

Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 12, No. 6

© 1973 Intercontinental Press

February 18, 1974

50c



Why Tories Called Election

Heath Versus the Miners

Accord on Police

One of the last major points in the Laotian accords was resolved on February 6 when Sot Petrasy, head of the Pathet Lao office in Vientiane, and Soukan Vilaysarn, of the pro-imperialist Souvanna Phouma regime, signed an agreement establishing a joint police force in Vientiane and Luang Prabang. According to the agreement, each side will have 1,000 policemen in Vientiane and 500 in Luang Prabang. There are already 1,200 Pathet Lao troops in Vientiane and 600 in Luang Prabang, as stipulated in the September 14 agreement, which called for the military neutralization of the two cities.

The major dispute that was resolved in the police agreement involved the role that the Pathet Lao police forces would play. The Vientiane administration had wanted them simply to be guards for the Pathet Lao officials in the "Provisional Government of National Union." On the other hand the Pathet Lao demanded, according to the February 7 *New York Times*, "that its policemen be permitted to share all police work, including traffic direction and ordinary anticrime responsibilities." In the February 6 agreement the Pathet Lao won that demand.

But despite the signing of the police agreement, the Pathet Lao forces in the two cities remain, in fact, nothing more than guards for their leaders. While both sides have an equal number of local policemen and troops, the proimperialist Royal Government has forces stationed near enough to the cities to easily step in and "restore order" should the coalition government break down.

For their part, the Pathet Lao have made a number of concessions throughout the course of the negotiations for the coalition government and have chosen to overlook the consequences of the two previous attempts to form such coalitions in 1957 and 1962, both of which were overthrown by right-wing coups.

The police agreement was reportedly described by both sides as an important step towards forming a coalition regime. □

In This Issue

LAOS	162	Accord on Police
BRITAIN	163	Heath Tries Red-Scare to Maintain Wage Controls
SOVIET UNION	165	Medvedev's Defense—and Critique—of Solzhenitsyn
ARAB EAST	167	Egyptian and Israeli Armies Begin "Disengagement"
	168	The Palestinian Movement and the Geneva Negotiations—by Nathan Weinstock
JORDAN	170	Soldiers Mutiny
AUSTRALIA	170	Student Organization Supports Palestinians — by Frans Timmerman
U.S.A.	171	New Holes in "Narrowing Nixon Defense Perimeter"—by Allen Myers
	174	Truck Drivers Strike in 20 States
URUGUAY	175	Dictatorship in Crisis
BOLIVIA	177	100 Reported Killed in Cochabamba Uprising — by Candida Barberena
CUBA	178	Brezhnev Pushes Detente During Visit to Havana
CHILE	178	Junta Faces Mounting Difficulties — by Jean-Pierre Beauvais
	179	Valparaiso Transport Leaders Arrested
	181	Christian Democrats Criticize Junta
ANTILLES	182	Workers Mobilization
BANGLADESH	183	Nationwide Protest Strike—by Ernest Harsch
MALAYSIA	184	Demand Release of Political Prisoners
INDIA	185	Food Protests Rock Gujarat
DOCUMENTS	186	Lebanese Trotskyists Denounce Plans to Liquidate Palestinian Cause
	188	How Guerrilla Raid Was Used by Peronist Regime
	189	History of Repression at Belgrade University
DRAWINGS	163	Harold Wilson; 164, Edward Heath; 165, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn; 168, Yassir Arafat; 170, Hussein; 171, John Ehrlichman; 172, Leon Jaworski; 173, H. R. Haldeman; 179, Augusto Pinochet; 180, Eduardo Frei; 183, Mujibur Rahman; 191, Tito—by Copain

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.
 CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.
 COPY EDITOR: Lawrence Rand.
 EDITORIAL STAFF: Candida Barberena, Gerry Foley, Ernest Harsch, Allen Myers, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders.
 BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.
 ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.
 TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Ruth Schein.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemeene, 75004, Paris, France.

TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright © 1974 by Intercontinental Press.

Heath Tries Red-Scare to Maintain Wage Controls

"It is difficult at the moment," the *New York Times* commented in a February 9 editorial on the British elections scheduled for February 28, "to see how or when the Government that takes office March 1 will be able to build that 'one nation' promised by Mr. Heath in 1970. It will be difficult enough to govern at all."

With Edward Heath's decision February 7 to dissolve Parliament and run for reelection against the striking coal miners, issues were posed that the influential U.S. bourgeois paper saw as highly relevant to the United States as well as Britain. The editors explained February 10:

"The issue is whether it is possible to replace the law of the jungle in industrial relations—the bitter confrontations among labor, management and often government of the kind that now threatens to paralyze Britain and that has recently disrupted the American economy—with a system and climate in which those inevitable tensions can be held within reasonable bounds by mutual agreement in a unified national interest.

"It is the universality of the problem in free, industrial nations that gives special interest not only to Britain's election campaign but to what happens when the new Government resumes the task of getting the coal miners back in the pits."

The *New York Times* of course wishes whichever party wins a majority February 28 every success in replacing "the law of the jungle" with a system of "mutual agreement" in which workers agree to accept limitations on their right to defend their standard of living and the employers agree that such limitations are indeed in the "national interest." As the editorial put it, what is needed is a "*modus vivendi* that would leave unions free to strive for higher wages but within a set of industrial ground rules and the limits of an agreed policy on incomes." And it noted that the Labour party is not necessarily more capable than the Tories of enforcing such an incomes policy: "The most spectacular political failure was that of Harold Wilson's Labour Govern-

ment in 1969."

The militant struggle of the members of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) has severely undermined Heath's attempts to force British workers to bear the burden of inflation under Phase 3 wage controls.



WILSON: Trying to outdo Heath as defender of "national unity."

Many commentators argued that the NUM was likely to win something very close to its original pay demands whatever the outcome of the February 28 election.

Alvin Shuster, in a February 7 dispatch from London to the *New York Times*, wrote that "it is generally expected that a victory for either party would mean a prompt end to the dispute. At this point, it would appear the miners cannot lose.

"If Labour won, former Prime Minister Harold Wilson would return to office, and he would move quickly to pay. If Mr. Heath returned, he too would be expected to pay after announcing an acceptable formula devised by an impartial board."

Wilson referred to this expectation

when he said of Heath's calling of the general election: "For the first time in history we have a general leading his troops into battle with the deliberate aim of giving in if he wins."

Whatever his plans for dealing with the miners in the event of a Tory victory, Heath made it clear that such a victory would be interpreted as a mandate for continued wage controls on the working class as a whole. His televised speech following the dissolution of Parliament stressed the theme of the government's "right" to impose its will on the unions:

"Do you want a strong government that has a clear authority in the future to take decisions that will be needed? Do you want Parliament and an elected government to continue to fight strenuously against inflation?

"Or do you want a government which will abandon the struggle against rising prices under pressure from one particular powerful group of workers?"

And of course Heath's remarks would not have been complete without the appeal to "national unity": "The election gives you, the people, the chance to say to the miners and to everyone else who wields similar power, 'Times are hard, we are all in the same boat, and if you sink us now we will all drown.'"

The Tory leader also indicated that "law and order" and a "red scare" would be a prominent part of his campaign: "There are some people involved in the mining dispute who have made it clear that what they want is to bring down the elected government—not just this government but any government. . . . The great majority of you are fed up to the teeth with them and with the disruption they cause."

An election campaign based on scare tactics was virtually the only alternative left to Heath once the results of the mineworkers' January 31 strike vote were in. With 81 percent of the miners voting in favor of a strike, there was no room left for a deal with the NUM leadership at the expense of the ranks.

At the same time that he dissolved Parliament, Heath wrote to the NUM

leadership, calling on them to postpone the strike until after the election. James Gormley, the right-wing president of the NUM, immediately announced that he was in favor of a postponement. It would be "ludicrous," Gormley said, to strike when there was no longer a government with which to come to a settlement. "Change the government," he said. "That is the real solution to the problem."

But Heath's attempt to divert the miners' struggle into parliamentary channels was unable to prevail over the massive sentiment revealed in the strike vote. On February 8, the NUM executive, by a vote of 20 to 6, overruled Gormley's wishes and decided to begin the strike on schedule February 10. The executive's decision two weeks earlier to conduct the strike poll had been taken by a vote of only 160 to 10.

In the February 9 *New York Times*, Alvin Shuster quoted Gormley as explaining the executive's vote by saying that "some leaders felt they could not stop miners in some areas from striking, even if the union leadership suspended the strike."

But at the same time, the NUM leaders partially gave in to the Tory pressures by promising to limit picketing. Shuster reported:

"The militants within the leadership agreed, however, to limit to six the number of men on each picket line. They will cover power stations, ports and mines and—in a new development—steelworks, so they can block shipment of coking coal. The miners were also urged to confine their picketing to these 'vulnerable points' and to cooperate with the local police to avoid violence such as occurred during the last coal strike two years ago."

If these instructions are followed, the miners will be deprived of one of their most effective weapons in the 1972 strike: the use of mass "flying pickets" to spread the strike. The idea of six pickets—in cooperation with the police!—shutting down a mine or port is plainly absurd.

The Labour party leadership, meanwhile, is doing everything possible to disassociate itself from the mineworkers. Rather than confronting Heath's scare campaign against the miners and boldly defending working-class interests against the wage freeze, Wilson and his associates are trying to outdo the Tories as defenders of "na-

tional unity."

"Inflation is the battle," Wilson replied to Heath's February 7 speech, "but you're not going to fight it by dividing the nation."

James Callaghan, Labour party chairman, told a news conference February 8: "What the miners decide is not my business but their business. We don't see the miners' fight as the issue in this campaign, except as it reflects government failure."

Even more disgraceful was the Labour leadership's response to the Tory effort to red-bait the NUM because



HEATH: Preparing for a long strike?

of statements by Mick McGahey, NUM vice-president and a member of the Communist party. McGahey had been quoted as saying of possible government use of troops as strikebreakers:

"It may be that they will call in troops to move the coal, but troops are not all anti-working-class. Many of them are miners' sons—sons of the working class.

"As far as I am concerned, if the government employ troops, if necessary, I will appeal to them to assist and aid the miners. You cannot dig coal with bayonets."

McGahey's statement produced howls of outrage from the Tory defenders of "law and order" and a craven repudiation of such fraterniza-

tion by the Labour party leaders. On January 29, Callaghan and Ronald Hayward, Labour party general secretary, issued a joint statement that said:

"We utterly repudiate any attempt by Communists or others to use the miners as a political battering ram to bring about a general strike or to call on troops to disobey lawful orders in the event of a strike. That is silly and dangerous nonsense. The miners have a long affiliation to the Labour party and we deny the right of Communists or extremist members of the NUM executive to speak for them on political issues."

In Parliament, Wilson endorsed the statement, saying that it showed that "the extremists in the situation are the vice-president of the NUM and Mr. Heath."

McGahey himself retracted some of his militant language, complaining that his remarks had been "distorted and taken out of context."

"I would not," McGahey said "ask any troops to disobey orders. . . . This is not mutiny. This is only allowing [troops] to understand the purpose for which they are employed."

Red Weekly, the paper of the International Marxist Group (British section of the Fourth International), commented:

"The prime concern of the Labour Party leadership at this crucial turning point in the struggle to defend working class living standards is to add their influence to the red-baiting campaign launched by Heath and the capitalist press against Mick McGahey. . . . This is nothing less than a pure and simple act of scabbing. . . .

"What is involved here is a simple question of class loyalty: Is your loyalty to the working class? Or to the capitalist state? Messrs. Callaghan, Hayward and Wilson have already given their answer. The rank-and-file militants of the Labour Party must now give theirs."

Despite the predictions of a quick settlement of the miners' strike as soon as the elections are over, the government gives every sign of preparing for a long struggle.

On February 10, a spokesman for the nationalized British Steel Corporation, which had already cut production to 77 percent of normal, announced a further cutback to 60 percent on February 11, the first work-

ing day of the miners' strike. Further 10 percent cuts are scheduled every two weeks, until a level of only 30 percent of normal production is reached.

"We will continue phasing down for two months," the spokesman said. "If the strike is not over by then, we will be producing virtually no steel at all but at least we will keep the coking ovens going."

In an attempt to generate public sentiment against the miners—and save some money in the process—British Steel also announced that it

would cancel, effective February 17, the 40-hour guaranteed week agreement for 130,000 of its 225,000 employees. The response of steelworkers to this attack will help to determine whether employers in other industries with guaranteed-week agreements follow the government lead.

Even if the strike of the miners is settled shortly after the election, the already weak British economy may by that time have reached a virtual standstill. Terry Robards reported in the February 11 *New York Times*:

"At the latest count on Feb. 2, coal

stocks at the nation's power stations totaled 13.3 million tons and national consumption was running at 1.2 million tons a week—somewhat less than anticipated because of the mild winter weather.

"The critical level of stocks—at which power blackouts would begin to occur randomly—is seven million tons. This would be reached in the week following the Feb. 28 election, assuming the strike is not settled earlier, but might come earlier if the weather turns frigid." □

Soviet Historian Answers Kremlin's Slanders

Medvedev's Defense—and Critique—of Solzhenitsyn

In a major development in the controversy over Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago*, Soviet historian Roy A. Medvedev on February 6 issued a 7,000-word review praising Solzhenitsyn's contribution to the history of Stalinism and defending his right to publish such a work.

It is clear from Medvedev's essay, excerpts of which were published in the *New York Times*, that the dissident historian, unlike the official critics, had taken the trouble to read Solzhenitsyn's book before commenting on it. In defending *The Gulag Archipelago* against the distortions of the Soviet press, Medvedev was able to draw on his own extensive studies of Stalinism, which were summarized in his 1971 book *Let History Judge*.

Medvedev also has criticisms of Solzhenitsyn's views, but these will not endear him to the Kremlin bureaucrats. For Medvedev attacks the myth, propagated by the bureaucrats and accepted by Solzhenitsyn, that the bureaucratic methods of the Soviet rulers are the lawful continuation of Leninism and the Bolshevik revolution.

"I cannot accept certain of Solzhenitsyn's evaluations or conclusions," Medvedev wrote, "but I must firmly state that all the basic facts given in his book and all the details about the life and torments of prisoners from the moment of their arrest to the moment of their death (in rare cases,

up to the moment when they were released) are completely authentic."

While disagreeing with some of Solzhenitsyn's statements of fact, Med-



ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN

vedev considers any inaccuracies as "infinitesimally few for such a significant book." In some cases, he regards the errors as minimizing, rather than overstating, the scope of Stalin's crimes:

"I think that Solzhenitsyn exaggerates the number of peasants evicted

during collectivization (15 million). But if we add to those victims the peasants who died of hunger in 1932-33 (in the Ukraine, alone, not less than three million to four million people died), then we will get a figure larger than the one Solzhenitsyn gives."

Medvedev defends Solzhenitsyn against the slander that he justified the action of soldiers who after their capture fought for the German fascists in the second world war. In the course of this defense, he provides a burning indictment of the criminal policies with which Stalin undermined the defense of the Soviet Union:

"For Solzhenitsyn, not his own arrest, but the cruel and awful destiny of millions of Soviet prisoners of war of his own age and of the age of the Great October Revolution, who made up the major part of our professional army in June, 1941, became a deep personal tragedy.

"This army was destroyed and surrounded in the first days and weeks of war because of criminal miscalculations of Stalin, who was unable to prepare either the army or country for war; because of Stalin's absurd and stupid orders on the first day of war and abandoning his post during the first week, and because of the shortage of experienced army commanders and commissars."

The lack of experienced personnel was due, of course, to the decapita-

tion of the Red Army in the course of the Stalinist purges. Medvedev's father, an army political commissar, was one of the victims of those purges. Medvedev described the consequences:


"More than three million soldiers and commanders landed in prison camps and one million others were later imprisoned. . . . But Stalin's Government betrayed its soldiers in prison, too, by refusing to recognize Russia's signature on the international prisoner-of-war convention. As a result, Soviet prisoners did not get help through the International Red Cross and were doomed to die of hunger in German concentration camps.

"Once again, Stalin betrayed those who survived when, after victory, almost all were arrested, increasing the population of 'The Gulag Archipelago.' This triple betrayal of Stalin's soldiers is what Solzhenitsyn considers the worst, gravest crime of the Stalinist regime.

"Solzhenitsyn does not justify and praise those desperate and unfortunate people [who collaborated]. But he is asking the tribunal of their descendants to take into consideration certain circumstances that would diminish their guilt. Those young and often illiterate fellows, most of whom were from villages, were demoralized by the defeat of their army; and they were repeatedly told in concentration camps: 'Stalin denounced you' and 'Stalin does not care about you.'"

The capitalist press of course has its own reasons for wishing to reinforce the bureaucrats' claim to being the continuators of Leninism. The excerpts from the essay published by the *New York Times* (less than half of the full text) therefore must be treated with particular caution where Medvedev discusses this failing of Solzhenitsyn's book. It is difficult, for example, to judge from paragraphs like the following the extent, if any, to which Medvedev regards the present rulers of the Soviet Union as not being Stalinist:

"Solzhenitsyn is wrong in assuming that this [Stalinist] system has been preserved in its basic features up to the present day. But it has not departed entirely from our social, political and spiritual life. Solzhenitsyn's book strikes a powerful blow at Stalinism and neo-Stalinism. None of us has done more in this regard than Solzhenitsyn."



STALIN: Spirit of gravedigger of revolutions still walks the corridors of the Kremlin.

There are also occasional ambiguities in Medvedev's criticism of Solzhenitsyn's identification of Stalinism and Leninism, although here his position is clearer than in the passage just quoted. Medvedev begins by quoting the following passage from *The Gulag Archipelago*:

"In the years before prison and in prison itself, I thought for a long time that Stalin had given a fateful direction to the course of the Soviet state. Then Stalin quietly died. But how much has the course of our ship of state changed in fact? The particular personal imprint he gave to events was dismal stupidity, willfulness and self-glorification. Otherwise, he simply followed exactly in the footsteps."

Medvedev replies that while there is a continuity between the Communist party of 1917 and the party today, "that continuity is not tantamount to identity. Stalin did not 'follow in the footsteps.' In the very first years after the revolution, he did not always follow in Lenin's footsteps. And certainly afterward, with every step he led the party astray.

"Stalinism in many respects negates

— and is bloody annihilation of— Bolshevism and all revolutionary forces. In a certain sense, it is a real counterrevolution. Of course, we do not contend that the Lenin legacy and the Lenin period in the history of our revolution do not require most serious, critical analysis."

Such a study of the real history of the period when Lenin—and Trotsky—led the Bolshevik party would be even more of a threat to the Kremlin bureaucrats than is Solzhenitsyn's study of Stalin's concentration camps. *The Gulag Archipelago*, a work consciously anti-Marxist, can nevertheless stimulate Soviet Marxists to rediscover the Leninism that has been hidden and distorted for decades by Stalinist bureaucrats.

While defending the right of non-Marxists like Solzhenitsyn to participate in this work, Medvedev concedes nothing to Solzhenitsyn's erroneous ideas. Noting that the novelist has turned to religion in his reaction against Stalinism, Medvedev comments:

". . . for the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people, religion is no longer and cannot become the truth.

Young people in the 20th century would hardly find guidance in belief in God.

"I do not very much like these ideals of Solzhenitsyn. I am deeply convinced that for the foreseeable future, our society should be built on a combination of socialism and democracy, and that specifically the development of

Marxism and scientific Communism will allow creation of the most just human society."

"Before the arrest," Medvedev notes, "Solzhenitsyn considered himself a Marxist. After he went through the cruel tests described with such merciless truthfulness in 'Gulag Archipelago,' Solzhenitsyn lost his belief

in Marxism. . . .

"Marxism will certainly not perish for loss of one of its former adherents. We even think that Marxism will only benefit from debate with such an opponent as Solzhenitsyn."

Medvedev is certainly right on that point. The losers in such a debate will be only the Stalinist bureaucrats.

Washington, Moscow Turn Attention to Damascus

Egyptian and Israeli Armies Begin 'Disengagement'

The agreement on "disengaging" the Egyptian and Israeli forces on the Sinai front of the October War is being implemented on schedule. On January 28 the Israeli army lifted its siege of Suez city and handed a large surrounding area over to troops from the United Nations Emergency Force. The Israelis withdrew to a line about two miles north of the Cairo-Suez road, thus opening the land route between Cairo and the Egyptian III Corps on the east bank of the Suez Canal.

The second segment of the Israeli withdrawal from the canal's west bank was completed on February 5, when territory extending north to the outskirts of the town of Gineifa was turned over to the UN forces.

The remainder of the Israeli bridgehead west of the canal is scheduled to be evacuated by the Israeli forces by February 22.

As the siege of Suez city was lifted, the Egyptian III Corps began withdrawing from the east bank. Concurrently, UN forces began moving into what will become the "buffer zone" separating the two armies when the disengagement is complete. According to the agreement, Egypt will be allowed to maintain 7,000 troops and thirty tanks in a five- to seven-and-a-half-mile strip east of the canal. The remainder of the 41,000 Egyptian troops stationed east of the canal will be withdrawn to the western bank. Israeli forces in a similar-sized strip on the other side of the UN-occupied "buffer zone" will likewise be limited to 7,000 troops and thirty tanks. The mutual thinning-out process is scheduled to be effected from February 22 to March 5.

While the Sinai front appears to have been stabilized, the Syrian front has

remained tense. From January 26 to February 5 artillery duels between Syrian and Israeli forces took place on a daily basis. The front was quiet for four days February 6-9, but fighting resumed on February 10.

The full Geneva conference is not expected to reconvene until a disengagement agreement has been worked out for the Syrian front. Washington's diplomacy has thus centered on imposing such an agreement ever since the Sinai separation of forces was agreed on. The outlines of the potential deal are clear. Israeli government officials have already indicated that they are not interested in maintaining control of the easternmost 150-square-mile section of the Golan Heights, which they conquered during the October War. They have also offered to turn over to the UN two of the three positions they are holding on Mount Hermon, which dominates the Golan Heights.

Tel Aviv's aim is to rearrange the Syrian cease-fire lines, hoping to establish a UN buffer zone between the Israeli and Syrian armies similar to the one between the Israeli and Egyptian armies. The buffer zone, perhaps combined with corresponding strips occupied by "limited" forces, would deprive the Syrian government of the weapon of war of attrition and eliminate the possibility of Damascus resorting to military pressure to dislodge Israeli forces from the Syrian land they have been occupying since June 1967. In exchange for such a stabilization, the Israeli rulers are willing to give up the extra territory seized in October.

The Syrian regime appears prepared to accept such an agreement. U. S. officials in Washington have indicated

that Syrian President Hafez el-Assad told Henry Kissinger in January that Damascus would sign a disengagement accord even if it did not entail future Israeli withdrawal from the entirety of the Syrian Golan Heights.

The obstacle to reaching the agreement is the question of Israeli prisoners of war taken by Syria during the October War. The Israeli regime claims it will not negotiate with Damascus until it is given a list of Israeli POWs held by Syria and until those prisoners are visited by representatives of the Red Cross. Tel Aviv has used the issue of the prisoners to whip up chauvinism in Israel and is unlikely to retract its demands.

El-Assad, however, is under pressure from the Syrian masses not to accept Tel Aviv's demands on the POWs until Israel agrees to withdraw from the territory it seized during the October War.

It is not likely that the impasse will persist much longer. Both Washington and Moscow regard whipping the Damascus regime into line as a top priority, necessary if the Geneva conference is to proceed and if the Palestinians are to be drawn into the process of stabilizing the region. The Kremlin has been holding continual meetings with Syrian leaders in Damascus, and Kissinger is scheduled to visit Syria in late February.

And if diplomatic pressure should fail to do the job, other options are available. Asked if he thought a disengagement deal could be worked out with Syria, Moshe Dayan replied: "I think there is a chance, because we are sitting forty kilometers from Damascus and there is a good chance that sooner or later they will realize what is good for them." □

The Palestinian Movement and the Geneva Negotiations

By Nathan Weinstock

[The following article appeared in the February 1 issue of *La Gauche*, weekly organ of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs (Revolutionary Workers League), Belgian section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The scenario for the Geneva Arab-Israeli negotiations set up so laboriously by Washington and Moscow is proceeding according to plan, the two "sponsors" taking care of exerting the pressure needed to bring any recalitrants to heel.

Thus, Kissinger forced Tel Aviv into negotiations that Golda did not want any part of. And, as a good realist convinced that Zionism has no future outside the American embrace, General Dayan has hastened to change his stripes and become a dove for the time being.

The goal of the two great powers is to stabilize the Middle East. For the peace that is being prepared at Geneva has been worked out long in advance so that each side can draw clear advantages from it. To be sure, the Israeli leaders will have to give back some territory and give up expansionist dreams. But in return they will gain borders guaranteed by the superpowers and will obtain an official declaration of nonbelligerence and de facto diplomatic recognition from the major state of the Arab world. That alone would qualify as an Israeli victory even apart from the fact that the negotiations will allow for ending a military mobilization that has been ruinous for the economy of the Jewish state.

It would also be a victory for the Egyptian bourgeoisie, which polished up its image by sending troops into combat, thus raising its political prestige and simultaneously obtaining the first withdrawal of Israeli forces. Furthermore, the reopening of the Suez Canal, which will be supplemented by

the Suez-Alexandria pipeline, will restore the national economy.

The beneficiaries of the operation necessarily will extend their thanks to the architects of this providential peace. Thus, Washington intends to consolidate its reentry onto the Egyp-



ARAFAT: Decides to become a "realist."

tian scene while at the same time preserving its grip on Tel Aviv. For its part, Moscow will renew its traditional ties with the Israelis (the decline of the anti-Soviet atmosphere in Israel since Soviet Jewish immigration was stepped up with the Kremlin's approval has been remarkable) and will find ways to profit from the Israelis' desire to maintain some margin for maneuver in face of diktats from the White House.

But above all, the two great powers are noting with satisfaction the defusing of the Palestinian powder keg.

For what is the main objective of the Geneva negotiations if not to confirm the existing balance of forces and prevent a revolutionary explosion with unpredictable consequences?

You catch more flies with honey than with vinegar, so the two great-power sponsors are using alluring perspectives to entice the Palestinian leaders. And they have succeeded beyond all their hopes, especially the Soviet leaders, who have acted through Azimov, the Soviet ambassador to Beirut. The overwhelming majority of the Palestine Liberation Organization, with Fateh and the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPF) in the lead, has opted for negotiating with the Israelis with a view to creating a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank.

What is behind the sudden shift of the main organizations of the Palestinian resistance? First let us set the problem in context. It is obvious that the about-face of the fedayeen leaders tallies logically with their policy of Palestinian particularism. Arafat never proclaimed any other aim than the liberation of Palestine. This narrow nationalism, in the name of which he rejected confronting the Arab leaders directly responsible for the fate of the Palestinians, was to be apolitical; so Fateh rejected organizing itself on a class basis. Hence, Fateh straightaway followed an objective policy of political conservatism. From the standpoint of this organization, a Palestinian ministate is a partial victory, and realism demands acceptance of this concession to the resistance from the great powers.

Although the DPF and its main leader, Nayef Hawatmeh, claim adherence to Marxism-Leninism, since the spring of 1970 they have in practice fallen into line behind Fateh's policies. Consequently, in the case of the DPF the current turn is sharper on a theoretical level—they now love what they used to denounce—but in the final

analysis, it is less discernible on a practical level.

The minority sectors of the resistance are divided, and even those organizations that still reject the Palestinian state have been significantly weakened by internal differences, by their loyalty to various Arab capitals, and, above all, by their lack of political perspectives.

It is on this point that clarity is needed.

The Palestine national liberation movement is an integral part of the Arab revolution. In fact, until "black September" it undoubtedly represented the vanguard of the Arab revolution, in a twofold sense:

— First, the fedayeen represented a *mass current* in struggle against Zionism and imperialism that was practicing *people's war*; that is, the resistance had reached the phase of armed struggle.

— And second, this fight was stimulating and polarizing the popular forces of the whole Arab world (and even beyond the Arab world, in Turkey and Eritrea, for example) by its exemplary valor and by the fact that it was indirectly threatening the existing regimes.

But after the military defeat of the fedayeen, the movement was unable to get a second wind. In the absence of a coherent strategy — and the only conceivable one was to link up with the class struggle in the Arab states of the Middle East in order to unify the vanguard into a common front — the resistance crumbled.

The spectacular, politically aberrant acts of Black September and the other terrorist grouplets obviously did not enable the resistance to regain its strength; for while the resistance had no lack of heroes or of blind courage, what it needed was a political perspective. The week of bloodletting in Amman had hardly ended before Arafat began trying to negotiate a return to the status quo with Hussein, as if nothing had changed and, more important, as if the September massacres had not proven the impossibility of coexistence between the Hashemite regime and the Palestinian resistance on the march.

The debacle of the Palestinian resistance was followed by a succession of setbacks for the Arab revolution (in the Sudan, Egypt, and Syria), the lessons of which the Palestinian

vanguard was unable to draw. Furthermore, the October War waged by the Cairo and Damascus regimes left no room for political mobilizations. Instead of allowing a resurgence of the mass movement, it permitted the Egyptian bourgeoisie to consolidate its previously shaken bases.

During this period of retreat for the Arab revolution, the Palestinian militants have to rethink their whole conception of the struggle. By all evidence, nothing is going to be as before. History never repeats itself exactly, and the lesson of the first phase of the armed struggle is that a revolutionary political program must underlie the battle. The defeat of the fedayeen is proof from a negative direction that a revolutionary policy cannot be carried out without revolutionary theory and that the Palestinian tragedy cannot be resolved without integrating the struggle of the Palestinians into the Arab revolution.

The proposal for a Palestinian state must be considered in this context. Without claiming the gift of prophecy, one can advance the following predictions:

1. Given the territory that has been allotted to it, the Palestinian state will be economically unviable. Hence, it will have to fall into the political orbit of one of its neighbors. Considering the Israelis' desire to achieve economic normalization with the neighboring countries (Israeli industry needs the market and labor force of the West Bank), the future mini-Palestine will probably be dominated by its powerful Zionist neighbor; moreover, this would be in conformity with the geopolitical situation.

2. The leaders of the future Palestinian state *will have to* make themselves instruments of Zionist repression. There is reason to doubt that Tel Aviv intends to withdraw from some of the territories conquered in 1967 in order to offer the fedayeen armed bases and jumping-off points for assaults on Israel. In practice, this means that the setting up of the Palestinian state will be conditional upon the willingness of the leaders of the state to liquidate the Palestinian resistance, whatever they may say about their long-term goals.

The example of Ireland is eloquent here. In 1921 the Irish revolutionary army was also offered partial realization of its objective: independence

on a portion of the national territory. History has shown that those who accepted that solution in the name of realism were led to wage a counter-revolutionary civil war and liquidate their former comrades-in-arms. And the Irish Free State promised by the British remained subordinate to British capital despite its political independence.

This analysis leads us to a negative view of the proposed Palestinian mini-state, which ultimately involves the liquidation of the political and military vanguard of the Palestinian resistance.

The Palestinian resistance today confronts the most difficult period of its history, just as the IRA did after the Irish bourgeoisie betrayed the national cause. Rejecting both right opportunism (the illusory Palestinian state, which would bury the hopes of the resistance) and left opportunism (the continuation of guerrilla war with no political perspective), the resistance must turn its activities toward winning the Palestinian masses in order to patiently organize them for the inevitable mass struggles ahead. This reorientation undoubtedly must involve putting the emphasis in the period immediately ahead on deep-rooted legal and semilegal mass work, while preserving underground the military apparatus of the resistance.

The growing militancy in the occupied territories, the radicalization of the Palestinian masses within the 1967 borders of the Israeli state, and the appearance of an Israeli revolutionary vanguard drawing its strength from a real, though diffuse, anti-Zionist current among Israeli youth, offer militants of the Palestinian resistance a fertile field of activity if they are able to define a long-term strategy in the framework of the development of the Arab revolution in the Middle East.

The Palestinian revolution is entering a new phase whose most salient characteristic may be the reappearance of the national liberation movement within the Israeli state, which, because of its Zionist and therefore quasi-colonial nature, can't avoid reproducing colonial relations vis-à-vis the Arab population within its own borders.

During this period, the key question for the future of the Palestinian resistance will be its joining with the Israeli vanguard and their common integration into a revolutionary front in the Arab East. □

Jordanian Soldiers Mutiny

Junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men of the 40th Armored Brigade of the Jordanian army began a mutiny on February 3 in the town of Zerqa, fifteen miles northeast of Amman. Western press accounts based on reports reaching Beirut said that about 100 Bedouin troops paraded in trucks and armored personnel carriers through the streets of Zerqa on February 3 and the following day, when they were

and in the civilian population." A dispatch from Zerqa in the *New York Times* the following day said: "Although the demonstration appears to have been easily contained, it nonetheless reflects a general discontent within the army that, reliable sources here say, has been growing in recent months."

King Hussein went to Zerqa on February 6 with a guard of 100 tanks to talk with the soldiers. Throughout the course of the mutiny, the troops maintained that they were still loyal to Hussein. In his discussions with them, Hussein promised salary increases for the army.

Because of the news blackout in Amman, the extent of the mutiny is not yet clear. Apparently it spread even further on February 6 and 7, with other units of the armored di-

vision joining those already in defiance of the army command. A report distributed in Beirut by the Palestinian guerrilla press agency Wafa said that some of the rebellious soldiers had surrounded key buildings on the outskirts of Amman, calling for the dismissal of the premier.

The February 8 *Washington Post* reported: "Diplomatic sources here [Beirut] said they could not confirm reports distributed by the Palestine news agency, that rebellious units had surrounded the oil refinery in Zerqa and other key installations.

"Palestinian sources also report that there has been rising criticism within the army over the limited role Jordan played in last October's Arab-Israeli war, and increasing demands that Jordan turn to the Soviet Union for surface-to-air missiles. Lack of air defenses has been Jordan's chief stated reason for staying out of the war."

While Zerqa appeared calm by the night of February 7, one soldier told a reporter: "It's not over, because tomorrow the prices will be just as high as they were today." □



HUSSEIN: Under pressure, promises pay raises for army.

joined by soldiers of the 60th Brigade.

The soldiers demanded higher pay, citing the inflation that accounted for a 7.3 percent rise in prices in December alone. The troops also called for the dismissal of Premier Zaid al-Rifai; Lieutenant General Zaid Ben-Shaker, the army chief of staff; and Court Minister Bahjat Talhuni. The troops charged them with corruption and taking cuts from arms deals.

The February 7 *New York Times* reported that "there was considerable sympathy for the demands of the mutineers throughout the armed forces

Australia

Student Organization Supports Palestinians

By Frans Timmerman

Sydney

At its Annual Council in January, the Australian Union of Students (AUS) passed a series of resolutions on the Middle East that have provoked widespread controversy amongst student organisations and in the bourgeois media.

About 200 delegates and official observers from 54 student unions representing almost 200,000 tertiary students in Australia met in Canberra for nine days to consider the Union's policies, elect officers, and plan activities for the coming year.

After a heated debate lasting two hours, the council adopted a series of motions on the Palestinian question. The motions included:

"That AUS inform the National Union of Israeli Students (NUIS) that

AUS does not recognise the existence of the state of Israel or of NUIS as the official student union in the region.

"That AUS recognise the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) as a legal student union in that area of the Middle East known as Israel (in reality occupied Palestine).

"That AUS examine the student unions of the Arab regimes to ascertain whether they are progressive organisations or simply apologists for their various reactionary regimes.

"That AUS open a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Beirut with a view to disseminating literature on the resistance through the organs open to AUS.

"That AUS supports the liberation forces of Palestine."

The council also reaffirmed its previous policy of opposing the member-

ship of NUIS in the Asian Students Association (ASA), and that GUPS should be a member instead of NUIS. AUS is a member of ASA.

The reaction of the Australasian Union of Jewish Students (AUJS) was very swift. Its president, Arnold Roth, who took part in the debate to put the Zionist position, issued a press release which said that AUS could no longer be considered as being representative of Australian tertiary students. The statement also attempted to link the AUS motions with so-called terrorist organisations. Roth called on Jewish students to organise a "Dump AUS" campaign by attempting to get

student bodies to disaffiliate from AUS.

The press statement gained wide coverage in the bourgeois press and on television. The "Dump AUS" campaign, however, soon met with some opposition from Jewish students who, although being Zionists, nevertheless support AUS in general. Several anti-Zionist Jewish students were also planning to defend AUS. A few days later the AUJS leadership called off the "Dump AUS" campaign.

The resolutions were considered "important" by the AUS council, so they will now be debated and voted on by each individual campus. Ratifica-

tion by a majority of votes of the campuses is necessary before the resolutions become final policy.

Tertiary students in Australia will resume classes in March. The AUJS has already announced that it will vigorously campaign against the AUS resolutions. Meanwhile, supporters of the Palestinian revolution, including the Friends of Palestine, the Socialist Workers League, the Socialist Youth Alliance, and the Palestine-Australia Solidarity Committee have begun to organise support for the AUS position. Activities will include teach-ins, forums, debates, and the distribution of literature. □

House Votes Subpoena Power for Impeachment Hearings

New Holes in 'Narrowing Nixon Defense Perimeter'

By Allen Myers

Speaking to reporters February 7, William Timmons, Nixon's assistant for Congressional relations, offered the opinion that "only" 100 members of the House of Representatives would vote in favor of impeachment if such a vote were taken now. The fact that such a statement is regarded in the White House as a defense of Nixon is a measure of how precariously he holds his office: With the House Judiciary Committee not yet having held any hearings, let alone having made its recommendation, "only" about one-fourth of the House is already prepared to vote for Nixon's impeachment.

Timmons, it is certain, did not exaggerate the extent of impeachment sentiment, his estimate of which he said was based not on an actual count but on his impressions from daily contacts with members of Congress.

Writing in the February 5 issue of the *Christian Science Monitor*, Godfrey Sperling Jr. described a survey conducted by that paper that indicated the likelihood that sentiment favoring impeachment in the House is even greater than Timmons admitted. The *Christian Science Monitor* survey found nearly two thirds of Democrats questioned either favoring or "leaning toward" impeachment while only a tiny handful of Republicans said they were



EHRlichman: "Copped out"?

in favor. But what Sperling regarded as significant for Nixon's future was the large number in both parties who said they had not yet made up their minds:

"Among 98 Democratic representatives responding to a Monitor questionnaire, 41 said they favored impeachment, 21 said they were leaning toward impeachment; and 26 said

they were 'undecided.' Only 10 were opposed.

"Of the 76 Republicans responding there were 2 who favored impeachment as of now; 1 who was leaning in that direction; and 19 'undecideds.' The remaining 54 were opposed.

"With only a bare majority needed for impeachment in the House, this survey showed that while impeachment was unlikely as of now, there were sufficient doubters among Democratic and Republican congressmen to help shape this result—should new Watergate-related events bring further significant damage to Mr. Nixon."

In fact, it is a practical certainty that the ongoing unwinding of the Watergate scandal will continue to erode Nixon's position, even if there are no more major "bombshells."

On February 6, by a vote of 410 to 4, the House for only the second time in U. S. history voted to give the Judiciary Committee broad powers—including authority to subpoena persons and documents—for an impeachment investigation of the president. Peter Rodino, Democratic chairman of the committee, said that he hoped it would not be necessary to subpoena Nixon but that the committee would do so if this proved necessary in order to reach a "fair" decision.

The vote on the resolution was ob-

viously not an accurate measure of the sentiment for impeachment in the House, but there is probably some significance in an earlier vote to reject proposed amendments. Nixon's defenders have been urging that a specific deadline be set for a recommendation by the Judiciary Committee, and an amendment was offered that would have required the committee to complete its work by April 30. But the House decided by a vote of 342 to 70 not to permit any amendments to the resolution.

With the authority granted by the resolution, the Judiciary Committee will have no excuse for not seeking all the relevant evidence from the secret White House tape recordings and files. And Nixon will have even less credibility in claiming "executive privilege" to withhold evidence than he has had in making the same claim before the courts.

The day after the House vote, Nixon indicated his awareness of this difficulty by having his lawyers arrange to meet with the committee counsel. The purpose of the meeting, James M. Naughton reported in the February 8 *New York Times*, will be "to discuss the extent of White House cooperation with the committee's investigation."

Any "White House cooperation" that the committee is able to obtain can only contribute to proving Nixon's guilt. The investigation has been divided into six areas: domestic spying such as that conducted by the "plumbers"; spying and "dirty tricks" connected with the 1972 election; the Watergate break-in and cover-up; Nixon's personal finances; the use of federal agencies against Nixon's political enemies; and various other charges including impoundment of appropriated funds and the secret bombing of Cambodia in 1970. In all these areas, the White House has already put out papers, statements, and whatever "evidence" is available that might tend to excuse Nixon. The tapes and documents that have so far been kept secret have been kept that way for obvious reasons.


White House—and CIA—Tapes

Nixon has already become embroiled in another dispute with the Watergate special prosecutor over this secret material. In his State of the Union speech, Nixon claimed that he

had given prosecutor Leon Jaworski "all the material he needs to conclude his investigations and to proceed to prosecute the guilty and clear the innocent."

In a television interview February 3, Jaworski pointed out that Nixon's statement was "inoperative." In fact, Jaworski said, he had requested a number of tapes and documents that had so far not been turned over.

Two days later, the special prose-



JAWORSKI: Finds Nixon's "cooperation" less than perfect.

curator's office announced that it had received a four-page letter from James D. St. Clair, Nixon's lawyer, apparently refusing to hand over the requested items. The prosecutor's office did not state specifically to the press what it was seeking, but it is thought that Jaworski wants tapes concerning meetings at which, according to John Dean's testimony, Nixon and his aides discussed executive clemency and cash payments to buy the silence of the Watergate burglars.

Jaworski, if he is to obtain the tapes, will thus have to subpoena them, posing the possibility of another confrontation between Nixon and the special prosecutor similar to the one last October that resulted in Nixon firing Archibald Cox.

Some tape-recorded evidence will never be available, having been destroyed by the CIA. In a telephone interview with the Associated Press

January 29, CIA director William Colby admitted that tape recordings relating to Watergate in the agency's possession are now nonexistent.

"Senator Baker asked us," Colby said, "if there were any other tapes that bore on the subject. And we don't have any other on this subject at the moment. We had periodic destruction of our tapes."

Colby claimed that the destruction of the tapes was just a routine matter and had occurred before he became CIA director last May: "This is before my tenure, but as I understand it, we would collect our tapes for a year or two and when the storage space got too full, there would be a request to destroy the old ones and the answer would come down to go ahead." But *Newsweek* reported in its February 11 issue that the CIA had destroyed the recordings "the day after receiving the Senate's request that they be preserved."

According to a CBS broadcast January 28, the CIA tapes may have included conversations between CIA officials and Nixon. The network said that the recordings may have concerned the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and the kidnapping of ITT lobbyist Dita Beard, who was spirited out of Washington in 1972 in the middle of Senate hearings on the corporation's promise to contribute \$400,000 to the Republican campaign in exchange for a favorable antitrust settlement.

In still another dispute over secret White House tapes, Nixon won a Pyrrhic victory of sorts February 8 in a decision handed down by a federal judge in Washington. The judge refused to order Nixon to hand over five tapes subpoenaed last July by the Senate Watergate committee. If its subpoena had been upheld, the committee would have sought a court order to enforce subpoenas for another 500 tapes and documents.

The judge's decision was based solely on the argument that release of the tapes to the committee would result in publicity that could prevent a fair trial for those who have been and are expected to be indicted in the Watergate affair. It specifically denied Nixon's right to claim "executive privilege" to withhold whatever he wishes:

"The Court rejects the President's assertion that the public interest is best served by a blanket, unreviewable

claim of confidentiality. . . ."

The judge went on to note that in preventing pretrial publicity, Nixon might be protecting his own rights in future criminal proceedings:

"The President has a constitutional mandate to see that the laws are faithfully executed and should therefore quite properly be concerned with the dangers inherent in excessive pretrial publicity. That the President himself may be under suspicion does not alter this fact, for he no less than any other citizen is entitled to fair treatment and the presumption of innocence."

Dissension in the Gang?

Presumption of Nixon's innocence, in most quarters, has already worn thin and seems destined to wear considerably thinner. Some broad hints from members of the Congressional Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation make it clear that that body will rule that Nixon owes considerable additional taxes on his income since 1969.

In a television interview February 8, Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, a committee member, tried to discourage speculation on the additional amount Nixon would have to pay. "I just urge you," Long said, "to just wait until we can report, because we are going to say exactly how much the president owes."

Long generously assumed that deliberate fraud on Nixon's part was not involved, since "everything I know would indicate that he did what his lawyer and his accountant told him to do. . . . Businessmen do it all the time. They are very busy, just like that man was. They do what their lawyer and their accountant tell them about their taxes."

In the February 6 *Washington Post*, Lou Cannon wrote that the amount Nixon may have to pay could come to as much as \$302,000.

It remains to be seen whether Nixon's lawyer and accountant will be willing to take the blame for his tax evasion, particularly if the Internal Revenue Service, which is also studying Nixon's tax returns, decides that they should be prosecuted for fraud. The Watergate scandal has, after all, been characterized by White House gangsters turning prosecution witness against higher-ups when faced with charges themselves.

Despite denials by his attorney, there are persistent rumors and some circumstantial evidence that John Ehrlichman, formerly the number three man in the Nixon gang, has "broken" with Nixon or is considering doing so.

On February 4, a California state judge in Los Angeles signed an order requiring Nixon to appear as a de-



HALDEMAN: Rattled.

fense witness at Ehrlichman's trial on charges growing out of the plumbers' burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The White House has said that Nixon will not appear but that he may be willing to answer written questions.

It is most unlikely that Nixon will ever be forced to testify at the trial in person—unless he is first impeached and removed from office—and it is generally assumed that Ehrlichman's request for the subpoena is nothing but a legal stratagem designed to allow him to claim that evidence needed for his defense is unavailable and that the indictment should therefore be dismissed. Nevertheless, his request undoubtedly causes Nixon political embarrassment at a time when he can little afford it—a sign that Ehrlichman's loyalty to Nixon does not extend to the point of jeopardizing his own defense.

The February 11 issue of *Newsweek* described some Washington rumors

that indicate that Nixon has reason to be concerned about Ehrlichman:

"With the inquiry nearing its climax, Mr. Nixon more than ever is dependent on the loyalty of a very few friends, and he has been at pains to demonstrate his loyalty to them. . . ."

"But Ehrlichman's place in the circle—and in the narrowing Nixon defense perimeter—has lately begun to look less secure. Friends confirm his growing alienation from his old White House colleagues, a distance widened by his own feeling that he has been 'abandoned' by them. A portent that particularly wounded him, one associate told *Newsweek*, was a welcome-home-to-California party thrown for [H. R.] Haldeman late last year by some of his and the President's well-heeled admirers there. Ehrlichman, according to this source, has been feeling a financial pinch—'He's been without a paycheck for a long time'—and the party fed his suspicion that Haldeman might be getting some help. In this curdling mood, he has put out a succession of danger signs, opening third-party feelers toward a possible deal with the prosecution—and last week moving to subpoena the President himself. Ehrlichman's signals have been read with deepening concern at the White House. 'A lot of people around here are worried about John,' acknowledged one staff member, and he is no longer counted safe for the Nixon defense."

Another member of the White House staff was quoted as saying of Ehrlichman: "He's copped out on us."

It is in this area particularly that Nixon's "victory" over the Senate subpoena can be especially harmful to him. All of the five tapes subpoenaed by the committee are already in the hands of the special prosecutor, and the rejection of the subpoena will therefore not protect high-level White House gangsters from prosecution. In fact, the decision means that they will find it more difficult to seek dismissal of charges on grounds of pretrial publicity and will thus be under greater pressure to save themselves at Nixon's expense.

The *Newsweek* article reported that Haldeman, who was chief of the White House staff, is also showing signs of nervousness as the evidence accumulates.

"Haldeman spent six long hours last week before the grand jury, which has been recalling the principals in the [E.

Howard] Hunt money case one by one. He came out looking tired and rattled; investigators familiar with the inquiry told *Newsweek* that he had had frequent 'memory lapses' on critical events and that he was surprised when the prosecution produced a sheaf of his own notes on a key meeting with [John] Dean and Mr. Nixon."

Haldeman may be further rattled by the recovery from "memory lapses" of another Nixon aide: Herbert Kalmbach, the president's former personal attorney.

Attorneys for Ralph Nader, who is suing the administration in the matter of a 1971 increase of milk price supports in exchange for campaign contributions, took a deposition from Kalmbach on December 13. The deposition was made public February 4 and described in the *New York Times* the next day.

Kalmbach testified that he had accepted a \$100,000 contribution from dairy cooperatives in 1969 on specific instructions from Haldeman. Kalmbach said that he had "advised Mr. Haldeman that [a dairy representative] was talking about a contribution, and I requested the authority to receive that contribution, and to receive that contribution in cash."

The *Times* described Kalmbach's recovery of his memory:

"Reminded that he had testified in an April 30 deposition that he had 'not recalled' any discussions with Mr. Haldeman about dairy contributions, Mr. Kalmbach said that new evidence refreshed his memory.

"'Well, these recent memoranda and the like have refreshed my recollection, and now with my memory refreshed I do recall I did discuss these contributions with Mr. Haldeman,' Mr. Kalmbach said."

Kalmbach's testimony raises the interesting question, How much was his memory refreshed by the special prosecutor's interrogation? Presumably Nixon and his former top assistants are wondering about that question.

On February 7, Sam Ervin, chairman of the Senate Watergate committee announced that the committee had agreed to a request from Jaworski May. It had previously been scheduled to be completed by February 28.

"Senator Ervin said," David E. Rosenbaum reported in the February 8 *New York Times*, ". . . that he had been 'led to believe,' presumably by

Mr. Jaworski, that the releasing of the report this month might hamper . . . efforts to obtain guilty pleas."

Ervin reportedly was told by Jaworski that a number of figures in the Watergate case were expected to plead guilty but might change their minds if publication of the committee's report raised the issue of pretrial publicity.

If the expected guilty pleas follow the pattern of earlier confessions in the Watergate affair, they will be the result of plea bargaining. That is, the culprits will be allowed to plead guilty to lesser charges in exchange for their testimony against higher-ups. And Jaworski's investigation is thought to be already quite close to the top.

Thus it is not surprising that Nixon's public declarations of his inten-

tion to remain in office have not stopped speculation that he will resign. On February 8, columnist Jack Anderson described one such report. The motive attributed to Nixon seemed completely characteristic:

"Despite President Nixon's firm resolve to stick out his full term, sources close to him believe he would resign if faced with certain impeachment.

"Impeachment would deprive him of his \$60,000-a-year pension. The pay-raise bill, now awaiting congressional action, will increase pensions. Under the bill, the President's pension would increase around \$15,000 over the next three years.

"Rather than give up a \$75,000-a-year pension check, our sources say, the President would resign if he could make a deal to avoid prosecution." □

National Guard Called Out

U.S. Truck Drivers Strike in 20 States

Negotiators for the independent truckers called on February 7 for an end to a week of truck stoppages after the White House made an offer that would allow the truckers to tack on a 6 percent surcharge to their freight rates. Nixon also agreed to freeze diesel fuel prices for one month beginning on March 1. Some truckers, however, termed the agreement a sellout. A February 7 Associated Press dispatch reported:

"Independent truckers meeting in various parts of the country tonight appeared to be voting overwhelmingly to continue their eight-day strike rather than accept a proposed settlement.

"Truck traffic was reported increasing in several states today but the sentiment of many strikers and some of their spokesmen seemed to be strongly against an end to the shutdown. Several officials said Federal troops might be used if needed to keep the highways safe."

Hit harder by the higher fuel prices than the large trucking companies, the independent truckers, many of whom own one or two rigs, have been demanding that Washington roll back the prices of diesel fuel. The first spontaneous truck stoppages occurred in December in Pennsylvania and Ohio

as a direct result of fuel shortages and high fuel prices caused by the artificially induced energy crisis.

A coalition of independent drivers, meeting in Washington on January 24, called for a nationwide shutdown on January 31. At that meeting, the representatives demanded an immediate ceiling on all petroleum-product prices, including diesel fuel, gasoline, and lubricants; an immediate audit of oil companies' reserves and refinery capacities in the United States and abroad; and a rollback of oil prices to the May 15, 1973, level. Later, in a series of meetings between Governor Milton Shapp of Pennsylvania and representatives of the Council of Independent Truckers, another demand was raised: "tighter controls to prevent big trucking companies from hoarding fuel in their tanks and sending their fleet drivers to compete with independent drivers for fuel at truck stops."

In an attempt to intimidate the strikers and to protect scab drivers, the National Guard has been called out in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan. As the truck-driver pickets began to face armed police and National Guards, some of the pickets being arrested for trying to stop scab drivers,

Attorney General William Saxbe lashed out at the strikers. "This handful of truckers is not going to bring this country to its knees," he said February 3. Two days later he called a news conference at the Justice Department and announced an investigation into the "violence" caused by the truck stoppages. He ordered Justice Department attorneys to work with the "Federal Bureau of Investigation and all other available resources to gather evidence of possible Federal violations."

"This means," Saxbe said, "we are going to have at every place that these people gather, and on the scene of every act of violence reported, people who are investigating and collecting evidence."

The strikers were attacked not only by the federal and state governments. On February 4, Frank Fitzsimmons, the president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, called on state and local governments, according to the February 5 *New York Times*, "to take whatever action was necessary to prevent interference with nonstriking truck operators." Echoing Saxbe's tirades, Fitzsimmons said: "The economy of this nation must not be brought

to a standstill by a very small percentage of independent truckers and their leaders, who are perpetuating acts of murder, violence and intimidation to gain concessions from the United States Government."

Despite the attempts to paint the truckers' strike as a "violent" action by a "small percentage," it has won wide support from other workers. As even the *New York Times* had to admit in a February 5 editorial, "Many Americans whose own livelihoods have not yet been so directly affected by fuel shortages and rising fuel prices will find it easy to sympathize with the truckers' anger at evidences of profiteering as well as their frustration over procrastination by Federal authorities."

The comment of one Teamster member in Pennsylvania summed up the attitude of the truckers to both Washington and the labor bureaucrats. "The public," he said, "especially truckers, are wondering if there is *any* honesty left in government. Nixon is totally bought off by the oil companies. The politicians are just like the union tops — once you stick your hand out for the easy money, you can't pull it back." □

the Río de la Plata petroleum industry, etc. The time has long passed, and now they don't even talk about plans. Publishing incoherent decrees that in a few days time are replaced by other equally ineffectual ones, the government no longer knows how to deal with the crisis.

All of their plans have fallen through. Six months ago the dictatorship announced that it had a foreign trade surplus of nearly \$150 million. At the end of 1973 when accounts were reckoned, the balance was only \$12 million. For a country like Uruguay, which was built on profits from foreign trade, the situation couldn't be more catastrophic.

The causes of all this lie in the relative positions of meat, wool, and petroleum on the world market; in a backward agrarian structure; and in the nation's industry.

Uruguay has to import all the petroleum it uses down to the last drop. The impact of the rise in prices has therefore been devastating. Short of tremendously raising the price of gasoline, transportation, etc., Bordaberry has been unable to take any coherent measures. In order to save electric energy — which is mainly generated by petroleum — the government issued decrees that it was unable to enforce; for example, one decree required mandatory layoffs and the shutdown of factories by zone for three weeks annually. No one obeyed the decree, and even the government has already forgotten that it existed.

The situation of the wool and meat industries is no better. Uruguayan wool, a traditional export product, does not have a good rating abroad. The kind of wool produced by Uruguay is of a quality such that hardly anyone buys it any more. That is the price of the indolence and backwardness of the Uruguayan oligarchy.

The meat industry, which was the big hope, has discovered that the present European economic crisis is tending to narrow its market. Meat supplies are building up, hanging on butchers' hooks in freezers. Cows continue grazing, with no buyers in sight. Although Brazil has made important purchases from Bordaberry, it hasn't been able to offset this situation.

The cattle raisers, the most powerful sector of Uruguayan bosses, have flown into a fuming rage. The Rural Association has begun publicly attack-

An Embarrassment to Big Bourgeoisie

Uruguayan Dictatorship in Crisis

[The following article appeared in the January 23 issue of the Argentine Trotskyist weekly *Avanzada Socialista*, organ of the PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores — Socialist Workers party), sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

When the puppet Bordaberry assumed dictatorial power after defeating last year's heroic general strike, we pointed out in *Avanzada Socialista* that the new regime was beginning its administration with a narrow base of support.

More than six months have gone by since the coup, and Bordaberry's regime is no stronger. If it survives

despite the failure of all its plans, it won't be because of its strength, but rather because of the weakness of the Uruguayan workers movement, which still hasn't rebounded since the general strike. The revival of the workers movement, small, initial signs of which are already visible, could mean the collapse of the regime.

Following the coup, the Bordaberry-military duet puffed and prated about their wonderful "development plans" that would soon lift the Uruguayan economy out of its depression. They held two big meetings (San Miguel and Nirvana) that were attended by the military, technicians, businessmen, etc. At the conclusion of each of these gatherings they ceremoniously announced that "in forty-five days" plans would be published for the fishing industry, for the countryside, for

ing the government, which in addition to refusing to guarantee a market, has doubled the annual tax on agriculture (improvement).

Moreover, the Uruguayan gorillas had counted on imperialist aid to get them out of their jam. Bordaberry's submissiveness to the Brazilian dictatorship has gained armaments and meat sales, but nothing else.

Bordaberry's government is lining up less and less with the big cattle-raising bosses and the weak industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. Moreover, it is becoming more and more hated by the workers and the important Uruguayan middle class.

The dictatorship's social isolation is clearly seen in the absurd Council of State, with which it replaced parliament. It's an assembly of fascists. With the exception of the Council's oldest fascist, President Etchegoyen, its members are all illustrious nobodies. *None of the important bosses wanted to embarrass themselves by becoming members of the Council of State.* Something similar has happened in the University of Montevideo since the government intervened following a left-wing electoral victory. The government hasn't found anyone who is willing to serve as a dean. As a result, most of the faculties are without heads.

Bordaberry's weak social base explains why he can't set up a regime along the lines of Brazil's or Chile's. Bordaberry's situation now looks something like Onganía's last days: Most of the bosses are opposed to him, and he has mainly based himself on bayonets of the military-police apparatus. But in contrast to Onganía's situation, the Uruguayan working class and middle class are not mobilized. This is the reason for the survival of Bordaberry's dictatorship.

Despite this absence of mobilization, the situation has had an impact within the armed forces. A division in the armed forces was publicly revealed in two weeklies backed by unclearly identified wings of the army. On the one hand, the far-right weekly *Azul y Blanco* [Blue and White] advances a semifascist solution based on the Brazilian model. On the other hand, the newspaper *Nueve de Febrero* [Ninth of February] puts forth a "Peruvian" solution based on the famous "Comunicados 4 and 7" imposed last year by the army's nationalist wing, which amounted to nothing more than promises.



BORDABERRY

Nueve de Febrero has begun to hawk a political plan for getting out of the "impasse": a constituent assembly of all Uruguayans (including the Frente Amplio?) to reorganize the country. That is, a Uruguayan "Great National Accord." With an extremely correct class analysis, *Nueve de Febrero* warns that with the present government there is the danger of a big rise in workers struggles winning over the middle class and leading to an insurrectional situation that would be difficult to stop. The plan for a "constituent assembly of all Uruguayans" would be the inoculation against this.

Nueve de Febrero has decided to go from propaganda to agitation: It has called a public meeting for mid-February in Montevideo. It goes without saying that the Communist party has firmly latched on to this "progressive" military wing and is urging people to attend the meeting. The fact that this wing of the military is look-

ing for "mass support" is another sign of the dictatorship's crisis.

The relationship of forces between the different military factions is still unknown. But it is symptomatic that Bordaberry hasn't dared to lay hands on *Nueve de Febrero*. We have yet to see if he'll allow the public meeting to be held.

The present government's survival, and the road that would open up should it be replaced, are directly conditioned by the form of action that the workers movement follows in the future. Although the defeat of the general strike wasn't a catastrophe on the scale of Chile, it led to demoralization, the firing of hundreds of activists, etc. The government outlawed the CNT [Convención Nacional de Trabajadores—National Workers Congress], but it hasn't touched the trade unions. It established ultrareactionary trade-union "regulations," but it was forced to "freeze" them in the face of the danger that, even with these rules, by calling for trade-union elections the left-wing would win as in the University.

The workers movement has been hit primarily on the level of factory activists, *internas*, etc. The CNT Stalinist bureaucracy could do nothing to defend them. But it is precisely here that the initial signs of a recovery can be seen. First of all, the people's spirit has changed. After the coup many workers thought that "the dictatorship would last twenty years." Now many workers already view the government as weak and divided. Besides this change in the morale of *compañeros*, a few struggles, although still small and restricted, are beginning to surface. The people too are beginning to realize that something has to be done to protect wages.

Sooner or later the recovery of the workers movement will be aided by the present government's own weakness and the divisions among the bosses. But, if this recovery takes shape under the aegis of the old Stalinist bureaucracy, the workers could face another disaster like last year's. The fact is that the CP hasn't learned a thing from this experience, and it blindly follows its line of having the workers tail-end the "progressive" civilian or military sectors of the bourgeoisie. There is only one way to avoid this danger: to construct a revolutionary workers party that can offer the workers a different alternative.

100 Reported Killed in Cochabamba Uprising

By Candida Barberena

Official Bolivian claims that peasant deaths in the January 29 armed forces attack on Cochabamba (see last week's *Intercontinental Press*) numbered only thirteen have been refuted by the Bolivian Commission for Justice and Peace, a prominent human-rights group including Roman Catholic clergy and laymen.

Jonathan Kandell reported the commission's counterclaim in a February 3 dispatch to the *New York Times*. "According to witnesses present," the group asserted in an open letter to the President published today, the number of "dead peasants in the Cochabamba valley reaches close to 100. Any massacre is inhumane, but it is all the more painful when it is perpetrated against the humble peasants of our country."

In addition to minimizing the death toll, the Banzer dictatorship acknowledges only ten wounded and twenty-one prisoners as a result of its bloody land and air assault on Cochabamba. The real figures are probably much higher.

The commission's document, published in the February 3 issue of the Catholic daily *Presencia*, noted that when General Juan Pérez Tapia, the military governor of the department of Cochabamba, had already negotiated a solution to the dispute, "the armed forces entered the zone on higher orders, resorting to armed violence, thus repeating the massacres of Catavi, San Juan, and Mylai."

Minister of the Interior Castro quickly responded that "nothing could be more untrue" and he called on the Commission for Justice and Peace to "speak the truth," reported the February 6 Buenos Aires daily *La Nación*.

However, comments to the press by General Raúl Álvarez Peñaranda, who coordinated the Cochabamba military operation, would appear to corroborate reports of high casualties. "We didn't come to play around," he was quoted as saying in the February 1 *La Opinión*. "We came to establish peace and tranquility in the department of Cochabamba, so as to pun-

ish those who have incited our peasant brothers and disturbed the peace of a Bolivian city." He stated that "for these reasons we came with the intention of acting energetically, having exhausted all the alternatives and having sent General Juan Pérez Tapia [to the strife-torn areas] with danger to his own person."

But in a January 31 speech Banzer left no doubts that the insurgents still face reprisals. In his address to peasant leaders from the high plateau town of Achacachi, Banzer asserted that if necessary he would sanction the death penalty for the "agitators."

The dictator's reference to "agitators" was a continuation of the theme, set forth in his previous night's appeal for support from the peasants, of "foreign Communists," who wanted to take away the peasants' land, using the increases in food prices as a pretext to incite the people against the government. Banzer has also charged "extremist elements" with seeking to transform Cochabamba into another Nancahuazú, the region where Che Guevara operated.

Substituting, for want of an economic cure, his own advice on how to deal with the "Communists," Banzer refrained from comment on the 100 percent increases in the cost of many food staples. He told the Achacachi peasant leaders, "As your leader, I'm going to give you an assignment," reported the February 2 *La Opinión*. "I authorize you—and I take the responsibility for it—to kill the first Communist agitator who comes to the countryside. Or else bring him here so that I can personally deal with him. I will reward you."

Banzer claimed that the "Communists had intoxicated the peasants with corn liquor and alcohol for six days, while the government sent three generals, two ministers, and other authorities [to the blockaded zones] to urge the peasants to lay aside their hostile attitudes and remain united under the peasant-military pact."

Banzer concluded by saying, "Many people thought that we were going to

fall from power, but they don't know that the armed forces are firmly united."

The peasants offered a different explanation in their comments to correspondents in Cochabamba, as reported in the February 3 *La Opinión*. "It isn't true that extremists were leading our protest," some said. Others stated, "We are against Communism, and we went to protect our sons and daughters who have nothing to eat. We were shot at in response."

The government's casualty and arrest figures also were contested by the peasants. They say that at least 25 peasants died, 30 have disappeared, and another 100 have been arrested.

The Commission for Justice and Peace responded to Banzer's shoot-on-sight orders with this statement, published in the February 5 *La Nación*: "We can't remain silent before these words [the invitation to kill "Communist agitators"] encouraging violence, which could have even more serious consequences when it is the government itself that is speaking them."

In other church statements critical of the regime, on February 3 the Episcopal Conference of Bolivia, representing Catholic bishops, asked the government to roll back the January 21 price increases. Jonathan Kandell reported to the *New York Times* the next day: "The bishops also called on President Hugo Banzer Suárez to stop describing 'as extremist or subversive any dissenting opinion.'"

The January 31 *La Opinión* underscored the meaning of the peasant opposition to Banzer:

"The situation is exacerbated by the poor reception the people gave to the government's calls for an early return to peace. The attitude of the peasants, who have demanded Banzer's resignation, represents the peak of the crisis, as it was the most resolute sector backing the Nationalist People's Front. The withdrawal of this support means that in practice the government, deprived of a mass cover, is weakened." □

Brezhnev Pushes Detente During Visit to Havana

On his way to Havana on January 28, Leonid Brezhnev sent from his plane a telegram to Nixon expressing his conviction that relations between Moscow and Washington would continue to improve "in the interests of international security and world peace."

Brezhnev's message was at least his second courtesy designed to reassure Nixon that nothing in the trip was intended to violate the spirit of the Washington-Moscow détente. Brezhnev, the *New York Times* pointed out in a January 30 editorial, "is believed to have delayed the visit, which was originally scheduled to begin in late December, so as to miss the fifteenth anniversary of the Castro revolution, with its attendant risk of offending Washington."

If Brezhnev's messages to Nixon have ever indicated that the Soviet leaders are offended by the threat to "international security and world peace" represented by Washington's continued economic and diplomatic blockade of Cuba, the fact is a closely guarded secret. On the contrary, the *Times* editors indicated that Washington expects Brezhnev to help it extract a price for any scaling down of its aggressive policies against Cuba:

"What the world [read Nixon] will

be watching for from Mr. Brezhnev's visit is an indication that he is urging Premier Castro to seek better relations with the United States. A more normal Washington-Havana relationship could not fail to advance the Soviet-American détente."

While only fragments of the declarations and speeches of the Cuban and Soviet leaders during the visit have so far appeared in the U. S. capitalist press, these indicate that one of the effects of the Washington-Moscow détente has been to force the Cuban government closer to the Kremlin's line. In his speech welcoming Brezhnev, Castro was reported to have said that the "idea of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems is gradually making headway in international relations" and to have endorsed "your efforts to overcome world tension and to achieve an end to the arms race."

A joint declaration issued February 4, after Brezhnev had returned to Moscow, contained a call for an end to the U. S. blockade of Cuba, but apparently spelled out nothing concrete that the Kremlin would do in order to help achieve that goal. Moreover, in terms of Soviet economic aid to overcome the effects of the blockade, Brezhnev would seem to

have promised nothing specific. "Rather than disclose any additions to Soviet aid to Cuba," the February 5 *New York Times* reported, "... the two leaders chose to emphasize plans for 'wider cooperation' in economic planning and administration and Soviet pledges of 'continued assistance' in principle."

The declaration also indicated that the Castro leadership has moved closer to the Kremlin's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The *Times* reported that the declaration carried the "implication" that Castro "had privately endorsed the Soviet campaign to organize a world Communist meeting with the intention of ostracizing Peking."

In an obvious attack on the Maoists, Castro in a January 29 speech had criticized "pseudo-left wingers and renegades of the revolutionary movement who, from allegedly Marxist stances, revile the Soviet Union, wretchedly betraying proletarian internationalism and serving the interests of imperialism."

In the joint declaration, Castro also endorsed the Kremlin's proposals for an Asian "collective security system," a plan that has been attacked by Peking as directed against China. □

Plans for 'National Reconstruction' Run Into Trouble

Chilean Junta Faces Mounting Difficulties

By Jean-Pierre Beauvais

[Jean-Pierre Beauvais, a member of the editorial board of the French Trotskyist weekly *Rouge* who had visited Chile just after the September 11 coup, recently returned from a second trip to Santiago. In the course of a three-week stay, he spoke with militants of the Chilean left and far left about the situation in Chile and the development of the international movement of solidarity with the Chilean people.

[The February 1 issue of *Rouge* published the first of a series of articles written by Beauvais after his return to France. The *Rouge* editors explained that future issues would contain articles on the situation of the Chilean working class and the forms of resistance to the dictatorship, as well as interviews with leaders of the underground organizations. We reprint below the first of Beauvais's articles.

The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

A little more than four months have passed since September 11. Four months of ferocious daily repression. The four bloodiest months Chile and all of Latin America have ever seen.

Four months during which the victory of the Chilean military and bour-

geoisie has been asserted.

Signs of normalization, "their" normalization are present everywhere, always visible.

At the airport, for example, where the controls are weak—they have to reassure tourists and especially representatives of potential investors.

In the center of the city, where all traces of the battles of September have been carefully erased, where the facades of the buildings have been wiped



PINOCHET: "Maximizing profits" for the big bourgeoisie.

clean or repainted on orders from the military, where the outer walls of the Moneda presidential palace have already been rebuilt.

And finally, in the Barrio Alto, the bourgeois neighborhood where they lounge on lawns or by the sides of swimming pools enjoying the bright sun of the southern hemisphere summer.

Such is the spic-and-span image of Chile 1974 that the Chilean military wants to give to visiting foreigners—businessmen, economic missions, etc.

But that normalization, while real, is but a paper-thin and sometimes completely transparent facade.

To find the real normalization you have to go elsewhere—to the factories, and *poblaciones*, to the countryside. There the military and the possessing classes present a much more truthful, more real image of themselves and the system they serve and represent. There the system of capitalist exploitation, made up of blood and misery, manifests itself openly and without embellishment.

After making the Chilean workers pay the price for their fears with a massive and blind repression, the bourgeoisie and the military moved to a new stage.

Assured of control, their order stabilized, they moved to make the workers pay the costs of "national reconstruction" (to use the official terminology), all the while continuing a more selective but no less brutal repression.

Starting production again was only the first step. They had to take advantage of the defeat of the workers to reorganize the productive apparatus according to a well-known law: *that of maximizing profit*.

It is this central objective that the Chilean military and big bourgeoisie are jointly working toward. That is what all their phraseology about "national reconstruction" really boils down to.

So, ironclad capitalist logic has replaced the massacres, innumerable disappearances, arrests, and politically motivated firings of the first days with a system of frenzied exploitation whose intensity and concrete conditions are difficult to imagine. Week after week, the social and economic gains the workers had made thanks to a different relationship of forces—under the Unidad Popular government—are being eaten away, repealed, annulled.

This has really hit the wage earners hard. According to official figures, be-

tween September 1973 and January 1974 inflation cut the buying power of the workers by slightly more than 50 percent, in spite of the "readjustments" put into effect with so much publicity. And that's an average figure! The buying power of the workers making "minimum" wages was cut by much more. And people who were fired, for political or other reasons, were not included in the statistics.

But this policy goes way beyond the wage earners. In the poblaciones the collective teams (for education and sanitation) and the distribution mechanisms that the workers had begun to set up themselves—the first fruits of their mobilizations and the local forms of self-organization they created—have been destroyed, razed, and outlawed, creating the most tragic situations. Many women, for example, have had to quit their jobs because the day-care centers have disappeared; and this compounds the reduction in the husband's buying power.

But there is a lot more in terms of rapacity and cynicism. Like the total reorganization of the social security and insurance system. That was one of the great "reforms" worked out by the junta. Until recently, the social security system was paid for by the state. But the reform aims at transforming it into a pillar of Chilean capitalism by introducing a system of forced savings to serve as an agency for generating

Valparaiso Transport Leaders Arrested

The military junta has arrested three leading managers of the Valparaiso public transportation company and the owner of a publishing house for allegedly writing a pamphlet critical of the regime's new fare hikes, which according to the transportation managers are insufficient. They are also accused of attempting to paralyze public transportation in Valparaiso.

"Observers view the arrest of the transportation managers as a clear sign of a split in the small civilian front on which the military government is based," reported the January 31 *La Opinión*. "Several days ago a number of shopkeepers also were arrested. The shopkeepers as well as the

transporters were initially ardent supporters of the military government."

During the government of Salvador Allende the transport managers were among the main opponents of the Unidad Popular. They organized two national transportation strikes as part of the right-wing offensive against Allende.

In addition to the fare increases, on January 30 the Ministry of Economics announced new tax rates. The increases will affect freight transportation, fuel costs, and foreign travel. Landholders and automobile owners will be required to pay 300 percent above the corresponding 1973 tax level. □

capital. Nothing could be more explicit in this regard than the statement of Minister of Economics Leniz himself: "[The reform of the social security system] must therefore generate capital; it must reach the point that this policy of capitalization can be made decentralized, preemptive, uniform, and can be entrusted to private companies. . . . In the framework of this program, decentralized development banks will be created aimed at collecting the resources of the various zones of the country. The initial contribution for these banks will be raised by assessments on the workers."

So the extension of the workday and the wage reductions are not enough. The workers have to donate a part of what they have left to the development of Chilean capitalism.

Such is the price of defeat. Those who were spared by the bloody repression will pay for it with misery, undernourishment, illness, and hunger.

Difficulties

The defeat was the responsibility not of the workers but of the reformist leaderships of the parties of the UP, who counterposed demobilization in the context of agreements with the bourgeoisie to the mobilization of the workers, leaderships who preached about the peaceful road to socialism in face of counterrevolutionary violence. The defeat was the responsibility of those who today in Europe and elsewhere conceal their own bankruptcy and call themselves the representatives of the Chilean workers.

But the junta's policy of frenzied exploitation based on the September defeat and permanent repression, while it has already borne more than modest fruit—investments by foreign private capital, bank loans, postponement of debts, and new production in the export sector—is running into considerable difficulty.

Difficulties due to internal contradictions within the Chilean bourgeoisie and to a working class that has been severely beaten but not totally crushed the way the military had wanted. Difficulties due also to the opposition the junta has met on an international scale. Difficulties that are uneven but dialectically linked, some of them predictable immediately after the coup d'etat but weighing much more heavily in the development of the dictatorship than could have been foreseen.

In the past few weeks the junta has announced its economic policies, which are based on effecting a new division of the income extracted by the frenzied exploitation and pauperization of the workers. The junta's orientation amounts to total free enterprise, both for the internal market and for foreign trade. Hence, there are virtually no restraints on prices (even for bread!);



FREI: His Christian Democrats getting nervous about the internal market.

import duties have been lowered; and, the indispensable complement, the escudo has been devalued in order to stimulate exports.

All these measures move in the same direction: They favor the traditional bourgeoisie tied to businesses centered around import-export trade and tied also to the big multinational corporations and more generally to imperialist penetration. These are the sectors represented by Leniz, presently minister of economics, formerly editor of the daily *El Mercurio*, which expressed the politics of the National party.

But this policy is running into growing opposition from other bourgeois sectors that are more concerned with the internal market (consumer industries, middle-sized agriculture), the sectors generally represented by the

Christian Democracy, whose program when it was in power under Frei from 1964 to 1970 (industrialization and development of the internal market) perfectly expressed the interests of this sector.

The proposed total lack of restraints on foreign trade in fact threatens to ruin a section of these industrial sectors, which rest on fragile financial bases and small productive units that are not competitive in spite of the low wages. But more than that, as far as these sectors are concerned, the junta has already gone *too far* in reducing the buying power of the Chilean workers. Demand in the internal market fell so low during November and December that many enterprises—hotels, restaurants, workshops, small factories—had to close down.

Hence, for several weeks the newspaper *La Prensa*, organ of the Christian Democracy, has been waging a daily campaign for substantial wage increases. The campaign is conducted supposedly in the name of social justice, elementary defense of the workers' rights, and so on, but it comes through quite clearly that the section of the bourgeoisie that this party represents is worried about the immediate defense of its interests.

For example, one editorial in *La Prensa* argued for a wage increase because "it is a prescription that in our view would effectively stimulate production" and because "the whole income of the vast majority of people goes onto the market as demand for goods and services, and it must be understood that this money, transformed into buying power, is a stimulus to production, which thus responds to demand as its dynamic source."

It could hardly be clearer whose interests the Christian Democracy is defending in its campaign for wage increases and for more so-called social justice. But the opposition of the sectors represented by the Christian Democracy to the junta's economic policy expresses itself on other, no less important points.

Dismantling the State Sector

One of the most important aspects of Leniz's policy in the context of a return to "complete liberalism" (sic) is the massive restitution to the private sector of factories under (administrative or financial) state control,

along with the whole banking apparatus.

The Christian Democracy is in favor of restoring to their former owners or stockholders the majority of factories that were taken over by the state during the reign of the UP, but it is vehemently opposed to completely dismantling the state sector, which it greatly contributed to setting up in the first place when it was in power. One of the reasons for this is that the state sector gives the CD a significant social base.

This dismantling of the state sector of the economy, while it is still only at an initial stage, has already reached incredible proportions. The minister of public works, for example, has already fired on a day's notice hundreds of functionaries, employees, and technicians. And that is only the first lot to go, because from now on public works will no longer be taken care of by the state but will be contracted out to private companies. And this in a country where three fourths of investment in construction of all kinds is financed directly by the state!

As we have seen, the entire banking sector is going to be returned in coming weeks to the private sector. Except, of course, for the Central Bank, the bank that issues notes, which will in any case cease functioning as a commercial bank. Because of this, more than 1,000 functionaries were laid off during the last week in December.

Many examples could be listed of things that have contributed in recent weeks to hardening the CD's positions.

These contradictions between the two main bourgeois parties and the sectors they represent are far from being a minor or superficial aspect of the Chilean situation at the beginning of 1974. *They totally dominate the political scene*, and the daily debates among their respective newspapers are but an attenuated reflection of much more violent confrontations within the state apparatus and the army. Confrontations that sometimes take on the aspect of showdowns that are fraught with serious consequences. This is the context in which we must understand the banning at the end of December of one of the far-right dailies by Minister of the Interior General Bonilla, whose ties to the CD are well known. The ban was issued under the pretext that the newspaper had reported the statements made by Chilean SP

leader Carlos Altamirano in Cuba! It is also in this context that we must understand the many statements, tainted with populism and demagoguery, made by this same Bonilla during his well-orchestrated, virtually daily visits to the poblaciones, factories, and offices.

But the implications of these contradictions go beyond such things. While the dominant sector in the state apparatus and in the army is and remains the most hard-line sector, with methods and objectives overtly fascist-like if not fascist, the increasingly open opposition of the sectors represented by the Christian Democracy has often made it difficult for the junta to put its plans into practice. For example, you hear a lot less talk about the constitutional projects directly inspired by Mussolini and Salazar that were so dear to General Leigh.

In fact, the unity realized immediately after September 11 by all the counterrevolutionaries, the unity of all the various bourgeois sectors

(the CD included) and the reactionary petty bourgeoisie, the unity that gave the dictatorship an important and active social base in the midst of the flush of victory, has vanished. For many, the hour of disenchantment has already come. But each side is conscious of the risks that an open break would involve, especially in respect to the unity and homogeneity of the armed forces.

Hence the efforts made by both sides to temporarily keep the contradictions within the framework of the present regime, and the adoption of measures like the tripling (or more) of officers' pay in terms of buying power—increases of 1,500 to 2,000 percent—in order to keep them aloof from the melee.

But this framework will be more and more difficult to maintain, for factors other than the quarrels among bourgeois factions with diverging interests are having their effect, notably the situation within the working class and the workers movement. □

Dictatorship Yes, 'Excesses' No

Christian Democrats Criticize Chilean Junta

In response to the Chilean junta's decrees in January banning all political parties, including the Christian Democratic party, from holding meetings, making statements, or distributing literature, some Christian Democratic leaders have made a few criticisms of the junta.

In a private letter sent to General Augusto Pinochet on January 18 and in meetings between Christian Democratic leaders and General Oscar Bonilla, the interior minister, the party leaders expressed their "concern" over some of the junta's actions. The letter was signed by Patricio Aylwin, the party president, and Osvaldo Olguin, the first vice-president. "Many Chileans," the letter said, according to the February 8 *New York Times*, "have been or are being deprived of their work, detained, censured, threatened or pressured in different ways without any justification except for the ideas or opinions they profess, or which are attributed to them."

The letter also mentioned the "denial of any real possibility of adequate

defense for accused persons, preventive detention of undetermined length for people who are not dealt with through competent tribunals and the use of moral or physical pressures to obtain confessions."

Although the Christian Democratic party welcomed the September coup, some of its leaders have become uneasy with the military dictatorship since then. Apparently the junta's decree "recessing" all parties struck a sour note with all elements of the party leadership. The *Times* reported that Christian Democratic sources asserted that the views in the letter had been endorsed by Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democratic leader who preceded Allende as Chile's president, although there was no confirmation from Frei himself.

Patricio Aylwin, in a private memorandum to party leaders summarizing his discussions with Bonilla, hastened to point out that his criticisms of the junta were offered to advance the interests of the regime. "We do not like it, but we concede that a period of

dictatorship is necessary. But we believe that in order for it to be efficient, excesses should not be committed, and it is these excesses which we are criticizing." The party leaders wanted the period of dictatorship, Aylwin went on, "to be as brief as possible, but we understand that it cannot be too brief, that it can last two, three or maybe five years."

Aylwin also feared that the ban on the activities of the Christian Demo-

crats might cause a political vacuum into which underground leftist groups might step. "In our judgment," he said, "the people who are naturally discontented because they are living badly, because they are living through grave problems, are going to find a comrade, a neighbor, a militant member or activist of the Marxist groups who will give them his own version, and will propose actions against the junta." □

[Socialist Revolution Group], Antilles section of the Fourth International, is exactly to fight for the unification, extension, and politicization of these partial battles.

They are doing this by calling attention to the forms of struggle (democratically elected strike committees, support committees, self-defense against the colonial armed bands). And they are doing it by raising in the union meetings and the support committees demands against unemployment and the high cost of living that can be taken up by all the workers.

The most important of these demands are: sliding scale of wages under workers control; against low wages, equal increases for all; against unemployment and layoffs, reduction of the workweek with no cut in pay.

And they are also doing it through their Jeunesses d'Avantgard [Vanguard Youth] circles by calling on the high-schoolers in struggle to join in the battles of the workers. Dissemination of news and linking of the various struggles are assured by distribution of a weekly workers bulletin called "Le Travailleur Rouge" [The Red Worker].

In France, in the heart of the colonial metropolis, our responsibilities toward our struggling Antilles brothers, oppressed for more than three centuries, are weighty. Certainly the wall of silence that surrounded the bloody repression of the riots of December 1959 and May 1967 in Guadeloupe and of May 1971 in Martinique is breaking down today. Nevertheless, chauvinism, fostered by the reformist parties, remains firmly anchored among the French workers. We must fight it on a daily basis.

The main unions in Martinique, supported by the political organizations, have raised the slogan of an "unlimited general strike" beginning February 11. On this island, where the clanging of the chains of slavery still rings out, where helicopters keeping watch are in the air constantly, where ten barracks of soldiers keep watch over three high schools, where the population is threatened by a contingent of legionnaires recently posted a few thousand kilometers away in Guyana, every development of popular struggle is immediately exposed to colonial repression.

Internationalist solidarity in France was never more decisive! □

General Strike Called

Workers Mobilization in French Antilles

[The following article appeared in the February 1 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly, *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The workers of *France-Antilles*, the colonial rag put out in the Antilles by the Hersant press trust, have been on strike for more than two months. They are demanding decent wages, the right of collective bargaining, and recognition of their union.

Since January 10 the construction workers have been in struggle against low wages and the high cost of living. They are demanding a 25 percent wage increase, which would bring the salary for an unskilled worker to 6.25 francs an hour [about US\$1.25], that is, 1,087.50 francs a month [about US\$217]. In an interunion general assembly they decided to go on strike indefinitely beginning January 10.

Since January 8 student youth in Martinique and Guadeloupe have been engaged in a powerful movement against increases in the price of room and board and partial board.

Since January 16 the agricultural workers at Vivé au Lorrain (in Martinique) have been on strike. They are demanding a daily wage of 35.60 francs, an increase of 6.05 francs a day.

At Fonds Brûlé and at Acier the agricultural workers are also mobilizing against the landowners.

At the Martinique International Paper Company, at Eux du Sud, in the hospitals, at SPEDEM, and at SPEDEG (in Martinique and Guada-

loupe), everywhere the workers are in struggle.

In face of this mobilization, the regime is not pulling any punches. It is responding with the club and with class justice. The cops invaded the offices of *France-Antilles* and threw the workers out. Two workers were tried and sentenced. The mobile guard burst into the high schools and clubbed the young strikers. The police department decided to close all the schools.

The employers, strengthened by government support, have deliberately sabotaged the so-called negotiations. *France-Antilles* is being peddled by cops! It's unprecedented.

But the workers and youth are not taking it passively. The exemplary struggle of the *France-Antilles* workers has spread like an oil slick and has touched off a virtually general movement of workers mobilization. That general movement was concretized by a general strike on January 8 to support the *France-Antilles* workers. Powerful mobilizations united the student youth and the workers of Fort-de-France. Also in Pointe-à-Pitre (Guadeloupe), the youth are demonstrating against the increase in boarding rates.

This wave of struggle is living proof of the sharpening contradictions of the colonial system. But the various struggles are not yet unified; they are not converging toward a general confrontation with the French colonialist regime. The task of the Antilles revolutionary Marxists, of our comrades of the Groupe Révolution Socialiste

Nationwide Protest Strike in Bangladesh

By Ernest Harsch

In the first major challenge to the Awami League regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD—National Socialist party) called for a "People's Resistance Day" on January 20. On that day the entire country was shut down by a general strike in protest of the regime's repressive acts, staged in violation of a government decree banning all gatherings of more than five people.

The JSD, in response to both verbal and physical attacks against it by the Awami League and its goons, has stepped up its own agitation against the regime. At a mass rally of more than 100,000 on December 30, JSD president, Major M. A. Jalil, a former leader of the armed resistance during Bangladesh's liberation struggle in 1971, had called for the January 20 action. The January 6 issue of the independent leftist Dacca weekly *Holiday* reported the December meeting and Jamil's call. "Blood is boiling in the veins of the oppressed people," he said. "Revolution is the order of the day. The workers are preparing for revolution; they have realised who are depriving them of the fruit of their labour. The peasants have also realised who are depriving them of the crop which they produce with their labour."

On January 4, the Awami League announced that it would also have a mass rally at the same site one hour after the one scheduled by the JSD, in an obvious attempt to intimidate the JSD. When it became clear that the JSD would not back down, the regime declared on January 13 that all political meetings, rallies, and demonstrations were banned for three weeks, "to prevent breaches of the peace." This was the first time that such a ban had been invoked since the creation of Bangladesh. The next day Jalil and Abdur Rab, general secretary of the JSD, called a press conference and demanded that the ban be lifted.

After another press conference on January 18, several hundred JSD members, led by Jalil and Rab,

marched in the streets in defiance of the government decree. They were attacked by the police, tear-gassed, and clubbed. According to the regime, eleven persons were arrested. In response to this attack, the JSD called for a general strike in Dacca on January 19 and throughout the country on January 20.

On January 19, Chittagong, Khulna, Comilla, Noakhali, Sylhet, and



RAHMAN: Facing mass opposition.

Narayanganj were shut down by strikes. The following day, the entire country was paralyzed by the general strike.

The JSD's increased actions against the ruling Awami League have taken place in an atmosphere of mass discontent with the regime, a discontent fired by economic stagnation, food shortages, and widespread corruption. Most of this unrest has been of a spontaneous character, without any real political direction. The January 6 issue of *Holiday* described the situation at

the beginning of the new year: "Strikes, *gheraos* [mass actions to surround and sequester business or governmental officials], demonstrations, are rocking the country. Industrial belts are in ferment. The low-paid employees are seething with discontent. The peasantry is getting aggressive. Wheels are not moving in the mills and factories. Offices are not functioning in government corporations and banks."

The kind of disturbances that took place around December 16, the anniversary of Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan, have become almost commonplace. "The celebration of December 16," wrote the December 23 *Holiday*, "was marred by explosions and armed clashes in different parts of the country, including the capital.

"Some people had thrown some explosives on the House of Soviet Culture on December 14, and at Sadar-ghat and in front of the offices of the Daily Banglar Bani and of the Indian Air Lines on December 15. A railway culvert near North Shahjahanpur, Dacca was blown up by explosives and railway tracks near Bhairab Bazar were removed on December 16. According to a Dacca daily, at least 25 hand-bombs were exploded at Barisal Town on December 16, many persons were injured and the office of the Communist Party of Bangladesh caught fire.

"Three police stations at Nalchhati in Barisal, Manikganj and Louhajang were attacked by armed people on December 15." The Communist party of Bangladesh supports the Rahman regime, a fact which may explain the attacks against its offices.

Many of the clashes of so-called miscreants with the government forces appear to be of a defensive nature or in response to the Awami League's reign of terror against its political opposition. "Combing" operations have been carried out by Rahman's Rakkhi Bahini and the BDR (Bangladesh Rifles) in many of the isolated rural districts in efforts to flush out the "miscreants." The December 26 issue of the JSD's newspaper, *Ganakantha* (People's Voice), reported that in the Sirajganj Subdivision alone more than 500 persons had been killed by the government forces. The Awami League regime also began to arrest members of the JSD and the National Awami

party (Bashani), another opposition party.

In a speech to Parliament on January 15, Mujibur Rahman expressed Dacca's attitude toward those opposed to his regime, implicitly directing his remarks against the JSD: "We believe in democracy. We have allowed democratic rights to all. . . . But the time has come to ponder whether those who talk of armed confrontation in the name of democracy and revolution have that right—possibly, they do not have that right—nay, they do not have that right."

While January 20 did not result in the final showdown between the Awami League and the JSD that some people expected, it did mark an important political step by the growing opposition to the Rahman regime.

The January 27 *Holiday* reported that hundreds were injured by the government forces throughout the country and that about 1,000 were arrested. "The day dawned on the city of Dacca," *Holiday* wrote, "with an ominous lull. The Rakkhi Bahini [paramilitary government forces], the BDR and the police were positioned at different strategic places. Truck loads of Rakkhi Bahini and police fitted with machine guns and rifles patrolled the city streets."

Since the JSD never officially canceled the rally it had originally called (although the JSD leaders failed to mention it in their calls for the general strike), thousands of demonstrators in numerous processions converged on the site.

"From 2:00 in the afternoon till dusk," *Holiday* continued, "the law enforcing agencies attempted to repulse the onrush of demonstrators. They used rifle-butts, lathis [clubs] and teargas to ward off the pressure of the angry crowd. But those were to no avail."

While the repression on January 20 was serious, it was nowhere near the level that the government pronouncements indicated it might be. The massive turnout may have been one reason for such "restraint." As *Holiday* observed: "The government and the ruling party might . . . have been taken aback by the massive spontaneous response of the people. They might have calculated that if they had used bullets, the situation might have gone out of control. So, they might have decided to make a tactical re-

fracture and wait for a better opportunity to crush the JSD."

The JSD later called for another

general strike, on February 8, to protest the government attacks on January 20. □

Relatives Demand Release

Malaysian Political Prisoners

[The following letter was sent to the secretary general of the United Nations by relatives of Malaysian political prisoners. It is reprinted from the January 25 *Socialist Action*, newspaper of the Socialist Action League, the New Zealand sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.]

* * *

Mr. Kurt Waldheim,
Secretary General,
United Nations

Your Excellency,

We, the undersigned, are writing to you on behalf of the families of political prisoners in Malaysia. There are over 300* of them in the political prisons of Batu Gajah, Muar, Taiping, and Seremban, as well as in a secret centre near Kuala Lumpur. We are appealing for your good offices to obtain an investigation by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and for your support to our demand for an immediate and unconditional release of the political prisoners.

Our loved ones have been in political prisons from between two to ten years. None of them have been charged with any offence or been given a chance to defend themselves in a court of law. The most that the regime in power has alleged against them is that they have organised against the government, but there are not even allegations of violent activities. In fact, they are patriots who have protested against a corrupt and dictatorial regime that serves the interests of wealthy foreign companies whilst depriving citizens of their basic rights. These political prisoners are

*This figure does not include many hundreds more political prisoners held by the same regime in the concentration camps of Sabah and Sarawak. — *Socialist Action*

prominent political and trade union leaders and intellectuals of our country who are thrown behind bars because of their political belief.

The arbitrary imprisonment of political opponents is a continuation of the policies of the colonial government. Under the notorious "Internal Security Act," every year hundreds are arrested and imprisoned without trial. It is many weeks before relatives are told of their whereabouts. In some cases the prisoner is transported to a secret centre where he is subject to solitary confinement, deprivation, and torture.

Some have been released after many years in political prisons but deprived of their fundamental rights. They are restricted to one district for residence and must observe a curfew. They may not take part in trade union and political activities. They are harassed in their efforts to obtain a livelihood.

Many others are being kept in prisons for deportation. Political prisoners of Chinese racial origin have their citizenship revoked and are held in prisons until the Chinese government accepts them for deportation, which it never has. This barbarous treatment is being justified on the grounds that when the present regime revokes their citizenship, they become Chinese nationals. In fact, these political prisoners regard this country as their home.

The political prisons are overcrowded, with little space for recreational activities. Political prisoners are behind these huge walls for year after year. Medical attention is very bad and prisoners have died from neglect. Others have gone mad during imprisonment. It is very difficult to get to a hospital for attention, and political prisoners are handcuffed even when sick and being taken to hospital.

Food in prisons is of extremely poor quality and is calculated to minimum nutritional levels. Another

deprivation that is seriously felt is that of reading materials. Books are heavily censored. Even local newspapers are censored. Books on educational subjects, on languages, or on health are amongst those not allowed to prisoners.

Political prisoners are allowed a few censored letters but in practice letters sent by prisoners frequently never reach their destination, and many letters sent to them do not get to them. This is particularly painful, as few families can afford to make frequent trips to see them for the strictly supervised visits.

Treatment of prisoners by the prison authorities has ranged from indifference to outright brutality. Conditions were especially harsh in 1969-1970, following the racial violence launched by the ruling party. They were treated even worse than criminals. Federal Reserve Units were brought into the camp to brutally assault the political prisoners. Female prisoners were molested. They were confined solitarily in cells of six feet by twelve feet for twenty-four hours a day. They were deprived of their rights of visit and correspondence. Even correspondence with and visit by legal advisers were refused. Forced labour was practised.

Police Kill Dozens in Gujarat

Food Protests Rock Indian State

"Even with India's demonstrated capacity to muddle through crises for ever and ever, the latest spate of political and economic eruptions have an ominous ring about them," wrote the January 21 *Far Eastern Economic Review*. "Food riots, mass uprisings against rising prices, deaths in police shootings, a wave of strikes by university teachers, mill workers, office employees, airline workers and doctors and nurses, and interminable political faction fights have risen to a crescendo in the last two weeks."

While the discontent over India's deteriorating economic situation has sparked unrest throughout the country, the most violent clashes have taken place in the western state of Gujarat. The January 28 *New York*

To use their own words: "During the reign of white terror which lasted for almost one year, detainees in solitary cells were beaten up until they fainted away while others were injured or lost their teeth. Their belongings were stolen. When the assaulted detainees asked to consult a doctor and made any complaints, they were subject to even heavier beatings. [A] sick detainee admitted to the hospital had his hands handcuffed to the ward-bed."

The continued imprisonment and ill-treatment of these patriots is causing great anger amongst relatives as well as the people of the country. There have been many hunger strikes and processions by political prisoners and their relatives. We are determined to struggle to obtain their release from prolonged and indefinite incarceration.

We request Your Excellency to [heed] our appeal and to request the Commission on Human Rights and other concerned organisations of the United Nations to act on it.

Yours faithfully,
Madam Maimun,
wife of Dzulkiyly b. Ismail
Madam Chuah Saw Heoh,
mother of Tan Hock Hin
Mr. M. Sundram,
father of S. N. Rajah

Times reported at least thirty-seven people killed in the food riots that swept Gujarat for more than two weeks. The unrest began on January 9 when university students staged protests over the high cost of food at a university dining hall. It quickly spread to other sectors of the population.

The underlying causes of the strikes and spontaneous uprisings were the 20 percent increases in food prices over the past year and the shortages of food staples, such as grain, eggs, milk, and cooking oil. "Food shortages, inflation and general deprivation have bred frustration and a feeling of insecurity among the people everywhere," said the January 12 *Bombay Times of India*.

Students and workers staged demonstrations demanding more food at lower prices and an end to government corruption. Stores, government ration shops, banks, and other buildings were attacked, looted, and set on fire. Some police and militiamen have been killed by sniper fire. The police, the paramilitary Border Security Force, and eventually the army were sent in to "restore order." Curfews were imposed and orders were issued to shoot on sight anyone breaking them; demonstrations were attacked and broken up by club-swinging police; crowds were fired upon; and more than 1,000 people had been arrested by January 24.

Washington Post correspondent Lewis Simons described the situation in the state capital: "The inner, old walled city of Ahmedabad was an armed camp today [January 25]. Police and militia men, wearing padded body armor and steel helmets and carrying rifles, submachine guns and shields, patrolled the streets and twisting, dark alleys.

"The roads were red with the rubble of smashed bricks and black where flaming refuse and rubber tires had been hurled down on the police. In some places, curbstones, weighing 100 pounds apiece, had been ripped loose, carried up stairs and heaved onto the streets."

A statewide general strike on January 25, called by the parties opposed to the ruling Congress party, was a success. The state government attempted to minimize the impact of the general strike by imposing a curfew on that day.

A January 28 dispatch by Simons speculated on the decision to bring in the army: "There have been rumors that members of the Ahmedabad police force, who have been battling the stone-throwing mobs day and night, would lay down their arms. Several persons with friends among the police say that their sympathies are more with the people demanding lower food prices than with the government. If true, this could explain [Gujarat Chief Minister Chimanbhai] Patel's decision to use the army, which has not taken an active law-enforcement role here until now."

Patel also charged that the Jan Sangh party, a right-wing religious party, and the Communist party of India were behind the strikes and the statewide unrest. □

Lebanese Trotskyists Denounce Plans to Liquidate Palestinian Cause

[The Revolutionary Communist Group, supporters in Lebanon of the Fourth International, held its founding congress in January in Beirut.

[The congress discussed reports on areas of work and on the structure of the organization. Resolutions were presented dealing with the building of the RCG and its activities in the high schools and at the Arab University of Beirut. Political resolutions were presented on the left in Lebanon and the building of the revolutionary party, the world situation and the Fourth International, and the "peaceful solution" to the Arab-Israeli conflict now being pushed by Washington, Moscow, and the Arab regimes. In addition, the congress drew up provisional statutes for the group.

[The congress also approved the general line of a resolution on the Arab revolution, which will soon be published in the name of all the Trotskyists of the Arab world. The group's magazine, *el-Mounadil* (The Militant), will be transformed into a monthly inter-Arab theoretical journal and will be supplemented by a fortnightly newspaper to be published by the RCG itself.

[The RCG, which began to coalesce in 1971, regards itself as part of the nucleus of an Arab section of the Fourth International, a revolutionary party embracing the whole Arab region and including the Israeli Trotskyists of the Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen-Marxist).

[We reprint below the resolution on the "peaceful solution" that was passed at the RCG congress. It appeared in the February 1 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly, *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

1. Political Situation in the Arab Region After the October War

- The October War represented a

shift in the Arab political situation, not in the direction of initiating a "battle for liberation" but in the direction of putting the "peaceful solution" into practice. The October War was aimed not so much at liberating the occupied territories (even a part of them), as at promoting the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242.

The goals the Arab regimes hoped to achieve through the war can be summed up as follows: to create a pretext for the great powers (American imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy) to intervene and put pressure on the Zionist state; to attempt to alter the Arab-Israeli military relationship of forces in favor of the Arab regimes; and, finally, to polish up the "patriotic" image of the Egyptian and Syrian regimes in such a way as to allow them to participate in a settlement with Zionism while minimizing the danger of popular mass response.

Of these three aims, the first was achieved and the second was not; as for the third, its effectiveness is eroding with time.

- The correct revolutionary position during the war was to give critical support to the military battle of the Arab states against the Zionist state, while denouncing its real aims and the limits put on it and putting forward an agitational program calling for continuation of the war and its transformation into a revolutionary war.

- The present diplomatic efforts aiming at finding a definitive formula capable of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and liquidating the Palestinian cause are a natural extension of the October War. American imperialism is playing the major role in these diplomatic efforts in all their various forms (the Geneva conference, Kissinger's trip), while the Kremlin bureaucracy contents itself with playing a secondary role, supporting the peaceful solution in conformity with one of the terms of the deal made between

the two great powers, the deal of "peaceful coexistence," at the expense of all the workers of the world.

The problem of Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since June 1967 is the main hitch in these efforts to find a solution. This is because of the contradiction between the Arab regimes' political need for a complete Israeli withdrawal and the Zionist state's desire to hold onto certain territories and to get the highest possible price for those it has to give up. While American imperialism is most certainly exerting some pressure to make the Israeli position more flexible, it is also seeking to impose a peaceful solution that corresponds as much as possible to its interests, that is, the well-known "Pax Americana."

- On the level of the Arab countries the new situation is characterized by the growing influence of Saudi Arabia and its accession to the post of choirmaster of the Arab regimes. The influence of the Saudi throne is based not solely on its wealth but also on the fact that it is the main Arab partner of American imperialism and is therefore capable of convincing the latter of the need to put pressure on Israel. While it is true that the "oil war" unleashed by the oil-producing Arab states corresponds to their interests, it also benefits American imperialism through the oil price increases it has engendered, price rises that fit into Washington's calculations. This shows that the Arab pressure on the United States is "enticing" rather than "negative" in nature. It holds up broad perspectives of economic cooperation between the Arab ruling classes and American imperialism and coincides with the opening of Egypt to American capital.

But the "oil war" has set off a process that has all but escaped the control of those who set it off, and that is what explains the concessions recently made by the Arab oil-producing states. As for the refusal of the Iraqi regime to carry out the embargo decisions, it is an expression of the ties linking that regime to European imperialism and Japan, which are victims of the Arab oil policy.

Another important hitch in the efforts to implement the peaceful solution is the matter of finding a means to liquidate the Palestinian cause. World imperialism, like the states of the Arab region and the Kremlin bu-

reaucracy, is not aiming solely at solving the problems created by the June 1967 war, but also wants to eliminate the Palestinian cause as the catalyst for the struggle of the Arab peoples against imperialism. That is why a significant section of the parties just mentioned are seeking to create a rump Palestinian state that would supposedly represent the exercise of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

This solution clashes with the desire of the Hashemite regime to regain control of the West Bank. As for the Israeli rejection of the rump state, it results from the fact that the Zionist regime is convinced that this plan would be unable to liquidate the Palestinian cause and at the same time would prove less effective in muzzling the armed resistance of the Palestinian people than has the Hashemite regime, which has already proved its capacities in this regard. And this is despite the fact that the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization anticipated the Zionist-Hashemite position and accepted the plans to set up the rump state, even though it fully knows that while this state does run counter to Hashemite plans, it falls within the framework of liquidating the Palestinian cause, for it would be a very weak rump state set up as a large-scale refugee camp under the aegis of the great powers and the Arab regimes.

2. The Plans for a Settlement; The Position of Revolutionary Communists

● Security Council Resolution 242, known under the name "peaceful solution," is a plan aiming at sanctifying the general relationship of forces established in the Arab region between the Arab states and the Zionist state immediately after the Zionist victory of June 1967. Any attempt to present implementation of this resolution as serving the Arab cause is an open attempt at mystification aimed at providing a cover for betrayal by the Arab governments.

Even total Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967 would not eliminate the aftereffects of the June aggression inasmuch as the withdrawal would be linked to conditions that directly sanction the fruits

of the aggression. Everyone knows that implementation of the peaceful solution would involve not solely the withdrawal of the Israeli army but also Arab recognition of the borders of the Zionist state and guarantees of their inviolability by the creation of demilitarized zones and an official agreement to abide by peaceful coexistence, as well as other guarantees such as Israeli freedom of passage through the Suez Canal, and so on.

In sum, the peaceful solution ties Israeli withdrawal to conditions that would mean liquidation of the struggle of the Arab peoples against Zionism. What revolutionists reject is not the Israeli withdrawal in itself, but the conditions that go along with it in the "peaceful solution." That is why to the betrayal of the Arab regimes they counterpose the demand for total and unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist army from the territories occupied since June 1967.

● For the struggle against the "peaceful solution" to be complete it must include a struggle against all the formulas for liquidating the cause of the Palestinian Arab people, both the formula of creating a Palestinian region federated to the Hashemite kingdom and the formula of setting up an "independent" Palestinian rump state. This absolutely does not mean that revolutionists are indifferent to the reestablishment of Hashemite domination of the West Bank. It simply means that revolutionists take the road of revolutionary struggle against the Hashemite regime and not the road of UN settlements.

Revolutionists refuse to choose between two formulas of liquidation. If a referendum is organized in the West Bank to select one of these two proposals, revolutionists will call upon the masses to boycott that referendum. The creation of a Palestinian rump state would in no way alter the present tasks of revolutionists; it would only add one new government to those that the Arab revolution will have to overthrow. Here and now revolutionists denounce any tendency claiming to represent the Palestinian people that participates in carrying out any of the liquidationist formulas. This denunciation applies not only to the traitorous "notables" of the West Bank, but also to any tendency within the Palestinian resistance that joins in the attempts at reaching a settlement.

● As far as the Palestinian question is concerned, revolutionists begin from the principle of defense of the complete and unconditional right of the Palestinian Arab people to reintegrate themselves into the land of Palestine. This cannot be achieved without destroying the Zionist state, imperialism's beachhead in the Arab East. Recognition of this right involves the continuation of the armed struggle of the Palestinian Arab people against the Zionist apparatus. For Palestinian revolutionists this struggle is not only a right but a duty whose abandonment would constitute betrayal of their national cause.

The liberation of Palestine, that is, the destruction of the Zionist state, is one of the tasks of the general Arab revolution, not only because the Palestinian people are incapable of carrying out the liberation with their own forces alone, but also because the Zionist state is a bastion operating against the entire Arab revolution. Consequently, the goal of liberating Palestine is part of the goal of the revolutionary overthrow of all the Arab regimes and the establishment of a revolutionary power, which alone is capable of taking on imperialism and Zionism.

Just as Zionism has direct or indirect agents in the form of the Arab governments, the Arab revolution has definite allies within the Zionist state: the Jewish and Arab revolutionists struggling to break the grip Zionism holds over the workers in Israel and to join them to the liberating struggle of the Arab toiling masses.

3. Immediate Tasks for Revolutionists

● The tendencies rejecting the peaceful solution from the standpoint of revolutionary political consciousness of the implications of the liquidationist plot are weak today. While it is true that the general sentiment of the Arab masses, and especially the sentiment of the masses of the Palestinian people, runs against the peaceful solution and the liquidationist projects, there is no revolutionary vanguard on the political scene capable of polarizing and organizing the masses' rejection.

The patriotic dissident tendencies within Fateh are a very clear illustration of this reality. Being in a very important position for the struggle

against the peaceful solution, they have shown great desire for developing a firm and revolutionary opposition to the Fateh leadership; but some of them tend to take the path of concession and compromise in face of the pressure from the leadership, thus forfeiting the possibility of polarizing the rank and file around rejection of the plans for capitulation and settlement.

Since the revolutionary forces do not have sufficient weight to prevent or even significantly restrict the execution of the peaceful solution, the value of the current struggle against the peaceful solution cannot be gauged so much by its practical effects as by its political impact, by the extent to which it makes a significant political contribution to the building of a revolutionary communist leadership of the proletarian struggle and the Arab revolution.

● In light of the above, it is obvious that political clarity on the struggle against the peaceful solution is the most important thing. This means that revolutionists cannot conclude a direct

political alliance with any tendency subordinate to one or another Arab regime under the pretext that this tendency "rejects" the peaceful solution without considering the motivation for the rejection. While it is possible to line up with such tendencies on the field of struggle, it nevertheless remains the case that the front that we want to form against the peaceful solution is a revolutionary front not only struggling against the plans for a settlement, but also pointing out the revolutionary road for defeating the peaceful solution, a road that has nothing in common with the bargain-rate sellouts of certain Arab regimes whose real positions history has revealed many times.

If this revolutionary front is formed, it would allow the revolutionary political struggle against national betrayal to multiply its impact. And in Lebanon, in order to guarantee maximum effectiveness, it must include Palestinian revolutionists and the Lebanese revolutionary left; that is, it must include all really anti-imperialist tendencies. □

against the reforms, and there was public opposition to reinstating the repressive laws.

● Second, it gives a handle to the entire far right and to the trade-union bureaucracy. With the possible ouster of [Oscar] Bidegain [governor of Buenos Aires Province], the far right of the trade-union bureaucracy would take over the government of Buenos Aires Province. [Under pressure from Perón, Bidegain resigned on January 22.] For those who want to impose the Pacto Social by force, Azul is manna from heaven. It's exactly what they need to create a confusion of Azul with legal workers' protests against the Pacto Social and to repress them with the justification of the struggle against terrorism.

We could go on drawing lessons. None would have a favorable conclusion for the workers movement, its activists who oppose the bosses and bureaucrats, or for the left wing. There is a saying: "The road to hell is paved with good intentions." And that's how it is in politics. The armed group that attacked the Azul military base may have—in words—very good intentions. As usual, they will say that they are for socialism, etc., etc. *But, every political act must be judged not by what is said, but by what the act accomplishes, especially by its consequences.* And here it must be pointed out that if the right wing had wanted to stage a provocation to win the passage of the Penal Code, to strengthen the bureaucracy, to give the green light to right-wing thugs, or to persecute the left wing and the class-conscious workers leaders, that provocation would not have been very different from what happened at Azul.

The guerrillas say they want socialism. We, too, want socialism. But socialism will not be established by either the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—People's Revolutionary Army], the CP, the PST, or the JP [Juventud Peronista—Peronist Youth]. The entire working class will achieve socialism when it is firmly convinced of the need to take power.

In 1917, almost on the eve of taking power, when the Bolsheviks were beginning to be a force with 20-30 percent of the workers supporting them, and in the heart of a revolutionary situation, Lenin stated that the party's essential task was "to patiently explain" to the remaining masses the character

How Argentine Guerrilla Raid Was Used by Peronist Regime

[The following article appeared in the January 23 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, weekly organ of the Argentine Trotskyist organization PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Last weekend [January 19] an armed group attacked the Azul military garrison, causing the death of several officers and enlisted men and the regiment commander's wife. The act had a profound impact throughout Argentina. General Perón addressed himself to the attack in a speech in which, in addition to alluding to the guerrilla action, he took the opportunity to attack the governor of Buenos Aires Province harshly.

As of this writing, the identity of the group that carried out the attack has not been confirmed. But there is little doubt that it was a guerrilla organization.

In the last issue of *Avanzada Socialista* we noted: "At this time guerrilla actions more than ever operate in a vacuum. Their only result has been to hand the Peronist government a ready-made excuse to try to reinstitute its repressive legislation."

The Azul events confirm and emphasize what we said seven days ago. For this reason, compañero, it is very easy to draw the lessons here.

● First, this adventurous action will be a big boost to the passage of the new Penal Code [approved on January 25]. The action occurred at a time when opposition to the reforms had seriously divided the ruling bloc, mobilizations were being organized

of the bourgeois provisional government and to win them over to the need for a workers government. For Lenin, no matter how strong the party was, it couldn't begin to overturn the provisional government without having won the majority of the workers, who still supported Kerensky.

In 1974, with a government that is backed by the vast majority of the working class, and in the absence of a revolutionary situation in Argentina, a tiny armed group launches forth on its own to try to overthrow Perón. There could be no greater contrast between the revolutionary policy of our teachers, Lenin and Trotsky, and the adventurist policy of those groups that attempt to achieve socialism without bothering to convince the masses, underrating their level of consciousness, their opinions, and their spirit.

Currently, 90 percent of the working class politically supports General Perón, whom they voted for in the September elections. The only thing a group accomplishes when it declares armed warfare under the pretext of fighting for socialism, is to isolate it-

self from the masses and move the masses—who are still Peronist—away from socialism.

At this time, without breaking en masse with Perón, the workers are beginning to put Peronism to the test, especially around the problem of the Pacto Social. The duty of real revolutionary socialists is to lead this mass experiment, utilize and impel the struggles that are opening up against the Pacto Social "to patiently explain" to the Peronist workers the class character of this government. It is they who elected the government, and they who will have to decide how and when and with what it should be replaced. Intervening in the struggles against the Pacto Social and maintaining this dialogue is the only way to influence growing sectors of workers in favor of socialism and to build a big workers party able to win power.

It is a political crime to cut off or sow confusion in this dialogue. And this is what the guerrilla grouplets are doing. The fact is that the Peronist worker is ready to mobilize against the freezing of wages and against the Pacto Social, but by no means will

he condone, or let elements that are outside the working class devote themselves to, making armed attacks on the government that it elected.

We're not surprised that the guerrilla groups are constitutionally unable to understand this concept, which is the ABC of Marxism. These groups from their inception have lacked the power to link up with the workers. They have never led even one of the thousands of workers struggles that have been waged since the Cordobazo. Under the [Lanusse] dictatorship their shortcoming was concealed by the hate all the workers felt toward the government. Now they clearly can be seen as an isolated, desperate, petty-bourgeois group, whose tantrums benefit only the class enemy. And they benefit with considerable cunning. So, thanks to these adventures, it will be more difficult for true revolutionary socialists, for all class-conscious activists, and for workers in general to prevent the reinstatement of the repressive laws, confront right-wing thuggery, and struggle against the Pacto. But it's for exactly this reason that *wemustdouble our efforts*. □

History of Tito's Repression of Dissenting Professors, Students at Belgrade University

[The article below was printed in the February 7 *New York Review of Books* with the following introduction:

"The following statement was prepared by experts on the situation in Yugoslavia whom we believe to be reliable. We think it will interest your readers.—Noam Chomsky, MIT; Robert S. Cohen, Boston University."

* * *

Background

1949-1950. A new generation of young philosophers and social theorists, many of whom took active part in the liberation war (1941-45), graduated and assumed teaching positions at the universities of Belgrade and Zagreb. They appeared on the scene during Yugoslavia's resistance to

Stalin's attempts to dominate the country. They were mostly Marxists, but from the beginning they opposed Stalinist dogmatism and emphasized freedom of research, humanism, openness to all important achievements of present-day science and culture.

1950-1960. A decade of discussions on basic theoretical issues, organized by the Yugoslav philosophical association. The debates were quite free; several groups opposed one another on different grounds. By the end of this period they all realigned along two basic lines, the orthodox one which stayed within the traditional framework of dialectical materialism and which considered theory to be essentially a reflection of the objective social situation and material surroundings, and the humanist one which emphasized the anticipatory and critical

character of theory, its unity with praxis, and its great role in the process of humanization of a given society.

1960. At a conference in Bled, the humanist, praxis-oriented trend prevailed and subsequently became dominant in Yugoslav universities, journals, institutes.

1962. Yugoslav society experienced its first postwar stagnation as a result of an unsuccessful attempt to make its currency convertible. At the biannual meeting of the Yugoslav philosophical association in Skopje, November, 1962, the view was expressed for the first time that it is urgent to go beyond abstract theoretical discussion about the nature of man and knowledge, about alienation and freedom, and the relation between philosophy and science—and toward

a more concrete, critical study of Yugoslav society, guided by general humanist insights.

1963. A series of conferences and discussions with the attempt to clarify some general social issues: the meaning of technology, of freedom and democracy, of social progress, of the role of culture in building a socialist society. In August, the Korcula Summer School was founded by Zagreb and Belgrade philosophers and sociologists, with the purpose of organizing free international summer discussions on actual social issues.

1964. The journal *Praxis* was founded by the same group. A new series of discussions, this time about sensitive issues of Yugoslav society: the meaning and perspective of socialism, bureaucratic and authoritarian tendencies in the party and the state apparatus, advantages and weaknesses of the existing forms of self-management and its possibilities for further development, the right of a minority to continue to defend its views rather than conforming to the views of the majority.

Most of these critical views and ideas seemed compatible with the liberal Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (accepted at the Seventh Congress, 1958), but in reality were met with intolerance by alarmed party leaders. The transition from criticism of Stalinism toward a concrete critical analysis of Yugoslav society led to an almost complete break of communication between party officials and leading Marxist social and political philosophers.

1965-1967. While preserving a political system far more elitist and authoritarian than a developed system of participatory democracy could tolerate, the political leadership introduced an economic reform that was to fail: returning to a nineteenth-century model of a laissez-faire economy, leaving the Yugoslav economy at the mercy of big foreign firms in the "free competition" at the international market, causing mass unemployment and huge foreign debts, allowing speculation in real estate and a rapid increase of social differences, encouraging the growth of autarchic tendencies in the existing six republics of the Yugoslav federation—which later constituted a material basis for strong nationalist movements.

Expression of critical views about these developments (themselves later condemned as manifestations of "liberalism" and "nationalism" by the party itself) was met by growing hostility by the party press. Critical philosophers and sociologists were branded "abstract humanists," "utopians," "revisionists," "anarcho-liberals," "neoleftists," "extreme leftists," finally, "political opposition that aspires to political power."

1968. In June, students of the University of Belgrade occupied all university buildings for seven days. They demanded abolition of bureaucratic privileges, further democratization, solution of the problem of mass unemployment, reduction of social differences, university reform.

In one of his speeches during the crisis, Tito praised the students, endorsed all their demands, and declared he would resign if he failed to realize them.

Later, when this grave political crisis was over, the political leadership and Tito himself came to the conclusion that philosophers were responsible for it because through their lectures they had "corrupted their students," "poisoned them with wrong ideas," and thus produced the student movement. The party organization at the Department of Philosophy and Sociology in Belgrade was dissolved. For the first time, Tito expressed the demand that further corruption "of students through their professors must be prevented," and that guilty professors must be ousted from the university.

1969-1972. Growing pressure was exerted by the Central Party leadership on lower-level political institutions to find a way to eliminate the professors. But this was a difficult task. Yugoslavia had developed a democratic organization of education and culture. All decision-making power in matters of electing, re-electing and promoting university professors was in the hands of the faculty councils—the autonomous, self-managing bodies composed of professors, assistants, and students themselves. The university law emphasized scholarly qualification as the sole criterion of election. It did not give political authorities any right to interfere.

In the previous period, the officially declared policy of the League of Com-

munist (LC) was that all theoretical controversies should be cleared up through discussion and free exchange of opinion. Therefore the rather democratically-minded leadership of the LC in Serbia resisted the use of repressive measures against some of the leading philosophers and sociologists of the country. They were, however, refused access to mass media and mass gatherings, and the possibilities for circulating their ideas became much more limited. Still, they were able to teach, to travel abroad, to have 300-400 participants from various countries at the Summer School of Korcula, to publish the journals *Praxis* and *Filosofija*, and occasionally to publish a book or two.

The time was used to develop a cluster of fairly sophisticated and concrete theories about socialism and social revolution, integral self-management, the phenomenon of bureaucratism, humanization of technology, democratic direction of economy and culture, the problem of nationalism, etc.

Fall, 1972. Tito ousted the leader of the League of Communists of Serbia, Marko Nikezic, and a number of his supporters. They were blamed for "liberal" practices and for opposing the new party line. The main feature of this new line was the return to a strong, disciplined, centralized, "monolithic" party that has the right and power directly to control and manage the realization of its policies. This called for complete ideological unity, consequently for a return to a crude form of ideological indoctrination, and for the abandonment of all former sophisticated ideas of creating new socialist consciousness through dialogues or struggles of opinion and patient persuasion.

The Faculty of Philosophy was now exposed to intense pressure. There were rumors of enemies, foreign spies on the teaching faculty; there were threats of stopping further financing, of closing the faculty. The faculty building was equipped with hidden microphones, some of which were found. The University Committee of the League of Communists drew up a list of eight professors to be fired. Passports were confiscated from five of them. Portions of some of their recently published books were banned. Some collaborators of the journal

Praxis were arrested and sentenced to jail.

At that moment dozens of internationally known philosophers and social scientists from Scandinavia, USA, Germany, France, and other countries wrote letters to Tito and the rectors of the universities of Belgrade and Zagreb, expressing their concern about those repressive measures and the hope that they would be discontinued in the interest of the further free development of Yugoslav democratic socialism. Many philosophical associations, departments of philosophy, academies, international institutions devoted to human rights and civil liberties passed resolutions of concern and sent them to Yugoslavia.

This discreet expression of solidarity of the international intellectual community made a considerable impact on Yugoslav authorities, who were proud of their past international reputation and who, in the existing economic and foreign-political situation of the country, could not afford to disregard world public opinion. They decided to take their time and to give repression a more democratic appearance.

Recent Developments

Slowly crushing the resistance of the Faculty of Philosophy without provoking too much international publicity required a series of steps. Some of these were easy; some were met with unexpected difficulties or even failed completely.

It was relatively easy to introduce certain important changes into existing university law. The law as now amended requires a university professor not only to have scholarly and moral qualifications but also to be politically acceptable. Political organizations now have the right to initiate a procedure in order to establish whether any individual university teacher meets political criteria.

A third change was a general and vague limitation of the principle of self-management. While heretofore the vast majority of the members of the faculty councils had to be elected by the faculty and students themselves, now the law prescribed that the composition of the council had to be determined through a "self-managing agreement" between the faculty and its founder—the Republican Executive

Council (i.e., the government of the given Federal Republic).

The next step was to translate those legal changes into more specific practical demands. The plan was *first* to specify political criteria for being a university professor in such a way that they could be applied to ousting the eight Belgrade professors, who previously could not be removed;



TITO

second to push the party organization and the students' organization into condemning their colleagues and teachers; *third* to compel the University of Belgrade to accept a sufficient number of outside voting members into the councils so as to enable political authorities to gain full control over the decision-making process in the Faculty of Philosophy.

These measures met with considerable resistance. When a text of Criteria for the Election of University Professors was first proposed to the University Assembly in June, 1973, most speakers objected strongly to it. They found certain criteria too rigid, for example, the requirement that a university professor must accept Marxism and actively support the politics of the League of Communists in his lectures and in all his scholarly and public activity. But later the Rector of the University, most deans, and eventually the University Assembly succumbed to the pressure, and in November accepted the text of the Criteria.

Only the Faculty of Philosophy rejected it, and gave the following grounds, among others: it was unconstitutional because the existing constitution guarantees freedom of scientific work and cultural creation and forbids any kind of pressure on individuals to declare what kind of belief they have; it was unacceptable because the vast majority of Belgrade University professors are not Marxists and are apolitical; it was discriminatory because it allows, by its vagueness, any conceivable kind of interpretation; and it was discriminatory also because these Criteria were being imposed on the University of Belgrade only, and not on any other Yugoslav university.

In May, 1973, the Belgrade University committee of the League of Communists sent an open letter to the party organization of the Faculty of Philosophy, demanding the ouster of eight professors: Mihailo Markovic, Ljubomir Tadic, Svetozar Stojanovic, Zaga Pesic, Miladin Zivotic, Dragoljub Mincunovic, Nebojsa Popov, Triva Indjic. After a series of meetings attended by a large number of higher-ranking party officials who exerted great pressure on students and professors to conform to the demand, the party organization of the Faculty of Philosophy nevertheless rejected the ouster demand. A few of the most active opponents were expelled from the party, but when the party organization of the faculty met again in November, it decided, again unanimously, that the eight professors should stay at the faculty. There was a complete conviction that a university professor cannot be fired for expressing critical views in his writings, especially taking into account that the party itself now was repeating many of the criticisms that were expressed by those same scholars several years ago.

In November, 1973, a university committee of the student organization made an attempt to force students of the Faculty of Philosophy into action against their professors, threatening them with possible violence if the faculty continued to resist. But the philosophy students refused to undertake anything of the sort and, on the contrary, to everyone's surprise, organized a street demonstration (although strictly forbidden in recent years, and in the past forcefully dispersed by the police). This time, stu-

dents protested against repression in Greece and against the massacre in the University of Athens. There was no violence.

The crucial issue during the last six months has been the composition of the faculty councils. Self-management in the university meant that even in the institutions of special social importance, such as educational ones, only a small number of outside members were nominated by political authorities. Now the executive council (the government) of the Serbian Republic demanded that half the members of the faculty councils must be nominated from outside the university. Taking into account that students and administration must also be represented in the councils, this would give only one sixth of the votes to both professors and assistants and would clearly replace self-management by compulsory management.

By October, after initial resistance, the Rector of the university and all faculties except the Faculty of Philosophy succumbed to the pressure. They were told that this new structure had been prescribed by the university law and therefore could not be a matter of debate. As a matter of fact the law only prescribed that the composition of the faculty councils had to be determined through a "self-managing agreement" between the faculty and its founder (the Republic's executive council). The Faculty of Philosophy refused to sign the agreement because it was unconstitutional and incompatible with the principle of self-management, and because the very concept of agreement involves negotiation. The faculty asked the Constitutional Court to decide about the legitimacy of the imposed "agreement." At the same time, the faculty also drew up a counterproposal. But there was no negotiation and communication was broken.

An extremely abusive campaign was launched against the Faculty of Philosophy through the party newspaper *Komunist*, as well as through the press, radio, and TV. The faculty was accused of opposing the introduction of "self-management" at the university, of opposing the policy of the League of Communists, of keeping a monopoly on education, and of opposing any influence from "society," of asking help from foreign scholars, etc. At the same time the faculty was threatened with expulsion from the Univer-

sity of Belgrade, with refusal to finance its further activity or to employ its graduated students, and with eventual closing down.

Under growing pressure of this kind, the Faculty Council decided on December 14, 1973, to authorize its Dean to sign the "self-managing agreement."

The Present Situation

The Faculty Council will now have half of its members nominated by political authorities. They will certainly be carefully selected from among leading political officials and disciplined members of the League of Communists. They will surely pose the question of removing the eight professors from the Department of Philosophy and Sociology as they do not meet the recently accepted political criteria. The political leadership will obviously press to clear the situation up before the Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the spring.

It may still not be an easy task. According to law, assistants are re-elected every three years, associate professors and assistant professors every five years—which means that legally one would have to wait for the expiration of that period for each candidate. Full professors do not undergo the process of reelection at all (i.e., they have tenure), which means that two among the eight (Markovic and Tadic) cannot at this time legally be removed at all.

Another important circumstance is also that the party organization of the Faculty of Philosophy—whose opinion counts when it comes to political evaluation—has never agreed to condemn, or endorse the elimination of, anyone from the group.

A relevant fact is that the threatened scholars enjoy a considerable reputation in the university and among other intellectuals. The action against them is not popular and, despite great efforts, the apparatus of the League of Communists was not able to find any well-known Yugoslav philosopher, sociologist, or political scientist to attack them.

The crucial questions are now (1) whether the outside members of the council will be disciplined enough by the government to perform according to their orders when they face their victims in the council; and (2) whether some of the inner members of the

council, professors from various other departments of the Faculty of Philosophy, will yield to pressure and eventually vote for the firing of their colleagues.

Neither development is inevitable, but both are possible. Without strong political pressure many outside members would—as in the past—not even attend the meetings, or would be passive or vote with the rest. Thus everything will now depend on how brutal the effort will be and how far the political authorities will go in pressing the members of the council. Meanwhile, during the past six months several of the eight professors under attack have again been deprived of their passports.

Call for Action

The degree of pressure will depend on whether the whole thing will pass in silence as a little episode in one of the world's many universities, or whether it will be understood for what it is: one of the last battles for survival of free, critical, progressive thought in the present-day socialist world, in a country which is still open to democratic development and where until recently it seemed to have every chance to flourish.

That is where the reaction of the international intellectual community may again play a decisive role. The whole political and economic position of Yugoslavia makes it sensitive to world public opinion. By showing an interest in what is going on now in Yugoslav cultural life, by spreading the information, by raising the issue in international organizations, by expressing concern and protest in the press or in letters to Tito (which, after the recent escalation, should have more resolute and sharp form than previous ones), scholars and intellectuals everywhere could help to relax the present grip of the Yugoslav leadership and induce it to live up somewhat better to its own ideology of self-management and socialist democracy.

All the repressive measures so far have not sufficed fully to isolate and suffocate Yugoslav philosophy. But this might well happen in the weeks to come if the scholarly world will tolerate the further escalation of brutality and fear in a country that until not long ago has been an island of hope for many. □