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
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January 28, 1974

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## **Heath Pushing Confrontation With British Workers**



## **What Sadat Gave Zionists in Sinai Pact**

## 7 Sentenced to Death

The Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran has asked that protests be sent to the Iranian government demanding freedom for twelve writers, filmmakers, and journalists sentenced by a military tribunal in Tehran January 9. Seven of the defendants were sentenced to death; two received five-year prison terms; three were sentenced to three years in prison.

The twelve were accused of conspiring to assassinate the shah and kidnap three members of his family. After agreeing to allow international observers to be present, the shah's government announced the trial date (January 6) only five days in advance and then rushed the trial to completion in only four days, effectively preventing the observers from attending.

"... the circumstances of this particular trial," said a committee statement released in New York, "suggest that the twelve have been arbitrarily arrested and framed up. They have been sentenced without receiving a trial in a civilian court in the presence of a jury, as guaranteed for political cases by the Iranian constitution.

"According to the Paris daily *Le Monde*, January 11, the defendants have twelve days to appeal their cases. The appeals court will also be a military tribunal. If past practice is followed, the proceedings will be secret; the court will take less than four days to hand down its verdict; and it will impose harsher sentences. Therefore, time is extremely short."

The seven defendants sentenced to death are: Tyfour Bathaie (filmmaker), Khosrow Golsorkhi (poet), Manouchehr Moghadam-Salimi (painter), Karamet Daneshian (accountant), Abbas-Ali Samakar (cameraman), Reza Allamezadeh (director), and Rahmat-Allah Jamshidi (writer).

Sentenced to prison were: Maryam Etehadieh (journalist), Morteza Siahpuosh (printer), Shokouh Farhang (writer), Ebrahim Farhang (insurance clerk), and Farhad Ghaysari (student).

Protests should be sent to Iranian embassies, the committee said. □

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## Disengagement Accord—A Betrayal of the Arab Masses

By Jon Rothschild

On January 18, in the now famous tent at kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, Egyptian Major General Muhammed Abdel Ghany el-Gamasy and Israeli Lieutenant General David Elazar signed an agreement to "disengage" their armed forces on the Suez front.

"The tent was closed and neither photographers nor newsmen were allowed to enter, unlike the November ceremony [when the cease-fire accord was signed]," wrote Henry Tanner in the January 19 *New York Times*. "The Egyptian side, it was reported, did not want pictures taken."

And no wonder. For the "disengagement" agreement is nothing more than an embellished version of Tel Aviv's "interim" settlement for which the Israeli regime had been pushing ever since the cease-fire negotiations began last November.

An additional pact was signed on January 18. Signed twice, in fact. In Jerusalem Golda Meir put her signature to a document known as the United States Proposal. Later that afternoon, Henry Kissinger brought a copy of the document to Aswan in Egypt, where it was signed by Anwar el-Sadat. While the disengagement accord sets the geographical lines of the new positions that will be occupied by the Israeli and Egyptian armies, the U.S. Proposal, whose full terms have yet to be made public, sets limits on the forces each side will be permitted to station at the front lines. The two agreements—the disengagement accord and the U.S. Proposal—constitute a single package.

The package is the result of a week of "shuttle diplomacy" conducted by Kissinger. But it must be said that even Kissinger was somewhat surprised at the ease with which Cairo accepted the essence of the Israeli position on disengagement.

Kissinger flew to Aswan in Upper Egypt on January 11, his third trip to the Arab East since the October War. U.S. reporters accompanying him were told that the purpose of Kissinger's trip was to "grease the

wheels" of the disengagement talks. At most, Kissinger was aiming at setting out a framework for moving the negotiations forward. In the January 12 *New York Times* Bernard Gwertzman reported that "a senior American official said that Mr. Kissinger hoped for more than just an improvement in the climate and that in shuttling between Egypt and Israel he would



KISSINGER: Even he was surprised at the rapidity of his success.

seek to work out a set of guidelines. It was felt that the Egyptian and Israeli negotiators in Geneva could then work out the details."

In his search for guidelines Kissinger planned to spend a day in Aswan, then fly to Tel Aviv for a day of talks with Israeli leaders, and then return to Aswan to report to Sadat before flying back to Washington.

But instead, Kissinger made three full round trips between Aswan and Tel Aviv, working out not merely guidelines but an entire, detailed agreement. The reason for the unexpected ease at reaching an accord was the

accommodation shown by Sadat to U.S. imperialism. To see just how accommodating he was, it is enough to look at Cairo's public position on the very eve of Kissinger's trip and compare it to the agreement that was signed on January 18.

In an article in the January 10 *New York Times* explaining the difficulties of disengagement, Henry Tanner wrote: "Egypt has stressed that any agreement on a disengagement of forces near the [Suez] canal must be followed by ironclad guarantees of a full Israeli withdrawal from the entire Sinai Peninsula. Egypt is insisting on a timetable for these subsequent withdrawals.

"Without such assurances, the Egyptians argue, the initial disengagement agreement would be nothing more than the 'interim solution' rejected by President Sadat before the October war, which is even less acceptable to him now. . . .

"The Egyptians point out that if they accept the stationing of a United Nations buffer force [between the Israeli and Egyptian armies], they would lose the ability to exert military pressure in case the Israelis refuse to follow up with full withdrawals." (Emphasis added.)

Eleven days after that dispatch was written, el-Gamasy signed his name to the disengagement accord and Sadat signed his to the U.S. Proposal.


### The Terms of the Deal

The package signed January 18 contains these essential points:

- Israeli forces will withdraw from their enclave on the west bank of the canal and establish a new front line (marked B on map, p. 68), about eight to fourteen miles east of the canal.

- The Egyptian front lines now held by the II Corps and III Corps on the east bank will remain in place, except that the gap between them opposite the Great Bitter Lake will be filled in. This will give the Egyptian forces control of a strip on the east bank





New York Times maps explain disengagement accord. On left is present position of opposing armies. On right is new posi-

tion called for in accord. Distance between Suez Canal and line C is about twenty miles.

approximately five to eight miles deep. (Line A on the map.)

- Between lines A and B will be a "buffer zone" three and a half to five miles wide occupied by the United Nations Emergency Force, which at present numbers some 7,000 troops.

- The area between the Suez Canal and line A, held by the Egyptians, "will be limited in armament and forces." The disengagement agreement does not specify the limitations. That is done in the U. S. Proposal. According to most reports, the Egyptians will be limited to 7,000 troops and thirty tanks. Currently, the Egyptian army has 41,000 troops in that area, 23,000 in the II Corps and 18,000

in the III Corps. Some 34,000 of these troops will be withdrawn to the west bank. The present Egyptian tank force on the east bank is estimated at 400-700.

- In the zone between lines B and C (five to seven and a half miles in depth) Israeli forces will be under the same limitations as the Egyptian forces between the canal and line A. Line C lies some fourteen to twenty miles east of the canal. But it lies west of the Gidi and Mitla passes and the el-Tasa road, which are the strategic keys to control of the Sinai peninsula.

- According to a report in the January 20 *New York Times*, the U. S. Proposal also calls on Egypt to re-

move all its heavy artillery (except the thirty tanks) and its SAM-2 missiles to a point "thought to be set at about eight miles west of the canal." Thus, the bulk of the Israeli forces in Sinai would be out of the effective range of the SAM-2, which is about twenty-five miles.

- A timetable was set up to implement the agreements. Military representatives of Israel and Egypt were called upon to meet within forty-eight hours after the signing of the agreement. They were given five days to come up with a plan for "detailed implementation" of the agreement. Disengagement is to begin within two days after the military representatives



complete their work and is to be carried out within forty days. The entire package will thus be put into effect within about seven weeks after signing, that is, before the end of the first week of March.

● The final paragraph of the disengagement accord states that the deal "is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference." Resolution 338, one of the cease-fire resolutions, reiterates the need for a general solution to the Arab-Israeli problem along the lines indicated by UN Resolution 242, passed in November 1967. Thus, the disengagement accord merely endorses 242.

## Who Gave In?

In the January 19 *New York Times*, military expert Drew Middleton opened an article on the disengagement agreement by saying that "from a military point of view Israel's withdrawal from her major bridgehead west of the Suez Canal and Egypt's retention of positions on the eastern bank and of bridges across the canal appear to shift the strategic balance in Cairo's favor."

In the same issue of the same newspaper Terence Smith cabled from Jerusalem: "The widespread initial reaction here is that Israel got a good deal. This sentiment is especially strong among the officials who participated in the exhausting week-long negotiations."

In the nearly twenty-six years of its existence, the Israeli state has never sacrificed a military "strategic balance" in favor of political gains unless forced to so by overwhelming U. S. pressure. And there is not the slightest evidence that any such pressure was involved in reaching the disengagement accord. In fact, Middleton's estimate, partially echoed in other sections of the U. S. capitalist press, is complete nonsense. Its aim is to prepare the U. S. population to go along with unconditional support of Tel Aviv in the future on the grounds that the Israeli state has undertaken an immense gamble.

The truth of the matter is that the disengagement agreement—even from

a purely military standpoint—is favorable to the Zionist state. Politically, it is an even greater victory for Tel Aviv.

From the military standpoint, the essence of the accord is that it effectively deprives the Egyptian government of any military options for the foreseeable future. The main front lines of the Israeli and Egyptian armies will be separated by about twenty miles, with a significant UN force stationed between them. This means that the tactic of a war of attrition, frequently useful for Cairo in the past, is ruled out under the agreement. Sadat will not be able to take any small-scale military measures against the Israeli forces.

Nor has the Egyptian army improved its chances for a large-scale assault to push the Israeli troops further east into Sinai. Any military buildup in the "limited" Egyptian zone east of the canal would be easily detectable by Israeli intelligence and therefore would be quickly countered. Surprise attack, which was responsible for the initial Arab gains in the October War, is now impossible.

Further, the October War demonstrated that the Suez Canal is not an effective antitank barrier. So the fact that the Israeli army has removed itself a few miles east of the canal means exactly nothing in terms of its ability to halt an Egyptian advance. The Israeli front line set by the accord is fully defensible and it lies, as has been noted, west of the passes that control the routes crossing the peninsula.

In effect, then, the disengagement accord establishes a new line between the Israeli and Egyptian forces that will be *easier* for the Israelis to hold than the pre-October line. And, into the bargain, it deprives Egypt of the weapon of war of attrition.

And the Israeli state will draw other benefits from the agreement. The enclave on the west bank of the canal, which would have been decisive had the war resumed, was getting to be more trouble than it was worth the longer the cease-fire held. The Egyptians were able to put constant pressure on the 20,000 Israeli troops there. Supplying the enclave was becoming increasingly annoying. "Actually," wrote Terence Smith in the January 19 *New York Times*, "Israel never intended to keep the territory, the area west of the canal having been cap-

tured for precisely the purpose of providing something to give back."

In sum, then, in exchange for depriving Cairo of every military option and establishing a more secure front line, the Israeli state has conceded a west-bank enclave that it never intended to hold anyway and a small strip of desert on which nothing of value is located. Israel maintains its occupation of more than 95 percent of the Sinai peninsula

Sadat did not even achieve a verbal pledge by Tel Aviv to withdraw eventually from any additional portions of Sinai. He will no doubt present the final paragraph of the agreement (the one referring to UN Resolution 338) as a commitment to total Israeli withdrawal. But in reality, the paragraph merely reiterates the validity of Resolution 242, which the Israeli regime has always maintained does not entail withdrawal from all of Sinai. Cairo had demanded a timetable for Israeli withdrawal. It got none. It had demanded the right to maintain its forces on the east bank, which is, after all, Egyptian territory. Instead, it was required to withdraw more than 80 percent of the troops it had positioned there. On no point has the Israeli regime retreated from the proposal it put forth as early as the end of November in the kilometer 101 talks.

## Why Sadat Did It

After the disengagement accord was announced, a senior American official briefing U. S. reporters in Jerusalem explained that he felt the chances for transforming disengagement into "peace" were greater than he had thought previously. "This was based," Bernard Gwertzman wrote in the January 18 *New York Times*, "largely on his impression of Mr. Sadat, who, American officials have said, is a pragmatic leader interested not only in peace in the Middle East but in improving relations significantly with the United States.

"In fact, another senior official said that he thought one of the more dramatic results of this disengagement agreement would be a highly visible improvement in Egyptian-American relations."

There has already been an improvement. Sadat referred to Kissinger as a "brother" and the government-controlled press in Cairo splashed photo-

graphs of Nixon's roving agent all over the front pages during his visits to Egypt. In the political sense, Sadat's acceptance of the disengagement accord represents a deepening of his turn away from the Kremlin and toward U. S. imperialism. The turn was begun in 1972 when Soviet military advisers were expelled from Egypt. After nearly two years during which Washington failed to respond to Sadat's overture, popular pressure on Sadat to act became unbearable. He then launched the October War, calculating that it would bring about a U. S. intervention favorable to him.

By accepting disengagement, Sadat has excluded waging such a war in the near future in favor of developing an alliance with Washington. One indication of this is the fact that the Kremlin played no public role in arranging the agreement. The official Soviet news agency, TASS, reported the disengagement accord in a brief dispatch without editorial comment.

And there are additional signs too. It has been reported that, while retaining his position as president, Sadat plans within weeks to relinquish his post as premier and that the premiership will go to Abdel Aziz Hegazi, the current vice-premier and minister of the economy and foreign trade. The appointment of Hegazi, who favors increased foreign investment in Egypt, would be a signal to the West and would be followed by further steps in denationalizing companies nationalized under Nasser and by a large increase in foreign investment, mainly American, in Egypt.

Sadat's intention, as it has been since the summer of 1972, is to prove himself a reliable, "pragmatic" ally of U. S. imperialism and thus convince Washington to pressure Tel Aviv to withdraw from a bit more of the Egyptian territory that it currently holds. And even if such pressure fails to materialize (as it has so far), U. S. dollars may prove useful in defusing the dangerous domestic situation in Egypt itself.

### The Next Steps

The day after the disengagement accord was signed, Sadat left Egypt on a tour of Arab capitals aimed at drumming up support for his policy. The first stop was Damascus. There he held

a six-hour conversation with Syrian President Hafez el-Assad. El-Assad has so far refused to initiate disengagement talks with Tel Aviv or to attend the Geneva conference. Reversing Damascus's attitude has thus become a top priority for both Sadat and Kissinger.

Kissinger followed Sadat to Damas-



SADAT: Off on a tour to peddle his capitulation.

cus, arriving there January 29 just one hour after Sadat's departure. After talking to el-Assad for four hours, Kissinger told reporters that the Syrian president had made "very constructive suggestions" on both disengagement and a "final" settlement. The main obstacle to the opening of Syrian-Israeli talks is Tel Aviv's insistence on receiving a list from Damascus of all Israeli prisoners of war now being held in Syria. El-Assad, whose control over both his population and his government is even less secure than is Sadat's in Egypt, has thus far refused to provide such a list. But it is likely that this obstacle will soon prove surmountable. If it is, disengagement talks between Tel Aviv and Damascus could begin, leading to a stabilization of the Syrian front along lines similar to the one achieved on the western front.

In the meantime, the Geneva conference is not expected to reconvene until the Suez disengagement is carried out. By that time, a new Israeli government will have been formed,

and possibly an Israeli-Syrian disengagement accord will have been reached. The conference would then move to "broader" issues such as the disposition of the West Bank of the Jordan, the Israeli occupation of Sinai and the Golan Heights, and the fate of the Palestinian people. With the military situation defused in a manner favorable to the Zionist state, those negotiations can, and probably will, drag on endlessly.

There are two main forces, however, that can disrupt the era of stability that the Arab-Israeli negotiations are trying to usher in: the Egyptian masses and the Palestinian masses. For a time, Sadat may be able to present the disengagement accord to the Arab masses as a victory—the first Israeli withdrawal from a piece of land seized in June 1967. But as the situation restabilizes itself with Israeli troops still in possession of most of the Sinai peninsula, and as Egyptian workers are subjected to increasing exploitation by foreign and domestic capital, opposition to Sadat's regime will undoubtedly intensify. How quickly this occurs and how effective the opposition is will depend in large part on the leadership the Egyptian workers and peasants are able to cast up.

The Palestinian response to disengagement will have a big effect on the development of the Egyptian opposition. For the Palestinian masses, both the disengagement agreement and the Geneva conference are a betrayal. Recognition of the existence of the Zionist state—by both the Egyptian and Syrian regimes, not to speak of the Jordanian—is incompatible with recognition of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. Already, the Palestinian cause has been a powerful catalyst for revolutionary struggles throughout the Arab East. If the leadership of the Palestinian movement rejects the disengagement accord and the Geneva conference, and mobilizes the Palestinian masses against them, not only will the power of the Palestinians be brought to bear against the sellout, but the opposition of the Egyptian and Syrian masses to it will be vastly strengthened. If, on the other hand, the Palestinian leadership follows the Arab regimes down the path of betrayal, the masses of the Arab East will be far less able to effectively oppose the machinations of imperialism, Zionism, and the Arab bourgeoisie. □



# Heath Pushes Confrontation With British Workers

By Tony Hodges

London

The measures announced by Edward Heath's Tory government December 13 are the most sweeping anti-working-class moves seen in a major capitalist country for more than thirty years. Heath ordered two-thirds of British industry onto a three-day workweek, forcing wage cuts and part-time employment on 16 million workers.

This massive onslaught on workers' living standards followed the government's failure to convince 270,000 miners to end a ban on overtime work launched November 12 to back up wage demands outlawed under the Tories' Phase III wage controls.

The miners have been demanding increases ranging from £8.21 to £12.71 in their basic rates, having suffered badly from inflation since their victory in the 1972 national miners' strike. Their present average gross wage is only £33.60 a week for a hard job in particularly dangerous and unpleasant conditions, factors that are presently convincing 30,000 miners a year to leave the pits in search of better jobs.

The government and the National Coal Board have refused to concede the miners' demands, saying that an increase of £2.30 to £2.57 is the maximum allowable under Phase III, which outlaws wage increases above 7 percent a year even though prices are rising far faster.

The effect of the overtime ban has been to force maintenance and safety work, normally carried out during weekends, to be performed during weekdays, thus reducing normal coal-cutting time. Output has fallen by 30 to 40 percent.

In early December 29,000 train drivers joined battle against Phase III. Their demand for a £40 weekly wage was also refused by the government, which ruled that a weekly wage of £33.00 to £36.95 was the maximum possible under Phase III. The train drivers refused to work on Sundays and, during the rest of the week, launched a work-to-rule action that decimated train services.

## The Tory Offensive

The Tories' reply to the challenges of the miners and train drivers was swift and massive. On December 13 Heath announced the three-day workweek, a national lockout of millions of workers forced onto part-time work. On December 17 the government unveiled a budget that slashes social services.

Sixteen million workers are now on a three-day week. About 2 million are registered as temporarily unemployed during part of the week in order to claim unemployment benefits. Many have not yet registered during their non-working days, because (so far) they are covered by 40-hour guaranteed week agreements in contracts and are ineligible for unemployment benefits. In many industries employers can and will suspend the 40-hour guaranteed week after two or three weeks' notice, so the number of workers registering for unemployment benefits in the coming weeks will soar.

Workers registered as temporarily laid off by the three-day week are suffering a huge cut in their standard of living, receiving the pittance of flat-rate unemployment benefit instead of earnings-related unemployment benefit. This means that a single person gets only £2.45 a week compensation for losing two days pay. A married couple with one child gets only £4.71.

The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has considered proposing to the government that guaranteed-pay deals be statutorily suspended, freeing employers from their contracts and from having to pay workers for a 40-hour week while three-day work lasts, a provocative action that the ruling class has not yet felt strong enough to take. But even where workers are protected by a 40-hour guaranteed week, their take-home pay is failing, particularly because of the stop in overtime payments, on which many workers have relied to protect their

standard of living against the ravages of inflation.

The December 31 London *Times* explained that "some loss of earnings is inevitable, even with guaranteed pay agreements, usually based on a proportion rather than their actual weekly wages. On top of this must be added any loss of overtime pay. Over £6 a week is the current average in manufacturing." According to the London *Observer* of January 13, gross wages have fallen by 11 percent since the start of the three-day week.

While workers' wages are plummeting, there are no signs of any letup in inflation. In fact, with output already down by 17 percent, employers will try to raise prices—no doubt with the approval of the Price Commission—to safeguard their profits and offset the effects of rising unit costs of production. This will be in addition to further big increases in the prices of many basic commodities, such as food, as a result of Britain's entry into the Common Market.

On December 17 the Tories made further attacks on workers' interests in an emergency budget that took £1,200 million off public expenditure. The government reduced by £69 million the expenditure on health, and it suspended its hospital construction programme. Some £200 million was slashed from education spending, including a £70 million cut in building programmes affecting 110 universities and colleges and a £95 million cut in the buildings-replacement programme for primary and secondary schools.

The Tories justified their unprecedented action of putting millions of workers on a three-day week by claiming that it was made necessary by the miners' overtime ban. According to Heath, the overtime ban was rapidly depleting coal stocks and threatening the country with power shortages and blackouts if emergency measures were not taken. In this way Heath hoped that all the blame for the crisis could be heaped on the miners.

In Parliament December 19, Heath



accused the miners of "inflicting through their action serious hardship on other people and serious damage to the country." He appealed to the "silent majority" to stand by Parliament and its laws against extremists and communists in the unions intent on destroying parliamentary democracy.

"We all know," Heath wrote in a special message in the January bulletin of the Conservative Political Centre, "that there are forces working in our society to undermine and destroy it. These groups rely on a false appeal to class loyalties. They also rely on the silence of the majority."

### Defending Phase III

Heath hoped that the suffering caused by the three-day week, combined with a big propaganda campaign to rally the nation, would slowly isolate and demoralise the miners, forcing them to settle within Phase III.

The Tories were prepared to take these drastic steps out of fear that the miners might drive gaping holes in the wage-control programme. They knew that if the miners won their demands, other groups of workers would follow the miners' lead and defy Phase III. The Tories acted to defend their whole wage-control policy from possible collapse. In doing so, they acted on behalf of the entire British ruling class, for whom the maintenance of wage controls is an urgent necessity.

British industry, plagued by a long-term decline in profitability, outmoded and backward, and unable to compete effectively with its imperialist rivals, can solve its problems only by restoring its profits at the expense of the workers, particularly by lowering real wages.

That was the Tories' objective from the moment they formed their present government in 1970. At first they hoped that they could keep wages down "voluntarily" by relying on the cooperation of the trade-union bureaucrats. But these misleaders could not sell voluntary incomes restraint to their rank and file. The victorious miners' strike in January and February 1972 left the policy in ruins, forcing the Tories to rethink their strategy and introduce a statutory incomes policy in late 1972, starting with a complete freeze of wages under Phase I.

Phase II, which allowed minimal wages rises of £1 plus 4 percent (increases that could not possibly keep

pace with price increases), followed in early 1973, and then, in the first week of November, came Phase III.

Phase III outlawed wage rises above 7 percent a year at a time when prices, as recorded by the Retail Price Index in October, were rising at an annual rate of 10.5 percent. Food prices were shooting up even faster—in October at an annual rate of 40 percent!

Legal controls on wages were only a part of the Tories' offensive against



HEATH: Asks "silent majority" to support attack on workers.

the working class. In 1972 the Industrial Relations Act became law, placing legal constraints on the unions' right to strike. This law set up a National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) with the power to fine or imprison trade unionists who refused to comply with its orders, a power shown only too well last October 22 when the NIRC fined the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) £75,000 for refusing to end a strike at the Con-Mech engineering factory.

In a similar vein, the Tories resurrected the 1875 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act to prevent unionists from effective picketing, and in February 1973 used this act to arrest twenty-four building workers—the Shrewsbury 24—for illegal picketing during the 1972 national build-

ing workers strike. Five days after the announcement of the three-day week, three of the Shrewsbury 24 were gaoled, after receiving prison sentences of three years, two years, and nine months.

Despite all these blows against the rights and living standards of the workers, the British ruling class has made little headway in ending its economic difficulties. By the end of 1973 the Tories' profit-boosting measures had so far failed to spur investment and the modernisation of British industry, and British capitalists were meeting still rougher competition on the world market, a fact dramatically underlined by continually worsening monthly balance-of-trade deficits. These now point to an annual deficit on the order of £2,500 million.

This was the context in which the miners struggle began and that forced the Tories to take their unparalleled action to defend Phase III. The Tories are prepared to stomach even severe cuts in profits, output, and exports in the short run in order to stand by their long-term strategic commitment to compulsory wage restrictions. As an industrialist quoted in the January 13 London *Sunday Times* put it: "I would prefer total chaos in the short term to the chaos if the government gives in."

### Miners Remain Determined

But the Tories have so far failed to intimidate the miners. To the contrary, the provocative actions of the government have intensified their determination and militancy. On January 2, tens of thousands of miners, unimpressed by Heath's patriotic appeals, stayed away from work, forcing a quarter of the country's pits to close.

Ronald Faux, visiting the Seafield colliery in Scotland, wrote in the *Sunday Times* that he "met no one who believed the miners should call off their overtime ban, or that the ban was responsible for the power shortages." He commented: "The Government believes this is a confrontation it must win, while the Scottish miners are clearly determined that they cannot afford to lose."

Faux gave a picture of the appalling work conditions that are firing the militancy of the miners. "The faces here are so steep that if anything breaks off or falls, it can maim a

man. Coal coming down a conveyor can suddenly avalanche. The injuries can be terrible. Five men were killed at Seafield last year in one accident,' Mr Willie Clark, a power loader said. To the injured could be added the 600 miners a year who die less spectacularly from pneumoconiosis."

Trevor Fishlock, also writing in the *Sunday Times*, quoted a Welsh miner: "If Ted Heath would come to our colliery, I would take him by the arm and show [how] we work. We would go down the pit and walk two miles to the coalface, crouching because of the low roof. His eyes would sting with the dust and he would think his brain was coming loose with the noise of the drills. He would see us eat sandwiches with filthy hands and hear about roof falls and he would get tired just watching us dig coal for seven hours in all that din and muck."

Fishlock quoted another miner as saying: "Mr Heath talks about the three-day week going on to the spring. He is digging in. But whatever his limit the miners will outlast it. This is a struggle to get a decent standard of living for working people. We want nothing less than we have asked for, and it is no good offering us riches in the distant future on condition that we knuckle under now. We want the bird in the hand."

A most striking confirmation of the militant mood of the miners was the "woolyback" revolt in the Leicestershire collieries. Called "woolybacks" by the rest of the country's miners for their sheeplike complacency in past struggles, the Leicestershire miners threw off their old reputation in a dramatic rank-and-file revolt against their long-established right-wing leader, Leicestershire NUM secretary and national executive member Frank Smith.

Smith had publicly advocated an end to the overtime ban and accused communists of fomenting industrial conflict. Immediately, 450 men stopped work at two pits, Ellistown and South Leicester. No-confidence resolutions were passed by the miners lodges. The Area Council, which consists of delegates from each pit, ordered Smith to retract his statement, and on January 12 he was hauled before a mass meeting of 700 miners to explain his actions. The meeting, in the most "moderate" coalfield in the country, where only 37 percent

voted for the 1972 strike, voted unanimously to continue the overtime ban.

Heath likewise failed to intimidate the train drivers. Militancy reached boiling point on the railways January 10, when thousands of train drivers staged a wildcat walkout after British Rail, under the orders of its chairman, Richard Marsh, started sending home drivers without pay when they refused to stop working to rule.

Philip Ginger, the train drivers' branch secretary at London's Waterloo Station, said that his branch members were "fed up with pussyfooting around. We've had great difficulty at branch meetings keeping the men from voting for an all-out stoppage." He added: "It has only been through the leadership of our general secretary, Mr Buckton, that the public have had any trains at all." But the anger of the drivers forced their union leaders to call an official one-day strike on January 15.

### Dangers to Heath's Policy

The Tories are also threatened by the likelihood of growing resentment as the three-day week begins to bite deep into workers' incomes.

On December 21, a mass meeting of shop stewards in the engineering industry in Liverpool suggested "strikes in reverse" if employers tried to suspend guaranteed pay deals, turning up to work on no-work days and striking on their allocated three working days. So far employers in the big engineering factories have not dared to suspend guaranteed 40-hour-week agreements.

On December 23, representatives of 100,000 engineering and car workers voted to stage sit-ins in factories if employers tried to cut wages. On January 12 workers walked out of several Lancashire textile mills after employers had refused to pay premium rates for Saturday work to workers forced onto a Thursday-through-Saturday workweek.

Heath's credibility could also take a knocking as the truth about coal stocks and the energy situation begins to spread, exposing the lies peddled to justify his emergency measures.

On December 29, the *London Times* wrote that "it is almost certain that stocks are about the same as at this time a year ago, and slightly better than before the national coal strike

of January-February 1972." According to the *Times*, coal stocks had been built up to unusually high levels in the months preceding the overtime ban, so that in October total coal stocks stood at over 35 million tons against less than 29 million in October 1972! The three-day week could boomerang against the government as workers see their standard of living slashed to solve an energy crisis based on myth and fabrication.

In addition to these problems, the three-day week will itself become an economic headache for the government if it continues much longer. The January 13 *Observer*, reporting a major survey of 120 manufacturing firms conducted by Business Decisions Ltd., revealed that "for most firms, February looks like being a critical month for a conjunction of difficulties: raw material supplies, cash-flow and profitability, and possibly labour relations (as companies gradually end guaranteed-week agreements). One in six manufacturers say their supply problem is critical. This will worsen to one in four in a fortnight's time, one in three by the end of the month, and between a half and two-thirds by the end of the first week in February."

Firms will have to continue to pay vast overheads and fixed costs while output, already down 11 percent, continues to fall, confronting firms with big jumps in their unit production costs and a drop in profits in many cases to zero.

### A General Election?

"The survey," the *Observer* continued, "raises the question of whether full-time unemployment and bankruptcies will have reached such serious proportions by the middle of February that the Government will be forced either to settle with the miners or go to the country [hold a general election]."

On January 9 the *Evening Standard* quoted a representative of the CBI as saying that "by the time we reach the spring we are really going to be nearly on our knees. The longer this goes on the more severe it will become. At the moment there is no general feeling that firms are struggling to exist. But after the next two weeks there will be a general severe deterioration."

The CBI was particularly worried that British industry might permanently lose some export markets as Brit-



ish firms, faced by three-day weeks and shortages of materials and components, fail to meet delivery dates on export orders. The *Evening Standard* warned that "reports were already coming in of orders being switched to other countries or cancelled, or that expected orders were being placed elsewhere."

If he is unable to make the miners or train drivers knuckle under, Heath may soon be forced to turn to either of two alternatives: calling a general election on the gamble that he will win increased authority for continued confrontation with the miners; or giving in to the miners' demands and risking the future of the entire wage-control programme. Lord Carington, chairman of the Conservative party, revealed this dilemma when asked by reporters January 4 whether Heath should call an election.

"I myself wonder," he replied, "whether it is a good thing to have a general election on issues of this kind. And they certainly are very divisive. But it may be that one may be forced to do so. There is only one sane solution to this critical situation. The miners should return to normal working."

The *Guardian*, in a January 7 editorial entitled "Reconciliation, not class conflict or party war," stressed the dangers facing the ruling class in an election at this time. A Conservative victory would "leave the Government confronting bitter and hostile trade unions" and might dangerously polarise the country without offering any guarantee that the miners would be more willing to settle their dispute within Phase III.

In line with their record of bold confrontation with the unions, the Tories may well decide that their only way of standing firm on Phase III will be to attempt to rally popular support against the unions in a vicious, mud-slinging, antilabour election campaign, gamble on winning, and then with renewed authority fight it out with the miners.

### Role of Labour 'Leaders'

None have proved more spineless in this crisis than the bureaucratic misleaders of the Labour party and the Trades Union Congress (TUC). At a time when the Tories have brought about a total shambles, with runaway inflation, part-time work, and massive wage cuts, the working-class

movement should be mobilising its huge potential strength against the government. But the established officialdom of the labour movement have done absolutely nothing. At first, Labour party leader Harold Wilson actually accepted the need for the three-day week; he criticised only its inequitable application!



WILSON: Favors "leadership and conciliation" over self-defense.

The TUC General Council turned down demands that a special congress of the TUC be summoned immediately to coordinate a united response from the labour movement to the Tories' attacks, instead contenting itself with a special meeting of union presidents and general secretaries on January 16.

The crisis has sent so-called left-winger Hugh Scanlon, president of the AUEW, running for cover. Speaking on London Weekend Television January 13, he defied his union conference's opposition to wage controls by calling on workers to settle pay disputes within Phase III. "Our problem," he stressed, "is to get an offer to the limit of Stage 3, not to break it. I am saying that categorically."

Scanlon was echoing TUC suggestions to the government that it treat

the miners as a "special case," granting them big wage increases in return for a TUC commitment to accept Phase III in other industries.

Jack Jones, general secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, another "leftist," explained it this way: "We say: Look, settle the miners' case as an exception. The legislation permits this, incidentally. We are not saying to the government: Drop all your legislation."

Both Jones and Scanlon are strongly supported by the Communist party in the trade-union movement. Indeed, Scanlon, along with Labour party National Executive Committee member Judith Hart and CP General Secretary John Gollan, will be the star speaker at a major CP rally.

Harold Wilson has been obsessed with the fear that Heath's confrontationalist attacks on the working class might strengthen militants in the unions and expose the bureaucracy to attacks from the left.

Nora Beloff, political correspondent of the *Observer*, shrewdly noted January 6 that "Labour moderates, including Mr Wilson, believe the anti-Communists in the NUM and other unions can best be helped by concessions, whereas Ministers take the opposite view. Surrender to militancy, in their view, would prove that strong-arm methods pay, and would encourage Communists and other revolutionaries to ask for more." But, Beloff concluded, "both sides identify the same enemy."

In a January 4 speech, Wilson accused the Tory government of being "God's gift to militants and trouble-makers." He continued: "Every act of government creates new militancy, when what the country needs is leadership—leadership and conciliation."

Wilson again accused Heath of stirring up militancy in the unions in a speech on January 9. There had always been militants in the coal industry, Wilson lamented, but "what worries us is what this government has done and is doing to the moderates in the coal industry."

The Labour leaders' capitulation before the Tories was confirmed on January 12, when the Labour party National Executive Committee and the parliamentary committee of the parliamentary Labour party jointly approved the text of the party's 1974 campaign programme. This document openly committed the Labour party



to maintaining wage controls, criticising the Tories merely for their refusal to work out a pact with the trade-union leaders to apply a "voluntary" incomes policy with union backing.

While the Labour party leadership has clung throughout this crisis to its traditional class-conciliationist, right-wing policies, Wilson has dispatched his shadow minister of trade and industry, Tony Benn, to give radical-sounding speeches to party and union meetings to placate criticism from the left.

Benn began to vocalise the growing public resentment of Heath's attacks on the miners and the three-day week. He blamed the Tories for creating a phony crisis by fabricating claims that the country was on the edge of a serious energy crisis.

Benn was careful, however, not to

propose any way forward for the working class other than to suggest establishing an enquiry by the Labour party into the country's real supplies of energy and the effects of the three-day week. As a top leader of the Labour party, Benn of course endorsed the party's commitment to an incomes policy.

Benn and Wilson reflect in their speeches the contradictory pressures they face during this crisis. As leaders of a party based on and created by the unions as a class alternative to the capitalist parties, they are forced to adopt radical rhetoric to appear attuned to the concerns and interests of workers in struggle. However, as privileged bureaucrats totally committed to the status quo, they pursue right-wing policies and aspire to govern a capitalist society themselves.

The Labour party and the TUC

should adopt a fighting programme demanding a full week's work or full pay; the spreading of available work by reducing work hours with no cut in pay; full support to the miners and train drivers; automatic wage increases to offset inflation; price committees of unionists, pensioners, women, students, and tenants to determine the real rate of inflation; and the repeal of legislation restricting the right to strike and to picket.

In support of such a programme, the Labour party and trade unions should organise rallies and demonstrations up and down the country to mobilise opposition to the Tories' attacks. But it is their fear of mobilising the working class in struggle to defend its rights and standard of living that has paralysed the established leaders of the labour movement before the Tory offensive. □

## Maneuvers of the Companies and the State in Switzerland

# The Arab Oil Boycott: A Conspiracy With the Trusts?

[The following article, the second in a series on the energy crisis and its effects, appeared in the January 1 issue of *La Brèche*, fortnightly organ of the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire, Swiss supporters of the Fourth International. The first article in the series was published in the January 21 issue of *Intercontinental Press*. This article, like the first, was signed by R.L. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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In the first part of this article we showed that the Arab countries' utilization of the oil weapon was not a sign of radicalization of the Arab countries' policy, but of a move to the right under the new leadership of Faisal, traditional friend of imperialism. The oil weapon is a carefully moderated means of pressure within the framework of the Geneva conference. The Arab regimes, in concert with the Soviet bureaucracy and U.S. imperialism, will seek to set up a situation that will allow the revolutionary process, of which the Palestinian cause has been a catalyst, to be

blocked up. In exchange for a few tiny concessions from the state of Israel—whose military power has just been bolstered once again by the Americans—the bourgeois Arab regimes, under the aegis of Saudi Arabia, are preparing to recognize the existence of the Zionist state and, in alliance with it, to stem the rise of the Arab socialist revolution.

We also showed that the Arab governments were unable and unwilling to keep their boycott going very long. Since the turn of the year 1970, when the oil market tightened, putting sellers, among them the Arab countries, in a position of strength, the five main axes of the policy of the oil trusts have been:

1. Monopolize alternative sources of energy: coal, bituminous shale, asphaltic sands, atomic energy.
2. Gradually disengage from the too great dependence on the third world, which does not offer sufficient long-range political guarantees for imperialist investment.
3. Initiate a process of oil price rises aimed at financing their investments and making other sources of energy competitive with oil.

4. Have governments finance their investments.

5. Increase their share of the distribution of petroleum products in order to compensate for profit losses in production, which tends more and more to be controlled by the producing countries (through participation, nationalizations, etc.).

And finally, we showed how the Arab boycott, because it tallied with this policy, had profitable effects for the trusts: It accelerates price increases; it gives them an easy excuse for additional increases ("it's the Arabs' fault"); it allows them to avoid the antipollution measures that restrict their operations by appealing for emergency measures against the oil shortage.

### Arab Boycott: A Maneuver by the Trusts?

This conjunction between the Arab boycott and the interests of the oil trusts has given rise to suspicion that there is a huge conspiracy between the trusts and the Arab governments. Obviously, this suspicion is strength-

ened by the well-known fact that Faisal and the emirs of the Arab-Persian Gulf are intimately tied to the oil trusts. Some people even go so far as to present the boycott as a case of Faisal and the emirs carrying out the orders of the imperialist trusts.

But that analysis is oversimplified and erroneous, for two basic reasons:

First, it totally ignores the political context of the Middle East crisis, of which the boycott is the result and to which the operation of the boycott is linked. Certainly the boycott is being carried out under the leadership of Faisal, who, along with the emirs, controls the largest part of Arab oil and therefore is mainly responsible for carrying the boycott out. But governments that have policies that are in relative opposition to the oil trusts, such as those of Algeria, Syria, and Libya, are also participating in the boycott.

But more than that, the conspiracy analysis overestimates the submissiveness to the oil trusts even of a Faisal and, in a way, totally ignores the role of the Arab masses, who cannot be suspected of collusion with the trusts. Faisal's policy is developing within a context that on the one hand obliges him to engage in certain actions having a nationalist veneer in order to win the leadership of the Arab world and, on the other hand, in "anti-imperialist" demagoguery that can always serve him momentarily to stem the pressure of the Arab masses in order to prop up his extremely fragile feudal regime.

Second, the conspiracy analysis underestimates the totality of politico-economic problems tied to energy policy in the capitalist system and attributes too great a margin for maneuver to the oil trusts as they come to decisions that have real repercussions—however different in magnitude from those now being trumpeted by the capitalist press—on the economic situation. It is one thing to say that the trusts can profit from the boycott. But that should not lead us to an understanding of the "crisis" as nothing more than a huge conspiracy of the trusts and their puppets in the Arab world.

The profitable effects for the trusts exist only insofar as the boycott remains within modest limits, as it has so far. But the imperialist countries are too dependent on Arab oil to tolerate a possible very tough or even

total boycott. Certainly, such a boycott is inconsistent with the character of the current Arab regimes. *But imperialism prepares for all possibilities.* The November 17 issue of the British weekly *The Economist* reported a statement by U. S. Senator Fulbright obviously aimed at laying down the limits for the game:

"[The Arab countries] must take account of the pressures and temptations to which the powerful industrial nations may be subjected should their economies be threatened by a long and severe energy crisis. . . . [The United States] is a superpower that can dispense with applying economic pressures, contradictory as that may seem. The Arab oil producers are the militarily insignificant gazelles in a world of lions."

The 1956 Suez expedition was aimed at assuring the security of oil deliveries to Europe. In recent years, the U.S. army trained in the subtropical forests of the Southeast United States in preparation for Vietnam. Lately, they have been training in the deserts of California and Nevada! "The United States has given the Marines a new assignment," wrote the August 27, 1973, *U.S. News and World Report*. "To be prepared, if needed, to fight in the desert . . . presumably in North Africa or the Eastern Mediterranean. That is where U.S. oil interests are great." In the present world situation, American imperialism would intervene with its own troops only as a last resort. First, it will use the powerful local policemen it has armed. The December 8, 1973, *Le Monde* reported a recent statement of the South Yemeni government, the most "leftist" in the Arab world, announcing that strong concentrations of *Iranian troops* had massed on its borders. So it is certain that before intervening directly, imperialism will first utilize its agents in the Near and Middle East, either Iran or Israel.

### A Well-Calculated 'Boycott'

Let's look now at the effects and consequences of the Arab boycott in the imperialist countries, particularly Switzerland.

One fact is clear: These countries, like all the capitalist countries that import oil (the economic situation in the underdeveloped capitalist oil-importing countries is even more serious), are to a very great extent

at the mercy of the multinational oil trusts, which totally control the market for petroleum products and are "organizing" the Arab boycott in order to reap to the maximum the profitable effects that the boycott entails for them.

In the first place, the trusts are sharing out the available oil on a world scale, rationing it, so as not to lose any customers. Thus, the trusts have demolished the selectivity that the Arab governments had wanted the boycott to have. The trusts are sending much greater quantities of non-Arab oil (Iranian, Nigerian, and Venezuelan) to the countries targeted by the Arab countries (the "enemy countries," Holland and the United States, and the "neutral countries," Germany and Switzerland). Thus, the trusts are dividing up the shortage and depriving the "friendly countries" (Britain and France) of the advantages that they thought they would draw from their "pro-Arab" policy.

Second, they are intensifying the "shortage" by hoarding so that the profitable effects will really be worth the effort. The December 15, 1973, *Economist* drew attention to the many fully loaded tankers anchored in British ports. It noted: "The oil companies are using them as floating reservoirs in the same way that they have been paying garages to keep their tanks full." And it seems they are doing the same thing in Switzerland. "An Argovian national counsellor reports that a number of petroleum transporters are lying without being unloaded in the port of Basle, and he is asking Why," reported the December 8, 1973, issue of 24 *Heures*.

### The Trusts and the Boycott in Switzerland

Since the start of the Arab boycott, the oil trusts in Switzerland, as in the other importing countries, have used it to get maximum profits.

1. The prices of petroleum products have risen with dizzying speed. The price of light heating oil has more than doubled, even though it had already increased 53.7 percent between July and October 1973! It should be noted that the price of gasoline has gone up less than the prices of other petroleum products, because too high an increase in gasoline prices would result in too big a drop in automobile sales. And, since the automobile in-



dustry is one of the driving forces in economic growth, too sharp a fall in sales would aggravate the coming recession!

2. The price increases bring the trusts a gigantic net windfall profit by raising the value of their current stocks, which were bought at the old prices but, obviously, will be sold at the new ones.

In Switzerland, in order to assure "economic defense of the country," the trusts are required by law to have constantly on hand in addition to their usual stocks a quantity equivalent to half of that consumed in the preceding year, that is, a little less than a six-month supply, taking account of the regular increase in consumption. So the windfall profits will be made on gigantic quantities of oil!

3. The trusts are supplying their own distribution outlets with more oil than the independent distributors in order to *eliminate competitors* by forcing them to raise their prices or by making it impossible for them to service their customers. "On Monday," wrote the November 28, 1973, *TLM*, "many independent gas stations had already raised their prices by about 5 centimes a liter. Other stations followed suit yesterday. On the other hand, the stations of the so-called integrated companies, Esso, Shell, BP, etc., are still holding their prices."

4. The Arab boycott furnishes the ever cooperative bourgeois state with the excuse to free the trusts from the restrictive and costly limitations imposed to protect the environment. "Yesterday," wrote the December 4, 1973, *TLM*, "the Federal Council was again busy with the oil crisis. In order to help maintain the supply of oil it decided to postpone the reduction of lead content in gasoline to .40 grams, which had been scheduled for January 1."


### The Oil Crisis: New Fuel for the Employers' Attack

The oil "shortage" does not profit only the oil trusts.

The bourgeois state and all the circles interested in atomic energy (private and combined private and public electricity companies, factory-building firms, in which the oil companies are also active) are getting ready to beat the drums about the oil crisis in order to sweep away the opposition that is

limiting and slowing down their prized atomic-reactor program.

Real estate companies and landlords are doing a brisk business. They are saving on fuel oil by reducing temperatures in offices and simultaneously raising the charges for heating by more than the increase in fuel oil prices. Moreover, they are benefiting from an increase in the value of their



FAISAL

oil supplies, because the tanks of most landlords were filled in September, before the boycott.

To "meet the oil shortage," the Federal Council has taken three measures aimed at reducing consumption of petroleum products: reduction of speed limits to sixty miles an hour; allocations of sales of petroleum products; and the celebrated prohibition of driving on three Sundays. Measures have also been taken to prepare for possible rationing.

*These measures are a fraud.*

1. By themselves, they will reduce total consumption of petroleum products by only an infinitesimal amount. The allocations are so flexible that they still grant complete freedom to oil sellers; and, most important, the automobile accounts for only a very small part of the consumption of petroleum products.

2. They are simply a government label stuck on a rationing scheme that was introduced much earlier by the

oil trusts and is totally controlled by them. "The companies had thus anticipated the government by limiting their sales in the Swiss distribution network. . . . The authorities' decision only legalizes an already existing situation, as it were." (*TLM*, November 22, 1973.)

3. Centered on automobiles, they aim, above all, at restricting the consumption of private individuals, and therefore at a not insignificant part of the work force, and not at any considerable number of industrial and commercial capitalists.

Here we come to one of the central functions of these measures and of the policy of the Federal Council in the oil crisis: to bolster the employers' attack by generating an atmosphere of crisis aimed at making the working class accept a reduction in its consumption. The oil crisis came at a good time for the bourgeoisie. It allows it to initiate a huge catastrophe-mongering ideological campaign aimed at making the workers swallow wage freezes in the name of the unity of all against a common danger. "Only a common effort will allow us to surmount the difficulties that may momentarily affect our supplies of energy," said the Federal Council's November 11 declaration.

The oil "shortage" has already hit the working class by raising the prices of gasoline and heating. It will be further utilized to justify an austerity policy, perhaps even income freezes.

In face of this, we affirm that the workers ought not to pay for the bourgeoisie's inability to assure a coordinated program for supplying energy—energy that is not at all scarce, as we shall see—nor should the workers have to pay for the profit-making and maneuvers of the oil trusts.

Apart from demands for across-the-board wage increases and a sliding scale of wages and pensions—the only immediate solutions to the "oil shortage" and its consequences for wage earners—the workers movement must

### Correction

On page 40 of last week's article, "The Arab Embargo and the Oil Trusts' Response," the first paragraph under the subhead "A Huge Maneuver and How to Make Others Pay for It" concludes with the phrase "investments estimated at a million dollars." The phrase should read "investments estimated at a million million dollars."



put forward the following demands:

— Open the books of all the oil companies to eliminate their monopoly of definite information on reserves, stocks, storage and refining capacities, and the quantities in circulation, a monopoly that covers a huge gamut of operations, of which we have been able to describe only a tiny fraction.

— Nationalize without compensation

all oil companies and their installations in order to establish a national department having a monopoly on supply, refining, and distribution of petroleum products. If it supplied itself on the world market not through the trusts but directly from the producing states, such a department would be able to eliminate the speculative maneuvers of the trusts; and it would be

able to lower sales prices, even while paying higher prices to the producing countries, by eliminating the profits and superprofits of the trusts—superprofits that run as high as 22.2 percent of the final prices, in addition to the "normal" profit (at least 10 percent) that is raked in at each stage (production, transport, refining, distribution). □

## Profits and Secrecy

# U.S. Imperialism and the World Energy Crisis

By Ernest Harsch

Not only has the energy crisis brought the prospect of higher profits to the American oil giants, it has also reaffirmed the hegemony of U.S. imperialism over the other capitalist powers. Because the United States commands greater supplies of domestic energy than Japan or West Europe, its economy as a whole has been better able to absorb the effects of the oil embargo and the price hikes.

In December the value of the U.S. dollar began to rise compared to other currencies. "The currency movements," wrote the December 28 *New York Times*, "illustrate dramatically how the energy crisis has altered market patterns. In the course of just a few months, the much-disparaged dollar, at times even refused for exchange by European banks, has again become the most sought-after currency in circulation." On January 7 the Japanese yen was devalued by 6.7 percent and on January 19 the Pompidou regime announced that the franc would be set free of any fixed rates, as both governments tried to alleviate the balance-of-payments deficits expected to result from higher prices for oil imports.

The greater susceptibility of Japan and West Europe to the oil embargo was one of the reasons for their hesitancy in backing Washington during the October War in the Arab East. Likewise, Nixon's call for a conference of "oil-consuming" states in Washington on February 11 can be viewed as an attempt by Washington to strengthen political and economic cooperation with its allies. According

to the January 19 *Business Week*, the conference would probably only "set up working groups to make recommendations on topics ranging from energy conservation to 'recycling' surplus Arab funds into Western money markets."

But since the economies of Washington's allies already face serious problems as a result of the embargo and the higher prices, the enthusiasm of those states for such a conference appears quite low. To obtain more immediate and concrete results, they have entered into direct negotiations and deals with the oil-producing states of the Arab-Persian Gulf.

"Japan has just promised Iran \$1.5-billion [thousand million] in joint ventures to build petroleum refineries and petrochemical plants," wrote the January 19 *Business Week*. "Belgium is dickering with Iran to set up a jointly owned refinery in Liege, tied to a long-term oil supply. Germany and Iran have several big projects for developing 'hostage' investments in each other's economy, as an assurance of long-term cooperation in oil." In addition, Paris concluded a deal with Faisal that would bring France 185,000 barrels of crude oil a day for three years. Another proposal still under negotiation would provide the Saudi regime with French fighter-planes, tanks, and industrial equipment in exchange for 800,000 barrels a day for twenty years. Yet another agreement would involve French construction of petrochemical plants in Kuwait and Abu Dhabi. London is also trying to confirm a deal

that would ensure it 1 million barrels a day from several of the Arab-Persian Gulf states.

Among those invited to the February 11 conference, Paris has been the most reluctant to go along with Washington's proposals. The January 17 *Wall Street Journal* wrote: "Diplomatic sources say the French view the Washington invitation as a Nixon ploy to reassert U.S. influence over Europe and the Mideast while undermining French influence. France would prefer an early Arab-European conference, which she expects to dominate because of carefully nurtured friendliness with Arab countries." The January 16 *New York Times* noted: "The French suggested that each conference participant remain free to make its own contracts with oil producers and arrange its internal oil market. This is a clear challenge to the idea of harmonizing consumer policy to avoid ruinous bidding against each other for oil."

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has warned some of the European states that if they proved uncooperative, Washington would be in position to outbid them for oil supplies. William Donaldson, under secretary of state for security affairs, who has been coordinating Washington's plans for the February 11 conference, echoed this threat when he said: "If we are forced to play that game, we should be a very strong player."

But Donaldson added, "Even if we did all right, the international trade and monetary system would be damaged or destroyed, and political sta-

bility shaken." Though the dynamics of capitalist rivalry pose the danger of fierce competition for oil supplies, both Washington and the other imperialist states would prefer to avoid such a conflict if possible.

One factor, however, that could further spur some states to conclude their own deals with the Gulf regimes would be additional increases in the price of crude. Though the American monopolies have benefited from the rise to \$11.60 per barrel, (an actual market price of about \$8.30), further price hikes by the Arab-Persian Gulf regimes could have political and economic repercussions that neither Washington nor the oil companies would care to face. Veiled threats of armed intervention against the Gulf regimes, should they try to make too great gains from their oil fields, were a clear indication of the limits to the price hikes that U.S. imperialism was willing to allow.

With the "disengagement" accord of January 18, the lifting of the oil embargo may now be politically feasible for the Arab regimes. Some U.S. officials, such as William Simon, the federal energy director, even expect that the price of crude might go down a little. That would do much to ease the problems of the other imperialist powers and would slightly undercut the tendencies toward competition with Washington.

The U.S. oil monopolies had welcomed the oil price hikes as a way to make domestic oil and alternate energy sources more competitive with foreign oil. Domestic crude oil had been selling for \$5.25-\$8.73 per barrel and estimates for shale oil extraction range from \$6 to \$8 per barrel. Thus, the increase in the world-market price of oil from the Arab-Persian Gulf makes domestic oil more competitive and the large capital outlay for the development of shale oil more feasible. From the viewpoint of the oil companies, further price hikes would not be necessary.

But if the price of crude oil from the Gulf should go down a few dollars, the oil magnates would want some kind of protection for their plans to expand their exploitation of U.S. domestic energy supplies. Treasury Secretary George Shultz suggested a variable levy on oil imports as the best form of protection. The January 13 *New York Times*, in an article discussing Shultz's proposal, said: "There

must be a mechanism to assure that Arab and other oil producers cannot break the oil price in the United States downward as they have just exploded it upward." Schultz is reportedly attracted to the "variable levy," an import duty that is adjusted daily to ensure that imports are slightly higher in price than the domestic products.

The profits that the oil giants can expect to reap from the development and exploitation of domestic energy sources are tremendous. The January 21 *Newsweek* noted that the Green River oil-shale formation in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming might contain as much as 1.8 million million barrels of oil or "2.7 times the world's proven petroleum reserves and enough to handle America's energy needs for 140 years at the 1973 consumption rate." Washington put up a number of these oil-shale tracts for lease, touching off a flurry of bids by the oil companies. Exxon already holds twenty-nine private shale tracts. The same issue of *Newsweek* carried a two-page Exxon advertisement extolling the virtues of nuclear energy. The oil monopolies own more than half of the uranium reserves in the United States and 40 percent of the uranium milling capacity.

Not only has the rise in oil prices made the development of domestic energy sources more profitable, it has also given the government a convenient excuse to help the oil companies by financing the research and development of those sources. Government officials have announced a \$1.6 billion program for energy research and development during fiscal 1974.

While the oil corporations receive Washington's aid in laying the basis for future profits, the American people appear to be less than enthusiastic about the energy "conservation" schemes proposed by Nixon. The January 18 *Wall Street Journal* wrote: "A sizable segment of the public, notwithstanding the Arab embargo, suspects the government and the industry of perpetuating a gigantic oil-shortage hoax. As a result, the policy-makers fear that public support for voluntary energy conservation could erode away. And oilmen worry that Congress will be moved to take measures against their companies." William E. Simon, the federal energy administrator, said in an interview in the January 19 *New York Times*: "Let's face it, we've got

a terrible credibility problem in this country today, and we've got a mood in this country where people really don't believe the institution of government, it seems."

On January 18, 3,500 members of three New Jersey unions—the United Automobile Workers; the International Union of Electrical Workers, Radio, and Machine Workers; and the New Jersey Industrial Union Council—demonstrated in front of an Exxon research center to protest what they said was a fuel shortage staged by the major petroleum companies for the purpose of driving up prices. Many of the demonstrators had lost jobs because of the energy situation.

Skepticism and anger on the part of working people has prompted the oil companies to launch their own Operation Candor. They have released reports and figures trying to convince people of their innocence in the energy crisis. A full-page advertisement by Shell Oil that appeared on January 18 in a number of newspapers read in part: "It is a natural tendency at a time like this to try to put the blame on someone. We, as an oil company, are prepared to bear our share of the blame, but let us remember that there is plenty of blame to go around to all segments of our society. The worst thing that could happen for everyone is if the oil industry should be made the scapegoat."

The distrustful response to the energy crisis has prompted some members of Congress to question the roles of the oil giants. One problem that has received considerable attention is the secrecy in which the oil companies operate. Various proposals to check the sales, profits, stocks, and refinery capacities of the oil companies have been suggested. But the January 21 *Newsweek* observed the difficulties of any kind of "watchdog" operation: "The major companies participate in every phase of the oil business, from the production of crude to distribution. This provides them with tremendous flexibility in accounting, making it difficult to determine exactly what part of their operations profits come from."

Even if there were no problem of corporation secrecy, the U.S. public could hardly expect a vigorous watchdog effort on the part of the federal energy administration. Commenting on his idea of "normal" profits in his January 19 *New York Times* inter-



view, William Simon said: "I think that every company in this country is entitled to a reasonable profit. And what is a normal return? A normal return is a return at the lowest possible level to induce investment in that company. Not excessive profits that come from an imbalance between supply and demand.

"And, in looking at the oil industry in particular over the last 15 years, our preliminary results of some of the numbers we've got right now on the net return on invested capital show them in the middle range of all manufacturing companies."

The much debated "windfall profits tax" would not seriously cut into the profits of the oil giants. The January 19 *Business Week* described one possible variant of the tax: A bill proposed by Representative Les Aspin and Senator George McGovern would impose an 85 percent tax "on all profits that exceed each company's average profit level during the past four

years—but companies can avoid the tax to the extent that they increase investment in domestic energy development." Such investment is exactly what the oil giants intend!

Nor has the U. S. government confined its generous treatment of the oil trusts to subsidization through tax incentives. Just one week after columnist Jack Anderson summarized the contents of secret memoranda on Aramco's operations in Saudi Arabia, another "oilgate" revelation was announced by Senator Frank Church, chairman of a Senate committee on multinational corporations. His committee has managed to obtain thirty-eight classified documents written during the Eisenhower administration. Although the documents themselves were not made public, Church's aides summarized their contents. The January 16 *New York Times* wrote:

"The Justice Department was considering antitrust action against several of the largest U.S. oil companies.

A proposal had been made to empanel a grand jury, with an eye toward obtaining criminal indictments.

"The State Department and the National Security Council wanted some U.S. companies to take part in a planned consortium to drill for oil in Iran. Normally, such a consortium might be construed as a violation of the antitrust laws. It was argued, though, that the U.S. companies would be a force against communism in Iran.

"The oil companies 'evidenced some reluctance' to go into Iran. To help induce them to do so, the antitrust attack from the Justice Department was watered down.

"First, the proposal for a grand jury was abandoned. The Justice Department then filed a civil antitrust suit against a number of the major oil companies. As a result of decisions made in the National Security Council, however, even this civil suit was watered down, to exempt the production end of oil business." □

## Franco Court Dooms Young Anarchist

# Widespread Effort to Save Life of Salvador Puig

Salvador Puig Antich, a 26-year-old anarchist who belonged to the Iberian Liberation Movement, was sentenced January 9 by a military tribunal in Barcelona to two death sentences—one for participating in an armed holdup of a bank in March 1972 and the other for killing a policeman in September 1972 at the time of his arrest.

Puig's two comrades, who were convicted of complicity in the bank holdup, received harsh sentences. José Luis Pons, 18 years old, was given 30 years in prison. María Augustias Mateos, 17 years old, was given five years.

On the eve of the trial, a number of European and American personalities sent an appeal for moderation to the tribunal. The list of signers included General Bollardiére, Laurent Schwartz, Alfred Kastler, Jean-Marie Domenach, Marcel Bataillon, Léo Maratasso, Michel de Certeau, Mrs. Germaine Tillion, Lord Caradon, and Joan Baez.

Referring to the assassination of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco Decem-

ber 20, the signers indicated that this event might sway the tribunal in reaching a verdict.

In a speech January 6, Dictator Franco in fact set up a witch-hunt atmosphere that clearly influenced the court. "Fighting this kind of terrorism is as important and preeminent a task," said the generalissimo, "as preparing our armed forces for a war to defend the fatherland from foreign attack. We must put our hearts into this struggle, redoubling the military qualities we dedicate to the service of our country."

At the trial, Puig did not deny any of the charges leveled against him. He acknowledged that he fired two shots at the policeman when he was arrested. But he insisted that he had fired only after a struggle during which he was severely beaten and shot in the jaw.

The defense cited the testimony of military doctors that the beating suffered by Puig at the time of his arrest could have caused temporary mental derangement, leading him to fire at

the policeman.

After the death sentence was passed, close to 1,000 persons marched in downtown Barcelona in a solidarity demonstration. They circulated a leaflet denouncing the regime's "attempt at legal assassination." Some of the demonstrators threw Molotov cocktails at the police.

On the following day about 2,000 persons assembled at the Place des Ternes in Paris to protest the sentences. The sponsors of the demonstration included Rouge, Révolution, Lutte Ouvrière, l'Organisation Révolutionnaire Anarchiste, l'Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme, the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria-ETA(VI), and the Front Révolutionnaire Antifasciste et Patriote.

Among the slogans demonstrators chanted were "To save Puig Antich, workers solidarity!" and "Franco assassin! Pompidou accomplice!"

In Toulouse a small group of far-left militants occupied the Spanish Cultural Center.

Puig's two death sentences are the

first to be handed down in Spain for a political crime since 1963. In that year, two anarchists, Joaquín Delgado and Francisco Granados, were executed on August 17.

On April 20, 1963, a Communist party leader Julian Grimau was executed by a firing squad.

The court decision in Puig's case must be submitted to the captain general of Barcelona. He in turn submits the papers, plus any comments filed

by the defense and his own observations, to the Supreme Council for final decision. However, Franco has the power to grant an amnesty at any time.

Commenting on the political implications of the case in the light of the assassination of Carrero Blanco in December and the subsequent reshuffling of Franco's regime, the January 11 *Le Monde* held that it was "very unlikely that the head of state will

commute Puig Antich's sentence of capital punishment to a prison term."

Amnesty International and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions have asked the Spanish state to commute Puig's sentence. In France, various political parties, trade-unions, and civil-liberties organizations have appealed to Franco for leniency.

Appeals have been sent to the United Nations and to the Vatican to intervene in the case. □

## 'Sherlock Holmes Has Solved a Lot Tougher Cases'

# Accumulating Evidence Keeps Pointing to Nixon

By Allen Myers

Suspending his own hearings into the "nonexistence" and erasure of subpoenaed White House tape recordings, Judge John Sirica on January 18 asked Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski to conduct a grand jury investigation of the missing evidence.

"It is the Court's considered opinion," Sirica read from a memorandum he had prepared, "that a distinct possibility of unlawful conduct on the part of one or more persons exists here. A grand jury should now determine whether indictments are appropriate.

"These statements cannot be construed as identifying any particular wrongdoer or unlawful act. The Court refrains absolutely from accusing any person or persons, and refrains as well from a final conclusion that any illegal conduct has occurred. Rather, the Court has concluded from the evidence now before it that the possibility of unlawful tampering with or suppression of evidence is sufficiently strong to merit grand jury scrutiny."

While Sirica's language was judiciously restrained, the testimony of the preceding days had made it absolutely clear that a "person or persons" had engaged in the deliberate destruction of evidence, that only a handful of persons had the opportunity to commit the crime, and that the person with the best opportunity and the best motive for doing so was none other than Richard Nixon.

On January 15, a panel of six ex-

perts assigned to study the White House tapes delivered to the court their unanimous conclusion concerning the recording of a June 20, 1972, conversation between Nixon and H. R. Haldeman, then chief of the White House staff. The report concerned a mysterious buzz that obliterated 18.5 minutes of the tape—the entire portion in which Nixon and Haldeman discussed the Watergate break-in, which had been discovered three days earlier.

When the gap was first announced in Sirica's court last November, Nixon's lawyers advanced the idea that it had been accidentally caused by Rose Mary Woods, Nixon's personal secretary. Woods said she "must have" inadvertently pressed the "record" instead of the "stop" button on the machine she was using to transcribe the tape when she was interrupted by a telephone call. But it was pointed out that she would have had to keep a foot pedal depressed at the same time, requiring extreme contortions to reach her telephone. And Woods said that she could not have accounted for more than four or five minutes of the erasure by her alleged accident.

The technical experts unanimously concluded that Woods had not caused any of the gap—at least not in the manner described. Their report stated:

"Magnetic signatures that we have measured directly on the tape show that the buzzing sounds were put on the tape in the process of erasing and re-recording at least five, and perhaps

as many as nine, separate and contiguous segments. Hand operation of keyboard controls on the Uher 5000 recorder was involved in starting and again in stopping the recording of each segment.

"The magnetic signatures observed on the tape show conclusively that the 18.5-minute section could not have been produced by any single, continuous operation. Further, whether the foot pedal was used or not, the recording controls must have been operated by hand in the making of each segment."

If the erasure occurred by accident, the panel's spokesman agreed with an assistant prosecutor, "it would have to be an accident that was repeated at least five times."

The experts also concluded that the erasure was done on Woods' office tape recorder, which according to Secret Service records was purchased last October 1. Therefore, whoever erased the tape must have had access to both the tape and that particular machine after that date. Earlier testimony before Sirica had indicated only four persons with access to the tape: Nixon, Woods, presidential appointments secretary Stephen Bull, and J. Fred Buzhardt, one of Nixon's White House lawyers. Nixon, of course, was the only one of the four whose conversation was recorded on the tape originally.

"The vanished eighteen minutes," the *New York Times* said in a January 17 editorial, "constituted the only part



of the tape that referred to Watergate — the first conversation on that subject between the President and his former chief of staff, three days after the Watergate break-in. As Mr. Halde- man's notes show, it contained the President's instructions concerning a 'public relations' response to the foiled political espionage plot. Under the circumstances, 'public relations' can only be considered a euphemism for cover-up. . . ."

Congressman John Anderson of Illinois, leader of the House Republican Conference, commented, "This is the most serious single bit of evidence to date. The theory that there has been a conscious effort to conceal evidence is no longer a theory."

"Not only was the tape doctored deliberately," Anderson continued, "but it probably occurred on the machine that Miss Woods used. Certainly, a very limited number of people in the White House would have had access to that machine. Sherlock Holmes has solved a lot tougher cases than that. . . ."

"One has the feeling of approaching the final denouement in this drama. I fail to see how this can do anything but accelerate the tempo of the impeachment process."

## Preventive Counterattack

Only a few hours before the report of the experts was delivered to Sirica, Vice-President Gerald Ford made a speech before a meeting of the American Farm Bureau Federation in Atlantic City, New Jersey. What drew attention to Ford's remarks was not his view of agriculture but rather what he had to say about Watergate.

The Watergate scandal, as Ford told it, stems primarily from the fact that "a few extreme partisans . . . seem bent on stretching out the ordeal of Watergate for their own purposes, whatever they might be." He named the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations and the liberal Americans for Democratic Action as two members of a coalition of "powerful pressure organizations . . . waging a massive propaganda campaign against the President of the United States."

Reporters who thought this view of the scandal sounded familiar soon wrung from the White House the admission that the remarks had been

prepared by Nixon's speechwriters.

Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported that the White House staff was also behind the remarks of Senator Barry Goldwater made during an interview on national television January 13. Goldwater, whom speculation in Washington has named as the leader of a potential Republican delegation that would ask Nixon to resign, asserted that he would refuse such a role if the delegation ever materialized. He went on to offer the opinion that Nixon's prestige was on the mend.

On the same day, Attorney General William Saxbe floated a trial balloon hinting at a possible Nixon strategy for interfering with the impeachment investigation. On another television broadcast, Saxbe indicated that Nixon would claim "executive privilege" in order to keep evidence from the House Judiciary Committee in its investigation of the various impeachment resolutions. This, he said, might delay the impeachment investigation for a long time, until the Supreme Court had ruled on the matter.

There was an obvious explanation for the sudden hard-line speeches stimulated by the White House. Nixon knew that the experts had uncovered the reason for the gap on the tape, and he was lining up whatever support he could muster. But such a strategy only makes sense if Nixon was directly or indirectly involved in the erasure.

"The shocking report of the technical experts," Evans and Novak wrote in their January 17 column, "was no surprise to either the prosecutors or the White House. Each side had been given progress reports by the experts, including information weeks ago that it was possible to discover 'fingerprints' on the tape left by the Uher recording machine. . . ."

"The President's lawyers had two possible responses. They could express their own shock and pledge an attempt to find the culprit. Or, they could issue a hard-nosed lawyer's challenge to Jaworski: Prove what you can, but we'll fight you every step.

"All steps point to the latter course."

The implications of Nixon's actions, the columnists concluded, had not been missed by others in Washington:

"So, with hard evidence now in hand that the tape was adulterated, the tougher questions remain of when,

where and by whom the deed was done. Jaworski is intent on getting the answers. That the President's lawyers seem ready to fight him at every step is scarcely reassuring to worried Republicans both on Capitol Hill and in the White House itself."

## The 'Snicker Factor'

During the course of the week, two additional scandals surfaced that further undermined the head of the White House gang. Both stemmed from leaks from someone on the Senate Watergate committee.

Lawrence Meyer reported in the January 16 *Washington Post* that the committee is in possession of memos in which a White House official discussed the use of federal funds to support Nixon's reelection. The memos, written in 1972 by Frederic V. Malek, a special assistant to the president, called on "every Cabinet agency except the State Department to make President Nixon's re-election a priority consideration in the award of government contracts and grants," Meyer wrote.

In one memo, "Malek cites a dozen instances where the Commerce Department made favorable grant decisions totalling roughly \$1 million 'which otherwise would not have been made' if the White House had not intervened. 'Politically,' Malek states, 'these actions have been most beneficial.'

"Malek goes on to say that 'the potential is much greater,' pointing to \$700 million in grants the Commerce Department had to award in the current fiscal year and another \$700 million in grants for the coming fiscal year 'which could be redirected in some manner.'"

The other leak concerned secret testimony of Richard G. Danner, an aide to billionaire Howard M. Hughes. Danner, who was an official in Nixon's 1968 campaign, reportedly testified that Nixon was present at a meeting with Danner and C.G. Rebozo in which it was decided to solicit the contribution of \$100,000 that Hughes ordered delivered to Rebozo in two installments in 1969 and 1970. Nixon has publicly denied even knowing of the gift until early in 1973.

There have been reports that many, perhaps a majority, of the members of the Senate committee are opposed to holding further public hearings. But even if the senators cooperate with Nixon in this fashion, he faces a con-

tinuing threat from the activities of the special prosecutor's office.

Jaworski, in a January 18 television interview, hinted rather broadly that he has already begun, or is preparing to begin, a process of "plea bargaining" with a number of the likely defendants in the Watergate case. That is, these potential defendants were put on notice that they could perhaps have the charges against them reduced if they agree to cooperate with the prosecution and tell what they know about higher-ups.

"Rumors of plea bargaining," Bill Kovach wrote in the January 19 *New York Times*, "circulated widely in Washington last week when it was learned that John D. Ehrlichman, known to be under investigation for his activities while serving as domestic adviser to President Nixon during the Watergate scandal, had visited Mr. Jaworski with his attorneys."

Columnists Evans and Novak reported January 16 that Jaworski's office is continuing to question former White House counsel John Dean, who pleaded guilty to one charge last October 19 in a deal worked out with the prosecutors. That deal granted Dean immunity from further prosecution, but with one exception: He could still be prosecuted for perjury if it should be found that he was lying in his charges against Nixon.

The fact that Jaworski continues to question Dean, the columnists pointed out, indicates that the White House tapes that Jaworski has obtained do not contradict Dean's testimony—as Nixon claimed they would.

It has been rumored for several weeks that Jaworski's office is studying the legal question of whether Nixon can be indicted by the grand jury without first being impeached by the House of Representatives and convicted and removed from office by the Senate.

The January 15 *Wall Street Journal* reported the response of 100 members of Congress whom the paper had interviewed regarding the question of impeachment. The survey was deliberately concentrated "among those members of Congress whose support is vital to the President's survival—Republicans and conservative and moderate Democrats."

The paper found a "fragile majority against impeachment" but added that this majority "could crumble quickly"



DEAN: Still talking.

if more evidence implicating Nixon were to surface. (The interviews were conducted before the experts' report on the erased tape was made public.)

The survey also found an "almost universal unwillingness of Republicans to argue the President's case for him. Instead of volunteering any defense of their chief, the Republicans emphasize that he is an isolated figure who will survive or fall on his own. As they discuss their indecisive feelings about impeachment, many Republicans make it clear that it wouldn't break their hearts to get rid of Mr. Nixon."

What many of those interviewed were concerned about, the paper wrote, was

Nixon's inability to regain any credibility with the public "even if Mr. Nixon survives impeachment."

The same problem, it is certain, is preoccupying the ruling-class circles from whom the Congress takes its instructions. This concern was called "the snicker factor" by one congressman, Republican William Hudnut of Indiana. "People he's trying to persuade laugh at him," Hudnut said. "They say, 'Who are you to talk about saving energy or election reform?'"

A president so hampered by the "snicker factor" that he cannot mobilize public support for the programs favored by the ruling class is a president who has lost most of his usefulness. On January 18, Wilbur Mills, an influential conservative Democratic congressman, put forward a proposal that may yet be served up to Nixon as a "compromise" he will be required to accept. Mills suggested that if the House Judiciary Committee votes to recommend impeachment, Nixon should then resign "rather than put the country into the greatest schism since the Civil War."

"Mr. Mills also said," Eileen Shanahan reported in the January 19 *New York Times*, "that he would favor legislation that would grant Mr. Nixon immunity from prosecution, once he left office, for any crimes he might have been involved in as President. There has been informal discussion of such legislation among members of Congress, but no such bill has been introduced, and Mr. Mills was the first major political figure to endorse the idea." □

## Indonesia

### Tanaka Visit Sparks Massive Protests

On the last leg of his tour of five Southeast Asian nations, Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka was greeted in Jakarta by thousands of youths protesting Tokyo's economic domination of Indonesia. On his arrival at the airport on January 14, about 800 students attempted to reach the airport terminal but were forced back by troops carrying automatic weapons.

The next day tens of thousands of students and young slum dwellers poured into the streets. Reporting to

the January 16 *New York Times*, correspondent Richard Halloran wrote: "From the late morning until late at night, despite a curfew declared by the Government, high-school and university students and others roamed large sections of this sprawling city, burning automobiles, trucks and motor bikes that were made in Japan. They built bonfires and fed them with furniture tossed out of Japanese office buildings.

"Buildings with Japanese signs were



attacked, flags were ripped down and stores were looted during the demonstrations."

Numerous buildings, a Japanese shopping center, and about 500 Japanese-made automobiles were burned during the protests. Don Oberdorfer, in a January 16 dispatch to the *Washington Post*, noted that "the legitimate students with a coherent program have all but disappeared from the streets and young toughs from slum areas have taken over."

The biggest clash that day occurred when army troops firing over the heads of demonstrators drove more than 10,000 youths away from the President Hotel, which is jointly owned by the Indonesian government and the Japanese firm Mitsui. Bands of demonstrators, some with up to 500 participants, continued to roam the streets, tearing down the ceremonial Japanese flags that had been put up in Tanaka's honor and attacking anything they considered a symbol of Japanese domination. Some ethnic Chinese businessmen were also attacked.

Foreign Minister Adam Malik declared in a January 16 interview, "It's not polite, with your guests here, to start shooting," and the troops had been ordered not to fire on the youths. But an official announcement of casualties said that 10 persons had died in the protests, 105 had been injured, and about 170 arrested. Some of the deaths resulted from clashes with the soldiers.

By January 17, after Tanaka had left, troops moved in to occupy the University of Indonesia, where the first actions against Japanese imperialism had originated. The chairman of the student council, Hariman Siregar, who had organized some of the earlier protests, was arrested along with a few instructors.

Indonesia is economically dependent on Japan for both imports and exports, and Tokyo views the resource-rich islands of Indonesia as an important source of energy and raw materials. In the course of his talks with President Suharto, Tanaka agreed to extend a loan of \$200 million for a liquefied natural gas development in North Sumatra and East Kalimantan, bringing Tokyo's total stake in the project to \$700 million. The Japanese imperialists expect to get 7.5 million tons of liquefied natural gas from Indonesia each year. □

## Case Arouses Widespread Support

# 7 Chileans Face Ouster From Britain

London

Seven young Chileans—two married couples and three single males—are challenging a ruling by British Home Secretary Robert Carr that they cannot remain in Britain either as students, as visitors, or for reasons of political asylum. The Chileans are supporters of the former Allende government and if forced to return now could expect imprisonment, torture, and possible death. The case has been taken up by the National Council of Civil Liberties and other groups and individuals concerned with defending democratic rights in Britain.

The seven Chileans, who arrived in Britain on December 7, were detained by immigration officials. At that time they were refused permission to stay in Britain either as visitors or students. On December 28 a deputation led by Lord Brockway (which included representatives of the Church of England, the Roman Catholic church, the Jewish Board of Deputies and several Members of Parliament) failed to get the Home Office's decision changed.

This refusal came from the government despite the fact that the Chileans had meanwhile obtained permission to register at various colleges in Britain. They also spoke English as a second language and had friends in England. They were due to be deported that evening, so they then made application for political asylum.

The next day, the Home Office refused the Chileans political asylum as well, and again ordered them deported. On New Year's Eve, after an eleventh-hour bid by their legal representatives, the seven Chileans were granted a temporary legal order restraining the government from deporting them.

At another hearing, on January 2, it was granted that the appeal of the seven Chileans should go to the High Court for a decision. The legal action is expected to come before the court in about a month. The Chileans' legal advisers have served notice of appeal against refusal of entry with the Immigration Appeals Tribunal.

The government's high-handed treat-

ment of the seven Chilean students has served to rally considerable opposition and has focused attention on the general policy of the British government towards refugees from Chile. According to the *Guardian* of December 28, Mrs. Mary Dines, the general secretary of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, charged the government with "lack of humanity." "She said France had received more than 400 refugees, Holland several hundreds, and Sweden an estimated 5,000. Britain had received only 54, all but one of whom had been an expatriate."

In an editorial entitled "A Shameful Affair" the December 30 *Observer* stated: "One is reminded of the Dutschke affair, in which a sick man was chased out of Britain to conciliate the paranoid fears of the right wing of the Conservative Party."

The internationally known civil-rights organisation Amnesty International has taken up the case. In the December 31 *Times* Roger Clarke of Amnesty International is reported as saying: "The United Kingdom has taken in only 54 Chileans, and we understand that all of those have either British or Irish relations. While they have been messing about refusing admission to these seven, other countries have been taking in hundreds."

The wide opposition to the threatened expulsions points to the possibility of an effective campaign on behalf of these victims of Tory policy. A successful outcome would be a great stimulus to others who are seeking asylum in Britain from various countries but are obstructed by a reactionary immigration policy. □

### He Had Nothing to Say

U.S. Attorney General William Saxbe told reporters January 15 that in his first week on the job he had approved the installation of three "national security" telephone wiretaps.

Saxbe assured a questioner that he himself was a "safeguard" against "excessive" wiretapping. He went on to add that he thought his own telephone had been tapped for twenty years and that it was no great inconvenience.

## The Bombay General Strike

By Kailas Chandra

Bombay

JANUARY 10—The "Maharashtra bandh," a statewide general strike called by leftist unions for January 2, was a complete and unprecedented success. Even Maharashtra Minister of State for Home Affairs Sharad Pawar had to admit grudgingly that the bandh had been total. Of the 2,000 factories in Bombay, only about fifteen remained in operation, and those with depleted staffs. The impact of the bandh was felt even in small towns and rural areas. More than 3 million workers all over the state responded to the strike call, heralding an era of bigger struggles in the new year.

The bandh was called by the AITUC (dominated by the Communist party of India), CITU (Communist party, Marxist), HMP (Socialist party), HMS, Sarva Shramik Sangh (Lal Nishan party), and a section of the INTUC (Congress party) and the BMS (Jan Sangh party). The demands of the action included the slashing of prices of essential commodities by at least 25 percent, revision of the cost of living index, unemployment relief, and adequate food grain rations.

The bandh began at midnight January 1, with the night-shift workers downing their tools and the road transport workers withdrawing their vehicles. By daybreak all industrial and business activities had come to a standstill in Bombay and in all the important cities in the state.

In Bombay over 1 million industrial workers and more than 100,000 workers of the port, dock, municipality, bank, and insurance offices stopped work. Government offices, commercial houses, shops, markets, cinemas, hotels, schools, and colleges were all closed. The newspaper employees, including journalists, also joined the strike, and as a result there were no evening newspapers on January 2 and none at all on January 3.

On the docks, loading and unloading operations stopped com-

pletely. Public transport came to a standstill. Several thousand workers of the two railway systems operating from Bombay (Central and Western) also joined the strike, their first strike action since 1948. All through-trains leaving the city were canceled and the local rail services were also suspended for the day.

The government came down with a heavy hand to break the bandh. According to a government statement, about 1,500 people were arrested in connection with the bandh, but the actual number was much higher. On the same day, the police opened fire at Wani, near Yeotmal district, on a crowd that was protesting the arrest of several leaders, including an elected legislator. Six persons were killed and many injured. The police also opened fire in Bombay, but there were no casualties. They used tear gas in many places and resorted to brutal baton charges in several urban centers.

The temper of the people was illustrated at a public meeting in Nagpur, the second capital of Maharashtra, where the audience refused to listen to a speech by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. As soon as she referred to the food problem as an all-India phenomenon caused by factors beyond the government's control, the entire crowd started shouting: "No bhashan (speeches), we want rations!" The protest was so loud that after seventeen minutes the prime minister had to end her speech abruptly and leave under heavy police escort. The audience hurled several thousand shoes and *chappals* at the dais from which she spoke.

The grand response and the mighty solidarity of all sections of the working class and the toiling masses in Maharashtra in observing the bandh was unheard-of in the history of the working class in the state. The statewide general strike proved a success far beyond the expectations of the sponsors belonging to the traditional left parties.

The ruling Congress party sought an alliance with a semifascist organisation, the Shiv Sena, in Bombay, to break the resolve of the working class to resort to common action against the Congress government. Deliberately with a view to frustrating the January 2 bandh of the working class, the Shiv Sena organised a "Bombay bandh" on December 18 with the support of the Congress party, ostensibly to focus attention on the "border dispute" between Maharashtra and the neighbouring state of Karnataka. On December 18 supporters of the Shiv Sena organised systematic attacks on non-Marathi-speaking linguistic minorities in the city. The police did not intervene at all.

For several days prior to the January 2 general strike, the Congress party, ruling both in Marathi-speaking Maharashtra and Kannada-speaking Karnataka, organised linguistic riots in the border towns of the two states to disrupt the working-class movement. The "Maharashtra bandh" was a fitting reply to the manoeuvres of the ruling class, coming as it did in the wake of the isolated struggles of workers, white-collar employees, and rural poor protesting against the antipeople policies of the government in almost all the states.

In Bombay nearly 200,000 cotton textile workers have been on strike since December 30 demanding a 25 percent increase in wages. The strike, led by three leftist unions (led separately by the CPI, the CPM, and the Lal Nishan party), is in defiance of a wage pact reached by the mill owners and the Congress-led Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Union conceding a nominal wage increase of Rs 25 (US\$3) a month.

Meanwhile an important election campaign was being fought from Bombay city for the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament). The Congress party candidate was challenged by the CPI, Jan Sangh, and the Hindu Mahasabha in a four-cornered contest. The Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee, led by Rajni Patel, a former CPI man, made an alliance with the Shiv Sena to fight the election. The CPI candidate was Roza Deshpande, daughter of the party's chairman S. A. Dange. Polling was scheduled for January 3. □



## Santiago Snipers Shoot at Refugees in Embassies

By Candida Barberena

An estimated 3,000 political refugees, perhaps many more, remain in jointly sponsored United Nations-church sanctuaries and in foreign embassies in Santiago nearly four months after the military coup. Their fate remains uncertain. The Pinochet dictatorship has decreed that they must be out of the country by February 3.

Although some governments, notably in Mexico, Argentina, Canada, France, and East Germany, have responded to an appeal to accept refugees addressed to them by UN High Commissioner for Refugees Prince Sadruddin Asa Khan, they have hedged their offers with "conditions." For example, Mexico and Argentina have required some of the refugees they accepted to "settle" elsewhere. The case of Peruvian revolutionist Hugo Blanco illustrates this arrangement.

Refused immunity in Argentina in 1970 after spending seven and a half years in Peru's El Frontón prison, Blanco was ultimately granted residence in Chile, where he was living at the time of the coup. Like thousands of other Latin American political exiles in Chile who had fled repression in their own countries Blanco once again had to find a country willing to receive him. It was finally with the help of the Swedish Embassy in Santiago that Blanco was able to obtain political asylum in Sweden, via Mexico.

Of a list of little more than fifty-four persons who have submitted visa applications for the United States, only a family of four had been accepted up to January 4. Britain has so far closed its doors to refugees. The Soviet Union has accepted only

six persons married to Soviet citizens. The January 5 *Washington Post* explained Moscow's policy as follows:

"Moscow's lack of enthusiasm about the non-Chilean refugees is understandable, diplomatic sources said, since many of them are Trotskyists or other unorthodox leftists who have been critical of the Soviet Union."

The *Post* further pointed out that "Moscow's failure to welcome these refugees, many of them in desperate situations, has caused some bitterness among Latin American leftists."

Cuba has placed no restrictions on immigration. Yugoslavia has agreed to accept sixty refugees and East Germany admitted 400.

Sweden is prepared to accept several thousand individuals, according to reports. Nearly 1,000 persons have so far entered France as refugees.

The West German authorities have adopted a highly selective system of screening prospective immigrants. "The Bonn government," *Le Monde* reported January 3, "has actually sent representatives from the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution to Santiago de Chile to interview candidates desiring to emigrate."

A communiqué by non-Chilean refugees published in the January 3 *Le Monde* denounced the immigration policies of West Germany, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Finland. These countries, the message said, "... choose us on the basis of our nationality, our skin color, our physical strength, and our formal education. They use commercial criteria."

In Chile, the carabinieri have been firing at refugees in the foreign embassies. On January 3 a sniper shot 27-year-old Leiva Molina. According to the police version, Molina, a Chilean citizen, had left the embassy to buy some sandwiches.

The report that appeared in the January 5 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión* contradicted the

police version. "... it is absurd to think that Leiva Molina would have left the diplomatic center when he already had a safe-conduct pass that would have enabled him to leave Chile. He would have only been taking an extremely futile risk."

The murder of Leiva Molina brought angry criticism from Argentina, including a pledge to take immediate steps to evacuate everyone living in its Santiago embassy. The Chilean reply was rifle fire into the home of Argentina's chief negotiator, Alberto del Carril. Del Carril was in his study in a different wing of the house when the bullet smashed through his bedroom wall.

A Chilean couple described in the January 3 *Le Monde* what asylum in the French Embassy in Santiago was like:

"The entire residence was a huge dormitory. There were refugees in every room, the dining room, the office, the attic, the garage, everywhere. It was a 'period of full occupancy' with up to 170 in the residence and 90 in the chancellery."

The weekend before the December 11, 1973, deadline for requesting safe-conduct passes "... twenty-five persons jumped the gate to the residence under the nose of the carabinieri, who sometimes let them go, sometimes not, stopping some of them instead."

On December 18, Rolando Calderon, Allende's former minister of agriculture, was gravely wounded by a sniper as he stood in front of the Cuban Embassy, where he was a refugee. The Swedish government sent neurologist Erik Kagstrom to Santiago to attend Calderón, rather than leave him to the mercy of the junta's doctors. The junta deported Kagstrom, claiming he had "caused public unrest."

The virtual siege of embassies in Santiago was described in the December 20, 1973, *La Opinión*:

"Various refugees who have managed to leave Chile during the last

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few weeks reported that all the embassies housing refugees were constantly besieged by police personnel, generally dressed in civilian clothes, waiting for a chance to seize important refugees. The Honduran, Argentine, Mexican, Cuban, and Swedish

embassies have been most often besieged. Last Monday [December 17, 1973] the leader of the dissolved Radical party Olaf Liend was arrested in the gardens of the Honduran mission. Liend had been a refugee for three months." □

## Protest Tokyo's Penetration of Thailand

### Thai Students March Against Tanaka Visit

In the largest demonstrations since the overthrow of the military regime in October, Thai students turned out to protest Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka's visit to Thailand and the American CIA's interference in Thai affairs. On January 9, about 5,000 students greeted Tanaka on his arrival in Bangkok, carrying signs reading "Invading Economic Animal," "Tanaka, Go to Hell!" and "Jap, Go Home!" Later, 2,000 students barricaded the exits to Tanaka's hotel, delaying his appearance at a dinner reception with Thai Premier Sanya Thammasak. Throughout the day, students marched through the streets of Bangkok and burned effigies of Tanaka along with Japanese televisions, cameras, and a papier-mâché model of a Japanese automobile. A few windows at Japanese department stores were broken and a plastic bomb was thrown at the Japanese trade promotion office.

Unlike earlier student protests against Japanese imperialist penetration in Thailand, the demonstrations on January 9 were not called by the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), the largest student organization. Since the imposition of the Sanya caretaker regime in October, the NSCT has to a certain extent cooperated with the new government in helping to channel continued discontent into acceptable forms. In fact, the NSCT came out in opposition to any mass demonstrations during Tanaka's visit.

"The NSCT requested all student organizations to refrain from 'any unreasonable protests' during the visit of Prime Minister Tanaka, an NSCT spokesman announced today," read a January 3 dispatch to the Tokyo

English-language *Daily Yomiuri*. "The NSCT will instead try to arrange a meeting with the Japanese prime minister on January 10.

"NSCT representatives on Wednesday [January 2] approached the police department asking its cooperation to provide radio communications equipment vehicles in order to help maintain good order among student bodies during Tanaka's visit.

"Communications coordinating centers would be temporarily set up at Chulalongkorn, Thammasat and Kasetsart universities in order to prevent any 'unreasonable protests.'"

Opening the January 10 meeting between Tanaka and thirteen Thai student leaders led by Sombat Thamrongthangawong, the secretary general of the NSCT, the students read a statement which began: "We apologize for any disturbing happenings, but there were so many Thais who did not believe that you were sincere in your past statements." They then cordially discussed with Tanaka the problems that Thailand faced as a result of Tokyo's economic domination and how the relationship between Japan and Thailand could be "changed" so that Japanese imperialism would instead "benefit" the Thais. In the light of the NSCT's moderate approach, the demonstrations against Tanaka, in opposition to the NSCT's call for a moratorium on protests, are even more significant than their numbers would suggest.

In a situation of inflation-spurred labor unrest (sometimes as many as fifteen or twenty new strikes a day are reported), the opposition to Japanese imperialism can be expected to increase. About 37 percent of all foreign investment in Thailand is

Japanese, according to official statistics. Likewise, Japanese goods account for 37 percent of all imports, and 25-30 percent of Thai exports go to Japan. The growing trade between Thailand and Japan has strengthened Tokyo's imperialist hold over the Thai economy. The December 5 *Daily Yomiuri* noted that "while Thailand has become more industrialized, it has become more dependent on imports from Japan, both producer and consumer goods." In addition, "Thailand is now becoming more and more dependent on Japan for an outlet of its products. This is an inevitable outcome of the greater involvement in trade and investment by Japan."

Most of the Thai exports to Japan are raw materials (agricultural goods, lumber, and fish, with an increased amount of mining and energy products since 1970), while imports from Japan consist mainly of consumer goods and machinery: a typical trade pattern between imperialist and underdeveloped countries. The Thai tariff regulations favor the import of Japanese machinery, thus curtailing Thailand's own industrialization.

Being dependent on Tokyo for finished products, the Thai economy is extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in Japan's growth rate. As a result of the current energy crisis, which has hit Japan harder than any other imperialist country, exports of Japanese machinery, petrochemicals, and other industrial materials to Thailand may drop considerably, further aggravating Thailand's economic problems.

One of the side-effects of Japanese industrial expansion in Thailand that was raised in the discussions between the NSCT leaders and Tanaka was the pollution caused by Japanese plants. As a result of the struggles in Japan against pollution, the Japanese imperialists have begun to build their industrial complexes in other Asian countries, in effect exporting pollution. The Autumn 1973 issue of *AMPO*, an independent leftist magazine published in Tokyo, noted that a large petrochemical complex, partially sponsored by the Mitsui and Mitsubishi interests (two of the largest Japanese corporations), is being planned near Bangkok, with construction scheduled to begin in 1976. The protests in Japan over pollution were



one of the reasons for locating the complex in Thailand.

Another reason was the Kra Canal project in the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand, which Tokyo plans to build as a way of strengthening its oil lifeline to the Middle East. The project will probably be a joint Japanese-American-Dutch-Thai operation. In an article written before the ouster of the Thanom regime, published in the quarterly *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, No. 3, 1973, Wolfgang Wehner said, "In the Gulf of Thailand huge oil deposits are suspected, the concessions of which have already been given to the following companies: Tenneco, BP [British Petroleum], Amoco, Gulf, Conoco, Union and Esso." The stability of the Thai regime, and its friendliness to foreign capital, is obviously something that concerns these interests. □



TANAKA: Gets hot reception from Thai student demonstrators.

oil crisis. The *Review* also noted: "The first rally of the Seksan-led student organization has gained enthusiastic public support. This may serve to indicate that, should FIST continue to gain support, it could become stronger than the NSCT."

[Early in December, Seksan toured the United States briefly, speaking mainly to Thais in Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C. The rally in New York, at Columbia University on December 14, drew an audience of more than 400 Thais, most of them students. The meeting was sponsored by Thai students and journalists in New York. Seksan presented a slide show of the October events—mass meetings, marches, street fighting, the massacre of students—and gave a talk on the dynamics of the student and worker uprising and on the current situation. The following interview with Seksan Prasertkul, conducted in English, was obtained on December 15 for *The Militant* and *Intercontinental Press*. The transcript of the interview, with minor stylistic changes, was not checked by him.]

## Interview With Seksan Prasertkul

### What Students in Thailand Are Seeking

[During the student demonstrations that led to the overthrow of the Thai military regime in mid-October, Seksan Prasertkul was in charge of the operational staff of the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT). The NSCT, which had more than 100,000 members, called the first demonstrations and protests against the old regime, demanding greater democracy and the drafting of a new constitution. Seksan, as the public relations officer of the NSCT and a member of its executive committee, was one of the most well known and popular student leaders.

[Early in November, Seksan and a few other leaders of the NSCT resigned from the executive committee over organizational and political differences. They charged that the NSCT, under the leadership of its general secretary, Sombat Thamrongthangawong, was too closely tied to the new regime of Premier Sanya Thammasak. The lack of democracy within the NSCT was also a factor that added to the political differences. The NSCT is currently on a campaign to "educate" Thais in the countryside and in the cities—complete with gov-

ernment approval and massive funding—on the mechanics of "democracy" and the parliamentary system. This is an obvious attempt to build up support for the new regime and to channel all political activities into the elections, which are scheduled for sometime in June or July.

[After leaving the NSCT, Seksan formed the Free Student Group at Thammasat University, where many of the student protests had originated. Later, similar groups at Chulalongkorn, Kasetsart, Chiang Mai, and Ramkhamhaeng Universities merged with Seksan's group to form the Federation of Independent Students of Thailand (FIST). Seksan was elected president.

[The political importance of FIST's emergence was underlined by the attention that the split received in the bourgeois press. Reports of it were published in periodicals from Japan, Hong Kong, the United States, and probably from other countries as well. The December 10 *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported FIST's first rally, which was held at Thammasat University at the end of November, addressing itself to Thailand's current

*Question. Could you briefly describe some of the events that led up to the October uprising?*

*Answer.* In June there was a demonstration against a rector of one university who repressed student freedom, freedom of opinion. During that demonstration, the students promised the people that they would fight for a constitution within six months.

*Q. Just prior to the uprising, some students were arrested at Thammasat University for distributing leaflets . . .*

*A.* Actually, you must admit that I can describe things only briefly. If there were more time, I would go into more background. You have the rice shortage. People have been suffering and becoming poorer and poorer. You have a big gap between rich people and poor people as a hidden feeling of oppression. You are roused to want more but you have no socio-structure to provide you with enough income to have more. The educational system is deteriorating. You suffer financially by sending your children to school; and they seem to learn

nothing in school. People who graduate from universities can get no jobs. Things like this.

And the government itself has violated many laws. For example, at the beginning of the year, there was a massacre, a killing, of some villagers. The people believed a government official was behind it. And then there was a violation of preservation of wildlife. A government official used a government helicopter for hunting animals in a preservation area. This resulted in student protests.

And then you have again the repression of student opinion. Those who were expressing their opinions against the government actions held a demonstration of 40,000 students at Thammasat University. The people started to think that because we have such a government unchecked by the people, that they have been doing things like this, there's maybe a need for a constitution, which to the people is an alternative to the dictatorship government.

So early in October this year, well, you know the story, a group of students and teachers passed out leaflets to the people, persuading them to join the constitutional campaign. They were arrested. The rest of the student leaders organized demonstrations at Thammasat University which lasted for five days and five nights. Later, they turned into the riots. In fact, there was a silent coup d'etat within the military itself. Three people were thrown out.

But we still have many thousands of remnants of the old ruling clique. This is why I am a little bit worried. The change of a few individuals doesn't do any good. Only three individuals. Even if we have a change in thousands of individuals, it won't do any good. There must be a change in the system. Because the systems themselves, whether educational, political, or economic, produce dictators. This is why I want to talk about what is to be done in Thailand.

So far we have had a long cycle of coups d'etat in parliament. Maybe it is about time to think of more details than just having a parliament. We might have a parliamentary system, but at the same time that means you have changed the top only, you have just changed the form of government. To me, you must change

the people, too.

The most immediate need is to change the people, to organize them into groups, organizations so that they can have real power. At the same time their power will be wielded through rather peaceful, systematic channels, instead of having nationwide demonstrations, nationwide strikes. For example, let me tell you now, one thing has changed in Thailand: People are more politically aware and they are aware of their power potential. But they are organized very loosely at the moment. To me, to have demonstrations, protests forever and ever, should not be an ideal society. People need to have their own power. We need to build up certain organizations and channels so that we can live in peace.

*Q. What kind of organizations?*

A. That's what I'm going to talk about. People can be organized horizontally or vertically. Vertically, you organize them around their occupations: workers, farmers, or any other kind of occupations. I talk about workers, farmers, or taxi drivers because the great majority of the Thai people are poor. If you want to talk about people, you have to talk about poor people. So, we organize them into groups like this, so that they will have a working mechanism. They should have freedom of organization. And when they belong to organizations, they not only have power, they have their own leaders. They will practice democracy by discussing problems among themselves. . . .

*Q. Holding mass meetings . . .*

A. Right. In doing so they will learn to respect themselves and they will gain confidence that they can solve their own problems to a certain extent. This will give them faith in democratic society. At the same time they solve their own problems, there will be less demands on the central government. The politicians in the parliament would have to base themselves on the people's organizations, not the military, not the bureaucracy. Though we could rationalize the bureaucracy and the military, so that they will serve the country better. But the people themselves will be the strongest power

center or power base for any kind of politicians.

*Q. So you think, then, that these mass organizations should run the country?*

A. They should be formed as pressure groups in Thailand. Not run the country by themselves. But they could take care of their own affairs to a large extent. Form cooperatives, a consumers cooperative, a marketing cooperative, that could become production units in many ways. They could take care of themselves, for if you have organizations strongly organized, with good leaders, respected leaders, they could take care of themselves in many ways. For example, workers could have their own schools, schooling for their children, farmers could solve the problem of the middleman and get more income. Things like this. This is the economic side of the problem. For the political side, as I said, we find true power bases for democracy. If you can't change the people, if you have parliament only, all politicians will find their power bases in the bureaucracy or among the military clique. And that's no good; it doesn't change the system. So you must change the people.

*Q. Do you think that the present government would allow such organizations to develop?*

A. If they won't then it can be predicted: Within five years people will get sick. They will not learn to have self-confidence. They will put too much faith in the parliamentary system. And then they'll be disappointed, because they will demand many things from their representatives in parliament who, according to modern norms, cannot give them anything. Because they are policy makers in the house, they cannot give you money; they cannot give you welfare, directly. If they do, that means they will have to interfere with the executive branch. And then the educated people will start complaining and attacking them. If they don't, poor people will start attacking them because they don't give them concrete supplies to their demands. So, eventually, the members of parliament will be attacked from both sides—by educated people and uneducated people. That would give a



pretext for the military to come in again. So, to me, if you don't change the people, you have no hope for a peaceful transformation.

*Q. Do you think that the military at this point is deciding to stay behind the scenes because they think that the new regime will be able to handle the situation?*

A. They will play with democracy for a while.

*Q. So you see a real danger of a coup if the new government can't handle things?*

A. They are talking beautiful words at the moment. They used to talk like this many years ago. I don't blame any particular person, whether they're General Kris [Sivara, the present army commander] or any other. I'm looking at my country scientifically. If a future coup d'etat does happen, the military leaders might feel they are morally supported by the people, to save the situation, to pacify the workers. People sometimes make mistakes with moral support.

*Q. Who in your opinion is actually running affairs in Thailand? In many underdeveloped countries, there are comprador elements who actually represent foreign companies and foreign investment. It's a higher level social class and they have many privileges. Does this exist in Thailand, is there such a social class? And what sort of political power do they have?*

A. In Thailand, the people with political power and the people with economic power are the same group of people. Except for the Chinese traders — middleclass — people who are considered national capitalist, national bourgeoisie, are maybe the same people who rule. For example, Generals Thanom and Praphas [two of the ousted leaders] used to have lots of business companies, the same as many government officials of high rank. Even in the present government, we still have many remnants of the old ruling clique. So nothing has been changed.

*Q. Do you see a contradiction in the new government, that these "rem-*

*nants" still exist in the government or are influencing it? Do you feel that there is going to be a conflict between these remnants and the new popular formations?*

A. Of course. Who wants to lose their privileges?

*Q. Some of the reports here indicated that besides the students in the October uprising, quite a number of workers got involved in it. Could you comment on that?*

A. Well, during the protests at Thammasat University, I was in charge of the operational staff. I controlled the platform and I received some notes, whether they were true or not, that said that railway workers and other workers would join us. Just wait until Saturday, when we are off work.

To me, I can't just say workers, because the issue of political liberty covers all strata of society. I saw my professors walking along with the workers. They may not know each other, but they are walking on the same street for the same purpose. Everybody is marching for political freedom. You have workers, of course. You have students, whether high-school, university, or vocational-school students, and you have ordinary housewives, intellectuals, government officials who favor political freedom. You have many people. In Thailand, class consciousness is not that overt to be able to distinguish a group of people. Many workers seem to be bourgeoisified.

*Q. In the past few weeks there have been quite a number of strikes all across the country. This is obviously a direct consequence of the uprising and the overthrow of the old government. Do you think this is a desire by the workers to realize economically the potential power they feel they have . . .*

A. Let me put it this way. The incidents of October 13 and 14 gave people self-confidence in their political power. This is a nationwide confidence. But at the same time, nothing has been changed that affects their day-to-day lives. There's a lot of exploiters and oppressors that they communicate with face to face. So the fact that three people fled the coun-

try didn't affect their day-to-day lives at all. So naturally, once they realize their power, once they see exploiters and oppressors in front of them, they will have to demonstrate and strike. For example, people up-country demonstrated against a governor. In many provinces, governors were chased out by the people. They see that these governors are just running dogs of the old leaders and these governors have oppressed us for a long time.

The economic situation is getting worse in Thailand. The fact that three people fled the country doesn't give the workers more meals. They realize their power, and they have a need to fight against their exploiters. So they do so.

*Q. In the elections that are coming up after the drafting of the constitution, how do you think this political and economic ferment will be reflected? Do you think that different parties are going to emerge? Before the coup in 1971, there was a labor party, a very small labor party. Do you think that there is a strong possibility of it developing again? What other kinds of political groupings do you think might come out into the open?*

A. I think there might be a movement for more freedom of workers, more freedom of organization. At least to me this is a just cause.

*Q. Do you think the workers organizations might put up their own candidates, or try to?*

A. No. They will support certain candidates. Many candidates will go to see them and ask their support.

*Q. During the October demonstrations, there were quite a number of old clique charges that the students had ties with the guerrilla groups fighting in the countryside. Could you comment on that?*

A. It is a joke. You know, people who were giving out pamphlets, leaflets, to the public, were accused of being "Communist-terrorist." And me, as a leader of the demonstrations, I was accused of being "Communist-terrorist." Later the public learned that the government was just doing this

to fool them. So these terms, which were used against anyone who was antigovernment, became more and more blank words with no meaning. Because people knew they'd been fooled for a long time. They are not "terrorist"; they are not "Communist." They found out that it was just a big lie broadcast over the radio. They saw their children fighting in the streets and knew they weren't "Communist-terrorist." Maybe there are only a few Communists and terrorists in Thailand, but many people are branded as such. So they have no choice. Me, I would have no choice—if we lose.

*Q. Did the Communist party of Thailand play any role at all in the demonstrations?*

A. I think they were shocked as much as the military. It took them three days before they gave the first opinion through their underground radio and leaflets.

*Q. Did they have any influence in the student movement at all?*

A. No. They tried to, but, you know, the student movement in Thailand has one unique characteristic. It wants to be independent from all parties. Even FIST, we want to be independent. We want to have our own standpoint.

*Q. In your talk last night, you made reference to the vocational schools. There seems to be a social difference between the higher universities and the vocational schools. What was the role of the vocational school students in the uprising?*

A. They constituted the major part of the demonstrators. And they were the most militant; they fought with guns, Molotov cocktails, with any kind of weapon they could find. Many of them died. While the university students, who are supposed to have bright futures, were the smallest group that joined the demonstrations.

And you know why the vocational-school students became militant? In our educational system, we imported the western system. We studied in school academically, and people from poor families with bad home environ-

ments could not climb up this social ladder. People who have other gifts, besides the academic gift, would find it very difficult to pass the conservative examinations, where you have to memorize. So when you have nowhere else to go, you go to a vocational school.

They are socially oppressed. They feel they are failures in society, because they come from poor families. They cannot climb up to the university level. Maybe because of the lack of financial support or maybe because of a disadvantage in home environ-



THANOM KITTIKACHORN: Dictator toppled by uprising.

ment, they cannot compete with the students from upper-class families.

For example, at Thammasat, you only have 3 percent of the students from the working class and only 3 percent from peasant families. Eighty-four percent of the students had graduated from Bangkok high schools. And Thammasat is the easiest place to get into. If you talk about Chulalongkorn University or medical school, you almost have only urban and rich people. So in the overall percentage, you have only 6 percent from rural areas in the universities. In ten universities, 94 percent are from urban areas. Most of them are rich people; so poor people would go to vocational schools or teacher-training colleges, which are supposed to be dead-ends on the superhighway of our education. So those students are mentally oppressed and they need

social recognition. They were not previously respected by public opinion. So now they explode in demonstrations.

*Q. Is FIST based on the vocational schools?*

A. No. They are my allies, because I was with them all the time during the demonstrations, while many other leaders gave up and made concessions with the old government. Personally, we are good friends, but principally I cannot take them into my own organization, because I don't want to cause any criticisms that they are my running dogs. People are tempted to say so because nobody respects them. Nobody thinks they have brains to think for themselves. People in Thailand love to believe that a group of youngsters would be manipulated by students from higher institutions.

*Q. So you think, then, that the vocational-school students should form their own organizations?*

A. I already helped organize them into the Vocational School Student Center of Thailand. As a matter of fact, they elected me as president, but I could not accept the position.

*Q. FIST is organized, then, separately from the National Student Center and the Vocational School Student Center? Do you have common work with these two organizations?*

A. Well, I'll talk about FIST first. At Thammasat University, the students at large don't give a damn about the country's problems, we know this fact. So I organized the minority group of students who are strongly devoted to the country and who are politically aware. In each university we have a chapter of from fifty to a hundred people. Now we have more than five or six university chapters. So, all together, we have more than a couple hundred members. We became the Federation of Independent Students. That means we are independent from the ordinary student unions or organizations and the National Student Center. We base ourselves on the people, especially the poor people. That will be our power base, not the student bodies. If we had just students as our constituency,



we would have to reflect their conservative ideas, their selfish ideas, to a great extent. So we are free from the universities. We are students, of course, but our constituency must be the people.

*Q. Would you say that these are the most politically aware students?*

A. I would say so. And the most strongly organized group of students.

*Q. There was a conference in Bangkok just recently, where students from Laos, Cambodia, Australia, and other Asian countries came, organized by the National Student Center to plan a campaign against economic problems . . .*

A. That was planned early this year. When I was in the NSCT, I knew about it. It was planned before the demonstrations, so it's just an ordinary economic conference, a conference on economic problems. But it turned into a demonstration. Although the NSCT is conservative, students from foreign countries are not. They marched to the U.S. Embassy, chanting "Yankee Go Home!"

*Q. It's clear that with this conference, students from foreign countries are beginning to have some direct contact with students in Thailand.*

A. They have for a long time, actually.

*Q. What sort of influence did the antiwar demonstrations around the world, and the student movement in the United States, Japan, and Europe have on the Thai students? Did you observe the actions of students in other countries?*

A. No time to observe. We have a long way to go. But we know that in Greece they were shouting "Thailand, Thailand!" and in South Korea they are tightening their organization and putting more pressure on the government. In the Philippines, news about the Thai student movement is censored. To me, from now on students in Thailand need to fill the gap between their image and reality. People expect a lot from them, but they

are still very loosely organized and unrespected in many ways. That is why I tried to set up a close organization, in which members are carefully selected. You could apply for membership, but first we assign you to a job for a month and then evaluate your abilities, your heart and your head. We then make a decision whether you can become a member or not. We decided to be strongly organized, to have a concrete, specific stand on the country's problems.

*Q. What are the next steps that FIST plans to take?*

A. We will try to organize the people into groups. That's the only way to

learn democracy, for poor people, by practice. You can't go and give lectures to poor people: Thomas Hobbes is great, John Locke, Rousseau, and President Nixon, the parliamentary system, the Senate, the Congress. Who cares about this? Especially people who didn't know anything about politics before.

Instead we talk about the rice shortage: You want cheaper rice, how, why don't you discuss it with each other, why don't you elect your representative and go and talk with the government and say, "We want cheaper rice." They will learn democracy by practice. This is the platform of my group. We don't go and give lectures; that is a middle-class consciousness. □

## When Norway's CP Made Its Choice

# Trotsky's Exile in Norway

By Jan Bjarne Boe

[The following article appeared in *Syn og Segn*, No. 8, 1973. In general, this periodical tends to reflect the thinking of the left populist, nationalist current among Norwegian intellectuals. It is written in New Norse, a language based on rural dialects claimed to represent a continuation of the old Norwegian language that fell out of literary usage under Danish rule.

[The movement to establish New Norse as the language of the country was a feature of the nationalist upsurge leading to separation from Sweden in 1905. But in independent Norway the bourgeoisie's enthusiasm for building a national culture cooled, and the attempt to replace the Dano-Norwegian literary language with New Norse was progressively dropped.

[In the recent period in particular, new left intellectuals and cultural radicals have become attracted to New Norse, regarding it as a more democratic form of expression and closer to the people than Dano-Norwegian. This milieu has been heavily influenced by a romantic idealization of Stalinist concepts of "national revolution" and "folk culture." Thus a

relatively objective article about Trotsky's stay in Norway stands out all the more. The translation from the New Norse is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Some persons assume such a position in their lives that they cast a long and heavy shadow. Leon Trotsky was one of these. He was born in the Ukraine in 1879, came to Norway in the summer of 1935, and was murdered in Mexico in 1940.

Recently there has been new interest in Trotsky. A film has been made in America about him. And, moreover, the new revolutionary generations in Europe and America have gone a long way in rehabilitating him and upholding his point of view against the power politics and rigid bureaucracy of the Soviet Union.

But in the Soviet Union, Trotsky continues to be a forbidden name.

For Norway Trotsky's presence led to a "Trotsky affair," and this case showed something of the connection between domestic and foreign policy. In order to understand the affair, we have to go into both national and

international politics in the 1930s. For the Norwegian Communist party, the Trotsky affair also raised the question of the party's national and international allegiance—Norway or the Soviet Union.

Trotsky's life was eventful enough. As a student he was arrested by the tsar's police and imprisoned in Siberia; he fled to England and returned to Russia to lead the Petrograd uprising in 1905. He was arrested again and once more escaped. From this time until the 1917 revolution, he lived in various places in Europe and the United States. In short, Trotsky had an international background and revolutionary experience.

When the proletarian revolution broke out in November 1917, he had joined Lenin's party. He became Commissar of Foreign Affairs and organizer of the Red Army, defending the revolution against its domestic and foreign enemies. In the middle 1920s, he came into opposition to Stalin and the party, was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1929, and settled in Turkey, France, Norway, and Mexico. In the last country, he was murdered by a Soviet agent—with typical Stalinist refinement, one might say. His skull was shattered by an ice axe.<sup>1</sup>

In the field of ideology, Trotsky is known for the theory of "the permanent revolution." This theory dated from the period before the revolution and dealt with how a socialist revolution would develop. Like Lenin, Trotsky maintained that the Russian proletariat, supported by the peasants, should take the leadership of the bourgeois revolution and carry it through to fruition. But Trotsky held further that it would be wrong to stop at that point. The proletariat would carry the bourgeois revolution on to beginning the socialist revolution.

The basic meaning of "permanent revolution," a term taken from Marx, was that one revolution would interlock with another.

After 1917 this question was settled.

The socialist revolution had already come. But primarily because of the struggle between Trotsky and the troika of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, the term "permanent revolution" came to have another content after 1924. The question was How should a socialist economy be built after the revolution had been carried out? An opinion had long been attributed to Trotsky, and now his theory was interpreted to mean, that the Soviet regime could not survive in Russia unless there was a proletarian revolution in the more industrialized European countries.<sup>2</sup>

Thus Trotsky's theory came into conflict with Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country," whose main tenet was that the Soviet regime should rely on its own resources and not tie its fate to a West European workers revolution. But this meant that Trotsky came into *political* conflict with Stalin. The question was what political line the Soviet Union would follow.

As mentioned above, Stalin came out the victor and Trotsky was forced to flee from the country. This is not the place to go into any further investigation of the ideological questions, but the result was that almost all ideological production and political behavior that did not fit in with Stalin's views was called "Trotskyism" and therefore "deviation."

When Leon Trotsky got a residence permit in Norway in the summer of 1935, it was on humanitarian grounds. Trotsky wrote to the Norwegian government: "I am ill, and my wife is ill. The situation is desperate. I request an immediate favorable answer."<sup>3</sup>

The decision was favorable, but there were conditions attached. The government gave Trotsky and his wife a visa to live in Norway with the explicit condition that he not carry on "any political agitation in Norway or against any state with which Norway has friendly relations."<sup>4</sup> Trotsky

accepted the condition.

In June 1935, he and his wife arrived in Norway. The first few days they stayed in the Jevnaker Hotel and afterward with Konrad Knutsen, later a member of parliament, at his estate of Vekshal outside Honefoss. A year later they were forced to go to the Sundby farm in Hurum and were placed under strict police surveillance. This last period meant isolation for Trotsky, and after he got permission to settle in Mexico, he and his wife went there under the closest secrecy in December 1936.

This is a brief sketch of Trotsky's stay in Norway. Far more interesting than these bare facts is the political situation that resulted from his stay.

Since the early 1920s, the Norwegian government had tried hard to maintain good relations with its large neighbor to the east. Both in the interests of trade and being able to play a general political role as an international arbiter, it was necessary to be on speaking terms with the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup>

The first year Trotsky spent in Norway did not lead to any change in our relations with the Soviet Union. But in August 1936, the government received an official note from the Soviet ambassador in Oslo to the effect that extending Trotsky's residence permit would "damage the friendly relationship that prevails between Soviet Russia and Norway and would be at variance with modern concepts of the rules of international intercourse."<sup>6</sup> The Norwegian government replied that Trotsky had accepted the condition that he would not conduct political agitation, and it informed the Soviet government that he had been placed under strict police surveillance.<sup>7</sup>

What had happened?

2. E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country*, Vol. II, London: Penguin, 1970, p. 46.

3. *St. meld.* [Storting Reports], No. 19, 1937.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Egil Danielsen, *Norge-Sovjetunionen: Norges utenrikspolitikk overfor Sovjetunionen 1917-1940*, Oslo: 1964, is the book that gives the best survey of the relations between the two countries in connection with the Trotsky affair.

6. *St. meld.*, No. 19, 1937, Bilag No. 5.

7. *St. meld.*, No. 19, 1937, Bilag No. 6.

1. Isaac Deutscher's trilogy on Leon Trotsky (Vintage Books, V-746, 747, 748, New York) is the best documented analysis of Trotsky. Most of the factual information is taken from these books.



In this period the first political trial had been staged of the series that came later to be called the Moscow trials. Among other things, Trotsky was accused of plotting to murder Stalin and other prominent party and government leaders, and to disrupt the Soviet state as well. Trotsky was able to disprove the charges, which were based, among other things, on accounts of events that allegedly happened in Norway.

Especially well known is the purported meeting between Trotsky and Pyatakov, another of the principal defendants. Pyatakov was supposed to have flown in secretly from Germany and landed at Oslo. Konrad Knutsen explained that it was impossible for such a meeting to have taken place. Moreover, the authorities at Kjeller airport stated that no foreign aircraft had landed there in the period cited.<sup>8</sup>

So, Trotsky was a heavy burden for Moscow—he could disprove the charges raised against him! The Soviet Union's motive for its note to Norway seems to have been to pressure the Norwegian authorities to keep Trotsky cut off as much as possible from politics. And the Moscow trials were politics and not law!

Out of concern for its good relations with the Soviet Union, the Norwegian government encouraged Trotsky to move to a "more secure" place. From the legal standpoint, one could doubt that the authorities had the right to deprive anyone of his freedom this way without a trial.

But in order to have a formal justification for putting Trotsky under house arrest, the government subsequently amended the aliens law.<sup>9</sup> Trotsky's biographer Isaac Deutscher was to make a sharp criticism of these methods. He maintained that it is a violation of justice to deny an accused person the right to defend himself.<sup>10</sup> But in this instance, there were opposing interests. Deutscher looked at the situation from Trotsky's stand-

point; the government looked at it from the standpoint of the national interest.

Individual moral values sometimes have to be pushed aside in international politics. And the Trotsky affair was an element in an international game.

In domestic politics, Trotsky's stay in Norway forced the Norges Kommunistiske Parti [NKP—Communist party of Norway] to take sides in the internal Russian struggle to a much greater extent than the party may have wanted. It was the Communist party—together with the furthest right party, the Nasjonal Samling [NS—National Union, the fascist party led by Vidkun Quisling]—that reacted most strongly against having Trotsky in the country. Many aspects of the interrelationship between Trotsky and the NKP are worth taking a closer look at, but let us confine ourselves to one that stands out and tells something about the situation in which the NKP found itself.

For the NKP the Trotsky affair raised the question of to what extent the party would keep its roots in the country or give full solidarity and allegiance to the Soviet Union. Most revealing about the kind of support the NKP gave to Moscow are the incidents around the NS burglary of Trotsky's house in August 1936.<sup>11</sup>

The Nasjonal Samling attacked Trotsky strongly, characterizing him as a dangerous revolutionist and organizer of popular revolts in France, Spain, and Greece. He was a dangerous fellow, a representative of international Communism. Therefore, he was a man to be watched. Against this background, the NS staged a break-in at Konrad Knutsen's house, where Trotsky was living.

The NKP, for its part, called Trotsky "a counterrevolutionary, a conspirator, and a terrorist plotting against the world's first workers state and its leaders,"<sup>12</sup> as well as an agent

of the fascists and the German state. The party put forward the views that were expressed in the Moscow trials.

But there was a problem here. How could Trotsky be both an enemy of fascism, as the NS claimed, and an agent of fascism, as the NKP claimed?

The NKP solved the problem by saying that Trotsky—a master of political hypocrisy and double-dealing—was an enemy of the working class. Since Trotsky and thus the fascists wanted to infiltrate the workers movement, they had to win the confidence of workers. The best way the fascists could accomplish this was to present Trotsky as a dangerous revolutionary. The greater the apparent difference between him and the fascists, the more easily such confidence could be won. Thus, the NS break-in was nothing but a Nazi farce staged to strengthen this impression.<sup>13</sup>

In broader circles, the NKP's explanation was regarded as *too* fanatical and *too* conspiratorial to be believed without further evidence. The party offered the same explanation as the rulers in Moscow, and most people either doubted or were bewildered by the charges in the Moscow trials. Thus, the party failed dismally in its task of making its views about Trotsky and his theories seem convincing. The general opinion was that the party was an appendage of the Soviet Union and voiced the charges that Moscow ordered it to.

In the party's official publications, for example in its central organ *Arbeideren*, little appeared to contradict the views cited above. But it can be seen that the party did not commit itself fully to its own statements about the teamwork between Trotsky and the NS. It seems reasonable to believe that the NKP found it hard to accept its own explanation of the NS break-in.

Such an interpretation seems natural if we take account of other aspects of Trotsky's stay in Norway. Moscow claimed that Pyatakov had flown in secretly to meet Trotsky, but the NKP could hardly have proceeded from the assumption that such a meeting had actually occurred. All the odds were against the NKP, and so the party took the position that the other side

8. Pierre Broue, *Moskvaprossene*, Oslo: 1967.

9. Egil Danielsen, op. cit., p. 187.

10. Isaac Deutscher, *Trotsky 1929-40*, New York: Vintage, 1963, p. 344.

11. The main aspects of the NKP's policy in the 1930s are studied in my thesis "Norges kommunistiske parti 1932-1940: En studie i partiets ideologiske og praktiskpolitiske reaksjon pa fascismen," Bergen University, 1972.

12. *Arbeideren*, August 21, 1936, editorial.

13. *Arbeideren*, August 31, 1936, Chr. Hill.

— Trotsky — should prove that Pyatakov had *not* flown to Norway; in other words, the NKP avoided documenting its own assertion.<sup>14</sup> This is a good indication of how difficult the party found the Trotsky case.

The NKP's position, thus, was the following: The party attacked Trotsky in the same terms as Moscow. But Trotsky was in Norway and to a certain extent could answer these charges. The reaction from other quarters in Norway was to distrust the NKP. The charges and the arguments were too fanatical. So the party suffered a crisis of confidence.

In hindsight, we can say that the NKP had come to a crossroads. It could either follow Moscow further in its attacks on Trotsky and thereby increase the crisis of confidence within its ranks and among the Norwegian people, or let Trotsky alone and be well on the way to breaking with the authority of Moscow.

The NKP chose the first way — the broad road that all the sections of the Third International traveled — and followed Moscow. That this posed a dilemma for the party can be well imagined. The NKP had steadily lost ground. Its vote dropped from 6.1 percent in the 1924 parliamentary elections, to 0.3 percent in 1936. The party had become a political sect, cut off from all political and trade-union influence. And the reasons for this can be traced to the NKP's adherence to the Communist International (Comintern), which was led by the Communist party of the Soviet Union. For the USSR, the Comintern was a tool of its domestic and in particular its international policy.

The tactical and strategic maneuvers of the Soviet Union were carried over at various times into the policies of the different CPs. This was the case as regards Trotsky, where the question can be seen as concerning an internal power struggle in the Soviet Union rather than an international ideological dispute. Continued obedience to Moscow's line could lead to the NKP's being wiped off the political map in Norway.

In short, the Trotsky affair embodied the dilemma of the NKP caught between loyalty to Moscow and loyalty to the Norwegian working class. This

was not a special problem of the NKP. Vladimir Dedijer, a prominent Yugoslav Communist, wrote in a recently published book:

"With his attacks and slanders against the leaders, Stalin put many Yugoslav Communists in a serious dilemma. No one has ever tried to depict these inner struggles. They contained elements of Greek tragedy, a conflict between two different conceptions of duty, duty to Moscow, which was the capital of the first successful



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socialist revolution, and duty to your own socialist revolution."<sup>15</sup>

In more literary form, Arthur Koestler said the same thing in his book *Darkness at Noon*, in which the main character is torn apart by doubts about what is right and who is right, the historical correctness of the Communist party, or the individual's conception of what is right. The main question is: Is truth something conditioned by time and manipulatable, or is it a great and constant thing?

In concentrated form, this affair posed the question of working-class patriotism or working-class internationalism, which had a national center, the Soviet Union. This was a question

that the NKP let the future decide. And it was answered in the worst period of the second world war. When the Soviet Union signed the nonaggression pact with Germany in August 1939, the NKP defended this action as correct. This meant that when the war came to Norway, the party had to choose between supporting the treaty and opposing German rule in Norway. There was no middle way for the NKP.

Only when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 could this problem be solved without coming into conflict with Moscow. But this was almost too late. The delay from the spring of 1940 to the summer of 1941 had led the party far from the resistance struggle among the people.

After war broke out in the East and the party had officially adopted an active military policy in December 1941, the NKP was among the most active groups in the resistance movement.

But still the problem the NKP found itself faced with is not the only question related to Trotsky's stay in Norway. As mentioned above, the Trotsky affair raised the problem of the connection between domestic and foreign policy.

As I see it, the "affair" began as an internal Soviet conflict dating from before the revolution and led up to Trotsky's expulsion from the Soviet Union in 1929, continuing on through the Moscow trials of 1936-38 to end with a blow from an ice axe in 1940.

Trotsky came to Norway in 1935, and the "affair" became a Norwegian problem. Shortly afterward, Norway's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated. Then an internal matter became a foreign policy problem. The Norwegian government tried to solve the problem by deporting Trotsky. The problem was shoved off onto another country.

This shows that there simply is no hard and fast division between domestic and foreign policy; one carries over into the other. There was nothing special about the Trotsky affair, although the background was unusually dramatic. The case became entangled with other events that cannot be explained without taking account both of national and international politics. □

14. *Arbeideren*, February 19, 1937.

15. Vladimir Dedijer, *Slaget som Stalin tabte* [The Battle Stalin Lost], Oslo: 1970, p. 97.



## Statement of Indian Trotskyists on Bombay General Strike

[The following statement was issued by the Bombay Committee of the Communist League of India, Indian section of the Fourth International.]

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The central trade-union organisations in Maharashtra have called a state-wide general strike of workers on January 2 to focus attention on the miserable plight of the working class caused by the spiralling prices of essential commodities and the gross failure of the Congress government to hold the price line. [See p. 85 for an account of the strike.] Most of the trade unions of industrial workers and office employees in urban centers, as well as organisations of agricultural workers, have supported the strike, which will be a unique demonstration of solidarity of the working class in the state.

We wholeheartedly support the strike and call upon all sections of the working class in the state to make it a tremendous success and a real challenge to the anti-people policies of the Congress government. We also support the textile workers of Bombay City in their heroic strike for a 25 percent increase in their wages.

The ruling Congress in Maharashtra has forged an alliance with the Shiv Sena, a semifascist organisation, just as the Congress in Karnataka has allied with the regionalist Kannada Chalavaligar to disrupt the democratic struggles of the working people in the two states. The "Bombay bandh," organised by the Shiv Sena on December 18 with the support of the BPC [Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee] and the state government, ostensibly to focus attention on the Maharashtra-Karnataka border dispute, was intended primarily to sabotage the prospects of the statewide general strike called by the trade-union centers on January 2.

The Congress-Shiv Sena alliance in Bombay is directed against the working class and democratic movements, with the strategy of setting Marathi

workers against their fellow workers belonging to Karnataka and other linguistic regions, thus serving the interests of their capitalist exploiters. We call on all sections of the working class in Bombay to stand united and frustrate the attempts of the capitalists and their stooges to divide their ranks.

The Congress leaders who have deliberately shelved a democratic solution of the boundary question for the last seventeen years, have raked up the controversy now to counter the mass struggles of workers and the rural poor against the rising prices and the capitalist policies of the Congress government. Unfor-

tunately some of the left parties in Maharashtra and Karnataka also are playing into the hands of the Congress by whipping up chauvinistic sentiments of the common people against each other. We call on all working class and left parties in the two states to condemn these manoeuvres and disassociate themselves from the disruptive tactics of the ruling Congress and various reactionary parties on the border question.

We call on all trade unions to organise "United Action Councils" of workers in different mills, factories, and workshops to coordinate their struggles on a long-term basis. The trade unions should also build up Workers Defense Guards to defend themselves and their unions against the hooligan tactics of the Shiv Sena and other reactionary parties. It is the primary duty of the working class movement in both Maharashtra and Karnataka to protect the linguistic minorities in the larger interest of maintaining unity of the working class movement all over the country. □

## Amnesty International Opens New Campaign

### End the Torture and Killings in Brazil!

Amnesty International appealed January 15 for a general amnesty for all political prisoners in Brazil and for an end to the torture and killing of dissenters.

The appeal came at the start of a new campaign to draw world attention to the plight of Brazilians suspected of opposing the regime. It coincides with today's meeting of Brazil's electoral college to choose the country's next president.

Amnesty International, which published a major report in September 1972 on torture in Brazil, said the torture of political prisoners was still going on, according to reports it has received since then.

A new and worrying trend was the disappearance of more and more people without trace. Also growing was the number of persons whom police claimed were "killed while trying to escape." Amnesty International is compiling a list of persons who have died

in custody in Brazil. The list will be presented to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights when it holds hearings on Brazil early next month.

Amnesty said it was seeking support from churches, trade unions, professional organizations and similar bodies throughout the world for its campaign to persuade the Brazilian government to release political prisoners. Focal points for the campaign are the inauguration of the president on March 15 and the tenth anniversary of the present military regime on April 1.

"A great deal of publicity has been given to the 'economic miracle' which the Brazilian government says it has achieved," an Amnesty spokesman said. "We believe the government would demonstrate its confidence in this achievement by freeing all political prisoners now and taking steps to end the torture and killing of real or suspected political dissidents." □