syria, who visited the city soon after the departure of the Israeli troops last June 25, compared the devastation to that of Stalingrad in World War II.

"The city is unrecognizable," correspondent Edouard Saab wrote in the July 4 *Le Monde*. "The houses are razed to the ground; they look more like tombstones. Part of the rubble is covered with fresh earth that still bears the traces of bulldozer tracks.

"Everywhere there are pieces of furniture, fragments of kitchen utensils, and Hebrew newspapers dating from the first week in June. A mattress with its stuffing spilling out lies to one side, the remnants of an old, Damascus-style awning to the other.

"On the rare walls still standing, inscriptions in Hebrew state, 'You are only getting what you deserve'; 'You wanted Quneitra, you can have it in ruins.'"

Before leaving the city, Israeli troops dynamited nearly everything they could not carry off. According to one local official, only the intervention of United Nations forces led them "to spare a part of the military hospital; one of the three mosques, whose minaret had already been blown off; and the two churches, which had already been stripped bare." The city's electrical transformers and the municipal water pumps have disappeared without a trace.

The area is still extremely dangerous. Syrian explosives experts have discovered more than 1,800 land mines left behind by the Israeli occupiers. Three of the minefields the Syrian technicians found were not listed on the maps the Israeli army provided.

"Can Quneitra be rebuilt?" Saab asked. "How is that possible," replied the governor of the district, "when

Zavieh and Banias, the two agricultural regions that belong to the inhabitants of Quneitra, are still occupied by the Israelis?"

"How can we start work, when the enemy, which still holds the two hills overlooking Quneitra, can control traffic on the roads? How can we

Portuguese Presidential Candidate Killed in 1965

Police Agents Held in Murder of Delgado

In a dispatch from Lisbon, the July 7 *New York Times* reported that three persons are under arrest on charges stemming from a political murder nine years ago. The case concerns General Humberto Delgado, who disappeared in Spain near the Portuguese border on February 14, 1965. Some two months later, his body and that of his secretary were discovered in a shallow grave near a town thirty-five miles south of Badajoz.

One of the early supporters of Salazar, Delgado became a dissident and ran against the dictator in the 1958 presidential election. He claimed that he had won a large majority but that the regime had falsified the voting results.

Delgado then went into exile and began organizing an underground opposition. He moved toward the left politically, and shortly before his murder, he spoke of the need for a Portuguese Fidel Castro.

Delgado entered Spain in early February 1965 to meet with Portuguese supporters who planned to slip across the border into Badajoz. On February 14, a colleague in Morocco received a coded postcard in which the general indicated that the meeting had taken place. Nothing further was ever heard from him.

When Delgado disappeared, the Spanish government denied any knowledge of his whereabouts or what had happened to him. It seemed quite likely, however, that the Spanish and

allow the population to return to the city when there is no housing, running water, electrical current, or sewerage system?"

For the moment, Syrian officials have done nothing to publicize the wholesale destruction carried out by the occupation forces. "They are inclined to believe," Saab wrote, "that the devastation of Quneitra. . . may compromise their efforts to prepare public opinion to accept coexistence with Israel within the framework of a 'just and durable peace.'" □

Portuguese political police had cooperated in seizing and murdering him. The April 30, 1965, issue of *World Outlook* (the former name of *Intercontinental Press*) reported:

"Followers of Delgado in Morocco charged on February 23 that he had been arrested in Spain. A few days later members of the Venezuelan parliament charged that Delgado had been arrested by the Spanish Civil Guards and handed over to the Portuguese secret political police. The Venezuelans said they were in possession of information that Delgado was shot without any pretense at a trial."

Now, according to the *New York Times*, two of the three police agents under arrest have confessed and apparently have confirmed the involvement of Spanish police. It remains to be seen whether the full story will come out, however. "Lawyers who have followed the affair," the *Times* reported, "say that the inquiry into General Delgado's death was just beginning and complained that it was not being pursued diligently enough by the criminal police. A young police inspector is said to be working on the case virtually alone." □

Always Asked for Identification

The Vatican, denying a charge that Pope Paul has received money from the Central Intelligence Agency, stated July 8 that the pope had never taken money "from the CIA or any other unknown source."

Committee Reports Pile Up Evidence Against Nixon

By Allen Myers

"At the beginning of last week," John Herbers wrote in the July 14 *New York Times*, "Mr. Nixon's chances of escaping impeachment and conviction seemed to be improving. He had just returned from trips to the Middle East and the Soviet Union that had earned him favorable headlines. The House Judiciary Committee in its impeachment proceedings had broken into partisan bickering. The public seemed to be growing tired of it all."

But that, as Herbers went on to note, was before a number of events pushed Nixon further along the road toward removal from office. "Each time the outlook for him brightens, a spate of new developments stirs up the storm with renewed force."

In the space of a few days, the House Judiciary Committee made public a large amount of material demonstrating Nixon's involvement in the Watergate cover-up and his attempt to pass off doctored transcripts of the White House tapes; the Senate Watergate committee revealed evidence of a personal slush fund maintained for Nixon by his friend C. G. "Bebe" Rebozo; and a jury in Washington, D. C., convicted John Ehrlichman, formerly one of Nixon's top two aides, of conspiracy and perjury in connection with the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist.

'The Whole Theory Has Been Containment, As You Know'

On July 11, the House Judiciary Committee released eight volumes containing chronological "statements of information" on the Watergate affair, along with supporting evidence. The statements were carefully phrased to avoid drawing any conclusions as to Nixon's guilt, but the simple list of facts was sufficient to prove Nixon's involvement. "Nowhere," James M. Naughton wrote in the July 13 *New York Times*, "in the 3,891 pages of the impeachment inquiry staff's presentation is there a flat declaration

that Mr. Nixon engaged in a Watergate cover-up. But the burden of the material, implicit on page after page in the view of those familiar with the evidence, is that Mr. Nixon at best did not halt and at worst directed the obstruction of the Watergate investigation."

The evidence included a tape transcript showing Nixon directing the cover-up as early as June 30, 1972, less than two weeks after the Watergate break-in. On that date, Nixon met with his then chief of the White House staff, H. R. Haldeman, and former Attorney General John Mitchell, who was to resign the next day as director of the Committee to Reelect the President.

Referring to this resignation, Haldeman said, "The longer you wait, the more risk each hour brings. You run the risk of more stuff, valid or invalid, surfacing on the Watergate caper. . . ."

Nixon replied: "Yes, that's the other thing, if something does come out, but we won't—we hope nothing will. It may not. But there is always the risk."

Haldeman: "As of now there is no problem there. As, as of any moment in the future there is at least a potential problem."

Nixon: "Well, I'd cut the loss fast. I'd cut it fast. If we're going to do it I'd cut it fast. . . ."

The committee's evidence also shows Nixon discussing clemency for the Watergate burglars with John Dean on February 28, 1973. (This was three weeks before the date on which, Nixon later claimed, he first learned of a cover-up.)

In a March 13, 1973, discussion with Dean, Nixon was told that Gordon Strachan, an aide to Haldeman, had already lied twice to the FBI concerning Watergate. Dean indicated that Strachan would continue to lie to investigators: "He'll go in and stone-wall it and say, 'I don't know anything about what you are talking about.' He has already done it twice, as you know. . . ." Several days later,

dictating comments into a recorder, Nixon approvingly described Strachan as a "courageous fellow."

Not surprisingly, Dean's comments on Strachan's perjury were edited out of the tape transcripts that Nixon made public on April 30 of this year. It was to be expected that Nixon would suppress as much as possible of the damaging evidence. But the great extent of his tampering with the transcripts was not indicated until July 9, when the House Judiciary Committee made public a comparison of Nixon's transcripts with its own transcripts of eight tapes that the committee has been able to obtain.

"Most of the thousands of discrepancies are inconsequential," David E. Rosenbaum reported in the July 10 *New York Times*, "but in dozens of cases they appear to provide a significant variation of tone or meaning. In every instance in which there is a substantial inconsistency, the President is cast in a better light in the White House transcript."

Some of the most interesting discrepancies occur in the transcripts of Nixon's meetings on March 22, 1973, when the cover-up was just beginning to come apart. At one point, for example, Nixon's version quotes him as saying: ". . . all John Mitchell is arguing, then, is that now we use flexibility in order to get off the cover-up line." The committee's transcript reports the last phrase as ". . . in order to get on with the cover-up plan."

Nixon's version simply omitted entirely sixteen pages of a conversation between Nixon and Mitchell on the same day. It is easy to see why.


The conversation included Nixon's praise for John Dean for having "put the fires out, almost got the damn thing nailed down till past the election and so forth."

Nixon then went on to compare his handling of Watergate with the way Dwight Eisenhower handled a scandal during his administration. Nixon referred to Sherman Adams, a top aide to Eisenhower, who was forced to re-

sign after he was caught accepting "gifts" from wealthy businessmen. Nixon plainly felt that Eisenhower had been unnecessarily strict in the matter:

"... it's unfair—Haldeman and Dean. That's what Eisenhower—that's all he cared about. He only cared about—Christ, 'Be sure he was clean.' Both in the fund thing and the Adams thing. But I don't look at it that way. And I just—that's the thing I am really concerned with. We're going to protect our people, if we can."

("The fund thing" would appear to be a reference to Nixon's nearly being dropped as Eisenhower's running



MITCHELL: Got orders from Nixon to "stonewall" Watergate investigators.

mate in 1952, when it was revealed that a number of California businessmen had set up an \$18,000 slush fund for him. Nixon saved his political career with his televised "Checkers speech.")

A few minutes earlier, according to the committee transcript, Nixon in effect ordered Mitchell and Dean, who was also present, to commit perjury:

"... I thought it was, uh, very, uh, very cruel thing as it turned out—although at the time I had to tell [unintelligible]—what happened to Adams. I don't want it to happen with Watergate—the Watergate matter. I think he made a, made a mistake, but he

shouldn't have been sacked, he shouldn't have been—And, uh, for that reason, I am perfectly willing to—I don't give a shit what happens. I want you all to stonewall it, let them plead the Fifth Amendment, cover up or anything else, if it'll save it—save the plan. . . ."

And a moment later, Nixon remarked to Mitchell: ". . . you know, up to this point, the whole theory has been containment, as you know, John."

The committee does not have possession of most of the White House tapes, and it appears that Nixon has continued to erase damaging material from those that are still in his exclusive possession. It was learned last year that 18.5 minutes had been erased from the recording of a June 20, 1972, discussion of Watergate between Nixon and Haldeman. A second erasure was mentioned in a courtroom hearing on July 11 by a Watergate prosecutor. Richard Ben-Veniste told the judge, "We have learned that one of the tapes contains almost a nineteen-minute gap." The gap occurs in the recording of a March 20, 1973, conversation between Nixon and Ehrlichman.

The Supreme Court is now considering whether to order Nixon to turn over sixty-four additional tapes subpoenaed by the Watergate special prosecutor. If, as is generally predicted, the court rules against Nixon, further destruction of the tapes can be expected. James St. Clair, Nixon's top defense attorney, told reporters July 9 that it might take as long as two months to "process" the tapes even if Nixon obeys a court ruling, which he may well decide to defy. It is obvious that two months would be ample time to decide which tapes would become "nonexistent" or would develop more mysterious erasures.

Ehrlichman Convicted

On July 12, John Ehrlichman became the thirty-sixth member of the Nixon gang to plead or be found guilty in Watergate-related crimes. He and three members of the White House "plumbers" unit were convicted of conspiring to violate the civil rights of Dr. Lewis Fielding, whose office was burglarized by the plumbers in an effort to obtain psychiatric records on Daniel Ellsberg. Ehrlichman was ad-

ditionally convicted on one count of lying to the FBI and two counts of lying to a grand jury. He was acquitted on one other charge of lying to the grand jury.

Ehrlichman's attorneys had argued that, since it had not been proved that he had specifically ordered a "break-in," but only a "covert operation," he should be acquitted. The judge rejected this argument and told the jury that any search of Fielding's files without a warrant was illegal. He also told the jurors:

"An individual cannot escape criminal liability simply because he sincerely but incorrectly believes that his acts are justified in the name of patriotism, of national security or the need to create an unfavorable press image or that his superiors had the authority to suspend without a warrant the protections of the Fourth Amendment."

The judge's remarks clearly had some application to Nixon himself, who has tried to hide virtually every one of the crimes he is charged with behind one or another "national security" justification.

The jury's verdict also provided a certain judgment on the credibility of Nixon and of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, both of whom testified for the defense.

Nixon's testimony was given in the form of a written reply to six questions. In it, Nixon admitted that he had "authorized the special investigations unit [plumbers] to prevent and halt leaks of vital security information." He thus admitted organizing a band of burglars, even though he claims not to have known what they were up to.

Kissinger was brought in personally in an effort to discredit the testimony of David Young, a plumber who testified for the prosecution in exchange for immunity. Young was quoted in the trial as having said that a psychological profile of Ellsberg "had been requested by Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Ehrlichman." Kissinger denied having ever made such a request. But the evident failure of the jury to regard his testimony as proof of Young's unreliability did not, in this instance, prompt any resignation threats from the secretary of state.

Writing in the July 14 *New York Times*, columnist James Reston observed that the "psychological effect

of the Ehrlichman conviction on the Judiciary Committee and the members of the House and Senate is probably more important than anything else."

This was Reston's polite way of saying that there is already on the public record far more concrete evidence against Nixon than that which sufficed to convict Ehrlichman. If a jury of ordinary citizens found Ehrlichman guilty on the basis of two or three memos and the testimony of admitted "plumbers" who testified to save their own necks, how will the general public view members of Congress who vote to acquit Nixon when he has convicted himself in his own words a dozen times over? The "psychological effects" may indeed be profound.

Another Slush Fund

Adding to the embarrassment that Nixon causes the U.S. ruling class is the accumulating evidence that he has never abandoned his old habit of using his office to line his pockets—the habit that he turned to his advantage when it was discovered in 1952. On July 10, the Senate Watergate committee released a report charging that banker Bebe Rebozo was the manager of a slush fund maintained for Nixon's personal use.

The report quoted a memorandum written by Haldeman to Ehrlichman on February 17, 1969:

"Bebe Rebozo has been asked by the President to contact [oil multimillionaire] J. Paul Getty in London regarding major contributions.

"Bebe would like advice from you or someone as to how this can legally and technically be handled. The funds should go to some operating entity other than the [Republican] National Committee so that we can retain full control of their use.

"Bebe would appreciate your calling him with this advice as soon as possible since the President has asked him to move quickly."

Since Nixon had been in office only four weeks at that point, and since his 1968 campaign organization had ended up with a surplus of more than \$1 million, there would seem to have been little need for the urgent collection of reelection funds. On the other hand, Nixon had several months earlier paid more than \$250,000 for his Key Biscayne, Florida, estate, and

was about to buy his San Clemente property for \$1.4 million.

The report uncovered at least \$50,000 that Rebozo had spent for Nixon's personal use, including \$45,621 on the Key Biscayne property and \$4,562 to buy a birthday gift from Nixon to his wife. The latter sum, the committee said, originated in funds left over from the 1968 campaign and was transferred through several accounts by Rebozo in an effort to conceal its origin.

The report also suggested that a \$50,000 "campaign" contribution from the head of a supermarket chain and a \$100,000 donation from financier Howard Hughes went into the slush fund. Rebozo claims that the \$100,000 from Hughes was allowed to sit idly in a bank vault for three years and then returned to him—a story every bit as credible as Nixon's denial of knowledge of the Watergate cover-up.

The report cited testimony by Herbert Kalmbach, formerly Nixon's personal attorney, to the effect that Rebozo had told him that part of the \$100,000 was given to Nixon's brothers Donald and Edward and to his secretary, Rose Mary Woods. But, the committee complained, its efforts to prove or disprove this charge were "frustrated" by the refusal of Rebozo, the two Nixon brothers, and Woods to obey subpoenas for their financial records.

(Persons who ignore Congressional subpoenas are usually indicted for contempt of Congress. When Nixon defied the subpoenas of the House Judiciary Committee, however, the committee sent him a letter saying he had defied their subpoena, which fact, presumably, he already knew. Nixon of course attempted to justify his refusal to comply with the subpoena by inventing the "doctrine of executive privilege." It now appears that this doctrine, whose properties at times seem almost magical, can be extended to the president's relatives, employees, friends, and anyone else who has knowledge of his crimes. At any rate, the Senate committee has taken no action against the persons who ignored its subpoenas.)

Evidence of Nixon's crimes continues to surface so regularly that even his henchmen in the White House have grown wary of denying new charges. "White House spokesmen," John Her-

bers reported in a July 11 dispatch to the *Times*, "declined today to deny specifically charges that campaign funds had been put to President Nixon's personal use and that another gap had been discovered in the Watergate tapes.

"Instead, the spokesmen made another attack on the Senate Watergate committee and the House Judiciary Committee, charging a calculated public relations campaign designed to manipulate public opinion against President Nixon."

Nixon's Congressional opponents have no real need to "manipulate public opinion" against Nixon: He does an excellent job of that by himself. The overwhelming majority of the public long ago recognized that Nixon is a crook. The decision still to be made—by the ruling class, not the public—is whether to remove the crook or allow him to stagger from one scandal to another for the next two and a half years. □

Better to Receive Than to Give

Since a *Washington Post* columnist reported in May that Richard Nixon's wife and daughters had received gifts of jewelry from Arab government officials that were not immediately turned over to the State Department—as U.S. law requires—the State Department has received a large number of such gifts from other U.S. officials belatedly complying with the law.

Former Vice-President Spiro Agnew has handed over a collection of trinkets presented to him by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the crown prince in 1971. This included a diamond-studded, gold-sheathed dagger, and diamond and pearl jewelry.

The wife of Senator William Fulbright, who heads the committee that drafted the law making such gifts government property, handed in emeralds and diamonds given to her by the petroleum minister of Abu Dhabi in 1972.

Senator Hubert Humphrey has finally turned over to the government an eight-carat diamond he received from President Mobutu of Zaire in 1968, when Humphrey was vice-president. But the State Department will have to do without ten leopard skins given to Mrs. Humphrey by an official of Somalia in 1968: Two years later the Humphreys sold the skins for \$7,500. A spokesman for Humphrey said the proceeds from the sale were donated to a school for the mentally retarded.

Why Liberals Won in Canadian Election

By Dick Fidler

The Liberal government headed by Pierre Elliot Trudeau was reelected in Canada's federal election July 8, winning 141 seats in parliament, 32 more than in the 1972 election. They gained in seven of the ten provinces and swept most of the major cities.

The Progressive Conservatives or "Tories" slipped from 107 seats in the last parliament to 95, smashing their hopes of replacing the Liberals in government.

The Social Credit party, based in Québec, dropped from its previous 15 seats to 11, losing some 200,000 votes in Québec, mainly to the Liberals, who took all but three of the remaining seats in the French-speaking province.

The biggest loser in the election was the New Democratic party (NDP), Canada's labor party. Its parliamentary representation was halved, dropping from 31 to 16 seats, and its share of the total vote declined by 2.5 percent to 15 percent. NDP leader David Lewis lost his own seat to a little-known Liberal candidate. In British Columbia, a traditional stronghold of the NDP, it dropped from 11 seats to 2. Its representation was also reduced in the other two western provinces where it holds office, Saskatchewan and Manitoba.

Ironically, the main factor in Trudeau's victory was inflation—over which he claimed he had no control. Prices are rising in Canada at a yearly rate of more than 10 percent, and the high cost of living was the dominant election issue.

According to Peter Regenstreif, a pollster, "Personal interviews showed that in some areas of the country concern about inflation was running as high as 80 per cent. In the history of polling in Canada, no issue has ever registered so strongly."

The Conservatives centered their campaign on a promise to impose "controls on prices and incomes"—i.e., wage controls—if elected. The electorate reacted sharply against this proposal. "By the end of the campaign,"

Regenstreif said, "close to half the electorate was against the proposal and barely one-third was in favor." The election became, in effect, a plebiscite on the issue of wage controls, with the Liberals opposing such controls as unworkable, while carefully refraining from committing themselves to



TRUDEAU: No answer to inflation.

any alternative proposal. In fact, Trudeau argued that the government was powerless to combat inflation, that national measures could not counteract an escalation of prices rooted in world conditions.

The NDP ought to have challenged this line and advanced an anticapitalist alternative program around such demands as a cost-of-living clause in union contracts, reopening of collective agreements to provide for immediate wage increases, and sliding-scale increases in pensions and other forms of fixed incomes. All these demands have been advanced by workers in recent strikes and other labor struggles.

But the NDP, a party largely fi-

nanced by the trade unions, offered no clear alternative to the demagoguery of the Liberals and Tories. The NDP advocated "selective price controls" and a nationalistic "two price" system under which basic export commodities, chiefly natural resources, would be sold at world market prices abroad but at lower, subsidized prices in Canada. In practice, such a system would benefit Canadian manufacturers, while Canadian consumers continued to pay world prices on manufactured products.

The NDP was seriously compromised, moreover, by the fact that for the past twenty months—during which prices have shot upward with no response from the government—it has voted consistently with the Liberals in Ottawa to keep the Trudeau government in office. In fact, the NDP leaders were in the peculiar position during this election of favoring reelection of a Liberal government.

Much of their campaign was spent in boasting of "concessions" they claimed to have wheedled from the Liberals in return for their parliamentary collaboration. This tended to appear as praise for the accomplishments of the Liberals at the expense of the NDP. To many voters, it must have seemed that the NDP differed but little from the Liberal party.

Above all, the NDP leaders campaigned—as always—as responsible parliamentarians, with "making parliament work" their highest priority. A major theme in their campaign, aside from *pro forma* calls for the election of an NDP government, was the advantage of minority government by one of the capitalist parties (the Liberals, it was implied) with the NDP providing helpful advice—and needed parliamentary support.

If a minority government is elected, Lewis told a television audience, "it will be our duty to look for ways to keep parliament functioning." And "not for eighteen months—but perhaps for two, three, four years," he told an interviewer.

According to the Canadian revolutionary-socialist fortnightly, *Labor Challenge*, one NDP leader, Edward Schreyer, the premier of the province of Manitoba, declared his support earlier this year for "a frank and open coalition" with one of the capitalist parties, if another minority govern-

ment were to be elected. When Lewis was asked during the election campaign if he would favor a formal coalition with the Liberals in the next parliament, he refused to comment.

The NDP leadership's attack on the corporations (for "excess profits") was more populist than anticapitalist. Lewis called for wresting decision-making power away from the corporations and placing it in a parliament and government purged of corporate influence.

In the wake of its election debacle, the NDP is almost certain to face an internal crisis. Even before the election, its membership was dropping, and there was considerable demoralization in party ranks as a result of its parliamentary collusion with the Liberals.

The Canadian bourgeoisie was elated with the election results. The Liberals' parliamentary majority relieves them of the necessity of relying on the support of the NDP for the next four to five years, the length of their electoral mandate. This is only the second time in the six elections since 1962 that the governing party has enjoyed an absolute majority in parliament.

U. S. capitalist circles, which own about half of Canada's manufacturing industry, were no less exultant. "Canada has given the world an impressive demonstration of the health and vibrancy of its democratic institutions and practices," wrote the editors of the *New York Times* on July 10.

"At a time when democratic institutions are in retreat or under heavy pressures almost everywhere," they wrote, "and when weak, minority governments are the rule rather than the exception throughout the Western world, the significance of the decisive outcome in Canada's general election can hardly be exaggerated."

A dispatch from Ottawa in the July 14 issue of the *New York Times* noted that Trudeau's electoral success reinforces his government's bargaining position in its continuing trade negotiations with Washington, which were left largely in abeyance during the last twenty months. ". . . the relationship along the 4,000-mile border is sharply different from that of three years ago, when the Canadians tended to be supplicants."

The *New York Times* noted that during the election campaign, Tru-

deau promised that the government would start insisting that all major new natural-resource projects, such as pipelines and mines, be owned at least 50 percent by Canadians. Up to now ownership has been predominantly foreign in these sectors.

A dispatch from Washington in the July 10 *New York Times* spoke of Trudeau's "shift in recent years toward economic nationalism," and suggested that this "may continue to pose an obstacle to the settlement of issues sought by the United States." A key issue is Washington's desire to modify a partial free-trade pact in automobiles and auto parts in order to allow duty-free import of U. S.-manufactured cars into Canada. Washington also objects to Canada's subsidizing manufacturers who export to the United States, Canada's scheduled reduction of crude-oil exports, its tariffs on U. S.-manufactured goods, and its recent ban on imports of some types of U. S. beef.

In reality, the Trudeau government's "mandate" resulted more from popular opposition to wage controls than from anything the government has done or proposes to do. Two days after the election, Ottawa released the latest statistics on inflation, showing that consumer prices have risen 11.4 percent in the past year, the largest annual increase in twenty-three years. The editors of the *Toronto Star* noted Trudeau's admission that the Liberals have their own "contingency program of income and price controls." The editors added regretfully, "Having campaigned so adamantly against controls, however, Trudeau has made it immensely more difficult to gain the vital element of public acceptance and co-operation in a program of economic restraint."

Despite the claim of the *New York Times* that "with this election, the Canadians have sharpened their identity as a united people and nation," the Québec national question was not a big issue in the election. No major party supports the self-determination of the Québécois nation (almost one-third of the Canadian population).

A traditionally high abstention rate in federal elections has reflected the alienation of the Québécois from the Canadian confederation. This year, the Parti Québécois, a mass petty-bourgeois party that advocates an independent Québec, called for Québec

voters to spoil their ballots as a protest against the oppression of Québec by Ottawa. Federal authorities refused to report how many ballots were spoiled in Québec; but in 1972, it was some 5.8 percent of the total, far more than in any other province.

The revolutionary-socialist alternative in the election was advanced by the Trotskyists of the League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière, the Canadian section of the Fourth International, and the Revolutionary Marxist Group, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

The LSA nominated Kate Alderdice, a woman worker and staff organizer of the League, to run in a Toronto constituency against External Affairs Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Mitchell Sharp.

Alderdice focused on Canada's complicity with the Chilean junta in refusing asylum to the majority of political refugees who have applied. She called for Canadian withdrawal from the imperialist alliances NATO and NORAD (North American Air Defense Agreement). Other major themes in her campaign were the need for anticapitalist measures to fight inflation and unemployment, defense of the national liberation struggle of the Québécois, and full support of the demands of the women's liberation movement.

The RMG presented three candidates in Toronto, Winnipeg, and Peterborough. The three candidates stressed what they termed "a program of direct and immediate action: objectives which can broaden the scope of workers struggles and improve the relationship of class forces in favor of the proletariat; methods of struggle which unify the working class and give it experiences in self-organization and proletarian democracy."

(The full texts of the LSA and RMG election programs were published in the July 1 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, pp. 875-80.)

Both organizations called for a vote for the NDP where there was no revolutionary candidate. The LSA also gave critical support to the RMG candidates.

According to incomplete election returns issued July 9, Kate Alderdice of the LSA received 109 votes. The RMG's results were as follows: Linda

Peevers (Peterborough), 207; Bret Smiley (Toronto), 40; and Murray Smith (Winnipeg), 78. Smiley and Smith ran in constituencies held by the NDP.

The Communist party ran 69 candidates around two central slogans: "Elect a large progressive bloc to parliament" in which "Communists and NDPers would play a major part"; and "Defeat the drive to the right." The first slogan expressed the CP's desire for an electoral bloc with the "non-monopoly bourgeoisie," while the second was aimed against the Tories, the "main party of the Right." Together, the two slogans amounted to a call for the election of a minority Liberal government.

The Maoist Canadian Communist party (Marxist-Leninist) ran 107 candidates, who denounced the elections as "a capitalist fraud." This slogan may have referred to the \$35,000 the Maoists and the pro-Moscow CP were forced to pay the government, since none of their candidates received anywhere near the required number of votes for a refund of the \$200 each candidate is required to deposit in order to run. Almost everywhere, the CP outpolled the Maoists, but none of its candidates received more than a few hundred votes.

A small grouping called the "Waffle," which split from the New Democratic party in 1972 around a program of English-Canadian "national liberation" from U.S. imperialism, ran three candidates in the province of Ontario. They, too, received no more than a few hundred votes. Waffle leader Jim Laxer, running in Toronto, had 669 votes. □

Trading With Martians?

The Australian followers of Gerry Healy [leader of the Workers Revolutionary party, a sectarian British group] have established for themselves a reputation for weird economic theory surpassing even their British mentors. The June 6 issue of their newspaper *Workers News* has, however, surpassed even their own standards. A front-page article by editor Nick Beams claimed that the "balance of payments of every capitalist country is now plunging into deficit. . . ."

Such a situation can only occur if all the capitalist countries are importing more than they are exporting. But where are they importing from? It's obviously not from the Soviet Union and China, the major noncapitalist countries.

— From *Direct Action*, June 22


July 22, 1974

Ethiopia

Army Rebels Announce Curbs on Cabinet

The Ethiopian rebel Armed Forces Committee issued a thirteen-point manifesto July 9 in Addis Ababa, making clear its intention to play a major role in any future civilian government.

"In their statement," wrote David B. Ottaway in the July 10 *Washington Post*, "the military reformers clearly indicated that they are not about to dissolve their committee and that they will continue to press the government



SELASSIE: "Loyal" army demands constitution restricting his power.

of Prime Minister Endalkachew Makonnen to carry out the changes they want to see made."

"The coordinating committee believes," said the manifesto, "that close cooperation between the council of ministers and [it] is proper and essential to enable the committee to present proposals and to ensure their implementation. The committee will therefore maintain its contact and cooperation with the council ministers."

Although pledging their "loyalty" to Emperor Haile Selassie, they made it clear they intend to oversee personally the constitutional reforms they have been calling for. Their objective, they said, was to accomplish "last-

ing changes without any bloodshed." They demanded that a new constitution, which would strip the emperor of many of his traditional powers, be "implemented on a priority basis."

Other than implementation of the new constitution, the committee's manifesto was vague about the precise reforms they wanted carried out. They were for modernization of the provincial administration, "abolition of certain traditional beliefs and customs that may hamper the unity and progress" of the country, and in favor of a "spirit of unity, equality, and brotherhood" among all citizens. But, pointed out Ottaway in the July 10 *Post*, "there was no specific mention of land reform, which is the number-one issue in Ethiopian politics today."

The committee was anxious to reassure tourists intending to visit Ethiopia that the "door is still open" for them. It also directed appeals to friendly governments to honor their aid commitments, "for this military movement is a movement dedicated to national development and progress." (Ethiopia has received about \$200 million in U.S. military assistance since the end of World War II.)

One thing the military is not dedicated to, apparently, is freedom for Eritrea. The first of five demands the military presented to Selassie July 3 was reported to have been amnesty for all political prisoners. This was the only demand the emperor hedged at. (See *Intercontinental Press*, July 15, p. 938.)

However, left out of the first English-language version of the committee's communiqué was a clause excluding from the amnesty offer all those "who have been charged with crimes against the unity and welfare of the nation." Members and partisans of the Eritrean Liberation Front make up by far the largest number of political prisoners in Ethiopia.

The military is continuing to round up present and former ministers, officers, police officials, provincial governors, and imperial advisers it has accused of corruption, abuse of authority, or blocking reforms. An army statement issued July 12 stated that

Ras Mesfin Sileshi, at the top of their wanted list, had surrendered. Mesfin was one of the most powerful men in Ethiopia, and with his capture the prospect of effective opposition to the army rebels' take-over is much diminished, according to Western diplo-

mats in Addis Ababa quoted by United Press International.

Other important officials arrested recently include former Agriculture Minister Djezasmach Kassa Wolde Mariam and Colonel Solomon Kedir, head of state security. □

of giant corporations. The huge sums expended by the corporations themselves became an issue in the campaign.

The LDP catchword was said to be "success with five, failure with three"—meaning that with 500 million yen (US\$1.8 million), an LDP candidate could be elected; but with only 300 million yen (US\$1.1 million), the candidate would fail. "The talk now, however," wrote an editorialist in the *Mainichi Shimbun* before the election, "indicates a higher figure, seven for success, five for failure." (The legal limit for campaign spending is \$65,000.)

According to the *Asahi Shimbun*, the LDP raised \$90 million for their 95 candidates, while the June 24 *Far Eastern Economic Review* refers to one estimate of \$140 million as the amount raised. The overwhelming bulk of this came from the largest Japanese corporations, the *zaibatsu*. □

Inflation a Major Issue

Elections Deal Setback to Tanaka's Party

"Japan's voters have administered an unexpectedly sharp setback to Premier Kakuei Tanaka and the Liberal-Democratic Government," commented the *New York Times* in an editorial on the July 7 elections to the House of Councilors, the upper house of the Japanese parliament.

With 130 of the house's 252 seats at stake, the conservative Liberal Democratic party (LDP) won only 62, a loss of 8, which reduced their total strength to 126. With the aid of three independents who generally support the LDP, Tanaka was thus just barely able to maintain a majority.

Of the four major opposition parties, the biggest gainer was the Communist party, which increased its total representation from 11 to 20. The Socialist party now has 62 seats, compared with 59 previously. Komeito, the party of the Buddhist Soka Gakkai sect, won one additional seat, for a total of 24. The right-wing Democratic Socialist party was reduced from 11 seats to 10. There are a total of 10 independents.

While the powers of the House of Councilors are limited, the election was seen as an important test of the popularity of the ruling Liberal Democrats. A fairly easy victory had been widely expected. The July 1 *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported that "the consensus within the LDP itself is for 75 seats," while Tanaka's own estimate was a "minimum of 80."

Inflation, higher in Japan than in any other industrialized country, was a key issue in the campaign. Retail prices have risen 25 percent in the past year, while wholesale prices are up 35 percent. Although a survey published July 7 by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* showed that 55 percent of the Japanese people thought the opposition parties would do no better than the LDP at controlling prices, resent-

ment is obviously being directed at the government.

Other important issues were environmental pollution and proposed laws that would restrict freedom of the press and the right to demonstrate.

Tanaka and the LDP attempted to offset their declining popularity by running movie stars and other celebrities as their candidates and by openly enlisting the financial and other aid

India

Gandhi Continues Antilabor Offensive

By Sharad Jhaveri

Jamnagar

The economic situation of the Indian working class is deteriorating at a rapid rate. Inflation during the last three months has reached an all-time high, and the scarcity of basic goods is becoming more and more acute. Industrial production is stagnating; its growth rate is near zero. Instead of taking action against the profiteers, the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has allowed several industries—including the manufacturers of soap and oil—to raise prices.

At the same time, the ruling Congress government has continued the offensive against labor that it began last May during the rail strike. It has refused to negotiate with the National Coordinating Committee of Railwaymen's Struggle (NCCRS) over the fate of victimised union militants. In addition, there is a move under way to ban strikes in essential services and industries.

The government is also preparing legislation prohibiting the payment of wages during a strike or allowing ad-

justments to be made with vacation pay. The principle of "no work, no pay" is to be applied at least to strikes in production units.

A wage freeze is being discussed as well, and there are reports that a virtual freeze has already been imposed on the public sector. According to the June 16 issue of the *Economic Times*, management in the public sector has been instructed to consult the government before granting any pay increases.

So far, none of the left parties has raised any protest to this threat. Only George Fernandes, a leader of the NCCRS and the Socialist party, has warned the government of the consequences of a wage freeze.

Although the pro-Moscow Communist party of India has withdrawn from its alliance with the ruling Congress party in West Bengal, it stated in a letter to the Socialist party that it is opposed to "total non-cooperation with the government." The CPI maintains that there is no contradiction "between our friendly relations with progressive congressmen and our

fighting against the anti-people's policies of the government."

N. R. Reddy, CPI national council secretary, claimed that the country's present problems could be solved only by a left democratic government, and said that the CPI's perspective was to form such a government by developing left and democratic unity.

The CPI seems to think that there are inherent limits beyond which the rightward shift of the Gandhi government cannot go. According to Reddy, the growing radicalisation of the masses and increasing trade with the Soviet Union and other workers states

are two factors that will check the shift.

It is clear that the class-collaborationist policy of both the CPI and the pro-Peking CPI (Marxist) greatly reduces the prospect of the various left parties uniting for the limited objective of fighting the government's anti-labor offensive.

The rapid appearance of a right-wing alternative to the ruling Congress also seems unlikely. The parties that had decided to merge to provide such a rightist alternative decided June 16 to postpone launching their new party until August. A national convention is to follow in October. □

Emulate Portuguese CP's Role

Spanish Stalinists Hail Church, Army

The entry of the Portuguese Communist party into the government of "national salvation" has encouraged hopes among leaders of the Spanish CP that they soon can play a similar role in their own country.

This was the theme of a mass rally of thousands of Spanish emigres held in Geneva, Switzerland, on June 23. The combined political meeting and festival, sponsored by the Spanish CP and its Swiss counterpart, the Parti Suisse du Travail (PST—Swiss Labor party), featured Spanish CP leaders Dolores Ibarruri ("La Pasionaria" of the civil war) and Santiago Carrillo. The audience, largely emigre workers, came from many cities throughout Western Europe. Some workers even came from Madrid, Barcelona, and the Basque country to attend the rally. Estimates of the number of participants ranged up to 20,000.

A giant banner reading "For a Broad-Coalition Provisional Government" floated over the platform at the skating rink, reported *Le Monde* special correspondent Marcel Niedergang in the June 25 issue of the Paris daily. "And the slogans in the hall called not for revolution but for 'liberty, amnesty, and democracy.'"

The arena echoed with enthusiastic chants, among them "We'll soon be in Madrid!" A particularly popular one was modeled on the slogan of Chile's Popular Unity coalition, raised anew this spring in Portugal: "A united

Spain will never be defeated."

The Swiss government had barred Ibarruri and Carrillo from addressing the meeting. But organizers bypassed the ban by prerecording their speeches and playing them over loudspeakers, while the two CP leaders sat silently on the platform. Then, to the immense excitement of the crowd, the two departed from the announced schedule and spoke briefly, Ibarruri reading the last two pages of her written text.

"A eulogy of the church and respect for the armed forces—these were the two general themes" of the Stalinist leaders, Niedergang reported.

Ibarruri, the party's chairwoman, spoke in praise of a "renewed church with a progressive hierarchy and thousands of priests who are reconciling the people with the church through their action." When someone asked her if "Spanish Communism is no longer atheistic," she replied: "We've changed because the world has changed. The church in Spain was reactionary. But what I know today is that the first meetings of the Workers Commissions were held in convents. We must look at things as they are and draw the right conclusions. . . ."

And she added, "The army has produced Francos and Pinochets, but it has also produced Spínolas, the Portuguese captains, and the Peruvian military."

Carrillo, the general secretary of the

Spanish CP, devoted at least a third of his own speech to the question of the armed forces, Niedergang reported. He hailed General Diez-Alegria, recently fired by Franco as chief of the Spanish general staff, as a "modern military man, who is not used to clanging sabers and spurs and who has the good taste not to threaten the Spanish people with the scarecrow of the civil war. . . ."

Claiming that the Spanish armed forces are "offended by the present regime," Carrillo urged that the military "must have the techniques and methods they require in order to play the role they are entitled to in the interests of the nation." The Stalinist leader said he looked forward to the day when children in Spain would "put red carnations in gun barrels."

However, he said, he was not calling for an uprising of army captains as occurred in Portugal. Instead, he thought that political change would come about through concerted pressure from all forces, of both the left and the right, that favor a return to freedom and democracy. To this effect, he and Ibarruri appealed for "dialogue" and a "vast national regroupment" in Spain.

Le Monde's correspondent summed up their speeches:

"They think that the division between left and right scarcely has any meaning in today's Spain, so different from the country that emerged, broken and exhausted, from the civil war. According to them, the real line of division is between the extremist politicians who are clinging to the principles codified during and after the civil war, and all those, both inside the Franco regime and outside the system, who aspire to a more modern, liberal regime for their country, adapted to the conditions of the Europe of the Common Market. . . ."

Asked how soon he thought the present dictatorship might be overthrown, Carrillo replied, "I am not a prophet, but it is much closer than you think. In any case, in less than several years."

The day after the June 23 rally the two CP leaders were banned "indefinitely" from "democratic" Switzerland by the federal government, on the grounds that they had "contravened" the government's prohibition on public speaking. □

AROUND THE WORLD



Arafat Says Israel Has A-Bombs

Yasir Arafat, the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was quoted by a Beirut newspaper July 10 as saying that Israel now possessed five atomic bombs of the size dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The paper said Arafat's remark had been made at a meeting in Beirut.

Arafat also said, according to the report, that the U. S. Defense Department was helping Israel develop weapons that use laser rays.

Big Jump in U. S. Arms Sales

It has been a good year for U.S. weapons' merchants, according to figures recently released by the Pentagon. In the fiscal year ended June 30, Washington sold some \$8,500 million worth of arms, almost double the total for the previous year. The figure does not include weapons provided as grants, such as the \$1,500 million given to Israel after the October War.

The overwhelming bulk of the sales were to states in the Arab East and the Arab-Persian Gulf region. Iran alone bought arms worth \$4,000 million. Israel, to supplement what it got for free, paid out more than \$1,000 million for additional items. Saudi Arabia spent some \$700 million on U.S. weapons.

Among the most popular items in the area were F-4, F-5, and F-14 fighter aircraft, helicopters, and an assortment of missiles. The F-14 is a long-range aircraft that carries the most modern missiles. Just now coming into use by U.S. forces, it retails for slightly more than \$20 million.

Cash sales from the Pentagon's arsenal to other parts of the world came to \$655 million in Western Europe, \$320 million in East Asia and the Pacific, \$220 million in Latin America, and only \$35 million in Africa.

U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger described the arms sales, particularly in the Middle East, as an effort to "strengthen deterrence and promote peaceful negotiations by helping our friends and allies to maintain adequate defense forces of their own." By this standard, the world is becoming more peaceful every day, and Washington can claim to be do-

ing more than anyone to promote peace. Western Europe and the Soviet Union each sold an estimated \$2,000 million in arms in 1973, and Eastern Europe sold an additional \$500 million. U.S. government officials estimate that, even allowing for inflation, worldwide arms sales in the 1970s have already surpassed the total for all of the 1960s.

Kelley: Can't Find Hearst

At a news conference July 11, FBI Director Clarence Kelley said the FBI still does not know the whereabouts of Patricia Hearst and the surviving members of the Symbionese Liberation Army.

"We do not know whether or not she is out of the country; we do not know where she is," Kelley said. He added that the investigation was continuing and that "we will prevail here, too."

Amin Charges Invasion Plot

Uganda radio announced July 13 that President Idi Amin had accused the governments of Tanzania and Zambia of aiding preparations for an invasion of the country by former President Milton Obote, Amin's predecessor. In a telegram to the chairman of the Organization of African Unity, Amin said that if such an invasion occurred, Ugandan troops would carry the fight into Tanzania, where Obote now lives in exile. Amin said Uganda would retain any territory captured in the process of repulsing an invasion.

Paris Training Chilean Military

The French government is providing military training to Chilean armed forces personnel. The Chileans are learning PUMA SA-330 helicopter maintenance. Helicopters were widely used to put down resistance to the September 1973 military coup in Chile.

Also reported are discussions between the two regimes to increase arms sales to the junta. Although such deals continued between the countries throughout the period when Allende was in power, sales of certain items were forbidden by French authorities, who must authorize all such transactions. Allende was unable

to buy AMX-13 tanks from France, for example, but could purchase 155-millimeter artillery, missiles, and rockets.

Nixon Backer on Senate Panel Accused of Accepting Bribes

Senator Edward Gurney of Florida was accused by a federal grand jury July 10 of running an influence-peddling and extortion racket since the beginning of 1971. He was indicted on one count of bribery, one count of conspiracy, one count of receiving unlawful compensation, and four counts of lying to the jury.

The grand jury said that at least \$223,000 had been collected on Gurney's behalf from contractors and real estate developers who paid bribes in order to get approval, with Gurney's help, of federal mortgages and housing insurance.

Gurney, a Republican, was a member of the Senate Watergate committee, where he was known as Nixon's most vigorous defender on that body.

He is the first senator to be indicted on felony charges since 1924.

Tensions Rise on Border Between India and Pakistan

A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman charged July 11 that Indian forces were engaging in unusual movements near the Pakistan border, especially around the city of Jammu in Kashmir. "In addition," the spokesman said, "Indian forces recently carried out exercises close to our borders with the apparent objective of familiarizing the troops with their operational control against Pakistan."

He also charged that the military forces of Afghanistan were engaged in similar unusual maneuvers along that country's border with Pakistan. Border troops were reported to be digging trenches, and the air force was said to have taken over a civil air field near the frontier.

An Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman replied the next day that India had not moved "any units to forward areas or indulged in any activities which are not usual during this part of the year."

The Indian spokesman went on to accuse Pakistan of having carried out large-scale maneuvers near the Indian border since the beginning of June.

Talks intended to continue the attempt to "normalize" Indian-Pakistani relations had been scheduled for June 10, but were called off by the Pakistani government to protest India's nuclear test.

Banzer Picks All-Military Cabinet

General Hugo Banzer Suarez, head of the Bolivian military government, dismissed his entire cabinet July 8 and replaced it with an all-military cabinet. The old government had consisted of twelve civilians and five army officers.

In a nationwide broadcast after swearing in his new cabinet, Banzer promised that "the country will be constitutionalized" some time next year.

In June, the leaders of an unsuccessful military coup demanded, in addition to Banzer's removal, an all-military government, followed by general elections.

The civilian members of the old cabinet, particularly those representing the ultrarightist Falange Nacionalista Boliviana (Bolivian Nationalist Falange), were known to oppose any return to an elected government.

South Africa to Build Bomb?

In a public speech July 11, Louw Alberts, the vice-president of South Africa's Atomic Energy Board, said that the government has the ability to produce nuclear explosives. "May I say," Alberts commented, "that our nuclear program is more advanced than that of India." The government's policy, he said, was to use its nuclear capacity only for peaceful purposes.

Comoros to Vote on Independence

The French government has agreed to hold a referendum on the question of independence for its Comoro Islands colony. The referendum is expected to take place next year. The islands lie at the northern end of the channel between Mozambique and the Malagasy Republic.

Kremlin Postpones Fahmy's Visit

The Egyptian government's Middle East News Agency reported July 10 that Moscow had asked Cairo to postpone the scheduled visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy to the Soviet Union. The visit had been scheduled to begin July 15.

The press agency said that Fahmy's visit had originally been arranged at the request of the Kremlin. The note asking the postponement was quoted as saying that the Soviet government was not able to make appropriate preparations before July 15.

On July 8, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny stopped briefly in southern Egypt en route to Somalia. He was greeted at the airport only by local officials.

NATO Ministers Oppose Plans to Reduce Dutch Forces

The council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a communique July 9 sharply attacking plans of the Dutch government to reduce its troop strength by about 20,000.

The Dutch government expects the planned reduction to save it about \$300 million over the next four years. The Netherlands military budget for 1973 came to \$2,100 million.

The communique complained that the Dutch moves would seriously weaken NATO defenses. "To redress these weaknesses would require an increase in the military and financial contributions of other allies."

The NATO governments are thought to fear that the Dutch moves might encourage other countries to reduce their own expenditures. One official in the Dutch Defense Ministry commented on the communique, "The blast was partially aimed over our heads at Britain's."

Laotian Assembly Dissolved

The Laotian coalition government announced July 11 that it was dissolving the National Assembly. The dissolution had been demanded by Pathet Lao members of the government. The assembly was elected prior to the coalition agreement and therefore contained no Pathet Lao delegates.

Seoul Court-Martial Condemns 14

A South Korean military court has sentenced fourteen civilians to death and imposed long prison terms on thirty-nine others.

On July 11 the court, sitting in Seoul, sentenced to death To Ye Jong, the alleged leader of the People's Revolutionary party, and six other accused members. Another fourteen defendants were given prison terms: eight for life and six for 20 years.

Two days later, the military judges condemned the well-known poet Kim Chi Ha, five students from Seoul National University, and an unemployed man. At the same time seven other defendants were given life sentences, twelve were sentenced to 20 years, and six were sentenced to 15 years.

Two other defendants, both Japanese citizens, were to be sentenced July 15.

The fifty-five defendants were all charged with violating an April 3 decree by President Park Chung Hee that outlawed membership in the National Democratic Youth-Student Federation and prohibited antigovernment demonstrations and the boycotting of classes. At least 253 persons are known to have been arrested on charges of having violated the decree.

Kim Chi Ha, the best known of the

defendants, had been arrested a number of times in the past for having written poems attacking corruption in the government. During one period of imprisonment, Japanese intellectuals organized a Committee to Save Kim Chi Ha, which circulated petitions in his behalf and eventually won his release. The charge on which Kim was condemned July 13 was that he had provided the equivalent of \$450 to help finance the activities of student demonstrators.

Port Said to Reopen

The harbor of Port Said, at the northern end of the Suez Canal, is scheduled to reopen for shipping July 17, the Cairo daily *Al Ahram* reported July 7. It said the Egyptian cargo ship *Abu Simbel* would dock in the harbor on that day.

The port has been closed since the 1967 war with Israel.

Arab States End Embargo on Oil for Netherlands

As its first item of business, the July 10 meeting of ministers of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries voted unanimously to end its embargo on shipments of oil to the Netherlands, which was imposed during the October War. A similar embargo against the United States was lifted March 19.

Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Arabian oil minister, told reporters, "All the members were convinced the Dutch government's attitude toward the Middle East had changed and lifting the embargo was imminent."

A spokesman of the Dutch Foreign Ministry said that "this decision will stimulate the development of good relations between the Netherlands and the Arab world, as the Netherlands has always wanted."

Because of the rerouting of Arab oil originally shipped to other countries, the embargo's effect on the Netherlands was limited. While Rotterdam harbor lost about \$9.4 million in port duties on oil traffic, Dutch oil reserves actually increased during the embargo.

1971 Tax Ruled Illegal

The U.S. Customs Court ruled July 8 that a 10 percent import surtax imposed by Nixon three years ago was illegal. The surtax was announced August 15, 1971, as one of the measures designed to reduce the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit and to force Washington's competitors to revalue their currencies. It remained in effect until December 20, 1971.

The government is expected to appeal the court's ruling. If the decision is upheld, it will produce a \$500 million windfall for importers, who will be given refunds on the surtax paid even though they were allowed to pass on the extra cost to customers.

Cubans Test Electoral 'Pilot Project' in Matanzas

By Dick Fidler

On June 30 the citizens of Matanzas, the province just east of Havana, went to the polls to vote for local government officials. It was the first election featuring universal suffrage to be held in Cuba since the triumph of the revolutionary armed forces in 1959.

The Matanzas elections were pictured by Cuban leaders as a pilot project for similar elections to be held later in other provinces.

Successful candidates are termed "delegates to the Organs of People's Power" (*Organos del Poder Popular—OPP*). According to Cuban authorities, these organs will introduce an element of formalized popular control over local government services that up to now have been administered directly from Havana.

A Reuters dispatch from Havana, published in the June 30 *New York Times*, reported that "subsequent elections are to be held for 'regional executive committees,' grouping the delegates of various constituencies. Later an executive committee is to be entrusted with running the whole province."

Cuban authorities say that Matanzas was chosen as the province to begin what they call "the general process of institutionalization" of the revolution because it is the smallest of Cuba's six provinces, with a population of about half a million persons, and because it is considered to represent a fair cross-section of the Cuban economy and society. Some 30 percent of its working population is engaged in agriculture, 20 percent in industry, 15 percent in construction and transport, and 35 percent in service industries.

A *Prensa Latina* dispatch, published in the June 27 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*, hailed the OPPs as "the embryo of a real people's revolutionary democracy," affirming that they "will contribute in no small way to ensuring that the people truly feel an increasing identity with the state power."

However, official accounts are rather unclear as to the exact scope and content of the authority of the "Organs of People's Power." An article in the June 9 issue of the English-language weekly selection of *Granma*, the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Cuba, described them as "the top organs of state power at the level at which they are set up: municipality, region, province and nation." It said that "People's Power will exist at the municipal, regional and provincial levels during the experiment taking place in Matanzas. Then, when the system exists all over the country, there will be a National People's Power."

Granma outlined the relation between the elected bodies and the state apparatus as follows:

"The Organs of People's Power, together with the central agencies of state administration, direct the units of production or services of local importance (municipal,

regional or provincial). These units are administratively subordinate to the Organs of People's Power, and, from the point of view of norms and methodology as well as in certain aspects of the planning process and the handling of technical and specialized personnel, subordinate to the central agencies of the state administration. The Organs of People's Power also take an interest in the functioning of those units of production or services whose characteristics or importance make it necessary for them to be directly subordinated to the administration of the state's central agencies, even though they do not direct them."

The Organs of People's Power, *Granma* said, will not be "just another administrative agency."

". . . as opposed to the present apparatus for local administration—where there is no agency with overall authority over the different administrative branches existing at each level—[they] will direct all locally important economic and social activities that take place within their jurisdiction, and they have total or partial authority over the administrators that carry out those activities."

According to *Granma*, the elected delegates "will be accountable to their electors for the authority vested in them, and they must periodically render account of their work to the electors." They "are subject to recall at any time by their electors when they are not doing their job adequately." Moreover, "the delegates are not professionals as such; they work as delegates to People's Power after having finished their regular jobs."

Granma did not describe how the process of accountability and recall would work in practice.

Delegates to the Organs of People's Power are elected by universal and secret suffrage. The Council of Ministers amended the 1940 Constitution to extend the right to vote to all Cubans aged sixteen or over and to members of the armed forces. (Under the old constitution the armed forces and persons under twenty could not vote.)

Excluded from voting or otherwise participating in the election were those who participated in Batista's phony "election" of November 3, 1958, just two months before the triumph of the revolution. Also excluded, according to *Granma*, are those who "served actively and directly in the leadership or the apparatus of the corrupt trade unions in the prerevolutionary period," and "those who have been sanctioned for practicing or advocating, regardless of the excuse, nonfulfillment of duties relative to the defense of the homeland and respect for its emblems."

Delegates are selected on the basis of territorial representation. There is one delegate for each "circumscription" or constituency; urban circumscriptions have about 1,000 voters, while rural ones have somewhat fewer. Each

municipal or sectional Organ of People's Power has at least twenty delegates, representing as many circumscriptions.

Granma traced the origins of People's Power back to speeches by Premier Fidel Castro in 1970, in which he had "posed the need to strengthen all the organizations and institutions that make up the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country: the [Communist] Party, the mass organizations and the state apparatus."

In a speech marking the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Federation of Cuban Women, on August 23, 1970, Castro said: ". . . we have scores of problems at every level, in the neighborhoods, in the cities and in the countryside. We must create the institutions which give the masses decision-making power on many of these problems. We must find efficient and intelligent ways to lead them deliberately forward to this development so that it will not be simply a matter of the people having confidence in their political organizations and leaders and their willingness to carry out tasks, but that the revolutionary process be at the same time—as Lenin wished—a great school of government in which millions of people learn to solve problems and carry out the responsibilities of government."

The experimental elections in Matanzas were first announced in a speech by Lieutenant General Raúl Castro, second secretary of the Cuban Communist party, at a mass rally last January 2 on the fifteenth anniversary of the revolution. The Organs of People's Power, which, he said, would exist at all levels of leadership in the country, "must promote participation by the masses in state and administrative affairs, so the people will be part of the state in a direct and institutionalized manner and feel more identified with it, and so it will increasingly be a state of the workers, a real people's revolutionary democracy."

Raúl Castro linked the development of these organs with the struggle against bureaucracy. "We are convinced that to the extent the masses participate in state affairs, the struggle against all forms of bureaucratism will be more effective, the needs of the population and the community will be better met and the revolutionary state will be stronger, more democratic and solid."

Raúl Castro also mentioned that the first congress of the Cuban Communist party has been set for 1975, and that during 1974, "work will continue on the elaboration of a Draft Constitution or Fundamental Law, in keeping with the conditions of socialist construction."

The June 1 issue of *Direct From Cuba*, published by Prensa Latina, reported that "the people's power will be directed by the Cuban Communist Party, which in recent months has been speeding up the process of general institutionalization of the country." The magazine explained that a commission had been created by the Council of Ministers "to organize, regulate and lead . . . in the creation of municipal, regional and provincial assemblies and executive committees." It is headed by Blas Roca, a member of the Secretariat of the CP; its vice-president is Julián Rizo, first secretary of the Matanzas provincial committee of the Cuban Communist party.

Although the Communist party is in charge of the pro-

cess, single-candidate slates were barred in the election, according to *Granma*. More than 4,000 candidates contested the 1,024 circumscriptions throughout the province; there were at least two candidates for each post. The candidates were selected by secret ballot in a series of preliminary elections held in May.

How Candidates Are Nominated

A typical meeting to select candidates was described in the June 2 issue of the English-language weekly *Granma*. It was a meeting held by residents of the Ciro Redondo Agricultural Base to nominate candidates to represent their region in the Municipal Council of People's Power. A roll call ascertained that 92 percent of the eligible voters were present.

The chairman of the meeting, Antonio Rodríguez, described the required characteristics of potential candidates. "He or she must be revolutionary, a good worker and neighbor and a true representative of the virtues shown by our people throughout these years of work and effort in building a new society."

Three persons were nominated. All three accepted. *Granma* reported the next points on the agenda:

"Following the order of the nominations, those present at the meetings gave their arguments for and against each one of the nominees, mentioning their good and bad points.

"The voting then got under way. The chairman counted the votes for, against, and the abstentions.

"He then reported on the results of the voting: Arelio Ramos, 25 votes in favor; Antonio Rodríguez, 13; and Juan González, 1. Five persons abstained."

On June 30, like their fellow citizens throughout the province of Matanzas, the residents of the zone (which includes several communities like the Ciro Redondo Agricultural Base) voted to elect a delegate to represent them on the regional council. They chose from among the candidates of the various communities in the zone.

"A biographical data sheet is made for each of the candidates of the zone, with an attached photograph," *Granma* reported. "It will be circulated among all residents of the zone so all the voters will get to know the candidates and will be able to choose the one who will represent them at the Municipal Council of the People's Power."

Judging from this and other accounts published in the Cuban press, candidates were nowhere chosen on the basis of adherence to any particular program, list of proposals, or platform. No parties other than the Cuban Communist party are mentioned as participating.

This may have caused some difficulty for many voters in the Matanzas elections as they sought to choose between several candidates contesting a single post. Commenting on the June 30 election results, Fidel Castro said that a number of contests were so close that a second round of voting would be necessary to decide the victor.

The experimental election in Matanzas had nothing in common with the phony "elections" that characterized Cuban politics prior to the revolution. *Granma* indicated what those were like in its June 23 issue in interviews with residents of the Zapata Swamp, an area in Ma-

tanzas province bordering on the Bay of Pigs. One of the most backward and underdeveloped parts of Cuba before the revolution, it has benefited from a vast redevelopment plan, providing new housing, electrification, and useful employment to its population.

Under the old regime, the Zapata residents explained, voting was compulsory, with penalties for noncompliance. Some told of having to walk along jungle paths for two or three days simply to get to a train to take them to a place to register. Voting lists were usually faked.

Those elections had only one purpose: to give a phony cover of popular "legitimacy" to one of the most brutal and tyrannical regimes in the Western Hemisphere.

But today Cuba is a workers state, in which all the important means of production have been nationalized; foreign trade is handled exclusively through state institutions, and long-range, centralized economic planning has been instituted. Imperialist domination and the economic power of the Cuban bourgeoisie have been decisively smashed. Bourgeois parties have been banned. Thus the relevant question in evaluating the role and effectiveness of the experimental electoral process is not how the Matanzas elections of 1974 compare with the "democracy" of the old regime, but rather how these elections, and the "institutionalization" process as a whole, measure up to the norms of proletarian democracy in a workers state.

An appropriate model is the early Soviet republic. In Lenin's time the basic institutions of rule were the "soviets," or councils, in which the various working-class political tendencies and factions were represented in accordance with the support they gained among the workers.

Meaning of Proletarian Democracy

A valuable description of how this system functioned can be found in Victor Serge's *Year One of the Russian Revolution*. Serge reports, for example, that the All-Russian Executive elected at the Third Soviet Congress, held in January 1918, was "composed of 160 Communists, 125 S-Rs [Socialist Revolutionaries], 7 Right S-Rs, 7 Maximalist S-Rs, 3 anarchist-communists, 2 Mensheviks, and 2 Menshevik Internationalists." (*The New Internationalist*, January 1949, p. 23.)

Political parties in addition to the Bolsheviks (or Communists) were allowed to operate freely, so long as they did not engage in overt counterrevolutionary acts. Serge relates that the Anarchists, bitter opponents of the Bolsheviks, published a large daily paper in Moscow called *Anarchy*. The Anarchists had armed contingents, the Black Guards, who numbered in the thousands. Even after they were disarmed by the soviets (following a series of armed provocations for which they had claimed responsibility), there was no serious repression of any kind against the Anarchists. Their daily paper reappeared with a headline, "Down With Absolutism!" They kept their organizations and their clubs.

As for the Bolshevik party, it was characterized by the fullest internal democracy. Minority tendencies and factions received representation on the Central Committee. For example, Serge reports, at the Seventh Party Con-

gress, in March 1918, the party nearly split in a sharp debate over whether to sign a peace treaty under the onerous conditions imposed by the German imperialists. But at the conclusion of the congress, "the opposition received representation on the Central Committee, as well as on a committee to revise the program."

For a period in 1918, the "Left Communist" faction published a daily newspaper, edited by many prominent members of the party, including Bukharin, Radek, and Uritsky.

In the leadership of the party, Serge reports, "the most important questions were settled by vote and often by slight majorities (for example, 7 to 6), yet the minority submitted without giving up its ideas. While in the minority, Lenin patiently waited for events to bear him out and continued to agitate for his policy without once breaking discipline." (*New Internationalist*, October 1948, p. 255.)

The party's practice of internal democracy enormously increased its ability to combat the bourgeoisie and to lead in the socialist reconstruction of the country. By ensuring full discussion of differences, the Bolsheviks were able to minimize the possibility of serious error and cut down the overhead cost of errors when they did occur. There was a party of critically minded leaders of the working class, capable of taking initiatives in action.

The Cuban leaders are well aware that their electoral procedures must be measured against the norms of proletarian democracy. Thus they argue that the elections in Matanzas—unlike the elections in a bourgeois democracy, which offer the voters no real alternatives—are designed to increase the masses' control over the economy and state administration. And it is certainly true, as Fidel Castro and Raúl Castro have stated in their speeches, that—apart from ending the imperialist blockade—the key to solving many problems facing Cuba today lies in strengthening the forms of democratic control by the masses over individuals exercising governmental power.

Fidel Castro on Workers' Democracy


In a couple of major speeches four years ago, Fidel Castro referred to the need to create representative organs of decision-making. Addressing a mass rally on July 26, 1970, just after the failure to achieve the goal of a 10-million-ton sugar harvest, Fidel suggested two possible ways to meet the problem of administrative inefficiency: the establishment of workers' committees to regulate distribution of goods and services outside of the factories, and the institution of some form of workers' representation in the management of production itself. (See *Intercontinental Press*, September 7, 1970, p. 715.)

A month later, on August 23, in his speech to the Federation of Cuban Women, cited recently by *Granma* as the original inspiration for the Organs of People's Power, Castro suggested that such control over administration of the economy be exercised through mass organizations similar to the already existing mass workers' organizations, such as the women's federation, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the trade unions, and the farmers' organizations. (See *Interconti-*

In this speech, Fidel also suggested that within the framework of support for the revolution, the Cuban leadership was prepared to tolerate and even encourage the expression of minority views. Alluding to the popular discontent he had described in his July 26 speech, Castro said: "When we speak of discontent or inconformity [nonconformity], we speak of discontented persons within the Revolution, not against the Revolution; to improve the Revolution, not to destroy the Revolution; to make the Revolution stronger, not to liquidate the Revolution! That is the difference, the radical difference

after some twelve years of formal existence, has yet to hold its founding congress. Nor is there any provision for tendencies or internal programmatic debate in this party.

These conditions not only inhibit the efficient functioning of the economy, but feed the tendency toward bureaucratic deformations arising from the lopsided economy Cuba inherited from the semicolonial regime, the isolation of the Cuban revolution, the blockade applied by U.S. imperialism, and the pressure emanating from Moscow to switch the Cuban leaders onto the road of "peaceful coexistence."



that exists between the revolutionary processes and among the discontented within the revolutionary process and the discontented outside the revolutionary processes."

Recognition of legitimate dissent implies recognition of the right to form tendencies within the party and even to form other parties within the framework of support of the revolution. Without the right of tendencies, "consultation" and "discussion" have little meaning; the mass organizations, and even elections, become simply vehicles for mobilizing the masses in plebiscites.

The procedures adopted in the experimental elections in Matanzas would seem to indicate that the Cubans have chosen to pattern their formal decision-making machinery on the current practices in the Soviet Union and other bureaucratically deformed workers states, and not on the Leninist model of soviet democracy.

It is true that the formal provisions of the Matanzas experiment contain many democratic features—such as recall and accountability, extension of suffrage to youth and the armed forces, and insistence on a multiplicity of candidacies in each circumscription. Moreover, in explaining these features, the Cuban leaders invoke the profoundly communist concept—expressed by Lenin in *State and Revolution*—that the functions of administration should be "within the reach of every literate person."

But fifteen years after the overthrow of Batista, and thirteen years after becoming a workers state, Cuba still lacks democratically elected workers' councils. And its political life is restricted to a single party, which,

Elections based on geographical representation are cast in the bourgeois form of democracy and can actually cover up the destruction of proletarian democracy. That was the kind of thinking that lay behind the adoption of the Soviet Union's revised constitution in 1936, after Stalin had consolidated his counterrevolutionary hold on the leadership, liquidating all opposition. Leon Trotsky, in his classic study of the process of bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union, *The Revolution Betrayed*, described the distinctive feature of that constitution as "its return from the Soviet system of election according to class and industrial groups, to the system of bourgeois democracy based upon the so-called 'universal, equal and direct' vote of an atomized population."

As justification for his revision of the Soviet constitution, Stalin cooked up an elaborate, self-contradictory—and totally false—theory that classes had been abolished in the Soviet Union, that the workers had become dissolved in the national "people." One of Stalin's most flagrant frauds was his provision for a secret ballot. The secret ballot had represented an important conquest for the workers during the rise of capitalism, for it helped protect them from reprisals by the bosses if they voted against the bosses' wishes. But in a society where dissenting views can be openly expressed, free from fear of economic reprisal or political repression, there is no need for a secret ballot. The secret ballot in Stalin's constitution, Trotsky argued, was a backhanded ad-

mission that the workers felt the need for protection from the bureaucracy.

Controlled by Communist Party

The control exercised by the Cuban Communist party over the Matanzas election does not bode well for development of the experiment into an expansion of proletarian democracy. The June 23 issue of the *Granma* weekly selection defined the "system of the dictatorship of the proletariat" in Cuba as being "made up of the Communist Party, the leading and guiding force in the system; the Young Communist League; the mass organizations—Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions, National Association of Small Farmers, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, Federation of Cuban Women—and the other organizations and social institutions; the mass media; and the main instrument of the dictatorship: the revolutionary state, which, until now, had had a provisional nature as far as its structure and form went, having organs for administration, justice and defense."

Granma maintained that "there are no relations of subordination between the Organs of People's Power and the political and mass organizations." But it went on to state that the OPPs "guide themselves by and act in keeping with the general directives issued by the Party on fundamental matters of the country's economic, political, cultural and social development. These directives are issued by the top bodies of the Party: Congress, Central Committee and Political Bureau.

"The Party," *Granma* continued, "will also direct the Organs of People's Power by means of the support and aid which, through its apparatus, it provides for the state organs in the fulfillment of their activities and through the members of the Party who work in the state apparatus and who, regardless of where they may be and the positions they hold, are compelled to fulfill and put into practice the decisions of the Party and try to convince nonmembers that those decisions are just and should be fulfilled."

The task of the "mass organizations," *Granma* explained, is to be "an extraordinary source of support for the work of the Organs of People's Power."

Thus the hierarchy of authority appears as follows: the Communist party guides the political line of the delegates of the Organs of People's Power, which administer the various levels of the state apparatus, with the support of the "mass organizations."

The extent to which this system functions democratically, then, is to a large degree dependent on the scope of internal democracy within the party. And in this respect, the Cuban CP does not apply the norms of a Leninist-type party. Since the party lacks any provisions for organized tendencies or internal discussion policy, membership has no means of initiating policies or of exercising control over them. That is done, as *Granma* indicates, through "directives" from the highest echelons of the party leadership. Such procedures can only increase the party's vulnerability to bureaucratic influences in the state administration, subjecting it to the danger of control by counterrevolutionary careerists and

opportunists.

The Cuban revolutionary leaders should be the first to be aware of this danger. In 1962 Fidel Castro was forced to take the extraordinary step of publicly denouncing as "sectarian" many "old Marxist militants"—meaning former members of the PSP, Cuba's Stalinist party—because they had attempted to pack the party apparatus with Stalinist hacks. "We were organizing or creating or making a straitjacket, a yoke, *compañeros*," Castro said. "We were not furthering a free association of revolutionists; rather we were forming an army of tamed and submissive revolutionists." (Speech of March 26, 1962, published under the title *Fidel Castro Denounces Bureaucracy and Sectarianism*, Merit Publishers [now Pathfinder Press], New York.)

The main target of Castro's attack was Anibal Escalante, an old-time Stalinist who had become organization secretary of the new party. Following Fidel's speech, Escalante and his supporters were removed in a sweeping purge, and the party was reorganized through wide-scale recruitment of "exemplary workers" elected by their fellow-workers in the plants and offices.

Lack Analysis of Stalinism

At the time of the attack on Escalante, Castro and others in the Cuban leadership tended to ascribe the problem to distinctly secondary factors—individual personality traits, the PSP's "isolation" under the previous repressive regimes, etc.

Subsequently, the Cubans indicated that they were developing a more profound understanding of the problem of bureaucracy. Speeches by Fidel Castro and Raúl Castro, as well as editorials in *Granma*, for example, linked the phenomenon of bureaucratic mismanagement and arbitrariness with insufficient integration of workers into the decision-making process. But a program to combat bureaucracy must be built around a clear concept of structured socialist democracy that permits the most complete expression of differing views within the context of general support for the revolution. Without a conscious program to fight bureaucratic deformations—not simply as an administrative, but as a *social* and *political* problem—the party is much more likely to succumb to the powerful pressures from class-collaborationist elements. These pressures are enormous, owing to the country's economic dependence on the Soviet bureaucracy's willingness to extend it long-term credits and other aid.

Thus it is particularly ominous that Blas Roca, the main leader of the Cuban CP in Batista's time, is in charge of the election process in Matanzas. And it is hardly coincidental that the Cuban press has recently featured a number of attacks on "Trotskyism." These developments cannot be dissociated from a noticeable drift by the Castro leadership toward Moscow's "peaceful co-existence" line.

These developments confirm the dangers implicit in the Cuban leaders' failure to develop a rounded theoretical understanding of Stalinism and the reasons for the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union.

A most serious manifestation of this borrowing of

Stalinist concepts is the concept of the monolithic party, which was applied in the electoral procedures in Matanzas.

The Stalinists have long contended that the party's dictatorship in the Soviet Union is synonymous with the dictatorship of the working class. Raúl Castro's argument that the task of the Organs of People's Power is to make the "people," the working masses, "part of the state . . . identified with it," echoes this rationale.

But Soviet democracy is not intended to *integrate* the workers into the state, but to give them *control* over it. The state is a product of class antagonisms. A workers state is the instrument by which the proletariat, having conquered political power, proceeds to smash the economic power of the bourgeoisie through expropriating it and instituting a planned socialized economy.

Because a workers state reflects the degree of economic and cultural development of the given society, it is subject—particularly in a backward country—to bureaucratic deformations. The task of the workers' parties and other organizations like the trade unions in such a state is to combat those deformations by defending the class interests of the proletariat. This can only be done by striving constantly to develop the class consciousness of the workers—which, in turn, requires the fullest possible democracy in the internal regime of the party and mass organizations. This means the right to organize tendencies or factions on a principled basis within the party, or to organize a separate proletarian party. What is involved is the right of proletarian minorities to fight to win the majority to their views.

Similarly, it is false to argue that a single party can express the interests of an entire social class. As Trotsky pointed out, "The dynamic of political consciousness is excluded from the historical process in the interests of administrative order. In reality classes are heterogeneous; they are torn by inner antagonisms, and arrive at the solution of common problems not otherwise than through an inner struggle of tendencies, groups and parties. It

is possible, with certain qualifications, to concede that 'a party is part of a class.' But since a class has many 'parts'—some look forward and some back—one and the same class may create several parties. For the same reason one party may rest upon parts of different classes. An example of only one party corresponding to one class is not to be found in the whole course of political history—provided, of course, you do not take the police appearance for the reality." (*The Revolution Betrayed.*)

It is true, of course, that after the initial period, the only legal party in the Soviet republic was the Communist party. But, as Trotsky explained, "The prohibition of opposition parties* was a temporary measure dictated by conditions of civil war, blockade, intervention and famine." And he added, "The ruling party, representing in that period a genuine organization of the proletarian vanguard, was living a full-blooded inner life. A struggle of groups and factions to a certain degree replaced the struggle of parties."

It would be a serious error to conclude that what are only trends in Cuba have already become finished characteristics. The Cubans are feeling their way hesitantly as they chart the course of their revolution. The Cuban leadership is still the only CP leadership anywhere in the world to acknowledge openly the need for a greatly increased voice by the masses in the decision-making process. They have nowhere closed the door definitively to legitimizing expression and organization of dissenting views within the revolution.

Meanwhile, partisans of the Cuban revolution should not overlook certain disturbing trends in present developments and should offer their suggestions on how these problems can be overcome, in order to strengthen the Cuban revolution. □

*By a decree of June 14, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets excluded both the Right SRs and Mensheviks from its ranks on the grounds of their association with "notorious counter-revolutionaries" seeking to "organize armed attacks against the workers and peasants." It recommended that all the Soviets exclude these parties. In July 1918, following provocations by Left SRs, such as the murder of the German ambassador, Count Mirbach, and attempted insurrections in Moscow and various provincial centers, most of the Left SR delegates to the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets were arrested. The Congress passed a resolution: "In so far as certain sections of the Left SR party associate themselves with the attempt to involve Russia in war . . . these organizations can have no place in the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies."

However, the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, meeting on the eve of the first anniversary of the revolution, at once approved an "amnesty," ordering the release of all those "detained by the organs for combating counter-revolution," unless a definite charge of counterrevolutionary activities were preferred against them within two weeks of their arrest. In fact, the Mensheviks and Left SRs continued to meet during 1919 and 1920. They were readmitted to the Soviets. As late as August 1920, the Mensheviks held a party conference openly in Moscow, and it was reported in the Soviet press.

In 1921, these opposition parties, having definitively gone over to the side of the counterrevolution, were suppressed. (Source: E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, vol. I, pp. 170-184.)

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Peronism's Thirty-Year Career

[The following article appeared in the July 4 *Avanzada Socialista*, weekly newspaper of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). The Spanish text is reprinted elsewhere in this issue. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Peronism was born in the midst of the June 4, 1943, crisis of the military government. The 1943 coup, led by the Colonels' Military Lodge [the GOU—Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, a secret military organization], was the response of the old economic and social structure of the country, which was under English control, to the pressure exerted by North America.

Yankee imperialism was moving into Latin America, attempting to bring us under its domination. The various sectors of the Argentine ruling class were giving in more and more to that increasingly powerful pressure. For that reason the military government found itself forced to look to other social forces for the necessary support to resist the U.S. assault. The old British imperialism, weakened by the war and in debt to the Yankees as well, could do little but begin its retreat.

From the Labor and Social Security Bureau, Colonel Perón looked to the labor movement for support in resisting the Yankee colonialist pressure. The policy of the Communist and Socialist parties facilitated his task, their leaders preferring to betray the workers rather than break an agreement with the "democratic imperialists."

Perón won support with economic and social concessions that substantially changed the conditions suffered by the working class under the conservative governments. He institutionalized bonuses for the workers and the bill of rights for agricultural labor, initiated collective bargaining, plant committees, and shop stewards' committees. Parallel to these conces-

sions, he organized another instrument to guarantee that the working class would not go beyond the framework of gains and demands he had set for it. That instrument was the trade-union bureaucracy.

The clearest and most precise understanding of the objectives and methods of that strategy can be obtained from Perón's speech at the stock exchange on August 25, 1944. There he posed the question directly: On the one hand, the Argentine ruling class had to learn to compromise on some things in order not to lose everything; on the other hand, it had to realize that the greatest "danger" threatening it was not that the workers might be organized under government supervision, but that, unorganized, they might succumb to the attractions of anticapitalist ideas: "Defense of the interests of businessmen, industrialists, and tradesmen is the very defense of the state." Here is the essence of Peronist policy as applied in all its phases.


Not without difficulties and contradictions did Perón begin implementing this plan. The concessions to the workers were possible thanks to ideal economic conditions existing during the war. Parallel to those concessions, the government promoted the rise of a powerful bureaucracy that controlled the unions with an iron grip. On the one hand, then, the labor movement was built up; on the other, it was placed under rigid state control. And when that was not enough, labor was also repressed, as evidenced in the strikes in printing, the railroads, metals, textiles, the telephone company, banking, the sugar industry, and others.

With a base of labor support, at first Perón could confront Yankee pressure and neutralize the bourgeoisie. The favorable economic situation, which allowed him to make concessions to the working class, also opened the possibility for the capitalists to make magnificent business deals. This resistance to Yankee penetration was the progressive side of the first Peronist administration.

But the favorable economic condi-

tions changed, and from 1949 on, the first symptoms of crisis began to appear. By 1952, these symptoms became more evident. More and more sections of the national bourgeoisie began to need ties with imperialism to modernize their plants and to incorporate new techniques. Imperialist pressure redoubled. The attempt to reduce the workers' income in order to increase the earnings of the bourgeoisie met with firm resistance from labor, and the bureaucratic apparatus began to show cracks.

Yankee imperialism, never slow to



RICARDO BALBÍN

move into action, took advantage of the situation and exerted all possible pressure, developing a closer and closer alliance with the majority of the ruling class. Perón's response was to retreat, while continuing to try to make deals. And this led to his overthrow.

The attitude taken by Perón in 1955 and in the events preceding his overthrow shows the fundamental character of his political outlook. He left the fate of his policies in the hands of the historic enemies of the working class. In his abdication, he entrusted to the armed forces the "heritage" of his government. He refused to resort to the only force that could confront the putschists and liquidate them: the workers. In his own words, "To arm the people would mean to doubt the integrity of the army."

Naturally, this would have been very

dangerous for the ruling class. As a conscious representative of its interests, Perón was not willing to run those risks. He always reaffirmed the correctness of his position, never admitting to any "error" whatsoever. On the contrary, once in exile, he continued to defend his role in having averted civil war. Even twenty years later, once again in Argentina, he confirmed that judgment anew.

The effort of the Peronist left to make one believe the opposite is part of the plan to give left cover to the figure of the "lider" and make him more palatable to the radicalized petty bourgeoisie. This plan revealed all its inadequacies during the past year, bringing the spinners of ideological fables face-to-face with reality.

To put it in a nutshell, the blood that working-class and revolutionary fighters shed after 1955 was not what "saved" Perón. History has demonstrated that.

Peronism out of Office

When the Peronist government fell, there was a brief interlude with Lonardi [Perón's successor as president], in which he and the union bureaucracy tried to reach a mutual understanding. But very soon the gorillas in power launched a brutal offensive against the workers' movement, with the aim of destroying the unions. This was met by a huge response from the labor movement. Even sectors of the bureaucracy, with their backs to the wall, were forced to fight.

Resistance had begun: On one side, thousands of new, heroic activists were to emerge; on the other, especially under Frondizi, a new labor bureaucracy with aspirations of its own was to take shape—the Vandorist bureaucracy. The defeat of the workers' movement in the big strikes of 1958 and 1959 opened a period of downturn, which would be reversed only with the Cordobazo.

The policy of General Perón during this entire period, a policy that space limitations prevent us from describing in detail, can be summarized very simply: to try to hold the capitalist regimes in check with the threat of the labor movement so that the ruling class would again recognize Perón as the great statesman of the Argentine bourgeoisie—the only one

capable of preventing a revolution by the workers and masses, the only one capable of balancing the opposing forces and arbitrating their differences.

That is what the "threat" really meant. That is the policy the Peronist youth confused with a revolutionary questioning of the system, whereas Perón's only aim was to be accepted once again as one of the regime's politicians.

Perón's "balancing act" is thus revealed: urge on the left one day and the right the next; today, encourage strike activists; tomorrow, call for them to vote for Frondizi or to "dismount until the dust settles" under the Onganía regime.

The Return to Power

We need only recall the election campaign of March 1973, which is fresh in everyone's mind. The public rallies of the Frejuli [Frente Justicialista de Liberación Nacional—Liberation Front for Social Justice, the Peronist electoral front] were studded with Montonero [one of the main Peronist guerrilla groups] posters. The slogans that were chanted courted the guerrilla groups and attacked the union bureaucracy. Having won the elections, thanks in large part to those posters and slogans, the union bureaucrats were converted into pampered children, and the left wing of the movement was confronted with harsh reality.

But it was certainly not the "balancing" policy that hastened the triumphal hour of General Perón. That arrived when the Cordobazos and the Rosariazos [semi-insurrections in Córdoba and Rosario in 1969 and 1971] raised before the eyes of the bourgeoisie the fearful specter of workers' insurrection. No one but Perón could slow down that ground swell.

And so it was. The bourgeoisie, forgetting twenty years of differences and insults, opened the doors for his return to power. This page of our political history is highly instructive for all workers. The GAN [Gran Acuerdo Nacional—Great National Agreement, a class-collaborationist plan developed by the dictatorship to return Argentina to constitutional rule], La Hora del Pueblo [the People's Hour—the Peronist-led plan to form a broad class-collaborationist bloc against the

dictatorship], and the elections are the instruments of this "reconciliation."

One year of Peronist rule showed that the continuity was not only institutional but was fundamentally political. Peronism in power was the consolidation of that Gran Acuerdo Nacional, concocted in face of the danger of the labor upsurge. All the differences between Perón, Balbín [head of the Unión Cívica Radical—Radical Civic Union], and Lanusse [final president under the dictatorship that preceded the Peronist return to power] tended to evaporate when the survival of the capitalist system was at issue.

However, the plans of the GAN, for General Perón to act as a brake on the workers' struggles, proved more difficult to carry out than had been calculated. To be accurate, it was impossible to carry them out. The differences between sections of the bourgeoisie soon reappeared. The crisis reasserted itself, and the cracks between the different wings of the union bureaucracy opened up again.

Peronism in power was not enough. Not even the presence of Perón in the country was adequate to slow down the workers' and people's struggles. It was necessary for General Perón personally to assume the presidency. And he did. But with each step he took, each time he put his prestige on the line—to prop up [Finance Minister] Gelbard, the Social Pact, the union bureaucracy, Villar and Margaride [police commissioners who had earned a reputation for brutality under the Lanusse regime]—with each new embrace of the military, each unpunished fascist attack, the confidence of the working class in him deteriorated more. Slowly but relentlessly began the decay of his personal prestige and the fracturing of the movement that was united around him.

Thirty years ago, Colonel Perón, by means of economic and social concessions, controlled the thrust of the working class. Now, on returning to power, he had to control the working class in order to avoid having to make concessions to it—a task that could not have any consequence other than to exhaust his prestige as "lider" of that class. In any case, now as then, his objective was always the same—to achieve an impossible class conciliation between the exploited and the exploiters. □

Why Argentine Workers Need Their Own Party

[In its first issue after the death of Perón, *Avanzada Socialista* analyzed the political alternatives before the Argentine workers. To those workers who supported the so-called orthodox, or "anti-Marxist," wing of the Peronist movement, the weekly of the PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing group of the Fourth International) pointed out that there could be no more doubt now about what "orthodoxy" implied.

[A contradiction had persisted while the populist caudillo was still alive: Some trade-union militants had fought for the interests of the workers against the effects of Perón's class-collaborationist deals, while still pledging unconditional obedience to "our general."

"Now this contradiction is finished," *Avanzada Socialista* wrote. "If you had any hope about Perón making a turn, that is over." The "orthodox" Peronist workers had to realize that backing official Peronism meant supporting the wage freeze, rightist goons, and a trade-union bureaucracy that denied the workers even the right to elect their own leaders.

[As for the left Peronists, who had been under direct attack from the rightist gangs and under political attack from "el lider" himself for many months, they also offered no alternative. In the first place, the left Peronist politicians had proved their inability to stand up to the offensive from the right:

"You who want to defeat adversaries such as imperialism and the oligarchy," *Avanzada Socialista* asked, "can you rely on an Obregón Cano, who confronted the semifascist coup in Córdoba by resigning?"

[Along with politicians like Obregón Cano, the Peronist left includes the old nationalist guerrilla groups now united under the name of the Montoneros (the Irregulars). *Avanzada Socialista* recalled how ineffective their military actions had proved in countering the political plans of the bourgeoisie.

"When they kidnapped Aramburu, they said that they had scuttled the

Gran Acuerdo Nacional [Great National Agreement, the scheme for a class-collaborationist regime that was eventually implemented by Perón], but it continued to sail along."

[The Trotskyist weekly also noted how the needs of staying in the framework of Perón's movement had prevented the left Peronists from effectively supporting or leading workers' struggles.

[The guerrillas' objective of winning "hegemony" within a bourgeois movement and a bourgeois government was illusory, *Avanzada Socialista* stressed. Either they would end up administering the capitalists' government for them or be forced to break totally from the bourgeoisie and its political formations.

[The major part of the article, which follows, discussed the problem of class-collaborationist politics at some length and contrasted this with the alternative of the PST, building a mass revolutionary workers' party. The Spanish text appears elsewhere in this issue. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

There is a third alternative not very different from the one proposed by the Montoneros, although it has more of a left, or Marxist, veneer. This is the popular front advanced by the Communist party and other sections of the left that are seemingly opposed to the Communist party, such as the FAS [Frente Anti-imperialista y por el Socialismo—the Front Against Imperialism and for Socialism].

The Communist party has been proposing a national coalition that all the bourgeois, oligarchic, and petty-bourgeois parties would enter to govern the country jointly. That is, it proposes a Social Pact too, although one with different—leftist—trappings.

We believe that such a recourse would be disastrous. We don't have to go very far to find examples. What happened in Chile with the Unidad Popular? What happened in Uruguay with the Frente Amplio?

Some of our readers may work in factories owned by Argentine capital-

ists. Maybe your bosses have problems in competing with the Yankees. But what do you think? When the fat is in the fire, are your bosses going to join with the workers against the Yankee big boss? Or is the little boss going to join with the big boss against the workers?

When the time comes to decide who owns the factories and the banks or who manages production, or still more, who rules in the country, who owns the means of production, who has the right to hold arms or to make the economic plans, are the bosses going to let us workers give the orders? Haven't we had to fight tooth and nail against the bosses, including the Argentine ones, in order to get food to eat, clothes to wear, and a place to live?

When the Social Pact was signed, all the advantages went to the bosses. Despite the fact that it was designed to guarantee them maximum profits, they were not satisfied and resorted to hoarding and black-market operations to get still more. If, when everything was in their favor, they still tried to gouge the workers for more, does it seem likely that they're going to let us run the economy of the country? Do you think that if we go into a government with them, they're going to become our benefactors?

So, the Communist party is deliberately deceiving us, because experience has already shown what happens in a deal between the bosses and the workers; it has already shown that even when the scales are tilted in favor of the bosses, they won't carry out their end of the bargain.

What is the Communist party trying to get us to swallow? That when we are in a government together with the bosses we can do what we want and the bosses will accept what they have never accepted before?

As regards imperialism, experience has shown us what is going to happen. Every bosses' government has a fundamental understanding with imperialism, an agreement to maintain the system of exploitation. Along with this, friction develops from time to

time over problems of competition. In view of this understanding, a bosses' government is hardly likely to expropriate the imperialists altogether. Moreover, in the cases where some governments have made partial expropriations, as did Perón's first administration and the Allende regime in Chile, the bosses have shown that they were completely incapable of resisting the imperialists when the latter struck back.

This is what happened to the Chilean workers. Their government did not arm them or prepare them to resist the coup by Pinochet. It left intact all the economic levers that could be used to create scarcity and a black market. It did not touch the armed forces, but left the officers armed and ready to strike. In short, the Allende government carried out a capitalist and not a working-class policy.

So, the government of workers and bosses that the Communist party proposes to us is really a government of the bosses. It would use false representatives of the working class to inflict on us the same thing that the Social Pact does now.

What they are calling on us to do is join hands with the so-called good, progressive bosses, with the "patriotic" officers, to adjust the program and the organization of the workers to fit the needs of the bosses.

At this point you might think that we believed we could never come together with bourgeois currents on anything. This is not so. There are some minimum, limited questions on which we might agree at times with currents that represent the bosses. For example, our position coincides with that of Balbín in opposing the penal code reform [the reintroduction of harsh penalties for political offenses]; and we have also found ourselves in agreement about the right of *El Mundo's* publishers to put their paper out. We agree with Oscar Alende that our oil should be exploited by Argentines and not by imperialists.

On these questions, we don't object to a common struggle embracing workers and bosses. These are struggles based on specific agreements that in no way involve the workers' movement in the plans of the bosses' government. They may even be very beneficial. But these agreements do not mean that we should participate in

the bosses' governments or let ourselves be directed by them, or join their parties, or vote for them. These are agreements for concrete struggles and not agreements involving support for a government.

The line of the Communist party in Argentina is the same as that taken by the Communist party in Chile. If the workers' movement takes this course, it will be heading for a catastrophe like the one suffered by our Chilean brothers.

All these variants differ considerably among themselves. It is possible,



LOPEZ REGA

moreover, that they will not emerge in precisely the same way as we have described them. It is possible that in the immediate future we will have a certain stability. But sooner or later we are going to see a struggle between the proponents of these different lines, who will be spurred on by the crisis of the Social Pact, by the conflicts among different sectors of the capitalist class, and also by the pressure of our own struggle, the fight waged by the workers' movement. These battles may lead to shifts in the government. The confusion that reigns in all sectors, including the capitalist class, makes it impossible to make any definite predictions.

However, all these variants, those put forward by the ruling group as well as by the opposition, have one

thing in common. In all of them the workers' movement is seen as the tail of one or another section of the capitalist class. *What they have in common is their opposition to political independence for the workers' movement.*

What does political independence for the workers' movement mean? It means that the workers' movement should organize its own political party. If this were achieved, it would be a big step forward. We, for our part, would try to make this party revolutionary.

For some time—to be more precise, since the Cordobazo [the insurrectionary general strike of May 1969]—the Argentine workers' movement has been starting to move in the direction of class independence, although in a contradictory way. The workers did not carry out the Cordobazo by following the Peronist principle of obedience to superior officers. They did it in opposition to the orders of the recognized leaders of the movement.

Most of the struggles the workers' movement has waged since the Cordobazo have pointed in the direction of political independence. In every one of these strikes, the workers have gone against the orders and advice that came both from their "líder" and the trade-union bureaucrats. They did not follow the order to "dismount until the dust settles." Riding over all these obstacles, the workers' movement has adopted a program of action, although a limited one in many cases, to fight for higher wages and to get rid of bureaucrats.

When the workers' movement voted for General Perón, it did so with the hope that he would defend its interests. But, in contradiction to the logic of this vote, it did not abandon this road toward working-class independence. While it continued to struggle against Perón's own directives and at times against his direct representatives, it voted for him in the elections.

This is a historic confusion, because many workers sincerely believed that voting for Perón was voting for the working class. This confusion can no longer be maintained; even while Perón was alive, it was dissipating.

If you are an activist in the printing workers' union and you are fighting for higher wages, if you are a metalworker in Villa Constitución and you

are trying to get the representatives you elected recognized, and if you are not listening to those who are telling you that you've got to go along with the Social Pact and the bureaucracy, then you're taking steps along the road to independence for your class.

What has been happening is that this class independence has been expressed in trade-union or political struggles. But this has been in an isolated, atomized way, without the compañeros in different parts of the country being able to get to know one another, to raise their voices in a coordinated and united way, or develop clear objectives.

The workers have got to govern this country. That is the only way to solve its problems. But in order to do this, they need a party. Only a workers' party, led by workers and with a program expressing the immediate and future interests of the workers, can unite the class and lead it to setting up its own government.

Both because we fought against the 1955 coup and for Perón's right to

return and because we did not vote for him, we have a right now to say that this is the time to push to build a big, independent, working-class revolutionary party. The ranks of our party are open to those who want to build such an organization.

The fundamental purpose of the PST is precisely this—to lay the foundations of a mass revolutionary workers' party. We know that the working class as a whole does not recognize us as its leadership. We are convinced, moreover, that there are other working-class currents that are in favor of political independence and will contribute to building a mass party.

Compañeros, don't let the Cámporas, the Bidegains, or the López Regas, or the Oscar Alendes decide things for you. You have seen all the variants they represent in power and you know what they are. Think back and you will recognize them.

It is the workers now, through their party, who should decide things without the tutelage of any boss. □

chain.

On the other hand, there was nothing new about our position. For months our paper, *La Verdad*, had been warning that the coup would inevitably succeed if a workers' government were not established and if workers' militias were not armed. We voted in favor of the interview with Perón to make it possible for our position to get a massive hearing among the workers. That is why we had to take the precaution of having it published in advance, to avoid subsequent distortions.

I remember that until 2:00 a.m. of the day of the interview there was endless phoning between the Dickman residence and the presidential mansion. On both sides there was the greatest concern that the entire executive committee attend. But, at the last minute, the presidential staff rejected our condition, and neither Pereyra nor I attended. The remainder of the committee did, however.

I heard the tale of what happened from Dr. Esteban Rey, who up until two months ago was a high functionary in the Ministry of the Interior. Rey is famous throughout the old left for being an exceptional talker with a great knack for telling stories and jokes—a fabulous raconteur. However, Rey returned from the interview in a downcast mood.

It seems that at that time, Rey was a Trotskyist and in agreement with the positions we took within the PSRN, although he was not a member of our organization. He supported militias and a workers' government as the only way to stop the coup. But unlike us, he decided to attend the meeting in the hopes of being able to interest Perón in these positions.

Rey's sadness flowed from the political irresponsibility of the PSRN executive committee, which prevented him from being able even to present the position. Of the three party members who spoke to Perón, one used the occasion to proclaim that he was always in the front lines of the street rallies held in defense of the government; another, a leader of the rail strike who had been jailed, took the opportunity to ask Perón to intercede with the police to get back a very valuable pistol that they had confiscated from him; and the third, who had just returned from Bolivia bringing

How the General Maneuvered

Interviews With Perón

By Nahuel Moreno

[The following article, written by a longtime Trotskyist and a leader of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International), appeared in the July 4 issue of the party's weekly paper, *Avanzada Socialista*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

I never spoke personally with Perón, and I am proud of the fact that in 1955, when I could have done so, Daniel Pereyra and I refused to attend an interview with him. I am going to describe the incident in detail, because it will provide a feel of the times and the personalities involved. The three anecdotes that follow reveal Perón's characteristic way of operating during

this period.

At that time the Trotskyists had entered the Partido Socialista de la Revolución Nacional [PSRN—Socialist party of National Revolution]. Pereyra and I were on the executive committee of the party, which included other currents and was headed by the Dickman group.

As one can well imagine, in August 1955 the political situation of Perón's government was desperate. The PSRN executive committee decided to ask for an interview with Perón.

Pereyra and I were in agreement with participating in the interview, but on one condition: We insisted that our position be publicized in the national and international press, in advance of the meeting. Obviously, we had to take this precaution because, justifiably, we distrusted the press, which was tightly controlled by the Apold

Perón greetings from Siles Suazo [then president of Bolivia], used the occasion to ask a favor in the name of the Bolivian people: With the extreme shortage of foodstuffs in the Altiplano, the idea had occurred to him that it might be helpful to send the Bolivians some Australian rabbits. Because rabbits reproduce very rapidly and provide good meat, an abundant food supply could thus be created.

At that point Rey could not take any more: He welcomed the rabbit proposal because within two years it was going to solve the food shortage in Bolivia—either the Bolivians would eat the rabbits or the rabbits would eat the Bolivians. . . .

That is what the PSRN executive committee talked about in their meeting with Perón just a few days before the country exploded! As you can see, I have no reason to regret not having attended.

In any case, this anecdote reveals more about the PSRN than it does about Perón. Three other meetings that took place in the course of 1954 between Perón and Dickman provide a full political portrait of the dead president.

When news of the oil contract with California [Perón signed a contract with Standard Oil of California, as part of a policy of preferential treatment to international capital] became public, our Trotskyist current launched an all-out campaign against it. In retaliation, a daily paper of the Apold chain initiated a series of attacks against me, including threats that I would be jailed. Within the PSRN the same attack against us was echoed by the other, progovernment currents.

The Dickman group then got interested in the matter. They had reached the conclusion that the old Socialist party had split because there was no protection for the various tendencies within it. That conclusion, in my opinion, was false, because over and above the lack of internal democracy, the old SP had broken up for deep political reasons, the main one being their lack of understanding of the phenomenon of imperialism.

In any case, that conclusion of the Dickman group, and its respect for the rights of different tendencies in the party, led them to intercede with Perón on my behalf. (Perón always had his

doors open to the Dickman group.)

Dickman told me that upon learning of the problem, Perón immediately promised he would provide me with absolute guarantees that I would not be jailed. Nor would I be persecuted for our defense of Argentina's oil resources against imperialist domination, or for our attack on the government itself. He added that, in the final analysis, our denunciation was justified: The Yankees thought that he was going to fence in and auction off the country in lots, but that was not going to happen. For deep political reasons, he felt forced to carry out the negotiations, but, meanwhile, it was good that we were defending the country from our standpoint.

Perón carried out this promise, and to the surprise of the entire PSRN executive committee, I was not jailed.

However, shortly thereafter, the attacks began anew, this time coming from the Ministry of the Interior. Emilio Dickman went into action again and, breaking with his personal habits, attended a reception at the Chilean Embassy, at which Perón was to be present. There he told the president that he had chosen this informal way to let him know that the attacks against us were still going on. Right in front of Dickman, Perón ordered Borlenghi once and for all immediately to stop the campaign. And this

really happened.

If these two anecdotes provide a picture of a Perón who, as he was negotiating with imperialism, was also willing to blackmail it, even tolerating—within certain limits—the revolutionary left, there is a third anecdote that shows one of those limits.

It seems that we were waging a mortal battle in Avellaneda with Puricelli, the bureaucrat of the metalworkers' union, and we had won control of the main factories. The battle was particularly hard at Tamet, where we had also succeeded in gaining control of the shop stewards' committee and the plant committee.

On one occasion Puricelli learned from the bosses that we had begun a strike. He armed a group of goons who waited for the workers on the railway embankment. Just when the thugs had a clear target, a milk wagon crossed their line of vision. The horse was frightened by the shots and saved the lives of the compañeros.

When Dickman found out about this, he ran to see Perón again, thinking he would have the same success that he had had twice before. But he found a very different Perón—cordial, as always, but inflexible. This time Perón did not intervene; he never interfered with the trade-union bureaucracy because it was a pillar of his regime. □

Interview With Juan Carlos Coral

A Dialogue With Perón in Madrid

[The following interview with Juan Carlos Coral, a leader of the PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party, an Argentine sympathizing organization of the Fourth International), appeared in the July 4 issue of the PST's weekly paper, *Avanzada Socialista*, which conducted the interview. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Question. Among your interviews and discussions with Perón, which do you remember best?

Answer. I met with Perón three times. On the first occasion, in Madrid, we chatted—or I should say, Perón chatted—a long time. I remember things that have a political value from that meeting. I won't refer to the other meetings, which took place at Olivos [the presidential country estate in Argentina], because they have been amply reported.

Q. When did the Madrid meeting take place?

A. In August 1967. I was returning from Havana, from the OLAS [Organización Latinoamericana de Solidari-

dad—Organization of Latin American Solidarity] conference. The plane made a stop in Madrid. But even before that, in Cuba, Gustavo Rearte, who has since died, conveyed Perón's invitation to me. Perón said he would like to take advantage of my stop-over to talk to me at Puerta de Hierro.

Q. What did he want to talk about?

A. With his usual eloquence, he gave me a long explanation of his entire life. He told me that his social concern was first awakened when he joined the army and saw the poverty of the laborers' children, who walked around in rope sandals. He referred also to how—years later—he chose the Labor and Social Security Bureau, realizing, as he said, that the workers would be the best propagandists of his ideas. But then he went to the heart of the question that was bothering him.

Q. What was that?

A. One year had passed since Onganía [the strong man of the Argentine military dictatorship] had taken power. Assuredly for Perón, the period for "dismounting until the dust settles" had passed, because he was set on establishing a democratic front to fight against the military dictatorship. Only after defeating it, he indicated, would it be necessary for the forces involved to delineate their differences; meanwhile, unity of all was essential.

Q. Whom did Perón propose unity with?

A. At that time he had begun discussions with Aramburu [strong man of the 1955 coup] in Paris and with the Radicals. That is, what later became La Hora del Pueblo [the People's Hour, the class-collaborationist bloc to oppose the dictatorship] was already germinating.

Q. What was your response?

A. At the very outset, I indicated differences—the same ones we hold now. I remember pointing out the danger of forming alliances with those parties and groups—that it could lead to a repetition of the tragedy of the pact with Frondizi. [Peronist elec-

toral support to Frondizi derailed the 1958 labor upsurge and facilitated a massive penetration of U.S. capital into Argentina.]

Perón retorted that it would not happen again because the masses were going to be on guard. On the other hand, he said, if I did not enter the front he was proposing, I ran the risk of repeating what happened with the Unión Democrática [Democratic Union, a popular front that supported

the "democratic" imperialisms and opposed Perón's bourgeois nationalism], when the Socialists and the Communists not only missed the bus but took one that was headed in the opposite direction.

Q. And your reply?

A. That it struck me that the one who was constructing a new Unión Democrática was Perón himself. □

Interview with Hugo Blanco

On the Situation in Latin America

[The following interview was given by Hugo Blanco to a French reporter at the beginning of July. The Spanish text appeared in the July 15 issue of *Intercontinental Press*.

[Blanco, presently in exile in Europe, led the 1958–1963 La Convención peasant movement in Peru—one of the largest and most powerful peasant movements in Latin America in recent years.

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. How would you assess the situation in Peru?

Answer. Fundamentally, the Peruvian government represents both nationalist and imperialist *desarrollista* sectors [sectors favoring industrial development] of the bourgeoisie. We do not deceive ourselves with false hopes about the possibility of changing its class character. Nor do we think that it is capable of getting free of imperialism. What happens is that sometimes it bends more toward bourgeois nationalism and accentuates its frictions with imperialism. This is combined with a populist policy.

We have always supported—and will continue to do so critically—all of the regime's progressive measures. But we never have and never will support this or any other bourgeois government. We fight intransigently for a workers' government.

You can understand the Peruvian

case better by placing it in the Latin American context:

The bourgeois nationalist sectors, even those that imperialism has forced into the role of middlemen, are in constant battle with the imperialists over the division of surplus value, constantly attempting to decrease their dependence on the imperialists. The relative strength of these sectors determines the different regimes in Latin America.

A second element is the political method of exploiting the masses. Some sectors favor strong governments of the Brazilian type; others favor making concessions to the masses and maintaining a measure of bourgeois democracy, as in Peru. This also is affected by the margin of maneuver that mass struggles allow them.

There is a relationship between these two factors, but it is not a mechanical one. By that I mean that it is not always the imperialists who favor strong governments and the bourgeois nationalists who are populists.

I think that in Peru in general the *desarrollista* sectors favor populism.

In Argentina in 1955 all sectors of the bourgeoisie, including those that had supported Perón, united to support the repressive coup. A similar thing happened in Chile, where all sectors of the bourgeoisie—headed by North American imperialism—got together to carry out the coup.

With respect to the coup in Chile: This event shifted the relationship of forces in South America against the

masses. One of its consequences was the creation of the bloc of pro-imperialist strong governments—Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, and Uruguay. This bloc represents an attack not only on the people of those four countries but also poses a grave threat to the people of the other South American nations.

From a distance it is difficult to estimate how close Peru is to a reactionary coup. My comrades of the FIR [Frente de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Front of the Revolutionary Left] point out in the organization's paper, *Palabra Socialista*, that such a danger exists, although only in a latent form.

As revolutionists we should urge the formation of a united front in action of all who are opposed to a coup. (The Trotskyists did this in 1955 in Argentina and in 1973 in Chile.) We should call on the reformist mass leaders to fight against the coup.

We have no confidence that they will do it in an effective way. Their anticoup policy consists of capitulating and making concessions to the procoup sectors, braking the advance of the masses. With this method they achieve defeat both for the masses and themselves.

Our anticoup policy is to drive the mass movement forward. The independent advance of the workers on the economic and political level objectively weakens the procoup sector.

The best way to expose the leaderships that say they are against a coup is by calling on them to adopt a meaningful anticoup position. This they cannot do.

Q. What role does the Peruvian Communist party play?

A. The PCP supports the bourgeois government, braking and betraying the day-to-day struggles of the masses. To do this it utilizes the bureaucratic leadership of the Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú [Peruvian General Confederation of Workers], which is in its hands.

Q. What is your opinion on the struggle for democratic rights?

A. The campaign for democratic rights is an important aspect of the Peruvian people's struggle, especially

if there is danger of a coup. Those who gain most by repression of the mass movement—jailing of its participants, deportation of revolutionists, and so forth—are the rightist, procoup sectors. Taking this into account, I sent an open letter to the Peruvian government in which I asked it to permit the return of all leftists who have been deported.

The best way to fight for democratic rights is to urge the construction of broad mass movements around this common denominator. This method is counterposed to the reformist stance of trusting fundamentally in legal procedures. It is also counterposed to the ultraleft stance of demanding that all who fight for democratic rights also agree on other political positions.

The reformist method is incorrect because one cannot trust in the judicial or state apparatus, which is in the hands of the class enemy. The ultraleft method is incorrect because it cuts off the possibility of broad mobilizations that could have an important political impact.

In France there is a Committee of Solidarity with the Victims of Repression in Peru. I hope that everyone in France who supports democratic rights in Peru will collaborate to revitalize that committee.

Q. Tell us something about your experience in La Convención.

A. The mobilization and organization of the peasant masses began around immediate demands. That is why it succeeded in embracing huge masses. If we had begun with very advanced demands, we probably would have ended up alone, saying very revolutionary things.

At the beginning, the struggle with reformism was waged more around the methods of struggle than around the demands themselves.

The reformists of the PCP used the mass mobilization for their maneuvers. We used legally defensible demands to mobilize the masses.

Once they mobilized, the masses realized their power. To achieve their demands, they took advantage of what they were entitled to by bourgeois law. But, very quickly, this went beyond bourgeois legality to the formation of embryos of dual power, that is, the rise of a peasant power opposed to the bourgeois power.

(They seized the land—making their own agrarian reform—established people's courts, ran public works, etc.)

One important element was defense. When the peasants began to feel that they were organized, strong, and moving forward, they also understood that they had to arm themselves to defend their conquests.

This was not spontaneous. We proposed it. We explained it. We began the preparations for armed defense, and we led it. But it would have been stupid to begin the work in La Convención with the so-called politico-military method. We would have been repudiated by the masses from the beginning and unable to bring them to an understanding of the necessity of armed struggle.

The great deficiency in the La Convención and Cuzco movement was the lack of a party. All aspects of the struggle, including the armed struggle, would have been stronger and better organized if there had been a party formed in the heat of the entire process of mass mobilization.

Because of this grave deficiency and because it was a regional peasant movement, the armed resistance was defeated. However, fundamental gains have been preserved. And the most important thing is that the peasantry of the region maintains a tradition of struggle that will play its role in the Peruvian revolution.

I have written a book about this experience—*Land or Death* [New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972]. Unfortunately, it has not been published in French. I think that critical studies made by protagonists of struggles are an important element in the education of the left.

Q. What do you think of the guerrillas?

A. I am against the guerrilla "strategy" as I would be against the "strategy" of the general strike, the "strategy" of strikes with factory occupations, the barricades "strategy." These are all very useful tactics, which can be used in certain countries under certain circumstances, applying them to the concrete reality of each country at the given moment.

Q. What can you tell us about Chile?

A. The Allende government was a

popular front because, although the two big workers' parties were the main component of it, it also included part of the Radical party, which is a bourgeois party. The fact that this sector was minuscule or only the shadow of the bourgeoisie does not change the popular-frontist character of the Unidad Popular.

In cases like that, this "shadow" is included to show the bourgeoisie that it is possible to work together, that the workers' parties have good intentions and that they are willing to carry out a bourgeois policy.

That was done in Chile. The Unidad Popular had a class-collaborationist policy in the service of the bourgeoisie. The reformist leaderships of the Com-

munist and Socialist parties acted as a brake on the mass movement, which was in a great upsurge. The "peaceful road" showed itself once again to be the bloodiest and surest road to a reactionary coup.

Reformism continually tied the hands of the masses.

Unfortunately, there was no revolutionary party that could present a clear alternative. The MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left] played a centrist role by not stating clearly that the Unidad Popular was reformist, by denouncing only the "reformist sectors inside it," thus feeding the masses' hopes of changing the Unidad Popular. □

Reactionary or Progressive?

Anatomy of Loyalist Strike in Ireland

[In the last two weeks of May, the right-wing, pro-imperialist loyalist organizations in Northern Ireland promoted a strike of Protestant workers against the Sunningdale plan worked out at the end of 1973 between the London, Dublin, and Belfast governments. The agreement included some token concessions to the bourgeois Catholic nationalists. It provided for "power sharing" between the old bourgeois nationalist Catholic party and the pro-imperialist Unionist Protestant party. Certain ministries were given to Catholic politicians. At the same time, the deal included token recognition of the unity of Ireland by calling for a Council of Ireland that would include representatives of the formally independent government in the South.

[These concessions represented an important gain in status for the second-class Catholic bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie in the Northern ghettos. They also gave a certain cover to the bourgeois Catholic rulers in the South, who could claim that a compromise solution had been achieved that offered a road to progress for the Northern Catholics as well as for the Irish people as a whole.

[Any formal concessions to the Catholic, or older Irish, population have traditionally been deeply resented by the Protestant, or settler community. It has always seen its interests bound up with the disenfranchisement and outlawing of the older population. Its determination to resist any concessions to the oppressed Irish nationality is summed up in its slogan "Not an inch!"

[Because of mass emigration of the Catholic population, a consequence of the way Ireland was integrated into the imperialist economy, the old Protestant colony bulks large. Of the 4.5 million inhabitants of the island, the main surviving pro-imperialist community includes about 900,000 persons. As a result of this, as well as of some historical complications, the question of the Protestant community has always been a central one for Irish revolutionists. The fact that this community appears to have taken the initiative in the latest phase of the Irish crisis has posed this question still more acutely.

[The following article from the July issue of *The Plough*, the newspaper of the Revolutionary Marxist Group (RMG—the Irish section of the Fourth International), analyzes the loyalist strike and projects an answer to the pro-imperialist offensive.]

* * *

The recent loyalist strike in the North has been loosely categorized with terms as diverse as "fascist" or "anarchist" by members of the British Government and the establishment. But the variety of labels and interpretations given to it by the republican and socialist movement indicates that it is even more confused than the ruling class on the lessons to be learned.

Official Republican spokesmen, such as Jim Sullivan in Belfast, saw the strike as one where loyalist workers were duped and used by "fascist" politicians; the Peo-

ple's Democracy stamped the strike fascist without explanation. The Communist Party of Ireland glorified the abortive actions of the trade union movement as forcing mythical breaks in sectarianism, and the Provisional Sinn Fein delighted in the downfall of the Executive, stating that a step had been taken towards loyalists and republicans together deciding the destiny of Ireland. Some stated that the strike resulted purely from intimidation and that it had no mass support.

Each of these positions shows basic misconceptions on the nature of the strike, and such imprecision can only contribute



BRIAN FAULKNER

to a failure to grasp the realities of the current period.

In fact, the strike clarified a number of issues. Firstly, the determination of the Protestant working class to retain its privileged position in the northern statelet.

The strike was the product of frustration among broad layers of the Protestant working class. The euphoria following the election of the eleven UUUC [United Ulster Unionist Council—right-wing Unionists] members to Westminster had worn off quickly with their inability to alter British policy. Loyalists saw a slip towards reform in the North and the dismantling of the Protestant ascendancy inexorably continuing.

The Ulster Workers' Council [UWC] was formed by workers in key industries, where the workforce remains almost ex-

clusively composed of Protestant workers, such as shipbuilding, oil, engineering and power. For some time the UWC threatened and prepared for a general strike, but it postponed action at the request of Craig, Paisley, and West, who backed action in Parliament. With this policy discredited, preparations for the strike were made in clandestinity, and May 14—when the Assembly vote would almost certainly back Sunningdale [the "power-sharing" agreement]—was selected as an opportune date for action. When the vote did support the British strategy, the strike call was made that evening.

Unlike its predecessor LAW [Loyalist Association of Workers] as a loyalist group in industry, the UWC was not a mass organization, although by the end of the strike it was claiming 80,000 members. Thus the UWC could not initially directly pull workers out of the factories en masse.

On the morning after the strike call, the majority of workers reported at work. In such loyalist strongholds as the Sirocco Works, Mackie's, and Harland and Wolff, figures of around 90 per cent attendance—a good average—were recorded. During the day, mass meetings were held in many of the key plants in the Belfast area, and many workers returned home during the afternoon. Workers left ICI and Carrickfergus, Gallahers in Belfast, while Carreras were left with a skeleton staff, and only a tiny portion of workers continued to report to the shipyards. Workers at Courtaulds voted at a mass meeting to run the works down gradually despite warnings of jeopardized jobs by the management. It was the first time the continuous production process had been shut down during any industrial dispute.

Outside these bases of loyalist workers, intimidation, often a warning telephone call from one of the loyalist military organizations, the UDA or UVF, and power cuts closed down many other works. By the next morning, according to figures of the Engineering Employers' Association, 36,000 (90 per cent) of engineering workers did not turn out for work.

Larne was barricaded off and services taken over by the UDA and UVF, hijacking brought the Belfast public transport system to a halt, and roadblocks prevented many from getting to work. A list of essential services to be maintained was published by the UWC.

But while intimidation and hijackings were early weapons of the strikers to hit areas of industry and commerce where UWC members were not strongly implanted, this was not to say that the workers were forced en masse from work against their will by intimidation or power cuts.

The demands of the strikers against Sunningdale found a ready response from

the Protestant working class, and once it had shown itself to be successful, the strike found mass support also.

Intimidation or power cuts did not halt work at Protestant areas such as Newtownards or Ballymena at the outset of the strike, and despite claims that lack of power was responsible for the complete halting of most industry, the Good-year plant at Craigavon, whose 2,000 workforce is largely Catholic, continued to work on reduced power, and at Armagh and the Maydown industrial estate at Derry, work went on.

The continuing production at Maydown became such a psychological thorn in the side of the UWC that on Sunday they threatened to entirely close down the Collekerragh power station if work did not cease. The authorities complied with their demand.

From early intimidation, the strike gained momentum as it gained the mass support of the Protestant working class. The elements involved found industrial power on a level previously outside its experience. A solidarity was formed which put irresistible pressure on the Assembly Unionist Party and which forced the British Government to come to terms with them.

On the fifth day of the strike a State of Emergency was declared by Merlyn Rees. The strains of growing loyalist extra-parliamentary strength began to tell on the Unionist parliamentarians. Then pro-Assembly Unionist Roy Bradford announced on May 20, "The Sunningdale Agreement was never at any time unconditional. . . there is wide sympathy for these (anti-Sunningdale) views among pro-Assembly Unionists." He broke the official line of the Faulknerite Unionists by calling for talks by the British Government with the strikers.

The previous day, the UUUC had thrown its support to the strike. The loyalist parliamentarians had initially been outflanked by the UWC and subsequently overtaken by Protestant working class action. Unsure of the support the strike might acquire, they were initially unfavourable. William Craig said on the first day of the strike that he was not in favour of such action at that time. Official Unionist William Thompson, MP for Mid-Ulster, said it was incorrect. A meeting held by Craig, West, Paisley's second in command William Beattie, and Glen Barr with Merlyn Rees brought no agreement, so on Sunday the UUUC pledged "full support" for the strike "in an all-out effort by bringing a change in British policy." Far from having led the strike, the loyalist parliamentarians found themselves forced to join in support of it.

Pressures were also on the pro-Assembly Unionists. On May 20 a statement announced: "There cannot be any

Council of Ireland as envisaged at Sunningdale." There must be no dilution, the SDLP replied. Rumours of a revolt within the pro-Assembly Unionist Party against Faulkner were refuted, as backbenchers issued a statement backtracking on previous support for Sunningdale. "By voting for the amendment we in the Assembly Party did not vote in favour of signing an agreement based on the Sunningdale proposals for a Council of Ireland without qualifications. . . these qualifications have not been fulfilled. . . we cannot agree to the Council of Ireland as suggested at Sunningdale. Aware of this, our party has been negotiating for several weeks along these lines, but our efforts have been unnoticed because of false propaganda."

This was despite denials of a report in the *Financial Times* some weeks earlier that such negotiations were taking place, denials made by Faulkner. The strength of the strike was altering the scales of the Faulknerites' balancing between the strategy of British Imperialism and the demands of the Protestant working class. The tensions within the Assembly Unionist Party grew in parallel with growing petty-bourgeois support for the strike.

Two days later, after the failure of the trade union "back to work" marches, the Sunningdale Agreement was, in effect, shelved. By 11-8 votes the Executive agreed that the Council of Ireland should be postponed for at least four years. A council of ministers was to be formed without executive powers or secretariat. All that remained of the agreement was a forum for the discussion of tourism, sport, geological surveys, and electricity.

The loyalists had won their first major concessions, and added impetus was given to their already considerable confidence. The UWC said the strike would go on until their demands, escalating with the success of the strike, were met. They called for elections for a new assembly.

Three days later Harold Wilson with his ham-fisted broadcast condemning the loyalists as "spongers" on Britain, yet again increased the loyalists' solidarity. The sponge became a symbol of the strike, and pieces were attached to supporters' lapels.

On May 28 Faulkner, faced with the most convincing mass protest, resigned. He said the degree of consent required to sustain the Executive did not exist.

By the general will of the loyalist population, the strike then ended. It was felt that a victory had been won, the threat to the ascendancy blocked. The UWC recognized the reality of the mass decision to return to work and called for a phased restarting of industry and services.

Massive demonstrations, some 10,000 strong, were held during the strike and at its end to celebrate the victory, taking place in Omagh, Portadown, Lurgan,

Armagh, Lisburn, and Belfast.

The strike was started by a movement of the Protestant working class to defend its privileges as a labour aristocracy. As its momentum gained the support of the petty bourgeoisie, the farmers were won and the loyalist politicians were forced to get into line. Politicians such as Craig and Paisley found their receptions in East Belfast and the Shankill Road at mass meetings not always the friendliest.

The UVF described the role of UUUC politicians as "disgusting" during the course of the loyalist strike, and stated that they had "opposed the strike and then, after it had gained popular support, used it for party propaganda." A clear rift was evident between the working class loyalists and the parliamentarians out of touch with the popular mood.

The strike must be characterized as reactionary, but not as "fascist," as groups from PD to some Official Republicans, Billy Blease of the ICTU [Irish Congress of Trade Unions], and British Labour politicians suggested.

The strike was not led by the petty bourgeoisie, the primary social layer motor force of fascist movements, nor was it aimed at the smashing and atomization of the working class, the destruction of all working class organizations, or the ending of all political liberties as the last resort of capitalism, as is fascism.

It was a reactionary strike, and tendencies within it could be utilized by a fascist movement. The attacks of the ICTU as "communist and republican" and the threat to withdraw Protestant workers from it could, if carried out, be a potentially dangerous annexation of the organized trade union movement by loyalism.

An East Antrim Workers' Council has been formed of 100 workers from about 20 factories, including ICI, British Enkalon, and Courtaulds, along with farmers, small traders, and representatives of the UDA and UVF. It has called for the formation of a "trade union movement which truly represents the feelings and views of the loyalist working class." The threat has not yet been carried out, and the loyalists' attitude to British-based unions has not been specified. The fascist movement to take advantage of such a situation is not in existence, although the influence of Britain's largest fascist group, the National Front, has been increasing.

The struggle against such developments will not, however, be aided by cries of "fascism" at every appearance of repression. Just as the cry of "wolf," as false alarms, led to the success of the animal when it finally did appear, so those who shout "fascism" with such frequency today confuse and obscure the true nature of fascism. This ultimately aids fascism to spread its own mystifications, to grow, and it will have disarmed the working

class by the time the real phenomenon appears.

But to glorify the Protestant working class and entirely ignore developments on the right is even more dangerous. Thus the Official Republican paper, *The Irish People*, has been quoted with satisfaction by the UVF in their paper *Combat* when columnist Ann Devlin suggested the strike was against businessmen like Hume and nincompoops like Cooper. Thus the strike is not even reactionary. Ann Devlin went on: "When the southern capitalist press screams for the forcible suppression of

working class Protestant people by the British Army, this is fascism." Such ignorance of both the nature of the Protestant working class and of fascism can only bring delight to those fascists within the loyalist camp.

The only effective way to combat the growth of fascism in the North is by a strong mass movement against repression which can split and demoralize the loyalist solidarity. □

[Next week: "In Wake of Loyalist Strike, What Perspective?"]

Interviewed by 'Le Monde'

MIR Leader Describes Situation in Chile

"The repression is ruthless. Ten months after the coup, it has become selective, but the same brutal, cruel methods are being employed," Edgardo Enriquez, a leader of the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) told *Le Monde*. The interview, held in Paris, was reported in the July 7 issue of the French daily.

"We still have no news of our comrade [Bautista] Van Schouwen. The junta might at least have the courage to show us his body if he is dead! We have no information about two members of the MIR's political committee, Arturo Villabella and Roberto Moreno, and no news of four members of the party's central committee: Luis Retamal, Alejandro Romero, Ricardo Ruz, and Ricardo Catalan. They were all taken prisoner; they all face the death sentence. We know that Van Schouwen has been horribly tortured.

"Today the junta is trying to present a more pleasing face to the outside world. It is trying to put its best foot forward. This is not easy. But it is sensitive to international pressures. That is why it finally had to let the political refugees leave the embassies. Of course, it hopes to gain some economic benefits from this gesture."

The MIR leader expressed optimism about opposition to the regime inside Chile. "The resistance to the junta is organizing. It is gaining strength and making headway every day."

As proof, he noted that many Chileans listen at night to foreign radio broadcasts aimed against the junta. "That already indicates an oppositionist attitude, a refusal, a choice. It is hard for the Chilean working

class to learn such things, for it is not used to these clandestine forms of action. But this is happening. And if we did not have such broad support among the population, we would not be able to maintain ourselves and carry on as we have since last September."

It is true that this evidence of resistance appears rather modest, Enriquez acknowledged. "But there will soon be spectacular and effective actions. Because the people, the worker and peasant masses, are no longer alone. Broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the upper middle class, victims of the junta's repressive policies, have switched to active opposition."

Edgardo Enriquez, the brother of MIR general secretary Miguel Enriquez, was in Paris to participate in the Pan-European Conference of Solidarity with Chile, which opened July 6. The parties of the former Popular Unity coalition government in Chile participated in the conference, which was sponsored by Stalinist and Social Democratic organizations in Europe. The conference was opened by Etienne Fajon, a leader of the French CP, and closed by François Mitterrand of the French Socialist party.

Enriquez emphasized that the MIR is interested in achieving "the broadest

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possible unity of all elements hostile to the present military regime," *Le Monde* reported. "Some four months ago," he said, "we proposed a political platform, and it was on the basis of this platform that a principled agreement was made with most of the formations of the former Popular Unity. It doesn't matter what name we give

this regroupment, which can include members and sympathizers of the Christian Democratic party. Resistance Front? Antifascist Front? The main thing is quickly to reach the stage of armed propaganda and then the armed struggle in the cities and the countryside."

After his visit to France and a few

other stops, Enriquez plans to return to Chile to "continue the struggle," he told *Le Monde*. "Our movement does not allow its leaders or members to leave the country to find refuge outside. The resistance to the regime must be organized and developed on the spot. We tolerate no exception to this rule." □

Quiénes Ayudaron a Washington

Papel de Moscú, Pekín en los Acuerdos de Vietnam

Por Dick Roberts

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Role of Moscow and Peking in Vietnam Accords", que apareció en *The Militant* el 28 de junio, y que se reimprimió en *Intercontinental Press* el 1 de julio].

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Un nuevo análisis de los acontecimientos que llevaron a los acuerdos de enero de 1973 sobre Vietnam apareció en un artículo de Tad Szulc, ex-corresponsal del *New York Times*, en el número de verano de la revista *Foreign Policy*. El artículo, que se refiere a la política tras bambalinas de Kissinger, confirma el papel que jugaron Moscú y Pekín presionando a los vietnamitas para que aceptaran los términos de Nixon.

El artículo de Szulc apareció en los puestos de periódicos la misma semana que Kissinger trató de acaparar la atención de los periódicos con su melodramática conferencia de prensa de Salzburgo, Austria. El Secretario de Estado argüía que era un hombre "de honor" y que era incapaz de mentir sobre el papel que había desempeñado cuando ordenó que se intervinieran algunos teléfonos.

Es asombroso el contraste que hay entre el lloroso Kissinger de Salzburgo y el Kissinger que Szulc pinta en su artículo.

Szulc revela que Kissinger llevó a cabo negociaciones secretas sobre el curso de la guerra en el sudeste de Asia ya desde 1969. Esas conferencias se mantuvieron en secreto hasta enero de 1972. Eran tan secretas, que sólo los más altos funcionarios

de los EUA, Moscú y Hanoi sabían de ellas. Según Szulc, el Primer Ministro sudvietnamita Nguyen Van Thieu no sabía nada. De hecho, dice Szulc, Kissinger mintió más de una vez a Thieu sobre cuál era la política de Washington.

Kissinger mintió también a los funcionarios del gabinete, a los embajadores de los Estados Unidos, a la Unión Soviética y Francia, a todo el Congreso de los Estados Unidos y, no se necesita decirlo, a toda la opinión pública norteamericana y mundial. ¡Y ahora nos pide que creamos que no mentiría sobre las órdenes que dió para que se intervinieran los teléfonos de personas que supuestamente se oponían a la guerra!

El artículo de Szulc se encuadra dentro del creciente culto liberal a Kissinger, como si finalmente hubieran descubierto al hombre que asegurará el dominio del imperialismo norteamericano sobre el mundo. La "historia de la negociación", dice Szulc, "nos ofrece una apreciación interna excepcional de la brillantez, el vigor y las tácticas de Henry Kissinger . . . es educativo seguir sus pasos—incluso sus errores y decepciones—a través de los campos minados de París y Hanoi, Saigón y Washington".

Kissinger, desde luego, nunca ha estado en un campo de batalla. Los "campos minados" de que se trata en este caso eran principalmente la opinión pública.

TRES LECCIONES

Dejando de lado esto, el artículo de Szulc es importante porque confirma,

desde un nuevo ángulo, las tres lecciones principales del ataque norteamericano contra el sudeste de Asia y de los acuerdos de París:

1) Llegó un momento en que los Estados Unidos no podían aplastar a los vietnamitas en el campo de batalla.

2) Esto se debió no sólo a que las fuerzas de liberación desbordaron a la máquina militar de los Estados Unidos—la más poderosa que se haya utilizado en la historia contra una revolución colonial. Se debió también a que el movimiento contra la guerra de Vietnam en los Estados Unidos restringió las opciones de Washington. Había que "poner un fin lento a la guerra" para aplacar la opinión pública norteamericana.

3) Para lograr esto, Washington tenía que conseguir la ayuda de Moscú y de Pekín. Para llegar a un acuerdo diplomático que dejara intacto el bastión militar norteamericano en Saigón, se necesitaba que Hanoi fuera presionado desde su misma fuente de ayuda militar y económica, especialmente desde Moscú. "El *impasse* se rompió diplomáticamente con las dos visitas de Kissinger a Moscú en 1972", resume Szulc, "enfaticando, entre otras cosas, que los soviéticos y los chinos podían desempeñar un papel más importante para lograr la paz de lo que Washington había creído anteriormente".

'IMPASSE'

Según Szulc, Washington y Hanoi tenían dos desacuerdos centrales durante las pláticas secretas de París.

El primero era que Washington insistía inicialmente en que se retiraran de Vietnam del Sur las tropas norvietnamitas, a cambio del retiro de las tropas norteamericanas. La segunda era la insistencia de Hanoi de que había que deshacerse del régimen de Thieu.

El giro sobre el primer problema se produjo en mayo de 1971, dice Szulc, "contra el fondo de una opinión pública cada vez más hostil en casa—el movimiento contra la guerra estaba en auge en 1971—y en el contexto de la convicción de Kissinger de que la clave para lograr un arreglo sobre Vietnam era llegar a un acuerdo general tanto con la Unión Soviética como con China".

Kissinger insinuó secretamente que Washington no insistiría en que se retiraran de Vietnam del Sur las tropas norvietnamitas, si Hanoi no insistía en que se quitara el régimen de Thieu.

Hanoi no aceptó y la guerra continuó. Washington retiraba sus tropas al mismo tiempo que escalaba los bombardeos. La presión contra la guerra en Estados Unidos aumentaba la ansiedad de la Casa Blanca por lograr un acuerdo. Habían comenzado ya las negociaciones secretas de Kissinger con Moscú y Pekín.

"Alrededor del 20 de julio de 1972 . . .", dice Szulc, "la Casa Blanca estaba tan alarmada, tanto por el creciente armamento de Vietnam del Norte como por el silencio que había mantenido Hanoi sobre el reanudamiento de las sesiones secretas, que decidió "hacer públicas" las [anteriormente secretas] proposiciones de paz de octubre y revelar que Kissinger había estado teniendo intermitentemente sesiones privadas con los comunistas desde agosto de 1969. La idea de "hacer públicas" las conversaciones había sido considerada desde hacía varios meses . . . debido a la creciente frustración con Hanoi y, con igual importancia, debido a la opinión pública doméstica. En el lenguaje de la Casa Blanca, la revelación se hizo para el 'teatro'—para confundir a quienes criticaban al gobierno por no estar actuando activamente para lograr la paz en Vietnam".

El 30 de marzo, los norvietnamitas comenzaron la dramática ofensiva que, de no haber sido por el bombardeo masivo que llevó a cabo Washington, hubiera derribado al régimen de Thieu.

Szulc escribe: "Cuando se comprendió finalmente la amplitud de la ofensiva comunista, surgió un poco de pánico en la Casa Blanca. La caída de Quangtri en abril profundizó la preocupación, así como la creciente creencia de que los Estados Unidos debían intervenir masivamente para evitar que Saigón se desplomara. Los que están cerca de Kissinger dicen que éste temía que el Ejército de la República de Vietnam no se pudiera sostener".

Fue en este contexto, dice Szulc, que "Nixon mandó a Kissinger a la capital soviética para que explorara la situación con Brezhnev, y para que ganara su apoyo para convencer a Hanoi de que parara la ofensiva.

"La misión de Kissinger en Moscú el 20 de abril estuvo rodeada de un secreto total", y fue un éxito. Brezhnev aceptó transmitir a Hanoi las proposiciones secretas de Kissinger e instar a los vietnamitas a que reanudaran las negociaciones.

"Pero, mientras tanto", escribe Szulc, "la situación militar en Vietnam del Sur se había deteriorado a tal punto, que Nixon y Kissinger comenzaron a planear una acción punitiva contra Vietnam del Norte . . ."

La segunda semana de mayo, Nixon ordenó el bombardeo de las ciudades vietnamitas y que se minara el puerto de Haiphong. Dos semanas después era recibido en Moscú; los funcionarios soviéticos brindaron y cenaron con Richard Nixon mientras llovían las bombas norteamericanas sobre los luchadores en Vietnam del Sur. Los partidos comunistas de todo el mundo ayudaron a descarrilar el movimiento contra la guerra con la falsa promesa de que las negociaciones de Nixon traerían una pronta paz a Vietnam.

Según Szulc, mientras Nixon estaba en Moscú, escuchó durante tres horas discursos de los altos dirigentes del Kremlin. " . . . incluso Kosygin confinó sus protestas al peligro de que las bombas norteamericanas dañaran un barco soviético . . . Ninguno de los tres rusos sugirió que la continuación de la guerra fuera un obstáculo para llegar a un acuerdo general".

El Presidente Soviético Nikolai Podgorny fue enviado a Hanoi "tan pronto como se pudo para comunicar a los norvietnamitas los puntos de vista que Kissinger había manifestado en Moscú".

BOMBARDEO DE NAVIDAD

Hanoi cambió su posición sobre Thieu en octubre de 1972, según Szulc. A partir de ese momento los negociadores norvietnamitas plantearon planes secretos para un acuerdo en el que se dejaba en el poder al régimen de Thieu, al menos temporalmente, y se dejaba para un futuro nebuloso la creación de una coalición gubernamental. Era el clavo ardiendo que Washington había estado esperando.

Sin embargo, afirma Szulc, en diciembre los norvietnamitas comenzaron a tener algunas dudas sobre el acuerdo, cuando vieron que los EUA se apresuraron a mandar armamento con un valor de un billón de dó-



HENRY KISSINGER

lares al régimen de Thieu para antes de que llegara la fecha de poner alto al fuego. Se informa que propusieron cambios en el texto, uno de los cuales era condicionar la liberación de los prisioneros de guerra norteamericanos hasta que se liberara a los cientos de miles de presos políticos que hay en Saigón.

A mediados de diciembre, Nixon lanzó el horrible bombardeo sin precedente de Hanoi. Szulc considera que "el gobierno se dió cuenta de que no podía sostener esos bombardeos por un período indefinido, tanto por razones nacionales, como internacionales. Se trataba, por tanto, de una pro-

posición de corta duración". Escribe que uno de los funcionarios norteamericanos dijo: "Los bombardeamos para obligarlos a aceptar nuestras condiciones". Otro funcionario consideraba, según Szulc, que la razón de los bombardeos de Navidad era "inflingir el mayor daño posible a Vietnam del Norte para que el régimen de Thieu pudiera aceptar el acuerdo".

CASTIGO

Szulc escribe: "Evidentemente, Hanoi consideró, a principios de enero, que ya no podía soportar más castigo y propuso la reanudación de las negociaciones. Irónicamente, como descubrieron los Estados Unidos interceptando las comunicaciones tácticas de los norvietnamitas, sólo tenía cohetes antiaéreos SAM para dos días cuando se pararon los bombardeos".

Szulc describe las negociaciones de Vietnam como la cúspide de la "brillantez" de las mentiras de Kissinger, de sus manipulaciones y de sus tratos secretos. Pero lo que reflejaban en realidad las negociaciones era un desarrollo histórico en que el papel individual de Kissinger contó muy poco. Lo que representaban las negociaciones era el revés que había sufrido el imperialismo norteamericano en la lucha de clases mundial, especialmente en el campo de batalla y por el movimiento internacional contra la guerra.

Washington se vió obligado a volverse hacia Moscú, a utilizar la política exterior contrarrevolucionaria del Kremlin. A través de diálogos secretos con Moscú, Pekín y Hanoi, los imperialistas trataron de salvar el que desde el principio había sido su principal objetivo—un gobierno pro-imperialista en Saigón, que sigue en el poder todavía ahora, quince meses después de que se firmó el acuerdo de "paz".

La información que aparece en el artículo de Szulc confirma lo correcto de la posición tomada por *The Militant* sobre el significado de los acuerdos de Vietnam y el acuerdo general al que han llegado Washington, Moscú y Pekín. Oponiéndose tanto al Partido Comunista de los Estados Unidos como al periódico maoísta *Guardian*, *The Militant* dijo que los acuerdos eran una traición contra los vietnamitas, cometida por los dos mayores estados obreros que debieron

haber sido sus aliados. Y dijo que los acuerdos de Vietnam eran una violación del derecho de autodeterminación del pueblo vietnamita.

Mientras que los stalinistas, tanto los de la variedad china como los de la soviética, lanzaban campañas para que Nixon "firmara ya" la posición negociadora de los nueve puntos planteada por los vietnamitas en octubre de 1972, *The Militant* contrapuso la exigencia de que "los EUA se retiraran de Asia inmediatamente". En los números de *The Militant* del 12 y 19 de 1973, Barry Sheppard escribió:

"Los vietnamitas, desde luego, tienen el derecho a negociar con los bandidos imperialistas que llevan a cabo una guerra genocida contra su país.

"Pero si el movimiento norteamericano contra la guerra llama a que Nixon firme los acuerdos negociados con los vietnamitas, entonces estaríamos diciendo que los Estados Unidos tienen el derecho de realizar esas negociaciones. . . .

"El movimiento contra la guerra debe denunciar cada fraude y cada juego sucio que hagan Kissinger y Nixon, incluyendo las concesiones que tratan de sacar por la fuerza a los vietnamitas.

"El modo más poderoso y efectivo de luchar contra la guerra es unirnos y construir un movimiento mundial, unido en la acción, para exigir el retiro inmediato e incondicional de las fuerzas norteamericanas de todo el sudeste asiático". □

Un Recuento Después de la Muerte del General

Treinta Años de Peronismo

[Esta es una reproducción del artículo "Treinta Años de Peronismo", que apareció en *Avanzada Socialista* (periódico del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional en Argentina), el 4 de julio].

* * *

El peronismo nació en medio de la crisis del gobierno militar surgido el 4 de junio de 1943. El golpe del 43, comandado por la Logia de los Coroneles (el GOU), se había producido como una respuesta de la vieja estructura económica y social del país, dependiente de Inglaterra, ante la presión norteamericana. El imperialismo yanqui avanzaba sobre Latinoamérica y pretendía someterlos a su órbita. Los distintos sectores de la patronal argentina cedían a esa cada vez más poderosa presión. De ahí que el gobierno militar se viera obligado a buscar en otra fuerza social el apoyo necesario para resistir la arremetida estadounidense. El viejo imperialismo inglés, debilitado por la guerra e, inclusive, endeudado a los yanquis, poco podía ya hacer e iniciaba su retirada.

Desde la Secretaría de Trabajo y

Previsión, el coronel Perón buscó en el movimiento obrero el apoyo para resistir la presión colonizadora yanqui. Facilitó su tarea la política de deserción de los partidos Comunista y Socialista, cuyos dirigentes preferían traicionar las reivindicaciones de los trabajadores antes que romper un entendimiento con los "imperialismos democráticos". Ese apoyo se logró con concesiones económicas y sociales que modificaron sustancialmente la situación que la clase obrera venía padeciendo bajo los gobiernos conservadores: aguinaldo, estatuto del peón, convenios colectivos, comisiones internas, cuerpos de delegados. Paralelamente, se organizó el otro dispositivo: el que debía garantizar que la clase obrera no desbordara el marco de conquistas y reivindicaciones que se le había fijado. Ese dispositivo fue la burocracia sindical.

El documento más claro y preciso fue el discurso de Perón en la Bolsa de Comercio el 25 de agosto de 1944, para conocer los objetivos y métodos de esa estrategia. Ahí se plantea sin vueltas el eje de la cuestión: por un lado, que la patronal argentina sepa renunciar a algo para no perderlo todo; por el otro, que sepa comprender que el mayor "peligro" que la amenaza no

es que los trabajadores se organicen bajo la tutela del gobierno, sino que, desorganizados, caigan bajo la seducción de las ideas anticapitalistas . . . "La defensa de los intereses de los hombres de negocios, de los industriales, de los comerciantes, es la defensa misma del Estado". He aquí sintetizada la política que el peronismo aplicó en todas sus etapas.

Perón fue consolidando este proyecto no sin contradicciones y dificultades. Las concesiones a los trabajadores fueron posibles gracias a las inmejorables condiciones económicas que existieron durante la guerra. Junto a esas concesiones surgió una poderosa burocracia fomentada desde el gobierno que controló férreamente los sindicatos. Por un lado, entonces, el movimiento obrero se desarrolló; por el otro, se lo estatizó rigidamente. Y cuando esto no fue suficiente, también se lo reprimió, como lo prueban las huelgas de gráficos, ferroviarios, metalúrgicos, textiles, telefónicos, bancarios, azucareros y otros.

Partiendo del apoyo obrero, al principio Perón pudo enfrentar la presión yanqui y neutralizar a los sectores patronales. La buena situación económica que permitía hacer concesiones a la clase obrera también daba la posibilidad de que los patronos hicieran magníficos negocios. Esta resistencia a la penetración yanqui es el aspecto progresivo del primer gobierno peronista. Pero las condiciones económicas favorables cambiaron y, desde 1949, se comienzan a dibujar los primeros síntomas de la crisis. A partir de 1952, estos se harán más evidentes. Cada vez más sectores de la patronal empiezan a necesitar la ligazón con el imperialismo para modernizar sus instalaciones e incorporar nuevas técnicas. La presión imperialista se redobla. El intento de reducir los ingresos de los obreros para aumentar las ganancias patronales produce una firme resistencia de los trabajadores y el aparato burocrático comienza a mostrar fisuras.

Ni corto ni perezoso, el imperialismo yanqui aprovechó la situación y apretó con todo en alianza creciente con la mayoría de la patronal. La actitud de Perón fue ceder negociando. Y esto lo llevó a la derrota.

La actitud que Perón asumió en 1955 y en los acontecimientos que precedieron a su derrocamiento mues-

tra el signo fundamental de su concepción política. Abandonó a los enemigos históricos de la clase obrera la suerte de su proyecto político. En su renuncia, confió a las fuerzas armadas la "herencia" de su gobierno. Se negó a recurrir a los únicos que podían enfrentar a los golpistas y liquidarlos: los trabajadores. Para decirlo con sus propias palabras: "Armar al pueblo, entonces, significaba dudar de la integridad del Ejército". Y, naturalmente, esto hubiera sido muy peligroso para la patronal, y Perón, como representante consciente de esos intereses, no estaba dispuesto a correr esos riesgos. Perón siempre refirmó la justeza de su actitud; nunca admitió "error" alguno. Todo lo contrario, ya en el exilio, continuó defendiendo el haber evitado la guerra civil. Incluso, ya en la Argentina, a veinte años de aquel episodio, volvió a confirmar ese juicio. El esfuerzo de la izquierda peronista por hacer creer lo contrario es parte de ese intento por "izquierdizar" la figura del líder y hacerlo más potable a la pequeña burguesía radicalizada. Un intento que mostró toda su inconsistencia en este último año y puso frente a la realidad a los tejedores de fábulas ideológicas.

En resumen, la sangre que "ahorró" Perón no fue, y la historia lo demostró, la que derramaron los luchadores obreros y revolucionarios después de 1955.

EL PERONISMO SIN GOBIERNO

A la caída del gobierno peronista, después del breve intervalo de Lonardi en que tanto éste como la burocracia sindical intentaron llegar a un entendimiento, los gorilas en el poder lanzaron una brutal ofensiva sobre el movimiento obrero, intentando destruir los sindicatos. Esto llevó, a corto plazo, a una gran reacción del movimiento obrero. Incluso sectores burocráticos, puestos entre la espada y la pared, se vieron obligados a luchar. Había comenzado la resistencia, donde, por un lado, surgirían miles de nuevos y heroicos activistas y, por el otro, especialmente bajo Frondizi, se iría formando una nueva burocracia con aspiraciones de juego propio: el vandorismo. La derrota del movimiento obrero en las grandes huelgas de 1958 y 59, abría un período de retroceso que sólo se habría de superar con el Cordobazo.

La política del general Perón en toda esa etapa, política que la tiranía del espacio nos impide seguir en sus detalles, se puede resumir muy simplemente: tratar de jaquear a los gobiernos patronales con la amenaza obrera para que la clase dominante lo volviera a reconocer como el gran estadista de la burguesía argentina, el único que podía evitar que esa amenaza se convirtiera en la realidad de una revolución obrera y popular. El único que podía equilibrar la balanza y arbitrar entre los descontentos. Eso es lo que significaba, en verdad, "jaquear al régimen", esa política que los jóvenes peronistas confundieron con un cuestionamiento revolucionario del sistema, cuando sólo apuntaba a ser aceptado otra vez como un político del régimen.

Esto explica el "juego pendular" de



HECTOR CAMPORA

Perón: impulsar a la izquierda, hoy; mañana, a la derecha; hoy, a los activistas de las huelgas obreras; mañana, llamando a votar por Frondizi o a "desensillar hasta que aclare" frente a Onganía.

EL RETORNO AL GOBIERNO

No hay más que recordar la campaña electoral para la elección de marzo de 1973, que está fresca en la memoria de todos. Los actos públicos del Frejuli estaban cruzados por carteles montoneros; las consignas que se voceaban festejaban a los gru-

pos guerrilleros y atacaban a la burocracia sindical. Ganadas las elecciones, gracias en gran parte a esos carteles y a esa consignas, los burócratas se convirtieron en los niños mimados y la izquierda del movimiento fue llamada a la dura realidad.

Pero no fue seguramente la "política pendular" la que aceleró la hora triunfal del general Perón. Esta llegó cuando los cordobazos y los rosariazos pusieron ante los ojos de la patronal el temible espectro de la insurrección obrera. Nadie más que Perón podía frenar esa oleada. Y así fue. La burguesía, olvidando discrepancias e insultos de veinte años, le abrió las puertas para el retorno al gobierno. Esta página de nuestra historia política es sumamente ilustrativa para todos los trabajadores. El GAN [Gran Acuerdo Nacional], La Hora del Pueblo y las elecciones son los instrumentos de este "reencuentro". Un año de gobierno peronista demostró que la continuidad no era sólo *institucional* sino, fundamentalmente, *política*: el peronismo en el gobierno era la consolidación de ese Gran Acuerdo Nacional urdido ante el peligro del ascenso obrero. Todas las diferencias entre Perón, Balbín y Lanusse, todas sus discrepancias, tendieron a evaporarse cuando lo que estuvo en discusión fue la supervivencia del sistema capitalista.

Sin embargo, el papel que los planes del GAN le reservaban al General Perón (frenar el ascenso de las luchas obreras) se mostró más difícil de lo calculado. Más bien, imposible. Entonces renacieron las diferencias entre sectores patronales, resurgieron las crisis y se reabrieron las fisuras entre las distintas alas de la burocracia sindical.

El peronismo en el gobierno no fue suficiente; ni siquiera la presencia de Perón en el país bastó para frenar las luchas obreras y populares. Hacía falta que el general Perón ocupara personalmente la presidencia. Y Perón la ocupó. Pero cada paso que daba, cada vez que arrojaba su prestigio sobre la mesa para apuntalar a Gelbard, al Pacto Social, a la burocracia sindical, a Villar y Margaride, cada nuevo abrazo con los militares, cada atentado fascista impune, iban deteriorando la confianza de la clase obrera en él. Lentamente, pero sin detenerse, se iniciaba la decadencia de ese pres-

tigio personal y, también, el fraccionamiento de un movimiento que se aglutinaba alrededor de su persona.

Hace treinta años, el coronel Perón controlaba el empuje de la clase obrera con concesiones económicas y sociales. Ahora, al retornar al gobierno, tuvo que controlar a la clase obrera para, precisamente, no hacérselas.

Una tarea que no podía tener otra consecuencia que la que tuvo: comenzar a desgastar su prestigio como líder de esa clase obrera. De todos modos, ahora como entonces su objetivo fue siempre el mismo: lograr una imposible conciliación de clases entre los explotadores y los explotados. □

¿Y Después de Perón Qué?

Ahora Más que Nunca, un Partido Obrero

[A continuación reproducimos el artículo del mismo título publicado en *Avanzada Socialista* (periódico del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, una organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional en Argentina), el 4 de julio. Los puntos 1 y 2 del artículo (El Peronismo Oficialista y ¿Un Neoperonismo "Opositor"? respectivamente) los resumimos por razones de espacio. Reproducimos íntegramente puntos 3 y 4].

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[En su primer número después de la muerte de Perón, *Avanzada Socialista* analizó las alternativas políticas que se abren ante los obreros argentinos. A esos obreros que apoyaron a la llamada ala ortodoxa, o "anti-marxista", del movimiento peronista, el semanario del PST señaló que ya no podía caber duda sobre lo que implicaba la "ortodoxia".

[Mientras vivía el caudillo populista existió una contradicción: algunos militantes sindicales luchaban por los intereses de los obreros contra los efectos de los pactos de colaboración de clases realizados por Perón al mismo tiempo que juraban obediencia incondicional a "nuestro General".

"Ahora esa contradicción ya no existe", escribió *Avanzada Socialista*. "Si usted tenía alguna esperanza en un posible giro de Perón, eso se terminó". Los obreros peronistas "ortodoxos" comprendieron que respaldar al peronismo oficial significaba apoyar la congelación de salarios, apoyar a los matones derechistas y a la burocracia sindical que negaba a los obreros hasta el derecho de elegir sus propios dirigentes.

[En cuanto a los peronistas de izquierda, quienes habían estado durante muchos meses bajo el ataque directo de los pandilleros de derecha y del mismo "líder", tampoco ofrecieron ninguna alternativa. En primer lugar, los políticos peronistas de izquierda habían demostrado ser incapaces de resistir la ofensiva de la derecha.

"Usted que quiere derrotar a enemigos tan tremendos como son la oligarquía y el imperialismo", preguntó *Avanzada Socialista* "¿puede confiar en Obregón Cano, que enfrentó al golpe semifascista con... su renuncia?"

[Junto con políticos como Obregón Cano, en el peronismo de izquierda se encuentran también los antiguos grupos guerrilleros nacionalistas, ahora unidos bajo el nombre de Montoneros. *Avanzada Socialista* recordó lo inútil que demostraron ser sus acciones militares contra los planes políticos de la burguesía.

"Cuando secuestraron a Aramburu dijeron que habían roto el Gran Acuerdo Nacional, sin embargo éste marchó viento en popa".

[El semanario trotskista destacó también cómo la necesidad de mantenerse dentro del marco del movimiento peronista había impedido que los peronistas de izquierda apoyaran efectivamente o dirigieran las luchas de los obreros.

[El objetivo de las guerrillas de ganar la "hegemonía" dentro de un movimiento burgués y un gobiernoburgués era ilusorio, subrayó *Avanzada Socialista*. O bien acabarían administrando el gobierno de los capitalistas, o se verían forzados a romper comple-

tamente con la burguesía y sus formaciones políticas.

[La mayor parte del artículo que publicamos a continuación, trata con cierta amplitud el problema de la política de colaboración de clases, contraponiéndola a la alternativa del PST de construir un partido obrero y revolucionario de masas.]

* * *

EL FRENTE POPULAR

Y hay una tercera variante. No es muy distinta de lo que proponen los Montoneros, aunque esté más decorada de izquierdismo, de marxismo; es el frente popular que plantea el Partido Comunista y otros sectores aparentemente opuestos, como el FAS [Frente Anti-imperialista y por el Socialismo].

El Partido Comunista está proponiendo un gobierno de coalición nacional donde entren todos los partidos burgueses, oligárquicos, pequeño burgueses, para gobernar juntos el país. Es decir, también un Pacto Social aunque vestido de manera distinta, de ropaje izquierdista.

Nosotros creemos que esa salida es un desastre y no hace falta ir muy lejos para buscar los resultados. ¿Qué pasó en Chile con la Unidad Popular? ¿Qué sucedió en Uruguay con el Frente Amplio?

Usted a lo mejor es un compañero que trabaja en una fábrica de patronos nacionales. Quizás sus patronos tienen problemas de competencia con los yanquis. ¿Pero qué le parece? ¿Cuando las papas quemén, los patronos se van a jugar con los obreros contra el gran patrón yanqui? ¿O el patrón chico se va a unir con el grande contra los obreros? Cuando haya que decidir de quiénes son las fábricas y los bancos o quién dirige la producción, o más aún, quién manda en el país; quién tiene que disponer de la propiedad, quién tiene que tener las armas o trazar los planes económicos, ¿la patronal va a aceptar que mandemos nosotros, los trabajadores? Para poder comer, vestir o tener una vivienda ¿no tenemos que luchar a brazo partido contra los patronos, incluidos los nacionales? El Pacto Social se firmó con todos los beneficios para los patronos. A pesar de que era para garantizarle el máximo de ganancias para ellos

no estuvieron conformes y apelaron a las medidas del desabastecimiento y mercado negro para ganar aún más. Si teniendo todo a su favor igual tomaron medidas para perjudicar a los obreros ¿le parece que nos van a permitir dirigir la economía del país? ¿Que cuando entremos a un gobierno con ellos nos van a favorecer a nosotros?

Entonces el Partido Comunista nos engaña conscientemente, porque la experiencia ya nos demostró cómo funciona un acuerdo entre patronos y obreros, ya nos demostró que los patronos no lo cumplen ni aún cuando es totalmente favorable para ellos.

¿Qué pretende hacernos "tragarse" el Partido Comunista? ¿Que cuando gobernemos junto con los patronos vamos a hacer lo que nos venga bien y los patronos van a aceptar lo que nunca hasta ahora aceptaron?

Con respecto al imperialismo la experiencia nos muestra lo que va a pasar. Todo gobierno patronal tiene acuerdos de fondo con el imperialismo; ese acuerdo es el de mantener el sistema de explotación. Al mismo tiempo, a veces tienen roces por problemas de competencia. Por la primera razón es que difícilmente un gobierno patronal llegue a expropiar a fondo al imperialismo; el último gobierno de Perón no lo hizo. Y cuando hubo gobiernos que lo hicieron, parcialmente, como el primero de Perón o el de Allende en Chile, los patronos demostraron que son totalmente incapaces de resistir al imperialismo cuando toma represalias.

Eso es lo que ocurrió a los trabajadores chilenos. Su gobierno no los armó ni los preparó para resistir el golpe de Pinochet. Dejó intactos los resortes de la economía, lo que permitió el desabastecimiento y el mercado negro; dejó tal cual a las fuerzas armadas, lo que permitió que los militares estuvieran armados y listos para responder. En síntesis: aplicó una política patronal y no obrera.

Por eso este gobierno de obreros y patronos que nos propone el Partido Comunista, en realidad es un gobierno de patronos que utilizan representantes traidores de los trabajadores para imponer lo mismo que nos impone ahora el Pacto Social.

Lo que nos propone es juntarnos con supuestos patronos "buenos", "progresistas", con los militares "pa-

triotas" y acomodar la actividad, el programa y la organización de los trabajadores a las necesidades de la patronal.

Usted quizás piense, a esta altura, que nosotros opinamos que es imposible realizar nada en conjunto con los patronos. No es así. Hay cuestiones mínimas, parciales en las que a veces coincidimos. Por ejemplo, con el doctor Balbín compartimos nuestra oposición a las reformas al Código Penal o también hemos coincidido en el derecho del diario *El Mundo* a aparecer. Con el doctor Oscar Alende estamos de acuerdo en la necesidad de que nuestro petróleo sea explotado por los argentinos y no por el imperialismo. Alrededor de esas cuestiones no hay problema ninguno en hacer una lucha conjunta entre obreros y patronos. Estas son luchas alrededor de acuerdos precisos que no comprometen para nada al movimiento obrero en los planes de gobierno de la patronal; incluso pueden ser muy beneficiosos. Pero estos acuerdos no significan que participemos de sus gobiernos, ni que nos dejemos dirigir por ellos, o que nos afiliemos a sus partidos, o que los votemos. Son acuerdos para luchar, no para gobernar.

La política del Partido Comunista en la Argentina es la misma que tuvo en Chile. Si el movimiento obrero elige esto, va a una catástrofe como la de los hermanos chilenos.

LA INDEPENDENCIA PROLETARIA Y EL PARTIDO OBRERO

Todas esas variantes son muy distintas entre sí. Es posible que tampoco se presenten tal cual como las acabamos de describir. Es posible que en lo inmediato haya una cierta estabilidad, pero tarde o temprano vamos a asistir al hecho de que se van a pelear entre ellas acuciadas por la crisis del Pacto Social y de las luchas interpatronales y también por la influencia de nuestra propia lucha, la del movimiento obrero. Estas luchas pueden llegar a originar desplazamientos en el poder; la confusión de todos los sectores, incluida la patronal, no permite decir nada en forma definitiva.

Sin embargo, sean oficialistas u opositores, todas esas variantes siguen teniendo algo en común: en to-

das ellas el papel que juega el movimiento obrero es a la cola de tal o cual sector patronal. *Lo que tienen en común es que no quieren la independencia política del movimiento obrero.*

¿Qué es la independencia política del movimiento obrero? Que el movimiento obrero se organice en un partido político propio. Si logra esto sería muy positivo. Nosotros, por nuestra parte, trataremos de que ese partido sea revolucionario.

El movimiento obrero argentino, hace un tiempo, más precisamente desde el Cordobazo, empieza a marchar en la dirección de la independencia de clase, aunque en forma contradictoria. El Cordobazo no lo hicieron los trabajadores acatando la verticalidad. Lo hicieron contra las directivas de los dirigentes reconocidos del movimiento. El grueso de las luchas que viene dando el movimiento obrero desde el Cordobazo tienden hacia la independencia política porque en cada una de esas huelgas, contraviniendo las órdenes y los consejos que venían tanto de su líder como de los burócratas sindicales, la de "desensillar hasta que aclare", rompiendo esas barreras, el movimiento obrero se dio su programa de acción, aunque en muchos casos fuera limitado, para pelear un aumento de salarios o echar a un burócrata.

Cuando el movimiento obrero votó al General Perón lo hizo con esperanzas, pero contradictoriamente. No abandonó ese camino hacia la independencia obrera. Porque mientras seguía luchando contra sus propias directivas y, a veces, contra sus propios representantes, lo votaba para las elecciones.

Esto es un equívoco histórico, porque para muchos trabajadores, sinceramente, votar por Perón era votar por la clase obrera. Este equívoco ya no se puede sostener e incluso ya se estaba debilitando en vida del General Perón.

Si usted es activista gráfico y está peleando por aumento, si es metalúrgico de Villa Constitución y está tratando de que lo reconozcan los dirigentes que usted eligió, desoyendo a los que le dicen que tiene que aceptar el Pacto y la burocracia, usted está dando pasos en el sentido de su independencia de clase.

De lo que se trata es de esa indepen-

dencia de clase que se manifestó en luchas sindicales o políticas pero aisladas, atomizadas, a veces sin que los propios compañeros de lugares distintos del país se conozcan, se expresen en forma coordinada, unitaria, con objetivos claros.

Es necesario que los trabajadores gobiernen el país. Esta es la única manera de resolver sus problemas; pero, para ello, es necesario tener un partido. Sólo un partido obrero, dirigido por obreros y con un programa que exprese sus intereses inmediatos y futuros puede hacer realidad la unidad de todos y la realización de su gobierno.

Pero, con la autoridad que nos da haber luchado contra el golpe del 55, por el derecho de Perón a regresar y también con la que nos da el no haberlo votado, decimos: éste es el momento de impulsar un gran parti-

do, independiente, clasista, revolucionario. El nuestro tiene sus filas abiertas para usted.

La razón de ser del PST es ésta: sentar los cimientos de un gran partido obrero revolucionario. Sabemos que no somos reconocidos por el conjunto de la clase trabajadora. Incluso estamos convencidos de que hay otras corrientes obreras que están a favor de la independencia política y que van a contribuir a formar el gran partido.

Compañero:

¡No permita que decidan por usted ni los Cámpora, ni los Bidegain, ni los López Rega ni Oscar Alende; todas esas variantes usted las ha tenido en el gobierno y las conoce: haga memoria y las conoce!

Ahora la que debe decidir es la clase obrera a través de su partido sin la tutela de ningún patrón. □

Juan Carlos Coral:

Un Diálogo con Perón

[Reproducimos aquí una entrevista entre Juan Carlos Coral, dirigente central del PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional, en Argentina), y el semanario del partido—*Avanzada Socialista*. La entrevista se publicó en éste el 4 de julio].

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Avanzada Socialista: De tus entrevistas y diálogos con Perón, ¿cuál es el que más recordás?

Coral: Estuve con Perón en tres oportunidades. La primera, en Madrid, charlamos, o mejor dicho, charló Perón, un largo rato. De allí tengo recuerdos que tienen un valor político. A las otras no me referiré, porque fueron las que hicimos en Olivos, de las que se informó ampliamente.

AS: ¿Cuándo fue?

C: En agosto de 1967. Yo regresaba de la Habana, del Congreso de la OLAS. El avión hacía escala en

Madrid. Pero ya en Cuba el difunto Gustavo Rearte me transmitió una invitación de Perón en la que me decía que aprovechara la escala para conversar con él en Puerta de Hierro.

AS: ¿De qué quería conversar?

C: Me dió una larga explicación, en su fluido estilo, de toda su vida. Me contó que sus inquietudes sociales se despertaron en el reclutamiento, al ver la miseria de los chicos, hijos de los productores, que andaban en alparagatas. Me refirió también cómo eligió, años después, la secretaria de Trabajo y Previsión Social, consciente, según me dijo, de que los trabajadores serían los mejores propagandistas de sus ideas. Pero después fue al fondo de la cuestión que lo preocupaba.

AS: ¿Y cuál era?

C: Había pasado un año de la instalación de Onganía. Seguramente para Perón ya había pasado el plazo de "desensillar hasta que aclare", porque estaba empeñado en lograr un

frente democrático para luchar contra la dictadura militar. Recién después de derrotarla, habría que marcar las diferencias, mientras tanto había que unirse con todos.

AS: *¿Con quién planteaba la unidad Perón?*

C: En esa época había empezado las entrevistas con Aramburu, radiado en París, y con los radicales. Es decir, estaba en germen lo que después fue La Hora del Pueblo.

AS: *¿Cuál fue tu respuesta?*

C: Desde el vamos señalé diferencias, que son las mismas que mante-

nemos ahora. Recuerdo que le señalé que corría el peligro, al aliarse con esos partidos y sectores, de repetir la tragedia del pacto con Frondizi. Me retrucó que eso no se repetiría porque las masas iban a estar alertadas y que en cambio si yo no ingresaba al frente que proponía, corría el peligro de repetir el caso de la Unión Democrática, cuando los socialistas y comunistas no sólo perdieron el ómnibus, sino que tomaron el que iba para el otro lado. . .

AS: *¿Y tu respuesta?*

C: Que me parecía que el que estaba construyendo la nueva Unión Democrática era él. □

El PST No Firmó 'Declaración de los 8'

[La siguiente nota editorial apareció en el número del 26 de junio de *Avanzada Socialista*, el periódico semanal del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, una organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional en Argentina. La nota trata sobre la participación del PST, junto con otros siete partidos, en dos entrevistas con el General Juan D. Perón.

[La primera entrevista se celebró el 21 de marzo. Su propósito era dramatizar el resurgimiento de la ultra derecha—que había llevado a cabo, entre otras cosas, un golpe de estado en la provincia de Córdoba el 27 de febrero—para ayudar a movilizar una resistencia activa contra ésta.

[En el informe que apareció en el número de marzo 28-abril 5 de *Avanzada Socialista* sobre la confrontación con Perón, la redacción indicó que el PST había firmado un documento conjunto que fue presentado al General por los ocho partidos que participaron en la reunión. Esto produjo ciertos malentendidos sobre la posición del PST, que la nota editorial intenta aclarar.

[La segunda entrevista con Perón, en la cual participaron las delegaciones de los ocho partidos, se llevó a cabo el 5 de abril. En esta ocasión no se presentó ningún documento general. Sobre la posición adoptada por el PST, ver "Coral Faces Perón in Defense of Strikers", *Intercontinental*

Press, 29 de abril, p. 501; y "Coral Confronts Perón With Five Demands", *Intercontinental Press*, 13 de mayo, pp. 606-608].

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Hemos recibido una carta de un lector europeo de nuestro periódico, que lo lee asiduamente en su país, aunque nos manifiesta que últimamente le han faltado algunos números. El compañero nos hace llegar su solidaridad por los atentados y asesinatos que ha sufrido nuestro partido, pero nos reclama una aclaración: habiéndose enterado que en el mes de abril una delegación de nuestro partido concurrió, junto a otras siete fuerzas políticas, a entrevistar al general Perón, nos pide que aclaremos si firmamos, en forma conjunta con esos partidos burgueses, un documento para ser presentado a Perón. La pregunta la realiza por tener tres informes contradictorios: uno de *Avanzada Socialista*, donde afirmamos que el documento fue firmado en forma conjunta; otra, la versión de un programa televisivo en que Juan Carlos Coral habría desmentido la firma de ese documento; y otra, finalmente, un artículo de la revista *Así* sobre ese programa, donde no aparece el desmentido de Coral. El compañero quiere saber si el documento firmado por los ocho partidos existió o no realmente. La pregunta va acompañada de otras consideraciones donde el com-

pañero critica la política de nuestro partido en relación a los acuerdos para la defensa de las libertades democráticas.

No vamos a debatir en esta breve respuesta con las distintas críticas políticas y teóricas del compañero. Sólo queremos reiterar aquí el fundamento de nuestra posición política y aclarar el problema del documento.

En nuestro país las libertades democráticas que ahora gozamos son el producto de grandes luchas obreras, que arrancaron con el Cordobazo. Esas libertades están amenazadas por el surgimiento de grupos fascistas, amparados por un ala del gobierno, la burocracia sindical y la burguesía. Frente a esta amenaza consideramos no sólo lícito, sino también obligatorio, realizar acuerdos circunscriptos, tácticos y circunstanciales con todos los sectores que se pronuncien por la defensa de las libertades democráticas. Eso no niega, sino que nos obliga, por otra parte, a seguir reivindicando la revolución socialista como la única salida de fondo a la crisis y a la vez delimitar el campo de nuestros acuerdos con los partidos burgueses, en cuya consecuencia democrática no podemos confiar.

Con una aplicación de esta política concurrimos a la entrevista con el gobierno y encaramos movilizaciones democráticas, como el repudio al asesinato de nuestros militantes y también de otros partidos.

Pasemos ahora a la cuestión del documento. Tal como dijo el 8 de abril ante una elevada teleaudiencia el compañero Coral, nuestro partido no firmó ningún documento conjunto con los demás partidos. Coral aclaró ante las cámaras que esa mención se debió a un error de *Avanzada Socialista*. Si la revista *Así* no recogió esa aclaración es porque el artículo es una selección hecha por el mismo periodista de un programa que duró casi dos horas. El público argentino puede certificar la desmentida pública de Coral y, además, que todo el programa fue un alegato contra el frente popular.

Por nuestra parte queremos aclarar que el error de *Avanzada Socialista* se debió a la siguiente confusión: uno de los ocho partidos propuso que se hiciera una declaración conjunta y presentó un proyecto. Nuestro partido propuso una serie de cambios que fue-

Intercontinental Press

ron parcialmente aceptados. Nuestra redacción creyó, en el momento de cerrar nuestra edición, que el documento llevaba la firma del *Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores*. En reali-

dad, no había sido firmado por subsistir todavía diferencias.

Cumplimos en consignar el error de esta redacción con respecto a la firma del documento. □

E.U.A.

Sindicatos Exigen Aumento de Salarios

Por Andy Rose

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Unions: 'Wages must match soaring prices!'", que apareció en el semanario socialista revolucionario norteamericano *The Militant*, el 12 de julio].

* * *

En todo el país los trabajadores están exigiendo aumento y escala móvil de salarios, para alcanzar los altísimos precios, y están recurriendo a la huelga como medio para respaldar sus exigencias.

Mientras que los precios y las ganancias han alcanzado cifras astronómicas, el aumento promedio que se ha concedido a los trabajadores sindicalizados ha bajado de 8.1% en 1971 a 6.4% en 1972 y a 5.2% en 1973.

A este terrible robo en el monto de los salarios se le dió el nombre de "control de precios y salarios" y está siendo impuesto por el gobierno.

A pesar de que los trabajadores han sido duramente golpeados por la inflación, en 1972 y 1973 el número de días de trabajo perdidos a causa de huelgas alcanzó el punto más bajo desde 1966.

Pero, desde que el 30 de abril se levantó el control del gobierno sobre los salarios, los sindicatos están recurriendo de nuevo a su arma básica para tratar de defender su nivel de vida y reconquistar lo que han perdido.

La primera semana de junio, los mediadores federales estaban tratando de resolver 523 huelgas que abarcaban a 308,600 trabajadores—el número más elevado que se ha registrado para esta semana en los últimos quince años. Esta cifra no toma en cuenta cientos de pequeñas huelgas, ni las huelgas de los empleados públi-

cos.

Los obreros de la construcción, que habían estado sometidos al control de los salarios más tiempo que ningún otro sector, están en la primera fila de la lucha por recuperarse. Los sindicatos de la construcción han realizado paros importantes en Filadelfia, Cincinnati, Denver, Syracuse, Memphis y otras ciudades. En este mismo momento, decenas de miles de carpinteros y de otros obreros de la construcción están en huelga en California.

A principios de junio, 110,000 miembros de la Amalgamated Clothing Workers [un sindicato de obreros de la confección] se lanzaron a su primera huelga nacional desde hace cincuenta y tres años.

Los trabajadores de cuello blanco, que anteriormente no habían destacado por su militancia sindical—como las enfermeras del norte de California—se han organizado y han dado luchas para mejorar sus salarios y sus condiciones de trabajo. Los empleados de Harper & Row [una de las principales editoriales de los Estados Unidos] están ya en su tercera semana de huelga—la primera que se produce en la industria editorial desde la década del 40.

Hasta ahora, sólo la huelga de los trabajadores de la confección ha sido una acción de toda una rama industrial; las otras han tenido un carácter local. Sin embargo, todavía están por realizarse varias revisiones de contratos nacionales: teléfonos, ferrocarriles, aéreo-espacio, metales no ferrosos, minas de carbón y refinerías de petróleo.

Por debajo de esta ola de huelgas se encuentra una nueva sensación de coraje por parte de los trabajadores norteamericanos. Cuando Nixon anunció por primera vez la "congelación

de precios y salarios" en agosto de 1971, casi todo mundo la aceptó, y se confiaba en que el gobierno limitaría realmente los precios. La amarga experiencia ha demostrado lo contrario.

La desilusión y la desconfianza en el gobierno son cada vez mayores, ya que no se limitan a los aspectos económicos de su política. Primero la guerra de Vietnam y ahora las revelaciones de Watergate, han abierto los ojos a millones de personas sobre la corrupción y criminalidad fundamentales del gobierno capitalista.

Hoy en día hay poca inclinación a sacrificarse en aras de los "intereses nacionales" de Nixon y de la ITT, o



WILBUR MILLS

a confiar en que el gobierno va a ayudar al pueblo trabajador. Por el contrario, se considera que el gobierno conspira con los explotadores.

En una encuesta realizada recientemente por Harris, el 60% de los entrevistados consideraba que la política económica del gobierno "está haciendo más mal que bien", en comparación con sólo un 23% de personas que tenía esta misma opinión en septiembre de 1971.

Comentando el reavivamiento de las huelgas, un funcionario del Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service [esta es la forma de conciliación y

arbitraje que se utiliza en Estados Unidos] dijo: "Esto refleja la frustración del pueblo trabajador por no poder hacer nada substancial sobre una gran cantidad de problemas nacionales e internacionales . . .

"Parece que la escasez de gasolina y granos mantiene constantemente preocupado al pueblo trabajador".

En todas partes el punto central es la protección contra el aumento de los precios. La demanda de una cláusula que especifique la escala móvil de salarios ha sido tomada por millones de trabajadores.

Al principio de este año, sólo 4.1 millones de trabajadores tenían en sus contratos alguna forma de escala móvil de salarios. Ahora, muchos sindicatos que nunca habían tenido esa cláusula—y otros que la tuvieron en el pasado, pero la perdieron—están planteando esta demanda crucial.

Los triunfos de algunos sindicatos ya han hecho que los patrones griten de rabia. Los economistas capitalistas otra vez están muy ocupados en denunciar los arreglos salariales "inflacionarios", sin tomar en consideración el hecho de que los salarios todavía están muy atrás de los precios y que el poder de compra del trabajador promedio es todavía 4.6% menor de lo que era el año pasado (según datos del gobierno).

El Departamento de Trabajo afirma que el promedio de ingresos por hora aumentó en mayo a un ritmo que equivaldría al 10.8% anual. De ser exacto este dato, esto sería el doble de la tasa de aumento de salarios de 1973. Pero todavía sería inferior a la tasa de inflación, que en mayo alcanzó el 13.2%.

Los capitalistas y su gobierno han decidido que sean los trabajadores quienes carguen el peso de la inflación. Por eso han lanzado una ofensiva propagandística contra la escala móvil de salarios y contra los aumentos considerables de salarios, diciendo que son "inflacionarios".

Por la misma razón, siempre está presente la amenaza de que se vuelva a decretar el control de los salarios. Demócratas destacados, como el congresista Wilbur Mills (Arkansas), han pedido públicamente que se siga este curso. Incluso sin que se decrete el control obligatorio, el gobierno no escatima ningún esfuerzo para mantener bajos los salarios—por ejemplo, a través de la presión de los mediadores

federales.

Además, tanto el ejecutivo como el Congreso están dispuestos a aprobar en cualquier momento una ley de "emergencia" contra las huelgas en los sectores vitales de la economía, como los ferrocarriles y las minas de carbón.

La inflación no es el único frente por donde está siendo atacado el pueblo trabajador. El gobierno está siguiendo deliberadamente una política recesitaria con el objetivo de aumentar el desempleo y reducir, de esta manera, la militancia obrera. La alta tasa de desempleo que hay en estos momentos—oficialmente es el 5.2%—no ha podido frenar hasta ahora la lucha por aumentos de salarios. Pero ha significado tiempos especialmente difíciles para millones de trabajadores sin empleo y para sus familias.

En nombre de "luchar contra la inflación" reduciendo los gastos federales, Nixon planea reducir el presupuesto destinado a la seguridad social.

El actual ascenso de las huelgas, si bien ha significado verdaderos logros para algunos trabajadores, no

ha trascendido todavía los métodos tradicionales de la dirección sindical: huelgas de un sindicato contra un patrón o contra una industria, conducidas sólo al nivel económico.

Para enfrentar el ataque múltiple contra el nivel de vida de los trabajadores, se necesitan nuevos métodos: sobre todo, que las acciones de los sindicatos sean políticamente independientes.

Los trabajadores no lograrán nada tratando de frenar los ataques del gobierno apoyando a los partidos capitalistas, el Republicano y el Demócrata. Esto se vió claramente con la incapacidad de los sindicatos para derrotar el control de los salarios impuestos por Nixon.

Un partido laborista independiente coordinaría y centralizaría las luchas obreras. Defendería los intereses de los trabajadores en problemas políticos de crucial importancia, como la guerra y la paz, la opresión racial, los impuestos, el control de los salarios, el desempleo y los servicios sociales. Sería un paso hacia la reorganización de la sociedad sobre la base de las necesidades humanas y no de la ganancia particular. □

DOCUMENTS

'Institutionalization' and Rightist Threat

[The following article is from the July 4 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly paper of the Argentine PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing group of the Fourth International). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Our party is the only militant left party in Argentina that has publicly stated that it supports the "process of institutionalization." In line with this, it was the only working-class and socialist current that, in order to participate in this process, did the work necessary to gain the status of a legal party and intervene in the elections.

In October 1972, representatives of our party went to meet with the representative of the military dictatorship to tell him that we supported the "process

of institutionalization" and to demand the withdrawal of the military junta from the government. More recently, in the case of the coup by Navarro in Córdoba, we met with the Peronist government. And, along with reiterating our opposition to military dictatorship, we called for a series of measures such as the repudiation of the Social Pact, democratization of the unions, and expropriation of the oligarchy and the imperialists.

These are the same demands we make today, when once again, in the aftermath of General Perón's death, we have reiterated our support for the "process of institutionalization" against the attacks of the putschist right.

What is the meaning of this process that we find ourselves supporting together with bourgeois political forces?

In Argentine politics, the term "pro-

cess of institutionalization" began to be used a few years ago with more or less its present meaning. This was not happenstance. Its meaning was associated with the struggle against the military dictatorship. More concretely, it meant ending the dictatorial regime of Onganía. Thus, different sectors that opposed the Onganía regime from different standpoints and with different perspectives, could use this common language.

In the same way, in these days, actions that represent an attempt to return to the methods of the Onganía dictatorship—the coup in Córdoba; the murders of left-Peronist, Communist party, and PST militants by fascist gangs with government protection; or the closing down of *El Mundo* or *El Descamisado* by the Ministry of the Interior—have all been condemned in the name of the "process of institutionalization." Different currents, including some bourgeois ones such as the UCR [Unión Cívica Radical—Radical Civic Union] and Alende's party, as well as working-class ones such as our party, have condemned these acts.

In a nutshell, since the Cordobazo unleashed the struggle against the Onganía regime, the word "institutionalization" has acquired a meaning in Argentine politics different from the one given in the dictionary. It has become a synonym for fighting to defend or win democratic rights.

This is why we have used the term in public statements. And we do not regret using it to condemn military dictatorship, even though this could have the effect of defending the elections the Peronists won; or to condemn the Navarro coup, even though this could have the effect in practice of defending Obregón Cano; or to condemn a coup d'état now, even if this has the effect of defending the Peronist government.

"Anyone who cannot defend a higher form of government against a lower one does not deserve to be called a revolutionist." (Lenin)

Neither the government of Obregón Cano nor the one of María Estela Martínez de Perón is the revolutionary socialist workers' government we want. But we condemn and will condemn any reactionary attempt to overthrow these governments, and we will fight together with them against

the common enemy for two reasons.

The first is that as far as we are concerned only the workers have the right to elect and to remove governments. As long as the masses want these governments, we will fight together with them against any reactionaries that try to overthrow them. At the same time we will patiently explain, until we convince the majority of workers, that what is needed is a socialist workers' government, that the constitution that governs Peronist Argentina is a bourgeois constitution and it serves the interests of the exploiters, that under Peronism the organization and leadership of the country is in the hands of the bosses, and that the working class must develop a new program, a new socialist, working-class plan and constitution, to replace this kind of organization and leadership.

And the other reason is that we must distinguish carefully among the various kinds of bourgeois governments. It is true that Perón's government was just as bourgeois as the one of Aramburu and Rojas. This can be easily demonstrated. Under Perón as well as under Aramburu and Rojas, the owners of the factories and those who controlled the police, the armed forces, and all institutions were bosses or agents of bosses.

Nonetheless, there were profound differences between the Peronist government and the "gorilla" dictatorship. For example, under Perón, the plant committees functioned; Aramburu tried to ban them. Under Perón, the unions could operate, although with bureaucratic leaders; Aramburu sent in military interventors. That is, the bosses' government of Perón was vastly more favorable for the workers and for the country than the bosses' dictatorship of Aramburu and Rojas.

This is what Lenin was referring to when he said that every revolutionist had to distinguish between forms of government and defend the higher ones. These forms are higher because they give a basis for better elements, types of organization, and more rights and opportunities for the workers so that they can fight the bosses more effectively to win their class and socialist objectives. What these higher forms of organization—which may be unions or revolutionary parties granted legal status by bourgeois gov-

ernments—represent precisely are islands, tools of workers' power, the first fragments of power won by the workers that are advance installments of the future workers' government and the future socialist society.

How must the process of institutionalization be defended?

The fact that in defending democratic rights our position coincides with that of non-working-class and non-socialist currents and parties does not mean that we agree with them on anything else or on the way to defend these democratic rights.

Our party will always agree with Balbin and the FAS [Frente Anti-imperialista y por el Socialismo—Front Against Imperialism and for Socialism] lawyers in opposing by all means the suppression of the daily *El Mundo*. Balbin does this in the name of the bourgeois liberal constitution he supports. We do so in the name of workers' democracy and socialism.

These convergences with bourgeois sectors can be expressed in the form of limited agreements, documents, statements, etc. A recent example was the rally organized by our party in condemnation of the Pacheco Massacre,* in which, besides the left, almost all the bourgeois democratic forces participated. All these various types of public actions, from joint communiqués to rallies, are useful and help to create the kind of social consciousness and climate needed to defend civil liberties or condemn fascism. Moreover, they safeguard and reinforce the legal rights of the revolutionary party.

It would be naïve, or—worse still—legalistic cretinism, to think that these rights can be defended simply by a scrap of paper or from a public platform. In our country, moreover, this would mean completely ignoring recent history. Here, the celebrated "process of institutionalization" is the direct result of the Cordobazo. It was this great mobilization of the workers and the people that awakened and spurred the dormant democratic consciences of the bourgeoisie. Since then, every gain, every prize, has been the result of great struggles, strikes, demonstrations, occupations, and mobilizations. The pride of our party,

*The murder of three members of the PST by rightist goons.—IP

the only militant left party intelligent enough to take the lead in the "institutionalization," is precisely that it has

intervened in every one of these struggles, strikes, demonstrations, occupations, and mobilizations. □

Program of the PAIGC

[The following text of the program of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde (PAIGC—the African party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) was published in the June 13 issue of the Lisbon daily *Diário de Lisboa*. It was not specifically indicated whether this was the text of the program as amended and brought up to date by the PAIGC congress of July 1973. According to an Agence France-Presse report of July 22, the revised program was first disseminated in its entirety in a July 20 broadcast by the PAIGC station, Radio Libertação. The translation of the text published in *Diário de Lisboa* is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

I. Immediate and Total Independence

1. To win immediate and total, unconditional independence for the people of Guinea and the people of Cape Verde by any means necessary.

2. To win power in Guinea for the Guinean people and in Cape Verde for the Cape Verdean people.

3. To eliminate all colonialist- or imperialist-type relationships—end the privileges of the Portuguese and other foreigners; disavow all accords, treaties, alliances, and concessions contracted by the Portuguese colonialists that have to do with Guinea and Cape Verde.

4. Sovereignty for Guinea and Cape Verde in their domestic affairs and international relations. Economic, political, diplomatic, military, and cultural independence.

5. Constant vigilance, based on the popular will, to block or crush all attempts by the imperialists and the colonialists to reestablish themselves in Guinea and Cape Verde in new forms.

II. National Unity in Guinea and Cape Verde

1. Equal rights and duties for all,

firm union and fraternal cooperation among all citizens regardless of the social layer or ethnic group to which they belong. Outlawing and eliminating all attempts to divide the people.

2. Economic, social, and cultural unity. In Guinea, this unity will take into account the social and cultural characteristics of the various ethnic groups, regardless of their size. In Cape Verde, every island or group of neighboring or related islands will be able to enjoy administrative autonomy within the framework of national unity and solidarity.

3. Return to Guinea of all emigrants who want to come back to their country. Return to Cape Verde of all emigrants or exported workers who want to return to their country.

4. Freedom of movement throughout the national territory for all citizens.

III. Union Between the Peoples of Guinea and Cape Verde

1. After the national independence of Guinea and Cape Verde is won, union of these two peoples on the basis of the popular will—which will be consulted at the proper time—so that they can build a strong and progressive African nation.

2. The form of union between these two peoples will be decided by their freely elected, legitimate representatives.

3. Equality in rights and duties, firm union and fraternal cooperation among Guineans and Cape Verdeans. Outlawing and eradicating all attempts to divide the two peoples.

IV. African Unity

1. After national independence is won, to fight, based on the freely expressed popular will, for the unity of the African peoples both on the continental and regional levels, with respect for the right of these peoples to political, economic, and social

progress.

2. To combat any and all attempts at annexation or applying pressure directed against Guinea or Cape Verde by other countries.

3. To defend the rights as well as the political, economic, social, and cultural gains of the peasants and urban workers in Guinea and Cape Verde as the prerequisite for achieving unity with other African peoples.

V. A Democratic, Anticolonialist, and Anti-Imperialist Regime

1. A democratic, secular, anticolonialist and anti-imperialist republican regime.

2. The establishment of the fundamental liberties, respect for human rights, and guaranteed exercise of these rights.

3. Equality of citizens before the law without regard to their nationality, ethnic group, sex, social origin, professional status, means, religious belief, or philosophical convictions.

Men and women will enjoy equal status in family life, work, and public life.

4. All individuals or groups of individuals that by their activity or behavior promote colonialism, imperialism, or divisions in the working class will be deprived by all means necessary of their fundamental liberties.

5. There will be executive and legislative branches of government. The legislative branch will be chosen by universal and direct vote by secret ballot. It will then elect the executive authority.

6. The autonomous regions in Guinea and in the islands and island groups of Cape Verde will have the power to take regional measures within the framework of national unity.

7. Protection for the person of all foreigners residing in Guinea or Cape Verde who respect the laws in force.

VI. Economic Independence, Organization of the Economy, Advancing Production

1. Elimination of all colonialist- and imperialist-type economic relations. Winning economic independence for Guinea and Cape Verde.

2. Planned and balanced development of the economy. Economic ac-

tivity will be guided by the principles of democratic centralism.

3. There will be four types of ownership: state ownership, cooperative ownership, private ownership, and personal ownership. The following resources will be exploited by the state as the property of the nation in Guinea and Cape Verde: mineral resources and the primary sources of energy, the forests, the waterways and other water resources, the means of industrial production, mass transport and the means of communication, ships and insurance, the radio and other means of disseminating information and culture.

The following will be exploited cooperatively on the basis of free consent: the land and agricultural production, consumer-goods and craft production.

Private exploitation of resources other than those that belong to the nation will be permitted when it promotes the economic development of Guinea or Cape Verde.

Personal ownership—in particular, of items of individual consumption, homes, and savings from income earned by labor—will be inviolable.

4. Development and modernization. Transformation of the system of tillage so as to end the one-crop economy: Abolition of the requirement to grow *mancarra* in Guinea and of the exclusive concentration on growing millet in Cape Verde. To overcome agricultural crises, droughts, and famines.

5. Agrarian reform in Cape Verde to do away with the big private estates and tenant farming; limiting the size of private landholdings in the countryside and giving sufficient land to all peasants. In Guinea, using the traditional agrarian structures and creating new structures so that the cultivation of the land can best advance the progress of the people.

In both Guinea and Cape Verde, nationalization of the lands and other property belonging to proven enemies of the freedom of the people and the independence of the nation.

6. Development of industry and commerce on a modern footing. Progressive development of the state industrial and commercial enterprises. Development of the African crafts. Control of foreign trade and coordination of domestic trade by the state. Adjustment and stabilization of prices. Elimination of speculation. A balanced relationship between economic activities in the cities and in the countryside.

7. A balanced budget. Creation of a new tax system. Creation of a stable national currency secure against inflation.

VII. Social Justice and Progress for All

1. Elimination of the exploitation of one person by another and all forms of subjecting human beings to unworthy interests for the gain of individuals, groups, or classes. Elimination of unjust profits. Elimination of poverty, ignorance, fear, prostitution, and alcoholism.

2. Protection of the rights of labor and a guarantee of jobs for all those able to work. Abolition of forced labor in Guinea and the export of forced, or "contract" laborers from Cape Verde.

3. Fair wages and salaries based on the principle of equal pay for equal work. Constructive emulation on the job. Limitation of the work day in accordance with the needs of progress and the interests of the workers. Progressive elimination of inequalities between workers in the cities and in the countryside.

4. Guaranteed trade-union rights. Real participation and creative initiative by the workers in running the nation at all levels. Promoting and supporting mass organizations in the countryside and in the cities, especially among the women and the youth.

5. Social assistance for all citizens who need it through no fault of their own because of unemployment, disability, or illness. All public health and hygiene facilities will be in the hands of the state.

6. Setting aside time for social welfare linked to productive activities. Protection for pregnant women and children. Protection for the elderly. Rest, recreation, and cultural facilities for manual and intellectual workers in the cities and in the countryside.

7. Assistance to those persons, and their families, who have suffered as a result of the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism and imperialism.

Education and Culture

1. Educational, scientific, and technical institutions will be considered the property of the nation and as such will be in the hands of the state. Re-

form of education, advancement of secondary and technical education, establishment of a system of higher education and scientific and technical institutes.

2. Rapid elimination of illiteracy. Free compulsory primary education. A crash program for training technicians and professionals and raising their qualifications.

3. Complete elimination of all the complexes created by colonialism, of the consequences of colonialist culture and exploitation.

4. In Guinea, promotion of the native languages, as well as the *crioulo* dialect, and the development of a system for writing these languages. In Cape Verde, promotion of the *crioulo* dialect in both spoken and written forms. Promotion of the cultures of the various ethnic groups and of the Cape Verdean people. Protection and promotion of the national literature and arts.

5. Utilizing all the values and gains of universal human culture to promote the progress of the peoples of Guinea and Cape Verde. Seeing that the culture of these peoples contributes to the progress of humanity in general.

6. Supporting and developing physical education and sports for all citizens of Guinea and Cape Verde.

7. Freedom of religion, the right to profess any religion or none. Protection of churches, sacred places and objects, as well as religious foundations. Freedom from foreign control for the professional personnel of religious groups.

VIII. Effective National Defense Linked to the People

1. Development of the necessary instruments for an effective national defense—an army, navy, and air force linked to the people and led by citizens of the nation. Using those who fought for national independence to form the central nucleus of this defense force.

2. A democratic regime in the armed forces. Discipline. Firm ties between the armed forces and the political authority that will preside over the life of the nation as a whole.

3. The entire people will be called upon to help maintain our guard and our defenses against the colonialists and the imperialists.

4. A strict ban on any foreign bases

on the national territory.

5. Military solidarity with the African nations subjected to colonialist or imperialist aggressions.

IX. An Independent National Policy in the Interests of the Nation, of Africa, of Peace, of Progress, and of Humanity

1. Peaceful cooperation with all the peoples of the world on the basis of

mutual respect, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in the internal affairs of any country, equality and mutual advantage, and peaceful coexistence.

2. The advancement of economic and cultural relations with all peoples whose governments are not colonialist or imperialist.

3. Respect for the United Nations Charter.

4. Nonadherence to military blocs.

5. Protection of Guineans and Cape Verdeans residing abroad. □

'Perspective' Reviews 'Disaster in Chile'

[For the information of our readers, we reproduce below a review of *Disaster in Chile* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974. 271 pp. \$2.95) that appeared in the June issue of *Perspective*, a monthly political-science journal published in Washington, D.C.]

* * *

Studies of the experiment in democratic socialism in Chile will begin to appear in great numbers now that Salvador Allende is dead. Les Evans has produced a necessary early contribution to this debate, drawing together material from eight Marxist observers. Evans, editor of a monthly Marxist magazine, considers the Chilean socialist strategy to have been a failure; and the 45 short articles beginning with one entitled "The End of Frei's Revolution in Liberty," taken from *Intercontinental Press* (September 14, 1970) attempt to reconstruct the Trotskyist critique of Chile.

"Except for the Trotskyists, every other tendency on the left misunderstood—willfully or otherwise—in face of mounting evidence—the inherent and self-imposed limitations of the Allende government," says Evans in the introduction. The limitations which the Trotskyists feel were most serious are, first of all, that Allende and the "Chilean Stalinists" hoped to gain acceptance for their objectives from "progressive" bourgeois elements, primarily from the Christian Democratic Party. "Allende's second fatal misconception was that the bourgeoisie would remain bound by the rules of

bourgeois democracy when these conflicted with its class interests." (p. 13)

The six chapters and short appendix on "Chile and the Global Struggle for Raw Materials" by Dick Roberts are chronologically organized. One can perhaps best understand the nature of the book, how it develops the struggle in Chile between 1970 and September 11, 1973, when the coup took place, by listing the chapter headings: "The Victory of the Unidad Popular," "Popular Frontism in Office the First Year," "The October 1972 Bosses' Strike and Allende's Turn to the Military," "The March 1973 Elections and the Rise of the Cordones," "The Approaching Showdown," and "The Downfall of Popular Frontism."

This deceptively topical organization hides what turns out to be the most extraordinary value of this collection: its prophetic quality. That is to say, most of the material is not retrospective but rather was written contemporarily with the events described. Some of it, for instance, consists of news features produced by Hugo Blanco, the exiled Trotskyist Peruvian peasant movement leader, who lived in Chile. Most of the material anticipated the final breakdown quite insightfully.

In December of 1971 the Fourth International (Trotskyist Party) passed a resolution on Chile in which it called for the rejection of collaboration with Chilean bourgeois elements and warned that "the working class must consider its own self-defense as an elementary task." "The task facing the workers and peasants is to arm themselves, to form political and military instruments of self-defense, to organize

a genuine popular militia, to disseminate revolutionary propaganda among soldiers." (p. 89)

News features such as Gerry Foley's "The Workers Move Forward—As Allende Retreats" (December 4, 1972) are quite fascinating because they produce a very critical picture of Allende and of what Foley calls "the miserable capitulation of the UP [Unidad Popular, as Allende's leftist coalition was called] parties." (p. 142) Hugo Blanco in April of 1973 describes further the conflict between the workers and UP leadership, especially the consolidation of what he calls the "UP's Right Wing" against spontaneous workers action.

Disaster in Chile is a manifestation of the deep controversy and conflict among various Marxist groups which should be invaluable for students of Marxism as well as those interested in Chile and Latin America. The elitist posture of much of the UP leadership; the failure to arm, train, and mobilize workers and peasants; the collaboration with and bringing into the cabinet of military officers are all skillfully critiqued. Some of the articles produce a picture of workers in factories trying to resist the final attack against Allende's regime but either unarmed (the arms caches locked in various party headquarters) or unable to use arms because no one taught them how. The coup and its aftermath are also well described in many cases by participants in the UP government.

There is no other collection like this book and, given the nature of it, its critical objectives, it is unlikely that quite the same approach to discussing Chile will emerge. The forthcoming volume by Valenzuela and Valenzuela is a much more comprehensive scholarly view of various institutions and processes in Chile as is Johnson's *The Chilean Road to Socialism*. This book serves actually two functions: first, it is a useful recapitulation of Allende's government in Chile. Of course, it produces a rather narrow interpretation of the events, but the major developments during the UP period are there. Second, it contributes very rich materials to the critiques within Marxist ideology of the "Stalinist" strategy; it is a very serious condemnation of the idea that a "Chilean way to socialism" is possible.

Steffen W. Schmidt
Iowa State University

Intercontinental Press