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First Complete English Text

Medvedev's Review of 'The Gulag Archipelago'



Caetano Fires Top Generals

Rebellion Deepens Rift in Portuguese Army

FBI Plot Against Black Movement

Questions Facing British Workers

Postal Workers Score Victory

The three-week postal strike in Bangladesh ended March 6, when the government agreed to the demands of the 42,000 striking workers. After the outbreak of the strike on February 13, the regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared the strike illegal and arrested a number of strikers, all of whom were released after the postal workers won their victory.

The postal workers first raised their demands in November and met with government representatives in December, but were simply told that the government was doing its best to meet their demands. The workers called for all postal employees in the Class III and Class IV pay ranges to be upgraded by one class. Since there was no promotion system for the postal workers, and employees remained in the same pay grade no matter how long they had worked for the post office, the workers also demanded that older employees be upgraded by one scale for every three year of service.

After months of inaction by the government, the workers struck. With the help of extensive public support, they forced the regime to give in. Not only were their demands met, but the government also said it would pay them for the full twenty days that the postal system was shut down.

The March 10 issue of *Holiday*, a leftist weekly published in Dacca, noted the significance of this victory: "Since the emergence of Bangladesh this is the first instance when the workers succeeded in realising their demands through a country-wide strike." A similar strike by teachers had earlier been defeated by the government with the aid of strikebreakers. □

No Horsing Around in Traffic Court

A man who rides a horse to work every day was acquitted of charges of a traffic violation by a North Carolina court March 14. He was accused of "operating a horse on a public street during hours of darkness when the horse was not equipped with headlights or tail lights."

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Fourth International Holds Tenth Congress

[The following press release was issued by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

The Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International (Fourth World Congress Since Reunification) was held in Sweden the last week of February. Some 250 delegates and fraternal delegates, representing forty-eight sections and sympathizing organizations in forty-one countries, took part in the proceedings.

The delegates paid their respects to the memory of the cadres of our movement who have died since the Ninth World Congress. These include Comrade Tomás Chambi, member of the Central Committee of the Bolivian section, killed while leading the La Paz peasant column that took part in the August 21, 1971, battle against the Banzer coup; Luis Mamani Limachi murdered by the Bolivian military dictatorship; Eduardo Merlino, murdered by the Brazilian military dictatorship; Nelson de Sanza Knoll, murdered by the Chilean military dictatorship; Luis Pujals, Pedro Bonnet, the other Trotskyist leaders of the PRT-Combatiente [Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—Revolutionary Workers Party], and their comrades, including those in Trelew, murdered by the Argentine military dictatorship; Peter Graham (Ireland), murdered; José Zuniga, peasant leader of the FIR [Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario—Front of the Revolutionary Left] in Cuzco, Peru, murdered; Georg Moltved (Denmark); Renzo Gambino and Libero Villone (Italy); Edith Beauvais and Charles Marie (France); Joe Baxter (Argentina); Lazaris (Greece); Maureen Keegan (Ireland); Kenth-Ake Andersson (Sweden).

The congress elected to its place of honor the Trotskyist comrades in prison in Spain, Chile, China, Bolivia, and Uruguay. As its honorary chairman, it designated Comrade Luis Vitale, prisoner of the junta in Chile and symbol of the revolutionary vic-

tims of repression around the world.

The following points were discussed by the congress:

1. A general resolution on the international situation. The reporter for the majority of the outgoing International Executive Committee was Comrade E. Germain. Comrade Hans reported for the minority, and Comrade Luigigave the report for a third tendency.

2. A resolution on "Bolivia: A Balance Sheet and Line of Orientation." Comrade Serrano gave the report for the majority of the outgoing IEC, and Comrade Lorenzo gave the report for the minority.

3. A resolution on "The Political Crisis and Revolutionary Perspectives in Argentina." The reporter for the majority of the outgoing IEC was Comrade Saoul; the reporter for the minority was Comrade Arturo.

4. A resolution on the problems of armed struggle in Latin America. Comrade Roman gave the report for the majority of the outgoing IEC, Comrade Juan gave the report for the minority, and Comrade Willi for a third tendency.

5. A resolution on the problems of building revolutionary parties in West Europe. The reporter for the majority

of the outgoing IEC was comrade Livio Maitan, the reporter for the minority was Comrade Roberto, and the reporter for a third tendency was Comrade Herb.

The resolutions presented by the majority of the outgoing IEC on each of these questions were passed by a majority vote. The congress elected a new International Executive Committee in which the tendencies present received proportional representation.

The Congress also adopted unanimously the statutes of the Fourth International and appeals for solidarity with the striking British miners, the Chilean workers in struggle against the military dictatorship, and the workers and students in Greece. It also passed unanimously a statement of solidarity with Rohana Wijeweera and the comrades of the JVP [Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna—People's Liberation Front] imprisoned by the Sri Lanka government.

The Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International registered the significant gains made by several sections since 1969, as well as an increase in the number of sections and sympathizing groups. It concluded a long period of lively internal debate—marked by the publication of 150 discussion articles—with the unanimous acceptance of organizational decisions confirming the unity of the Fourth International in accordance with the rules of democratic centralism. □

Ethiopia

Strikes, Protests Continue to Rock Regime

By Ernest Harsch

The four-day general strike called by the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU), which shut down all air and sea ports, most factories, and all other unionized sectors of the economy, ended on March 11 after the conclusion of a compromise agreement with the government. While the unions did not win their demand for a minimum wage of US\$1.50 a day (the average wage in Addis Ababa is \$0.50 a day), the regime agreed

"in principle" that a new minimum wage would be set after a two-month "cooling-off period."

The agreement did, however, spell out some other, more concrete, victories for the workers. The regime gave in on the demand that government employees no longer be forbidden to organize or strike. The agreement also stipulated that any worker injured on the job would get free medical care, that nationwide price

controls would be instituted, and that the children of union members would get free education. It was also announced that the strikers would get paid for the four days they were out.

But apparently some workers were not satisfied with the agreement or were unwilling to follow all the directives of the trade-union bureaucracy. The March 10-11 *Le Monde* noted: "It seems that important differences exist among the unionists. Some of them are ready to give the order to end the strike, but others have decided to apply pressure on the new government until it resigns. The situation is such that an order given by the CELU to halt the strike is liable not to be followed by everyone."

The CELU was originally set up eleven years ago by the Ethiopian government and is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), a pro-Washington labor organization dominated by the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations). Correspondent Jean-Claude Guillebaud reported in the March 9 *Le Monde* that the CELU was assisted by three U. S. advisers.

In the March 13 *Le Monde* Guillebaud pointed out that the CELU "is now being challenged by its basic units, that is to say, the different unions affiliated to it. It is condemned either to follow a movement for which it has had no previous preparation, or to lose all credibility." He also reported that the unorganized workers, particularly the airline workers, were considering the formation of a new "more genuine" labor confederation.

This more militant sector of the Ethiopian labor movement went into action almost immediately after the end of the general strike. Only a few hours after the airports at Addis Ababa and Asmara reopened on March 11, they were shut down by the air-traffic controllers and other airline workers to protest the arrest of forty-six workers for distributing leaflets during the general strike. The strikers are government employees and the strike, which was called for an indefinite period, was still illegal, since the regime's promise to allow government workers to organize and strike had not yet been made into law. Guillebaud quoted one airline employee as saying: "We are striking in order to win the right to strike."

The March 15 *Washington Post* reported that 2,000 workers at the government-owned Imperial Tobacco monopoly also went out on strike to demand higher pay and better conditions at the factory.

The unrest in Ethiopia has even spread to sectors of the population that are not known for militancy or for hostility to the regime. A report over the Ethiopian radio announced on March 12 that 500 priests of the Coptic Christian Church, who said they spoke for Ethiopia's 200,000 priests, had threatened to strike for higher pay, pension rights, and cheaper medical care. The priests asked for the raise in a petition to Abuna Theophilus at the Trinity Cathedral in Addis Ababa. The church is one of the richest and most powerful institutions in Ethiopia and one of its biggest landowners. Priests receive salaries of about \$7.50 a month, plus food and lodging.

Other sectors have also continued their antigovernment agitation. On the first day of the general strike, March 7, more than 300 students at Haile Selassie University in Addis Ababa attempted to march to the center of the city chanting: "Down with the aristocrats!" "Down with the ministers!" and "Land to the tillers!" Although they were dispersed by the riot police, another group of 200 students reached the office of Prime Minister Endalkachew Makonnen. They too were dispersed after being attacked with tear gas and rifle fire.

On March 11, teachers at Haile Selassie University met and demanded the ouster of Makonnen and free elections to choose a new government. Afterward, several hundred students protested at the university and burned an effigy of the new prime minister. Their signs called for free speech and an end to massacres of political prisoners, a reference to a rebellion at Akaki prison on March 3, which was put down at a cost of at least thirty-six lives.

The comments made by some of the students to foreign journalists express their determination to continue their struggles. One student leader told an Associated Press reporter: "We want popular elections. We do not want any government appointed by the emperor. We want to choose our own." The March 18 *Newsweek* quoted a science student as saying: "These are the last days of Haile Selassie. And the church

must go, too." Another student told Guillebaud that the events taking place were an "Ethiopian May 1968."

A March 10 radio broadcast in the name of the Ethiopian armed forces warned people to ignore the antigovernment leaflets that have been circulating throughout Addis Ababa. "It said," wrote the March 11 *New York Times*, "that the army would take 'direct action' against anyone found spreading leaflets that called on the people to take power and [that] suggested that the army would support such a rebellion."

Despite the broadcast, the fact remains that some important sections of the armed forces, led by the ranks or by junior officers, might indeed support a rebellion. During the course of the military mutiny in late February and early March the rebellious troops not only pressed for the dismissal of the old cabinet, but also forced Selassie to oust his grandson as the navy commander. In addition, the troops arrested numerous officers and government officials. The March 5 *Tokyo Daily Yomiuri* reported that 330 army and navy officers had been taken captive in the province of Eritrea alone.

While the mutiny, which at its peak involved more than 10,000 soldiers, has subsided somewhat, the agitation by "revolutionary elements" within the armed forces, as Guillebaud termed them, has continued. The appearance of leaflets signed by various units within the armed forces and raising various demands has become quite common in Addis Ababa.

The march 13 *New York Times* reported that, according to "informed sources," the mutiny was continuing in the Ethiopian Air Force. The mutineers were demanding the ouster of twenty-one officers and, according to the sources, were "being insubordinate, threatening their officers and refusing to come to work." The mutiny flared up among enlisted men at the air force bases in Asmara and Debre Zeit.

In early March a leaflet appeared in Addis Ababa, signed by army and air force units at Debre Zeit, that said, according to the March 7 *Le Monde*: "No, we have not been bought off by the salary raises. We are with the people and the students. Continue your movement; we will join you soon."

The March 18 *Newsweek* reported that the chairman of an underground

committee within the military told their correspondent Andrew Jaffe: "Our demands go much further than money. The whole system must be changed." He then outlined a series of demands, including the establishment of political parties, freedom of the press, the release of political prisoners, free elections, and the abolition of Ethiopia's feudal landholding system. "If the government continues to stall," a sergeant added, "we may have to take power."

The political ferment has also begun to affect the peasantry, who comprise the overwhelming majority of the population. Guillebaud reported in the March 13 *Le Monde*: "The old peasant world, a guarantee of stability and conservatism, is also moving. There are signs of this in Jimma, Gondar, and the Sidamo. . . . 'If you think that the peasantry is permanently welded to conservatism, you are wrong,' observed a young Ethiopian intellectual. 'If events continue at this rate, all the demands and all the divisions could flare up in an instant.'"

Retreating even further in the face of such widespread unrest, Selassie said at a press conference on March 11, according to the next day's account in the *New York Times*, "that while the monarchy was a durable institution needed to hold Ethiopia together, its once overwhelming political power was not 'eternal' and could be varied according to the 'requirements and exigencies of the time.'"

He also said that while Ethiopia now had no political parties whatsoever, it "might best be served" by one official party. He then hastened to add that he did not exclude allowing other parties to emerge if the constitutional conference, which he said during an address on March 5 would be convoked some time in the future, suggested that freedom of political association be incorporated in a new constitution.

But promises of limited reforms seem likely to do little to undercut the spreading unrest. As *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Henry S. Hayward observed in the March 13 issue: "Unless the host of political, economic, and social improvements that have been demanded here in the past three weeks show some signs of being put into effect rapidly, further confrontations between the government and its people seem almost inevitable." □

Peronist Youth Ask: 'What's Happening, General?'

Right-Wing Offensive Continues

By Gerry Foley

After winning his basic objectives in the left stronghold of Córdoba by means of a carefully stage-managed police uprising, Perón is continuing to press his offensive against "Marxism" and the militant sections of the trade-union movement.

On March 14, the Argentine legislature passed a bill designed to "normalize" the universities. Article 5 of the new law states: "It is forbidden to carry out partisan political activity within the universities or propagate ideas contrary to our democratic system."

After the purges of left-wing Peronist professors and administrators that have followed the old caudillo's declaration of "war on Marxism" in September, there can be little doubt what kind of political activity will be proscribed. If any question remained, the head of the Peronist bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, Ferdinando Pedrini removed it when he said in the debate March 14:

"We don't want universities where there are guerrillas who attack the people's government as if it were a military regime."

Since it began shortly after his election, Perón's campaign against the "guerrillas" has meant a wave of terror against the entire left, including trade-union militants. The removal of Bidegain, the liberal governor of Buenos Aires province, was justified by the alleged needs of fighting the guerrillas, as was the Córdoba coup itself.

Perón had less of a problem getting the universities bill through parliament than he did in his take-over of Córdoba province. It passed the Chamber of Deputies by a vote of 142 to 15, opposed only by some left liberals. The main opposition party, the UCR (Unión Cívica Radical—Radical Civic Union) supported the bill. While the ouster of a legally elected government by a Peronist strongman gave the classical bourgeois parliamentary party an acute case of nervousness, both big bourgeois electoral formations had a common interest in trying

to clamp down the lid on the universities. The main obstacle, the question of patronage, was removed by a concession from the Peronists. They pledged in effect not to fire non-Peronist professors and fill the professorial chairs with their own followers.

"There was no other choice but to support the bill," said Antonio Troccoli, a legislative leader of the moderate Radical Civic Union, the main opposition party. "Almost everybody believes that the universities must go through a period of normalization."

"Mr. Troccoli emphasized that the opposition parties managed to dilute the original university bill presented by right-wing Peronists who wanted to give Government-appointed rectors complete power to guide the universities for an indefinite period." (Jonathan Kandell in the March 16 *New York Times*.)

The bill did not end democracy on the campuses, Troccoli claimed, because it stipulates that after eighteen months the rectors have to turn the government of the universities over to general assemblies representing students, faculty, and other university employees. Thus, the "normalization" of the universities rather resembled the process that was carried out in Córdoba under the same name. Perón assumed full powers and overruled the democratic rights of the students in order ostensibly to achieve better democratic functioning at some later date, when presumably the "guerrillas" will have been removed.

One dissident Peronist deputy, Rodolfo Ortega Peña, who was purged from the Buenos Aires law school faculty, was denounced in sharper terms than the ousted government of Córdoba. But he also made a stronger political protest. Ortega Peña is one of the eight alternates who were seated March 13 to replace the left Peronist deputies who resigned rather than vote for the repressive new penal code that was passed several weeks ago.

He chose to take the seat that legally fell to him but not to join the Peronist parliamentary bloc, explaining his position this way:

"I want to inform the people of my Fatherland of my firm decision to be guided in my work as a legislator by the motto 'The blood that has been shed will not be negotiated,' and to carry out the program that the people voted for.

"This position, which I have taken as a Peronist, leads me to the conviction that I cannot join the FREJULI [Frente Justicialista de Liberación Nacional — Liberation Front for Social Justice] bloc, since I believe that at present this structure is in total contradiction to this slogan and to carrying out this program. This has been shown by the voting of legislation such as the Ley de Prescindibilidad [Civil Service Unemployment Law], the trade-union law, the law on state enterprises, the law on foreign investments, the reform of the penal code, the intervention in Córdoba, and others.

"Therefore, faithful to the popular mandate of Peronism and convinced that the Fatherland comes first, then the Movement, and finally individual personalities, I will try very humbly to put this seat at the service of the Peronist people, of the oppressed workers, and all those Argentines who want to see a genuinely liberated Argentina."

Pedrini's answer to that was that if Ortega Peña wasn't satisfied with FREJULI, "let him go to Moscow." In the parliamentary debate the leader of the Peronist bloc took the opportunity to say, evidently also in response to the dissident's statement: "My seat and that of all my compañeros—I may say—is not ours but Perón's."

Of the left Peronists Ortega Peña seems to have gone the furthest so far in criticizing the leadership of "the Movement." He went to the verge of breaking altogether with it, but did not take that step. But having felt the ax himself and facing a thoroughgoing purge of left Peronists in the universities, he had urgent reasons for making the strongest possible protest. That was all, in effect, Ortega Peña's statements meant, since he did not propose an alternative to the Peronist leadership.

The biggest losses suffered by the

left Peronists have been among the university youth, according to the February 21 issue of the Buenos Aires weekly *Panorama*. "The desertions from the JUP [Juventud Universitaria Peronista — Peronist University Youth] are estimated to vary between 30 and 40%." Most of these are supposed to have gone into the more "orthodox" organizations. On the other hand, the desertion in the left Peronist trade-union organization, the Juventud Trabajadora Peronista (Peronist Young Workers) was reported to be "minimal" at that time.



ATILIO LOPEZ

On the same day the universities law was rammed through the House of Deputies, Perón issued a decree banning the printing, publication, and circulation of the daily *El Mundo*, which has been accused of reflecting the views of the ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo — Revolutionary Army of the People). "At 3:00 p.m. yesterday members of the Cuerpo I de Vigilancia de la Policía Federal arrived at the offices of Sarmiento 760 where the editorial office of *El Mundo* is located," the March 15 *Clarín* reported. "They stationed themselves in the door and prevented anyone from coming in." According to the order, however, the building was not to be closed.

The decree accused *El Mundo* of "clearly concurring with the activities of illegal organizations, which has been shown by its publicizing and exalting these activities . . . which are never defined as crimes. It has been shown

likewise by permanent disrespect for the institutions and organizations that make up the social body of the nation [presumably the police and army], inciting to violence and subversion against them and their legitimately constituted authorities."

The offices of *El Mundo* had been attacked by right-wing commandos several weeks earlier. On February 18, newspaper workers in Buenos Aires struck for two hours in protest against the shooting of a photographer for the banned daily, Julio César Fumazola, and threats of death against other *El Mundo* workers. When a reporter from the paper, Ana Guzzetti, questioned Perón in a news conference February 8 about the activities of the right-wing Peronist goon squads, the caudillo ordered her indicted for "defamation."

Guzzetti had said: "In the last two weeks, exactly twenty-five buildings that did not exactly belong to the ultraleft have been bombed, twelve political activists have been killed, and yesterday the murder of a photographer was discovered. It is obvious that this has been done by ultrarightist parallel police groups." This was the basis of the charges against her.

On the labor front, also, Perón tightened his control. After seizing formal leadership of the Córdoba CGT while the putschist police and union goon squads were terrorizing the city and the militant labor leaders were forced into hiding or in jail, the right-wing Peronists moved on March 9-10 to consolidate their control of the metal workers union. Lorenzo Miguel was reelected to the top position. There were no opposition slates.

One incident that occurred in mid-February illustrates the methods by which the right-wing Peronists retain control of the union apparatus. A group of activists from the PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores — Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing section of the Fourth International) were distributing leaflets for an opposition slate in the metalworkers union election outside the CORMASA—CORNÍ foundry in the Pacheco area of Buenos Aires. They were attacked by an armed goon squad. One PST member, Eduardo Greizenstein, was shot in the back with a .32 caliber pistol. The bullet struck only a few

inches from his spine.

Another supporter of an opposition slate, Néstor Benegas, a member of the JTP, made a complaint, *La Opinión* reported March 12, that he had been kidnapped by four men who claimed to be police and who beat and tortured him.

The right-wing union bureaucrats saw very clearly what the Córdoba coup represented. One participant in the metalworkers union election told *New York Times* correspondent Jonathan Kandell March 11: "Our patience is wearing thin," said Aníbal Martínez, a burly young union leader in Buenos Aires. "That is why Córdoba happened and the same thing may occur in other provinces."

Perón's minister of labor, Ricardo Otero, who presided over the "normalizing" congress of the CGT in Córdoba, was elected to the number two position in the UOM (Unión de Obrera Metalúrgica — Metalworkers Union). He set the tone for the right-wing offensive: "Perón is the greatest genius in all Latin America. He is the man who cannot be questioned but must be obeyed."

Kandell's March 11 dispatch continued, noting:

"Mr. Otero and the leaders of the other big unions—construction, light and power, textiles and automechanics among others—have backed the President's [Perón's] efforts to maintain a price-wage freeze. In turn he has rammed through a bill giving the big unions a monopoly in organizing their industries and lengthening the tenure of entrenched union leaders to four years from two."

Not only the rightists, like Kandell's "burly young union leader," but also many on the left expected that the blitzkrieg in Córdoba would lead quickly to the fall of the other liberal Peronist governors in Salta and Mendoza. That may happen. But at the moment Perón's strategy seems to be to consolidate his gains and maintain a steady advance.

In the first place, a risky operation like the one in Córdoba is probably not needed. If Perón can consolidate his victory in the stronghold of the militant labor movement, the remaining "left" Peronist officials can be expected to surrender in good time, or be removed relatively easily.

Córdoba was a decisive test of the

will of the Peronist left, and the result was quite clear:

"For Navarro and his allies, the essential condition for the success of the operation was getting through the first 24 hours," the March 14 issue of *Panorama* wrote. "'If there aren't any mob outbursts, we will have won,' a high right-wing Peronist official told us." There was no mass response.

Protests continued on the part of the "constitutional opposition" against the rebel police chief's remaining in office, and the CGT Combativo (Militant CGT, an alliance of López's left Peronist unions and the class-struggle-



RICARDO OBREGON CANO

tendency unions led by Agustín Tosco and René Salamanca) held meetings in the plants and "lightning rallies" in various places.

But it was not until March 12, the day that Perón's interventor, Dr. Duilio A. R. Brunello, was named, that the putschist forces left the broadcasting studios.

"Yesterday at 5:00 p.m. LW1 Radio Universidad resumed its regular news bulletins," the Buenos Aires daily *La Prensa* reported March 13. "At the same time the armed guards who had been watching all the local radio transmitters withdrew without any prior notice. The TV screens announced that television broadcasting was about to resume. Everything seemed to indicate that with the appointment of the interventor, the severe pressure that the staffs of the broadcasting media and some newspapers had endured in the fourteen days of the police revolt, which had given rise to sharp criticisms from professional groups in the media af-

fects, as well as from municipal institutions, had ceased."

Having accomplished his job, the putschist chief of police resigned on March 13, apparently to help quiet the unrest that remained in political circles after the successful putsch.

In his statement of resignation, Navarro claimed complete victory:

"I have helped to demonstrate that the Marxist forces that for so long intimidated the population are nothing but a myth, thereby restoring the confidence of the people in their future—with their faith in Our Lord God and guided by the incomparable leadership of the commander of the nationality, Lieutenant General Juan Domingo Perón.

"From the very bottom of my heart, I express my gratitude for the support I received from the labor movement, the rank-and-file units, the political leaders, and the people in general, who from the first gave me their backing. I am leaving you only in a temporal sense, because, always, at every moment, my heart will be with my beloved Córdoba police force."

It was the sort of speech military officers are wont to give when they have received a promotion. And that may have been the case:

"It has been learned in the last few days," *La Prensa* reported March 13, "that Navarro may be given a post in the presidential guard at Olivos mansion."

Even after the "institutional crisis" in Córdoba was "solved" by the appointment of one of Perón's stooges as interventor, the minicoup continued to hold the attention of the Argentine press, perhaps, among other reasons, because it symbolized the growing number of attacks on reporters and newspaper offices.

In particular, the March 14 *Panorama* devoted some space to describing the background of the dramatic events that began February 27 when the police and rightist goons seized the city, locking up a good part of the executive branch of the provincial government and over a thousand "leftists."

"The final blow against Obregón," *Panorama* wrote, "was decided on a week before the uprising, after—it seems—the visit of Colonel (Retired) Jorge Osinde and a special envoy of the Ministry of the Interior."

Osinde was in command of the "security forces" at Ezeiza on June 20 when these elements killed an unknown number of persons, perhaps hundreds, after opening fire on a march to welcome Perón home from eighteen years of exile.

While Perón seemed to have achieved the objective Navarro mentioned of "showing that the Marxist forces are a myth," that is, of dealing a stunning blow to the morale of the militant sections of the labor movement, he apparently wanted to avoid giving the left the impression that it was facing a decisive confrontation. Thus, although Brunello was described in the press as a "right-wing Peronist" and was an official in the Social Welfare Department presided over by the rightist López Rega, he is not known as a strongman.

Furthermore, Perón so far has not accepted right-wing appeals to intervene the legislative and judicial branches of the Córdoba provincial government.

Thus, Perón's representative will have to face a large opposition bloc in the parliament; and the possibility remains of judicial obstacles to arbitrary police actions. While it is not yet clear how FREJULI will line up in parliament, the UCR has strength almost equaling the Peronists.

In the Senate, the UCR has 16 seats as against 21 for FREJULI; in the Chamber of Deputies, the ratio is 17 for the UCR to 19 for FREJULI. On the local level, the UCR controls 100 municipalities as against 106 in the hands of FREJULI. The provincial UCR, moreover, took a stronger stand against the coup than the national party. Obviously its position was more directly threatened by the right-wing Peronists' decision to unilaterally kick over the parliamentary chess board.

In the March 14 issue *Panorama's* analysts predicted that the interventor would have to play a difficult balancing role: "The man who occupies the post of federal delegate . . . will have to govern with the right but without crossing swords openly with the left and the democratic forces. In the provincial congress, the seats are divided between FREJULI and the UCR. In the Senate, the situation is more favorable to a center-right policy. On the other hand, in the Chamber

of Deputies, there is a broad spectrum of pro-Obregón forces, which, added to the Radicals, indicates a burgeoning opposition. . . .

"The Juventudes Políticas [Political Youth Movement, the umbrella organization of the left Peronist youth groups] will provide their agitation-apparatus. At the same time, the CGT Combativa will add its undeniable weight in the labor field to mobilize the opposition.

"Paradoxically, the only sector that might want a center-right policy, the various groups of employers, have their reservations. The companies demand 'peace and order,' but this objective is beyond the control of the Orthodox political-trade-union axis. The situation can only be stabilized by the militants and the youth in general."

These elements will "stabilize the situation," from the point of view of the employers, only if they can be persuaded not to make any economic or social demands that the capitalists are not prepared to meet. The problem under the Obregón government was that the militant unions were winning wage settlements that went beyond the guidelines worked out by the trade-union bureaucracy and the bosses in the Pacto Social.

On the other hand, it is probably not clear yet to the capitalists how expensive a full-scale crackdown on the left would be or how much of a price it is really necessary to pay in order to achieve sufficient "stability." After all, the country has just completed a long experience with a naked military dictatorship that became increasingly expensive and could not insure "stability."

In the last period of the dictatorship, the radicalization of important sectors of the masses became very wide and deep. The extent of this was shown by the vote the Peronists won on a radical-sounding program and by the events that followed their electoral victory. A head-on clash, thus, could be expensive for the capitalists.

The question of how far the conservative crackdown can go in the present period seems to depend primarily on how well Perón can maintain his hold over his left-wing supporters, despite his clearly reactionary policies. This has not yet been definitively answered, although the fail-

ure of the Peronist left to stand up firmly to the caudillo in opposing the Córdoba coup was a major victory for the right.

The secondary question is how much of a hold the left Peronists can maintain over their followers, if they continue to capitulate to the right, even in the name of obedience to "the supreme commander of the Argentine nationality."

The populist ideology of even the most left-wing Peronist leaders is a big obstacle to consistent opposition to Perón. Many of them apparently believe that a broad nationalist movement around a charismatic leader is the only effective way to liberate the country. At the same time they are profoundly opposed to the Marxist conception of the need for educating the masses, which requires taking principled positions even though they may not be immediately understood by large numbers of people or be instantly popular.

This populism, plus the common, garden-variety parliamentarist opportunism of figures like Obregón, seems to explain why, despite a severe crisis in the Peronist movement, the left has been unwilling to go beyond a limited tug of war where it is the one that is always forced to give ground.

In the wake of the Córdoba coup, some reformist observers hoped that the crisis in the Peronist movement and in the country could be resolved by a new balance.

"If anything merits attention, if there is a political fact that deserves to be singled out from the welter of reactions touched off by the Córdoba events," the March 14 *Panorama* wrote, "it is the attitude of limited protest assumed by the young left of the Peronist movement. If anyone expected the JP [Juventud Peronista — Peronist Youth] cadres, or those of the other organizations that make up the progressive spectrum of the Peronist movement, to express their condemnation of these events by street battles, they were immediately surprised or disappointed. The disciplined demonstration in the Estadio de Atlanta on the night of Monday, March 11, was marked by a climate of *warning*, of *political alert*."

The March 11 rally, the principal response of the left to the Córdoba coup, was called on a "left" program,

for the first anniversary of the FRE-JULI victory. The "revolutionary tendency" proved it still has a mass following. Estimates of the crowd ranged from 40,000 to 50,000. There were some remarks that tacitly reproached Perón for betrayal. The ousted youth leader Rodolfo Galimberti, said, for example:

"When we had to fight against the dictatorship, we were the 'marvelous youth,' and now we are supposed to be infiltrators."

Perón formerly spoke of the "marvelous youth" in praising the young people who engaged in guerrilla activity against the anti-Peronist governments. The symbols of the Peronist guerrilla movements were prominent in the rally, according to *Panorama*. One of the main speakers was Mario Firmenich of the Montoneros (Irregulars, the united Peronist guerrilla organization). Even *New York Times* correspondent Jonathan Kandell thought the guerrillas had just cause for complaint. In the March 6 issue of the astute imperialist daily, he wrote:

"The guerrillas—both the Marxists and those who claim allegiance to Mr. Perón—proved useful to him during his long exile. They frustrated the anti-Peronist military governments and helped him put pressure on powerful trade unionists who threatened to come to terms with the military leaders." Kandell was apparently referring here to Vandor, the head of the metalworkers union, who was mysteriously assassinated in 1969. It was ironic, therefore, that Firmenich referred to the rightist trade-union bureaucrats who now form the firmest base of Perón's power as "Vandoristas."

From a not disinterested point of view, the *New York Times*, one of the main voices of U.S. imperialism, summed up the political message of the March 11 rally this way:

"The gist of the speeches was that left-wing Peronists would continue to follow General Perón despite the conservative nature of his government and policies."

Like Galimberti, Obregón and López also raised a certain note of challenge in their statements of resignation, without, of course, directly criticizing "the supreme leader":

"This plot has been orchestrated with the support of officials in the national government, especially the minis-

ter of the interior [Llambí] and the minister of labor [Otero]," Obregón said. "As a result, it is impossible for me to return to my post. . . . I do not want my person to be the cause of a political and institutional scandal with unforeseeable consequences for the country." He demanded a full investigation of the police uprising and punishment of all those implicated in it.

At the same time Obregón expressed special gratitude for the support of "the noble and manly youth of Córdoba, who, together with the youth of the entire country, did so much to bring about Lieutenant General Perón's return to the country and to power and to achieve the victory of the Social Justice Movement."

The labor leader López was more concrete and direct in his statements to the press after his resignation. He said he would return to his post as the head of the UTA (Unión Tranviarios Automotor—Bus Drivers Union), and would not recognize the authority of the "normalized CGT." Furthermore, he pledged: "I will form a common front not only with Tosco but with all those who fight for the interests of the working class and national liberation."

The veteran leader of the illegal Peronist union movement repeated Obregón's accusations against Llambí, whose resignation he called for, and he made a particularly sharp attack on Otero: "He talked openly against the elected government of Córdoba to the union delegations that visited him and topped this off by attending the so-called normalizing congress of the CGT, from which the majority of the Peronist unions were absent. In spite of this fact and the fact that the people's government of Córdoba had been imprisoned, Otero went to this meeting and at the end declared that the regional federation had been 'normalized.'"

The Peronist government's response to these charges was to institute legal proceedings against Obregón for "defamation." Other legal proceedings were reportedly in progress against Navarro. But in the March 11 issue of its weekly edition of selected news stories, *La Nación*, the best-informed of the Buenos Aires dailies, expressed strong doubts that the putschist police chief ever would be tried:

"By a nonpartisan vote, the national

Chamber of Deputies voted a severe moral condemnation of the chief of the Córdoba police. It called for sanctions against Lieutenant Colonel Navarro and his co-participants in the uprising. In fact, such a complaint had already been initiated in Córdoba through the relevant legal channels. Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine that the man who is still entrusted with the command of the Córdoba police is ever going to pay the penalty imposed by the penal code for the crime of sedition.

"Beyond the moral sanction, which is no inconsiderable thing, an observer cannot expect any measures that do not flow from Argentine political reality. This means that there is a limit beyond which it is inconceivable that Colonel Navarro will accept indefinitely the role of the lone scapegoat for a matter that is at least complex.

"There is not room in Argentina, to our knowledge, for a Watergate-type affair, and no one can have any reasonable interest in straining the limits of the present political context, unless they want to create the conditions for a breakdown of the prevailing political arrangement." The response to the Córdoba coup indicated that in fact no major political force wanted to do that.

In the March 13 *La Opinión*, Mariano Grondona advised an accommodation between the left and right based on the "lessons" of Córdoba, as he saw them:

"Córdoba demonstrated that the left cannot govern alone in Argentina. The exhaustion of the Obregón experience, like that of Cámpora, indicates clearly that a 'pure' left government in today's Argentina leads to a coup d'état." On the other hand: "It is not in our interest for the left, now without power, to be ejected from the government. Because if it is allowed to form an alternative pole to the present regime, it will try to force an impossible political situation on the country, which the decisive forces will not permit."

There are some signs, however, that it will not be easy to convince the radicalized sections that still follow Perón to accept this "fait accompli." The militant-sounding speeches of the left Peronist leaders at the March 11 rally were met with shouts from the JTP benches of "Break the Social Pact Now!" □

Nixon's 'Confrontation' With Impeachment Committee

By Allen Myers

In its March 18 issue, *Newsweek* magazine reported that Nixon's mounting Watergate difficulties have produced a "sentiment [that] has stolen over Congress—a climate of fatalism in which impeachment is accepted as not just thinkable but probable."

Concerning the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment investigation, the magazine continued: "That it will reach the conclusion that a case exists has never been doubted; the change has come in what had been the conventional wisdom in the White House and on the [Capitol] Hill only a few weeks ago—that a motion to impeach would draw no more than 100 votes on the floor. The Watergate indictments, and the line of complicity they drew nearly to Mr. Nixon, have fed a now pervasive feeling that the House will indeed vote articles of impeachment and so bring Mr. Nixon to book before the Senate. 'Just this week, for the first time,' said one Senate Republican, 'I heard people saying in the cloakrooms, "There's going to be a trial." They just didn't believe it till now.'"

Nixon's behavior following the March 1 indictment of seven of his aides in the Watergate cover-up and the March 7 indictment of six Nixon gangsters in the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist strongly suggests that he and his advisers share the "pervasive feeling" described by *Newsweek*. Nixon and his lawyers have made it clear that it would take the most extreme pressures to force them to turn over to the House Judiciary Committee any evidence not already available to it from other sources. Their assumption appears to be that impeachment is likely in any event and that Nixon's best hope is to persuade thirty-four senators that the evidence available is not sufficient to convict him. This presupposes that the available evidence will be kept to a minimum.

Nixon's withholding of the evidence has been so brazen that many observers have concluded that he is attempt-

ing to provoke the committee into a confrontation over that issue. In this view, Nixon feels he has a better chance of acquittal if the issue is "executive privilege" versus a Congressional subpoena rather than his involvement in such crimes as burglary, obstruction of justice, conspiracy, etc. In the March 17 *New York Times*, James M. Naughton described an "attractively simple scenario" based on this analysis:

"The President would refuse to honor a committee request for tape recordings of 42 Watergate conversations. The committee would formally subpoena the tapes. Mr. Nixon would disregard or defy the subpoena. The House would cite the President for contempt of Congress and make the contempt charge the centerpiece of articles of impeachment."

"Congress," Naughton continued, "almost certainly would take offense at a Presidential refusal to supply the tape recordings. Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the Senate Republican leader who has tried to stay loyal to the White House, told newsmen he would have to support the House committee, as a creature of the independent Congress, in any fight with the President over access to relevant material. But the prospect of assembling a House majority to vote for impeachment on so narrow and technical a question seemed slim, and the probability that two thirds of the Senate would convict Mr. Nixon on such grounds even slimmer."

Certainly the likelihood of Nixon being impeached and convicted on such grounds is considerably slimmer than his chances would be if all the evidence were turned over to the committee. The forty-two tapes requested by the committee cover six periods between February 20 and April 18, 1973, the time when the Watergate cover-up was beginning to come apart. The evidence in any one of these areas would probably be sufficient to convict Nixon of participation in the cover-up and/or other crimes. These

areas are:

1. A February 20, 1973, conversation between Nixon and H. R. Haldeman, then White House chief of staff, concerning a job for Jeb Stuart Magruder, the former deputy director of the Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP). Former presidential counsel John Dean testified before the Senate Watergate committee that there were "intense" efforts to find a good position for Magruder, apparently to ensure his loyalty in the cover-up conspiracy.

2. Conversations on February 27, 1973, between Nixon, Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman, then Nixon's top domestic adviser, concerning the assignment of Dean to work directly with Nixon on Watergate matters. Dean testified that when Nixon gave him this assignment, he explained that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were "principals" in the case.

3. Conversations between Nixon and Dean on March 17 and March 20, 1973. The White House has admitted that during the March 17 meeting Dean told Nixon about the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. On March 20, Dean testified, the two men discussed "executive privilege" as a means of hampering Congressional investigation of Watergate.

4. Conversations between Nixon and Ehrlichman on March 27 and March 30, 1973. Nixon has claimed that on March 30 he told Ehrlichman "to conduct an independent investigation" of Watergate.

5. All conversations of Nixon with Haldeman and Ehrlichman from April 14 to April 17, 1973. Nixon claims that on April 14 Ehrlichman submitted a report on his "investigation." The alleged report has never been made public. Dean testified that on April 15 Nixon mentioned having authorized payments and promises of executive clemency to the Watergate burglars. The tape of this Nixon-Dean conversation was one of those declared "non-existent" by the White House.

6. Nixon's conversations with then

Attorney General Richard Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen in the period April 15-18, 1973. On April 15, Kleindienst and Petersen briefed Nixon on the fact that the cover-up was coming unstuck. On April 18, Petersen has said, Nixon told him that the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist was a "national security matter" that the Watergate prosecutors should stay away from.

Nixon and his aides have repeatedly referred to these requests as a "fishing expedition," and one of his advisers seemed to go out of his way to offend the committee members by comparing them to "a lot of children" who want to grab more than they can handle. But while toying with this sort of provocation, Nixon has so far been careful to leave open a path for retreat if his current efforts at obstruction should backfire. Although he and his accomplices have publicly indicated that they will hang on to the tapes, Nixon to date has not made a completely unequivocal public refusal and his chief defense lawyer, James St. Clair, has not formally replied to the committee's request.

But so far it has been the committee, rather than Nixon, that has retreated on this issue. While the committee has never stopped threatening to subpoena the evidence, it has been extremely reluctant to carry out the threat.

Democratic Congressman Robert F. Drinan told reporters March 13 that he and other committee members had been persuaded by John Doar, the committee's chief counsel, to "build our case carefully—get all our ducks in a row—before moving further and avoid forcing a showdown on the wrong issue at the wrong time."

Another Democratic member, Jerome Waldie—like Drinan, a liberal who has been among Nixon's most vocal critics in Congress—explained: "We are not drawing back from confrontation. We are moving strongly and firmly ahead. We're just not rushing in."

Although Waldie would appear to be confused about directions, the committee appears likely to stumble over evidence justifying Nixon's impeachment no matter which way it staggers.

One of the most likely subjects for an article of impeachment is Nixon's March 21, 1973, meeting with Haldeman and Dean. The Watergate grand

jury that heard the tape of that meeting included the conversation as one of the steps in the cover-up conspiracy. The March 1 indictment, without mentioning Nixon by name, stated:

"On or about March 21, 1973 . . . Harry R. Haldeman and John W. Dean 3d attended a meeting at the White House in the District of Columbia, at which time there was a discussion about the fact that E. Howard Hunt Jr. had asked for approximately \$120,000."

The indictment then goes on to note that later on the same day, \$75,000 was delivered to Hunt's attorney.

Nixon and his lawyers obviously consider this sequence a real danger. St. Clair has tried to suggest, basing his argument on contradictory testimony before the Senate Watergate committee, that the \$75,000 payoff was actually made on March 20 and thus could not have been decided upon at the March 21 meeting.

But in the March 15 *Washington Post*, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein quoted "informed sources" as saying that the prosecutors had proof of the March 21 date. The two reporters went on to indicate the danger for Nixon:

"After listening to the tape of the March 21 Nixon-Dean meeting, the sources said the prosecutors concluded that they had one of two elements necessary before they could establish Presidential involvement in the cover-up conspiracy, namely participation in a discussion of illicit activity. The second element would have to involve a subsequent 'overt act' in furtherance of such a conspiracy. . . ."

"After listening to and transcribing the March 21 tape, the prosecutors began looking at what happened after the Nixon-Dean meeting, the sources said."

When the prosecutors looked, what they found was the \$75,000 payment on the night of March 21. It will be difficult for the House Judiciary Committee not to find the same thing.

While the committee "strongly and firmly" wanders in circles, special prosecutor Leon Jaworski is reported to be proceeding in several matters that could also end up producing evidence to support impeachment.

John M. Crewdson reported in the March 17 *New York Times* that Nixon has refused to give Jaworski docu-

ments he requested in order to investigate the appointment of ambassadors in exchange for campaign contributions:

"The prosecution's formal request for such materials, according to well-placed sources, was among those that Mr. Jaworski described as 'still pending' in a letter last month to Senator James O. Eastland, the Mississippi Democrat who heads the [Senate] Judiciary Committee.

"The sources said that, although the White House was still not cooperating, Mr. Jaworski was continuing his investigation. . . . They suggested that indictments against Republican fund-raisers, and possibly some contributors, could be expected soon."

Crewdson added that the House Judiciary Committee was also looking into this area, and that Nixon had refused to provide it too with the requested documents.

On March 15, the *Wall Street Journal* reported that Jaworski is also investigating charges that large campaign contributors were rewarded with favorable rulings from the Cost of Living Council when they asked permission to raise prices under Nixon's Phase Two economic program.

In addition to these problems, Nixon has to contend with an expected report by the Congressional committee investigating his income taxes that he owes perhaps as much as \$500,000 in taxes that he avoided during his first four years in office.

Speaking to a Chicago business club March 15, Nixon was reduced to claiming that the committee at least had found "no evidence of fraud"—a remark that probably overstated the case. *Newsweek* reported March 18 that "the Internal Revenue Service is conducting a criminal-fraud investigation of Mr. Nixon's 1969 income-tax return."

Nixon seems inclined to blame his former tax lawyer, Frank DeMarco, for any fraudulent statements in his tax returns. But *Newsweek* quoted a friend of DeMarco as predicting that the lawyer was not inclined to play the role of scapegoat.

"I can tell you one thing," the friend reportedly said. "If Frank has to go, he ain't going alone."

Despite all the reluctance in Congress, events continue pushing it closer to a vote on impeaching Nixon. □

Memos Show FBI Plot Against Black Movement

By Baxter Smith

[The following article is reprinted from the March 22 issue of the revolutionary-socialist weekly *The Militant*, published in New York.]

* * *

An assortment of seven Xeroxed memorandums containing major new revelations on the FBI's disruption of the Black Panther Party, Socialist Workers Party, and various unnamed Black nationalist groups was made public March 7 by Attorney General William Saxbe. Also released were documents relating to the Ku Klux Klan.

The rigorously censored documents are the second batch of counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) memos to be released to NBC reporter Carl Stern, who had sued for them under the Freedom of Information Act. The first ones were made public Dec. 6.

Other COINTELPRO papers have been released to the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance, who have also filed suit against the government.

The latest memos, from the late FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover, call on FBI agents across the country to "expose, disrupt," and "otherwise neutralize" the groups and individuals named.

"The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor," one memo says, "is to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters. . . ."

Although names, sentences, and entire portions of the documents are deleted, the memos are the most extensive and damaging to be released so far.

Dating from 1961 to 1970, they thoroughly debunk the notion that illegal government surveillance and disruption began with the Nixon administration.

To the contrary, the SWP "Disruption Program" memo is dated Oct. 12, 1961, and was put into effect under John Kennedy. During the Lyndon Johnson years, which witnessed the

ghetto revolts and the rise of the Black liberation movement, stepped-up programs of repression against Black groups and individuals were put into motion.

The newly released papers contain the strongest evidence yet seen from official sources of government complicity in the murders of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr.

The FBI's goal, as revealed in a document dated March 4, 1968, (one month before King was assassinated), had been to "prevent the rise of a 'messiah' who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement."

Although the names that follow are blotted out on the Xeroxed copy, the name Malcolm X fits into one blanked-out area, by counting the letters and spaces made by the typewriter. Moreover, part of the X is still visible.

That sentence would then read: "[Malcolm X] might have been such a 'messiah;' he is the martyr of the movement today."

Counting the typewriter spaces and with an educated guess, a following sentence might read: "[King could] be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed 'obedience' to 'white, liberal doctrines' (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism."

The FBI papers, never meant to be read by the American people, reveal the fear and hatred the ruling powers in Washington feel toward the Black liberation movement, and the degree to which they are willing to cast aside their own laws to repress and destroy that movement.

One document, dated Aug. 25, 1967, spells out what FBI agents should do to thwart the growth and consolidation of what it terms "Black nationalist-hate groups." It tells agents how to prevent such groups from being able to "consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents. . . ."

The memo states: "No opportunity should be missed to exploit through counterintelligence techniques the or-

ganizational and personal conflicts of the leaderships of the groups and where possible an effort should be made to capitalize upon existing conflicts between competing black nationalist organizations."

The same memo that refers to King and Malcolm X boasts how COINTELPRO was effective in the summer of 1967 in putting one group out of commission through constant police harassment.

Using the typewriter method, that group appears to be the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.

The paragraph referring to it would then read: "The [Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, a black nationalist-hate] group, was active in [censored] in the summer of 1967. [censored] alerted local police, who then put [SNCC] leaders under close scrutiny. They were arrested on every possible charge until they could no longer make bail. As a result, [SNCC] leaders spent most of the summer in jail and no violence traceable to [SNCC] took place."

Under COINTELPRO, the FBI took pains to implement all channels of disruption. The same memo contains other goals of the program that bear this out.

One goal reads: "Prevent the *coalition* of militant black nationalist groups. In unity there is strength; a truism that is no less valid for all its triteness. An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real 'Mau Mau' in America, the beginning of a true black revolution."

Another COINTELPRO goal says that agents should work to "prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining *respectability*, by discrediting them to three segments of the community."

The memo lists the groups to be targeted, but the names are blotted out.

The memo requests ninety-day progress reports and concludes, "The response of the field to the Counterintelligence Program against the Com-

munist Party, USA, indicates that a superb job can be done by the field on counterintelligence."

To Hoover and the government, the Black Panther Party during this period represented the most dangerous Black organization because it was attracting a militant, youthful following.

According to these COINTELPRO documents, the FBI wasted no effort in funneling disruption programs toward the Panthers.

One memo, dated Dec. 24, 1970, speaks about a disruption program that was apparently used against the Bay Area Panthers. The memo talks about "neutralizing" the organization. The memo mentions the split within the Panthers, which was not made public until a couple months later.

This information was gathered by FBI and police spies within the Panthers who, no doubt, had a role in precipitating the split.

By using the typewriter method, it is not hard to guess whom Hoover

is referring to. He writes: "Recent information indicates [Cleaver] has broken with the [censored] organization and is in the process of forming a new group. For this reason, and because of the expanding complexities of the proposed technique, no further action should be taken on this suggested disruptive technique."

In subsequent weeks, the two factions began public feuding and deaths resulted. The "proposed technique" was, no doubt, a plan to deepen the split, and may have included assassination.

For some unknown reason, one of the memos has little censoring and refers directly to the Panthers.

The memo talks about fabricating documents that would appear to have been "pilfered from police files," planting spies pretending to be "disgruntled police employees," and promoting factionalism by "indicating electronic coverage where none exists; outlining fictitious plans for police raids or other counteractions; revealing misuse or

misappropriation of Panther funds; pointing out instances of political disorientation. . . ."

The memo brags: "Effective implementation of this proposal logically could not help but disrupt and confuse Panther activities."

During the New York Panther 21 trial in 1970, an undercover cop surfaced who said he had been in the organization since 1968. He said that prior to that he had been a member of Malcolm X's group, was a bodyguard to Malcolm, and was present the night he was assassinated. But he gave no further details.

These new documents of government disruption of the Black struggle raise new questions on the FBI's role in the deaths of Malcolm and King. But most important, the documents add fuel to the demand that all disruptions stop, that all secret FBI documents be made public, that the truth behind the deaths of Malcolm and King be unraveled, and that those responsible be brought to justice.

Against the Stream

Some Lessons for the Left in British Elections

By Oliver MacDonald

[The following article is reprinted from the March 9 issue of *Red Weekly*, the paper of the International Marxist Group (IMG), British section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

The national press and TV focused on only one of the elections that took place last week: the general election. But socialists should not forget the other election—both for its own importance and because it helps to put the Labour party leadership's campaign in perspective. The other election was at Clay Cross.

In the general election, Wilson fought for the "national interest" and won less than 50% of the seats. In Clay Cross, the Labour councillors fought for working class interests and won more than 90% of the seats, polling the highest ever Labour vote in one of the wards.

Wilson's Feet

The Labour leadership have tried to excuse their miserable showing in the election by complaining that they have been slandered as soft on extremists and wreckers, and by bemoaning the undeniably vicious anti-Labour campaign in the Tory press. At least they cannot be accused of giving support and assistance to the councillors at Clay Cross.

Lord Denning denounced the Clay Cross councillors as common criminals. The courts slapped penal fines on them. The Whitehall bureaucracy moved their agents into the town to throw the elected councillors out of office and organise new elections. And to cap it off, Edward Short went to the trouble of tramping out to the White City to declare on the BBC that the Labour leadership was in no way backing the "law breaking" councillors at Clay Cross.

But the fact remains: 90% to Labour at Clay Cross; 45% to Labour in Westminster. If we are to accept the logic of the reformist politicians in Transport House [Trades Union Congress headquarters], we must imagine the working people of Clay Cross to be a bunch of thieves and con men—for how else could they vote for councillors with the worst TV image in British politics?

The answer is simple: Wilson spent three years refusing to support or launch a single mass struggle against the Tories, followed by three weeks campaigning to get working people to unite with the employers, the landlords and Lord Dennings in One Nation. That was a campaign for the Liberals and Tories. After all, if you want to unite workers and bosses, why vote Labour, when the Labour party is based on unions whose job is to struggle against the bosses?

The Clay Cross councillors had the

courage to act on a simple truth: the conflict between the interests of working people and those of the capitalists. They refused to raise rents whatever was thrown against them; they refused to freeze the wages of council workers whatever the pay laws said; they refused to make the people of the town suffer from electricity cuts because the Tory Government wanted to confront the miners. Little wonder that such leaders were backed by the working class of Clay Cross.

And little wonder that working class voters are less than enthusiastic for Wilson, with his feet of clay.

Communist Party

Whichever way you look at it, 32,741 votes for forty-four candidates is a disaster for the Communist party. More than that, it is a decline in the CP vote since 1970 in spite of the tremendous working class struggles in which some members of the CP have played a big role. How can this be explained?

Of course, the electoral system in this country does not favour minority parties, but this does not explain the failure of the CP to substantially increase its number of votes. The last three years have seen substantial growth in the active socialist forces in the working class movement. The CP must have been standing in the main centres of its strength, and yet its vote was lower than its total membership. A party that fields candidates in forty-four constituencies and cannot do better than that against the Labour party is in trouble. Moreover, the Blyth result showed that candidates of the left can beat the official Labour candidates where the choice is a clear-cut and striking one.

The CP leadership has put their bad results down to the capitalist witch-hunt, and refusal to provide the CP with publicity on the mass media. But we need only note the fact that the CP has always suffered these disabilities, and indeed has suffered much less from them than, for example, the Republican movement in the north of Ireland. Yet the latter can get considerably higher votes than the CP got even in Jimmy Reid's constituency.

Most damaging of all is the fact that the Communist party results were little better, and in some cases worse, than those of the small revolutionary

groups like the IMG and the WRP [Workers Revolutionary party]. This is a really critical problem for the party leadership. Only five CP candidates polled more than 1,000 votes, yet the WRP candidate in Wallsend polled 1,108 votes and the WRP candidate in Pontefract polled 991 votes.

We can compare the revolutionaries' votes and those of the CP in one of the strong centres of the Communist party—Sheffield. In the Brightside constituency in that city, the full resources of the party were put behind one of its national leaders, Vi Gill. She got 513 votes. Yet the IMG candidate, Tariq Ali, with much more limited resources, preventing the IMG from systematic canvassing, got within 90 votes of that figure. If we remember that the IS group was refusing to vote for the revolutionary candidates, we begin to see the scope of the decline of the CP's influence in relation to the revolutionary left.

Here we have one of the main clues to the CP's debacle: why vote for a CP candidate rather than Labour when the CP says little that is different from the words of the Labour left? Was it not true, for example, that CP local councillors in Scotland actually voted against fighting the Housing Finance Act to a finish, in marked contrast to Clay Cross?

This is only part of the answer. The other hard fact that the Communist party leadership cannot answer is its refusal to admit that the bureaucratic dictatorship in the USSR is an antisocialist regime which has nothing in common with communism; and that the USSR itself is not at all a working class democracy or a socialist society. At meeting after meeting in the election campaign, class conscious workers asked the question: do you think the USSR is socialist? The Communist party cannot give an honest answer. It cannot break from 45 years of Stalinism and repression of workers' democracy in the USSR. As more and more workers turn to socialism and Marxism, they demand an explanation of these facts. Only the revolutionary Marxists could give it.

Floating With the Stream

After an initial silence, the International Socialists' paper *Socialist Worker* eventually took up the question of whether to vote for the revolutionary candidates in the election. On 23

February, a carefully worded statement from the editor explained that while IS was not opposed in principle to putting up revolutionary candidates, it was opposed to putting them up in *this* particular election.

Unfortunately, the statement did not clearly distinguish between two quite different problems: first whether IS should itself put up candidates; second, whether IS members should vote for the Labour party, *against* the candidates of the revolutionary left. It was the second problem that was preoccupying socialist militants, including many members of the IS, while the *Socialist Worker* statement addressed itself to the first question.

But a careful reading of the statement provides an answer to the IS view on how to vote. The editor declares: "For revolutionaries to stand candidates in such an election is simply a diversion from the main issues and constitutes a tactical blunder." In other words there is *something special* about this election which makes it wrong to stand against the Labour party. More than that, a revolutionary candidate would be a *diversion*—he or she would divert people from the *main issues*—in this particular election, but not in others. This is the only fair rendering one can make of the extraordinary IS statement.

The mystery therefore is this: *what* is so special about this election that makes candidates putting forward full-blooded socialist policies, a *diversionary* force distracting people from the *main issues*?

If we look around us, there is one outstanding feature of this election which makes it peculiar in comparison with others in the last twenty-five years: the fact that the *capitalist system* is in an *unparalleled* crisis. This crisis, and its catastrophic consequences for working people, was the main issue for the working class in this election. Because of this crisis situation a reformist, class collaborationist Labour leadership is going to be unable to resolve the immediate needs of the mass of people in this country. It is scarcely capable of getting rid of the Tory government, after three years of unrelenting attacks on the working class.

Just about the only thing that is *not* peculiar about this election has been the miserable attempts by the Labour left to persuade militants to subordinate every struggle and issue

to vote-catching for the Labour party.

A revolutionary organisation is in a sad state when it considers that the more critical the state of the capitalist system, and the more acute class struggle, the more diversionary is the presence of revolutionary candidates

in an election. Such moods are understandable among Social Democratic workers. They are inexcusable amongst people who claim to be revolutionary socialist leaders.

The IS statement was far more serious than a "tactical blunder." □

After the Elections

Six Key Questions Facing British Workers

By John Marshall

[The following article is reprinted from the March 9 issue of *Red Weekly*, the paper of the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

This has been a week of working class victories. Three stand out. First, it is clear that the miners have won their strike. Second, the councillors at Clay Cross have won a resounding victory. Third, and most famous, the Tory government has fallen.

All these represent great strides forward for the working class and a weakening of the position of the employing class. But it would be wrong and very dangerous to be complacent. A battle may have been won, but the war is still very much with us. The employing class, their state and the reformist Labour leaders have many more tricks up their sleeve yet.

The first crisis will come on the economic front. A recent report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development shows what the continuation of capitalism in Britain will mean. It predicts up to 12.5% inflation and a balance of payments deficit of over £3,000 million for 1974. These estimates, particularly of inflation, are if anything too low. It is also known that unemployment will reach 1 to 1.5 million next winter. The attacks on the working class which the employers will demand in such a crisis will be increased by the need to negotiate international loans to cover the balance of payments deficit.

Of course, these crises could be overcome by expropriating the capitalist class and introducing a planned econ-

omy, but Labour has not the slightest intention of doing this. Indeed, they have hardly even mentioned the word "socialism" during their campaign. Although the strength and pressure of the workers' movement will undoubtedly force a few concessions from the Labour leaders in the short term—repeal of the Industrial Relations and Housing Finance Acts for example—fundamentally Labour will carry on the same pro-capitalist economic policies as the Tories.

But if the Labour government is bound to carry through pro-capitalist policies, nevertheless the struggles of the last months show that the working class is in a strong position to resist these attacks. The ruling class was unable to use repression to break the miners' strike because of the massive working class response—even a general strike—that such an attack would have provoked. It was precisely because he could not use such repression that Heath was forced to call the election.

No section of the working class which has gone into struggle, with the minor exception of the ambulancemen, has been defeated in the struggle. The firemen, the power engineers and the miners have all won victories, and the ASLEF men have not been defeated. Of course, sections of the working class failed to go into struggle; but this represented a crisis of political perspective, not a clear-cut defeat. The working class can recover from such a situation in a few months, particularly in a situation where the class as a whole has won a famous victory over the employing class. Such a situation is totally different to the situation where the workers have suffered a clear defeat. The UPW [Union of Post-

al Workers], for example, has not recovered three years after its defeat; nor have the London busmen after theirs.

Even those sections of the working class which did not launch a struggle against Phase 3 would have responded massively to attacks on the miners. Neither did the three-day week, although it did have a cautionary effect, succeed in demoralising the working class. In short, the organisational strength of the working class is totally intact and the workers' movement will be in a position to put up very fierce resistance against coming capitalist attacks. While there will probably be some temporary downturn on the wages struggles, as the trade union leaders wheel and deal with the Labour government, the perspective remains one of very big struggles both by the working class and other oppressed layers of the population.

In this situation it is vital that the left understands clearly what are the key questions to concentrate its forces on. There are six points which above all stand out as the ones on which the fight back must be started.

1. Inflation

With inflation running at around 15% it is vital to launch a struggle to defend the incomes and standard of living of the working class. Already, despite the fall of the Tory government, the employers continue with their plans to cut workers' living standards. The latest attack comes in engineering, where, as Bill Simpson, secretary of the Foundry section of the AUEW [Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers], has pointed out "the workers in engineering have been offered about one per cent." This would mean a fall in the real income of workers.

Already some union leaders are talking of selling out on wage claims. Jack Jones said on Tuesday it was necessary to "stop wage claims going over the top." What he means is accepting an incomes policy. Under capitalism this would only be used to attack the working class. All workers should follow the lead of the last AUEW and ASTMS conferences and refuse to accept an incomes policy from any government. This means all wage demands should be forced through for the full claim, and all wage claims already settled under

Phase 3 should be reopened and new demands submitted. In particular the miners' claim must be met in full and the engineers must not settle for a penny less than their full claim.

But simply putting up wages is not enough. The gains must be protected. Under Phase 3 there was a 7% threshold agreement. This meant that wages went up automatically for every 1% increase in the cost of living above 7%. This was totally inadequate. Every penny of wages must be protected against inflation. With a 7% threshold the income of a worker can fall by anything up to 8% without him receiving a penny more. What is needed is full compensation for every penny increase in prices. This means a sliding scale of wages or a "nil norm" threshold. In other words, automatic cost-of-living increases for every increase in the price index. Workers in Belgium have already won a similar demand. The trade unions must demand the full implementation of such a policy here. Such a sliding scale must also apply to all state benefits, and a minimum wage must be introduced. In order to get a decent wage for norm, *equal pay now* must be fought for.

On the prices front, the Labour party has proposed statutory controls and some subsidies. These policies are completely inadequate. Food subsidies will come out of higher taxation—most of which will fall on the working class. The machinery of the civil service cannot police prices properly.

Three decisive measures are necessary here. First, the trade unions must start industrial action against price increases. The workers at Allied Suppliers in Glasgow have already shown the way here by their industrial action against increases in the price of lentils. Second, there must be a freeze on prices, policed by the trade unions and organisations of working class consumers, not by the civil service. In Nottingham, for example, such organisation has already started with the picketing of Marks and Spencers. Third, the monopolies (starting with the food monopolies) must be nationalised.

2. Unemployment

Unemployment this year is going to rise to 1 to 1.5 million. It is vital that the working class breaks this attack. Again the nationalisation of all major industry and the introduction of a planned economy is the only real solution. However, until that can

be achieved the working class has to fight to prevent capitalism transferring the burden of its crisis onto the workers. This means in particular fighting for:

- *Work or full pay. All layoff threats should be met with the demand of "work-sharing with no loss of pay."*

- *All redundancies to be met with occupations. The demand should be advanced that the Labour government nationalise without compensation any firm declaring redundancies, and guarantee work for the full labour force.*

- *The unemployed to be organised by the unions. The demand of full pay for the unemployed must be put forward.*

3. Housing and Education

The social services are at present in chaos due to the economic system of capitalism. On housing, all land owned by companies and all major building firms should be nationalised without compensation. A crash housing programme must be launched immediately.

This is a long-term solution, but housing is desperately needed *in the short term*. It is well known that hundreds of thousands of houses are just sitting empty. Working class organisations, squatters and tenants associations should take these over at once, and demand that the government and local councils take these properties over without compensation. The Housing Finance Act must be repealed; but rents must also be reduced to their level before the Act, as a first step to the provision of free housing for all.

On education the full student demands on grants must be met, and rapid increases in teachers' pay awarded. To attract teachers to London, where prices are very high, the full union demand on London allowances must be met.

4. Ireland

Ireland is at present the most open case of British imperialist oppression. It is a scandal that Labour has maintained a bipartisan policy with the Tories on this. All British troops must be withdrawn from Ireland, self-determination granted, and all Irish political prisoners must be released.

5. Repression

Throughout the last years even the bourgeois democratic rights of the working class have been undermined. There are dozens of steps which must

be taken on this front. But four stand out. First, the six men imprisoned at Shrewsbury must be released immediately; immediate pardons must be granted to all those convicted and the 1875 Conspiracy Act, under which they have been prosecuted, must be repealed. Secondly, the Price sisters and all Irish political prisoners must be released. Third, the High Court decision preventing the former Clay Cross Councillors from holding office must be overturned and the surcharges levied against them for unpaid rents lifted. Fourth, the Industrial Relations Act must be immediately repealed and all funds seized by the National Industrial Relations Court must be repaid to the unions in full, with interest.

6. Racism

By far the biggest threat to the forging of working class unity for the coming struggles is that of racism. The Labour party continually capitulates to racism. Instead of immediately rebuffing and rejecting Enoch Powell's call for a Labour vote, for example, Wilson and Company silently accepted it. This not merely goes against all the needs of the working class for unity, but it even threatens the electoral prospects of Labour. The insidious poison of racism can split the solidarity of the organisations of the working class in a way no other issue could. By supporting the immigration laws and carrying on no campaign against Powell and the other racists Labour gives credibility to the view that it is immigration, rather than capitalism, which is responsible for the problems which affect the working class. A big campaign must be launched immediately to break up the attempts of the racists and the fascists to organise, and also to force repeal of the Immigration Act, the Pakistan Act and the Aliens Act.

The most important thing in the coming months is to smash the argument that now that there is a Labour government in, things must be left to them—"we must not rock the boat." Labour will proceed, despite some initial concessions, to a series of vicious attacks on the working class. In the election the International Marxist Group raised the slogan "Vote Labour but rely only on your own struggles." The working class voted Labour to get rid of the Tories. They succeeded. Now it is precisely *only* their own struggles they will be able to rely on. □

Lisbon Weighs 'Africanizing' Colonial Wars

By Tony Hodges

London

"A political and military crisis in Portugal's African territory of Mozambique," James MacManus wrote in the February 14 London *Guardian*, "has prompted the Government in Lisbon to take steps towards an 'African solution.'

"The Prime Minister, Dr Marcello Caetano, has given discreet backing to a new grouping of predominantly African Nationalists in Mozambique. This 'third force', as it is termed, is a loose association of about 300 people drawn from the professional classes.

"They have quietly been given permission by the Portuguese Government to form a pressure group in Mozambique this spring under the name of Grupo Unido de Moçambique (GUM). This will, in effect, be a political party pressing for independence."

MacManus also described reports circulating in Lisbon that the Portuguese governor of Mozambique, Pimentel dos Santos, will be replaced by "a more imaginative administrator attuned to the need to create a predominantly African Government in the colony." MacManus believes that as part of this programme the voters' roll, at present a meagre 150,000 out of over eight million people, will be "significantly expanded."

Rumours of urgent plans to "Africanise" the colonial administration in Mozambique spring from the publication in Lisbon in February of General Antonio de Spínola's *Portugal e o Futuro*. Spínola argues in his book that no military solution is possible after nearly thirteen years of war in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique. It is Spínola's view, said the March 2 London *Economist*, that "since the guerrillas in all three Portuguese territories . . . can benefit from porous borders and massive external aid, the Portuguese army can neither annihilate them nor cut off their supplies. The arid search for military victory, General Spínola believes, amounts to little more than a holding operation that is bleeding the home country dry.

He is deeply concerned about the backwardness of Portuguese industry and the lagging standard of living which is driving many people to emigrate."

Spínola does not underestimate the depth of the crisis facing the regime: "Today Portugal is living one of the gravest hours, perhaps the gravest hour, of its history." Spínola is particularly worried that the Portuguese economy, one of the most backward



MARCELLO CAETANO

in Europe, will be unable to sustain an endless drain of its resources into the wars. "If we maintain the rate of increase in our resources devoted to defence, we shall before very long reach the limit of our resources." These dangers have been underlined by a war-primed inflation rate of over 20 percent a year, the third-highest rate of inflation in Europe after Greece and Iceland, according to the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Spínola writes that there is a danger that the Portuguese could wake up to find themselves living "like old hermits, isolated to the end of their days, cocooned in a halo of sanctity but weak and impoverished."

Spínola seems also to challenge one of the long-unquestioned ideological tenets of *Salazarismo*: "We must also smash the myth according to which the essence of the Portuguese nation is the civilizing mission, as if one could accept its corollary that we would cease to exist as a nation if we stopped accomplishing this mission."

According to the February 23 London *Times*, "the fact that the Government allowed his book to be published is considered a sign that his views are similar to those of Dr Caetano, the Prime Minister." Spínola is widely respected by the Portuguese ruling class and has been regarded as a possible successor to Admiral Tomás as president. He was governor and military commander in Portuguese Guinea between 1968 and 1973.

Spínola's policy is not a Portuguese withdrawal from Africa but the establishment of multiracial puppet regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea within a federation in which all decisive powers would be held by Lisbon.

The March 2 *Economist* explained: "The answer, for General Spínola, is not to abandon these places. It lies in a political federation that would allow the right of political self-determination to each of its constituent parts. It would consist of four equal states—metropolitan Portugal, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea—each with its own parliament and elected governor, responsible to a federal parliament and a central government, presumably based in Lisbon. The central government would retain responsibility for finance, defence and foreign affairs, and would include a 'secretary for government and coordination' who would keep some check on the independent efforts of state administrations in areas such as education and economic development. The central government would also keep the right of veto over state budgets."

The *Economist* speculated that "Senhor Caetano may be hoping that his [Spínola's] book will serve as a lightning conductor for right-wing reaction, leaving the prime minister free to pursue a milder federalist programme."

However, it is doubtful whether any federalist window-dressing could reverse Lisbon's mounting difficulties in Africa. Over seventy governments have recognised the independent Republic of Guinea-Bissau, established on September 24, 1973. On November 5 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution welcoming the statehood of Guinea-Bissau and calling on Portugal to desist from further violation of the territory and all acts of aggression against the people of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands. The resolution was passed by ninety-three votes to seven.

Lisbon's biggest headache is Mozambique, where the 60,000-strong Portuguese army has been dealt heavy blows by the liberation fighters in recent months.

MacManus reported in the February 14 *Guardian* that "at the start of the year, Frelimo, the Nationalist African guerrilla group, launched a new offensive, which has now firmly placed guerrilla units astride the vital road and rail links from the Indian Ocean port of Beira west to Rhodesia and north to Zambia and Malawi. . . . The appearance of Frelimo in considerable strength so far South, and its logistic implications, has meant a dramatic new phase in what until last summer had been a hit-and-run war confined mainly to remote areas in the Tete district and in the Northeast."

Bruce Loudon reported from the Lourenço Marques in the February 11 *London Daily Telegraph* that "growing official concern at the penetration of Frelimo terrorists into the 'White heartland' of Mozambique has been admitted by a top public official in the Beira region.

"The admission comes as a public crisis of confidence is developing in the ability of Portugal's 60,000-man army to counter guerrilla infiltration from the north."

According to Loudon, Frelimo made 19 attacks on the railway line from the port of Beira to Malawi between the new year and February 10, most centering around Inhaminga, a junction town 100 miles north of Beira. Other attacks have been made on the Beira-Rhodesia railway around the town of Vila Pery. Loudon reported that "the feeling in Mozambique is that there is a Frelimo 'front line' from Beira through the Vila Pery central district to the Rhodesian frontier. The general attitude is: 'If we cannot hold

them here, we cannot hold them anywhere.'"

The Portuguese defence chief of staff, General Costa Gomes, made a two-week tour of Mozambique at the end of January to review the deteriorating war situation. At the end of his visit, according to the February 4 *Dar es Salaam Daily News*, "the General said that reports reaching him daily showed that Frelimo was actively spreading 'subversion' as far south as Vila Pery, near the Zimbabwe border, and to districts around Beira.

"We are facing a difficult situation which I, of course, do not take as alarming', SAPA [South African Press Association] quoted him as saying. 'What we have to do is face it with calmness and firmness.'"

One component of Portugal's "firm" counterinsurgency programme, borrowed from Washington's methods in Indochina, has been forcibly to remove the African peasant population from their villages and place them in strategic hamlets known as *aldeamentos*. Colonel Sousa Teles, district governor of Beira, reported to the Beira District Council in February that about 146,000 villagers had been moved into aldeamentos in the Beira district in the last six months of 1973. Teles lamented, though, that Frelimo forces were attacking six or seven aldeamentos each night.

These rapid advances by the liberation fighters around Beira, Vila Pery, and Inhaminga in the central province of Manica e Sofala are not only disquieting for the Portuguese government: They have the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia rattled too. Ever since Smith's illegal declaration of independence in 1965 and the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations, Rhodesia has depended on its rail and road links to Beira for much of its imports and exports. These are now in jeopardy.

Moreover, the liberation war is spreading into Rhodesia itself, where thirty-one members of the Rhodesian army have been killed since December 1972 in clashes in the northeast of the country. According to the March 2 *Economist*, "the Rhodesians have felt obliged to cordon off the northeast; to introduce forced labour of civilians as well as harsh new laws and mass detentions; to enlarge the army and extend the national service; and to launch an ambitious immigration drive to offset the drift of those leaving the

country. Now they are also faced with major disruptions on their lifelines to the sea through Mozambique."

The Smith regime has turned to South Africa for assistance and now enjoys the support of South African troops in its security operations in the northeast. Lisbon expects to receive increased United States aid for the war. "Portugal," reported the March 2 *Economist*, "has tried to strike a deal with the United States in return for the help it gave last year by letting the Americans use the Azores base for flying arms to Israel during the Middle East war." The Nixon regime has opened the way for stepped-up arms deliveries to Portugal by defeating an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill that would have banned U.S. arms supplies to Portugal.

The United States government and the Gulf Oil Corporation have also continued to supply Portugal with oil in defiance of the Arab countries' oil embargo imposed against Portugal last November. Additional help has been given by Washington's refusal to recognise the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and its apparent intention to veto the seating of the republic in the United Nations.

Further U.S. aid for the Portuguese dictatorship and its African wars will be discussed at talks expected to be held shortly in connection with the renegotiation of the U.S. lease of the Lajes airbase in the Azores. According to the January 29 *Portuguese Digest*, a spokesman for the U.S. secretary of state has announced that these talks are expected to recommence shortly. □

They're Not All the Same; They Get Worse

Guess who said:

"This administration has proved that it is utterly incapable of cleaning out the corruption which has completely eroded it and reestablishing the confidence and faith of the people in the morality and honesty of their government employees.

"The investigations which have been conducted to date have only scratched the surface. For every case which is exposed, there are ten which are successfully covered up. . . .

"The great tragedy is not that corruption exists, but that it is defended and condoned by the president and other high administration officials."

— Senator Richard Nixon, in a November 13, 1951, speech attacking the Truman administration.

Rebellion Deepens Rift in Army

About 200 members of an infantry regiment rebelled and marched on Lisbon with the apparent intention of overthrowing Premier Marcello Caetano early in the morning of March 16. The troops were thought to be backers of General António de Spínola, who was ousted from his post as deputy defense chief of staff two days earlier.

Also dismissed with Spínola was General Francisco de Costa Gomes, the chief of staff, who was known to support his deputy's proposals for creating a "federation" with Lisbon's African colonies.

The brief uprising in the Fifth Infantry Regiment, stationed at Caldas da Rainha, about fifty miles north of Lisbon, appears to have been put down with little or no bloodshed. In a March 16 dispatch from Lisbon, Henry Giniger of the *New York Times* reported that the government's chief press officer "said that the rebels had hoped to gather support from other military units as they moved on the capital. Instead they were confronted by the Seventh Armored Regiment, which remained loyal to the Government. . . .

"The confrontation was peaceful. The rebels, who were led by junior officers, discussed the situation with the loyal troops and then went back to Caldas da Rainha. The barracks there had been surrounded by other loyal forces, and the rebels were understood to have been placed under arrest."

The following day, Giniger reported a government spokesperson as saying that about thirty officers had been arrested. "They were believed to be mainly junior officers, followers of General Spínola. The most prominent was Lieut. Col. Joao Almeida Bruno, a close associate of General Spínola" when Spínola commanded Portuguese forces in Guinea-Bissau. Costa and Spínola were not arrested.

The leader of the hard-line opposition to Spínola's proposals is reported to be President Américo Thomaz. Thomaz was said to have insisted on the dismissal of Costa and Spínola.

"Premier Marcello Caetano," Giniger wrote March 14, "apparently fearful

of the effects on the army and on his own position, and not so opposed to a policy of evolution as the right wing, resisted these demands. At the same time he could not appear to endorse the wholesale changes called for by General Spínola.

"Last week the Premier went before the largely conservative National Assembly and won a vote of confidence for a policy that seemingly rejected General Spínola's theses but left the

West Germany

Doctors Speak Out for Right to Abortion

"I hereby declare that, without regard for financial considerations, I have performed abortions or helped women to obtain abortions and that I will continue to do so."

Thus began a statement signed by 329 West German doctors and medical assistants in which they publicly admitted their violation of Paragraph 218 of West Germany's criminal law, which outlaws abortion. The statement, printed in the March 11 issue of the weekly *Der Spiegel*, could theoretically subject each of the signers to ten years in prison.

Spiegel reported that a few women were able to collect the 329 signatures in a period of only four days. The statement itself indicated that the doctors had been moved to act by a similar declaration of women who had had abortions:

"Nearly three years ago women themselves publicly admitted having had abortions and thus broke through the taboo.

"Until now doctors have remained silent.

"We are no longer willing to be silent!"

The Bundestag has been considering for nearly four years a reform of Paragraph 218 that would allow abortion during the first three months of pregnancy. *Spiegel* reported that the pros-

door open for change in the present policy."

The divisions created within the Portuguese government and army by the inability to win the colonial wars are likely to deepen as the wars drag on. Even prior to the March 16 uprising, Thomaz's allies were reported to be carrying out a purge of officers thought to favor Spínola's position.

The purge and rebellion would seem to have severely reduced Caetano's usefulness as a bridge between the two positions.

"Among political pundits here," Giniger wrote March 15, "there is a feeling that Mr. Caetano's tightrope act cannot long continue and that he will soon fall." □

pects for passage even of this limited improvement are not good because of opposition within the ruling Social Democratic-liberal coalition.

"About sixty SPD [Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands — Social Democratic party of Germany] deputies," the magazine reported, "favor instead of legal abortion during a limited time period the setting up of certain conditions that would allow abortion only for medical, ethical, hygienic, or social reasons. Under this plan, women would still remain subject to the whims of medical boards."

The 329 medical personnel stated a sharply different view of the right to abortion:

"We doctors and medical assistants will no longer be accomplices in the hundreds of deaths and thousands of cases of maiming of women that occur every year! No longer accomplices in the humiliation and patronizing of women! Interruption of pregnancy is not a gift, but a right! We believe that only the woman herself can decide whether or not to be a mother. We believe that as doctors we are *obligated* to put our knowledge in this area at the disposal of women. The compulsion to motherhood is a profound interference in the life of a woman and an assault on the most elementary human rights." □

Dublin to Admit Some Refugees From Chile

[The following is from the March 15 issue of the Provisional republican paper *An Phoblacht*.]

* * *

The Irish Committee for Chile, according to a supplied statement, welcomes the "Free" State government's decision to allow an initial number of 12 Chilean families to enter the country and, even more, the fact that non-Chilean refugees from Brazil, Uruguay and Bolivia are not to be excluded.

"Their plight has been particularly precarious since a large number were shot indiscriminately in the first few weeks of the coup, being blamed for all the country's troubles. We sincerely hope that the already extended delay of the refugees' arrival will not be obstructed by further red-tape or screening," according to the statement.

It adds that, according to reports, 1,600 refugees are still in UN camps near Santiago; 2,000-3,000 are in Panama and Mexico; 1,000-2,000 are in Argentina; and possibly the same number in Peru; several hundreds are in the embassies in Chile and an indeterminate number of thousands are still "free" in Chile, urgently wanting to leave. About 2,000 have been resettled in Europe (report from International Committee for European Migration).

"Many of the refugees waiting to leave Panama and Mexico are non-Chileans. In Argentina, Chileans are generally unwelcome and refused employment and non-Chileans are given permission to stay only for between 10 days and a fortnight. Apart from that, the general violence of the situation in Argentina at the moment is hardly encouraging refugees from Chile to stay," the statement continues.

"In the embassies in Santiago a large number of people have now been refused safe-conduct passes and the government is putting pressure on those who have sought asylum to come out. This is done by reprisals taken upon the refugees' families, or

bargains proposed. For instance the junta offered to let a large group leave from the Colombian Embassy if Oscar Garretón, the leader of MAPU [Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria—Movement for United Popular Action], was handed over to them.

"The condition of those who are still 'free' but living in terror of imprisonment is aggravated by the soaring

'Peace' 75% as Expensive as War

New Figures on U.S. Military Aid to Saigon

Further proof has emerged that U. S. military aid to the Saigon regime is far greater than the amount officially admitted.

A report issued March 6 by the U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO) revealed, as diplomatically as possible, that aid figures given to Congress by the Defense Department "have not reflected the entire value of contracts" under which supplies are provided to Saigon.

John Finney wrote in the March 12 *New York Times*, "The report, signed by Controller General Elmer B. Staats, said the Pentagon had, in a 1972 report, understated the amount of 1971 aid to Saigon by \$400-million, more than a quarter of the total."

Furthermore, Finney continued, "Mr. Staats said that when the G. A. O. tried last year to audit Army and Air Force expenditures, the agency was told the estimates given to Congress 'did not necessarily have a direct relationship to actual obligations.'"

There is no reason to believe that the Pentagon's accounting practices have improved any in the meantime, despite the fact that it has asked Congress to increase military aid to the Saigon regime by 65 percent next year.

In addition to the \$2,400 million requested in openly military aid, further funds will go to Thieu's army

inflation and the lack of work. In Santiago alone, 25,000 were rendered jobless due to the crime of voting for Allende. Some of those who have been in hiding have been forced to give themselves up because they were starving and had no means of survival.

"The Irish Committee for Chile would like to bring to the notice of the public these facts. Also we would like to thank the many people who have contacted us to offer concrete services. Our number, once again, is 776545."

The address of the Irish Committee for Chile is c/o 5.01, Trinity College, Baile Atha Cliath, 2. □

through the State Department's Agency for International Development. AID has requested a budget of \$600 million (up 70 percent) for next year's economic aid to Saigon, most of which will be spent for military purposes.

These figures, in themselves suspect, actually reflect only a part of the picture, for additional funds are routinely channeled to Thieu through the top-secret Central Intelligence Agency budget, the Food for Peace program, and "Postwar Reconstruction Assistance." (See *Intercontinental Press*, March 11, p. 281.) Nor do they include the more than \$1,000 million in aid to neighboring Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos.

While it is difficult to get accurate figures from Washington, it is possible to assess the vital role this endless stream of cash plays in propping up the Thieu regime. In a dispatch from Saigon in the March 3 *New York Times*, correspondent James M. Marckham reported:

"The South Vietnamese economy, drastically affected by the American military withdrawal, remains today totally dependent on United States aid. More than half the South Vietnamese budget is underwritten by the United States. The bulk of the nation's increasingly costly imports are paid for through a roundabout piaster-for-dollar scheme. Saigon's elaborate mili-

tary runs completely on dollars."

What this means in terms of Thieu's military effort can be gauged from the following statistics:

"According to the Pentagon," Markham wrote, "since the 'cease-fire' of Jan. 27, 1973, the United States has furnished South Vietnam with 180,412 tons of artillery and ground munitions, 27.5 million rounds of aerial ammunition and 87,150 bombs and antipersonnel bombs—among other

things.

"The total replacement program for weapons and munitions is said to have cost \$284.7-million in the first year of 'peace,' or roughly 75 per cent of the levels for 1972, which saw extremely heavy fighting."

In addition, there are now more U. S. troops in the Western Pacific than there were ten years ago, before Washington's escalation of its intervention in Vietnam. A study released March

13 by the Americans for Democratic Action, a group closely associated with the liberal wing of the Democratic party, stated that there were 173,000 U. S. troops in the Western Pacific as of Sept. 30, 1973, compared with 156,000 in 1964.

According to the Pentagon figures used in the study, the biggest increase in troop strength was in Thailand—up from 9,000 in 1964 to 39,000 at the end of 1973. □

Indochina War

U.S. Press Debates Meaning of Hanoi Speech

By Michael Baumann

The Western capitalist press, particularly in the United States, has taken a notable interest in the recent session of the North Vietnamese National Assembly. Special attention has been given to the policy statement delivered to the assembly February 4 by Vice-Premier Le Thanh Nghi, who spoke on behalf of the Twenty-second Plenum of the North Vietnamese Communist party. (Major portions of the speech are reprinted in the Documents section of this issue.)

The attention of the press to policy statements of the North Vietnamese government reflects a very practical interest of the U.S. government. While it is never stated openly, the debate about Hanoi's "intentions" aims to evaluate the likely response of the North Vietnamese and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam to the Thieu regime's continued violations of the cease-fire agreement.

This debate has been going on almost from the moment the agreement was signed in January 1973. Its continuation and intensification now rest on the unspoken assumption that Washington will continue to encourage Thieu to persist in the attacks on liberated areas of South Vietnam—and perhaps even to escalate them.

Nghi's speech was seen as significant by the U.S. press because of its apparent shifting of priorities in comparison with similar reports in the past. The section that drew the most attention was the following:

"In the period 1974-1975, the task of North Vietnam consists in quickly completing the healing of the wounds of war, striving to rehabilitate and develop economy and develop culture, continue to build the material and technical foundation of socialism, consolidate the socialist regime in all spheres, stabilise the economic situation and the people's life, consolidate national defence and endeavour to fulfil our duty to the heroic South."

Western news analysts have attached great importance to the fact that this section lists aid to the anti-imperialist struggle in the South as the lowest priority, following seven political and economic tasks yet to be accomplished in the North.

Coming as it does one year after the signing of the peace accords, and at a time when the Thieu regime does not seem to be giving any ground, the statement has created a stir in Western diplomatic circles.

Some Western analysts have been quick to seize upon the statement as proof that Hanoi intends to abandon the struggle against imperialism in the South.

The editors of the *Christian Science Monitor*, who have a reputation for reflecting the thinking of the State Department, viewed the speech as one in a series of recent indications that Hanoi "has decided to give top priority to rebuilding its war-shattered economy, and wants American aid for this purpose. In return it is prepared to abandon plans for a new large-

scale offensive in South Vietnam."

"The decision," the March 13 *Monitor* editorial continued, "is said to be a follow-up to last December's meeting in Paris between Henry Kissinger and [Hanoi negotiator] Le Duc Tho."

Similar views have been put forward by another journalist who appears to have close connections with State Department and intelligence officials. George McArthur, Saigon correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times*, offered his analysis of Nghi's speech in a February 17 dispatch from Saigon:

"The North Vietnamese Politburo, it is now considered virtually certain, has made a momentous decision to shelve at least temporarily any major military moves in Indochina in favor of sorely needed economic reconstruction.

"That is the message that Western experts read in speeches at the just-concluded session of the North Vietnamese Assembly.

"While the major speeches pledged continued support for the war in South Vietnam, it was equally evident that military plans have been sharply trimmed. The voice of Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap was not even heard at the session.

"Many sources in Saigon agree that this means there will be no major offensive this year, as many had feared earlier. It means that Hanoi's military machine will be supported only enough to maintain the fighting

at something like the present level.

Stating that the Hanoi leadership was "quite likely influenced by Russia and China," McArthur went on to write:

"The shift in priorities from war to reconstruction was clearly indicated in the assembly speech delivered by Vice Premier Le Than Nghi, the party's leading economic theorist and the man long responsible for international aid negotiations with Communist countries. The substance of the speech was incorporated in the state budget and the 1974 'state plan,' which the Assembly routinely adopted . . . February 9.

"Nghi's speech," McArthur continued, "was the keynote address. It far overshadowed the brief and routine military report, which was given by a little-known general well down in the Party hierarchy."

The North Vietnamese people, McArthur concluded, "have now been told that reconstruction is the main task. Not only that, Nghi ticked off a long list of priorities—and in Assembly speeches such things are carefully weighed. In two important sections of his report, Nghi listed military efforts, in both South Vietnam and Cambodia as dead last, though in each case he promised continued Hanoi support."

McArthur then cited the paragraph from Nghi's speech quoted above and stated, "The internal debate on priorities between reconstruction and the war in the South is believed to have been churning within the Politburo since well before the Paris cease-fire agreements of January 1973.

"The influence of China and the Soviet Union, was evidently on the side of reconstruction. Not only does Hanoi depend on both the Soviets and Chinese for munitions and essential economic help, it must [also] have something like 800 million tons of imported foodstuffs this year to feed its people."

McArthur's interpretation of Nghi's speech caps a long series of conflicting reports in the U.S. press about Hanoi's intentions toward the anti-imperialist struggle in the South. His evaluation contrasts with earlier Washington and Saigon predictions of a major Hanoi offensive in the South in the spring of 1974.

Nixon and his military advisers, it became apparent, found such pre-

dictions of an offensive useful in bolstering requests to Congress for hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid for the dictatorial Thieu regime. The "menace from the North" theme was also used in an attempt to cover up for Thieu's murderous attacks on the areas held by the liberation forces.

It has been more than a year since the cease-fire accords were signed, yet the Thieu regime continues to shell and strafe the areas held by the Provisional Revolutionary Government. It has also refused to let peasant refugees return to their homes and villages in the liberated areas and has refused to hold the elections called for in the accords.

Thieu's open violations of the cease-fire agreement naturally led to concern that Hanoi and the PRG would be provoked into a large-scale military response.

In October, press reports pointed to the fact that the liberation fighters were building a network of hard-surface roads in northwestern South Vietnam as an indication that Hanoi was planning a major offensive.

"One of the roads," correspondent Fox Butterfield wrote in the October 1 *New York Times*, "already reaches more than 250 miles from the North Vietnamese border straight south to Pleiku Province, and intelligence officers believe it will eventually connect with the Communists' southern headquarters in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon."

Butterfield also reported that the liberation fighters had been provided with 300 tanks and a similar number of heavy artillery pieces earlier that year.

However, some U.S. sources in Saigon did predict at that time that a major push backed by Hanoi was unlikely. Those analysts cited the fact that draft calls had been low in North Vietnam all year and that the North Vietnamese newspapers had been "devoted almost exclusively to economic reconstruction, in contrast to late 1971 and early 1972—before the last offensive," when they frequently discussed perspectives for large-scale military operations.

At the end of October, Thieu claimed in a national television speech that North Vietnam was preparing a major new offensive. The claim was dis-

counted in some press reports, however, as a maneuver by Thieu to obtain more U.S. aid and to cover his own forces' "pre-emptive" attacks on the liberation fighters.

On November 6, forces under the Provisional Revolutionary Government launched a rocket and mortar attack on the Bien Hoa air base near Saigon. The PRG publicly stated that the attack was in retaliation for recent air strikes originating from the base. According to the November 7 *New York Times*, the move was interpreted in Saigon as "clear evidence that a new offensive is on." The *Times* agreed that it at least indicated a "shift in the tone of Communist pronouncements on the cease-fire agreement. . . .

"The [PRG] delegation has been issuing statements on the activities of the Communist forces in South Vietnam, but has usually described them as defensive tactics. Yesterday's statement said nothing about defense, but termed the action an 'attack' and a 'punishment.'"

Predictions from Saigon of a major offensive by the North continued through November and December. On December 12, the *Wall Street Journal* devoted a lengthy article to an assessment of the evidence for and against such a view.

In a dispatch from Saigon, correspondent Peter R. Kann presented what he claimed was the then current Washington position on the "menace from the North."

"U.S. and other analysts," he wrote, "are less convinced [than Thieu] that such an offensive is in the offing. But they consider it a real possibility. . . ."

Kann then cited four factors pointed to by U.S. analysts who expected an offensive:

1. The liberation fighters had not been having "sufficient success at low-level warfare" and had "to risk a major offensive."

2. The odds had improved since U.S. bombing was removed as a factor. "The 1972 offensive scored some successes despite massive U.S. air power," Kann pointed out. "A 1974 offensive, without U.S. air power, ought to be considerably more effective."

3. Nixon's Watergate problems reduced the likelihood of a resumption of U.S. bombing.

4. Better supply routes had im-

proved the military capabilities of the liberation fighters.

At the same time, Kann listed the factors weighing against an offensive, noting that Hanoi "has its own allies to worry about. . . . Russia and China each have important bilateral interests with the U.S., and neither nation is considered, by analysts here, to be eager for a major offensive and the resulting strains with America that it could cause."

In addition, he said, the liberation fighters "have devoted much energy to consolidating and developing those portions of South Vietnam that they clearly control—mostly in the border and mountain areas. This includes everything from road construction to refugee resettlement to rice production. These can be read as signs that the Vietcong are serious about turning their 'zones' into a 'third Vietnam.' But more work needs to be done. An offensive would divert attention from this task as well as risk destruction of what already has been accomplished.

"Those are the arguments against a major offensive," he continued. "But even those who advance the arguments tend to believe that there will be increased combat in coming months."

A few days later, there appears to have been an important intervention on the part of Washington and Moscow. Le Duc Tho flew to Paris December 17 and held a closed-door meeting with Kissinger on December 20, the meeting referred to in the March 13 *Christian Science Monitor* editorial.

A cloud of secrecy enveloped the Kissinger-Tho talks. First, it was not clear who had called the meeting. According to the December 18 *New York Times*, Tho "said the talks had been arranged at the request of the United States." However, the dispatch continued, "When they were first announced last Friday [December 14], the White House said they had been arranged 'through mutual consultation.'" South Vietnamese officials in Paris, on the other hand, said the meeting had been called by Hanoi.

Second, it was not clear why the meeting had been called. "Neither side," the *Times* reported, "suggested that the Paris accords would be renegotiated, or that it was prepared to take new steps to put the cease-fire agreement into effect. A spokesman for Hanoi here

[Paris] said he did not know the purpose of the meeting. . . ."

Third, it was not clear why the meeting was important enough to have Graham Martin, U.S. ambassador to Saigon, fly in to attend it.

Fourth, it was not clear why at one point in the meeting "the negotiators sent away all aides except their interpreters and talked alone for half an hour." (*New York Times*, December 21, 1973.)



THIEU: Expected to continue attacks on liberated areas.

The joint statement issued after the meeting conveyed no more than the fact that Tho and Kissinger "exchanged views on matters of mutual interest in the context of the current situation."

Less than twenty-four hours later, three important developments occurred. First, the Saigon regime's negotiators in Paris apparently provoked an incident, forcing the PRG delegates to walk out of the negotiating session.

Second, a similar incident occurred the same day in Saigon, and PRG delegates there walked out of a negotiating session.

Third, Moscow announced a program of economic aid to the Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam. According to a Decem-

ber 21 dispatch from Moscow by *New York Times* correspondent Hedrick Smith, "Pravda reported [today] that Moscow would send machines, farm equipment, oil products, fertilizers, metals, medicines, foods and other goods under an agreement signed by Vladimir N. Novikov, a Deputy Premier, and Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, the Foreign Minister of the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government."

"Reflecting evident concern over the danger of sharper and more serious hostilities in Vietnam, the Soviet press also quoted Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, as reaffirming support for the cease-fire.

"Some Western observers," the dispatch continued, "saw the moves, in connection with the visit here of Nguyen Huu Tho, leader of the Vietcong's National Liberation Front, as part of a Soviet effort to bolster the fragile peace agreement. . . ."

"Soviet sources" also told Smith "that Moscow played an important behind-the-scenes role in arranging the meeting yesterday in Paris between Secretary of State Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. . . ."

"The Soviet explanation," Smith continued, "is that both Hanoi and the National Liberation Front were becoming increasingly restive and impatient."

Presumably their impatience stemmed from the fact that Thieu—backed by massive shipments of U.S. military aid—was continuing to bomb and strafe PRG-held areas of South Vietnam in violation of the cease-fire accords.

That fact, however, seemed to carry little weight in Moscow. Smith reported that Soviet officials appeared to rest content with trying "to appease the North and South Vietnamese Communist leadership both with more active diplomacy and with pledges of economic aid to the Communists in the South."

An alternate explanation, of course, would be that Moscow was holding the aid agreement as a club over the liberation forces in South Vietnam and over the Hanoi leadership, tossing in as a sweetener its promise to use diplomatic pressure to counter Thieu's cease-fire violations.

Three weeks later, the question of Hanoi's intentions toward the anti-imperialist struggle in the South was still being hotly debated in Washing-

ton. A shift in views, however, appeared to be under way.

The *New York Times* reported January 14 that on the previous day Nixon had received a Central Intelligence Agency policy paper on the question. This report, prepared by CIA Director William Colby and George A. Carver Jr., senior CIA intelligence officer, reflected what the *Times* called "the formal position of the intelligence community." It stated that the "chances are slightly less than 50-50 that Hanoi will strike in a big way in the next six months."

The "informal" position among Washington intelligence analysts was substantially different, however. Following off-the-record conversations with intelligence officers in the CIA, the Defense Department, and the State Department, *Times* correspondent Leslie H. Gelb reported that in private "most intelligence officers believe the odds are not slightly but significantly less than 50-50."

Gelb explained the contradiction by pointing out that "it is not unusual for the intelligence community or the bureaucracy generally to display official caution in a formal position paper and then a greater degree of candor in private briefings of senior officials. . . . As a result, the informal briefings of senior officials tend to assume greater importance than formal papers."

A week later the Western press pointed to a diplomatic move on Hanoi's part as a "major departure." A January 17 Agence France-Presse dispatch from Hanoi reported:

"North Vietnam wants to set up diplomatic relations with the United States, subject to certain conditions, according to a foreign ministry white paper published here today to mark the first anniversary of the signing of the Paris peace accords.

"The 15,000-word text stressed in its conclusion that if Washington disengaged completely from South Vietnam, fulfilled its obligations to reconstruct North Vietnam and respected the 'fundamental national rights of the Laotian and Cambodian peoples,' Hanoi would consider 'normalization' of relations with the United States. . . .

"North Vietnam had previously used the term 'establishment of new relations' between Washington and Hanoi. The expression 'normalization' represented a major departure."

The dispatch then pointed out that

the white paper "came at a moment when Hanoi's two great allies, China and the Soviet Union, were both improving their relations with the United States."

It also commented that "the North Vietnamese call for 'normalization' came a month after a private meeting between Secretary of State Kissinger and the North Vietnamese negotiator, Le Duc Tho."

Six days later, on January 23, speculation in Washington as to Hanoi's



KISSINGER: Presented with contradictory reports from CIA.

intentions was further fueled by the order in which Nguyen Duy Trinh, a member of the Political Bureau of the North Vietnamese Communist party, listed Hanoi's priorities. The following exchange took place with a *New York Times* reporter:

"Asked what the Communist priorities were at this stage, Mr. Trinh answered: 'The safeguarding of peace—making it stable and durable; the dressing of the wounds of war and the building of socialism in the North; the completion of the national and democratic tasks in the South, and movement toward peaceful reunification of the motherland.'"

On January 31, *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Daniel Southerland pointed to a series of articles that had appeared in late December in the official North Vietnamese Army newspaper *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*. "The series," Southerland reported, "is be-

lieved to have been written by one of the top North Vietnamese generals.

"It suggests that the Communists are now engaged in a 'protracted and complex' struggle in the South which will only 'gradually' change the balance of forces. It does not suggest a big offensive."

When the prisoner exchange program was resumed February 8, after a six-month suspension, this too was cited by Washington analysts as a significant step. The February 9 *New York Times* reported:

"Under the Paris accord, the exchange of prisoners was to have been completed by last April, but it has been delayed several times by disputes over procedures, the number of prisoners held and who should be released.

"Some officials in the International Commission of Control and Supervision saw in the renewed exchange a sign that tensions between the Vietcong and the Saigon government might ease."

On February 14, Western dispatches began to report that an analysis of troop movements since the accords showed that Hanoi had for the first time begun to return a significant number of troops to the North.

Citing "informed sources in the South," George McArthur wrote in the February 14 *International Herald Tribune* that "the number of North Vietnamese [troops] permitted to return home in the first year of the unstable cease-fire agreement ranged from 40,000 to 50,000.

"In the same period, these sources said, the North sent about 70,000 men to the southern battlefronts. . . .

"Such figures correspond to the less active years of the war," he wrote, "and are far below the infiltration figures which marked the offensives of 1968 or 1972."

Still cautious, however, he warned later in the dispatch that "it is far too early to draw conclusions from the figures now available, since the dry season will last about another five months.

"In addition, these figures are somewhat discounted even by those experts who compile them. There is an inevitable time lag and there are duplications and countless other difficulties inherent in such estimations."

Three days later, however, in the February 17 dispatch cited above, he ruled out the possibility of major Ha-

noi aid to the struggle in the South.

It would appear that some circles in Washington felt that the North Vietnamese "threat" was being downplayed too much. In the March 4 *New York Times*, Drew Middleton wrote that "an extensive build-up in men and equipment by the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam" was "causing concern in the Pentagon." According to Middleton's sources in the Pentagon, "In the last three months more than 300 tons of supplies a month are said to have been moved by sea into the port of Dong Ha from the north and then by truck to the areas of Khe Sanh, Quang Tri and Cam Lo."

On February 28, the *New York Times* printed its first report of Le Thanh Nghi's speech to the National Assembly. In the *Times* view, the policy statement meant that "North Vietnam's leaders have begun an ambitious two-year economic reconstruction and development plan and, at the same time, appear to have decided upon a 'holding pattern' in the South. . . ."

The *Times* then pointed out that "in the wake of a new emphasis on 'building socialism in the North,' Western intelligence analysts are interested in a recent secret resolution adopted by a Central Committee session [the Twenty-second Plenum] of the ruling Lao Dong (Communist) party.

"According to diplomatic sources, the resolution, drafted after the Dec. 20 meeting in Paris between Secretary of State Kissinger and Le Duc Tho of the North Vietnamese Politburo, urges the southern front to heighten the 'political struggle,' revamp its propaganda effort and 'retaliate' against military strikes by the Saigon side.

"But the resolution—No. 21—appears to foresee no major military initiative in the South. Usually, analysts say, such resolutions have a life span of about 18 months to two years.

"'They're keeping their options open,' said a well-placed intelligence analyst, who was unwilling to infer from the resolution that the Communists had actually decided against a major offensive in the next two years."

The *Times* too has apparently decided to keep its options open. While stating, but not endorsing, the view that Hanoi plans to decrease support to the South, it leaves the door open for resurrecting the charge of the "menace from the North" in case Thieu should appear to be in danger. □

March 25, 1974

Demonstrations in Tehran, Europe, U.S.

Iranian Students Protest Executions

By Majid Namvar

Three policemen and an unknown number of students were killed, and many others were injured February 16 when police in Tehran attacked a demonstration by university and high-school students. The students were protesting the sentences of Karamet Daneshian and Khosrow Golsorkhi, who were executed February 18. (See *Intercontinental Press*, March 4, p. 239.)

According to a statement released by the Confederation of Iranian Students, the demonstrators also raised the slogans "Down with the reactionary regime" and "We want freedom."

The recent wave of judicial murders in Iran has produced broad protest actions outside the country as well. Even the shah's controlled press could not maintain its usual blackout on these protests.

The March 9 and 10 air editions of the Tehran daily *Etelaat* reported a number of protests by Iranian students abroad. On March 8, the paper said, members of the Confederation of Iranian Students took over Iranian embassies in Brussels, Stockholm, and the Hague. There was also a demonstration outside the Iranian Embassy in London. *Etelaat* reported that the demonstrators carried photographs of Golsorkhi and Daneshian and signs demanding the withdrawal of the shah's troops from Oman, where they are attempting to crush the liberation forces in Dhofar.

The students who took over the em-

bassy in Brussels used the telephone switchboard to call Agence France-Presse to explain the purpose of the international actions.

In Stockholm, police arrested sixteen of the students. Several were also arrested in the Hague.

In the United States on March 14 and 15, protest marches were held in San Francisco; Chicago; Arlington, Virginia; Gainesville, Florida; and New York. In New York about 150 persons, mostly Iranian and Ethiopian students, responded to a call by the Iranian Student Association to demonstrate against the shah's crimes. The demonstration took place in front of the United Nations building, with the marchers wearing masks to prevent agents from SAVAK, the shah's secret police, from identifying them.

Perhaps moved by the widespread disgust at the wave of executions, the Iranian Embassy in France issued a statement, which was published in the March 6 *Le Monde*, claiming that the six religious militants executed February 19 were common criminals and saboteurs.

The same issue of *Le Monde* carried a statement by the "Iran Liberation Movement, Foreign Section" charging that the six had actually "died under torture." It said the six were students of Ayatollah Raabani, a well-known religious leader who had been arrested by SAVAK, severely beaten, and sentenced to three years in exile. □



Demonstrators outside United Nations protest shah's crimes.

How Reformists Saved Belgian Monarchy

By Eddy Labeau

[The following article, part of a series on the development of the strong state in Europe, appeared in the December 6, 1973, issue of *Rood*, the Flemish paper of the Revolutionaire Arbeiders Liga, Belgian section of the Fourth International. The translation for *Intercontinental Press* is by Russell Block.]

* * *

The Belgian monarchy behaved quite differently in the thirties than it does today. Now, the royal house remains behind the scenes, appearing primarily when new governments are being formed, watching carefully over how they are put together. But in the thirties Leopold III intervened in political life much more directly. He played a very important role in the introduction of the policy of neutrality.

After the resistance of the workers and the short-lived economic recovery of 1937 put an end to Degrelle's fascist "monarchical movement," Leopold III was the figure around whom the bourgeoisie united.

When the German army invaded Belgium on May 10, 1940, Leopold III took command of the army. On May 25 the main body of the government left Belgium from France via London. The king remained in Belgium even after he had surrendered. On August 31, eighty-nine deputies and fifty-four senators gathered in Limoges. They indicted the surrender agreement the king had signed and declared their solidarity with the government.

At the end of 1940, the Belgian government in exile was formed in London. In Belgium Leopold III followed a policy of collaboration with the fascist occupiers that has yet to be completely clarified. In June 1944, Leopold III married Liliane Baels, who became the "Princess of Réthy."

On June 7, 1944, the king and his family were "deported" to Hirschstein. In September 1944, Belgium was liberated and the government returned from London. On May 7, 1945, Leopold III, who had in the meantime

been transported to Austria, was freed from German hands by the American army.

The Belgian bourgeoisie was aware that a serious revolutionary crisis could break out after the war. In order to forestall this, they made a number of concessions to the working class (e.g., social security) and took the Social Democratic BSP and the Stalinist CP into the government.

But, just the same, they were on the lookout for a solution that would allow them to install a stronger regime, which would require fewer concessions to the working class.

The maneuver centering around Leopold III was carefully prepared:

"The May 28 surrender should have won the soldiers over. The call for 'resuming work' should have won over the entrepreneurs, who were anxious to begin 'economic collaboration.' The marriage [to a Fleming] should have brought over the Flemings. The 1944 deportation was supposed to have built a 'unity in resistance' around the king. The nobility and upper ranks of the clergy were won over as a matter of course. Wasn't it worth a try?" (E. Germain in *l'Avant-Garde*, Vol. 1, No. 1.)

The working class, however, didn't see it this way. No sooner was the return of the king mentioned than strikes began to break out. In June 1945, there were strikes over the defense of trade-union rights; in July, 10,000 people demonstrated in Charleroi under the slogan "For a Republic" and they liberated trade-union militants who had been arrested; in August, there was a strike in the Luikse metal industry and in October, a general strike nearly broke out in Borinage when a rumor circulated that an attempt had been made on the life of Achiel Van Acker [a Social Democratic leader].

The working class was too strong and the bourgeoisie had to shelve their plans for the return of Leopold III.

On July 19, 1945, parliament decided that the king could return only if his

return were supported by a majority vote of both chambers (parliament and Senate) in joint session. This law reinforced the king's exile. Because of it, the CVP [Christelijke Volkspartij—Christian People's party] left the four-party coalition government (BSP-CP-Liberals-CVP).

The BSP and the CP had an excellent opportunity to rid themselves of the Liberals and form a workers government that would mobilize the working class to smash the bourgeois state apparatus.

Van Acker not only kept the Liberals in the government but he further broadened the coalition by adding the UDB (Union Démocratique Belge—Belgian Democratic Union).

This was indicative of the position of the Social Democrats and the Stalinists. They refused to resolve definitively the question of the monarchy by launching a campaign under the slogan "For a Republic" because this would have called for a mass mobilization that might well have gotten out of their control.

Only the Trotskyist organization (at that time, the IKP—Internationalistische Kommunistische Partij—Internationalist Communist Party, Belgian section of the Fourth International) took a revolutionary position:

"Instead of calling 'Down with the King' as the Social Democratic and Stalinist renegades installed in the government have done, the correct slogan would have been 'Down with the Monarchy,' the system that allows a single man to take positions such as those Leopold III is now being reproached for, a system that is one of the essential props of the capitalist regime.

"Our party alone launched this slogan. The Social Democrats and the Stalinists never talk about their republican views. Moreover, in a situation where the only correct form of action against Leopold III is mass action and the mobilization of the working class, the traitorous leaders of these parties maintain that the struggle must remain within constitutional bounds and must be fought by parliamentary means alone." (*Lutte Ouvrière*, July 10, 1948.)

The slogan for a republic was explained further in our organization's theoretical magazine:

"For the proletariat there naturally can be no question of choosing between this or that form of bourgeois rule. 'In itself' the bourgeois republic of-

fers no advantages at all over the capitalist monarchy. But history, just like philosophy or the consciousness of the masses, recognizes no 'things in themselves.' Since the defense of the monarchy has become a question of life and death for the capitalists, the fall of the monarchy can become the point of departure for the fall of the whole regime." (E. Germain, *l'Avant-Garde*, Vol. 1, No. 1.)

The Trotskyists' positions give a very good example of the application of the strategy of the transitional program. From 1949 on, the slogan of a general strike against the return of Leopold III was launched, combined with the slogan for action committees among the rank and file. Other slogans were: "To defend democratic rights we must extend them," "Down with the Senate; One sovereign chamber," "Against the separation of powers," "Recall of representatives at the will of the constituents," and "Abolish the permanent army and replace it by workers' militias." (H. Vallin, *Lutte Ouvrière*, August 13, 1949.)

The call for a general strike was necessary because after 1945 the question of the monarchy was left hanging by the betrayal of the BSP and the CP, and the relationship of forces between labor and capital had evolved to the advantage of the latter. The working class was demoralized by the participation of its parties in the government, by partial struggles that resolved little. This was reflected in the fact that the CVP and the Liberals were able to form a government in June 1949.

In 1949-50 everyone expected a deep economic crisis, and the bourgeoisie thought the time had come to carry out a new attack rapidly, before the working class had a chance to go on the offensive again. The return of Leopold III was once more placed on the agenda.

The CVP pushed through a referendum on the question of the monarchy; 57.7 percent voted for the return of the king. But there were large differences among the provinces: in Flanders 72.2 percent voted Yes, in Brussels 48.2 percent, and in Wallonia a mere 42 percent. When the king returned in July, a general strike broke out. On July 30, three demonstrators were shot to death in Grâce-Berleur. The bourgeoisie was in danger of losing power. A quick compromise

was reached with the Social Democracy: Leopold III abdicated but the monarchy was retained.

That had been what the BSP wanted in the first place:

"For four years the question of the monarchy—or rather of Leopold—has divided Belgian opinion. The position of the Socialist party is clear: Neither the monarchy nor the dynasty are in question." (From a BSP pamphlet.)

If we wish to draw the lessons for the present from this experience, the following elements are important to note.

The bourgeoisie attempted to institute the strong state in a period of deep economic crisis, at a time when it had become very difficult for it to rule by normal parliamentary means. Thus, they opted for the return of the king, who probably would have ruled with the instrument that brought him to power—extraparliamentary plebiscites. But the relationship of forces between labor and capital was the factor that determined when the bourgeoisie could make its move.

In 1945 the first attempt was quickly abandoned. It was only after the Social Democrats and Stalinists had sown confusion and demoralization in the working class for four years that a new attempt could be made. But this attempt in turn led to a significant crisis in which the working class recovered its combativeness and launched its greatest offensive of the postwar period.

Thus, the struggle against the strong state is clearly bound up with the working class's struggle for power. We will discuss the Social Democracy's attitude toward the strong state in a later article. With respect to the question of the monarchy, it is necessary to

note that the BSP was prepared in its own interest to defend democratic freedoms, even to the point of mobilizing the workers, insofar as they could be held within the framework of capitalism (which in this case meant within the framework of the monarchy).

As early as 1949 action committees, made up of representatives of the BSP, the ABVV, and the socialist cooperatives and mutual societies, were established on a regional and national scale. It is characteristic, however, that the other currents in the workers movement (and the CP in particular) were excluded.

* * *

The Belgian working class prevented the installation of the strong state with the general strike of 1950. In this sense the strike was a partial victory. The possibilities, however, were greater. The socialist revolution was on the agenda. But the working class lacked a revolutionary leadership, a revolutionary party.

Why did the Trotskyist organization not succeed in winning over significant sections of the working class? In our opinion the answer to this question is not to be sought in its political line in the postwar period or in its position on the question of the monarchy in particular. The main reasons lie elsewhere.

The Social Democracy was able to maintain a significant portion of its base through the concessions that the bourgeoisie granted after the war. The Stalinists captured that portion of the working class that broke from the Social Democracy thanks to the enormous prestige won by the Soviet Union and the Red Army during the second world war. □

Pakistani Officers Sentenced

The trials of thirty-four Pakistani military officers on charges of conspiracy have ended with nineteen convictions and sentences ranging from two years to life imprisonment, according to a report by Qutubuddin Aziz in the March 14 *Christian Science Monitor*. "Most of the accused," Aziz wrote, "were middle-grade officers and none commanded a policymaking position."

The officers were arrested at the end of March 1973. At the time he announced the uncovering of a military conspiracy, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was engaged in a sharp dispute with opposition parties over provisions of a new constitution.

"The evidence of conspiracy produced by the prosecution," Aziz reported, "was largely in the nature of loose talk." □

Healyites Fail the Acid Test of Watergate

By Allen Myers

The Watergate scandal, because it is unprecedented in U.S. history, has provided the various groups claiming adherence to revolutionary Marxism with an unusual opportunity to demonstrate their capacity to analyze a major political event and to advance a correct course of action in relation to it.

Particularly tested—and found wanting—have been the ultraleft organizations that under more normal circumstances mask their inability to relate to major political events with "intransigent" rhetoric. In the December 17, 1973, issue of *Intercontinental Press*, I described how their misunderstanding of Watergate was leading some of these groups on a reformist course.

This was especially clear in the case of the Workers League, the U.S. followers of Gerry Healy¹. I pointed out then that the Healyites, by their panicky acceptance of the liberal contention that Nixon's crimes are an abrupt break with the "American tradition" of bourgeois politics, had put themselves on the road of becoming apologists for "normal" capitalist democracy and its liberal defenders.

As a particularly telling example of where their errors were leading them, I cited the Healyites' attempt to provide a left cover for George Meany and the other bureaucratic misleaders of the AFL-CIO when the latter broke their shaky alliance with Nixon and called for his impeachment in order to ease their return to the Democratic party fold. The Healyite paper, the *Bulletin*, on that occasion went so far as to say that "refusal [by the bureaucrats] to act against Nixon now would amount to the greatest betrayal in the history of the labor movement."

Unfortunately, rather than correct their errors, the Healyites have de-

cidated to pursue them no matter where they lead. In the January 25 and February 5 issues of the *Bulletin*, a two-part article by Melody Farrow takes the Workers League several steps further on its rightward path. The Healyites seem determined to demonstrate the truth of Lenin's observation that ultraleftism and opportunism are two sides of the same coin.

Farrow's article, billed as an "answer" to the Socialist Workers party (SWP—the U.S. Trotskyist organization) and specifically to my articles in *Intercontinental Press* and two articles by Les Evans and Cliff Connor in the December *International Socialist Review*, adopts the old debater's trick of accusing others of one's own failings. Thus, while defending the Healyite support of Meany's return to the Democratic party, Farrow accuses the SWP of "a very conscious turn towards alliance with the 'progressive' section of the labor bureaucracy and the liberal Democrats."

It is unlikely that Farrow herself believes the slander; her chief "evidence" in support of it consists of the assertion that the SWP does not mean what it says.

If it consisted only of that slander, Farrow's article would not be worth noting. However, the bulk of it consists of an unwitting demonstration of the Healyites' largely unconscious adaptation to reformism and liberalism. Since this adaptation is based in part on misunderstandings that have some currency outside the ultraleft sects, it may be useful to discuss them in some detail.

48-Hour 'Dictatorship'

What does Watergate reveal about U.S. capitalist democracy? In my series "Behind the Watergate Scandal," particularly in the November 26 and December 3 issues of *Intercontinental Press*, I argued that the continually increasing need of U.S. imperialism for a centralized and powerful executive was in conflict not only with real democratic rights but even with the

myth of bourgeois democracy:

"The contradiction is not a mere temporary crisis in the 'credibility' of the Nixon administration. For half a century, democratic illusions have served as an ideological complement and support to U.S. imperialism's drive toward world hegemony. Now the very successes of imperialism and the effects of the radicalization have combined to turn the complements into contradictions. The present crisis of the ruling class centers on the effort to find a new combination or balance of these now essentially irreconcilable elements of its rule."²

Farrow, on the other hand, opens her article by revealing that the Healyites have extensive illusions about the ability of capitalism to provide and protect democratic rights. The SWP, she writes, is engaged in "a polemic against the Workers League and any tendency that sees in the Watergate events a threat to the democratic rights of the working class.

"The SWP has gone to great lengths to demonstrate that Nixon's actions in Watergate do not represent any significant departure from the traditional methods of capitalist rule in this country.

"They have concluded that Watergate merely reveals the 'undemocratic' nature of capitalism and attacks [sic] the repeated warning of the Workers League that the political methods of Nixon were a sharp move towards one man dictatorship."

It is true that we think that capitalist government is essentially undemocratic—without quotation marks. As long as capitalist government exists, none of the democratic rights won by the working class and its allies will be secure. The U.S. ruling class continually attempts to restrict democracy to the maximum extent possible without provoking a massive defensive response by the working class.

The Healyites have forgotten this rather elementary Marxist lesson. The

2. From this passage, Farrow extracts the word "balance" and uses it to "prove" that the "SWP creates the illusion that Nixon will continuously retreat"; that "the Socialist Workers Party sees a future of unlimited social reforms"; and—the most powerful thunderbolt in the Healyite arsenal—that Myers does not understand "dialectics." It would seem that *Bulletin* readers are not expected to be familiar with the original sources against which the Healyites joust.

1. Healy is the British sectarian who heads the "Workers Revolutionary Party" and the "International Committee." Reactionary legislation in the United States prevents the Workers League from affiliating with the "International Committee," but the organizations are in political agreement.

disagreement is not over whether Nixon poses a threat to democratic rights, but whether his threat is qualitatively different from that inherent in any U. S. bourgeois government. Farrow's answer is clear: To the Healyites, Watergate reveals a "significant departure from the traditional methods of capitalist rule in this country."

The effect of such a position, obviously, is to whitewash the "traditional methods of capitalist rule." If Nixon's actions represent a departure from those methods, then from the standpoint of the working class, the "traditional methods" of the ruling class must be preferable to the nontraditional methods introduced by Nixon.

To show how the Healyites go wrong on this question, it will be useful to take a more detailed look at Nixon's supposed "move towards a one man dictatorship" as they portray it.

Farrow writes: "It is not, as the SWP states it, that we see a dictatorship already established and all rights eliminated. It is a question of *warning* the working class of the dangers in order to prepare it for the new political tasks it now faces in order to build the revolutionary movement." (Emphasis in original.)

Before correcting the SWP's misunderstanding of the Healyite position, Farrow might do well to circulate the quoted paragraph to the *Bulletin* staff, along with a request to avoid assertions such as "the military has gained almost absolute power within the inner councils of the government." (*Bulletin*, January 15.)

Moreover, Farrow informs us a few paragraphs earlier that we have already survived a Nixon "dictatorship." She gives the following evaluation of the "Saturday Night Massacre" of last October, when Nixon put forward his phony "compromise" plan on the White House tapes and fired the special prosecutor, attorney general, and deputy attorney general:

"It was at this moment that a sharp break took place. What had been up to that point a series of gradual changes in the role of the president suddenly turned into a sharp and open clash between Nixon and Congress and the Constitution. In that 48 hours Nixon did in fact rule as a dictator."

The reality was considerably less dramatic. During Nixon's 48-hour "dictatorship," Congress was not in session, having adjourned for the weekend. Nixon, far from clashing

with that body or its members, secured the agreement of three prominent senators—Sam Ervin and Howard Baker, chairman and vice-chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, and John Stennis of Mississippi—to the phony "compromise" before announcing it publicly.

But during the weekend that looms so large in the Healyite view, Nixon did have vast powers concentrated in his hands. This authority is not mentioned by Farrow, but a Senate committee study of presidential powers described them as including "the power . . . to seize property, organize and control the means of production, seize commodities, assign military forces abroad, call reserve forces amounting to 2.5 million men to duty, institute martial law, seize and control all means of transportation, regulate all private enterprise, [and] restrict travel. . . ."

To this already impressive list should be added the not insignificant power to destroy the human race by launching nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological warfare.

If one wanted to argue that Nixon was a dictator during the weekend of October 20-21, 1973, his access to the powers cited would seem more impressive evidence than his unsuccessful attempt to put over a phony compromise and his dismissal of three appointees, neither of which actions "clashes" with the Constitution. (It should be recalled that prior to his second inauguration Nixon asked for and received the resignations of *all* his high-level appointees.)

Why does Farrow not cite these far more convincing facts? Precisely because the vast powers in Nixon's hands, far from being a "departure," are an absolutely inescapable aspect of the "traditional methods of capitalist rule in this country."

Who Toppled the Tyrant?

The Healyite hysteria about a Nixon dictatorship thus turns into a "left" apology for the very real and very serious danger to the rights—and even the very existence—of the working class inherent in the "traditional methods" of rule of the capitalist class in the United States. Moreover, in exaggerating the conflict between Nixon's course and the traditional methods and institutions of capitalist rule, the

Healyites go even further, implying that those methods and institutions can serve to *protect* democratic rights.

After all, if Nixon was in fact a dictator for two days, it is necessary to explain how the dictatorship was overthrown. Farrow does not deal directly with this question. However, at the time, the Workers League Political Committee issued a statement assessing the state of the Nixon presidency.

The statement, which was printed in the October 30 *Bulletin*, described the "dictatorship" that Farrow claims existed only a week earlier as a "weakened and crisis-ridden government." Contrary to the usual Healyite practice, the statement did not invoke a nonexistent mass movement of the organized working class to explain the abrupt transformation of Nixon's presidency. In fact, the only mention of the working class is in the future tense, in a call for the unions to organize demonstrations demanding Nixon's resignation.

To whom, then, do the Healyites give thanks for the salvation, even if only temporary, of working-class democratic rights? Presumably to the individuals and groups mentioned as responsible for weakening the Nixon government. In their entirety, these were Congress, which was confronting Nixon in "a head-on clash"; fired special prosecutor Archibald Cox; the "news media, which like Cox have been relentlessly hounding Nixon's trail"; the American Bar Association; and Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, Judge John Sirica, and acting Attorney General Robert Bork.

Were they not blinded by their own rhetoric, probably even the Healyites would be able to see that their list would hardly constitute a very effectual leadership of an antidictatorial movement even if there *were* a dictatorship, such as they describe, to oppose and even if these groups had the inclination to oppose it.

We may anticipate that, had she been aware of the contradiction in the Workers League position on this question, Farrow would have attempted to explain it away by reference to more powerful bourgeois forces behind the opposition to Nixon, basing herself on the major split that the Healyites claim to have discerned in the U.S. ruling class.

Has Rockefeller Lost His Voice?

There are of course at different times disputes of varying intensity within the U. S. ruling class. As I noted in the December 17 article to which Farrow takes such exception, the only question on which the ruling class has a completely monolithic view is the desirability of maintaining its own power.

Such disputes as arise generally concern merely tactical questions, important as these may be. Consequently the groupings in these ruling-class debates tend to be fluid. The alignments in a debate on Indochina policy, for example, are not automatically duplicated in ruling-class discussions on policy in the Arab East or on dealing with the Watergate scandal.

Neither is it possible to draw a one-to-one correspondence between the different positions in these tactical debates and specific economic groupings. The holdings of the major ruling-class families are often so diversified that a policy that reduces the value of one portfolio may increase the value of another. In addition to oil, Rockefeller family holdings include agriculture, real estate, banking, rubber, textiles, etc. The Mellon family has major holdings in at least 100 companies. When their profits from Chrysler Corporation (automobile) stock dropped as a result of the oil shortage, their profits from Gulf Oil rose. Similarly, the Du Pont family, in addition to numerous other interests, has major holdings in both General Motors and Phillips Petroleum.

Thus it is not surprising that tactical disputes in the ruling class may find members of the same family holding opposing positions. In the November 1973 issue of the *International Socialist Review*, Dick Roberts cites the example of Charles S. Mott, the largest individual shareholder in General Motors, and his son Stewart Mott. Charles Mott financed the ultrareactionary John Birch Society and Young Americans for Freedom. Stewart Mott is a left liberal who supported George McGovern for president and even contributed money to the anti-war movement.

Disregarding this reality, the Healyites deduce from Watergate a deep and more or less permanent split in the ruling class along strictly economic lines.

To accept Farrow's description of this supposedly fundamental split would absolve the dominant sector of the U. S. ruling class of responsibility for the policies of the Nixon administration. Before considering this point, it is necessary to dispose of some sleight-of-hand tricks Farrow uses to defend her analysis of the differences in the ruling class.

In the December 17 *Intercontinental Press*, I cited the major contributors to Nixon's 1972 campaign to demonstrate that his backing represented a very broad cross section of the U. S. ruling class—contrary to the position of the Healyites, the Communist party, and the Maoists, all of whom maintain, with slight variations, that Nixon represents the "cowboy" sector (Western and Southern new capital) of the U. S. ruling class in opposition to the "yankees" (the older, primarily Eastern, established capital). Farrow makes a brief bow in the direction of reality by acknowledging:

"It is true that at the time of Nixon's election campaign in 1972, he was supported by the capitalist class as a whole."

However, the Healyites consider it bad polemical style to admit that an opponent could ever be right about *anything*, so Farrow immediately attempts to take back with one hand what she has just given with the other. A rather lengthy quotation is necessary to give the full flavor of the resulting confusion:

"But it cannot be denied that those who have been traditionally closest to Nixon are the get rich quick speculators whose fortunes are largely the result of financial wheeling and dealing.

"This includes men like Bebe Rebozo, Robert Vesco, and Arnholt Smith, all under investigation for their shady financial empires, men who have carefully prepared and financed Nixon's rise to power.

"But it also includes all the major industries that mushroomed during the postwar boom, particularly the most corrupt monopolies like the oil and gas corporations.

"In fact, many of the traditional corporations only backed Nixon's 1972 campaign reluctantly and were practically forced to donate funds."

Nixon has indeed been "traditionally close" to men like Rebozo, Vesco, and Smith. But in 1962 his "cowboy" ties proved insufficient to win him

election as governor of California. Nixon's political career appeared finished at that point precisely because he had not been able to win any enduring support from broader layers of the capitalist class. At that point he abandoned his California base and started over again in New York: as a law partner of John Mitchell, Nelson Rockefeller's personal attorney.

That Farrow is not totally unaware of this part of Nixon's career is indicated by her attempt, in the third paragraph quoted, to amalgamate the oil and gas monopoly corporations with the Rebozos, Vescos, and Smiths.

Not only the oil interests are amalgamated with the "cowboys," but "all [!] the major industries that mushroomed during the postwar boom." Does Farrow know of any significant number of major industries that did *not* mushroom during the postwar boom? When major industries stagnate or decline, the situation is not called a boom, but a recession or depression.

In attempting to prove her point, Farrow has thus combined the two wings of the ruling class whose mutual antagonism she was trying to demonstrate. This "dialectical" leap is about as useful in explaining Watergate as is Mao Tsetung's dictum "Two merge into one."

Since this is not what she is supposed to prove, Farrow immediately divides one into two again by asserting that the "yankee" corporations were "practically forced" to contribute to Nixon's campaign.

Nixon's fund raisers did round up large sums by methods that in some cases were clearly extortionate. This happened most frequently with corporations or individuals who needed a favorable ruling from some agency or were in trouble with the government. It is precisely newer capital, rather than established capital, that is most likely to find itself in such a position relative to the government, and, in fact, most of the cases of extortion by Nixon fund raisers that have been exposed involved cowboys rather than yankees.

The dairy cooperatives that gave \$400,000 in exchange for a price-support increase were formed only over the last two decades; Howard Hughes, the richest of all the cowboys, had to make a payoff to win Justice Department permission to acquire another hotel; most of the corpora-

tions that admitted illegally donating company funds were cowboy-type firms such as the smaller, independent oil companies. And then there is Robert Vesco, cited by Farrow as the example of the sort of cowboy to whom Nixon is "traditionally closest." Vesco was shaken down for \$250,000 in exchange for promises to help him out of difficulties with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Once the money was paid, Vesco, with reason, obviously felt that he had been double-crossed; while the Nixon gangsters manipulated the SEC to conceal Vesco's contribution to CREEP, they did not stop Vesco from being formally charged with looting the mutual fund company he headed. Yet Farrow would have us believe that operators like Vesco are more influential in the Nixon administration than the established capitalist families.

One outcome of all this confusion is that Farrow comes to the position of apologizing for the yankee capitalists.

"It is also clear [!]," she writes, "that it was the established section of capitalists who made the decision to discredit Nixon by bringing out *every detail* of the Watergate scandal such as the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* newspaper interests." (Emphasis added; grammatical and political confusion in original.)

No, Ms. Farrow, that is not true, no matter how strongly your theories tell you it ought to be true. In the first place, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* were not at all equally involved in breaking the scandal; the *Times* reported very little that had not been reported elsewhere until the scandal had already begun to break out of control.

More importantly, if you really believe that those two papers have brought us or intend to bring us "every detail" of the scandal, then you are laboring under a liberal illusion about the "independence" of the bourgeois press. There are many very significant details about Watergate that have been hushed up by the press and more that will remain so: The use of provocateurs against the anti-war, Black, and socialist movements; what really happened, and on whose orders, at Kent State University; who in Congress was informed about the "secret" bombing of Cambodia; the other activities of the plumbers unit.

These are a few of the examples that spring to mind. Even Farrow could probably think of some more.

The nonsense about the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* is only a prelude to further absurdity. Farrow goes on to tell us that Nixon has excluded the most powerful sectors of the capitalist class from influence over the government:

"Nixon set up a select group of military men and advisors with no traditional ties to the government who now make all decisions.

"The major corporation leaders who



BORK: Healyite candidate for savior of democratic rights.

have always influenced the government through connections with Congress, the courts, and the entire government bureaucracy have now become concerned they have no voice in the government."

If that "concern" really existed, it would be worthy of study as an unusual incidence of mass psychosis affecting the commanding strata of U.S. capitalism. Unfortunately, however, the flight from reality is by the Healyites, not the major capitalists.

It is obvious that if the voice of yankee capital is without influence in the government, then Nixon must be pursuing policies opposed, or at least not approved, by the Rockefeller,

Harrimans, Du Ponts, etc. Which of Nixon's policies would Farrow put in this category? Vietnamization? Détente with Moscow and Peking to hold back revolutions? The attempt to impose a wage freeze on the working class? The arming of Israel? She offers only one specific example of such alleged policy differences:

"Nixon's policy after the election to allow inflation to rise unchecked benefited the new section of capitalists."

We will take a closer look below at the Healyite attempt to relate Watergate to economic matters. Here we need note only two points.

First, Farrow's argument clearly assumes that with a different "policy" the capitalist government *could* control prices. That assumption is part of the stock-in-trade of Keynesianism, but it is not advanced by revolutionists who know the difference between Keynesianism and Marxism.

Second, Nixon's policy of restraining wages so that the working class pays for inflation—a policy followed before as well as after the election—benefited the capitalist class as a whole, not merely the "new section."

According to the February 9 issue of *Business Week*, all U.S. corporations in 1973 raked in profits totaling \$126,500 million—a 29.1 percent increase over the 1972 figure of \$98,000 million. The sector with the greatest increase is of course the oil industry, which is dominated by yankee corporations. Preliminary figures in the February 2 *Business Week* show that the top ten U.S. oil corporations—all of them controlled by yankees—increased their profits from \$5,135.4 million in 1972 to \$7,763.3 million in 1973, a rise of more than 50 percent.

Could the Rockefellers, Mellons, Du Ponts, etc. find any use for an additional "voice" in the government—except to say "thank you"?

But despite all the evidence to the contrary, the Healyites would have us believe that the yankee, or liberal, sectors of the ruling class are not responsible for Nixon's policies, that "they have no voice in the government." That sort of distortion of reality can serve only one political purpose. And that is to justify support for the capitalists on the "outside" against those "inside," those alleged to have sole control over the government.

A Relevant Digression: Maoists Merge Into Democrats

The Healyites would do well to pause a moment and take a look a little further down the road they are traveling. What they would see is another group of ultraleftists, similarly frightened by their own rhetoric, in hot pursuit of the liberal wing of the Democratic party.

The Maoists of the New York weekly *Guardian* differ from the Healyites in that they proclaim Nixon a "fascist" threat rather than a mere run-of-the-mill would-be dictator. With that exception—which is not as significant as it might seem, since the Maoists have no idea of what fascism really is—there is little difference between the analyses provided by the two groups.³

Writing in the February 6 issue of the *Guardian*, Carl Davidson provided another critique of the Trotskyist view of Watergate. In the process he provided a lesson, which it is to be hoped the Healyites will take to heart, of how easily ultraleft "intransigence" transforms itself into opportunism.

Davidson begins with a "left" criticism of the "right opportunists," the *Guardian's* designation for the pro-Moscow CP:

"The SWP would have a point to make, primarily against the revisionists tailing the Democratic party, if its argument rested on the difference between 'imminent danger of fascism' and 'steps toward fascism.' The right opportunists in this country have often exaggerated tactical clashes within bourgeois democracy into 'fascist threats' requiring left support for bourgeois reformists, the most notable of which was supporting Lyndon John-

son against Barry Goldwater in 1964."

Readers who detect in Davidson's argument the implication that a *truly* "imminent danger of fascism" would "require left support of bourgeois reformists" are directly on the mark. In fact, the danger does not have to be very imminent at all to send Davidson wagging his tail behind the liberal Democrats and "right opportunists." After several paragraphs attempting to portray Trotskyists as defenders of Nixon, he writes:

"What the SWP actually demonstrates . . . is that it liquidates the question of fascism entirely under the guise of opposing the hysteria and paranoia fanned by the right opportunists. In this way they fall into the classic swamp pointed out by Georgi Dimitrov in his 1935 speech, 'United Front Against Fascism':

"Before the establishment of a fascist dictatorship, bourgeois governments usually pass through a number of preliminary stages and adopt a number of reactionary measures which directly facilitate the ascension to power of fascism. Whoever does not fight the reactionary measures of the bourgeoisie and the growth of fascism at these preparatory stages is not in a position to prevent the victory of fascism but on the contrary facilitates that victory."

However, the question is not *whether* to fight reactionary measures, which do of course facilitate the tasks of a fascist movement, but *how* to fight them. A real "united front against fascism" was never put into effect by the Stalinists. In Germany, in face of the rise of Hitler, the Stalinists refused to form a united front against fascism. Beginning in 1935, they shifted to the "popular front."

This consisted precisely of what Davidson pretends to criticize the pro-Moscow CP for doing, namely tailing after the "progressive" wing of the bourgeoisie. In the United States this took the form of supporting "liberal" candidates of the Democratic party.

Move over, right opportunists, and make room for the Maoists!

Pentagon and 'Peaceful Coexistence'

Unlike the Maoists, the Healyites have not yet reached the point of openly advocating class collaboration to meet the Nixon "threat." That is not because their analysis is superior, but because they understand less than the Maoists the logic of their position.

But that logic will operate all the more forcefully the more the Healyites hide it from themselves with "left" rhetoric.

The *Bulletin* has already printed "explanations" of U.S. imperialism's actions and of Watergate-related events that are indistinguishable, except for their more hysterical tone, from the liberal apologetics that deny the existence of imperialism and portray the actions of Washington as the responsibility of a few "evil men." In accordance with this liberal view, the Healyites tend to locate these evildoers—except for Nixon himself—in the Pentagon.

In its January 18 issue, for example, the *Bulletin* carried an editorial entitled "The Pentagon Plot Against the Working Class." It began:

"The discovery of a military 'spy ring' within the White House is a warning of the growing danger the working class faces as long as Nixon remains in power.

"The spying by Pentagon officials on Henry Kissinger and other members of the National Security Council and the stealing of classified documents concerns the basic rights of every worker."

The *Bulletin's* explanation of the alleged connection between "the basic rights of every worker" and the protection of classified documents does not improve much on this already unpromising beginning. The editorial goes on to assert that Nixon's détente policy "created great unease within the Pentagon," which eventually concluded that it "could no longer leave the political defense of the system up to the Republican Party." Nixon, the fantasy continues, has been forced into a "new level of collaboration" with the Pentagon as the result of the Watergate scandal:

"The military has acquired enormous power in every section of the government. While they rule together with Nixon now, they will not hesitate, if they feel it necessary, to move independently and establish direct military rule."

Finally, the *Bulletin* assures us that the Pentagon chiefs are considerably more wicked than the civilian politicians:

"It was this military which plotted the coup d'état in Greece which brought another dictatorship to power and in Chile assisted the army to overthrow a democratically elected government, and then launched a reign of terror against the working class. This same

3. The question of "fascism" is discussed at some length in my December 17 article. Farrow's article contains one passage that seems to indicate that the Healyites are coming closer to the Maoist and pro-Moscow CP view that Nixon is a "fascist" threat, although the imprecision of Healyite rhetoric makes it difficult to be certain. The passage is:

"The Social Democrats based their policies on a firm belief that compromise and reforms were possible and that capitalist expansion would continue forever.

"Thus on the eve of Hitler's rise to power, they refused to recognize the Fascist danger and relied on a section of the bourgeoisie to stop Hitler.

"This is the very same basis upon which the SWP now stands."

military has now considered overthrowing Nixon."

It would be pointless to ask why the *Bulletin* then regards it as so important that Nixon be forced to resign, thus clearing a path for the military conspirators; the questioner would only be lectured that he or she failed to understand "dialectics."

Of more interest is the *Bulletin's* assertion that Nixon's détente policies caused "great unease" in the Pentagon. The Healyites do not have an inside line to the thinking of the military chiefs; the assertion is based on nothing more than acceptance of the liberal view that sectors of the U. S. ruling class sincerely desire "peaceful coexistence" with the Soviet Union. The corollary of this view is that other sectors, and especially the troglodytes in the Pentagon, are constantly attempting to frustrate these good intentions. The Healyites, to be sure, go further even than most liberals—or writers of science fiction—in claiming that the generals have lost faith in the reliability of the Republican party as a defender of the system.

And in order to "prove" one absurdity with another, the *Bulletin* editors assert that it was the Pentagon that "plotted" coups in Chile and Greece.

In reality, if it were important to determine which organ of the U. S. government carried out imperialism's instructions in those countries, most of the dirty work was probably done by the CIA rather than the Pentagon. But the Healyites' major mistake here is not naming the wrong instrument but confusing the instrument with the class that wields it.

For Marxists, it is elementary that the operations of the various branches of the state apparatus—whether CIA, Pentagon, Congress, president, or what have you—serve, and receive their direction from, the dominant sectors of the ruling class. But in the Healyite explanations, Nixon, the military, courts, etc. are treated as completely independent. On the increasingly rare occasions when the Healyites are reminded that there is a connection between governments and class interests, they get the connection exactly backward. We have already seen an example of that in Farrow's argument that Nixon's rise to the presidency means the dominance of cowboy over yankee capital rather than Nixon's acceptability to the dominant sectors of the ruling class.

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U. S. interventions in Chile, Greece, or any other country, let it be repeated, are the responsibility first of all of the dominant sectors of U. S. finance capital. Placing the *primary* blame on the Pentagon—or CIA or any other governmental organ—accepts the liberal argument that imperialism will cease to operate if "good" capitalists replace the "bad" capitalists in the government.

How They Got That Way, or Who Let the Bogeyman Into the Ivory Tower?

The Healyites' willy-nilly adaptation to reformism and liberalism stems from causes going back long before Watergate appeared on the scene. In attempting to misrepresent the positions of the SWP, Farrow inadvertently hints at the source of the Healyites' present rightward course. She writes: "For years, the Socialist Workers Party turned its back on the trade union movement and the struggles of the working class and devoted itself



ROCKEFELLER: What could he find to say except "thank you"?

to building mass middle class protests around the Vietnam War, women's rights, and similar issues.

"The fight of the Workers League for a labor party, for the political independence of the working class was ridiculed by the SWP because in their

view, the working people were hopelessly reactionary."

Once again Farrow provides evidence that *Bulletin* readers are expected to be unfamiliar with the positions of those it attacks. The SWP does regard some things as "hopelessly reactionary" but the working class is not among them. One of them is the notion, more popular with frustrated petty-bourgeois individuals than with workers, that "the Vietnam War, women's rights, and similar issues" are the sole concern of the "middle class" and have nothing to do with the working class.

The SWP is justly proud of its role in the antiwar, nationalist, and feminist movements against capitalist oppression. These struggles demand the support of any organization claiming to be revolutionary because they objectively weaken the class enemy.

Moreover, the Trotskyists have recognized that these movements would have profound effects within the labor movement: speeding the molecular processes of radicalization, drawing sectors of organized labor into political struggles independent of the capitalist parties, and providing impetus for the formation of rank-and-file bodies (Black caucuses, women's caucuses) in opposition to the bureaucracies within the unions.

The Healyites, on the other hand, have consistently abstained from these movements, even evading the elementary duty of defending Vietnam against U. S. imperialism. Their "participation" in the antiwar movement, for example, consisted of occasional appearances at antiwar conferences—where they would sit in a tightly grouped phalanx to prevent the penetration of opposing ideas—to demand that the movement adopt the Workers League program. After the predictable refusal by the conferences to accept parental responsibility for such an orphan, the Healyites would return home to write *Bulletin* articles accusing the antiwar movement in general and the SWP in particular of betraying the Vietnamese.

The "fight of the Workers League for a labor party, for the political independence of the working class" is richly deserving of whatever ridicule it has received for the simple reason that it has never consisted of anything except sham and posturing.

Unable to understand what is going on around them, the Healyites have

for years confined their activities almost exclusively to the production and circulation of the *Bulletin*. In order to reassure the faithful that the Workers League was not being left behind by historical events that refused to conform to its economist views, the *Bulletin* began blossoming with predictions that the "real" proletarian battles, the "real" crisis of imperialism, etc. were only just around the corner.

But if you predict an event week after week and month after month, it eventually becomes necessary either to admit that your timing is a bit awry—at the very least—or to declare that the prediction has come true. The Healyites chose the latter alternative and thus caught themselves up in a spiral of constantly escalating rhetoric—to the point that nearly every issue of the *Bulletin* now declares that some part of the United States is in a state of "civil war" or that a strike poses the question of the working class immediately taking state power.

By the time the Watergate scandal began to unfold, the Healyites had convinced themselves that the fantasies of the *Bulletin* mirrored reality. Watergate was incorporated into their system of illusions as the culmination of the long-awaited "real" crisis. After all the *Bulletin* reports of "civil war," it would have been an anticlimax to declare that the scandal represented anything less than the imminence of "dictatorship."

Here was the "real" crisis suddenly before them; the bourgeoisie was about to impose a brutal dictatorship; and the Workers League was obviously too small and insignificant a group to prevent the catastrophe. They had nowhere to turn—except to Congress, George Meany, and the American Bar Association.

Madness in Their Method

The Healyite fantasies developed a life of their own because they were never submitted to the test of practice. (The avoidance of such a test is one of the things that makes abstention attractive to the Workers League.) Consequently, events in the real world have little power to influence them. The obvious inapplicability of the Healyite predictions and explanations are dismissed as mere misleading "appearance" that is contradicted by a hidden essence whose real meaning is known only to the Healyites.

Thus Farrow, in her attack on the

Trotskyist analysis of Watergate, never deals with the concrete facts on which such an analysis must be based. Instead, she tries to conjure them away, to give them a label that will make them "inoperative." In order to "prove" the existence of Nixon's 48-hour dictatorship, she writes:

"The method of Myers and the entire SWP is to begin with appearance which is viewed as unconnected and separate from every other appearance. . . .

"With these methods, all the SWP can do is to recognize the appearance only when they are directly confronted with it and then comment on it after the fact. They do not seek to grasp the contradictory content within every appearance."

The Healyites long ago forgot the difference between "grasping" the meaning of events and *imposing* preconceived notions upon them. Farrow exposes more of the Healyite "method" than she herself realizes when she writes:

"The same methods lead Myers and Evans to reject our statement that a split has developed within the capitalist class. They see no split because they deny any economic crisis.

"A split in the ruling class is important because it expresses the whole breakup of capitalism and the paralysis and indecision of the capitalists on how to deal with the working class.

"In this sense, such a split is a necessary precondition for revolution for it exposes the weakness of the government and encourages the working class to move forward against it."

Farrow will undoubtedly find the idea difficult to comprehend, but the real reason that Myers and Evans reject the Healyite notion of a ruling class irremediably split wide open is that such a split, occurring in a real ruling class in the real world, would inevitably produce concrete effects as a consequence. For instance, the differences that arose in the ruling class during the Vietnam war over what tactical course to follow led to a sharp public debate. During World War II, the ruling classes in some countries split over whether to support the Axis powers or the Allied camp, leading to the formation of Quisling-type governments and "governments in exile" like the one headed by deGaulle.

The Healyites habitually dismiss this recourse to concrete evidence as "em-

piricism." For them, reality can impose no limits on "theory." On the contrary, "theory" modifies, transforms, or totally does away with material facts according to the Healyites' factional needs of the moment.

The Healyites' profoundly *idealist* method is evident in Farrow's argument that Myers and Evans, if they only accepted the Healyite view of economics, would then "see" a split in the ruling class that is otherwise invisible. There is no appeal to evidence, to material facts, to justify their view of a fundamental split in the U.S. ruling class, but simply the assertion that Healyite economic "theory" proves its existence regardless of reality.

Moreover, Farrow goes on to *derive* additional "facts" from her logical processes. The ruling-class "split," she writes, "expresses the whole breakup of capitalism and the paralysis and indecision of the capitalists." (Emphasis added.) One would think that the "whole breakup of capitalism" would produce at least a few easily observable symptoms, but no licensed Healyite theoretician would be so "empirical" as to cite them; it is sufficient to develop the proper "theory" in order to reduce capitalism to ruins.

Finally, Farrow brings out the real clincher: "such a split is a necessary precondition for revolution"! It has been a Marxist truism for a century that deep divisions in the ruling class are characteristic of a prerevolutionary situation. Farrow idealistically stands the truth on its head: The situation in the United States is prerevolutionary (the *Bulletin* finds the situation to be one of "civil war"); *therefore* a split in the ruling class exists.

Crisis in Healyite Economics

The Healyite penchant for using "theory" to turn away from reality finds what is probably its sharpest expression in economic theory. Motivated primarily by factional considerations, the Healyites over the years have developed an analysis of imperialist economics that stands Marxist theory on its head, making circulation—and particularly the role of gold, money, and credit—rather than production, the primary determinant of the economic cycle. Dick Roberts provided a detailed description of the Healyite revision of Marxist economics in the May 7, 14, and 21, 1973, issues of *Intercontinental*

Press. Here we can consider Healyite economics only as it relates to their view of Watergate.

Farrow frankly admits that the Healyite view of Nixon's "dictatorship" is derived from their theory of an "economic crisis." Defending the *Bulletin's* contention at the time of the Saturday Night Massacre that Nixon "has moved to establish a one-man dictatorship," Farrow writes:

"This assessment was based above all on an understanding of the new stage that had been reached in the economic crisis. Without this understanding, the depth of the political changes in preparation cannot be grasped.

"Watergate exploded at a time when every capitalist country is plunged into recession, uncontrollable inflation, and unemployment not seen since the 1930's."

Even bourgeois economists have noted increasing signs of a recessionary trend — one, moreover, that could lead to simultaneous recessions in all the major capitalist countries. The Healyite contribution to Marxist economic theory is to declare that all the long-term trends of capitalism have, at all times and all places, already worked themselves out to completion. As with other Healyite positions, no analysis of reality is required; the assertion that "every capitalist country is plunged into recession" is sufficient to wipe out the 1973 increase of 29 percent in U.S. corporate profits and any other facts that contradict the Healyite "theory."

Even the Healyite faithful must find it a little difficult to understand the precise connection between Watergate and the "economic crisis," since the Healyite press in both Britain and the United States has been trumpeting the existence of this same crisis for a decade. The "new stage" of the "crisis" doesn't help much either, since that phrase is regularly used to freshen up the previous week's headlines.

The polestar of the *Bulletin*, Gerry Healy himself, proclaimed in August 1966 that "world imperialism is drifting rapidly towards its most severe economic crisis since the end of the second world war." In March 1968 Healy announced "a new stage of the world capitalist crisis." Healy wrote at that time, ". . . it has become impossible for the capitalist class and their representatives to halt the present crisis."

If words mean anything, the "new

stage of the world capitalist crisis" must have been with us continuously since March 1968. Why did it take Farrow nearly six years to notice this important development? And more importantly, if the "new stage" of the "economic crisis" is the cause of the Watergate scandal, why didn't Watergate occur in 1968? Perhaps a typographical error has distorted Farrow's meaning. Could it be that she intended to say "the new stage of the new stage that had been reached in the economic crisis"?

In fact, according to the *Bulletin*, there was still another "new stage" that intervened between Healy's "new stage" of March 1968 and Farrow's "new stage" (of the new stage) in October 1973. In its March 19, 1973, issue, an editorial declared: "Because exchange value can no longer be realized, the capitalists are forced to cease production entirely."

Thus it seems that Nixon, according to the Healyite press, was moved to establish a 48-hour "dictatorship" by the new stage of the new stage of the new stage that had been reached in the economic crisis. Moreover, although it has not been mentioned in the *Bulletin*, it would be reasonable to assume that after the second new stage, in which production ceased entirely, there must have been another stage of revival before the third new stage in which capitalism again collapsed "on a scale not seen since the 1930s."

Arrested During Anti-Tanaka Demonstrations

Threaten Death to 42 Indonesian Protesters

Admiral Sudomo, chief of staff of the Indonesian security agency, Kopkamtib, announced on February 21 that forty-two students and professors, who had been arrested in January during the massive protests against Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka, would be tried on charges of subversion. About 800 others who had been arrested were released, he said.

According to the February 23 *Tokyo Daily Yomiuri*, Sudomo said that the forty-two face death sentences, life imprisonment, or twenty-year prison terms if convicted, because

Even within the Healyite fantasy world, the "economic crisis" turns out to be of no use whatsoever in explaining Watergate. Last May, for example, the British Healyite paper *Workers Press* announced that because of the "economic crisis" a "powerful section of the American ruling class [was] growing more and more determined that he [Nixon] must go." The *Bulletin*, meanwhile, was proclaiming, on the basis of the same "economic crisis," that "all sections of the ruling class are beginning to come to Nixon's defense."

The real function of the Healyite "economic crisis" is to justify their hysteria and adaptation to liberalism and reformism. Accusing the SWP of complacency, Farrow writes:

"This complacency is the result of the SWP's refusal to begin with the development of the economic crisis, its contradictory character. Without an understanding of this crisis, as it changes at every point, the perspectives of the party became hollow propaganda with no relation to the party's day to day work."

For the Healyites, "day to day work" consists of distributing the *Bulletin's* strident appeals for someone — anyone — to stave off impending "dictatorship." Unless the Workers League comes down to earth, learns to analyze reality correctly in accordance with the Marxist method, and abandons its sectarian, abstentionist line, its only perspective will be a further reformist degeneration. □

The Struggle for Independence of Comoro Islands

By Kamaroudine Abdallah

The Comoro Islands, situated in the entry of the Mozambique Channel, early attracted the attention of Western capitalists hungry for new markets, raw materials, and new routes to "the gold of Asia."

Double-crossing the English and Portuguese, who used to lay anchor in Comorian harbors to take on food and water, the French colonialists tricked the local ruler, the sultan, into signing "protectorate" accords with France in 1841. This enabled the French military to intervene directly in internal affairs, crushing any popular revolt that challenged the royal, feudal, or early colonial rule. It took only a few years for the French colonialists to exert full control on all four of the main islands and initiate the long colonial night.

In 1912, French imperialism violated the protectorate accords and officially proclaimed the country a colony of France, to be ruled by French colonialists in Madagascar. The people of the Comoro Islands have seen various changes in the form of colonial rule: 1946, French Union and administrative autonomy; 1952, customs autonomy; 1956, reorganization of the colonial administration; 1958, French Community; 1961, internal autonomy. But through all these changes, the reality of colonization and exploitation remained.

Colonial rule worked drastic changes in all aspects of Comorian life. The peasants were violently dispossessed of their land. Comorian culture, a vestige of a brilliant civilization, was systematically ruined. French colonialism replaced the preexisting educational structures with a policy of maintaining ignorance and obscurantism, thus pushing the people into passivity and fatalism. Industries that existed before the coming of the French, such as sugar, soap, oil, etc., were disrupted in order to open a market for French products. Heavy taxes were levied on the peasants in order to bring them into the money economy.

After nearly a century and a half of colonial domination, the scene is one

of desolation, misery, hunger, and obscurantism. More than half of the cultivable land is in the hands of feudalists and colonial enterprises.

Plantations exploit hundreds of workers to produce sisal, cocoa, coffee, ilang ilang, vanilla, and jasmine. The ilang ilang and jasmine plantations provide the entire French perfume industry with more than 80 percent of its raw materials. These semi-industrial perfume plants are favored at the expense of rice and other essential products, causing conditions of hunger and famine. The forests are being denuded for the benefit of colonial joineries and related activities.

To deprive the people of any possibility of mobilization, French colonialism, making use of a few local feudal elements, has maintained a situation of political absolutism, in which any organization or press was banned. Up to the 1960s, the country was completely isolated from the rest of the world.

In the field of education, the colonial pressure has been tremendous. It was only in the 1960s that the only lycée was opened, enabling Comorian students to enter universities in France.

This combination of hunger, unemployment, illiteracy, and political absolutism caused the early heavy emigration of Comorians to Madagascar, Zanzibar, Réunion, Tanganyika, Kenya, Mozambique, etc. Those who stayed behind were obliged to submit to exploitation and oppression.

But since 1841, the wind of resistance has never ceased to blow in the country. There were numerous peasant revolts, land occupations, and refusals to pay taxes. All these manifestations of resistance were suppressed by the French military forces.

After the second imperialist world war, French colonialism had to make concessions to the vast movements for liberation in the colonial countries while its specialists were planning new methods of domination and exploitation. After many "sophisticated" changes, our country was granted "in-

ternal autonomy" in 1961.

This was a mystification worked out by de Gaulle, the aim of which was to appease the anger of the colonized masses by installing local puppets while the effective power still rested in the hands of the French government and its representative, the high commissioner. There were no more French colonies—only "overseas French territories" or "départements" of France: Comoro Islands, Djibouti, New Caledonia, Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Tahiti, Wallis and Futuna, etc. On paper, there was supposed to be a change, but the Comorian people, in their day-to-day existence, were still subjected to the same exploitation, the same oppression.

In the early 1960s, the first strike of the only lycée was organized. It proved to be a spark on a dry prairie, heralding a vast anticolonial movement.

The French responded by stepping up their policy of divide and rule. Using their lackeys like Marcel-Henry and others, they started a separatist movement in one of the islands, Mayotte, thus contradicting the French government's earlier recognition of the country as a "united country" inhabited by the same people, with the same language, history, religion, customs, etc.

In February 1968, the violence of the repression perpetrated by the French paratroopers, police, and Foreign Legion against the second lycée strike brought the people into the streets. Faced by a similar problem in the metropolis, the French government was forced to make concessions.

It was in this atmosphere that the first political organizations appeared in the country:

1. Union Démocratique des Comores (UDC—Democratic Union of the Comoros), grouping the feudal elements and other lackeys of French imperialism. It opposes independence.

2. Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Comorien (RDPC—Democratic Alliance of the Comorian People), formed by the new generation of opportunist intellectuals interested in the

crumbs of the colonial cake. Its goal is to replace the feudalists and exploit the status quo.

3. Parti Socialiste des Comores (Pasoco)—Socialist party of the Comoros, formed by peasants and some intellectuals. It favors national liberation from the colonial yoke and its lackeys.

Outside the country, the already existing Comorian organizations strengthened their anticolonialist positions. The Comorian Students Association in France (ASEC) decided to link its destiny with that of the exploited masses. On the other hand, the Mouvement de Libération Nationale des Comores (Molinaco—National Liberation Movement of the Comoros), which was formed abroad in 1963, decided to remain outside the country, carrying on anticolonialist propaganda, despite the possibility of establishing itself at home after 1968.

Radicalizing their struggle, the people began to win back some of the rights that they had so long been deprived of, notably the right of association and demonstration.

The issue of independence clearly separated two opposing groups. On the one side, Pasoco and ASEC are militating for immediate independence. On the other, opposition to independence comes from UDC, RPDC, and other reactionary groups such as Umma-Mranda and Mouvement Marcel-Henry, which play the colonial game of sterile competition for parliamentary seats.

At its sixth annual congress in September 1971, ASEC answered positively Pasoco's call for the regroupment of all patriotic forces in a United Patriotic Front (FPU).

The years 1971-73 saw extreme political unrest. The reactionaries were driven to form a union to resist the anticolonial tide that was sweeping the country. In order to control the situation, the alliance of reactionary parties (UDC-RPDC) adopted in the local *chambre des députés* a "Resolution for Independence."

The reactionaries had not really changed their position. They were trying to implement the French neocolonialist strategy of an "independence" that would be gained "in friendship and cooperation with France." Molinaco, ignoring the demand for independence, revealed its opportunist face by joining the reactionary alliance.

The real nature of the scheme was revealed in the "Communiqué Commun" on Comorian independence. The Communiqué Commun was chiefly the work of the Elysée and was endorsed by the Comorian reactionaries in Paris on July 15, 1973. This perfidious document put forward French imperialism's conditions for nominal Comorian independence: 1) a delay of five years (in order to permit the strengthening of French imperialism's military, economic, and political base); 2) an island-by-island referendum on independence (in order to divide the country).

No mention was made of such vital problems as the French military forces.

The communiqué has met massive condemnation by the Comorian people. When Bernard Stasi, the French colonial secretary, visited the country last September 23-24, there were vast hostile demonstrations. All sectors of the economy were paralyzed. Dock workers, workers in the colonial enterprises, construction and building workers, taxi drivers, schoolteachers, and students of the lycée all went on strike.

After a bitter clash between the striking lycée students and the French forces, many students and other patriots were jailed. The government closed the lycée and created an atmosphere

of intimidation (curfews, etc.). But when the detainees went on a long hunger strike, the authorities retreated before the indignation and anger of the whole population and released the prisoners.

The social, economic, and political problems of the country obviously cannot be solved by the reactionary alliance RDPC-UDC-Molinaco because it is linked with the main oppressor of the Comorian people, French colonialism. The United Patriotic Front of Pasoco and ASEC is convinced that national liberation will be the work of thousands of exploited Comorian people and not of feudal parties or parties under petty-bourgeois leadership. Real independence, it believes, must ensure the implementation of the following conditions:

—Cutting off any institutional organic link with the colonial power, and the defense of our territorial integrity.

—Denunciation of secret military accords or any accord permitting the establishment of French military forces in the Comoro Islands.

—Withdrawal of all French forces and political police.

—Liquidation of all commercial and economic monopolies and denunciation of any accord linking the Comoro Islands to France and the European Common Market. □

Spain

Demonstrations Protest Execution of Puig

Demonstrations took place in several European cities in protest of the Spanish government's execution of Catalan anarchist Salvador Puig Antich, a member of the Iberian Liberation Movement. Puig was executed March 2 by garroting, a form of execution dating from the Spanish Inquisition. The sentence was carried out despite numerous appeals for clemency, both in Spain and abroad.

In Barcelona, where the execution took place, demonstrations were held three days in a row. According to the March 5 *Le Monde*, two demonstrations took place there the day of the execution. On March 3, more than 1,500 people, including several

priests, demonstrated in front of the cathedral.

The following day, according to a dispatch in the March 5 *New York Times*, demonstrations took place in Barcelona's two universities and in the city streets throughout the day. "When several hundred students marched down the Ramblas, one of the city's main promenades, riot police fired into the air to disperse them," the *Times* reported.

University students also demonstrated March 4 in Madrid, where mounted riot police invaded the campus to halt the protest.

In France, several thousand demonstrated near the Spanish Embassy in

Paris March 2, and a demonstration of fifty was held the same day in Toulouse, near the Spanish border. In Brussels, a demonstration of sev-

eral hundred was held outside the Spanish Embassy March 2.

In Switzerland, a protest march of 1,500 was held in Geneva March 4,

and 1,200 took part in a demonstration in Lausanne March 6. A demonstration of 150 was held in Berne March 9. □

DOCUMENTS

Roy Medvedev's Review of 'The Gulag Archipelago'

[A complete translation of the Russian dissident historian Roy Medvedev's assessment of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's work *Gulag Archipelago* is given below. Long excerpts from this article, the Russian original of which is dated January 27, were published in the February 7 *New York Times*.

[Although many of the deletions seem to be appropriate for reducing it to a more easily publishable length and some are rather unimportant, the *New York Times*, overall, obscured the political message of the article. There were also some mistranslations, but these were less critical.

[The *Times* version omits in particular the passages where the Russian oppositionist tries to approach the problems of the October Revolution and the civil war in a concrete way and from a revolutionary point of view.

[Regardless of the validity of many of Medvedev's specific historical criticisms, he does try to put himself in the place of the revolutionary leaders of 1917-22, something that was no doubt quite incomprehensible for the *New York Times* editors.

[In a passage also omitted by the *Times*, Medvedev himself admits the difficulty of criticizing the decisions of the Bolshevik leadership that were made under the most dramatic conditions. An outside observer could add that this difficulty is compounded by the fact that much of the essential source material on the history of the Russian revolution became taboo after the triumph of Stalinism and is unavailable to independent-minded Soviet researchers.

[Some of Medvedev's facts and assertions, thus, might be questioned. But what is most interesting is his attempt, looking back over decades

of the most brutal and indiscriminate repression—he says the greatest suffering in the thousand-year history of Russia—to achieve a positive and realistic revolutionary-socialist perspective. The *Times*'s excerpting of his article reduces all this to a few generalities.

[Medvedev's perspective is still more obscured by the *Times*'s omission of his program for socialist democracy.

[The reemergence of Marxist thought and revolutionary tendencies is likely to be a difficult and contradictory process in the Soviet Union. But Medvedev's article is interesting as an example of the revival of honest thinking about the problems of revolution and socialist construction after decades in which virtually all political thought and discussion were stamped out by ruthless bureaucratic repression.

[The translation from the Russian and footnotes, except as indicated, are by *Intercontinental Press*. The passages omitted in the *New York Times* version are enclosed in brackets, ex-

cept for the section entitled "Solzhenitsyn on Krylenko," which was suppressed in its entirety.

* * *

General Assessment

In this essay I have tried to express only brief preliminary thoughts about Solzhenitsyn's new book, not only because the author has published only the first of three or four volumes.

Solzhenitsyn's work is crammed with fearful facts. It also contains a number of assertions that are hard to believe, but these are far fewer. What has already been published is too considerable to grasp and to evaluate all at once. In this volume are depicted concretely the strange and tragic fates of hundreds of persons, which were, however, typical of past decades.

The book is full of deep and true thoughts and observations, and some that are not so true but were born of the monstrous sufferings of tens of millions of people, sufferings never



ROY MEDVEDEV and ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN

before endured by our people in the many centuries of their history.

None ever came out of the awful "Archipelago" of Stalinist camps and prisons the same as they went in, not only in their age and health but in their ideas about life and people. I think that few people would get up from reading this book the same as when they turned to its first page. In this respect, I can think of nothing in Russian or world literature to compare with Solzhenitsyn's book.

Facts on Which Solzhenitsyn's Account Is Based

A certain I. Solov'ev wrote in the January 14 *Pravda* that the facts given in Solzhenitsyn's book were not genuine and were either the product of a sick imagination or of a cynical falsification by the author. This, of course, is not so.

I cannot accept certain of Solzhenitsyn's assessments or conclusions. But it must be said emphatically that all the basic facts in his book, and especially the details about the life and torments of prisoners from their arrest until their death (or in rarer cases, until their release) are completely authentic.

Of course, in background research of such scope, which is based not only on the impressions of the author but on the testimony and first- and second-hand accounts of more than 200 former prisoners, it is inevitable that there will be some inaccuracies. And that is all the more true because Solzhenitsyn wrote his book under the most clandestine conditions and was unable to discuss it, even with many of his closest friends, before it was published. But such inaccuracies are insignificant in the context of such a considerable work.

I think, for example, that the extent of the expulsions from Leningrad in 1934-35 (the Kirov wave) was less than Solzhenitsyn indicates. Tens of thousands of people were expelled. But not a quarter of the two million people living in the city. But I do not have exact figures. I am only going by fragmentary testimony and my own impressions (I lived in Leningrad for more than fifteen years).

It is hard to believe the story Solzhenitsyn got from an unknown in-

formant that Ordzhonikidze¹ used to talk to old engineers with two pistols lying on the right and left of his desk.

In order to track down old Tsarist officials (and it was not even looking for all of them but mainly those from judicial bodies and the police), the GPU hardly needed to rely on random notes by random people. All of these lists could have been found in local archives and the reference books that were available.

I think that Solzhenitsyn exaggerates the number of peasants exiled in the years of collectivization (he says there were fifteen million). But if to the victims of those years we add the peasants who died of famine in 1932-33 (there were no less than three or four million in Ukraine alone), then you can come up with a figure higher than the one Solzhenitsyn gives.

After Stalin's death not ten but about 100 leading officials in the MGB/MVD² were jailed or shot. (In certain cases there were no open hearings.) But all the same, this is a tiny number in comparison with the criminals in the *organy*³ who went free or even got various high posts.

In 1936-37, Bukharin was no longer a member of the Politburo, contrary to what Solzhenitsyn says, but only an alternate member of the Central Committee.

But these and some other inaccuracies are absolutely immaterial for such a tremendous work of background research as Solzhenitsyn has done. On the other hand, Solzhenitsyn's book has other "shortcomings," about which he himself writes in his introduction.

He was not able to see everything, to remember everything, or to figure out everything. He writes, for example, about the rounding up of amnestied and repatriated Cossacks in the mid-1920s. But still more terrible in its consequences was the campaign of "de-Cossackification" and massive terror in the Don and Ural areas in the winter and spring of 1919.

1. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, one of the organizers of the Five Year Plan, commissar of heavy industries under Stalin.

2. Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Besopastnosti/Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del; Ministry of State Security/Ministry of the Interior.

3. The word *organy* (organs) is widely used to designate state security organs.

This campaign lasted "only" a little more than two months, but it prolonged the civil war, with all its excesses, no less than a year, giving the White armies dozens of new cavalry regiments.

[And 500 hostages were shot in Petrograd, which the *Ezhenedel'nik VCHK*⁴ records in only two lines. To describe all this, many books are needed. I am confident that they will be written.]

While *Pravda* tried to show that the facts given by Solzhenitsyn were not genuine, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* tried on January 16 to convince its readers that there was nothing new in the book. That is untrue.

Although I have been studying Stalinism for more than ten years, I found many things in Solzhenitsyn's book that I did not know before. Except for former prisoners, Soviet citizens, even those who remember the twentieth and twenty-second party congresses of the Communist party, hardly know one-tenth of the facts Solzhenitsyn writes about. And young people do not know even a one-hundredth part.

Solzhenitsyn on the Vlasovites

Many newspapers write that Solzhenitsyn justifies, whitewashes, or even praises the Vlasovites.⁵

This is a deliberate and malicious distortion. Solzhenitsyn writes in the *Archipelago* that the Vlasovites became the pitiful hirelings of the Hitlerites, that the "Vlasovites could be tried for treason" (page 249), that they took arms from the enemy and when they

4. The Weekly Report of the Vserossiiskaia Chrezvychainaia Komissia po Borbe s Kontrevolutsiei i Sabotazhem (All-Russian Commissariat for Fighting Counterrevolution and Sabotage).

5. General A. A. Vlasov, a Red Army commander captured by the Nazis, was persuaded by his captors to recruit fellow prisoners of war to form a Russian unit in the German army. His example was utilized a great deal in Nazi propaganda. As for the ex-Vlasovites' opinion of Solzhenitsyn's portrayal, one view appeared in the March 2 issue of *Novoe Russkoe Slovo*, an emigre daily published in New York. What was most distressing to the writer of this article, Riurik Dudin, was that Solzhenitsyn described the Vlasovites as a band of desperate and disoriented men rather than principled anti-Communists.

got to the front they fought with the desperation of the condemned. Solzhenitsyn himself, along with his battery, was almost annihilated in East Prussia by Vlasovite fire. But Solzhenitsyn does not simplify the problem of the "Vlasovites" [and similar units of the fascist army].

In the many "waves" of Stalinist repressions, many of us have our own special tragedies.

[I know, for example, that for A. Tvardovskii it was the "de-Kulakification"—which claimed the life of his father, a hard-working peasant from the poor stratum of that class, a recent veteran of the Red Army, a defender of Soviet power, who was exiled to the other side of the Urals with his entire family. The only one to survive was his oldest son, who had happened to go into the city to study. That was the one who was to become our great poet, A. Tvardovskii. And he once had to deny his father. He wrote about all that in his last poem, "It Is Right to Remember."

[For my family, the tragedy was the repressions of 1937 and 1938, in particular the purge of the commanders and commissars of the Red Army. My father, a commissar of a division and a teacher in the military-political academy of the RKKA,⁶ was one of those who were arrested and perished. Those people were totally devoted to Soviet power, socialism, and the Bolshevik party. As participants in the civil war, they were romantic heroes in my eyes, and I never believed that they were "enemies of the people."]


For Solzhenitsyn this deep, personal tragedy was not his own arrest but the cruel and terrible fate of millions of Soviet prisoners of war, Solzhenitsyn's contemporaries, the generation of October, who made up a large part of our professional army in June of 1941.

This army was shattered and surrounded in the first days and weeks of the war because of the criminal miscalculations of Stalin, who was unable to prepare either the army or the country for war; because of Stalin's absurd and stupid orders on the first

6. From 1918 to 1946 the Red Army was officially called the *Raboche-Krestianskaia Krasnaia Armiia*, the Workers and Peasants Red Army.

day of the war and then abandoning his post in the following days of the first week of the war; and because of the lack of experienced commanders and commissars, who had been liquidated by Stalin.

More than three million soldiers and officers landed in prison camps, and one million others were later imprisoned in "pressure cookers" near Vyazma, near Kharkov, on the Kerch Peninsula, and near Volkhov. But the Stalin government betrayed its soldiers even when they were in captivity, by refusing to recognize Russia's signature on the international convention on prisoners of war. As a result of this, no aid went to Soviet pris-



SOLZHENITSYN: Doesn't simplify problem of Soviet defectors to Wehrmacht.

oners through the International Red Cross, and they were condemned to die of hunger in the German concentration camps.

Those who survived were betrayed again by Stalin after the victory when they were all arrested and went to swell the population of the "Gulag Archipelago." This triple betrayal of Stalin's soldiers is what Solzhenitsyn considers the worst, gravest crime of the Stalinist regime [—a crime unprecedented in the thousand-year history of Russian governments. "I felt," Solzhenitsyn writes, "that this history of

several million Russian prisoners would hold me forever, the way a pin holds a cockroach." (Page 245.)]

[Only a tenth part of our prisoners joined the Vlasovite units, the police units, the work battalions, the ranks of the "voluntary" helpers of the Wehrmacht. The majority of those who joined sincerely hoped that once they had gotten food and arms, they could go over to the side of the Soviet army or the partisans. These were, as it soon turned out, false hopes. The chances for escape were too few.]

Solzhenitsyn does not justify and praise those desperate and unfortunate people. But he asks the tribunal of their descendants to take into consideration certain extenuating circumstances. These young and often illiterate fellows, mostly from the countryside, were demoralized by the defeat of their army; and they were repeatedly told in the concentration camps: "Stalin has denounced you" and "Stalin doesn't give a damn about you." [And they could see very well that this was true and that death by starvation awaited them in the German camps.]

[Of course, I can't agree with everything Solzhenitsyn says. I don't feel any pity, for example, for a certain Yuri E., a Soviet officer Solzhenitsyn tells about who did not starve in a prison camp and who went over to the side of the Hitlerites quite consciously, becoming an officer in the German army and even the head of a spy school.

[From Solzhenitsyn's book, we can see that this Yuri E. went over to the side of the Soviet army when he already foresaw the defeat of the Germans and not because he felt the call of the motherland. His idea was to hand over "the secrets of German intelligence" to our intelligence service, that is, in fact to switch from the German spy agency to the Soviet MGB. Moreover, this Yuri was convinced that a war would break out immediately between the USSR and its allies and that the Red Army would be quickly defeated.]

As for the fierce battle that some large Vlasovite units waged at Prague against German units under the command of SS General Steiner, that is a historical fact that cannot be denied. What happened, happened.

[Virtually all the "Vlasovites" were condemned to twenty-five years in the

labor camps. They were not affected by any amnesty, and almost all of them died in prison or in exile in Siberia. I also think that for most of them this was too severe a punishment, because Stalin bore a far greater guilt in this tragedy than anyone else.]

'Liberalism' of the Hitlerites and of Russian Tsarism

Solzhenitsyn is being accused of minimizing the atrocities of the Hitlerites and the cruelty of Tsarism. It was not Solzhenitsyn's task to examine the German "Gulag Archipelago," although he speaks in a number of places about the torture carried out by the Gestapo and the inhuman treatment of Soviet prisoners by the fascists. But he is not at all wrong when he writes that long before Hitler came to power, Stalin had started massive repression, deportation of millions, torture, and frame-up trials; and that all of this continued in our country many years after the defeat of German fascism.

The Russian tsars could hardly be compared to Stalin in this respect. Solzhenitsyn speaks a lot about tsarist prisons and exile in his book, since it was a frequent subject of conversation among prisoners, especially when an old Bolshevik turned up among them. (Prisoners from the other socialist parties had almost all died out already before the war.) In these conversations, the old system of repression, both in its severity and extent, seemed like a rest home to the prisoners of the 1940s.

During the revolution of 1905-1907 and the years that followed, the tsarist executioners shot as many workers, peasants, and craftsmen in a year as were shot or died in the camps in one day. [What can be compared with this?]

The Best Chapters

[I think it varies from reader to reader which chapters make the greatest impression.] The ones that were most important for me were "The Blue Caps" and "Capital Punishment." Here the author achieves the greatest depth in psychological analysis of the behavior of both prison guards and their victims.

In this respect, Solzhenitsyn goes deeper than Dostoevski. I don't mean at all to say that he is a greater artistic genius. I am not a literary scholar. But it is obvious that what Solzhenitsyn experienced—a hundred years later than Dostoevski's arrest and imprisonment—in his terms at hard labor in Stalinist prisons and camps, in transit camps on the road to penal exile, and in prison colonies gave the author of *Gulag Archipelago* ten times greater opportunities to study the various forms of evil in the human soul and human institutions than the writer of *Notes From the House of the Dead*. And, of course, Solzhenitsyn accomplished his task as only a great writer could.

Solzhenitsyn on Stalin

In several places, Solzhenitsyn's book has deep and exact observations about the personality of Stalin, which appear, however, almost as asides. The author considers Stalin's personal role in our country's disaster and even in creating the "Archipelago" so unimportant that most of his remarks on Stalin are not included in the essential text but in short comments and notes.

Thus, in his notes to the next-to-last page, page 605, Solzhenitsyn writes: "In the years before I was imprisoned and while in prison, I also long considered that Stalin had given a fateful direction to the course of the Soviet state. But then Stalin quietly died. And how much in fact has our ship of state changed its course? He did add a personal note of dismal stupidity, petty despotism, and self-adulation. But otherwise he simply followed in the path that had already been marked out."

Solzhenitsyn speaks very briefly in the second chapter about the waves of repression in 1937-38 (why go into detail about "what has already been described at length and will be repeated again many times"?—when the main cadres of the party leadership and intelligentsia, the commanding and political officers of the Red Army, most of the management personnel in big industry, and the Communist Youth leadership were annihilated in the prisons of the NKVD; when the top levels of Soviet administration, the top levels of the NKVD itself, the foreign service, and so forth,

were changed by force. He writes (once again in a note): "Today, having seen the Chinese 'cultural revolution' (which also followed seventeen years after the decisive victory), we can surmise that there is very likely a historical law here. And even Stalin himself begins to seem only a blind and accidental agent." (Page 80.)]

It is hard to agree with such a view of Stalin's role and his significance in the tragedy of the 1930s. Of course, it would be wrong to completely divorce the era of Stalinist terror from the preceding revolutionary era. [There was no such sharp dividing line between these two periods, not in 1937, as many think, nor in 1934, as Khrushchev claimed, nor in 1929, as Solzhenitsyn himself thought, nor in 1924, when Lenin died and the Trotskyist opposition was defeated, nor in 1922, when Stalin was elected general secretary of the RPK(B).⁷ Nonetheless, in each of these years, and in a few others, there were very substantial changes in policy that require special study.]

Of course, there is a line of continuity between the party that took power in October 1917 and the one leading the USSR in 1937, in 1947, in 1957, and in 1967, when Solzhenitsyn completed *Gulag Archipelago*. But this thread of continuity does not mean that the party did not change. Stalin did not follow "in the footsteps." Even in the early years of the revolution, he did not always follow the direction set by Lenin. And later on, with every stride, he carried the party away from this path.

[In this case, surface similarities only mask very great inner differences—in some respects, even opposites. And the transition to such opposites was not always regular, determined, and inevitable. A deeper, scientific analysis, to which the events Solzhenitsyn researched for his literary work will no doubt be subjected, will certainly show that even within the party and in the context of the party-state relations that were established in Russia in Lenin's time, in some methods Stalin carried out a fundamental change, preserving only the external appearance of the so-called Leninist norms, only the terminology of Marxism-Leninism.]

7. *Rossisskaia Kommunisticheskaia Partia (Bolshhevikov)*, Russian Communist party (Bolsheviks).

In many respects, Stalinism represented the negation and bloody extermination of all revolutionary forces. In a certain sense, it represents a real counterrevolution. Of course, I by no means think that the Leninist heritage and the Leninist period in the history of our revolution do not require the most serious critical analysis.

Solzhenitsyn does not set himself the task of studying the phenomenon of Stalinism, its nature, peculiarities, its development, history, its premises. Such a notion as Stalinism probably does not exist for Solzhenitsyn, who feels that Stalin "only followed in the path that had already been marked out." What might be called historical background is completely absent from Solzhenitsyn's work.

The book opens with a chapter called "Arrest," through which the author emphasizes immediately that he is studying and describing only the world of prisoners, the world of outcasts, the mysterious and terrible country of Gulag: its geography, its social system, its written and unwritten laws, its population, its customs, its rulers, and its subjects.

And Solzhenitsyn has no great need of historical background, because his Gulag Archipelago came into being in 1918 and has been developing since then according to its own laws.

This one-sidedness, which, it is true, is relieved not infrequently by profound comments, is maintained throughout the volume. Of course, the author has every right to take this approach. Even without uttering a word about Stalinism, and seemingly denying the validity of such a concept altogether, by his literary study of one of the main components of the Stalinist system, Solzhenitsyn has greatly aided the examination of the whole criminal and inhuman system of Stalinism.

Solzhenitsyn is wrong in claiming that in its essential features this system has preserved itself to our day. But it has not yet completely disappeared from our social, political, and cultural life. Solzhenitsyn's book deals a very powerful blow to Stalinism and neo-Stalinism. In this respect, none of us has accomplished more than Solzhenitsyn.

Solzhenitsyn on Lenin

[While still a youth in the Kom-

somol,⁸ Solzhenitsyn doubted the wisdom and integrity of Stalin. This doubt, expressed in one of his letters from the front, was the cause for his arrest and sentencing. But at that time he had no doubts whatever that "the October Revolution was splendid and just and was led to victory by people of high aspirations and utter unselfishness." (Page 229.) Now Solzhenitsyn is of another mind about the October Revolution and Lenin.

[Of all the accusations that Solzhenitsyn raises either directly or indirectly today against Lenin, I will dwell



"Those who replaced Lenin at the head of the party did not have his intelligence, his knowledge, or his ability."

on only two.] Solzhenitsyn thinks that in 1917 Lenin insisted on carrying out a new-fangled "proletarian, socialist revolution" in Russia despite the fact that the Russian people were not ready for such a revolution and had no need of it. He also considers that Lenin wrongfully used terrorist methods in struggling against his political opponents.

It is easy to sort out a revolutionist's errors fifty years after the revolution. But the first socialist revolution was inevitably a step into the unknown. There was nothing to compare it with. Its leaders had nobody's experience to borrow from. In that case, it was impossible to calculate and weigh everything in advance. [The

basic decision and methods of revolutionary struggle can be adopted and corrected only in the course of events. Lenin understood all this very well and often repeated Napoleon's words: "First we have to join combat and then we will see." A revolution of this type could not be carried out without risks—without the risk of defeat and without the risk of errors. But failing to give the signal for revolution when the possibility appears is also a great risk for a revolutionary party.]

[It is not surprising, therefore, that Lenin and the Soviet government headed by him made many miscalculations and errors that prolonged the civil war in Russia and increased its cruelty. These miscalculations delayed the transition to NEP and increased the economic dislocation of the early years. Lenin's hopes for a rapid development of revolution in Europe, which would then have given Russia technical and educational assistance, were not realized. The Soviet government went too far in restricting democracy in our country.

[This list of miscalculations and errors could be continued.] But no computer can show that the armed uprising of October 24, 1917, was historically premature, or that all the subsequent crimes of the Stalinist regime flowed from this fateful error of Lenin.

[After Lenin's death also, the road ahead for the party had not been traveled by anyone before. Unfortunately, those who replaced Lenin at the head of the party did not have his intelligence, his knowledge, or his ability even in the most difficult circumstances to find the correct solution. Therefore, they failed to take advantage of even a small part of the possibilities the October Revolution opened up for a rapid advance to a genuine socialist and democratic society. Today we are still far from these goals. Stalin not only did not "only follow the path that had already been marked out" but, to judge from the steps Lenin indicated in his last remarks, Stalin very quickly went off that path.

[In the conditions of revolution and of civil war no government can avoid using some forms of violence.] But the most objective historian would have to say that a reasonable limit of violence was exceeded many times even in the early years of Soviet pow-

8. *Kommunisticheskii Soiuz Molodezhi*, Young Communist League.

er. Starting in the summer of 1918, our country was swept by a wave of both White and Red terror. A major part of these acts of mad violence was absolutely unnecessary and even harmful from a rational standpoint and in terms of the class struggle. [This terror only increased the cruelty of both sides, prolonged the war, and gave rise to new needless violence. Unfortunately, in the early years of the revolution even Lenin said the word "shoot" much more often than the developing situation required.]

[Solzhenitsyn does not distort when he quotes from Lenin. But his comments are always negative. But hardly anyone today would approve of the order that Lenin gave to the chairman of the Nizhgorod provincial soviet, R. Federov: "Strain every effort to apply mass terror immediately, shoot and clear out all the hordes of prostitutes who are consorting with soldiers, former officers and the like."⁹ Clear out, yes, but why kill women?]

Such abuses of power are deplorable; they must be condemned. Nevertheless, this terror in civil war times did not predetermine the frightful terror of the Stalin era.

Lenin made not a few mistakes; he himself acknowledged many of them on frequent occasions. An honest historian must certainly note all these errors and abuses of power. Nonetheless, the general result of Lenin's work, I am convinced, is positive. Solzhenitsyn thinks otherwise. That is his right. In a socialist country everyone must be able to express his or her views and opinions about the activity of any political leader.

Solzhenitsyn on Krylenko

In his book, Solzhenitsyn does not have any sympathy with any of the Russian revolutionary parties. The Social Revolutionaries were terrorists and windbags, who "never had a proper leadership." The Mensheviks, obviously, were only gasbags. But the ones who come in for the biggest condemnation from Solzhenitsyn are the Bolsheviks, who, however, were able to take power and hold it in Russia,

but in doing so exercised excessive and completely unnecessary cruelty. Of the Bolshevik leaders, Solzhenitsyn singles out N. V. Krylenko, the chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, who was the main prosecutor in many "show" trials in the early years of Soviet power. To these cases, Solzhenitsyn devotes almost two entire chapters ("The Law Is a Child" and "The Law Matures"); and we often come across Krylenko's name in other chapters as well.

Of course, it can be said that the early years of Soviet power were the time of the Soviet republic's fiercest struggle for life. And if the revolution and Soviet power were necessary, then it was necessary to defend them from their many and merciless foes. And that could not be done without revolutionary tribunals and the VCHK. But in such arguments, one cannot overlook how unjust and how senselessly harsh these judicial and extrajudicial reprisals were in many cases, or how many unqualified, stupid, and utterly brutalized persons found their way into the VCHK and the tribunals. And in this Krylenko soon became one of the main stage managers.

Krylenko differed little in fact from the presiding judge of the Jacobin tribune Coffinhal, who, while he did send some royalists to the guillotine, also sent many ordinary citizens, including a 70-year-old woman and an 18-year-old girl, revolutionists dissatisfied with Robespierre, and the famous chemist Lavoisier. When Lavoisier asked for permission at least to finish an important series of experiments, Coffinhal replied, "We don't need scientists."

Of course, Krylenko was not exceptional among the Bolsheviks. But not all leaders of the party were like Krylenko. Unfortunately, it is not only the most honest and courageous persons of their time who become revolutionists. Also attracted to revolutions, especially in periods of rise, are the vain, the ambitious, the self-seeking, people with cold hearts and unclean hands, as well as many who are simply stupid and narrow-minded, fanatics capable of anything. But that is by no means a reason to condemn all revolutions and all revolutionists.

Another thing must be taken into account. For revolutionists, the main test is not prison or banishment to

a labor camp, not dashing charges under the fire of the White Guards, not hunger and cold; but power, and power that in the initial period will be almost unlimited. It has long been known that power often distorts and corrupts the best people. It must be noted with regret that very many of the Bolsheviks did not pass this test of power.

Long before they perished in the meat grinder of Stalinist repression, these persons themselves came to be leaders and participants in numerous, cruel repressions, which in the majority of cases were unjustified, unnecessary, and harmful. But from this it by no means follows that even before the revolution these Bolsheviks were as unjust and cruel, or as indifferent to human suffering; that even then they were not guided by the finest motives and the highest aims and ideals.

Solzhenitsyn understands the corrupting effect that power has on people. He has described his own case with complete frankness. After years of a hard and hungry life as a soldier, he writes, after years of drill and exhausting parading, after suffering many injustices at the hands of the most junior commanders, he completely forgot about all of this as soon as he became a lieutenant and then a captain. In his mind he began to set himself off from the soldiers under him. The memory of a front-line soldier's hard life became dimmer and dimmer. Increasingly he came to see himself as something apart from these men, a different kind of being, a member of a different caste.

He unthinkingly took advantage of all his officer's privileges, spoke in a condescending tone to men old enough to be his father or even his grandfather, harassed his orderly, and sometimes even was so severe with the men that an old colonel thought he had to give him a lecture right in the middle of an inspection.

"It turned out," Solzhenitsyn admits, "that the officers epaulets that had been trembling, swaying on my shoulders for no more than two years had cast a golden, poisonous dust into the empty space between my ribs." (Page 551.) What is more, Solzhenitsyn almost became an officer in the NKVD. They had convinced him to go to the

9. PSS [Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii] Vol. 50, p. 142. This is Medvedev's note. The phrase is partially illegible in the Russian text.

NKVD school; and, if they had pressed a little harder, he would have accepted.

Solzhenitsyn is merciless with himself. "I considered myself selfless and self-sacrificing. And at the same time, I was thoroughly prepared for the role of a hangman. And if I had gone to the NKVD school in Yezhov's time, maybe under Beria I would have grown to find myself right at home." (Page 175.)

But if Solzhenitsyn changed so much in two years as a junior officer, what should we say about Krylenko, who in a still shorter time was catapulted from being barely an ensign to the top command of the entire Russian army, and then to the chairmanship of the supreme tribunal, to the post of deputy commissar of justice and the chief prosecutor of the RSFSR? Although Krylenko had completed two courses of study before the revolution, he was so dulled and intoxicated by such exceptional power as to become almost unrecognizable.

"Apparently crime," as Solzhenitsyn writes, "is also a matter of a threshold, like certain chemical reactions. Yes, for their whole lives people waver and are buffeted back and forth between good and evil; they slip, fall, struggle to their feet, repent, and once again lose their way. But as long as they do not overstep the threshold of crime, they can turn back. But when by the extent of wrongdoing or as a result of rank or absolute power they pass over this threshold, they step outside the bounds of humanity. And there may be no turning back." (Page 182.)

"Let any reader who thinks that this book is going to be a political indictment shut it right now," Solzhenitsyn writes in another place. "If it were only that easy! If it were just that there were some evil persons, people who have committed evil acts, and had to be identified and eliminated. But the line dividing good and evil runs through the heart of every human being. And who is going to eliminate part of his own heart? In the lifetime of one heart, this line shifts even within it, sometimes pressed by exultant evil, at other times opening room for the flowering of good.

"One person in different ages and in different situations can be a completely different individual. At times, he may be close to being a devil,

at others to being a saint. But the name doesn't change and we attribute everything to him." (Pages 175-176.) In this profound observation of Solzhenitsyn's we see at least a partial explanation of the drama and the moral fall of many Bolsheviks, who before they became victims of Stalin's terror were not unimportant gears in the oppressive machine that had been created.

What Does Solzhenitsyn Propose?

But if power distorts and corrupts people, if politics, as Solzhenitsyn thinks, "is not a science but an empirical field that cannot be described by mathematics and is even subject to ego and blind passions," if all professional politicians are only "boils on the neck of society preventing it from freely moving its head and arms," then what is it we should strive for? How should we build a just human society?

Solzhenitsyn speaks about that in passing. He puts his ideas in parentheses without explaining or interpreting them in detail. From these brief comments, it is clear that he believes the most suitable social structure would be one "headed by those who can direct the activities of society most intelligently." (Pages 392-393.)

That means primarily engineers and scientists (workers, in Solzhenitsyn's opinion, are only helpers of engineers in industry). But who will offer moral leadership in society?

It follows from Solzhenitsyn's reasoning that moral guidance cannot be provided by any kind of political doctrine but only by religion. Only faith in God can serve as an underpinning for human morality, and it was always deeply believing people who were best able to endure all the privations of Stalin's labor camps and prisons.

[But these thoughts smell of utopianism. They are not even very original. Solzhenitsyn has dealt mighty blows to all kinds of political deception. He rightly calls on the Soviet people and above all the youth not to promote falsehood, not to cooperate with lying. However, it is necessary not only to convince people of the untruth of a political doctrine but also to offer them the truth, to convince them of the truthfulness of some view.]

But for the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people, the truth is no longer and can never be religion. And the youth of the twentieth century are hardly likely to find guidance in faith in God. [Moreover, how can the engineers and specialists take control of the affairs of society, or even of the economy, without politics and without political struggle? But even if this were possible, how can such a society be prevented from degenerating into a dictatorship of the technocrats? And wouldn't turning the moral guidance of society over to religion lead to the worst kind of theocracy?]

[Speaking of the repressions of 1937, Solzhenitsyn writes: "Maybe 1937 was *necessary* in order to show the worthlessness of the whole world view that they strutted around drugging themselves with while they were plundering Russia, wrecking her bulwarks, trampling on her shrines." (Page 138.) He is talking, as can easily be seen, about Marxism. But Solzhenitsyn is wrong. Marxism did not produce the Stalinist deformation, and overcoming Stalinism will not mean the collapse of Marxism and scientific socialism. And Solzhenitsyn knows—he says it in another place—that religious ideology facilitated the Inquisition's two centuries of savagery, the burning and torturing of heretics.]

I find these ideals of Solzhenitsyn quite unappealing. I am profoundly convinced that for the foreseeable future our society must be built on a combination of socialism and democracy; and that it is precisely the advance of Marxism and scientific communism that will make possible the creation of the most just human society.

[Engineers and specialists must have a far greater weight in our society than they have today. But this by no means excludes a scientifically organized political leadership. It assumes, in particular, the abolition of all sorts of privileges for leaders, reasonable limitations on power, self-management wherever possible, an increased role for organs of local government, the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, limitations on the time any political mandate can be exercised, full freedom of speech and conscience—including, of course, freedom to propagate religion, freedom to organize and freedom

of assembly for individuals and groups of all political persuasions, free elections with full freedom for all parties and groups to put up candidates for every post, and so forth.

[Only such a society, which of course would also be free of the exploitation of one person by another and would be based on collective ownership of all the principal means of material production, can guarantee the unhindered and balanced progress of all humanity and its individual members.

[As long as this genuine socialist democracy does not exist, our country

will continue to develop in a slow and unbalanced way, and such giants as Solzhenitsyn will not often appear among us.]

Before his arrest, Solzhenitsyn considered himself a Marxist. Having passed all of the cruel trials that are described with such merciless truth in *Gulag Archipelago*, Solzhenitsyn lost his faith in Marxism. That is a matter of his conscience and convictions. A sincere change of opinion should be understood and respected.

[Solzhenitsyn has betrayed or sold out no one. Today he is an opponent

of Marxism, and he does not hide that.]

Marxism will not, of course, collapse because it has lost one of its former adherents. I even think that Marxism can only benefit from a polemic with opponents such as Solzhenitsyn.

[It is much better to have an opponent like this than "defenders" like Sergei Mikhalkov or Aleksandr Chakovskii. A "scientific" ideology that had to hold people by force or the threat of force alone would be worth nothing. Fortunately genuine scientific socialism does not need compulsion.]

North Vietnam National Assembly Sets Tasks

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D.R.V.N. Government's Report on the Economic Rehabilitation and the 1974-1975 State Plan.

Hanoi VNA February 6—At the 4th Session of the D.R.V.N. National Assembly, 4th legislature, Vice-Premier Le Thanh Nghi on behalf of the Government submitted a report on the tasks and directions for economic rehabilitation and development in North Viet Nam in the two years 1974 and 1975.

The report is in three parts:

—The economic rehabilitation and development in 1973.

—The tasks and directions for economic rehabilitation and development in the two years 1974-1975 and the 1974 State plan; and

—The main measures to ensure the successful implementation of the 1974 State plan.

In the first part, dealing with the economic rehabilitation and development in North Viet Nam in 1973, the report said:

The great efforts of the North Vietnamese people in 1973 have brought good results: we have achieved an important part of the task of overcoming the immediate aftermaths of the war, thus creating favourable conditions to continue the advance toward fulfilling the task of economic rehabilitation and development.

Our biggest achievement last year was made in the communications and transport service.

Within a short period after the war, we reopened traffic on the main arteries, re-

paired or restored such major bridges as Long Bien, Ham Rong, Phu Luong, Lai Vu, Hoang Mai, Viet Tri, and many other bridges. Many rivers and seaports have been dredged and restored to normal operations. Most of the railroads and motor roads and many chief railway stations have been restored.

Soon after the war, almost all the industrial enterprises which had been evacuated to a safe place have been moved back to their old sites, and repaired and restored while carrying on their operation. By now, the industrial enterprises at the central and regional levels have in the main stabilized their activities.

In agriculture, part of the bomb craters on the fields, mostly in the former fourth interzone, have been filled. The irrigation systems have been restored. All the State farms and nurseries have been rebuilt and restored.

Thanks to the efforts of the State and the mutual assistance among the localities, we have repaired part of the damaged houses, built 60,000 square metres of brick and concrete houses and 400,000 square metres of bamboo cottages for victims of U.S. bombings. The people have themselves repaired and built a good number of houses. Active steps have been taken to restore the damaged public facilities such as the water plants in Hanoi, Hai-phong and Hatay, where many more water pipes have been laid to meet the needs of production and people's life.

The medical service has concentrated its efforts on the repair and restoration of hospital beds, hospitals, and many medical delegations have been sent to the various localities to organize prophylactic campaigns and attend to the health of the people.

The educational, cultural, art, physical culture and sports services have resumed their normal activities. Particular attention

has been paid to the schooling of children. The damaged schools have been urgently repaired. A number of new schools and classes have been built. Within a short period, we have made a good start for the new academic year.

In spite of innumerable difficulties, all the economic branches have effected initial changes for the better and recorded new achievements in the implementation of the 1973 State plan.

In the last Spring-Summer crop, the acreage under rice cultivation exceeded the plan, and the gross output as well as per hectare yield reached the level achieved in the best years in the past. The recent Winter rice crop met with many climatic vagaries such as a prolonged drought lasting two months at the beginning of the cultivation, followed by repeated storms that caused widespread waterlogging. However, the population of the stricken areas have worked with great courage and devotion to save many key dike systems, thus preserving the rice crop and keeping down to the minimum the damage by fierce storms, waterlogging and floods. In the rest of North Viet Nam, the people stepped up intensive cultivation and kept the yield stable. Seven provinces exceeded their norms for rice yield per hectare, 10 provinces achieved higher yields than in 1972. Notable progress has been made in hog breeding; by October 1, 1973, the herd of pigs had increased by 9.1 per cent compared with 1972, exceeding the plan by 4.4 per cent. The average weight of marketable pigs was also bigger. Worthy of note is the 17.6 per cent increase in the herd of sows compared with the same period of 1972. Stock raising in the family sector [saw] new development, while that in the co-op sector and State farms was also better than in the previous year.

In industry, the electric service has been urgently restored: all the former thermal

power plants have resumed operation, the Thac Ba hydro-power plant and many small sized hydro-power stations in various localities have been commissioned. The electric output in 1973 reached the targeted norm and represented an [increase of] 24 per cent compared with 1965, the peak year in the pre-war period.

The coal service has made further efforts in stripping, coal extraction, repairing the sorting plants, coal tubs, roads and harbours.

Almost all the establishments of the engineering service which had been evacuated or dispersed during the war have been moved back to their former sites and resumed operation. The engineering service has stepped up the production of barges, accessories, motor vehicles and tractors to meet the needs in communications and transport and in agriculture.

The building material service has made great efforts. The Hai Phong cement plant has restored almost all its kilns. By the end of 1973, the output of the State-run brick and tile-making establishments was 20 per cent higher than in 1971.

The chemical service has actively restored the fertilizer, chemical and rubber factories, and more phosphate fertilizer has been turned out.

The light [industries] and food industries have repaired and restored their factories and quickly resumed production. A number of necessities for the people's life have been turned out in greater quantities than in the pre-war years. All told, the gross output value of industry and handicraft in 1973 increased by nearly 17 per cent compared with 1965.

The state has invested quite a big sum — 24 per cent bigger than in 1972, and 60.3 per cent bigger than 1965 — to restore the damaged projects and continue the building of those whose construction had been disrupted by the war, along with starting the building of a number of new projects in 1973.

After the war, the gross national product already approximated the level of 1971, a relatively stable year for economic construction, and exceeded that of 1965.

By now, an important part of the immediate sequels [consequences] of the war has been overcome.

Production activities and the people's life are stabilized step by step. Economic management has recorded further progress.

This, however, is still an initial result. It nevertheless brings out the great vitality of the socialist regime in North Vietnam, shows the great efforts and potentials of our people and creates the basis for us to continue our powerful advance in the year ahead.

In its second part, dealing with the tasks and directions for the economic rehabilitation and development in North Viet-

nam in the period 1974-1975, and the 1974 State plan, the report said:

Recently the meeting of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers' Party laid down the following general tasks of North Vietnam in the new stage:

To unite the entire people and carry out the struggle to preserve peace, strive to carry out socialist industrialization, step up the three revolutions, take North Viet Nam quickly, vigorously and steadily to socialism; closely combine economy with national defence; heighten vigilance and stand ready to defeat all schemes of U. S. imperialism and its henchmen; strive to fulfil our obligation in the revolutionary task aimed at completing independence and democracy in the South, and proceed to the peaceful reunification of the country; at the same time fulfil our international obligation to the revolution in Laos and Cambodia.

In the period 1974-1975, the task of North Vietnam consists in quickly completing the healing of the wounds of war, striving to rehabilitate and develop economy and develop culture, continue to build the material and technical foundation of socialism, consolidate the socialist regime in all spheres, stabilize the economic situation and the people's life, consolidate national defence and endeavour to fulfil our duty to the heroic South.

The two above-said tasks for the two years lie in the initial step of the process of socialist industrialization of North Vietnam aimed at creating the necessary conditions to build North Viet Nam on an ever larger scale and at an ever quicker tempo, and also at strengthening the position and power of the revolution in the entire country, and [establishing a] very firm basis for the struggle to preserve peace, and complete independence and democracy in the South.

The two years of economic rehabilitation and development (1974-1975) will be two years of very intense efforts of our people aimed at the following main objectives:

1. To mobilize and organize the social labour force into production and construction with enthusiasm, making the fullest use of the potentials of the economy, stepping up production and practising economy, and raising social production and the production of each economic branch and each economic unit to the same level as, and even to a higher level than, that achieved in 1965 or 1971, which was the highest to date; striving to quickly raise the gross national product and the national income from production, ensuring the fund for social expenditures and increasing the accumulation from the economic activities while fulfilling the duty to the heroic South.

2. To consolidate and take another step in perfecting the socialist production relations in both sectors, State-run and col-

lective, [and to] overcome negative aspects of the economic and social life.

3. To strengthen the leadership and management work of the State, and readjust the economic management machinery from the central down to the basic level. To solve immediate questions while actively preparing for long-term plans for economic and cultural development.

In the carrying out of the economic tasks and the implementation of the State plans, we should firmly grasp and correctly apply the following guiding principles:

1. To rehabilitate and develop the economy simultaneously, to combine economy with national defence, to combine the immediate tasks with the long-term task of economic development.

2. To develop the productive forces at the same time with consolidating and perfecting the socialist relations of production.

3. To advance quickly, vigorously and steadily with a view to socialist industrialization.

4. To uphold the spirit of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance as the essential measure while actively winning international assistance and expanding economic relations with foreign countries.

Dealing with the concrete tasks of various economic and cultural branches in the years 1974-1975, and the 1974 State plan, the report gave the following directions:

I. Industry and Handicrafts

During the period of economic rehabilitation and development, we should give still bigger scope to the motive role of industry with regard to the national economy.

The basic direction for industry in the years 1974-1975 is to concentrate on the rehabilitation and development of the key branches having the effect of promoting the restoration and development of the whole national economy.

It is necessary to vigorously develop the potentials of the central industries and regional industries and to give still greater attention to the productive capabilities of small industry and handicrafts. The central industries and regional industries (including small industries and handicrafts) must closely co-ordinate their activities and achieve a good distribution in the use of labour materials, raw materials, and funds in order to help one another make the best use of the potentials and to increase the production of items with high economic effect and to better serve production, the people's life and export.

Gross industrial and handicraft output value in 1974 is expected to be up 21 per cent from 1973. The increase is targeted at 27 per cent for group (a) and 17 per cent for group (b). Regional industries (including small industries and

handicrafts) are expected to rise by 12 per cent.

II. Agriculture and Forestry

In the years 1974-1975, in view of the new situation and new requirements, we must firmly grasp the leadership in agriculture and step up agricultural production along the direction already mapped out by the resolution of the 19th session of the Party Central Committee, aimed at better meeting the increasing needs in food and foodstuffs, in raw materials for industry, and agricultural products for export, and taking agriculture gradually and firmly from small production to large-scale socialist production.

The Council of Ministers will have to solve in a fundamental and all-round manner a series of very important and urgent questions of agriculture such as: consolidating the agricultural co-operatives and State farms, organizing the machinery for the management of agriculture from the central level to the co-operatives, step by step unifying the managerial organization for agricultural production and the processing of farm produce, working out policies to encourage agricultural production and the production of farm items for export, settling the question of technical equipment for agriculture, the mechanization of agriculture, the planning of agriculture, the research on and development of agriculture, the training of cadres for agriculture, etc. . . .

We must ensure that in 1974-1975 we will be able to carry out intensive cultivation in the plains while ensuring good development of agriculture in the mountain areas and the midland, and actively and steadily encourage the population and build new economic centres in order to create a new position for agriculture and for the economy as a whole and for national defence.

In 1974, we must strive to achieve a 16 per cent increase of the total gross 1975 [sic] agriculture and subsidiary occupations as compared with 1973.

To develop the economy in the mountain regions and the midlands, and further expand the acreage, is a strategic direction for North Viet Nam's economy. It is aimed at creating a basis to create more jobs, rationally redistribute social labour and the population, and ensure harmonious development of the economy in the mountain regions, the midlands and the plains, combine economic build-up with the strengthening of national defence. In the mountain regions and the midlands, it is necessary to closely combine agriculture with forestry; combine agriculture, forestry and the movement to settle for [establish] sedentary farming; and endeavour to develop the three strong points of the agricultural economy of the mountain regions (forestry, animal husbandry

and industrial crops).

It is necessary to build new economic centres in a comprehensive and balanced way, providing them with production bases, communication facilities, and service establishments for the workers' and people's life (schools, hospitals, department stores . . .) and ensure that the labouring people in these centres can feel secure to carry out production and settle permanently in their new homelands. To carry out reforestation, protecting and replenishing the forests are urgent economic tasks of long-term significance for the national economy. We must closely combine the replenishment and protection of the forests and reforestation with land reclamation and the building of new economic centres with a view to a comprehensive development of the economy in the mountain regions and the midlands. To consolidatively increase imported goods and the economic interflow in the country. [Original reads: "The consolidatively increase the imported goods and on economic interflow in the country."] The 1974 plan foresees an increase by 32 per cent in tonnage and 34 per cent in ton kilo metres for the volume of goods transported compared to 1973.

IV. Capital Construction

Economic rehabilitation and development and stabilization of the people's life are urging us to push capital construction further ahead.

In the years ahead, the annual building tempo must double compared to the previous years. However, at present, due to many limitations, the plan for capital construction in the two years 1974-1975 must concentrate, both in terms of investments and capacity, on the accomplishment of the most urgent tasks.

State investment in capital construction for the economic and cultural sector in 1974 is expected to rise 50 per cent compared to 1973. Investments in assembly work alone will be up 32 per cent.

Of the total investments in assembly, constructions of a productive character will account for 84.7 per cent (34.2 per cent for industry and construction, nearly 20 per cent for agriculture and water conservation, 17.2 per cent for communications and transport). Investments in capital construction not having a productive character accounts for 15 per cent, of which housing production will make up 6 per cent.

In the two years ahead, the restoration and the building of cities and the countryside has a very important significance. We must accelerate the selective restoration and construction of the cities and countryside, first of all in the areas heavily devastated by war like: Hanoi, Haiphong, Namdinh, Quangninh, the township and countryside in the form-

er fourth interzone (southern part of North Viet Nam). In the countryside, the reconstruction of houses and other facilities for life must be combined with the replanning of the production based on the reshaping of the fields. Particular attention must be paid to the economization of cultivated land, especially in the plains. To solve the difficulties in building materials, it is necessary to exploit all sources of materials in the localities, and turn out more adobe and laterite bricks.

V. Export, Import, and Economic Co-operation With Foreign Countries

To strive for a rapid increase of exports in order to raise our capacities for import is a very important task in service of economic rehabilitation and development, and stepping up socialist industrialization. This is a fairly big source of accumulation. In 1974 the value of export goods must be up 31 per cent from 1973 and active preparations must be made to further increase exports in the following years.

In the new stage of economic construction, in order to increase our assets and technical capacities, create conditions for more effective exploitation of our national resources and make the fullest use of the labour force, [and] step up production in service of domestic needs and increase our exports, we need to increase our economic, scientific, and technical co-operation with the other socialist countries and expand our foreign trade, economic and technical relations with other countries.

VI. Trade, Finance, Currency, and Prices

In the coming two years, the trade service must develop its active role in service of agricultural and industrial production and in service of people's life and make active contributions to stabilizing the economic situation.

On the basis of the rehabilitation and development of industry and agriculture, we should increase the purchase and the control of the sources of goods, effect a very close management of the market and actively achieve balance of payments.

We must strive to stabilize prices and readjust irrational prices, and go ahead with the study to improve the price system (along with improvement of the wage system) in order to encourage production and achieve a rational distribution of the national income.

VII. Labour, Wages, Training of Technical Workers and Cadres

In the face of the big tasks of economic

rehabilitation and development, the key problem at present is to organize and make good use of social labour, to stimulate and organize everyone to work, to work seriously in conformity with the State regimes and in strict observance of discipline, to work with great expertise and high productivity.

On the wages problem, it is necessary to expand the system of piece-work on the basis of a correct determination of the medium advanced norm, to carry out correctly the remuneration on the increase of productivity and remuneration on the fulfillment of the State plan, on the regular upgrading of workers and public employees . . .

The training of technical workers is a very urgent task which must be stepped up at a higher tempo than in the previous years, with a view to responding well to the immediate tasks and preparing for the following years.

In 1974 we will recruit for training 110,000 technical workers, up 83 per cent from 1973.

On the training of cadres: the enrollment at higher educational institutions at the beginning of the 1974-1975 school year is projected at 70,370, up nearly 6 percent from the previous year. Enrollment at secondary vocational schools is set at 74,200, up more than 22.3 per cent.

VIII. Scientific and Technical Work

In the years 1974-1975, scientific and technical work must be focused on solving urgent problems in order to contribute to ensuring the realization of the tasks of economic rehabilitation and development. At the same time due attention must be paid to the requirements for further development in the following years.

IX. Education, Culture, and Health Care

The general, higher education and professional schools must improve their management and organize the "two well" (teaching well and learning well) emulation movement with a view to raising the quality of education in all fields. We must complete preparations for the scheduled educational reform.

Complementary education must be further improved and developed.

The medical service must actively learn to use and apply the achievements of advanced medicine of the world; at the same time it must exploit, develop and improve the national medical science and its experiences in disease prevention and treatment as well as the pharmaceutical resources of the country.

We must actively carry out disease prevention to check the epidemics and other

diseases often seen in the post-war periods.

We must care better for the health of mothers and children, and pay particular attention to family planning in order to achieve a rational population growth.

It is necessary to expand the movement for physical training and sport in order to raise the people's health for effective labours and to increase the preparedness to defend the Fatherland.

In cultural and artistic domains, it is necessary to develop the cultural and art activities of the masses and the movement for productive labour and thrift and building a new life and the new man.

X. Stabilize the People's Life, Solve Satisfactorily Post-War

After long years of a fierce war, the stabilization and step-by-step improvement of the people's life is a very urgent task aimed at reducing the difficulties, preserving and replenishing the people's force.

The settlement of problems concerning the people's life in the two years ahead is aimed at meeting the most urgent requirements in food, housing, study and health work. Special attention must be paid to the families meeting with difficulties due to the war.

A very important task in stabilizing the people's life is to solve the post-war social problems.

XI. Step Up Preparations for Long-Term Plans for Economic and Cultural Development

We must urgently work out a project for the five-year plan (1976-1980), study a plan for the development (within ten to 15 years) of the important economic branches, a plan for the distribution of economic areas, towns and industrial centres. We must step up the survey and prospection of natural resources and natural conditions, and carry out some surveys of the economic and social situation. We must have a plan for the training of workers and cadres in a way suitable for the requirement of economic and cultural development and have a plan for the development of science and technology in close co-ordination with the long-term plan for economic and cultural development.

In its third part, the report pointed to the main measures to ensure the successful realization of the 1974 State plan. These are:

1. To raise our capacity for management of the State, to standardize economic management and take a further step in improving managerial work in general.

2. To intensify and improve planning work.

3. To intensify the enforcement of socialist laws.

4. To intensify ideological work.

5. To launch a revolutionary movement among the masses, and to organize the emulation movement for productive labour and for practising economy.

The report concluded: with the successful realization of the 1974 State plan, the economy of North Viet Nam will take an important step forward compared with 1965, which was the peak year for production in the prewar period.

Gross national product will be increased by 21 per cent, the national income by 14 per cent, the gross output value of industry and handicrafts by 42 per cent, that of agriculture and sideline [allied] occupations by 16 per cent, the volume of goods transported by 81 per cent, State investments in capital construction by 2 point four times, and the flow of goods in retail commerce by 94 per cent.

With the attainment of the objectives set in the 1974 State plan, an important part of the tasks in the period of economic rehabilitation and development will be realized, creating conditions for continuing the march forward to accomplish well all these tasks in 1975 and to prepare for a still more vigorous advance in the ensuing five-year plan (1976-1980). □

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