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
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## Solzhenitsyn in Exile



'New Communist Party' of U.S. Maoists  
White House Tapes Entangle Nixon  
Tokyo and the Energy Crisis  
Grenada Repression

### Rebels Clash With Philippine Troops

According to the Philippine Department of Social Welfare, about 10,000 people have died or are missing in the clashes between Moslem rebels and government troops that broke out on February 4 in the Sulu Islands in the southern Philippines. On February 7 the Moslem rebels, who have been demanding a separate Moslem state in the south, attacked and overran the airport and the headquarters of the 1st Army Brigade at Jolo, the capital of the Sulu Island chain.

Philippine Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile reportedly said that the mayor of Jolo, Aminkadra Barlie Abubakar, had joined the rebels. Manila also said that a "Moslem Maoist" named Nur Misuari was one of the rebel leaders.

On February 11 the government forces struck, driving most of the insurgents out of the city into the surrounding countryside. Air force planes bombed and strafed the city, two-thirds of which had been completely razed by the time it was retaken by the government troops. Manila also announced that it had captured two other Moslem-held towns in the Sulu Archipelago. The military command in Cotabato, the southern part of Mindanao, reportedly began "mopping-up" operations against Moslem strongholds in the Reina Regente Mountains.

Manila admitted that at least 30,000 refugees had fled Jolo as a result of the fighting. Red Cross personnel reported that there were an additional 35,000 refugees from the fighting in the towns of Datu Piang, Tulunan, Pikit, and Malang in the province of Cotabato. The February 13 *New York Times* reported that the number of refugees could reach half a million.

President Ferdinand Marcos had gone to Jolo in December to accept the surrender of some of the Moslem rebel leaders, among them Maas Bawang and Tupay Loong. Manila had declared that the surrenders marked the end of the Moslem insurgency. But, as the February 17 *New York Times* noted: "Now . . . the rebellion is a more serious threat to the Marcos regime than ever."

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## Exile of Solzhenitsyn a Warning to All Dissidents

By Candida Barberena

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's February 13 arrest and expulsion to West Germany the following day marked the culmination of a long campaign of condemnation and personal vilification, often rising to vitriolic proportions. Although the swiftness with which Solzhenitsyn was expelled came as a shock to some Western observers, some action against the dissident author had been expected since the publication of *The Gulag Archipelago*.

Announcing the move, an official Soviet press release by TASS reported: "By the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A. I. Solzhenitsyn has been stripped of citizenship of the USSR for performing systematically actions that are incompatible with being a citizen of the USSR and detrimental to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and was expelled from the Soviet Union on February 13, 1974.

"Solzhenitsyn's family can join him when they deem it necessary."

Friends of the Solzhenitsyns gave the following account of events surrounding the author's expulsion, as published in the February 15 *New York Times*:

"Immediately after five police agents forcibly took him from his family apartment at 5:30 P. M. Tuesday, they drove him directly to the Lefortovo secret police prison. There, all his clothes and personal belongings were taken from him and he was subjected to a rigorous bodily search, as criminals are, and given prison attire.

"That evening he was presented with a formal charge of treason—violation of Article 64 of the Criminal Code, which carries 10 to 15 years in prison or a death sentence. The written indictment was signed by a man named Zverev, who had led the team of police officers who had arrested Solzhenitsyn. He identified himself as a 'senior counselor of justice.'

"Mr. Solzhenitsyn refused to acknowledge the charge, to sign the interrogation protocol as normally required, and told his prosecutors he

would take no part in the investigation. He spoke not another word that evening."

The campaign against Solzhenitsyn following the December 28, 1973, publication in Paris of *The Gulag Archipelago* had shown signs of tapering off, leading some observers to reverse initial speculation that the Kremlin was planning to bring Solzhenitsyn to trial, presumably on charges of violating new Soviet copyright laws by publishing his book abroad.

But on February 8 the Soviet state prosecutor's office issued a legal summons for Solzhenitsyn to appear for an investigation. Solzhenitsyn's wife, Natalya Svetlova, refused to accept it on the grounds that it stated no charges or cause for investigation and was improperly drafted in other ways.

Apparently anticipating a quick reprisal from the Kremlin, Solzhenitsyn prepared a statement in which he vowed never to cooperate with authorities attempting to interrogate or imprison him. When a second summons was delivered on February 11, Solzhenitsyn rejected it for reasons he had explained in a written statement read to Western correspondents the day before by his wife. The statement shows that Solzhenitsyn had no illusions about the treatment he could expect:

"In advance, I declare any tribunal of common law on Russian literature, on any of its books, on any Russian author, to be incompetent. If any such tribunal is called against me, I shall not go there on my own legs. I shall be taken there with my hands bound, in a police van. At such a tribunal, I shall reply to none of its questions.

"Condemned to incarceration, I shall not submit to the verdict unless manacled. Once incarcerated, having already sacrificed my best eight years at forced labor for the state and having caught cancer there, I shall not work even for one half-hour for my oppressors.

"In this way, I leave them the simple possibility of being caught out in the

open: To kill me quickly because I have written the truth about Russian history."

This was too much for the Soviet bureaucrats to swallow. The day after Solzhenitsyn rejected the second summons he was spirited away via Lefortovo prison to exile in West Germany.

Shortly before the arrest, *Le Monde* deduced what would ultimately be the consequence of Solzhenitsyn's statement of refusal to recognize the existing law.

"Expulsion would unquestionably involve the fewest problems for the authorities," wrote Jacques Amalric in the February 13 issue of the Paris daily. "To initiate legal proceedings would only reactivate the controversy and embitter the atmosphere of East-West relations. Solzhenitsyn would still be front-page news, especially in the United States, at a time when relations between Washington and Moscow are running into certain difficulties. Expulsion . . . would undoubtedly create a sensation for a while, but in the end it would be fairly soon forgotten. By practically denying the legality of the Soviet regime and its institutions, Solzhenitsyn, in domestic exile, has given arguments to those who would like to send him into foreign exile. A re-reading of Soviet press attacks by those favoring expulsion indicates that they were already numerous at the beginning of the campaign against the writer."

Solzhenitsyn has refused to tell reporters the details of the Kremlin operation, presumably for fear of jeopardizing his family's emigration.

However, Western press sources speculated that the four-hour delay in takeoff of Solzhenitsyn's plane may have reflected a certain hesitation on the part of the Kremlin to deport Solzhenitsyn. "Since the weather wasn't bad," reported the February 15 *France-Soir*, "the delay has been regarded as a last-minute attempt by the Soviet writer to convince Soviet authorities to reverse their decision."

*France-Soir* continued: "They refused

to martyr him in prison or in a camp, which he was prepared for. He was attacked more subtly and cruelly: A man who had always refused to forsake his homeland was stripped of his Soviet citizenship like a mere undesirable; they got him off their hands by sending him to a foreign country."

"Truly the decision taken by Moscow authorities," *France-Soir* remarked, "objectively appears to be clever and efficient. They remove a man who has been giving trouble, separate him from his cultural environment, isolate him. A wiser decision than imprisonment or house arrest, or confinement in a psychiatric hospital, this was the best way to silence him and neutralize his influence. In this respect banishment is a veritable personal tragedy for Solzhenitsyn."

*New York Times* correspondent Hedrick Smith gave a similar view of Moscow's motives in a February 3 dispatch from Moscow:

"With Mr. Solzhenitsyn growing more outspoken, the leadership felt more impelled to discipline and silence him—to squelch any possible renewal of the debate over Stalinist terror. But it hesitated to put him on trial lest hostility in the West disrupt delicate negotiations with the United States and West European nations in a number of fields.

"Banishing Mr. Solzhenitsyn offered a way out by allowing the Kremlin to rid itself of a painful irritant without engendering the kind of angry reaction in the West that would have resulted if he were sent back to prison."

It is obvious that the Kremlin bureaucrats sought to deal with Solzhenitsyn in a manner that would produce the least embarrassment domestically and internationally. But the effect of their concern for the détente with Washington was not as simple as presented by most commentators.

The U. S. imperialists, after all, scarcely qualify as sincere defenders of democratic rights, in the Soviet Union or anyplace else. Nixon is no more inclined to allow the détente to be disrupted by the Solzhenitsyn case than Brezhnev is disposed to allow it to be upset by the Watergate scandal.

Since Stalin consolidated his power in the Soviet Union, the imperialists have consistently used the lack of democratic rights in Russia as a tool for discrediting "socialism." In the context of the détente, the more vocally

anticommunist sectors of the U. S. ruling class have tried to use their pretended concern for democracy to extract greater concessions from the Soviet bureaucrats. The persecution of Solzhenitsyn for the "crime" of writing the truth about Stalin's terror serves both these purposes of the imperialists, whether the author's punishment is prison or exile.

It is interesting to compare the reaction of Western governments to Solzhenitsyn's expulsion with the last



ZHORES MEDVEDEV

previous case of forcible exile from the Soviet Union: that of Leon Trotsky in 1929. The governments of the United States and Western Europe that are now eagerly offering asylum to Solzhenitsyn repeatedly refused Trotsky's requests for a visa.

More recently, these same governments have shown the greatest reluctance to admit refugees from the terror in Chile. By exiling Solzhenitsyn, the Soviet bureaucrats have helped divert attention from imperialists' dereliction on this pressing question.

The Kremlin's hacks meanwhile have continued their campaign of vilification of Solzhenitsyn, which is being used as a threat to other dissidents. A clear warning was issued in a letter to *Pravda* by Soviet propagandist Aleksandr Zharov, which was reprinted in the February 16 issue of the *New York Times*.

"Foreign reactionaries to whose tune Solzhenitsyn danced, not free of charge, have plenty of grounds to grieve and rage. . . . Solzhenitsyn was interesting to them when he was here. The 'melodies' of his ideological subversive activities caressed their ears when they sounded from our country. But now he is a covered trump card to them. When the bosses of Solzhenitsyn realize that this game is lost, they will dump him."

Whereas the Belgian, Italian, and Swedish Communist parties expressed cautious disapproval of the Soviet government's treatment of Solzhenitsyn, the first reaction from a Stalinist government enthusiastically endorsed the Kremlin's actions. The East German government used Solzhenitsyn's exile to warn its citizens against any attempt to speak in defense of Solzhenitsyn's freedom of opinion. The East German CP organ, *Neues Deutschland*, also warned that it was "potential suicide" to act like Solzhenitsyn.

The February 15 *Frankfurter Allgemeine* reported on the *Neues Deutschland* attack, which was signed by Harald Hauser, a highly placed CP official. "The Soviet writer and Nobel prize winner was labeled 'an antisocialist and a class enemy' who smears with filth the name of socialism and socialist democracy."

But on February 13 a Swedish television station played a recorded reply to the expulsion prepared jointly by a group of Soviet dissidents. They demanded that Solzhenitsyn be allowed to return to the Soviet Union and that *The Gulag Archipelago* be published in that country. The statement, read by the physicist Andrei Sakharov, also said: "The whole world must learn the truth about what happened in the Soviet Union. . . . I know that Solzhenitsyn felt he belonged in the Soviet Union. To penalize him this way was to use violence against him," reported the February 15 *Le Monde*.

The same issue of the Paris daily questioned the meaning of Solzhenitsyn's exile for other Soviet dissidents.

"It still remains to be seen if the solution applied to the affair will be an exception or, on the contrary, the beginning of more wide-scale recourse to the practice of expulsion and exile, voluntary or involuntary. All eyes are of course looking toward the scholar

Sakharov, who is increasing his uncompromising statements and still waiting for an answer to his visa application for the United States."

It should be remembered in this regard that within the last two years the physicist Valery Chalidze and the biologist Zhores Medvedev have both been stripped of their Soviet citizenship while travelling abroad with the per-

mission of the bureaucrats. Dealing with dissidents in this manner attracted considerably less public attention, of course, than the forcible exile of Solzhenitsyn.

In any case, the Kremlin bureaucrats have issued an unmistakable warning to the dissident movement. Dissemination of the truth about their history will not be tolerated. □

## The Case of Pyotr Grigorenko

### Ailing Soviet Dissident to Be Held Longer

Pyotr G. Grigorenko, the former major general confined in a Soviet psychiatric hospital since 1969 because of his political beliefs, has once again been denied release. The Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners reports that Grigorenko was given the required semiannual psychiatric "review" in January and ruled still "insane."

There is no information available indicating any improvement in Grigorenko's health, which has deteriorated severely since his arrest. At last report, he was blind in one eye and suffering from skin sores. Grigorenko is now sixty-seven years old.

Since the previous "review" of his case in June 1973, Grigorenko has been transferred from the "special" psychiatric hospital at Chernyakhovsk to an ordinary psychiatric hospital in Stolbovaya, thirty-five miles southeast of Moscow. The transfer may have come in response to the international attention aroused last fall by the issue of psychiatric confinement of political dissidents. That the move was not intended as a real concession to the ailing Grigorenko is indicated by the Soviet authorities' continuing to deny him the right to use pencil and paper.

Grigorenko's present imprisonment is the second occasioned by his political beliefs and activities. He was classified "mentally ill" and hospitalized from February 1964 to May 1965 because, in the words of an official psychiatric report, he had "studied Marx and Lenin and pondered the mistakes of the political leadership, [and] tried to map out the right course." During his imprisonment, his army rank was reduced to private and he was expelled from the Communist party—reprisals

giving the lie to the official claim that Grigorenko was considered not responsible for his actions.

After his release in May 1965, Grigorenko at first attempted to confine his



PYOTR GRIGORENKO

activities to "scholarly work." This consisted primarily of preparing a manuscript honestly describing the early phases of the war with Nazi Germany. (He had been reprimanded during the war because of his criticisms of some of the mistakes caused by bureaucratic bungling.)

But the bureaucratic regime dares not permit honest scholarship, and Grigorenko soon found himself again in conflict with the authorities. When A. M. Nekrich, the author of a much milder critique of Stalin's military misleadership, was expelled from the CP and publicly denounced in 1967, Grigorenko wrote a lengthy defense of the

author based on his own experiences and research. Although Grigorenko's study was not completed because of his arrest in 1969, the long letter defending Nekrich was circulated in samizdat.

From 1966 until his second arrest, Grigorenko became increasingly active in the movement for socialist democracy in the Soviet Union. He was prominent in the defense of arrested dissidents, in the protests against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and in the defense of oppressed national minorities within the Soviet Union. He was especially well known for his efforts in behalf of the Crimean Tatars, who were exiled en masse from their homeland by Stalin in 1944 and are still denied the right to return by Stalin's successors.

At the end of last October, several psychiatrists from the United States and Britain, part of a delegation visiting the Soviet Union, were permitted to see Grigorenko briefly. Dr. Alfred Freedman, president of the American Psychiatric Association, saw Grigorenko in Stolbovaya but reported that the prisoner refused to be interviewed when denied the right to use his own, rather than a government, interpreter. Freedman said that one of the Soviet psychiatrists present cited this refusal as a proof of Grigorenko's "insanity."

In an interview published in the December issue of *APA Monitor*, the paper of the American Psychological Association, Freedman expressed reluctance to "draw any conclusions in regard to [the] motivation or inner thinking" of Soviet psychiatrists involved in the "treatment" of dissenters. Despite this diplomatic reluctance, he nevertheless had some observations relevant to the Grigorenko case.

"Although it was stated," Freedman said, "that criticism itself is not a sign of psychopathology, one does get the impression that dissent, criticism or opposition are considered to be bizarre behaviors and important manifestations of disease."

Among the "crimes" considered to be evidence of mental illness by Soviet authorities, Freedman mentioned "demonstrations in Red Square" as an example. "One must conclude that Soviet individuals may be charged with crimes and involuntarily hospitalized in psychiatric facilities in situations which would have a different outcome in the United States," he said. □

## British Students Demonstrate for Improved Grants

London

More than 35,000 students from across Britain gathered in London February 8 in the largest demonstration yet in the National Union of Students (NUS) Grants Campaign. In Glasgow, 8,000 students marched through the centre of town and another 2,000 demonstrated in Belfast. The demonstrations were the high points in a one-day national student strike called by the NUS in pursuit of a fairer system of government grants for students.

The London march was organised in college contingents revealing a broad representation of student bodies across the country. Most of the major university student unions were represented, as were numerous groups of students from polytechnics, art and technical schools, medical colleges, colleges of agriculture and education, as well as the National Union of School Students.

The grants campaign, which was initiated in 1972, has been in something of an eclipse on a national level because of the lack of clear direction from the NUS executive, which is led

by the Communist party. In February 1973, more than 60,000 students demonstrated in twelve cities, and in March the NUS called the first national student strike, but these actions were followed by a decline in nationally co-ordinated activity.

The chants and slogans of students on the march showed the awareness of many students of the connection between the grants issue and the pay claims of miners and other unions. Many of the slogans expressed solidarity with the miners and opposition to the Tories and their Phase III wage controls.

The NUS-organised march and rally was the first public display of support for the miners. The first speaker at the rally, Jack Dunn—representing the Kent area of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)—announced the NUM's decision to carry through with the coal strike despite Heath's calling of a general election.

"If the miners lose, everyone loses," Dunn said. "If the miners win, everyone wins." He also pledged continued miners' support for the student struggle.

During the 1972 miners' strike, students joined picket lines and arranged accommodation for pickets. In some areas, the universities became centres for strike support activity. At Essex University miners from Yorkshire held a joint occupation with students and used the facilities of the college as a base for picketing local power stations.

Already contacts between trades councils and students at Kent University have led to discussions about similar support action this year.

The grants campaign has been spurred by recent further cutbacks in social services, including major cuts in education spending, which have created very real hardship for many students. The students are demanding:

—An equal and full grant for all students, increased from the present £465 to £655. Because of inflation, the value of the full grant has decreased by 35 percent in the last decade. The increase demanded would return the grant to its 1962 value.

—An end to the discretionary award system, which permits a maximum grant of only £180 for students whose grants are awarded at the discretion of local authorities. Because of cutbacks in educational expenditures, many of the 87,000 students on these meagre awards may soon get nothing at all.

—An end to the parental means test, which reduces grants according to parents' income the previous year even if students receive no financial support from their parents.

—An end to discrimination against married women, whose grants have not risen since 1965. The maximum grant possible now is about half of a full grant and it can be even further reduced by a parental means test.

Speakers at the London rally included Jack Mansell, vice-president of the Association of Teachers in Technical Institutions; Lou Lewis, a London building worker and spokesperson for the Shrewsbury 24 Defence Committee; and Judith Hart, a leading "leftist" in the Labour party and a member of Parliament.

The rally ended with a speech by



Part of February 8 protest in London organized by NUS.

John Randall, the NUS president, who urged students to unite with the trade-union movement in the fight against Phase III. He also urged students to vote Labour, while warning against "illusions about any future Labour government."

But the NUS leadership at the demonstration projected no clear way forward for the movement. In his speech, Randall outlined a "week of action" on grants for the first week in March, just after the opening of the new Parliament. However, the "week of action" comes within two weeks of the end of the university term and will therefore

not have maximum effect.

Over the past year, the NUS leadership has concentrated on high-level negotiations with the government and on gaining the support of college authorities for the demands. At the last NUS conference in November, a motion of censure was passed against the executive for its lack of leadership. But in the ensuing bitter debate over strategy, groups to the left of the CP, with about one-third of the delegates, were unable to carry a line in opposition to the CP-dominated leadership.

Since then the NUS has kept the

campaign at a relatively low key nationally. But despite the lack of national leadership, there have been some militant struggles around local issues such as food prices and accommodations during the past term. Presently more than half the universities are on rent strikes.

The lack of a militant national student leadership will also hamper the necessary coordination of student support for the striking miners. It is nevertheless likely that students will provide important aid for the miners while advancing their own demands on the government. □

## Luxembourg

# Labor Bureaucrats Move to Exclude Militants

[The following appeal was issued by the Comité de Défense de la Liberté d'Expression Politique au LAV (Committee for the Defense of Free Political Expression in the LAV). Letzeburger Arbecherverband (Luxembourg Labor Federation) is the trade-union federation influenced by the Social Democracy to which the large majority of Luxembourg's workers belong. The statement denounces the labor bureaucracy's maneuvers to exclude revolutionists and trade-union militants from LAV membership.

[Letters of protest should be sent to LAV, 60 Bd Kennedy Esch/A, Luxembourg. Copies to the committee should be addressed c/o Militant, 1182 Luxembourg/Ville, Luxembourg.]

\* \* \*

Several days ago the LAV executive committee decided to put forward at its February 3 national conference the principle of "incompatibility" of membership in the LAV and membership or sympathizer status in the revolutionary organizations Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire [Revolutionary Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International] and the Union des Communistes du Luxembourg [Luxembourg Union of Communists]. This exclusionary move follows numerous attacks in the trade-union newspaper *Arbecht* on communists and revolutionists, who have never been given an opportunity to defend themselves

by answering the charges in the same newspaper. The LAV leaders feel justified in excluding trade unionists only because these trade unionists are part of a more combative and different political current of the workers movement than their own. This measure is in glaring contradiction to LAV's statutes, which clearly state that the federation is "independent of all political parties" and that all workers can join regardless of their "ideological, religious, or political convictions."

The attempt to exclude revolutionary trade unionists must be understood in the context of a rise in workers struggles in Luxembourg that came to a head in the October 9, 1973, general strike and demonstration of 30,000 workers. More and more workers are breaking with the tradition of class collaboration practiced by their labor leaders and are beginning to organize independently for their struggle. This comes in the wake of exemplary workers struggles throughout Europe, increased rationalization in the iron and steel industry, worsening working conditions, and an inflation that has been eating up the working masses' buying power.

Thus, in spring 1973, the Arbed/Belval rolling mill production workers began to regulate the rate of production, thus bringing a halt to the hellish pace. Without the support of the LAV leaders, they organized themselves in rank-and-file assemblies and democratically decided what actions to take. And it is the revolu-

tionary trade unionists who were most often at the head of these first workers struggles (only a few of which we note) that broke with several decades of "social peace." It was combative workers (often coming from the Luxembourg CP) who initiated these actions, which were supported and extended by revolutionary organizations.

The proposal to exclude members and sympathizers of revolutionary groups is thus aimed at all combative workers; it is a catch-all formula that particularly affects immigrants (30 percent of the working population).

The only valid basis for excluding a member from LAV would of course be if he harmed the trade union by betraying the interests of the workers to the advantage of the bosses. So our colleague leaders are careful not to draw out such lines of reasoning. They are fully aware that the revolutionists in the LAV are among the best trade-union militants, often signing up the most new members. It was the revolutionists in the LAV who mobilized in full strength for the October 9 demonstration and were among the first to take up the call on that occasion to mount strike pickets, while all the reactionaries baited the workers movement.

The consequences of excluding revolutionists from the LAV are obvious: Without trade-union protection, these militants will be left to the mercies of the bosses and threatened with losing their jobs. What the LAV leaders don't understand is that capitalist repression

of one tendency of the workers movement is in reality an attack against the entire movement. When the Gaullist government dissolved the Ligue Communiste, an organization of our French fellow-militants, because they were struggling against the fascist vermin, all the French left organizations solidarized with them. The Luxembourg labor leaders on the contrary are preparing to throw revolutionary workers out as prey for the bourgeoisie.

But the members of LAV's executive committee are in danger of underestimating the rank and file's reaction. Many LAV militants—socialists, Communists, and independent—presently agree with certain revolutionary positions, without, however, accepting a complete revolutionary line. They're in favor of reviving the internal life of the trade union so as to make it more effective in confronting the bosses, of stimulating the functioning of rank-and-file organizations by building company-level sections, and of allowing all tendencies to express themselves freely so that a better struggle can be waged for a single national trade union.

It is workers themselves who have begun to get people to sign petitions against the exclusion of revolutionary militants. Among them are the Merzig local of the LAV, which includes many Goodyear workers; the president of the trade-union youth of LAV; militants of the Union Nationale des Etudiants [National Student Union] and the Parti Ouvrier Socialiste [Socialist Workers party], etc.

All the militants have agreed to respect trade-union discipline and democratic decision-making in this struggle against excluding revolutionists, which is a struggle for workers democracy in the trade unions. Given the unfortunate lack of democratic discussion inside the union, we must today call on all dedicated workers and trade unionists in Luxembourg and in Europe to protest energetically against the labor leaders' maneuvers to divide the workers movement. This exclusionism is actually exceptional in the European labor movement. It concerns all militants who are struggling for workers democracy in the trade unions and for a fighting trade-union tradition.

*Long live a strong and united LAV!*

*Long live a class-struggle LAV trade union!*

## Kim Dae Jung May Be Barred From Leaving

### New Arrests Reported in South Korea

South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Dong Jo said in an interview in early February that it was highly unlikely that Kim Dae Jung, a prominent leader of the bourgeois opposition, would be given a passport to leave the country. In August Kim Dae Jung was kidnapped in Tokyo by South Koreans and taken to Seoul, where he was put under house arrest for his denunciations of the Park regime.

The international outcry over the scandal, plus student demonstrations in South Korea, forced the Park regime to apologize for the kidnapping and give indications that it would allow Kim to leave if he wanted. The Park regime's shift in position in indicating that Kim might not be allowed to leave took place in conjunction with the escalation in January of repression against other South Korean dissidents.

In addition to blocking Kim's departure, the Seoul regime has stepped up its arrests and convictions of oppositionists. The Seoul district prosecutor's office announced on February 5 that two South Korean novelists and three literary critics had been arrested: Lee Ho Chui, Chung Eul Byung, Im Hun Yung, Kim Wu Jong, and Chang Byung Hee. They were charged with spying for North Korea and violating the anti-Communist law.

On February 7, six Protestant ministers were sentenced to prison by special courts martial at the South Korean Defense Ministry. The courts martial were set up by the January 8 decree banning any criticisms of the constitution. Four of the religious leaders received fifteen-year terms and two received ten-year terms.

New censorship regulations were imposed on the press December 28. The regime has now indicated that Cheon Kwan Wu, a former managing editor of *Donga Ilbo*, the country's largest daily newspaper, is being investigated on charges of espionage. *Asahi Shimbun*, a Tokyo daily newspaper, has also been banned from South Korea for its coverage of dissident activities.

In defense of the new repressive actions, Premier Kim Jong Pil said on February 8 that "those people who have violated the emergency measures have been prosecuted and we hope this will serve as a lesson to others. When school opens in the spring, I do not feel that sensible students will get out of line."

He also said that "regardless of the number of dissidents, we cannot afford to let them make so much noise, particularly when we are faced with such difficulties economically. . . . the people do not want noise and we do not want social disorder and noise." □

### Seek Control of Oil Transport Routes

## U.S., Iran Extending Indian Ocean Bases

By Dianne Feeley

Since the British government pulled its military forces out of the Arab East three years ago, control of the vital waterways of the Arab-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean has been up for grabs. The shah of Iran has attempted to fill part of the "vacuum" left by the British by proclaiming Iran the "guardian and protector of 60 percent of the world's oil reserves." He has taken over three islands that control the mouth of the gulf, expelling

or killing the Arabs who lived there. Military bases have been built on two of the islands.

According to Western diplomatic sources quoted by the *New York Times*, the shah now has 1,500 troops fighting in Dhofar Province in Oman. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf puts the number of Iranian troops in Oman at as many as 30,000.

The shah has undertaken a crash



program to build a \$600 million military base by 1975 at Chah Bahar Bay, on the Indian Ocean. There is a second military installation farther west, at Jask. These bases will provide support for his ambitions in the Indian Ocean.

With an oil tanker sailing through the Arab-Persian Gulf every twelve to sixteen minutes, and from there into the Indian Ocean, either toward Japan or Western Europe and the United States, the economic and political importance of the sea lanes is obvious. Last year the shah agreed to provide Mauritius, off the coast of Madagascar, with an undisclosed amount of aid in exchange for port facilities.

Particularly since the October War in the Arab East, and with the prospect of the Suez Canal being reopened, Washington has shown reluctance to leave military responsibilities in the area entirely to the shah. The U. S. Defense Department is "now committed to maintaining naval forces in the Indian Ocean on a regular basis," according to a report in the January 22 *New York Times*.

However, the U. S. navy finds its present facilities too limited: communications setups on several islands and an obsolete facility in Bahrain, in the Arab-Persian Gulf. The government of the Malagasy Republic, moreover,

closed the port of Diégo-Suarez, on the northern end of Madagascar, during an attempted visit by four U. S. destroyers last December 26. The official explanation was that the normal docking space was unavailable, but Washington is obviously concerned that it will not be able to rely on the port. Shortly after this incident, the U. S. Defense Department revealed that it is considering establishing a naval base on Diego Garcia, a British-controlled island midway between Madagascar and Sri Lanka.

The U. S. already has a small communications station with 200 personnel on the island and a permanent air station capable of being used as a base for aerial reconnaissance.

The U. S. plans for Diego Garcia have already produced diplomatic and popular protests in Sri Lanka and India, but Washington is anxious to increase its naval force in the area and is already feeling the lack of port facilities.

When the U. S. aircraft carrier *Hancock* was sent into the Indian Ocean during the October War, it took three tankers and two supply ships from the U. S. fleet in the Western Pacific to support the carrier. A "reliable" base on Diego Garcia could significantly reduce such strains on U. S. naval power. □

dia, Orissa in east India, and Manipur, in northeast India."

The Bombay *Economic Times* also noted the connection between the Congress regime and the wealthy farmers. "It is shocking," it said, "to note that the Government should have bungled so badly, with procurement almost everywhere running way behind targets. The Government evidently does not want to displease their rural patrons by stepping up procurement." Chief Minister Patel had been charged by the demonstrators with shielding the hoarders in return for financial and political support.

The February 11 *New York Times* quoted economist Balraj Mehta as pointing out the existence of shortages throughout India. "Situations similar to Gujarat," he said, "threaten to erupt in many other parts of the country. The public distribution system is on the verge of collapse in Kerala and Bihar. Open-market prices for food grains are soaring to dizzy heights all over the country. The food situation has never been so critical since independence." □

## Army Takes Over in Upper Volta

Under the leadership of General Sangoulé Lamizana, the army seized total control of the government in the West African nation of Upper Volta on February 8. Premier Gerard Kango Ouedraogo was deposed, the constitution suspended, the National Assembly dissolved, and a curfew imposed. Lamizana, who has been president for eight years, will retain that post. He had served with the French forces in Indochina and came to power in 1966, when the military overthrew the regime of President Maurice Yaméogo.

In 1970 Lamizana allowed a partial return to civilian rule, with the establishment of a constitution and a National Assembly. In January the National Assembly had voted down some government-sponsored bills, an action that the president claimed had "paralyzed the apparatus of government" and produced a "catastrophic situation."

The cabinet that he appointed three days after the take-over further strengthened Lamizana's control. □

## Food Protests Topple Gujarat Government

In the face of continued food riots, which have been raging for more than four weeks, the government of the western Indian state of Gujarat fell February 9. Unable to "handle" the situation, despite the use of federal troops, Chief Minister Chimantbhai Patel submitted his resignation and the state was put under the direct rule of the federal government in New Delhi.

Within hours of the fall of the state government, tens of thousands of demonstrators marched through the streets in celebration, then began attacking shops, police stations, banks, and post offices in Ahmadabad, the state capital. The police killed two demonstrators, bringing to forty-seven the official death toll for the month of disturbances. The February 4 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, which said that the unrest in Gujarat "has assumed the proportions of a civil war," reported that

leaders of the Congress party had been attacked and beaten up in their homes and that the police had been fired upon by protestors.

The demonstrations, strikes, and rioting were sparked by shortages of rice and wheat in the government ration shops. Much of the shortage has resulted from large-scale hoarding by the wealthy farmers who hope to get higher prices for the grain on the black market, and from the government's reluctance to procure sufficient quantities. As the February 11 *New York Times* put it:

"One factor, according to critics, is the Government's 'lack of will' to compel states to procure food because big farmers remain politically powerful and are donors to the governing Congress party, which is now undergoing a series of key election tests in such states as Uttar Pradesh, in north In-

## Grenada Prime Minister Arresting Opposition

Six hours before the predominantly Black Caribbean island of Grenada gained its independence from Great Britain on February 7, sixty policemen burst into the home of Maurice Bishop, a leader of the New Jewel (Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation) Movement and arrested him on the charge of planning to assassinate Prime Minister Eric Gairy. Warrants were put out for the arrest of six other leaders of the New Jewel Movement. The home of a lawyer for the NJM was also burned to the ground.

Gairy's crackdown on the opposition to his continued rule came after weeks of demonstrations and strikes that paralyzed the island. While most Grenadians favored independence from Great Britain, they wanted it without Gairy, who has ruled Grenada for most of the past two decades. Some of Gairy's opponents compare him to the late dictator of Haiti, "Papa Doc" Duvalier.

Gairy has a personal secret police unit of 500 armed goons, many of whom he recruited from prisons. While they are now called the Volunteers for the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights, the former names for the squad were more accurate: the Night Ambush Squad, and later the Volunteer Secret Intelligence Squad. The nucleus of this personal army is said to be a criminal gang called the Mongoose Squad. Much of the opposition to Gairy has centered on his use of these goons to intimidate and terrorize his political opponents.

Like Duvalier, Gairy also delved into mysticism. A Rosicrucian, he told *New York Times* correspondent Michael T. Kaufman in a February 6 interview: "I was appointed by God to lead Grenada. I have known this from the beginning." Besides being prime minister, Gairy serves as minister of external affairs; home affairs; national security, tourism, land, and surveys; national resources, planning and development; and information. He once said: "Lots of people have tried to get rid of me and they are lying in the cemetery." He then explained that they had died "natural deaths."

The members of the New Jewel Movement have been the victims of the Gairy goon squad's most vicious attacks on opponents. He has characterized them as "greedy types who came back from universities with some funny ideas in their heads." The NJM was formed two years ago by Blacks who returned from universities abroad. It has several hundred members and considers itself pro-socialist.

In a report to the February 5 *Washington Post* from St. George's, the capital of Grenada, correspondent Bruce Handler described the NJM and Gairy's approach to it: "There is talk here that after independence Gairy will raise an alarm about a threatened Communist take-over to try to get foreign aid from the United States and other Western countries.

"Actually, the New Jewel Movement does espouse some socialist ideas. If it got power in Grenada, it says, it would try to replace the island's present British-style Parliament with a so-called people's assembly and set up Cuban style 'people's courts' to deal with local justice.

"The Movement would also nationalize the U.S., British and Canadian banks and take over foreign-owned resort hotels, so that poor people from the Caribbean could enjoy Grenada's beaches as well as the few rich whites who can afford the current high prices."

In the context of Grenada's stagnant economy and with a well-organized labor movement, such ideas do not fall on deaf ears. Grenada is dependent on the export of a few spices and on the tourist trade, has a per capita income of \$300, rampant inflation, and an unemployment rate of about 50 percent.

Since January 1 the island has been paralyzed by a general strike that was called by a coalition of forces opposed to Gairy: the NJM, the trade unions, and a few businessmen who fear that Gairy's policies may eventually jeopardize foreign investment. Support strikes were also successful on the docks of Trinidad, Barbados, and Curaçao, cutting off Grenada's oil supplies.

Gairy's response was typical. Members of the NJM and other opposition-

ists were attacked and beaten up by the goon squads. On January 21, at an antigovernment rally called by the NJM, which drew 4,000 persons, the secret police attacked with clubs and guns. Rupert Bishop, father of the arrested NJM leader, was shot and killed by Gairy's thugs. In the subsequent disorders Gairy's backers looted stores and shops while the uniformed police stood by and watched.

Two days before the arrest of Bishop, another leader of the NJM had predicted that they would be rounded up after independence had been formally declared. The rapidity of the crackdown, however, apparently took even the NJM leadership by surprise. As he was being arrested, Maurice Bishop told his wife and a reporter for the *London Observer*, who happened to be there at the time: "As the Government's violence increases, so the people's opposition will harden. It is up to the people."

The police who arrested Bishop "discovered" ammunition and maps in his home; the cache, Gairy claims, proves that the NJM had been planning to assassinate him. The orchestrated frame-up even included the well-worn "outside elements" angle. "There is a definite connection," Gairy said, "between the Jewel and outside subversive agents. There were plans to assassinate me by an outside Communist source."

While the leaders of the New Jewel Movement have gone into hiding and the secret police have begun to fan out over the island rounding up Gairy's opponents, the strikes and demonstrations against the prime minister have continued.

The February 11 *Christian Science Monitor* discussed the NJM's immediate perspectives: The NJM "probably doesn't have the strength to overthrow Mr. Gairy by force, and no general elections are scheduled for several years.

"But the movement is strong in urban areas of the island, and has the capacity to disrupt essential needs, as strikers have been doing with power, light, and telephone services. Actually, the strikers are not members of the

New Jewel Movement, but their actions are supported by the movement."

Although the dock workers, who have been on strike since the beginning of

the year, may go back to work, the union leaders said that it would be only temporarily, to unload essential cargoes. □

## Venezuela

# Oil Nationalization: On Whose Terms?

[The following article was published in the January 15 issue of the Venezuelan Trotskyist fortnightly *Voz Socialista*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

The weakening of imperialism on a world scale, the rise in the mass movement, the energy crisis, and the Arab petroleum policy have changed the world political situation. These are the causes of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie seeking a better position in its deals with imperialism.

This is what [outgoing President Raphael] Caldera meant when he said, "I'm convinced that moving ahead to recover the oil holdings is in all respects advisable and even necessary . . . it will be up to the next session of Congress to do so." Revealing the weakening of imperialism, Watherrel, a Shell Company employee, stated that his corporation "is willing and prepared to consider any new set of relations for petroleum operations . . . so as to fulfill Venezuela's aspirations and objectives."

And after meeting with Caldera, [President-elect] Carlos Andrés Pérez, adapting to bourgeois nationalism and firmly approving the agreement among various sectors of the bosses, said: "As regards the petroleum industry, I believe that we are heading for general national agreement in Venezuela that will help me in the decisions I must make as head of state."

Responding to this agreement among different sectors of the bourgeoisie to nationalize the petroleum industry, the MAS [Movimiento al Socialismo—Movement Toward Socialism] says that because it is the Venezuelan bosses who will profit from such a measure (this is true, but only part of the story), they prefer to oppose nationalization and offer a coun-

terproposal: the socialization of the petroleum industry. But is this a concrete solution to a concrete problem? To counterpose the socialization of the petroleum industry to its probable nationalization is an abstract alternative that politically disarms the Venezuelan working class in its day-to-day battle with the bosses.

Trotsky said: "These measures [the nationalizations] are entirely within the domain of state capitalism. . . ."

"What should be the policy of the workers' party in this case? It would of course be a disastrous error, an outright deception, to assert that the road to socialism passes, not through the proletarian revolution, but through nationalization by the bourgeois state of various branches of industry and their transfer into the hands of the workers' organizations. . . . One can of course evade the question by citing the fact that unless the proletariat takes possession of the power, participation by the trade unions in the management of the enterprises of state capitalism cannot give socialist results. However, such a negative policy from the revolutionary wing would not be understood by the masses and would strengthen the opportunist positions. For Marxists it is not a question of building socialism with the hands of the bourgeoisie, but of utilizing the situations which present themselves within state capitalism and advancing the revolutionary movement of the workers."

The MAS—instead of opposing a measure that goes against the interests of the main enemy of the Venezuelan revolution, that is, U.S. imperialism—should both answer for itself and explain to the workers precisely how, taking the nationalization of the petroleum industry as a point of departure, to struggle so that the masses will challenge the Venezuelan bosses' petroleum profits.

We don't have even an ounce of

trust in the bourgeois government. The Argentine and Peruvian experiences once again show that bourgeois nationalism cannot rescue the Latin American countries from the clutches of dependence. But this general truth still doesn't solve the question.

Any nationalist measure carried out by a bourgeois government in a semi-colonial country like Venezuela is self-contradictory: It is progressive because it strikes against imperialist interests; reactionary, because it is controlled by the "national" bourgeoisie. This is why we are launching—and propose that the MAS compañeros launch—a struggle for nationalizing the oil fields and placing them under workers control. This slogan will impel nationalization forward and at the same time call on the workers to place no confidence in the management of the bourgeois state.

We must be the most consistent fighters for this nationalization, because it strikes a blow at Venezuela's main enemy, because we want to share this experience with the workers, and because in this way the working class will be able to prove that only when it has power in Venezuela will the petroleum industry serve the masses.

At the same time that we are struggling for workers control of a nationalized industry, we put forth the slogan "no compensation."

We shouldn't pay one cent to industrial concerns like Creole and Shell. First of all, investments made by the foreign companies have been amply returned by their profits. Second, compensation could be used for reinvestment in a different sector of our economy, in this way continuing the exploitation of the Venezuelan workers. Third, opposing compensation will bring into the open the limitations of "nationalization" as proposed by the COPEI [Comité Organizado por Elecciones Independientes—Committee for Independent Political Action] and the AD [Acción Democrática—Democratic Action—the Christian Democrats]. □

### Check That Spelling

As part of his Watergate defense, Nixon has been having friends and relatives explain to the press that he is innocent. Nixon's son-in-law, David Eisenhower, spoke to reporters February 5 and, according to the *New York Times*, "described Mr. Nixon as a 'brilliant man' with a mind of steel."

## White House Tapes Winding Tighter Around Nixon

By Allen Myers

In a letter to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee February 14, Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski confirmed press reports that Nixon has refused to provide any further tapes or documents relevant to the Watergate investigation.

The material sought, Jaworski wrote, involved four areas: the Watergate break-in and cover-up, 1971 and 1972 contributions to Nixon's campaign from dairy cooperatives, the operations of the secret White House plumbers unit, and unspecified investigations in which requests for documents were made as far back as last August and October. ". . . it is now clear," Jaworski said, "that evidence I deem material to our investigations will not be forthcoming."

Jaworski went on to note that Nixon had not even bothered to assert "executive privilege" or to argue that the material was unrelated to Watergate: "There was no indication in the latest refusals that any requested recording is either irrelevant to our inquiries or subject to some particularized privilege."

Nixon's refusal to hand over the evidence requested by Jaworski appears to be based on the calculation that the prosecutor's desire to proceed with indictments will cause him to avoid a public confrontation in the courts. Indictments had been expected to be handed down near the end of February, but an attempt to subpoena the withheld evidence could take months to move through the courts.

"Even without the new material," the conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote February 9, "Jaworski's prosecutors are confident they have evidence enough to indict and convict Mr. Nixon's former aides."

But Nixon's refusal to hand over the evidence involves him in additional dangers, as the columnists went on to note:

"The latest noncooperation has hurt the President with the all-important fence-straddlers in Congress.

"Worst of all, the new developments tie Mr. Nixon ever closer to the fate of his former lieutenants—particularly H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman. If the prosecutors really do have the goods on them, the President is either guilty of foolish loyalties to fallen comrades or needs to shield them to protect himself. Thus, now more than ever, Mr. Nixon appears to be personally committed to exoneration of Haldeman and Ehrlichman."

Nixon's refusal of Jaworski's request is also being viewed as something of an experiment. If the reaction to this obstruction is relatively mild, Nixon might be encouraged to withhold information from the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment investigation. Robert P. Hey reported in the February 15 *Christian Science Monitor*:

"It is known that some influential Republican legislators believe that whether the House votes to impeach the President or not will depend on whether he provides all the information they seek. In this view, refusal to provide the material would result in a vote to impeach.

"There have been persistent reports the President might not provide requested information to the 38-member committee. . . .

"If the White House is considering not providing any requested information, says one key congressional source, 'they better get some good nose-counters down there' who realize how many angry congressmen would react by voting impeachment."

But Nixon may be reckoning on the likelihood of an impeachment vote in any case. John Pierson reported in the February 13 *Wall Street Journal*:

"A significant number of GOP [Republican] votes in committee for impeachment (five or six, in the view of a White House aide) would probably move a significant number of Republicans and Democrats on the House floor to vote for impeachment."

Pierson wrote that the senior Re-

publicans on the committee do not now favor impeachment, but predicted that some might break ranks as Jaworski's indictments are made public and as the committee gathers its evidence. He noted some signs pointing in that direction, among them the fact that "all the senior Republicans" on the committee "express confidence in the ability and fairness" of the majority and minority counsel conducting the investigation; say they are satisfied with the pace of the proceedings; and believe that Nixon should turn over whatever material the committee requests.

"Some of the seven senior Republicans," Pierson continued, "say they will vote to impeach Mr. Nixon if they have only 'probable cause' to believe he committed an impeachable offense. . . .

"Some of them say they will vote to impeach Mr. Nixon if they think he is guilty of grave offenses short of indictable crimes.

"At least one senior Republican resents what he feels was a White House attempt to influence his vote on impeachment. On the other hand, not all of them resent the campaigns in favor of impeachment by organized labor and other liberal groups; one GOP member asked them to send him their legal briefs."

In a February 12 editorial, the *Wall Street Journal* suggested that Nixon might prefer to risk an impeachment vote based on his refusal to provide evidence requested by the committee:

"Some people are talking as if this issue will now go away because an impeachment resolution is before the House Judiciary Committee. But this is true only if Congress really is prepared to impeach a President for refusing its subpoena, and that is scarcely clear. Indeed, with only about 20% of the House currently favoring impeachment, the President might decide to force an early vote by refusing subpoenas. If he must be impeached, after all, he would surely prefer to be impeached not for a third-rate bur-

glary but for defending the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers."

Nixon's maneuvers, it is apparent, are being made from a position of weakness rather than strength. They can be easily countered by Jaworski or the House Judiciary Committee if either is serious about securing the necessary evidence. The February 17 *New York Times* reported that Jaworski's purpose in writing to the Senate was "to bring public pressure on Mr. Nixon to back down. Informed sources say he has enough information to return indictments in the Watergate break-in case and will hand them down before the end of the month. Then, the sources say, if the White House attitude has not changed, he will seek subpoenas for the material he needs to make as strong a case as possible in these and other trials—and a head-on collision may result."

The prospect of indictments, with or without the benefit of the additional evidence, increases the prospect of high-level White House gangsters making a deal with the prosecution. The indictments, *Newsweek* magazine reported in its February 18 issue, "will, one insider said, bury the principals under 'a snowbank of charges,' partly because the nation will expect it . . . and partly to give the prosecutors material to bargain with.

"The message has not been lost on the Nixonians; the dominoes have begun toppling, or wobbling, in a line that could reach the President. John Ehrlichman has sounded out the possibilities of a deal, though he was said last week to be still wavering in his loyalties to the White House. L. Patrick Gray, the former acting FBI director, was reported to be cooperating in the inquiry; so was the President's private lawyer and fund raiser, Herbert W. Kalmbach. And now, *Newsweek* learned, Paul O'Brien, a former lawyer for the Committee for the Re-election of the President and a key figure in John Dean's recital of the cover-up, has begun talking with Jaworski's people. Associates deny that he and the prosecution have made a deal; if they do, said one lawyer involved in the case, the prosecution 'will be talking to the horse's mouth,' since O'Brien could corroborate Dean's story that payments to the original Watergate defendants were meant as hush money."

The report went on to indicate some of the areas to which deals with the probable defendants might lead:

"The defections have compounded the danger of Mr. Nixon's being entangled in the case—and named in the indictment. His defense thus far has rested heavily on his contention that his people kept him in the dark about Watergate until last March 21. But the prosecution has been showing intensifying interest in three periods before then in which witnesses have suggested otherwise—Jan. 3 to 5, when Dean



GRAY: Unsteady domino?

says Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt demanded and got a promise of executive clemency; Feb. 14, when [Charles] Colson says he warned Mr. Nixon that [John] Mitchell was involved in planning the original break-in at the Watergate; and March 13 to 20, when Hunt got itchy again and was paid \$75,000 in what Dean says was silence money."

The persistent rumors of plea-bargaining by high-level Watergaters indicate that there is little confidence in Nixon's ability to protect his former associates with his latest effort to conceal the evidence. Nixon has thus put himself out on a limb with not much prospect of gaining anything in exchange for the risk he is taking.

Moreover, there are reports of additional scandals involving those White House tapes that were earlier

turned over to Jaworski. The White House has denied a *Washington Post* story that two of these tapes were copies rather than originals. John Herbers reported in the February 16 *New York Times* that other tapes appear to have been erased, in addition to the June 20, 1972, recording on which 18.5 minutes of discussion about Watergate were wiped out:

"In Washington, Mr. Jaworski's office said that it had found additional erasures in the White House Watergate tapes that it now has and had turned them over to technicians for examination."

Nixon's press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, when asked about this report, issued a denial that sounded rather like a confession:

"To our knowledge—and I think we would know—there are no other gaps in the tapes. The taping system, as we have talked about before, was not a very good system, and there are sounds, I am told, throughout it, overrides and so forth, but there is no gap similar to the 18.5 minutes."

Instead of "gaps" there are "sounds" and "overrides." It is a safe assumption that these "sounds" and "overrides," like the 18.5 minute erasure will occur in the midst of discussions about Watergate between Nixon and his fellow conspirators.

Nixon's aides have attempted to delay expert study of these tapes, so far without success. George Lardner Jr. reported in the February 9 *Washington Post* that "White House lawyers reportedly asked [Judge John] Sirica at a recent conference that the experts not be allowed to examine other subpoenaed tapes for signs of tampering until they could document their conclusions about the June 20 tape with detailed scientific data and worksheets."

The request was rejected by Sirica, who asked the experts to proceed to study the tapes not yet tested.

Nixon undoubtedly has further tricks up his sleeve, but they are unlikely to be any more effectual. For the foreseeable future, the noose of evidence will continue being drawn tighter and tighter. □

#### Because Dogs Don't Vote?

Television commercials in which a Liberal candidate for Parliament pushes dog-food have been temporarily banned so as not to give him an "unfair advantage."

## Bosses Trying to Manipulate Immigrants

[The following two articles appeared in the January 1 and January 24 issues of *La Brèche*, fortnightly newspaper of the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Marxist League), the Swiss organization in sympathy with the Fourth International. The articles originally appeared under the headlines "Slave Dealers" and "Counter the Third Anti-Immigration Bill." The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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On Friday, December 21 [1973], in Lausanne a series of measures affecting seasonal workers was denounced at a joint press conference of the Vaudois Reception Center and the United Committee of Swiss Citizens and Immigrants.

As a matter of fact, of the seasonal workers who are leaving Switzerland en masse at the end of the year to return to Spain or Italy, a number of them will be taking off without the guarantee of being able to return in 1974. Although they've agreed to return next year, their employers haven't given them return permits, as they used to in previous years. Once again this situation sheds light on the serious problem of job security, which is totally lacking for seasonal workers.

The July 6, 1973, federal decree had for the first time limited the number of seasonal workers by instituting a canton [province] quota system; but in the present situation the construction industry bosses themselves seem to be contemplating an even tighter restriction: They are considering a 25 percent reduction in the total number of seasonal workers for 1974 in the canton of Friburg; 40 percent in the canton of Vaud; and as much as 50 percent in Geneva.

This leads to an absolutely insufferable situation for seasonal workers that the Reception Center denounced in its press release:

"The worker goes back to his native country without knowing if he'll be able to return. He doesn't worry about looking for work in his country,

because despite everything, he still has hope of returning to Switzerland. If the seasonal worker who has already spent several months in Switzerland cannot return, he loses the right to change his status from seasonal worker to year-round worker; the same thing will result if he can't return in time."

This state of affairs calls for a certain number of observations.

1. The role played by the masses of immigrant workers, particularly seasonal workers, as a reserve labor force that can be cut back in case of an economic crisis becomes rather clear in this situation. The bosses are eager to preserve seasonal labor precisely because of this "flexibility." (Since 1968, the proportion of seasonal workers and border workers has increased, while year-round workers have decreased.) Brugger [head of the Federal Department of Public Economy] cynically illustrated the bourgeoisie's use for this labor force when he recently hinted to Italian members of parliament that Switzerland might forgo plans for clamping down on seasonal immigration (as West Germany has done), provided that Italy makes certain concessions on petroleum deliveries. (*Corriera della Sera*, December 14, 1973.)

2. The July 1973 decree had already put into force a *flagrant violation of the Italo-Swiss agreements*, as it established a category of seasonal workers who are deprived of the right to improve their status. The present abrupt reduction tends to limit as much as possible the number of long-standing seasonal workers eligible to obtain a B permit (year-round worker). We have already explained in *La Brèche* why the bosses are opposed to long-standing seasonal workers gaining year-round work status. [See *Intercontinental Press*, November 5, 1973, p. 1276.]

3. While the workers have not been guaranteed work permits, the bosses on the other hand have applied for hiring quotas: In response to a survey, state agencies reported that there have been as many applications for hiring quotas this year as in other

years. This means that the bosses protect their future by applying for as great a hiring quota as possible, but then putting the contingent on ice until they have a better picture of the overall economic trend. During this period the worker is left absolutely in the dark. It is significant that applications for seasonal labor allocations were submitted this year only in December, after the vote on economic plans, and not in October or November as in the past. This means that the bosses, aware of the relative squeeze on the construction industry that passage of the federal decree implies, have closed down the flow of immigration, fearful of a slow-down in the building trade.

Can one really talk about the threat of a recession?

Of course a real economic squeeze exists. There are signs of a recession: The economic downturn (or more exactly, the end of a boom and the beginning of a downturn) in the United States since June 1973 and in West Germany since August could mean a coinciding of the recessions in 1974. (The clear signs of coming economic difficulties for Spain around mid-1974 would tend to confirm this.) The bourgeoisie is thus trying to insure itself against any substantial drop in the profit rate by freezing wages, abolishing jobs that produce too little revenue, increasing productivity by tightening supervision, etc.

Now, the oil crisis has come just in time to make it easier for the bourgeoisie to dish out this medicine. Behind certain objective economic difficulties generated by the oil crisis there is also an especially broad campaign of deception being orchestrated by the capitalists. Our energy resources are supposedly threatened; the price increases and the sacrifices that everyone will have to make are therefore supposed to have resulted from natural calamity, the bosses having nothing to do with it. To confront this misfortune, bosses and wage workers, producers and consumers, are supposed to show their great solidarity by sharing the difficulties. And then suddenly they slip in a few price increases and freeze some wages!

The measures against seasonal workers fall into this context: In a climate of insecurity, by first striking out at foreigners, the bourgeoisie hopes to close the ranks of the "Swiss com-

munity" and deepen the division between Swiss citizens and immigrants. The *climate of insecurity* thus created among immigrant workers is put to use to instigate a pernicious rivalry by threatening a weeding-out process. As the Friburg construction firm [Immoparticipation, Inc.] stated bluntly: "We will be obligated to use a method of selection so as to employ only the best workers in 1974."

The task of revolutionists is to explain the totality of the bourgeoisie's devices and schemes so as to prevent the holy interclass alliance from consolidating a response "in the face of hard times," which would reinforce anti-immigrant sentiment in the name of national self-interest and in the last analysis weaken the working class as a whole—immigrants and Swiss—in confronting the bourgeoisie's attacks.

But the present measures probably have a specific political aspect too: to prepare the bourgeoisie to react to a third anti-immigration bill that will come up for a vote in 1974. Actually, as this bill calls for a reduction in the total number of seasonal workers from the current 190,000 to 150,000, one can regard not only the July 1973 decree (which for the first time limited the number of seasonal workers), but also the restrictive measures currently being taken, as a bourgeois attempt to discount the impact of the bill.

In addition, our counterthrust can only be an overall response: a struggle to eliminate the category of seasonal workers by showing that its elimination would do away with one of the tools of the bosses' "divide and conquer" policy, and would strengthen the working class as a result.

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At the beginning of 1974 immigration is becoming one of the dominant issues with the opening of discussion on the third anti-immigration bill of the MNA.

In fact, the recent Federal Council report has just launched this campaign, which might well continue until 1975 if during its spring session the parliament is able to convince the Federal Council to introduce a counterproposal to the bill, a move the Council has refused to make for the moment.

Let's briefly recall the substance of this bill: It sets a limit of 4,000 to

the total number of annual naturalizations. The total number of immigrants cannot exceed 500,000 (12 percent of the Swiss population in the cantons, 25 percent in Geneva); the total number of seasonal workers must be reduced to 150,000 and border workers to 70,000. The total reduction is supposed to be completed before December 31, 1977, which means that some 180,000 applications for immigrant status, including permanent residency, would be rejected annually.

In its proposal to reject the bill, the Federal Council paints a catastrophic picture of the consequences of such a reduction in the number of immigrant workers. It is an established fact that in the advanced capitalist countries immigrant manpower has to a considerable degree become a structural component of economic growth. This implies that a drastic and sudden reduction in the size of the immigrant labor force would put in question the very functioning of the mechanisms of the economic system. Obviously, when the bourgeoisie talk about a catastrophe they avoid pointing up the role immigrant workers play in the expansion of Swiss capitalism. In the coming year, the conditions of the 1972-73 boom will persist; therefore, the bosses will look favorably on increasing immigrant labor, so as to expand the labor market. This would limit wage increases even more. But it is possible that part of the immigrant labor force will be turned away—or their contract renewals withheld—if the recession that can already be seen in West Germany spreads to France and the United States and hits Switzerland at the end of 1974 or beginning of 1975. However, it would be absolutely incorrect to believe that the bourgeoisie can readily use immigration as a shock absorber if a recession were to occur. In reality, the only sector that could give new impetus to the Swiss economy during a recession is the basic industry sector, public works, etc. So in order to guarantee the revival of this sector, it is essential that immigrant labor, which makes up the major part of this sector, be used as a "crisis reserve."

Hence the bourgeoisie's opposition to the third anti-immigration bill, sometimes cloaked in a humanitarian veil, expresses the bourgeoisie's fear of any tendency toward altering the

system's machinery, in which large-scale immigration plays an important part.

In this context the bourgeoisie must cope with two contradictory needs: On the one hand, the bourgeoisie is inclined to preserve an immigration policy that protects the growth mechanisms of the capitalist system; on the other hand, the bourgeoisie must modulate xenophobic sentiment (that its nationalist ideology helped create) in order to avoid any major political crisis and to keep the anti-immigration movement from becoming crystallized on the political plane and unsettling its system of political domination (the alliance between the three bourgeois parties and the social democracy). The quota system is the product of this dual need: On the one hand, it limits the entry of new workers each year; and on the other hand, it strives to increase the number of "permanent residency" workers, workers who have been "integrated into the productive process," while preserving an important reserve labor force of seasonal and border workers.

But this is a most delicate balance: In the political arena the anti-immigrationists carry things much too far, even challenging the number of seasonal and border workers—who up until now were not regarded as a part of the "Ueberfremdung" [foreign penetration], because their rights were so limited, eroded, and suppressed. And in the economic arena, the imposition of a quota system reduces the bourgeoisie's margin of maneuver and tightens the labor market.

In fact, in the face of the immigration question and its political and economic effects, the Swiss bourgeoisie is at an impasse. While traditionally the bourgeoisie pressured the trade-union heads to popularize among the workers its campaign against the anti-immigrationists (as in the June 1970 Schwarzenbach initiative), it is aware that this can no longer be done. It isn't that these trade-union heads have taken any clear positions against collaboration. But rather, as the January 17 *Handelszeitung* put it, because "the SP and the trade unions are no longer clearly ready to collaborate, as in 1970, to meet head on the simplistic ideas of some of their members." In other words, the trade-union leaders—especially in metallurgy—would rather not say anything to the anti-

immigrationists, rather than take the risk of antagonizing their own union members. Moreover, the objective tensions generated between boss and trade-union organizations by the inflationary trend threaten to undermine the "common front" against the anti-immigration movement.

Unable to check the anti-immigration movement, confronted with difficulties in ensuring the collaboration of the trade-union leaderships (or at least these leaderships as a whole), and faced with the fact that the bourgeois parties are in crisis (a reflection of all the tensions among the various cantonal cliques and sectoral interests), the most conscious layer of the bourgeoisie is seeking to set up an "independent" arbiter, a sort of Swiss Bonaparte who will stand above these conflicting interests.

This part of the bourgeoisie asked Brugger to play the role Celio played in establishing the current policy. So, the *Handelzeitung* states: "Most of the weight of this fight [against the anti-immigrationists] will now fall on the shoulders of Switzerland's bourgeois president—as it did during the vote on the emergency economic decrees."

As we square off against the anti-immigration movement, and against both the bourgeoisie's calls for "national unity" and the labor bureaucracy's disgraceful "Schwarzenbachism," our main task is twofold.

First, we will have to denounce the false solutions advanced by the trade unions—namely, a strengthening of the quota system "while necessarily foreseeing the need to resort to stricter regulatory measures against foreigners" (*Lutte Syndicale*, January 15, 1974), as suggested by the FTMH in their support of the Federal Council's policy. Here we will have to underscore the narrow nationalist character of this position, which supports the preservation of most of the discrimination linked to the position of an immigrant at the present time. And second, we will have to counterpose the defense of the right of everyone working in Switzerland to full and equal political, civil, and trade-union rights.

Moreover, given a perspective of certain future economic difficulties, it is clear that the issue of guaranteed jobs could presently gain support. Around this issue it will be necessary to put forward the most strongly felt demands, such as demands concerning

social security and wages. In this way we will have established a field of concrete action against the anti-immigration movement and against the bourgeoisie's "divide and conquer" politics; and we will have established the possibility of shedding light on the condi-

tions for a common struggle of Swiss citizens and immigrants against the bourgeoisie and the anti-immigrationist reactionaries.

Our campaign against the third anti-immigration bill will be waged on these two fields. □

## Is the 'Miracle' About to End?

# Tokyo Responds to the Energy Crisis

By Ernest Harsch

Echoing the initial panic set off in Tokyo by the oil embargo and the oil price increases, one Japanese industrialist declared that "the miracle of the Japanese economy is over. The fantastic growth of the Japanese economy is now a story of the past." Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka said that the effects of the energy crisis on Japan marked "a historic turning point, both economically and politically."

For the past decade, Japan has been the fastest growing imperialist power in the world, with an average annual growth rate of around 10 percent in real terms. The competitiveness of cheaply produced Japanese goods made itself felt both in the United States and in Europe, particularly in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Although inflation in Japan was higher than in any other imperialist country (according to the official index, consumer prices rose 80 percent from 1961-71) the rapid expansion of the Japanese economy enabled the capitalists to meet some of the wage demands of the workers, compensating them, to a considerable extent, for the higher prices of goods. The advent of the artificially induced energy crisis, however, undermined this "economic miracle."

While much of the hysteria generated by the government and the press in Tokyo over the imminent shortages of fuel was designed to "impress" the working class with the need to tighten their belts, the anxiety over oil supplies does reflect a major weak point of Japanese imperialism. Although the immediate effects of the oil embargo were far less than Tokyo expected, the long-term effects of the price increases can have grave consequences

for Tokyo's economy. As Don Oberdorfer observed in the December 18 *Washington Post*: "Any shift in the terms of trade in resources has serious long-term implications for Japan, which is essentially an industrious island factory using imported energy to process imported raw materials and then selling the product to the world."

## Tokyo's Fragile Lifeline

Japan is the world's second largest user of petroleum and its leading importer. It uses petroleum for 73 percent of its primary energy sources, compared to 53 percent for West Germany and 44 percent for the United States. It has virtually no oil resources of its own. In 1972 it received 36 percent of its crude oil from Iran, 21 percent from Saudi Arabia, 11 percent from Kuwait, 16 percent from Indonesia, and 16 percent from other countries.

The oil embargo by the Arab-Persian Gulf regimes during the October War in the Arab East and the price hikes of crude oil in December struck the Japanese imperialists at a particularly vulnerable point. It forced them to take a more "independent" diplomatic stance than has been the norm.

The oil embargo against Japan did not approach the level that the Gulf regimes indicated it would. Japan's oil reserves, according to industry sources quoted in the January 23 *New York Times*, dropped by only 10 percent as a result of the embargo. In fact, some government officials believed that part of this drop was caused, not directly by the embargo itself, but by the diversion of oil destined for Japan to other countries, such



as the United States, by the U. S. oil companies.

The threat of a real embargo, however, quickly forced Tokyo to accede to the Gulf regimes' diplomatic demands. On November 22 Tokyo issued a statement declaring that it would reconsider its policy toward Israel and support the UN Security Council Resolution 242 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied in the 1967 war.

Tokyo's new "pro-Arab" stance put it on the "friendly nation" list of the Arab-Persian Gulf states and once more ensured that oil would flow into Japanese industries—at least for the moment. But the worst "oil shock" was yet to come. On December 23 representatives of the Gulf regimes announced increases in crude oil prices that put the world market price for a barrel of crude at \$8.30, a 290 percent increase.

While the oil embargo was predominantly a political lever used by the Gulf states to gain the diplomatic backing of Europe and Japan it also fitted in with the plans of the major oil monopolies to increase their profits. The rise in oil prices fitted in with their schemes even more.

The crude oil that Tokyo gets directly from the regimes of the oil-producing countries accounts for only about 1 percent of its imported oil. The better part, more than 70 percent, is purchased from the major multinational oil trusts: 55.2 percent from U. S. companies and 17 percent from British.

Since the United States has considerable resources of domestic crude oil and of other energy sources, U. S. capitalism emerged from the energy crisis in a stronger competitive position vis-à-vis European and Japanese imperialism.

### Washington: Antagonistic Ally

After the defeat of Tokyo in the second world war, the U. S. occupation forces began to rebuild Japanese industries. As part of its strategy of containing and then rolling back the Chinese revolution, Washington wanted a strong ally in Asia. Tokyo, as the largest industrially developed country in the region, was the obvious candidate.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, Washington's aid in strengthening Japanese industry accelerated and

included the promotion of the Japanese arms industry. For the next two decades Tokyo became a major supplier of arms to Washington's Asian puppet armies. Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack noted in *Japanese Imperialism Today* (London: Association for Radical East Asian Studies, 1971): ". . . by early 1951, 72% of Japan's production capacity was directly engaged in weapons manufacture—a staggering figure, which had a great effect on the whole shape and structure of postwar re-industrialization." By the mid-1970s this percentage had fallen to a more "balanced" proportion: Munitions production accounted for "only" 12 percent of all machine-building production.

But the reemergence of Japanese imperialism went much further and much faster than the U. S. imperialists had expected or wanted. By the early 1970s Washington was looking for a way to slow down Tokyo's economic growth.

The first of the "Nixon shocks" came in August 1971, when Nixon imposed a 10 percent surtax on imported goods. This surtax was aimed against European and Japanese goods, which had become very competitive on the American market. Washington also cut the U. S. dollar loose from the gold standard, setting off a world monetary crisis that led to a revaluation of the yen.

Discussing the implications of Washington's economic moves against Tokyo, the authors of *Japanese Imperialism Today* wrote: "The first objective of the Nixon measures is clearly to slow down Japanese exports to the USA.

"But the purpose is wider than this: it is to effect an overall slowdown in the rate of Japan's economic growth. Revised estimates are that growth for 1971 as a whole will fall from the original target of 10-12% to around 7%. Such a slowdown may not appear serious to those habituated to the sluggish Western capitalist economies, but in Japan, where bank loans play an even greater role than in other capitalist societies, numerous businesses live on a razor's edge, where survival is only ensured by a non-stop *fuite en avant* [rapid and uncontrolled advance]. A slowdown even to 7% will drive many businesses to the wall."

While the 1971 measures against Japan did not slow down its economic expansion to the extent that Halliday

and McCormack thought they might, the energy crisis may very well bring it almost to a stop if the prices of crude oil remain as high as they are.

According to the November 19 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Tokyo's Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) "estimates that industrial and mining production in the December-March period will fall by 15% compared with the previous four months, and that total GNP [gross national product] will decline by 10%. This will mean that GNP growth for fiscal 1973 (ending March 1974) will be only 5%—less than half the pre-crisis estimate of 10.7%. In other words, by the end of March 1974 total output of goods and services could be back to what it was 12 months before, or even less. In an economy geared to a very high rate of investment and productivity growth, the consequences for employment—not to mention public sector infrastructure spending and private anti-pollution investment—could be very serious."

The higher fuel prices can also have disastrous consequences for Japan's balance of payments. As correspondent Koji Nakamura reported in the January 7 *Far Eastern Economic Review*: "Should Japan keep importing crude totalling 3,000 million tons or more a year, it would have to pay more than \$15,000 million—or more than 30% of its total import bill—and more than four times the fiscal 1973 oil bill." Tokyo's foreign exchange reserves have been dropping drastically. A year ago they stood at \$19 thousand million. By January they had fallen to below \$13 thousand million and some predictions indicate that they could total less than \$10 thousand million by April.

Thus the immediate effects of the energy crisis have abruptly reminded Tokyo that the U. S. imperialists intend to maintain their dominance, allowing Japanese imperialism only the status of a junior partner. Tokyo has no choice but to accept the situation. The most it can do in the next period is to attempt to lessen its dependence on the oil supplies of the major petroleum trusts by stepping up exploration and the development of its own energy sources and by entering into direct deals with the oil-producing countries.

But even Tokyo's new "independent" moves (its verbal "pro-Arab" stance, the direct deals with the Arab-Persian

Gulf regimes) have taken place within the framework of its sometimes strained alliance with Washington. The January 28 *Far Eastern Economic Review* noted: "Government leaders, including Tanaka and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, have repeatedly declared that, whatever problems might arise, the US will remain the main partner in Japan's foreign policy operations; they have indicated that Tokyo will confine itself to the boundaries 'set' by Washington."

## Shifting Gears

In their speeches to the opening session of the Diet (parliament) December 1 Tanaka and Finance Minister Takeo Fukuda offered their proposals to deal with the energy crisis; they stressed different approaches to solving Tokyo's dilemma, Tanaka said, according to the December 2 *New York Times*, that "the Government believes that it will be fully able to secure a stabilization in supply and demand." The flurry of diplomatic tours by Tanaka and other officials since his speech suggest he is banking on securing more "stable" sources of energy, an approach that will take years before it substantially lessens Tokyo's dependence on crude oil controlled by the oil majors.

Fukuda, on the other hand, stressed the steps that would have to be taken domestically to adjust the Japanese economy to the new situation. The same issue of the *Times* reported: "Mr. Fukuda, a long-time critic of Mr. Tanaka, said the economic crisis would force Japan to abandon her two-decade-old policy of high economic growth and necessitated 'more restrictive' measures to curb consumer and industrial demand." While the *Times* report evaluated Tanaka's and Fukuda's speeches as conflicting reports, the views reflected in them are actually two aspects of a single approach.

On December 22, after the Diet passed two emergency energy bills, Tanaka ordered a 20 percent cutback in oil and electric power to the major industries. (Since the oil embargo caused less of a shortage than had been anticipated, the cutbacks were reduced, in a January 11 announcement, to 5 to 15 percent until the end of February.) The emergency bills also gave the government powers to fix prices and to regulate the production and supply of oil and other vital necessities.

In November the de facto value of the yen had fallen by 5 percent. On January 7 Tokyo removed its spot rate support of the yen, allowing it to fall another 6.64 percent.

But these "austerity" measures were to apply not only to industry. In a series of New Year advertisements placed in the major newspapers, Tanaka said: "It is up to each one of us as individuals and as a nation to



YAMANI: "You do need oil."

re-evaluate our rather wasteful habits and our happy-go-lucky life styles of the past few years."

Shigesaburo Maeo, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, was more philosophical in his call for "austerity." The January 2 *Washington Post* paraphrased his New Year's message: "People should take this opportunity to correct the national error of seeking happiness through materialism, he declared, and 'make a new start as a nation of morals which would be respected by the world.'"

Tsuneo Uchida, the director-general of the Economic Planning Agency, was more concrete. As reported by the January 23 *Christian Science Monitor*, he called for "restraint by both management and labor in the next round of wage negotiations in the spring." The major labor federations usually present their wage demands in the spring.

And just as the U.S. oil giants have

used the energy crisis as a pretext to ask for government handouts and to deactivate the environmental laws, Tokyo will attempt to use its economic difficulties to the same ends. The February 6 *New York Times* quoted one Japanese government economist as saying: "We will have to be willing to spend much more money for research, and we will have to give up our environmental objections to a whole range of things, nuclear power plants, new dams, geothermal plants inside national parks."

## Diplomacy and Energy

In December Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki made a tour of eight countries in the Arab East and secured "friendly nation" status for Tokyo. That was just the beginning of Tanaka's efforts to extend Tokyo's control over the oil and raw materials that it needs to continue its economic expansion.

The January 28 *Far Eastern Economic Review* described Tokyo's diplomatic offensive following the New Year celebrations: "On January 6, Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira returned from a visit to Peking. On the following day three separate missions left for their respective destinations: Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka for the five ASEAN nations [Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia]; Minister of International Trade and Industry Yasuhiro Nakasone for Europe and the Middle East; and Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki for the US. On January 15 Zentaro Kosaka, the former director of the Economic Planning Agency, began his tour of Arab nations in North Africa and the Middle East."

Tokyo's moves toward gaining greater access to and control of energy sources in other countries and the development of the related infrastructures began even before the advent of the oil embargo. At the end of September Tanaka visited France, Great Britain, and West Germany in an attempt to wrap up some oil deals. The only concrete agreement he managed to conclude, however, was one with French President Georges Pompidou, who promised that Paris would export to Japan 1,000 tons of enriched uranium beginning in 1980.

A few weeks later, according to an October 19 dispatch from the Tokyo

New Asia News press service, the Pacific Consultant Company, a Japanese firm, announced that it would participate in a highway project planned to run from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, passing through Syria, Jordan, and Iraq to Oman on the Arab-Persian Gulf. The NAN dispatch said: "Pacific Consultant is one of the firms which recruited Japanese labor for American military construction in South Vietnam. Most recently it has been instrumental in helping the Kyushu Sekiyu Kaihatsu (Kyushu Oil Development) Company buy 100 million tons of Iraqi crude and helping the Japan Line procure Abu Dhabi oil."

During Miki's three-week tour of the Arab East, he offered Egypt \$280 million in credits, which would cover 70 percent of the projected costs for dredging and expanding the Suez Canal. Tokyo also has a major interest in the Kra canal project across the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand. The canal would link the South China Sea with the Indian Ocean, providing Tokyo with a shortcut for oil tankers from the Arab East. Washington is also involved in the project, since it wants easier naval access to the Indian Ocean from its bases in the Pacific Ocean and other Asian waters.

A number of direct deals for crude oil from the Arab-Persian Gulf states have been consummated, with the encouragement of the Gulf regimes. Saudi Arabian oil minister Sheikh Zaki Yamani said January 28, during a visit to Tokyo: "Japan is able to enjoy a bilateral arrangement. You do need oil. Oil will be scarce very soon in the coming few years. And therefore you can get much more than the others. You need that bilateral arrangement." Yamani later termed the bilateral arrangement "a very beautiful arrangement . . . a very happy marriage which will have no divorce."

While the details of the agreement were not announced during Yamani's visit, they will probably involve the exchange of Japanese technical and industrial assistance for guaranteed crude oil shipments. *Washington Post* correspondent Dan Oberdorfer, in a January 30 dispatch, remarked on other aspects of the arrangement: "Unwritten but perhaps more important parts of the emerging arrangement appear to involve political support by Japan for Saudi viewpoints in the forth-

coming Washington meeting of oil-consuming nations, and future sales to Japan of Saudi oil which will be removed from control of the large American-based multinational petroleum companies, the so-called 'majors'."

Deals with other states in the Middle East include: a \$1 thousand million loan by Tokyo to Iraq to finance petrochemical plants and an oil re-



TANAKA: Farewell to "happy-go-lucky life styles"?

finery there in exchange for 1.2 million million barrels of oil and other petroleum products over a ten-year period; a "huge loan to Syria to rebuild an oil refinery," according to *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Charlotte Saikowski; and a possible \$1-2 thousand million deal with Iran. In addition, Algerian Minister of Industry and Energy Belaid Abdesalam talked with executives of the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and other conglomerates in January about joint ventures in the areas of steel, petrochemicals, and electrical machinery.

But the Middle East is not the only area that Tokyo is interested in. When Nakasone visited London in January, he tried to secure a stake in the development of North Sea oil. When Tanaka visited Indonesia during his Southeast Asian tour, he agreed to extend a loan of \$200 million for a liquefied natural gas development in North Sumatra and East Kalimantan, bringing Tokyo's total stake in the project to \$700 million. Tokyo expects to get

7.5 million tons of liquefied natural gas from Indonesia each year.

Dovetailing with its efforts to strengthen diplomatic ties with Moscow and Peking, it also hopes to get energy deals with the two workers states. Although the discussions over joint Japanese-Soviet development of Siberian natural gas have dragged on for over two years without any concrete agreements being reached, other discussions might prove more fruitful. The deputy chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, I.D. Morokhov, proposed in Tokyo on January 7 that Tokyo and Moscow cooperate in the exploration for and development of uranium.

The January 5 *New York Times* reported that on the previous day Foreign Minister Ohira and Premier Chou En-lai discussed for three hours in Peking matters related to the energy crisis. A month later it was announced that Peking would supply Tokyo with 12 million barrels of crude oil in 1974.

In concurrence with Tokyo's shift toward acquiring ownership or special rights to oil and other natural resources that it previously purchased on the open market, it has also begun to locate new heavy industries in the underdeveloped countries. This would put them close to the sources of the raw materials that they need and would also enable them to take advantage of the cheaper labor power in those countries. □

### Qaddafi Nationalizes 3 U.S. Oil Companies

The Libyan regime of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi on February 11 nationalized the Libyan subsidiaries of three U.S. oil companies. The companies, which produce about 5% of Libya's oil output, were owned by Texaco, Standard Oil of California, and Atlantic-Richfield Company. Texaco and Standard Oil of California jointly operated one of the companies.

Tripoli radio called the nationalizations a "severe blow to American interests in the Arab world." It also said that the takeovers coincided with the opening of the Washington conference of the major oil-consuming nations, which Qaddafi has denounced.

In September Qaddafi nationalized 51 percent of these oil companies. The broadcast said that a committee would be formed to study the accounts of the three oil companies to decide what compensation should be paid. □

## Why U.S. Maoists Fail to Form 'New Communist Party'

By Jon Hillson

*Of particular importance has been the emergence and dramatic growth of new communist organizations—both multinational groups such as the Revolutionary Union (RU) and the October League (OL) and organizations among the oppressed nationalities, such as the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, the I Wor Kuen and the Black Workers Congress.*

*The practical experience, theoretical investigation and fraternal relations among these groups and others—including many individuals who are not now members of any particular group—is laying the basis for the emergence of a new communist party in America.*

—Editorial, the *Guardian*, November 28, 1973.

*Stalin is the bridge between Lenin and Mao theoretically, practically and organizationally . . . we do not conceal our bias: Since the imperialists and their ideological running dogs, the Trotskyites, have not spared themselves in abuse of Stalin . . . we have the tendency to want to defend him and do so.*

—"Against the Brainwash," by the Revolutionary Union.

*The Trotskyites have a no-win strategy. They haven't won anywhere. That's why Ho Chi Minh took care of business with the Trots. That's why Chairman Mao did. And that's why we're going to, you can be sure.*

—Michael Klonsky, Chairman of the October League (M-L), in a speech in Boston, January 13, 1974.

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Since the disintegration of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the leading ultraleft-spontaneist organization of the 1960s in the United States, those of its members who remained active, and those in the succeeding years who repeated their errors and embraced their mistakes, have

sought a pole of attraction around which to reconstitute an organization.

In the process of that search, some of these radicals joined the American Trotskyist movement—the Socialist Workers party and the Young Socialist Alliance. Others turned to a handful of sects laying claim to revolutionary Marxism. Some joined the Communist party.

But aside from the large majority, who dropped out of left politics, most of these militants remained committed to the creation of some new organization that could, at a more mature level than the wild last days of the SDS, embody their ultraleft heritage.

While the American Trotskyists were gaining recognition for their positive role in the mass antiwar, women's liberation, and student movements, this ultraleft layer went through various experiences, from unproductive implantation in factories and living and working in collectives to participating in study groups. They joined ill-defined local coalitions, set up embryonic national gatherings, mobilized in "radical" caucuses at national meetings of various mass movements.

As followers of the *Guardian*,\* the ranks of this current were characterized not only by ignorance of Marxist theory, but by rejection of the forms of struggle and central demands thrown up by the mass movements. They impressionistically adapted to and were demoralized by the periodic

\* The *Guardian* was founded in 1948. Dedicated to supporting the Progressive party headed by the left-bourgeois politician Henry A. Wallace, its main backing came from sympathizing circles of the Communist party. With the decline of the Communist party, it too went into decline. After the Khrushchev revelations in 1956, it moved to the left, offering critical support to candidates of the Socialist Workers party. Under successive new managements, it shifted erratically, eventually becoming the de facto SDS paper. Today as an out-and-out apologist for Maoism, it is trying among other projects to rehabilitate Stalin.

downturns encountered within the general rise of the mass struggle.

Running through all their utopian, workerist, sectarian, and ultraleft experiments, an unusually uniform theme emerged: irreconcilable hostility to the American Trotskyists.

In the last few years, this layer has attracted new elements—those who were unable to assimilate the key lessons of the student antiwar struggle and its impact on the American scene, those who backed away from the new challenges posed by the rise of the women's liberation movement, and those who feared the estrangement of white workers from socialism if revolutionists fully embraced the struggles of the oppressed nationalities. Anti-Trotskyism provided the mucilage holding them together.

What was lacking was a consistent political analysis giving form and focus to the outlook of this layer. Innovations couched in the rhetoric of American exceptionalism had failed. Anarchism and spontaneism had spectacularly flunked the tests of struggle in the late 1960s. Moscow, whether seen as state capitalist, social imperialist, or simply bureaucratically moribund, had been discredited. Trotskyism, in their view, was historically obsolete and counterrevolutionary; or, at best, infrequently capable of some progressive work only because it rode the crest of petty-bourgeois student protest.

The driving ambition of the central, most ideologically conscious elements of this layer was to articulate a thorough critique of Trotskyism and concomitantly develop an apparatus—a centralized national party—to fight Trotskyism and lead the American revolution in the way they envisioned.

A growing number of this layer had in fact come to realize that a party is essential. They reached this conclusion in the period of frustration and reflection following the breakup of the SDS during which they had an opportunity to see what a revolutionary cadre organization, as represented by the American Trotskyists, can do in

practice. However, Trotskyism with its hard insistence on revolutionary principles was repellent to them.

The trouble with Trotskyism, as they saw it, was its isolation—that is, its lack of ties with any state power. It had neither a Rome nor a pope.

Not able to stomach the crass class collaborationism practiced by Moscow, they turned to Peking as offering an attractive alternative. Peking countenanced the most bizarre forms of ultraleftism, yet offered the spiritual satisfaction to be found in a cult with a holy center and an infallible oracle.

### 'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom Together'

During the 1960s, Peking granted the Maoist franchise in the United States to the Progressive Labor party (PL). That organization had emerged from splits in the Communist party paralleling the differences in the emerging Sino-Soviet conflict. PL's leaders were devotees of William Z. Foster, an early CP leader who played an active role in expelling the Trotskyists during the consolidation of Stalin's dictatorial regime.

PL developed rapidly into a shrill, sectarian, ultraleft group which, at its peak, reached 1,000-2,000 members. The organization won infamy in the radical movement for its rigid opposition to Black nationalism and its strident workerism, as well as an aggressive entry into SDS that played a major part in shattering that organization.

In the last year of SDS (1969), the anti-PL leadership and some layers of the ranks also embraced Maoism, especially its Third World orientation and its military strategy of "people's war," two components of the Maoist line that PL tended to steer clear of. At the split national conference of the SDS, the PL and anti-PL factions accused each other, in the words of Mao, of "waving the red flag to defeat the red flag."

PL's interpretation of Mao Tsetung Thought turned out to be inflexible. With Peking's betrayals of the Bengali and Sri Lanka uprisings in 1971, PL announced its break with Mao. It stated that the victory of the Mao wing of the bureaucracy in the "cultural revolution" had ushered in a period of capitalist restoration that was now complete. Proclaiming that

only the Paris Commune and the cultural revolution were workers revolutions (the October 1917 Russian revolution was a peasant uprising, realizing a dictatorship of the peasantry) PL gave up the American franchise for Maoism. PL is now a shell of its former self, an opportunist sect functioning in a few cities.

The Bay Area Revolutionary Union (BARU), founded in San Francisco in 1968 as a small Maoist nucleus, had opposed PL in SDS, posing as the orthodox, pro-Peking current. Some BARU leaders were converts from PL, having disagreed with that organization's understanding of Maoism. A smaller group consisted of veteran CPers who had left the Moscow wing of Stalinism out of sympathy with Peking in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

BARU's entry into the SDS was modest and subdued compared to PL's, and in harmony with the general trend of the anti-PL leadership toward Peking. The BARU called for SDS to transform itself from a large, amorphous, and politically heterogeneous student organization into a Marxist-Leninist party.

The anti-PL faction was known as the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM). It, in turn, was divided into a majority, RYM I, which evolved into the Weatherman terrorist grouping, and a minority, RYM II, which dissolved itself after a year of independent existence and dwindling influence. RYM II advocated industrial concentration and opposed RYM I's heavy emphasis on the need to organize military units of white street youth for assaults against the capitalist system.

BARU blocked with the RYM faction against PL. Inside RYM, it lined up with RYM II, but criticized it for its "social pacifist" aversion to violence and opposed the "white skin privilege" line that both RYM I and RYM II shared.

The "white skin privilege" line, which was widely held by ultralefts at that period, postulated that working-class unity between Blacks and whites could only come about through conscious repudiation of the "privileges" bestowed on white workers by racism, and that this process had to occur independently of and, if necessary, prior to the actual struggles of the Black people. It rejected the need for a multinational party and uncritically

supported any self-proclaimed Black leadership.

Unable to regroup SDS after it broke up, its disagreement with RYM II growing in sharpness, BARU soon became a national organization, the Revolutionary Union (RU).

Three central leaders of RYM II took different paths that would cross again. Lynn Wells, a leader of the left-liberal Southern Student Organizing Committee (SSOC) that SDS expelled as a fraternal organization in 1969 because of its alleged "CIA ties," became a founder and leader of the Georgia Communist League, based in Atlanta, the site of the old RYM II's national headquarters.

Michael Klonsky, whose father is a district leader of the Southern California CP, became a founder and leader of the October League (Marxist-Leninist), based in Los Angeles.

Carl Davidson, an early SDS leader and student-power theoretician, was to emerge as a leading ideologue of the *Guardian*.

In 1972, the October League and the Georgia Communist League merged, taking the OL's name, with Klonsky elected as national chairman.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the SDS, the *Guardian* had called for a "new new left." As recently as a year and a half ago, in its "Voices of Revolution" column, it printed Trotsky on fascism one week and Stalin on the national question the next. Today, as the principal national forum of the Maoist regroupment, such errors of "egalitarianism," as Chairman Mao might put it, are excluded.

A series of articles in the *Guardian* in 1973 attacking Trotskyism has been issued as a pamphlet "Left in Form, Right in Essence." This first critique of Trotskyism by the regrouped ultralefts is quite unoriginal and amateurish even by the crude standards of Stalinism. Taking special aim at the American Trotskyists, author Carl Davidson—the former student syndicalist—shows himself to be an industrious student of the Stalin school of falsification.

Because of their semiclandestinity, it is hard to accurately estimate the size of the RU and the OL, the two cadre organizations. The RU is the larger, having branches in about seventeen cities and claiming chapters of the Attica Brigade, a student front organization, on some twenty to thirty campuses. It has perhaps 200-400

members.

The OL, a newer group, with branches in about six major cities has 100-200 members.

In competition with the RU's monthly paper, *Revolution*, the OL publishes the *Call*. The circulation of these two papers is far below that of the *Guardian*, which is around 20,000, a reduction of several thousand from its peak in the heyday of the SDS.

RU has a small pamphlet series and an irregular theoretical journal, *Red Papers*, which has appeared six times since 1969 to announce major RU policy statements. The OL has begun a small pamphlet series, and the *Guardian* publishes a small number of pamphlets consisting of reprints of articles from its pages.

The apparatus of the regroupment includes a variety of local eight- to twelve-page monthly "workers newspapers," a majority fed by the RU, although some are products of small, local Maoist collectives unaffiliated to the major groups. There are perhaps twenty of these papers in the United States.

The entire movement—that is, those genuinely interested in constructing a new communist party: the national Maoist organizations, the Black, Latino, Chicano, and American-Asian groups, the politically conscious periphery of the *Guardian* (a modest fraction of its total readership), and the local groups and collectives, whether in the big cities or on the larger college campuses—probably includes between 1,800-3,500 persons.

## Maoism and the National Question

While the key organizations are the RU and the OL, both of which are multiracial and multinational organizations (with the *Guardian* posturing as a latter-day *Iskra* for the yet-to-be-formed "new communist party"), groups composed of members of oppressed nationalities play a significant role in the Maoist regroupment in the United States.

These groups—the Black Workers Congress (BWC), the Puerto Rican Revolutionary Workers Organization (PRRWO), and I Wor Kuen (IWK)—number perhaps 100 each. All of them have expressed their inclination to join in forming a multinational party. They have collaborated with each

other and with the OL, RU, and the *Guardian* in propaganda projects and joint actions.

In the spring of 1973 the *Guardian* sponsored a forum series in New York City that featured leading members of the Maoist regroupment, including representatives of Black, Latin, and American-Asian organizations, on questions of strategy, tactics, and party building. The forums averaged approximately 500 in attendance, with the presentation on the construction of a new communist party drawing upwards of 1,300.

The BWC withdrew from the *Guardian* forum series, stating its loyalty to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, and its incapacity to define a line on the national question.

IWK, which has forces in the Chinese communities of San Francisco and New York, is involved in community organizing. It bases itself on the rise in sympathy for the People's Republic of China in the Asian-American communities. In virtually all of the Asian-American organizations in the Bay Area, which has the largest concentration of these groups in the country, Maoism is the dominant trend.

The PRRWO, which evolved from the Young Lords party, a Puerto Rican emulation of the early Black Panther party, took a sharp antinationalist turn, partly in response to advice received by a delegation visiting China. Reversing its orientation toward the Puerto Rican community, it moved in a workerist direction, and is now being bypassed by groups like the larger, more influential, and much less regroupment-prone Puerto Rican Socialist party. The PRRWO's newspaper, *Palante*, ceased publication six months ago.

With a growing interest in Marxism developing among sectors of the movements of the oppressed nationalities, smaller, unaffiliated Black and Chicano organizations have linked up with the regroupment, although their trend towards Maoism is not matched in the Black and Chicano communities as a whole.

All of these groups have had to wrestle with the contradiction between the dynamic of independent struggles shaped by the nationalism of the oppressed and the Maoist call for "proletarian unity."

While they pay literary obeisance to national liberation struggles, the Mao-

ists—no matter what their internal differences on this question—have sought in practice to contain and block independent political action by the oppressed nationalities. At the same time they seek to somehow adapt to them for organizational gains. The autonomous struggles of the Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and American-Asians are indeed portrayed as important; but only secondary, a prelude to the "real class struggle," that is, the struggle of a unified proletariat unhampered by the claims of those who insist on fighting as nationalities for equality, self-determination, and emancipation from white supremacy.

Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the struggle of the predominantly Black, Puerto Rican, and Asian residents of inner-city District 1 in New York to win community control of their schools. The struggle, which has challenged the racist union bureaucracy of the American Federation of Teachers headed by Albert Shanker, a right-wing Social Democrat, has received national attention in the capitalist communications media. The meager coverage of this struggle in the *Guardian* (which is published in New York, where the struggle is going on), the PRRWO's opposition to it, the silence of the RU press and the abstention of its New York members, and the abstention in practice of the IWK, testify to this milieu's real attitude toward the struggles of the nationally oppressed.

The contortions of the Maoists on the Black liberation struggle have left their mark in the pages of the *Guardian*.

Noting that Stalin's criteria for nationhood are not met by the American Black population (who are dispersed without common territory in a variety of urban areas, lack a common national market, a language, etc.), the *Guardian* denies the Black population the right to self-determination. But the *Guardian* supports the "democratic content" of the nationalism of the oppressed and is for the "Black belt" theory advanced by the American CP in the early thirties.

According to this schema, the "Black peasant nation" in the rural South had the right to self-determination. Moreover, on the basis of this theory, the CP itself was in position to raise the demand for a separate Black state. The *Guardian* holds that though Blacks have the right to self-

determination in the Black belt, the new communist party to be formed would be well-advised to subordinate this slogan to demands for equality that pose less of a dilemma for white workers.

In a polemic with the RU, the OL backed the *Guardian's* thesis. According to the RU, Stalin's criteria are not applicable to the U.S. Black population, which is a "nation of a new type."

While advocating self-determination for Blacks on paper, a position that bends to sentiment in the Black community, the RU is far from consistent. In its demonstrations and in its press, it stresses the "class unity" formula in mechanical opposition to the nationalist dynamic. And it holds that separate organization of the Blacks is a temporary phenomenon that will be superseded by a class consciousness transcending the need for independent Black action and organization.

The "Black belt" theory of the *Guardian* and the OL is taken to its logical extreme by the Communist League, a small sect some of whose cadres consist of former members of the RU, PL, and the CP, as well as former Weathermen. This organization calls propagandistically for a separate state and refers to the Black belt as the "Negro nation."

The most notable feature of the Communist League, which is largely underground and engages primarily in setting up study groups and colonizing members in factories, is that it took the majority of the once influential League of Revolutionary Black Workers that emerged out of the militant Black caucuses in Detroit's auto industry in the late 1960s.

The central issue that split the LRBW was the national question, with the majority evolving into the Communist League, and the minority evolving into the workerist economist Black Workers Congress, which, as mentioned earlier, withdrew from the *Guardian's* series because of its confusion as an all-Black organization over what its line on the national question should be.

The contradictions that broke up the LRBW, that have apparently incapacitated the BWC theoretically, and that have turned the PRRWO into a hostile spectator in the most explosive struggle of the Puerto Rican community of New York City in the past several years will inexorably grow in

acuteness in the organizations of the oppressed nationalities that adhere to Maoism.

### Where They Stood in the Antiwar Struggle

*Lacking an analytical approach, many of our comrades do not want to go deeply into complex matters, to analyse and study them over and over again, but like to draw simple conclusions which are either absolutely affirmative or absolutely negative.*

—Mao Tsetung, "Our Study and the Present Situation."

After the initial flush of excitement over the size of the *Guardian* forum series, the American Maoists ran into a hard fact. The key components of the regroupment are divided on a wide variety of issues that cannot be resolved simply by promissory notes for seats on the Central Committee and Politburo of the projected "new communist party."

A brief review of some of the issues contested in the American antiwar movement should serve as background for a better understanding of these differences.

The antiwar movement witnessed a struggle between two contradictory lines. One line, in opposition to the two capitalist parties and their pro-war labor lieutenants, stressed the principled demand for unconditional and immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. It advocated street demonstrations on the most massive scale possible. This line, first articulated and supported by the SWP and the YSA, represented the position of a tiny minority in the early days of the antiwar movement.

The other line (really a mishmash of lines) sought a course of least resistance to U.S. imperialism. It pushed a variety of demands—that the U.S. government negotiate with the Vietnamese; that the antiwar movement endorse the seven negotiating points of the Provisional Revolutionary Government; that the antiwar movement support the conditions imposed on the Vietnamese by the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho accords; that Nixon "sign" them, "honor" them, etc. Periodically other demands were added—in opposition to racism; in opposition to the exploita-

tion of workers; in support of victory for the various fighting fronts in Indochina. The proposed strategy ranged from symbolic gestures of civil disobedience to generalized confrontations between demonstrators and police. The participants who especially favored "confrontations" singled themselves out as "anti-imperialist contingents."

The Communist party constituted the largest sector of this bloc. Other sectors included the pacifists and the ultra-lefts, among them the Maoists.

As antiwar sentiment broadened to encompass the broad majority of the American people, the ultra-lefts declined in relative strength. Through the Student Mobilization Committee and the National Peace Action Coalition, the policy and strategy advocated by the Trotskyists came to the fore.

Within the ultra-left as a whole, the Maoists became increasingly dissatisfied over being manipulated by the Communist party through its antiwar fronts. The year 1972 marked an upswing for the "anti-imperialist contingents" who were critical of the CP but at the same time antagonistic to the central slogans and forms of antiwar struggle advanced by the Trotskyists.

In the fall of 1972, the American elections dampened the antiwar struggle by diverting militants into hustling votes for capitalist "peace" candidates. The courses followed by both Moscow and Peking in seeking a détente with U.S. imperialism acted as a further depressant. The fall antiwar actions were relatively small.

The Maoists organized narrow fronts to build their variant of the fall demonstrations. They demanded support to the "peace moves," a cessation of attacks by the bosses against the workers, and an end to attacks by the government against oppressed nationalities. These demonstrations—a few hundred persons in some areas, at most 2,000 or so in New York—were generally not as large as those supported by the Trotskyists, but they drew some attention just the same. And on January 20, 1973, on the eve of the signing of the accords, NPAC's San Francisco demonstration, which had gotten the grudging endorsement of the CP and its allies in the antiwar movement, drew 8,000 to 10,000 persons. In the same city, on the same day, the RU-inspired Inauguration Day Coalition demonstration drew 3,000-5,000. The

CP, PL, and, of course, the SWP were excluded from participating in building the action.

In Washington, D.C., on the day Nixon was inaugurated for his second term, NPAC's action drew 100,000, of whom 5,000-8,000 were in the "anti-imperialist contingent." The speakers representing this sector attacked the Trotskyists by name from the podium. In meetings that had discussed plans for the march and rally, their representatives toyed with ice picks.

The Maoists concluded from the size of their contingents that their regroupment was real and that they could contend with the Trotskyists and the CP. The *Guardian* forum touched off further exuberance.

In recognition of the détente and the Vietnam settlement, which was its first fruit, the *Guardian* voiced the heartfelt sentiments of the Maoists. As the editors saw it, the present period is characterized by "the emergence of People's China as a recognized world power" and by the imminence of the victory of the Vietnamese revolution, as shown by the accords.

### 'And a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend'

The momentum provided by these events has not proved sufficient to offset the differences among the contending schools of Maoist thought that stand in the way of consolidating a cohesive movement. The differences include the national question, aspects of the struggle for women's liberation, trade-union strategy, orientation to the student movement, and the relative priorities of building a party and building a "united front against imperialism." In other words, the issues involve the central aspects of strategy and tactics for the American revolution.

The RU has come out against the Equal Rights Amendment for women, echoing the hesitations of the CP, while the *Guardian* and the OL have supported it. Both the OL and the RU currents reflect the esteem for the Chinese family voiced by the Maoist bureaucracy. They are also concerned about counteracting the fears of proletarian patriarchs in the United States—they warned that the Supreme Court's legalization of abortion pointed up in an ominous way the antichild attitude of the capitalists. Both the

OL and the RU abstained from the struggle to legalize abortion.

The OL abstains from the student movement and centers its work almost exclusively in factories. The *Guardian*, like the RU, considers this to be erroneous. The RU has sought to "re-build" the student movement, this time as an "anti-imperialist" student movement to be headed by its student-front group, the Attica Brigade, named in honor of the prison rebellion in which inmates were murdered on order from New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller in 1972.

Membership standards in the Attica Brigade are reduced to agreement with its program, which opposes racism and campus cutbacks, and is for solidarity with workers struggles, for defense of political prisoners, and for solidarity with national liberation struggles. It has 300-500 members.

The organization has a low level of political activity, takes leadership from the "open" and "secret" members of RU assigned to it (the majority of RU's membership is not public) and excludes in principle joint action with the Trotskyists, the CP, or PL. The RU assigns secondary importance and few cadres to student work. Its newspaper rarely mentions student activities or the student movement.

At the fall 1973 Attica Brigade conference, RU leader Bob Avakian, who had recently returned from a European tour, in a moment of rare comradeship called for the group to defend the Ligue Communiste, the banned French section of the Fourth International. In an equally rare show of independence, the audience booed him.

In the unions, RU favors the creation of "anti-imperialist" caucuses to relate to the advanced workers. They define "advanced workers" as those whom other workers respect the most and who are the most disciplined, not the most politically conscious (a designation that in actuality embraces economism and opportunism).

The OL, on the other hand, opposes such caucuses, implying that they are "dual unionist" in nature. They prefer to tail the bureaucrats uncritically as they have done in the strikes in which they have been active.

At the center of the disagreements between the OL and the RU are the national question and party building. The first issue has been considered above. It has led to public name-calling, with the OL branding the RU

as "idealist"—few crimes are greater in the lexicon of Maoism! The RU has charged the OL with "opportunism"—a step away from dread revisionism—and has implied that they are fake Marxist-Leninists.

Both organizations agree on the centrality of the party, on its need to be monolithic and free of factions, and on the programmatic objective of forming a united front against imperialism, that is, a bloc of four classes applied to American conditions.

On carrying this out, however, charges of opportunism and sectarianism have been exchanged. The RU, which excludes in principle the SWP, the CP, and the Democratic party from participating in demonstrations staged by its fronts, has built its own "mass" organizations, caricatures of the fronts set up by the CP in past years. Attempting to capitalize on the anti-Nixon mood in the country, the RU has initiated "Workers Committees to Throw the Bum Out," a slogan that ought to have been launched in Peking when the bum was clinking glasses with Chou and Mao.

Virtually all of the RU's work is handled through fronts, whether proclaimed in the labor movement, the student movement, or the women's movement. For the RU, the united front (right now, in anticipation of the breakaway of the progressive bourgeoisie) is the RU; that is, the RU consists of its fronts and the "mass" elements that turn out in response to its appeals. The RU is against placing primary stress on building the party at this juncture, and underlines the need to build the united front as a means of building the party. To recruit publicly and to stress the party are wrong in its view. As the RU's monthly paper, *Revolution*, puts it, it's an attempt "to rip off the people's organizations."

Anticipating both ordinary and fascist victimization for their "vanguard" work, the RU leaders talk about the need for revolutionists to master illegal tasks. The RU leans heavily on secrecy and its members may be "unpublic" for several years before revealing their affiliation.

The OL argues that the RU's perspective liquidates the party into the united front. According to OL, the united front must be built around stressing the need to organize the party. Although the OL tends to be more



open and less blatant in its frontism, it too equates the erosion of bourgeois democracy with the breath of fascism, calls for its members to prepare for illegal work, and maintains a posture of semiclandestinity.

Recently, the two organizations have competed with each other in trying to gain from the Watergate scandal. They stage "mass actions" for impeaching Nixon, posing as the "communist" pole in turnouts involving only themselves and their fronts. RU organizes around the slogan, "Throw the Bum Out, Organize to Fight," while the OL centers on the slogan, "Dump Nixon, Stem the Fascist Tide."

The demonstrations have ranged from 75 to 200 persons around the country. The inability to get together in such similarly motivated actions shows what formidable obstacles stand in the way of the Maoist regroupment process in the United States.

While the *Guardian* has attempted to cushion the struggle between the two groups, in some cities RU members and sympathizers have stopped attending OL events. It is not clear if the opposite is true. Thinly veiled references to each other continue to crop up, although each organization publicly calls for unity. Both the OL and the RU consider themselves to be only components of the regroupment process and are careful to avoid referring to themselves as *the* new party.

Maoist argumentation is generally carried on at a high pitch. It is a derivative of Peking's intrabureaucratic fights. The method is the "two-line struggle": the struggle, as official Peking ideology puts it, between proletarian revolution and the capitalist road; a clash, we are assured by the mouthpieces of official ideology, that is never-ending and universal. The method assures the victor the right to place the label of "class enemy" on the vanquished, fosters a purge mentality, and disallows an unheard of "third line."

This Stalinist method is aped by the neophyte Maoists in the United States and around the world.

As Mao Tsetung stated: "Opposition and struggle between ideas of different kinds constantly occur within the Party; this is a reflection within the Party of contradictions between classes and between the old and the new in society. . . ."

Perhaps sooner than they anticipate, the leaders of the Maoist regroupment

in the United States will begin, privately at first, to assess the "class struggle" going on in their circles and

will assign to the other tendencies the path they are obviously following—down the capitalist road. □

## Interview With a Trotskyist Leader

# Situation in Japan and the Activities of the Revolutionary Communist League

[The following interview with Tadamashi Nagai, a leader of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Japanese section of the Fourth International, was obtained in New York on January 14.]

\* \* \*

*Question. The rise in oil prices and the oil embargo have hit Japan harder than any other imperialist country. Could you describe what effects this might have on Japan's economy and on its imperialist role in Asia?*

*Answer.* The oil crisis in Japan has hit harder than in other imperialist countries and, especially in Japan, it will spur on a recession. Already the Japanese government is asking companies to cut down 15 or 20 percent on oil usage. Production will go down to some extent. Although even without an oil crisis Japan might have gone into a recession, the crisis worsens the economic situation. I think this will influence the attitudes of the imperialists of Japan. They are more eager to tap energy sources from other parts of the world, especially Siberian natural gas. They are already talking with the Soviet government and there has been a conflict with the U.S. imperialists. In this regard, the Japanese imperialists might give more concessions to the Soviets to get the natural gas. Also, the oil crisis will accelerate the Tokyo-Peking negotiations to import Chinese crude oil. There will be a hardening of the contradictions between Japan and the United States.

*Q. Would a recession in Japan have any effects on Thailand and South Korea, or any other country in which Japan has economic interests?*

A. If a recession goes further, if it

affects the buying power of the Japanese economy, it will make it harder for many goods to be imported from South Korea or Taiwan.

*Q. How has the working class responded to the high rate of inflation in Japan?*

A. The rate of inflation has been at a very high level for ten years. Inflation is always a big problem for the Japanese people, and workers in Japan want to get some wage increases. Up to now they have gotten wage increases through their annual spring struggles. The wage increases have been a little higher than the rate of inflation. So there probably has been a general improvement in wages for Japanese workers. But inflation now is getting higher and higher and developing more rapidly. This year the workers struggle for wage increases to compensate their loss from inflation will be very big.

At the end of last year, workers initiated some special struggles against inflation. They wanted special compensations for the rapid inflation. They got a special bonus of 30 percent of their monthly wage. There were strikes by railway workers, post office workers, and others. There was a very interesting aspect to the struggle: When the bureaucrats of the post office union decided to accept conciliation, the workers got angry about the concession. The leadership of the Tokyo district of that union was dissolved. In this struggle the bureaucrats and the government made a strange compromise. Usually the workers of the public sector got some money at the end of the fiscal year in March, a traditional bonus. The bureaucrats told the workers that the special payment on inflation that they had won, the 30 percent bonus, was an independent gain for them. But the govern-

ment said that they paid this inflation compensation as a substitute for the year-end bonus. So there is a big difference over the meaning of the gain. The struggle will rise again in March and it will put the bureaucrats in a more difficult position to maneuver.

*Q. With a recession, do you see unemployment as becoming a problem and how will that be reflected in the labor movement?*

A. I think that this year such problems as layoffs and shutdowns as well as wage demands will trigger struggles in many places in Japan. Usually layoff is not so easy a business for the capitalists, so if they want to lay off some workers, they will face some very hard struggles. In this case I think the workers will raise the slogan of workers control. We are now expecting struggles in Japan like the one at Lip in France.\*

*Q. Could you describe how the working class is organized, what the major trade union federations are?*

A. In Japan there are three main trade union federations. The biggest is Sohyo [General Council of Trade Unions], which consists mainly of public-sector workers, although it also includes some private-sector workers. But the main base is among the public sector—national railways, telephone and telegram, post office. Also there is Domei [Confederation of Labor Unions], which consists mainly of basic-industry unions. And there is Churitsuroren, which is mostly electrical workers. Sohyo traditionally supports the Socialist party and Domei the Democratic Socialist party [DSP]. Churitsuroren is neutral between the two.

*Q. What are the struggle committees and what role do they play in the labor movement?*

A. The struggle committees are not yet widespread, but in some small factories that have had struggles for many years, these struggle commit-

tees have developed. This year when the spring struggle occurs, there will appear some autonomous workers organizations of struggle such as struggle committees or strike committees.

The movement for such a development will arise from the feeling among workers that the trade-union bureaucrats are a block in the struggle.

*Q. You mentioned that the Socialist party had a big influence in Sohyo. What kind of influence does the Communist party have in the labor movement?*

A. The Communist party also has an influence in Sohyo. I think one-third of Sohyo is under the influence of the Communist party. The Socialist party depends on the bureaucrats of Sohyo. Although they have a small membership, they can gain many posts in the elections. It is because they are supported by the bureaucrats. But also the Communist party is supported by bureaucrats. I don't think the supporters of the Communist party are rank-and-file. So there is no significant stratification among trade unionists who support the SP or the CP.

Also a problem of the Communist party is that they don't have any established strategy in the labor movement. They have mainly been concerned with trade-union elections, every type of election. In 1964 the Communist party made a big mistake in their trade-union policy. When Sohyo decided to call a general strike, the Communist party opposed it. The CP said it was a provocation by the U.S. imperialists.

*Q. In the past elections, both for the Diet [parliament] and in municipal elections, what sort of gains have the CP and SP made?*

A. In the last Diet election, the CP gained considerably, but it was not so successful as the leaders had anticipated. Also the Socialist party recovered the seats they had lost in previous elections. After the last election, much cooperation developed between the CP and SP in municipal elections. Now the main cities, Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya, Yokohama, have mayors supported by the CP and SP or some other party opposed to the Liberal Democratic party

[Premier Kakuei Tanaka's ruling party].

*Q. In some of the elections, the CP and SP have made blocs with the Komeito [Clean Government party] and the Democratic Socialist party and even with some figures who left the Liberal Democratic party . . .*

A. Sometimes they utilized a split in the Liberal Democratic party.

*Q. What chances do you see for an electoral bloc between the CP, SP, the Komeito, and maybe the DSP for the Diet elections in the spring?*

A. For the elections and for the next political period, the SP is now claiming that all the parties against the Liberal Democratic party should form a coalition for the election. But the Communist party claims that they should exclude the Democratic Socialist party.

In actuality, the Socialist party is divided into two camps. One camp is in favor of establishing a popular front in the next stage. The other camp is in favor of some left-centrist government, excluding the Communist party and including some factions of the Liberal Democratic party. So a coalition of all the opposition parties, except the Liberal Democratic party, means some compromise within the Socialist party.

*Q. Could you tell us something about the Komeito—what kind of party it is?*

A. The Komeito was born first from some religious movement, some kind of Buddhist sect, the most militant Buddhists. They were always very angered by the corruption of politics. So they are called the Clean Government party. Five or six years ago they went through a very heavy crisis when they maneuvered to stop a certain publication that depicted the real nature of the Komeito. Their maneuver was attacked by everybody, so they changed their line. More left-centrist, more pacifist. There has been much discussion about the nature of the Komeito. Some say it might be an embryonic fascist organization. But now I think there is no such danger about the Komeito. It's really a pacifist-type, petty-bourgeois party

\*In 1973, faced with massive layoffs at the Lip watch factory in Besancon, France, the workers occupied the factory and began to operate it under workers control.

now.

*Q. Could you give us some idea of how strong the CP is?*

A. The CP says it has 300,000 members and a Sunday circulation of 1 million for their daily paper. Their circulation for the daily issue would be about 500,000, the biggest circulation for any CP in the capitalist world.

*Q. What projections does the Japan Revolutionary Communist League have for the spring elections?*

A. We are now running a united-left candidate for that election. That means we want to clarify the political situation, especially the difference of political line between the popular front and the united front. So in this election, we will go to the factories and trade unions and we will explain the real meaning of popular frontism. The CP and SP are now showing some possibility of forming a popular front. We counterpose our notion of a united front in the next political period. This election is a beginning for such a struggle between popular front and united front. We will start with this election to clarify and to struggle for a real united front of workers.

*Q. What other groups will be supporting this candidate?*

A. Many groups. For example, those people—intellectuals and activists—who had belonged to the Beheiren movement, the anti-war movement. Also some former left structural reformists will participate in this campaign. Also one group that is state capitalist; but they are not so eager about the election. Of course, there are some left groups who oppose participating in any election.

*Q. Will the different groups supporting this candidate try to work up a common election program?*

A. There are many supporters for this candidate and we find it difficult to get some common program for the election. So we didn't decide on any united program. But, of course, we have *our* program for the election and other groups have theirs. About this election, we think it's most important to get into the factories and trade unions, where previous dis-

cussions have usually been around the decision made by the bureaucrats to support the SP.

Freedom of political discussion and support had been a main demand of the Communist party, but every time they claimed such a freedom, the bureaucrats who supported the Socialist party rejected it. I think a real discussion has not taken place. So this time we put forward the position that workers must support workers parties. There are many types of workers parties and it's their right to determine which party they support, but workers must support workers parties. This means a very serious discussion with the Communist party. This would be a very big political education for the workers.

*Q. What other kinds of activities does the League carry out in the trade unions? Around what issues?*

A. We have some forces, some influence in the public-sector trade unions especially. Of course, we have some members in private-industry trade unions, such as the chemical industry or metal industries and so on, but mainly our comrades now are in the public-sector trade unions—national railway, post office, telephone-telegram trade union, teachers union. In some districts they are in a position of leadership of their locals.

Of the far-left groups in Japan, I think we have the strongest influence within the trade-union movement. In the spring struggles we will fight in the front ranks. And we will also present a position against bureaucratic maneuvers and against any compromises reached with the capitalists without the workers having been consulted. Through this struggle we wish to win more influence among young workers and recruit them to our youth organization.

*Q. What sort of activities have the other left groups carried out in the labor movement?*

A. Some left groups have influence in some special trade unions. But generally speaking, one state-capitalist group has been engaged in some type of entryism work for the trade-union bureaucrats. In the trade unions, they themselves become bureaucrats. They restrict their orientation solely to trade-union activities.

*Q. Is there also a trend among some far-left groups toward red unionism?*

A. Yes. There are some who proclaim red unionism, but I think they have no real influence among young workers in Japan.

*Q. What stage is the Japanese student movement in now?*

A. The Japanese student movement seems to be in a downturn. I think there are two reasons for this. One is the misleadership of the far-left groups. The other is the repression by the government, the police force, and so on. But a general sentiment of dissatisfaction is continuously spreading among the students. It could burst into a big upsurge at any time.

*Q. What kind of activities do our comrades carry out?*

A. We are now aiming for a resurgence of autonomous student organizations. The mistake of the far-left groups in past years has been their splintering of the student movement into sectarian political organizations. When some autonomous movement of students appeared, it would soon split along the lines of the several far-left groups. We are now trying to initiate a resurgence of Zengakuren, a national federation of student organizations, which played a main role in the struggle against the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty in the 1960s.

*Q. What political issues do you see this resurgence based on?*

A. The main issues would be around anti-imperialist struggles and struggles against the control of the school authorities. The government has been strengthening its control of the universities.

*Q. What influence did ultraleftism and violence have within the student movement?*

A. I think some of the far-left groups are now indulging in infighting, [literally] killing each other. So, such activities mean they are excluding ordinary students from participating in the student movement. We are against such inner physical fighting because it prevents students from participating

in the movements. When students want to do some political activity in the universities, they must belong to some ultraleft group, or they would be attacked by an ultraleft group that is controlling the university in coalition with the authorities. Sometimes they are connected with the authorities.

*Q. The students in Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia in the past months have protested the role of Japanese imperialism in Asia. How have these struggles been reflected in Japan itself, among the students?*

A. I think the struggles of students in Asia will have a big impact on Japanese students. Already there are some groups who are engaged in solidarity movements with Korean students, Vietnamese students, and so on. The Japanese student movement will be revived through these activities, developing them into strong and clear anti-imperialist movements.

*Q. What have our comrades done in solidarity with students in South Korea and Thailand?*

A. I think for a political group we have the strongest connections with students from South Korea and Vietnam. Whenever we had large mass meetings, usually we got messages from South Vietnamese student organizations in Japan.

*Q. What kind of struggles have taken place over the homeporting of the U.S.S. Midway at Yokosuka?*

A. We had very big demonstrations against this. We set up a headquarters at Yokosuka for continuous organizing activity among citizens and workers. In some ways we tried some cooperation with U.S. soldiers at Yokosuka.

*Q. Japanese industries are notorious for the amount of pollution they produce, both in Japan and other countries in Asia. How have people responded to this?*

A. The struggles against pollution are now getting stronger and stronger in Japan. Many struggles, such as those of the people in Minamata who were poisoned by mercury, have been going on for years against the chemical companies; they finally won a par-

tial victory. Now many types of anti-pollution struggles exist. So Japanese capitalists find it very difficult to build new factories, new industrial centers. They are now looking at other countries in which to build their plants, in South Asian countries: Korea, Taiwan. We call it export of pollution. Those people who are engaged in the antipollution movement must be aware of this phenomenon, the export of pollution. They shouldn't be satisfied with the sacrifice of another country's people.

*Q. Sekai Kakumei [World Revolution, the newspaper of the JRCL] has featured articles about the struggles of the outcasts in Japan. Could you tell us something about this movement?*

A. We are involved in the struggles of the outcasts; our teacher comrades especially are involved. In this struggle, the problem of education becomes crucial for the struggle. In such cases, we are always on their side against the municipal authorities or against the government.

The outcasts are, of course, Japanese, but in the era of feudalism they largely engaged in work—such as butchering—that, from the viewpoint of Buddhism, was regarded as "dirty." So feudal laws discriminated against them. The landlords wanted to satisfy the peasants by showing them there was an even lower layer in society than they. It was a maneuver of the ruling class. This discrimination didn't disappear after the first stage of the bourgeois revolution—the Meiji restoration. So in Japan they have a long history of struggle. Today, they are discriminated against in social practice, in every phase of social life, to get jobs, to marry, and so on.

*Q. What's the situation on Okinawa now?*

A. The movement of the Okinawan people had two big issues in previous years. First, they wanted integration with Japan. The other was the removal of all military bases from Okinawa. When the first issue was settled, the movement itself integrated into the structure of the Japanese mass movement, in which the CP and SP were dominant. So some independent political parties in Okinawa became affiliated to the CP and SP. The people's

struggle in Okinawa came under the control of the mainland movement. Now I'm afraid we couldn't expect any specialized struggle about Okinawa.

*Q. A recent issue of Sekai Kakumei carried an article on a meeting of 2,000 trade-union women. Could you give us some information about the role of women in the work force and in the trade-union movement?*

A. Usually Japanese trade unions have women's departments, but they are very subordinated to the male organization. Recently there were some developments of a more independent tendency, a more militant spirit in the women's departments. Our women comrades are participating in the trade-union movement through the women's departments.

*Q. What stage has the women's liberation movement in general reached in Japan? What issues does it raise?*

A. I think in Japan women's liberation is only at the beginning stage. Last year Evelyn Reed [of the U.S. Socialist Workers party] came to Japan and held many meetings in several cities. The tour was a real success and provided us with a start in the women's liberation movement. Now our main issue for the women's liberation movement is against the revision of the abortion law. You see, in Japan abortion is permitted almost freely. But now the government wants to revise it because the rate of childbirth is very low. They are very anxious about the work force in the next generation. So they want to restrict abortion and introduce more rigid legislation. That would deprive women of the right to decide for themselves. It's a very big political issue in the women's movement in Japan.

*Q. How does the League's participation in the women's liberation movement differ from that of other left groups?*

A. We carry out the most consistent work and the most mass-oriented work in the women's liberation movement. Our women comrades now are issuing *Women's News*, which has a circulation of 1,000 copies a month. It has a big influence in the women's movement in Japan, because there is

no other regular magazine in the women's movement there. Other left groups participate a little, and there are some independent women's organizations, which we think do good things but have limited perspectives. We think they don't have an orientation to the mass movement, to mass work.

*Q. What is the general civil-liberties situation in Japan?*

A. There are many invasions of individual rights, especially political rights. In this connection, the right to hold public meetings, and the right

to stage demonstrations are being restricted more and more. Seventy-two hours before we want to hold a mass meeting, we must ask the police. If we neglect to do this, they attack the meeting and forcibly dissolve it. Also, many times our comrades are arrested in demonstrations. The arrests take place not because they violate some law, but because the police want only to victimize some activist.

*Q. What kind of defense activities are there?*

A. We have Red Aid, because the Socialist party and the Communist

party did not want to defend us, even on such things as democratic rights. So we set up this organization for aid, Red Aid. This is a united organization of the left. Red Aid gets lawyers, sets up meetings to defend the arrested, brings food and clothes.

A big civil-liberties problem is the struggle against the violence law, which is directed against any political body that openly proclaims the overthrow of the government through violence. We are always in a position threatened by that law. The government could apply that law against us at any time. A large part of our defense work is against this law. □

## REVIEWS

### Pursuing Nixon in Print: Books on Watergate

It was only to be expected that a phenomenon like the Watergate scandal would produce a large number of books on the affair and on the career of Richard Nixon. Some publishers, anxious to cash in on the apparent market before their competitors, have gone a bit out on a limb with books that are in danger of being outdated by the continuing development of the scandal.

Leonard Lurie's *The Impeachment of Richard Nixon*, despite its topical title, was published in June 1973, thereby missing some of the most important developments in the hearings of the Senate Watergate committee. The cover of the book bore the slogan "A Call to Action" next to a photograph of a broken presidential seal. At some point after the October upsurge in sentiment for impeachment, the seal was covered with a red sticker bearing the word "Now!", thus providing the book with an inexpensive if spurious timeliness.

This is not to say that there have not been points in the scandal that offered an obvious and useful occasion to pause and evaluate what had so far been revealed. The account of the London *Sunday Times* team (Lewis Chester, Cal McCrystal, Stephen Aris, and William Shawcross) covers developments to one such point, the August recess of the Senate hear-

ings. The *New York Times's* book stops at another, the end of "phase one" of the committee hearings on September 25.

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*The Impeachment of Richard Nixon* by Leonard Lurie. New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1973. 208 pp. \$0.95.

*The Strange Case of Richard Milhous Nixon* by Jerry Voorhis. New York: Popular Library, 1973. 350 pp. \$1.25.

*Watergate* by Lewis Chester, Cal McCrystal, Stephen Aris, and William Shawcross. New York: Ballantine Books, 1973. 280 pp. \$1.50.

*Watergate: Crime in the Suites* by Michael Myerson. New York: International Publishers, 1973. 182 pp. \$1.95.

*The Watergate Hearings*, edited by the *New York Times*. New York: Bantam Books, 1973. 886 pp. \$2.50.

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The month of publication of Michael Myerson's *Crime in the Suites* is not specified, but it would appear to have been completed in July or August.

Factually, it is the least reliable of the books listed. Myerson shows a fine disregard for the details of the conspiracy—telescoping events, attributing one Watergater's crimes to another, and treating as sworn testimony leaks that were in fact contradicted in public testimony by the persons to whom they were originally attributed.

And of course it did not require the Watergate scandal to uncover the fact that Nixon is a disreputable character. Jerry Voorhis's *The Strange Case of Richard Milhous Nixon* was written in 1972, apparently as a contribution to the Democratic election campaign. The book was later revised and updated to include the known Watergate disclosures in June 1973.

The *Sunday Times* team's *Watergate* is subtitled "The Full Inside Story"—a clear misrepresentation. There is nothing "inside" about the account, which is based throughout on public testimony, press reports, etc. Nevertheless, it is probably the best available general summary of the Watergate scandals.

*Watergate* covers the revelations concerning the plumbers, illegal fundraising, the ITT and dairy campaign-contribution scandals, and of course the Watergate break-in and cover-up.

The authors also go further than has most of the press in the United States

in hinting at some of the implications of the White House scandals. A case in point is the May 1972 assassination attempt against George Wallace by a young man from Milwaukee named Arthur Bremer.

The removal of Wallace from the presidential campaign was an undoubted benefit to Richard Nixon, since Wallace would have siphoned off many votes that eventually went to Nixon. This was regarded as something of an irony by commentators, since "left-wing literature" was found in Bremer's apartment and he had, according to the diary introduced at his trial, originally planned to kill Nixon rather than Wallace.

The *Sunday Times* reporters note that the Nixon gang nevertheless reacted to the assassination attempt in a way that suggested it was hiding something:

"According to a *Washington Post* story published in June, 1973, the attempted assassination of Wallace caused perturbation in the White House. The *Post* story quotes a 'White House source' as saying that when the President heard of the shooting that afternoon he voiced concern that the attempt on Governor Wallace's life might have been made by someone with ties to the Republican Party or his campaign. Such ties, he is alleged to have said, could cost him the election. According to the 'source': 'The President was agitated and wanted the political background on Bremer.'"

The authors point out that Watergate burglar and plumber E. Howard Hunt testified that shortly after Wallace was shot, White House special counsel Charles Colson wanted him to break into Bremer's apartment and search for evidence that would link Bremer to leftist causes. They draw the conclusion:

". . . with hindsight, it is easy to see why there should have been concern in the White House. By this time CREEP's excessive loose change had financed so many dirty tricksters that it was just conceivable that one of them might have been Arthur Bremer."

And so it might have. The actions of Colson and Nixon indicate, if nothing else, that both were aware of the election sabotage campaign and that it at least potentially involved some very dirty tricks indeed.

An unfortunate but unsurprising omission from *Watergate* is the lack

of any mention of the campaign of undercover operations against the radical and antiwar movements, except for a chapter on the mass arrests during the 1971 Mayday demonstrations. For the U. S. ruling class, a prime concern has been to limit the Watergate revelations to the one area considered to be the serious crime of the Nixon gang: the use of methods intended for non-ruling-class opponents against the other capitalist party.

The *Sunday Times* team correctly attributes the origin of Nixon's transgressions in this area primarily to the requirements of his policy in Vietnam. While it is nearly obscured by liberal mythology, there is considerable truth in their description of the 1969 wire-tapping of reporters and government officials, which was designed to stop leaks concerning Nixon's expansion of the Vietnam war:

"The issues involved in the wire-tapping were more than a question of what constituted good manners between friends. For they illustrated how soon the Nixon administration had, under pressure of its Vietnam policy, embarked on a policy of corruption. As early as mid-1969 this corruption operated at three levels. The first was in the decision not to entrust the American people with the true nature of the war policy. The second was in the readiness to deceive the people's elected representatives, even in secret session, about that policy. The third, and ultimately most destructive, was a logical outcome of the first two: they could not trust even themselves. In the aftermath of Watergate this distrust became almost a galloping disease with 'friend' tapping 'friend' without any hint of conscience. Paranoia reigned."

The *New York Times* book, *The Watergate Hearings*, is basically a reference work. The bulk of it consists of excerpts from the transcript of the first phase of the Senate hearings. Also included are a week-by-week summary of the testimony written by R.W. Apple Jr., a chronology of Watergate-related events, Nixon's statements on the scandal, and various documents that have been made public: the "Dean papers," CIA memoranda, etc.

For anyone interested in a serious study of Watergate, *The Watergate Hearings* is indispensable. It is easy to regard the book as a means of entertainment as well. For mystery

fans, there is more than the most complex novel can provide. And those who appreciate low comedy will particularly relish Nixon's statements, such as the following remark at an August 1972 press conference:

"What really hurts in matters of this sort is not the fact that they occur, because overzealous people in campaigns do things that are wrong. What really hurts is if you try to cover it up."

With the exception of *The Watergate Hearings*, which is intended as documentation, all the books try to find the underlying meaning of the scandal. None are really successful.

Perhaps most disappointing in this respect is *Crime in the Suites*. Myerson, a member of the Communist party, claims to provide a Marxist explanation. He notes, correctly, that there is an intimate connection between Watergate and the Indochina war, but he trivializes this connection:

"There is no way to look at Watergate without seeing Vietnam. The same men, the same system, the same agencies, the same ideology, the same interests that caused the slaughter of the innocents of Indochina brought about the Watergate conspiracy. And they told the same lies. . . ."

This is followed by pages of recitation of U. S. war crimes, frame-ups of dissenters, Nixon's lies, etc. All of these factors are relevant, but listing them does not constitute an explanation of why the Watergate conspiracy was hatched, why it was exposed, or why the exposure created a major political crisis for the U. S. ruling class. Neither does Myerson's one attempt to analyze his list:

"The Nixon Administration and the powerful forces it represents came to believe that, faced with an impending defeat of imperialist goals in Indochina, its options were becoming increasingly limited. Popular democratic opposition would narrow those options still more; hence channels of opposition expression must be shut off. The National Guard against students and ghetto dwellers would not alone suffice; nor would beatings and 'conspiracy' trials of radical dissenters be sufficient. The ruling class itself was sharply divided because of the mass disaffection, and those opposition forces within it had also to be silenced. A campaign was launched to discredit network television news

and the metropolitan press; Congress was encouraged towards self-immolation; and, finally, the Presidential elections of 1972 were manipulated and sabotaged beyond recognition as 'free choice,' even by Cook County standards."

But by the time of the 1972 elections, the ruling-class divisions over the Vietnam war had been narrowed by the prospect of success for Nixon's policy. Thanks to the cooperation of the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies, defeat was no longer impending. In his desire to cover for the Kremlin Myerson calls the Vietnam accord a "victory" for the Vietnamese, but such misrepresentation cannot drive Thieu from Saigon.


The ruling class was not deprived of its "free choice" in the 1972 election; in its overwhelming majority, it chose Nixon. But by sabotaging the Democrats, Nixon undermined the two-party electoral fraud. This sabotage and Nixon's establishment of embryonic private police units, whose first loyalty was to him rather than to the capitalist class as a whole, produced a reaction by the ruling class that completely cut across the earlier divisions over the Vietnam war.

Although the point is made one-sidedly, the *Sunday Times* team provides a better explanation of what the ruling class regards as Nixon's sins:

"In the spring of 1971 the men around Nixon were obsessed by two linked problems—the President's low standing in the polls and the quest for a conclusion in Vietnam. Although most, like Nixon himself, were considered anti-Communists, they saw the war as the biggest single obstacle to his re-election. Peace had to be achieved but it had to be 'with honour,' and this implied the most delicate of secret diplomatic minuets behind the veil of national security policy. At that time the careful construction of Nixon as the strategic 'peace' candidate—in China and the Soviet Union as well as Vietnam—was set in motion. There was, therefore, from the outset what appeared to be an identity of interest between the cause of national security and their own political well-being. The interests were, in fact, different but the confusion between the two is the clue to most of the domestic crimes they committed."

However, the Nixon gang's "con-

fusion" was conditioned and largely created by a number of historical factors outside its control. These factors were: in general, the long-term trend of U. S. imperialism to strengthen the executive of its government; and, in particular, the effort to develop a strategy that could roll back or contain the radicalization of U. S. society that began in the late 1950s and that, despite ups and downs, is still with us today. Omission of this historical setting necessarily reduces the Watergate scandal to an accident con-



WALLACE: Removed from 1972 campaign by assassination attempt.

ditioned by the personal characteristics of Nixon and his aides. Immediately after the paragraph quoted above, the *Sunday Times* team goes on to offer the further "explanation" that the Nixon gang is "self-righteous," and that Haldeman and Ehrlichman are Christian Scientists who could not stand criticism.

The deficiencies of that kind of explanation become even more obvious when the author has a liberal ax to grind. Lurie, for example, near the end of his indictment brings forth the following defense of "the American system" against the taint it has sustained from Nixon crimes:

"This felonious, amoral political behavior is not part of the American system. It represents the failure of

Richard Nixon, not the failure of American democracy. This is not politics as it is usually practiced, or was meant to be practiced, in the White House. This is Richard Nixon's brand of politics, as he has practiced it throughout his career. He has finally fought his way into a position where his lack of self-restraint and deficiencies of character have proven fatal."

These passionate assertions manage to evade the central question: Why was it precisely the amoral, character-deficient Richard Nixon who was elected president in 1968 and 1972? It is no secret that Washington is swarming with politicians who would walk over or sell their grandmothers for the opportunity to experience a similar "failure." If Nixon's cynically corrupt career were really a major departure from U. S. political norms, it would undoubtedly be destined for widespread imitation. Nothing succeeds like success, even when liberal apologists call it "failure."

Lurie's book itself sufficiently documents the fact, if documentation is needed, that Nixon's crookedness has been well known to the powers that be since he first ran for office in 1946. For more than a quarter of a century, red-baiting, election fraud, and bribery have been present whenever Nixon sought or achieved office. Lurie requires four pages just to list "Articles of Impeachment" against Nixon—that is, the crimes committed only since 1969. A list for the years 1946-1969 would undoubtedly be much longer.

In the course of his narrative, Lurie conjures some rather tarnished angels as a foil for Nixon's devil. For example, he writes of the 1968 presidential campaign:

"Despite the extraordinary caution and unlimited expenditure of money, Nixon was almost defeated. During the last three weeks of the campaign, Hubert H. Humphrey, ebullient, quick-witted and honest, came on with a rush. His most serious liability had been the fact that he was Vice-President under an increasingly unpopular Lyndon Johnson."

Poor old Honest Hubert Humphrey, who was not quite quick-witted enough to make the voters forget his ebullient support for Johnson's unpopular policy of aggression in Vietnam!

Writing of the scandal surrounding

the 1969 FBI wiretaps of reporters and government officials ordered by Nixon, Lurie actually speaks of "the disgrace which the White House had inflicted on the agency's [FBI's] previously good reputation."

Still another of Lurie's tarnished angels is Jerry Voorhis, the author of *The Strange Case of Richard Milhous Nixon*. Voorhis was a Democratic congressman from California until he was defeated by Nixon in the 1946 campaign.

"Nixon's campaign," Lurie writes, "was marked by vilification, obfuscation, smears, and lying. . . ."

"Mild-mannered Voorhis had to be pictured in the voters' minds as the personification of evil. Since our wartime alliance with the Russians was cooling, he had to be represented as a dyed-in-the-wool Communist who was managing to disguise his true Stalinist sentiments only with the greatest difficulty."

Nixon coined the phrase "lip-service American" to describe his opponent, whom he accused of "consistently voting the Moscow . . . line in Congress."

It was ironic that the target of Nixon's red-baiting should have been the Democratic liberal Jerry Voorhis, for Voorhis himself had done more than his share to contribute to the developing witch-hunt atmosphere that Nixon rode all the way to the vice-presidency. As a member of the notorious House Committee on Un-American Activities, Voorhis had authored the Voorhis Act, an anti-communist measure still on the books, which among other things prohibits U. S. political parties from affiliating to international organizations.

Red-baiting and misrepresentation of his opponents have characterized Nixon's style since his first success in 1946. Voorhis believes that Nixon has always operated on "the assumption that anyone opposed to Richard Nixon, representing as he did all that was pure and holy in free enterprise Americanism, must be in some manner or another subversive. How could there be any other explanation of why anyone would oppose him?"

"And having reached this assumption, Mr. Nixon and his followers felt justified in using any methods and tactics that might seem necessary to defeat his 'subversive' opponents."

Lurie also regards Nixon as having

an unusual capacity for self-deception. He writes of Nixon's role in the frame-up of Alger Hiss:

"Simply because Chambers had repeatedly lied to the F. B. I., to numerous government officials, to the House Un-American Activities Committee, to the grand jury, to the American people, singly and *en masse*, and last, but not least, to Richard Nixon, did not mean he was lying in his final version of the truth. Liars sometimes tell the truth. But to want to send a previously respected man to jail on his word required a monumental suspension of judgment on Nixon's part.

"In terms of Nixon, the real lesson



HOWARD HUNT with his attorney.

to learn was that he had a mental susceptibility which allowed him to convince himself, rapidly and without much evidence, that what he wanted to believe was believable."

Lurie is too generous in assuming that Nixon really believed Whittaker Chambers in 1948. But the fact that Nixon continues to call attention to his own role in the frame-up, at a time when it can no longer do his political career any good, would seem to indicate that he has since convinced himself of his own righteousness in the affair.

Similarly, Voorhis's argument that Nixon really believes his opponents to be "subversive" gains some credibility from aspects of the Watergate scandal such as the recent use of Vice-

President Gerald Ford to proclaim that the insignificant Americans for Democratic Action and the conservative mossbacks of the AFL-CIO are directing an impeachment conspiracy of "super-welfare staters." Ford's ludicrous speech was based either on the belief that the demons of the witch-hunt period retain their full power to terrify or on the conviction that opposition to Nixon and "subversion" are synonyms.

But such attempts to deduce Nixon's psychology are necessarily speculative and in any case of no real use in explaining more than the very incidental in politics, including the Watergate phenomenon. Whether or not the secret 1970 spy plan, for example, satisfied Nixon's psychological needs, it clearly was intended to serve the political needs of the U. S. ruling class and was so judged by the heads of the various espionage organizations. The plan or something like it would have been developed no matter who was president. (In fact, all the illegal activities of the 1970 plan had been used against dissidents in the past.)

Treating Nixon as a sport on the body politic implies that the system itself is sound and can be returned to "normal" by lopping off the unwanted mutation. This was argued, as we have seen, quite explicitly by Lurie.

The reality is considerably less comforting to liberal illusions. Sometimes this is inadvertently revealed even by our liberal authors. In stressing the dangers they see posed by Nixon, they admit that Nixon is not the only source of those dangers. Voorhis writes:

"Is Henry Steele Commager right when he says, 'It would be an exaggeration to say that the United States is a garrison state, but none to say it is in danger of becoming one?' There are reasons, all too many, to believe that he is right. The very kind of laws needed to repress dissent of any kind are on the statute books."

Presumably something more than modesty is involved in Voorhis's failure to mention that one of those laws is called the Voorhis Act. His book is intended to defend the same system that he defended in Congress. That this system made Richard Nixon and Watergate is a fact on which all the liberal explanations eventually founder.

— Allen Myers

Intercontinental Press