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**From Terrorism
to Neocolonialism?**

What Portuguese Junta Plans for African Colonies

Tamara Deutscher on Pyotr Grigorenko

Interview With Former Red Guard Leader

Irish Nationalism and Protestant Workers

Park Discovers Another 'Plot'

The director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) announced April 25 that sixty students, religious figures, intellectuals, and others were under arrest and 180 more were being "investigated" for their alleged activities in the National Democratic Youth and Student League, which organized student protests in Seoul April 3 and was outlawed the same day by President Park Chung Hee.

The KCIA declared that the League had planned to turn the protests into "riots," seize the presidential palace, and establish a "labor-farmer regime." Park's April 3 decree provided for long prison terms or the death penalty to anyone belonging to the League or staging antigovernment protests.

Despite the decree and the tight restrictions on foreign journalists in South Korea, some reports of continued protests leaked out of the country. On April 8 a farmer burned himself to death in Seoul after shouting, "Down with Park Chung Hee!"

The April 22 *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported that on April 11, students at Chonnam University in Kwangju demonstrated against the regime and twelve were arrested. The following day, students at Seoul National University, which has been at the center of the student struggles since October, also demonstrated. Unconfirmed reports indicated that there were protests in Pusan, Taegu, Taejon, and Chonju.

The regime announced that rewards of 2 million Won (US\$5,013) would be paid to anyone giving information leading to the arrest of three student leaders who are in hiding.

A report by Elizabeth Pond in the April 10 *Christian Science Monitor* commented: "President Park's main concern just now, according to observers in Seoul, is to avoid a direct confrontation between students and troops. These observers believe . . . that South Korea's citizen army of draftees would not shoot demonstrating students." □

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What Portuguese Junta Plans for African Colonies

By Allen Myers

At 12:30 in the morning of April 25, a Lisbon radio station broadcast a song by a popular leftist folk singer. The song was a signal to military units to begin the coup that within a matter of hours toppled the government of Premier Marcello Caetano.

There was very little armed resistance to the coup. Two units of an armored regiment called to defend Caetano immediately went over to the rebels. Caetano took refuge in the barracks of the paramilitary Republican Guard, was surrounded, and surrendered at 7:30 in the evening.

Calling themselves the Movement of the Armed Forces, the rebel junior officers announced the formation of "a junta of national salvation" headed by General António de Spínola, the deputy chief of staff who was fired March 14 at the insistence of conservatives in the government opposed to the neocolonial policy that Spínola advocated in regard to Portugal's African colonies. Also included in the seven-man junta was General Francisco da Costa Gomes, the former chief of staff who was fired along with Spínola for supporting the proscribed policies.

A proclamation broadcast by the junta cited as its first reason for overthrowing the old regime the fact "that after thirteen years of fighting overseas the present political system has been unable to define an overseas policy leading to peace among Portuguese of all races and creeds"—i.e., between Portugal and its African colonies.

Speaking at a news conference the day after the coup, Spínola said that a "provisional government" (which he is expected to head) would be formed within three weeks and that elections to a constituent assembly would be held within a year. He announced an end to press censorship and legalized freedom of political association, assembly, and trade-union organization.

Ninety-nine political prisoners were released from Caxias and Peniche prisons April 27. The cells of Caxias prisons were quickly filled by members

of the political police. These arrests had an aspect of protective custody: Henry Giniger reported in an April 26 dispatch to the *New York Times* that army troops had a difficult time preventing crowds from attacking the political police, who are notorious for torturing prisoners.



SPINOLA: Applause from "New York Times."

In the United States, the liberal imperialist bourgeoisie did not even wait for Spínola to announce these concessions before giving the junta its endorsement. In an editorial the morning after the coup, the *New York Times* described the new regime as composed of "idealistic Portuguese Army officers, determined to restore democracy at home and peace to the African territories."

The *Times* editors went on to explain: "If the junta . . . can carry out its program, it will lift a great load from a NATO alliance constantly embarrassed by a member government that practiced repression at home and

pursued colonial wars in Africa."

On April 28, the *Times* suggested that the Spanish and Greek armies should imitate the Portuguese:

"The coup and the program announced by General Spínola are certain to encourage those elements in Spain—perhaps even some military leaders—who are convinced that Spain must liberalize and that Premier Carlos Arias Navarro or a successor must greatly broaden the base of Government in order to avert chaos after General Franco's departure.

"General Spínola's actions will also embolden officers in Greece who are alarmed at the increasing repression and dangerous drift of the country under the iron fist of Gen. Demetrios Ioannides."

At first glance, Spínola might have seemed an unlikely object of liberal applause: A military officer since 1930, he served as a volunteer with the fascist forces in the Spanish civil war and during the second world war was an observer with the Nazi forces in the Soviet Union. He volunteered to fight in Angola when the liberation movement began guerrilla warfare there in 1961, and from 1968 to 1972 he was commander of the Portuguese forces in their war against the people of Guinea-Bissau.

But with the publication in February of his book *Portugal e o Futuro*, Spínola emerged as the chief public advocate of a neocolonial "solution" to Lisbon's slipping grasp on its African colonies. Basing his argument on the practical consideration that it was impossible for the Portuguese colonialists to achieve a military victory, Spínola urged the creation of a federation of "equal states" in which the most equal state would exercise its control less directly but more effectively through proimperialist layers of the African populations.

Caetano himself had cautiously attempted a certain liberalization of Lisbon's colonial policy, permitting, for example, the formation of a biracial

pro-autonomy group in Mozambique. But the publication of Spínola's book galvanized into action the ultrareactionary opponents of any and all concessions, and Caetano lacked a sufficient base to resist. Spínola, on the other hand, had the army, which saw no future in continuing the thirteen-year effort to defeat the liberation movements militarily.

Moreover, to the ultraconservative sectors of the Portuguese bourgeoisie, Spínola's background makes him perhaps the least objectionable figure to carry out a neocolonial operation. In a brief biography of the general in the April 26 *New York Times*, Paul Montgomery wrote: "Observers often call him Portugal's de Gaulle—a man of the right who can effect a disengagement from colonial ties without causing political chaos or beginning a civil war."

But Spínola has considerably fewer resources at his disposal than did de Gaulle. For years, Lisbon's African wars have regularly absorbed more than 40 percent of the government budget, a tremendous drain on one of the most backward economies in Europe. Opposition to the continued colonial adventure is overwhelming in the civilian population: In the most recent levy, 50 percent of the draftees refused to report for induction. It is estimated that 100,000 draft resisters have left the country. It seems unlikely that whatever popularity Spínola has achieved from the announced liberalization and the overthrow of the hated Caetano regime would endure very long in the face of continued fighting in Africa.

"General Spínola," the *New York Times* editors warned April 28, "must negotiate for that 'peace among Portuguese of all races and creeds' promised by his junta's first proclamation or his coup loses much of its meaning." His problem is that the independence movements have little reason to negotiate with him.

While the independence forces in Angola are divided and have experienced a temporary downturn in their struggle, in Guinea-Bissau the Portuguese forces control little territory outside Bissau. The Republic of Guinea-Bissau has been recognized by eighty countries. The situation in Mozambique was described as follows by John Grimond, Africa correspondent

of the London *Economist*, in an article printed in the April 28 *New York Times*:

"It is in Mozambique that the Portuguese are hard-pressed. There they have been fighting the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) for 11 years, but the war, once confined to the two northern provinces nearest Tanzania, now embraces half the country. The most significant development has been the guerrillas' newfound ability to operate 300 miles from bases in Zambia and Tanzania.

"... the guerrillas' most effective operations have been against roads and railways. Since the beginning of this year they have several times paralyzed the two railway lines, one an important lifeline to landlocked Rhodesia, from the port of Beira."

The racist Rhodesian regime long ago provided concrete evidence of its concern over the guerrilla successes in Mozambique. In an April 22 article, Peter Niesewand and Antonio de Gigueiredo of the Manchester *Guardian* described a secret Portuguese army report that had been smuggled out of the country. The report indicated that the Caetano government had encouraged terror raids deep into Mozambique in which Rhodesian troops were instructed to slaughter anyone they met.

"In the past four years," the report stated, "collaboration has been maintained all along the border with Rhodesia, mainly in the districts of Tete and Vila Pery, but since the beginning of last year, the cooperation has been intensified with the permission given to Rhodesian airborne groups to operate over a vast area to the north and south of the Zambezi River and, in certain special cases, up to the meridian that passes through the village of Carindo, 100 km inside Mozambique territory.

"Such activity consists of speedy paratroop actions, in specified areas, and the liquidation of any human lives (with no military or civilian prisoners) and immediate return to their bases in Rhodesia."

The apartheid regime of South Africa clearly has similar reasons for concern over the independence movements in both Mozambique and Angola. Grimond indicated that Prime Minister John Vorster would support whatever neocolonial scheme Spínola

might work out:

"The South African Government has decided that for the time being it will send men to Rhodesia to make the stand for white supremacy at the Zambezi River. But there is little doubt that the South Africans would be happier if Angola and Mozambique each became a buffer state under a moderate white or an amenable black stooge."

But even with such support, the junta will not have much time to try to carry out its plans.

"Already," Giniger wrote in an April 27 dispatch, "General Spínola was



CAETANO: Toppled for inability to win colonial wars.

showing signs of alarm at some of the activities of the left as it gave vent to feelings that had been contained by almost a half century of dictatorship. He warned that he might have to use force to prevent anarchy in the country.

"Yesterday a mob sacked the offices of the right-wing newspaper *Epoca*. Last night young leftists paraded with banners calling for the end of capitalism and the war against black African rebels and sprayed revolutionary slogans on monuments and sidewalks. Military and police forces avoided confrontation with the crowds by staying out of sight." □

'Coup' Attempt in Egypt Stirs Diplomatic Pot

By Michael Baumann

In the early morning hours of April 18, an hour-long gun battle rocked the engineering division of the Egyptian military academy just outside Cairo. Official reports put the death toll at eleven and the number of wounded at twenty-seven.

Later that same day, according to the April 23 issue of the Beirut daily *Al Anwar*, President Sadat's motorcade was sprayed by machine-gun fire as he drove to the academy to launch a personal investigation. Although Sadat was said to have escaped unharmed, up to twenty persons, including four of his bodyguards, were reported killed, and many others wounded.

"Egyptian official sources Tuesday [April 23] described the stories about the assassination attempt as 'completely false,'" John K. Cooley reported in an April 24 *Christian Science Monitor* dispatch from Beirut. "But diplomatic sources here have received information that the assault on the military academy was far more serious than first reported."

New York Times correspondent C. L. Sulzberger reported that the academy attack was really part of a coup attempt involving far more significant forces than the tiny band of "religious fanatics" the Egyptian authorities claimed.


There is "accumulating evidence," he wrote in the April 27 *Times*, "that last week's putsch by cadets in Cairo's military technical school was actually mounted by student officers from all services in several Egyptian academies; that it aimed at killing top officials in an effort to seize power."

Sulzberger then pointed a finger at Moscow. "Although such reports may well be distorted," he wrote, "there is an indication of efforts, coordinated by Soviet agents, to bring down Mr. Sadat because he endorses Henry Kissinger's ideas. Moscow is spreading anti-Sadat propaganda, denigrating the disengagement accord with Israel, and seemingly working with any group willing to endorse these objec-

tives."

Sulzberger did not mention any assassination attempt. However, a second account of it in an April 23 United Press International dispatch from Beirut pointed out that the source of the story, *Al Anwar*, is "noted for its well-informed reporting on Egyptian affairs."

The clash at the academy occurred in the midst of new signs of Cairo's diplomatic shift away from Moscow and toward Washington. Following months of overtures toward Nixon and Kissinger and harsh criticism of



SADAT: Making good use of coup attempt in maneuvers with Washington.

the Kremlin, Sadat told a large student audience April 16 that he intended to rely on U.S. backing in the effort to reach a settlement with Israel.

On April 18 he announced that Cairo would reverse its eighteen-year policy of exclusive reliance on Soviet military equipment. Since everything from the Egyptian forces' underwear to SAM-7 missiles are of Soviet manufacture, the changeover to "other"—presumably U.S.—equipment will be a long and difficult process.

The announcement was widely interpreted as meaning that Sadat is not planning any military engagement with Israel in the near future. "One Western diplomat," reported the April 19 *New York Times*, "said that a commander in chief could make such a fundamental decision only if he was convinced he was going into a long period of peace."

The editors of the *New York Times* agreed. Sadat's decision, they said April 22, "is the most promising signal that Cairo, if not yet other Arab capitals, sees a settlement with Israel as a realistic goal of policy."

"When it came to making war, the Arabs found their most useful friends in the Soviet Union. Once thoughts began to turn toward making peace—or a reasonable facsimile thereof—the United States, rather than Moscow, was seen as uniquely equipped to deliver the goods."

In point of fact, however, Sadat himself has raised a number of questions as to how useful Moscow was in the recent war with Israel. On March 29, for example, he accused Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov of passing on false information in order to get him to bring the war to an early end. The Soviet ambassador, he said, falsely informed him in the early hours of the war that Syria had requested an immediate ceasefire. Furthermore, Sadat has charged on several other occasions that Moscow held back badly needed arms.

In trying to limit the Egyptian army's effectiveness and bring about a quick halt to the fighting, Moscow was only carrying out its part of the bargain in the détente with Washington. The result, however, was Sadat's rapid conclusion that if Soviet assistance on the scale necessary to deal with Israel was ruled out, the only alternative was to rely on Washington's diplomatic efforts. What Moscow perhaps did not count on was the speed with which Sadat pursued the logic of this course.

But if Sadat was less than satisfied with the Kremlin's level of support, the involvement of a significant number of young cadets in the attack on the military academy indicates that at least some elements of the Egyptian army are not prepared to accept reliance on Washington's diplomacy either.

What actually happened at the

academy is still not clear. It is clear, however, that the Sadat regime has tried to turn the event to its own advantage by using it in a campaign to whip up popular sentiment against the Palestinian resistance and the Libyan and Iraqi regimes—three important critics of Sadat's increasingly friendly attitude toward the imperialist camp.

Initial police accounts said that the ringleader, later identified as Saleh Sariyah (also spelled Surayya), was an Iraqi national, carrying an Iraqi passport. He was reported to have had close ties to the Libyan regime and the ultrareactionary Muslim Brotherhood. He was also reported to have been a former intelligence agent for the Iraqi government and a former member of the Jordanian Communist party.

A welter of contradictory reports in the next few days said that he was carrying two passports, one from Iraq and one from Libya, and that he was not an Iraqi but a Palestinian. He was also described as a leader of a formation called the Islamic Liberation Organization, a group that had never been heard of before but was alleged to be "more fanatical" than the Muslim Brotherhood. Later police accounts said the group's real name was the "National Organization for the Entry Into Paradise."

Egyptian authorities declared a press blackout April 21 while they "interrogated" Sariyah. On April 24 the prosecutor's office released an account said to be based on his confession.

"Tonight's statement," reported an April 24 *Washington Post* dispatch from Cairo, "declared that Surayya had gone to Libya following a written invitation from the Libyan Relations Bureau in Cairo dated June 6, 1973.

"Surayya confessed under interrogation that during his visit to Libya he had a long, private meeting with [Prime Minister Muammar] Qaddafi, the statement charged.

"The purpose of the invitation, he said, had been to discuss unification of Palestinian commando organizations, 'but this purpose was diverted into a discussion on the formation of commando organizations inside the Arab states to carry out illegitimate and illicit activities.'"

The Libyan government denied any connection with either Sariyah or the

attack on the academy, but the stream of government communiqués and press reports seems to have had the desired effect: "Travelers arriving here [Beirut] from Cairo," reported the April 24 *Christian Science Monitor*, "say a wave of anti-Libyan and anti-Palestinian feeling has swept through Egypt's capital. Arab observers here blame this in part on reports in Cairo newspapers, especially Al-Ahram and Al-Akhbar, projecting the Palestinian and Libyan connections in last week's events."

Cairo officials announced April 26 that seventy-five people had been arrested in connection with the attack on the academy, including sixteen cadets and two sailors. The official arrest figure rose to 100 later that day when a group of Muslims stormed the parliament building to protest the disappearance of their religious leader, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been linked to Sariyah in early police reports.

On April 27, Cairo authorities stepped up the press attack on Qaddafi, accusing him of using Libya's vast oil revenues to set up subversive organizations in a number of "moderate" Arab countries. The implicit comparison with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—which have pledged to use part of their oil revenue to buy arms for Sadat—would not be lost on Cairo newspaper readers.

The uncertain atmosphere created by the clash at the military academy

comes at a critical point in Sadat's maneuvers. Closer ties with Washington have yet to produce any tangible gains but have led to some serious losses—Moscow's further cutbacks in military and economic aid.

Over the past six months Moscow has rejected four Egyptian requests for arms, including vital spare parts and a scheduled shipment of MIG-23 aircraft. The Kremlin has also refused to defer payment on arms already shipped and has declined to extend credit on exports of food. Sugar and tea are already rationed as a result, and further shortages can be expected.

Moscow has also stepped up its pressure on the diplomatic front, charging that Egypt has allowed its troop-disengagement agreement with Israel to be exploited by the Zionist regime for "continued military attacks" on other Arab countries. At the same time, the Soviet press has increased its expressions of support for Syria.

Sadat's move to dismantle and re-equip Egypt's armed forces at a time when Syrian troops are still fighting on the Golan Heights was a calculated risk. It could not be counted on to find much support in the Egyptian army or masses, but Sadat apparently felt that the support he won in the October War would be enough to push the measure through.

The current unrest among student officers, made clear in the clash at the military academy, is the first visible sign of resistance. □

Trotskyists Arrested in Greece

In an April 15 statement, the Diethniko Kommounistiko Koma (Internationalist Communist party, the Greek section of the Fourth International) reported that two of its members, Yannis Felekis and Yannis Nikas, were arrested following the upsurge of students and workers last November. The statement also noted the arrest of Sofronis Papadopoulos, who belongs to a different Trotskyist group.

Among the other far-left groupings, fifteen members of the International Workers Union, which is associated with the Workers Revolutionary party in England, have been reported arrested. Only the following five names, however, have been released by the junta: Theodoros Koutsoumpas, Konstantin Kardesis, Emanuel Sakakis, Angeliki Stavropoulos, and Heraklis Lanthothetis.

The total number of those arrested since

the uprising, the statement continued, is about 250. In the revolt itself, it is estimated that about 800 persons were seriously wounded and about a hundred killed. □

Zionism Pays

Pro-Zionist U.S. senators can count on at least one steady source of income—"lecture fees" for speaking before such Zionist groups as the United Jewish Appeal, the Development Corporation of Israel, and B'nai Brith. Senator Birch Bayh has received \$21,500 for fourteen appearances, while former Vice-President Hubert Humphrey did even better, making \$27,500 for only eleven engagements. Henry Jackson, known alternately as the "senator from Boeing" and the "senator from Tel Aviv," took home \$9,700 for seven talks.

Krivine Campaigns for Revolutionary Alternative

By Dick Fidler

"The main thing separating Giscard d'Estaing and Chaban-Delmas isn't the way they smash a tennis ball or squeeze an accordion. And it won't be found in their income-tax returns. It's the fact that both want to be president in order to carry out the same policies," Alain Krivine, Trotskyist candidate for president of France, told a nationwide television audience as he launched his campaign April 19.

"If you want to do away with this regime, then vote Mitterrand, some people tell us," he continued. "But is it sufficient to change the president? Of course not. It is the logic of the system that is in question, a system where everything that is produced is produced for profit and not to satisfy people's needs. A system where advertising expenditures are twice the health budget, where more is spent on the army than on the schools. . . . A system where, despite fantastic scientific progress, working and living conditions are continually getting worse. . . .

"And to keep this system in power, there are a hundred thousand police, secret agents, company unions, thousands of wiretaps . . . and an army trained for civil war. That's what a society based of profits is; that's what capitalism is. . . .

"Now, let's think a little. If Mitterrand were elected tomorrow, Chaban-Delmas and Giscard d'Estaing would be gone. So much the better. And that's partly why we are calling for a vote for Mitterrand on the second round. But capitalism would remain. . . .

"We say to the leaders of the Union of the Left: If today you are sacrificing struggles in order to gain a few votes from the right; if tomorrow you hold out your hand to reactionary army officers to calm the fears of the bourgeoisie; if you leave the capitalists at the decisive points of control, then you are disarming the workers and giving reaction the time to prepare its counterattack. The only possible alternative is socialism. We must pre-

pare the way for it in today's struggles. That is the meaning of the campaign of the Revolutionary Communist Front."

Krivine was scheduled to address television and radio audiences almost daily up to May 5, the date of the first round of voting in France's presidential election. The Revolutionary Communist Front (FCR), which is sponsoring Krivine's candidacy, is using the openings offered by the election to mount an intensive campaign to take its program to millions of French working people.

The FCR is holding mass meetings in cities throughout France to discuss the issues in the campaign. The weekly newspaper *Rouge* has been converted to a daily in support of the revolutionary candidacy.

The FCR is focusing its propaganda on a few key themes, Krivine told the Swiss Trotskyist fortnightly *La Brèche*. The first is that it is the social system and not just the president or government that must be changed. "We place no confidence in the Common Program and the Union of the Left. . . . Hence ours is a clearly anticapitalist campaign, aimed at structuring the current of distrust that exists toward the Union of the Left. Our campaign will have no immediate electoral results—we have no illusions on that score—but it is addressed to the hundreds of thousands of workers who, even if they vote pragmatically for Mitterrand on the first round, are extremely critical of his program, and even distrust him personally."

Another major theme, Krivine explained, "will be the balance sheet of what happened in Chile." If the Union of the Left were to take office, "when the workers discover that their problems are not resolved, they will fight harder and harder against the bosses. And sooner or later, they will have to confront the hostility of the Union of the Left and its police. That is why we must prepare the independent organization and self-defense of the workers, both against the far right,

which will do all it can to maintain a climate of violence, and perhaps against a possible military coup, in which case there is a risk that the reformists will leave the workers disarmed. We will not take this risk, and will endeavor in this period 'to arm the workers with the desire to arm themselves,' as Marx put it."

Above all, Krivine said, the revolutionary campaign should be a means for "the new workers vanguard to mobilize and express itself." To this end, "we will use our speaking time on radio and television, and our daily press, to give a voice to those who tend to be excluded from this kind of campaign."

Thus at a mass meeting in Paris April 10, supporters of Krivine offered their platform to a young Tunisian, Djellali Kamel, who is running as a candidate of the immigrant workers. Nominated by a group of immigrants who have been on a hunger strike since March 25 to protest the government's refusal to give them work visas and work permits, Kamel is supported by several immigrant organizations as well as *Rouge* and the FCR.

Similarly, when the leaders of the trade unions and parties of the Union of the Left canceled the traditional May Day demonstration, as part of their efforts to bring about a "social truce" in the preelectoral period, the FCR joined with other far-left organizations to call for and build a mass demonstration in Paris on May 1.

Supporters of Krivine's candidacy were in the forefront of the demonstrations across France on April 20 for free abortion and contraception.

The government has tried to prevent the FCR from using Krivine's campaign appearances on television and radio as a platform for high-school and workers militants. The National Control Commission, which regulates candidates' use of air time, rejected Krivine's attempts to interview representatives of Red Committee and Red Mole supporter groups, as well as the FCR, on the state radio and television system, the ORTF. The commission claimed that the support committees did not represent nationally recognized political groups or parties, and it is stalling on giving recognition to the FCR.

In a radio address on April 22, Krivine denounced these maneuvers. "First of all, they prevent the revo-

lutionary militants from speaking. Then they open the way for the future minister of the interior in a Giscard-Chaban government to repress or even ban the organization we have just founded, the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire."

He challenged the workers organizations, including the Communists and Socialists, to defend the FCR's rights and said he would leave the remaining fourteen minutes of his air time to the commission to explain how the FCR was not a political organization, and why the militants he had invited were not being allowed to speak. The program then ended.

In response to Krivine's appeal, the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU — United Socialist Party), which is supporting Mitterrand, offered its television time to Krivine and his supporters. Thus on April 23, television viewers watched Krivine interview "three PSU militants," actually members of the FCR, as everyone knew. Jean, a coal miner, exposed working conditions in the mining industry; Violette, a bank worker, described the recent national strike in that sector, in which all decisions had been made by general assemblies of the workers and delegates to the strike council had been elected by the ranks. André, a worker in the state electricity trust in Brest, described how the experiences of his fellow workers showed that "the workers are capable of managing a socialist society, just as they are capable of running their factories and conducting their own struggles."


Krivine and his supporters have also confronted the other candidates in face-to-face encounters on television and radio.

A central purpose of the FCR campaign is to cut across the widespread illusions about Mitterrand and the Union of the Left. Each issue of *Rouge* carries extensive coverage of Mitterrand's campaign. In a criticism of Mitterrand's economic program in the April 19 *Rouge*, Jacques Saulnier noted that the Socialist party candidate proposes to nationalize only nine industries in the next five years, pledging to leave the rest in private hands. That would leave the private sector in control of 87 percent of jobs, 86 percent of production, and 55 percent of industrial investment, *Rouge* said.

The modest reforms projected by the Common Program of the Union

of the Left and by Mitterrand — such as a minimum monthly wage of 1,200 francs (\$240), and a 40-hour work-week (it is presently 44 hours in France, one of the highest in Europe) — would be financed out of taxes paid mainly by workers, *Rouge* explained. "It is illusory to pretend that in the framework of the capitalist system wages can be raised much without the bourgeoisie getting it back in whole or in part by raising prices or increasing the pace of work."

"The Common Program and, even more, the policy announced by Mitterrand," *Rouge* said, "leaves the bour-



MITTERRAND

geoisie in control of the bulk of its instruments of domination, and maintains the capitalist system." Mitterrand promises to retain the Gaullist constitution of the Fifth Republic, saying he will "democratize it" by adding a "Charter of Liberties." By leaving intact the army, police, and courts, he is paving the way for disaster, as shown by the experience in Chile, *Rouge* said.

"Mitterrand represents a dead end for the workers in France," Krivine told a rally of more than 1,500 persons in Nancy April 23. "He is seeking votes to the left and to the right, and wants to try Allende's experiment in France." The April 12 *Rouge* explained that if Mitterrand's attempt to "widen his alliance to the right" had not yet picked up major support from

bourgeois parties, the presence of the Left Radicals in the Union of the Left "is already an indication of the compromises that the reformist leaders are prepared to make."

The Trotskyists are also using the campaign to clarify their differences with other political currents to the left of the CP and the SP. *Rouge* has sharply attacked the PSU for supporting Mitterrand. An initial attempt spearheaded by *Rouge* to field a united far-left candidacy around Charles Piaget, a leader of the Lip strikers, seriously divided the PSU's membership. A minority within the PSU quit the party when its national council voted to support Mitterrand.

"The effect of the Piaget candidacy was like throwing a huge paving stone into a swamp," Krivine told *La Brèche*. "From now on, there is a clear and precise line of division separating the revolutionists from the reformists within the centrist-type organizations. . . . We saw what the infamous 'self-management socialism' so vaunted by the PSU leaders really means: unconditional capitulation with bag and baggage to Mitterrand. To be sure, this wasn't the aim of the proposal to run Piaget. But a clarification has taken place."

The existence of a candidate from another far-left organization, Arlette Laguiller of *Lutte Ouvrière*, has given rise to polemics between the two organizations on questions of revolutionary strategy in France today. The April 12 issue of *Rouge*, for example, argued against a recent article on abortion in *Lutte Ouvrière's* theoretical magazine. While claiming to support the struggle for repeal of "all repressive laws on abortion," the article held that abortion is "murder" of "fetal life." It concluded: "We must be especially careful not to endow abortion with revolutionary virtues that it does not have."

"Of course abortion and contraception are not 'in themselves' revolutionary and liberating," *Rouge* responded. "But in today's conditions, they are the basis of the fundamental demands of women, and especially of working women, who do not have access to them. It is just hot air to talk of emancipation without the right to abortion and contraception."

Rouge invited members of *Lutte Ouvrière* to "come and explain their positions in the mass movements." □

Canadian Police Grill Chilean Refugees

By Ray Warden

[The following article is reprinted from the April 15 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Toronto.]

* * *

If refugees from the Chilean terror refuse to cooperate with RCMP [Royal Canadian Mounted Police] interrogators, Solicitor General Warren Allmand declared March 5, they can be denied admission to Canada as "security risks." He was explaining why forty-five Chileans applying to emigrate to Canada had been rejected as threats to "national security."

In conducting their witch-hunt of Chilean refugees, the minister admitted, the RCMP collaborates with U. S., British, and French intelligence agencies—and with the Chilean military regime.

Now the full implications of RCMP interrogation have come to light: Canadian "security" officers working hand in glove with the Chilean military junta and other Latin American regimes in collecting intelligence on the left and workers movements.

The latest revelation is contained in an Inter-Church statement on the Chilean refugee situation presented to Allmand and Immigration Minister Robert Andras by representatives of Canada's major churches March 26.

According to information from Charles Harper of the World Council of Churches, the church representatives said, refugees temporarily in Peru who applied to emigrate to Canada were being grilled by the RCMP for information on the Peruvian and Chilean left.

"In particular," the statement said, "the questioning appears to be oriented toward 'intelligence' functions rather than toward Canadian security. . . ." "National security" is only a euphemism for harassment and persecution of the left. The government has no more right to pry into the political views of the refugees than it does to harass Canadian citizens.

The questions refugees in Peru are

being forced to answer include:

1. Describe your political militancy and what your political party was in Chile.
2. Did you work as a trade unionist?
3. Be specific about your work as an activist in Chile.
4. Did you participate in marches and demonstrations?
5. How many did you participate in?
6. Did you participate in arms operations, and which ones?
7. Have you been involved in confrontation with the military?
8. How many military men have you killed?
9. Is your party organized in Peru?
10. Where do you live in Peru, and how many Chileans live with you?
11. What did you do in your political meetings in Chile?
12. What political contacts do you have left in Chile, and who are they?

"This latter question," the Inter-Church statement noted, "puts the refugee in the moral dilemma of being asked to be a 'stool pigeon' for persons quite possibly still in grave danger in Chile, in return for *possible* acceptance by Canada."

Harper reported that when ninety refugees in Chile applied to emigrate to Canada, an initial group of twenty were subjected to this grilling. Only seven of them were accepted. Questioning by security officers was so severe, church representatives said, "that many other applicants refused to go to their interviews."

Not only harassment by intelligence agents, but the whole gamut of immigration department procedures, serve to discourage or block the emigration of refugees to Canada. And the situation is increasingly desperate.

About 4,000 refugees now in Peru on temporary visas are under heavy pressure to leave the country. Approximately 10,000 more are in Argentina under similar circumstances. In Chile the terror launched by the junta shows no sign of subsid-

ing. While 11,000 political prisoners languish in the regime's jails, tens of thousands of workers have been fired from their jobs and blacklisted for political reasons. Without any income, they must flee the country or starve.

The Inter-Church statement protested the recent termination of the government's special program by which Canada's restrictive immigration laws were somewhat relaxed. While the refugees' need is as great as ever, Canada's doors are swinging nearly closed. All applicants now have to pass through the highly selective point system.

The church representatives strongly objected to the miles of red tape that refugees from the Chilean terror are forced to submit to in seeking admission to Canada. Officials in the Canadian Embassy in Chile have told applicants that immigration procedures require five months or longer to complete. "Among the documentation required is a Certificate of Good Conduct from the Chilean government, surely an outrageous requirement. . . ."

None of the refugees that have so far arrived under "special permit" in Canada, the statement noted, have been granted "landed immigrant" status. In some cases, this has been used as sufficient cause to block the arrival of their families. For those refugees arriving in Canada without documentation, the church representatives recommended, procedures should be made "clear, simple, humane, speedy, and public."

The Canadian government welcomed and offered financial assistance to 30,000 Hungarian refugees in 1956, 11,000 Czechs in 1968, and 3,000 Ugandan Asians in 1973. Yet of the 14,000 refugees from the Chilean terror who have applied to Canada's immigration department, only 1,100 have been accepted. Of those who applied under the government's now disbanded "special program," about 38 percent have been turned away. Refugees forced through the red tape of the regular restrictive immigration channels are being rejected at a rate of 98 percent!

The initiatives of Canada's major churches, and other organizations like the Canadian Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners, to force open Canada's doors to the Chilean refugees must be backed up by the organized strength of the

labor movement and the NDP [New Democratic party—Canada's labor party]. Down with all the red tape!

Call off the RCMP witch-hunters! Open wide the doors to refugees from Chilean terror! □

is not interested in or does not contest these flagrant transgressions of human rights, which are implicit in the international isolation and persecution of Chilean patriots?

Is this the definitive proof, among others, of the absolute uselessness of the UN and its leadership?

2. At present, we are in an anguishing and desperate situation:

a. The lack of economic resources for housing, food, and medical care forces us to live all together, indiscriminately, without the most elementary conditions of health and hygiene.

b. The lack of personal security and a totally uncertain future, together with the repression and police persecution that we are exposed to, get worse each day.

c. Most of the members of our families—our wives, children, mothers—remain in Chile in an equally anguishing and tragic situation because the absence of the head of the family, political persecution, being fired from their jobs, hunger, and desperation have been hard blows to them.

3. Faced with the tragedy we are living through today, crushed by the most bestial and repugnant fascist coup that has occurred in the world in the last thirty years, we Chilean democrats lodge the charge of indifference against the governments throughout the world and against the international organizations.

At the same time we make a fervent appeal to the sense of solidarity of the workers of the world and to the fraternal spirit of humanists so that they will intercede with their governments and with international organizations, the communications media, and religious and political authorities to create a climate of opinion that will force an immediate and massive solution to our current critical condition as victims of this inhumanity and bureaucracy. If no immediate solution to this problem is found, the imminent, massive tragedy will shame and stain the conscience of people of the world, and the historic responsibility for it will fall on each and every one of the countries, organizations, institutions, and religious and political authorities that could have avoided it.

It's up to them to decide, not tomorrow but this very instant, if these 10,000 human beings and their families do or don't have the right to life and liberty! □

Peru

Ask Right of Asylum for Chilean Refugees

[The following appeal from the Comité de Pro Refugiados Chilenos (Committee for Chilean Refugees) in Lima is dated February 26, 1974. It appeared in the April issue of *Campanha*, a magazine published by Brazilian exiles. Translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

A call to the conscience of the world:

1. Because of the severe restrictions that the fascist military junta has imposed on the right of political asylum in Chile, the attempt to get asylum in a foreign embassy entails a great risk to one's life for persecuted Chileans. Access to accredited embassies in Chile is under strict control by the armed forces, who fire on anyone attempting to enter in search of asylum. Obtaining political asylum in Chile is hindered for this and other reasons.

The World Council of Churches, the only international organization that has shown concern for this problem, has provided protection for more than 10,000 Chileans who have left their country as "tourists." These Chileans today find themselves in uncertain and irregular situations in Buenos Aires, Mendoza (Argentina), and Lima (Peru) waiting for some country to make the humanitarian gesture of welcoming them as refugees in a definitive way.

Unfortunately this humanitarian gesture by the World Council of Churches has led to a dead end and a tragedy for the following reasons:

a. The hostile attitude of the Peruvian and Argentine governments toward the persecuted Chileans, who are denied authorization for residence in these countries. Every day more restrictions are placed on refugees remaining even temporarily in their territories while they find a solution to the problem. Worse yet, they are threatened with being deported back to Chile en masse, with tragic and fa-

tal consequences that are predictable (and have already begun to occur): jail, torture, shootings at the border.

This situation will reach crisis proportions within the next thirty days owing to the fact that the majority of the tourist visas are about to expire. In turn, this will create the conditions for these governments to act on the announced deportations, which, in view of the proven barbarity of the fascist Chilean military junta, will result in the mass murder of thousands of Chileans at the very borders of their own country.

b. Harshly, the Latin American countries have shut their borders to Chileans. They have even gone so far as to deny tourist visas to anyone of Chilean nationality. This is intolerable political isolation and a pitiless and criminal act of persecution.

As for Europe and the rest of the world, there is an obvious contradiction. On the one hand, there are the gushing statements that emanate from all levels of the various governments and international organizations, expressing repudiation of the fascist coup in Chile, and support for persecuted Chilean patriots. On the other hand, what the Chileans find at accredited embassies in Lima and Buenos Aires, with the notable exception of Cuba, is harsh indifference and rejection.

c. Up to now, the United Nations has taken no action to demonstrate its moral responsibility for the defense of human rights, dementedly trampled under foot in Chile. Nor have they acted in defense of the very lives of these 10,000 or more persons who have been isolated and persecuted politically, even beyond the borders of their country, for the "crime" of having supported and encouraged a constitutional government that was internationally known for its unrestricted defense of human rights and civil liberties.

Are we to understand that the Human Rights Commission of the UN

Catholic Bishops Accuse Junta of Torture

By Judy White

New accusations of torture were leveled at the Chilean military junta April 24 with the issuance of a 2,000-word statement by the Roman Catholic church. The statement voiced concern with "the climate of insecurity and fear" in the country, which it said was rooted in "accusations, false rumors, and the lack of participation and information."

The text continued, according to excerpts published in the April 25 *New York Times*, "We are concerned also by the social dimensions of the current economic situation, among which we could point out the increase in unemployment and job dismissals for arbitrary or ideological reasons. We fear that, by accelerating economic development, the economy is being structured in such a way that wage earners must bear an excessive share of sacrifice, without having the desired level of participation."

"We are worried that the educational system is being structured and oriented without enough participation by parents and the academic community."

"We are worried, finally, in some cases, over the lack of effective legal safeguards for personal security that is evident in arbitrary or excessively long detentions in which neither the persons concerned nor their families know the specific charges against them; in interrogations that use physical and moral pressures; in the limited possibilities for a legal defense; in unequal sentences in different parts of the country; in restrictions of the normal right of appeal."

The statement warned: "We understand that particular circumstances can justify the temporary suspension of certain civil rights. But there are rights that affect the very dignity of the human being, and those are absolute and inviolable."

General Gustavo Leigh, one of the leaders of the junta, said in response to the Church statement: "I have great respect for the church, but like many men, without realizing it, they are vehicles for Marxism."

In reality, these "vehicles of Marxism"

were careful to indicate their support for the junta, going so far as to say: "We do not doubt the righteous intention nor the goodwill of our governors." The statement called for a "reconciliation among Chileans"—presumably not including those already murdered by the junta—to "help establish



LEIGH: Surrounded by "vehicles of Marxism"?

a regime of coexistence in which all Chileans can live and feel as brothers."

But the fact is that world outrage against the abuses of human rights perpetrated by the junta has become so great that even these conservative supporters of the regime have been forced to make their most outspoken public declaration to date.

On the same day, the Venezuelan Senate also voted a condemnation of the Chilean junta for its repressive policies.

Venezuelan Senator Miguel Otero Silva was quoted in a United Press International release published in the April 28 *El Diario* of New York as

saying, "I said, and I repeat, that the military junta installed as the result of a coup in Chile constantly violates human rights."

Elaborating his charges, Otero Silva continued: "It has muzzled the press, decapitated the unions, militarily intervened the universities, driven hundreds of men and women from the country, jailed thousands of citizens, and tortured political prisoners in a monstrous fashion. It assassinates with impunity and shoots individuals without bringing them to trial."

Otero Silva's charges served as the basis for the April 24 Senate vote, which Chilean Embassy officials in Caracas complained were the result of the Senate having been "caught unawares" by Otero Silva's "lies."

The Prague-based International Organization of Journalists has provided additional information on destruction of press freedom in Chile. The April 24 *Le Monde* reported that the organization had issued a statement describing censorship of the mass media and detailing the cases of several dozen journalists who have been victims of the repression. According to the organization's report, thirty-nine of their colleagues remain in prison, six have disappeared, five await safe-conducts from embassies in Chile, and sixty-four are in exile.

Among those about whom nothing is known are Rodrigo Rojas, former editor in chief of *El Siglo*, organ of the Chilean Communist party; Oscar Weiss, former editor in chief of the daily *La Nación*; Alberto Gamboa, staff member of *Clarín*; and Carlos Naudon, of Channel VII television and Radio-Corporación. Carlos Jorquera, press secretary of President Allende, is being held in a prison camp on Dawson Island.

This international protest against torture and arbitrary treatment of political prisoners is having its repercussions even inside Chile.

In the show trial of sixty-seven air force and civilian personnel begun in Santiago the third week of April, the prosecution was forced to order an investigation of a defense claim that the confession signed by defendant Carlos Trujillo was not the one he had actually made, reported the April 20 Buenos Aires daily, *La Opinión*. The sixty-seven are on trial for their active support of the legally elected Allende government in the period prior

to the September 11 coup.

Furthermore, General Leigh, in his response to the Chilean Catholic bishops' statement, felt impelled to make the demagogic promise that "the government would begin proceedings next week against all political prisoners, and speed the release of those with no charges against them," according to Jonathan Kandell's report in *The New York Times* April 25.

The worthlessness of Leigh's promise was indicated by reports coming from Chile April 26 that a new secret trial, of five civilians, had taken place the previous day. The proceeding reportedly resulted in the death sentence for the five, who allegedly had given weapons instruction to leftists before the September 11 overturn.

According to a *New York Times* story April 27, not even representatives of the Red Cross were allowed to attend the trial.

For the second time since the coup, the junta closed down the radio station Presidente Balmaceda, according

to the April 20 *La Opinión*. The station is associated with Chile's Christian Democratic party and got the six-day suspension for "including in its programs commentary and editorials 'with an obviously partisan political intent.'"

The closure follows earlier signs of dissatisfaction within ruling-class circles that had welcomed the coup. In January of this year, for example, a private letter from the Christian Democrats was sent to Pinochet criticizing some of the brutal repressive measures that had aroused worldwide protest. (See *Intercontinental Press*, February 18, p. 181.)

At that time, Christian Democratic leader Patricio Aylwin hastened to assure the junta that the criticisms were offered to advance the interests of the regime.

The suspension of the radio station suggests that there remain some differences of opinion over the question of how much repression is really necessary to advance those interests. □

materials, etc.). And we will not be able to go on defending our basic rights if we don't find the necessary organizational channels.

This is the task that must be initiated school by school with the opening of the academic year. We must understand how to take advantage of legal loopholes to avoid being victimized by the authorities. At least in Lima, a dynamic already exists for activists to gather around newspaper clubs and utilize the papers as organs for publicizing the problems of students. We feel that that dynamic should be carried forward to forming more general coordinating committees. In this concrete case, we think that the Asociación de Periodistas Escolares de Lima [APEL — Scholastic Press Association of Lima] has taken very important steps and that it should be strengthened by the participation of all secondary-school students in shaping the newspaper clubs. In schools where the students have more power, where they have even already taken over the newspaper clubs, they can use loopholes in the Reforma Educativa [Educational Reform] and throw themselves into forming student associations, defending to the maximum the autonomy of secondary-school pupils.

Only by taking advantage of the democratic openings that this government allows will we be able to keep on advancing, contributing to the strengthening of student organization among those attending secondary school. Let's begin now! The JAS has bitten off this task; all compañeros who agree with driving forward student organization should join the JAS to continue constructing an alternative leadership for the movement of secondary-school students. □

News Flash From Beirut

"The Lebanese daily *Al Yom* reproduced the reminiscence entitled: 'When the people eat millet we also take it' from the book 'Among the people,' which vividly tells about the revolutionary ideas of the affectionate, fatherly leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, who leads our people always to victory and glory, and about the sagacity of his leadership, his lofty virtues, revolutionary method of work and popular style of work, according to a report from Beirut." — *Pyongyang Times*, April 6.

But what would happen if the people ate potatoes?

Peru

Time for Secondary Students to Organize

[The following article appeared in the April 8 issue of *Palabra Socialista*, a Peruvian Trotskyist fortnightly. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Now that classes have begun, we feel it appropriate to draw a brief balance sheet of the gains made last year, so that we can pinpoint the situation we face and the basic tasks for the current year.

We of the JAS [Juventud Avanzada Socialista — Vanguard Socialist Youth] have been stating that since the May 2 conflict, in Lima and throughout the country an extraordinary upsurge of secondary school students has begun. In the main struggles of the working class, and especially in the teachers' struggle, secondary-school students have played a very well-known role. Last year there were more than seven compañeros who were victimized, shot to death when they were

participating in mobilizations with the workers (Tumbes, Chimbote, Arequipa, etc.).

Despite that, we want to add that many weaknesses persist, which we now have to overcome. There was no coordination among struggles last year. No organizations arose to group together the totality of secondary-school activists; the organizations that did arise, like COFESELM in Lima and the Federación de Estudiantes Secundarios del Perú [Peruvian Federation of Secondary-School Students], have ended up being watered down and bureaucratized.

That's why we want to begin by facing the problem of student organization. All of us — as products of capitalist crisis and the educational system — experience a series of problems in the schools (absence of freedom of expression, abuse from bad teachers and their assistants, the trampling of our dignity by the hierarchical system, lack of scholastic mobilization, inflated prices of books and other

Why Washington Is Relaxing Ban on Sales to Cuba

By Gerry Foley

When Washington permitted sales to Cuba in March and April by affiliates of U. S. companies in Canada and Argentina, it seemed in effect, despite claims to the contrary, to be moving toward dropping the trade embargo against the Castro regime. Influential elements in the U. S. government and in the ruling class were quick to press for following the logic of these decisions.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously April 23 to introduce a resolution into Congress recommending that the president formally end the embargo and resume diplomatic relations with Cuba.

On the previous day, Representative Whalen of Ohio introduced a bill in the lower house of Congress that contained the following provisions:

1. An end to the ban on economic aid to Cuba and repeal of the part of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that authorizes the president to establish and maintain an embargo on trade with Cuba. The ban on sale of military equipment to Havana and sanctions against other countries that do so would remain in effect.

2. Lifting restrictions on selling U. S. goods to countries that "sell, furnish, or permit their ships or aircraft to carry any equipment, materials, or commodities to Cuba."

3. ". . . our legislation repeals Public Law 87-733, the so-called Cuban Revolution [apparently a typographical error in the *Congressional Record* for "Resolution"]. That enactment expressed the U. S. policy toward Cuba in October 1962 when that country was involved in subversive activities in Latin America. Now, 12 years later, that involvement has substantially subsided, if not terminated."

Further on in his motivation for the bill, published in the April 22 *Congressional Record*, Whalen expanded on the last point:

"Mr. Speaker, last year I was the spokesman for a group of my Republican colleagues who presented to the House a study of the possibilities

of normalizing relations with Cuba. In our report, we recommended that the Congress and the executive branch take several steps that, hopefully, would lead to the accomplishment of this objective. Since that time, a number of our proposals have been carried out by both branches.

"In Congress, subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees have held the hearings we urged. . . .

"In the executive branch, the Hijacking Accord was reached on February 15, 1973, just 2 weeks after the issuance of our paper.

"This year there have been further encouraging developments. It is reported that Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, when visiting Havana in January, urged Premier Castro to soften his posture toward the United States. Indeed, the joint Cuba-Soviet Declaration of February 2, 1974, which Castro and Brezhnev signed, states:

"Cuba and the Soviet Union declare themselves in favor of the full validity of the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and the renouncing of the use of force and the threat of using it in relations among the nations of Latin America, as well as in other areas of the world."

That is, Whalen clearly thought that the Kremlin chief's visit to Cuba at the end of January, and the statements he made there, as well as the Soviet-Cuban communiqué of February 2, meant that Havana had been definitively brought behind the policy of "peaceful coexistence," under the firm control of the Soviet Union.

Whalen then noted as "significant announcements" the U. S. government's decision to lift the ban against the sale of trucks and automobiles to Cuba by American-owned companies in Argentina, and the decision of the hemisphere foreign ministers meeting in Atlanta to "explore the possibility of inviting Cuba to their next meeting

in Buenos Aires in March 1975."

The State Department's declarations that the Argentine case was an exception and did not mean abandoning the embargo came in for heavy fire from the most internationally minded and farsighted organs of the American capitalist press.

In an editorial April 22, the *Washington Post* said:

"It is now pretty clear from soundings at meetings of the OAS [Organization of American States] in recent days, that at least a simple majority—if not the necessary two-thirds—of its members is ready to lift or relax the organization's trade restrictions with Cuba. The grave threat from Fidel Castro that was thought to exist in the 1960s no longer looks so terribly menacing. The sensible course of American diplomacy, it seems to us, would be to take the lead in acknowledging this reality, just as this country took the lead in imposing the embargo itself."

The editorial explained that if the United States tried to maintain the principle of the blockade, while at the same time making exceptions under pressure, it would double its political losses. It was neither possible nor desirable to delay the inevitable abandonment of the embargo.

The most authoritative of the American capitalist papers, the *New York Times*, noted in an editorial April 24 that the U. S. government did face some embarrassment in shifting its policy toward Cuba. But, it stressed, it did not think it was wise to protest too much.

"No one expects the United States to lead a drive for repeal of the sanctions. What many of the 23 O. A. S. members—and a great many Americans—had been hoping for was simply an expression that this country had no objection to reviewing the policy of excluding Cuba. Secretary Kissinger marred an otherwise positive contribution to the moderately successful 'new dialogue' he has launched with the other American

states by his silence at Atlanta on this important question."

The *Times*, thus, expected Washington to drag its feet, as far as its public positions were concerned, and let the Latin American "national" bourgeoisies take the lead. This had the obvious advantage of saving the appearance of the "principles" that Washington had trumpeted so often in the past, and at the same time of giving the weak Latin American bourgeois governments some much needed "nationalist" luster. The *Times*, however, apparently thought the Nixon administration was making rather too much of a show of reluctance. The *Washington Post*, in its April 22 editorial, was more explicit:

"Cuba has become another example of the present peculiar phase of Mr. Nixon's ideological politics. Having made large and desirable changes in American policy, he preserves a few small remnants of the old customs as an attempt to offer symbolic reassurance to that part of his constituency which takes ideology seriously. It serves the national interest, according to the current definition, to trade with the Soviet Union and China but, in contrast, Cuba is a Communist country committed to world revolution. Therefore it is a manifest menace to international stability."

In other words, the bourgeois liberal daily saw Nixon's apparent hesitations about including Cuba in the détente simply as a device to maintain the reactionary rightist constituency that in the post-Watergate period in particular provides the bulk of his public support.

Despite the public hemming and hawing of the Nixon administration, the Latin American "nationalist" bourgeois regimes moved enthusiastically to play the role the *New York Times* evidently expected them to play.

"The Argentine Republic opened the doors yesterday for Cuba's return to the Latin American community," the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión* wrote in a headline in its April 19 issue. It ran the full text of the memorandum presented by the Argentine minister Vignes to the conference of hemispheric foreign ministers in Atlanta:

"1) By natural right, Cuba is a part of the Americas. 2) The isolation of Cuba creates an abnormal situation that affects the normal course of relations between the American countries.

3) This situation must be examined in the context of world and hemispheric relations. 4) The American countries agreed unanimously in April 1973 that ideological plurality was a precondition for regional solidarity. Every state has the right to adopt its own system of government and its own form of economic and social or-



FIDEL CASTRO

ganization. 5) At present Cuba does not constitute a danger to the peace and security of the continent. 6) It would be very useful to have a full and frank analysis of the problem to arrive at a solution which, while respecting principles and the interests of each of the American states, would enable us to end this abnormal situation and facilitate the full exercise of the right of self-determination."

The Venezuelan government, one of whose predecessors had made the motion for expelling Cuba from the OAS in 1962, apparently concurred with the fifth point of the Vignes memorandum:

"The government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez, according to Schact [the foreign minister], believed that when they were applied, the sanctions were justified and that the procedure was correct," the Buenos Aires paper *La*

Nación reported in its April 22 weekly airmail edition, "but that in the ten years that have passed since then the situation has changed substantially."

The motion to invite Cuba to the 1975 conference of ministers in Argentina was made by Mexico, whose government has served for a decade and a half as Washington's unofficial channel of communication to Havana.

"It is obvious," Heriberto Kahn wrote in the April 19 *La Opinión*, "that Argentina, Mexico, and the United States were the pivots around which the delicate negotiations that led up to this historic resolution [to invite Cuba to the ministers' conference] revolved. But the preponderant role was played by Rabasa [the Mexican foreign minister], who visited Havana at the end of March. There Fidel Castro told him that he was irrevocably opposed to returning to the OAS. But at the same time, he made a positive response to the idea of a possible invitation to a meeting of foreign ministers outside the framework of this inter-American body. Shortly after this trip, Rabasa met with Kissinger in Acapulco, where the latter had gone for his honeymoon."

The overtures to Cuba had the explicit backing of Mexico's President Echeverría, a not very independent-minded "friend of the United States."

In a dispatch from Mexico City March 30, *New York Times* correspondent Alan Riding analyzed the objectives of both the Mexican and Cuban governments in these negotiations:

"Both Mexico and Cuba, however, appear to have clear though unrelated political motives for wanting to strengthen their ties. Since the overthrow of President Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile last September, Mr. Castro has reportedly wished to shore up his relations with other friends on the continent. Mexico, on the other hand, wants to obtain Cuban support for her diplomatic offensive in the third world.

"'Within Latin America, Cuba is a key symbol,' one diplomat said. 'To be accepted as a third-world leader, President Echeverría clearly needs the blessing of Premier Castro.'"

The "blessing" of the Castro regime has had obvious advantages for a government such as the demagogic and repressive Peruvian junta of General Juan Velasco Alvarado. With the aura provided by Fidel's endorsement,

Velasco has been able to rally well-known leftist figures in Peru to his government despite its brutal suppression of strikes, union organizing, and the right of expression for the left groups themselves.

In the aftermath of the military coup in Chile, Fidel went so far as to assure the Peruvian and Latin American left as a whole that there was no reason to suspect the revolutionary commitment of the Velasco junta:

"Contrary to the Chilean Army, the Peruvian Army made it possible for men from the most downtrodden sectors of the population to enter military schools, and the class composition of the Peruvian Army is different from that of the Chilean Army. This factor facilitated the work of some leading commanders and officers who, headed by General Velasco Alvarado (*applause*), led the Armed Forces of Peru to unity with the people and to progressive positions, in opposition to the oligarchy. The example of Peru had great repercussions in Latin America.

"Imperialism is seeking to offset the example of the Peruvian Armed Forces. . . .

"Now, we aren't concerned about the ideological differences between the movements in Argentina and Peru and the Cuban Revolution."

In this speech on September 20 in the Plaza de la Revolución, Castro did stress the importance of a consistent political approach. "Marxism-Leninism, socialism, means political definition. (*applause*.) It means having a guide, a north star, a compass; it means knowing what steps must be taken along the revolutionary path." (*Granma*, English edition, October 7, 1973.)

Whatever Castro's conception of revolutionary strategy at this point, it apparently did not include telling the truth to the Cuban or Latin American workers, or relying on their struggles to defend the island against imperialism. At this point, at least, his strategy seems to revolve around holding Soviet support, no matter what political price he has to pay.

The weak and treacherous national bourgeois regimes in Latin America are not the only governments that need some reflected revolutionary or anti-imperialist luster. The line of the Kremlin and the local pro-Moscow parties toward anti-imperialist strug-

gles badly needs some renewed credibility. The strategy of supporting "national bourgeois" revolutions as a "first stage" in the struggle for socialism—in fact unconditionally supporting any bourgeois politician or military strongman who might be willing to make some kind of a deal with the Soviet Union—has taken a bad beat-



BREZHNEV: Praise from "Izvestia."

ing in the postwar period. Some of the hardest blows in fact were dealt by the Cuban revolutionary leadership itself in the earlier days.

For the first ten years or so of its existence, the Castro regime did try to defend the revolution by extending it. But its strategy of trying to initiate revolutionary process through the action of small rural and urban guerrilla groups proved notably unsuccessful.

When the Allende government came to power in Chile in 1970, the Cuban regime seemed to center its hopes on the "Chilean process." The crushing defeat of the Chilean workers in the week of September 11-18, 1973, was a heavy blow to the Cubans' perspective for breaking the imperialist encirclement.

Since the fall of Allende, the strategy of the pro-Moscow CPs in Latin Amer-

ica has come to center around the Peruvian and Argentine models, on the theory that a purely "nationalist" process that does not threaten the social status quo or move "too quickly" against imperialism can achieve reforms without provoking a military coup. There is no indication that the Cuban leadership has an alternative to this policy.

In his speech in the Plaza de la Revolución on July 26, 1971, Fidel said:

"But life teaches us that an impossible thing—or a thing that seems impossible—is often possible in the realities of life. It is possible especially when the peoples are armed with ideas, when revolutionary ideas are taken up by the masses. Then all those things that had seemed impossible became possible."

However, the Castro leadership, with all its obvious advantages as the first workers state in Latin America, has not been able to find a way to take revolutionary ideas effectively to the masses. As a result it has had to become more and more passively dependent on Soviet material aid, at the expense of revolutionary ideas and of truth in general. This process culminated in Brezhnev's visit to Cuba at the end of January.

In his speech in the Plaza de la Revolución, the Soviet Union's counterrevolutionary Stalinist party boss made it absolutely clear what he wanted:

"The Cuban Revolution is now fifteen years old. That is in a way no short period. That is why, when it comes to the new regime in Cuba, I believe that less should be said about youth and more about adulthood. . . .

"The Soviet Union has always considered inadmissible—in fact, criminal—any attempt to 'export counter-revolution,' any outside interference aimed at crushing the sovereign will of a revolutionary people. Likewise, communists are not in favor of 'exporting revolution.' Revolution matures on the internal field of one or another country. How and when it surges forth, what forms and methods are employed to bring it about, concern only that country."

The Stalinist dictator devoted the middle part of his speech to explaining the disarmament agreements with the United States. He pointed out:

"But the concept of peaceful coexistence isn't just limited to acknowledging that war is no longer useful in solving disputes among nations, especially between the two social systems. In our day, the conviction that an active and fruitful collaboration among all nations is necessary becomes stronger with time."

Brezhnev made it clear that Soviet aid to Cuba was within the context of the peaceful coexistence policy.

"It is well known that the Soviet Union gives aid to Cuba for strengthening its national defense. We know very well that Soviet arms in Cuban hands aren't for attacking anyone or for worsening the international situation. They serve the just cause of defending the revolutionary conquests of the country, the cause of peace and tranquility." (*Applause.*)

In his speech and in the Soviet-Cuban communiqué of February 2, Castro made a complete and humiliating political capitulation to the Soviet bureaucracy.

Speaking to the crowd in the Plaza de la Revolución, Castro threw his prestige into the breach to defend the Soviet Union against attacks from the left:

"There are also pseudoleftists and renegades of the revolutionary movement who, adopting alleged Marxist positions, miserably betray proletarian internationalism and serve the interests of imperialism." (*Hisses.*)

In the joint communiqué, Cuba was forced to subscribe to practically every point of Moscow's current foreign policy. It endorsed the Soviet Union's Middle East line of guaranteed "security" for all "peoples and states" in the region, including the Zionist settler state.

In particular, the Cubans were forced to line up with the Kremlin's campaign against Maoist China:

"Both Parties are irreconcilable with revisionism—of the right as well as the left—and with the hegemonic and chauvinist trends that contradict the international line collectively outlined by the Communist and Workers Parties."

There was even an indication that Cuba risked being drawn into a military alliance against the world's second-strongest workers state:

"The Cuban leader supported the Soviet proposal for a system of collective security in Asia," a *New York*

Times correspondent cabled from Moscow February 4, "an initiative that Peking itself has said was directed against China." It is to be hoped that Havana will deny that inference.

The communiqué even committed the Cuban government to supporting the "proposals made by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view to that country's democratic and peaceful reunification."

It seems clear, then, why the moves to "bring Cuba back into the inter-American community" escalated after Brezhnev's visit. The public humiliation of the Castro regime was the necessary demonstration that Havana had definitely subordinated itself to the strategy of "peaceful coexistence."

The triumphant editorial in the April 5 *Izvestia*, in the commentary

column, made this absolutely clear:

"There is no question that the visit of L.I. Brezhnev promoted the further growth of Cuba's international prestige. The attempt to develop new interstate relations and cooperation that would strengthen national independence and the unity first of all of the northern Latin American countries is winning more and more supporters. Despite the efforts of the imperialists, Cuba is beginning to take part in this process on a basis of equality. . . ."

"A brief look at the list of foreign guests in Cuba recently says a lot: Two Peruvian government delegations, representatives of the Panamanian Ministry of Economic Development, more than two hundred Argentine businessmen accompanying a government delegation headed by the minister of commerce." □

Argentina

Metalworkers Press Fight for Democracy

Following on the heels of the successful metalworkers strike in Villa Constitución in mid-March, the Comisiones Internas (plant committees) at the Acindar, Marathon, and Metcon plants called an "antibureaucratic plenum" to be held April 20.

According to April 19 and 23 *La Opinión* accounts of the plenum, it was convoked in support of carrying out the agreement won as the result of the strike, which was fought over the issue of union democracy, the right of rank and file workers to elect their own leaders. (See *Intercontinental Press*, April 29, 1974, for a complete account of the strike.)

Approximately 3,000 persons from all over Argentina attended the plenum, including Córdoba labor leaders Agustín Tosco and René Salamanca. Speakers asserted the need for workers to regain control over their unions, and said that it was essential to organize and unify the labor movement in order to make this possible.

These affirmations are especially important in light of reports in *La Opinión* that UOM (Unión Obrera Metalúrgica—Metalworkers Union) officials were up in arms over the continuing campaign of the Comisiones

Internas for rank-and-file control over union leadership. A communiqué issued by local UOM leadership was quoted by *La Opinión* as objecting that the workers "want to impose their criteria on the elected delegates and even on the national secretary[!], whom they accuse of being a bureaucrat."

The Peronists' alarm at the break from their control represented by the Villa Constitución strike is further indicated by a statement local officials published, reminding metalworkers that their first loyalty should be to General Perón. □

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Maoist Campaign Aimed at Chinese Army Command

By Les Evans

"Lin Piao drooled, 'Of all things, this is the most important: to restrain oneself and return to the rites.' He regarded the restoration of capitalism as the most important of all things. This fully shows that Lin Piao's line was an out-and-out revisionist ultra-Rightist one."— *Peking Review*, April 5, 1974

Since the second week of February, a massive campaign has been waged in the People's Republic of China to "criticize Confucius and Lin Piao." The necessity to "defeat" two men who are already dead was quite obscure at first. The connection between the ancient sage and Lin Piao was even harder to discern. Things are now becoming clearer.

The dead are being utilized as object lessons; and the obscurantist denunciations filling the Chinese press are directed at some specific targets, all very much alive. The regime's foremost target is the group of high-ranking officers of the People's Liberation Army who rose along with Lin to unequalled power in the course of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69.

Since the fall of Lin Piao in September 1971, the Communist party hierarchy around Mao and Chou En-lai has systematically whittled away at the power and prerogatives of the army, particularly the group closest to Lin in the PLA's Fourth Field Army. The caution with which the regime has moved suggests that important military-bureaucratic cliques with significant organizational bases in the provinces and in the army high command survived the purge of Liu Shao-ch'i in the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent disappearance of Lin and a number of other high military figures in 1971.

For a year prior to the Tenth Party Congress, held in August 1973, Lin was denounced in the most vitriolic terms by the Chinese press, but with no mention of him by name. The code phrase was "Liu Shao-ch'i and other swindlers." At the Tenth Congress Chou En-lai himself, who usually assigns such dirty work to subordinates, delivered the first public anathema against Lin. This congress, called on short notice without any of the usual pre-congress publicity, was limited to opening the campaign against Lin and to redrafting the party constitution, the constitution adopted by the Ninth Congress in April 1969 having named Lin as Mao's heir and successor.

It was shortly after the close of the Tenth Congress that the first articles appeared in which Confucius was made a target along with Lin. The objective was to link the hidden supporters of Lin in the army with the discontented to be found among the eight million "educated youth" and intellectuals deported to the countryside after the forcible suppression of the radical sections of the Red Guard students in 1967-68.

Unlike the egalitarian demagoguery of the first period of the Cultural Revolution, the themes of the anti-Confucian campaign have been for more discipline and the use of force against any and all political opponents or critics of the regime. The propaganda has been virulently anti-cultural and anti-intellectual.

After the Tenth Congress, in a move aimed against the regular army, the militia was given a boost. A September 29, 1973, *Liberation Army Daily* editorial accused Lin Piao of having opposed militia-building, adding:

"Experience shows that the militia can be an important factor in the socialist revolution in ideological, political and economical spheres, in suppressing reactionary classes at home, thwarting enemy sabotage, safeguarding public security, and protecting state property and the people's interest. It is a shock brigade in production that can actively contribute to socialist construction."

This list of attributes anticipated the more general themes of the anti-Confucian campaign in its stress on the repressive functions of the militia and on the use of military units to speed up workers in industry.

The most dramatic move came in January, when all of China's senior military commanders were transferred from their traditional regional command—and organizational base—to different regions. Many of these commanders exercised power on a governmental as well as military level, holding posts as chairmen of the provincial Revolutionary Committees set up in the course of the Cultural Revolution as the nonparty civilian arm of government.

Some of these officers had been stationed in the same place since the troops under their command defeated Chiang Kai-shek during the civil war of 1946-49. These were generally not personal fiefs, but the centers for groupings within the military, represented by the officer corps of each of the five field armies that compose the PLA. The transfer of these men to new regions, cutting off old clique ties, reduced the ability of the army or a sector of it to claim power or prerogatives at the expense of the party center, now under Mao's exclusive control.

Whether the regime intends to carry out a deepgoing purge of the army hierarchy remains to be seen. It is significant that the "criticize Lin and Confucius" campaign began only a few weeks after the shift in the regional commanders had been completed. Moreover, a new slogan has begun to appear in the Chinese press: "Criticize Lin Piao and other swindlers."

Coming barely six months after the public admission that the phrase "Liu Shao-ch'i and other swindlers" really referred to Lin, the appearance of the new label sounds ominous.

Some candidates for a new purge seem to have been designated through wall-poster attacks put up by local Maoist stalwarts. The most prominent official to be publicly condemned is Li Teh-sheng, who was reassigned in January from the post of chief political commissar of the PLA to commander of the Shenyang Military Region in Manchuria. Western reporters have been shown wall posters in Li's home province of Anhwei calling for his removal.

Li, who is associated with the Second Field Army, rose from obscurity in the course of the Cultural Revolution to become one of the five deputy chairmen of the CCP. He was placed on its all-powerful nine-member Political Bu-

reau Standing Committee at the Tenth Congress. Others who have been similarly criticized include Hsieh Chen-hua, the military commander of Shansi province, where an opera was recently denounced in the central party press as "anti-Mao"; Tseng Ssu-yu, the commander of the Shantung Military Region; and Han Hsien-chu of the Lanchow Military Region.

A single "egalitarian" note—hailed as a sign of socialist democracy by the New York Maoist weekly *Guardian*—was included in a veiled attack seemingly directed against yet another high military figure, Chung Hsueh-lin, described by Hsinhua (January 28) as "a leading cadre in the Political Department of the Foochow units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army." In January, the Peking *People's Daily* gave front-page treatment to a letter from Chung's son, Chung Chih-min, who confessed that his father had used his influence to get him into college while most of his generation were being sent to the countryside. On being found out, Chung Chih-min dutifully gave up school and returned to laboring in the service of Mao Tsetung Thought.

While his father must have looked rather bad, Chung Chih-min was made something of a hero and given a further opportunity to denounce his parents through the guise of a strictly personal self-criticism. In a January 30 interview, also front-paged by the *People's Daily*, Chih-min castigated himself for his former wastrel ways, saying: "I did not mind a bit when I lost a watch worth more than four hundred yuan. My family later bought me another watch worth 180 yuan. I live a lavish life and do not aim high politically. If I do not mend my ways, I shall become a renegade to our revolutionary forefathers!"

This attack on privilege is remarkable because it has become so rare in the Chinese press. It is, of course, directed at a high-ranking member of the army.

The average peasant, for whom 400 yuan is a year's pay, or a skilled worker, for whom it is six months earnings, is bound to appreciate the scale of privileges indicated by the watches the military elite can supply to their children. Questions about the pay scales and privileges of other sectors of the party and government bureaucracy are today denounced as "ultraleftism." □

Soviet Dissident Held in Mental Hospital

Pyotr Grigorenko's Fight for 'Leninist Principles'

By Tamara Deutscher

[The following article was distributed by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation in preparation for the May 7 protests demanding freedom for Pyotr Grigorenko.]

* * *

Pyotr Grigorenko is one of the most outstanding figures among the dissidents in the Soviet Union. This 67-year-old veteran of the second world war (during which his bravery earned him six military decorations including the Order of Lenin), a Candidate Master of Military Sciences, and a former senior lecturer at Frunze Military Academy, has been confined since 1969 to a psychiatric institution, maltreated, and subjected to many indignities.

By now we are familiar enough with Soviet methods of dispensing "justice" not to ask what was the medical diagnosis on the basis of which Grigorenko was sent to a lunatic asylum, but rather what was the political offense for which he is so perversely punished.

Grigorenko fell afoul of the authorities over ten years ago. At the end of 1963 he founded the Union of Struggle for the Revival of Leninism, the aim of which was to "conduct an ex-

planation of Leninist tenets among the people and to spread Leninist principles." The group produced and distributed some leaflets, typewritten or duplicated, and protested against some bureaucratic bungling of the Khru-

him up in a psychiatric clinic. Yes, indeed, to have "reformist ideas" and to see the need to "reorganize the state apparatus" must have seemed to the doctors of the notorious Serbski Institute a clear indication of mental illness.

Grigorenko was released in May 1965. For a time he refrained from oppositional activity, or rather, he changed his methods. Instead of reacting by "illegal" leaflets to immediate abuses by the bureaucracy, he embarked on a scholarly work, analyzing the reasons for the disastrous errors that occurred in the initial phase of the war.

Grigorenko could not remain aloof for long from the growing ferment and dissent. In 1966 he came under the influence of Aleksei Kosterin, who had survived seventeen years of Stalin's concentration camps and who, released in 1955, remained to the end of his life as stubbornly Marxist-Leninist as he was when he joined the Bolshevik party in 1966. Around Grigorenko and Kosterin gathered a whole group of young dissidents eager to learn the true history of the revolution and to fight for revolutionary legality.



PYOTR GRIGORENKO

shchev administration. Obviously, it would have been much too embarrassing to conduct a political trial against a man who called for a return to "Leninist norms," and so the medical profession promptly obliged by declaring Grigorenko mentally ill and shutting

Grigorenko and Kosterin were especially active in demanding that the Crimean Tatars, the Chechen, and the Ingush people, as well as the Volga Germans, be allowed to return home from the deportation to which Stalin had condemned them during the war.

In July 1968, while the Czechs and Slovaks still hopefully celebrated the Prague Spring, Kosterin together with Grigorenko and three other Communists signed a statement of solidarity with the "working people and all socialist forces" of Czechoslovakia. Grigorenko and Ivan Yakhimovich personally delivered this message of solidarity and goodwill to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow.

When, a month later, the tanks of the Warsaw Pact countries rolled into Czechoslovakia, a small group of Grigorenko's young friends demonstrated against the invasion in Red Square in Moscow. By that time the security forces were on the alert. Five of the demonstrators were tried and sentenced in October 1968. Again it was Kosterin and Grigorenko who, among others, issued most energetic protests.

Kosterin died in November 1968. With a courage bordering on recklessness, defying all the police prohibitions, Grigorenko organized the funeral of his friend. More than 400 persons gathered at the Novodevichy cemetery to pay their last tribute. Among the eighteen or nineteen speakers were many Crimean Tatars, Ingush, and Chechens from the outlying republics, whose freedom from Great Russian oppression both Grigorenko and Kosterin had so often publicly defended. Ordinary police and a swarm of plainclothes security men were unable to break up the dense crowd, and it remains a source of pride to Grigorenko that the mourners succeeded in enforcing their will and did not disperse until all the planned valedictions were over. Thus the burial of one of the most unyielding Bolsheviks became a political demonstration, the first of its kind in over four decades.

Grigorenko once said that it was Kosterin who turned him "from a rebel into a fighter," and so after his friend's death Grigorenko went on with his fight against bureaucratic arbitrariness. In December 1968 he addressed a formal protest to USSR Prosecutor General A. R. Rudenko against a police provocation in an Uzbek town

where the security forces attacked a group of Crimean Tatars peacefully celebrating no more "subversive" a date than the anniversary of Lenin's birth. He protested also against the search of his own flat, where the KGB confiscated, apart from his military writings, the texts of funeral speeches in memory of Kosterin.

Although by that time the authorities showed an increased determination to stamp out all dissent, Grigorenko did not give up his struggle. He could not keep silent when the news of the tragic death of Jan Palach percolated to the Soviet Union.

"This protest which took such a frightful form [Palach's self-immolation] was intended above all for us, soviet citizens," wrote Grigorenko jointly with Yakhimovich in a stirring appeal. "We all share part of the guilt. . . . By approving the venture of our troops, justifying it, or simply keeping silent, we contribute to the continued burning of human torches in the squares of Prague and other cities. The Czechs and Slovaks always considered us their brothers. Will we let the word 'Soviet' become synonymous with the word 'foe'?"

Grigorenko urged his fellow citizens that they should "by all legal methods . . . bring about the withdrawal of

Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia."

This appeal to the truly international spirit of the Soviet people was too dangerous to the ruling caste. Grigorenko was arrested.

In August 1969 one psychiatric commission declared him sane. But the ill-famed Serbski Institute reversed the decision. His trial was held in February 1970, but he was "too ill" to attend. The doctors pronounced him "too ill" to receive a visit from his wife or to contact his defense lawyer. He was transported to the special psychiatric prison hospital at Chernyakovsk.

Since 1973 he has been in a "normal" mental hospital in Moscow. Every six months his case, like all the similar ones, is apparently reviewed by a special medical board. Grigorenko stubbornly refuses to change his opinions, views, and principles. His health is declining rapidly. He has had two heart attacks; he is losing his sight, and cataracts threaten him with complete blindness. No medical treatment is provided.

It is late, but not yet too late, to demand his release: "We all share part of the guilt. . . . By simply keeping silent we contribute" to his continued sufferings at the hands of doctors—loyal servants of the state. □

Italy

The Stakes in the Divorce Referendum

[The following article is from the April 10 issue of *Bandiera Rossa*, the organ of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist Groups, Italian section of the Fourth International). It deals with the May 12 referendum to repeal the Fortuna-Baslini law, a measure enacted in 1970 to loosen somewhat the historic ban on divorce in the Italian legal code. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

We have to vote "no" first of all because the reactionaries, the Christian Democrats, the MSI [Movimento Sociale Italiano—Italian Social Movement, the neofascists], and in general

all of right-wing public opinion wanted this referendum so that they could use the campaign to constitute a "bloc for order," to lay the bases for a "firm-handed" solution to the crises the country is experiencing. By abolishing the Fortuna-Baslini law, the reactionaries want to take the first step toward a more general assault on democratic rights, on the right to strike, the right of political activity in the schools, freedom of the press—in short, all the liberties the mass movement has won by its struggles from 1968 until today.

Of course, we know perfectly well that a reactionary attack can never be blocked by a vote. We are well aware that in this society elections are only a distorting, very distorting mirror of the needs and aspirations

of the various social classes. We are certain that even an overwhelming victory for divorce would not stop Fanfani [the general secretary of the Christian Democracy] from continuing to nourish his plans for a "new de Gaulle."

We are convinced that in this election especially the results cannot accurately mirror the relationships among classes in the society, the relationship of forces, for the simple reason that the prodivorce front includes a little bit of everything: the PLI [Partito Liberale Italiano—Italian Liberal party, the classical secular right], the PRI [Partito Repubblicano Italiano—Italian Republican party, petty-bourgeois liberals], the PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano—Italian Communist party], the PSI [Partito Socialista Italiano—Italian Socialist party], extraparliamentary left groups, and even the three most influential bourgeois papers in Italy (*Corriere della Sera*, *Messaggero*, and *Stampa*).

Moreover, the bourgeoisie gives the right to vote to nuns, to seventy-year-olds, to priests, etc., but it denies it to youth under twenty-one, thereby excluding from the contest an extensive social stratum that by its dynamism and political awareness can influence the outcome of the confrontation.

So, these elections will have definite limitations. We are going to vote No along with forces we want nothing to do with, capitalist forces like the PLI or the PRI. But we will vote No so that, on the electoral level also, a clear rejection of fascism is expressed, as well as a commitment to defend the liberties won by the mass movement.

But in the election campaign and after May 12 we will have to say some things very different from what many of those who happen to be voting No along with us (PRI, PSI, etc.) are saying.

We want to say clearly that this system—along with the political force that forms its backbone (the Christian Democracy), with its institutions (e.g., the parliament), and with its state—has shown in recent months its complete inability to solve the most pressing problems of the society (rising prices, unemployment). We want to speak out clearly and say that in these last months the system has shown all

its rottenness, shot through as it is with corruption and power struggles. We want to say that once again the government has shown itself under this system to be a servile instrument in the hands of the capitalists, the big oil companies, and the raw materials hoarders.

In no way can the Geddas, the Lombardis, and the pious Figlie di Maria [Daughters of Mary] singing "*Sempre con il papa fino alla morte, che bella sorte, che bella sorte*" [With the Pope to the death; what a beautiful fate] be the moral guardians of public life.

Of course we know that Almirante [the neofascist leader] is thundering against "the filth and corruption," that Fanfani is posturing as if he were Christ returned, telling the people: "*Bisogna punire i neghittosi, premiare i laboriosi*" [The lazy must be punished and the industrious rewarded]. But let's remember that under the fascists the government was more than ever at the service of small ruling groups, that corruption was the order of the day. Let us remind the honorable Fanfani of one thing: It was under his tutelage that the most mafioso of the mafia ministers, the honorable Gioia, began his inexorable rise to power.

The only real alternative to this political system is workers power, is opening up the books and the accounts of all the companies and government agencies and putting all these things under direct supervision by the workers.

Never have the pressures for an "iron-fisted" solution been as heavily felt as in the last months. For the first time (in January 1974) the army chose to intervene with massive military maneuvers to make its voice heard and its weight felt in the Italian political situation. For the first time, a magistrate (Calamari in Florence) took it on himself to call on the police to investigate the "nature" of a far-left organization (Avanguardia Operaia) and to search the homes of dozens of far-left activists. At the same time, in Milan the police fabricated frame-up charges against the Re Nudo [The Emperor Has No Clothes] group.

We know very well that as the internal crisis of the system and its government increases, the more the determinedly reactionary forces will take the initiative to push, or to try to

push, the entire bourgeois front into unleashing a vast repression, into beefing up the powers of the state repressive bodies, and into using the weight of the army to shift the political axis in the country to the right and to intimidate the weaker social strata. At the same time, more and more magistrates will want to find a way out of the acute crisis of the Italian judicial system by hasty methods such as exemplary sentences.

A victory for the Christian Democracy and the MSI in the vote would be a victory for repression. Defeat of this referendum, accompanied by a strong mass response and a struggle in defense of democratic rights, would be a defeat for the forces that are most determinedly seeking a "strong state."

Many acute problems created by the national and international crisis of capitalism, by the bosses' attempt to shift the costs of this crisis onto the backs of the workers, have not been solved by either the first or the second Rumor government.

There is no question but that if the reactionary bloc wins on May 12, it will feel that it has greater backing from public opinion and will have less hesitations about openly defending the interests of the bosses, about allowing prices to rise more easily so as to guarantee the capitalists their profits.

So, it is necessary to defeat these forces in the electoral arena as well. This is not enough to stop the rising cost of living, and we must say so honestly and clearly. We can stop the rising cost of living and defend wages and salaries effectively only if we can force the unions to undertake a general struggle, drawing in behind the working class the popular strata that have been hit by the crisis. This is the only way to defeat the government of high prices, the government that is inflicting sacrifice, humiliation, and double work on thousands of families. This alone can win a complete sliding scale of wages under workers control, which is the only means of defending wages and salaries effectively from continually rising prices.

In all capitalist societies, women are forced into a subordinate role, the role of domestic slaves and of sex objects for advertising purposes when

they are young, to be rejected when they get old.

In Italy in particular, the ideological dominance of the church has nourished the ideal of "the home," of woman as the "faithful and silent companion of man," while for decades a penal code has existed imposing a mild sanction for "crimes against honor" committed by men, while punishing these same infractions much more severely in the case of women. This is to say nothing of a whole set of beliefs and superstitions about male superiority in every field, from the sexual to the cultural, the political, etc.; or about the subtle division that is already at work in elementary school between male and female, between men's work and women's work (or "lady's work," as was written on report cards under the fascist regime).

In their long march toward emancipation, women cannot fail to revolt against the church and its ideology. But neither can they fail to realize that they can achieve real liberation only in a completely different political and social context. It has to be a context where the conditions have been achieved for liberating humanity in general, with the disappearance of the patriarchal-type bourgeois family that assigns the husband the role of undisputed family head and women the role of domestic slaves, and condemns children to economic bondage and sexual and ideological oppression. That is, women can achieve liberation only in a socialist society where a whole set of tasks are taken over by the collectivity (such as education, training, etc.) and in which a whole set of domestic chores can be abolished or replaced (automatic laundries, etc.).

But right now, by our struggles, we can lay the groundwork for the socialism of tomorrow, by fighting for the extension of free social services (from child care to laundries and schools) and putting all of this under workers control, by fighting to win and consolidate the right of women to control their own bodies, by fighting for free abortion on demand. We can move toward this goal also by fighting to have centers set up in the factories, in the schools, and in the neighborhoods for sex education and the free distribution of contraceptives. □

Provisional IRA Offensive in North

Ireland: How Close to Victory?

By Bob Purdie

[The following article is from the April 12 issue of *Red Weekly*, the paper of the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

This Easter thousands of Irish people will take to the streets to commemorate the Easter Rising of 1916. They will be looking forward, in this year which the Republican Movement has named "The Year of Victory," to momentous events which seem to be just around the corner.

The results of the general election, and the unprecedented escalation in the Provisionals' military campaign, have deepened the cloud that hangs over the Sunningdale Agreement, and many Republican supporters now consider that its demise is only a matter of time.

Whitelawism

This is despite the fact that they have not had much encouragement from Labour's new Secretary for Ireland, Merlyn Rees. The Labour Government seems to have taken on board the baggage of Whitelawism. Of the seven proposals put to the Commons last Thursday (4 April), only the seventh, the maintenance of the Sunningdale Agreement, is of any long-term importance.

Labour adheres to Sunningdale not just because Merlyn Rees and Stan Orme are the only two Labour MPs prepared to take on the job (although they are), or because both think that the sun shines out of Whitelaw's arsehole (although they do), but because Sunningdale is of immense importance to the British ruling class.

The Sunningdale Agreement is distinguished from previous British strategies (the British Army intervention of 1969; the anti-IRA offensive of July 1970; and internment), by virtue of the fact that it does not seek to

achieve an immediate solution to the problem of violence. Instead, it ties stabilisation in the North to Britain's long-term aim of handing over control of the whole of Ireland to the most stable bourgeois force in the island—the Southern ruling class. All previous measures failed, not just because the violence continued, but because they *postponed that eventual outcome*.

Sunningdale has achieved the triple goals of creating a collaborationist force within the catholic community (in the shape of the SDLP), splitting the loyalist opposition to Britain's long-term aims, and creating a medium-term possibility of stabilisation. Because of this no British government, particularly a Labour one, will lightly throw it aside.

Flaws in the Deal

But this strong commitment cannot hide the flaws in the deal. For a start, the two main partners in the Northern Executive have quite different aims. Like Benjamin Franklin they hang together for fear of hanging separately.

Since direct rule Faulkner's aim has remained relatively consistent. He wants to keep as much as possible of both aspects of Unionism—the link with Britain and the protestant ascendancy. He accepts power-sharing and if it became politically possible would accept the Council of Ireland—but only as necessary evils. His real interest in Sunningdale is to get sufficient political and economic concessions to weld together a new 'mark two' Unionist bloc. This would be a smaller and somewhat battle-worn version, but would embody the same multi-class sectarian character and rest on the "special relationship" with Britain.

The SDLP needs power-sharing so that it can appear to the catholic masses as the distributor of jobs, houses and opportunities for advance-

ment. But no less important, it needs power-sharing to build a political machine; and it is succeeding. The SDLP now offers a viable career to flocks of young, floral-tied, up-and-coming catholic professionals.

The catholic middle class has seen two examples of what can be achieved by a petty-bourgeois political force which gets its hands on governmental power. In the South both the Free Staters in 1922, and Fianna Fail in 1933, succeeded in jacking up their section of the petty bourgeoisie to full bourgeois status. Although the SDLP has only one handle of the gravy bucket, it will hang on to it with grim determination.

For the Southern bourgeoisie the Council of Ireland, by seeming to offer unification, gives a shred of cover to its collaboration with British imperialism.

Provos Rebound

But despite the determination of its adherents since the turn of the year, the balance has swung seriously against Sunningdale. Against all expectations the Provisional IRA has rebounded from last year's serious losses to launch the fiercest military campaign ever. On the weekend of 30-31 March they inflicted £10 million worth of damage, with major bombings in Armagh, Bangor and Lisburn. This followed the major coup the previous weekend of blowing up the British Army HQ in Royal Avenue, Belfast.

It is worth noting that none of these explosions was accompanied by the politically damaging loss of life associated with previous campaigns on this scale.

The Republicans today are in their most powerful position since the summer of 1972—when they forced the British Government into a short-lived cease-fire. But there are some important differences.

In purely military terms the IRA is much stronger. Its actions are spread over a wider geographical area, including the smaller towns and the border areas. A steady toll of lives has been exacted from the Crown forces. Equipment, training, organisation and discipline are much more developed than two years ago. The aim of this campaign is to force the new

British Government into another cease-fire and round of negotiations. Irish newspapers are full of speculation about this being imminent.

Rees's proposals have been interpreted as a hint that he would consider this. The reduction in troop numbers, the "sign-out-a-terrorist" scheme [providing for release of detainees on the basis of a sponsor's signature], and the legalisation of Sinn Fein could be taken as a step toward the Provos' demands. (These are an end to internment, a phased withdrawal of troops, a firm date for complete withdrawal of Britain from Ireland, and an amnesty for all political prisoners.)

But the political base of the Republicans has weakened. The no-go areas are gone, and the SDLP has demonstrated that it can gain the electoral support of considerable numbers of catholics, even in the strongest Provo areas. The Provisionals remain unable to develop mass opposition to the deepening collaboration by the Coalition Government in the South.

This is serious. It means that the British Government, which still commands considerable military capacity, also has increased political elbowroom for manoeuvring against the Republicans.

But on the other hand, the British Government is opposed from both ends of the political spectrum. The huge swing to the anti-Sunningdale Unionists in the general election gravely weakens the agreement.

It is not clear how much this aids the Republicans. Although the elections results discredit Sunningdale, they have slowed down other favourable developments within the protestant community.

Prior to the election a deep despair had gripped the protestants. The Council of Ireland loomed over them, and they saw this as the final sellout to the South. All methods of resistance had become discredited, and there was serious political fragmentation. In this situation some of the protestant groupings began to think the unthinkable, and to consider discussions with the Republicans.

It is necessary to be careful about this development. No section of the protestants broke from sectarianism. All of them, the UDA *et al.*, were trying to safeguard the protestant ascendancy.

A Bridge

They wished to make some arrangement with the Republicans, in order to more effectively pressurise the British government. This was the case even with Desmond Boal, who seemed to move close to the Provisionals' views on Regional Government.

The Republicans were wrong to foster illusions in the *nature* of these moves. But they were right to see them as a positive development, and were right to respond favourably to them. They gained some short-term advantages: for example, UVF/UDA backing for their accusations of British involvement in the sectarian assassination campaign.

In the long term such contacts could provide the bridge over which some sections of the protestant community could cross to join the ranks of those opposed to British imperialism in Ireland. But this can only result if any last illusions that they have of saving the protestant ascendancy are destroyed.

The result of the election can only postpone such a development, since it opens up a new credible means of scuppering the Council of Ireland—through parliamentary means. The psychological importance of this is considerable.

Despite the savagery of the sectarian assassinations, and periodic pogroms, the political unity of the protestants has depended on "establishment" leaders, and "constitutional" methods. The existence of a strong and united parliamentary expression for anti-Sunningdale Unionism will slow down the fragmentation, and lift the cloud of despair.

Troops Out Movement

The very complexity of the situation argues against any imminent resolution of the conflict, even if a cease-fire were to occur. The British Government still does not have enough strength to make Sunningdale stick, and the Provisionals do not have enough strength to get a settlement which would fulfill their minimum requirements.

The outcome still depends on whether or not the Provisionals can extend the base of the struggle, and

draw in new forces against British imperialism in Ireland. Their continued blindness to the need to fuse the struggle in the North with that of the working class in the South becomes daily more serious.

However, there is another possibility. The continued inability of the British Government to solve the Irish problem, and the possible breakdown of Sunningdale, could create a crisis in British politics sufficient to force a withdrawal of the Army from Ireland.

The indications are faint, but it is clear that such a crisis is on the agenda. At one pole individual bourgeois commentators broach the pos-

sibility of a withdrawal (even the Army has been quoted as postulating that a withdrawal would not necessarily lead to a bloodbath), and at the other there is increased consciousness in the labour movement, and in civil liberties groups, of what is being prepared in Ireland for use in Britain.

These trends emphasise again the possibilities for building a movement in Britain for withdrawal of the troops from Ireland. That is why the message of this Easter to the British left must be to plunge into this task and help to swing further the balance of forces against British imperialism in Ireland. □

Conference Votes to Continue Grants Campaign

British Students Fight Victimizations

London

The continuing fight for a better system of grants and against government cutbacks in education spending were the major issues before the more than 1,300 delegates and observers, representing 660,000 students, who attended the spring conference of the National Union of Students (NUS) at Liverpool University April 1-5. Underlying the debates was the need to launch a mass campaign to defend students recently victimised by college authorities.

The eighteen-months-old student grants campaign and a number of major struggles at local level have led to victimisations of student leaders. Three of these local struggles—at Kent, Oxford, and Essex Universities—were at the centre of attention during the NUS conference.

The action at Kent University, Canterbury, where a Communist party activist was arbitrarily expelled, ended successfully after an occupation uncovered information exposing the frame-up and forced the authorities to reinstate the activist.

At Oxford University, on the other hand, twenty students were arrested during a struggle for a central students union. Eighteen students were tried by the University Disciplinary Court and suspended for a year.

The biggest struggle is taking place at Essex, where thirty-six students had disciplinary charges against them

stemming from NUS demonstrations in the grants campaign last November. A defense campaign for the students, which involved picketing the university, obtained the backing of the Colchester Trades Council.

In March the university authorities called in 450 police to break the picket, and fifteen students were arrested. When students responded with mass picketing, ninety more were arrested. The following day, 2,000 students from across the country demonstrated in Colchester, including the eighteen Oxford defendants, who left the courtroom to express their solidarity.

These struggles dominated the atmosphere of the NUS conference. One grievance commonly directed against the NUS executive was that lack of effective national leadership made it easier for college authorities to take disciplinary action against individual students.

During the conference, police again moved onto the Essex campus to break the picket. Many delegates and observers left Liverpool to reinforce the picket line at Essex.

The conference voted to uphold the demands of the grants campaign and to have a mass picket in Essex April 24 to coincide with the trials. A national rally in London will follow in May, and a fighting fund is to be set up for the victimised students at Oxford and Essex. Trade unionists are

to be asked to support the student picket line at Essex.

The NUS executive, which is led by the Communist party, inclined towards toning down the student grants campaign, using as an excuse the advent of a minority Labour government. The government already has indicated that it is prepared to replace the triennial review with an annual review of grants. But the events at Essex and cutbacks in education spending recently announced by Labour angered many students, and the executive were unable to carry their line.

Writing in the April 12 issue of *Red Weekly*, newspaper of the International Marxist Group (British section of the Fourth International), Steve Webster summed up the general approach of the Broad Left, the group through which the CP exercises its influence in the NUS:

"Before the general election the Broad Left's strategy in the NUS campaign . . . was based on building an alliance with the Vice Chancellors, Labour MPs and any other 'progressives' to put pressure on the Tory Government. And the mass of students? Well, occasionally we were trotted out to provide lobby fodder for marches to Parliament, the Education Department, or Local Education Authorities.

"The election of a Labour Government changed the Broad Left's *emphasis*, but the basic strategy has not changed. Now we are to politely request that Labour MPs honour their election pledges.

"The pressure politics of lobbies, petitions, and rallies continue. But not too much! We might rock the Labour boat, and this would not do."

Students' inability to get an adequate grant is part of the major cutback announced for education spending. Last December plans for a £168 million expenditure were held up by the Tories. Not much change was forthcoming from the Labour government. On March 27 Reginald Prentice, Labour's secretary of state for education and science, announced that plans for new buildings have been slashed by £135 million and delayed for three months. Only £33 million of the £168 million programme is to be allowed.

This policy of "education on the cheap" will involve the possibility of

loans instead of grants, an increase in the student-staff ratio, reduced enrollments, redundancies for college employees, poorer facilities and working conditions, and rising cafeteria prices and rents.

The NUS conference overwhelmingly passed a motion for a national campaign against the cuts, including occupation of colleges and a national demonstration.

"We want a far better education system than that viciously knifed by the Conservative government," said John Randall, the NUS president. "The Labour government seems content not only to leave the knife in, but to twist it in the wound."

In a manoeuvre designed to cover its own failure to give leadership, the CP-led Broad Left ran its own candidate for president against Randall. While Randall was reelected, in the votes for other offices that were contested the Broad Left strengthened its hold over the executive. But a consistent one-third of the delegates voted for the various far-left candidates.

The CP was defeated, however, in an important debate on Soviet dissidents. The conference censured executive members who had accepted a report claiming that there was insufficient evidence for a valid opinion on this matter.

"The most significant decision of the conference," Webster wrote in the *Red Weekly*, "one that upset the capitalist press no end, came with the vote to stop racist and fascist organisations from meeting on campus 'by whatever means necessary.' A similar step forward was the joint statement on this matter adopted by the entire left at the conference."

This decision was made in a fairly close vote after it was supported by Steve Parry, the NUS national secretary. "The action we carry out," Parry said, "must not just be one or two individuals disrupting meetings, but mass mobilisations to ensure that fascists do not have a platform to speak on."

In other major votes the Liverpool conference condemned the racist immigration policy of the British government and its discriminatory policy towards overseas students. Delegates denounced the reactionary role of the British government in Ireland and called for an end to the Special Air Services, for the freeing of internees,

and for the transfer to Northern Ireland of Irish political prisoners held in English jails. The conference also

Great Britain

Rightists Attack Irish Martyrs March

By Bob Cleaver

[The following article is reprinted from the April 19 issue of the *Red Weekly*, newspaper of the International Marxist Group (IMG), British section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

The Manchester Martyrs' March held on Monday, April 15, was viciously attacked by a demonstration led by Union-Jack-waving members of the National Front, supported by some local residents.

About 300 fascists and irate local citizens, whipped up by anti-Irish hysteria from the NF, attempted to stop the march as it proceeded through Moston. The march is an annual event, held to commemorate the hanging of three Irishmen in 1867 for killing a guard while attempting to release Fenian prisoners.

The graves of the martyrs had earlier been daubed, and most of the bourgeois press described the assault as a spontaneous outburst by the people of Moston.

But while the counterdemonstration did gain support from local residents, the National Front had done much preparatory work, and shipped in supporters and thugs from other areas.

The counterdemonstration's chants of "NF" and "Irish Out" were led by the Front, and NF agitators approached groups of bystanders, urging them to attack the march.

Unfortunately, the Martyr's March was poorly attended, with only about 150 turning out. These were mainly members of Sinn Fein, independent Republicans, and the IMG. The low attendance, and the fact that the NF was able to gain support in this working-class area of Manchester, should be a salutary lesson to the Manchester left.

For the first time in the area, the fascists have been able to intimidate

demand that British troops should be confined to their barracks pending complete withdrawal. □

an anti-imperialist demonstration and get away with it. This is because the left failed to turn out for the march, and because they have failed to take up the question of Ireland inside the labour movement.

Sinn Fein has announced that it will organise a mammoth rally in Manchester in defence of their right to demonstrate, and it is essential that this is supported by all sections of the labour movement.

Hopefully, the forthcoming conference on racism to be held at the Renold Theatre in Manchester on May 18 will take the appropriate steps to ensure that no working-class or anti-imperialist organisation or event can be attacked by the fascists in the future.

The conference is being supported by sections of the labour movement in Manchester. Details from Manchester Anti-Fascist Committee, c/o 27 Thatch Leach, Chadderton, Oldham, Lancashire. □

'People Wouldn't Understand'

In an effort to allay possible misunderstanding concerning its recent jump in profits, Mobil Oil has been airing a TV commercial that contends that drilling for oil is a risky business, since only one well in sixty pays off. This claim, however, has been shown to be somewhat inaccurate.

Figures compiled by the American Petroleum Institute, the industry's own lobby, show that 61.2 percent of all new wells drilled worldwide last year struck oil, a record that is thirty-six times better than that claimed in Mobil's ad.

When questioned, a representative of the agency that prepared the ad said the TV figure actually referred only to exploratory wells. The ad did not explain this, he said, "because the public wouldn't have understood."

There is another item the public may have difficulty in understanding: Mobil Oil's public records show a 21.4 percent rate of success in drilling exploratory wells.

Dalit Panthers Attacked in Bombay

Four persons were killed and more than twenty-five injured when police opened fire during a clash between groups of untouchables and upper-caste Hindus in the Worli area of North Bombay April 13. Three of the four dead, and most of the wounded, were Buddhists. (Untouchables often convert to Buddhism as a way of rejecting the Hindu caste system.)

In clashes in the past, the police invariably sided with the upper-caste Hindus, often encouraging them to attack protests and marches called by the Dalit Panthers. During the first clashes in January all the Panther leaders were arrested and several hundred untouchables were beaten up.

A dispatch by Harji Malik in the April 24 *Christian Science Monitor* observed: "Almost daily the press reports incidents involving Harijans [untouchables]—a woman is raped, men are beaten up because they resisted an outrage, a local Harijan leader is killed because he dared to stand for election against a high-caste rival."

The April 13 clashes were sparked by a similar outrage. The police stripped a Buddhist youth, blackened his face, attached a tail to him, and paraded him through the area where most of the clashes between untouchables and Hindus occurred.

The Dalit Panthers first formed themselves in April 1972 to fight the oppression of untouchables, after some of the younger militants became disillusioned by the failure of the Republican party of India (RPI), which claims to speak for the untouchables, to improve their condition.

"The Dalit Panthers have for the first time," Moin Shakir wrote in the April 20 Bombay *Economic and Political Weekly*, "exposed the gap between the haves and the have-nots within the scheduled caste [untouchable] community. The three factions of the RPI seemed content with caste politics and the concessions given to the educated sections of the scheduled castes. They have in the past joined hands with a variety of parties, from the Congress to the Jan Sangh. The Panthers constitute a serious threat to the political

survival of the RPI leaders. It is not surprising, therefore, that the three factions of the RPI, which could never unite on the question of atrocities on the dalits, have now patched up their differences to put down the Dalit Panthers."

Besides struggling for the rights of the untouchables, the Panthers also identify, and seek to ally themselves, with all oppressed sectors of Indian society.

Actions Spread Throughout State

50,000 Students Protest in West Bengal

About 50,000 students took part in a series of demonstrations, strikes, gheraos (mass actions to surround and sequester management or government officials), and civil disobedience actions beginning April 4 in the Indian state of West Bengal, according to the April 13 Bombay *Economic and Political Weekly*. Led by the Students Federation of India (SFI), which is influenced by the Communist party of India (Marxist), the actions spread to about thirty cities and towns in the state, including Calcutta.

The students demanded adequate supplies of food and kerosene, cheaper writing paper and textbooks, and reforms in the educational system.

The police responded by attacking the student protesters and arresting about 1,000 throughout the state. Although actions in Calcutta on April 8 were not attacked, police in other cities and towns showed less restraint. Students were fired upon in the subdivisional town of Basirhat in the 24-Parganas district bordering on Bangladesh. Police attacked students in Bongaon and in Chandernagore with clubs and tear gas. Demonstrators were beaten in Howrah, and in Chinsura ninety-one students were admitted to hospitals for treatment.

The police attacks were followed by even larger student protests and

In an article in the April 8 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Malik speculated that the untouchables might ally themselves with the Adivasi tribespeople, most of whom are landless laborers, and who recently launched the Adivasi Movement. Although Malik considered an alliance between India's 80 million untouchables and 40 million tribespeople a "remote possibility," he admitted that "recent developments could mean that the young 'untouchables' of India, with the tribal people, are going to make life tough for those who, in the past, have counted on these groups' meek acceptance of injustice as a permanent state." □

strikes. A strike called jointly by the CPI(M), Forward Bloc, the Revolutionary Socialist party, and other leftist parties was particularly successful in Chinsura. The SFI called for a statewide student strike April 9 and the Center of Industrial Trade Unions (CITU), which also is influenced by the CPI(M), planned to hold a mass rally in Calcutta the same day in solidarity with the students.


The *Economic and Political Weekly* reported that talks have begun between the SFI and the student groups of some of the other leftist parties to coordinate student actions. Even the student groups of the ruling Congress party and of the Communist party of India (CPI), which gives political support to Gandhi, announced that they would initiate actions around the same demands as those raised by the SFI. The secretariat of the West Bengal CPI, and its youth group, Yuba Sangha (Youth League), issued press statements protesting the police attacks on the student demonstrations. □

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AROUND THE WORLD



Soviet Trade With West Is Up

Soviet trade with the advanced capitalist countries increased more than 40 percent in 1973, according to preliminary figures published in Moscow. Total trade with West Germany was \$1,620 million and with the United States \$1,560 million.

Slightly different figures from the U.S. Commerce Department put total U.S.-Soviet trade at \$1,414 million, the Soviet Union exporting \$214 million worth of goods and importing \$1,200 million from the United States.

Soviet trade with all the other workers states increased 9 percent in 1973. Trade with China declined slightly.

UN Agency Warns of Food Shortage

The outlook for food supplies in many underdeveloped countries is unusually "bleak," according to a report released by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization on April 19. The report said that grain reserves of the principal exporting countries had almost disappeared in the last year and that this fact, combined with rising fertilizer prices, could create severe shortages in a number of countries.

"A crop failure in just one major producing region would be very serious in view of the very low stocks," the report said. Regions considered especially threatened are the drought areas in Ethiopia, the Sahel area of Africa, parts of East Africa and the Middle East, and possibly India.

Kremlin Pushing Meeting of Communist Parties

In a public speech April 22, a national secretary of the Soviet Communist party called for a world conference of Communist parties. Boris Ponomarev made the vaguely worded proposal during Kremlin ceremonies marking the anniversary of Lenin's birth.

The Soviet bureaucracy is known to have been pushing for such a meeting as a weapon against Peking.

Ponomarev spoke as though the initiative for a conference had come from other parties. Because of the desire for unity among Communists, he said, "many fraternal parties put forward proposals direct-

ed at further raising the Communist movement's role in social development, at strengthening its political and ideological cohesion. Together with the fraternal parties the Communist party of the Soviet Union is ready to undertake new steps in the name of these aims."

4,000 Join Paris Abortion March

Charging that most of the presidential candidates had ignored the question of abortion, 4,000 people marched in Paris April 20 under banners calling for free abortion on demand. The demonstration was organized by the Mouvement pour la Liberte de l'Avortement et de la Contraception (Movement for the Freedom of Abortion and Contraception). Abortion "is a matter for women, not parliament, to decide on," said the organizers. "Elections or not, we will defend our rights."

Profits Up in U. S.

Corporate earnings in the United States during the first three months of 1974 were 24 percent higher than in the same period of 1973, according to a study by First National City Bank of New York. The figures were for after-tax profits. The largest profit increase was in the petroleum industry, which raised its after-tax income 72 percent.

A Monument for Khrushchev

Western journalists in Moscow report that a monument for the grave of former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev is scheduled to be built this year. The sculptor of the monument is said to be Ernst Neizvestny.

In 1961, during a visit to a modern art exhibition, Khrushchev publicly criticized Neizvestny, saying "a donkey with his tail could do better work." The sculptor later said that he received no orders for his work for eight years after the incident.

Israeli 'Spy' Case

The thirty-two Arab and Jewish Israelis arrested since December 1972 on trumped-up charges of spying for Syria are scheduled to have their appeals heard before the High Court. They are currently serv-

ing sentences ranging from seven to seventeen years. Some were convicted solely on the basis of having been seen speaking with Palestinians thought to be sympathetic to the resistance movement.

According to the March issue of the Paris monthly *Israel and Palestine*, all thirty-two "have been under pressure, since their jailing, for carrying out political work in prison."

Norwegian Social Democrats, Stalinists Plan Fusion

The left-wing electoral bloc that contested last year's national elections in Norway has announced its intention of fusing into a single organization, the People's Socialist party. Components of the new formation are to be the Norwegian Communist party, the People's Socialist party, and a grouping of dissident former Labor party members.

The Communist party has asked for more time to prepare for the fusion, but its partners are in a hurry. They want the fusion to be carried out well before the 1975 municipal elections.

The committee charged with carrying out preparations for the fusion has announced that compromise positions have been worked out on such questions as the class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, democratic centralism, and relations with the Soviet Union. It was unable to reach agreement on the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but this does not appear to have been viewed as a major obstacle.

Iranian Students Demonstrate

About forty Iranian students marched to the Iranian Consulate in Bombay on March 23. Their demands included a call to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to investigate repression in Iran.

Two days later the Bombay police confiscated the passport of one of the protesters, Nosrat Temoorzaddeh, and arrested him on a minor charge. Two other Iranian students, Asghar Nosrati and Latif Shosh-tari, who had not even participated in the demonstration, were later arrested when they went to the police station to inquire about Temoorzaddeh. After nearly two weeks in jail, they were released on bail

April 9, and the next day all charges were dropped against them.

On April 11, however, the three students were served with expulsion orders, signed by the under secretary of the Maharashtra state government, to leave the country within three days. The students were booked on an Air India flight scheduled to pass through Tehran. The three students refused to board the plane, and the April 13 Bombay *Economic and Political Weekly* reported them still in Bombay.

Tokyo Agrees to Lend \$1,000 Million to Moscow

Tokyo and Moscow signed a protocol agreement April 22 in which Tokyo would provide Moscow with a \$1,000 million low-interest loan after the terms of three Siberian development projects are agreed upon. The projects mentioned in the protocol are (1) up to \$450 million in loans for the development of coking coal operations in Southern Yakutsk; (2) up to \$500 million for timber development in the Soviet far east; and (3) a maximum of \$100 million for natural gas exploration, provided U.S. companies participate in the exploration operations.

Bonn Legalizes Abortion

By a vote of 247 to 233, the West German Bundestag on April 26 voted to legalize abortion during the first three months of pregnancy. A reform of Paragraph 218 of the criminal law, which outlawed abortion, had been under discussion by the legislators for four years.

The opposition Christian Democratic party announced that it would oppose the measure in the Bundesrat, the upper house of parliament, where it has a majority. The Bundesrat can delay the legislation but cannot veto it.

Protest Torture of West Bank Arabs

The Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights has asked for support in its campaign to halt the arrest and torture of Arabs living in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. While many of the prisoners simply vanish and are never heard from again, some have lived to describe their interrogation at the hands of Israeli prison officials.

One who survived was Wadji Kamhawi, 27, who was arrested January 5 and charged with being a supporter of the Palestinian resistance. He was stripped naked, had ice-cold water poured over his body, was forced to drink salt water, and was beaten intermittently for four days.

Another West Bank resident, arrested the same day, received harsher treatment. After several days of torture similar to that of Kamhawi, Bassam Abd-El Razzala

Amira was twice beaten to the point of being unable to walk. On February 13, thirty-nine days after his arrest, he was for the first time allowed to wash and change his clothes.

Rostropovich to Go Abroad?

Soviet cellist Mstislav Rostropovich is reported to have received an exit visa allowing him to live abroad for two years. He is expected to go on concert tours in Western Europe and the United States.

Rostropovich has been out of favor with the Kremlin bureaucrats because of his friendship with exiled novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Rostropovich's most recent concert in the Soviet Union was on February 11. Prior to that he had not performed publicly for thirteen months.

Bolivian Elections Canceled

The Banzer dictatorship has once again postponed the national elections scheduled for 1975—this time indefinitely. Such elections would only divide the country, Banzer said, and that would be particularly harmful now. The dictator said that all of Bolivia's resources should be focused on regaining the territory lost to Chile in 1879. No elections have been held in Bolivia since 1966.

National Minorities Candidate Ruled Off French Ballot

The Constitutional Council has ruled that Robert Lafont, a candidate representing "national minorities," is not eligible to run for the French presidency. Lafont had been nominated by Lutte Occitane [Provencal Struggle], and was supported by other organizations fighting for self-determination and national rights for France's national minorities.

Although no reason was given for the decision to exclude Lafont from the ballot (the council is not required to explain its rulings), members of Lutte Occitane said his candidacy was probably judged to violate Article Four of the French Constitution, which says that "political parties and groupings must respect the principles of national sovereignty and democracy."

"What that means," said Jean Navarine, an organizer of Lafont's campaign, "is that our candidacy was seen as a blow at the integrity of French territory." He said they supported "autonomy," not "separatism." It is illegal in France to advocate separation of any part of the present territory.

Mathieu Roux, another member of Lutte Occitane, said: "For centuries France has followed a policy of ethnocide toward the peripheral peoples. It has made workers feel guilty about speaking their work-

ing language, whether Basque, Breton, Corsican, or whatever, in the belief that their languages were patois. Now there is a new force rising against internal colonialism. That is what scares the princes who rule us."

There are two other candidates running on behalf of national minorities in the election: Jean-Claude Sebag of the Mouvement Federaliste Europeen, and Guy Heraud of the Parti Federaliste Europeen.

Swiss Journalist Tortured in Chile

Swiss journalist Pierre Rieben, arrested in Santiago de Chile April 11, was released by the Junta on April 21 and expelled from the country. Rieben told a press conference in Geneva on April 22 that he had been released following inquiries by the Swiss ambassador to Chile. He said he was tortured by electric shock by air force officers whom he had denounced in an article found in his residence.

Starvation Reported in Bangladesh

Rising prices and food shortages have created starvation conditions in many areas of Bangladesh. During the week ending April 13, daily newspapers in Dacca reported at least thirty-two deaths by starvation in the countryside. One account reported that a woman in Rangpur district had been forced to sell her child for 100 takas (about U.S.\$13.33 at official exchange rates) in order to obtain food.

Sri Lanka 'On Verge of Disaster'

Sri Lanka is "on the verge of disaster," the United Nations was told April 17 by Felix Dias Bandaranaike, Sri Lanka's minister of public administration and justice. The country is in serious economic difficulty, he said, because it must import rice and oil, two products whose price has risen sharply. At the same time, tea—one of Sri Lanka's main exports—is selling at a low price on the world market.

Unless Sri Lanka and other countries in the same situation receive immediate economic aid, he warned, "the very foundations of their political and social systems may be threatened."

Lebanese Police Raid University

Lebanese police occupied the campus of American University in Beirut April 24 and arrested sixty-one Arab students. The students had held campus buildings in a five-week-long protest. The Lebanese interior minister announced after the police raid that those arrested would be charged with "subversion."

The October War and Israel's Economic Crisis

By Arie Bober

[This is the final installment of an analysis of Israel's economic and political perspectives in the wake of the October War. The series began in the April 15 issue of *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

If the workers are to defend themselves successfully, if they are to defeat the bourgeoisie's offensive, they must and will go beyond the framework and limits of the Histadrut—but not only of the Histadrut. A serious and effective struggle means a fight around democratic and transitional demands; it means a struggle for full equality and the abolition of all privileges enjoyed by one group at the expense of another: Jews at the expense of Arabs, Western Jews at the expense of Oriental Jews, immigrants at the expense of Israel-born. It means a fight for the establishment of militant unions and a real workers party; it means a fight for workers control and workers self-defense.

In short, it entails an anticapitalist mass struggle going far beyond the political framework of Zionism, a struggle that already in its early phase will find a way to unite with the mass struggle of the Arab people against imperialism and its local servants: Zionism and the Arab bourgeoisie.

If such a mass struggle actually unfolds and the spontaneous workers action committees transform themselves into defense committees on a national scale, out of which a real union would be organized; if in the course of the mass mobilization and radicalization a real workers party were formed that, tested and steered in the stormy struggles ahead, transcended the limits of Social Democratic reformism and led the masses of Israeli workers beyond the boundaries and framework of Zionism—if, in short, the Zionist "labor bureaucracy" should fail to contain and crush these impending workers struggles in their early phase—what then?

The answer to that question shouldn't come as a surprise. In such an event, the bourgeoisie would attempt to take over direct rule, not by any spectacular coup with tanks storming the Knesset (whatever for?), but by the "peaceful" and respectable procedure of forming an "Experts and Generals Unity Government of National Emergency." It would then proceed to transform the Israeli sociopolitical structure into a corporative fascist one modeled on Mussolini's Italy or Franco's Spain, thus attempting to "solve" the economic and social crisis in accordance with

its class interests.

Such an eventuality may seem to many far-fetched and perhaps even impossible, but in reality such a transformation of the Israeli state would be quite a *modest* change. The gap separating the "only democracy in the Middle East" and a corporative-fascist state is indeed quite small—much smaller than is generally realized. Consequently, in attempting such a transformation the Israeli bourgeoisie would enjoy many advantages in comparison to its colleagues in other bourgeois democracies.

An Old Political Reality

Many are still taken in by the myth of "socialist" Israel being the "only democracy in the Middle East." Nevertheless, even those who push this cheap propaganda would have to admit that it is a very peculiar democracy indeed.

We are not referring here to the all-too-evident and widely known repressive measures employed against the Palestinian Arabs throughout the history of the "Zionist enterprise." Less well known is the fact that even in regard to Jews the "promised land" ruled by the Zionists was never a democracy—not even a bourgeois democracy, let alone a socialist one. The closest characterization one could apply to the internal political structure, both in the Yishuve and afterwards in the state of Israel, would be that of a *very strong state*. This characterization should be understood with some important qualifications. Using the term "very strong state" in regard to the Israeli political structure simply means the following:

I. The Israeli state, without abandoning the trappings of democracy, relies more and more on repressive measures of the state machine, foremost against the Palestinians, but to a growing extent against the Israeli Jews themselves.

From the early 1920s, the "labor bureaucracy" used various repressive measures against *any* force within the Yishuve that opposed its authority or its politics, especially and systematically against two consistent political forces opposing it: the Communists on the left and Zabutinsky's "revisionists" on the right. These measures included harassment of individual members, boycott, expulsion, blacklisting, physical violence, and even betrayal to the British authorities, in whose hands the "dissidents" might suffer long imprisonment or even death.

Once the Israeli state was established, the systematic use of repressive measures

by the state machine became even more pronounced. The main, but not by any means the only, target was the Palestinians under the domination of the Zionist state. Repressive measures were employed more and more against workers, a very extreme and early example being the crushing in 1951 of the great seamen's strike, with the full approval and participation of the Histadrut. Other targets were the Oriental Jews protesting and struggling against discrimination, the repression against the Black Panthers being a recent example in a series of instances—such as the repression employed during the Vadi Salib riots in Haifa in 1959. And these measures are employed against political organizations, primarily against the Communist party and the organizations of the anti-Zionist revolutionary left, but not excluding other organizations opposing or protesting even particular aspects of Israeli politics.

Far from being the land of freedom and liberty, as the Zionist propagandists would have us believe, Israeli "democracy," which does not even have a constitution or a citizens' bill of rights, relies to an ever growing extent on the repressive measures of the state machine.

II. The political character of Israel stems from a central structural feature of the "Zionist enterprise" similar to the one undermining bourgeois democracy in the West, i.e., from the fact that the "Zionist enterprise" could not have functioned or attained its goals without the *continuous and direct intervention* of a state machine that for all practical purposes existed long before the formal establishment of Israel in 1948.

The "labor bureaucracy" was the social and political force that in the 1920s and early 1930s formed and consolidated a central apparatus—a state machine in the absence of a state—around the Histadrut, which was founded in 1920 by a number of petty-bourgeois Zionist parties of various "leftist" and "socialist" colorings. Through the Histadrut, the "labor bureaucracy," constantly growing, gained control of the "national institutions" of the embryonic Jewish state and of the funds flowing into the country from the World Zionist Organization, thus laying the basis for its hegemony in the Yishuve and in Israel after 1948.

This central apparatus did more than represent the Zionist settlers in their relations with the British and the Arab masses. It actually functioned as a state machine, continuously and directly inter-

vening in all aspects of the process of colonization and subordinating "sectoral" interests and short-term considerations to the "general" long-term interests of the Zionist colonial movement as a whole. The "labor bureaucracy" used this central apparatus to organize the Jewish armed forces, sometimes secretly against the British but mostly against the Palestinians in collusion with the British. It created a system of social and health security, opened up recruitment offices everywhere, and regulated the right to work. It created its own school system, its own promotion societies, and its own production and services cooperatives.

Moreover, the "labor bureaucracy" used the embryonic state machine to make long-range investments, especially in the infrastructure, that no private capitalist would have made. It established banks and other modern credit and distribution facilities, subsidized private capitalists and farmers, and employed "Keynesian techniques" as early as the beginning of the 1930s to protect the Yishuv's economy.

With the establishment of the state in 1948, the "labor bureaucracy" took over the government. The Histadrut with its business concerns and immense wealth became part of the "public sector" and was integrated into the state.

The development of the "public sector" and the intervention of the state in the economy, however, had to be accelerated with the mass immigration and the increasing flow of capital imports and unilateral transfers from abroad.

Using the immense funds flowing into the country and the economic resources of the "public sector," the state intervened continuously in all aspects of the Israeli economy. It made large-scale investments in the infrastructure and basic industries; it financed the investments and guaranteed the profits of local and foreign capitalists; it brought about mergers and financed the research of the capitalists, making special arrangements and creating hot-house conditions for the Israeli bourgeoisie, who constantly grew in numbers and wealth; and it intervened directly or through the Histadrut to support private capitalists against their workers, which was especially effective because of the fact that the government and the Histadrut are the two largest employers in the country. It was from the inability of the colonial "Zionist enterprise" to function without the direct intervention of the state machine, and from the far-reaching integration of the state with the capitalists and bureaucrats functioning in the economic field, that the very strong Israeli state emerged and developed.

III. Finally, when characterizing Israel as a "very strong state," we are comparing its specific features to the strong state's features in the West: openly repressive laws, the banning of left-wing organizations and the harassment of their members, close collaboration between the state and individual employers, collaboration

with the extreme right, strengthening of the police, the intense cultivation and systematic use of racism, the growing reliance on the army, etc. It is obvious that the Israeli state has gone much further and is more "developed" in these measures than any bourgeois democracy in the West.

Consequently, if the Israeli bourgeoisie is faced with the failure of the "labor bureaucracy" to crush the workers' radicalization and pull Israel out of the economic and social crisis inflicted by the October War, it will undoubtedly opt for a "final solution": taking over direct rule through a National Emergency Government and then proceeding to transform the Israeli "democracy" into a corporative-fascist state. In such an attempt, the Israeli bourgeoisie would have many factors working for it—factors inherent in the Israeli economy, society, and politics. Some of these factors merit a more detailed discussion.

Elements of an Israeli Corporatism

One of the basic features of a fascist-corporate state is the "corporation": a joint organizational structure of employers and workers controlled by and integrated into the state. The Histadrut is obviously not a real trade union—not even a rotten bureaucratized trade union. It was founded in 1920 under the name "General Federation of Hebrew Workers in the Land of Israel." Membership was limited to Jews who lived "on the fruits of their labor"—workers, artisans, tradesmen, and self-employed workers—and consequently its membership today includes no fewer petty-bourgeois elements and other "independents" than real workers.

The basic principles of the "General Federation" made clear that "national interests" took priority over "economic interests." In 1960, the general secretary of the Histadrut, P. Lavon, stated: "Our Histadrut is a general organization to its core. It is not a workers' trade union, although it copes perfectly well with the real needs of the workers."

Being "general to the core" has meant that in the Histadrut, trade-union affairs were always subordinated to nationalist—i.e., Zionist—affairs. This led to an extremely hierarchical organizational structure, and a huge bureaucratic machinery was set up so that all trade-union organization was subordinated to the management of the political bosses. (Union dues are collected by special offices, which the Histadrut has set up throughout Israel, and local branches receive their funds from the center rather than from their local membership. This severely limits their independence. The Histadrut employs a permanent staff of 30,000, and its bureaucracy has a very tight hold on its members.)

The "trade-union department" of the Histadrut has never had any independence, or even autonomy, and always obediently accepts the dictates of the government. The attitude of Israeli workers toward

the Histadrut is frankly described (even by the Histadrut leaders themselves) as an "open crisis of confidence." This crisis is deepening from year to year. It is expressed in the fact that the majority of the workers are hardly aware of the Histadrut's trade-union activities; in the fact that 35-40 percent of the membership fails to vote in the elections for the Histadrut General Council; and above all in the fact that the overwhelming majority of strikes in recent years have been wildcat strikes conducted in the face of bitter opposition from the Histadrut leadership. It was the strike wave of 1971 that forced the ruling Labor party to ratify a labor-relations law establishing the Histadrut's monopoly as the representative of the Israeli workers. In addition, the law makes all "unauthorized" strikes illegal, subject to criminal proceedings with huge fines and imprisonment as punishment.

Thus the Histadrut is in no sense a workers organization. By any criterion, it is much closer to a fascist-type corporation than a real trade union. Obviously this is a big advantage for anyone who would attempt to transform Israel into a fascist-corporate state, since it is highly doubtful that in such an event it would become necessary to smash this so-called workers organization. On the contrary, it seems reasonable to assume that the Histadrut would be used to crush the workers' opposition and would "naturally" become the main pillar of the not-so-new order.

The colonial character of the Israeli state is, of course, another advantage for the bourgeoisie. The Israeli social reality of oppression and dispossession of the Palestinian Arabs has produced an extremely deformed collective consciousness—prevailing no less among the workers than among the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie—concerning democratic norms, elementary citizens' rights, and individual liberty. This becomes more crucial in view of the fact that Israel has no separation of state and religion, nor a constitution, and the fact that the overwhelming majority of the country's population either grew up in this "democratic" reality or emigrated from countries with no democratic tradition whatsoever.

Israeli public opinion has grown accustomed to the loss of basic rights and the suppression of democratic freedoms, to emergency regulations and administrative decrees, to tortures in prison and political show trials, to police violence against prisoners, demonstrators, and workers on strike, and to jumping to attention when a military officer or Shin Bet agent appears.

Furthermore, the colonial emergency regulations enacted by the British in 1945, which are still in force in Israel, give the military governors a frightening authority. They may arbitrarily and administratively decide whatever they like concerning the property, liberty, and even life of persons they decide are a "danger to

security." Those regulations are "open terrorism in legal disguise," as Dov Yosef, a former justice minister, stated. Shimshon Shapira, another former justice minister, declared, "Even in Nazi Germany, there were no such laws."

Those regulations have been used mainly against the Palestinian Arabs, but it is impossible to escape from the fact that a people that oppresses another cannot itself be free. The regulations have been used more and more against the Jewish population as well, against striking workers, Black Panthers, Rakah, Siah (the Israeli New Left), and the organizations of the revolutionary left. Has anyone any doubt that "when necessary" the regulations would be used against mass struggles of the workers?

Another important advantage for anyone contemplating a transformation of Israel into a fascist-corporative state is the fact that for many decades the Israeli Jews have been brainwashed with anti-Arab racism and with hatred for the international labor movement and socialist internationalist values. Israeli society is saturated with racist, nationalist values, chauvinism, and primitive religious myths. These are the ideological lubricants for the change to a corporative-fascist political structure.

Moreover, nobody can afford to ignore the fact that declared fascist organizations are openly operating in Israel. These organizations are spreading the poison of racist and pogromistic anti-Arab propaganda. In the best tradition of such organizations, they do not limit themselves to words. They have launched violent attacks on Arabs, Christian religious missions, and the "defeatists": the "doves" of the Zionist left, the CP, and the anti-Zionist revolutionary left. Their activity has the tacit agreement of the government, the "understanding" of judges, and a wide support from intellectuals, writers, and journalists. Has anyone any doubt that in a real social crisis these fascist organizations, which would greatly increase their strength, would be used systematically against workers struggles, to smash their political organizations? We already witnessed a hint of this when the Jewish Defense League started attacking the Black Panthers during the 1971-72 upsurge of their struggle.

It is essential to stress this point in view of the widespread illusions among the "doves," the Zionist left, and the Communist party. It is true that in the wake of the October War there is a certain awakening in the Israeli population, a questioning of past doctrines and policies. Undoubtedly there is a significant increase in the number of "moderates," and perhaps even an increase in the strength of the organizations of the Zionist left and of Rakah. This leads them to the feeling that somehow the "hawks," the extremists, are done for, that this time the "doves" have the upper hand. However, this is an extremely dangerous illusion, and it

would be disastrous to believe that the strengthening of the "moderates" is a one-way process.

What is actually happening today in Israel is a process of political polarization between the right and the left in their broadest definition. Not only the "doves" are getting stronger; the "extremists" and the Likud are getting even stronger.

One of the main components of the Israeli class structure is the petty bourgeoisie. In view of its great weight in society and the economic difficulties it will experience in the immediate future (much the same as the workers), the petty bourgeoisie could constitute the human material of a nationalist, fascist mass movement. This danger becomes even greater as a result of the fact, already mentioned, that even among the workers there are a large number of first-generation workers with a petty-bourgeois past—a fact that could become crucial during a crisis.

The petty bourgeoisie is not an independent class. It always follows one of the main classes in society, either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Whom it supports in time of social crisis depends to a large extent on its view of which class is about to emerge victorious. In Israel, however, it is more probable as things stand now that the petty bourgeoisie would follow the bourgeoisie, if only because the bourgeoisie has today a new image and a new leadership, full of self-confidence and conducting an aggressive policy.

The workers, on the other hand, lack any real leadership. The petty-bourgeois "labor bureaucracy" that pretends to speak in the name of the workers is completely rotten, opportunistic, and cowardly, and above all it is conscious of its "Zionist and national responsibility." No better off are the organizations of the Zionist left outside the "Labor Alignment" and Rakah. All of them are stuck in the swamp of reformism, two-stage theories, and class collaboration.

Not the least of the bourgeoisie's advantages is the above-mentioned acceleration of the militarization of Israeli society and the profound changes occurring inside the army.

In the wake of the October War and with the eruption of the "War of the Generals," the Israeli public suddenly discovered that Zahal is no longer a nonpolitical army above classes and outside political parties. There are army divisions belonging to Likud and there are divisions of the Labor Alignment. And surely of all the officers infesting all levels of society at least a few retired "charismatic" generals could be found who, understanding the "historic necessity," would respond to the "call of the nation" and take over the post of prime minister, heading a National Unity Emergency Government.

Inconceivable? Impossible? Pity those who console themselves by thinking so.

Of course nobody would publicly declare such a plan, and evidently nobody

would disclose such an ambition. But we must ask the meaning of the repeated calls in the newspapers, on television, in lectures, advertisements, and so on, for the establishment of an "Experts and Generals Government of National Unity." Why is it that those who in the past attacked the slogan of "war economy" when it was raised by Ben-Aharon have now become the most enthusiastic supporters of emergency planning and "war economy"?

Similarly, what is the meaning of the surprising alliance between Moshe Dayan and Arik Sharon "King-of-Israel," whose mutual animosity in the past was widely known? Is it only a coincidence that the main election slogan ("We are the alternative") of the right-wing Gahal party (the main component of the Likud) has become the election program that asked the public for a mandate to establish a government of "national emergency unity"? And what is the motive of those political leaders and functionaries inside and outside the army who are so diligently spreading the legend that "our situation is serious and will become even more serious because the decisive victory over the enemy was snatched away at the last moment by frightened and cowardly politicians who stuck a knife in the back of the glorious Israeli army"? Does this remind anyone of anything?

Let us repeat: We do not believe that this is on the agenda tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow. We do not think that this is the most practical and immediate strategy for the Israeli bourgeoisie. But this is the most probable strategy should the petty-bourgeois "labor bureaucracy" fail in its task.

If the "labor bureaucracy" fails to achieve the aims of the bourgeoisie, we have no doubt that the "only democracy in the Middle East" will follow the path of "the birthplace of democracy," Greece. And the Israeli bourgeoisie, using peaceful or less peaceful means, will change the political structure of Israel into a corporative-fascist one, headed by a popular "charismatic" general.

* * *

Two extremely crucial questions are, therefore, posed before the Israeli working class.

Will the "labor bureaucracy" succeed in containing, diverting, and smashing the impending workers struggles in their early stages? This question won't be decided in learned discussions and intellectuals' symposiums, nor by ads and petitions in newspapers, nor by "responsible" union struggle within the framework of the Histadrut, nor by polite political debate in the Knesset. It will be decided in the street, in the factory, in the community, through extraparliamentary mass struggle, out of which a real trade-union and workers party will be organized, leading the workers in struggle around democratic demands for abolition of national

and ethnic discrimination and around transitional demands such as workers control and workers self-defense.

Here the second question is posed. Will the Israeli bourgeoisie succeed in realizing its "final solution" to the crisis in the event that the "labor bureaucracy" fails to defeat the workers? In order to stop the bourgeoisie's attempt to establish a fascist military dictatorship, the Israeli workers' struggle must unfold to the utmost and unleash to its final conclusions the anti-

capitalist — i.e., anti-Zionist — dynamic embedded in it. This "internal" Israeli class struggle (whose range and scope is conditioned by and depends upon the upsurge of the mass struggle in the whole Arab East) must find from the very beginning — and so it will — the way to join the masses of the Arab East in their revolutionary struggle against imperialism and its local servants: Zionism and the Arab bourgeoisie.

Thus these questions merge into one

critical question that will decide the destiny of the Israeli Jewish minority in the Arab East, that is, whether the Israeli workers' struggle releases the anti-Zionist and anti-capitalist dynamic embedded in it and thus integrates itself into the revolutionary mass struggle in the Arab East.

The Israeli proletariat, and the anti-Zionist revolutionary left (yes! despite our small numbers and our weakness), will undoubtedly give an affirmative answer to this question. □

Background to French Election

Bourgeoisie Divided in Response to Social Crisis

By Pierre Frank

[The following article was published in the April 20 issue of *La Brèche*, the Swiss Trotskyist fortnightly. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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One of the best-known outstanding features of the French bourgeoisie is that, after it had partially overcome its backwardness (at least temporarily) under de Gaulle's Bonapartist regime, which had encouraged an enormous concentration of capital, it found when he left the scene in 1969, that it had a Bonapartist regime with no Bonaparte but no real political structures to replace it (for example, a presidential regime balanced by a parliament). To surmount the resulting political crisis, de Gaulle's successor, Pompidou, strove to use the possibilities offered by the constitution of the Fifth Republic to centralize the uncontrolled state powers even more than de Gaulle had.

For about eighteen months it had been rumored that Pompidou was stricken with an incurable disease. Attempts by sources close to the president to suppress these rumors had failed, and for the last two or three months there was no longer any doubt. Pompidou limited his appearances to the minimum, canceled his trips within France and abroad, shunned photographers (for his appearance was eloquent proof of his condition), and issued repeated announcements that he was stricken with influenza. Finally, when it was common knowledge that he was suffering from cancer, he is-

sued a medical report announcing that he had hemorrhoids. The clearest indications as to his state of health issued from UDR [Union for the Defense of the Republic, the leading Gaullist party] circles themselves and from other groups in the government majority, where everyone was preoccupied with the issue of who would succeed him.

Another, fairly clear, indication was also provided by the recent ministerial shuffle, the second Messmer cabinet being replaced by the third. This change was intended to install a smaller team, easier for the president to control, and to put a specialist in electoral skulduggery in charge of the Ministry of the Interior, the whole object being to increase as much as possible the present majority's chances in a presidential election.

The UDR and other circles of the government are aware that the whole political situation in France can be suddenly transformed in the wake of Pompidou's death. What we are seeing is a division, a fragmenting of the right, in the face of the Union of the Left, which despite serious internal wrangling will not be broken up this year or next year or probably even in 1976, the year when Pompidou would normally have ended his mandate. The divisions within the right are extensive. The UDR is continuing to decline. It has been abandoned by people who consider themselves Gaullists and not supporters of Pompidou. One of them, Fouchet, formerly one of de Gaulle's ministers, has announced his intention of running against any candidate of the present majority. The minister of

finances, Giscard d'Estaing, the leader of the Independent Republicans, has made no secret of the fact that he would run against any candidate of the UDR. And the only candidate with any weight in the latter's camp is Jacques Chaban-Delmas, whom the UDR rebuffed as prime minister last year. Even if these two crooks make way for a third, Pierre Messmer or Edgar Faure, things won't be changed very much. The divisions, the distrust, the bitterness, are such that it will be hard for any one of the candidates to round up all the votes on the second round, even by brandishing the Communist scarecrow. Many circles of the bourgeoisie are resolved to do away with the UDR, and some have not lost hope of being able to detach François Mitterrand, if elected president, from his alliance with the Communist party. We should add that in this situation, probably also partly on account of his illness, Pompidou had piled up some errors and failures, as well as some accidents like the *Canard Enchaîné* affair¹ that discredited Marcellin and the police.

Mitterrand, in contrast, has a good chance of getting elected, perhaps even on the first round, as the candidate

1. One night last November, the publisher of the popular antigovernment satirical weekly *Le Canard Enchaîné* surprised plainclothes police in the act of installing hidden electronic listening devices in the new offices of the newspaper, then under construction. In the resulting investigation, which is still under way, it was suggested that the cops were acting on direct orders of Raymond Marcellin, who was then minister of the interior. — *IP*

of the Union of the Left. (The CP leadership has no intention of running their own candidate in the first round this time.) The top leadership of the Union of the Left—both the CP and the SP leaders—feigned indifference, on the pretext that they were respecting Pompidou's private life, and they spread the word that they were not preparing for an early election. They could act that way, knowing that electorally they had the wind in their sails and that last-minute maneuvers would have little effect. In fact, their worries are elsewhere. Since last November, they have shown less interest in taking office than they had two months earlier. For in the meantime the "oil crisis" has developed with all its consequences. Inflation and the threat of unemployment are wearing out those who are in power. In 1976, things could be going better . . .

The Real Problems


The problems that were in the forefront during the legislative elections of March 1973 still remain. The National Assembly was to discuss this April a draft law on contraception and abortion that had gotten bottled up last year, owing to divisions among the majority on it; then there was a "Fontanet plan" dealing with secondary education, which has already led to high-school student demonstrations like those against the Debré law last year. Other problems, such as pollution and highway safety, have also given rise to discontent and demonstrations. Among the middle classes, the small shopkeepers and peasants whom the government has been wooing are also dissatisfied. Hardly a day passes when there isn't some demonstration on this or that issue. We should also mention the uneasiness in the police, the legal system, and the army.

The grimmest outlook lies without doubt on the economic front. Inflation is a serious problem. For the time being, there is no threat of massive unemployment, but there are pockets of unemployed in some cities and in particular industries and firms. Coming after the shock created by the "oil crisis," this is enough to create some worry, and no one in government or management circles is hazarding any guesses about next fall's employment picture.

The government was talking of steps

it planned to take to stop the rise of prices, or rather, to ensure that price increases not go beyond those of neighboring countries. In reality, it is operating by means of expedients.

Its efforts to purchase cheaper oil supplies were unsuccessful. To maintain and if possible to increase exports, which presently account for an important share of the French economy, the government has been trying all sorts of maneuvers to find markets, especially for its arms production,



CHABAN-DELMAS

with what appear to be only mediocre results. It floated the franc in what amounts to a devaluation, which will become clear when official figures are released later this year. It is going to sell off the passenger liner *France* to save the several tens of millions of francs that ship costs each year, but it continues to pour immense sums into the Concorde supersonic transport plane that no one wants to buy. It tried to speed up the collection of direct taxes. It increased the taxes on fuel and transportation, and so on.

As for wages, it defined its policy as follows: to hold the line on this year's standard of living, but not increase it. In practice, wages are already lagging behind the rise in prices (even the official index, as rigged as it is, cites a 3 percent increase in January and February) and the gap threatens to grow.

No one is satisfied with this policy, not even the bosses. The National Center of French Management (CN-PF) has just issued a rather curt statement emphasizing the uncertainty ahead. Playing the role of a Cassandra since he left office, former Premier Michel Debré is devoting himself to harsh criticisms of the government's financial and economic policies, saying that inflation has reached a level where it endangers the regime. But he proposes an "incomes policy" that the government would not dare introduce.

Militancy Is Not Declining

The workers are putting up considerable resistance to the attacks on their standard of living and jobs. The list of strikes every day is very long. The bank employees strike is one of the most remarkable. Beginning some six weeks ago at the *Crédit Lyonnais*, a nationalized bank (deposit banks were nationalized at the end of the war), it now embraces several hundred thousand strikers throughout the country. It is a very militant strike, the vast majority of banking personnel today being young people. Almost every day there are demonstrations of tens of thousands of strikers in the center of Paris.

Besides this undeniable militancy, there is also a growing *politicization* in these mass movements. That is undoubtedly one of the products of the Lip movement. The television recently showed workers, in a printing plant in the Paris area that had been closed by court order, who decided to use the machines to perform jobs that would let them pay themselves. When the interviewer asked them if they had been inspired by Lip, they replied: "It made us think." The Lip movement began to make workers understand that it is possible to go further than the strikes they used to have, and that they must look for possible demands and methods of struggle that go further.

Another expression of a heightened political consciousness is the increased number of strike committees that are formed, elected directly by all the strikers. The strike committees are not counterposed to the unions but neither are they subject to the close control of the trade-union apparatus.

What are the traditional organizations of the working class doing in this situation? The CP and the SP declare their solidarity with the work-

ers in struggle—it's the least they can do—but they are mainly preoccupied with putting the finishing touches to the Common Program they had drawn up before the "oil crisis" came along, which was based on the expectation of an economic "growth" that has now become problematic. In their view, the mass movements and workers struggles should be left to the unions, as their "privileged domain." That in itself testifies to their desire not to try to unify struggles around political perspectives.

In the trade-union movement, what we see is a variant of the fact that the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] does not have the same relationship to the SP that the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] has to the CP. In many struggles the CFDT seems to be taking a position to the left of the CGT. The rightward course of the CGT has been expressed most typically in the negotiations that the CGT's professionals and engineers unions are conducting with the CGC (General Confederation of Professionals), whose leader Malterre championed a "French Algeria" and led a bitter, prolonged struggle in his union to maintain and even increase salary differentials. The CGT leadership supports this policy of a wide-open salary scale on the pretext that the professionals would only be alienated if the wage hierarchy were abolished; the CGT is reluctant to defend demands for equal across-the-board wage increases, in contrast to the CFDT, where there is strong pressure from elements favoring wage-leveling, including the professionals and technicians it recruits.

Joint action between the CGT and the CFDT is continuing, but at the same time differences have appeared between them. The CGT leadership has taken the initiative in expressing them publicly, and with a certain vehemence. The CFDT often seems to encourage strikes, while the CGT tends to restrain them and even cut them off. Without examining in detail the trends that are occurring, one readily notes that:

1. The CGT shows its hostility toward every movement over which it cannot maintain tight control. On the other hand, it is not afraid to act, and act decisively, when it has almost complete control, as is the case in the Rateau strike in the Paris sub-

urbs, where it wants to make an example—its own Lip, one might say.

2. At the present time the CGT does not encourage the mass picketing or industrywide shutdowns that it has organized more than once in the past. Thus, in the mines in eastern France, it strangled a strike by coal washers that management had answered with a lockout (hypocritically called "technical unemployment"). In doing so, the CGT showed its fear of generalizing the strike to the whole mining industry, where as yet there is no threat of unemployment.

3. The CGT is very hostile to movements where strike committees or other bodies are formed. The differences involved here are not between a revolutionary policy and a reformist policy. The CGT's point of view was formulated very well by one of its secretaries, Bertelot, in a recent interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur*. Here are some excerpts:

"We have entered a period of rising social struggles. In such a period, the attitude of the CFDT appears extremely dangerous to us. . . . What was tolerable several months ago. . . is no longer, today. . . . Our CFDT comrades prefer to support minority movements in which elements from outside the unions and even outside the factory intervene sometimes. . . . To take responsibility for the disorderly agitation of spontanément elements, to encourage their initiatives without trying to find out if they have any chance of succeeding, then to say to the CGT, If you had supported us, we would have won: That's not serious! . . . If they are conducted vigorously, these ventures can bring a certain fame to the union that supports them, especially in the present climate of general discontent. But it doesn't last. . . ."

It is obvious that the increasingly difficult conditions for struggles in the present period, given the resistance of the bosses and the government, are only a pretext for the CGT leaders. They reproach the CFDT leaders for not having sufficient control of their ranks, of following movements that explode spontaneously or under the influence of vanguard currents. You are recruiting at present, they tell them, but. . . . But it is not *responsible* (a word that often comes to the lips of the CGT leaders); you are the playthings of the ultraleftists. It is espe-

cially true that the CFDT leaders are devoid of any *political perspective*. As for the CP and the CGT leaders, in no way did they want to be thrust into government by a mass movement of the May '68 type. That is obviously quite different from coming into office on the basis of an electoral victory. The first possibility would be particularly advantageous for the revolutionary vanguard.

The Coming Social Crisis

Whatever the case, here we are in an electoral period that will last up to May 15 or thereabouts. It is certain that the leaders of the unions and the workers parties are going to act as a restraining factor in struggles and demonstrations; it's the same old false argument that the voters must not be frightened. If Mitterand is elected, the situation will take a new turn with repercussions not only for France but for the whole of Western Europe. If the right wins, the mass movement will be no more paralyzed than it was after the legislative elections last year.

In any event, the militancy and politicization of the working masses of France (in the face of which more active fascist and reactionary currents are also beginning to mobilize) are leading more or less rapidly and inexorably toward an enormous social crisis. The vanguard militants, especially the revolutionary Marxists, will have to use the presidential campaign to prepare the masses and themselves for this crisis.

Divisions in Bourgeois Camp

Because the constitution of the Fifth Republic treats the president as a sort of Bonaparte placed above the parties, prospective candidates go through all kinds of contortions trying not to appear to be chosen by a political formation. With the sudden death of Pompidou, none of them had time to perfect his scenario, a situation giving rise to all kinds of incidents. These were all the more amusing the greater the disarray among the politicians of all the bourgeois formations, as they faced the serious possibility that Mitterand, the candidate of the Union of the Left, might be elected.

It began with a race to see who could declare first—as soon as the corpse was buried. Chaban-Delmas,

a former rugby player, won that one, followed closely by Edgar Faure. Giscard d'Estaing, beaten in the first heat, waited two days, invoking respect for conventional decencies. Were there really going to be three candidates for the majority? One clan, whose fortunes had been closely linked to Pompidou's, went after Chaban-Delmas's hide; they pushed Prime Minister Messmer into putting forward his own candidacy and asking the other three to withdraw. Edgar Faure, looking for a way out, took advantage of this to withdraw and save face. But Chaban-Delmas gave Messmer a negative response in an interview whose tone can be judged by the fact that it lasted for only three to four minutes. Messmer had to retreat, his standing even lower than before.

Thus there will be two bourgeois candidates, Chaban-Delmas and Giscard d'Estaing, who on the first round will share the votes of all those opposed to the left and far left, with the exception, however, of a small proportion who will opt for various candidates like National Front candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen, or right-wing Gaullist Jean Royer, both of whom have second-rate personal or political followings.

The Réformateurs [Reformers] will divide between the two principal candidates (Jean Lecanuet is already committed to support Giscard), who have committed themselves to standing down on the second round in favor of whichever of the two comes in ahead on the first round.

How will the electorate they are fighting over divide up? The backward part of the masses, the chauvinists and racists, who traditionally voted UDR, will go for Chaban-Delmas. Giscard will have the support of older bourgeois and petty-bourgeois layers. It is difficult to trace the line of cleavage that will take place among what is called the "new middle layers," who will be sought after not only by these two candidates but also by Mitterrand. Last year Giscard would have been the choice, benefiting from his title as minister of finance and the economy in a period of favorable economic conjuncture. That post could easily hurt him today, with the dismal economic outlook. But one can never be sure of anything; the struggle between the two will be very close, and in view of their need to unite on the second round, they will have to handle

each other with kid gloves.

Whatever the results on both the first and second rounds, after the elections there will be a very harsh settling of accounts among the political personnel of the Fifth Republic. Even the election of Chaban-Delmas would not serve to strengthen the UDR, and it will disintegrate within a relatively short period of time. The end of this formation is becoming a necessity for the French bourgeoisie. The UDR was the "10th of September Society" made to measure for de Gaulle. It was not based on a social category, or on any political principles, or on any combination of the two: It was simply the organization responsible for supporting the president of the Republic in the country and in parliament. Under de Gaulle's reign, it was even proud of being his "shapeless old shoe."

With Pompidou, this situation was already becoming more difficult. The UDR was controlled by several "barons" who could hold their own against him. But in the end no one really challenged him. Now that is over. But by that very fact, the UDR not only becomes useless; it is actually a nuisance. If need be, the constitution of the Fifth Republic could accommodate a presidential-style regime in place of the Bonapartist one, but there would have to be an effective and safe system of rotation within a new regime of that kind. With the UDR, this doesn't exist. The old Gaullist formula (it's us or the Communists; it's us or chaos) had throttled all the old political structures of the bourgeoisie. With the UDR around, the inevitable alternative solution is what we now see: a polarization of the workers around a "Union of the Left" that contains the CP.

French capitalism greatly fears a government that includes the CP except during periods of extreme danger, like a revolutionary period when it would constitute the last hope for saving the capitalist system. Unlike the bourgeoisie in Great Britain or West Germany, French capitalists do not have a Social Democratic party that can provide a useful alternative against a more or less negligible CP. The problem is all the more serious today in France in that not only is the CP a major party in the working class, but in recent years it has been seriously challenged on its left by a revolu-

tionary vanguard. Is French capitalism capable of getting rid of the UDR and creating an adequate new political structure in its place? We are inclined to reply in the negative. In any case, for the time being, the presidential election is speeding the crisis and disintegration of the UDR.

The Mitterrand Candidacy

For some months it was expected that Mitterrand would be the single candidate of the left even on the first round. The CP leadership had made statements along these lines, while not spelling out the reasons. What could those reasons be?

Many purposes could enter into it: to avoid putting up a candidate who would get a lower vote than Mitterrand on the first round; to wrap Mitterrand in the "Common Program" from the beginning; perhaps even to weaken his candidacy indirectly. But this attitude of the CP has considerably helped Mitterrand, in the sense that he can readily use it to suggest that he has freed himself from the control of the parties supporting him and also from the content of the Common Program. He has carried out his operation with considerable skill, knowing that the leadership of the CP does not want to take the initiative for a split, and that it cannot, since it has no policy other than the Union of the Left. Mitterrand will not campaign on the Common Program; a program, he says, is something for a government, while the president of the Republic can only formulate the "themes" that will be his guidelines.

Mitterrand is supported not only by the Union of the Left, but also by those who said they were critics of the Union of the Left and its Common Program: the self-proclaimed champions of a "self-management socialism," the leaderships of the PSU and the CFDT. We will have occasion later, in dealing with the far-left candidates, to indicate the reasons why Michel Rocard and Edmond Maire rushed to grant Mitterrand their support without expressing the least criticism or reservation. Their actions showed clearly that all their previous statements criticizing the Union of the Left and the Common Program, all their words about how workers struggles should not be subordinated to elections—all of it disappeared as soon as Mitterrand's election to the presidency of the

Republic became plausible, with the death of Pompidou.

Mitterrand has also received support from circles that are altogether tiny and insignificant to him, but whose action should be called to the attention of those who follow the organizations that claim to be part of the revolutionary far left. These are the pseudo-Trotskyists of the OCI/AJS, the Lambertists.² Not long ago they were denouncing the bid by Mitterrand, a bourgeois politician, to take over the Socialist party; they called for the defense of that party against his operation. Only a few months ago, they were denouncing the Union of the Left above all because of the presence of Left Radicals in it. However, an element of equivocation began to characterize their attitude during the 1973 election campaign. After long discussions with the *Ligue Communiste* and *Lutte Ouvrière* on the possibility of dividing up electoral districts and counterposing the revolutionary road to the electoral and parliamentary road advocated by the Union of the Left, they ended up running in some twenty districts, against the candidates of the *Ligue Communiste* and *Lutte Ouvrière*. Today, the double-talk is gone: the OCI/AJS are calling for a vote for Mitterrand beginning with the first round. Yes, there are the Left Radicals, they say, but there are other bourgeois running against them. "In the present situation," they add, "Mitterrand's election is a stage on the road of the necessary struggle against capitalism and the bourgeois state." The Trotskyist vocabulary this group still continues to dip into can no longer hide its role as a pressure group around the Union of the Left.

During the last presidential election, in 1969, the vast majority of the bourgeois camp rallied around Pompidou's candidacy, the CP ran Jacques Duclos on its program, and the SP was forced by Gaston Defferre to run him in a hopeless campaign. It was a year after May '68, and the *Ligue Communiste*, which had just been founded, saw an opportunity to appear in the political arena, presenting the revolutionary Marxist program in the light of the lessons of May '68.

2. Organisation Communiste Internationaliste/Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme—Internationalist Communist Organization/Alliance of Youth for Socialism.—IP

This time, the political situation is different. There is, to be sure, a powerful mass current in support of the Union of the Left, and the Mitterrand candidacy has real chances of achieving an electoral victory. But there is also in France—and this has been manifested for two or three years—a far left that is not politically insignificant and that can play a very important political role in the present revolutionary upsurge. Through its activity, this revolutionary far left can prevent the process involving the Union of the Left from ending in an abortion as occurred with its homologue in Chile.

* * *

Was it possible to provide authentic expression for this far left in the presidential election? Was it possible to give its views an effective hearing?

The reply to these questions appeared very quickly within the revolutionary organizations: If Charles Piaget, the main leader of the Lip movement, were to run on a precise program, he would symbolize for broad layers of workers, intellectuals, students, and peasants, too, the desire for anticapitalist and extraparliamentary struggle, and a distrust of the Union of the Left and its electoralist methods. The Piaget candidacy would mobilize men and women far beyond the organized formations of the far left, and would have powerful repercussions, not least among many in the electorate who would vote for the Union of the Left candidate.

* * *

The far-left formations and newspapers quickly reached agreement on the proposed candidacy, with the exception of *Lutte Ouvrière*, which decided straight off to run a member of its own leadership, Comrade Arlette Laguiller, who at that moment was part of the leadership of the bank employees' strike. (For the *Lutte Ouvrière* comrades, the Krivine candidacy of 1969 was just an advertising campaign, and without troubling themselves with any profound political thinking, they intend to carry out a similar operation in their own interests.) But Piaget is a member of the PSU and the CFDT. He was inclined to respond favorably to the proposal made to him (and which had also

been made previously to the PSU), but he did not wish to be a candidate against the opinion of his party.

No sooner had the first approaches been made than Michel Rocard and Edmond Maire issued statements categorically rejecting such a venture. They, too, had quickly understood the significance the Piaget candidacy could not fail to acquire, the impact that it would have during the election campaign and for a long time after. Hence the veto by Rocard (who is quite willing to accept a job in a ministry of the Union of the Left), and the veto by Maire, which has much more impact. Both, it must be emphasized, issued their vetoes without even asking the opinion of the bureaus of their organizations.

At the PSU, the National Political Directorate (its central committee), convening after the event, adopted by 48 votes to 35 Rocard's position in favor of the proposal to run a PSU candidate. During the Easter weekend the national council will meet to make a final decision. The CFDT has called a special meeting of its national council, which will be convening only after Maire has made his public statement supporting the Mitterrand candidacy. Some will probably be opposed, but it is unlikely that Maire's position will be overturned.

* * *

In the event that all the efforts of the far left should not succeed in getting Charles Piaget to run, *Rouge* had asked *Lutte Ouvrière* to run, as a common candidate on an agreed program, a worker militant who would not belong to the leadership of an organization. This proposal, too, was rejected by *Lutte Ouvrière*, which intends to keep its candidate in the running, whatever happens. In these conditions, *Rouge* will present Alain Krivine as its candidate. The presence of two revolutionary candidates in the campaign, while unfortunate, will only express the differences that lie behind the existence of the two formations, and in one form or another these differences will be expressed in the campaigns conducted by the candidates.

The election campaign is about to open. In a forthcoming article, we will look at the issues that will be posed by all the candidates during the campaign.

April 11, 1974

Role of Students in the 'Cultural Revolution'

[The following interview with Yeung Cheng is reprinted from the April 12 *Socialist Action*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Wellington, New Zealand.

[In its introduction to the interview, *Socialist Action* said that Cheng was a high-school student in Canton when the Cultural Revolution began in 1966. He was a leader of the Red Guards until their dissolution by Mao Tsetung in 1968. Cheng became disillusioned with Maoism and left China. He is now active in the International Young Socialist Alliance, a socialist youth organization in Hong Kong. For information on the IYSA, see *Intercontinental Press*, April 15, p. 456. The interview took place in Hong Kong, and was conducted through an interpreter.]

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Question. In the West, the picture is often painted in left-wing circles of the Chinese people being solidly and enthusiastically behind Mao. How true is this image in your experience?

Answer. When I hear this question, I feel these people are exactly the same as us when we were in China before the Cultural Revolution. We also believed in Mao totally, and we worshipped him. But after the Cultural Revolution we no longer trusted Mao. So I feel that what is happening in the West is kind of funny: that's the way we were before the Revolution; but it was the Revolution which made us change our minds.

Before the Cultural Revolution, power was in the hands of [President] Liu Shao-chi. In order to overthrow the power of Liu Shao-chi, Mao had to make use of a mass force—the Red Guards.

But during the Cultural Revolution we discovered that the people who ruled the country were actually a bunch of people who had special privileges. That's what we observed, and that's what we were against, and therefore we insisted on overthrowing the whole system.

Now, what Mao originally aimed at was just the overthrow of Liu Shao-chi, that's all. But because Mao was really in favour of the system, he started to suppress us. Then we understood that Mao was not a revolutionary who would bring us a new world, but only a bureaucrat who insisted on his own privileged system.

Q. You said that Mao launched the Red Guards in order to have a mass force to beat back his opponents. Who were the Red Guards, and what was their relationship to Mao Tsetung?

A. These Red Guards were very young students, and they thought that Mao Tsetung was a person who could bring them a new world, who could lead them in a genuine revolution. That's why they followed him. Even up to January 1967 they were still in favour of Mao.

But in the middle of January 1967 the Red Guards, together with the workers, started to attack Mao—not only Liu Shao-chi, but also Mao. And the Red Guards and the workers established their own power, organised along the lines of the Paris Commune. The people who administered were elected by the people—there were no bureaucrats in this organisation. This was the first historic creation of the Red Guards and the workers.

In September 1967 there was quite a well-known document written by the Red Guards in Hunan, called "Where is China Going?" This document said that 99 percent of the cadres had formed a bureaucratic caste. And the article put forward a new revolutionary programme to wipe out this bureaucratic caste and establish a government of the people, ruled by the people themselves instead of by a small bunch of bureaucrats.

Q. What brought you personally into the Red Guards, and how did the course of events affect your attitude toward the Mao Communist party leadership?

A. Actually, I was not aware of the

system at all. I didn't know anything about the system. But I could observe something which was irrational in the society at that time, and I thought society might change this.

So in June 1966 I started to criticise the school authorities. That doesn't mean I had the intention of overthrowing the system—I just wanted to make the system better than it was.

At that time Liu Shao-chi began to send working teams consisting of high-ranking cadres into the schools. And these working teams were to defend the school authorities.

I was really angry at that, so I started to attack these working teams by criticising them, and I even put up posters against them. And my ideas were correct, because I was supported by my fellow students.

Then I was condemned by the working team as a person who was against the party, against the people, against the revolution and everything. They condemned me as a right-wing person.

I was really shocked because I was really a loyal person to the people and to the government of the people. But I found that the government was not for the people, and my illusions in the society started to crack. And after being condemned as a counter-revolutionary, I was under surveillance for two months, and I was being despised by people and everything.

But at that time, as I told you, Mao relied on a mass movement. And that's why we were actually useful to Mao, to overthrow Liu Shao-chi. That's why Mao needed us very much indeed. And in August Mao said that we were the left wingers, that we were the genuine revolutionaries, and that we should be liberated.

So at that time I really adored Mao Tsetung. I thought that he was the only person who had brought me a new life. I could say I totally, 100 percent, adored Mao Tsetung.

So we started to form our group within the school, and then we started our Red Guard organisation, with the encouragement of Mao Tsetung.

At first we started to criticise, and started to fight against, the school authorities, and after that we fought against the district authorities, and after that over an even wider area.

And through this movement we discovered that the authorities were very

bureaucratic, and the people told us many things about the authorities in the various districts.

So the authorities started to organise their own forces, amongst those still-blinded people, against us. But because our ideas were correct, our organisation started to grow, even under this repression.

It was during this movement we discovered that this society could not change itself, with the system of this small bunch of people exploiting the masses.

So in January 1967 we started to seize power. We wanted the right to control this society to go to the people; the people should have their own rights, and the existing authority should not administer the country any more; it should not act for the people but rather the people should administer for themselves.

At that time I was the leader of the new authority in the school, and we controlled the school at that time. This happened not only in the schools, but also in the factories and even part of the villages. Students controlled their own schools, workers controlled their own factories, and peasants controlled their own fields. This seizing power was called the January Revolution.

We were still not satisfied, because we had the power in one district only. But the bureaucrats controlled the military area, so we directed our activity towards the military area as well. And we went into the military area and tried to convince the soldiers to rise up and fight against their superiors.

In February the bureaucrats in the military could no longer stand us, so they started to suppress us with military force. This happened all over the country, this military suppression. It was called the February Counter-current.

Mao did not agree with us. He said we should not run into collision with the military because he said that the army was the main thing that could keep a proletarian dictatorship alive. It was the essence of the proletarian dictatorship, and we were not supposed to fight against it.

So the army grew more confident, and they started to organise the conservatives in May of that year, and started to suppress us even more severely.

And we were forced to defend ourselves. So we started to fight against the military, and I participated many times in these battles. At that time I was an instructor of the Red Guards to fight against the military. These battles became more severe, and often in one battle there would be many thousands of people on each side. And in August of that year the battles reached their peak. This was called the August Civil War in China.

Because we were so determined, Mao



Red Guards, Mao, and a former close comrade-in-arms.

Tsetung was forced to give way, and he asked the military to reconcile with us. But at that time we were still very naive, you know, and we still didn't know what was the future of the Chinese revolution, and we didn't really know what society we should aim at.

Mao suggested that we Red Guards form revolutionary committees with the district bureaucrats and also the military bureaucrats; three into one, the revolutionary committees joining the three things together. We had no choice at the time, so we accepted this idea. But I personally felt that it wasn't a good thing at all, but rather I could feel that we were going to be dissolved because of this idea. I was even elected to be a member of a revo-

lutionary committee in one district, but I refused because I did not trust this organisation.

Q. What result did the formation of these revolutionary committees have?

A. Following the creation of these revolutionary committees in September 1967, Mao began to suppress the Red Guards again. And we became very discontented.

That's why in the following year, 1968, in May, the Red Guards and the workers decided to rise up again, and we started to steal guns and arms, and once more went into collision with the military.

At that time Mao could stand it no more because what the Red Guards and the workers aimed at was the government, which was now dominated by Mao himself. That's why he couldn't stand this movement. So again, with the support of the military, he started to suppress the Red Guards. And that time it was really disastrous, so many people were killed during the collisions and the battles.

Eventually the Red Guards were totally suppressed by Mao, our organisation was dissolved and banned, and we were told by the bureaucrats to go down to the villages and work there. The main reason that Mao sent the Red Guards to the farms and villages was because he didn't want them to rise up again in the cities. And we were obliged to go to the villages because we couldn't find a living in the cities, because the government didn't allow us to get a job in the city area.

We were despairing at that time, and we found that when we got to the villages that the life there was even harder. Actually we were very happy to accept a hard life provided that life is worked for the people, for the benefit of all the people. But during the Cultural Revolution we saw that this system was no longer a system for the benefit of the people but only for the benefit of the bureaucrats. So we felt that going down to the villages to work and lead a hard life was really senseless.

Take for example those children of the high-ranking cadres—they did not have to go to the villages. They had the opportunity of getting into the universities, and they could also join the army, etc. So they had privileges

that we ordinary people did not have.

So that's why we felt that while we worked so hard in the villages it was only for the benefit of that little bunch of people sitting up high in the government.

Our lives in the villages were very restricted. As soon as we found something on which we wanted to express ourselves, or we wanted to discuss some question, these things would be reported to the government and we would be condemned as counterrevolutionary. That's why many young people didn't really want to work in the farms and the villages. They would rather run the risk of starvation or unemployment and things like that if they could get in the city area.

I spent three years in the villages, but I couldn't stand the hard life, which was senseless, and I decided to flee the country. So I swam down the river to Hong Kong, at night.

Q. How many other Red Guards, undergoing disillusionment, also fled to Hong Kong?

A. As far as I know it was about ten thousand Red Guards who managed to flee the country by means of swimming along the river down to Hong Kong. But I don't know how many others died on the way.

Actually we were the lucky ones, because I visited the north of the country where many Red Guards were very discontented with the government. But they were too far off the coast, so they couldn't flee the country.

Q. What role do you think these ten thousand Red Guards in Hong Kong can play in future developments in China?

A. Just about all of them are despairing and disillusioned, so you can hardly find any of them who still want to make a revolution. I would say very few of them. But we cannot put the blame on these young people. Actually I think this is an indictment of the government inside China.

I would like to point out one thing: I don't think that capitalism is good. And that is not the reason I came to Hong Kong. I still strongly believe in socialism, and I will try my best to carry out another revolution in China.

And I intend to continue my revolutionary life while I am in Hong Kong.

I believe I can help to make preparations for another revolution in China. You may ask me how I can help to

provoke another revolution in China? I think it seems very hard, because China is quite sealed off at the present time. But I still believe that we can do it eventually. □

Accuses Saigon of Violating Treaty

Pham Van Dong Interviewed in Sweden

[The following interview with the premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, was written by Bengt Albons and published in the April 11 issue of the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

"People believed that there would be peace, and I would say that the peace treaty was a great victory. The treaty assured what we Vietnamese were fighting for; it embodied what we always demanded. But the Saigon government is not respecting its provisions."

North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong gave a press conference in Stockholm on the next to last day of his official visit. He talked about the peace treaty that was signed a year ago and about the future.

"Saigon has not observed the treaty as regards the cease-fire and democratic freedoms; the political prisoners have not been released; national unity and the political solution have been sabotaged. The treaty has been violated in the most brazen way."

That might seem pessimistic, but Pham Van Dong is optimistic:

"Fighting is going on in the South, but it cannot be said that the third Vietnamese war is beginning. The people of Vietnam will never let this tendency go that far. The Provisional Government of South Vietnam (the PRG) and my own government will never permit this. We are successfully combating the violations of the treaty. And we have the capacity to see that the treaty is carried out."

"The situation now is not at all the same as after the Geneva treaty in 1954. We are much stronger now and we have world opinion with us. The situation in Vietnam and the rest of

Indochina has changed to the advantage of the Vietnamese people. We grow stronger every day, while the Saigon government grows steadily weaker.

"We will see to it that peace is re-



PHAM VAN DONG

stored, that South Vietnam is liberated, and that the country is reunified."

Pham Van Dong's was a different kind of press conference. He said that he wanted to talk with us journalists, and he did just that. He offered his smiles and his warm charm, as well as the profound humanism that has been the basis of the entire Vietnamese liberation struggle. As he spoke, he used weighty words like humaneness, peace, solidarity, and friendship. And he meant them all.

For those who have followed Pham Van Dong and seen his people strug-

gle to rebuild a bomb-shattered country, there can be no doubt. The Vietnamese mean what they say, and they will certainly never give up before their country is liberated from foreign influence, before Vietnam is reunited and independent.

That may take a long time, but the Vietnamese have a different conception of time than we impatient Swedes. They have taken Ho Chi Minh's statement seriously that "we can fight ten years, twenty, or still longer."

The North Vietnamese premier has had talks with Olof Palme [the Swedish premier] for three days now. He did not want to go into what the discussions were about, but it could be assumed that the two discussed recognition of the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

Should Sweden recognize the PRG? "I can't answer that question for your government. You have to decide on that. But naturally we think that the PRG is the only real representative of the South Vietnamese people."

During the flight to Sundsvall on Wednesday afternoon, Pham Van Dong got a briefing from Olof Palme on Swedish domestic policy. None of the other party leaders has tried to meet with our guest. Many saw their failure to turn up at the government's banquet on Monday as a bourgeois demonstration.* (Communist party leader C. H. Hermansson had a good excuse; he is in Hanoi.)

But Palme was informed on the plane that Thorbjörn Fälldin was taking care of his father not far from Sprängsviken, where the two heads of government were to have lunch with Ambassador Jean-Christophe Oberg's foster parents.

From Sundsvall, they called Fälldin and invited him to lunch.

Fälldin accepted, got into his car, and drove there.

Olof Palme, Pham Van Dong, and Ambassador Oberg slipped away from the entire delegation and went there by helicopter.

In this way, Pham Van Dong also met the leader of the opposition. And tomorrow morning he is to have lunch with the king. □

*In Sweden, the bourgeois parties call themselves "bourgeois parties," and refer to the Social Democratic party and other parties that claim to be socialist as "workers parties." — IP

What Strategy for Socialists and Republicans?

Irish Nationalism and Protestant Workers

[The following article is reprinted from issue No. 6 of the *Plough*, the organ of the Revolutionary Marxist Group, Irish section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

Most socialists and republicans like to look on the Protestant working class as a natural ally in the struggle for socialism. More often than not, they confuse what is only a desire with *fact*. The unity of Catholic and Protestant workers in joint struggles against a common enemy is usually believed to be just around the corner. Anyone who doubts this is either a reactionary with no faith in the working class or a Catholic nationalist bigot.

If there is one thing clear in the current struggle, it is that such unity is not imminent. It is more obvious now than ever that the Protestant working class has no interest in a united Ireland and is still greatly attached to the imperial ideals of Unionism and Orangeism. The Northern Westminster election results indicated that this attachment is as strong as ever. In the main urban constituencies, the Loyalists [right-wing Unionists] increased their percentage of the poll considerably over the Assembly elections of June '73. In East Belfast they increased their share from 28.9% to 58.2%; in North Belfast from 42% to 62.8% and in South Belfast from 37.4% to 54.2%. (In West Belfast on both occasions they were unopposed by the Faulknerites [pro-Sunningdale Unionists]). Altogether they got two-thirds of the Protestant vote in the city inhabited by the bulk of Protestant workers.

This is firm evidence that the Protestant workers are far from the verge of unity with their fellow Catholic workers. On the contrary, it shows without doubt that they are as firmly rooted as ever in the Unionist and Orange tradition. Instead of concocting dreams (as the Officials did after the local election results!) or grasping at straws in the wind (as the Provos grasped at Boal's harebrained

scheme), socialists and republicans must scientifically analyse the *basis* of the Protestant workers' adherence to politically backward and reactionary ideas and then grasp the revolutionary dynamic necessary to break them from such ideas.

There are *three* main theories in the revolutionary intellectual tradition of Ireland which attempt to explain the nature of the Protestant community and the Protestant working class in particular. The most important of these is the republican theory which claims that the Protestants constitute an integral part of the historic Irish nation. This theory finds its origins in the attempted alliance between the Protestant middle class and the Catholic peasantry in the eighteenth century. The Protestant middle class, who were originators of the Irish republican tradition, wanted to use the Catholic peasantry as a battering ram to smash British mercantile control, while the Catholic peasantry found the Protestant middle class useful in their struggle against the aristocracy. The idea of a common unity of interests as a single nation was formulated to provide an ideological basis for this alliance.

Since then, of course, the economic interests of the Protestant middle class have changed fundamentally, and the concept of an integral Catholic-Protestant nation is now only a myth which reflects no real community of interests.

The second theory is an economist one which sees an essential unity between Protestant and Catholic workers because of their common socio-economic status. This is a major determinist argument that envisages economic phenomena as directly shaping social consciousness. It ignores the interplay of historical and ideological factors.

Also involved in this theory is a misunderstanding of the nature of the economic aspects of the class struggle. The struggle for immediate material gains produced what Lenin described as the bourgeois politics of the working class. Capitalism is essentially a system of universal buying

and selling of goods, and the economic struggle by itself concerns only the buying and selling of a particular commodity — labour power.

As such it does not go outside the fundamental framework of capitalism. Because of this, workers' attempts to win immediate gains do not necessarily constitute revolutionary struggle. Consequently it is impossible to argue that *this* is the essential sphere in which the various sections of the Irish working class are to be united to overthrow capitalism and British imperialism.

Finally we come to the Marxist position, the foundations of which were laid by James Connolly. Although Connolly was in the republican tradition and based himself firmly on the working class, he dispensed with all preconceived ideas about the Protestant workers. He made reality his starting point and, by examining the evolution of the Protestant community in Ireland, arrived at a new and accurate concept of the Protestant workers.

Connolly saw that there was a distinct difference in attitude between Catholic and Protestant workers. He described the nature of the difference as follows: "At one time in the industrial world of Great Britain and Ireland, the skilled labourer looked down with contempt upon the unskilled and bitterly resented the latter's attempt to have his children taught any of the skilled trades; the feeling of the Orangemen of Ireland towards the Catholics is but a glorified representation on a big stage of the same passions inspired by the same unworthy motives." And he explained the reasons for such an attitude when he said that "the Orange working class are slaves in spirit because they have been reared up among a people whose conditions of servitude were more slavish than their own."

What Connolly perceived, therefore, was not an underlying unity of interests but a sharp hostility arising from distinct social and economic difference. Unfortunately he never analysed these differences any further. But his reference to the labour-aristocratic mentality of the Protestant workers throws a searching light on the origin and nature of these differences.

A brief look at the development of Northern capitalism and the rise of the Protestant working class shows how correct Connolly's observations

are.

Under the terms of the Plantation of Ulster the Protestant peasantry received a special security of land tenure. This enabled them to develop their holdings, accumulate a small capital, and engage in the handcraft production of linen. Handcraft linen became the basis of the linen industry and when the industry was manufactured in the middle of the last century, the Protestant peasantry, having accumulated the necessary skills and techniques due to their privileged position, filled all the important areas of employment in the industry. Likewise, when ship-building and engineering developed to service the linen industry, the Protestant peasantry entrenched themselves in these industries too.

Because of the fragmentation of the Irish market (due largely to the impoverishment of the Catholic peasantry), Northern capitalism could not broaden its base beyond the linen, shipbuilding and engineering industries. As the flight from the land accelerated and large numbers of Catholic peasants entered Belfast (where Northern industry was almost exclusively concentrated), there was no way of absorbing them into new industries. In addition, the existing industries were highly mechanised and technocratic, so that even in the established industries there was little enough scope for general employment.

Given that there was little room for general workers, the competition for employment developed between general workers (largely Catholic) and established skilled workers for the skilled positions of industry. It would have been bad enough had the Catholic workers been experienced industrially and in the possession of skills themselves. But the fact that it was an oppressed rabble that was challenging their security produced in the skilled Protestant workers a ferocious reaction. In this way the animosity between Catholic and Protestant peasantry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was repeated among the working classes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

For a reliable contemporary witness to this process, one could not call on a better observer than Thomas McKnight, a pro-Unionist and editor of the *Northern Whig* for twenty-five years. In his memoirs he describes what happened and how the Protestant

workers reacted to it. Referring to the early eighteen-sixties, he wrote: "[The Belfast] industries, principally established by Protestants, were giving remunerative employment to the Catholic working classes beyond what they had any prospect of attaining in the mountainous districts of Ulster, into which many of their ancestors had formerly been driven. With their increasing numbers there was a growing confidence of the Catholics in their strength. They were therefore less inclined to submit to that spirit of ascendancy which was ready enough to manifest itself among the Protestant artisans, who regarded the newcomers as intruders and rebels included under the one comprehensive term 'the Papishes.'" (*Ulster As It Is*, Vol. 1, pp. 32-33.)

Connolly's views were therefore founded on a genuine understanding of reality. But to what extent do they retain their relevance to today's situation? Insofar as most of Connolly's followers acknowledge his views on the Protestant workers, they immediately try to diminish their importance by denying that the situation remains fundamentally the same as it was in Connolly's time.

There is an element of truth in this argument. Since the end of the Second World War, British imperialism and its Unionist bedfellows have been trying to diversify the Northern economy to protect their investments. They have attempted to extend the nature and type of industry, so that they could spread their capital out more. Their aim for a long time has been to establish a new light industrial base which would in turn provide opportunities for semi-skilled and general employment. They have had undeniable success with this project. Since 1945, 80,000 new jobs accounting for 40% of the present employment in the North have been created. A lot of these have been centred in the electronic, electrical goods, man-made products, automobiles, aero-engines, and rubber products industries.

How far has this contributed to providing equal employment opportunities for Catholic workers? How far has it gone toward breaking down the obvious difference in social structure between the Catholic and Protestant working class? There is no way of giving exact answers to these questions, but a general look at the Northern working class as it presently

stands gives a rough reflection of the true situation.

Two landmarks in the development of postwar northern capitalism stand out: (i) the massive decline in traditional industries with high rates of Protestant skilled employment. This decline has been particularly noticeable in the linen and ship-building industries; (ii) despite efforts to create new industry, all the lost employment outlets have not been compensated for. The overall rate of unemployment remains high—7% to 8% in the last few years. More importantly, unemployment among Catholic workers was abnormally high—running at 25% in some areas.

What this picture reveals is firstly, that the Catholic working class has not benefitted much from the post-war changes, and secondly that while the major areas of employment for Protestant workers have contracted and forced many into less advanced types of occupation, they nonetheless still have a near monopoly on skilled jobs. Moreover, while the traditional industries have declined, they continue to be of central importance in the Northern economy.

Despite significant changes, therefore, Connolly's concept of the Protestant working class is valid for today. Without realising that the Protestant working class, as presently constituted, has a vested interest in maintaining the Orange-Unionist status quo, one will be unable to understand why they should have reacted violently to the Civil Rights movement and the introduction of power-sharing. The traditional explanation that they are dupes of the Unionist capitalist class cannot help save face any longer. In fact half of the Unionist business world, including its highest command, is in favour of civil rights and power-sharing. Why does only 20% of the Protestant working class support this "progressive" section while 80% supports the traditional reactionary half?

In the phase of political development that has opened up, the republican and economist conceptions of the Protestant working class could be very dangerous. Already these misconceptions have done a lot of damage. Believing that the Protestant workers were essentially revolutionary and moving in the same direction as their Catholic counterpart, the Officials used their influence in the early Civil Rights movement to limit the mass

upsurge for fear of alienating the Protestant workers. The Protestant workers were alienated anyway and the only fruit of the Officials' good intentions was to split and disrupt the unanimous character of the mass movement. Of course, the Officials blame People's Democracy and the Provos for this while ignoring the fact that such organisations were bound to come into existence to try to carry the struggle forward from the point where the Officials tried to put the brake on.

The economists for their part made a similar mistake (especially in Derry). They imagined that the economic struggle would provide a base for common unity. By confining themselves to issues such as housing and trade-union activity, they missed the main areas of struggle. This mistake could easily be repeated. Overshadowed as it is by the national question, the economic struggle continues. In times of lull it inevitably makes itself felt and the economist tendencies of the left and republican movements are accentuated by it, to the detriment of revolutionary politics.

Take for example the Harland and Wolff strike of April last year. Most of the left-wing groups embellished its importance and declared their uncritical solidarity with the shipyard workers. Not a single one of them bothered to note the sectarian aspects of the strike—the fact that in this stronghold of Protestant working-class ascendancy, the Protestant workers were demanding compensation for allowing Catholic workers to work with them, seemed to be simply beside the point!

Any attempt to get involved in the economic struggle without continuing a principled position on the national question must lead to such a capitulation to sectarianism and inevitably alienate the Catholic workers!

The hard truth is that there is no short-cut to winning the Protestant working class to revolutionary politics. The question still remains therefore: What strategy and tactics should be used by socialists and republicans to help bring about the unity of Catholic and Protestant workers on a principled basis?

The strategy and tactics necessary to this task must take into consideration the real social and economic differences between the different sections of the workers as a starting point. As long as the relatively privileged po-

sition of the Protestant workers remains unchallenged, they will continue to stay aloof from and despise their fellow Catholic workers. That is why Connolly answered the desire of other Irish socialists to avoid this thorny subject by saying:

"A real Socialist movement cannot be built by temporising in front of a dying cause, as that of the Orange Ascendancy, even though in the paroxysms of its death struggle it assumes the appearance of health. A real Socialist movement can only be born of struggle, of uncompromising affirmation of the faith that is in us. Such a movement infallibly gathers to it every element of rebellion and progress and in the midst of the storm and stress of the struggle solidifies into a real revolutionary force."

To challenge the ascendancy position of the Protestant workers it is essential to understand the precise basis of that position. It was the distorted and fragmented nature of the Northern market, which took shape under the pressure of Britain's colonial and imperialist machinations in Ireland, that created a narrow stratum of skilled employment and enabled the Protestant workers to monopolise this. The consummation of that deformed economic development was the foundation of the Unionist statelet in the twentieth century to prevent the absorption of the Northern market into a unified Irish market that might have provided the basis for rapid economic development in all of Ireland.

It is only by abolishing that statelet, by expelling every vestige of British imperialism, by uniting all the economic and social resources of all Ireland for the common good of the working class, that the foundations upon which the reactionary mentality of the Protestant workers stands can be shattered. Connolly, as might have been guessed from his previous remarks, foresaw the necessity of this strategy. "With the entrance of Ireland upon the normal level of civilised, self-governing nations, the old relations of Protestant and Catholic begin to melt and dissolve, and with their dissolution will come a new change in the relations of either faith to politics. The loss of its privileged position will mean for Protestantism the possibility of immense spiritual uplifting and the emergence into a knowledge of its kinship with its brothers and sisters of different creeds."

From the standpoint of practical politics this strategy implies that revolutionaries must keep the national question to the fore. This does not mean that they should exclude every other struggle from the sphere of their activity, but simply that they should view these struggles through the prism of the national question. At this point in the evolution of the struggle in the North, the immediate outcome of such a strategy would necessitate taking the objective needs of the Catholic working class as representing the historic needs of the entire Irish revolution. It would demand the mobilisation of the Catholic masses in a struggle to protect themselves against the Stormont regime. This would take the form of a campaign against internment and for the withdrawal of British

troops and the crushing of extremist Loyalist military organisations. Such a campaign would be a prelude to a more fundamental and general struggle for control of the Catholic areas and the opting out of the power structure of the Unionist statelet. Finally it would herald the beginning of a movement towards a democratic, secular and socialist Ireland.

The disintegration of the Unionist statelet in the course of this process, the economic dislocation this would bring about and the social alignment it would initiate are the only levers for freeing the Protestant workers from the domination of regressive and pro-imperialist politics. The sooner the revolutionary movement in Ireland faces up to this the better. □

DOCUMENTS

Vote Labor but Fight for Socialist Policies

[On April 10, the Australian Senate, in which the bourgeois opposition parties have a majority, took the unprecedented step of refusing to vote funds for the Australian Labor party (ALP) government headed by Gough Whitlam. Whitlam was consequently forced to dissolve both the Senate and the House of Representatives and call new elections, which will be held May 18.

[The following article is reprinted from the April 13 issue of *Direct Action*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Sydney. The article has been condensed for reasons of space.]

* * *

Only sixteen months after the election of the Labor government in December 1972, a double dissolution of both houses of Parliament will now take place. The Labor government is now faced with a vital test of survival. The election of Labor at the end of 1972 was an extremely important event in post-war political life in this country. It meant the end of twenty-three years of the most reactionary policies of the big business parties of Australia — the Liberal and Country parties.

It signified a change in the overall political complexion of Australian society. For the first time since the onset of the Cold War and the long post-World War II economic boom period, the majority of Australian working people had rejected the open class rule of the capitalist parties. The election of a Labor government represented an elementary step forward

in class consciousness for working people as a whole. The ALP, as the party of organised labor, was a different sort of party — one which was subject to the turbulent currents of change within the trade unions and labor movement overall.

Labor came to power on a massive groundswell of popular discontent with the policies of the Liberal-Country party coalition. It was the Liberals who sent Australian troops to support the U. S. war machine in the imperialist onslaught in Vietnam. The massive antiwar movement which developed in opposition to these policies had contributed mightily to breaking the hold of anticommunist ideology over the Australian population, and opening the way for a Labor victory.

"Kicking the communist can" just didn't work any more, as the DLP [Democratic Labor party, a right-wing split from the ALP] found to its cost.

The broad radicalisation of youth in the 1960s had thrown up a number of new movements with their own demands; all of which the Liberals rejected and sought to suppress. The demands of women for equality, for the right to abortion and for equal pay were ignored by the L-CP governments. The growing militancy of Blacks was attacked by the Liberals, and their calls for land rights, better conditions, an end to discrimination, and other demands were turned back in every way. The demands for homosexual rights were scorned by these guardians of justice, law, and morality.

Successive reactionary Liberal-Country party regimes attacked the unions with the

repressive penal powers of the arbitration system. This culminated in the O'Shea case in 1969, which represented an initial broad confrontation between the reactionary government and the trade-union movement.* From this period, a new reawakening of militancy among broad layers of workers has taken place. This set the stage for the coming to power of Labor in the political sphere.

In the 1969-72 period, Liberal government attacks on the living standards of the working people intensified with the new period of international economic recession. At the elections in late 1972 unemployment stood at more than 120,000, or greater than 2 percent of the workforce.

The Liberals poured money into the coffers of the rich private schools while neglecting the needs of the schools in working-class areas. Liberal-Country party policy encouraged the decimation of forests and the environment.

In Niugini and elsewhere L-CP policies fostered Australian and overseas imperialist domination and exploitation.

In every area, the Liberal-Country parties spelt disaster for the interests of working people in Australia.

Now they want to get back into government again by forcing a double dissolution, which they think they can win. What a disaster for the oppressed and exploited of this country if they do!

The Liberal-Country party bid to re-establish their regime must be rejected overwhelmingly. The attempt to use the dead hand of the Senate to throw out an elected Labor government must be decisively crushed. What an example of the class hatred of these conservative gentlemen when they are prepared to ignore their own hallowed "Parliamentary tradition" concerning the use of a Senate majority to reject a Supply Bill passed by an elected Labor government in the House of Representatives.

But this is quite normal. The Liberal and Country parties are only doing their job in representing big business in this country. The answer of working people must be not to lament the hypocrisy of the capitalist parties, but to fight them and throw back their offensive.

What would be the future under another Liberal-CP regime? Some idea was given in Billy Snedden's press interview laying out the Liberal leader's election promises. Here are some examples. First, moves to

* In May 1969, Clarrie O'Shea, secretary of the Victorian Tramways Employees Union, was jailed when he refused to pay an \$8,000 fine imposed for an "illegal" strike. The next day, 250,000 workers struck in protest. Most unions called one-day strikes and there was talk of a general strike. The government found a way to release O'Shea and still maintain face when, a week after the jailing, a Sydney "philanthropist" paid the fine for O'Shea. — IP

ward a three-month "voluntary" wage-price freeze. Second, cut government expenditure by curbing the growth of the public service and other "capital expenditure." What can this mean but a direct attack on social services, education, and public works? Third, increase spending on defence and offer to send Australian troops back to Singapore. The Liberals have also offered to reestablish the principle of universal military conscription. All the antiwar struggles of the past mean nothing to these people. Fourth, the Liberals will restore tax concessions and exploration subsidies to the giant mining corporations. And these are just some examples of Liberal intentions.

Return of an L/CP government would represent a real setback to the aspirations and confidence of working people and oppressed groups. We must say firmly: No, not again! Twenty-three years was enough!

How can Labor win?

Only by taking up the conservative challenge, and adopting a fighting program which can mobilise Labor's supporters in a vigorous campaign to defeat the Liberal offensive. In 1972, the Labor campaign drew on the support of thousands of youth, workers, women, students, teachers, antiwar activists—all those who looked to Labor to change society in the interests of the oppressed. And Labor has carried out a number of much-needed reforms. But many have been sorely disappointed by Labor's record in power. Again and again, the Whitlam leadership has retreated from defence of the interests of the working people. In every area, the response to big business pressure has been: Full steam ahead, in reverse.

Retreat on the penal clauses of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act. Retreat on the national health scheme. Retreat on education. Labor failed to take a firm stand on women's rights—especially on the question of repeal of all abortion laws. Labor has failed to act decisively to implement Black rights on land ownership, on discrimination, and in other areas. Labor has pursued a foreign policy based ostensibly on "peaceful co-existence" but in reality an endorsement of reactionary regimes in Asia, such as in Indonesia,

Thailand, and the Philippines. Labor threatened workers with a "prices-incomes policy," or, in reality, a wage freeze.

Is this the way to defend the interests of working people? Now the Labor government is faced with the most severe threat to its survival. The fight must be carried right up to the Liberal mouthpieces for



WHITLAM: Full steam ahead in reverse.

big business. What has been done so far? Labor spokespeople have gone backwards, not forwards.

Labor apparently hopes to win by palliatives to procapitalist "public opinion." For instance, Defence Minister Barnard announces a new defence spending program, which can only increase the striking power of Australia's armed forces in the service of imperialism. On the national health scheme, the government tries to make deals with the doctors and the private health funds and offers them all sorts of concessions. The government is making the question of "foreign owner-

ship and control" a major issue in the campaign. Rather than take up the challenge of capitalist ownership as a whole by posing the question of nationalisation under workers control, Labor leaders divert the struggle by concentrating their attacks on "foreign monopolies" manipulating the Australian economic and political scene.

Labor ministers seek to paint the Liberal and Country parties as being controlled by foreign interests. They try to present Labor as the true patriots. This can only divert Australian working people from the real task of challenging the big business system in its entirety.

On these and a number of other issues, the Labor leadership offer no real solutions. It is essential to fight for an alternative program—one which really offers a challenge to the employers and their L-CP instruments. Such a program would include these proposals:

- Automatic wage adjustments on a monthly basis in accordance with a realistic cost-of-living index kept by the unions and checked by the working people.

- Continual reductions in the working week; an immediate 35-hour week for all workers.

- Immediate repeal of all penal powers, and an end to all anti-union legislation.

- Repeal of all abortion laws; make contraception freely available for all.

- Equal rights for women in all areas; equal pay and job opportunities; equal rights to education; universal, free child-care centres.

- Total support for Black rights on land ownership, compensation, jobs, education.

- Free education for all; massive aid to working-class schools; an end to all subsidies to private schools.

- Student wages for all; student-staff control of schools and universities.

- Strict controls on pollution and environmental destruction; neutralise companies that cause pollution.

- Open the books: let the working people see the facts on corporate super-profits; nationalise under workers control without compensation all corporations that make excessive profits.

Keep the Liberals out! Vote Labor! Fight for socialist policies! □

Action Program for a French Workers Government

["Pompidou's death has put the problem of a change in régime on the order of the day," wrote the editors of *Rouge* in the April 12 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly. "Millions of workers are hoping for a change in the régime. The Union of the Left, incapable of drawing the lessons of the Lip struggle and of Chile, offers a reformist response. What is the re-

sponse of the revolutionists to these problems? We are reproducing here the final part of *Rouge's* 'Action Program.'"]

[The themes and proposals advanced in the following document constitute the platform that Alain Krivine, candidate of the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire (FCR — Revolutionary Communist Front) is explaining and

defending in the presidential election campaign. *Rouge* is supporting Krivine's candidacy and the FCR campaign.]

* * *

The workers must have no illusions: To be in office is not to be in power. Even when it has been shoved out of

government, the bourgeoisie still has its investments, its army, its laws, and its international allies. Winning control of the government can be a springboard toward the conquest of power only if the workers are aware of the need to go beyond the narrow framework of the Common Program by moving forward without compromise.

The Union of the Left, which the SP and CP present as their concrete alternative to the UDR government, already illustrates the class-collaborationist perspective of these parties. The workers must place in the forefront of their demands the breaking of all links, of any agreement by the workers organizations to collaborate in any way with the bourgeoisie.

The way to do this is to develop the independent organization of the workers in factory, district, and neighborhood committees composed of elected delegates subject to recall. Workers control committees, price-watch committees, inspection committees. These express the class power of the workers, counterposed to the power of the bosses in the factories and districts, which the Common Program would leave intact. But as long as the economy remains a market economy, these committees will not have the function of managing firms even if they are nationalized. For if they did, the workers in the nationalized sector would be applying the laws of capitalist profit against themselves and against the workers in the private sector. As long as the economy remains a market economy regulated by the law of value, the workers need to be able to impose their control. They need to have the right of veto. They must not fall into the trap of competition and self-exploitation under the cover of an alleged self-management.

A situation of dual power on a national scale cannot last forever. It must end with a victory of one of the two camps. That is why the workers will demand:

The repeal of the constitution, the dissolution of parliament, the convening of a constituent assembly composed of representatives of factory, district, and neighborhood committees.

In their struggle for state power, the workers will demand *the expropriation—that is, the nationalization without compensation or purchase—of all the big industrial trusts.* The Common Program, however, only projects



ALAIN KRIVINE

the nationalization of several trusts, and with compensation, letting the capitalists rob the workers a second time and use this money once more against them.

The workers will demand *the expropriation of the banks and all the major companies in trade, transportation, food, and energy* that govern the life of the country.

Then and only then, in the course of the revolutionary struggle, will the workers take *direct control of the management of companies*, as they did during the revolutionary process in Chile.

On the level of economic demands, it is not our task to engage in one-upmanship. We must advance demands that are rooted in the needs

of the workers and that point the way toward socialism.

● To counter the intrigues of the international bourgeoisie and the risk of inflation, *priority must be given to raising the minimum wage and instituting the sliding scale of wages.*

● But the most important demand must be a *huge decrease in the work week to thirty hours*, without reduction in wages and without speedup. This is essential if the workers are to have the time, the inclination, and the means to reconstruct their lives, to control their affairs, to manage their factories, and to reorganize society. This demand flows from political considerations. If need be, it should take priority over other, less fundamental, demands.

Such steps toward socialism will inevitably encounter the bitter opposition of the bourgeoisie, as in Chile.

If the workers were to believe in a government that promises them "socialism without civil war," they would reap civil war without socialism, as did the Chilean workers. If the reformists leaders refuse to go forward, the workers will have to overthrow them and take power themselves, for the choice will then be posed: either a military dictatorship or revolution.

● *To prevent economic sabotage by the bourgeoisie:*

— Immediate expropriation of the property of anyone who plots against the regime!

— Abolish business and banking secrecy! Open the books!

— For a state monopoly on foreign trade!

● *To prevent the bourgeoisie from poisoning public opinion:*

— Expropriate the Hachette publishing company and the big press, printing, and paper trusts.

— Uncensored freedom of the press, but with a guaranteed right of reply.

— Publish the accounts and the budgets of all newspapers.

— Keep the ORTF [French Radio and Television System] as a state monopoly with equal right of expression for representative unions, factory and neighborhood committees, and parties during elections in the committees.

● *To crush in the egg the military plotting of the bourgeoisie:*

— Recognition of union and political rights for soldiers, including the right to refuse any order that is contrary to the interests of the workers.

— Arming of the workers militias

in the factories and neighborhoods.

— Immediate recall of officers who bully the soldiers or take anti-working-class measures.

— Dissolution of special repressive bodies.

— Abolition of all special jurisdiction for the army.

— Recognition of the right to strike for police.

The French workers' march to revolution would arouse an immense solidarity movement among the proletariat of the entire world. But the workers should see to it that the government does not limit itself to hollow phrases on the solidarity of the peoples of the world but instead *concretely builds proletarian internationalism* by:

— Recognition of the same rights for immigrant workers as for French workers, without restriction, and not a special status for immigrants as the CP demands.

— Unconditional recognition of the right of self-determination and independence of the so-called Overseas Territories and Departments, and not just of autonomy, as the SP and CP are saying.

— Political and material aid to peoples struggling for their political and social emancipation, and not a kindly neutrality.

In these days of multinational trusts, it is all the more impossible for socialism to be built in a single country.

Against the Europe of the trusts, we must fight for a Europe of the workers. Contrary to what the Common Program states, this struggle means breaking with the Europe of the Common Market. It presupposes, instead, total support to the struggles of the European proletariat, *for the Socialist United States of Europe*.

Those are the key points, the criteria that define a workers government seeking to base itself on the mobilization of the masses to do away with capitalist oppression and exploitation. The Common Program of the left is not firmly committed to that road; it is confined to managing and rearranging the present society. That is why, in the event of an electoral victory of the left, we would not accept any truce that is justified in terms of a supposed national interest linking the workers to their bosses. □

dangerous in the past, can only bring disaster in the future. This period in the struggle has been one in which a lull has been enforced. The nationalist population in the north has been hit badly by arrests, sectarian assaults and harassment by "security forces." While the contradictions inherent in the six county state will not be solved by the Sunningdale agreement, the six county state will not "die away" of its own accord.

What then can be done to revitalize the national struggle? The nature of the period must be assessed. Consistent repression and murder aligned with political measures which have been designed to split the nationalist population have confused and disorientated the anti-imperialist forces. This can be seen in both wings of the Republican movement. Traditional republicanism as an ideology is undergoing a slow process of disintegration. The attitude of the Provisionals towards the "Boal Plan" with the consequent emphasis on a Federal Ireland is evidence of this. In the Officials the sharp debate between those who have a basically defeatist attitude and those who seek an alliance with the Provisionals has brought about a complete re-evaluation of old principles. At a time of such confusion it is vitally important that a clear leadership be given.

The only instrument that can revive a movement during a period of lull, after it has suffered at the hands of reaction, is a campaign that takes up the question of the victims of repression. As such, a campaign against repression in defence of those who have been victimised is basically a defensive one. However, it is only on the basis of such a defensive campaign that an offensive can be embarked upon in the future. It must integrate a wide spectrum of republican, socialist, labour and people's organisations on a common limited programmatic basis. Any attempt to avoid this necessity by substituting other "stunts" or political manoeuvres can only be detrimental to the movement as a whole.

Can such a united front work? On the basis of a principled front on limited issues unity can be attained by organisations mobilising around these issues and acting responsibly to maintain such unity. There is no real alternative to such action. Attempts to enter the bourgeois political arena by basing oneself on purely conjunctural issues (e.g., Boal plan), or to engage in isolated military adventures in the south, can only lead to a complete disorientation—precisely because such actions are not related to the mass movement they will confuse it and lead to the isolation of the anti-imperialist organisations.

The collaboration between British imperialism and its allies in Ireland must be undermined. The combativity and confidence of the nationalist population must be built around mobilisations against repression on a thirty-two county basis. Re-

Which Way Forward to a United Ireland?

[The following statement by the National Committee of the Revolutionary Marxist Group (RMG—Irish section of the Fourth International) was published in issue No. 5 of the *Plough*, the organ of the RMG.]

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The national committee of the Revolutionary Marxist Group rejects totally the proposals made by Desmond Boal, towards the amalgamation of the 6 and 26 county states. We reaffirm our demand for a 32 county socialist workers republic, as the only solution to the struggle for national unification which will solve the needs of the working class.

We consider that the enthusiastic and uncritical support given the Boal initiative by both wings of the Republican movement represents a retrograde move on the part of both organisations.

This is the natural development of the strategies of both bodies. On the one hand we have Gardiner Place [the Official republicans] with its perspective of social struggles separated by the border, and necessitating a reliance on, and tail-ending of, the Protestant Labour Aristocracy. On the other hand there is Kevin St. [Provisional republicans], with its con-

ception of an "Eire Nua," which tries to offer something to all classes in Irish society, which sees British Imperialism as a purely military problem, and which cannot deal with the more subtle, but none the less real, Imperialist influence in Irish life.

The fact is that Boal's proposal must be seen in relation to others that have appeared and will appear from the Loyalist camp in the current period. It is a further expression of the disintegration of the Unionists' Monolith. Boal's proposal differs from Taylor's only in its intelligent evaluation of the essential refusal of the bourgeoisie of the Republic to interest itself in or seriously defend the Nationalist minority in the northeast. His proposal is to rely on Leinster House rather than Westminster as a defender of the "Protestant (read Orange) Way of Life." This will give the shadow of victory beyond their wildest dreams to the bourgeois nationalists, while leaving the substance firmly in the hands of the Northern ruling caste. Both interests will then be able to collaborate happily in keeping down disorders north and south.

One of the biggest weaknesses in the anti-imperialist movement has been its lack of unity even on the most limited of issues. This weakness, while being

publicans and socialists must utilize all areas of possible radicalisation (e.g., the economic struggle, harassment in border

areas, etc.) in order to put the question of repression in the forefront of all struggles. □

MIR Leader Discusses Resistance Strategy

[The following interview with Miguel Enriquez, general secretary of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) in Chile, was published in the March 22 issue of *Rouge*, the French Trotskyist weekly. It is probably the most complete statement up to now by a leader of the MIR on the experience of the 1970-73 government of the Unidad Popular (UP—Popular Unity), and on the perspectives for the struggle against the military junta.

[A statement issued by the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee mentioned near the end of the interview was published in the March 11 issue of *Intercontinental Press*.

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Question. What is the MIR's reaction to the charges (mainly by the CP) that it was partly responsible for the fall of the Popular Unity government?

Answer. In actual fact, these charges originate essentially from two sources: the left reformists and the bourgeoisie. We know that some leading individuals in certain European Communist parties have devoted themselves to laying the blame for the fall of the UP government on the MIR's "impatience," "ultraleftism," and "heedlessness." They are doing this in an attempt to provide a historical justification for the failure of their reformist policy in Chile, in order to be able to apply such policies again in other countries. These charges are based on the UP's failure to seal an alliance with the Christian Democratic party of Chile.

Despite the scope of the subject, we shall reply as briefly as possible.

The UP government was a left petty-bourgeois government. It was based on an alliance between working-class reformism and petty-bourgeois reformism. For three years it followed a reformist policy characterized by its subservience to the bourgeois order and its constant attempts to carry out its class-collaborationist intentions.

Because the reformists did not understand the character of the period during their stay in government, they were unable to work out their class-collaborationist plans successfully. The system of capitalist domination had entered a crisis. The mobilizations and activity of the mass move-

ment, which had increased since 1967, reached the boiling point when the UP formed the government. During the last three years, the masses stepped up their mobilizations and developed their level of organization and consciousness beyond anything previously seen in Chile.

At the same time, and partly as a result of what I've just said, the crisis within the bourgeoisie continued to deepen. This is what threw the reformists off base. Seeing the increasing struggle within the bourgeoisie, they expected to seal an alliance with one of the bourgeois factions without understanding that both factions of the bourgeoisie, despite their disagreements, had clearly understood from the beginning that the rise of the mass movement, by its very character, was going beyond the half-hearted reforms the UP was proposing and that it threatened the very system of capitalist domination. The ruling class as a whole was absolutely determined from the outset to defend the system of capitalist domination and to struggle to overthrow the UP government. The increasing polarization of the class struggle historically closed off any possibility for the reformists' class-collaborationist hopes to succeed.

Continuing to base itself on this illusory class-collaborationist schema and the illusion that it had seized power, the UP followed an economic policy that essentially affected the consumption sector and not the ownership of the means of production—through carrying out a drastic redistribution of incomes to increase consumption, and increasing production by simply making maximum use of the existing productive capacity, which was achieved by the middle of 1972. The UP also took action with respect to the means of production, but only in a limited way, through nationalizing the big copper mines and the banks, projecting an addition to the state sector of only ninety-one large-scale factories (although there are between 500 and 800 such factories), and protecting all the big firms in the construction and distribution sectors.

On the other hand, the UP carried out only slightly more than 1,000 expropriations in the agricultural sector during 1971, later expropriating up to 3,000 rural properties. However, only properties of 80 hectares [1 hectare = 2.47 acres] or more, with irrigation facilities, were expropriated. The latifundistas [big landowners] had the right to keep a reserve

of 80 hectares, and could choose the best lands for themselves. In this way the UP was led to openly protect the big agricultural enterprises which just happen to be between 40 and 80 irrigated hectares in size. (These properties accounted for almost 50 percent of all agricultural production in Chile in 1973, and they have increased in number from 4,500 in 1970 to 9,000 in 1973.)

Politically, the UP's class-collaborationist intentions were expressed not only in its subordination to bourgeois institutions, but also in the way it extolled the legitimacy of these institutions to the masses, while the ruling class, with "legality" on its side, continued to control powerful institutions of the state apparatus such as the parliament, the judiciary, the treasury, and the majority of the officers' corps of the armed forces. Through these institutions, in actual fact, the bourgeoisie constituted a kind of parallel government, subjecting the UP government to constant attack: obstructing it in parliament, bringing charges against ministers, putting civil servants on trial, and so on.

These concessions and vacillations of the UP regime were not inconsequential matters of little concern to the mass movement, the only possible real source of strength for the government. All these concessions—the protection given to big businessmen, the promise to repay the foreign debt to the Americans, the recognition paid to the high-ranking officers of the armed forces, and so on—strengthened the ruling classes. Supported by the American financial blockade, they managed to keep their hands on enormous means of power and wealth that they didn't hesitate to hurl violently against the government, the working class, and the people—through sabotaging production in the factories they continued to hold; through hoarding, speculation, and use of the black market; through inflation, military pressures, and the like.

Moreover, all these concessions by the reformists dealt blows at one section of the population after another. The protection provided to the big businessmen in industry, agriculture, and the consumer goods industry, etc., blocked the path of workers struggles. There was the lack of support given to the direct mobilizations of the workers, and the attacks against them, including even occasional repressive actions. There was the struggle to prevent political work within the armed forces. As a result, the left was fragmented, and the workers, who regarded the government as an instrument of their struggle, were divided and confused.

Politically, the UP fostered the parliamentary road through frustrated attempts to form an alliance with the Christian Democratic party. And each time these attempts failed, the UP not only refused to appeal to the masses, but it would fall

back on the state apparatus, forming joint civilian and military governments, thereby increasing the weight of the state institutions, especially the reactionary high-ranking officer corps of the armed forces, within the regime.

But, lost in their vacillations, the reformists were forced to retreat before the pressures of the mass movement, their broad base of popular support, and before the power of the direct mobilizations of the population. It was the masses who occupied more than 300 big factories and forced the government to take them over. It was the masses who burst into the strongholds of the agrarian bourgeoisie, seizing irrigated properties of 40 to 80 hectares, occupying many construction companies, vineyards and some distribution exchanges.

But these concessions by the reformists to the workers were limited, and few and far between. They were always resisted at first, and sometimes curbed—for example, when peasants and workers were expelled from the lands and factories they had occupied. Thus the government was only *conceding* to the pressures of the mass movement, which means that it was repudiating the masses' support, that it was not leading them, that it was even resisting them, which as a result provoked the fragmentation, dispersion and confusion of the mass movement. Despite this, the legitimacy that the government ended up giving to these conquests of the mass movement served to harden and infuriate the ruling classes.

Thus the government, subservient to the bourgeois order and trying to seal an alliance with a section of the bourgeoisie, made all kinds of concessions to institutional authority and the ruling class, contrary to the interests of the disoriented working class and people. During that time, the ruling classes never lost sight of the increasingly revolutionary, anti-capitalist character of the mass movement, and from the beginning they adopted a hostile posture toward the government despite all the government's promises and the limitations it imposed on its reformist plans.

Accordingly, the UP government failed to achieve the strength that it would have got from an alliance with a section of the bourgeoisie. Instead, it strengthened the ruling classes and weakened its real source of strength, the mass movement, dividing and dispersing it.

All these tendencies were magnified after the attempted military coup of June 29, 1973, and the continuing threat of a coup that it brought in its wake. On the one hand, the government took no measures against the real conspirators. It made no changes in the army leadership, confining its actions to arresting those who were directly involved, and so on.

The mass movement, headed by the

working class, reached an extraordinary level of consciousness and organization: It occupied hundreds of factories, organizing itself in "cordones industriales" (similar to workers councils) and in several places, in "comandos comunales" (comprising workers, slum dwellers, students, and peasants). It even succeeded in developing systematic, material forms of self-defense on a massive scale.

The ruling class used a dual tactic. On the one hand, it developed a powerful offensive—the truck owners' strike, assassinations, charges against ministers in the parliament, freezing of the public accounts, statements by the presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, and so on. On the other hand, it left a sector of the Christian Democratic party free to open a dialogue with the government, with calls for concessions at first, then insistence on the need for consensus, followed by appeals for the government's capitulation and finally for its resignation.

Under the illusion that it was engaging in a dialogue, the government began to capitulate, and thus sealed its fate in the following weeks. It established the "cabinet of dialogue," then the civilian-military cabinet. It aimed its blows against the workers, returning dozens of factories conquered by the workers to their original owners. It fought the institutions of popular power, the comandos and the cordones, occasionally carrying out repressive operations to evacuate seized factories, assailing in the streets workers from certain cordones and inhabitants of shantytowns, waging a furious struggle against the revolutionary left, charging it with subversion. It permitted dozens of military raids in factories in search of arms, in the end endorsing these raids. In some of them, such as at Nentehue and Sumar, workers and peasants were savagely tortured. It launched criminal proceedings against sailors in the Chilean fleet who were preparing self-defense measures in case of a military coup—thereby endorsing the brutal tortures to which these sailors had been subjected by navy officers, and allowing the criminal prosecution and persecution by the navy's military courts of the general secretaries of the Socialist party, the MIR and the MAPU [Movement for United Popular Action].

All these actions by the government served to reinforce the offensive by the ruling class and the reactionary upper ranks of the officers. At the same time, they frustrated, disconcerted and dislocated the rank-and-file sections of the army opposed to a coup, and divided the left, paving the way for the coup.

It is this responsibility of the reformists' policy that some people are trying to hide and obscure. Many of their parliamentary representatives and members later fought heroically against the gorillas. Some went into exile, while others remain in Chile to-

day, confronting the repression.

As for us, during the last three years we warned the workers and the left about the catastrophe the reformist policy was dragging them into, and as a party we did everything we could among the masses to avoid it.

The masses were not "ultraleft" when they mobilized increasingly to defend their interests. Having placed the UP in office, they stepped up their march along the only road that history offered them. It was not they who stood in the way of the alliance between the UP and the Christian Democratic party, but the laws of the class struggle. The working class and the people can constitute a social force—as they were when they put the UP in office—only to the extent that, as a class, they understand their interests. Objectively, that could have been achieved in Chile, a capitalist country, only by consistently attacking the interests of the ruling class—and that will continue to be the case, as it is today. The section of the ruling class whose interests are expressed politically by the Christian Democratic party understands this as well as anyone. From the beginning it fought to defend the capitalist system, struggling against the advance of the working class, with the aim of overthrowing the Popular Unity government that the workers' struggles had created.

The masses were not mistaken in acting the way they did, just as history is not "mistaken." Nor was it the "ultraleftists" who alienated the Christian Democratic party, a bourgeois party. What led Chile to the catastrophe of today's gorilla regime was the political line of the reformists, who consistently aimed their blows against the social force that had placed them in office and that constituted their fundamental power base—the working class and the people—frustrating them and finally demoralizing and disorienting them.

As far as we are concerned, we are not guilty of either "impatience" or "ultraleftism." We gave leadership, to the extent that we could, to the historic advance of the workers against the ruling class and the capitalist class, in the factories, on the rural estates, in the shantytowns, the high schools and universities, and in the regiments. But we were unable to win the leadership of the mass movement from the reformists. That was where our weakness lay; that was where we were found wanting. Not anywhere else.

We are remaining in Chile to reorganize the mass movement, seeking unity with the whole left and all sectors prepared to fight the dictatorship of the gorillas. We are preparing the revolutionary war that will overthrow the dictatorship and put the workers in power with the establishment of a revolutionary workers and peasants government.

But in the last analysis, that is not

the main subject of polemics in Chile today. We are trying to achieve the unity of the whole left. What has happened, however, must be a lesson for all the peoples of the world. You will find very few examples in history where the disastrous effects of the reformists' policy have been so obvious. At the same time, the attacks against us by some individuals and parties in Europe have forced us to reply, in order that truth can prevail against the distortion of facts.

We are replying to their charges and clarifying the facts, since by distorting what happened, they deprive the peoples of the possibility of drawing the lessons provided by the Chilean experience, which they must do if the errors committed in Chile are to be avoided. They sow confusion and demoralization among the people when they fail to indicate that in Chile it was not socialism or a revolutionary policy that was defeated, but rather a weak and illusory reformist experience. It is necessary that the reformists acknowledge their responsibility before history, and not look for whipping boys among the revolutionaries.

At the same time we are proving that we are the supporters of unity of all the forces of the left and all sectors prepared to struggle against the dictatorship, in a political front of the resistance, as required by experience and the conditions that exist today in Chile. We are already in contact with all the left forces here in Chile. The publication of a joint call by the whole left in exile is an important step forward in the developing unity of all left forces and it has also been very useful here in Chile.

Q. What is the position of the MIR with respect to a tactical alliance with all "democrats," a so-called "broad front," which will aim only at the reestablishment of the parliamentary form of the bourgeois dictatorship?

A. We encourage the unity of all forces prepared to participate in practice in the struggle against the dictatorship, in the resistance front that we mentioned previously. Our understanding is that this front would include all the left organizations, those of the former Popular Unity and ourselves, as well as a sector of the Christian Democratic party, the so-called "progressive" or democratic petty-bourgeois sector, which before the military coup came out openly against it and did the same thing immediately after the coup.

The fundamental base of the struggle against the gorillas' dictatorship will be the working class and the people. As a result of the recent tragic experience with the bourgeois dictatorship in the form of a representative democracy, the masses will not likely be content to go through another experience with it.

Another sector of the Christian Demo-

cratic party that some people call democratic, that is, the sector led by Frei, supported unconditionally the ruling class's attacks against the workers and the government. It instigated and prepared the conditions for the military coup, as shown by Frei's statements demanding arms searches in the factories, the declarations of Congress on the illegitimacy and illegality of the government, and so on. This sector immediately recognized and applauded the military coup, and has continued to do so. Today it is participating in the dictatorship, providing it with technicians as well as a minister and some undersecretaries. And while it is timidly asking the junta to moderate its policy of repression and its economic policy through the medium of several pressure groups, it is simply shaking out its banners with the sole aim of accumulating forces in its struggle with the leading faction of the bourgeoisie in order to increase its share of the resources and power at the disposal of the state—to get the run of the copper industry, tax exemptions, state credits, etc.

Like all the populist movements of the past, this sector of the CD is simultaneously seeking to win the support of social sectors that are victims of the junta's policies and trying to add in the popular support of the reformists—with the intention, once it has achieved its objectives, of repressing them. *The working class, the people, and the revolutionaries cannot make alliances with this sector that would decapitate their program and their methods of struggle.* On the contrary, they must take advantage of all the breaches that are opened up by the sharpening of the struggle between different sectors of the bourgeoisie today.

Q. How does the MIR envisage the possibilities for a regroupment of the revolutionaries at the rank-and-file level?

A. The leadership of the struggle against the gorillas' dictatorship will not be won by issuing decrees or declarations. It will be won in the course of the struggle itself.

The struggle against the dictatorship is the struggle of the working class and the whole population against a sector of the armed forces officer corps. Because of that, and in order to provide a vehicle for all those sectors of the people who are prepared to struggle against the dictatorship, whether they be members of political parties or not, we are encouraging at the rank-and-file level—and with some success already—the formation of the movement of popular resistance to the dictatorship, based on the creation of committees in every factory, campamento, high school, university, public office, and so on.

Q. How do you reconcile tactically a

rapprochement with democratic sectors and the development of the armed struggle?

A. Obviously, only sectors prepared to initiate or give practical support to the struggle against the dictatorship on all levels will be part of the resistance movement. Thus there shouldn't be any fundamental problems in reaching agreement on tactics. The reorganization of the mass movement has proceeded apace for several months. The fundamental form of the armed struggle in Chile will be one that avoids the isolation of the vanguard from the masses, that increasingly involves the working class and people in forms of armed struggle. The revolutionary people's army will arise from the popular resistance movement, as the only force able to confront the army of the gorillas and to overthrow the dictatorship.

Q. In your view, what is the likely effect on the reformist parties of the failure of the Chilean road to socialism?

A. The failure of the reformist road in Chile would seem likely to indicate an end to the domination of reformist illusions among the working class and the people, at least in our country. But reformism as a political schema does not disappear because of a defeat. What will sweep reformism from the leadership of the mass movement is the experience the workers and left-wing militants, guided by revolutionary tactics and strategy, have already acquired, and will continue to acquire, in the struggle itself.

Q. In your opinion, is the Chilean left, and the MIR in particular, isolated in relationship to the outside world?

A. As for isolation from the rest of the world, I think it is the dictatorship of the gorillas that is the most isolated! The working class, the people, and the left in Chile have received enormous support from the socialist countries, from revolutionary Cuba, and from revolutionary and progressive sectors around the world. And they will continue to receive that support.

The revolutionaries in the Southern Cone of Latin America have established a [Revolutionary] Coordinating Committee composed of the Argentine ERP, the MLN-Tupamaros of Uruguay, the Bolivian ELN and the Chilean MIR, which not only makes any isolation impossible, but also signifies an enormous step forward for the revolutionary struggle in the Southern Cone. However, any initiative that tends to unify and strengthen the struggle against imperialism and for the revolution will be greeted enthusiastically by the Chilean revolutionaries. □