

# Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 12, No. 21

© 1974 by Intercontinental Press

June 3, 1974

50c



El Mundo

Portugal

## **African Students Speak Out Against Spinola's Neocolonialism**

Palestinians Forced to Flee Refugee Camps

Israeli Terror Bombings Claim New Victims

In the Hands of the Chilean Junta

Journalist Describes His Arrest and Torture

# Demand Freedom for Feliciano

About 100 persons demonstrated in New York City May 23 in defense of Carlos Feliciano, a Puerto Rican nationalist framed on charges of possessing explosives. The protesters staged their action outside of the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court as Feliciano's lawyers attempted to appeal his September 1973 conviction on the possession charges.

When defense attorney William Kunstler attempted to file the appeal, however, he was prevented from doing so because Judge Arnold Fraiman, who had presided over the September trial, had failed to prepare the necessary papers. The appeal has been postponed until June.

Feliciano was first arrested in May 1970 on charges of bombing forty-one buildings in New York, but the jury in his first trial, which was held in the Bronx in 1972, found him innocent of that frame-up charge.

At the second trial in Manhattan, however, Feliciano was found guilty on the possession charges after Judge Fraiman ordered the deadlocked jury to return with a verdict. In the course of the second trial, defense attorney Kunsler discovered evidence that helped prove the frame-up nature of the prosecution's case.

It was revealed that the New York City Bureau of Special Services and Investigations (the "Red Squad") had originally put Feliciano and other Puerto Rican nationalists under surveillance after consulting the FBI, the Puerto Rican police, and the President's Special Security Service.

Fraiman did not allow Kunstler to call to the stand witnesses who would have testified that the government had conspired to frame Feliciano and discredit the Puerto Rican nationalist movement. The defense appeal is based on this refusal to allow key defense testimony.

Following the guilty verdict at the September trial, Feliciano was sentenced to four years in prison, but was released on bail pending a decision on the appeal. Feliciano had already served seventeen months in pretrial detention. □

## In This Issue

U.S.A.	674	Demand Freedom for Feliciano
	678	Why Nixon Defies Watergate Subpoenas — by Allen Myers
	679	Magruder Draws 10-Month Sentence
	701	Police File Charges Against Patricia Hearst
PORTUGAL	675	African Students Seize Colonial Agency in Lisbon—by Gerry Foley
ARAB EAST	677	Israeli Terror Bombings Claim New Victims — by Michael Baumann
FRANCE	680	In the Aftermath of Round Two—by Dick Fidler
	683	"Rouge" Sentenced to Heavy Fine in Lawsuit
BRITAIN	683	London March Supports Palestinians
	689	Workers' Struggles Defy "Social Contract" — by Elizabeth Smith
	690	Wilson's Strategy for Wage Restraints — by Tony Hodges
ARGENTINA	684	Peronist Youth Taken Aback by May Day Paddling—by Judy White
	686	A Year of Attacks on Working Class
	686	1,000 Join Fernandez Funeral March
CHILE	687	Observer Describes Santiago Show Trial
	698	Swiss Journalist Describes His Arrest and Torture
IRELAND	694	Bombings Require United-Front Response
NEW ZEALAND	694	Labour Party Leaders Try to Bar Socialist
SOVIET UNION	695	Prisoners Demand National Rights
	702	The Opposition Movement in Ukraine — by Oleh Illytzyk
MAURITIUS	699	The Political Situation
AROUND the WORLD	696	
DRAWINGS	678	Moshe Dayan; 679, Leon Jaworski; 682, Valery Giscard d'Estaing; 690, Harold Wilson—by Copain

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

COPY EDITOR: Lawrence Rand.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Candida Barberena, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Allen Myers, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.

TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Ruth Schein.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemenee, 75004, Paris, France.

TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright © 1974 by Intercontinental Press.

## African Students Seize Colonial Agency in Lisbon

By Gerry Foley

Lisbon

While most of the political talk in Portugal is about the composition of the provisional government, the fundamental political question remains what the new regime will offer the peoples of the colonies.

In his book, *Portugal e o Futuro* (*Portugal and the Future*), General António de Spínola, the head of the Junta de Salvação Nacional, clearly excluded independence as a possible solution to the wars of liberation in Portugal's colonies.

The general's position, as set forth in his book, is bourgeois-nationalist. It has two sides: the first is that Portugal cannot continue to support the burden of its colonial wars. The drain on the national economy puts the country at too great a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Common Market countries.

In particular, the extensive emigration resulting from this growing disadvantage threatens to produce social explosions by bringing an active layer of the Portuguese working class into contact with a standard of living their mother country "cannot match." Therefore, the drain of the colonial wars must be stopped.

But the second side of General Spínola's argument is that Portugal also cannot afford to give up the colonies. The country is so weak vis-à-vis the other European powers and the United States that without its African dependencies, Portugal's independence would be threatened.

The only way out of this dilemma is to find African allies willing to accept some concessions within the framework of a "Lusitanian Community." Spínola seems particularly vague and romantic when he evokes this "community of spirit." But he may have something more definite in mind when he writes about Africans who "want to be Portuguese."

In order to create the conditions for a neocolonial settlement in the parts of Africa under Portuguese rule, Gen-

eral Spínola and the junta have had to take a great risk. They have had to scuttle the system of police-state repression that stood in the way of any concessions to the African peoples and that ruled out attracting any popular support for political initiatives.

The most lucid sector of the Portuguese bourgeoisie, represented by Spínola and the junta, apparently felt they had no choice but to take this risk. Spínola lays out the reasons clearly enough in his book. But the dangers of this choice for the Portuguese bourgeoisie have been quick to appear.

One of the first results of the "democratic opening" is that hundreds of African students, formerly condemned to total silence by heavy police surveillance, have begun to speak out and express directly their aspirations and those of their peoples.

### Loud and Clear

What they have had to say does not fit in with Spínola's scheme of a great Lusitanian confederation. They have spoken out loud and clear for immediate independence for the colonies, and by doing so imposed themselves as a key political force in the present situation in Portugal, a force the junta clearly fears.

This new force emerged abruptly. On May 6, the newspapers in the northern city of Oporto, where I was at the time, reported a demonstration of several hundred African students in Lisbon demanding immediate independence for the colonies.

Next, they reported that the students had seized the premises of the government agency for colonial students, the Procuradoria dos Estudantes Ultramarinos [Procurate for Students from the Overseas Provinces]. The students had renamed the rooms the Casa dos Estudantes das Colónias [Colonial Student House].

This action fitted into a pattern of

many occupations aimed at destroying the apparatus and institutions of the corporate state set up by António Salazar. In the case of the African students, this action took on a powerful political momentum.

The junta's representatives complained that if the government so much as accepted the name "Casa dos Estudantes das Colónias" it would "destroy the unity of the Armed Forces Movement." That is, some elements in the junta would not accept any name other than "overseas provinces."

I went out to the ex-Procuradoria to talk with the occupiers. The premises were on the sixth and seventh floors of a modern office building on the Avenida da República in an outlying section of Lisbon. The Avenida at this point is rather like an expressway through thinning urban sprawl.

On the front door of the building there was a sign "Casa dos Estudantes das Colónias" and the floor number. The sign had obviously been up several days but had not been defaced. The neighborhood was covered with slogans of the far-left groups, as it seems every neighborhood in Lisbon is, even the medieval labyrinth of the Alfama district.

I took the elevator to the sixth floor. Some Portuguese cleaning women asked me what I wanted. I said that I had come to talk to the students. They called one of the student representatives. The staff seemed to be working together with the students, but it was apparent that there were material difficulties in running the facility under student control.

A Cape Verdian student, Scapa, ushered me very politely into what must have been the director's office. Later a young man in uniform, a junior officer of some kind, poked his head into the room. Scapa explained that the officer was a representative of the junta sent to check into the material problems, to see how the facility was operating, and to ascertain—if possible—what had happened to the money that was supposed to be

on the premises before the coup.

The young officer was very polite and did not inquire about the presence of a foreigner in the former director's office.

### 'Neocolonial Solutions'

Scapa told me that the African students understood perfectly well that the junta did not intend to grant independence to the colonies, and that the group occupying the ex-Procuradoria was determined to oppose any "neocolonial solutions."

The students also knew, Scapa said, that because of the junta's political needs of the moment, the Africans at the University of Lisbon had considerable leverage. He said he thought it was unlikely the junta would try to oust them by force from the rooms they were occupying, at least for some time.

Scapa proved to be right. Later on he came into the room carrying a copy of an agreement the junta had just made with the students. The text was as follows:

"1. The Delegate of the Junta supports the democratic operation of the Institute by a board elected democratically in a broad assembly.

"2. The Delegate of the Junta supports the election of a Comissão Directiva Provisória [Provisional Management Board] to manage the facility and considers that it was correct for representatives of this Comissão Directiva to participate in the liquidation of the former P.E.U. [Procuradoria dos Estudantes Ultramarinos].

"3. The Delegate of the Junta agrees to keep these facilities open and in regular operation, since the Comissão Directiva guarantees the order and maintenance of these facilities.

"4. The Delegate of the Junta confirms the abolition of the P.E.U., the ouster of the old directors, and the abolition of the C.E.U. [Circulo de Estudos Ultramarinos—Study Circle on the Overseas Provinces].

"5. Scholarship payments will be guaranteed from Monday, May 13."

### Embarrassment to Junta

Scapa was smiling broadly. It was a great victory, because there could be no doubt that the occupation and the activities of these African students were and remain a great embarrass-

ment to the junta and General Spínola's plans for a "Lusitanian community."

One of the first acts of the Estudantes das Colónias was to denounce a pro-"Lusitanian community" statement of a group of "moderate" African students, a statement of some importance for the junta's plans. The reply of the Estudantes das Colónias, dated May 7, said, in part:

"We denounce the opportunist, demagogic, and neocolonialist character of this position and make it clear that it does not represent the liberation movements, the vanguard of the fighting peoples of the colonies.

"We proclaim (based on documents that we have in our possession) the fact that the elements who signed this communiqué were linked to the abolished Circulo dos Estudos Ultramarinos, a fascist and colonialist body.

"We reaffirm our position that there can be no real solution of the problems of the peoples in the colonies except in the framework of total independence of the respective colonies. We reaffirm our repudiation of all colonialist and neocolonialist positions. We declare our solidarity with the positions assumed by the PAIGC, the MPLA, and FRELIMO [liberation groups in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique]."

### Abolish Political Police

The Estudantes das Colónias also raised some demands that were embarrassing to the junta in an even more immediate way. For example, they called for the abolition of the old political police, the PIDE [Policia Internacional para a Defesa do Estado—International Police for the Defense of the Portuguese state], in the colonies, thereby highlighting the fact that this hated force, which has been abolished in Portugal, has been left intact in the territories Portugal controls overseas. In the colonies, the government has said, it intends to reconvert the PIDE into a "military intelligence force."

The African students also called for the release of all prisoners in the colonies. The junta has released what it considers to be prisoners of conscience, but it has refused to release persons it claims are "prisoners of war." As long as this last category is maintained, however, it is clear that

the colonial war is continuing.

Another embarrassing subject for the junta has been raised by the Estudantes das Colónias. The students have appealed to the 20,000 Cape Verdian workers in Portugal to assert their dignity by fighting for the independence of their homelands and for equality for themselves in Portugal.

The Cape Verdian workers are the most brutally exploited section of the working class in Portugal, Salomé, one of the student spokespersons, told me.

They live almost entirely on rice and potatoes. In addition to their economic impoverishment, they are subject to racial prejudice. None of the African students I talked to believed the stories about the lack of race prejudice in "Lusitanian civilization."

### Long-term Effects

Most of the African student activists, as well as the immigrant African workers, are Cape Verdians. The politicalization and mobilization of this layer, as a result of the process going on in Portugal, can have important long-term effects for the struggle in the colonies.

The most extensive assimilation has occurred in Cape Verde; and, the Cape Verdian students explained to me, their people have been used by the Portuguese as intermediaries. The struggle against colonial rule has tended to lag in Cape Verde, and this unevenness has created tensions within the liberation movement.

The activation of the Cape Verdian students has been a very rapid process. Salomé told me that the police supervision was so heavy before the fall of the Caetano regime that all political discussion was impossible. The students were so carefully screened that there were no representatives of the national liberation movements among them and they were quite ignorant of these groups' activity and program before the coup.

While the African students formerly could not even whisper about the liberation struggle in their countries, the main room of their center is now named after Amílcar Cabral, and the walls are covered with pictures of the nationalist leaders and the camps of the various forces. There are flags, posters, and pictures of schools in the liberated zones.

These newly active students seem to be a critical lot, far removed in temperament and political outlook from the sentimental young followers of the Communist and Socialist parties who sang praises to the junta in the May Day demonstration.

On May 15 I watched the investiture of the provisional government on TV in the student center. When the incredibly pompous General Costa Gomes gave his speech, sagging under the weight of his braid and medals, the students howled, especially as he coughed, adjusted his glasses, and turned another page of the seemingly huge sheaf of papers in his hand.

It was a long, boring speech about civic responsibility and how freedom does not mean "anarchy," etc.

Salomé told me that the African students were disgusted with the Communist and Socialist parties for their servile attitude toward the junta. As for them, they were determined to maintain their revolutionary principles at all costs.

There did not seem to be any doubt about the idealistic intent of these students or their power to deal serious political blows to the junta's neocolonialist plans. The next few weeks will show whether they have the tactical and organizational skill to press

their advantage.

This will also be a test for the Portuguese far left, which is supporting and aiding the African students.

The colonial question is absolutely vital for the junta, and so this relatively small group of African youth is likely to be drawn into the very center of Portuguese politics and subjected to the strongest political and material pressures. They will need the clearest possible political perspective and the most advanced tactics to win out against the combined forces of the "modernist" bourgeoisie and the reformist parties that dominate the scene here at the moment. □

## Palestinians Forced to Flee Refugee Camps

# Israeli Terror Bombings Claim New Victims

By Michael Baumann

After driving the Palestinians from their homeland a quarter century ago, the Israeli government now appears intent on driving them from the shelter of United Nations refugee camps across the border in Lebanon.

On May 19 and 21, Israeli forces carried out three more terror raids against a refugee camp and a number of mountain villages in southern Leb-

anon, an area the Israeli press usually refers to as "Fatahland." The new raids are part of a continuing series of attacks intended, as Israeli authorities put it, to make the area "unlivable."

In the May 19 raid, Israeli gunboats launched a fifty-minute rocket attack on the 12,000 refugees in the Rashidiyah camp, just south of the port city of Tyre. According to a resistance leader at the camp, the rocket fire killed eight Palestinians and wounded ten more. "The dead and wounded," he told *New York Times* reporter Juan de Onis shortly after the attack, "were mainly those who didn't have a chance to run."

Israeli bombings May 21 came in two waves, hitting the villages of Bayada, Deir Ames, and Mahrounan twice, and Hasbaya and Quenia once each. Twenty of the twenty-one casualties were children, three of whom later died from the wounds they received.

These latest deaths brought to sixty-seven the number listed as killed in the stepped-up Israeli raids that began May 16. The camps that were struck in the first two days of bombing are still suffering from the impact.

*New York Times* correspondent Steven V. Roberts reported from Beirut May 20 that camps housing some 80,000 refugees "have been

largely evacuated since the Israeli attacks began."

"United Nations officials," he continued, "report that 80 per cent of the houses in the camp at Nabatieh in southern Lebanon were damaged or destroyed by Israeli planes last week, along with several United Nations buildings.

"At Nabatieh and the other camps, the United Nations has been providing blankets, extra food and emergency medical help, but distribution of regular food rations has been hampered by the dispersal of the refugees, either because their homes have been destroyed or because they fear further Israeli raids."

Their fear is well-grounded. Israeli oppression of the Palestinian people virtually guarantees future incidents with commando squads such as the one at Maalot May 15, the propaganda cover for the current series of bombings. At Maalot, twenty-one Israeli teen-agers were killed when the school in which they were being held hostage was stormed by Israeli troops.

Israeli authorities have made it clear they cannot prevent another Maalot from occurring, and will not negotiate when it does. Instead, they have let it be known that they will respond



'New York Times' shows location of camp attacked in recent Israeli terror raids.

with stepped-up repression of Arabs living in Israel and further Nazilike reprisals on the densely populated refugee camps in Lebanon.

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan spelled this out in a speech to the Knesset May 20, stating that Israel would continue to shoot it out with guerrillas who seize hostages. Otherwise, he said, exchanging prisoners for hostages would be an endless process in a state like Israel: "If in a foreign country such decisions are taken, they are done so because there is hijacking and hostage-taking is a one-time affair. But Israel is exposed to this danger constantly."

"The real question," he concluded,



DAYAN: Eager to shoot it out with guerrillas no matter who is killed in the cross fire.

"is: What kind of protection do we want? I saw pictures in the papers today of soldiers with gun belts posted on the roof of a yeshiva in Safad [a village near Maalot]. Is that the kind of atmosphere we want to live in?"

The alternative the Zionist leaders prefer is to step up the bombing of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians. The hope is that such attacks will demoralize the Palestinian refugees, drive a wedge between them and the Lebanese masses, and prod the Lebanese government into taking action against the resistance movement.

A similar Israeli terror campaign was partially successful in 1973, and led to the Lebanese government's placing a number of restrictions on guer-

rilla activities. The thinly veiled threat behind those and the current raids is that Israel may annex the southern part of Lebanon if Beirut does not take sufficient action against the guerrillas. The Israeli delegate to the United Nations underscored this threat in April 1973, when he told the Security Council that through lack of action against the guerrillas, Lebanon had "forfeited" the right to claim respect for its territory.

Like a prospective landlord seeking to drive out unwanted tenants, the Israeli air force has already succeeded in forcing a large number of the area's residents to flee their land. *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent John K. Cooley reported May 17 that "Lebanon's Council of the South, which tries to help Lebanese refugees from the border area, estimates that nearly half of this region's people have fled their homes in the past year."

Israeli authorities have made no secret of the fact that they feel the Litani River just north of Tyre would make an excellent "natural boundary" for the settler state's northern border. Apart from the political and military benefits of exercising direct control over the area, they have also expressed great interest in the water available there for irrigation.

So far, Lebanese officials have not been able to take any action against the resistance movement. And if the bombings were aimed at decreasing popular support for the Palestinian struggle, they have had just the opposite effect. *Le Monde* correspondent Edouard Saab reported from Beirut May 19 that "a wave of hatred for Israelis has spread across the country. At the same time, fraternization between the Lebanese and Palestinians has never been more sincere, more spontaneous." □

## 73 Percent in U.S. Think Him Guilty

# Why Nixon Defies Watergate Subpoenas

By Allen Myers

"May 22, 1974, was a bleak day," the *Washington Post* editorialized May 23, "for those who still held out hope that somewhere, somehow, the President could come forward with persuasive exculpatory evidence. Apparently there is none."

On May 22, Nixon made what amounted to the latest of a long series of admissions that his sole hope of avoiding being proved guilty of crimes in the Watergate affair is to conceal the evidence. In three letters from Nixon and his attorney, James St. Clair, to the House Judiciary Committee, which is conducting the impeachment investigation, he refused to comply with subpoenas for evidence or to provide other information that had been requested.

In his letter to the committee chairman, Peter Rodino, Nixon added that his refusal applied not only to two subpoenas voted by the committee on May 15, but also to "such further subpoenas as may hereafter be issued."

This attempted cover-up necessarily extends to evidence incriminating Nixon's co-conspirators. After Judge John Sirica on May 20 ordered the White House to turn over to special prosecutor Leon Jaworski sixty-four subpoenaed tapes for use in the trial of Nixon aides indicted in the Watergate cover-up, St. Clair appealed the ruling on May 24 to the same Court of Appeals that last fall upheld a similar ruling by Sirica. The object here can only have been to gain time by protracted litigation—an object that may have been defeated by Jaworski's immediate request that the Supreme Court take up the matter directly.

In still another case—that of the White House "plumbers" indicted for the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist—St. Clair has indicated that Nixon may again refuse to comply with whatever subpoenas are issued. The effect of such a refusal would be to let these Nixon gangsters go free, since court rulings require the "government" in the per-

son of the prosecutors to drop a case if the "government" in the person of Nixon refuses to turn over evidence allegedly needed by the defense.

Even in the capitalist press, there are few commentators who continue to pretend that Nixon is primarily concerned with "executive privilege" rather than merely defending himself against criminal charges. In the May 26 *New York Times*, for example, John Herbers summarized Nixon's intentions quite succinctly:

"Whatever Mr. Nixon's personal feelings about the need to preserve some semblance of executive privilege, the strategy on the surface was the classic action of the defense in a criminal case: resist and delay to play for time."

On May 23, columnist Joseph Kraft described one interest that Nixon has in delaying the impeachment proceedings. Kraft described a study of how senators are likely to vote if, as seems increasingly likely, Nixon is impeached by the House and tried by the Senate:

"The study was made by the office of Lloyd Bentsen, the Texas Democrat who is organizing the 1974 senatorial elections for his party. According to the analysis of Sen. Bentsen's office, there are only 16 senators considered sure to vote for Mr. Nixon. . . .

"With only 16 hard-core votes, the President is going to have to scramble hard to put together the 34 votes needed to hold office. But there are six Republican senators up for reelection who, while under strong pressure to go against Mr. Nixon if the vote came before polling day, might turn around if their fates had already been decided."

The "strong pressure" stems from the fact that the overwhelming majority of the U.S. population realizes that Nixon is guilty of one or more crimes in the Watergate scandal and would correctly interpret a vote to acquit him as a cover-up. A Gallup poll conducted May 10-13 showed that 73 percent of those questioned considered Nixon guilty in the Watergate break-in or its cover-up and only 14 percent regarded him as innocent.

Further release of White House tapes could only reinforce this opinion. The tape transcripts released by Nixon April 30 were highly incriminating in themselves, but it is apparent that Nixon edited out addition-



JAWORSKI: Takes subpoena issue directly to Supreme Court.

al material that even his most devoted defenders would find it difficult to characterize as "ambiguous." The House Judiciary Committee was already in possession of at least two tapes for which Nixon provided edited transcripts, and some of the discrepancies between Nixon's versions and what was really said have been leaked to the press. In the May 17 *Washington Post*, Lawrence Meyer reported on Nixon's editing of a September 15, 1972, conversation:

"Although the White House transcript of the conversation appears to contain no deletions, other than expletives and unintelligible remarks, the Judiciary Committee version shows that lengthy passages were omitted in the White House version without any indication that material was excised."

Nixon's version omitted, among other things, discussion of plans to retaliate against the *Washington Post* for its coverage of Watergate.

The other transcript for which the committee already possessed the tape was that of a March 21, 1973, meeting in which Nixon and his top aides discussed the payment of hush money to Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt, who at that point was threatening to implicate higher-ups unless he was immediately paid another \$120,000. After listening to the tape during

a session of the Judiciary Committee May 21, Representative Jerome Waldie of California described some of the misinformation introduced by Nixon's editing. At one point in the transcript, Nixon pictured himself as saying:

"Hunt, because he is the most vulnerable in my opinion, might blow the whistle and his price is pretty high, but at least we *can* buy the time on that. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

The last-quoted phrase would be even more incriminating if it had been transcribed as Waldie said it appeared on the tape: ". . . at least we should buy the time on that. . . ."

Such deletions and falsifications make it easy to imagine how freely Nixon must have handled the transcripts of tapes not in the committee's possession.

The disclosures that have already been made preclude the possibility of any sizable segment of the public drawing any conclusion from Nixon's refusal to comply with the subpoenas except the obvious one: that the tapes contain absolutely incontrovertible proof of Nixon's guilt. In its May 23 editorial, the *Washington Post* pointed out that there is already sufficient evidence on the record to justify impeachment. It concluded:

". . . by this latest act of evasion and contempt, the President has released everyone from the injunction against drawing inferences from his refusal to produce subpoenaed evidence. And if he will not cooperate—so be it: the White House will have to proceed without him on the basis of what it now knows." □

## Magruder Draws 10-Month Sentence

Jeb Stuart Magruder, the former deputy director of the Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP), was sentenced to a ten-month to four-year term in prison May 21 for his part in the Watergate scandal.

Last August, Magruder pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy in a deal with the prosecutors. He admitted having lied to the FBI about the Watergate break-in and to having perjured himself before the Watergate grand jury and at the trial

of the seven burglars.

When the Watergate cover-up began to come apart in April 1973, Magruder was the first high-level Nixon gangster to tell what he knew in exchange for a promise of leniency from the federal prosecutors.

Four days before Magruder was sen-

tenced, Herbert L. Porter, the former scheduling director of CREEP, was released from prison after serving 27 days of a 30-day sentence. Porter, who also admitted committing perjury, was sentenced on a single count of lying to the FBI. □

## The French Elections

# In the Aftermath of Round Two

By Dick Fidler

In the second round of France's presidential election, May 19, Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was elected with 13,396,203 votes, or 50.7 percent of the total, against François Mitterrand with 12,971,604 votes, or 49.3 percent.

Giscard, leader of the Independent Republicans, was endorsed by all the major capitalist parties, including the liberal Radical Socialist party led by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber.

Mitterrand, first secretary of the Socialist party, was supported by the Union of the Left, an alliance of the Communist party, the Socialist party, and the Left Radicals, a splinter bourgeois grouping.

When the CP and SP leaders formed the Union of the Left in 1972, they hoped to broaden the traditional voting base of the reformist workers parties, around a popular-frontist perspective, that is, a policy of class collaborationism. Although until recently they had been unsuccessful in signing up more than the Left Radicals, the possibility of actually winning the presidency in this election was sufficient to attract new forces in the workers movement to support the coalition backing Mitterrand's candidacy. These included France's second-biggest labor federation, the French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT) and the left Social Democratic Partie Socialiste Unifié (PSU—United Socialist party), which had previously refused to join the Union of the Left on the grounds that its program was not sufficiently radical.

Yet, despite this new support, Mitterrand's 43.4 percent share of the vote in the first round of the election on May 5 was slightly below the pro-

portion of the vote that the Union of the Left candidates, including the Left Radicals, had obtained in the first round of the 1973 legislative elections.

In the second round, Mitterrand picked up two million more votes, but his percentage of the total vote increased by less than 6 percent—not enough to elect him.

Another aspect of the election that aroused interest among French political analysts was the nature of the vote for candidates standing to the left of Mitterrand, in particular Alain Krivine, candidate of the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire (FCR) and its newspaper *Rouge*, and Arlette Laguiller of *Lutte Ouvrière*, which likewise claims to be Trotskyist. Together these two candidates obtained close to 700,000 votes on the first round—a significant increase from the 239,000 Krivine had won in 1969.

Some commentators noted that this was by far the biggest "far-left"<sup>1</sup> vote in many years. That is accurate if the PSU is not included among the far-left parties in 1969, when its candidate, Michel Rocard, obtained more

1. The term "far left" is normally used in France to denote all those political formations that claim to stand to the "left" of the Communist and Socialist parties. The "left," as used by the bourgeois press, includes the traditional mass workers parties and "leftist" petty-bourgeois formations. In ordinary usage, the bourgeois political commentators make no distinction between revolutionary and reformist programs or parties, although they commonly restrict "far left" to those currents that deny the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism.

The term "radical" is not used in France in making political distinctions, since the word is associated with the Radical So-

than 800,000 votes.

Another interesting aspect of the election was the division of the far-left vote between Laguiller and Krivine. Laguiller received 595,247 votes, or 2.33 percent of the total, while Krivine won 93,990 or 0.36 percent.

In the May 20 issue of *Intercontinental Press* we outlined how the various far-left tendencies approached the election campaign, and in particular what their respective attitudes were to Mitterrand's candidacy. In the May 27 issue, we published the analysis made by the FCR of the first-round results and of Mitterrand's second-round campaign.<sup>2</sup>

Here is how other tendencies looked at these questions.

### Lutte Ouvrière: 'A New Relationship of Forces'

As was to be expected, *Lutte Ouvrière* was exultant over its results on the first round. The vote for Arlette Laguiller, wrote the editors of *Lutte de Classe/Class Struggle*, the organization's bilingual theoretical journal, had confirmed that "within the revolutionary movement itself, a new relationship of forces has appeared, or—should we say—has been confirmed."

The strength of *Lutte Ouvrière's* influence had already been indicated in the 1973 legislative elections, they said, when the organization ran almost twice as many candidates as the Ligue Communiste, and got over twice as many votes. But in the 1973 elections, the two organizations had signed a no-contest agreement, the supporters of each organization voting for the candidates of the other. This year was the first time they had

cialist party, a strictly bourgeois formation.

In the past, some commentators have classified the PSU as "far left" on the basis of its standing to the left of the Communist and Socialist parties. However, since the PSU endorsed Mitterrand's candidacy, and appears headed toward formally joining the Union of the Left, it is now considered to have moved away from the "far left."

2. See the earlier *Intercontinental Press* articles "How the Far Left Met Mitterrand's Candidacy," May 20, p. 628; "What the Vote Totals Revealed," May 27, p. 656; and "How French CP Pursued Gaullist Votes," May 27, p. 659.



come into direct competition in the electoral arena.

But *Lutte Ouvrière* acknowledged indirectly that the electoral results were not an entirely accurate register of the real relationship of forces in the left. The editors contended that the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire had not run as aggressive a campaign as it could. "*Rouge's* support for the candidacy of Piaget,"<sup>3</sup> said *Lutte de Classe*, "showed in fact that the ex-Ligue Communiste wasn't very enthusiastic about presenting its own candidate in this election. Convinced that the far left would be literally 'squashed' by the Union of the Left, it clearly would have preferred that there be no candidate at all to the left of Mitterrand, or that it be one not representing a revolutionary group. And so Krivine was in the end a candidate without really wanting to be one, so to speak; in fact, he ran so as to prevent our comrade, Arlette Laguiller, from being the sole candidate of the revolutionary movement."

The FCR has criticized *Lutte Ouvrière's* campaign as "electoralist," "apolitical," and as being "personalized" around Laguiller's candidacy as a "working woman." *Lutte Ouvrière* replied to these charges in its magazine.

Electoralist? But they had not hidden their opinions. Laguiller had campaigned "on the key idea that the workers' strength is not in the ballot-boxes, but in the factories"; her campaign "was a model of antielectoralism." And anyway, it was not antielectoralism, but "irresponsibility," to be "indifferent to the number of votes that working men and women would give a revolutionary candidate."

A "personalized" campaign? Yes. Krivine's campaign, it was true, had put greater emphasis on organizational affiliation. But only by "asking Alain Krivine to repeat the name of the new organization as often as possible."

Since "Krivine's campaign was . . . reduced to his TV or radio appearances and to the meetings he held in the provinces," the FCR's campaign was in fact "very much 'personalized' by the almost complete absence of the militants of his own organization."

This was in contrast to the campaign of "the militants of *Lutte Ouvrière*, who during recent weeks were pasting up posters, making public speeches in the streets or at factory gates, or organizing local meetings.

*Lutte Ouvrière* thought the FCR's low profile was "nothing new. A similar attitude was observed during the March 1973 legislative elections, following which *Rouge* itself deplored that in some constituencies the militants of the ex-Ligue Communiste were not even willing to paste up the posters of their own candidates."

*Lutte Ouvrière* attributed this alleged reluctance to campaign to the FCR's "petty-bourgeois composition" and its adaptation to middle-class "leftists," some of whom "recently discovered that deep in their hearts they had always been pro-Mitterrand; others scorned any participation in elections and considered it unworthy of themselves to call the workers to vote for them."

*Lutte Ouvrière* even found fault with Krivine's use of television and radio broadcast time to interview working-class activists. Laguiller did not have to "invite" workers to her broadcasts, it said, because she is a worker. Krivine's tactic was "a bit of workerism — which did not make [his campaign] any less petty-bourgeois."

As for those who criticized *Lutte Ouvrière's* campaign as being apolitical, "they are incapable of seeing politics where it is, when it is expressed through the concerns and in the language of the workers." Laguiller's campaign, the magazine said, had in fact been more "programmatically" than Krivine's, because it had dealt with basic anticapitalist themes, while Krivine had based his campaign themes on what should be done if Mitterrand were to win (when in fact "the most probable outcome" was "another electoral success for the right").

*Lutte Ouvrière* indicated its own view that a significant difference was actually to be found between Mitterrand and Giscard when it charged that the FCR and Krivine had never advanced a program to meet the situation "if Giscard d'Estai g becomes president. . . ." They "practically ignored the problem," *Lutte de Classe* claimed, "because at the time it was the "in thing" in the pro-Mitterrand left not to mention that possibility, which ruined all plans based on an elec-

tion-oriented strategy."

Finally, *Lutte Ouvrière* said, "Krivine almost always discussed the Union of the Left as if the Mitterrands or the Marchaises were sincere socialists who had become reformist because they were a little naive and did not 'understand' that the police and army staff would have to be disarmed." Instead, it said, Krivine should have illustrated the role of the reformists as "conscious agents of the bourgeoisie" by exposing Mitterrand's record during "the years he served as a bourgeois politician."

Not inaccurately, *Lutte Ouvrière* saw its own electoral success as a sign of growth for the whole "far left," saying that "the revolutionary movement in France, far from falling back . . . has been developing and has diversified its influence and credibility." In view of the extremely heavy pressure to vote for Mitterrand in hopes of a first-round victory for the Union of the Left candidate, it said, this vote had to be considered a conscious rejection of his reformist program.

This analysis did not stop *Lutte Ouvrière*, however, from calling on its electorate to vote for Mitterrand on the second round. Arlette Laguiller spent the two weeks between the two electoral rounds campaigning across the nation for the former "bourgeois politician" who was touted by the Union of the Left as France's new hope.

"We are calling for a vote for Mitterrand without ulterior motives and without any reticence," she told a public meeting in Nantes on May 13. "On May 5, those who voted for me already expressed their reservations and their distrust toward the candidate of the Union of the Left. Precisely because of this, they shouldn't fear that their vote will be misinterpreted."

The Paris daily *Le Monde* reported that a "young militant" got some support from others in the audience when he asked if it wouldn't be "more honest" to abstain on the second round. Laguiller replied: "Not a single worker's vote should be withheld from Mitterrand."

While admitting in its press that a Mitterrand government would be a reactionary one, *Lutte Ouvrière* said it was supporting him because the workers would see a Mitterrand triumph as their own victory. Consistent with this view, it stated on the

3. See *Intercontinental Press*, April 22, p. 469.

day after the second-round voting: "If the workers are aware that after all they didn't lose much, that Mitterrand would have followed the same policy [as Giscard] . . . nothing has been lost." It was not easy to see how *Lutte Ouvrière's* campaign had helped the workers to reach that conclusion.

### AMR: 'Important Political Breakthrough'

The Alliance Marxiste Révolutionnaire, the group headed by Michel Pablo, lauded the results of the first-round vote as an "important political breakthrough" for the far left, but at the same time interpreted the results as discrediting the organizations that had accounted for this electoral result.

For the AMR, the "far left" is a very general category. The May 8 issue of its newspaper *L'Internationale* included in the far-left vote tally not only the votes of Laguiller and Krivine, but also "the bulk" of the votes for René Dumont, the "ecology" candidate, "not counting those who cast their ballots on the first round for Mitterrand in order to vote 'pragmatically'" — that is, in hopes Mitterrand would win on the first round.

The AMR had earlier characterized the candidates of *Lutte Ouvrière* and the FCR as "candidates of despair." Now it declared that their results had "exploded the theory that the revolutionary candidates were candidates of division, who could even prevent Mitterrand's election on the first round." Their campaigns were an example of the far left's ability to "march separately but strike together." On condition, of course, that everyone rallied to support Mitterrand on the second round.

*L'Internationale* noted that "this advance of the far left goes together with a drop in the vote for the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire." It described this as "a new blow at the myth of the possibility of building a working-class organization on a combination of nice propagandist actions and well-orchestrated street demonstrations." What this meant was not made clear.

The AMR's newspaper found no clear meaning in Laguiller's vote. Her campaign had centered on denouncing "politicians" and "demagogically" defending the "little people." While she could justly lay claim to the "feminist" vote wasn't hers a somewhat "ambig-

uous" electorate?

The AMR concluded that "the political proof of the quality of these votes" would be "revealed on the second round" — that is, if they all went to Mitterrand.

The AMR repeated its call for the formation of united rank-and-file committees to elect Mitterrand, adding that it was necessary to fight to get Mitterrand to respect and apply "the anti-capitalist measures contained in the Common Program" of the Union of the Left. It did not explain what anti-capitalist measures are supposedly in-



GISCARD d'ESTAING

cluded in this popular-front program.

Following the second round, the AMR issued a statement that hailed Mitterrand's vote as "a success of the workers movement." It concluded: "To find a solution to the workers' problems, we must extend and consolidate the unity that was formed around support of Mitterrand. We need a permanent united front that brings together all the currents claiming to be socialist, in democratic unity committees that support the workers' demands."

### OCI: With Mitterrand to the Bitter End

The Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI), which is headed by Pierre Lambert and Stéphane Just,

ridiculed the "brutal" 0.36 percent vote received by Krivine in the first round. "It certainly compromises the march toward hegemony over the so-called 'broad workers vanguard,'" said the May 8-15 issue of the OCI's weekly *Informations Ouvrières*. "The leaders of the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire couldn't prevent even some of their own members from voting on the first round for François Mitterrand, the first secretary of the Socialist party, and thereby expressing their confused desires to line up with the Trotskyist policy of the United Front, against the policy embodied in the Krivine candidacy, of dividing the class front."

Throughout the election campaign the OCI attempted the contortionist feat of making its "unconditional" support for Mitterrand in the first round (the "class front") appear as a principled position, while claiming that anyone who expressed doubts and reservations about Mitterrand's credentials as a "workers candidate" was unprincipled and "opportunist."

OCI leader Claude Chisserey, writing in the May 1-8 issue of *Informations Ouvrières*, attacked Alain Krivine as being illogical in promising that the FCR would support Mitterrand on the second round if the Socialist party leader makes no agreement with significant sectors of the bourgeoisie.

So, Chisserey argued, the FCR has called for a vote for Mitterrand on the second round; thus the FCR must think that Mitterrand has no significant links with the bourgeoisie. But what about Filippi, the banker, who is a Left Radical — one of the components of the Union of the Left? Hasn't Krivine heard about the Left Radicals? Their presence in the Union of the Left makes it a "popular front." Hence Krivine is supporting popular frontism.

The OCI leader didn't stop to ponder the implications of the OCI's own position. By explicitly acknowledging that Mitterrand was directly allied with the bourgeoisie, the OCI certainly supported popular frontism by supporting Mitterrand ("unconditionally").

For the OCI, it seems, the only problem with Mitterrand's alliances with the Left Radicals and other bourgeois elements was that these alliances inhibited his ability to attract votes. "It has to be repeated over and over," they wrote in the May 8-15 *Informa-*

tions Ouvrières, "significant layers of the petty bourgeoisie . . . hesitate to declare their support for [Mitterrand] because they feel . . . the ambiguity of a political line that promises 'change' while being based on an alliance with the banker Filippi, a Left Radical."

The OCI newspaper noted that in some traditional strongholds of the CP and SP, Mitterrand's vote in the first round had not attained the level reached by these parties in the 1973 legislative elections. The OCI reacted to this by advising the Union of the Left leaders to mobilize these votes by raising such demands as "nationalization without compensation of the 235 firms that control four-fifths of the country's economy."

The OCI acknowledged that the CP and the SP leaders were not likely to heed their advice; the Common Program talks only of nationalizing six companies—with compensation.

This rhetoric seemed to have no purpose but to cover the OCI's own embarrassment as its rationale for supporting Mitterrand came apart at the seams. It had argued that supporting Mitterrand was the way to assure the defeat of Gaullism, which it saw as the main task facing the working class in the election. But the absurdity of this line of argument became obvious as Mitterrand and his supporters, led by the CP leadership, redoubled their efforts to woo Gaullist voters—starting with the first round—by claiming the "Gaullist tradition" as their own.

The OCI's "Workers United Front" with the Union of the Left existed nowhere but in the pages of *Informations Ouvrières*.

The May 15-22 issue of the OCI weekly complained that "the leaders of the workers parties are disorienting the popular masses with their policy of increasing concessions to 'Gaullism,'" making it "extremely difficult for the working class to assure the defeat of the big business candidate, Giscard." But the OCI carefully avoided identifying Mitterrand, "the first secretary of the Socialist party," as being in on this strategy.

Instead, it concentrated its fire on the Stalinist leaders, accusing them of "systematically trying to demoralize the CP membership, and trying to smash the movement towards the Workers United Front as it is ex-

pressed in the working class's powerful hopes of seeing Mitterrand win."

The OCI campaigned for Mitterrand to the bitter end. □

## Far-Right Candidate Objects to Article

### 'Rouge' Sentenced to Heavy Fine in Lawsuit

The French Trotskyist newspaper *Rouge* was sentenced May 4 to pay far-right presidential candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen 20,000 francs in damages [1000 francs=US\$200] for libel. In addition, *Rouge* was fined 2,000 francs and ordered to pay the cost of publishing the court judgment in five newspapers.

Le Pen had taken *Rouge* to court for an article on him in the April 19 issue of the weekly, entitled "Torturer and Candidate." The article cited accounts in the book *La Pacification* by Hafid Keramane that told how during the Algerian war Le Pen, then a member of the French Chamber of Deputies and a member of a parachute brigade, had personally supervised the "interrogation" in Algiers of suspected members of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). The book documented that Le Pen himself had administered torture through electric shock, beatings, and other methods.

These acts, *Rouge* noted, had all been carried out under a government headed by Guy Mollet, then the Socialist party leader, a government in which François Mitterrand was minister of the interior and Pierre Mendès-France, a leading Mitterrand adviser,

was vice-president. And among the parties voting the "special powers" for the French war against the Algerian independence movement was the Communist party, the leading partner in Mitterrand's electoral coalition.

*La Pacification* was published in 1960, and similar charges against Le Pen were published elsewhere over a decade ago, without any response from Le Pen. This time, however, he sued *Rouge*.

Among those testifying to the truth of the newspaper's assertions was Paul Teitgen, general secretary of the Algiers police between 1956 and 1958, when Le Pen carried on his activity. Le Pen's lawyers tried to justify the "pacification" carried out by French forces in Algeria.

The judges did not dispute the evidence that Le Pen had in fact practiced torture in Algeria, but declared *Rouge* liable for its statement that Le Pen had continued such activities on French soil in the 1960s, and had headed an "assassination commando" against Algerian immigrants. *Rouge* lacked decisive proof of these charges.

*Rouge* has announced that it may appeal the ruling after legal consultation. □

## London March Supports Palestinians

London

"Palestine belongs to the Palestinians!" "Free! Free! Palestine!" chanted hundreds of Arab and Pakistani immigrant workers and students outside Israel's London Embassy May 19 following a 1,500-strong march through central London in support of the Palestinian people's struggle for self-determination.

The demonstration, called by the General Union of Arab Students (GUAS), was held to honour the twen-

ty-sixth anniversary of the Palestinian people's liberation struggle since the Zionist declaration of Israel's independence on May 15, 1948. But marchers were also protesting the cold-blooded slaughter of Palestinian refugees in Israeli terror raids against refugee camps in Lebanon May 16 and 17.

Participating in the demonstration were the Palestine Action Campaign, the Arab Workers Union, the Pakistan Solidarity Front, *Free Palestine*, the Young Muslim Organisation, the

Coordinating Committee of Overseas Students, and the Yemeni Workers Union.

Small groups of pro-Zionists made an unsuccessful attempt to intimidate the marchers as they set off at the beginning of the demonstration, following a rally in Hyde Park. Several

bottles and sticks were thrown at the marchers, but the determination and militancy of the march soon demoralised these thugs.

The Palestinian movement faces a more powerful opposition in the British Labour government, which gives full military and political backing to the

Israeli regime. Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson has on many occasions expressed the British Labour party's solidarity with the reactionary Israeli Labour party, often through the auspices of the so-called Socialist International, of which both parties are members. □

## General Wields a Heavy Stick

# Peronist Youth Taken Aback by May Day Paddling

By Judy White

The repercussions of Juan Perón's May Day attack on his youthful left-wing supporters are still rumbling in Argentina.

The only political group that demonstratively opposed attending Perón's "Festival of Labor and National Unity" was the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). The April 24 issue of the PST's weekly *Avanzada Socialista* carried the headline "We are not going to Plaza de Mayo" (site of Perón's rally). The editors explained:

"The Peronist government will hold its rally at the Plaza de Mayo. Those present will include the [trade-union] bureaucracy, [Economics Minister] Gelbard, the JP [Juventud Peronista—Peronist Youth], the armed forces, and the church. Under the umbrella of this 'national unity' held by the president, the government wants to get the workers to support the Social Pact, the wage freeze, the firings resulting from the Law on Redundancy, and the repression at Villar—all policies that the old gorillas support. Perón has the right to organize that rally to defend his policies and we think it would be an error and a provocation to try to change the content of it. The rally will be what Perón, [Minister of Labor] Otero, and the organizers want it to be. But we have the right to say to the workers that they should not go and support that anti-worker line. We invite them to participate in the antibureaucratic, anti-boss, anti-imperialist, anticapitalist, socialist, and internationalist rally

that the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores is calling."

The PST-organized rally in Buenos Aires was held at the Plaza Flores on April 30. On the platform were worker activists from Villa Constitución, Ledesma, Banco Nación, and other unions that have been fighting Perón's policies on the job in recent weeks. Alongside them were leading members of the PST and a leader of the Chilean Partido Socialista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Socialist party, Chilean section of the Fourth International).

The crowd included many delegations from high schools and colleges mobilized by the Juventud Socialista de Avanzada (Vanguard Socialist Youth). Messages of revolutionary solidarity from organizations in several Latin American countries and the United States were read.

The tone of the rally was set by Claudio Lariguet, a leader of the Federación del Personal de Gas del Estado (Federation of State Gas Workers). He spoke strongly against the government's campaign against Argentine workers. "There is only one way to deal with this bourgeois alliance," he said; "coordinate our struggles in order to hit the bureaucracy head on and in that way hit the sell-out policies of all the exploiters."

The rally was in marked contrast to the Plaza de Mayo "Festival" organized by the Peronists. On the general's platform were the leaders of various bourgeois parties. The crowd of 60,000 to 100,000 was made up of right-wing trade-union hacks, the JP and Montoneros, and individuals

who had come on their own. Almost half the crowd was mobilized by the JP and Montoneros; the trade-union bureaucrats had made little effort to get workers to the rally.

The JP and Montoneros had called on people to attend the Plaza de Mayo rally "in spite of the threats and intimidation" they had suffered because, they stated, "it was necessary to be present where the masses were, to change the content of the rally, and to support 'the process initiated May 25 [the day the Peronists took office in 1973], which is today menaced by a proimperialist gorilla offensive."

They marched into the Plaza in formation, chanting, "What's going on, General? The national government is full of gorillas," and "The union bureaucracy is going to be done away with."

As Perón crowned the Queen of Labor, the youth shouted, "We don't want *carnaval* [Mardi Gras]; we want a popular assembly."

There was only one speaker at the Plaza de Mayo rally—the general. He lauded the rightists as the "backbone of our movement," and attacked the "beardless," "insolent," "stupid" youth for not approving "everything we have done" in the "twenty years of struggle" that he said the Peronist movement had waged. He also accused his young supporters of being "infiltrators who work from within . . . the majority of whom are mercenaries in the service of foreign capital."

As Perón began his insults, the youth withdrew from the Plaza de Mayo, singing "The traitors remain, the fighters leave." Their de-

parture was accompanied by scattered confrontations with the police, who fired tear gas into the crowd and made some arrests.

The PST, in the May 3 *Avanzada Socialista*, stated its opinion of the course taken by the Montoneros and the Juventud Peronista: "We believe that you cannot oppose the union bureaucrats meaningfully without denouncing the support that the Perón regime gives the caste controlling the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor] and the unions. The JP has done the opposite: They have sought a thousand explanations to try to show why the bureaucrats and traitors are in their posts. They have even gone so far as to say that it is due to the immaturity of the workers movement. To sum up, they have given all arguments except the right one: that the bureaucrats are where they are principally because Perón and his government support them, as they were supported before by the military dictatorship and still earlier by Frondizi."

The statement continued, "Perón has made it clear that he favors the bureaucracy he created twenty years ago. You are wrong to maintain that the bureaucracy has 'infiltrated' into the [workers] movement and that it has been sustained and has grown against the will of Perón."

The CGT bureaucracy understood the meaning of Perón's speech, *La Nación* indicated in its May 6 issue. The executive committee of the CGT, the bourgeois journal reported, showed a "marked reserve about forming judgments on the new stage opened for Peronism" resulting from the speech. However, the article went on, there was a general sentiment that the unions had gotten the go-ahead for a fight "if the insolent ones don't give in."

The leadership of Unión Obrera de la Construcción de la R. A. (Construction Workers Union of the Argentine Republic) took a less "reserved" position. In the May 9 *La Opinión* they published a large ad with the headline "Now there is no more room for doubt about who is who." They saw the general's endorsement of the union apparatus as an appeal that "obliges us to accentuate our efforts to accompany the Leader in the historic, heroic effort at national reconstruction, which

is a necessary precondition for the liberation of our Homeland."

The union must be prepared to take action in view of the polarization between "the immense mass of the citizenry, involved in fruitful work, seeking happiness through peace" and "the minuscule groups" of Marxists, "infiltrators who want to corrupt young minds, derailing them from the course that is their historic mandate."

For several days, there was stony silence from those who had been "critical supporters" of the general since he took office in October 1973. The first break in the silence came from some Peronists in Havana May 10, as reported in *La Opinión*. Juan Carlos Dante Gullo, speaking for a delegation of JP leaders visiting Cuba, called for "the creation of a broad liberation front of all sectors opposing imperialist domination of Argentina." He condemned "the rightist press for suggesting there had been a rupture between the youthful crowd who withdrew from the May 1 rally and Perón."

Then, on May 16, a press conference was held in Buenos Aires by the Montoneros and the JP. Mario Firmenich, the central leader of the Montoneros, read a document signed by the two groups. In it they complained that a dialogue with Perón was not achieved because the general "does not permit anyone to ask him why the traitors of yesterday have now become the heroes of the homeland, and the guerrillas of yesterday have become the fervent Peronists we are told to respect today." The Montoneros and the JP reiterated their opposition to the Social Pact, but defended the foreign policy of the regime and advocated an undefined "popular and revolutionary nationalism."

It was widely rumored that the joint statement signaled a return of the Montoneros to guerrilla warfare, this time with the active participation of the JP.

The May 21 *La Opinión* published articles on the positions taken by the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP—People's Socialist party) and the Frente de Izquierda Popular (FIP—People's Left Front) on Perón's speech.

In a document issued by the national committee, the PSP urged the "popular political forces, representative of the working class and middle layers to close ranks with the people's

government." The PSP saw this as the way to "impede the undermining of the government by retrograde forces, thus avoiding the strangulation of the national sovereignty by the fascist encirclement in which imperialism has enmeshed us."

The FIP directed its remarks at the JP and the Montoneros, suggesting that they did not belong in the Peronist movement. "The JP demands that Perón change his historic program for another that they don't define with clarity, but which, it can be inferred, would have a certain socialist character." Such a goal, the FIP continued, was illogical: "If that is true, the Peronist youth have no place within Peronism. You can't fight for socialism within Peronism, because this criterion leads to a confrontation with the head of the movement, who is not a socialist."

These pressures on the JP seem to have had an effect. *La Opinión* on May 22 reported a new split in the JP in the provincial city of Santa Fé, which led to the formation of a group described as "equidistant" between the "Revolutionary Tendency" and orthodox Peronism.

The most important sign that the general has not lost control of the bulk of the left wing of his movement, however, was the announcement of a new series of meetings between the JP and the JPA (Juventudes Políticas Argentinas—Argentine Political Youth, the youth group of orthodox Peronism). The meetings were part of a "dialogue" between the regime and other political parties interested in promoting "national unity." The "dialogue" of May 22 involved the JP and Ricardo Balbin, the top leader of the bourgeois Unión Cívica Radical (UCR—Radical Civic Union). □

#### Broadcasters Worried About Nixon's #%&\*! Language

U.S. television executives planning to provide live coverage of the House of Representatives impeachment hearings say they are confronted with a thorny problem: broadcasting the eighteen unexpurgated Nixon tapes the House committee has on hand may run afoul of U.S. censorship laws, which forbid the airing of many of Nixon's favorite profanities and "ethnic characterizations." A spokesman for House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino told them not to worry. "We don't expect to play any of the tapes in the open session" anyway. And, of course, they could always turn out to be [inaudible].

### A Year of Attacks on Working Class

"Paradoxically what looked to be the easiest [task] before has turned out to be the most difficult: forcing the workers movement to give in." That was a central point made by *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly paper of the Argentine PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International) about the "accomplishments" of the Peronists in their first year in office, which ended May 25, 1974.

The PST pointed out that the working class has been asserting itself more and more in strikes against the bosses, the union bureaucrats, and the government itself. Among the sectors involved have been the teachers (out on strike 200,000 strong, according to the May 24 *New York Times*), the metalworkers at Villa Constitución, the bank workers, the Matarazzo spaghetti factory workers, municipal workers, and the Cormasa foundry workers.

The main issues involved in these struggles have been wages, the lack of union democracy, and the firing of union militants.

The Peronist regime has responded to the strikes with a number of measures, which were analysed in the May 22 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*. With the Ley de Prescindibilidad (Law on Redundancy), Perón has "legalized" the firing of workers in the state sector. The new Ley de Asociaciones Profesionales (Trade-Union Law) was passed to protect and extend the soft jobs of the union bureaucrats. The Penal Code was modified to make factory occupations a serious crime. In recent months such occupations have become one of the commonest forms of struggle against the bosses. The creation of an industrial police force "to maintain order" in the factories has been announced. And on top of all that, the paper noted, a goon squad to threaten and kill union militants has appeared.

All of these instruments have begun to be applied against the Argentine working class. In the space of a few days in May alone, *Avanzada So-*

*cialista* reported, the following incidents occurred: Two compañeras of the Municipal Housing Commission were arrested when a work stoppage and hunger strike were in process to press for the rehiring of twelve "redundant" workers; thirty compañeros at the Vibrim Company were arrested during a plant occupation demanding higher wages; six workers at Matarazzo were tried and threatened with fifteen-year jail sentences under the penal code—for the "crime" of occupying the factory to demand the rehiring of thirty-two co-workers; unionists at Cormasa who were demanding an explanation of the murder of PST member Inosencio Fernández were threatened with legal proceedings; and sixteen workers at Panam were detained.

The PST pointed out that this joint offensive by the police, the bosses, and the union bureaucracy has made more clear the political character of these struggles and the role of the Peronist regime itself in repressing the workers movement. To fight back against Perón's offensive the party proposes the formation of a national coordinating committee of solidarity and struggle. Such a body would be a coalition of plant committees and other fighting organizations. The PST put forth this concept at the April 20 anti-bureaucratic plenum held in Villa Constitución after the recent metalworkers strike there. (See *Intercontinental Press*, April 29, 1974, p. 499, for a full account of that strike.)

One such coordinating committee has since been formed in the north Buenos Aires zone, where Cormasa and Matarazzo are located. The PST called on workers in other zones to follow their example. □

### 1,000 Join Fernandez Funeral March

At 4:00 p.m. on May 13, five hundred persons began a farewell march and rally for Inosencio "Indio" Fernández, slain member of the PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—

Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). By 6:30 the crowd had swelled to 1,000—"Indio's" fellow workers from the Cormasa foundry,



Interior of Beccar headquarters of PST after bomb explosion earlier this year.

party comrades, and factory delegations from Matarazzo, Del Carlo, Standard Electric, Corni, and many others.

Fernández had been gunned down May 7 in the Buenos Aires district of Pacheco. A new member of the PST, he was a subdelegate in his union, the UOM (Unión Obrera Metalúrgica — Metalworkers Union) — and had a record as a fighter against the bureaucracy.

Explaining at the rally why Fernández had been assassinated, PST leader Juan Carlos Coral stated, "There are millions of workers who have to leave for work at 4:00 a.m. like 'Indio.' Many of them don't have political consciousness. Others are political; they know they are exploited, but they lack the courage and don't fight back. 'Indio' had class consciousness and manly courage. That's why he has fallen."

The murder of Fernández was only the most recent of a series of potentially lethal assaults on the PST and its members. On April 26, a powerful bomb demolished the door and damaged the interior of the party's offices in Morón. Similar bombings of PST headquarters in Mendoza, Beccar, and Neuquén were carried out in March.

At the rally a delegation of Cormasa workers and PST leaders presented a petition to the under secretary of the interior, who is in charge of the Fernández case.

Messages of solidarity demanding that the murder be investigated and action be taken against the escalating repression against the workers and socialist movement began to arrive: from the provincial committee of the Communist party of Córdoba, the Student Center for National Liberation of the Law and Social Sciences faculty of the National University of Buenos Aires, the Educators Association of Berazategui, the Brown Slate of the UOM at Villa Constitución, the Revolutionary Radical (party) Youth, the Partido Política Obrera, and many more unions, political organizations, and student groups.

By May 14 a strike had begun at Cormasa demanding justice and the resignation of the union delegates, to be followed by new elections.

Three days later the strike escalated into a work stoppage throughout the foundry, since the UOM had remained unyielding to the workers' demands.

That evening the authorities gave in: The bosses recognized a workers commission elected democratically by the rank and file. A speedy investigation into the death of Fernández was promised. The union bureaucracy published a belated ad demanding "justice" and condemning the murder of

Fernández.

As *Avanzada Socialista*, organ of the PST, pointed out in reporting these events: "These three partial victories show that we have to continue forward along the road of mobilization and united struggle in the name of 'Indio.' He is more alive now than ever." □

## 'Dawson Island Synonymous With Buchenwald'

# Observer Describes Santiago Show Trial

[The following are major excerpts of an interview obtained by the United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners with Martin Garbus of the New York City Bar Association. As part of the Lawyers Committee for Chile, Garbus recently traveled to Santiago, where he observed the junta's show trial of sixty-seven air force and civilian personnel on charges of conspiracy. The entire interview will appear in the July-August 1974 issue of the *USLA Reporter*.]

\* \* \*

*Question. Can you explain why, in your opinion, the military junta set up these open trials?*

*Answer.* I see the trials as an attempt, on the part of the junta, to establish a basis of legitimacy, to show that due process is being followed and that people are being treated fairly.

To some extent, the junta got a good deal of political mileage out of our being there, because then they were able to report to the world that they were so confident of their procedures, they could open the trials and allow people such as ourselves to come down and observe them. I think they have made a calculated decision that whatever we have to say about them when we get back will not cut into the good effect the junta has had by saying that the trials are open.

The open trials and Kissinger's upcoming trip to Chile are, together, the cornerstones of the junta's claim of

legitimacy.

*Q. Can you describe the atmosphere of the trials?*

*A.* The experience of observing the trials was remarkable. Each morning, as our car approached within 250 feet of the air force academy where they were being held, we were stopped by four soldiers dressed in fatigues, with machine guns over their shoulders, fingers on the triggers. After they checked our credentials, we walked down the road to the academy between lines of soldiers—seeing more soldiers, tense and armed, behind embankments, trees, and bushes, watching us and everything that might be moving toward the academy.

At the academy entrance we passed another checkpoint, a dozen more soldiers, and then were led to a small gatehouse where we emptied our pockets, took off our jackets, and were given a finger search on each part of our bodies.

On the first day of the trial, an eminent right-wing lawyer, described to me as a fascist, got so outraged by this procedure that he walked away and refused to go through with it because "it was degrading." He was excluded from the courtroom.

The government presents its case without live witnesses. The prosecutor relies solely upon the confessions of the defendants to prove his case. In cases where the penalties are twenty and thirty years, it sometimes takes the junta twenty minutes to present its case. Before the trials were opened, the military tribunal felt that by sitting four hours a day, the sixty-seven

trials could be finished in a week to ten days. However, it now appears it can't be done that quickly.

*Q. Do the lawyers who are defending the sixty-seven people on trial have leftist leanings?*

A. The leftist lawyers have either left the country or are too afraid to take these kinds of cases, and with very good reason. All of the defendants originally had great difficulty in obtaining lawyers. Nearly all of their present attorneys are from the right or center, originally supporters of the junta, and former opponents of Allende.

*Q. We understand you were able to meet with representatives of the junta.*

A. Yes. They tried to assure us that elections would come back, and that they had no plans of turning Chile into a military dictatorship. They said they felt that Chile would be ready for elections in five to ten years.

*Q. The junta has recently termed reports that Chilean prisoners have been tortured "a grave distortion of reality." Did you see any evidence of torture when you were in Chile?*

A. I did not see any torture. Of course, they would not allow me to see that. But I spoke to many people who had been tortured, and the compilations that have been put together—such as the one by the International Commission of Jurists—are, to the best of my knowledge, accurate.

*Q. Have any of the lawyers for the defendants attempted to raise evidence on torture in Chile as part of their cases?*

A. Yes. There are two lawyers we should talk about. At the end of the first day, one of the lawyers told the press that he thought he was going to raise the issue of torture—he called it maltreatment. He was told by a judge of the military tribunal, who overheard him, that if this were done, he would be arrested for treason. He hasn't raised the issue.

Another lawyer raised the issue of the constitutionality of the court, the legitimacy of the junta to suspend the

courts and then try people. That lawyer was immediately removed from the case, and is now in the process of being disbarred. What happened to him, no one knows.

At lunch one day during the trial, a colonel high in the administration told me the lawyers who are now representing the defendants are Marxists. If they weren't, he said, they wouldn't be representing them.

Some of the lawyers who feel that ultimately they are going to have to raise issues that will displease the regime are thinking of sending their wives and children out of the country.

*Q. Each of the defendants on trial has signed a confession. What do these confessions admit?*

A. With respect to the confessions, there is one thing I ought to point out. These defendants are being charged with having supported the Allende regime prior to September 11, 1973. The military junta's theory is that after 1970, the Allende government acted illegally, that it wasn't following the rule of law. So anything that was done by people in support of the Allende government, from 1970 to 1973, was illegal. When speeches were made by the various defendants saying "I support the Allende government," or "Let's do this; let's do that," these acts—which were perfectly legal at the time, and in fact were part of the democratic process—are now characterized by the junta as evidence of treason! One of the remarkable things about the confessions is that, by and large, they are true. These people did say these things and did do those things.

There's another factor involved. Early in 1973, people in the Allende regime began to become concerned about a coup, and, in fact, there was a small coup prior to September 11. What you had in the Allende regime was people talking about how to stop a coup. Those people who tried to defend the government from a coup are defendants in this case, on the grounds that they were seeking to perpetuate an illegal regime. This may be hard for you to grasp because it's such nonsense. It's really an Alice-in-Wonderland theory, and it violates every constitutional principle that anyone could possibly be familiar with.

*Q. Has the Chilean press been reporting on the trials?*

A. The Chilean press is a totally controlled press. It does cover the trials. I could show you some of the clippings. They're pure propaganda. The prosecutor's allegations in the trial each day are interspersed with the front-page news in the press in order, it seems, to justify his claims in the trial.

The second day of the trial, for example, the press carried announcements of the arrests of thousands of "extremists" in the workers' quarters in Santiago. The third day, the government announced that 10,000 "extremists" were massing on the Argentine border, preparing to invade Chile. Then the story disappeared. Nothing more was ever heard of it. The following day, there was a news story that those who had been confined on Dawson Island—a concentration camp in the south of Chile—had arms and were planning revolutionary acts. Those of us who are familiar with the security precautions at Dawson Island know, of course, that this would be impossible. So, the Chilean press is a very important tool, if you will, for the junta.

*Q. What about the international press? How have they treated the trials?*

A. A Swiss newsman who the junta felt was not reporting the trials fairly disappeared for five days. No one knew where he was. The last time he was seen was at the Santiago airport, leaving the country under military escort.\*

The *New York Times* has two people covering South America. The *Times* people know that if they print stories that are critical of the government, they will get booted out. So, there's a kind of self-censorship that goes into these articles. I would say that by and large the coverage of the trials that you see in the American and European press has nothing dishonest in it, but it has never told the full story. It has never related the trials in their entirety. It hasn't pointed out, for example, that even as these open trials are going on,

\*An interview with the Swiss journalist, Pierre Rieben, appears elsewhere in this issue. — IP



there are thousands of closed trials going on in Santiago and throughout the country, where people are being killed.

*Q. Were you able to visit Dawson Island and other prison camps?*

A. I have not visited Dawson Island. They wouldn't let anyone in—not even the Red Cross. I have not visited prison camps, only the jail in Santiago. The jail cells there are six feet by eight feet. They have men sleeping nose to nose. The cells were probably meant for two people.

The sixty-seven defendants that we saw did not look terrible. They brought everybody in the first day and everybody looked nice and shiny. The torture had been a long time ago and everything they wore was freshly pressed.

*Q. Do you think the junta moved the prisoners in from Dawson Island to prepare them for trials where the signs of torture would be unseen?*

A. Yes. Dawson Island has become synonymous with something like Buchenwald. It's the name that connotes something. I think they wanted to get rid of that image. Also they felt you can hold people for just so long. A lot of these people were arrested at the end of September—six or seven months now—and by and large without seeing lawyers or their families. At some point you've got to come to grips with that.

*Q. The trade-union movement in Chile—the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores—United Federation of Workers]—has been banned. Did you see any evidence of a revival of trade-union activity on the part of the workers?*

A. No. But putting that question another way—Did I see any revival of the left or the resistance?—I did not see that either. It may be that I didn't see it because I wasn't meant to see it, or it could be that I didn't see it because it wasn't there. □

#### Hedging His Bets

Evangelist Billy Graham, who is known as the unofficial White House spiritual adviser, has asked the public to pray for both sides in the impeachment dispute.

## Britain

# Workers' Struggles Defy 'Social Contract'

By Elizabeth Smith

London

"Scanlon Orders: Stop Britain Now," read the headline on the London *Evening News* on May 9, as strike instructions went out to 1,200,000 engineering workers.

The national executive of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), headed by president Hugh Scanlon, voted to call its membership out in protest at the seizure of its assets by the National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC).

Almost immediately, the production of national newspapers ceased, the major car producers (Ford, British Leyland, and Triumph) shut down completely, and power plants lost production.

The AUEW has forfeited over £200,000 in defying rulings of the NIRC. In the latest development, the court had ordered the AUEW's assets seized because the union had refused to pay the damages levied against it after a work stoppage at a small plant south of London seven months ago.

The court's ruling was all the more outrageous in that the source of its authority, the Industrial Relations Act passed by the previous Conservative government, is due to be repealed soon and replaced by the Labour government's "Trade Union and Labour Relations Bill," which has been drawn up with the participation and approval of the Trades Union Congress (TUC).

Labour MPs and ministers, furious at the court's decision against the AUEW, saw it, in the words of some, as a "last act of provocation" by the NIRC's presiding judge, Sir John Donaldson. Renee Short, MP, a member of the Labour party's National Executive, said, "It is quite fantastic. The court wants to break the union, and the union and the labour movement will not stand for it. Here is this court on its last legs, having its last vicious, dying kick before it expires."

But Labour's minister for employ-

ment, Michael Foot, appealed to the AUEW to take its case back to the court. A week previously, in response to impassioned appeals by Foot and the Labour government to support Labour's "social contract," the AUEW's national committee had voted by 27 votes to 25 to end the ban on overtime that it had launched in support of its £10-a-week pay claim.

Just as the strike was beginning to take effect, however, the NIRC was approached by an anonymous donor offering to pay £65,000 to cover the fines and damages levied against the union. Only twenty-four hours previously, the court had rejected the same offer. This time it accepted, the union's assets were returned, and the strike was called off.

Sir John Donaldson claimed that "the payment did not involve any surrender of the court's authority." But the *Economist* commented that "whilst the law was eventually technically enforced, [the court] had suffered yet another crushing moral defeat."

The continuation, even though temporarily, of the Conservatives' Industrial Relations Act and incomes policy has brought wide layers of the labour movement into conflict with the minority Labour government.

Workers from the public and social service sector, with no tradition of trade-union militancy, are now moving into opposition to the government to defend their standards of living and conditions of work.

On April 29 virtually all London schools closed as teachers walked out in support of their claim for an increase of £230 in their London Allowance, a salary adjustment to compensate for higher living costs in the London area. In the afternoon some 20,000 persons, mainly young teachers, marched to parliament to lobby MPs. It was the largest demonstration ever held by teachers in Britain.

(This militancy has been further reflected in the election of two professed

revolutionary socialists among the three places allotted to London on the national executive of the National Union of Teachers.)

Joining the teachers march were members of the National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO), who are also pressing for an increased London Allowance. Some of the more militant NALGO associations are already taking action, despite appeals by Len Murray, the general secretary of the Trades Union Congress, to "give the Labour government a chance."

Murray's appeals were also rebuffed by the London Divisional Council of the Association of Teachers in Technical Institutions, itself struggling for an increase in the London Allowance. The council overwhelmingly passed resolutions calling on the TUC to press the government for an immediate award, and urging closer links with NALGO's campaign.

Barbara Castle, former Labour minister for employment and now minister for health and social services, was besieged April 30 by a demonstration of 1,500 nurses demanding an increase in their pay and better working conditions. On May 9, in what is said to be the first nurses strike in fifty years, nurses in one of Britain's largest mental hospitals, at Huddersfield, left their wards for over an hour. Nurses throughout the country held meetings and demonstrations that day in support of their demands. In some areas nurses have boycotted hospital canteens to draw attention to the cost of meals and their meagre wages, especially for student nurses.

As Murray's attitude and the AUEW's ending of its overtime ban indicate, the new Labour government has been relatively successful in its dealings with the TUC. Its food subsidies and a £10 million tax rebate to trade unions penalized by the previous Conservative government, have been popular. Nevertheless, the last Labour government's attempt to shackle the unions with its "In Place of Strife" legislation remains fresh in the memories of many trade unionists.

At the same time the teachers, nurses, and local government officers, who represent sections of the trade-union movement that are not traditionally tied to the Labour party, and whose members include a large num-

ber of youth radicalized as students, are moving to challenge the "social

contract" that constitutes the axis of government policy. □

## Can He Succeed Where Tories Failed?

# Wilson's Strategy for Wage Restraints

By Tony Hodges

London

Militant pay protests by local government workers, hospital nurses, airline cabin crews, and teachers are posing serious challenges to the Labour government's wage control programme.

These workers have to fight the La-



**WILSON:** For "a living and developing relationship"—also known as wage restraint.

bour government's incomes policy in order to defend their living standards against inflation. In the past year, the real wages of British workers have fallen, and all signs point to a further decline in the coming months.

Between March 1973 and March of this year, retail prices soared 13.5%. In the first quarter of 1974, however, retail prices shot up even faster, at an annual rate of 19.8%. Hourly wages, by contrast, rose only 14.9%.

Further price rises are in the pipeline. Wholesale prices swung up at an annual rate of 38% in April, a warning that big retail price rises are in store. Another index of falling living standards has been the slump in retail sales since December; they fell 2% in April alone.

The profits bonanza of the major capitalist corporations over the last year contrasts with the fate of working people. Companies reporting their annual pretax profits in April announced a 51.8% rise. Some of the biggest increases were reported by the chemical monopoly ICI (108%), the mining company Rio-Tinto Zinc (134%), and the building firm George Wimpey (127%).

## Maintaining Tory Wage Restraints

The so-called Counterinflation Act, placed on the statute book in 1972 by the Tory government, has been a major stumbling block to workers attempting to make their wages keep pace with inflation. While holding back wage increases, the act has done little to control prices, and so has helped the capitalist class to boost its profits. The Labour government has so far refused to repeal this reactionary piece of Tory legislation.

Phase Three of the wage-control programme initiated by this act began last November and is still in operation. It limits wage rises to 7% a year. Provision was made that if the Retail Price Index (RPI) rose by more than 7% from its level last October, then workers would be allowed to receive a further £0.40 wage increase and additional £0.40 increases for every additional rise of one percentage point in the RPI.

About 3 million workers have "threshold agreements" with their employers entitling them to these additional payments. It is widely expected

that when RPI figures for April are published they will show that retail prices have risen 7% or even 8% since October, thus triggering adjustments based on the threshold agreements.

But these agreements are inadequate to protect workers from inflation. A worker earning the average gross industrial wage of £46-47 a week who received the additional £0.40 would add only about 0.85% to wages and so fail to compensate for a 1% rise in prices. In addition, the average worker would never be able to spend part of the increase: 20% would vanish in additional taxes and national insurance contributions. And in any case the RPI is not an accurate measure of working people's living costs, since it gravely underestimates the importance of food in workers' budgets. Food prices have risen far faster than the RPI in the past year.

In order really to protect workers from inflation, a campaign should be mounted throughout the labour movement to force the Wilson government to live up to its preelection promises to repeal the Counterinflation Act and abolish all statutory control over wages. That would allow unions to fight for sliding-scale clauses in wage agreements that would guarantee wage increases to offset price rises. And the trade-union movement could establish its own price index to gauge accurately the increase in workers' cost of living.

Such a campaign would require a total break from the "social contract" between the Labour government and the top bureaucracy of the Trades Union Congress (TUC). The social contract, first unveiled by Wilson at an election rally February 17, is designed to persuade workers to hold down wage demands in the interest of higher profits for the big corporations.

The Labour leaders are intent on keeping wage increases well inside the norms of Phase Three, voluntarily if possible, but by law if necessary. The government and the TUC hope that pleas to workers not to "rock the boat" while the Labour government lacks an absolute majority in Parliament will restrain workers from struggling for higher wages. But the fear that workers will respond to the pressures of mounting inflation with militant struggles for major wage increases has convinced the government that they had better retain the Tories' wage

laws.

The Labour leaders are particularly afraid that the 29% wage increase won by the miners in defiance of Phase Three has shown other workers that militancy pays. On March 11 Michael Foot, the best-known leader of the "left" of the Labour party and Wilson's secretary of state for employment, met TUC leaders at a session of the National Economic Development Council to propose that Phase Three stay on the statute book. Two days later, the TUC Economic Committee agreed to accept Phase Three, and on March 18 Foot reported to Parliament that the Tories' Pay Board and Phase Three would "continue in operation for a transitional period." The announcement was warmly welcomed by the ruling-class press and the Tories. [See *Intercontinental Press*, April 8, p. 407.]

### Planned Decline in Living Standards

The social contract has been trumpeted to the unions as a bargain that the unions must "live up to." Wage restraint by the workers has been traded for a number of minor reforms by the Labour government, none of which have drawn any substantial opposition from the Tories or threatened Parliamentary defeat for the Labour government.

These reforms include plans to repeal the Tories' Industrial Relations Act, the raising of pensions to £10 a week for single persons and £16 for married couples, minor changes in the Price Code, £500 million of food subsidies, and £10 million compensation to the unions for money lost under the Industrial Relations Act.

The pensions increase is pitiful. British pensions, even after this increase, are lower than in practically every other industrialised country of Western Europe. The decision to give £500 million of subsidies to hold down the prices of key foods is also inadequate. It will lower the RPI by only 1.5 percent while other decisions of the government have increased the RPI by much more.

The food subsidies were announced to Parliament by Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey on March 26 in his budget speech. The budget was hailed by the TUC bureaucracy as beneficial to the working class.

"Left-winger" Jack Jones of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), interviewed in the *Guardian* March 29, put it this way: "We must get our industrial relations atmosphere right and the Chancellor's Budget, with its many proposals which have been taken from the TUC Economic Review, helps us move toward that ideal."

More astute or more honest observers commented differently. Peter Jenkins wrote in the March 29 *Guardian* that an "unspoken theme ran through Mr Healey's Budget." Healey was attempting to "budget for a real decline in the living standards of the British people."

Jenkins estimated that "probably, by the end of the year, the average industrial earner will be experiencing a decline in living standards of the order of 60p a week. . . . Circumstances could hardly be less propitious for the signing of the so-called 'social contract.' . . . Mr Healey's budget is, by admission of the Treasury, inflationary. That is to say that prices are expected to rise a little faster as a result of it than they would have done without it. At first sight, therefore, the minimal condition for the so-called social contract has not been met by the government."

While reducing retail prices 1.5% with food subsidies, Healey's budget raised retail prices by 1.75% by placing value-added tax on petrol and sweets and by increasing duties on tobacco and drink. Healey also announced big rises in charges by nationalised industries, scheduled to take effect later in the year, which should add about 2% to the RPI. Electricity charges to householders will be raised by 30 percent in August; coal prices will go up £2.50 to £3 a ton in November; telephone charges will jump 15-20%; postage rates will increase; and steel prices were raised 25% immediately after the budget was presented.

The government's changes in the Price Code are also minimal. The Prices Bill, published on April 3, allows wider use of discretionary powers by the government to fix maximum prices of essential consumer goods. But on April 26, Shirley Williams, secretary of state for prices and consumer protection, announced that the prices of only nine foods would be fixed at all times in all shops.

Further proposals that a company could not raise the price of a product more than four times a year and that retailers reduce their gross profit margin reference levels by 10 per cent were severely weakened after protests from the Retailers Consortium and the Confederation of British Industries (CBI).

## Preparing the Climate

On May 1, the government published a Trade Unions and Labour Relations Bill, promising as part of "its side" of the social contract to repeal the hated Industrial Relations Act. The new bill is planned to return British industrial law to its state prior to the Tories' 1970 election victory. It excludes the more "controversial" proposals desired by trade unionists.

The new bill runs little danger of meeting Parliamentary defeat at the hands of a combined opposition from the bourgeois parties, especially since the government has indicated a readiness to back down on any changes in industrial law that spark major objections from the opposition parties.

The Liberal party was committed to repealing the Industrial Relations Act in its election manifesto, and the Tories who enacted it in 1971 have little will to fight its repeal today. This is because widespread union opposition to the act made it unworkable and only intensified the radicalisation in the unions.

Most of the act's provisions never materialised because of the scale of union opposition. Campbell Adamson, director general of the CBI, days before the election in February, publicly called for repeal of the act on the grounds that it had sullied every aspect of industrial relations. The *Economist* on April 27 noted that the Tories "do not intend to oppose repeal as such. Many Tory politicians now concede that had they stayed in power they would at least have modified the act in keeping with the country's desire not to cross the unions any more." The Labour government has recognised that the future of its social contract and wage-control programme depends on establishing a climate of class conciliation that the retention of the Industrial Relations Act would have obstructed.

Foot's Trade Unions and Labour

Relations Bill carefully excludes any changes in the legal rights of unions that would draw opposition from the Tories in Parliament. The bill fails to repeal the antiunion 1875 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, under which six building workers have been gaoled for up to three years as a result of charges growing out of the 1972 national building workers' strike. The Labour government has refused to free these victimised trade unionists. And Foot's bill does nothing to protect the right to picket in future strikes, not even granting the right to stop vehicles on picket lines for the purpose of peaceful persuasion.

## 'Understanding' From TUC

Len Murray, TUC general secretary, urged union understanding of the government's failure to grant all their demands. On April 24 the TUC general council agreed to drop its demands for protection of the right to peaceful picketing. "The government," Murray told the general council, "is making a strenuous effort to fulfill its part of the agreement, and this requires a response from the trade-union movement."

Wilson and Foot also held back from ordering the outright abolition of the National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC). All cases brought against unions under the Industrial Relations Act prior to May 1 will continue to be tried by the court until its abolition when the Trade Unions and Labour Relations Bill becomes law in July. But even then the cases will not be dropped: They will simply be transferred to the High Court!

The seriousness of the government's refusal to order the immediate abolition of the court and dropping of all antiunion cases became clear only two days after the publication of Foot's bill, when the NIRC ordered the sequestration of the entire financial assets of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW). A nationwide strike by the AUEW swept aside this reactionary ruling in less than twenty-four hours, demonstrating that independent mass struggle by the unions is the way for workers to win their demands.

But the social contract, with its appeals to workers to tailor their demands in the interest of class conciliation in return for a few minor

reforms, is a recipe for a decline in the living standard of the working class. As Murray himself put it in a TUC circular to unions on April 15: "The general pattern of settlements which has been established in recent months should continue for the remainder of the present period." The "general pattern" under Phase Three has been a decline of real wages.

The TUC bureaucrats are on a campaign footing to try to convince workers that the Labour government has carried out its side of the contract and that now it is the turn of the unions. "If we have nothing to give governments, then they will have nothing to give us," Murray argued at the national conference of the National Federation of Professional Workers on April 2.

The next day Wilson met leaders of the TUC and the CBI at the monthly meeting of the National Economic Development Council. The TUC leaders renewed their pledge to stand by Phase Three and discussed new government proposals for strengthening arbitration and conciliation procedures. The April 4 *Financial Times* reported that "these proposed initiatives in effect mark a new co-operative approach by the TUC to the country's economic and labour problems—an approach which did not exist under the Conservative government."

Phase Three was ratified yet again at a meeting of the TUC Economic Committee on April 10. It was decided that unions should give a "positive response" to the government's "progressive and constructive policies." The April 11 *Financial Times* commented that the decisions amounted to a "plea to union leaders to persuade their members at annual conferences during the coming months to restrain pay demands."

On April 15 Murray sent his circular letter to member unions, codifying the approach agreed upon by the TUC in its many meetings with government ministers. The letter began by urging unions to "take due account of the needs of the economic and industrial situation and of the policies being pursued by the government." The TUC, the letter continued, "will look to unions to take into account . . . the undertaking that union attitudes would be influenced

by the constructive policies of the Labour government."

And there was a word of advice for union leaders under pressure from their ranks to resist this disastrous policy: "Unions which find themselves in difficulties in conforming to the spirit of this policy will be expected to inform the general council of the circumstances and seek their advice; or to respond to an invitation by the general council to discuss the situation with them."

The April 16 *Financial Times* wrote that "the TUC's advice amounts to an appeal to unions broadly to accept Stage Three pay limits without trying to cash in on the miners' high increases."

### Can the Bureaucrats Deliver?

On April 19, Dennis Howell, a minister in Wilson's government and president of the Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staffs (APEX), told the APEX conference in his presidential address that "there can be no planned economy, no meaningful priorities, no social justice, unless the TUC can deliver the goods. We have got to show that the voluntary response for which we campaigned in the election has become a reality. And that means that every union in the TUC will, in the last analysis, accept the collective judgement of the TUC upon individual wage claims. Individual trade unionists must also accept the responsibilities and constraints which go with such policies. I am quite sure that if we who hold high office give the leadership which is required, then the rank and file membership will respond."

On April 22, the *Financial Times* observed of the social contract that "the most positive result so far has been the attempt by the TUC to exercise some control over its members' wage claims. . . . The TUC is making a genuine effort to live up to its side of the bargain."

Forecasting a "new spirit of unity and conciliation in industry" and urging the "need to get away from the confrontation and disputes of the last three years," Wilson himself plunged into the campaign to win support for the social contract when he addressed the annual conference of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Work-

ers on April 28. Wilson spoke of the social contract as "a living and developing relationship covering the whole range of our social and economic policies."

Foot repeated the idea in Parliament on May 1. "We hope," he said, "that this social contract will not merely go on for a short period of crisis but for many years ahead under the auspices of this government and its successor."

But will this confidence trick really work? The ruling-class press and the Tories, while in no mood to bring down the government so long as the social contract has a chance of success, are keeping a close watch for concrete results. "The fundamental question remains," the *Financial Times* wrote on April 22, "Does the TUC have the authority to make the policy stick?"

The government has won only one test of its policy to date. After hearing an appeal from Foot for a "year of industrial peace," the national committee of the engineering section of the AUEW voted April 24 to call off a ban on overtime begun April 15 to back up demands for a £10-a-week increase. Prior to the overtime ban, the AUEW and other unions in the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions had already agreed to drop demands for a thirty-five-hour week, equal pay for women, and a guaranteed weekly wage.

After calling off the overtime ban, the engineering unions agreed to accept increases of £5 for women and unskilled workers and £7 for skilled workers in two installments between then and next March. "For the present at least," the *Financial Times* concluded on April 29, "the engineering unions appear to be staying within the terms of the social contract."

But not all workers have been intimidated by the barrage of propaganda for wage restraint. On April 29, Jack Carr, speaking for the executive committee of the technical staffs (TASS) section of the AUEW at TASS's annual conference, declared that "within a capitalist system any form of wage restraint will go against the worker and only help the employer. We are therefore opposed to the concept of the social compact, which will further erode the standard of living of the workers and make

bigger and better profits for the ruling classes."

On April 2, the executive committee of the National Union of Bank Employees decided that it was not bound "in any shape or form" by the social contract and voted to press ahead for 40% pay rises for bank workers.

Under extreme pressure from grossly underpaid workers in the civil service, Gerry Gillman, general secretary of the Society of Civil Servants, replied to Murray's April 15 circular letter, informing the TUC that "just as we attacked Stage Three in November as being rigid, unjust and complex, so the criticism stands today."

London Transport tube workers are demanding a 22% pay rise despite the Pay Board having banned the increase as impermissible under Phase Three regulations.

On May 13, Walter Kendall, general secretary of the Civil and Public Servants Association (CPSA), addressing a conference of the CPSA that had just censured his executive for "inefficiency and ineptitude" in negotiating civil servants' last pay deal, saw "immediate trouble," social contract or not, if civil servants did not get a better deal.

Only days later, one of the most right-wing union leaders, Tom Jackson, general secretary of the Union of Post Office Workers (UPW), warned Foot at the UPW's national conference that workers' discontent was so massive in the post office that there was a risk of "an explosion of resentment and probable widespread industrial action in the post office." The conference voted to push for pay rises of around 14% on top of their annual increases.

### New Layers in Motion

One of the most striking characteristics of the new wave of struggles against wage restraints is the radicalisation of sections of workers with little past record of union militancy or class consciousness. On May 6, for example, a mass meeting of British Airways stewardesses and stewards voted to strike for pay rises and improvements in working conditions.

A new trade-union consciousness is

spreading among white-collar workers, who are breaking out of the "professional" image that kept them strait-jacketed for decades. The 250,000-member National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO), which had never called a strike in its entire history, is now backing strikes and overtime bans by its London members in defiance of the social contract. NALGO's pay demand, adopted by the union in April 1973, fell foul of both Phase Two and Phase Three, and now union members are so angry that they have pushed their union leaders into supporting industrial action despite repeated appeals from Foot and Murray to honour the social contract.

The youth radicalisation is having a profound effect in the unions. Young ex-students are among the leaders of the local government struggles. And

## Statement of Irish Trotskyists

## Bombings Require United-Front Response

[Twenty-three persons were killed and about eighty wounded in Dublin May 17 when bombs planted in three automobiles exploded during rush hour. Later the same day, five were killed and twenty wounded in Monaghan, eighty miles north of Dublin.

[The following statement was issued May 18 by the Political Committee of the Revolutionary Marxist Group, Irish section of the Fourth International.]

\* \* \*

The recent bombing outrages are clearly the actions of Orange extremists. This is the ultimate logic of the attempts of the Protestant working class, encouraged by Unionist big business, to defend its privileged interests against the Sunningdale agreement. These contradictory interests were created by British imperialism and its allies. Sectarian killings, the recent mass strike, and now the Southern bombings are manifestations of the creation of the Northern state by Britain and its Irish allies over fifty years ago.

[Prime Minister Liam] Cosgrave has

young women teachers were an overwhelming majority in the huge demonstration of 20,000 London teachers on April 29.

Another sign of changing times came on May 16, when the Confederation of Health Service Employees resolved to give Wilson four days to grant nurses a 55% pay rise or face a nationwide strike by its 75,000 members in the National Health Service. This would be the first strike ever held by British nurses.

Thus, despite all the appeals from the labour traitors who sit in the government and in the general council of the TUC, there are growing signs, especially from women, the young, and the lowest-paid workers, that the working class is not prepared to pay the price for the crisis wracking British capitalism. □

told us that it can be solved by the acceptance of the Sunningdale agreement and the imprisonment of Republicans. The bombings have shown us only too clearly that this is not the case. The nationalist population in the North in their struggle against British imperialism have clearly shown part of the solution—the end of partition.

The cynical and hypocritical efforts of Cosgrave to whip up feelings against Republicans and socialists must be firmly opposed. The parties to the Sunningdale agreement have insisted that only the Provisional terrorists stand in the path of a peaceful solution to the present crisis. The Dublin and Monaghan bombings show that this is not the case. The real enemies of peace are British imperialism and its Unionist clients. By collaboration with these oppressive and corrupt forces the Irish government also shares responsibility for the recent bloody events.

The Revolutionary Marxist Group calls for setting up a united front against repression by all Republican and socialist forces. In the last analysis only a mass movement can pre-

vent the Loyalists, British imperialism, and its collaborators from carrying on their campaign of aggression against the working class of Ireland.

## New Zealand

## Labour Party Leaders Try to Bar Socialist

The New Zealand Labour party leadership is attempting to expel a revolutionary socialist from the party. The threatened activist is Keith Locke, a member of a Wellington branch of the party. Locke is also editor of *Socialist Action*, the fortnightly newspaper of the Socialist Action League, New Zealand section of the Fourth International.

On February 8, John Wybrow, the general secretary of the Labour party, sent a letter to Locke's branch, urging that "under no circumstances must his membership be renewed for the forthcoming year. This position will obtain whilst Mr. Locke remains a member of the Socialist Action League."

The first moves by the Labour party leadership to exclude revolutionary socialists from membership occurred in May 1972, shortly after the League announced its "Socialists for Labour Campaign," in which it supported Labour party candidates but did so by raising issues that the reformists were unwilling to raise. The Labour party Executive met that month and decided that "membership of the League is incompatible with membership of the party."

A number of figures within the Labour party opposed the action and none of the branches of the Labour party took the initiative to expel League members. At the end of 1973, however, Wybrow began to put pressure on Locke's branch to expel him. The branch decided at that time that the question of expulsion was beyond its constitutional powers.

In the May 10 *Socialist Action*, Locke noted that Wybrow's February 8 instructions to the branch were unconstitutional, since no Labour party officer can refuse to "renew" a person's membership. The Executive stated that two reasons, among others, why it was demanding the expulsion

of League members from the Labour party were that "the League seeks to impose on the Party, by public action, policies already rejected by the Party," and "the League has publicly proclaimed that it will actively campaign against those aspects of the policy of the Party with which it disagrees."

If the above provisions for expulsion were put into practice, Locke said, it "would rule out involvement of party members in virtually any protest group, protest meeting or demonstration. If it were implemented, many members of the party, including many MPs, would have to be expelled."

"The party leadership," Locke continued, "is breaking with the party's

traditional approach of allowing people to be members of the party whatever their particular socialist views. Once the leadership starts excluding people on political grounds, where will it stop? Many of the radical policies advocated by the League are also held by thousands of party members. . . .

"Clearly, the attempt by the NZ Executive to exclude me from the Labour party because of my membership in the League is a serious threat to democracy in the party and the right of people to publicly disagree with its leadership."

Locke called on Labour party members and affiliated trade unionists to defend his right to remain in the party. □

## Document Written in a Labor Camp

# Soviet Prisoners Demand National Rights

[The following report on a Soviet samizdat document is taken from the March issue of *Wiener Tagebuch*, a magazine published by a grouping expelled from the Austrian Communist party because of its criticisms of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

[Parenthetical remarks are by *Wiener Tagebuch*. The translation for *Intercontinental Press* is by Bob Cantrick.]

\* \* \*

Sixteen representatives from the Baltic countries, Ukraine, and the Caucasus, who are confined in a [forced-labor] camp in the USSR, have drawn up the following eight demands—addressed to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR—for the restoration of the sovereignty of the non-Russian Soviet republics and autonomous regions.

The introduction states that according to the constitution of the USSR, all power is derived from the soviets, that is, from the Supreme Soviet of each republic. In practice, however, all power proceeds from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in which Russians predominate, while the national republics and regions are treated as regional organizations of the party.

The demands are:

1. Full recognition of the national language in all spheres of public life. (At present, in addition to the schools where the national language is used for instruction—which are more and more crowded out of the educational system—there are Russian-language schools, attendance at which is practically indispensable for a higher education.)

2. Full autonomy for all national minorities and elimination of special privileges for members of the Russian nationality. (In all republics of the Soviet Union there are a number of large state-run enterprises and research institutes in which numerous Russians are employed. Schools, cultural institutions, publishing houses, etc., are established for them, and members of other nationalities are faced with the choice of sending their children either to the Russian school or to the (second-rate) school of their own republic. Throughout the entire Soviet Union the Russian minorities have autonomy in each Soviet republic, but there is no autonomy—above all, no schools—for the non-Russian minorities in the Russian federation. These minorities often comprise hundreds of thousands, even millions, of

members, as, for example, the Ukrainians.)

3. The right of the non-Russian republics and territories to independent political, economic, and cultural relations with all other republics and regions in the Soviet Union. (Such relations are at present possible only through the central Moscow bureaus.)

4. The right of all non-Russians to fulfill their military service in their own territorial units, as provided in Article 18 of the constitution. (At present, most non-Russian draftees are assigned to the divisions of other republics or are stationed far from their homelands. The reasons for this were demonstrated, for example, in Lithuania during the 1972 disorders, when paratroopers from Kazakhstan and Russian units were sent in.)

5. The placing of all factories and natural resources under the administration of the republics and autonomous territories.

6. Restoration of the full rights of the soviets and all constitutional bodies. Separation of the functions of state and party; state control over the activities of the party.

7. All problems of the non-Russian republics and territories must be resolved in accord with the interests of those who live there. According to Article 125 of the constitution, every citizen has the right to demand enforcement of this principle.

8. Breach of sovereignty and of the rights guaranteed in the constitution give the non-Russian republics the right to demand secession from the Soviet Union in accordance with Article 17 of the constitution. (At present, all such aspirations are characterized as "bourgeois nationalism" and are severely punished.) □

## Intercontinental Press

[ ] Six months \$7.50  
[ ] One year \$15.00


Please print name

Address

City State Zip

P. O. Box 116, Village Station  
New York, N. Y. 10014

# AROUND THE WORLD



## New 'Chronicle' Appears in Moscow

A new issue of the samizdat journal *Chronicle of Current Events* has appeared in Moscow. Issue Number 31 was dated May 17, the thirtieth anniversary of Stalin's forcible deportation of the Crimean Tatars. The entire issue was devoted to the Tatar's struggle for the right to return to their homeland.

This was the fourth issue of the *Chronicle* to appear in recent weeks. Prior to publication of issue Number 28, the Kremlin's political police had succeeded in suppressing the best-known of the samizdat publications for a period of eighteen months.

## Chilean Junta Returns Factories

The Chilean military junta announced May 24 that twenty-one metal factories nationalized by the Allende government had been returned to their former owners. The junta reported at the same time that it was negotiating with the Inter-American Development Bank for a \$400 million loan to increase industrial and agricultural production.

## Bangladesh Prisoners on Hunger Strike

Nine political prisoners at the central prison in Mymensingh, Bangladesh, began a hunger strike May 16 to protest the beating of fifty political prisoners the week before. The protesting prisoners are members of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD — National Socialist party), and of student and peasant groups affiliated to the JSD.

The May 14 JSD daily *Ganakantha* (People's Voice) first reported the beating incident, which occurred after political prisoners complained about the food they were receiving. Leaders of the JSD, the Opposition Sramik (Workers) League, and the Opposition Chhatra (Students) League issued statements condemning the beatings.

The political prisoners at the Mymensingh jail demanded an inquiry into the assault, but when none was made, they launched their hunger strike. In addition to an inquiry, they demanded that all the political prisoners at Mymensingh, including JSD President M. A. Jalil, be given political prisoners status and that the prison-

ers be provided with adequate food and proper medical care.

## Brazilian Lawyers Protest Violations of Human Rights

The Brazilian College of Lawyers and the presidents of all the state lawyers' associations have made public a memorandum they submitted to Armando Falcao, minister of justice in that country, concerning violations of human rights and civil liberties.

The action, which is credited with being inspired by recent events in Portugal, was announced May 11.

Ten violations of basic rights are opposed by the lawyers:

1. Denial of the free exercise of justice as guaranteed by the constitution.
2. Ineffective functioning of the constitutional bodies supposed to guarantee human rights.
3. Almost complete disregard for the law that guarantees the right to habeas corpus.
4. Secret arrests that at times take on the character of kidnappings.
5. Routinely keeping prisoners incommunicado, even from their attorneys, beyond the legal time limit and without bringing charges against them.
6. Kidnapping lawyers to force them to reveal the whereabouts of their clients, and searching lawyers' homes and records.
7. Blindfolding, and inhuman methods of interrogation; humiliating treatment of prisoners and their lawyers.
8. Censorship, often carried out as vendettas against the press.
9. Immunity for functionaries who perform arrests and interrogations.
10. Unfounded identification of attorneys with the political views of their clients.

## Washington Disclaims Mininukes

The U. S. government on May 23 assured delegates to the Geneva Disarmament Conference that it would not develop miniaturized atomic weapons, known as "mininukes." The statement from U. S. delegate Joseph Martin came more than a year after questions about U. S. plans had been raised by the Swedish delegate.

Mininukes are generally considered to be atomic weapons of an explosive power

comparable to conventional weapons. Their military advantage over conventional weapons lies in their lethal radiation.

The U. S. statement did not apply to so-called tactical atomic weapons, which have a larger explosive force but can be delivered by such conventional means as artillery. Martin's statement indicated that Washington would continue to develop its stockpile of tactical atomic weapons.

## Furtseva Reported on Way Down

Yekaterina A. Furtseva, the only woman of ministerial rank in the Soviet government, is reported to be in danger of a demotion and is not expected to be re-nominated to the Supreme Soviet, in which she has been a deputy for the last twenty years.

Furtseva's difficulties reportedly stem from her being caught with her fingers in the public coffers: She is said to have used state funds to build herself a lavish dacha outside Moscow.

## Iraq, Iran to Negotiate Border Dispute

United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim told the Security Council May 21 that the Iraqi and Iranian governments had agreed "in principle" to a mutual withdrawal of troops along their border. Extensive fighting took place along the 630-mile border during February. Waldheim said that his representative had secured the agreement of both governments to refrain from hostilities and to open talks aimed at agreeing on a delineation of the border.

## Sri Lanka Prisoner Charges He Was Tortured

In the course of the Criminal Justice Commission's show trials of the leaders and alleged members of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP — People's Liberation Front), one of the defendants stated that he had been tortured and forced to sign a confession.

Merril Jayasiri, according to the May 23 weekly *Ceylon News*, was arrested by the government forces on August 8, 1971, four months after the beginning of the JVP's armed resistance to the Sri Lanka regime's crackdown on the young rebels. Jayasiri was taken to the notorious fourth floor of the Criminal Investigation De-



partment (CID) building, where he was stripped and beaten by CID officers.

After attempting to escape, he was taken back and beaten some more. "He was handcuffed," wrote the *Ceylon News*, "his leg was chained to the table, and he was assaulted by the CID officers. Inspector Upali Seneviratne questioned him about bombs. He did not make bombs, nor did he ask others to make bombs, and he told Mr. Seneviratne that he had nothing to do with bombs." Jayasiri told the commission that he was forced to sign a confession that contained a number of false statements.

### Sanya Out and In as Thai Premier

The cabinet of Sanya Thammasak, which came to power in October after the overthrow of the old military regime by massive student and worker mobilizations, resigned on May 21. Three days later Sanya agreed to return as premier and form a new cabinet. During the period after the cabinet's resignation General Kris Sivara, commander in chief of the army, put the military on a nationwide alert. Kris said the move was a precautionary measure and not "preparation for a coup."

The National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), which organized the initial protests that led to the overthrow of the old regime, responded by calling on the population to unite in resisting any attempts by "any group of men who may want to take this opportunity to bring back military rule."

Some sources speculated that the Sanya cabinet resigned, in part, because of continued criticisms from the student movement over the delay in the holding of general elections, and under pressure of the right, which charged the government with being too "soft" on strikers.

After Sanya's announcement that he would return and form a new government, the NSCT demanded May 25 that anyone who had served under the old military regime of Thanom Kittikachorn be excluded from the new cabinet. "We don't want any friends of military dictatorship in our next government," Sombat Thamrongthangawong, the president of the NSCT, stated. The most prominent figure of the old military regime who was part of the cabinet was Defense Minister Dawee Chullasapya.

### Prices Jump in Britain

The official Retail Price Index in Britain rose 3.4 percent during the month of April, the government announced May 24. This was the largest monthly increase since the government began keeping records on inflation in 1947. Much of the increase was attributed to tax measures put into effect by the Labour government in March.

The biggest increases were in tobacco

(13%) and alcoholic beverages (6.7%).

The April jump in prices put the increase for the last year at 15.2%, the largest increase in any one-year period.

### Purge of Yugoslav CP

An official report made public in Belgrade May 21 revealed that more than 10 percent of the membership has been removed from the party in the last two years. More than 51,000 members were expelled for alleged "nationalist" or "liberal" deviations, and another 92,000 were removed from the party's ranks for what were said to be nonpolitical reasons. The purge was most extensive in Serbia and Croatia.

In an interview published the day before the report was released, Tito gave the following explanation for the expulsions: "In the past, disunion existed in some leaderships but the base of the League of Communists has always been united. Therefore, it was possible to eliminate in a humane and democratic way those who opposed the party's policies in a relatively short time period and without any major disturbances."

### 67 Face Death in Secret South Korea Trial

South Korean Minister of Information Yun Chu Yung announced May 17 that sixty-five Korean dissidents and two Japanese would be tried before a closed court-martial for their antigovernment activities. If convicted they could receive the death penalty. Yun said the next day: "The government has firm evidence that they were controlled by the Communists and intended to topple the government."

Believed to be among the dissidents facing trial were Lee Choi, Yu In Tae, and An Yang No, university students active in the April 3 antigovernment protests. Some Christian dissident leaders were also thought to be among the sixty-seven. The two Japanese, a free-lance journalist and a graduate student, were accused of helping the South Korean dissidents by providing them with funds from Tokyo.

### Kremlin Gets Eximbank Loan

The U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) granted a \$180 million loan to the Soviet Union May 21. The application for the loan, the largest the Eximbank has ever given the Kremlin, had been pending for more than a year.

The loan is intended to help finance about \$400 million of purchases in the United States for a fertilizer complex being built in the Soviet Union. Included in the project is a plan to trade U.S. superphosphoric acid for ammonia and urea fertilizers produced in the new Soviet complex.

Interest on the loan was set at 6 percent, although the current Eximbank rate is 7 percent.

### Lagos Plans to Acquire Controlling Interest in Oil Corporations

The Nigerian government has announced that it will acquire a 55 percent interest in foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria. The companies affected are Gulf Oil, Mobil Oil, Agip S.p.A. of Italy, the Elf Group of France, and a joint operation of Royal Dutch-Shell and British Petroleum.

### Uruguayan Novelist Released

Uruguayan novelist Juan Carlos Onetti has been released after serving a 94-day sentence imposed by the Bordaberry dictatorship. Onetti was arrested in February because he had served on a literary jury that awarded a prize to a short story that offended the dictator. Apparently taking a lesson from the manner in which Soviet bureaucrats deal with their political critics, Bordaberry had Onetti confined in a psychiatric hospital for most of his sentence.

### Marines to Leave Peking

A U.S. State Department spokesman announced May 24 that the six-man marine guard for the U.S. liaison office in Peking was being withdrawn at the request of the Chinese government. He added that the request did not reflect any change in relations between Washington and Peking.

The marines are thought to have annoyed the Chinese government by overly boisterous parties and by wearing Vietnam war decorations on their uniforms. At one point, the Chinese asked that the marines stand guard in civilian clothes rather than in their uniforms.

### Argentine Teachers Strike

An estimated 200,000 Argentine public school teachers conducted a one-day strike May 23 to back up wage and other demands.

The teachers are seeking a wage increase to \$200 a month, compared with the present \$140; a union-controlled pension fund; and an end to "ideological interference" in the schools by the Peronist government.

### Washington Would Be 'Sympathetic' to Egyptian Arms Request

U.S. Secretary of Defense told reporters May 21 that Washington would consider "sympathetically" any Egyptian request to buy arms from the United States. Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat announced in April his government's intention to end its dependence on Soviet weapons.

The Soviet Union is reported to have resumed in mid-May shipments of arms to Egypt that had been suspended for the previous six months.

## Swiss Journalist Describes His Arrest and Torture

[Swiss journalist Pierre Rieben was arrested in Santiago de Chile April 11. He was released by the Chilean junta April 21, after being subjected to several sessions of torture.

[Rieben was in Chile as the correspondent for *La Brèche*, fortnightly newspaper of the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Marxist League), the Swiss section of the Fourth International. He also provided articles for the Swiss daily *Badener Tagblatt*, the French newspapers *Politique Hebdo* and *l'Unité*, and the German trade-union paper *IG-Metall*.

[The following interview with Rieben appeared in the April 25 issue of the French Trotskyist newspaper the daily *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

*Question: How did your arrest take place?*

*Answer:* Several plainclothes cops came to the place where I was staying Thursday, April 11, around 12:30 in the afternoon. They asked me to accompany them to the bureau of investigations, supposedly to clarify my status as a foreign resident in Chile. We had hardly gotten into the car (an ordinary yellow Austin Mini, which struck me immediately as somewhat bizarre for an official police vehicle) before they began to rough me up a little. Then, as we were driving, they handcuffed me, covered my head, and forced me to crouch down on the floor of the car.

We drove around like this for nearly half an hour, probably driving in circles around Santiago. We then arrived at what I later learned was the air force academy. Here they continued, shall we say, to rough me up. Still blindfolded, I was then put in a cell. Actually, I was kept blindfolded continually during the week I passed in the hands of Pinochet's thugs. Those people do not like to have their faces seen. I was very quickly subjected to my first interro-

gation.

The proposition was the following: Tell us what you know and in a few hours you will be at the airport and aboard the first plane out of here. Otherwise your life is not going to be worth very much. What they wanted me to tell them was the names and addresses of my supposed "informers" on the Chilean situation, the activities of the left-wing organizations, and, above all, the activities of the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left], which seemed to be their *bête noire*.

Given my lack of cooperation, the second interrogation and those that followed took a different turn. I was systematically kicked and pummeled in the stomach and head. But they also used more classical, more refined methods: electric shocks, for example. The officers strapped me down to a table and attached electrodes to my penis, in my anus, and to my toes. The sessions lasted for half an hour. The pain was excruciating, almost as if they had torn off my genitals and my legs.

They led me to believe that the woman I was with had also been arrested. They said she was in the next room, and that if I didn't talk she would pay. Shortly thereafter, cries from women who were apparently being tortured came from the room next door.

Apart from their brutality and bestiality, these torturers never ceased displaying their incredible stupidity in the course of the interrogations. For example, in my rooms they found an article on the methods employed by the torturers at this very same military academy. The article mentioned the names of a number of the torturers. However, the one who seemed to be directing the operation in my case was not mentioned. This cost me a volley of blows and particularly violent treatment from this petty official, who was furious at not having been mentioned on the public "honor roll."

*Q. Your arrest, did it take place as part of a new wave of repression?*

A. Actually, it has been in the period since mid-March that a new wave of repression of a totally new scope and brutality has swept across Chile. Since that time, arrests—both individual and collective—have been stepped up and have become much more selective than previously. Arrests and disappearances are a part of everyday life.

Those who are arrested and discovered to have been political militants to one degree or another, disappear without ever leaving any trace. This way the judges in the military tribunals do not have to put in any overtime. This new development in repression corresponds to a reorganization of the repressive forces, or rather to a dramatic increase in their numbers.

For several months, thousands of young people, particularly those who come from the youth organization of the former National party, but also from *Patria y Libertad* [Fatherland and Freedom—a fascist group], have been trained and integrated into various branches of the police and army. These new recruits have been sent directly into the DINA [Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional—National Intelligence Agency], the body that coordinates the various branches of the intelligence service and the police. DINA is under the *direct control of the junta*. This has enabled them to set up a systematic intelligence network in the cities, above all in the center of Santiago.

It is a network of a peculiar sort. Uniformed soldiers have been replaced by harmless-looking strollers, or even by pseudo leftists in long hair and "hippie" garb. Day and night they watch over the crowds in the streets, looking for behavior the slightest bit suspect (standing too long on a street corner, an encounter that may not appear to have been by chance, etc.).

This proliferation of agents of repression has not been limited solely to the streets. Factories are systematically "hiring" cops and professional

informers. Camouflaged as workers and highly paid (about ten times the wages of a worker), they are instructed to observe everything that takes place in the factory. That includes possible meetings, contacts between workers and elements outside the factory at the end of the workday, and the individual behavior of each worker. This is done to prevent any trade-union or political activity, as well as any form of production sabotage.

*Q. What is happening right now in the workers movement? Have there been any strikes recently like those of December and January?*

A. Given the scope of the police intelligence network and the censorship, it is extremely difficult, even on the spot, to get an overall idea of what is taking place. In spite of everything, however, you do hear of sabotage of production, systematic slowdowns, and even strikes. We know, for example, of the case of the workers in a small metalworking factory. The bolts they produced were regularly dropped off at a nearby dump.

A series of slowdown strikes took place recently at the subway construction sites. At these same sites, it happens that in the morning you find inscriptions, which are quickly erased, that are hostile to the junta, to Pinochet. Usually, these actions are harshly repressed, as was the case with the numerous strikes in December and January.

These strikes and these actions are aimed at immediate objectives: against layoffs and for an increase in wages. Prices continue to soar, reducing a good part of the workers to total misery. As for the strikers, they are reduced to beggary. Never before have the streets of Santiago seen so many beggars, especially young ones. And their number is increasing daily.

*Q. And the left?*

A. There are very few visible signs of activity among the different parts of the left. The parties that were part of the UP [Unidad Popular—Popular Unity], which were smashed after the coup, are scarcely visible in any form. Only a few nuclei of militants here and there seem to have an organizational life, and their numbers are still very

small. In fact, with the new dimensions taken by the repression in the last few weeks, the rebuilding process that has been projected or undertaken here and there has become much more difficult.

Even the MIR, which as a revolutionary organization stood up to the coup quite well, and whose leadership (except for Bautista Von Schouwen) is still intact, has experienced great difficulties in its work in the interior of the country, difficulties in adapting to the new conditions of repression and in laying the foundation for resistance to the dictatorship.

*Q. What, in your opinion, is the role of the solidarity movement in this context?*

A. It has been and remains fundamental. It can aid all the victims of the fascist repression and give new

confidence to the workers, to the Chilean militants, by letting them know that they are not alone in the very difficult combat they are engaged in today. Furthermore, the military is extremely embarrassed by the development of the worldwide solidarity movement. They need massive aid from the imperialist powers and therefore must be a little careful about their image, or at least do things discreetly. That is why all the actions that denounce and explain what is taking place down there, all the actions that have the possibility of leading to an effective boycott of the military regime, are important.

What happened in my case is a good example. The very broad and rapid campaign, especially in Switzerland, that immediately followed my arrest, the fact that it had instant repercussions in Chile and was known to the military, was the decisive element in my being released. □

## Since Independence Was Won

# The Political Situation in Mauritius

[The following interview was recently granted by a Mauritian militant to a correspondent of *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

*Question. Can you first give us some information on Mauritius and its recent political history?*

*Answer.* First we must get rid of the idea that Mauritius is only one island of 720 square miles. It is a group of islands and islets, the largest of which we call Mauritius. Apart from the main island, the most important of the others are Diego Garcia and Rodrigues. I shall come to the problems of the former in a moment, but this is roughly what Mauritius is physically.

The group is situated in the Indian Ocean 750 miles or so from the east coast of the Malagasy Republic. It was originally uninhabited. No one can complain that another person is an "immigrant," for in that sense we are all immigrants there.

We became "independent" in 1968. Mauritius is no different from other former colonies except perhaps in one sense: Almost since the capture of the island by the British in 1810, the internal political and economic life was dominated by the local Franco-Mauritian minority, which

until the early twentieth century refused to allow any "Asiatic" intrusion into it.

The fight for "independence" was led by Ramgoolam's Labour party [LP], founded in the early 1940s with working-class and trade-union support.

*Q. What has been the experience of British colonial rule?*

A. In a sense the British presence was hardly felt. If you had been in Mauritius in the 1950s, you would have found that most of the grievances of the majority of the people were aimed at the local white minority. That is for precisely the reason that this minority controlled all sectors of economic life (sugar refineries, docks, imports and exports, and so forth). In a way, they were faithful to their British masters, who had complete confidence in them and gave them a free hand, at least temporarily. They continued their colonial game on behalf of their masters right to the date of "independence," which they fought hard to prevent. With the help of the flamboyant fascist Gaetan Duval, they succeeded in large measure in dividing the island into anti- and pro-independence groups, using the most monstrous methods of the divide-and-rule theory so well developed by the British in India and Cyprus—racial hatred, casteism, religious bigotry in which the

Catholic Church played a leading role, and so on.

*Q. What has changed since independence?*

A. Virtually nothing, at least from the point of view of political thinking. With the coalition of the LP and Duval's PMSD [Parti Mauricien Social Democrite—Mauritian Social Democratic party], those whites who had fought Ramgoolam so viciously before "independence" are now his best friends and have more influence, both political and economic, than they ever had before. Since 1968 we have seen the strengthening of the local Hindu, Muslim, Creole, and Chinese bourgeoisies. These two developments have made the Ramgoolam-led coalition rely more and more on a powerful "Mauritian" bourgeoisie, whose cooperation has already led to the postponement of the general election until 1976. This coalition of interests has come into being entirely at the expense of the Mauritian working class and peasantry, especially the landless peasantry.

*Q. Has there been any industrial development since independence?*

A. Yes, parallel to the development of the class structure there has been considerable industrial development. Foreign and local investors started by exploiting female labor at daily wages of US\$0.60. With inflation running at 40 to 50 percent, life has become terribly hard for the poorer classes, and even the bourgeoisie is not satisfied with the government's performance. These two developments are very important politically. The strength of the urban working class is growing and, along with the workers and *artisanat* [skilled workers] in the sugar industry and the small and the landless peasantries, it will have an important role to play in the political developments.

*Q. What are the origins of the Mouvement Militant Mauricien [MMM]? What is its program?*

A. The MMM was founded by some enthusiastic students in 1969, among them Dev Virahsawmy and Paul Berenger, both fresh from Europe. By 1970 the political activities of the MMM were well under way and by 1971 it had "taken over" the dockers and transport unions and had considerable influence in the sugar-industry unions. Paul and Dev, its main spokesmen, were antielectoralist, but this belief received a body blow when the MMM fought and won a by-election in Ramgoolam's own three-member Triolet constituency. Since then the MMM has participated in all elections.

A leading MMM document, *Mauritius in Crisis* (1971), stated: "The MMM is Marxist-Leninist." But all that has certainly changed since then, to make the MMM a Social Democratic party basic-

ly not different from either the LP or the PMSD.

*Q. Could you describe the problems of communalism and the attempts of the MMM to promote a feeling of nationalism?*

A. This problem has many facets and I cannot deal with them all now. The population of more than 800,000 consists of 51 percent Hindus, 10 percent Muslims, 33 percent Creoles (persons of mixed origins), and the rest are Chinese and Franco-Mauritians in roughly equal proportions. As in many other countries, grievances had been created by the colonial power favoring this or that group. The civil service was dominated by the fairer-skinned Creoles, and the sugar-industry *artisanat* by the darker-skinned ones. On the other hand, the Creoles did not own any land, all land being owned by either whites or Hindus and Muslims. In terms of ownership, there has been no land reform whatsoever, and especially during the preindependence period no attempt was made by the LP to explain to the minorities the consequences of political emancipation. The result was that the LP became Hindu-dominated and has remained so ever since. The Creole and Muslim working class were left at the mercy of the PMSD colonialist propaganda. Racial riots occurred in 1965 and 1968.

In its early stages the MMM tried to deal with this problem by popularizing as much as it could the theory of the class struggle, and any work done in this field goes to the credit of the MMM. But the party itself became rapidly "bourgeoisified." It started recruiting anybody who came along, including many whose political past was, to say the least, suspect. Eventually it had to make compromises on the communal question. For example, Paul Berenger would not stand in the Triolet election because he is white and the constituency was a Hindu-dominated one.

On the other hand, its program became more and more diluted. The April 1973 program was in almost every single point a compromise with the bourgeoisie. Apart from the fact that the MMM had become obsessed with bourgeois elections, the program proposed nationalization of only three or four sugar factories and a British-style nationalization of the docks. In a November 1973 document, even this meager proposal has disappeared. Clearly, I can see nothing left of the MMM which can be called socialist.

*Q. What was the background of the 1971 crisis?*

A. During 1971 the MMM was at the zenith of its popularity. It controlled many unions, but had already given up private meetings for public, open-air meetings. With rampant inflation, the government was unpopular. But for many reasons it

got over the problem. First of all, Paul Berenger was going for power when the necessary conditions did not exist to justify doing so. The dockers strike was basically economic and the workers were not prepared yet to carry out a political struggle. Secondly, by 1971 Berenger had already bureaucratized the party, and he wanted now to do the same thing with the unions. He would never allow them to take any decision on their own. He wanted to dictate to them. Thirdly, the sugar industry was hardly involved. In the end, with the docks and transport services paralyzed (Mauritius imports most of its food), Ramgoolam reaped an almost logical political advantage.

*Q. Could you describe the repression imposed by Ramgoolam since 1971?*

A. At the height of the crisis, Paul and Dev and a few other MMM militants were arrested and imprisoned for nearly a year. There was a lot of police and army brutality against workers during the crisis. Emergency regulations were used to impose censorship and ban public and even private meetings. Police surveillance increased. The MMM leaders were released in late 1972. Recently, the Duval-Ramgoolam coalition ended, apparently over the issue of a French naval base in Mauritius, and the government had to lift the emergency regulations because it no longer had the two-thirds majority in the Assembly. There is a persistent rumor both in London and in Mauritius that if there is any election in or before 1976 it will be on the basis of an MMM-Ramgoolam bloc.

*Q. What has been the role of British imperialism in the repression unleashed by Ramgoolam?*

A. Mauritius has a "defense" agreement with Britain. British troops were used in Mauritius during the 1965 and 1968 riots. The Special Mobile Force (about 700 men) is British-trained and -staffed, and the police has British advisers. One can easily see that if the situation had got out of hand in 1971, British troops would have landed in Mauritius from Singapore.

On the other hand, France has troops only fifteen minutes flight from us on our sister island, Reunion; and Duval until the end of the coalition was both France's and South Africa's man in the Mauritian cabinet. South Africa wants to keep both trade and dialogue going on with Mauritius, and France seems to have an interest in this.

*Q. What about Diego Garcia?*

A. Our territory was dismembered before "independence." Diego Garcia was cut away from us and three islands were taken away from the Seychelles to form what is now called the British Indian Ocean Territories. Even the conservative London *Times* admitted in a recent lead-

ing article on the Seychelles that these islands were taken away from the Seychellois when they and the British were "to say the least unequal partners." To get even Ramgoolam to agree to the terms of this unequal treaty, the British used the most monstrous form of blackmail, which exploited the internal communal division of the island over the issue of independence.

The Mauritian and Seychellois peoples want their lands back, and I am convinced that even the bourgeois International Court of the Hague will find that they have a just claim. Incidentally, one clause in the agreement provides that in

the event of the islands not being used, they will be returned to their respective owners.

Seychellois leader James Mancham is simply not worried. He is at the head of 10,000 mulattos and whites who are exploiting the majority 50,000 blacks, who are condemned to be fishermen. With U.S. tourists buying the whole place, Mancham's position is secure. He recently asked Britain for complete independence after his plea for integration had failed.

Ramgoolam seems to have started protesting, but his protest is aimed at getting more money from either Britain or the United States. □

## Six Dead in 'War' on SLA

# Police File Charges Against Patricia Hearst

On May 22, five days after the spectacular police rampage in Los Angeles that resulted in the deaths of six presumed members of the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Los Angeles District Attorney filed eighteen charges of kidnapping, robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon against Patricia Hearst, the 20-year-old heiress kidnapped by the SLA last February and since then allegedly converted to membership in the bizarre organization.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had earlier classified Hearst as "an armed and dangerous fugitive"—a virtual order to "shoot on sight to kill."

The cops had traced members of the SLA to a house in a Black ghetto in south-central Los Angeles May 17. Some 500 local police and FBI agents surrounded the neighborhood, and issued a call on the house's occupants to surrender. But instead of waiting them out, the police then opened up in an hour-long firefight. While hundreds of local residents fled for cover, the cops poured many hundreds of rounds of ammunition into the house.

"It was a war, no other way to describe it," a police spokesman told *Newsweek*. The magazine reported that the cops "poured so much fire into the building that they ran out of ammunition in the first few minutes and called repeatedly for more." According to some reports, the FBI used fragmentation grenades.

After 45 minutes, the house caught

fire. The cops held back fire engines and let it burn to the ground. Found in the ruins were the bodies of six presumed members of the SLA, sought in connection with the Hearst kidnapping. According to the coroner's report they are Donald DeFreeze, Patricia Soltysik, Nancy Ling Perry, William Wolfe, Angela Atwood, and Camilla Hall. After some initial uncertainty, it was announced that Patricia Hearst was not among them.

After it became clear that Hearst was still at large, the FBI announced May 19 that she had been a participant in a shooting at a sporting goods store in the Los Angeles area on May 16, the day before the shoot-out. According to the FBI story, witnesses had identified Hearst as the woman who fired submachine-gun blasts into the store to cover the retreat of two SLA members, William and Emily Harris, after the Harrises had been caught shoplifting by store employees.

However, initial reports on this incident had suggested that the woman who fired the gun was Angela Atwood, killed in the police attack the following day. Police did not explain why it took three days to ascertain Hearst's identity.

According to the police, Hearst and the Harrises had then abducted a high-school student on the pretense of buying a van he wanted to sell and drove around with him until dawn

on May 17, when they commandeered another driver in his car and rode with him until shortly before noon.

It is these events of May 16 and 17 that constitute the basis of the FBI's eighteen charges against Patricia Hearst.

This story conflicts with the testimony of an 18-year-old Black youth, James Johnson, who told the *New York Times* that he and other neighborhood residents had talked with Hearst at length on May 16 after she and "seven others" first moved into the house in Los Angeles that police later attacked. Johnson insisted that she did not leave the house until three hours before the police surrounded it.

Whatever the facts, the massive police assault in the Los Angeles ghetto on May 17 indicates the fate that faces Patricia Hearst if and when she is located. It is becoming increasingly unlikely that any presumed members of the Symbionese Liberation Army, including Hearst, will be allowed to survive to describe the real story behind the bizarre events of recent months.

The reckless police rampage in Los Angeles aroused outraged protests from the Black community and civil liberties defenders. Eyewitnesses were angered by the way police had flaunted their weaponry and deliberately intimidated ghetto residents. Members of the Black media, pointing to extensive contradictions in the cops' version of events, have called for a congressional investigation and coroner's inquest into how the victims of the police attack died. □

## Little Red Sales Manual

American salesmen trying to take advantage of recently opened opportunities in China have run into a number of obstacles. For one thing, a firm grasp of Mao Tsetung Thought, a weapon not found in the arsenal of many salesmen, is often essential in clinching deals. All discussions, one salesman said, "eventually came to a point at which an applicable statement of Chairman Mao would be discussed and explained to us. It didn't take long for me to decide to read through the Little Red Book myself."

Traveling salesman jokes are not a recommended alternative. "This is not to say the Chinese are humorless," he explained. "They are not. They simply didn't think our jokes were very funny."

## The Opposition Movement in Ukraine

By Oleh Ilytzykij

[The following article is based on a speech given at Harvard University on May 7, as part of a rally in defense of the imprisoned Soviet dissident Pyotr Grigorenko.]

\* \* \*

All too often, when the subject of Soviet dissent is broached, it is almost automatically assumed that we are speaking about the Russian dissident movement. Of course, there is no question that the Russian movement is very important, but under no circumstances can we assume that it is the only dissident movement in the Soviet Union today, nor, for that matter, that it is representative of the civil-rights movement as a whole.

Only rarely does the Russian dissident movement address itself specifically to the problems of the other national groups and republics, and even more rarely is this problem discussed in the West. It is significant, therefore, and highly appropriate that we should be commemorating Pyotr Grigorenko's plight today, for in his concern for the Crimean Tatars he has drawn attention to the most important fact that the movement for human and civil rights in the Soviet Union includes national grievances and discontents as well.


With this in mind, I would like to address myself specifically to the question of dissent in the Ukrainian Republic.

The first signs of Ukrainian dissent in the post-Stalin era can be traced to 1959 and 1961, when a total of twenty-seven individuals were secretly (and therefore illegally) brought to trial—two of whom were later executed, while the others received harsh prison sentences. Their crime consisted of making plans to demand the secession of the Ukrainian SSR from the Soviet Union, a right guaranteed to all republics by Article 17 of the USSR constitution.

Also in 1961, seven men were arrested, all of them of working-class

or peasant origin, and illegally (i.e., secretly) brought to trial. One was sentenced to death, a sentence later commuted to fifteen years imprisonment. Their aim had been to conduct peaceful propaganda (permitted by Article 125 of the constitution) in favor of the secession of the Ukrainian Republic from the Soviet Union.

During 1965-66, when the world was kept spellbound by the staged trials of Sinyavsky and Daniel, a series of searches were conducted throughout Ukraine. Hundreds of people were interrogated, and at least twenty persons were arrested, tried,



VYACHESLAV CHORNOVIL

and sentenced to camps for various lengths of time. Some of the persons arrested during the 1965-66 period are still serving their sentences today.

In January 1972, according to the *New York Times* and other news sources, at least 100 persons were arrested in Ukraine "under suspicion of nationalist activity," as the *Times* put it. Some staged trials were held and severe sentences were handed down, some totaling fifteen years. In fact, since January 1972 there has been a steady stream of arrests, merciless sentences, and inhuman treatment of pris-

oners.

There is no way to estimate the exact number of persons who have been arrested and sentenced to prisons throughout the Soviet Union or to labor camps in Mordovia. One source has estimated that Ukrainians comprise 60 to 70 percent of the prisoners in that prison republic. But absolute numbers are difficult to gauge. Of the thousands in Mordovia, at least 300 are known by name. The rest remain anonymous, since most trials are secret and often not even the next of kin are notified of arrests and sentences.

Much of the information that is available today about Ukrainian political prisoners and their thoughts is due to two men: Ivan Dzyuba, author of *Internationalism or Russification?* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), a critique of Soviet nationalities policy; and Vyacheslav Chornovil, the compiler of eyewitness reports of the 1965-66 secret trials. Chornovil's report was published in the West by McGraw-Hill as *The Chornovil Papers*. Chornovil was arrested in 1967 for this book and sentenced to three years of hard labor. He was released after having served half his term, but rearrested in 1972 and sentenced in February 1973 to seven years of labor camp and five years exile. He has recently been transferred to a harsh-regime block and is in poor health.

Ivan Dzyuba was also arrested in 1972 because of his book, and was sentenced to a total of ten years imprisonment and exile. In November 1973 it was learned that Dzyuba had been released after "confessing" his guilt and promising to repudiate his earlier work. It is known that Dzyuba is suffering from tuberculosis, and it is doubtful that his confession was voluntary.

Another political prisoner of note (unfortunately, there are too many to mention all of them here) is Valentyn Moroz, a historian who was arrested during the 1965-66 period and is serving a fourteen-year term in Vladimir Prison, east of Moscow. Moroz is one of the most outspoken dissenters in Ukraine, and an author with a particularly fiery spirit. The latest news to reach the West indicates that he will begin a hunger strike on July 1 (other sources say June 1) that will last, he says, until either his prison regime is

improved or he is transferred to one of the labor camps. If this is not done, Moroz says, he prefers to die, since he fears going insane. The authorities are adding drugs to his food to induce madness.

Moroz was sentenced "for propaganda directed at separating the Ukraine from the USSR," and was branded a "bourgeois nationalist." In his own defense, however, Moroz spoke of the problem of Russification in Ukraine and of the unequal status the Ukrainian SSR has within the Soviet Union. He declared that he was no "bourgeois nationalist" and that he wanted neither a bourgeoisie nor nationalism, but only equal rights for Ukraine.

The demands and anxieties expressed by Ukrainian dissenters that I have cited above are not exceptions, but rather a representative sample of the major issues that concern them. The issues are essentially cultural; that is, they deal with the threatened linguistic, historical, and artistic heritage of Ukrainians. The fact that a cultural question is politicized as when dissenters demand secession from the USSR, only reflects the hopelessness that many Ukrainians feel in the face of an authoritarian regime that is destroying their culture and language and eradicating their history, all supposedly in the name of socialism.

Secession from the Soviet Union, it should be stated, is an extreme position, considered unrealistic even if desirable by most dissenters. The majority of the dissenters, such as Dzyuba and Chornovil, advocate a return to the principles of Marxism and Leninism, which they feel have been abandoned. Theirs is a call to stem the tide of Russification, which is engulfing the republics of the Soviet Union, and to return to the true principles of Marxist internationalism: namely, the defense of liberty and equality of all peoples and a struggle against chauvinism, which in this case is clearly Russian.

To grasp the nature of the Ukrainian dissident movement, it is important to know its historical background. It has roots in the period immediately following the October Revolution.

For Ukraine, the revolution was not only socialist, but also a very important occasion for undoing centuries of czarist oppression, which, among its many other aberrations, had outlawed

the Ukrainian language in 1876.

The revolution and the years immediately following were, therefore, an important period of cultural renaissance, the likes of which Ukrainians had not known for more than a hundred years. The period from the revolution to the late 1920s is known in Ukrainian history as the "Ukrainization" period, a term that at once reveals the poverty to which this nation had fallen under czarism and the hopes that were placed in the future.

As an example, here are a few figures: In 1926, 47% of the population was illiterate; only 41% of the proletariat was Ukrainian; only 19.5% of the institutions of higher learning used Ukrainian as the language of instruction; only 19.1% of the mine workers spoke Ukrainian. By the end of the twenties the percentages had changed: Illiteracy dropped to 4%; the percentage of Ukrainian proletariat jumped to 53%; and institutions using Ukrainian as the language of instruction jumped to 69%. But it can be seen that Ukrainization was still far from complete when it was interrupted by Stalin in the beginning of the thirties.

The objective of Ukrainization was to create a socialism that would undo the cultural damage Ukraine had suffered under czarist rule. This national and cultural revival was given impetus by Lenin's view that Russian nationalism had been oppressive and destructive to other nationalities. Both the Twelfth Party Congress (April 1923) and the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee (June 1923) repudiated Russian chauvinism and ordered that all minority cultures be given preferential treatment in developing their language, literature, art, and history.

Lenin held that Russian chauvinism was a major threat to the Soviet system and that local nationalism in both politics and culture was the inevitable reaction of the oppressed. He pointed out that development of national cultures was not only desirable but imperative and that this did not imperil in any way the creation of a socialist society. In fact, in the early stages of the revolution and the period of the civil war, Russian Bolsheviks considered the other national groups as progressive forces, since they were a source of disaffection with czarist rule, which had continually discriminated

against them.

The policy of Ukrainization also drew strength from the principle of federalism, namely from the rights granted in the Soviet constitution to the individual republics against all centralizing tendencies. Mykola Skrypnyk, the Ukrainian commissar for education from 1927 and a very prominent figure during this period, said the following in 1924:

"Two aspects appear in the foundations of our constitution. . . . Above all is the principle of the union of all peoples and of the Union republics into a single force . . . against world capital. And, secondly, that which our Union has given in the area of state construction—a union on the principle of the sovereignty of each people, liberated from the power of capital. . . . Within the limits of the constitution the Union is sovereign; within the limits of the constitution each republic is also sovereign. With deep abhorrence, with contempt, we recall the ancient time of the czarist empire, a single, indivisible state. For us there is no single, indivisible state."

Another individual active at this time (Zatonsk'kyj) had this to say in March 1921: "It is necessary to distinguish in fact between indispensable centralization and simple Russian chauvinism. . . . Comrades must get out of their heads the idea that the Soviet federation is nothing more than a Russian federation, because the important fact is not that it is Russian, but that it is Soviet."

As one can see from the last quotation, the goal of Ukrainian Communists was to ensure that no national group claim superiority over another. To renounce claims of superiority, argued the Ukrainians, would mean to renounce Russification. The goal was a truly international culture, identified with no single nationality but drawing from the progressive elements of all.

However, this view did not prevail. By the end of the thirties, the equality of nationalities was abandoned and Russian ways became preferred.

Stalin's defense of Russian leadership and superiority was in effect a rebirth under the Soviet banner of earlier czarist identification of rule with Russian interests. Stalin justified his preference for Russian institutions and culture with the argument that

Russian development, in Marxist terms, had supposedly proceeded further than in Ukraine. Second, it was said that Russia was a unique example of the first socialist revolution and developer of Leninism. The upshot of this argument was to identify Russia and Russian institutions with Marxism and Bolshevik rule and, concomitantly, to refuse demands for an independent Ukrainian culture. It was clear by then that Russian chauvinism, which Lenin had condemned, was not a transitory capitalist phenomenon but was alive and well, disguised as Marxism.

Therefore, when the 1930s inaugurated Stalin's reign of terror, in Ukraine it was a question not only of political-bureaucratic purges, based on ideology and the cult of personality, but primarily a question of purges that struck at something more fundamental, namely at the very heart of Ukrainian national and cultural existence.

By 1933, those Ukrainian communists and socialists who had adhered to the principles of internationalism were liquidated, and with them the policy of Ukrainization. Writers and intellectuals who were active during the twenties were exiled, shot, or committed suicide. In 1932-33, thanks to Stalin's unscrupulous efforts at grain collection, a famine swept through Ukraine and wiped out 3 million persons.

Equally destructive was what is known in Ukrainian history as the "Postyshev reign of terror," which also occurred in 1933. Postyshev was secretary of the City Committee of the CPSU in Moscow. He was sent in January 1933 into Ukraine ostensibly to correct errors in grain collection. Instead, he unleashed a drive against Ukrainian culture. He destroyed two famous Ukrainian historians, Matvij Javors'kyj and M. Hrushevskyj. He branded as counterrevolutionists almost the entire Ukrainian Association of the Marx and Lenin Institute. And according to Postyshev himself, "the Academy of Sciences and the University of Kiev had 300 members purged." A few months after his arrival in Kharkiv, the monument to the Communist poet Ellan Blakytynj was removed during the night after an alleged accident in which it was damaged by a truck.

The monument was never reerected.

The crowning touch to the cultural purges in Ukraine was perhaps the creation of the Union of Soviet Writers (1932-34). Its creation not only marks the end of all heterogeneous literary activity, for it abolished all autonomous literary organizations, but it also had the effect of relegating Ukrainian and every other non-Russian literature to the status of a minority literature. Anthony Adamovich, a specialist in Byelorussian literature, described it this way:

"When, under Stalin, the concept of a 'single, multinational Soviet literature' was implemented in the USSR—a concept supported by the authority of Gorky—the effect was to deprive all the non-Russian literatures . . . of their national status and to reduce them to the status of provincial literatures. Not only the central but also the centralizing position in the complex of the 'multinational literature' was given to Soviet Russian literature, still referred to both in the West and in the USSR by the genuine name of Soviet literature."

This schematic overview of historic events, while necessarily incomplete, does point to the main difference between the Russian and non-Russian dissident movements. As can be seen from what was outlined above, Ukrainian and other non-Russian dissenters are constantly faced with the basic problem of their national and cultural survival—a problem Russian dissenters are not faced with, since theirs is the dominant and dominating culture, not only in their own republic but in most republics of the Soviet Union.

Ever since Stalin's time there has been a steady program to eradicate national and cultural differences and to substitute Russian standards. For example, the Twenty-second Party Congress (in 1961) proclaimed that "the nations will draw together until complete unity is achieved." This is nothing but Russification.

Given these conditions, the non-Russian dissenters are forced to speak not only in terms of civil liberties but also in terms of their national and cultural rights.

Generally speaking, Russian dissenters are concerned with what can be described as the scope and breadth of their freedom. They need not dis-

pute or concern themselves with its cultural form: It is always Russian.

In this respect, Ukrainian dissidents face a unique problem, for they are struggling to overcome the official roadblocks that stand in the way of the natural development of their national culture and, on a wider scale, of their country. In this struggle, where the culture cannot be taken for granted and must always be a subject for discussion rather than simply the medium of that discussion, Ukrainian dissenters are often slandered, as Moroz was, by being called "bourgeois nationalists."

Ivan Dzyuba puts the problem in perspective: "From past and recent history it may be seen that in the Ukraine it was permissible to label as 'nationalist' anyone possessing an elementary sense of national dignity, or anyone concerned with the fate of Ukrainian culture and language, and often simply anyone who in some way failed to please some Russian chauvinist . . ."

Finally, it should be stated that after the Stalin period, when the so-called thaw began, there was some relaxation of the Stalinist strictures and a certain rehabilitation of writers who had been condemned, exiled, or shot. The rehabilitation was never complete; many an author and intellectual still remains unpublished and unmentioned today.

But the "thaw" did give rise to a host of young writers and intellectuals known in Ukrainian as *Shestydesjatyky*, that is, people of the sixties. But there is a terrible irony here: These men and women of the sixties, these products of the "thaw," are today Ukraine's leading dissenters. They are reaping the rewards of the "thaw"—by spending their time in concentration camps and psychiatric wards. □

### Streak-in

Streaking, considered by many advocates as a way of thumbing your nose at established authority without running too much of a risk, has now been put to a more "practical" purpose. When a \$112 suit Michael Dacosta bought at a London department store began to fall apart at the seams, the store refused to take it back. "I lost my temper," Dacosta said, "took off the suit and ran around the store naked, shouting at people not to buy anything there. That did it. They gave me a new suit immediately."