
Israeli Terrorists Bomb Palestinian Refugee Camps



Portugal

Stalinists Denounce Factory Occupations

China

Anti-Confucius Drive Aimed at Rebel Youth

Britain

Aid to Chilean Junta Divides Labour Party

Class-Struggle Slate Wins Union Election

The class-struggle tendency of Córdoba's Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor (SMATA—Union of Automotive Machinists and Allied Trades) won a victory May 10, when René Salamanca and others on his slate were returned to office by a substantial majority in elections for the union's regional leadership.

The class-struggle Lista Marrón (Brown Slate) received 4,027 votes. Its endorsers included the Juventud Trabajadora Peronista (Peronist Worker Youth). The Lista Gris (Grey Slate)—representing "orthodox" Peronism—got 2,770 votes. A third slate, supported by "rank-and-file" Peronist organizations, the Communist party, and the Movimiento Obrero Radical (Radical [party] Workers Movement), got 793 votes, according to a May 12 dispatch in the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*.

Campaigning had been marred by arrests and torture of supporters of the Lista Marrón, and threats to the union's continued autonomy.

On May 7 *La Opinión* reported that Salamanca had been arrested, accused of possessing illegal arms.

This followed on the heels of a denunciation by the Córdoba architecture students' center of the arrest and torture of their general secretary, Victor Paciaroni, who was picked up April 26 while handing out campaign literature for the Lista Marrón.

As the elections themselves got underway, the delegate of the Junta Electoral Nacional (National Election Board) assigned to supervise the voting, in a final effort to head off Salamanca's reelection, refused to sign the necessary documents because he disagreed with the procedures established by the union ranks. This, commented *La Opinión* May 10, threatened to invalidate election results and to lead to the regional union leadership bodies being intervened. □

Congressman Knows His Man

A congressman has introduced a bill to keep Nixon from taking a tax deduction for any "gift" of his tapes.

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Israeli Terrorists Bomb Palestinian Refugee Camps

By Michael Baumann

The U.S.-equipped Israeli air force has once again demonstrated who the real terrorists are in the Arab East.

In three separate raids on Palestinian refugee camps and Lebanese civilians May 16-17, Israeli Phantom and Skyhawk jets unleashed a torrent of napalm, rocket fire, and 1,000-pound bombs in what Israeli Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur termed an effort to make southern Lebanon "unlivable."

Lebanese officials described the raids, the heaviest ever carried out against the country, as "premeditated massacre." Hardest hit were the densely packed refugee camps at Ein al Helweh and Nabatieh, and a Lebanese working-class quarter in the southern port city of Sidon. Lebanese reports put the death toll as of May 17 at 48, with 174 wounded and twenty missing. The figures will undoubtedly climb higher when rescue teams finish combing through the rubble left in the wake of the bombing.

Known dead so far include eleven children at the Nabatieh school, which suffered a direct hit. Other children may yet die. Lebanese Information Minister Fahmy Shahin charged in a May 17 news conference that Israeli pilots had dropped explosive toys in an attempt to cause additional casualties among children. According to photos published in Beirut newspapers, the booby-trapped toys included dolls, tops, and model cars.

The Israeli bombing May 16 came in two waves. The greatest damage was done by the first raid, in which thirty-six planes hit at least five refugee camps and a number of villages on the western slopes of Mount Hermon.

"The main attack," reported *New York Times* correspondent Juan de Onis in a May 16 dispatch from Sidon, "struck at the Ein al Helweh camp, the largest in Lebanon, on the southern side of this city, and at the Nabatieh camp, 10 miles to the southeast.

"The attack on the Ein al Helweh

camp, which holds more than 20,000 people, caused severe damage to the closely packed shanties and cement-block houses where the refugees live, as well as to nearby three-story apartment buildings occupied by low-income Lebanese families.

"The walls of three apartment buildings, each holding 18 families, were shattered. The roof of one was torn off by two bombs that left craters 20 feet deep in the dark clay soil. The apartments also had gaping holes



MEIR: No change in policy on negotiating with guerrillas.

where rockets had hit."

A May 17 dispatch from *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent John K. Cooley in Shebaa, Lebanon, indicated that the working-class quarter of Sidon may have suffered even greater damage than the camp. "An eyewitness in Sidon, 40 miles south of Beirut," he reported, "said that if Israeli planes were aiming at the Palestinian camp of Ain al-Helweh, they missed their target completely. Most

of the damage and casualties were in a public housing area for poor Lebanese and most or all the casualties there were Lebanese."

Washington Post correspondent Jim Hoagland reported that more than half the Nabatieh camp, which was hit twice May 16, had been razed. The size of the bomb craters, he said, "indicated 1,000-pound bombs were used in the attack at the densely populated camp."

New York Times correspondent Steven V. Roberts also visited the Nabatieh camp. He reported that the bombing there had been so intense that "the trees had been shorn of their leaves, and bits of clothing hung from the bare branches." Before the bombing, 3,500 refugees lived in the camp.

The second raid, and the third one the following day, May 17, were primarily aimed at mountain villages in the southeastern region of Lebanon, an area Israeli bombers had already hit heavily for several weeks.

"The planes come mainly in the afternoon," a farmer in Shebaa told *Monitor* correspondent Cooley. "They are looking mainly for guerrillas. There are none here—they are hiding back that way," he said as he pointed to a forested area off to the north. "But the planes drop their bombs on the road and on our farm houses anyhow. There's nothing you can do but hide when you hear the planes."

Israeli Pretext

The Israeli terrorists were provided with a propaganda cover for their assaults by events that occurred in the northern Israeli village of Maalot May 15. At Maalot, twenty-one teen-age Israeli students were killed and an additional seventy wounded when the school in which they were being held hostage was assaulted by the Israeli army. Also killed in the attack were three Palestinian guerrillas affiliated with the Popular Democratic Front

for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). The three were holding the students in an effort to secure the release of twenty-three imprisoned guerrillas.

Although the assault lasted ten minutes and was covered by continuous Israeli gunfire into the school, military authorities claimed that all student casualties were caused by the guerrillas. It is doubtful that even Zionist public opinion will swallow this story. The parents of the dead children evidently did not.

When the parents saw the school being stormed, reported Yuval Elizur in the May 16 *Washington Post*, "many of them went into shock." Immediately after the assault, reported Terence Smith in the May 16 *New York Times*, "The townspeople seemed enraged, either by the way the army handled the incident or simply by the fact that the incident had occurred at all. A crowd tried to attack [Israeli Defense Minister Moshe] Dayan as he emerged from the school. It took a squad of soldiers to push him through and down to the command post. . . ."

Apparently expecting the attack by the parents, Dayan first tried to disperse them with a ruse. "Get out of here, get out of here," he shouted as he left the school. "There's a charge set to go off at 6." The crowd fled momentarily, but went for Dayan a few minutes later when no explosion occurred.

As both Dayan and the students' parents must have been well aware, the decision to attack the school could have been undertaken only with the full knowledge that most of the students inside would be killed or wounded in the cross fire. Furthermore, there is evidence that Israeli authorities deliberately stalled the negotiations until they could claim it was "too late" to meet the guerrillas' demands.

Official Israeli accounts of the negotiations are not only self-contradictory but also in direct conflict with the accounts given by other principals in the discussions. Even the pro-Zionist *New York Times* felt compelled to point out, in a May 15 dispatch from Bernard Gwertzman, that "some of the details were unclear and others appear contradictory."

In a nationwide television address

the evening of May 15, Prime Minister Golda Meir tried to claim that the attack on the school building had been unavoidable. According to the summary of her speech given in the May 16 *New York Times*, she said that the Israeli government had been prepared to break a long-standing precedent against negotiating with guerrillas and "release 23 prisoners in return for the safety of the approximately 90 teen-aged hostages. . . ."

"But the deal fell apart, she said, partly out of confusion," when the three guerrillas insisted on a password before they would begin negotiations. "The code word never arrived from abroad for use by the French or Rumanian Ambassadors, who were prepared to begin discussions, she said."

It was only late in the afternoon, the *Times* quoted Meir as saying, that Israeli officials learned that "we were to fly the released prisoners to either Damascus or Nicosia [Cyprus]. When they arrived, for example, in Nicosia, then the Rumanian Ambassador would receive the code word. . . ."

"But," she stressed, "I want everybody to know, that was already 5 P.M."

The following contradictions immediately became apparent:

French Ambassador Jean Herly told Agence France-Presse May 16 that he had known all along he would receive the required password only after the prisoners had arrived safely in either Damascus or Nicosia. Furthermore, he said, the French Embassy had informed the Israeli Foreign Ministry of this at 2 p.m. May 15.

Israeli Chief of Army Intelligence Shlomo Gazit told reporters May 16 that Israeli authorities knew at 3:30 that the prisoners would have to be flown out before the password would be received.

PDFLP spokesman Abu Yasser Rabo told a Beirut news conference May 17 that Gazit himself had been in the Rumanian Embassy in Tel Aviv all day May 15. And since the embassy had been in direct contact with the PDFLP headquarters all day, Gazit would have known from the beginning what was required to obtain the password.

Finally, even if Meir's story were to be taken as true—that is, that the Israelis did not learn until 5 p.m.

that there would be no password until the prisoners reached Cyprus—there was still enough time to carry out the prisoner-release operation. Israeli authorities claimed the prisoners were already at the airport, and Nicosia is only 250 miles from Tel Aviv, a flight commercial planes routinely make in about forty-five minutes.

Only one conclusion can be drawn: Meir and Dayan's stalling tactics were designed solely to provide a cover after the government had already decided to sacrifice the lives of the Maalot students by storming the school.

Dayan in effect admitted this May 17 when he told Associated Press: "If the terrorists believed that they could get what they want without paying with their lives, they would come back again and again. The only way we can deal with them is to make it quite clear they will be killed."

International Reaction

Pro-Zionist forces around the world, however, preferred to ignore the facts and heap slanderous abuse on the Palestinian and Arab masses. Maalot was, they said, a "mindless" action (Nixon); an "affront to human decency" (U.S. Senate); an "evil outrage" (Harold Wilson); the product of "sub-human, mindless savages who must be stamped out" (B'nai B'rith spokesman Arnold Forster); "so repulsive as to be almost unbelievable" (Canadian Minister of External Affairs Mitchell Sharp).

How were the Israeli bombing raids viewed? They were "understandable in fury and frustration" (*New York Times* editorial, May 17); "purely a military operation" (Israeli armed forces command); "will not, unfortunately, repair [Israel's] grievous loss" (*Washington Post* editorial, May 16).

A leader of El Fateh directing evacuation from the smoldering ruins of the Ein al Helweh refugee camp accurately summed up the reaction of the imperialist regimes and their Zionist camp followers: "Our land is occupied and when we fight to get our homes back we are called terrorists," he told *New York Times* correspondent Juan de Onis May 16. "But when the Israelis bomb civilians they are heroes to you." □

Lisbon March Supports Newspaper Strike

By Gerry Foley

Lisbon

The city spreads across steep hills overlooking its harbor. In most neighborhoods, streets are narrow and precipitous. Offices and shops mingle with old apartment buildings flying the family wash from innumerable balconies.

As I turned the corner of one such street today (May 10) in an area in which many newspapers have their offices, I found the tight passageway clogged with a crowd carrying red carnations and banners. Children hanging over a railing on the street above were looking down and singing. Women were standing on the balconies up and down the street. They held flowers. The scene reminded me of the giant May Day march.

For a long time, perhaps an hour, the crowd stood chanting. And they must have been there for at least an hour before that. They were gathered outside the offices of *O Seculo Ilustrado*, a picture magazine apparently connected with the daily *O Seculo*.

The occasion for the demonstration was a strike by the *O Seculo* workers. They had been locked out by the bosses after the paper's editors demanded codetermination and an end to censorship. The owners are known to have been supporters of the Caetano government. Obviously there is a great dislike among the people for the slightly reconstructed fascist press lords, and a feeling that a purge should be pressed.

Most of the banners were political: "O Seculo is still fascist" and "Free press!" The most common slogan was "A free press in Portugal"

At the same time, there were many strictly trade-unionist slogans: "The people at *Seculo* are fighting for their bread." "A free union!"

Of course, the crowd chanted "The people united will never be defeated," the slogan of the May Day march. But it also chanted a more active slogan than the ill-fated motto of the Chilean Unidad Popular. The chant "The people will win" seemed to compete more and more with the passive

watchword of the Allende coalition.

After a while, the white banners with their red lettering started to look like red flags: There was a steady, penetrating drizzle that morning.

Then the crowd started to march; it kept walking for about forty-five minutes through the steep, narrow streets. I wondered why the leaders had chosen this route, why they didn't lead it into an avenue. But after a while the demonstration stopped in front of a newspaper office. The chant went up: "Down with the lackeys of the bosses." It must have been an affiliate of *O Seculo* or another striking paper. Persons in the crowd seemed to recognize the older men in business suits standing nervously on the balcony.

After standing and chanting a while, the crowd moved on through similar narrow, winding streets. After a time, it came to a stop facing a street on a higher level. From the street above, speakers addressed the crowd. There were two main speakers.

One man, apparently in his mid-thirties, with long hair and a mustache, had a radical style of oratory. He took up the slogan "The people will win," explaining that the people had not yet won. Struggle, he said, was not won in offices but in the street.

The point that the people had to fight for themselves seemed to draw approval. But the implied criticism of the junta, contained in the statement that the people had not yet won, drew murmurs. I had the impression that his approach seemed too abstract and negative to many of those listening. In the atmosphere of euphoria following the coup, it is of course very difficult to warn people not to trust the regime that ousted the heirs of almost fifty years of hated fascist rule.

The radical speaker was generally correct in what he said. But in a situation as complex as that in Portugal, with the enormous illusions about the junta that exist, this type of "sloganizing" is not likely to get very far. Furthermore, unless the revolutionists

can find formulas that can capture the imagination of the people, they can easily be pushed aside by the reformists of the Communist and Socialist parties. In particular, the Stalinists have a very strong popular influence at the moment.

(Only a few minutes after leaving the demonstration, I talked with a Communist party sympathizer connected with one of the big papers here. She explained to me that the struggle at *O Seculo* was being "ruined" by an ultraleftist on the shop committee. It was because of this "ultraleftist" and the "too advanced" demands put forward under his influence that the junta was backing the owners. "Some people don't understand that the revolution wasn't socialist," she said. "You have to take things in stages.")

After the radical speaker had talked for a while, he seemed to be pushed to the background. An older man came to the fore, explaining the need for the workers to run the enterprise themselves. But his speech didn't seem to catch on either. Finally, a third speaker announced that the demonstration would continue, "united in its support for the junta de salvacão nacional."

The crowd was obviously enjoying the demonstration. It marched for hours in a soaking drizzle. It didn't seem willing to sit back and let the junta solve its problems. And the onlookers, the people who threw flowers from the windows, obviously like to see people demonstrating. They did not think, apparently, that people should stay at home and let the junta do it. After so many years of passivity, there is an obvious desire among the people to be active, to determine their own fate.

And, at the moment, the opportunity is there. I have never seen a demonstration so unsupervised. I did not see one cop on the whole route except traffic police. And the march went right down the middle of the road when it chose to. There was only one point when a couple of soldiers, looking bored, approached, but they left after a few moments.

There was clearly sympathy for the strike in the media. At Radio Maritima, activists in the building echoed the marchers' slogans with bullhorns.

But in this demonstration at least, no revolutionary leaders were present who could crystallize the aspirations

of the marchers into powerful concrete slogans and demands. There was no

leadership that could give a conscious form to, and put to use, the vague re-

jection of the whole capitalist system that created fascism. □

Try to Slow Down Mobilizations

Stalinists Back Warnings of Portuguese Junta

By Gerry Foley

Oporto

"The junta says it cannot sanction disrespect for duly constituted authorities," Oporto's major daily *Jornal de Noticias* said in a headline May 5.

In response to a wave of both spontaneous and union-organized actions aimed at destroying the fascist institutions, ousting bosses with a record of brutality or links with fascism, and punishing the repressors of workers, the junta issued a harsh warning:

"It has come to the attention of the Junta de Salvação Nacional that the normal functioning of various public services has been impeded by meetings held during work hours. Moreover, in the course of these meetings persons holding leading positions have been illegally removed. This clearly harms the national interest and the public order. Therefore, this junta makes it known that it will not sanction any disrespect for the constituted hierarchies. If need be, disciplinary hearings will be held to determine responsibilities.

"We repeat that all interference in the conduct of public affairs, which is the function only of the duly constituted authorities, will be considered acts of insubordination and crimes against the Armed Forces Movement and as such will be vigorously investigated.

"Once again we appeal to everyone to resume work calmly and, if possible, with greater effort and dedication to building a better Portugal."

Immediately under the headline proclaiming the junta's threat, *Jornal de Noticias* ran a headline about a Communist party statement. In fact, the two statements were perfectly complementary, like "hard cop" and "soft cop."

The headline over the text of the CP statement said: "Occupations ob-

struct the process of democratization." This was followed by a subheading: "Salutes the alliance of the Armed Forces with the Popular Forces."

The statement was full of uncritical praise for the junta:

"The PCP, conscious of the decisive role played by the Armed Forces Movement in changing the political situation considers that the maintenance of this movement [in power] at least until the elections for the Constituent Assembly is an essential condition for consolidating and broadening the results achieved and for successfully warding off counterrevolutionary conspiracies and attempts. . . .

"All of our people understood immediately that the depth and breadth of the process of democratization begun April 25 would depend on a vital, fraternal, and active alliance with the Armed Forces."

Since the interest of the ranks of the army and navy, like that of the workers, is to directly assure the dismantlement of the fascist system, so as to be able to begin building a new democratic system based on their own action and forms of organization, it is clear that what the CP meant by "Armed Forces" was essentially the ruling junta. And what they meant by "alliance with the Popular Forces" was the subordination of the masses to the junta, the subordination of the masses' aspirations to the junta's program of "democratization." That is, the masses should stand back, in a disciplined way, and let their heroes get on with the job. The popular movement should exercise only a gentle pressure.

The PCP statement said: "Equally dangerous are opportunism of the right, which is manifested in a tendency to abandon the fundamental

objectives of the democratic movement; and ultraleftism, which is expressed above all in a lack of patience that fails to take account of the relationship of forces as well as engaging in divisionist and disruptive actions. The PCP, fully conscious of its responsibility, disapproves of actions for which the conditions have not been created, actions that do not correspond to the existing relationship of forces. Initiatives in occupying city departments, for example, do not facilitate, but rather create grave obstacles to, the process of democratizing Portuguese life in general, except in very special cases. The PCP will firmly combat opportunism and adventurism which objectively serve counterrevolution."

The Communist party statement did say, however, that it would have still more confidence in the Armed Forces Movement on one condition: "The participation in the Provisional Government of all representative democratic parties and sectors (including the PCP) would be a guarantee of the democratization continuing and free elections being held.

"Discrimination against the PCP, the largest antifascist party, would run contrary to the democratization of Portuguese life."

That means that, in the view of the PCP, positions in the government would be a fitting reward for the party's "responsibility." That would formalize the kind of alliance between the "Armed Forces and the Popular Forces" they have in mind. □

When You Move...

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Time Running Out on Portuguese in African Colonies

By Ernest Harsch

In the course of discussions with Portuguese army commanders in Nampula, the headquarters of the colonialist forces in Mozambique, General Francisco da Costa Gomes, chief of the Portuguese military staff and vice-president of the Lisbon junta, expressed pessimism about Lisbon's ability to hold on to Mozambique, according to a report by Henry Kamm published in the May 13 *New York Times*.

Although the officers in Mozambique had a "positive attitude" toward the continuance of the war against the African guerrillas, there was widespread agitation among the draftees.

"A number of manifestos of left-wing groups circulate freely among soldiers here," Kamm wrote, "and General Costa Gomes was given several of them by a local official. The manifestos all demand the immediate cessation of the war and independence for Mozambique." One source told Kamm that many of the officers and soldiers had been sent into active combat units by the ousted regime of Marcello Caetano as punishment for their political views. Some of the Portuguese officers said that the troops were more likely now to try to avoid the guerrilla forces.

This growing unreliability of the colonial army further underlined Lisbon's failure to stop the African nationalists by purely military means, a failure recognized in the April 25 coup. But Costa Gomes was not the only one pessimistic about Lisbon's continued grip on its African empire.

In response to the emergence of various political groups in Mozambique calling for negotiations with Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique—Mozambique Liberation Front) and to Lisbon's own professed desire to bring the guerrillas to the conference table (on Lisbon's terms if possible), a layer of rightists in Mozambique have been stirred into action.

A crowd of 5,000 whites rallied May

5 in front of the city hall in Lourenço Marques, the capital of Mozambique, to demand that Lisbon continue its war against the guerrillas. Banners at the rally, organized by a newly formed group, Fico (Portuguese for "I stay"), proclaimed: "Out With Traitors," "We Stay in Mozambique," and "Mozambique Is Our Life." One speaker shouted: "We ask the army to defend Mozambique, or we will defend it ourselves, every last man."

At a meeting called by the Grupo Unido de Moçambique (GUM—Group for the Union of Mozambique) in Beira May 12 and attended by about 5,000 persons, mostly Africans, a group of whites interrupted the rally with hostile shouts, touching off clashes between whites and young Africans in the area. A number of whites were wounded and the police intervened, firing warning shots. The same day, thousands of whites demonstrated outside the governor's palace, where Costa Gomes had just arrived, and shouted "Arms, arms," and "Down with Frelimo."

Such a growing polarization of the political forces in Mozambique has prompted the Lisbon government to try to act quickly to introduce the junta's neocolonialist schemes before events get completely out of control.

Lisbon issued its first cease-fire proposal to the African guerrillas May 6, but it was rejected by all the guerrilla forces in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau. Combining threats of continued war with offers of amnesty and the right to "free" political activity if the liberation forces would lay down their arms and become "non-violent" political parties, the junta continued to press for a truce. The guerrilla groups, for their part, had already indicated their willingness to negotiate with Lisbon—but only on the basis of their demand for immediate independence, and without laying down their arms.

In a May 14 interview in Lisbon,

Washington Post correspondent Miguel Acoca reported, Costa Gomes said that while he was in Mozambique he conferred informally with persons in contact with Frelimo and that he thought direct contact would soon be established. Such direct contact has already been reached between Lisbon and the guerrilla forces in Guinea-Bissau, whose representatives agreed to begin talks in London May 25.

In an article in the May 9 *New York Times* exploring Lisbon's political dilemma in Mozambique, Kamm wrote that the junta's call to the guerrillas to lay down their arms "strikes observers as a maximal and unacceptable demand. It reminded a diplomat with long experience in South Vietnam of Saigon's constant proposal to the Vietcong to abandon the war and enter politics under Saigon's rules."

While pressing the guerrilla forces to lay down their arms, the Lisbon junta has also made efforts to capitalize on certain layers of the African and Portuguese populations in the colonies who are favorable to a neocolonialist relationship between Lisbon and its empire.

In the wake of the Portuguese coup, various political groups emerged in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau that favored negotiations with the guerrilla forces. In an apparent effort to use these groups as mediators with the liberation forces and as bases for the creation of a so-called third force, Costa Gomes conferred with the different groups in Mozambique, particularly with leaders of GUM, according to the May 14 *Le Monde*.

Composed of Portuguese and African intellectuals and professionals, GUM was actually formed a few months before the coup. In a manifesto drawn up April 6 and presented to the old colonial governor, GUM leaders outlined their positions. According to an April 27 *Argus Africa News Service* dispatch, the points in the manifesto included:

"— A firm stand against rebel guerrillas in Mozambique, who should be resisted as long as they resort to arms.

"— Autonomous government for Mozambique though links with Lisbon would be maintained and Portuguese troops would stay here to ensure stability and fight Communist-inspired guerrillas.

"— Respect for human rights, individual liberty, established order of private property."

Joana Simião, a GUM leader, explained, according to a report by Henry Kamm in the May 4 *New York Times*, that a May 3 rally called by GUM, which addressed about 5,000 Africans, was designed "to explain to illiterate people what the coup means and what we can do in the new context." Another leader of GUM, Jorge de Abreu, a wealthy Portuguese businessman and a former president of the chamber of commerce, told Kamm that he "always believed in treating the natives well" in the businesses that he owned.

GUM held a number of rallies throughout Mozambique in support of its positions and, as reported in the May 7 *Le Monde*, called on General Spínola to pronounce a cease-fire under "international control" and to open negotiations with Frelimo.

Another new group in Mozambique, the Democrats, also held numerous demonstrations and rallies. They called for the freeing of political prisoners, the treatment of captured Frelimo members under the rules of the Geneva convention, the release from the army of conscripted student activists, and reform of the educational system. They also called for immediate negotiations with the guerrillas.

Similar groups have emerged in the other two Portuguese colonies: the Democratic Movement of Guinea in Guinea-Bissau and the Civic Democratic Commission in Angola.

In the *New York Times* article assessing Lisbon's political prospects in Mozambique, Henry Kamm noted the inherent weakness of such so-called third-force organizations. "On one hand," he wrote, "the army's growing disgust with a costly war that it says cannot be won militarily was a principal cause of its overthrow of the regime. On the other, there seems to be no middle ground between a Mozambique controlled by the army and

one under Frelimo's control."

In addition to the renewed offensive by Frelimo, which was launched following Lisbon's May 6 cease-fire call, the active opposition to Lisbon's continued hold on Mozambique began to spread to the cities.

Among the more than 550 political prisoners released in Mozambique May 1 were a number of early members or sympathizers of Frelimo, many of whom began to freely express their political views upon release. Some told of the torture and harsh treatment they had received in prison.

Following the ousting of the regime in Mozambique and its replacement with a military administration loyal

rightist rupture with Lisbon similar to the Rhodesian regime's Unilateral Declaration of Independence from London in 1965.

The May 10 *Le Monde* wrote: "Some strikes by African workers have begun in certain sugar cane plantations and in some factories in Beira. Last week, the dockers in Beira successfully struck for a wage increase. Until the change of regime in Portugal, news concerning worker unrest in the African territories was censored." A dispatch from Lisbon in the May 16 *Christian Science Monitor* briefly noted more reports of "sporadic industrial unrest" in Mozambique.

At the May 3 rally in Lourenço Mar-



Frelimo guerrillas somewhere in Mozambique.

to the junta, left-wing students in Lourenço Marques demonstrated April 28, demanding the demobilization of students drafted into the Portuguese army. The following day students distributed leaflets demanding that captured guerrillas be treated as prisoners of war and proclaiming the students' present support for the junta. The April 30 *Le Monde* reported demonstrations in Lourenço Marques against the secret police, and the appearance of student leaflets denouncing any attempts by "fascist elements" to embark upon a

ques called by GUM some of the participants began chanting "Frelimo! Frelimo!" in response to a speaker's call of "Long live liberty!"

The biggest danger that Lisbon faces in its neocolonialist maneuvers is the potential for mobilization of the African masses. As Philippe Decraene wrote in the May 12-13 *Le Monde*: "In the African neighborhoods on the outskirts of Lourenço Marques the number of supporters of total independence has continued to grow during the past few days." □

10,000 Protest British Aid to Chile Junta

By John Blackburn

London

"Labour must break all links with Chilean junta!" was the message on the leading banner of a 10,000-strong demonstration through central London May 5. The demonstration was called to demand an end to the Labour government's collaboration with the bloodstained military junta in Chile. It followed an announcement three weeks earlier by Labour Foreign Minister Jim Callaghan that Britain would go ahead with a contract to supply four warships to the Chilean navy in violation of previous Labour party conference decisions to break all relations with the Chilean dictators.

Organised by the Chile Ad-Hoc Committee, the demonstration demanded "Not a penny, not a gun for the Chilean generals!" "Open the doors to all political refugees!" "Labour must break all diplomatic, military and trade links now!" "Release all political prisoners now!" and "Solidarity with the Chilean resistance!"

Prominent in building support for the march was the International Marxist Group (IMG), British section of the Fourth International, and among the speakers at a rally in Hyde Park before the march was Tariq Ali, a leading member of the IMG. Other political groups that participated included the International Socialists (IS), Workers Fight, Labour party Young Socialists, and numerous constituency Labour parties.

Trades councils from cities throughout Britain were represented, along with branches of the Transport and General Workers Union, the Association of Teachers in Technical Institutions, the National Association of Local Government Officers, the National Union of Public Employees, the actors union Equity, and the printers union NATSOPA. Large numbers of students, activists in local Chile committees, and Latin Americans took part. A large IMG contingent marched chanting "Armed Road, Only Road!" and "Only Solution: Revolution!" as well as demands to end British complicity with the repression in Chile.

The Communist party gave minimal support for the demonstration, after weeks of opposing mass action on May 5 to avoid "rocking the boat" while the Labour party is in government. Gerry Healy's ultrasectarian Workers Revolutionary party refused to participate in any way in the campaign.

But the Chile Ad-Hoc Committee was successful in welding together a broad and powerful coalition of student groups, trade-union bodies, political parties, and

Chile committees to rally support for the May 5 mobilisation. The success of May 5 must now spur efforts to build an ongoing mass movement to force the British government to reverse its policies.

Tariq Ali, writing in the May Day issue of *Red Weekly*, the paper of the IMG, explained that the campaign should aim "to isolate the junta internationally by blacking Chilean goods, preventing the sale of arms, demanding that the Government breaks all links with the Pinochet dictatorship and preparing suitable 'welcomes' for the ambassadors and representatives of the Chilean regime in Europe." The campaign should demand that "the Labour Government opens the doors for all Chilean refugees." Ali urged that the May 5 mobilisation be seen as "only the beginning of a mass campaign of solidarity with the Chilean victims of repression."

A mass campaign has the potential to win wide support within the British labour movement and to embarrass severely the Labour leadership. Before taking office in early March, Prime Minister Harold Wilson and other Labour party leaders, aware of the widespread disgust at the Chilean coup felt in the labour movement, voiced opposition to the military regime and the pro-junta stance of the Tories.

The Labour government's decision to continue arms sales to the junta openly violated a resolution passed by the Labour party at its annual conference on October 4, 1973. This resolution condemned the coup and the Tory government's recognition of the junta. It demanded the breaking of diplomatic relations; a halt to all aid, loans, and credits; British assistance to Chilean refugees; a campaign in the British Labour movement for democracy in Chile; and a programme of financial aid to the Unidad Popular coalition.

The previous day, the conference had sent a telegram to Tory Prime Minister Edward Heath, asking him to intercede with the generals to save the life of imprisoned Chilean Communist party leader Luis Corvalan. On the same day, leaders of fourteen trade unions sent similar messages to Chile.

Time and again in the following months, the Labour party leaders pledged that a future Labour government would break all links with the junta. On November 4, Judith Hart, a member of the national executive committee of the Labour party and presently minister for overseas development in the Wilson government, addressed a rally of 15,000 called by the

Chile Solidarity Campaign (CSC) in London. She condemned the role of the major imperialist powers and the multinational companies in preparing the coup.

But when the Labour government came to power, the leaders did nothing to implement their previous promises other than to announce at the end of March the cancellation of direct aid worth less than 500,000 pounds. Only two days before the announcement, the Labour government's representative at the Club of Paris was silent when it was decided to allow the junta to postpone repayment of credits of more than 300 million pounds.

On April 10, Callaghan announced the government's decision to allow the delivery of four warships—two frigates and two submarines worth a total of 70 million pounds—now on order for the Chilean government. The first of the frigates had been handed over to a Chilean crew prior to the announcement but was still in British waters. The three other ships are still under construction on Clydeside and will be presented to the junta at the end of the year.

Two weeks before Callaghan's announcement, the Chile Solidarity Campaign held a national conference in Birmingham. A resolution was presented to the conference by a workshop on "the lessons of the coup," proposing a mass demonstration in London on May 5. But the Communist party leaders of the CSC, anxious not to embarrass the Labour government, refused to allow either discussion or a vote on the resolution. The CP argued that the Labour government should be given time and that no action should be taken until the anniversary of the coup in September.

The IMG and others who had supported the May 5 proposal decided to go ahead and plan the demonstration. They called on the executive of the CSC to endorse the mobilisation at its meeting on March 30. But again the CSC leaders refused to support May 5. So the IMG and the IS called for an ad-hoc committee to be formed to build the demonstration. At the initial meeting of the Chile Ad-Hoc Committee on April 9, more than fifty delegates attended, representing trade-union branches, trades councils, student groups, local CSC branches, and several left-wing groups.

Fear of the development of a mass Chile solidarity movement outside the control of the Labour leadership prompted opposition to Callaghan's announcement on the warships from within the Labour government. On April 13, Eric Heffer, the industry minister, publicly attacked Callaghan's decision. "It is clear," he said, "that Chile could become a type of Vietnam issue. I would hope that the Labour party, because of its previous experience over Vietnam, had learned that lesson. It has rightly been brought to my attention that there is widespread disquiet in the party at all levels. It is my view that we should never say one thing in opposition and do something else in gov-

ernment."

But when asked to address the May 5 rally, Heffer refused, preferring to remain a minister in Wilson's government rather than help to build a mass Chile solidarity movement.

Though widespread support for Heffer's statement came from Labour party backbench members of Parliament, Wilson and Callaghan hoped that during the Easter parliamentary recess, opposition from within the parliamentary party would die away. Spokesmen of the ruling class were quick to support the government. Edward Taylor, an extreme right-wing Tory MP, tabled a motion congratulating Callaghan "for resisting pressure from his left-wing colleagues in permitting the delivery of frigates and submarines to Chile." And an editorial in the April 16 *Times* commented: "Mr Heffer is Minister of State in the Department of Industry which makes his intervention a multiple fault. He has chosen to break a convention of collective responsibility which enjoins ministers to refrain from quarreling publicly with the decisions of their colleagues."

In a radio interview April 15, Callaghan said that he hoped that the prime minister would take Heffer on one side and "offer him a few words of advice about what collective responsibility means." Callaghan claimed that he shared Heffer's views about the Chilean regime but said that government ministers had to make decisions that were sometimes very unpleasant and went against their personal wishes.

The dispute in the Labour party over aid to Chile reveals the contradictory nature of this mass reformist party of the British working class. Wilson and Callaghan are totally committed to administering the capitalist system and wish to do nothing to interfere with lucrative arms deals with the Chilean generals. The April 27 *Financial Times* noted these considerations behind the Labour government's policy: "Britain could lose up to 260 million pounds worth of orders if it does not deliver the warships contracted for by Chile. . . . Any failure to deliver . . . could jeopardise further orders from Latin America, which is seen as one of the biggest customers for British shipyards and arms manufacturers."

The Labour leadership also gives total support to NATO and other imperialist war alliances. It has no wish to break with the U.S. government, whose agencies were directly involved in the coup.

Heffer, however, reflected the deep revulsion in the Labour movement for all forms of collaboration with the junta and the desire to keep this discontent within parliamentary channels. The Communist party, too, was forced to attack the government's action. Mick McGahey, leader of the Scottish miners and a member of the executive committee of the CP, moved an emergency resolution on Chile at the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) on April 18. This prompted Ron Hayward, general secretary of the Labour

party, to condemn the government's relations with Chile in an address to the STUC.

"I don't speak for the Labour government," Hayward said, "but I do speak for the Labour party. It will not do to for-



FOOT: No vote.

get from whence we came and who we represent. It will not do to say one thing in opposition and another in government. It is more important for the Labour government to stick to principles than to stick to power."

Meanwhile, workers at Rolls-Royce in East Kilbride, Scotland, blacked [banned] work on eight Avonjet engines to be used in Hawker Hunter jets ordered by the junta. Workers remembered that Hawker Hunters were used to bomb the Moneda Palace during the September coup.

Jim Sillars, Labour MP for South Ayrshire, commented: "I should hope that this action by Scottish workers is not lost on the government. It is heartening to find that workers are prepared to take action themselves to stop the sickening arms trade between Britain and this shocking regime in Chile." Peter Allison, secretary of the Scottish Labour party, stated that the executive committee of the Scottish Labour party had unanimously endorsed Hayward's attack on the government at the STUC.

The dispute was carried to the national executive committee of the Labour party at its meeting on April 24. Michael Foot, secretary of state for employment, and other "left-wingers" around the newspaper *Tribune* argued for a policy reversal. But after Callaghan informed the meeting that there could be no change in policy, the "lefts" did not even take the issue to a vote.

By this time support for the May 5 demonstration was gathering fast. In a statement published April 25 in *Red Week-*

ly, Emlyn Williams, president of the South Wales miners, said that "the May 5 demonstration comes at an important time when the Labour government is vacillating over its conference decisions. . . . We need some clearer statements from the workers of this country to ensure that Labour does not flout its conference decisions."

Other trade-union leaders decided to back the march and rally. They included Jack Collins, a member of the executive of the National Union of Mineworkers; Ernie Roberts, assistant general secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers; and Alan Sapper, general secretary of the Association of Cinematographic and Television Technicians. The CSC, at a national delegate conference in Liverpool on April 20, finally decided to back the May 5 march despite opposition from the CP, which still refused to support mass action against the Labour government. It was only in the last few days before the mobilisation that the CP felt itself forced by the scale of backing for May 5 to give its reluctant support.

That 10,000 marched for Chile on May 5 against the Labour government is a sign that masses of workers and students will not stand idly by while the minority Labour government carries out right-wing, proimperialist policies. "Taking advantage of the feeling in the workers movement," Tariq Ali wrote in the May Day *Red Weekly*, "the Chile solidarity movement can mount a powerful campaign of mass demonstrations, boycotts, blacking of Chilean goods and strikes. Only then will Labour listen." □

500 Attend Revolutionary Student Rally

London

Five hundred students from throughout Britain attended a Revolutionary Student Rally held in London on May 4 by the International Marxist Group (IMG), British section of the Fourth International.

The day-long rally, attended by dozens of activists from the wave of student struggles that has swept British colleges and universities in recent months, reflected the growing influence of the IMG in the student movement.

The rally opened with speeches by John Ross and Tariq Ali, members of the political committee of the IMG. Ross spoke on the prospects for world revolution and Ali on the lessons of the defeat in Chile. Pierre Rousset, a leading member of the FCR (Front Communiste Revolutionnaire — Revolutionary Communist Front) of France, addressed a session on the political situation in France and the significance of the FCR's running of Alain Krivine as a candidate in the presidential elections. The rally also heard Ivan Har-

tell, a Czechoslovakian revolutionary, speak on Stalinism and repression in Eastern Europe. The rally included workshops on anti-imperialism, racism and fascism, and repression and the strong state.

Greetings to the rally came from the FCR of France; the GIM (International Marxist Group), German section of the Fourth International; the GCR (Revolutionary Communist Groups), Italian section of the Fourth International; and the LCR/ETA-VI (Revolutionary Communist

League/Basque Nation and Freedom VI), a Spanish sympathising group of the Fourth International.

Ernest Mandel, a leader of the Fourth International, toured Britain prior to the rally and spoke to large audiences in several cities. Two hundred persons heard Mandel in Manchester, 250 in Birmingham, 200 in Leeds, and 300 at the London School of Economics. At an Oxford teach-in attended by 200, Mandel shared the platform with a leading British Marxist economist, Bob Sutcliffe. □

Chile

Runaway Inflation Eats Into Living Standards

Despite massive loans from such imperialist agencies as the Inter-American Development Bank and an increase in foreign investment, the Chilean junta has been unable to halt the steady deterioration of the economy.

The depth of this deterioration was indicated in a headline in an April 30 article by Fernando Martínez in the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*: "Wages not adequate to feed a family." Martínez pointed out that a Chilean worker currently takes home an average of 18,000 escudos per month (US\$24 at the official exchange rate of 750 escudos per dollar), which must serve to purchase the following: bread, which went up from 11 to 134 escudos between September 1973 and April 1974; sugar, up from 12 to 280 escudos; cooking oil, from 14 to 460 escudos a liter; and milk, from 3.5 to 60 escudos a liter—to list only a few basic food items. According to Martínez, at these prices a normal diet for a family of four would require an income of 90,000 escudos per month.

Added to these skyrocketing food prices are increases like those reported by José Cayuela, the former editor of the Chilean pro-Communist party magazine, *Chile Hoy*, in the April 6 Cuban television interview. The April 21 English-language *Granma* quoted from Cayuela's description of the current price situation:

"When comparing how much one has to work in order to make a living, Cayuela revealed that before, it took two workdays to buy a shirt, and now twenty workdays are needed. A

pair of shoes could be bought before with the equivalent of five workdays, and under the present fascist regime twenty workdays are needed."

However, the plight of the working class was not Martínez's main preoccupation. The main headline in his *La Opinión* article read: "Conspicuous contraction of the Chilean economy causing massive business failures." He reported that more than 600 mer-

chants and small and medium-sized industries have gone bankrupt. The primary reason, according to their owners, was the lack of buying power among consumers. Still looming on the horizon, wrote Martínez, are "massive failures in the coming months."

This prospect has caused vocal dissatisfaction among affected sectors of the Chilean business community. On the one hand, they direct their fire against the producers and distributors, accusing them of hoarding merchandise, cornering the market, and speculation. On the other, they point to the policies of powerful import and export interests as causing the rapid price increases. A further complaint is addressed to the junta itself, since the regime has imposed a 5 percent sales tax on all transactions over 102 escudos, a measure that businessmen maintain cuts into their sales.

Adding its voice to these critics is the generally pro-junta daily *La Segunda*. Along with its condemnations of speculation, it has questioned increased prices of a number of goods, and accused the monopolists of "enjoying the protection of decontrolled prices." □

Churches, Jurists Accuse Junta of Torture

A new spate of documentation of abuses of Chilean dissidents was made public during the middle of May.

Most important was the release in Mexico May 16 of the report of an interchurch group, the Committee of Cooperation for Peace in Chile; it contained evidence on hundreds of cases of torture since the military seized power eight months ago. Reporting on the documents, the May 17 *New York Times* quoted the committee as saying, "The tortures noted here are only those that leave no margin of doubt."

Among the cases included were a number involving people who had been tortured to death, according to committee members. The evidence came from "traces on the victims' bodies, when there is an absence of any other cause" of death.

"In one case," the report stated, "a seventeen-year-old minor under detention told a visitor about the mistreatment he had received. Two days

later he was reported to have died while attempting to escape."

This report served as the basis for the Catholic Church's statement last month criticizing the junta's violations of human rights (see *Intercontinental Press*, May 6, p. 539).

Also on May 16, a three-member delegation of the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva issued a preliminary report on their ten-day visit to Chile. They stated that there are still 10,000 political prisoners in that country with no charges against them.

"At times," the attorneys stated, they suffer mistreatment that "takes the form of severe torture exercised systematically."

Denunciations of torture and repression by a lawyers' group in Paris were reported in the May 14 *La Opinión*, and a major article on the question was published in the May 13 *Wall Street Journal*. □

Balaguer Reelected After Opposition Withdraws

By Judy White

The Balaguer regime won a hollow victory in the May 16 Dominican presidential elections. While the dictator was reelected to a third term, he failed to create the desired "democratic" facade in the process.

By the time the vote actually took place, all significant opposition parties had withdrawn their candidates from the race. Balaguer's one remaining opponent—Rear Admiral Luis Lajara Burgos of the Partido Demócrata Popular (PDP—Popular Democratic party)—received 10-15 percent of the vote.

The predicted voter turnout of 90 percent in the capital was actually only 50-60 percent. In addition, the May 19 *New York Times* reported, about 40 percent of the ballots actually cast were invalid because voters turned in empty envelopes, or stuffed them with old newspaper clippings or candy wrappers instead of ballots. Some voters were reported to have expressed their view of the proceedings by scribbling obscenities on the ballots.

Charging the Balaguer regime with plans for fraud at the polls, creating a climate of violence in the country, and stalling on the questions of release of political prisoners and repatriation of exiles, the three major opposition formations pulled out of the election. They are: the rightist Movimiento de Integración Democrática (MIDA—Movement for Democratic Integration), the liberal Movimiento de Conciliación Nacional (National Conciliation Movement), and the largest opposition electoral bloc—the Acuerdo de Santiago (Santiago Agreement).

There were good grounds for the complaints of violence from Balaguer's opponents. Over twenty deaths had been reported in election-associated incidents in the final weeks of the campaign. Targets of the repression ranged from the MIDA to the Acuerdo de Santiago in what came to a well-organized effort. Party head-

quarters were raided and their supporters beaten up or killed by agencies widely credited with being directly under Balaguer's control.

The only opposition grouping enjoying mass support was the Acuerdo de Santiago. It was an electoral bloc whose main components were the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD—Dominican Revolutionary party),* the conservative Partido Quisqueyano Demócrata (PQD—Dominican Democratic party), and the Maoist Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD—Dominican People's Movement). For president the bloc proposed Silvestre Antonio Guzmán, a rich landowner who had not been prominently involved in Dominican politics in the past, and for vice-president, General Elías Wessin y Wessin, former head of the island's air force, who led government troops in putting down the 1965 rebellion.

Though the bloc had been red-baited by Balaguer supporters throughout the campaign, it presented no coherent program of any sort in counterposition to the incumbent's. It was widely and rightfully described as a marriage of convenience for the sole purpose of ending Balaguer's *continuismo* (self-perpetuation).

Other forces opposed to *continuismo* had earlier stated their intentions not to challenge Balaguer in the electoral arena.

Juan Bosch gave the PLD position in an April 14 interview with the Do-

*Until November 1973 the PRD was the party of Juan Bosch, the president of the Dominican Republic who was overthrown in a 1963 military coup. In April 1965 a popular uprising took place to restore the constitutional government of Bosch. It was smashed with the aid of the United States military.

Last fall the PRD split, leaving Jose Francisco Pena Gomez in command of the party. Bosch and his supporters later formed the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD—Dominican Liberation party).

minican daily *La Noticia*:

"Question. In the next elections, will you run as a candidate for the presidency of the Dominican Republic?"

"Answer. Absolutely not. In the first place, because there won't be any elections here, only an electoral farce. And, in the second place, because I am not fighting to consolidate the system. Just the opposite, to see how the country can overpower it. We are entering a different stage now. And to participate in elections here helps to strengthen the system.

"Q. Concretely, will the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana, which you head, call for abstention on May 16?"

"A. We can't call for anything because we aren't a legal party."

The Dominican Communist party, after vainly trying to form "an alliance of progressive forces," then called on the people "to cast a blank ballot or take some other stance in opposition to the existing candidates," the April 22 weekly *Ahora!* reported.

The lack of a leadership for the mass opposition to Balaguer was the more glaring in view of the upsurge of mass struggles in the preelection period, especially around the issue of political prisoners.

There are a reported 600 political prisoners in the Dominican Republic, many of whom have been held long after their sentences were completed. Among the latter are four leaders of the MPD who were arrested in 1970: Fafa Taveras, Edgar Erichson, Julio de Peña Valdez, and Ingeniero Baez.

In addition, several inmates have died in prison as the result of systematic mistreatment.

There have been ongoing efforts to win the release of these prisoners, but the struggles took their most dramatic form during the last two weeks of the presidential campaign. On April 30 about 200 political prisoners went on a hunger strike to demand their freedom and the return of all exiles to the Dominican Republic. Inmates

at La Victoria, La Fé, Santiago, Dajabón, San Francisco de Macoris, and Nagua participated, reported the April 30 *El Nacional de Ahora!* of Santo Domingo.

The strike reportedly was begun in answer to a call from inmates who have formed the Comité Unitario de Presos Políticos (United Political Prisoners' Committee). They explained their action as the only recourse left to them, faced with the empty promises of the Balaguer regime to free them. "Each time the pro-



BALAGUER: Elections in the style of Nguyen Van Thieu.

amnesty movement reaches a significant level," they wrote, "the government resorts to absurd political tricks to implicate the political prisoners in some supposed or real actions that we have absolutely no connection with."

This type of maneuver was employed in the current struggle to win amnesty. As part of its attempted face-lifting, in which the elections played a central role, the dictatorship on several occasions stated its willingness to discuss release of political prisoners.

However, these promises were accompanied by contrary reports such as the one that appeared in the April 30 *El Nacional de Ahora!* The paper cited an armed forces and police statement that an alleged attempted as-

sault by leftists on Balaguer's La Vega election headquarters had endangered the possible release of prisoners.

Immediate repressive measures were taken against inmates at La Victoria Prison in response to the hunger strike. Some 150 of them, reported *El Nacional de Ahora!*, were transferred to a single cell, which had no beds, lights, or running water.

By May 1 support for the strikers had spread. It was reported that some sixty youths had occupied the San Rafael Catholic Church in solidarity and that hundreds of common prisoners were prepared to join the hunger strike.

All political parties participating in the elections had made demagogic statements about the political prisoner

question, but the Acuerdo de Santiago showed its true position when mass mobilizations began to occur on the issue.

An Associated Press dispatch printed in the May 12 *El Diario* of New York quoted PRD general secretary Peña Gómez as saying, "The general strike and total paralysis of economic activity in whole provinces is prejudicing, not helping, the situation of the political prisoner." The strikes, he said, "are consuming the energy of the youth before the real struggle for power in the country is unleashed."

According to Associated Press, Peña Gómez—though speaking on a PRD radio program—made it clear in the same statement that he was speaking for the bloc as a whole in opposing the protests. □

Argentina

PST Member Assassinated

Inosencio "Indio" Fernández is dead, shot down apparently as he was leaving home in the Pacheco district of Buenos Aires May 7. His body was found several days later, totally burned, several kilometers away.

Fernández was twenty-six years old, a trade-union militant in the UOM (Unión Obrera Metalúrgica—Metalworkers Union) at the Cormasa foundry. Only recently he had joined the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers Party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International), after being won from the Juventud Peronista (Peronist Youth).

Fernández made his decision to join the PST after experiencing two struggles against the union bureaucracy, reported the May 15 *Avanzada Socialista*, organ of the PST. They revolved around attempts to elect an alternative leadership in the UOM at Cormasa. Both were defeated as the result of maneuvers by the Peronist bureaucrats, and after going through these experiences and six months of work with the PST members in the UOM, Fernández decided that "with Perón nothing is going to happen,"

and he was won to socialism.

In a call for united action to prevent further attacks against those who criticize Perón the PST pointed out:

"This bloody deed is similar to those that have aggrieved other popular forces, like the Juventud Peronista or the Communist party, which have had their buildings dynamited and have seen members kidnapped, shot up, and martyred. This act places our 'Indio' Fernández alongside Peronist Compañera Liliana Ivanoff, who was kidnapped and murdered a few days ago: Both are political victims of crimes that have not been accounted for.

"But it is not hard to figure out who the intellectual and material authors of these crimes are. When the dead are fighters against the Social Pact and the union bureaucracy, we can assert that the assassins must be sought on the sidewalks in front, among those using fascist methods to defend the Pact and the bureaucracy."

The PST has been attacked fifteen times in the last eight months, but this is the first fatality resulting from the violence. □

Danger of a Coup in Peru?

[The following article appeared in the April 8 *Palabra Socialista*, a Peruvian Trotskyist fortnightly. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Recently there has been much speculation about the possibility of a coup against Velasco being organized outside the country. Such a coup would be in accordance with the general project, proposed by presidents Pinochet, Banzer, and Geisel at their summit meetings in Brazil, of forming a "continental anti-Marxist bloc." Political talk has centered around these rumors and the possibility of a conflict between Peru and Chile precipitated by the question of the 1929 treaty and the arms race.*

Aside from all the speculation and sensationalism, what is concrete in our opinion is the declarations by J. Vargas Prada, the well-known reactionary deported from Peru last year, who has proclaimed himself "president of the Peruvian government in exile"; and the call of Eudocio Ravínez from Mexico for armed intervention "to save Peru from Communism."

It is not necessary to stress the importance to Peruvian workers of correctly answering the question: Are we on the brink of a coup?

Leaving aside the delirious statements of Vargas Prada, we believe that ultraright groups are conspiring inside and outside the country. Since the Velasco government came to power and pressed a nationalist policy,

there have been constant conspiracies. But that is not enough to conclude that we face a real and imminent danger of a coup.

The recent experiences in Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay have taught us that the fundamental condition for a coup is a decision by the bourgeoisie or sectors of it to carry one out.

During the five years of military rule, the oligarchy has continually



JUAN VELASCO ALVARADO

been plotting and agitating for a way out through elections. In addition, rumor has it that there have been attempted coups—all of which failed. If all such attempts, rumored or not, have not been realized, it is because the Peruvian bourgeoisie, or its most rightist sectors, have not seriously decided on this course.

In our opinion, this danger has not become immediate mainly because of the relative economic stability achieved by the military junta thanks to their nationalist, reformist policy. Peru's economic situation has permitted them to broaden their margin of maneuver with the oligarchy and imperialism.

As a result of this relative economic stability, the government has recently succeeded in bringing the indus-

trial sectors together around a policy of "increasing production," carried out through superexploitation of the workers. This does not mean that everything is harmonious. There are contradictions that persist, and they will cause an explosion once the economic equilibrium breaks down again.

Imperialism, on the other hand, continues to follow a cautious policy with respect to the government and has agreed to sign the "Lima Pact," the terms of which provide for the Peruvian government to pay the United States US\$76 million for the expropriations involving the Cerro de Pasco mines, the fishing concerns, the Grace Corporation, and other lesser enterprises. (Cerro had demanded an indemnification of US\$300 million, and the value of the fishing installations had been set at US\$150 million.)

In addition, Velasco has recently succeeded in acquiring four important foreign loans at a very low rate of interest, permitting him to refinance the foreign debt—a perennial factor in budget deficits—and to finance a series of economic plans.

These are the basic facts of the current political situation; there is no important sector of the bosses that has seriously decided to move toward a coup.

In response to the rumors and publicity campaigns, Velasco has said, "We must let things come to a head." When it has felt so inclined, the government has not hesitated to exile any reactionary who favored putschist or electoralist solutions. But it has not resorted to a policy enabling it definitively to liquidate all sectors (like *La Prensa*, *El Comercio*, etc.) that continue to plot and to set under way sensationalistic campaigns designed to convert Peru into another Chile or Bolivia.

We continually hear government denunciations of the role played by the so-called multinational corporations like ITT, which participated in the attempted coups in Chile. Nonetheless, up to now, the government has not taken a single concrete step against these corporations. And, in fact, it permits them to go on cooking up their seditious plans.

Here is an example: At present the imperialist concern Motor Perú continues to sabotage government plans for rationalizing the automotive industry, by forcing the workers to pro-

*The 1929 treaty was the United States-mediated settlement to the 1879-84 War of the Pacific. The treaty awarded to Chile extensive littoral territories that previously had been ruled by Peru and Bolivia.

This treaty and the arms race referred to have relevance to contemporary Peruvian politics inasmuch as there have been recent announcements by Bolivian authorities that they will strengthen their armed forces as a prelude to regaining access to the Pacific.

It has also been reported that Peruvian authorities are predicting a similar armed confrontation over this question. — IP

duce more cars than the number set by law. Several leaders and activists of the union have been jailed and fired for coming out against this. The sole response of the government has been to use the facilities of State Security to finger these compañeros and imprison them. It has refused to settle the conflict.

There is no immediate danger of a coup. The PC (Unidad) [Partido Comunista (Unidad) — Communist party (Unity)] and other reformist sectors who claim that there is such a danger, do so to cover up their capitulation to the government and their refusal to fight for wage increases.

In our opinion, this government is different from the previous ones, although it remains essentially bourgeois in its class character. It has carried out important progressive nationalist measures, which we are willing to support critically against attempted sabotage by the oligarchy and imperialism. But that does not entail any confusion on our part; it is not a workers government. It is only a government of the bosses that tries to haggle with the imperialists for a bigger share for the national bosses.

In our opinion, only a workers and peasants government will definitively expel imperialism and the oligarchy from the country and begin to build socialism. That is why we believe that we cannot fight against a coup if we don't maintain our total independence, relying only on the mobilization of the workers and other popular sectors.

If a coup actually occurs, we will be in the front line, calling for mobilization of all the workers and the people to repulse it. And we will be willing to make a common front—while maintaining our class independence—with all nationalist and reformist sectors who, though they aren't for socialism, want to fight against the coup.

But for the labor movement to be able to do this sometime in the future, it must go on strengthening its unity and organization today, struggling for wage increases and against all concrete manifestations of capitalist exploitation. The achievement of working-class unity today within a single union federation would allow us in a more favorable period ahead to be prepared in an organized way to confront the ultraright danger. But we

will not achieve that through the policy of the Communist party, which calls for "labor unity to deepen the revolution" and not to go on strike be-

cause strikes "play the game of the counterrevolution." We can only do it through a policy based on the concrete struggles of the workers. □

U.S. Rallies Demand: No Aid to Chile Junta

Prominent unionists, politicians, and churchmen were among those who spoke at demonstrations held across the United States the week of May 11. The actions demanded an end to U.S. aid to the Chilean junta and the release of all political prisoners in Chile.

Though modest in size, ranging from 50 to 500 persons, the actions occurred in some fourteen cities in response to a national call by the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA) and four other groups. In many areas, the actions received the broadest organizational support of any activities since the military coup.

The protests focused on the cases of six political prisoners in Chile, who, according to an USLA press announcement, "symbolize the plight of the victims of the junta's terror." The six are Clodomiro Almeyda, former foreign minister; Luis Corvalán, general secretary of the Chilean Communist party; Orlando Letelier, for-

mer Chilean ambassador to the United States; Luis Vitale, Marxist scholar and a leading figure in the world Trotskyist movement; Luis Figueroa, president of the Central Unico de Trabajadores (CUT—United Federation of Labor); and Bautista Van Schouwen, leader of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR—Movement of the Revolutionary Left).

The keynote speaker at the New York rally was Martin Garbus of the Lawyer's Committee on Chile. Garbus recently returned from observing the show trial of sixty-seven air force and civilian personnel in Chile. According to a release from the New York coalition, Garbus noted that the junta is placing importance on this trial to establish its legitimacy in the eyes of international public opinion. At the same time, the release quoted Garbus as saying, "The press is self-censoring the reports of the trial for fear of being expelled from the courtroom." □

U.S.A.

Kleindienst Pleads Guilty in ITT Case

In a deal with the Watergate special prosecutor, former Attorney General Richard Kleindienst pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge May 17. The charge, refusing to testify before Congress, carries a minimum sentence of one month in prison and a maximum of one year and a \$1,000 fine. The judge delayed sentencing.

Kleindienst never really refused to testify to Congress. In March 1972, during Senate Judiciary Committee hearings into a favorable antitrust settlement given to ITT in exchange for promises of a contribution to Nixon's reelection campaign, Kleindienst said under oath: "In the discharge of my responsibilities as the acting attorney general in these cases, I was not interfered with by anybody at the

White House. I was not importuned. I was not pressured. I was not directed."

But last October, it was revealed that in April 1971, Nixon had phoned Kleindienst and ordered him not to appeal a court ruling in the case. By pleading guilty to the misdemeanor charge Kleindienst thus avoided the likelihood of being indicted and tried for perjury.

The day before Kleindienst's plea, another member of the White House gang was sentenced to ten to thirty months in prison. Dwight Chapin, formerly Nixon's appointments secretary, had been convicted April 5 on two counts of perjury in connection with earlier testimony to a grand jury investigating the activities of campaign saboteur Donald Segretti. □

What the Vote Totals Revealed

By Pierre Rousset

[The following article by a leader of the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire, the French Trotskyist organization that supported the candidacy of Alain Krivine in the presidential election, was published in the May 10 issue of *La Gauche*, the Belgian Trotskyist weekly. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The main lesson of the first round of the election is the confirmation of a far-reaching political realignment of the French right wing. This realignment is a product of the crisis of the state apparatus established by Gaullism in 1958. Chaban-Delmas, the candidate of the UDR [Union of Democrats for the Republic] "party-state," was routed, receiving only 15 percent of the votes even though he represented the party that has been in power for sixteen years and that was the majority of the former governmental majority.

The bourgeoisie formed a bloc behind Giscard d'Estaing, the minister of finance, who received 32.6 percent of the votes.

Mitterrand, with 43.24 percent, registered the radicalization and the shift to the left by the electorate, receiving one million more votes than the Union of the Left had received during the last legislative elections, in 1973. In percentage terms, his vote was considerably higher than in the 1965 presidential elections and analogous with the 1973 legislative results. The abstention rate was very low (15.77 percent), which generally benefits the right. Mitterrand did not, however, reach the 45 to 46 percent on the first round that he needed to be able to look forward to a fairly easy victory on the second.

A section of the left-wing electorate did not vote for Mitterrand in the first round of the election. And the significant overall result for the far left—between three and four percent—

probably reflects the wariness of a part of the workers vanguard and Communist party members toward the politician Mitterrand and the right-wing campaign of the Union of the Left. But an analysis of the far-left votes is more complex.

Arlette Laguiller, the candidate of *Lutte Ouvrière*, received 595,247 votes, or 2.33 percent of the total. Alain Krivine, for the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire, got 93,990, or 0.36 percent. René Dumont, nominated by the ecology movement, got 337,800, or 1.32 percent; it is very difficult to know how his votes divide up on the political spectrum. But it is important to compare the results of the two candidates who claim to speak for Trotskyism, Arlette Laguiller and Alain Krivine.

The very obvious difference between their votes cannot be explained by the respective degree of implantation of the two organizations (the city-by-city breakdown of the vote indicates that this had little effect), or by their respective capacity to mobilize crowds (the FCR's turnouts in meetings and demonstrations were larger than *Lutte Ouvrière's*). *The difference is explained above all by two differing political choices with respect to the style and content of the campaign.*

Once the idea of running Piaget had been given up, the FCR decided on an electoral campaign centered around *political education*, pointing to the problems that would arise in future struggles, especially if Mitterrand should win. This campaign was considerably better than those of previous years, and much more concrete. We made a considerable effort to "depersonalize" our candidacy, by turning over our platform to many men and women activists during the broadcasts and meetings.

Drawing on examples from the French Popular Front of 1936, from Chile, and from recent workers struggles, our radio and television programs were able to pose problems

as varied as the woman question, the role of the army and antimilitarist work (forcing the war minister Galley into a public polemic), the function of strike committees in struggles, and workers self-defense. *Its political repercussions were considerable.* And the "Krivine" vote was seen as a vote for the socialist revolution.

Lutte Ouvrière opted for another kind of campaign: exposés of capitalist exploitation and the oppression of women, and an elementary expression of distrust toward the bourgeois politician Mitterrand. In doing this, *Lutte Ouvrière* had to avoid posing the fundamental problems of the struggles that are coming. But *Lutte Ouvrière* did succeed in crystallizing around Arlette Laguiller (a woman worker and trade unionist) a diversified grouping of minority electoral currents that identified with her candidacy: Communist party members who found it hard to swallow the bitter pill of the Mitterrand candidacy, feminists voting for a woman candidate, and populists voting for a worker. A recent opinion poll by Sofres [Société Française d'Enquêtes par le Sondage—French Association of Public-Opinion Surveys] and *Le Figaro* [a Paris daily]—whose results should be taken with a grain of salt—indicated that at the opening of the second-round campaign, 42 percent of the "Laguiller electorate" would give their votes to Giscard d'Estaing and only 46 percent to Mitterrand. If this were true, it would indicate an even greater heterogeneity in the Laguiller vote than we had thought.*

A significant number of far-left sympathizers, moreover, voted for Mitterrand on the first round, because they wanted to vote "practical" in the hope that he would win on the first round.

*The May 11 *Le Monde* reported that SOFRES had admitted that its description of the Laguiller electorate was based on a very small sample of "around twenty persons" and that the poll therefore contained "a wide margin of error." Another survey, by Publismetrie, which was reported in the May 10 *l'Aurore*, indicated that 79 percent of Laguiller's voters would support Mitterrand in the second round; 5% would support Giscard; and 16% were undecided. The same poll indicated that 66% of Krivine's voters would back Mitterrand; 3% would vote for Giscard; and 33% were undecided.—IP

We think that revolutionary militants had the obligation to prepare for the future, rather than aim for "electoral credibility" at the price of watering down their program. That being said, today the FCR and *Lutte Ouvrière* are committing all their forces to the second-round battle, calling for a vote for Mitterrand to beat Giscard d'Estaing. For it promises

to be a close struggle.

The Union of the Left response is to shift its campaign significantly to the right. They see their task as one of winning some Gaullist votes that went to Chaban-Delmas on the first round. The revolutionary militants have the job of making this campaign a class confrontation.

May 9, 1974

Antilles

Campaign Posed Issue of Self-Determination

By Dick Fidler

There are some 800,000 voters in what remains of France's colonial empire, its "overseas territories and departments." All the candidates sent their representatives to the colonies to drum up support.

The majority of the colonial population lives in the Antilles. The islands with the largest populations are Martinique and Guadeloupe. A key issue here is their political status in relation to metropolitan France. A large proportion of the population favors increased political "autonomy" and a substantial minority calls for complete independence.

When the Union of the Left was formed in 1972, its "Common Program" claimed to recognize "the right of self-determination of the peoples of the overseas departments and territories." However, the program says nothing about the right of *separation* of the colonies, and confines its concrete proposals to a promise that the colonial people will have the right to "discuss" their status with the French government.

Even this shame-faced proposal, permeated with the chauvinist prejudices of French imperialism, was too strong for the Socialist party in Guadeloupe. It split in two, a dissident section forming a "Guadeloupean Socialist Movement" that opposes the Union of the Left and proclaims its "attachment to France."

At the outset of the campaign, Union of the Left candidate François Mitterrand dispatched his Socialist party confrere Gaston Defferre, the mayor

of Marseille and former minister of overseas territories, to the Antilles. No sooner had Defferre arrived in Guadeloupe than he was explaining that the Common Program's position on the colonies was "badly edited," that a new version was being prepared, and that Mitterrand was bound only by what he himself stated on this question. "We know how much the people of the Antilles are attached to France," Defferre said, in an obvious pitch for the dissident Socialists' votes, "and François Mitterrand does not want to break with the Antilles—quite the contrary."

A correspondent in the Antilles of the French Trotskyist daily *Rouge* commented ironically that the tropical sun seemed to have made Defferre about twenty years younger, so that he sounded like "the minister of colonies that he was under the Fourth Republic."

Also supporting the Mitterrand candidacy was the Parti Progressiste Martiniquais [PPM—Progressive Party of Martinique], a proautonomy grouping led by Aimé Césaire, who is also mayor of Fort-de-France, the capital of Martinique. At a joint election meeting with Defferre in mid-April, Césaire attempted to belittle the differences on the colonial question: "The important thing is not independence (which, after all, we're not asking for) nor even autonomy, although it is true that some of my friends support that; the important thing is the fact that François Mitterrand would bring the people of Martinique the right to speak

and to choose, and the guarantee that their choice will be respected."

In contrast to the reformists and petty-bourgeois nationalists, the Groupe Révolution Socialiste (GRS), Antilles section of the Fourth International, waged a joint campaign with the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire of France in defense of the right of self-determination of all the French colonies, including their right to national independence.

A leading member of the FCR, Jean-Pierre Beauvais, toured the Antilles at the invitation of the GRS, and Philippe Pierre Charles, a leader of the GRS, toured France during the campaign, sharing the platform with the FCR presidential candidate Alain Krivine at election rallies and on television.

In an interview published in the May 4-5 issue of *Rouge*, Charles explained that the GRS saw no contradiction between supporting self-determination and at the same time participating in a French election campaign. In the present circumstances, he said, a boycott position would be an abstract gesture; the workers in the Antilles are following the election with considerable interest, and their national consciousness is not on the level it was, say, in Algeria or Indochina. "And the workers are very well aware that our participation in the election in no way signifies an acceptance of the French institutional framework."

The GRS, like the FCR in France, called for supporting Krivine on the first round, and voting for Mitterrand on the second round.

"Despite all the limitations of the Union of the Left on colonial questions," Charles told *Rouge*, "for the workers in the colonies, a France with Mitterrand is not the same thing as a France with Giscard. The politicized workers in our country have a lot of illusions about what a Mitterrand victory can bring. We are not dupes; we are well aware that Mitterrand is trying to carry out a bourgeois political operation and to use the trade unions and workers parties that support him as a stepping-stone. We know Mitterrand's record on colonial questions: He was the minister of the interior who in 1954, at the beginning of the Algerian liberation struggle, stated that in Algeria 'the only negotiation is war.' We also know that

while the Common Program talks of self-determination for the overseas territories and departments, Mitterrand and the Union of the Left have since retreated, claiming they are 'interpreting' this section. . . .

"But we are aware that Mitterrand's electoral triumph in France would appreciably modify the political situation in our country. The greater the workers' present illusions, the greater will be their disillusionment. It is absolutely certain that if Mitterrand wins, the struggles in the colonies will increase."

Charles's predictions about the Antilles voters' expectations of Mitterrand

were borne out by the results of the first-round voting. In Guadeloupe Mitterrand had an absolute majority, doubling the united-left vote of 1969. In Martinique he trailed the Gaullist Chaban-Delmas, but obtained two-and-a-half times the left's vote in 1969.

Alain Krivine received about the same proportional vote as he did in metropolitan France. Arlette Laguiller of *Lutte Ouvrière*, which campaigned with its Antilles cothinkers of *Combat Ouvrier* around a program that also supported the colonies' right of self-determination, received a somewhat higher vote. □

American ambitions while putting obstacles in the way of Moscow's great obsession: an integrated Western Europe."

At the outset of the campaign, Moscow made no secret of the fact that it favored Jacques Chaban-Delmas, the candidate of Pompidou's party. After all, was Mitterrand any better? The *New York Times* reported May 1 that it had submitted a questionnaire to the two candidates and found that they had "positions that seemed to have more in common than in conflict." Mitterrand, like Chaban, favored continued membership in NATO and the Common Market. The *Times* found that the main difference was over Israel. "Mr. Mitterrand's position on Israel and on oil talks came much closer to that of the United States. It offered more support for Israeli views than any French Government has advanced since de Gaulle abruptly shifted policy upon the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war."

Moscow Backs a Winner

Soviet Envoy Pays Respects to Giscard

"Hello. This is the USSR Embassy in Paris. We wish to inform you that our ambassador, Monsieur Stepan Chervonenko, will pay a visit to the minister of economy and finances this afternoon, at 5 o'clock. You may send photographers."

That was how the press agencies learned of the Soviet ambassador's visit to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing two days after the results of the first-round voting in the French election had indicated that Giscard might well become the next president of France.

The Political Bureau of the French Communist party, campaigning hard for François Mitterrand, issued a public rebuke. "The Soviet ambassador's move is inopportune. Unfortunately, it may encourage speculation that this represents a position of support for the right-wing candidate."

The embassy stated that the call was only "normal diplomacy." Wasn't Giscard, as finance minister, head of the French-Soviet economic commission due to meet in Moscow next month?

But Giscard would no longer be finance minister after the May 19 runoff election, since he would either win and become president, or lose to Mitterrand and be removed from the government.

In fact, as *Le Monde's* Moscow correspondent noted in the April 24 issue

of the Paris daily, "the Soviet leaders don't like the unknown." Throughout the French election campaign, they have been expressing the hope that the foreign policies of the late president, Georges Pompidou, will be continued — by whatever means necessary.

Pompidou fitted in reasonably well with the Soviet view of détente. "Holding firmly to the reins of power," *Le Monde* said, "[Pompidou] was a valuable and useful partner, who could hold his own against excessive

The French CP sent a delegation to the Soviet Embassy on April 20 to object to Moscow's failure to line up behind the Union of the Left. But by this time Chaban was already trailing badly in the polls. The tone of Soviet commentaries shifted. They now contrasted the divisions within the outgoing government with the "unity of the left." *Izvestia*, after taking a sideswipe at the "Trotskyist and anarchist candidates of division," denounced the "fervent pro-Atlantic Al-



"L'Express" cartoonist TIM pictured Brezhnev in shirt worn by Giscard supporters. Slogan means "Giscard to the helm."

liance elements" and other "Europeanists" supporting Giscard d'Estaing.

But the first-round results indicated that Mitterrand faced an uphill climb if he was to take the presidency. Hence, the Soviet ambassador's conspicuous gesture to the more likely winner. Two days after his meeting with Chervonenko, Giscard told a breakfast meeting that his foreign policy would be "similar to Georges Pompidou's." A few hours later Pompidou's former foreign minister, Michel Jobert, announced that he was supporting Giscard for president. And Chervonenko's assistants were telling the press that the ambassador had been "satisfied" by his conversation with Giscard.

Was there a substantial contradiction between the line of the Kremlin and the line of the French CP? Not really. Both want to collaborate with the French bourgeoisie, rather than overthrow it. The difference is that Moscow can deal directly with the existing rulers, while the French Stalinists have for the last twenty-seven years been deprived of that possibility. That is why the French CP initiated the formation of the Union of the Left with the Social Democrats and the Left Radicals, a bourgeois party. Its aim was to forge the popular-front instrument that it hopes will eventually give it a direct role in administering the bourgeois state.

The "conflict" between the French CP and the Kremlin is not unlike the situation that arose during the last U. S. presidential election, when Brezhnev and Company supported Nixon, while the U. S. Communist party campaigned for his Democratic party opponent, George McGovern. In the last analysis, both tactics serve the same strategic end: peaceful coexistence with imperialism. □

Joy in the White House

The White House, which has to take its support where it can get it these days, has sent out a special mailing of 6,000 copies of the results of a recent poll by a little-known Philadelphia outfit. The poll, taken between April 29 and May 5 by the Albert Sindlinger Company, purportedly discovered that only 29.9 percent of the country wants Nixon impeached.

This was viewed as particularly heartening news in Nixon circles, since the better-known Roper poll showed that 53 percent favor impeachment.

Marchais's 'Passion for France'

How French CP Pursued Gaullist Votes

[The following article appeared in the May 7 issue of *LeQuotidien Rouge*, the French Trotskyist daily, immediately after the first-round voting in the presidential election. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Those who didn't see [CP leader] Georges Marchais on television Sunday night [May 5] giving Lecanuet [leader of the Democratic Center party] and Sanguinetti [general secretary of the UDR, the main Gaullist party] a lesson in Gaullism missed a great show.

A simple calculation of electoral arithmetic lies behind this remarkable overture to the Gaullists: If all the votes of Laguiller, Krivine, and Dumont [the "ecology" candidate] were to go to Mitterrand, he would attain 47 percent. If you added the votes of Royer and Le Pen [marginal right-wing candidates] to Giscard's, he would get 37 percent. Mitterrand can win, then, if only a quarter or a third of Chaban's voters withhold their votes from Giscard, either by abstaining or by voting for Mitterrand. Hence this spectacular pitch for support, in which the CP's position is even more outrageous than the SP's.

Even before the first round, Georges Marchais had set the tone in his meeting at Marseille: "There are men and women in our country who are Gaullists because for them de Gaulle embodied France's greatness, its independence, and its prestige in the world. Are they so different from us? We share in common that passion for France, for its sovereignty, and its influence." At that moment, Chaban's decline registered in the polls, was sounding the death knell for the UDR. The CP proposed to build a victory for the [Union of the] Left by scrounging among the UDR's remains.

On the night of May 5, when Mitterrand's returns proved slightly less favorable than expected, this class-collaborationist line cloaked in the language of national union was escalated.

The leaders of the CP and the SP stepped up their bids. Marchais explained on the radio that the distance separating Chaban's voters from Mitterrand is "infinitely smaller" than the gap between them and Giscard, who wants to sell out "the Gaullist heritage." Duclos, with the anecdotal skill that he alone possesses, related in a good-natured tone: "I have a neighbor who's a Gaullist. Well, I can tell you, he's a contradictory type. . . ." And Marchais capped it all off: The Gaullists are for change; so are we! They're for progress; so are we!

These words reveal the outlines of the major themes of the second-round campaign. Marchais goes even further: On television, he explained to the flabbergasted and sarcastic Lecanuet that there will be only six or seven Communist ministers in the government (which is not such a big deal!) and that since the [Union of the] Left wanted to form a government of "national union," there are still some posts for those would like to join them.


This "operation," so vigorously denounced by Sanguinetti, is not the work of the CP and the SP alone. The leadership of the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] is likewise not afraid to add grist to the mill: "On May 19, all the workers will unequivocally choose which side they're on. The workers who voted Gaullist must rejoin their camp. . . . In massive numbers, the workers will choose the road of progress, freedom, and national independence."

The theory that Gaullist turncoats will participate in the Mitterrand campaign, within the perspective of a government of "national union," has little chance of taking shape. The FJP and Grandval [president of the Union Travailiste, a left Gaullist group] will no doubt remain exceptions.

But it can't be taken for granted that the whole of Chaban's electorate will rally to Giscard.

In any case, one thing is clear: We were perfectly justified in stating our lack of confidence in the Union of the Left. □

AROUND THE WORLD



Tito Elected President-for-Life

The Yugoslav Federal Assembly voted unanimously May 16 to approve an "unlimited" term of office for President Josip Broz Tito. The assembly also elected eight persons to the newly created collective presidency, which consists of one member from each of Yugoslavia's six republics and two provinces.

The Slovene representative in the collective presidency is Edvard Kardelj, who is widely considered the likely successor when Tito's lifetime term runs out.

Tito is now 82 years old. The average age of the presidents is considerably younger: 61 years.

Immigrant Workers Occupy Government Office in Paris

Some 100 immigrant workers from Tunisia, Pakistan, and Mauritius occupied the government employment office for the Paris region May 8. They demanded that the rights granted May 6 to thirty immigrant workers who had carried out a hunger strike be extended to all other immigrant workers who are in France illegally. They called in particular for immediate visas and work permits.

Jamaica to Raise Bauxite Prices

Prime Minister Michael Manley asked the Jamaican Parliament May 16 to increase the royalties and taxes paid by foreign companies on Jamaican bauxite from the present \$80 million to \$200 million a year. Jamaica is the world's leading exporter of bauxite, the ore from which aluminum is extracted.

Manley also asked for legislation to require aluminum companies to maintain production at levels set by the government. Manley delivered his request to Parliament after negotiations with six major aluminum corporations broke down May 14.

Income from bauxite accounts for 40 percent of Jamaica's foreign-exchange earnings. Manley pointed out that the country's expenses for imported petroleum, formerly \$50 million a year, had recently risen to \$150 million.

"The underdeveloped nations," Manley said, "can no longer continue to supply raw materials to developed countries on the old basis, and in an inflationary world

it is important to link the value of raw materials to the value of finished products."

Pentagon Admits Weather-Warfare

In testimony before a Senate subcommittee, Pentagon officials have admitted that U.S. forces did engage in extensive rain-making as a weapon in the Indochina war. The testimony was given March 20 but not made public until May 18.

The cloud-seeding began in March 1967 and was discontinued in July 1972 after it was reported in the U.S. press. At the time, then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird denied the press accounts. The subcommittee released a January 1974 letter from Laird, in which he apologized for that denial, saying he had "just been informed" of the rain-making program.

Laird did not indicate how newspaper reporters happened to be better informed of Pentagon activities than the secretary of defense. Columnist Jack Anderson described the cloud-seeding operations as long ago as March 1971.

Superfin Sentenced

A Soviet dissident, Gabriel Superfin, is reported to have been sentenced in mid-May by a court in Oryol, 200 miles south of Moscow. Superfin was formerly a researcher for novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

After a three-day trial, Superfin was convicted on six counts of "anti-Soviet activity." One of the charges was that he had helped to publish the samizdat journal *Chronicle of Current Events*. He was sentenced to five years in a strict-regime labor camp, followed by two years internal exile.

Workers, Peasants Continue Protests in Ethiopia

Following the arrests of eight of their leaders in Addis Ababa, postal workers staged a four-hour protest strike May 4. The army and police moved in to guard both the post office and the telecommunications buildings.

The next day Emperor Haile Selassie, in a radio and television address, called on the armed forces "to show discipline" and to be on guard against "agitators"

who were threatening continued unrest.

The bus drivers in Addis Ababa began another strike May 15 after the body of a bus driver was found under mysterious circumstances.

According to the May 18 *Le Monde*, thousands of persons from the provinces of Tigre and Wallo came into the capital and demonstrated in front of the parliament building, protesting the famine conditions in their provinces.

Kremlin Reported Planning to Put Pyotr Grigorenko on Trial

According to information received from the New York-based Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, a commission of Soviet psychiatrists has ruled that dissident Communist Pyotr Grigorenko "no longer needs psychiatric treatment." However, he must now stand trial.

Grigorenko has been confined in mental hospitals and psychiatric hospital prisons since his arrest in May 1969 for his activities in defense of the Crimean Tatars and other minority nationalities deported by Stalin during World War II.

The specific charges the bureaucrats intend to try him under and the date for the trial are not yet known.

Grigorenko was tried under Article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code in February 1970 and sentenced to compulsory treatment for an indefinite term on the basis of a forensic "diagnosis" by the Stalinist bureaucrats' psychiatrists at the notorious Serbsky Institute. Their diagnosis said that Grigorenko suffered from "reformist ideas . . . of an obstinate character." Because of the harsh conditions of Grigorenko's confinement, his health has deteriorated considerably. He is now partially blind and has suffered three strokes, the most recent on April 5. His wife, Zinaida, reports that he is now too weak to write.

The campaign to free Grigorenko received added impetus as a result of demonstrations held May 7, "Grigorenko Day." A demonstration sponsored by the Union of Crimean Tatars for Total Rehabilitation in front of the United Nations headquarters in New York raised as one of its demands the immediate release of Grigorenko and also of Crimean Tatar activist Reshat Dzemilev, who is presently imprisoned by the Kremlin bureaucrats because of his activities in defense of the rights of the Crimean Tatar

peoples. The demonstration was held to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of Stalin's mass deportation of the Crimean Tatar people from the Crimea to Central Asia on May 18, 1944, and the abolition of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The Crimean Tatar people are still denied the right to return to their homeland.

The bureaucrats' decision to put Grigorenko on trial provides a major focus for an international defense campaign demanding that Grigorenko be released.

Gujarati Group Demands Action Against High Food Prices

★ પડો... ઓર... લઢો ★

જીવનમાં અન્યાયને અંત આપવા માટે આજે આજીવન સુધી આંતરરાષ્ટ્રીય સ્તરે વિદ્યમાન વિદ્યાર્થીઓને જોડીને વિદ્યાર્થી સંઘનું સ્થાપન કરવામાં આવ્યું છે. આ સંઘનું મુખ્ય કાર્યકરો તરીકે નીચેના નામોના વિદ્યાર્થીઓને પસંદ કરવામાં આવ્યા છે.

કામ કોણે?	વિસ્થાપન	કોણે રીતે?
• નકશા પોરીનું	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.
• સંપ્રદાય પોરીનું	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.
• કાળા વ્યવસ્થાનું	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.
• શોધણી પોરીનું	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.

• આ સંઘનું મુખ્ય કાર્યકરો તરીકે નીચેના નામોના વિદ્યાર્થીઓને પસંદ કરવામાં આવ્યા છે.

વિદ્યાર્થી આક્રમણ... શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.

• આ સંઘનું મુખ્ય કાર્યકરો તરીકે નીચેના નામોના વિદ્યાર્થીઓને પસંદ કરવામાં આવ્યા છે.

કામ કોણે?	વિસ્થાપન	કોણે રીતે?
• શિક્ષણ ક્ષેત્રે	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.
• તબીબી સારવાર ક્ષેત્રે	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.
• કાનૂની ક્ષેત્રે	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.	• શ્રી રામ વિદ્યાલયના કાર્યકર તરીકે.

The above Gujarati-language leaflet is being distributed in 50,000 copies by the Study and Struggle Alliance in India in the state of Gujarat. The leaflet calls for measures to end profiteering, hoarding, and black-marketeering.

The price of many food items has risen 100 percent in Gujarat in the last year. The Study and Struggle Alliance has headquarters in the cities of Baroda, Ahmadabad, and Surat.

India Conducts Nuclear Test

India became the sixth country to join the "nuclear club" May 18 by announcing its first successful test of a nuclear device. The underground explosion was estimated by the chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission to have a force of ten to fifteen kilotons. The U.S. bomb dropped on Nagasaki in 1945 had a force of twenty kilotons.

A government statement described the blast as "a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment." The statement continued that the government has "no intention of producing nuclear weapons and reiterated its strong opposition to military uses of nuclear devices."

Divorce Law Retained in Italy

By a 3-to-2 margin, Italian voters have rejected an attempt to repeal the country's divorce law, which went into effect in December 1970. Final results in the referendum, held May 12-13, gave 59.1 percent of the vote in favor of retaining the law and 40.9 percent favoring its repeal.

The referendum had been requested by opponents of the law, who collected 1,300,000 signatures on petitions demanding that divorce be outlawed.

The present law permits a judge to end a marriage after the couple has been separated five to seven years, depending on circumstances, or in cases in which either husband or wife has been imprisoned for a serious crime. Since the law went into effect, three-fourths of the divorces granted have gone to couples who had been separated more than twenty years.

The issue caused a division in the ruling coalition. Premier Mariano Rumor's Christian Democratic party favored repeal of the law, while his partners in the Socialist, Social Democratic, and Republican parties favored its retention.

Among the nongovernmental parties, the chief advocate of repeal was the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement.

cept Gutierrez Mendieta, according to *La Opinion*. Apparently, however, the charges of conspiracy are still pending against the five.

Danish Workers Strike to Protest Tax Increases

Tens of thousands of workers in Denmark struck May 16 to protest sales-tax increases voted by the parliament the night before. In the afternoon, a crowd estimated by police at 60,000 marched on the parliament building shouting "Out with [Premier Poul] Hartling!" The increased sales taxes are expected to raise the prices of some items by 5 to 25 percent.

Kremlin Asks Red Cross to Visit Helicopter Crew Downed in China

The Soviet government has asked the International Red Cross to visit the three-man crew of a helicopter that landed in Chinese territory March 14. Peking has refused to release the crew, charging that they were engaged in a spying mission.

U.S. Production Drops

The U.S. real gross national product in the first quarter of 1974 fell at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 6.3 percent, according to the Commerce Department. In April, the department estimated the first-quarter decline at 5.8%. Real GNP is expressed in terms of 1958 dollars to remove the effects of inflation.

The decline was the largest since 1958, when real GNP dropped at an annual rate of 9.2% in the first quarter.

The Commerce Department's figures also showed prices rising at a rate of 11.5% annually. The earlier estimate of inflation was 10.8%. A first-quarter increase of 12% in corporate profits was attributed entirely to price rises on existing inventories.

Turkish Amnesty Excludes Political Prisoners

The Turkish National Assembly passed an amnesty bill May 15 that is expected to affect more than 50,000 persons. The bill reduces prison sentences by one-third. Excluded from the amnesty, however, are political prisoners convicted of "anticonstitutional" crimes.

Kurdish Radio Reports Fighting

Voice of Kurdistan Radio claimed May 16 that Kurdish forces had scored a victory in a two-day battle with Iraqi government soldiers. The broadcast said that 156 government troops had been killed, while Kurdish casualties were 16 dead and 24 wounded.

Belgian Strikers Seize Goods They Produced

Striking workers at the Ampex electronics factory in Nivelles, Belgium, have followed an example set by the Lip strike in France and expropriated part of the factory's stock. More than half of Ampex's 150 employees went out on strike in April to protest threatened layoffs and a cut in the year-end bonus. They announced May 9 that they had seized 10,000 tape cassettes and would begin selling them to the public at cost if their demands were not met.

Lechin Arrested in Argentina

An alleged plot to overthrow the dictatorship of General Hugo Banzer led to the arrest of five Bolivians in Argentina the first week of May. The arrests followed widespread reports that the Argentine government was giving a free hand to Bolivian conspirators in Buenos Aires, and served as a pretext for the Banzer government to extend the state of siege in Bolivia another three months.

Those arrested were Juan Lechin Oquendo, former mineworkers leader; Ted Cordova-Claure, international news editor of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinion*; Jorge Gutierrez Mendieta, former diplomat and member of MNRI (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda—Left Revolutionary National Movement); Edil Sandoval Moron, ex-president of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies; and Oscar Pena, journalist for *El Cronista Comercial* in Argentina.

As of May 8, all had been released ex-

Inflation Issue Defeats Trudeau Government

The Canadian government headed by Pierre Elliot Trudeau was defeated May 8 when it lost a no-confidence motion in the House of Commons over its proposed budget.

The opposition Conservative party joined with the New Democratic (labor) party on a motion that defeated the Liberals by 137 to 123. A federal election has been called for July 8.

The key issue in the Trudeau government's downfall was inflation—the government's failure to stem prices, now rising at a rate of 10.4 percent a year. The NDP motion, without pro-

since 1968, when as newly appointed leader of the Liberal party he was elected to office on a wave of personal popularity that Canadians called "Trudeaumania." With 152 of the house's 264 seats, his government was the first since 1962 to have a clear parliamentary majority. But increasing unemployment, the continuing rise of Québécois nationalism, and the government's general inability to respond to the popular illusions about Trudeau led to a decline in the government's support. In the October 1972 election, the Liberals were once more reduced to a minority position in parliament, and they continued to hang

on to the government only with the support of the New Democrats, who held 31 seats.

That informal coalition (although the NDP consistently voted with the government, it was never represented in the cabinet) lasted for a year and a half. But in recent months the alliance came under increasing strain, as a series of labor struggles spurred by inflation put pressure on the trade-union-based NDP to break its links with the Liberals. (See *Intercontinental Press*, May 13, page 586.)

The Canadian Trotskyists of the League for Socialist Action-Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière, Canadian section of the Fourth International, will give critical support to the NDP in this election, calling for a vote for the NDP as an elementary expression of working-class political action but giving no support to the Social Democratic party's program. □



TRUDEAU: Inflation erodes "mania."

posing any alternative, simply condemned the government's "failure to apply any measures to help pensioners or others on fixed incomes, to deal with the housing crisis, and to remove the glaring inequalities of the tax system."

In fact, the Conservatives favor the application of wage controls, while the NDP calls for "selective price controls" and a "two-price system" under which basic commodities would be sold at world-market prices abroad but at lower, subsidized prices in Canada.

Trudeau has been prime minister

Canadian Doctor Charged Under Antiabortion Law

Court Overturns Acquittal of Morgentaler

A Québec Appeals Court on April 26 overruled the November 13 jury acquittal of Dr. Henry Morgentaler on a charge of performing an illegal abortion. If convicted of the charge, Morgentaler faces possible life imprisonment. His lawyers have appealed the case to the federal Supreme Court.

Although Morgentaler had admitted during the November jury trial in Montréal that he had performed the abortion in question, he argued that the law making abortion illegal was unjust. As Heidi Fischer, wrote in the May 13 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Toronto: "The jurors [by acquitting Morgentaler] reflected the widespread opposition to the abortion laws and the widespread support for Dr. Morgentaler."

A press release of the Toronto Committee to Defend Dr. Morgentaler stated that the appeals court overturn of the previous acquittal "represents a further attempt to victimize this doctor and, in doing so, deal a severe blow to the abortion rights movement. It demonstrates the lengths to which the government and courts are pre-

pared to go to get a conviction in this case, thereby threatening the rights of every woman who may wish to decide whether or not to complete a particular pregnancy. This ruling attempts to negate this right and reinforce the federal government's restrictive antiabortion law, despite majority support for women's right to safe, legal abortion."

Demonstrations in response to the ruling took place in Toronto, Winnipeg, Ottawa, and elsewhere, with more than 100 persons turning out for the Toronto protests.

A message from Morgentaler was read to the rally in Toronto, in which he said: "Our fight is a fight for human rights, for freedom to choose, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion. Our fight will demand sacrifice and effort—sustained effort."

"I am determined to continue this fight until this basic right of women to control their reproduction and to obtain abortions when needed, in safety and dignity, is achieved."

The defense committees are planning further actions in support of Dr. Morgentaler. □

Anti-Confucius Drive Hits at Rebel Chinese Youth

By Les Evans

Next to the suspected supporters of Lin Piao in the People's Liberation Army, the most prominent targets of the "anti-Confucius" campaign now being waged by the Maoist regime in Peking are the millions of "educated youth" and intellectuals deported to the countryside at the end of the Cultural Revolution. The need to silence intellectual dissenters underlies the government's choice of Confucius, the classical prototype of a Chinese intellectual, as a convenient symbol in the present campaign against the alleged elitism of the youth.

In 1966, when Mao Tsetung sought to dislodge and destroy the sector of the Chinese Communist party leadership around the then head-of-state, Liu Shao-ch'i, he opportunistically appealed to the student youth to "make revolution" against the party apparatus in the name of socialist democracy and egalitarianism. This resulted in the closing of all Chinese universities and the creation of the millions-strong Red Guard organizations, which began their political life as instruments of the Mao faction of the bureaucracy. Many of these young people, however, sought to practice what Mao preached and turned their fire on Maoists as well as Liuists in what had begun as a purely intrabureaucratic struggle. Mao called on the army, then commanded by Lin Piao, to ensure maintenance of bureaucratic control. The army took charge and finally dissolved the Red Guard groups. From mid-1967 to the end of 1968 the hundreds of different Red Guard organizations were demobilized and their radicalized members deported en masse to remote areas of the countryside to be "reeducated" by the peasantry. But the massive numbers involved have not proved easy to control. Youths want to return to their homes after four or five years of rural labor; their relatives in the cities, including within the party, are a further source of resentment and discontent.

The scope of the alienation of the youth from the regime can be gauged from the numbers sent to the countryside, and the concomitant cutbacks in higher education. A December 22, 1973, Hsinhua dispatch reported: "More than eight million educated young people have left Chinese cities and towns to settle in the countryside during the past five years."

Some analysts in the West have sought an explanation for this massive shift in population—5 percent of the total urban population—in a lack of employment opportunities in the cities. This interpretation is belied on several counts. At the present time Chinese heavy industry is expanding at a rate of about 9 percent a year, while population is growing at about 2 percent; industry is growing at about twice the rate of agriculture, which should mean a faster increase in urban employment over the countryside, which has been traditionally overpopulated in relation to jobs. Moreover, this measure has been used by the regime before for similar purposes, in 1957-58 and again in 1963 when massive shifts to the rural areas were ordered. In both previous cases the

shifts came at a time of strong industrial growth but on the heels of a repressive campaign against intellectual dissent (the "anti-rightist" campaign of the fall of 1957 and the crackdown that followed the slight intellectual thaw of 1962).

The Maoist press makes hardly any effort to veil the repressive function of the deportations. No claim is made that the educated youth are being sent to the countryside to raise the cultural level of the rural areas, as was done in Cuba in the campaign against illiteracy. It is claimed instead that the students represent a danger to the regime and a threat of "capitalist restoration." A February 3 Hsinhua dispatch, for example, gave the following explanation of the deportations:

"Student Sun Hai-yan of the Physical Engineering Department of Tsinghua University said: 'Chairman Mao calls on the educated young people to go to the countryside and integrate with the workers and peasants. This is a measure taken against the outmoded conceptions of the exploiting classes that prevailed for thousands of years, and a critique of Confucius and Mencius. Lin Piao, an out-and-out disciple of Confucius, looked down on the workers and peasants and manual labour and said the educated young people were doing "forced labour" in the countryside, in an attempt to disrupt Chairman Mao's fundamental measure against revisionism and for bringing up successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat. Lin Piao wanted to poison our revolutionary young people and tried to pull us back to become his tools for restoring capitalism.'"

Thus on the one hand, youth who protest going to the countryside are accused of looking down on workers and of being "tools for restoring capitalism," while those who submit are granted the dubious title of "successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat." But after years of "proletarianization" by the "poor and lower middle peasants," the regime does not seem to have found many of the deported millions trustworthy enough to enter the bureaucratic apparatus that will constitute the "succession" when Mao dies. The December 22 Hsinhua dispatch cited above revealed that out of the 8 million deportees, only 60,000 have been admitted to the Chinese Communist party. The CCP has about 32 million members, or roughly one out of every 18 adult inhabitants of China. Among the "revolutionary successors" sent to the countryside, only one out of every 133 have been reeducated enough to qualify.

The universities, which were closed in 1966, reopened only in 1970, with drastically reduced enrollments. The course of study was then cut from four or five to three years, with one of the three years devoted to productive labor in installments of four months each. Thus a college education has been reduced to half the amount of schooling required before the Cultural Revolution. This should theoretically allow China to double the number of

students. No doubling has occurred.

The new crop of students, although described in the press as "workers, peasants, and soldiers," also happen to be selected almost entirely from within the Communist party or are tested members of the Young Communist League. A March 29, 1974, Hsinhua dispatch revealed that 70 percent of the 1974 graduating class at Tsinghua University in Peking were party members (45 percent were members when they enrolled; the rest were admitted while at the university). This compares to 0.7 percent of party members among the deported youth. Today all applicants to colleges are required to complete at least two years of productive labor before being eligible for consideration. They must then be recommended by the party unit where they work and approved by party units at the university where they apply. The most important single criterion for acceptance is political orthodoxy.

A December 30, 1973, Hsinhua dispatch reported that the total number of college students who graduated in China in 1973 was 29,000. This compares to 200,000 for the 1962-63 school year or only 14.5 percent of the number ten years ago. Total graduations, given the population increase, are barely at the same level as they were in 1951-52, when 18,000 students graduated. (*China: A Handbook*, Yuan-li Wu, editor. New York: Praeger, 1973, p. 698.)

The Shanghai *China Monthly Review* reported in its November-December 1952 issue that at that time there were 220,000 college students in China. There was then a four or five year course. If today's three-year course turns out 29,000 graduates in a year we might suppose that the total number of students is somewhere between 80,000 and 100,000, or half of what it was twenty-two years ago. This is not even taking into consideration the one million college graduates that China lost (taking the 1963 rate as a basis) by leaving its universities idle for five years. Surely the country is not so rich in skills that it can sustain such a loss without serious harm.

A case can be made for the usefulness in a workers' state of intermixing study with productive labor to prevent study from becoming abstract and divorced from life. But this proposition has little in common with banishment to a lifetime of rural toil of the great majority of the best and the brightest of the young generation. The attack on the youth, as it was in the Soviet Union under Stalin, is a sure sign of the inability of the authoritarian bureaucratic caste to win over or assimilate the young rebels of the new generation.

To suggest that "capitalist" ideas find their most fertile ground among youth who were not even born when capitalism was overthrown would be, if true, an admission of the bankruptcy of the Maoist regime.

"Elitism," as a separate question from capitalist restoration, also flows from real material privileges and power, not from "learning." It is not the students in China who command high salaries and wield power over others, it is the aged officialdom of the CCP. Here the Chinese press, which discerns capitalists and spies everywhere, is noticeably silent.

While the Maoist regime claims it wants to teach the youth the virtues of hard work, it opposes allowing them to become industrial workers. This is a principal indicator of the repressive function of the movement to send the youth to the countryside. The peasantry historically,

despite its proven revolutionary qualities in the struggle against foreign imperialism and for land reform, is the purveyor of self-interested localism and of the mentality of small proprietors, not socialism. This is one of the most profound problems and difficulties in administering a workers' state in an underdeveloped country and one of the sources of bureaucratic degeneration when, as in the Soviet Union under Stalin, the backwardness and limited cultural horizons of the peasantry are exploited by the bureaucracy as a weapon against the cities with their proletarian base and intellectual ferment. Mao turns the youth over to be "reeducated" not by the working class but by the "poor and lower-middle peasants."

The Chinese press today carries many accounts of the life of the deported youth. Although these are meant to show the loyalty of the former students to the regime and record the progress they are making, they are notable also for being taken almost always from the most remote and desolate regions, where the horizons on the world and on life opened by a taste of knowledge and culture in a city high school or college must seem distant indeed.

An October 27, 1973, Hsinhua dispatch describes how 400 middle school graduates sent out from Shenyang in 1970 "have built a new village on an uninhabited seashore in Northeast China's Liaoning province and turned the saline land there into fertile fields." Although the area is uninhabited, the youths are not completely isolated, being visited occasionally by their new instructors: "Old peasants often educated them in class struggle by recalling their sufferings in the old society in contrast with the happiness of today." The article added that "Some of the more advanced have been admitted into the Communist Party of China or the Communist Youth League."

A February 15, 1974, dispatch tells of a group of youth who have "benefitted from re-education by former poor and lower-middle herdsmen" on the grasslands of China's northern frontier:

"Since 1968, 1,100 educated young people from the cities of Peking, Huhehot and Silinhot have come to settle in Abaga Banner in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous region. Determined to take root in the grasslands and build them up, they assiduously study works by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Chairman Mao in association with reality. They often ask former poor herdsmen to recall their past misery and contrast it with their present happy life. They also study the history of class struggle in this animal husbandry area and how the herdsmen were emancipated."

There are occasional "model examples" of young people who have made good in the countryside, usually after very considerable stays in the rural zones. Hsing Yentzu, Hsinhua pointed out in a September 20, 1973, dispatch, was elected to the party Central Committee at the Tenth Congress after having been "educated by the party and former poor and lower-middle peasants over the past 15 years" while working in a commune "to turn a vast low-lying alkali area into high-yield land."

One of the most frequent accusations against Lin Piao is his alleged description of the deportation movement as a disguised form of "forced labor." This suggests that this opinion is sufficiently widespread in China for the regime to feel the need to attribute it to the most prominent villain of the day in order to discredit others who

raise the charge.

Evidently Mao's opponents on this score include not only the youth themselves, but a growing number of their parents, who understandably object to the bleak future their children face and to the long separation that the peasantization campaign has imposed. The regime has responded by giving a particularly ingenious twist to the anti-Confucian propaganda. Confucius, it is pointed out, was a staunch upholder of the family and a proponent of filial piety; hence, objections to separating families are a sign of dangerous Confucian tendencies. Two of the more pliable youth at a commune in Honan province were given an opportunity to expound on this subject in a February 5, 1974, interview with a Hsinhua reporter. Hu Hsin and Chu Tung-hui declared in a joint statement:

"Confucius spread the reactionary idea that 'while his parents are alive, the son should not travel far.' For thousands of years, the exploiting classes vigorously advocated this. Lin Piao and company did their utmost to prevent educated young people from integrating themselves with the workers and peasants and to sabotage the work of settling educated young people in the countryside. Their purpose was to confine young people to their homes and divorce them from the workers and peasants and from the practice of the three great revolutionary movements and make them their tools for subverting the dictatorship of the proletariat and restoring capitalism."

Hu and Chu had evidently learned their lessons well, although they could not resist a little embellishment at the end: "Though we are now far from our parents, we are closer to Chairman Mao's revolutionary line."

Despite the repeated references to "integrating" the former Red Guard youth with the "workers and peasants," in practice the aim seems to be to keep them as far from the workers as possible. While there are hundreds of articles in the Chinese press about educated youth settling in the countryside, there are virtually none about such youth who have become factory workers in the cities. Instead, a great play has been given to a few cases of youth sent down to the communes who have rejected offers by their parents to find them factory jobs and thus arrange for their return to the urban centers. The January 5 Peking *People's Daily*, for example, published on its front page a letter from an educated youth, Chai Chun-tse, in reply to a letter from his father, under the headline, "Daring to Break with Traditional Ideas." The Hsinhua account ran as follows:

"In August, the young man received a letter from his father, in which his father told him that some factories were going to recruit new workers and asked him to return to the city and apply for a job. In his reply, the young man criticized his father's idea and reiterated his determination to stay on and help build up the socialist countryside." In his letter to his father, Chai Chun-tse wrote:

"Our aim is to eliminate private ownership and break with old ideas. Such ideas as attaching greater importance to industry than agriculture, to the city than to the countryside and looking after only one's own interests are based on private ownership."

The father is reported to have confessed his error and to have encouraged his other children to follow in the footsteps of Chai Chun-tse. In an accompanying editorial,

the *People's Daily* said:

"We hope to see more revolutionary young people giving challenges to older revolutionaries and more older revolutionaries accepting the challenges and leading the young people in marching along Chairman Mao's revolutionary line."

The implications of a workers' state touting the idea that becoming a factory worker is an example of a mentality wedded to "private ownership" need hardly be elaborated. Nor is this an isolated instance. A similar exchange between a father and son was featured, for instance, in the December 20, 1973, *Liaoning Daily*. In this case, the father, a party cadre, hinted that he could get his son a job as a coal miner and thus arrange for his transfer back to the city. The son replied:

"Father, I really cannot explain how disturbed I was after reading your letter. . . . I understand your intentions very well but I still firmly adhere to the view I told you of a year ago, which is that my subjective [outlook] should comply with the objective needs in the revolution of the proletariat. . . . The subjective wish to be a factory worker seems to be in accord with the objective situation of our family, myself and my personal interests. However, it is not in compliance with the real, the most fundamental and the greatest interests of my family and myself. This most fundamental interest is eliminating the system of private ownership and breaking with old concepts." (Cited in the *China Quarterly*, January-March 1974, pp. 211-12.)

Behind the mystification about "private ownership" in a country that abolished private ownership twenty years ago is the need to clamp down on party cadres who are using their influence to arrange to bring their children home. Since such moves are not voluntary but depend on approval from party units at both ends of the transfer, this campaign suggests a good deal of discontent among lower ranks of the bureaucracy itself. Educated youth without influential parents are in no position to return to the cities, whatever their subjective desires.

The regime has also sought to pressure its cadres into compliance by featuring examples of parents who have encouraged their children to go to the countryside. Some of the parental farewell speeches reported in the Chinese press, while lacking something in warmth, leave no doubt as to the approved course of conduct. As veteran worker Yu Jen-min reportedly put it to his son, "By going to the countryside, you are repudiating Lin Piao and Confucius. You must make real efforts to study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, modestly accept re-education by the poor and lower-middle peasants and resolutely fight against the traditional ideas of the exploiting classes." (Hsinhua, March 16, 1974.)

One of the most ominous turns taken in the anti-Confucius campaign is the insistent lauding of the "revolutionary correctness" of the ancient Legalist philosophers and of the first Chinese emperor, Chin Shih-huang, who suppressed dissenting Confucian intellectuals by burying hundreds of them alive and burning their books.

Under a Stalinist regime that rewrites history to order for the purpose of finding analogies for its current policy, the favorable recalling of book-burnings and executions of intellectuals under an ancient tyrant can only be taken as a dire threat to any of the young dissenters who continue to assert their opinions. □

Why Revolutionists Support Kurdish Self-Determination

[The following article appeared in the March-April issue of *Al Munadel*, newspaper of the Revolutionary Communist Group, Lebanese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Once again "northern Iraq"—that is, the part of Kurdistan that British colonialism included within the borders of the Iraqi state—is the site of a confrontation between the forces of the Baghdad government and those of the Peshmerga, the armed movement linked to the Kurdish Democratic party (KDP). Judging from the circumstances that led to the present conflict and from the fact that the fate of the Kurdish people in Iraqi Kurdistan is at stake, it seems this time as though we are on the threshold of a war of vast scope, a war of the sort witnessed during the Aref era [1963-68] and the end of the Kassem era [Kassem headed the Iraqi government from 1958 to 1963].

In fact, however, from the second decade of the twentieth century to the present—that is, for more than half a century—there has been nearly permanent war between the Kurdish people and its various Arab, Persian, British, and other oppressors, a war occasionally interrupted by periods of truce that always turned out to be temporary. The cause of this permanent war is a secret to no one: The Kurdish nation is one of the most oppressed nations of our epoch. It not only suffers from separation and division, like the Arab nation, but also from the fact that none of its parts in themselves constitute a state.

Colonialism supervised the division of Kurdistan into segments incorporated as (oppressed) minorities into the larger states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (and even the Soviet Union). The Kurdish nation thus suffers oppression on two levels—that of its splintered national reality and that of each of its parts. This oppression is not solely political but is multifaceted in the extreme. It includes a very important cultural aspect, inasmuch as the different states into which Kurdistan is divided seek in varying degrees to smother the cultural expression of the Kurdish people (more so in Turkey, and relatively less in the Soviet Union).

The question may be raised as to why there is a Kurdish revolution under way only in the Iraqi section. The explanation for this fact is not to be found in some higher level of consciousness of the Kurds in northern Iraq, nor in other subjective factors, but mainly in the different

relationship of forces from one state to another.

In Iraq, the Kurdish people represent at least a quarter of the country's population, while in the other states it is not even close to this proportion. Furthermore, the region they inhabit represents a significant portion of the territory of the Iraqi state. This is why the Kurdish national liberation movement has been able to develop in Iraq and impose itself by force of arms on successive governments in Baghdad.

On the other hand, in Iran, Turkey, and Syria the movement has remained much weaker. In these countries it has had to face the repressive terror of states that are much stronger than the present Kurdish movement within their borders.

The Kurdish Movement and the Present Iraqi Government

When the Baath grouping took power in Iraq in July 1968 through their habitual putschist methods, the first task they set for themselves was to liquidate the revolutionary upsurge that Iraq as well as the other Arab countries had experienced since June 1967.

The principal manifestation of this revolutionary upsurge was perhaps, in that period, the armed struggle launched by Khaled Ahmed Zaki in southern Iraq. Khaled's undertaking—which was not without a certain fociist inspiration—was based on a dual gamble. On the one hand, he counted on a linkup between the armed struggle he and his comrades had launched with the radicalized tendencies inside the Iraqi CP, where a split had resulted in the formation of the "Central Leadership." On the other hand, he also gambled on a linkup between his struggle and the forces of the Kurdish revolution.

The Iraqi bourgeoisie became aware of the seriousness of the situation and of the revolutionary possibilities that could result if this tripartite linkup were to take place. This fact was of decisive importance in accelerating the Baathist coup. The putschists took action with the aim of thwarting Khaled's revolutionary undertaking.

They set out to liquidate all real or potential revolutionary forces, beginning with the weakest—the armed struggle nucleus—in order then to crush the "Central Leadership." That was to be followed by an effort to crush the active forces of the classical Stalinist faction of the "Central Committee"—indeed every component of the organized workers movement in Iraq. As for the Kurdish movement, the Baath-

ist regime chose to neutralize this force until it had settled accounts with the Communist tendencies. This neutralization was strictly a provisional, tactical measure aimed at dividing the opposition forces, isolating each one, and suppressing them.

The Baathist regime's efforts to neutralize the Kurdish movement were codified in the well-known accords signed March 11, 1970.

The agreement reached between the Baghdad government and the KDP leadership was the common fruit of tactical calculations by the Baathists and the Kurdish movement's military forces. The accords contained—as the price of the truce they established—some concessions on the part of the Baathist regime, including the promise to grant self-government to the Kurdish people in Iraq by March 1974, that is, four years later. This was the length of time the Baathists judged sufficient for carrying out their plans. In the meantime, the Kurdish movement and the Baghdad government were supposed to work out the terms of the self-government formula.

This was not the first time the Baathist regime had resorted to the tactic of neutralization. As early as March 1963, a month after they had taken power and begun their odious campaign of exterminating the communists and the workers movement, the Baath putschists purchased the neutrality of the Kurdish movement through a set of agreements that also promised self-government. These accords soon crumbled, however, and fighting began again in June of the same year.

The Iraqi Baathists' reputation for demagoguery has already been solidly established, since they have always tried to glorify to the maximum their most vile measures, and to present decisions based on strict calculations of their narrow interests as the product of the purest principles and the most unblemished revolutionary idealism. From the farce of the "Progressive Patriotic Front," the political cover for a Baathist dictatorship described as the summit of democracy (if Great Britain is the "cradle of parliamentary democracy," the Iraq of today is assuredly the grave of democracy in any of its forms!), to the March 11, 1970, accords, which were described by the Baathists as proof of the "internationalism" of their party (sic!)—there is no reason for us to be astonished at this pretension of internationalism, since the Baathist regime also claims adherence to "socialism," and even to its "scientific version!"—from the one to the other we see the same method of combining mystifying propaganda with

an absolutely hollow din.

Similarly, upon examination the "self-government" plan put forward by the Baath party this year turns out to be, not Kurdish self-government, but self-government for the Baath party in the Kurdish region! This plan projected special administrative apparatuses for the Kurdish region (it could hardly have done otherwise!), but they were to be subject to the direct and total control of the Baghdad central government. The plan also gave the central government broad prerogatives for intervening in the affairs of Kurdistan, which (if they had ever come to be applied) would have represented a step backward in some regions, given the actual autonomy they currently enjoy under the control of the Peshmerga.

It was therefore to be expected that the KDP would refuse this caricature of self-government, following its previous refusal to join the farcical "Progressive Patriotic Front." For the KDP is the genuine leadership of the Kurdish national movement, as opposed to those grouplets bound hand and foot to the Baghdad government—such as the one that has given itself the name Kurdish Revolutionary party in order to carry out a counterrevolutionary policy, or the groups of traitors in the pay of the Baath party, the Iraqi equivalent of the Jaabari traitors on the West Bank of the Jordan.

We say that this rejection was to be expected, but not because we believe in the revolutionary virtues of the KDP leadership. We do not have the slightest illusions on that score. We say it because the KDP and the movement it leads are strong enough to be free of any compulsion to sell their sovereignty for a "mess of pottage" and submit to a fictitious self-government scheme such as the one proposed by the Baath party. In the same way, it was the strength of the KDP that enabled it to refuse to participate in a "front" that in reality would have signified the submission of its members to the Baathist regime.

To those who explain the position taken by the KDP as being instigated by Iran and by U.S. imperialism—an explanation that seeks to justify support to the Baghdad government—we ask the following questions: When the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad faced British, Iranian, and Iraqi aggression in 1946, was its military leader, the same Mullah Mustafa Barzani, an agent of the alliance between Iran and the imperialists? When Barzani fled to the Soviet Union and lived there for more than ten years, was he acting under the instigation of imperialism? When the Kurdish movement took part in the 1958 overthrow of the Hashemite regime, an agent of imperialism, was it motivated by reactionary aims? And how can we explain the fact that this movement also fought the Kassem regime (beginning in 1961), and then its bitter Baathist enemies, and afterwards the Aref regime . . . ? Can we ex-

plain this persistence in the national struggle through some external logic? This is categorically excluded! The genuine and fundamental motive force of the KDP's struggle is its nationalism (which is also, as we shall see, the reason for its opportunism).

The Kurdish Democratic party is, in a way, a broad national front comprising diverse social layers and classes, ranging from semifeudal elements to poor peasants and workers. Inside the KDP there coexist various political currents ranging from religious reactionaries to left-wing petty-bourgeois elements, all of which have nationalism as their common denominator. The Barzani leadership constitutes, if one may speak in these terms, a Bonapartist leadership trying to recon-



MUSTAFA BARZANI

cile the class divisions among the Kurdish people by leading their struggle from a nationalist point of view and covering over the internal social differentiation.

The KDP's nationalism enables it to justify all sorts of alliances and sources of aid if they meet the needs of its immediate national struggle. For this reason, it could just as well collaborate with the Soviet Union as with the United States or another imperialist power—that is, with anyone who is opposed to the central government in Baghdad.

Thus it is not support from Iran that determines the position taken by the KDP but rather the KDP's nationalism that explains its predisposition to collaborate with Iran. If we emphasize this fact, it is because it is connected with the problem of what position should be taken on the Kurdish revolution.

Revolutionary Communists and the Kurdish Question

The Leninist position on the national question—which is put forward not only in all Lenin's writings on the question but also in the actual practice of the Leninist leadership of the young Soviet republic and Communist International—is based on two fundamental principles: defense of the right of nations to self-determination, which includes unconditional support to the struggle of oppressed nations against their oppressors; and a class analysis of the national movements, along with aid to the formation of a proletarian tendency inside these movements, a tendency that may be able to stand up to the leadership by prevailing over the other class tendencies.

There is no contradiction between these two basic considerations; on the contrary, they are in perfect harmony. Communists' defense of oppressed nationalities regardless of the nature of their leadership is the best, if not the only, way to strengthen the proletarian communist current within these nationalities.

Failure to understand this point means a failure to understand the entire Leninist strategy for proletarian revolution!

How would the Leninist position—the only genuine position of proletarian internationalism—be interpreted where our subject is concerned? The question is not the least bit complicated.

Revolutionary communists defend the right of the Kurdish nation to self-determination, including its right to separate from its oppressors and form its own state (from this alone it is obvious that characterizing the Kurdish movement as separatist can in no way influence the position of revolutionaries). They support the struggle of the Kurdish people unconditionally, regardless of the nature of its leadership. At the same time, however, they seek to expose the limitations and opportunism of the Kurdish movement's feudal-bourgeois leadership.

They also encourage the Kurdish workers to form their own organization and fight to gain the leadership of the Kurdish revolution in order to assure that it links up with the struggle of the workers and poor peasants of Iraq and all the other states that oppress the Kurdish nation.

That is the Leninist position and the only internationalist position! As for the support of Stalinist Arabs to the Baghdad government, this coincides perfectly with what we have been accustomed to see from them: the betrayal of the most elementary principles of proletarian internationalism if they come into contradiction with the policy of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The Soviet bureaucracy currently supports the Iraqi government. This is a continuation of its foolish policy of cooperating with everyone who desires it, even if their desire for such cooperation

is motivated by narrow, reactionary interests of a temporary character and has the purpose of assuring the neutralization of Soviet supporters in their own country (we say this policy is stupid because it has resulted in a number of setbacks, even for the Soviet bureaucracy itself). The Stalinists see a "great step forward" in the present Baathist self-government plan, whereas they viewed its March 1963 counterpart as a mystifying maneuver of the "fascist" Baath party!

To those who refuse to support the Kurdish movement under the pretext that its leadership—the leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani—is reactionary and backward, we ask the following questions: What do you think the "right of nations to self-determination" means if you pose as a precondition to this right the existence of a revolutionary leadership at the head of an oppressed nation? And do you believe that you will contribute to the creation of this revolutionary leadership if you refuse—in the name of "revolutionary" principles—to support the struggle of the oppressed nation? Quite the contrary, your position will strengthen the arguments of the counterrevolutionaries within the oppressed nationality.

For the same reasons, Lenin warned against basing one's position in respect to oppressed nations on the nature of their leaderships. He supported recognition of Finnish independence despite the fact that the leadership of the separatist movement consisted of reactionary Social Democrats. Let us note the fact that Finland withdrew from the Soviet Union when the latter was led by the Bolsheviks. What then can be said if the "separatists" are struggling against the government of a Baathist dictatorship?

Lenin's reply to Bukharin on the proper attitude toward the national question is extremely clear and correct:

"We cannot deny [the right to self-determination] to a single one of the peoples living within the boundaries of the former Russian Empire. . . . What, then, can we do in relation to such peoples as the Kirghiz, the Uzbeks, the Tajiks, the Turkmen, who to this day are under the influence of their mullahs? . . . Can we approach these peoples and tell them that we shall overthrow their exploiters? We cannot do this, because they are entirely subordinated to their mullahs. In such cases we have to wait until the given nation develops, until the differentiation of the proletariat from the bourgeois elements, which is inevitable, has taken place.

" . . . To reject the self-determination of nations and insert the self-determination of the working people would be absolutely wrong, because this manner of settling the question does not reckon with the difficulties, with the zigzag course taken by differentiation within nations.

" . . . Every nation must obtain the right to self-determination, and that will make the self-determination of the work-

ing people easier. . . . If we were to declare that we do not recognise any Finnish nation, but only the working people, that would be sheer nonsense. We cannot refuse to recognise what actually exists; it will itself compel us to recognise it. The demarcation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is proceeding in different countries in their own specific ways. Here we must act with utmost caution." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 29, pp. 172-74.)

And to those who justify their chauvinist attitude under the pretext of objection to the relationship between Iran and the Barzani leadership of the Kurdish movement,* we ask the following: If someone told you that he refused to support the struggle of the Palestinian people because the leadership of Fateh is linked with Saudi Arabia, what would you say in reply? The question under discussion



"New York Times" map indicates principal Kurdish areas.

here is identical, and you cannot resort to different yardsticks depending on whether or not the oppressed belong to your nation or to another! That position represents the height of opportunism and chauvinism.

Does our position mean that we do not criticize the ties between the Barzani leadership and Iran? To the contrary, our duty as communists is to denounce the Barzani leadership and to struggle for the formation of an alternative proletarian leadership for the Kurdish revolution!

The opportunism of the feudal-bourgeois leadership of the Kurdish movement, the Mullah Barzani leadership, has on several occasions led the Kurdish people's struggle into dead ends. In 1963 for example, it took a neutral attitude toward the reactionary Baathist coup and permitted the Baathists to organize their cam-

*Why do they say nothing about the alliance between the Turkish government—a reactionary, proimperialist dictatorship—and the Iraqi government against the Kurdish movement?

paign of exterminating communists. In return, its repayment was a new war launched by the Baathist regime a few months later.

The Barzani leadership agreed to come to terms on a truce with the Baathist regime that emerged from the July 1968 coup. The new regime then took advantage of the truce to attack the workers movement. Today it has once again shown its fangs to the Kurdish movement after having accomplished its initial task.

In both cases, the Kurdish movement found itself weakened by the weakening of the workers opposition, that is, after the Kurdish movement itself had permitted the weakening of the latter.

Barzani is currently allying himself with the shah of Iran as though he had forgotten that the shahinshah's government is one of the most ferocious oppressors of the Kurdish nation, and as though he were unaware that genuine self-government in Iraqi Kurdistan would represent for the Iranian government a far more serious danger than the Baghdad regime. Barzani has thus formed an alliance with a force that will undoubtedly stab him in the back. The fact that he declares he is prepared to renounce Kurdish national rights in Iran and Turkey is only a new product of the extreme opportunism he is capable of. In this case it has led him to betray the interests of the other sections of his own nation.

Limiting the Kurdish national struggle solely to Iraq performs a service for imperialism. For the main aspect of the revolutionary potential of the Kurdish people's struggle stems from the fact that it is in conflict not only with the Iraqi government but also with the Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian governments. The very dynamic of this struggle leads it to this confrontation, because the Kurdish nation is a unit despite its division.

Reunification of the Kurdish nation is a task of considerable scope because it involves a revolutionary confrontation with the reactionary governments in the imperialist camp. This task cannot be taken up, much less be carried out, except by a revolutionary proletarian leadership that will have to get rid of the present reactionary leadership. This task can be accomplished only if the struggle of the Kurdish nation is linked to the struggle of the working masses of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. That is, it must be integrated into the process of socialist revolution on a scale that embraces the entire region.

Defend the right of the Kurdish nation to self-determination!

For a proletarian leadership of the Kurdish revolution!

For a united, independent, socialist Kurdistan!

Long live the fusion of the Arab and Kurdish revolutions!

Long live proletarian internationalism! □

Voices of the Soviet Opposition

Reviewed by Ken Coates



Karl Marx was very fond of Balzac, and Lenin had a positive reverence for Tolstoy. Paul Lafargue tells us that Marx's admiration for Balzac was "so profound that he had planned to write a criticism of *La Comédie Humaine* as soon as he should have finished his economic studies." Lenin himself displayed a powerful sympathy for Tolstoy, about whom he wrote a whole series of articles, at least one of which still bears reading: It is called "Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution," and it begins with a very wise question:

"To identify the name of a great artist with the revolution, which he has obviously failed to understand and from which he had obviously alienated himself, may at first seem strange and artificial. How, indeed, can one describe as a mirror that which does not reflect things correctly?"

Yet nonetheless, although Lenin's philosophy was worlds apart from Tolstoy's, the revolutionary could not fail to see in the work of the novelist a "world significance," reflecting "the world significance of the Russian Revolution." In exactly the same way, the Balzac whom Marx held in such affection was, in his political allegiance, an almost pure reactionary.

That dwindling band of apologists who maintain that every baseness of the modern Russian government is a signpost to worldwide brotherhood should refresh their memories of these facts, for the plain truth is that the case of Alexander Solzhenitsyn makes

them all topical again. Beyond doubt Solzhenitsyn is a writer who connects on the same plane as Balzac and Tolstoy, whose novels, as Georg Lukacs recognized, not only embody the best

Letter to Soviet Leaders From A. Solzhenitsyn. London: Collins & Harvill in association with Index on Censorship, 1974. 64 pp. £1.25.

Samizdat: Voices of the Soviet Opposition, edited by George Saunders. New York: Monad Press, 1974. 464 pp. \$3.95, £1.65.

traditions of realism, but at the same time demand to be placed among the great artistic achievements of the twentieth century. They could fulfill the second of these claims without meeting the first, but the fact that they combine them both means that it is perfectly reasonable to see Solzhenitsyn, just as Lenin saw Tolstoy, as a "mirror of the Russian Revolution." Critical realism is not a literary style to be affected, but a commitment to the preservation of living truths, which has frequently in the past set the output of great writers at odds with their own strenuously advocated professions of belief. Whether we look into *The Human Comedy* or into *War and Peace*, we find infinitely more than the patchwork of prejudices which made up their authors' creeds. Marxist critics like Lucien Goldmann have repeatedly discussed this phenomenon. For the benefit of both Stalinist backwoodsmen and the hierarchs of the liberal establishment, it needs to be explained again in relation to *Cancer Ward* and *The First Circle*. It also, alas, needs to be understood when one reads the latest Solzhenitsyn work, the "Letter to Soviet Leaders."

In this tract we can hear again the accents of the querulous Tolstoy, advocating abstinence and asceticism. Solzhenitsyn doesn't stop here, adding zero growth and deference to a de-ideologised party elite, which have the effect of bringing the mixture into phase with some current vogues in the West. A veritable quacks' chorus has arisen in the liberal press to tell us how profound this all is, and how *Russian*. Yes, it is Russian all right—part of the same Great-Russian nonsense which underpins all the dreadful conservatism of the Soviet authorities, and inimical to that free and cosmopolitan Russian spirit which made both 1917 and the richly humane contributions of Solzhenitsyn's own vast novels. When Tolstoy died, a liberal commentator wrote of him, in an obituary celebration, "How majestic, how mighty, a figure cast in a single piece of pure metal, stands this Tolstoy . . . this living incarnation of the integral principle."

"Uph," snorted Lenin, "eloquent talk but it is all untrue. The figure of Tolstoy is neither in a single piece, nor in a pure piece, nor even in metal. And it was *not* for his 'integrity' but precisely because of his departure from integrity that all these bourgeois admirers rose in honour of his memory."

Solzhenitsyn's pamphlet gets some things right, of course. The use of the motor car *does* threaten Russia, just as it is already ruining England. The sale of Soviet natural gas and oil to the United States might be very good for President Nixon or his successors but it won't be an unmixed blessing either for Russia or for the rest of the world. A war with China *would* be a disaster, although it would hardly be, as Solzhenitsyn sees it, purely an ideological battle—the Soviet government maintains huge forces on the Chinese frontier for material

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reasons as well as mental ones, and it did not invade Czechoslovakia in order to reinforce a reading of dialectical materialism, but in order to maintain the hold of a very material power structure over the USSR itself. When he outlines his platform of ecological conservatism, Solzhenitsyn's proposals are particularly hairy—the settlement of North Eastern Russia isn't at all an attractive proposition in present circumstances, which may not prevent Mr. Brezhnev from contemplating it.

But the worst feature of the Solzhenitsyn scheme of things is that it completely writes off the struggle for democracy, and aspires only to the creation of a benevolent despotism liberated from dogma. No modern despot can be benevolent, and this is most of the real trouble in modern Russia. No one man or group of men can assimilate the necessary feedback, leave alone stimulate the necessary feedback, to direct the political and economic destinies of a contemporary state without creating the most monumental ballups. However painful and slow it may be, democracy is the only institution which can call forth that degree of critical social insight which complex economic collectives need to adjust their policies. That Soviet democracy will not have to face the problems of fundamental class conflicts does not in the least mean that all personal and group interests are identical, or that all are in the short run readily to be reconciled. What democracy can do for the Soviet Union, and what autocracy, however benign, will never do, is to make this divergence of interests into a constructive social force, instead of driving it underground. Disfranchised, it seeds apathy and withdrawal, and rots away at the morale of the entire body politic. Needless to say, such a re-born democracy will not need either a stock exchange, or a war with China, or a House of Lords. We saw the beginnings of its outline in the Prague Spring, and a Moscow Spring is on its way.

Anyone who doubts this should complement his reading of Solzhenitsyn with a study of *Samizdat*, a most useful collection of writings from the Soviet underground, where many of the most dedicated socialists in the USSR are to be found. This book

gives half its space to documents from the Trotskyist opposition, which are often moving, and sometimes very informative about past history. But its second half, which presents writings by Grigorenko, Yakhimovich, Plyushch, Kosterin, Moroz and others, is in many ways more important. Undoubtedly the crucial obstacle to the regeneration of Soviet socialism is the fact that the Soviet people lacks access to its own history, and will continue to do so until the martyrs of the nineteen-thirties can be objectively discussed. But at the same time, the crucial growth-point for the trend which will finally produce the Moscow Spring is the sheer guts, and heroic decency, of such men as Major General Grigorenko.

Solzhenitsyn may not like the new Russia when the disciples of these men have won their freedom, and with it the freedom of socialism in the USSR; but he will be at home there, and we



ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN

can be quite sure that no one will ever want him to leave. □

Tracing the History of Norwegian Feminism

[The following review is from the March 9 issue of the weekly *Orientering*, the organ of the Norwegian Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People's party), a left Social Democratic formation. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Agerholt says in her forward to the first edition of her book, which was published in 1937, that the subject of her work is "the woman question in the nar-

Den norske kvinnebevegelses historie (History of the Norwegian Women's Movement), by Anna Caspari Agerholt. Republished by Gyldendal, Oslo, 1973, with an introduction by Kari Skjonberg. Price: 34.50 kroner (approx. US\$6.30).

rowest sense, the struggle for equality with men." She concerned herself hardly at all with the cultural and historical background in the earliest period, that is the period before 1870-80.

In the introductory chapter, which she calls "Women's Liberation Before 1870," she tries to put the woman question in its social context. There she says: "What brought about the sweeping changes in relationships was not primarily liberating concepts or a revolt by the female sex but modern technology and economic and social shifts in the structure of so-

ciety." By that she means the growth of industry and the resulting development of cities and "the flight from the countryside."

Here we have already an indication of the way Agerholt understands the concept of liberation. Today it is in general defined in terms of equality, where equality means the opportunity for women to achieve the same status as men in all areas of social life, while liberation means the abolition of the economic system under which we live—capitalism, which oppresses both sexes. Agerholt does not define these concepts any more precisely but, as she uses the terms, equality concerns more material questions, while liberation applies more to moral and intellectual questions.

She identifies this struggle for cultural liberation with Camilla Collett and Aasta Hansteen. And she calls their time the utopian period in the history of the women's movement, the period when the question was not approached in a practical way, when "there was no attempt to win changes in the laws, no struggle organizations were founded, no petitions were sent to the Storting [the Norwegian parliament] and the government, and there was no involvement in politics."

From this, one could conclude that when women did organize, they engaged in politics (sent petitions, etc.). The greatest shortcoming of the book, in my opinion, is that precisely when she comes to the period when women began to engage in politics, Agerholt confines herself

to the woman question in the narrowest sense—struggle for equality with men. In the period she herself says she puts the most emphasis on, the 1880s and 1890s and up to 1913, she does not try to put this question in its social context.

This is a major objection to the way Agerholt approaches the history of the women's movement. But the book is very valuable because it contains a lot of information about what happened inside the organized women's movement from 1850 to 1937.

This history is an important part of our identity. For our sex the central need is for a basis of identity. Since women are not included in written history, since women are not considered a special and essential part of history, we lack an important part of the basis of women's identity.

So the republication of Anna Caspari Agerholt's *Den norske kvinnebevegelses historie* is welcome. We ourselves must enrich, improve, and advance her work.

—Eva Almhjell

Who Controls North Atlantic Fishing?

[The following article is from the March 30 issue of *Klassekampen*, the organ of the Revolutionære Socialister Forbund (Revolutionary Socialist League, Danish section of the Fourth International). The paper's address is Vendersgade 9; 1363, Copenhagen K, Denmark. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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In its current problems series, Demos has just published a book on the fishing industry in the North Atlantic. The work was put together by the Komite for Bevarelse af Fiskeribestanden i Nordatlanten [Committee for the Preservation of Fish Stocks in the North Atlantic], which was founded by Greenlanders, Icelanders, Faeroese, and Norwegians living in Copenhagen. The group can be contacted c/o Unge Gronlaenders Rad, Lovstraede 6, 1152 Copenhagen K. Its telephone number is (01) 14 82 09.

The authors include political figures, marine biologists, economists, and sociologists from Denmark, Greenland, Iceland, the Faeroe Islands, and Norway. The

book is divided into four main sections: biology, politics, population policy, and the North Atlantic.

In the period between World War II and the end of the sixties, the world catch of fish rose annually by 7%. In 1969, the expected 7% rise did not occur. Instead the total world catch dropped by 2%. In 1971, 1972, and 1973 also the total catch fell. For example, the world's largest fishing operation, the Peruvian anchovy fisheries, was hard hit and it collapsed in 1972, when the catch dropped to less than half the normal level.

Because of the great importance that preserving the fish stocks in the North Atlantic has for the four countries represented by the authors, these nations have an immediate common interest in halting the plundering of these waters by foreign companies. But at the same time, this common interest is complicated by the various kinds of ownership of the means of production in the fisheries and by the different structure of the fishing fleets. For example, in the case of Iceland a good half of the trawler fleet is owned by the town governments, which also own the

factories that process the catch. The rest of the trawler fleet is privately owned. A large part is owned by the "officers," that is the captains, master machinists, and the mates, while the rest (20-30%) is owned by the shipbuilders. Foreign capital is excluded from the Icelandic fisheries by law.

In contrast to this, the book notes that, of the 95 giant West German trawlers, 58 belong to the firm Nordsee, den Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH. in Bremen. But the English-Dutch trust Unilever Ltd. owns 68% of the stock in Nordsee. The firm Hanseatische Hochseefischerei AG (which belongs to the Oetker trust) owns 20% of the trawlers. Of the 300 British trawlers, the Associated Fisheries Ltd. trust owns 164, as well as many distributing firms and processing factories.

The Boston Deep Sea firm owns about 80 trawlers. Its operations are linked to Unilever Ltd. (which turns up once again). Against this background, the authors claim that the Icelandic territorial waters question and the cod war was more than just a struggle of the Icelandic shipbuilding capitalists for profit. It was also a struggle between English (multinational) profit interests and the Icelandic fishermen, who are fighting for their existence.

In north Norway, the situation is somewhat different. The fishing fleet here consists of small boats for coastal fishing, and the processing industry (essentially freezing plants) is owned by big trusts such as Findus International A/S, and a new branch of the Swiss giant Nestle de Alimentana A/S.

The book's strongest side is its detailed information on the problems of ecology and resources. It is up to us to put this in the relevant economic and political context. And we can do that. But as an introduction and background to the question, the book is welcome.

—Hans-Erik Rasmussen

DOCUMENTS

Committee to Defend Brazilian Political Prisoners

[The following communication, dated April 6, 1974, was received from the Comitê de Defesa dos Presos Políticos no Brasil (Committee for the Defense of Brazilian Political Prisoners), located in São Paulo. It is entitled "You will not be able to read this in the newspapers." It was accompanied by a list of fifty-four political prisoners whose cases the committee is publicizing. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Last week in São Paulo thirty-three persons associated with the university—students, professors, intellectuals—were taken prisoner. The event would have passed unnoticed if it weren't for the large number of persons arrested at a single time. Arbitrary imprisonments are a commonplace. So common that no one pays attention.

Thousands of young students, intel-

lectuals, and workers are imprisoned, tortured, and killed. The press never mentions them. The strict police control imposed on the country at this time prevents any demonstrations whatsoever by the Brazilian people, who have not forgotten the habit of questioning, of freely expressing their ideas, of open disagreement, despite the existence of a regime that has oppressed them for more than ten years.

Today the press is closely scruti-

nized. Students are imprisoned and tortured. Intellectuals cannot present their works in public. Workers cannot demand higher wages. Today mass arrests of our trade unionists are taking place. The freedom of the unions has turned into a farce in which the demands made are those that have full support of the government. The opposition is repressed with more imprisonment and torture.

"Brazil is growing and there has never been so much democracy," say the country's rulers. The people are hungry and they see their wages shrinking in a frightening way, so frightening because of the rise in prices of basic foods. The government says the cost of living went up 13 percent but in actual fact it increased more than 30 percent.

Neither of the last two governments was chosen by the Brazilian people, and all their actions—including those of the "new one," in which only the name of the president is "new"—maintain the basic policies of superexploitation. They keep wages at a minimum and enormously increase the profits of business. A great part of the country's production is exported. The Brazilian housewife does not find meat in the supermarkets. With the support of the government, the cattle owners get rich by selling livestock abroad. That is only one example.

Given this situation, the discontent of the Brazilian people is substantial and increasing, and the people are looking for forms to express it. And so the number of prisoners increases.

In view of these facts, we—students, families of the political prisoners, representatives of the church, the MDB [Movimento Democrático Brasileiro—Brazilian Democratic Movement, the official "opposition"], and lawyers—held a mass meeting at the University of São Paulo and resolved to form the Committee for the Defense of Brazilian Political Prisoners. This organization is made up of students, family members, religious figures, MDB representatives, and lawyers, and it welcomes participation by other sectors of the population.

The objectives of the committee are:

1. To publicize all imprisonments or arbitrary acts taken against different sectors of the population. This publicity is important in that it helps

guarantee the physical well-being of the prisoners.

2. To publicize the number and present conditions of the political prisoners.

3. To try to obtain legal assistance for the persons imprisoned.

4. To try to obtain material aid (financial) for the prisoners' families.

The Committee for the Defense of Brazilian Political Prisoners is an on-

going organization, and extensive participation from all sectors of the population is required to accomplish its objectives. This document is an initial step in concretizing them. Therefore we pledge to disseminate it widely and fulfill its objectives.

Freedom for the political prisoners!

Freedom of expression and political organization! □

On the May Day Demonstration in Lisbon

[The following statement appeared in the May 4 issue of *Diário de Lisboa*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The Liga Comunista Internacionalista, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International, the World Party of the Socialist Revolution founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938, informs all the press through this communiqué of the positions it upheld and of what it did on May 1, the international labor day.

In a call dated April 30, the LCI expressed its "support for the central demonstration in the Alameda D. Alfonso Henriques at 3:00 p.m. and appeals to all workers to gather at this point."

Thus, on May 1, the members and sympathizers of the LCI participated along with other organizations and groups in a united march symbolizing the chance for uniting the working class in action. It marched behind a banner that raised the call "Workers and toilers to power" and behind this banner were others that said: "Down with capitalist exploitation," "Free trade unions," "Right to strike," "Bring the soldiers home, Bring the deserters home," "Immediate independence for the colonies," "Socialist revolution."

All along the route, the demonstrators raised the voice of the working class both in and out of uniform, of the toilers and the revolutionary youth, by shouting loud and clear: "Not a single soldier for the colonies," "Down with capitalist exploitation," "Power to the workers," "Independence for the colonies," "Socialism," "Socialist Revolution."

About 10,000 demonstrators entered the stadium behind these slogans. Once there, facing the podium, it was decided to ask for speaking time for the revolutionists. For this purpose, a group of demonstrators carrying red flags sought out the organizing committee of the action. Asking only a chance to speak to the workers gathered in the stadium, these demonstrators found not only that the organizers refused to meet with them at all but that they were threatened with physical violence.

Faced with such attitudes on the part of the organizing committee, attitudes conflicting with the most elementary principles and practice of workers democracy and with the working class's desire for unity, the revolutionists decided, after all the speakers had finished, to leave the stadium and try to participate actively in the rally outside the stadium, since they had not been permitted to do so inside.

Shouting revolutionary slogans, they left the May Day stadium and moved toward the Campo Pequeno, where several persons spoke, standing on a military truck and fraternizing with the uniformed workers and toilers there.

The LCI took this opportunity to appeal to all the workers, soldiers, and sailors, workers organizations, and revolutionary groups to exercise greater vigilance and to begin laying the groundwork for blocking any attempt to dispatch soldiers and sailors to the colonies.

The LCI called for unity in action by all the workers, soldiers, and sailors of all workers organizations and revolutionary groups in order to respond strongly to all attempts to continue the capitalists' war, the colonial war. □