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
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## After Perón, What Next for the Argentine Bourgeoisie?



Switzerland

**Separatism & Regional Underdevelopment**

Entrevista con Hugo Blanco

**Sobre la Situación de América Latina**

## Boom in Pet Foods

According to a study carried out by a panel of twenty-six experts commissioned by the U.S. Senate Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, the sale of pet foods in the United States "rose by 12 per cent over the first nine months of 1973."

Part of the spectacular rise might be attributed to the population explosion among pets in the world's richest country. However, the study estimates that "as much as one-third of the pet foods sold in ghetto areas [are] being used for human consumption. For areas with high proportions of elderly poor, the estimates [are] even higher."

In reporting to the Senate committee on June 19, Ronald Pollack, who headed the study panel, stated: "I would be pleased to tell you that we have made substantial progress in the effort to eradicate hunger. However, to do so would be untruthful. For the sad and tragic truth is that, over the past several years, we have moved backwards in our struggle to end hunger, poverty and malnutrition."

Food costs have risen at a much higher rate than welfare payments or government allowances of food stamps (U.S. forms of the dole)—or wages. Pollack noted that pork sausages increased in price by 68.8 percent between December 1970 and last March; rib roasts, 43.3 percent; hamburgers, 60.3 percent; and dried beans, 256 percent.

This resulted, naturally, in heightened demand for cat and dog foods, which are heavily advertised on television for their protein content, nutritiousness, and savor.

The well-known columnist Jack Anderson, who is of an experimental cast of mind, had his associate Les Whitten try out some of the pet foods.

"He found the canned pet foods, though edible, had a rank taste which made him queasy," Anderson reported. "The dry foods, sold in bulk quantities, were coarse tasting and hard to swallow."

"When he mixed them with water and salted them, they were at least palatable. Peanut butter or cheese spread made dry dog foods easier to get down, he found. But the poor seldom can afford these tasty spreads." □

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## After Perón, What Next for Argentine Bourgeoisie?

By Gerry Foley

"Crowds that had gathered outside the cathedral began shouting 'Perón! Perón!' as the mass ended and the coffin was carried out. A few women and men shrieked and fainted. The crush of mourners was so great," Jonathan Kandell cabled July 2 to the *New York Times*, "that it took the cortege almost an hour, despite fierce shoving and kicking by policemen, to travel the 10 blocks to the National Congress building, where the general's body was to lie in state.

"The lines of mourners waiting to pass by his bier—to touch him, kiss his face or wipe handkerchiefs over his brow—wound through narrow streets and broad avenues for several miles. The numbers were so great that the funeral service, originally scheduled for tomorrow, was postponed until Thursday [July 4] to permit another day of lying in state."

Already by July 2, the Buenos Aires daily *La Razón* reported, more than 17,000 persons among the crowds waiting to see Perón's body had required first-aid treatment. Most were apparently suffering from forms of hysteria.

The Peronist trade-union bureaucracy, which had been one of the main builders—and the most direct beneficiary—of the myth of the "people's general," filled the papers with *solicitudes* (paid advertisements) exalting their vanished caudillo.

The building-workers union advertisement proclaimed: "Perón is eternal . . . the 'líder' lives in the hearts of his people. . . . Perón is not dead, long live Perón!"

The restaurant workers union said: "Perón will continue to guide us from eternity."

The *solicitud* of the Asociación de Empleados de la Dirección General Impositiva (Association of Central Tax Bureau Employees) was one of the most lyrical: "Now is not the time for warnings, but here by the side of this fallen condor we swear to complete his revolution, overcoming any enemy that may try to take advantage of our irreparable loss.

"General, now that God has called you to His side, along with the cry of 'present' that we offer you as soldiers of the national cause, we repeat respectfully before your tomb: 'General, how great you are.'"

Most of the innumerable *solicitudes* stressed the need for national unity around Perón's designated heir. "He lived and died for the Fatherland and for his People," the union of workers in the state-owned oil fields proclaimed. "PERON still lives in this Fatherland and in this People. It was our Lord God's will that Perón return to the land of his birth to show us the road, the road of *National Unity*, and to summon us to accomplish a task, the *Liberation*, and the *Reconstruction* of our country. We state oil-field workers will not depart from this mission. . . . We declare:

"1. We share in the immense grief provoked by the physical death of the outstanding Leader of the Social Justice Movement and the President of the Argentines, Lieutenant General D. [sic] Juan D. PERON.

"2. We will continue in his footsteps, accepting the principle of centralized command. This command is now fully assumed by the vice president of the Argentine Nation who heads the executive branch, Maria Estela Martínez de PERON, to whom we offer our most resolute support in her administration of government.

"3. We confirm our adherence to the Confederación General del Trabajo [CGT—General Confederation of Labor, the national union federation built largely by Perón] and the 62 Organizations [the traditional Peronist union bloc], giving the same total support for the basic approach and objectives determined by the doctrinal principles of the ideology of Social Justice.

"4. In this spirit, we pledge to defend the fundamental institutions of the country, loyally and patriotically serving the ideal of National Unity in order to achieve the only truth, PERON's dream of seeing our Fatherland become *la ARGENTINA POTENCIA* [the great-power Argentina].

"5. In this moment of mourning, before the mortal remains of our Illustrious Chief, D. Juan D. PERON, we pledge to the people to maintain absolute loyalty to the principles for which he fought and to the persons on whom he lavished all his love."

*New York Times* correspondent Kandell reported in his July 2 dispatch: "The outpouring of grief appeared temporarily to drown the bitter divisions—within the Peronist movement between Peronists and anti-Peronists, leftists and rightists—that General Perón was unable to stifle during the nine months of his final Presidential term.

"Conservative trade unionists, youths identified with the left-wing Peronist guerrillas, middle-class families and the urban poor all milled about the heart of Buenos Aires, but no significant incidents were reported."

Like the original Bonaparte, the demagogic general achieved his broadest spectrum of support in death. Excommunicated by the Catholic church in the mid-1950s when he cut state subsidies to religion, Perón was given the clergy's highest recommendations as he "passed into eternity."

"And at the service today a different Cardinal, Antonio Caggiano, hailed the late President as a 'Christian,' a 'humanist' and a man who 'was an enemy of violence,'" Kandell reported in the same dispatch. "He praised General Perón for having negotiated alliances with business and organized labor, and laid full blame for the violence that has wracked the country on left-wing guerrillas."

The Communist party, which during Perón's initial term had attacked him as a "fascist" who allegedly supported Germany against the "democratic" imperialist powers, and then later, in the 1950s, attacked him as a "lackey of Washington," also rallied at last to the "people's general."

"The Communist party of Argentina published a statement," a TASS dispatch in the July 3 *Izvestiia* noted, "saying that President Perón had focused his efforts on strengthening democracy and achieving national uni-



ty. It was pointed out that the foreign policy of his government [presumably increased trade with the Soviet-bloc countries] corresponded to the interests of Argentina."

Even the *New York Times*, one of the principal voices of U.S. imperialism and one of the rejoicers at Perón's overthrow in 1955, held that the old caudillo's death was particularly unfortunate and untimely. A July 2 editorial said:

"The supreme tragedy in the life of Juan Domingo Perón is simply stated: By the time he was willing to deploy his undoubted capacity for leadership and his formidable political skills to the task of bringing together a divided and drifting Argentina, it was too late. At 78 and suffering from respiratory illness complicated by a weakened heart, he could only work part-time at the job of President that he had triumphantly regained in a free election landslide last September after eighteen years of exile."

But even in the midst of the general mourning, the *Times*, it seemed, could not forget its old grievances against "the Supreme Leader of the Argentine Nation":

"His [Perón's] efforts to rebuild Argentine unity, domestic peace and economic stability during the last nine months of his life stood out in marked contrast to the fascist-type demagoguery of his nine earlier years as President (1946-55). Then in his prime, he squandered his talents and his support—stoking class war, provoking mob violence, jailing and silencing opponents and running a flourishing economy into the ground with extravagance and statism."

Perón, like any Bonaparte, ruthlessly suppressed his political opponents, in particular the workers' leaders and militants who threatened to upset his game of balancing between classes, of basing himself on the support of the workers to advance the interests of the Argentine national capitalists. But his "silencing opponents" was notably ineffective against the Washington-supported military coup that overthrew him in 1955.

In the postwar period, Perón was able to exploit the conflict between British imperialism, which by then was in full retreat, and American imperialism, which had not yet firmly established its dominance in Argentina, to develop a somewhat nationalistic economic policy. He also had the benefit of the financial and trading

advantages Argentina gained as one of the main sources of foodstuffs for a war-ravished Europe. In his conflict with U.S. imperialism and the older sectors of the Argentine ruling class, he based himself on the working class and promoted mass unionization.

In these circumstances, it was both profitable and possible for Perón to offer relatively substantial concessions to the workers. They achieved a standard of living in his first term that was unprecedented in Argentina and has not been equaled since.

In fact, the real wages of Argentine workers began to be cut drastically almost immediately after the violent military coup that overthrew Perón. And this deterioration continued steadily under all the succeeding regimes, in which the army first exercised veto power and then, from 1966 to 1972, held power directly. Thus, the reign of the populist caudillo came to be looked on by the masses as a kind of golden age, or a lost paradise.

As their conditions grew worse, the hard-pressed Argentine poor found a kind of solace and hope in dreams of Perón returning, like a messiah, in a "black airplane." And this cult was fostered by the bureaucracy of the mass trade-union and political movement that he had built up. It seems now to have reached a paroxysm in the mass hysteria of grief over the death of the long-awaited savior, with thousands of poor Argentines fainting and collapsing from nervous exhaustion at the foot of his coffin, and who knows how many thousands and tens of thousands more lighting candles in front of idealized photographs of their lost idol.

The basis of the Perón myth had already disappeared before he was overthrown in the 1950s. Argentina's wartime reserves were exhausted, the conflict between American and British imperialism was settled, and the timid nationalist economic measures that had been carried out were now regarded as a burden rather than a benefit by the decisive sections of Argentine capital. Perón was no longer able to offer concessions to the workers and faced the prospect of sharpening conflicts with labor and growing disillusionment among his most devoted supporters.

Although it was obvious that the capitalists were preparing to over-

throw him, Perón was too loyal to the bourgeoisie and his own bourgeois perspectives to permit the workers to mobilize to block the coup. That would have begun a process incompatible with the survival of capitalism in Argentina. After his ouster, Perón could no more restore the golden age of his first term than Bonnie Prince Charlie could restore the patriarchal relations of the clan system with which he became identified in the eyes of the Scottish Highlanders who followed him and sacrificed themselves in his name.

But it was precisely the myth, the cult of Perón, that made him useful to the Argentine bourgeoisie when all of its other institutions had become discredited and it found that it could no longer rule by military coercion alone. The mythical hero was brought back, not to restore the lost golden age of Argentine labor, but to convince the workers to accept a "discipline" that could no longer be imposed on them by physical coercion.

For labor, the most notable result of Perón's second administration has been not a marked rise in the workers' standard of living but creation of the Social Pact, a wage restraint agreement between the union bureaucrats and the bosses, that is, the "alliances between business and organized labor" for which Cardinal Caggiano praised the former "scourge of Christianity." This was the use of his "undoubted capacity for leadership and his formidable political skills" that the *New York Times* approved of in its July 2 editorial.

However, while the editors of the *Times* regarded Perón's final use of his charisma as highly positive, they seemed to show very little appreciation of what was required to build up and maintain such a cult. For example, they noted:

"Some of General Perón's difficulties after his return had to do with the fact that during his exile disgruntled groups ranging from the fascist right to the Marxist left had assembled under his Justicialist banner. He could not satisfy them all and his moderate course consistently provoked left-wing youth groups, which he had bitterly assailed in the last few weeks."

There is no sense, after all, to praising Perón for devoting himself to the task of "bringing together a divided



and drifting Argentina" and then complaining that "he could not satisfy" all the elements in his coalition. His success as a bourgeois demagogue depended precisely on encouraging contradictory hopes. In particular, he had to play off different elements alternatively against each other.

In the late 1960s, when it appeared that the trade-union bureaucracy might make a deal with the military regime and abandon Peronism, the caudillo gave the nod to the radical youth. The leader of the rightist bureaucracy, Vandor, was assassinated, apparently by left-wing commandos. When Perón needed to suppress the more militant elements in order to maintain the Social Pact, he encouraged the trade-union bureaucracy's goon squads to slaughter his devoted young radical followers. This was precisely what his "formidable political skills" consisted of.

"Perhaps his greatest shortcoming, however, was his inability to share power," the *Times* editorial complained. "This caused him, during his exile as well as after his return home, to cut down any aide or deputy who might conceivably have posed a challenge to his leadership. It was this tendency that caused him to impose as his Vice-Presidential running mate last September his third wife, María Estela (Isabel) Martínez, wholly without experience of statecraft."

However, the charismatic demagogic leadership that the *Times* regarded as such a positive factor in its last phase depended precisely on Perón's personal touch. This could not be relegated to subordinates, for they would have become leaders of vying groups in the Peronist coalition. Perón could only maintain the unity of his largely working-class movement and keep it within the framework of his bourgeois objectives by subordinating it totally to his person and his legend.

Naturally such a system of leadership and control stands in the way of orderly succession. But that disadvantage is an inevitable corollary of the advantages Perón's role represented for the bourgeoisie. Of course, in the crisis produced by the disappearance of the indispensable Bonaparte, the fears of the defenders of the *status quo* come to the fore. This was evident in the *Times*' criticism of Perón's personalism. The editorial, after

all, was not very optimistic about the prospects for bourgeois stability in Argentina:



Ricardo Balbin offers his condolences to María Estela Perón.

"Señora Perón, who now becomes President at 43, will doubtless command the sympathy and the immediate support of a vast majority of Argentines. With Argentina still plagued by Marxist terrorism, inflation and unrest, she will need all the sympathy and support she can get."

The aura of political legitimacy that Perón sought to bequeath to his last wife is not likely to last much longer than the period of mourning. For a short time, the mass emotionalism, fed by the media and nearly all the bourgeois institutions, may hide the furious struggle among the different factions in the Peronist movement and the scramble of the bourgeois politicians for a new formula that can offer hope for at least temporarily stabilizing the class struggle.

It seems unlikely that a viable solution even in the short term can be found within the framework of the Peronist movement itself. Its credibility as a united national movement has been badly shaken, if not destroyed, by two years of gun battles and assassinations involving the left and right factions. In fact, in March

the right-wing Peronists removed the left-wing Peronist governor in Córdoba by an armed coup d'état. Moreover, struggles in the presidential palace of the type likely to develop in the days to come are not suited to producing leaders or formulas that can renew the confidence of the masses in the ability of the official Peronist family to "unite the nation."

At this point, the Argentine bourgeoisie's main hope for achieving a new reprieve seems to lie with the "democratic and progressive opposition"—that is, essentially the UCR (Unión Cívica Radical) and the CP-led left liberal coalition, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria (People's Revolutionary Alliance).

The bourgeois and petty-bourgeois opposition has pledged its support to the "process of national and social liberation" that Perón promised to carry out. At the same time it has denounced the "undemocratic" tendencies in the Peronist movement, that is, the gang terror that the government and its right-wing supporters have used to maintain the Social Pact. It has thus sought to establish an image attractive to the masses entranced with Peronism; and, for the bourgeoisie, an image of "law and order" respectability and political dependability.

The idea of an all-party government has already been aired. After the old caudillo forced the liberal Cárpora to resign as president and opened a turn to the right, important sectors of the bourgeois political world responded by favoring an "enlarged coalition" to be symbolized by a Perón-Balbin ticket. Perhaps because he needed a completely personal regime to carry out the difficult process of "restoring order" in his movement, Perón rejected this idea at the time. But once the main Peronist left leaders capitulated after a series of sharp blows, and the caudillo began to feel the need to shift his weight toward the center, he started once again to court the opposition, saying that in many ways he found it easier to work with than his own movement.

Now with the death of the charismatic leader, with rising fears of a civil war between the Peronist factions, and with mounting resistance to the renewed rightist terror, some of Argentina's bourgeois leaders may think the situation calls for an all-party government of national unity. In any case, the most prominent protagonist of this solution, Balbin, was quick

to float a trial balloon.

"While hundreds of thousands of grieyed Argentines are waiting patiently in lines to bid their last farewell to the deceased President Juan D. Perón," an AP dispatch noted in the July 4 issue of the New York Spanish-language paper *El Diario-La Prensa*, "various prominent political leaders were studying how to shore up President Isabel Perón and the constitutional regime.

"Reliable sources reported that after the end of the official mourning for Perón, there will be a meeting of political leaders to consider questions running from the possibility of a coalition cabinet to how to overcome the

many problems Mrs. Perón is expected to encounter. . . .

"Ricardo Balbin, the chairman of the Unión Cívica Radical, the second largest Argentine party, will probably draw up the invitations. It is expected that representatives of the ruling Peronist movement and a series of parties from the Communists to center groupings will be present.

"It is considered certain that leaders of the Peronist-controlled Confederación General del Trabajo . . . as well as leaders of the Confederación General Económica [CGE—General Confederation of Business], which collaborates closely with the government, will be present." □

## 'All Marxist Organizations' Threatened

### Rightists Continue Attacks on PST

"Watch it, Bolshies, we're going to kill you" painted on factory walls; an attempt to burn the Mar del Plata headquarters; union activists fired; threatening leaflets and communiqués—these are the latest forms of harassment against the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party, an Argentine sympathizing organization of the Fourth International).

The June 26 *Avanzada Socialista*, weekly of the PST, provided details on the written threats:

The antiguerrilla Condor Commando Group issued a leaflet in Mar del Plata, stating that they were going "to wage an underground fight against all Marxist organizations, especially the PST."

At the San Javier Foundry in Morón a "Communiqué to the Socialists" signed by the San Javier Peronist Commando Group accused "a little group of gentlemen," "mercenaries in the pay of international reaction" of "shameful plans." The commandos elaborated: "We thank the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores for services rendered against the people's government. . . .

"These little sectarian socialist groups now know that the people's government can be meek and tolerant, but not stupid. Therefore we will act regardless of the consequences, regardless of who may be victimized. . . ."

The class-struggle plant committee at the foundry called an assembly at which the threats were denounced. "Although we do not have to go to the

extremes of these goons, if it comes to that, they will be the ones to be smashed, because we have them spotted," said one worker.

On June 13 two PST members were fired from their jobs: Hugo Barros from a Swift plant and Roberto Loscertales from the Río Santiago Shipyards. *Avanzada Socialista* linked the firings to an incident that occurred three days later: The Asociación de Trabajadores de la Universidad de La Plata (ATULP—University of La Plata Employees' Association) was reported expelled from the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor). The two PST members and ATULP had been actively supporting a strike at the Propulsora Iron and Steel Works.

Barros has a long record of union and social involvement. When his co-workers learned that he had been fired, they immediately went to the shop stewards to demand his reinstatement. The bureaucrats and bosses stalled. Finally, as *Avanzada Socialista* described it, "In a magnificent display of unity in action, the JTP [Juventud Trabajadora Peronista—Peronist Worker Youth] handed out a leaflet calling on the entire factory to fight for the compañero who had been fired." Other tendencies in the union did the same, and the following day Barros was reinstated

The wave of repression against those opposing the Peronist wage-price freeze also hit a leading maritime worker in Mar del Plata. S. Olobardi,

a left Peronist militant, was injured when he fought off kidnappers in mid-June. During the fight three police agents were also injured. Olobardi was arrested—accused of belonging to the group of escaped kidnappers. He was still being held incommunicado as of June 26. Shortly before, Olobardi had been in the forefront of a confrontation with the Ministry of Labor over union issues.

Twenty-nine members of the Partido Comunista Revolucionario (PCR—Revolutionary Communist party, an ultraleft pro-Chinese group) in Misiones were arrested June 8. The police claimed that they found "subversive" material, arms, ammunition, and maps of army and police installations in the house where the arrests were made. Even the bourgeois press did not swallow the story. "As is customary in such proceedings, the 'compromising' material 'found' showed no such character. It is what one usually finds among youth," wrote the daily *El Territorio*.

On the evening of June 22, two youths were gunned down in front of a Buenos Aires trade-union hall, where a dance was being held. Among the assassins were a union bureaucrat and an off-duty policeman in civilian clothes. Since the victims had no union or party affiliations, authorities maintained that the crime was not of a political nature.

*Avanzada Socialista's* editorial in response to this assertion applies equally to all these attacks:

"Although this might not have been the intention of the government, isn't their position indirectly to favor the development of these groups? Isn't that why such groups feel that they can act with total impunity?

"The conclusion is that this certainly is a political assassination. Even if the victims are not activists in some union or party, it is a political act because of the persons who committed it and because it is the product of a policy of allowing the perpetrators of this kind of deed to go unpunished." □

### New Ideological Weapon?

On June 18, Hsinhua, the Chinese government news agency, issued a press communique that began: "In the excellent situation in which the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius is developing in depth, China successfully conducted a new nuclear test over the western region of the country at 2 p.m. on June 17, 1974."

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## New Strikes Challenge Junta's Crackdown

The Portuguese junta has continued to move ahead rapidly, after crushing the postal workers' strike on June 20, to try to eliminate the liberties the masses won in the wake of the April 25 coup. Immediately after its victory over the postal workers, it passed a harsh press-censorship law. On July 3, the new regulations were implemented.

"The newspaper A Capital was fined \$4,000 and Republica, \$1,200," the *New York Times* reported July 4, "for publishing news of a demonstration staged last week against the arrest of two officers who had refused to accept a plan to assume military control of the strikebound post office. The strike collapsed before the plan could be put into effect."

The postal workers' strike was broken primarily by political pressures. The Communist party, the strongest political party in the labor movement and in the government, mobilized against the strikers, calling them accomplices of the "fascists."

The Communist party, which holds the Ministry of Labor in the provisional government, proved its usefulness to the junta, since if the strike had continued, the "patriotic" officers would apparently have had difficulties in carrying out their threat to conscript the workers.

Nor could there be any doubt about the usefulness of the Socialist party ministers to the bourgeois nationalist junta. One in particular was called upon to demonstrate unusual devotion to his office.

"The charges against Republica were not made known," the *New York Times* noted in its July 4 article, "but the action was particularly embarrassing because the Minister of Information, Raul Rego, was its publisher. The ministry informed the papers of the sanctions."

Rego is a well-known Socialist party personality, and his paper, *República*, generally reflects the outlook of that party.

Under the Caetano regime, *República* was the only daily courageous enough to oppose the government. Under the new regime, the publisher

has taken on the task of repressing his own paper.

The postal strike and its aftermath have illustrated the strengths and weaknesses of the new regime. It does not yet have firm enough control of the army to repress the masses who were encouraged by the fall of the police state to begin struggling for their long-thwarted aspirations. It has to depend on the workers' own parties to convince the masses not to demand "too much," or to "misuse" democracy. But the reformist workers' parties, which are the only ones so far that are well known, have thrown their full weight behind the junta and its objective of reimposing firm bourgeois control over the society.

In fact, the development in Portugal since the fall of the police state has shown quite clearly the contradiction that exists between democracy and the needs of the capitalist system. For example, in a long article on the business page of the July 5 *New York Times*, correspondent Henry Giniger described the problems "too much democracy" had caused one small capitalist, a U.S. shirtmaker who had been lured to Portugal by the prospect of cheap labor.

"When he built the plant," Giniger wrote, "his wage bill was about 20 cents an hour, which had more than doubled under inflationary pressures by 1974. Wage scales had been based in the incentive system that the owner asserted was the only way to get full production in the garment trade."

The mood that developed among the workers, nearly all women, after the fall of the police state, resulted, the capitalist said, in a 40 percent drop in production. But he was prepared to be understanding and continue to pay "full wages." Then:

"He was confronted May 23 by a workers' commission like those that were formed in every office and factory in the country. The commission came to demand a minimum wage of \$200 a month, more than two and a half times the minimum he had been paying; a 40-hour week instead of the 48 hours then being worked, and

the dismissal of almost all the old supervisory personnel on the ground they had the fascist attitude of the old Government."

Despite a plant occupation and being locked in his office for a time by his workers, the capitalist managed, with the help of the government, to resist most of these demands. But this was no solution as far as he was concerned. The government was forced to establish a minimum wage; while it was less than the wage the workers were demanding, it was still more than he wanted to pay.

"For the American, the new minimum was something he asserted he could not live with because it destroyed the incentive system, which was essential, in his view, to maintain production." Presumably his base pay was well below the subsistence level.

Furthermore, even with the help of both of the well-known workers' parties, the government is finding it difficult to put a lid on the very widespread ferment released by the fall of the Caetano regime. No sooner is one strike ended or defeated than new struggles break out.

The junta and the Communist party had just succeeded (and it was not an unqualified success, as Giniger's report indicates) in breaking the postal workers' strike, when a strike of agricultural workers began in the key food-producing area of Alentejo. This large and brutally exploited category of Portuguese workers was not covered by the new minimum wage.

"In the old days," a July 4 dispatch to the *Times* noted, "little was ever heard from Portugal's semiliterate farm population, which worked for low wages when it could. . . ."

But after the breakdown of the old repressive system and the new government's promises of change, the farm workers could not tolerate their situation any more. As one explained to the *Times* correspondent: "We thought we would have good work conditions after April 25 but things are not better yet." □

### Just Like Home!

When Nixon entered Amman, Jordan, last month he was greeted by the strains of John Philip Sousa's "Washington Post March," a tune composed at the request of the newspaper for an 1889 promotional campaign. Jordanian authorities were apparently unaware that the *Post's* current circulation efforts center around its coverage of Watergate.



## Clampdown on Palestinians in Lebanon

By Michael Baumann

The Israeli bombings of Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon appear to have been temporarily halted following the wave of attacks that claimed at least seventy lives June 18-21. The highly publicized promises of Arab military intervention had little to do with the cessation of the attacks; the real explanation lies in the secret maneuvers by Cairo and Damascus designed to assure the Zionists that the Arab regimes could and would assume the task of clamping down on Palestinian commando actions originating in Lebanon.

*Washington Post* correspondent Jim Hoagland cabled the following account of the behind-the-scenes maneuvers in a July 1 dispatch from Beirut:

"Egypt and Syria have moved to preserve the Middle East ceasefire by pressuring Palestinian guerrillas to halt attacks that would trigger new Israeli reprisal raids across the Lebanese frontier, informed Palestinian sources said today.

"A pledge to suspend actions from Lebanon against Israeli targets was made by guerrillas speaking for the most important Palestinian groups to Lebanese Prime Minister Takieddin Solh last night, these sources confirmed.

"The pledge is similar to past undertakings made by the guerrilla leaderships after Israeli retaliation against Lebanese towns and Palestinian camps, but the direct Egyptian and Syrian involvement in the latest pledge appears to make it more substantial.

"The Egyptian and Syrian demands on the Palestinians have been kept secret, but Arab diplomatic sources suggest that they may have been more important in maintaining the ceasefire than the well-publicized threats by both governments to help Lebanon militarily if the Israeli raids continued."

What Cairo and Damascus gave away was the resistance movement's last open base of operations. Following the disastrous defeat at the hands

of the Jordanian army in September 1970, the Palestinian resistance has found its freedom of movement increasingly restricted by the bourgeois Arab regimes upon which its leadership continues to rely.

Cairo has for several years refused to permit the Palestinians to use Egypt as a base. Damascus, which has always exercised tight control over the guerrillas' freedom of action, secretly pledged as part of the May 31 disengagement accord with Israel that it would halt commando actions originating on Syrian territory, according to reports in the U.S. capitalist press. Only the Lebanese regime had, until now, been unable to assert control over the commando forces.

There are a number of reasons why Beirut was unable to do this. Most important is the fact that the Palestinian struggle has the genuine support of the Lebanese masses. The Israeli bombings, in part intended to drive a wedge between the Palestinians and the Lebanese, actually had just the opposite effect.

"A peaceful border [with Israel] would be a wonderful thing," a young Lebanese army officer told *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent John K. Cooley. "But we are, all of us, Lebanese and Palestinians, in this together until the Palestinians get a homeland of their own and are able to go to it."

"This sentiment," Cooley wrote in the July 2 *Monitor*, "seems shared by most people in south Lebanon's border regions. Israeli air, sea, and land strikes seem to have cemented a growing feeling of solidarity between Lebanese and Palestinians."

A second reason is the fact that Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon are an important part of Lebanese political and social life. Numbering some 300,000, they account for about one-tenth of the country's population. And in a country as small and divided as Lebanon—a country almost equally split between Muslims and Christians, and home to some fourteen reli-

gious sects—a mobilization against such a powerful minority would carry with it the threat of a civil war.

A third factor is the relative weakness of the Lebanese armed forces in comparison with the military units of the resistance movement. The most generous accounts of the size of the Lebanese army give it no more than 16,000 men—a number that could easily be matched by a mobilization of the well-armed resistance forces. Lebanon is a banking and commercial center, not an industrialized country. It cannot afford an army sufficient to keep the resistance movement in check. Only assurances of support



YASIR ARAFAT

from Cairo and Damascus, or a larger army bankrolled by the Arab states, would make the government bold enough to try.

A series of armed clashes between the Lebanese army and the resistance movement last spring did produce a temporary agreement to curtail commando operations against Israel. The agreement was impossible to enforce, however, and was eventually allowed to lapse.

In the period before the Syrian-Israeli disengagement accord was signed, neither Syrian President Hafez el-Assad nor Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat had any objection to using the commando operations as a

bargaining counter in the negotiations. "We can stop the Palestinian guerrillas," Assad and Sadat in effect told Israel, "and we will do so if you agree to return the territory you occupied in 1967."

But the commando operations had a dynamic of their own. They formed a central part of the Palestine Liberation Organization's strategy of "fight and negotiate"—that is, continuing the pressure of armed attacks on Israel as a means of pressing for the return of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to Palestinian control.

As long as the raids continued, they served to insure Fateh leader Yasir Arafat and the other "moderate" Palestinian leaders against any loss of prestige and political influence stemming from their agreement—ratified at the June 1-9 meeting of the Palestine National Council—to negotiate with Israel and thus recognize the Zionist regime's right to exist as a separate state on part of the Palestinian homeland.

The Israeli "retaliations" posed a difficult problem for the Arab regimes. If Cairo and Damascus did nothing and simply allowed the Zionist terror bombings to continue, they faced the danger of losing the popular support they had gained in the October war. On the other hand, action sufficient to halt the Israeli attacks would destroy the accords worked out by Kissinger and threaten to unleash a mass upsurge capable of quickly out-running the bounds these regimes could tolerate.

Sadat and Assad's eventual response—tough talk of military intervention as a cover for quietly forcing concessions to the Zionists—was apparently seen as the safest alternative. According to *Washington Post* correspondent Hoagland, three major Palestinian leaders yielded to the pressure and agreed to the deal—Aboul Zaim, commander of the guerrilla forces in Lebanon; Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the PLO political department; and Fateh leader Salah Khalef.

It is possible that differences over this move were behind the clashes that occurred June 28 at refugee camps near Beirut. These shootings, which are reported to have caused the deaths of at least twenty Palestinians, involved members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General

Command and supporters of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The latter organization is known to generally back the positions taken by Fateh.

The strategy of relying on the Arab regimes instead of on the power of the Arab masses, organized in common struggle against both their own rulers and Israel, is at the root of the resistance leadership's current dilemma. If they halt the military operations, they could lose an important part of their political authority for negotiating with Israel—as well as their chief bargaining chip in such negotiations. If they continue the commando actions, they run the risk of losing their major source of military support.

When the defense and foreign ministers of the twenty states belonging to the Arab League met in Cairo July 3-4 to discuss a response to the Is-

raeli threat to Lebanon, the meeting's only real purpose was to ratify what had already been worked out behind the scenes. The only concrete measure reported to have been proposed—an offer by Damascus to provide the refugee camps with anti-aircraft missiles—was quickly vetoed by the Lebanese delegation. The Palestinian delegation's request for a statement that the Arab states would consider reimposing the oil embargo went unanswered.

By their agreement to further restrict the Palestinian resistance movement's freedom of action, the Arab regimes have provided exactly what the Zionists wanted—a period of relative quiet on Israel's last unsecured border. The Palestinians are the real losers in the deal; Israel has merely consented to a pause in its terror attacks now that they have at least partially attained their objective. □

## Ethiopia

# Rebel Troops Arrest Government Officials

By Ernest Harsch

Virtually powerless to counter the actions of rebel military units, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie made further concessions on July 3 to troops occupying key installations in Addis Ababa.

Units of the Fourth Army Division moved into action on the night of June 28 and occupied one of the two government radio stations, from which they broadcast denunciations of twenty-five officials who had been arrested more than two months earlier by rebel troops and who were still in their custody. By the following day, the Addis Ababa international airport, the telecommunications center, and the second official radio station were also in the hands of military units. The moves were directed by an "armed forces committee" believed to consist of noncommissioned officers and low-ranking commissioned officers.

The pretext for the action was an appeal, made by eight members of the landlord-dominated parliament, that the twenty-five government officials and military officers be released. In

communiqués denouncing "conspirators against the Ethiopian people," the rebel military units replied to the appeal by stating: "We are ready to take the necessary action against the detained cabinet ministers."

In the following days, the armed forces committee arrested additional government officials, charging them with corruption and with impeding promised reforms. In a June 30 communiqué signed by units of the army, navy, air force, imperial bodyguard, police, and territorial army, the junior officers said they were arresting officials who "acted or were conspiring to obstruct the smooth functioning" of Prime Minister Endalkachew Makonnen's government.

According to the July 2 *Washington Post*, "Troops under cover of curfew today [July 1] began a house-to-house hunt to track down rich landowners and businessmen and some government officials."

Among those reportedly arrested were Minassie Haile, former minister of foreign affairs who resigned in May; Yilma Deressa, former minister



of finance, commerce, and industry; Major Admassie Zeleke, member of parliament; Ato Assafa Difaye, general manager of the government-run Awash Valley Authority; Zewde Gebre Hiwot, president of the Senate; Abbot Habte Mariam Workineh, adviser to the emperor on church affairs; and Ato Abebe Kebede, administrator of the Haile Selassie Foundation. Also arrested was Ras (Duke) Asrate Kassa, president of the twelve-member Crown Council (which advises the emperor), who is considered the spokesman of the aristocracy and the Coptic Christian Church.

Ras Mesfin Sileshi, the former governor-general of Shoa province, who is one of the country's wealthiest landowners and a close friend of the emperor, managed to escape the dragnet of the rebel troops. Mesfin is also head of the reactionary Patriotic Association, a private army financed by landowners. It reportedly numbers about 100,000, or almost twice the size of the Ethiopian army. A dispatch by Bruno Dethomas published in the July 4 issue of *Le Monde* reported that the rebel troops were making a particular effort to track down Mesfin.

On July 3 the armed forces committee made five demands, four of which Haile Selassie agreed to the same day. The rebel troops called for (1) amnesty for all political prisoners (excluding the arrested officers and government officials in the hands of the armed forces committee), (2) repatriation of all political exiles, (3) immediate implementation of constitutional reforms outlined by the emperor on March 5 (see *Intercontinental Press*, March 18, p. 295), (4) continuous consultation between government officials and the armed forces committee, and (5) continued meeting of the parliament, which was scheduled to begin its summer recess, in order to complete the drafting of a new constitution.

A radio broadcast announced that Selassie had accepted the last four demands and that he had ordered an "immediate study" of the possibility of a general amnesty for political prisoners, of which there are believed to be several hundred. A July 5 United Press International dispatch reported that the emperor had agreed to release some of the twenty-two rebel troops who were arrested by the government after the first military revolt in February.



Luis J. Medrano in *La Nacion*

The same UPI dispatch reported more arrests by the rebel troops, including a general, three senators, and another close adviser to the emperor. According to a July 5 Reuters dispatch from Addis Ababa, the emperor appointed an acting president of the Senate to replace the arrested president and swore in Lieutenant General Aman Anndom as the new army chief of staff to succeed Selassie Bereka, who was unpopular with the troops.

While there were rumors in Addis Ababa that the military was preparing a coup, it appears that the rebel units are still reluctant to break entirely with the traditional institution of the

monarchy and take power in their own name. The existence of differences among the military units themselves probably adds to their caution.

One evidence of the divisions among the troops was a clash between paratroopers and airmen at Debre Zeit air force base June 20, which left two persons dead and twenty wounded. According to a report in the June 25 issue of *Le Monde*, the paratroopers were in control of the base, a situation that was becoming more and more intolerable to the airmen, some of whom were accused of planning to bomb the imperial palace during the earlier military mutinies. □

## Dozens Killed 'To Protect Lives'

## Tanks Invade Chinese Quarter of Bangkok

Twenty-eight persons were killed and 124 wounded, according to government figures, in four nights of fighting between residents of Bangkok's Chinese quarter and government forces.

"The riots started Wednesday night [July 3], over a seemingly meaningless incident in which policemen tried to arrest a taxi driver who was parked illegally," a July 5 United Press International dispatch reported. "The violence then built up as the result,

observers believed, of long pent-up frustrations over record inflation, labor conditions and other social grievances. . . .

"The rioting, largely by young Chinese, was believed to reflect political and ethnic as well as the economic and other social grievances."

After attempting to prevent the arrest of the taxi driver, the crowd reportedly burned police vehicles and attacked a police station. The fighting quickly spread through the district and con-



tinued on the following nights. A July 4 Associated Press dispatch said that 3,000 persons had participated in one attempt to storm the police station.

The government of Premier Sanya Thammak responded by declaring a state of emergency on July 4 and sending in police and troops supported by tanks to cordon off the Chinese district.

"The police crackdown," the AP dispatch reported, "was a turnabout for the Government of Mr. Sanya, which has backed away from dozens of potential confrontations since a student uprising put him in office last October."

Lieutenant General Narong Mahanond, the Bangkok police chief, told the AP reporter: "We will not compromise or be soft anymore. This is an order from the top."

A government announcement warned that rioters would be treated as "Communist terrorists." After an emergency cabinet meeting July 5, Sanya stated that "police as well as military troops have been ordered to do their utmost to maintain tranquility. Arms must be used when it is absolutely necessary to protect lives and property in accordance with the law." □

## New Swiss Canton to Be Formed

### Issues in the Jura Autonomy Vote

[On June 23, the residents of the predominantly French-speaking Jura region of northwestern Switzerland voted to break away from the German-speaking canton of Bern (Berne, in French) and establish a new canton, Switzerland's twenty-third. The vote in the seven Jura districts was 36,802 in favor of separation, 34,057 against, and 1,726 abstentions in a record 90 percent turnout of registered voters.

[The formation of a new Jura canton will annul a decision of the 1815 Congress of Vienna, following the downfall of Napoleon, which attached the once autonomous Jura bishopric to Bern, the federal capital. The Jura had come under the rule of Paris following the French Revolution.

[The June 23 plebiscite was the outcome of several decades of popular agitation for increased autonomy for the Jura region. In recent years the question of Jura self-determination had become a major issue in Swiss political life.

[Underlying the separatist agitation is the regional underdevelopment of the Jura area in comparison with other parts of Switzerland, including the canton of Bern. More than half of industrial employment in the region is in watchmaking and related industries, many of which are small-scale, backward operations, declining in the face of monopolization and foreign competition. Agriculture plays a

relatively large role in the local economy (12.5 percent of employment, against 9.1 percent in Switzerland as a whole). And the tertiary sector, comprising government services and administration, provides far fewer jobs (20.3 percent in Jura, 36.8 percent in the whole country)—reflecting the general lack of an economic infrastructure in the Jura region that is sufficiently large to attract investment capital.

[The result of all these factors is a lack of employment openings, and lower wages for Jura residents. A study in 1968 found that the average Jura wage-earner received 1,240 francs (1 Swiss franc equals US\$336) per month, while the average wage-earner in the French-speaking cantons (Geneva, Vaud, Neuchâtel, Fribourg, and Valais) received 1,380 francs.

[Population growth in the Jura has for many decades been much slower than the average for Switzerland as a whole, and in times of economic crisis the region has experienced a net loss of population. In addition, the lack of job openings forces more than 5,000 Jura workers—one in every thirteen—to commute to areas outside the Jura every day in order to find work in the major surrounding cities. In turn, some 3,500 workers from outside the Jura region, more than half of them women, come into the area to work in the low-paying tobacco, tex-

tile, and watchmaking industries.

[Over the years, the French-speaking proportion of the population has been declining; before the second world war there was a steady increase in German-speaking "immigration," and since 1950 there has been an enormous influx of non-Swiss immigrants willing to work at the lower wage rates. (Some 10 percent of the Swiss work force is composed of immigrant labor.) In the June 23 plebiscite, the four southern districts, with a greater German-speaking population, voted against a break with Bern.

[The present separatist movement in the Jura region arose after the war. The predominant current is the Rassemblement Jurassien (RJ—Jura Regroupment), which was founded in 1947 as the Mouvement Séparatiste Jurassien (Jura Separatist Movement). Officially "nonpartisan," the RJ is in fact heavily influenced by the Catholic Christian Democratic party (PDC—Parti Démocrate-Chrétien), which is the major party in the Jura, although it is supported by only 5 percent of the voters in the Bern canton as a whole.

[Besides calling for formation of a French-language Jura canton, the RJ urges phasing out of German-language schools, improvement of technical schools, state aid to the Jura peasantry, higher family welfare benefits, and lower taxes "to encourage savings and local investment." Its proposed constitution for an autonomous "Jura state" is basically a replica of the other cantonal constitutions. The Swiss Trotskyists of the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire, analyzing the RJ's program in the February 25 issue of their fortnightly newspaper *La Brèche*, stated that "the RJ represents the interests of a belated petty bourgeoisie that does not possess the normal means of defending its interests on the national level that were transmitted (by the federal constitution) to other regional Swiss bourgeoisies."

[The RJ's widespread support among Jura workers, *La Brèche* explains, is due to the failure of the workers' organizations—primarily the Social Democratic party and the trade unions—"to combine, in a radically anticapitalist movement, the justified democratic demands of the separatist movement with demands relating to the wage earners."

[During the 1960s, younger elements

in the separatist movement attempted to take a more radical course, forming organizations like the Jura Liberation Front and the Béliers group (the mountain ram, or *bélier*, is the symbol of the Jura). But since these groups did not advance a program fundamentally more radical than that of the RJ, they served primarily as a means for the RJ leaders to blackmail the federal authorities with the threat of "extremism" if autonomy was not granted to "responsible" Jura leaders.

[Another expression of the Jura population's deep-felt rejection of the Bern constitution is the refusal by many Jura youth to engage in military service, which is compulsory under Swiss law. When a general military alert and occupation were declared in the Jura, in September–October 1968, in order to "combat terrorism," a group of forty-one army officers of Jura origin issued a declaration protesting their dilemma: "honor our rank and function and agree to firing on our Jura brothers, or affirm our patriotism and put in question our belonging to the Swiss officers corps."

[Mass pressure has forced some concessions from the federal bourgeoisie. In 1950, a revision of the Bern constitution recognized the existence in the Bern canton of two distinct peoples, and since 1970 the Jura peoples have had the constitutional right to self-determination within the Swiss federal state. It was the 1970 law that regulated the June 23 plebiscite.


[The following theses on the Jura question were published in the June 21 issue of *La Brèche*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*. Emphasis is in the original.]

\* \* \*

1

The Bern government's decision to hold a plebiscite—much to the surprise of the *Rassemblement Jurassien*—has thrown a spotlight on the principal tendencies in the separatist movement and opened a new stage in the "Jura question."

It is useful to situate the Jura separatist movement in a more general framework, so as to understand more clearly the nature of the positions of the RJ and the positions that the revolutionary workers' movement must defend.



Shaded area of "New York Times" map is Jura area of Bern canton.

2

Throughout its history, and more specifically since the "bourgeois revolutions," Switzerland has gone through a process of integration of different nations (in the sense of societies based on a common culture, language, etc.). It is therefore a nationalities' state in which the national question has been almost completely resolved. In this rapprochement of the various original nations, the federalist structure has helped to define a common denominator of interests among the bourgeoisies of the various cantons, within the framework of state centralization and the interpenetration of the differing original nations.

The Jura question must be situated in this context: The Jura community, with its own language and culture, was placed in a canton, Bern, where the majority of the population was of different cultural and linguistic origin. Moreover, the existence of a Bern state structure gave a relatively privileged status to the Bern bourgeoisie on the federal plane, with the result that on this level, any autonomous expression of the interests of the Jura bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie was held back. Added to these historic roots is the fact that after more than twenty-five years of growth for Swiss capitalism, there is a noticeable relative underdevelopment of the Jura region in comparison with other regions of Switzerland. This has played a role

in strengthening the separatist movement.

3

The relative regional underdevelopment of the Jura region is manifested on several levels. The absence of jobs, both in quantity and diversity, means that every day some inhabitants of the Jura are obliged to "emigrate"; Jura workers sell their labor power in Biel, Basel, La Chaux-de-Fonds, Granges, etc. This confirms one of the functions of regional underdevelopment under capitalism: to furnish a reserve army of labor for the more dynamic centers of economic development. Another of the "major weaknesses" of Jura industry is manifested in the lack of diversification of its industry. This increases the risk of structural unemployment in the event of an accelerated crisis in the watchmaking and small machinery sector. A rapid look at the number of youth, especially young women, engaged in secondary studies also provides a glimpse of this relative underdevelopment.

The phenomenon of uneven regional development is linked with the capitalist system itself. Growth in such an economy is basically determined by the needs of capital investment in the search for higher-than-average profits. But the determinants of this higher profit level cannot be distributed equally throughout the national territory, even if the country is a small one, and still less in a big country. It follows that there is no solution to regional underdevelopment under capitalism. And the most obvious proof of this is the increasing relative underdevelopment of Wallonia in Belgium, the south of Italy, and Wales in Britain, despite all the capitalist economic aid and reconversion plans.

4

In confronting the reactionary Bern bourgeoisie and its state, the Jura separatist movement has encouraged a limited challenge to the "state authority," evinced in the development of a certain antimilitarism and in the denunciation of the Bern state's regional development policy—as well as in demonstrations and cultural productions that, given the Swiss political climate, shake up certain institutional norms a bit.



But in order to focus these elements toward a clear anticapitalist consciousness, the workers' movement will have to confront the official ideology of the RJ, and constantly propose its own solutions to the workers of the Jura region.

The RJ goes out of its way to conceal the real roots of the present crisis in the Jura. It tends to assign greater importance to being part of the "Jura people" than to belonging to a social class (according to the RJ, a Jura worker has more in common with a Jura boss than he has with a Bern worker). The RJ promotes respect for the federal bourgeois state; for years it has been appealing to it to intervene to save the situation. This whole ideology is obviously not accidental. The essential objective of the leaders of the RJ, and that part of the bourgeoisie that supports it, is *to be able to have control of a cantonal state that provides them with a more effective expression of their interests on the federal plane*, and with the manna of federal subsidies. This cantonal state would provide them with a means of rising in the social order, as well as financial aid in the form of subsidies and public works orders.

Within this perspective, the separatist leaders have set about teaching respect for the bourgeois state to the Jura youth and workers—the sameworkers who, tomorrow, will have to pay the taxes for the development of projects that benefit the Jura industrialists; the same workers whose demonstrations will perhaps have to confront the police of the Jura cantonal state.

The traditional workers' movement in the Jura region (at least that section that declares its support for self-determination) has never challenged the ideology of the RJ. It has always upheld the RJ and even participated more directly in determining its policy.

## 5

*While affirming and supporting the right to self-determination of the Jura people and the formation of a Jura canton*, revolutionary militants counterpose the working class's own solutions to the solutions proposed by the Jura bourgeoisie. This is very important because, confronted with the appearance of a Jura canton or state structure, the workers' movement must be armed for struggle around an entire range of important issues, such as taxation, the social security

system, unemployment insurance, and democratic rights.

Revolutionary militants warn the Jura workers and youth *against all attempts to make them give up their demands* in the name of respect for the Jura state (which will be the instrument of the Jura bourgeoisie) and in the interests of building "the model canton of the Jura region."

They will show that the only real solution in the struggle against regional underdevelopment is to combat and smash the very functioning of the capitalist system, and to replace it through a socialist economy, based on collective ownership of the means of production. A socialist economy, in contrast to one based on private ownership of the means of production, does not put priority on the search for the highest profit for each firm nor does it invest only where the highest profits can be made. Instead, it seeks to determine investments on the basis of the interests of the working masses on a national scale. Thus, in a socialist economy, a priority task is to transfer resources from developed regions to underdeveloped regions, in accordance with the overall interests of the workers on a national scale.

There must be democratically centralized planning, with the essential choices determined by all the workers.

Beginning now, the revolutionary militants will propagandize and ex-

plain, in order to prepare the Jura workers and youth to *mobilize in defense of their interests* when the bourgeoisie and its representatives move to establish the whole legal and institutional framework of the cantonal state. There will be mobilizations around issues like the organization of the school system, women's rights, taxation, social insurance, and free speech. The establishment of the Jura cantonal state will put many problems on the agenda.

Revolutionary militants will have to defend the workers' class solutions against the bourgeoisie's solutions.

## 6

For several months the workers and youth of the Jura region have demonstrated their desire for "independence." They have already declared broad support for self-determination and a "Yes" vote in the plebiscite. Revolutionary militants support this decision, while denouncing all the illusions that the RJ is today promoting. Revolutionary militants repeat that there will be no "real independence for the Jura region"—in the sense of the workers being able to make the decisions for this region and for the country, as well as with respect to the operation of the economy—without the creation of a socialist Switzerland! □

# 185,000 Casualties in Vietnam 'Peace'

Since the Vietnam cease-fire accord was signed in January 1973, military sources in Saigon estimate that over 185,000 persons on both sides have been killed or wounded, according to a Reuters dispatch published in the June 28 *Christian Science Monitor*.

Most of these casualties, Reuters reported, occurred after U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho signed a revised cease-fire agreement on June 13, 1973, in Paris.

From noon on June 15 last year, when the second cease-fire was to go into effect, to 6 a.m. June 12, some 134,000 casualties have been reported, according to "military sources" cited by Reuters.

"They included 45,855 Communist troops listed as killed by government forces, 12,817 government troops killed, 49,945 wounded and some 6,000 missing. Also included are more than 4,000 civilians killed, nearly 11,000 wounded, and more than 5,000 missing."

These statistics were released by the Saigon regime on June 12. □

## An Excellent Citizen?

President Sese Seko Mobutu of Zaire has a new title. The governing Popular Movement of the Revolution announced June 26 that henceforth the president will be addressed as "Citizen Mobutu" rather than "His Excellency."



# AROUND THE WORLD



## Iceland Coalition Defeated

Premier Olafur Johannesson of Iceland resigned July 2, after final tallies in the June 30 election showed that his coalition had lost its majority. Johannesson's Progressive party retained its 17 seats in the 60-member parliament, and the Communist-led People's Alliance won 11 seats, an increase of 1. But the third partner in the coalition, the Liberal Left party, was reduced from 5 seats to 2.

The conservative Independence party, which ruled from 1959 to 1971 in a coalition with the Social Democrats, won 25 seats, an increase of 3. The Social Democrats won 5 seats, compared with 6 in the previous parliament.

Johannesson was forced to call the June 30 election when his coalition broke up in May, with the Liberal Left walking out in opposition to Johannesson's plans to restrict wage increases as a means of coping with inflation, which is running at a rate of 40 percent a year.

The election results are expected to result in the U.S. military continuing to maintain a base at Keflavik. Johannesson's government had announced plans to close the base by mid-1975. The Independence party in its campaign urged that the base be retained.

## Chou Reported Hospitalized

After concluding a six-day visit to China, U.S. Senator Henry Jackson told reporters in Tokyo July 6 that Premier Chou En-lai had been hospitalized but was apparently recovering from his illness. "Obviously he has been ill," Jackson said. "I do not know the nature of his illness." Jackson added that there "just isn't any question" about Chou's "mental ability to do his job."

Jackson met with Chou for half an hour on July 5. This was Chou's first meeting with a foreign visitor since May.

## Grigorenko Gets Reduced Pension

Soviet dissident Major General Pyotr Grigorenko, who was released June 26 after five years imprisonment in psychiatric hospitals, has been given a pension equal to only US\$60 a month. A retired officer of Grigorenko's rank and

experience would normally receive a pension of from \$268 to \$402 a month.

At the time of his arrest in 1969, Grigorenko was reduced to the rank of private as punishment for his political activities even though, according to the Soviet authorities, he was "insane" when carrying them out.

Grigorenko is now 67 years old. During his imprisonment he suffered three heart attacks.

## Peking Buys Canadian Wheat

The Canadian government announced June 26 the sale of 74.6 million bushels of wheat to China. The price is estimated at \$350 million. The sale brought Chinese purchases of Canadian wheat this year to a total of 112 million bushels.

## Prague, Washington Agree on Claims

Negotiators for the U.S. and Czechoslovak governments on July 5 initiated a preliminary agreement settling financial claims against each other that in some cases date back to the end of the second world war.

The agreement provides for the return to Czechoslovakia of gold now worth about \$80 million that was first seized by German occupation forces and later by a U.S.-British-French commission at the end of the war. In return, Prague agreed to compensate U.S. citizens for property nationalized in 1948.

## Israel Raises Taxes, Cuts Wages to Pay for October War

The Israeli government announced a sweeping series of economic measures July 2 aimed at reducing inflation and offsetting the huge deficits accumulated as a result of the October War. Over the last eighteen months, the Israeli consumer price index has risen some 50 percent, one of the highest rates of inflation in the world.

The new measures include a sharp cut-back in government spending and public construction, new taxes on income and imports, and a freeze on half the cost-of-living increases all Israeli workers were scheduled to begin receiving this year. In addition to the increase in what is

already one of the highest tax rates in the world, Israeli workers will also be compelled to purchase war bonds in the amount of 10 to 20 percent of their incomes.

The Israeli war deficit would be even greater if Nixon had not recently written off \$500 million of the debt the Zionist regime owes Washington. The \$500 million, plus an additional \$1,000 million written off in April, were part of a \$2,200 million loan replenishing Israeli military stocks after the October War. Israeli officials are currently seeking \$7,500 million more in U.S. military aid over the next five years—almost all of it in the form of outright grants.

## Peasants Demonstrate in Bangkok

Several hundred peasants from eleven provinces in Thailand converged on Bangkok in the last week of June and occupied the Sanam Luang park in the center of the city. They demanded that the lands which they had to sell to repay usurious loans be returned to them. The peasants also called for the expropriation and prosecution of big landowners.

## Shah Gets Nuclear Plants in Deal With Paris

At a press conference in Paris June 27, concluding a three-day state visit to France, the shah of Iran announced that Iran would purchase five nuclear generating plants from France.

In addition, France will furnish Iran with the enriched uranium required to operate the plants, and the two countries will study jointly the possibility of further collaboration in the production of super-generators and nuclear-powered merchant ships.

The Franco-Iranian accord also provides for collaboration to establish a center for nuclear research in Iran, and for the French to train specialized personnel in the nuclear industry.

The five nuclear power plants will have the capacity to produce a total of 5,000 megawatts of electricity.

The nuclear accord is part of a package of trade and business deals with Iran that are expected to yield French capitalists at

least 20,000 million francs (US\$4,000 million).

These deals include, among other things, orders for construction of a subway system in Tehran and electrification of Iran's railroads.

Iran plans to build twenty-five nuclear power plants before the end of the century, in anticipation of the exhaustion of its oil reserves.

The two main French contractors for the five plants in the June 27 accord, CGE and Creusot-Loire, are operating under American patents.

### Chilean Prisoners Sentenced

Sentences were announced in the latter part of June for several scores of supporters of the former Chilean Popular Unity government. Military tribunals had tried the cases behind closed doors.

In Concepcion June 22 twenty-eight persons received sentences from 3 to 25 years for supposedly violating the arms control law. The official announcement did not indicate if the accused were arrested before or after the September 11 military coup.

On the same day in Temuco, fifty individuals convicted of belonging to the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) had their sentences voided as the result of "trial irregularities." They will be retried at the end of July.

On June 28 a military tribunal in Santiago handed down verdicts in the cases of thirty-three men accused of having killed four policemen and having opposed the army and police at the time of the military coup. Two of the defendants were sentenced for life, thirty to 5 years, and one to 4 years.

### French Government Bars Immigrants

The French government announced July 4 that no more foreign workers would be permitted to enter the country until October, "when the situation will be reviewed." The restriction was evidently intended to make immigrant workers the scapegoats for fears of recession and unemployment.

Immigrants in France total about 4 million—8 percent of the population. One million are North Africans; 695,000 are Portuguese; 630,000 are Spanish; and 589,000 are Italian.

### Rome Announces Austerity Moves

The Italian government on July 6 announced a new series of austerity decrees designed to reduce the funds available to consumers by \$5,000 million in the next year. The decrees will cost every Italian an average of \$100, but those

with lower incomes will lose the most. The value-added tax on beef and other basic consumer goods was tripled, from 6 to 18 percent.

"The measures adopted today mean sacrifices for the Italians," said Treasury Minister Emilio Colombo. "They are necessary to lift Italy out of the grave economic difficulties in which she is enveloped."

Italy now has a trade deficit running at an annual rate of \$13,000 million. The rate of inflation is 20 percent.

### British Economists See Decline in Demand for Goods

Increased oil prices will reduce the "discretionary income" available to British consumers and thus affect the sales of industry, according to a report released July 1 by the National Economic Development Office. The National Economic Development Office functions as an advisory group to both the government and private industry.

The report predicted that there will be reduced demand for automobiles because of a 40 percent increase in operating costs between 1973 and 1977. It also foresaw reduced demand for clothing made from synthetic fibers; a decline in dining out and foreign travel; and a decline of as much as 25 percent in spending on major electrical appliances such as refrigerators.

### French Assembly Liberalizes Sale of Contraceptives

The French National Assembly voted overwhelmingly June 28 for a law liberalizing the distribution of contraceptives. The new law, which was passed with only one dissenting vote, makes contraceptives available to all, including minors under the age of 18, through the national health system. Financing for the program is to be included in the health system's budget. Because of restrictions in the old law, only about 6 to 10 percent of French women currently use the contraceptive pill, compared with 46 percent in Britain.

### Nixon Friend Indicted on Fraud Charges

C. Arnholt Smith, a longtime friend of Richard Nixon and a major contributor to the latter's campaigns, has been indicted on charges of criminal conspiracy and fraud by a federal grand jury in San Diego, California. The twenty-five-count indictment, handed down July 2, accuses Smith and a business associate of illegally using bank funds, making false statements to federal bank examiners, and falsifying bank records.

According to the indictment, Smith and his partner illegally diverted a total of \$170 million in bank loans to their own

use. A large part of this amount allegedly was obtained from the United States National Bank, which Smith and members of his family controlled. The bank was declared insolvent last October.

The Internal Revenue Service last year brought a civil action against Smith, seeking \$22.8 million that he allegedly failed to pay in income taxes for 1969.

### Minamata Moving to Tokyo?

Is the "Minamata disease" spreading to Tokyo? The disease, which causes deformities, convulsions, deafness, blindness, and death, first appeared in the Japanese village of Minamata in the 1950s. Only years later was it discovered that the disease was actually mercury poisoning caused by wastes that a factory had dumped into a local stream. There are 428 officially recognized victims, 69 of whom died as a result of the poisoning.

Before any of the Minamata villagers were stricken, the symptoms of the disease were observed in village cats, who ate fish from the mercury-polluted waters. In the last year, Tokyo veterinarians have reported a sizable number of similarly affected cats, all of them normally fed on fish purchased in Tokyo stores. Veterinarian Sengoku Kasai has tested fifty such cats and found that all of them had high concentrations of mercury in their fur, intestines, and brains.

One cat, which had a level of 23 parts per million of mercury in its fur—compared with less than 10 in normal cats—has given birth to a total of sixteen kittens. Twelve of the kittens died within days of their birth; one of the remaining four later lost all control over its legs; and the other three developed leg deformities, became deaf, and suffered convulsions.

An official of the city government's environmental protection agency has tested human residents and found further evidence of mercury contamination in fish. His figures showed that the average Tokyo resident has 8 parts per million of mercury. Persons working in fish markets have 10.7; workers who handle raw fish in restaurants have 14.8; and tuna fishermen have 19.9 parts per million.

### India, Sri Lanka in Border Pact

The Sri Lanka Foreign Ministry announced June 29 that it had reached agreement with India on demarcating the strait that separates the two countries. The statement said that "mutually satisfactory provisions have been made regarding navigation, pilgrimage, fishing, and mineral exploration of the area."

The announcement did not mention the disposition of Kachchaitivu, a small uninhabited island claimed by both sides.



# Why Revolutionists Advocate Sliding Scale of Wages

[One of the questions discussed at the June 1-3 workers' conference sponsored by the French Trotskyist organization, Front Communiste Révolutionnaire (see *Intercontinental Press*, July 1, p. 869), was the demand for the sliding scale of wages. The following article, presenting the Trotskyist weekly *Rouge's* position on the demand, appeared in that newspaper's June 14 issue. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

*What is the sliding scale of wages?*

This demand is essentially aimed at combating the effect of inflation on wage earners' buying power. It is based on a simple principle—assuring that wages automatically catch up with the increase in prices.

In April 1974 prices rose 1.9 percent. This meant that, on the average, 1.9 percent more money was needed at the end of April than was needed at the end of March to buy the very same items. The sliding scale would automatically assure an increase of 1.9 percent in all wages.

Thus the worker who at the end of March earned 1,200 francs [1 franc equals approximately US\$0.204] would, at the end of April, earn 1,200 francs plus the following: 1,200 francs multiplied by 1.9 and divided by 100, that is, 1,222.80 francs.

The executive who at the end of March earned 5,000 francs would, at the end of April, earn 5,000 francs plus the following: 5,000 francs multiplied by 1.9 and divided by 100, that is, 5,095 francs.

An automatic wage adjustment of this sort has been forbidden by law since de Gaulle came to power. Nevertheless, in dealing with struggles for higher wages—and occasionally in the context of multiyear contracts, wage agreements, or factory settlements—a number of companies have recently agreed to something resembling the sliding scale.

It is true that these agreements, whatever their form, do lead to wages at

least partially catching up with prices. But as viewed by management, their function is at the same time to halt all other wage demands. That is why we denounce these contracts and the trade-union collaboration that they involve, for they provide only a very partial guarantee against a drop in buying power.

*Taking your example, it seems as though the sliding scale favors higher-paid personnel and actually increases the disparity in wages. The pay of an executive would increase 95 francs, while that of a worker would increase only 22.80 francs a month!*

That's not true! The executive's 5,095 francs at the end of April are worth no more [than the 5,000 francs at the end of March], just as the worker's 1,222.80 francs just barely enable him to purchase the same goods he could have bought with 1,200 francs a month earlier.

The reality is that inflation lowers the value of each franc. These wages, expressed in francs, seem to have increased, but if they are expressed in terms of goods or services purchased by the wage earner—executive or worker—they would both remain on the same level.

This in fact is the aim of the sliding scale: maintaining each person's buying power at its current level. The sliding scale does not change inequalities in the wage structure. It simply maintains the structure. To understand this it is sufficient to note that the ratio between the wages of the executive and those of the workers was the same at the end of April as it was at the end of March—4.17.

*Okay, so the sliding scale maintains the wage structure. But shouldn't revolutionists fight this every chance they have?*

Of course revolutionists should fight the gap in wages; it is a tool of division in the hands of management. But is it correct to fight this by decreasing the buying power of higher-

paid employees?

The problem is not one of leveling the wage gap downward, but rather upward by increasing considerably the buying power of the lower and middle wage-categories. This is something the sliding scale cannot accomplish. By itself the sliding scale cannot solve all wage problems; much more is necessary. Other demands are just as urgent—the 1,500-franc minimum wage, the 200 francs for everyone.

Refusal to apply the sliding scale to technicians and executives would, moreover, result in increasing higher-paid employees' submissiveness to management and would thus limit the possibilities for unity in the struggle of all wage earners. More generally, while it is clear that the trade unions should not base their line of action around defense of the privileges of those more favored, it is equally true that they have no interest in excluding the latter from a struggle with management. Maintaining the purchasing power of higher-paid employees is not incompatible with increasing the buying power of the lowest-paid workers, especially if it is possible to carry everyone along in the struggle.

In fact, behind the refusal to maintain the purchasing power of executives and technicians stands a very doubtful notion, bordering on open collaboration with management: that of seeking to redistribute among workers as a whole the total amount of wages management is willing to pay—the well-known notion of simply cutting the same pie a different way.

*But the sliding scale boils down to a percentage increase, whereas Rouge has always come out for equal pay increases for everyone.*

Exactly! We would even say that the two demands—the sliding scale and equal pay increases for all—are not contradictory but complementary.

We support the demand for an equal pay increase for all because it is pos-



sible to unite employees around such a single demand, especially if the objective—200 francs or 300 francs for everyone—is viewed as a real mobilizing force by the overwhelming majority of employees.

Thus it is possible to build around such a demand a relationship of forces capable of compelling management to give in.

It must be admitted, however, that management would not have given up very much. What does an across-the-board raise of 200 or 300 francs mean if a few months later inflation has completely absorbed the increased buying power won through struggle?

At the present rate of inflation, a monthly wage of 1,000 francs is worth 200 francs less at the end of one year (and a wage of 2,000 francs is worth 400 francs less, etc.). In general, however, it is not possible to carry out two major strikes for higher wages within a six-month interval. Thus the sliding scale seems to be the only way to protect our wage gains. That is why we do not treat the two demands separately: Two hundred francs (for example) right now in order to increase our present buying power! The sliding scale of wages to protect this new buying power!

*Some militants in the CFDT [Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor] say that the sliding scale demobilizes workers. What does Rouge have to say about that?*

Do paid vacations demobilize workers? Obviously only those who think it would be "unreasonable" to demand anything further.

We should be clear about this. We have already said that the sliding scale will not solve all wage problems. It simply prevents management from using inflation as an additional instrument for exploiting wage earners. It in no way means that we can dispense with carrying out a fight to increase buying power, particularly that of the low and middle wage-categories.

The correct reply to those CFDT militants is to point out that they are either supporting the line that "the worse things get, the better the opportunities for struggle"—a line that has never borne fruit—or that they are viewing the sliding scale the same

way some unions do.

It is either a variation on "the worse it is—the better it is" theme, or else these comrades see the sliding scale as something tying the hands of trade-union militants, something like the contracts containing gradual wage increases signed by some CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor] and CFDT unions.

*On the whole, Rouge's position is not very different from that of the Communist party today. CP militants now are frequently proposing a certain percentage, which they refer to as a "catch-up in buying power," and a few index points, which they call an "increase in buying power." For example, in the public sector the UGFF [Union Générale des Fédérations de Fonctionnaires—Federation of Civil Service Workers' Unions] has just agreed to 1.75 percent and 5 index points.*

On the contrary, the difference is quite clear. It is as great as that between 1.75 percent on June 1 and the sliding scale all the time, or that between 5 points for everyone (about 35 francs) and forty points (282 francs) for everyone. And the difference between the two is not merely quantitative.

The first demand is one negotiated around a table and is at most based on a few days of organized action with no follow-up.

The second demand requires a massive mobilization of workers. This mobilization, moreover, is made possible precisely by the very scope of the objectives—when they correspond to the workers' militancy.

That's the nub of the problem. We believe that, in a great many sectors, the militancy of workers is at such a level today that it is both possible and necessary to put forward very advanced objectives—an across-the-board increase of 200 francs for everyone, for example. It is precisely because these objectives correspond to the level of militancy that they become mobilizers. Thus the means do exist for building the relationship of forces necessary for taking on the bosses.

On the other hand, what really tends to demobilize the struggle are the objectives proposed by the bureaucrats

—the percentage increases, the index points. They can then go negotiate without the necessary relationship of forces and bring back pitiful victories like the 1.75 percent and the 5 points in the public sector. That is, they can do this when the bosses don't simply spit in their faces.

This does not mean that it will be easy to win more advanced objectives. No struggle is "easy" or won in advance. We simply say that today a large number of workers are ready to fight and that steering this militancy toward advanced objectives will make it possible to deal management the greatest blow.

Insofar as the ban on the sliding scale as such is concerned, this is a Gaullist law that must be overturned. Without underestimating whatever local victories may be obtained, only a national relationship of forces can compel management as a whole to relinquish one of its sources of profit—inflation.

*Isn't there any way of reconciling both an increase in and maintenance of buying power by demanding a sliding scale that is "equal for all"?*

The formulation is seductive but in general not very realistic. It is understood, of course, that such a formulation must not be taken to mean an equal share for everybody in an increase in total wages proportional to the increase in prices (this, however, is the position of the CFDT Fédération de l'Eclairage!). Such a formulation in effect sanctions a systematic decrease in the buying power of every wage earner whose pay is higher than the factory's median wage.

For this formulation to gain the support of the majority of wage earners, it would have to guarantee protection of the buying power of all wage earners who make up to 3,000 francs a month (to give an example).

Thus a 5 percent increase in prices would involve an increase of 3,000 francs multiplied by 5 and divided by 100, that is, 150 francs a month for everyone. This would mean that each time a worker making 1,200 francs a month lost 60 francs in purchasing power, the boss would have to give him 150 francs. Furthermore, at the present rate of inflation (20 percent) the wages of the worker would rise in one year from 1,200

to 1,800 francs a month!

This demand would therefore generally be seen as utopian. It would result in the contradiction that the lowest wage-categories would see their buying power *increase* with inflation.

In factories where the spread in wages is not great, this demand would of course be perfectly reasonable. It cannot, however, solve the problem of raising buying power any more than the sliding scale can.

*Rouge's program of action says that the three prongs (1,500-franc minimum wage, a 200-franc pay increase for everyone, and the sliding scale) must not be separated in the present wage struggles. But concretely, when there is a possibility for a struggle,*

*which demand should be emphasized?*

There are no "gimmicks" or ready-made recipes. It is first of all up to the workers themselves to formulate their demands. We intervene in favor of the demand that seems to us best suited to a united mobilization of all the employees. Wherever a system already exists that assures a certain adjustment of wages in relation to prices, we insist on an equal increase for all. Where no such system exists, we cannot—in the present period of heavy inflation—downgrade the importance of the demand for the sliding scale. In every case, we extend full support to the demands adopted by the strike assembly. □

## Venezuela

# Perspectives for Revolutionists

[The following is a translation of sections of "Flood of Dollars and Growing Misery," which appeared in the April-May 1974 issue of *Revista de América* of Argentina. (The Spanish text was printed in the July 8 *Intercontinental Press*.)

[The article reflects the views of the Venezuelan Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party, Venezuelan section of the Fourth International) and the Juventud Socialista (JS—Socialist Youth), which is in political solidarity with it. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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## The Labor Movement

According to official statistics, there are approximately half a million industrial workers in Venezuela. The young Venezuelan proletariat began to gain strength in the early 1950s, when the process of import-substitution industrialization was initiated. This proletariat already has to its credit big struggles like the one at the Orinoco Iron and Steel Company (SIDOR) during the 1971 wildcat strike.

It was just a short time ago—the

week before the new president [Carlos Andrés Pérez] took office—that the hospital workers led a strike for wage increases, which affected all the hospitals of Caracas. The teachers have postponed direct action until the new president sets a policy with regard to wages. No one can now fail to recognize the fact that the labor movement—despite its numerical and organizational weakness—is an important force with a fundamental role to play in the transformation of Venezuela.

The Venezuelan bourgeoisie itself was the first to recognize this fact. COPEI<sup>1</sup> as well as Acción Democrática<sup>2</sup> have sought to increase their in-

1. Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente [Committee Organized for Independent Political Action]; Social Christian party founded in 1946. It held office between 1969 and 1974 (the presidency of Rafael Caldera), carrying out a policy of relative independence with respect to imperialism. COPEI amnestied the guerrillas.

2. Acción Democrática [AD—Democratic Action]; Founded in 1944. It held office between 1945 and 1948 (presidencies of Romulo Betancourt and Romulo Gallegos) and from 1959 to 1969 (presidencies of Betancourt and Raul Leoni). Intimately tied to imperialist monopoly interests, it led a harsh repression against Castroist guerrillas.

fluence in the labor movement, trying to win electoral support for their economic plans.

The Venezuelan workers' movement is grouped in four labor federations. The strongest is the Central de Trabajadores Venezolanos (CTV—Venezuelan Federation of Labor), led by a bureaucracy controlled by Acción Democrática; next is the Central Unica de Trabajadores Venezolanos (CUTV—Venezuelan United Federation of Labor), under the influence of the MEP<sup>3</sup> and the Communist party; third is CODESA, controlled by the COPEI bureaucracy. The fourth, the CGT, is quite weak. The bourgeoisie supports these bureaucratic leaderships as a safety measure to keep the workers from fighting for their rights.

This division in the leadership of the labor movement extends also to the level of unions and factories. Where there are several unions, it creates obstacles to the development of labor struggles.

Nonetheless, one of the plans of the bourgeoisie is to unify the labor leadership in an attempt to control the workers' movement more tightly and use it in its policies of capitalist development and "confrontation" with imperialism. That is why a process of "unification" was initiated toward the end of last year.

Francisco Olivo, president of the CTV, opened the process when, in his end-of-the-year message, he announced, "In the coming year we will focus on achieving the unification of all Venezuelan union circles."

William Franco, president of CODESA, and Cruz Villegas of the CUTV made similar statements and have set the month of October as the date for the unity congress.

The bourgeoisie's interest in controlling the workers thus coincides with the interests of the union bureaucracy, which hopes to strengthen its apparatus.

3. Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo [People's Electoral Movement]; A party organized in 1967 as the result of a disagreement in the heart of the AD. It constituted the "left" wing of that bourgeois party. In the last elections it formed part of the Nueva Fuerza [New Force], an attempt to reproduce the experience of the Chilean Popular Unity, with much less electoral success than its model.



This bureaucratic unity from the top, however, is also related to the workers' struggles that are making themselves felt in Venezuelan political life. The workers find themselves faced with a contradictory situation: The bureaucrats propose unity for their own reasons, but unity can be a decisive weapon in the hands of true fighters.

That is why numerous union activists and the Venezuelan PST demand the carrying through of the unification. Not by means of "congresses" of handpicked leaders but through a rank-and-file congress, with delegates elected at factory assemblies. And we also demand that this unity serve to promote a plan of struggle for (1) an immediate wage increase of 30 percent, (2) a sliding scale of wages with a minimum of 800 bolivars [about US\$188], (3) annual collective bargaining—contracts are presently negotiated every three years, and (4) unemployment insurance to be paid from the inflated state coffers.

The uncontrollable inflation since the beginning of the year has provoked a growing unrest among the workers and the people in general. The projected 100 percent fare hike in public transportation has stimulated a reaction from all sections of labor and the students, causing the government to suspend the increase for the moment. The outlook for increased inflation and the reactions of the militant hospital workers' and teachers' unions permit us to foresee new labor confrontations this year. The wage increases announced by the new government will do no more than postpone the conflicts.

It will be in these mobilizations that the activists will have daily experience with the bureaucratic leaderships and where the revolutionary party will meet its first test in battle. The crisis of guerrillaism and of the reformism embodied in the Venezuelan Communist party will facilitate the creation of a new, class-conscious, revolutionary workers' vanguard, capable of posing itself as an alternative leadership for the workers and masses of Venezuela.

## The Student Movement

A few facts will illustrate the importance that the youth in general,

and the students in particular, have in Venezuela. Fifty-two percent of the population is less than 17 years old (more than 6 million people). If we add to this the number of inhabitants who have not reached 30, we find that figure reaches 80 percent (about 9.6 million persons). We do not have precise information on the number of high-school students, but it is calcu-



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lated that at midyear 100,000 will enroll, which will bring the secondary school enrollment up to more than half a million. At the Central University of Venezuela there are 50,000 students.

But at the same time, the tremendous crisis of the educational system is reflected in the fact that only 2 percent of the population between 17 and 30 years old goes on to college.

The new president has stated that he plans to provide primary schooling for an additional 450,000 children. But this does not meet the real needs for access to education, nor does it provide possibilities for those completing primary school to go on to high school. And the problem does not end there, since the bourgeois educational structure is incapable of providing space in the university for high-school graduates. In the recent period 29,000 students applied for 8,000 openings, leaving 21,000 applicants waiting a year for a new chance at

admission. The situation gets worse each year. There are applicants who have been waiting more than four years to get into the university.

Up until this year, there were no demonstrations to protest this situation. The explanation for this lack of activity lies in the crisis of the student movement—in the high schools as well as in the universities. The movement had become totally disorganized after the failure of guerrillaism and reformism. When student organizations like the university-based Federation of Centers and the high-school United Committee disappeared, the students found themselves with no channels for their struggles, and the authorities had a free hand to carry out their plans.

It was only this year that a mobilization of applicants began. They achieved a partial victory when the minister of education was forced to declare that all applicants would be admitted and the National Council of Universities was forced to expand the number of incoming students.

## The Student Movement Begins to Recover

The first symptoms of recovery of the student movement were seen in the elections of student delegates to the university council. The leftist slate organized by the MAS<sup>4</sup> won the elections, getting more than 8,000 votes.

At the beginning of this year, elections for the student center took place at Simón Bolívar University (the most traditional university in Caracas). Only two slates met the electoral requirements: one supported by the MAS and the other organized by the Juventud Socialista. While the former held reformist positions—for example, "Find solutions to student

4. Movimiento al Socialismo [MAS—Movement Toward Socialism]; In December 1970, 22 of the 51 members of the Central Committee of the Venezuelan Communist party and 74 of the 75 members of the Central Council of the Communist Youth voted to split from the Stalinist party and to form the MAS. Its main figures are Pompeyo Marquez (general secretary) and Teodoro Petkoff. MAS ran the leftist independent Jose Vicente Rangel as its presidential candidate. It came out of the elections as the third largest party, after AD and COPEI.

problems that are workable and therefore acceptable to the authorities"—the latter proposed student control of teaching, support of and links to workers' and people's struggles, and a more democratic, new form of organization—the delegate assembly.

The MAS slate got 824 votes, against 324 for the Juventud Socialista. The latter's votes came in large part from recently enrolled students at the university and their importance lies in the fact that it was the first JS campaign, while the MAS already had leadership of the center.

In the high schools, reorganization began through delegate assemblies—of all students in the same class in some cases, and of student centers in others. Here too the JS played an important role, stimulating this process and extending the new organizational form to the main high schools in Caracas. The reorganization and the struggles begun in various institutions have led to the rise of an organization that projects uniting all Venezuelan high-school students. This is the High-School Committee for Federation, organized by the main centers and delegate assemblies functioning in Caracas. Independent activists and the JS are collaborating in the construction of this tool, which will be fundamental to successful student struggles. Unfortunately the rest of the left has not understood the importance of the committee and has not participated in its work.

All these symptoms foreshadow a new awakening of the student movement, capable of confronting the bourgeoisie's plans to produce technicians for its capitalist development scheme. The bourgeoisie hides its plans under the pompous title created by the new government—"democratization of teaching." Also foreshadowed is the fact that this revived movement will have to unite with the workers' and popular struggles that are beginning.

## The Left

The Venezuelan Communist party has been one of the most important in Latin America. As with its counterparts elsewhere, the objective of its policy is class collaboration—the desperate search for bourgeois nationalist sectors to ally with in a popular front. Thus they abandoned guerrilla warfare and accepted legality: not in

order to develop workers' and popular struggles but to ally themselves with the most "progressive" sectors.

This policy split the CP. Pompeyo Márquez, Teodoro Petkoff, and the Communist Youth abandoned the CP and formed the MAS. In a country of youth the CP was transformed into a party of old men. In the last elections the CP supported the candidate of the MEP for president and ran its own slate for parliament, obtaining 49,455 votes as opposed to the 103,591 they obtained five years before.

The electoral results deepened the crisis of the CP. Veteran leader Eduardo Machado insisted that the CP had made an error in not supporting COPEI, while the grouping headed by Jesús Faria maintained that it was correct to have supported the MEP. As a result, what remains of the powerful CP is being worn down in the dispute over which bourgeois politician to support.

Venezuelan Stalinism has not drawn any lessons from the Chilean popular front; it has lost all influence among the students and has been reduced to almost nothing in the workers' movement.

The MAS got 200,000 votes with its candidate, independent José Vicente Rangel, in the December 9 elections. MAS rejects the concept of the popular front and the "revolution" in stages. This socialist formation won the sympathy of Venezuelan youth who were acquainted with the experience of guerrillaism and reformism. However, the MAS did not propose the formation of a Leninist party and has begun to revise the basic premises of revolutionary Marxism. It began by denying the leading role of the proletariat, putting forward the notion that in Venezuela the numerical weakness of the working class made it no more important than other sectors, like the students and the petty bourgeoisie. MAS continues to question the Leninist concept of the need to form a party, posing itself as a *movement* instead. And now it is developing a new theory of the role of the bourgeois parliament, stating that MAS members of congress will force that institution to fulfill its "real function," as if its real function were not to provide a "democratic" facade for class oppression.

These positions are causing the MAS to advance along the dangerous road of writing off workers' mobilizations, and the organizations that these mo-

bilizations create, as the fundamental places where revolutionists must work. Not seeing the function of socialists in congress as one of agitating within parliament to show the masses that they should not place any confidence in that body, that MAS is sliding down the hazardous slope of reformism.

## The Perspectives

On the basis of these elements, we can return to the partial analyses of left currents that we made at the beginning of this article. It is true that President Carlos Andrés Pérez directed the repression and also that AD and COPEI have a de facto agreement to take advantage of petroleum earnings to develop the country and reduce the proportion of earnings that go to the big imperialist monopolies. We cannot discount the possibility that they may take some anti-imperialist measures, and the nationalization of petroleum firms seems to be a virtual certainty.

But just as it is erroneous to think that the government has to take an ultrareactionary direction, it is also wrong to think that petroleum income in the hands of the national bourgeoisie will change the semicolonial character of the economy, overcoming its brutal, insoluble contradictions under capitalist rule.

We are at the beginning of a contradictory period, since the big earnings will permit the bourgeoisie a certain stability. But at the same time, these earnings will encourage the workers to demand better contracts because of the prosperity.

The agreement between AD and COPEI, based on that same prosperity and on a common objective of developing the capitalist economy, will lead them to maintain parliamentary rule and a degree of freedom that can be utilized by the workers to strengthen their struggles.

The bourgeoisie, which needs the workers' movement as a base of support in its policy of blackmailing imperialism, proposes labor unity under the control of its slavish bureaucracy. However, that unity can aid the workers in their mobilizations.

The Venezuelan masses, who have had a valuable experience with the failure of guerrilla and reformist currents, are faced with a very complex situation, but one which is full of possibilities.

The legal openings can be utilized to stimulate mobilizations. The fabu-



lous resources of the state and the bosses open up the possibility of winning wage increases, as well as access to education. Steps that may be taken against imperialism will demand a correct position—support to the measures themselves but not to the bourgeois government. Each mobilization will require the formation of a workers' united front or unity in action of all anti-imperialist forces. The nationalization of oil will place on the agenda the demand for workers' control; the same demand should be raised whenever any imperialist enterprise is nationalized.

The bourgeoisie hopes to use the big earnings from the petroleum deal for their exclusive gain and to negotiate

with imperialism without breaking with it. This plan could fail thanks to the class struggle. To encourage that struggle, organize it, and lead it is the big task facing revolutionists.

For that task, however, the proletariat needs an irreplaceable weapon: the revolutionary party, formed in the very struggles of the exploited. The new rise in the class struggle reemphasizes the urgent necessity to construct such a party. The Trotskyist Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores of Venezuela has taken on this task, as it begins to pose itself as the new alternative leadership that the movements of the workers, the students, and the people require. □

## Only Half a Century Late

# 'Monthly Review' Editors Make a Discovery

By Allen Myers

In its June issue, the New York "independent socialist magazine" *Monthly Review* marked its twenty-fifth anniversary with an editorial looking back over some of the problems confronting Marxist theory during those two and a half decades and attempting to evaluate the magazine's contribution to the resolution of those problems. The editors, Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, concluded that the period witnessed a "veritable renaissance of Marxism," a rebirth in which *Monthly Review* played a not insignificant part.

Anniversary self-congratulations are a well-established tradition among Marxists and non-Marxists alike, and *Monthly Review* has undoubtedly published meritorious articles and books to which attention could be called without a hint of immodesty. In this case, however, Sweezy and Magdoff have laid claim to a contribution that was not made by *Monthly Review*, and in the process they misrepresent the real lessons of the most significant revolutionary upheaval of the period, the Chinese revolution.

A "renaissance of Marxism" was required, according to Sweezy and Magdoff, by the failure of the expectations of "Marxist conventional wisdom" at the end of the second world war. This

conventional wisdom expected: (1) "recurring and increasingly severe crises and depressions" in the advanced capitalist countries; (2) in the "precapitalist" countries, "bourgeois revolutions, backed and in some cases perhaps even led by the working classes; thereafter they would follow the same road as the already capitalist countries"; (3) in the workers states, productivity and living standards rising "by leaps and bounds, catching up with and then surpassing even the most advanced of the capitalist countries."

It appears that the second point, the question of the nature of the revolution in the colonial and semicolonial countries, is the area in which Sweezy and Magdoff believe that the Marxist "renaissance" has accomplished most. A rather lengthy quotation is necessary here:

"With few exceptions the influential Marxist theorists of the period through the Second World War were Europeans, or at least European-trained. Not entirely inconsistently with Marx, but also by no means with unambiguous backing of his authority, they saw the history of the rest of the world repeating that of Europe. Once capitalism was implanted in feudal or other precapitalist

formations, it would inevitably expand in accordance with its inner nature, spawn a native bourgeoisie and proletariat, and initiate the successive dramas of bourgeois and proletarian revolutions. . . . The trouble was that things didn't work out that way. Here again China was a key. The Kuomintang-Communist alliance which was supposed to produce national liberation and a period of capitalist development led only to the disastrous defeat of 1927 and further subjection of China to the rule of foreign capital. The other side of the coin, however, was the Communist withdrawal to the countryside, the rise to leadership of Mao, and the hammering out of a new course with the peasantry as the base, the proletariat as the leading factor, and assorted bourgeois factions in altogether subordinate roles. The fact that this course led, by a long and tortuous route, to the victory of 1949 was in itself a standing challenge to the old ideas. But it was only in China that the traditional view failed to provide reliable political guidance. In case after case, beginning [?] with India, national bourgeoisies refused to recognize their supposed revolutionary responsibilities and instead became in effect local allies and agents of imperialist rule. In response to this situation, Marxists, especially in the Third World itself, began to see the absolute necessity of rethinking the entire problem of world capitalist history, the place in it of the colonies and dependencies, and the requirements of a successful strategy of liberation. Out of this came a burst of creative writing around the double dialectic of center/periphery and development/underdevelopment, leading inexorably to the conclusion that the day of the bourgeois revolution is past and that in the second half of the twentieth century only a proletarian-peasant revolution can bring genuine liberation to the peoples of the Third World—a conclusion supported positively by the experience of Cuba and negatively by a sadly long list of failed revolutions in the last two decades. (We at MR are proud that one of the earliest and most influential contributions to this literature was the late Paul Baran's *Political Economy of Growth*, published by MR Press in 1957. . . .)

While Sweezy and Magdoff's recognition, however belated, of the fact

that "the day of the bourgeois revolution is past" can only be welcomed, their suggestion that *Monthly Review* blazed new trails in this field of Marxist thought is inaccurate.

The earliest systematic Marxist analysis of the inability of the bourgeoisies in the underdeveloped countries to lead a thoroughgoing struggle for national liberation and the transformation of precapitalist relations was developed by Leon Trotsky in his writings on the 1905 revolution in Russia. Trotsky concluded that already in the first half of the twentieth century historical development had rendered it impossible for the Russian bourgeoisie to carry through to completion the tasks of the bourgeois revolution. These tasks therefore fell upon the shoulders of the proletariat, which would combine them with the tasks of the socialist revolution. Trotsky summarized the process in the journal *Nachalo*:

"Our liberal bourgeoisie comes forward as a counter-revolutionary force even before the revolutionary climax. At each critical moment, our intellectual democrats only demonstrate their impotence. The peasantry as a whole represents an elemental force in rebellion. It can be put at the service of the revolution only by a force that takes state power into its hands. The vanguard position of the working class in the revolution, the direct connection established between it and the revolutionary countryside, the attraction by which it brings the army under its influence—all this impels it inevitably to power. The complete victory of the revolution means the victory of the proletariat. This in turn means the further uninterrupted character of the revolution."\*

The entirety of Trotsky's book *Results and Prospects* (published in 1906) was devoted to explaining the application of this theory of "permanent revolution" to Russia—a theory brilliantly confirmed by the October Revolution itself.

But in the 1920s, the emerging Stalinist bureaucracy singled out the theory of permanent revolution as the axis of its attack on Trotsky and the Left Opposition. In 1929, Trotsky replied to the Stalinist attacks in *The Permanent Revolution*. If Sweezy and

Magdoff have not yet read the book, we suggest that they begin with the concluding chapter, in which Trotsky briefly summarized the "basic postulates" of permanent revolution. These include the following:

"With regard to countries with a belated bourgeois development, especially the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the theory of the permanent revolution signifies that the complete and genuine solution of their tasks of achieving *democracy and national emancipation* is conceivable only through the dictatorship of the proletariat as the leader of the subjugated nation, above all of its peasant masses.

"Not only the agrarian, but also the national question assigns to the peasantry—the overwhelming majority of the population in backward countries—an exceptional place in the democratic revolution. Without an alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry the tasks of the democratic revolution cannot be solved, nor even seriously posed. But the alliance of these two classes can be realized in no other way than through an irreconcilable struggle against the influence of the national-liberal bourgeoisie. . . .

"The dictatorship of the proletariat which has risen to power as the leader of the democratic revolution is inevitably and very quickly confronted with tasks, the fulfillment of which is bound up with deep inroads into the rights of bourgeois property. The democratic revolution grows over directly into the socialist revolution and thereby becomes a *permanent* revolution." (Emphasis in original.)

The "conventional wisdom" that ordered the Chinese CP to subordinate itself to the Kuomintang in the interest of a bourgeois "national liberation and a period of capitalist development" was not Marxist but a *Stalinist* revision of Marxism and the lessons of the Russian revolution itself.

Sweezy and Magdoff are not unaware that this was a key issue of contention between the Stalinists and the Left Opposition. But acknowledging the fact would logically require them to settle theoretical accounts with a prominent defender of the Stalinist revision of Marxism: Mao Tsetung. The *Monthly Review* editors find it easier to pretend that there was no challenge to "conventional Marxist wisdom" until after the victory of the

Chinese revolution.

Because of Mao's defense of the Stalinist two-stage theory of revolution in the underdeveloped countries, Sweezy and Magdoff, even while claiming to have discovered that "the day of the bourgeois revolution is past," refuse to break completely with that theory. After all, they tell us, the theory and the 1927 defeat that it produced "led, by a long and tortuous route, to the victory of 1949." If that were really the case, why would Sweezy and Magdoff regard the 1949 victory as a "challenge to the old ideas"?

It is simply absurd for the *Monthly Review* editors to present the eventual victory as a *consequence* of the earlier disastrous defeat. If we applied the same logic to everyday events, we would have to congratulate an acquaintance run over by a bus: "As a result of your accident, after long and tortuous treatment you will be able to limp out of the hospital on crutches."

Marxists expect that sooner or later there will be successful socialist revolutions in every country of the world. This does not imply that every preceding event contributes to that victory. Do Sweezy and Magdoff now regard the victory of fascism in Germany as a progressive event because it "led, by a long and tortuous route," to the establishment of a workers state in East Germany?

The resistance of world imperialism already makes the road to socialism sufficiently long and tortuous. The task of Marxists is to show the proletariat the shortest and easiest route. Sweezy and Magdoff's role is to proclaim that the Stalinists, who for decades led millions off the road entirely, were following the only available path. □

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\*This and the subsequent quotation are taken from *The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects*, New York: Merit Publishers (now Pathfinder Press), 1969.



### Smith Convoca a Elecciones en Rodesia

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Smith Orders New Rhodesian Election", que apareció el 8 de julio en *Intercontinental Press*].

\* \* \*

Refiriéndose al "estado de incertidumbre" que se vive en Zimbabwe (Rodesia), el Primer Ministro Ian Smith disolvió el 19 de junio la Asamblea Legislativa y llamó a elecciones generales para el 30 de julio. Esta acción se produjo después de que el Consejo Nacional Africano (CNA) rechazó la proposición de Smith de que los africanos recibieran una ma-

después de once meses de negociaciones secretas entre Smith y el Presidente del CNA, el Obispo Abel Muzorewa.

El CNA se formó en 1971, cuando los africanos rechazaron por abrumadora mayoría la proposición de pedir que Inglaterra reconociera la independencia de Rodesia, que había sido declarada unilateralmente por Smith en 1965. Este acuerdo hubiera significado que no existiera nunca un dominio de la mayoría de la población, los 5.6 millones de africanos.

El CNA realizó una campaña de oposición al acuerdo, en torno a la consigna "un hombre, un voto" y llamando a un gobierno de la mayoría. Las manifestaciones, los actos públicos y otras protestas de los africanos obligaron a Londres a aplazar el reconocimiento de la independencia de Rodesia hasta que se pudiera encontrar alguna fórmula que contara con algún apoyo africano.

Al mismo tiempo que Smith anun-

ciaba las elecciones generales, llamaba también a la creación de una mesa de conferencias en la que estuvieran representados el régimen y los diferentes sectores de la población africana, para discutir la "crisis constitucional" a que se enfrenta el régimen—referencia al no reconocimiento de Salisbury por Londres y las resultantes sanciones económicas que las Naciones Unidas impusieron al país. Se suponía que el Consejo de Jefes, que tradicionalmente ha apoyado al régimen de Salisbury, participaría en esa conferencia, dando a Smith más peso para cualquier discusión posterior con el CNA.

Muzorewa, sin embargo, rechazó el 20 de junio la proposición de la conferencia, según informó Reuters, ya que "todos los grupos africanos responsables estaban ya representados en el consejo [CNA]". El CNA anunció también ese mismo día que no presentará candidato en las elecciones generales.

El régimen racista respondió con el arresto de Edson Sithole, dirigente del CNA, el 20 de junio. Sithole fue liberado apenas recientemente y todavía se encuentra sujeto a una serie de restricciones que limitan su libertad de movimiento. □



ABEL MUZOREWA

yor representación simbólica en la Asamblea Legislativa. El "estado de incertidumbre" se refiere también a los efectos que ha tenido sobre el vecino Mozambique el golpe de estado que tuvo lugar en Portugal el 25 de abril.

El rechazo del CNA de la proposición de dar a los africanos seis puestos más en el parlamento (actualmente se les permite tener dieciséis de un total de sesenta y seis) se produjo

### La Protesta Internacional Libera al Disidente Soviético

#### Grigorenko Ha Sido Liberado

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Grigorenko Released from Mental Hospital", que apareció en *Intercontinental Press* el 8 de julio].

\* \* \*

La campaña internacional por la libertad de Grigorenko logró su objetivo. El 26 de junio se ordenó la liberación del disidente comunista de 67 años, que estaba preso desde hacía cinco en un hospital para enfermos mentales. La orden de su liberación ocurrió en la víspera de la visita de Nixon a Moscú.

Grigorenko, que había sido general del Ejército Soviético, fue encerrado en el hospital psiquiátrico desde mayo de 1969. En un juicio en su contra celebrado en febrero de 1970, fue acusado y sentenciado bajo el Artículo

70 del Código Criminal Soviético ("crímenes especialmente peligrosos contra el estado"). Su crimen era haber defendido el derecho de los Tártaros de Crimea a regresar a su patria, de la que fueron deportados en masa en 1944 por órdenes de Stalin.

Pasó los primeros tres años y medio de cárcel virtualmente incomunicado. El otoño pasado fue transferido a un hospital psiquiátrico normal en Stolbovaya, treinta y cinco millas al sur de Moscú, donde estuvo en un pabellón con treinta y seis enfermos mentales.

A pesar de que un reconocimiento psiquiátrico al que se sometió en agosto de 1969 demostró que se encontraba totalmente sano, tres meses después se llamó un nuevo equipo de "expertos" para que lo volvieran a examinar. La segunda comisión, que

estaba dirigida por el famoso Instituto Serbsky de Medicina Psiquiátrica Legal de Moscú, diagnosticó que padecía "ilusiones reformistas" y dijo que requería "tratamiento intensivo en un hospital psiquiátrico especial" por tiempo indefinido.

La publicidad que rodeó el caso de Grigorenko dificultó que las autoridades soviéticas mantuvieran la excusa de que lo encerraban porque padecía una enfermedad mental. Esta dificultad aumentó con la aparición en la prensa de varios informes según los cuales se le había ofrecido varias veces su libertad, a condición de que abandonara sus actividades políticas.

En mayo de 1974 una tercera comisión de psiquiatras soviéticos diagnosticó que Grigorenko ya no necesitaba tratamiento. Como resultado de esta decisión, su caso regresó a los tribunales soviéticos. Después de tanto tiempo de cárcel, su salud se ha deteriorado considerablemente. Ha sufrido tres ataques del corazón y fue herido en la cara por un enfermo mental.

Grigorenko ingresó al Partido Comunista cuando tenía 20 años, y al ejército cuando tenía 30. Después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial fue nombrado profesor de cibernética en la Academia Militar Frunze, en Moscú. En 1961 fue despedido de ese puesto por haber criticado a Jruschov. En 1964 fue arrestado, pasó varios meses en prisión sin que se le juzgara y fue encerrado durante otros ocho meses en un pabellón psiquiátrico.

En abril de este año se convocó a realizar el 7 de mayo un día internacional de protesta, ya que era el aniversario del encarcelamiento de Grigorenko. Los que firmaban la declaración eran el disidente soviético exilado Pavel Litvinov, el opositor checo Jiri Pelikan, y Ken Coates y Chris Farley de la Fundación Bertrand Russell.

El esfuerzo más reciente en favor de Grigorenko tuvo lugar dos días antes de que fuera liberado. En una carta abierta dirigida a Nixon y Brezhnev, Sajarov presentaba una lista con los nombres de unos veinte presos políticos que se encuentran en estos momentos en las cárceles soviéticas, en hospitales para enfermos mentales o en campos de trabajos forzados. Grigorenko era uno de los más conocidos personajes que se mencionan en esa lista. □

## 'Todas las Organizaciones Marxistas' Amenazadas

### Más Ataques Derechistas Contra el PST

[Esta es una traducción del artículo "Rightists Continue Attacks on PST", que aparece en este mismo número de *Intercontinental Press*].

\* \* \*

"Ojo, bolches, los vamos a matar" pintado en las paredes de las fábricas; un intento de quemar el local partidario de Mar del Plata; despidos de activistas sindicales y amenazas en volantes y comunicados son las últimas formas de hostigamiento contra el Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (una organización argentina simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional).

El 26 de junio, *Avanzada Socialista*, el semanario del PST, daba detalles sobre las amenazas que mencionamos arriba:

El Comando antiguerrillero Cóndor publicó un volante en Mar del Plata, diciendo que iban "a combatir desde las sombras a todas las organizaciones marxistas y en especial al PST".

En la fábrica de Fundiciones San Javier de Morón, apareció un "Comunicado a los Socialistas" firmado por el Comando Peronista de San Javier, en el que se acusa al PST de ser "un grupito de señores", "mercenarios de la sinarquía internacional" con "designios inconfesables". El comando decía: "Le damos las gracias al Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores por los servicios prestados contra el gobierno popular . . .

"Estos grupitos socialistas y sectarios ya saben que el gobierno popular podrá ser manso, tolerante, pero no tonto. Por lo tanto actuaremos pese a quien pese y caiga quien caiga . . ."

La Comisión Interna clasista de la fundición convocó a una asamblea en la que se denunciaron las amenazas. Ahí, uno de los trabajadores dijo: "Si bien no hay que ponerse a la altura de estos matones, en última instancia los que saldrán reventados serán ellos, porque los tenemos bien marcados".

El 13 de junio dos miembros del PST fueron despedidos de sus trabajos: Hugo Barros de la fábrica Swift y Roberto Loscertales de los Astille-

ros Río Santiago. *Avanzada Socialista* vincula estos despidos con otro hecho que ocurrió tres días después: la Asociación de Trabajadores de la Universidad de La Plata (ATULP) fue expulsada de la CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo). Los dos miembros del PST y la ATULP habían estado apoyando activamente la huelga de la Siderúrgica Propulsora.

Barros tiene una larga historia de actividad socialista y sindical, y cuando sus compañeros de trabajo supieron que había sido despedido, fueron inmediatamente a la junta de delegados a exigir su reinstalación. Los burócratas y los patrones trataron de evadir el problema. Finalmente, describe *Avanzada Socialista*, "dando un magnífico ejemplo de unidad en la acción, la JTP [Juventud Trabajadora Peronista] repartió un volante donde llamó a toda la fábrica a luchar por el compañero despedido". Otras tendencias que están en el sindicato hicieron lo mismo, y al siguiente día Barros fue reinstalado.

La ola de represión contra quienes se oponen a la política peronista de congelación de precios y salarios ha golpeado también a un trabajador dirigente de los obreros navales en Mar del Plata. S. Olobardi, militante peronista de izquierda, resultó herido a mediados de junio en una lucha contra varios individuos que intentaron secuestrarlo. Durante la lucha también resultaron heridos tres agentes de la policía. Olobardi fue arrestado, acusado de pertenecer al grupo de los secuestradores. Todavía el 26 de junio seguía incomunicado. Poco tiempo antes, Olobardi había estado en la primera fila en una confrontación con el Ministro de Trabajo sobre problemas sindicales.

El 8 de junio fueron arrestados veintinueve miembros del Partido Comunista Revolucionario (PCR—un grupo ultraizquierdista pro-chino). La po-

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licia dijo que había encontrado material "subversivo", armas, municiones y mapas de las instalaciones de la policía y del ejército en la casa donde se hicieron los arrestos. Ni siquiera la prensa burguesa se tragó la historia. "Como suele ser habitual en estos procedimientos, el material 'comprometedor' que habría sido 'hallado', no revestiría tal carácter y suele ser de tenencia habitual en sectores juveniles", decía *El Territorio*.

La tarde del 22 de junio, dos jóvenes fueron asesinados en Buenos Aires frente a un sindicato en el que se estaba realizando un baile. Entre los asesinos había un burócrata sindical y un agente de policía de civil y franco de servicio. Como las víctimas no tenían ninguna filiación par-

tidaria o sindical, las autoridades sostienen que el crimen no tuvo un carácter político.

El editorial de *Avanzada Socialista* sobre estos asesinatos es igualmente válida para todos los casos:

"Aunque no fuera ésta la intención del gobierno, su posición, indirectamente, ¿no está favoreciendo el desarrollo de estos grupos, y por eso es que se sienten totalmente impunes para actuar?"

La conclusión es que éste sí es un asesinato político, porque si bien los asesinados no son activistas sindicales o de algún partido, es político por quienes lo cometieron y porque es producto de una política, la de hacer la 'vista gorda' y dejar sin castigo a los autores de hechos de similar naturaleza". □

## Entrevista con Hugo Blanco

### Sobre la Situación de América Latina

[Esta es una entrevista concedida en español por Hugo Blanco, a principios de julio. Hugo Blanco dirigió el movimiento campesino de "La Convención", en Perú, de 1958 a 1963. Este ha sido uno de los movimientos campesinos más grandes y poderosos de América Latina en los últimos años.

[En estos momentos, Hugo Blanco se encuentra en el exilio en Europa.

[En el próximo número de *Intercontinental Press* aparecerá una traducción al inglés de esta entrevista].

\* \* \*

**Pregunta.** ¿Cómo aprecias la situación en el Perú?

**Respuesta.** El gobierno peruano representa fundamentalmente a los sectores burgueses desarrollistas, tanto nacionales como imperialistas. No nos hacemos ninguna ilusión acerca de la posibilidad del cambio de su carácter de clase. Tampoco creemos que sea capaz de liberarse del imperialismo. Lo que sucede es que a veces se inclina más hacia el nacionalismo burgués y acentúa sus roces con el imperialismo, al mismo tiempo que combina esto con una política populista.

Nosotros siempre hemos apoyado y

apoyaremos críticamente todas las medidas progresivas del régimen. Pero nunca hemos apoyado ni apoyaremos éste ni ningún otro gobierno burgués. Luchamos intransigentemente por un gobierno de los trabajadores.

Se entiende mejor el caso peruano situándolo en el contexto de América Latina:

Los sectores burgueses nacionales, aún aquéllos a los que el imperialismo ha sometido a la categoría de intermediarios, mantienen pugnas permanentes con éste por el reparto de la plusvalía y para tratar de disminuir su dependencia.

La mayor o menor fuerza de estos sectores determina los diferentes regímenes de América Latina.

Combinado con esto, está el método político para explotar a las masas. Algunos sectores están a favor de gobiernos fuertes, tipo Brasil; otros están a favor de hacer concesiones a las masas y mantenerse dentro de una relativa democracia burguesa, como en el Perú. Esto también depende del margen de maniobra que les deje la lucha de las masas.

Hay una relación entre estos dos factores; pero no es una relación mecánica. Con esto quiero decir que no siempre los sectores imperialistas están por gobiernos fuertes y los sec-

tores burgueses nacionalistas por una política populista.

Considero que en el Perú, en general, los sectores desarrollistas nacionales están por el populismo.

En Argentina en 1955 se unieron en favor del golpe represivo todos los sectores burgueses, incluyendo los que habían apoyado a Perón. Cosa parecida sucedió en Chile, donde todos los sectores burgueses se hermanaron para hacer el golpe, encabezados por el imperialismo norteamericano.

A propósito del golpe en Chile. Este acontecimiento puso la relación de fuerzas en América del Sur en contra de las masas. Una de sus consecuencias fue la creación del bloque de gobiernos fuertes y pro-imperialistas: Chile, Brasil, Bolivia y Uruguay. Este bloque no sólo significa un atentado contra los pueblos de esos cuatro países, sino que es una grave amenaza contra los pueblos de los otros países sudamericanos. Desde la distancia es difícil apreciar cuán cercano está el peligro de un golpe de estado reaccionario en el Perú. Mis camaradas del FIR señalan en el periódico de la organización, *Palabra Socialista*, que el peligro existe, aunque en forma latente, no inmediata.

Los revolucionarios debemos impulsar la creación de un frente único en la acción en el que participen todos los que se opongan al golpe. (Esto hicieron los trotskistas en 1955 en Argentina y en 1973 en Chile). Debemos llamar a las direcciones reformistas de las masas a luchar contra el golpe.

No confiamos en que ellas lo harán en forma efectiva. Su política antigolpe consiste en capitular y dar concesiones a los sectores golpistas, frenando el avance de las masas. Con este método lo que consiguen es la derrota de las masas y su propia derrota.

Nuestra política antigolpe es impulsar el movimiento de masas. El avance independiente de los trabajadores en el plano económico y político debilita objetivamente al sector golpista.

La mejor forma de desenmascarar ante las masas a las direcciones que dicen ser antigolpistas, es llamándolas a adoptar una actitud antigolpista consecuente, que no podrán tomar.

**P. ¿Qué papel juega el Partido Comunista Peruano?**

R. El PCP apoya al gobierno burgués frenando y traicionando las luchas reivindicativas de las masas. Para esto utiliza la dirección burocrática de la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, que está en sus manos.

P. ¿Qué opinas de la lucha por las libertades democráticas?

R. La campaña por las libertades democráticas es un aspecto importante de la lucha del pueblo peruano, especialmente si hay peligro de golpe de estado. A quienes más favorece la represión contra los movimientos de masas, el encarcelamiento de quienes participan en estos movimientos y la deportación de revolucionarios, es a los sectores derechistas que propician el golpe. Dentro de este contexto envié una carta abierta al gobierno peruano, en la que pido que permita el retorno de todos los izquierdistas que estamos deportados.

La mejor forma de luchar por las libertades democráticas es impulsar la construcción de amplios movimientos de masas alrededor de este denominador común. Este método se contraponen tanto a la actitud reformista de confiar fundamentalmente en las tramitaciones legales, como a la actitud ultraizquierdista de exigir que todos los que luchan por las libertades democráticas estén, además, de acuerdo con otros planteamientos políticos. El método reformista es incorrecto porque no se puede confiar en el aparato judicial o estatal que está en manos de la clase enemiga. El método ultraizquierdista es incorrecto porque frustra la posibilidad de movilizaciones amplias que pudieran tener un importante efecto político.

En Francia existe un "Comité de Solidaridad con las Víctimas de la Represión en el Perú". Espero que todos los franceses que están a favor de las libertades públicas en el Perú colaboren para revitalizar ese Comité.

P. Dinos algo sobre tu experiencia en "La Convención".

R. La movilización y organización de las masas campesinas comenzó por consignas mínimas. Por eso logró abarcar grandes masas. Si hubiéramos comenzado con consignas muy elevadas, probablemente nos hubiéramos

quedado solos, hablando cosas muy revolucionarias.

Al principio, la lucha con el reformismo se daba más por los métodos de lucha que por las cosas que reclamábamos.

Los reformistas, (el PCP) usaban la movilización de masas para sus maniobras. Nosotros usábamos las reclamaciones legales para la movilización de masas.

Las masas aprendieron a apreciar la fuerza de su movilización, a la que, al principio, se recurrió para alcanzar lo que la ley burguesa les otorgaba, pero que pronto sirvió para rebasar la legalidad burguesa y constituir embriones de poder dual; o sea, el surgimiento de un poder campesino opuesto al poder burgués. (Se tomó la tierra haciendo una reforma agraria propia, se establecieron tribunales populares, se dirigió las obras públicas, etc.)

Un aspecto importante era la defensa. Cuando los campesinos además de sentirse organizados, fuertes y avanzando, comprendieron que era necesario armarse para defender esas conquistas, comenzaron a hacerlo.

Esto no fue espontáneo. Nosotros lo planteamos, nosotros lo explicamos, nosotros comenzamos la preparación de la defensa armada y nosotros la encabezamos. Pero hubiera sido estúpido comenzar el trabajo en "La Convención" con el método que se autodenomina "político-militar"; hubiésemos sido repudiados por las masas desde el inicio y no hubiéramos podido llevarlas hasta la concepción de la necesidad de la lucha armada.

La gran deficiencia en el movimiento de "La Convención" y Cuzco, fue la inexistencia del partido. Todos los aspectos de la lucha, incluyendo el de la lucha armada, hubieran sido más fuertes y mejor organizados si hubiese habido un partido formado al calor de todo el proceso de movilización de masas.

Por esta grave deficiencia, y porque se trataba de un movimiento campesino regional, fue derrotada la resistencia armada. Sin embargo, se mantienen conquistas fundamentales. Y lo más importante es que el campesinado de la zona conserva una tradición de lucha que jugará su rol correspondiente en la revolución peruana.

He escrito un libro acerca de esta experiencia: *Tierra o Muerte*. Desgra-

ciadamente, no sé por qué no se edita en francés. Creo que los estudios críticos hechos por los protagonistas de las luchas son un factor importante para la educación de la izquierda.

P. ¿Qué opinas de las guerrillas?

R. Estoy en contra de la "estrategia" guerrillera, como estaría en contra de la "estrategia" de la huelga general, de la "estrategia" de la huelga con ocupación de fábrica o de la "estrategia" de barricadas. Todas éstas son tácticas muy útiles que pueden ser usadas en determinados países y en determinadas circunstancias, estudiando la realidad concreta de cada país en cada momento.

P. ¿Qué nos puedes decir sobre Chile?

R. El gobierno de Allende fue un Frente Popular pues, aunque los dos grandes partidos obreros eran la mayoría en su seno, estaba también una parte del Partido Radical, que es un partido burgués. El hecho de que este sector haya sido minúsculo o sólo la sombra de la burguesía, no cambia el carácter de Frente Popular que tuvo la Unidad Popular.

En casos como éste, esa "sombra" de la burguesía es mantenida dentro para mostrar a los burgueses que es posible estar juntos, que los partidos obreros tienen buenas intenciones para con ellos, y que están dispuestos a llevar a cabo una política burguesa.

Eso se hizo en Chile. Fue un política de colaboración de clases en servicio de la burguesía. Las direcciones reformistas del Partido Comunista y el Partido Socialista cumplieron el rol de freno del movimiento de masas, que estaba en gran ascenso. La "vía pacífica" demostró una vez más ser la vía más sangrienta y más segura hacia el golpe de estado reaccionario.

El reformismo a cada momento ataba las manos de las masas.

Desgraciadamente, no hubo un partido revolucionario que se mostrara como alternativa clara. El MIR jugó un rol centrista al no decir claramente que la Unidad Popular era reformista, al denunciar sólo a "los sectores reformistas dentro de ella", manteniendo así las esperanzas de las masas en la posibilidad de corregir a la Unidad Popular. □



# BOOKS

## Revolutionaries in Mao's Prisons

Reviewed by Ernest Harsch



*Revolutionaries in Mao's Prisons: The Case of the Chinese Trotskyists*, by Li Fu-jen and Peng Shu-tse. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974. 23 pp. \$0.50, £0.20.

Under the guise of taking a "census," agents of the Chinese Communist party swooped down on the homes of about 200 Chinese Trotskyists, their relatives, and sympathizers on the nights of December 22, 1952, and January 8, 1953. They were questioned for several hours, bound, and taken away.

No official charges were ever brought against them. No show trials were staged to justify the arrests. Not even a single word appeared in the Chinese press to mark this purge of revolutionists. They simply disappeared into Mao's prisons, never to be heard from again.

The title article in *Revolutionaries in Mao's Prisons*, written by Li Fu-jen, chronicles this purge of Mao's left-wing critics by the Chinese Stalinists.

The pamphlet's second article, an appeal by five Chinese Trotskyists who managed temporarily to escape the dragnet, had to be smuggled out of the country. Written a few weeks after the purge, the appeal notes earlier repressive acts against the Chinese Trotskyist movement. Beginning in August 1949, Trotskyists were persecuted, kept under surveillance, vilified, and in some cases arrested and summarily shot—under the slanderous charge of being "Kuomintang agents."

The authors of the appeal refute the charge that the Trotskyists were carrying out "counterrevolutionary activities." They cite how the revolutionary Marxists participated in the campaigns to carry out land reform, fight corruption, and oppose U. S. "aid" to Korea. Even before the Maoist regime expropriated the remaining holdings of the Chinese bourgeoisie in 1952–

53 during the Korean War—after the capitalists had begun a campaign of proimperialist sabotage—the Chinese Trotskyists had advocated the elimination of all bourgeois elements from the state apparatus.

Many of the leaders of the Chinese Trotskyist movement had, in fact, been active for decades in the struggles against both Chinese capitalism and foreign imperialism. Some were founding members of the Chinese Communist party, active participants in the 1925–27 revolution, who later realized the errors of the CCP's Stalin-dictated course—errors that led to the defeat of the revolution. Many were active in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship and later against the Japanese occupation, some of them

spending years in the jails of Chiang and the Japanese imperialists.

In the April 14, 1953, open letter by Peng Shu-tse to the Chinese Communist party (the third article of the compilation), the author notes that the arrests of the Trotskyists were not prompted by any belief that they were "Kuomintang agents." Referring to Stalin's elimination of the old Bolsheviks, Peng writes: "Your previous and present hostility and persecution towards our comrades is undoubtedly fruit of this vicious and poisonous tradition of Stalin's bureaucracy."

A statement issued by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International on April 16, 1972 (the fourth and final article of this collection), ends with an appeal in defense of the imprisoned Chinese Trotskyists: "Demand that the Mao government respect rights guaranteed in the [Chinese] constitution! Demand the observance of proletarian democracy in China! Demand the release of the Chinese Trotskyists!"

"We ask all the organizations that have defended the People's Republic of China against its foes, that have supported the Chinese Revolution, to take a stand on this issue to help break the wall of silence." □

## DOCUMENTS

### For a 'Third Round' of Social Struggles in France

[The following Political Resolution of the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire (FCR—Revolutionary Communist Front), the French Trotskyist organization, was published in the June 21 issue of the weekly newspaper *Rouge*. Its complete title was, "For a 'Third Round' of Social Struggles . . . For Fusion of the Trade Unions . . . For a Government of the Workers' Organizations Established by General Strike!"]

[*Rouge* reports that the resolution was adopted with three abstentions and no dissenting votes by the FCR's provisional national leadership on June 16.

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

1. The presidential elections marked the official end of Gaullism, hastened the pace of changes taking place within the workers' movement, and expressed in a distorted way the unprecedented scope of the upsurge of the workers and other social layers that is occurring six years after May '68.

2. The Gaullist Bonapartist regime arose on the basis of a defeat of the working class and in a period of strong economic expansion that enabled it to present itself as an arbiter placed above social classes and

parties, and to win the support of a not inconsiderable section of the working-class electorate. It was based on a movement or "regroupment" of adventurers originating among the Gaullist circles of the former Resistance movement and survivors of the Pétain regime, including former members of the RPF [Rassemblement du Peuple Français—Regroupment of the French People, a political party formed after the war and headed by de Gaulle], a kind of "Society of December 10."<sup>1</sup> It sought to neutralize and integrate the working class through a complete policy of class collaboration and labor-capital partnership, ranging from the Toutée procedures to participationist schemes, and including the Vallon amendment and the Ordinance of 1967 on profit-sharing.

While these expedients usually failed, class-collaborationist illusions and mirages could be sustained, owing to a period of exceptional expansion. Between 1968 and 1972, the Gross National Product increased by 26%, compared to 22% in Belgium, 20.8% in West Germany, 14.5% in Italy, 8.8% in Britain, and 11.02% in the United States. Between 1969 and 1973, the volume of exports increased

at an annual rate of close to 14%, slightly ahead of Japan and far ahead of any other advanced capitalist country.

This new competitiveness of French capitalism was due in part to a speed-up in the pace of work, the small size of wage increases, and the relative lull in social struggles that followed May '68. Between 1969 and 1972, wages increased by an average of 12% a year, while in Italy and Germany they increased by 20%. Dur-



CHABAN-DELMAS: Policy designed "for voters who will never vote" for him.

1. The reference is to the organization Louis Bonaparte built from the dregs of society, with whose aid he carried through his coup d'état on December 2, 1851. The name "Society of December 10" commemorated the day of Louis Bonaparte's election as President of the French Republic in 1848.

Marx described the Society as follows: "On the pretext of founding a benevolent society, the *lumpenproletariat* of Paris had been organized into secret sections, each section being led by Bonapartist agents, with a Bonapartist general at the head of the whole. Alongside decayed *roues* [rakes] with doubtful means of subsistence and of doubtful origin, alongside ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jail-birds, escaped galley-slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, *lazzaroni* [beggars], pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, *maquereaux* [procurers], brothel-keepers, porters, *literati*, organ-grinders, rag-pickers, knife-grinders, tinkers, beggars, in short the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass thrown hither and thither, which the French term *la Bohème* . . ." (*The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in *Selected Works*, vol. 2, International Publishers, no date, pp. 369-70.)—IP

ing the same period, France lost only one fifth as many working days through strikes as did England. Nevertheless, the minimum wage advanced by an average of 14% per year, and the crumbs resulting from the expansion enabled Chaban-Delmas [Pompidou's first premier] to fulfill his promises of a "contract for advancement" and to nourish the myth of the New Society.

3. However, the balance of forces that Gaullism was based on began to break up in 1968. The May-June general strike established a new relationship of forces that expressed the numerical strengthening and rejuvenation of the working class, and its regained militancy and class consciousness. From that point on, the regime had lost one of the conditions neces-

sary for its survival: the relative submissiveness of a defeated proletariat. The regime had only two options—transform itself or face collapse. Less than a year after May '68, at the time of the April referendum, the bourgeoisie, using Giscard as the hatchetman, got rid of the Bonaparte.

Pompidou, who had prepared the way for the changing of the guard, launched the formula of an "opening in continuity." He was no longer a Gaullist president, but the man who could impose on all the factions of the UDR [Union des Démocrates pour la République—Union of Democrats for the Republic, the main Gaullist party] the new presidential majority, enlarged to include the Independent Republicans [Giscard's party] and the Centre Démocratie et Progrès [CDP—Center Party for Democracy and Progress]. This new presidential majority was to end up running against the Union of the Left in the 1973 legislative elections under the single designation of the URP [Union des Républicains de Progrès—Union of Republicans for Progress].

With the fall of the Bonaparte, the keystone of the regime had fallen: As de Gaulle himself had stated, "an edifice that depends on the presence of a single man for its stability is necessarily a fragile thing." Four years later, Sanguinetti [general secretary of the UDR] was noting that "in 1969 M. Pompidou got only a tiny percentage of votes out of the support of Giscard d'Estaing and Duhamel [CDP leader]—votes without which, in any case, he could have been elected."

4. The second blow to the regime was the demonstration that it was impossible to expect to integrate the working class through participationist schemes and profit-sharing plans over the heads of the workers' trade-union organizations. Unlike the profit-sharing plans, which appealed individually to each worker in the factory, the "contracts for advancement" recognized the trade-union organizations as the natural bodies for the state and the bosses to deal with, which fitted in with the logic of reinforcing the trade-union rights granted at Grenelle.<sup>2</sup>

2. "Grenelle" is the name of the street in Paris where general accords are negotiated between the unions and the French government and bosses—IP



However, from that time on, Chaban's policy did not receive unanimous support either among the bourgeoisie or within his own movement. It was designed, Chirac [Giscard's premier] said, "for voters who will never vote for us." The dismissal of Chaban and the appointment of Messmer to head the government in July 1972 marked a change in orientation in order to prepare for the elections.

Without openly abandoning the contractual policy, they began to address themselves "to disadvantaged elements" and to lure those elements by cunning preelection handouts in accordance with the logic one finds in the Provins program. Through a series of budgetary and legislative provisions, attempts were made to woo shopkeepers and tradesmen, farmers, small and middle businessmen, and administrators.

The majority won the March 1973 legislative elections, but the UDR lost its absolute majority in parliament. This was the second stage in the fall of Gaullism. Sanguinetti lucidly commented that the victory was a bitter one: "Bitter, because it has been established that the united front of candidates this strategy called for, but that most of us did not want, did not accurately reflect the full range of the present majority. Bitter, too, because we have established that our alliances pulled us to the right and because of that we lost part of our populist electorate, and if we are not populist we have no meaning. . . . We have to determine whether we will remain Gaullists, or whether we will become a conservative party."

5. Chaban's overturn is only the last and definitive stage in the fall of Gaullism. Through his candidacy in the presidential elections, he claimed to embody "the rallying spirit of Gaullism" just when the UDR, going from setbacks to defeats, had fallen by 1973 to the status of just one parliamentary faction among others, and less homogeneous than others.

Chaban sought to give this regroupment a populist flavor by invoking themes like "a contract for advancement" or the "new society," at the very time that (with the end of the expansionist euphoria) contracts were in-

creasingly empty and the lures of class collaborationism increasingly less attractive. And he sought to be the defender of the institutions of the Fifth Republic, at the very moment that the contradictions of a regime deprived of its Bonaparte, deprived of the movement that supported it, were becoming explosive. It is significant that Pompidou, who in his time had known how to fill the void by declaring his own candidacy, was unable to designate his successor, although he knew he was a dying man. It is therefore logical, from the standpoint of its own interests, that the bourgeoisie chose Giscard.

6. For big business, Giscard was the best candidate. Sensing the approach of difficult times, he oriented his campaign around anticommunism and electoral handouts. He appeared as the determined candidate of the union of the right; the candidate of a bourgeoisie that rejected any truck or trade with the Communist party.

Giscard won, and now the problems are posed. First, because he was elected as the right-wing candidate with barely 51 percent of the votes, and thus cannot remain the president of the right wing alone without running the risk of being broken in a class confrontation. The government therefore has no choice but to carry on in the style of a senile and decadent Bonapartism. Moreover, Giscard cannot help but attack in the economic sphere the same layers on which he based his electoral support. Further, he must resolve the problem of those bastardized institutions bequeathed by Gaullism that are situated somewhere between parliamentarism and the presidential system, for these institutions could be paralyzed in the conflicts that may now arise between the president and the Assembly.

Giscard will try to carry through the transformation of the regime into a presidential system, that is, in the sense of a further reinforcement of the executive arm and the absolute independence of the government in relation to the Assembly with, as its counterpart, an Assembly that cannot be dissolved by the president. But the viability of such a constitutional system presupposes the existence of a strong, conservative bourgeois party that can provide a base for the president, and it also implies the possi-

bility of alternating between two big bourgeois formations, or formations controlled by the bourgeoisie.

This is not 1945, however, and the same factors that destroyed the populist ambitions of the Gaullist movement will not permit the formation of a big Christian Democratic or conservative party enjoying the advantages of a broad populist electoral clientele. And this is not the United States: The existence of a politically strong and organized working class deprives the bourgeoisie of two possible majorities that it could play upon one after the other. That is why the new majority that Giscard talked about in his campaign is still only a fragile coalition around the president. And that is why the Chirac government is only a transitional government, as ill-assorted and ill-matched as the contents of the back room of a secondhand shop.

The UDR, pulled together by, and for the control of, the state apparatus, cannot easily survive the loss of absolute power. From now on, two major paths have opened before it: rallying to the new majority outlined by Chirac, or participating in a regroupment of the "Center-Left." Jobert [Pompidou's foreign secretary] has already blazed the trail for this latter course, which is supported by a section of the UDR. But in the long run, the decomposition and breaking up of the UDR are foreseeable; the appearance of autonomous right-wing, corporatist, and fascistlike currents is a possible result.

7. The Left's results constitute the second lesson of the presidential elections. Thirteen million voters, more than 49 percent of those who voted, united in a vote that was seen, despite the candidate himself, as a class vote. The overwhelming majority of wage earners and youth voted for the Left, even though those under 21 years of age as well as 3 million immigrant workers were deprived of the right to vote.

This unprecedented result for the Left ensures a political outlet on the horizon of workers' struggles. It can be said that the Majority kept the presidency but lost the elections; a new period is opening up in the class struggle.

8. This new electoral surge of the Left has precipitated the changes that

are taking place in the workers' movement. The Socialist party, the main beneficiary of François Mitterrand's united candidacy, is continuing its recent growth and is restoring to its advantage the balance of electoral forces relative to the Communist party, a process already begun in 1973. Further, the majority of its present members joined after the establishment of the new SP at the Congress of Epinay; they represent a current no longer confined to the intellectual strata or the technical and administrative professions, but one that is close to the heart of the working class.

This development will only be encouraged by Mitterrand's statements greeting the fact that members of the CFDT [Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail — French Democratic Confederation of Labor] rallied to the SP, and the petition in the same sense being distributed within the CFDT itself immediately after the presidential elections. And this new layer of SP members is composed of many elements: It embraces at one and the same time firmly reformist, anticommunist positions, and centrist, anti-Stalinist positions; it is to the right, but also to some extent to the left of the CP.

9. This polarization around the Union of the Left tears at both the centrist currents in the far left and the class-struggle currents in the unions. The SP and Mitterrand need endorsement from the left in order to open up the possibility of new alliances further to the right, to reduce the CP's influence in the Union of the Left, and to water down the Common Program. By calling for a vote for Mitterrand from the first round, and by presenting his campaign as widening the Common Program to include the concept of self-management socialism, the majority leaders of the PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié — United Socialist party] and the CFDT began to give him this needed support. The adherence to the SP of secondary leaders of the CFDT, and the favorable response by the leadership of the PSU to the appeals of the SP's leadership, have a similar meaning.

Thus a basis has been created for the SP to extend its audience, organized or unorganized, in the working class. It has become a pole of attraction and a framework for the evolution of a significant number of cen-

trist currents. The revolutionary Marxists must pay the closest attention to this development, in order to work toward the clarification of these centrist currents, and win from them militants who refuse to side with class collaborationism and reformism against the socialist revolution. The revolutionary Marxists must look for opportunities to confront them and debate with them. This struggle should be carried on as part of the revolutionary road to socialist self-management.

The CP, for its part, finds itself for the first time in a long while in a minority position electorally in relation to the SP. As a result of the relations established between the CFDT and the SP, the CP is in danger of losing its absolute organizational monopoly over the workers' movement. This new situation can only induce a questioning attitude among CP members, sharpening the contradictions within the party.

Far from reacting through a hardening up or a swing to the left programmatically, the most recent meeting of the Central Committee of the CP reaffirmed the overtures to the Gaullists, reiterated the slogan for a Union of the French People, and passed judgment on the election campaign as too radical and far out, stressing that the Common Program is not aimed at opening the way to socialism. The only immediate counter to the problems facing the party has been the "open door" publicity campaign,<sup>3</sup> which indicates the narrowness of the CP's margin of maneuver at a time when its ties with the Soviet Union are frayed by conflicts and tensions.

10. Throughout its electoral campaign, the Union of the Left affirmed its intention of being a loyal manager of capitalist society.<sup>4</sup> This means that allowing for its own results and the

3. Between June 10 and 25, the Paris federation of the Communist party organized a series of political and cultural events to acquaint the public with the views and activities of the party. The campaign included opening up internal meetings of the party cells to nonmembers. — *IP*

4. This is a reference to a statement by Leon Blum, Socialist party leader and Popular Front premier in the 1930s, who defined the role of the Popular Front as being "a loyal manager of capitalist society." — *IP*

fragility of the regime, it presented itself as the last possible resort, the last democratic card the bourgeoisie could play in the event of an open political crisis. Such a role does not necessarily require any new allies, or even any widening of alliances. It could even be said that any rupturing of present alliances would be suicidal both for the CP, which has built its whole strategy thereon, and for the SP, which was rebuilt around this alliance following the catastrophic results obtained by Deferre in 1969 on the basis of a contrary strategy.

As for broadening its base, the Union of the Left and primarily the CP (like the Italian CP) have concluded from the coup in Chile that it is necessary to broaden their social and political base prior to winning control of the government. That is why the Italian CP is proposing a "historic compromise" to the Christian Democracy. That is why the Union of the Left, including the CP, has been making greater efforts since the fall of 1973 to win over small and middle businessmen and administrators (as in the UGICT-CGC negotiations).<sup>5</sup> And that is why, during the campaign, Marchais [CP general secretary] launched the slogan of a Union of the French People, first at Marseille, then before the May 8 meeting of the Central Committee, explaining that it was not an incidental slogan but the concept of an alliance that is valid whatever the results of the elections.

This is the perspective in which an alliance with the Gaullists is projected. But the political polarization resulting from the establishment of a strong state in France does not lend itself to unstable alliances and parliamentary combinations.

Electorally, Mitterrand gained less from the rallying to the Union of the Left of several bosses and left Gaullists than he did from the far left. For their part, JJSS [Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, leader of the Radical Socialist party, a liberal capitalist party] chose to support Giscard, and Lecanuet [leader of the Réformateurs (Reformers), a small bourgeois party]

5. The reference is to fusion negotiations taking place between the Confédération Générale des Cadres [General Confederation of Technical and Administrative Personnel] and the engineers and technicians' section of the CGT. — *IP*



explicitly ruled out any alliance or collaboration with any coalition including the CP. The bourgeoisie, drawing its own lessons from the events in Chile, has concluded that its interests lie in a policy of class against class.

Thus the Union of the Left could become a final solution for the bourgeoisie in the event of a political crisis, but only as the Union of the Left, including the CP. The dynamic of the election campaign only served to clarify the class-collaborationist logic of the Common Program, without any need for new alliances or the transformation of the Union of the Left into a Popular Front.

11. For the workers, the electoral failure of the Union of the Left was felt not as a defeat, but as a disappointment. It should not be forgotten that Pompidou's death and the presidential campaign came in the midst of a wave of workers' struggles, and that the traditional electoral truce itself remained quite limited. Faced with the consequences of the oil crisis and the economic slowdown, the issue "Who is to pay?" was posed still more sharply, and the struggles over the division of wages and profits was intensified. Management and government met this nascent mobilization with a hard line: the lockout at Saint-Nazaire, sending police into the banks, using scabs and the CFT [Confédération Française du Travail—French Confederation of Labor, a company-sponsored scab "union"].

However, marked progress has been achieved in the six years since May '68. There is the scope of mobilizations: Big battalions have gone into action, in contrast to the preceding period marked by exemplary but relatively isolated struggles (Batignolles in 1971, Joint Français in 1972, Lip in 1973); industrial sectors and cities scarcely touched by the 1968 strike wave have entered the struggle. There is the content of demands: across-the-board demands for equal wage increases, the struggle against speedup, the demand for workers' control.

There are the forms of struggle employed: a great many occupations, flying pickets, strike committees as in the banks, experiments in workers' control following the example of the Lip workers. There is the tendency for struggles to spread to the level of the city, the region, or the indus-

trial branch. There is a new upsurge of struggles among the youth, related to workers' struggles (for the first time, the technical schools are in the front lines).

12. Contrary to the statements of Edmond Maire [head of the CFDT], the close result of the presidential election offers the prospect of a third round of social struggles, and the question of struggle tactics takes center-stage in the debates. After the [general strike of the] Sixth of December, which they left without a follow-up, the CGT and CFDT leaderships sang a different tune; the former proposed national days of action, as in the civil service, a kind of controlled preelectoral bombardment; while Edmond Maire talked about keeping up a running fire of actions. But both sought to avoid the convergence and centralization of struggles.

Today, the federal leadership of the CGT, far from advancing the perspective of an offensive, is demanding negotiations so that the workers still led astray by Giscard's demagoguery can, through their own experiences, compare the promises he doesn't keep with the draft laws placed on the order paper in the National Assembly by the deputies of the Left. Preoccupied with strengthening the "noncommunist left," the CFDT's federal leadership is adjusting its demands to the objectives of the Common Program: Thus, the demand for a 1,500-franc minimum wage has been lowered to 1,200 francs. And at the same time, since the differences over struggle tactics is linked more than ever with differences involving political strategy, there is a trend toward increasing repression of revolutionary militants by the two trade-union bureaucracies.

13. In our opinion, the election results, reflecting a powerful movement for unity, can only encourage the workers to become aware of their strength and their possibilities. In a similar way, the results of the legislative elections in 1973 encouraged workers' struggles, and the 1967 results created conditions favoring the explosion of May '68. In this context, the basic content of *Rouge's* Action Program remains on the order of the day, although it may be updated.

14. However, in redefining our tasks in the light of the new situation, we

must stress particularly:

a. The need for coordination, unification, and centralization of struggles, in order to avoid the real danger of a fragmentation of struggles, and a differentiation of levels of consciousness and combativity in the working class. We call for a "third round" of social struggles, to win the workers' demands through struggle, and to prepare the way for a combined movement and a general strike.

b. At a time when the union leaderships claim agreement on essentials, it is significant that they do not envisage or propose the kind of trade-union unity that gave such strength, enthusiasm, and confidence to the working class in 1935. For fusion of the trade unions, with the right of tendencies, in order to forge a more effective, united and democratic instrument of struggle!

c. The regime is not about to resolve its contradictions, and the government is plainly on probation; everyone senses that the next major confrontations will not await the electoral encounters set for five or seven years hence. Rather than going into retirement, Mitterrand has set himself up as a standby government, advancing the slogan "Neither truce nor pause." In the face of Giscard's regroupment of the right wing, and all the attempts at class collaboration, we must begin now to call for a government of the workers' organizations, established by a general strike and based on the mobilization of the masses.

d. The publication during the campaign of the manifesto of the FSMAR [Front des Soldats, Marins et Aviateurs Révolutionnaires—Revolutionary Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Front] and the Appeal of the One Hundred Soldiers<sup>6</sup> spotlighted the importance of antimilitarist propaganda

6. A statement signed by 100 enlisted men on the eve of the election, demanding that the candidates declare their position on a series of demands, such as free choice of date of draft induction up to the age of 25; payment of wages equal to the legal minimum wage; the right for those who choose to remain in the army to renegotiate their contracts; abolition of hazing; an end to being stationed outside of France; the right to read what one wants, and to free expression; an end to special courts and discipline. The full text of this statement was published in the May 16 issue of *Le Quotidien Rouge*. —IP

and the response it is getting. It is more necessary than ever to support and build the FSMAR and the sol-

diers' committees, and to develop the antimilitarist campaign among the civilian population through the CDA

[Comité de Défense des Appelés — Committee to Defend the Conscripts] and the trade-union movement. □

## No PST Signature on Statement Handed to Perón

[The following editorial note appeared in the June 26 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party), an Argentine sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. The note deals with the PST's participation, together with seven other political parties, in two interviews with General Juan D. Perón.

[The first interview took place on March 21. It was intended to help dramatize, and thereby help mobilize active resistance to, the resurgence of the ultraright that had led to, among other things, a coup d'état in the province of Córdoba on February 27.

[In its report in the March 28–April 5 issue of *Avanzada Socialista* on the confrontation with Perón, the editorial staff indicated that the PST had added its signature to a joint document presented to the general by the eight parties that participated in the meeting. This led to some misunderstandings of the position of the PST, which the editorial note is intended to help clear up.

[The second interview with Perón, in which delegations from the eight parties participated, was held April 5. No general document was presented on this occasion. For the stand taken by the PST, see "Coral Faces Perón in Defense of Strikers," *Intercontinental Press*, April 29, p. 501; and "Coral Confronts Perón With Five Demands," *Intercontinental Press*, May 13, pp. 606–608.]

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We have received a letter from a European reader who follows our newspaper closely, although he reports that recently a few issues have not reached him. The compañero expresses solidarity with us in facing the violent attacks and assassinations our party has suffered, but he would also like something cleared up.

He learned that in April a delegation from our party participated,

along with seven other political organizations, in an interview with General Perón. He asks us to make clear whether we—along with these bourgeois parties—signed a document to be presented to Perón. The question arises from three contradictory reports: one in *Avanzada Socialista*, in which we stated that the document was jointly signed; a second, an account of a television program in which Juan Carlos Coral denied having signed the document; and a third, an article in the magazine *Así* about the television program, in which Coral's denial was not mentioned.

The compañero wants to know whether or not there was actually a document signed by the eight parties. Along with his question, the compañero makes other points in which he criticizes our party's policy with regard to agreements for the purpose of defending democratic rights.

In this brief reply we are not going to take up the various criticisms of a political and theoretical nature made by the compañero. Here we want only to state again the basis of our political position and clear up the question of the document.

In our country the democratic liberties we have at present are the result of tremendous workers' struggles that erupted with the Cordobazo [the 1969 semi-insurrection in Córdoba]. These liberties are being threatened by the rise of fascist groups that are supported by a wing of the government, by the union bureaucracy, and by the bourgeoisie. Faced with that threat, we consider it not only permissible but obligatory to make limited, tactical, temporary agreements with any sector that comes out for the defense of democratic rights. That does not stand in the way of—on the contrary, it requires—our continuing to advance the socialist revolution as the only way to really solve the crisis. And, at the same time, for this purpose we have to narrowly define our agreements with bourgeois parties, since these parties cannot be relied

upon to defend democratic rights consistently.

It was to press this policy that we attended the interview with government officials, and mounted mobilizations for democratic rights to counter the murder of our members and those of other parties.

Let us turn now to the question of the document. As Compañero Coral told an immense television audience April 8, our party did not sign any document jointly with the other parties. Coral explained in front of the television cameras that the report in *Avanzada Socialista* was the result of an error.

If *Así* did not take note of Coral's explanation, it was because the article is a reporter's selective treatment of a program that lasted nearly two hours. The Argentine public can verify Coral's public denial, and also the fact that the entire program argued the case against popular frontism.

For our part we want to make clear how *Avanzada Socialista* happened to make the error. It resulted from the following sequence: One of the eight parties proposed that a joint declaration be made, and it presented a draft. Our party proposed a series of changes that were partially accepted. At the time we went to press, the editorial staff thought that the document bore the signature of the *Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores*. Actually, it was not signed because there was still disagreement with it.

We on the editorial staff complete the record by indicating how the error was made with regard to the signature. □

### Correction

The translators of two documents on the case of Vladimir Bukovsky that appeared on page 927 of our July 8 issue were incorrectly identified. The translation of the letter to the International Red Cross was done by Pat Galligan. The translation of the complaint to Deputy Prosecutor Rekunkov was done by Carol Lisker.