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
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## Energy Crisis and Oil Profits



# Moscow Hardships

Lower and middle-ranking Soviet bureaucrats in the Russian Republic are being confronted with a situation that the Russian minister of automotive transport says is loaded with "a whole tangle of psychological problems." According to a report by Christopher S. Wren in the January 12 *New York Times*, many of the bureaucrats are losing their chauffeur-driven automobiles.

One can easily imagine the psychological trauma experienced by a status-conscious bureaucrat confronted by the prospect of such a loss. "Chauffeur-driven cars are more conspicuous here [Moscow] than anywhere in the capitalist world," Wren observed. "While their exact number is not known, the Government ministries alone train 145,000 new drivers a year."

An undisclosed number of "service automobiles" were phased out last year, and another reduction of 15 to 20 percent is expected this year. But what appears to create the greatest fears among lower-ranking bureaucrats is the even larger reduction in the number of drivers, who are being reassigned to taxis and buses. This means that even many of those officials who retain cars will be forced to the ultimate indignity of driving them themselves. Wren indicated some of the hardships that could result:

"The service car not only carries a bureaucrat to his daily appointments but often fetches him from and delivers him to home, runs his personal errands to the shops and market, and even takes his children to school."

Yevgeny G. Trubitsyn, the automotive transport minister, suggested in an interview with the Moscow weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* that officials might learn to "prefer to use public transport." But who ever heard of sending a bus to run errands to the market?

Trubitsyn was confident, nevertheless, that Soviet officials could learn to imitate their counterparts in the United States and Western Europe. There, he said, "I personally saw company managers, company directors and even Government ministers driving their own personal cars." □

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# Energy Crisis: More Profits for the Oil Giants

By Ernest Harsch

The huge American oil companies function under a heavy cloak of secrecy that even the government, let alone the American people, can scarcely penetrate. The massive profits they raked in during 1973 as a result of the artificially induced oil shortage, and their tight control over all accurate information on the extent of oil reserves and stocks, have led many people to speculate that the oil companies were behind the sharp increases in the price of Arab oil.

The nationally syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, in a column that appeared in the January 10 *New York Post*, summarized material from confidential sources within Aramco that supports this theory. (The Arabian-American Oil Company, Aramco, is a consortium of four American corporations that exploit the vast oilfields of Saudi Arabia.)

"Locked in the files of Aramco," Anderson wrote, "intended for the eyes only of its top executives, is evidence that the giant U.S. oil combine encouraged Saudi Arabia to increase oil prices.

"According to the secret paperwork, Aramco calculated that a price increase would boost its 'rate of return.' So the company, fearing nationalization of its Saudi oil works 'well before 1980' and wishing to squeeze out more profits before the takeover, pressed quietly for higher prices."

Anderson also notes that the Arab-Persian Gulf countries would have probably raised their prices anyway. But whether or not Aramco applied any pressure, the partial embargo and the price rises fitted neatly into the plans of the oil monopolies.

On December 23 representatives of the oil-producing states of the Arab-Persian Gulf—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq—announced that they would double the price of crude oil to \$11.60. This new rate is used simply to calculate the amount of royalties that the states receive from the oil companies—about \$7 per barrel at the new price. On

the world market, a barrel of crude oil from the Arab-Persian Gulf would actually sell for about \$8.30. The increase in the royalties paid to the Gulf regimes in no way affects the profits of the American corporations, since they are allowed to deduct the taxes they pay abroad from their taxes to Washington on a dollar-for-dollar basis.

The most immediate and important result of the price hikes for the oil monopolies, however, will be to assure them even more spectacular profits in 1974 than in 1973. As the January 8 *New York Times* succinctly put it: "The oil crisis appears to be bad news for everybody—except the oil industry itself." The massive profits raked in by the oil giants in 1973 came mainly from their foreign operations—particularly from the Arab-Persian Gulf. The *Statistical Abstract*

States itself. Domestic crude oil has been selling for \$5.25-\$8.73 per barrel. The companies saw an increase in the price of foreign oil as necessary to make the domestic operations more profitable and to provide enough incentive to extend them. The market price of Arab-Persian Gulf oil after the December 23 price increases comes close to the level of the most expensive domestic oil. An analysis prepared by the National City Bank of Minneapolis concluded that in 1974 the profits on domestic oil would increase by as much as 300 percent.

Another, more long-term benefit to the oil corporations from the price increases will be tighter control of alternative sources of energy (shale, coal, natural gas, atomic energy), which require greater outlays of capital investment. As rates on crude oil are cranked up, these alternative energy sources suddenly become more competitive. That this was an important factor in the motivation behind the price hikes of Middle Eastern crude can be seen by the remarks made by the shah of Iran on December 23:

"We must compare the price of oil," he said, "to the other sources of energy—what is the real price for the extraction of shale, the extraction of gas, the liquification of coal?"

"The price should be the minimum that you would have to pay to get shale, for example, or the liquification of gas or coal.

"How much it costs you to exploit these other sources should be a basis for the cost of oil."

The effects of the price hikes on the development of shale-oil extraction were almost immediate. The January 12 *Business Week* reported the first major step. "For years there has been talk about the vast potential of the oil locked up in shale deposits in the western U.S. But as long as adequate quantities of oil could be obtained by conventional—and far cheaper—drilling methods, there was little chance that any company would in-

	Millions of Dollars	Percentage Increase Over 1972
Atlantic Richfield	\$178.5	37%
Exxon	1,656.0	59
Getty	82.4	60
Gulf	570.0	60
Mobil	571.2	38
Occidental	55.4	417
Shell	253.4	41
Standard Oil of Calif.	560.5	40
Standard Oil (Indiana)	389.8	32
Standard Oil (Ohio)	62.5	55
Sun	154.9	43
Texaco	838.9	35
Industry Composite (31 companies)	6,413.3	47

Source: Business Week

of the United States reported that although only 2 percent of all U.S. direct investment abroad is in Middle Eastern oil, the returns from that area account for 20 percent of the total profits taken in on all foreign investments.

But the oil corporations wanted to make comparable gains on crude oil extracted and refined in the United

vest heavily in shale lands.

"Now all that is changed. But few were ready for the abruptness of the about-face when a high bid of \$210.3-million was submitted by Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) and Gulf Oil Corp. for a 5,089-acre tract of government land in western Colorado this week."

This tract was the first of six to be offered for lease by the Interior Department as part of its program to stimulate commercial development of the western United States shale oil. Some estimates put the amount of high-grade shale oil at more than 600 thousand million barrels—or more than the oil company figures for the crude oil reserves in the entire world.

Another result of the artificially created energy crisis comes into play in relation to the shale-oil tracts. Such extraction can be environmentally damaging, since most of the shale will be strip-mined. To extract the oil from the shale, the rock is heated, swelling in volume by 25 percent. The simplest method for the oil companies to use to get rid of this extra scrap shale would be to dump it in nearby canyons.

While the secrecy surrounding the operations of the oil corporations makes precise information difficult to obtain and publicize, many people have already drawn the conclusion that the oil giants are behind the energy crisis. A Gallup survey taken in December reported that when asked the question: "Who or what do you think is responsible for the energy crisis?" 25 percent of the respondents named the oil companies, 23 percent the federal government, and 19 percent the Nixon administration (there was some overlap). William E. Simon, the head of the newly created Federal Energy Office, was upset with this general evaluation. "Blaming the oil companies," he said, "is a very popular game that everybody's playing today. Find out who's to blame and let's hang them."

The response by working people to the effects of the energy crisis might be more than the oil companies expected. Especially when those effects become exacerbated in the coming year.

Hundreds of thousands of workers have already been laid off in the United States, either directly or indirectly as a result of the oil shortages. Great

Britain has been put on a three-day work week. The economies of Japan and some of the western European countries face the prospects of recession—some economists even predict a worldwide recession.

After the imposition of the Saudi oil embargo on the United States, representatives of the Faisal regime indicated that if a settlement were reached at the Geneva talks, they would increase oil production significantly—to 20 million barrels a day by 1980. But Jack Anderson, in his January 11 column describing the contents of con-



FAISAL: Wants a bigger share of Aramco.

fidential Aramco documents, reported that production might only be able to go up to 7.5 million barrels a day, as a result of Aramco's destructive methods of oil extraction. The Aramco memos expressed fears of "possible nationalizations" and "unstable political conditions." "The rush to get oil out," Anderson wrote, "caused technical problems. As early as last June, engineers warned that production was too fast. Their secret reports tell of 'huge pressure drops' and 'erratic production.'" The hurried pace of Aramco's operations created a large amount of natural gas that was simply burned off. At a slower development rate, the gas could have been used to increase the pressurization in the wells, allowing more oil to be extracted.

While the oil embargo and the price hikes dovetail with the plans of the oil companies, the efforts of the Arab-

Persian Gulf states to gain a larger portion of the wealth of their oil fields may go far beyond what the imperialists wanted. The authors of the Aramco memos recognized this when they expressed their fears of nationalizations. Even the adverse affects of the price hikes on the relations between the United States, Japan, and the European capitalist states seem to have worried the Aramco officials.

Anderson's January 10 column describes how, although Aramco at first agitated for higher prices, it later became alarmed at the levels to which those higher prices might go: "Aramco sent a delegation, headed by George Piercey, a senior Exxon vice-president, to urge Saudi Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani last fall to hold down the price demands. 'We were trying,' an Aramco spokesman told us, quite accurately, 'to keep prices from going crazy.'

"But Aramco's only concern, judging from the documents, was to prevent political repercussions in the West."

Such "political repercussions" probably refer to the hesitancy of Washington's European allies to fully support its military backing to Israel during the October War. The greater susceptibility of the European states to the oil embargo and the price hikes have prompted them to try to make their own oil deals with the Arab-Persian Gulf states.

On January 7, French Foreign Ministry officials announced that an arms-for-oil deal with the Faisal regime had been concluded that would provide France with 280 million barrels of oil over three years. There was also some speculation that a twenty-year agreement might be reached. Sheikh Yamani confirmed that the Saudi oil ministry was discussing a similar deal with London.

On January 10 Nixon made an attempt to head off the rush by Japan, France, Italy, and Great Britain to conclude their own oil deals with the oil-producing states. He invited the governments of Canada, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Great Britain to attend a conference on February 11 to discuss a joint approach toward safeguarding their energy sources.

"We can go our own separate ways," he said, "with the prospect of progressive division, the erosion of vital in-

terdependence, and increasing political and economic conflict; or we can work in concert, developing enlightened unity and cooperation, for the benefit of all mankind."

While indications are that such a conference may take place, the European states seem to have little enthusiasm. In the December 20 *New York Times*, Clyde Farnsworth reported on the reactions in Paris to earlier calls for a joint U. S.-European-Japanese "energy action group":

"Two principal points disturb the

French:

"— Fear that their own plans for Europe to establish a special relationship with the Arab world to assure oil supplies at stable prices in return for European technology would conflict with Kissinger's ideas of global cooperation.

"— Concern that the Kissinger plan implicitly aims at continuing European dependence on the United States for supplies of enriched uranium for the nuclear power stations of the nineteen-eighties." □

## Washington Threatens Military Action Against Arab-Persian Gulf States

Washington has raised the threat of armed intervention against the oil-producing countries of the Arab-Persian Gulf should these states go too far in disrupting the world capitalist market through their restrictions on oil production.

The January 9 *Wall Street Journal*, after noting the possible extreme dislocations in international economic relations suggested by computer studies projecting the effects of soaring oil prices, reported: "The picture of a world thrown so wildly out of financial balance is unreal, most econ-

omists contend. They assume that the industrialized nations would react with countermeasures — ranging all the way from currency devaluations to military expeditions — to prevent such a disaster."

In a television interview broadcast on January 7, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was asked if there might be greater demands for a show of force by Washington if the oil embargo began to hurt severely. He replied, "That is a risk." "We should recognize," he went on, "that the independent powers of sovereign states

should not be used in such a way as would cripple the larger mass of the industrialized world. That is running too high a risk, and it is a source of danger, I think, not only from our standpoint but from the standpoint of the oil-producing nations."

In response to this threat, officials in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia announced that the main oil fields in those countries had been wired for immediate detonation should an armed intervention actually take place.

While the danger of a confrontation is present, the Arab-Persian Gulf regimes have no intention of breaking with U.S. imperialism. Their desire for a greater share of the oil wealth and for an increased political role in the Arab East is tempered by their dependence on Washington's financial and military support. Although their recent moves are also indirectly a result of the pressure of the Arab masses, they are merely waiting for some kind of settlement to come out of the Geneva talks to call off the embargo and will probably claim whatever settlement takes place as a victory. In an interview at Rome airport on January 10 Sheik Yamani said, "What we want is peace," indicating that the Arab regimes were willing to "collaborate with all." □

### Background to the 'Energy Crisis'

## The Arab Embargo and the Oil Trusts' Response

[The following article, which appeared signed by R. L. in the December 6 issue of *La Brèche*, fortnightly organ of the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Marxist League), the Swiss organization in support of the Fourth International, was the first of a series dealing with various aspects of the Arab oil boycott and the energy crisis. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The Arab countries' utilization of the "oil weapon" and the consequences for the supply of oil to the imperialist

countries is front-page news. The theme of the energy crisis is being debated in more or less apocalyptic fashion as problem No. 1 of "our civilization." The bourgeoisie and its spokesmen are using that argument to call upon "everybody" to limit consumption. The "ecologists" who advocate the zero-growth theory are proclaiming their analysis verified: Natural resources have been exhausted by industrial development; only a return to a "less affluent life-style" can avert disaster.

In this first article we will analyze the political meaning of the Arab countries' utilization of the "oil weapon" and the policy of the big petroleum

trusts, and will see how these two factors intertwine.

In the next article we will show that there is no conspiracy between the Arab producers and the big trusts; we will analyze the consequences of the restrictions imposed by the Arab countries for the state of the world capitalist market, the meaning of the measures taken by the Swiss Federal Council, and the intensification of the attack on the buying power of the working class that the oil crisis engenders. Finally, we will discuss the problem of civilization that the "energy crisis" masks and will answer the advocates of "zero growth" by show-

ing that behind the energy crisis lies the alternative "socialism or barbarism."

## The Arab Restrictions

On October 16, six Arab countries on the Persian Gulf unilaterally raised the price of their oil by 70 percent. On October 17 the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) decided to reduce oil production 5 percent a month and to slap a total boycott of oil deliveries on the United States and the Netherlands in order to force these countries to abandon their policy of intensive support for Israel.

All these measures were aimed at forcing the imperialist countries to act to make Israel relinquish the occupied Arab territories and restore the national rights of the Palestinian people. On November 4 OAPEC hardened its position by deciding to immediately reduce production by 25 percent. But it decided that "friendly" countries — France, Britain, and Spain — would receive the same quantity of Arab oil as they had previously. On November 18, after the pro-Arab declaration of the Common Market countries and Japan, OAPEC decided to exempt those countries, except Holland, from the 5 percent reduction scheduled for December.

Despite these modifications, the restrictions hit especially hard at Europe, which is dependent on Arab countries for 65 percent of its oil, and even harder at Japan, which gets 90 percent of its oil from Arab countries. The main target, the United States, was less seriously affected, since less than 20 percent of its oil comes from Arab countries. According to the November 17 issue of the British weekly *The Economist*, the restrictions imposed by the Arab countries represent a 20 percent reduction in the total amount of oil traded on the world market.

The Arab countries wanted the restrictions to be selective. But the selectivity was to a large extent destroyed by the big oil trusts, which control almost all world oil trade and tended to share out shortages by directing greater quantities of non-Arab oil than usual to the countries affected by the Arab reductions.

## The 'Oil Weapon' — A Rubber-Tipped Foil

Reactionary bourgeois circles present the Arab restrictions as the fruit of antiwestern Arab radicalism. The reality is the opposite: The utilization of the oil weapon is not a sign of radicalization of the Arab countries' policy, but of a move to the right.

This move to the right was stimulated by the crushing of the Palestinian resistance in 1970 with the complicity of all the Arab regimes and by the death of Nasser, which left a leadership vacuum that Faisal, the Arab countries' main creditor and a staunch friend of the U.S.A., has been able increasingly to fill, thus further accelerating the move to the right.

Utilization of the oil weapon is symbolic of Faisal's leadership and will intensify that leadership still further, for Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer in the Arab world. Sparsely populated, it is not short of currency for development plans, unlike Algeria or Iraq. It can therefore reduce its oil receipts without great consequences. The Arab regimes already owe Saudi Arabia a great portion of their resources, and to compensate the losses they will sustain because of the restriction of oil production they will certainly apply for more credit. Faisal will thus strengthen his means of putting pressure on them and on the Palestinian resistance movement, which is also in debt to Saudi Arabia.

The oil weapon, like the October War, is an instrument of diplomatic pressure. It allows the regimes to make the Arab masses believe that a resolute anti-imperialist nationalist offensive is going on and covers up the important concessions they are preparing to make at the Geneva conference to establish a "just peace." It allows the regimes to put some pressure on imperialism to meet these concessions half way in order to avoid a mobilization of the Arab masses.

The "just peace" will be presented as a victory and the Arab regimes will extract themselves from the situation of "no war, no peace," of nonresolution of the Palestinian problem, which was greatly undermining the popularity of these regimes, even the most "progressive" ones. Faisal will appear as the hero of the Arab na-

tion and his specific weight in the Arab world will be bolstered, to the advantage of imperialism.

While the Khartoum conference of 1967 said "no" to any recognition of or negotiations with Israel, the Algiers Arab summit of 1973 gave Egypt and Syria the green light to sign a peace treaty with Israel, provided it returns the occupied territories. The recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people "sounded" radical, as did the assertion by Abu Ayad, a leader of the PLO, that liberated Gaza and the West Bank should not be returned to King Hussein. But in reality, this only indicates that the Arab countries and the PLO are abandoning their old demand for the destruction of the Israeli state in favor of contenting themselves with a little Palestinian state limited to Gaza and the West Bank.

The "moderate" character of the utilization of the oil weapon was confirmed by the statements made by Yamani and Abdessalam, oil ministers of Saudi Arabia and Algeria, during their recent educational tour through Europe: "According to the Danish financial journal *Boersen*," wrote the November 23 *Le Monde*, "Mr. Yamani, Saudi minister of oil, who took a private trip to Copenhagen before arriving in Paris on Monday, declared that the Arab countries have no interest in ruining the economy of the western world, because it is from there that they derive their basic income."

That is the effective limitation on use of the oil weapon. The Arab countries will not be able to keep the embargo going very long. Saudi Arabia and the emirates of the Persian Gulf can hold out the longest, but they will not be able indefinitely to prop up the resolve of the other countries by handing out subsidies. The November 26 issue of *Nouvel Observateur* wrote that "Algeria, whose financial reserves are limited, is reportedly planning to ask its partners that it be partially released from its boycott obligations."

And the November 25-26 *Le Monde* quoted an Egyptian magazine as reporting that Libyan oil was allegedly getting to the United States via some Caribbean countries.

The Arab governments are hurrying to sit down at the negotiating table

and reach an accord with Israel so as to be able to halt the embargo. "We hope that it will all end soon," Yamani declared Friday morning upon his arrival in Brussels. And the November 28 *Le Monde* reported: "If a timetable for the liberation of the occupied territories were set up, simultaneously another timetable could map out the return to normal oil production. Mr. Yamani confirmed this on television."

Furthermore, the imperialist governments, with Nixon in the lead, are not fooled by the oil weapon. The proof is that they have taken no retaliatory measures. The U.S. government has stated that the only means of exerting counterpressure would be a boycott on food deliveries, which would be an ineffective boycott since the Arab countries do not buy much food from the United States and could get these commodities elsewhere anyway. And what about the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of "aid" that the U.S. government sends to Saudi Arabia and what about the airplanes and other arms Washington has delivered to Saudi Arabia since the Arab oil restrictions were imposed?

The imperialist governments are quite well aware that the oil weapon will be used only for a limited time in the context of a diplomatic game in which the Arab countries will make great concessions and in which the structure of imperialist interests will be broken by no one. They are only too happy to see Saudi Arabia's leadership in the Arab world strengthened, a Saudi Arabia traditionally sworn to the allegiance of U.S. imperialism, financed and armed by it, and protected by it from the Arab revolution, a Saudi Arabia that is the candidate for replacing Israel as the policeman of imperialist interests in the region.

Finally, one additional element explains the failure of imperialist governments to take retaliatory measures: The oil trusts can profit to a certain extent from the Arab boycott.

And here we broach more directly the problem of the "energy crisis."

## The Masters of Energy

The world oil market is dominated by seven giant trusts. They are, in order of size: *Exxon* (formerly *Esso*, Standard Oil of New Jersey, the sec-

ond-largest American corporation), *Royal-Dutch Shell* (the largest non-American corporation), *Mobil Oil* (seventh-largest American corporation), *Texaco* (eighth-largest American corporation), *Gulf Oil* (eleventh-largest American corporation), *Socal*



YAMANI: "No interest" in "ruining" Western economy.

(Standard Oil of California, twelfth-largest American corporation), and *BP* (British Petroleum, fourth-largest non-American corporation).

Three of these, *Exxon*, *Mobil*, and *Socal*, belong to the Rockefeller Chase Manhattan Bank group. As of 1970, these seven "majors" owned 77 percent of oil production, 57 percent of refining, and 56 percent of distribution in the capitalist world outside the United States.

It is these seven big trusts that largely determine the world oil market, even if they have to face smaller, not negligible competitors. It is these seven trusts that in reality decide the attitude of all the oil trusts in relation to the producing countries.

Jean-Marie Chevalier, a young French economist, has just published a book, *Le nouvel enjeu pétrolier* (The New Stakes in Oil), devoted to analyzing the policy of the oil trusts. This book, surprisingly advanced in its political positions, is basic to understanding the real mechanisms of the energy crisis. It appeared before the

imposition of the Arab restrictions. What we are going to explain about the turn of the oil market and the plans of the trusts is largely drawn from this book, which we recommend to our readers.

## The Turn of the Oil Market

The year 1970 marked a turn in the development of the world oil market. The market suddenly tightened, strengthening the position of the sellers of oil relative to the buyers, the producing countries relative to the companies, and the companies relative to the importers. A growing scarcity in supply was combined with an abrupt increase in demand and in costs:

— The Tapline (Transarabian Pipe Line), which had been piping 17 percent of Saudi Arabian oil to Lebanese ports, was closed down following Syria's refusal to allow it to be repaired after an accident in May 1970 because the government wanted larger tolls.

— The new Libyan leaders raised taxes and prices on the oil companies and demanded a reduction in production by the second-level trusts, such as Occidental Petroleum, which had been pumping frantically since 1960.

— The costs of shipping by sea rose sharply because the companies had been counting on a quick reopening of the Suez Canal, closed since 1967, and had therefore waited too long before ordering the extra ships necessary.

— The orders for giant tankers increased the demand for fuel oil on the part of the steel industry. In 1970 the demand for oil on the capitalist market increased between 13 and 20 percent as compared to 8 percent during preceding years.

— New fields (North Sea, Alaska, Gulf of Guinea, Amazon, eastern Siberia, China Sea) turned out to be very costly, and the governments concerned felt it necessary to put off pumping in order to protect the environment.

The tight market put the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC, which includes the Arab oil producers plus Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, and Nigeria) in position to demand increasingly important price concessions

from the companies. To this was added more and more nationalizations by producing countries (Libya, Algeria, Iraq) as well as the perspective of growing U.S. dependence on oil imports from third-world countries. (The United States imported 18 percent of its oil in 1959 and 22 percent in 1969, and it will have to import 40 percent of its oil by 1980, mostly from the countries of the Persian Gulf, according to the July 30, 1973, *Express*.) And to all this is added the perspective of a definitive exhaustion of oil supplies.

### The Trusts' Plan: Prepare for Winding Up on Oil

Faced with this combination of various factors, what is the strategic plan of the big oil trusts, especially the American trusts?

*In the long run* (thirty to fifty years), they are preparing to end oil production while setting themselves up to maintain their monopoly on alternative sources of energy.

In the United States, the oil trusts already control about half the atomic energy industry. But the way is not entirely clear for the development of atomic energy because of the pressure of wide layers of the population that have been alerted by scientists to the dangers of atomic reactors. So other, "more classical" sources of energy can be put to use.

The United States still has enormous coal reserves. As of 1970, some 32 percent of American coal production was controlled by oil companies. These companies are in the lead in preparing to exploit the Rocky Mountain bituminous shale deposits and the Athabasca asphalt sands.


*In the medium term* (ten to twenty years) the oil trusts want to extract themselves from third-world countries that are too unstable politically and that have been making more and more demands, above all the Arab countries. (The price demands don't scare the trusts. But more and more countries are asking that profits be reinvested in the country instead of exported.) This desire for disengagement fits in with the general disengagement of imperialist investment in the third world because of the rise of the colonial revolution.

Oil prospecting is being directed toward regions where imperialist domination is more assured: the coasts of the imperialist countries, the North Sea, Alaska, the Amazon basin (in dear old Brazil).

Finally, during the medium term, the American companies want to reestablish U.S. independence in energy. With the bituminous shale, the coal, and the Athapasca sands, this would be assured.

### A Huge Maneuver and How to Make Others Pay for It

Two problems stand in the way of the trusts achieving these objectives: On the one hand, these new sources of energy are not competitive with



NIXON: Not fooled by Arab embargo.

oil because their utilization requires greater expenditure; and on the other hand, achieving these goals would require gigantic investments estimated at a million dollars.

That is why the oil trusts have launched a three-pronged offensive that has been under way since 1971.

1. *Massively increase the price of OPEC oil in order to:*

— Raise this price in the immediate future to the level of the price of American oil and thus eliminate the disad-

vantage U.S. industrialists face in relation to European and Japanese industrialists in having to pay much more for their oil.

— Increase their profit margins by raising the sales price still higher.

— Set in motion a process of oil price increases that will eventually make the new sources of energy profitable.

As Chevalier notes (on page 94 of *Le nouvel enjeu pétrolier*):

"For both electoral and strategic reasons, the United States has been constrained to keep the price of domestic oil at a high level and to seek to encourage internal research and production.

"Under these conditions, in 1970 the United States had every interest in provoking a strong rise in the price of non-American crude in order to rebalance its position. Such a price rise . . . would diminish the commercial advantage of their European and Japanese competitors and in addition strengthen the competitiveness of American crude.

"This solution was easy to set in motion, because all that was necessary was to stimulate a movement toward general demands by the producing countries. It is not accidental that it was exactly the shah of Iran who became the spokesman of the producing countries in the sense desired by the United States by setting off an increase in the price of non-American crude that was miraculously equal to the price difference between Middle Eastern and American crude."

Thus, the successive oil price rises conceded to OPEC in the Tehran accords, and later in the Tripoli, Geneva, and New York agreements, which looked like victories for the third world, were in fact the result not of concessions by the companies but of the companies' desire at the outset.

2. *Make governments finance their plans.*

The U.S. oil trusts, which already enjoy staggering financial benefits (because of the country's energy independence), began clamoring for and received more subsidies in order to begin exploiting the new oil deposits (in Alaska and the North Sea), as well as the discoveries of bituminous shale and asphalt sands.

But their great master stroke was making the producing countries



finance their plans, all the while passing this off as a concession to these countries' "participation":

"Thus," Chevalier writes on page 232, "Iran is participating in the North Sea explorations and is engaged side by side with the members of the Consortium in downstream activities (refining, distribution, petrochemicals) in the industrialized countries. For its part, Saudi Arabia is investing in the American oil industry."

And: "At first, Saudi Arabia was assessed \$200 million for a 25 percent participation in Aramco. [Aramco is a consortium owned as follows: Saudi Arabia 25%, Socal 22.5%, Exxon 22.5%, Texaco 22.5%, Mobil 7.5%; that is, the Rockefeller group controls 52.5%.] But the deal was finally closed at the price of \$500 million." (Chevalier, p. 232.)

3. *Increase their share in the distribution of petroleum products* in order to boost their downstream profits and eventually compensate for the diminution of their upstream profits. In the United States the five largest oil trusts control 32.5 percent of the market in distribution of petroleum products.


To put the finishing touches on what they needed to achieve their aims, the big oil trusts created out of whole cloth the idea of a fear-laden energy crisis by evoking in their statements and publications a psychosis about energy shortage and exhaustion of oil\* so as to make people swallow their price increases, to get out from under the environmental protection measures constricting them, and to obtain more state subsidies.

## The Energy Crisis Comes Onto the Scene

Thus, they just made up the oil shortage in the United States in the spring of 1973, well before the Arab boycott.

On March 28 Texaco began rationing gas in Los Angeles. At the beginning of May, Socal rationed gas in the western states. In April the retail price of gasoline rose 1.5 percent. The

\*We do not mean by this that there is no energy crisis or fear about it. The point is that the cause is not exhaustion of resources, as is generally thought.



An oil refinery on the Arab-Persian Gulf. Part of the "upstream" apparatus.

trusts cut down on their deliveries to independent refineries and distributors in order to drive them off the market. About 1,000 independent gas stations were forced to close and another 1,800 were threatened with closing for lack of supplies.

The oil industry explained this "shortage" by saying that the refining capacity in the United States was insufficient (through a declaration by the president of the American Petroleum Institute to a Senate committee in May). But on April 6 the director of the American Office of Emergency Preparedness had declared that U.S. refineries were running at only 88.7 percent of capacity!

In the September 15, 1972, issue of *Platt's Oilgram News Service*, Allan Hamilton, the treasurer of Exxon, wrote: "As long as the real nature of the crisis is not understood and as long as profit levels are not such that the industry has confidence in its investments, energy supplies will not be developed."

Thus, this gentleman openly declares that the cause of the crisis is not a shortage of oil but a "shortage" of profits. But the profits of the five American oil trusts were 26 percent higher in the first quarter of 1973 than in

the first quarter of 1972; they reached \$2,000 million. Exxon's profits rose by 43 percent.

Obviously, the bourgeois state prostrated itself before the trusts. In his April 18 statement to Congress on the energy crisis Nixon announced that it would be necessary to accept a rise in prices and promised new subsidies for the companies. He proposed that the government pick up the companies' tab for unsuccessful prospecting ventures and announced that larger sections of the continental shelf would be leased to the companies for undersea prospecting, despite the fact that undersea operations are a major source of ocean pollution.

## 'Profitable' Effects of the Arab Boycott

In light of this policy, it is understandable that the Arab oil boycott could have favorable effects for the big oil trusts.

It causes prices to rise, giving them an excellent excuse to raise their own prices (it's the Arabs' fault). It increases the energy crisis psychosis, thus allowing them to get more subsidies and to dispense with antipollu-

tion measures while in no way calling into question their control of the world oil market.

Thus, Nixon's November 7 message to the nation on the energy crisis entailed nothing but advantages for the oil trusts:

"I will seek an Environmental Protection Agency that will relax environmental regulations on a temporary case-by-case basis. . . .

"I will ask the Atomic Energy Commission to speed up its authorizations

for and construction of atomic reactors.

"We must have legislation allowing construction of the Alaska pipeline."

And on November 16 he signed into law a bill, authorizing construction of this pipeline, that had been blocked for three years (the pipes have been on the scene since May 1971) by the pressure of wide circles that support the territorial demands of the plundered Indian tribes and believe that a pipeline conducting oil at a

temperature of 176 degrees Fahrenheit running through frozen lands shaken by frequent earthquakes constitute a major danger to the environment. The Arab oil boycott allowed these completely appropriate objections to be swept aside.

These "profitable" effects perhaps explain the initially surprising fact that at the November 17 meeting between the trusts and OPEC the companies declared that they have no opinion on the current crisis. □

## Arab CP Makes Gains in Israeli Elections

# Meir's Labor Party Retains Control of Government

By Jon Rothschild

The large number of parties and blocs contesting the Israeli parliamentary elections and the intensity of campaign rhetoric tended to give the impression that basic questions of policy were at stake and that the election's outcome would have a big effect on the Geneva negotiations.

But in fact, the plethora of parties results from a peculiarity of the Zionist movement rather than from a vast number of counterposed political ideas. Nearly all the parties are Zionist, that is, committed to preserving the Israeli state as the "ingatherer" of a mythical "world Jewish nation." None of the major parties favors restoration of the national rights of the Arabs of Palestine; none favors returning the territories conquered in 1967 to the Arabs; none favors breaking with U. S. imperialism.

The results of the election were not surprising. The current ruling bloc, which won 46.2 percent of the vote in the 1969 elections, dropped to 39.9 percent. The major right-wing opposition bloc increased its share of the vote from 25.98% to 27.4%. Although the official apportionment of parliamentary seats will not be announced until January 14, initial indications were that the ruling Labor-Mapam coalition will suffer a loss of four or five seats, while the opposition will pick up six or seven.

Golda Meir's Labor party, which presently controls the cabinet in a bloc with the National Religious party and



MEIR: Still in charge.

the Independent Liberal party, will retain its control, although the two minor coalition parties are expected to press for a few more ministerial posts in the new cabinet. The right wing's push to oust the Labor party regime failed.

But there were also non-Zionist parties running in the elections. And the increased vote for the largest of these, Rakah, is far more significant than

the shifts within the Zionist camp. This becomes clear with a cursory look at the real divisions among the Zionist parties and blocs.

## The Zionist Contenders

All Zionist parties in Israel are members of the Jewish Agency, the organizational backbone of the Zionist movement. The money raised each year by this outfit (it exceeds \$100 million) is used to finance all Zionist activities, including the activities of the Zionist parties in Israel. The distribution of funds allows parties that would otherwise fall apart for lack of support and membership to go on functioning, running candidates, blocking with other parties, and in general maintaining a constant struggle for increasing their shares of the hand-outs. The ease with which parties can attain funding also partly explains the strong tendency of Israeli parties to split over seemingly trifling issues.

The elections to the 120-seat parliament, the Knesset, are normally held every four years. The vote is by national lists, and seats are apportioned among the lists on the basis of proportional representation on a countrywide scale. Lists receiving less than 1 percent of the vote are eliminated from the Knesset (and incidentally forfeit the ballot fees they are required to put up to enter the elections).

The 1973 Knesset elections, which

were held December 31, were contested by twenty-three lists. Some lists were presented by single parties, others by blocs. Of the Zionist lists, the most important were these:

1. *The Maarakh (Workers Front) bloc.* Maarakh, which actually means "alignment," calls itself the workers front because it is composed of parties claiming to be socialist. It has two main components, the Labor party (the party of Golda Meir and Company) and Mapam.

*The Labor party* is itself a product of a 1969 fusion of three components: Mapai, Achdut Haavodah, and Rafi. Mapai is historically the main party of the Zionist colonization of Palestine. Founded by David Ben Gurion, it has always controlled the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut, the two most powerful agencies of Zionism. It has consequently always been the dominant force in the government.

Achdut Haavodah walked out of Mapam, the furthest "left" Zionist party, in 1954, when Mapam decided to accept Arab members. Rafi was formed in 1965 by Ben Gurion and Moshe Dayan. Generally considered more "hard line" than Mapai, it entered the "national unity" government formed on the eve of the June 1967 war and later participated in the fusion that formed the Israeli Labor party.

*Mapam*, formed in the 1940s, is the left wing of the Zionist left and the second-largest party in Israel. The masthead of its newspaper, *Hamishmar*, declares its dedication to "Zionism, Socialism, and Friendship among Nations." Since its foundation, Mapam has steadily jettisoned the latter two goals in favor of the first. It supported both the 1956 invasion of Egypt and the June 1967 aggression. It joined the 1967 "national unity" government, and its members have been instrumental in settling the territories occupied since then. Its main role in Israeli politics is to drum up international leftist support for Israel.

2. *The Likud bloc.* Likud was constituted shortly before the October War under the leadership of General Ariel Sharon, who during the October War commanded the Israeli troops that broke through to the west bank of the Suez Canal. Like Maarakh, it represents a bloc of blocs.

*The Gahal bloc* is the dominant component. Gahal is an alliance of the Herut party, which was formed in 1948 as the legal cover of

the gangsters of the Irgun (organizers of the Deir Yassin massacre), and the Liberal party, a 1961 creation formed of a union of right-wing Zionists.

The other members of the Likud are the Free Center party, founded in 1967 by a faction that opposed Herut from the right, and the National List, which is composed of those members of Rafi who refused to participate in the reunification with Mapai.

In the Knesset elected in 1969 the Maarakh bloc held 56 seats, just short of a majority. The parties that now compose Likud held 32 seats. These were the two main blocs fighting it out in the 1973 elections.

Despite the fact that the election campaign was very bitterly fought between Maarakh and Likud, the differences between them are of secondary importance. Likud's main slogan was "not one inch," meaning that the Israeli state should return none of the conquered territories to the Arab countries, not even in exchange for a "peace" agreement. The Likud parties belong to the "territorialist" wing of the Zionist movement: the section of Zionism that favors grabbing as much land as possible, regardless of the number of Arabs consequently added to the population of the Israeli state.

Maarakh, on the other hand, has declared its willingness to make modest territorial concessions to the Arab states in exchange for a settlement. It insists, however, on maintaining control of the Golan Heights, Arab Jerusalem, most of the West Bank, and parts of Sinai.

In addition to Maarakh and Likud, there were several other Zionist parties and blocs presenting lists in the elections. Three of these were religious parties: the National Religious party (which held 12 seats in the 1969 Knesset and has been part of the ruling coalition cabinet), the Agudat Israel (4 seats in the 1969 Knesset), an orthodox opposition party, and the Poali Agudat Israel (2 seats in the 1969 Knesset), which ran in a bloc with Agudat Israel.

The two major blocs and the religious parties still do not exhaust the Zionist lists in the elections. Other candidacies included the Independent Liberal party, which held 3 seats in the 1969 Knesset and is a member

of the ruling coalition; Mokad, a fusion of the pro-Zionist Communist party (Maki) and a section of Siah (the Israeli New Left); and Mery, a bloc between Uri Avneri's oddball New Force movement and another section of Siah. Also presenting a list was Meir Kahane's fascistic Jewish Defense League.

## **Rakah and the Revolutionary Marxists**

The fundamental division in Israeli politics is not between "left" and "right" Zionists but between Zionists and anti-Zionists. More important than the fluctuations in the relative strength of the "doves" and "hawks" in the Knesset is the fact that the October War has generated an unprecedented process of political questioning within the Israeli population. While popular disgust with the Meir-Dayan regime may temporarily bolster the bargaining power of the right, the more deepgoing effects of the October War will create new opportunities for the growth of a revolutionary anti-Zionist movement.

The problem facing the Israeli revolutionists in the Knesset election was how to utilize the election to capitalize on these opportunities. The members of the Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen-Marxist), Israeli supporters of the Fourth International, decided to do this by giving critical support to the candidates of the Rakah Communist party.

Rakah is the product of a 1965 split in the Israeli Communist party. In that year one faction of the CP, which retained the party's official name, Maki, finally resolved to jettison its anti-Zionism in a bid for respectability. Maki objects to identifying Israel as an ally of imperialism and considers any critique of Zionism irrelevant. It describes the 1967 war as a fight for Israeli survival. The membership of Maki is nearly all Jewish, and it has virtually disappeared as a political force in Israel.

Rakah grew out of the CP faction that refused to follow Maki into the camp of Zionism. Its membership is almost totally Arab. In fact, it is the only political party in Israel with a mass base among the Arabs. It was the only party with Knesset representation that opposed the 1967 war.

Rakah was and remains a Stalinist party. It aims not at the overthrow of the Zionist state but at the formation of a "progressive" bloc that can limit the more brutal aspects of the Israeli ruling class's policies. But the combination of Rakah's ties to the Soviet bureaucracy and its mass base among the Arab population of Israel forces the regime to try to isolate it, restrict its right to function, and arrest its members. Rakah is thus continuously pressed into opposition to the ruling class. At the same time, in order to maintain its Arab base Rakah is compelled to defend the Arabs against victimization by the state.

Rakah is not a revolutionary party. But neither is it a Zionist party. That is what separates it from all the other large Israeli political formations.

While Rakah continues to command the allegiance of masses of "Israeli" Arabs, discontent with the reformist policy of the Rakah leadership has created an opposition within the party. In the past several years that opposition has broadened. In an article published in the August 1973 issue of *Matzpen-Marxist*, A. Said explained the attitude of the Israeli Trotskyists toward Rakah members as it relates to Matzpen-Marxist's election policy:

"The treachery that has been manifested in Moscow's policies in recent years and Rakah's drifting along after the Kremlin, along with the appearance of a revolutionary nucleus putting forward a Leninist political program and line, have intensified the process of alerting and awakening that is going on among Rakah's members and supporters. An indication of this is Rakah's attacks on Trotskyism and on what the leadership calls 'ultraleftism' and the disciplinary measures (such as expulsion from the party) taken against critical elements.

"But we must not deceive ourselves. There is still a long way to go before it will be possible for a revolutionary organization to offer these groups a realistic alternative by gaining the confidence of considerable sections of the working class and the intelligentsia.

"In our opinion, participation in the elections through an independent slate in the current elections does not serve this task. If we go ahead with such a step, we will gain the support only



Israeli soldiers guard prisoners in occupied territory. None of the Zionist parties favors return of lands seized in June 1967.

of a tiny, limited group, while to the great majority of groups and individuals who are critical of Rakah's reformism—and the revolutionary organization must recruit them to its ranks—such a step would be considered 'anticommunist' and 'adventurist.' These elements would then be driven back into the arms of Stalinism. . . .

"It is evident from these considerations that the position of Matzpen-Marxist is the call to support Rakah critically in the eighth Knesset elections, a support accompanied by exhaustive political criticism and refusal to tone down our critique of Stalinism and its reformist practices, coupled with a campaign against parliamentary and reformist illusions in general."

The election results fully confirmed the Matzpen-Marxist estimate of Rakah's continued strength among the Arab population. "Arab lists affiliated to the Labor party lost votes (Arab Labor deputies dropped from four seats to three) while the pro-Soviet Communist party, Rakah, the majority of whose members are Arab, increased its vote by 38 percent," reported the January 8 *Le Monde*. "This success is all the more significant in that this party had lost votes in the elections to the Histadrut . . . that took place in September 1973. In the meantime, there was the October War, and Rakah waged a dynamic electoral campaign under the slogan 'Let us,

also, restore our Arab honor.'"

Rakah's advances were especially marked in Nazareth, the largest Arab city in Israel, where Rakah got 59 percent of the vote, as compared to 47 percent in 1969. In the municipal elections, which were held along with the Knesset elections, Rakah won the mayoralty of Nazareth.

Opposition to the Zionist state was also manifested in Arab Jerusalem. The leaders of the Palestinian resistance movement urged the people to boycott the election in protest against Israel's annexation of Arab Jerusalem. The abstention rate was 88 percent, with less than half as many Arabs voting as in 1969.

After the elections, the leaders of Rakah took pains to insist that their party in no way intended to challenge the existence of the Zionist state and denied that the large Rakah vote represented anti-Zionist sentiment on the part of the "Israeli" Arabs. Notwithstanding the Stalinist leaders' claims, the big CP vote and the huge abstention rate in Arab Jerusalem reflect nothing else but a rise in the anti-Zionist confidence of the Arabs, brought on by the October War.

The strengthening of anti-Zionism among the Arabs in Israel along with the mood of rampant insecurity and political questioning developing among Israeli-Jewish youth are far more important for the future of the Arab East than the shifting parliamentary balance of forces between Zionist "hawks" and "doves." □

### Since the Junta Came to Power

[The following interview with two Chilean intellectuals, political refugees of the October coup, was published in the December 10, 1973, issue of the Costa Rican weekly *Universidad*. Roberto Pizarro and Eduardo Ruiz are former administrative heads of the University of Chile. Pizarro is the ex-dean of the School of Political Economy and Ruiz the ex-vice rector of the University.]

[Although Pizarro and Ruiz still entertain grave illusions about Allende's popular-front government, their report contains facts of interest. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

*Question. What are the most recent steps the junta has taken?*

*Roberto Pizarro.* Since the junta was formed, the country's economic situation has been set back eighty years. The sector of public property made up of factories taken over by the socialist government is being returned to its former owners. As for the copper mines that were nationalized, the tendency is toward returning them to the monopolies. Only a few days ago the junta acknowledged Chile's debt to imperialism on the basis of terms set by the imperialists. Although the debt will remain unpaid, its recognition sets a foreboding precedent and, what is worse, keeps the economy tied to imperialism.

*Q. What means has the government taken to meet the inflation?*

*Pizarro.* It has been unable to halt the inflation. On the contrary, since the junta came to power, prices have risen between 1,000 and 1,500 percent. For example, the price of medicines has gone up 200 to 500 escudos [one escudo equals one third of a U.S. cent]. Bread, which during the Unidad Popular government cost 7 escudos, has gone up to 40 escudos, and of course wages have not been adjusted. The government is following a policy of making prices as flexible as possible, so that the hardships im-

posed on the people in general are already posing serious problems for the junta. Food lines no longer exist because prices are so high that it is wishful thinking to imagine buying provisions or other articles. The government is only controlling the price of bread, cooking oil, noodles, and sugar. Despite this, the cost of cooking oil recently rose from 30 to 250 escudos. We estimate that by the end of the year prices will increase 1,500 percent and inflation will multiply by ten.

*Q. What is the situation of the leftist parties in Chile?*

*Eduardo Ruiz.* Despite the fact that they are suffering casualties because of the struggle they are offering, the situation is relatively good. A counter-offensive is being initiated, despite the particular dislocations affecting us at this moment in history. Under the repression, the regroupment has a united left leadership that has retreated in its positions but that has favorable prospects.

Although the repression has cruelly hit the principle leaders, it is in general being wielded against the working masses who are the main enemies, the strongest enemies, of the military. It must be understood that the situation of the left wing in Chile differs from the situation of the left wings in other countries, as our country is highly politicized. The repression in Chile has not aimed its fire against the institutions or social framework, but against an entire class that is organized throughout the country. This direct repression against the people became tragically clear with the bombing of whole shantytowns, companies and factories, and nitrate works.

Leftist parties are trying to restructure themselves in the most strict clandestinity. Political formations are alive and actively functioning. Their reorganization is made possible precisely because they are rooted in the masses; this has enabled them to rebuild and regenerate. I feel that this readiness to fight flows from what Dr. Allende's

popular government meant in organizing the working class and raising the workers' level of consciousness. This is why I feel very optimistic with regard to the readiness of the workers to fight back upon reintegrating themselves into the struggle.

*Q. What information do you have on the shootings?*

*Ruiz.* Officially, 400 to 500 people have been executed, but based on what we were able to witness and on the figures provided by foreign press correspondants in Chile, close to 30,000 persons have been executed by different methods. Among those who were shot were four generals from the carabineer forces who refused to fight against the people and a nephew of [ex-president] Eduardo Frei who was killed while undergoing torture.

*Pizarro.* There is also a curious point. According to information that has filtered from Chilean military sources attached to the U.S. military, the bombing of La Moneda [the presidential palace] was carried out by U.S. pilots. These military sources indicate that Chilean pilots lack the skill and experience required to carry out this kind of bombing, which demanded great precision. This shows that the CIA and the U.S. government were directly implicated in the coup d'etat.

*Q. Professor Ruiz, How has university life been affected?*

*Ruiz.* I would like to point out the historic importance of the repression that has been unleashed against every aspect of culture in Chile and especially against intellectuals and centers of higher learning. This repression has a very profound political motive, and those of us with university standing are obligated to bring it to world attention.

In Chile, the left-wing intellectual superstructure was transformed from a superstructural sector merely reflecting the politics of the masses into a real organic element in the politics and tasks of the workers. In Chile this sector began to become organically integrated; it developed its own techniques and was moving away from the cultural dependence characteristic of Latin American countries. The intellectual sector understood that

its role was not one of leading or representing the revolutionary process, but of serving the needs of the worker. In this way, the workers provided the context of the intellectual's work in Chile. In other words, intellectuals became involved in political developments as a whole. This is why the military burned down libraries and laboratories and abolished journalistic and political science studies, expelling thousands of students from the universities. One moving case was the

University of Concepción, which is a left-wing center: half of the 16,000 students were expelled.

*Q. What is the status of the Chilean exiles?*

*Answer.* Your question is difficult to answer, but we can say that as political exiles we will not be separated from our condition as political beings, which is tied to the fate of our country. □

tary of the Radical Party, Carlos Parra, at Labour's annual conference in Cork and by a reported indication from the Irish Congress of Trade Unions that the issue of work permits would not be opposed.

"Father O'Donoghue says that there are now five United Nations refugee centres in Chile, all of them crowded. The junta has set a deadline, at the beginning of the New Year, for their evacuation. The problem is, therefore, not only serious—stories of atrocities are still trickling out of Chile—but urgent."

Because of their involvement with the labor movement in Chile, the two foreign worker-priests were a prime target of the junta.

"When the coup took place in Chile, Joe O'Donoghue was one of the luckier ones," the *United Irishman* wrote. "He asked to be repatriated and this was done. Others were not so lucky. Near his home the police took twenty Brazilians out of a van, lined them up and then sprayed them with bullets."

The two Irishmen were forced to take refuge in the British Embassy.

"I didn't like going there," O'Donoghue said in his interview with *Eolas*, "because the British really supported the coup. After all, the Chilean Navy is ordered on British lines, Leyland has major interests in the country and the planes that bombed the Moneda Palace (the president's official residence) on the first day of the coup—they were Hawkers Hunters [British military aircraft]."

In his interview with the *United Irishman*, O'Donoghue stressed the confusion of the workers, who were handed over bound hand and foot to the military hangmen by the reformist policies of Salvador Allende: "It was a shock for the workers. They didn't know what was happening. Many of them wouldn't believe that Allende was dead. They were hoping that a revolutionary section of the army would revolt in the south, but this didn't happen although there were many rumours on the first day."

Neither interview commented on the support of the Catholic hierarchy for the bloodthirsty "anti-Communist" junta, nor were any parallels drawn between the church's support of repression in Chile and its opposition to the anti-imperialist struggle in Ire-

## Two Priests Organizing Activity

# Demand Ireland Be Opened to Victims of Chile Repression

Two worker priests who were forced to flee Chile are trying to organize a committee in Ireland to oppose the terror of the U.S.-backed military junta.

Joseph O'Donoghue, a Mill Hill missionary born in Killarney, and James Roche, a Dominican father from Cork, have been working on behalf of the victims of the repression in Chile since their return to Ireland after the September coup. They described their objectives in interviews in the January issue of the paper of the Official republican movement, *The United Irishman*, as well as the Official republican international bulletin, *Eolas*.\*

"During their stay in Ireland the two priests spent much of their time trying to organise opposition to the new junta and laid the basis for an Irish Committee in Support of Chile," the *United Irishman* reported. "They hope that it will expand in the new year from catering for the needs of the political refugees at present seeking asylum, to building up a voice of opposition to the new regime that will bring pressure to bear on the Irish government."

*Eolas* explained that the priests had already "made their first approaches to the Government through senior

members of the Labour Party from whom . . . they had won a promise that the subject would be raised in the Dail [the lower house of the parliament]."

The Official republican bulletin



SALVADOR ALLENDE

pointed out that "now both men want Chilean refugees allowed into the Republic. The conditions for entry to Britain, which still maintains recognition of the junta, are restrictive. Here they are given hope by the reception which greeted the international secre-

\*Subscription rates can be obtained from Sean O Cionnaith, International Affairs Bureau, 30 Gardiner Place, Dublin 1, Ireland.

land. But, speaking about a mission in northern Peru run by a well-known Irish cleric, James Roche said: "It

might as well have been Skibereen as Peru. The priests lived on a different plane to the ordinary people." □

## Venezuelan Elections

# The MAS Wins 200,000 Votes

[The following article appeared in the December 20, 1973, issue of the Venezuelan Trotskyist biweekly *Voz Socialista*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

Apart from the optimistic aspirations of those who asserted that the MAS [Movimiento al Socialismo — Movement Toward Socialism] would win more than 500,000 votes [in the December 9, 1973, presidential elections], we socialists must hail as a victory the 200,000 votes cast by Venezuelans who have no confidence in the traditional bourgeois parties. For the first time in Venezuela, 200,000 people deliberately rejected the boss alternative as well as the popular-front alternative offered as an illusory solution by the PCV [Venezuelan Communist party], when it backed first the MEP [Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo — People's Electoral Movement], and later, in an indirect way, the COPEI [Comité Organizado por Elecciones Independientes — Committee Organized for Independent Electoral Action, Christian Democrats].

These electoral returns imply an enormous responsibility for the leadership of the MAS, as the struggle for socialism neither begins nor ends in the electoral arena — socialism is not achieved on that road.

On December 14, in an article in *Punto* entitled "Socialist Opposition Facing the Country," Pompeyo Márquez outlined the policy of the MAS for the period ahead. He proposed four basic points: (1) Denounce and criticize the regime and the form of social organization in Venezuela. (2) Move toward the broad masses. (3) Establish an organizational apparatus. (4) Provide socialist answers to all the problems of concern to the masses.

This program of the MAS could be

very dangerous, as it proposes creating an "intransigent opposition," as one of their well-known leaders put it, within the bourgeois parliament.

It is a dangerous program because what is essential is not to issue denun-



TEODORO PETKOFF: Leader of MAS.

ciations and criticisms, or to give answers to every problem that concerns the masses (as if there were any problems that didn't concern them), but to organize and mobilize the masses under the leadership of the workers in order to establish a Workers and People's Government.

Bourgeois sectors also issue criticisms and denunciations. They also come up with answers to the people's problems. However, it goes without saying that they don't achieve socialism that way. Don't the Democrats criticize and denounce Nixon?

Don't Perón and Velasco Alvarado say they have "socialist" answers to the problems concerning the masses? And no one can say that the masses are in power in Argentina and Peru.

Criticism should begin by clearly telling the workers and the masses why they should have no confidence in the elections or parliament, why no one should believe that socialism will come from the ballot box, and why the masses should counterpose their own organizations to those used by the bourgeoisie to perpetuate the oppression and exploitation of the working people.

Seats in parliament should be used to show that this system only favors the capitalists and that socialism will be built by mobilizing and organizing the masses led by the workers — never by the votes or by means of parliamentary legislation. Also, to win minimal gains approved by parliament, the workers will have to be mobilized. Is it possible for anyone to believe that the MAS's proposals will be voted on and approved in a parliament where 90 percent of the members belong to bourgeois parties?

The MAS is in a dilemma. Either it becomes an "intransigent opposition," issuing criticisms and denunciations within the parliamentary framework, tending in this way to become the regime's left wing, or it chooses to mobilize the workers, beginning with the struggle for an immediate wage increase, demanding nationalization of petroleum under workers control, etc., until a Workers and People's Government is established. And in this way the MAS would transform itself into a workers alternative.

With our working-class program we will continue to struggle against the bosses, placing confidence in the struggles of the workers, peasants, and students, and not in parliament. By pressing for unity among socialist tendencies that act in the interest of the workers movement and that see it as the great force capable of transforming society, we will build in the heat of these struggles the only tool capable of winning over these tendencies: a Leninist combat party.

These proposals are an extension of those we advanced to compañeros of the MAS and the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria — Movement of the Revolutionary Left] during the electoral campaign: To form a

## 3,500 in Attendance

# Argentine Trotskyists Hold Special Congress

By Norman Oliver

[The following article appeared in the January 11 issue of the American revolutionary-socialist weekly *The Militant*.]

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BUENOS AIRES—The largest gathering of Trotskyists ever held in Latin America took place here Dec. 15-16.

The event was the special congress of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers Party) of Argentina, which was attended by 3,500 people.


The 371 delegates to the convention were elected from PST branches in every major city in Argentina on the basis of one delegate for every 10 full members of the organization.

The convention was noteworthy for the impressive number of worker-militants, women, and youth who participated. A 61-year-old member of the PST's executive committee said, "I've seen more than 100 trade union and political congresses and they've been mostly older men. Here it is youth and women who predominate."

Also present were invited guests from Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, exiles from Chile, and representatives from the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance in the United States. Greetings were read from Trotskyist organizations in Australia, Venezuela, and Peru.

At the beginning of the congress the delegates elected an honorary presiding committee composed of Tulio Cardoso, an exiled Brazilian student leader and one of the founders of the Trotskyist Grupo Punto de Partida (Starting-point Group), murdered by the Chilean junta; Luis Vitale, noted Marxist scholar imprisoned in Chile; Mateo Fossa, a veteran Argentine unionist who joined the PST shortly before his death this year; James P

Cannon, national chairman emeritus of the Socialist Workers Party; Hugo Blanco, the Peruvian peasant leader now exiled in Sweden; and two veter-



CORAL: PST candidate against Peron.

ans of Argentine Trotskyism.

A proposal from the delegates to include the entire Chilean working class in the honorary presidium was also adopted.

## Growth of PST

The opening address to the congress was given by Juan Carlos Coral, presidential candidate of the PST in both the March and September elections last year.

Coral said that congresses of many groups in the past had pretensions that they had launched a revolutionary party. All turned out to be failures. So when the PST was launched a year and a half ago, its claims were modest, though its aims were great.

"However," Coral went on, "our work in the last 18 months, culminating in this congress, shows that we were not the victims of a romantic myth, but have made much progress in building the revolutionary party of the Argentine working class.

"We have done so under conditions of considerable difficulty—the popularity of Perón; the economic offensive of the bosses; the 'Great National Agreement' of class collaboration; and the hostile criticism of the reformists, sectarians, and ultralefts.

"The latter condemned us for participating in the first elections, from which they abstained. But we said we are not going to put the party at the service of the elections, but the elections at the service of the party to promote the struggles of the workers."

Coral continued, "Our candidates and comrades went to all the factories to tell the truth to the workers. We told them that Perón is an agent of the bosses, whose mission is to sidetrack them from the road of struggle for their demands.

"We refused to meet with Perón. Unlike other tendencies on the left, we don't talk behind closed doors with the enemies of the working class. We went alone against the stream. Our sole point of reference was the needs of the class struggle. That is the only road for revolutionaries to take." Here Coral was interrupted by several minutes of applause and chants.

As a result of its election campaigns and participation in the workers' struggles, the PST has grown significantly. It now has 60 headquarters. Despite the landslide support for Perón in the September elections, the PST received 190,000 votes, more than double its vote in the March elections.

In his address Coral also spoke of the recent coup in Chile. He said the tragic defeat of the Chilean work-



ers was the latest catastrophe of reformist policy.

The Communist Party in Chile, he said, "told the workers socialism could be achieved along the peaceful, parliamentary road. This was like the fairy tale parents tell children about the stork bringing babies. The workers did resist and fight back, but their struggles were leaderless and disorganized. The indispensable element for victory was lacking—the presence of a revolutionary party implanted in the masses."

In its fall election campaign the PST gave priority to building a solidarity campaign for the Chilean workers and peasants. It helped organize a number of significant demonstrations against the coup.

The PST was the only party in Argentina to denounce Perón as an accomplice of the Chilean butchers for closing the doors of Argentina to refugees. Of those who did manage to get into the country, Perón exiled the Chileans to a remote area in northern Argentina and deported refugees from other countries.

Coral ended by saying that the new political situation in Argentina provides an "opportunity to train and prepare our cadres for the next large-scale upsurge of the working class, which the PST must get into a position to lead."

## Fourth International

The central theme of the rest of the congress was, like Coral's speech, internationalism.

The main questions taken up were the issues facing the upcoming world congress of the Fourth International, the world Trotskyist organization. The reports and discussions showed that the PST delegates were well-informed about the issues under debate. There were reports and discussions on the current world political situation, the strategy for building revolutionary parties in Europe, and a balance sheet of the developments in Bolivia and Argentina since 1969.

All the reports were adopted unanimously, with no abstentions. The congress voted to send a full delegation to the world congress of the Fourth International to put forward the PST's views on the questions on the agenda.

The reporter on the present situation in Argentina and the tasks of the

PST stated that the prerevolutionary situation inaugurated by the Cordobazo (a mass uprising in Córdoba) in 1969 ended with the consolidation of the Peronist regime after the second election last year.

The relationship between the capitalist government and the working masses has changed. During the military dictatorships of Onganía and Lanusse the bourgeoisie was divided and its regime was opposed by 90 percent of the population.

Today the capitalist class is united in support of Perón. At this time, the overwhelming majority of the working class has been deluded into support of Perón. The middle class as well looks to Perón for a solution to its problems.

The new stage in Argentina is characterized by the PST as one of a precarious relative stabilization for the bourgeois regime. However, Perón's coming to power has also set into motion a dynamic that will undermine this stabilization.

The expectations of the Argentine working class and other exploited and oppressed layers have risen tremendously. They expect the new government to reduce and eliminate the social evils that plagued them under Onganía and Lanusse. The Peronist regime is incapable of doing this because it is a capitalist government. It is based on the power and interests of the capitalist class, which contradict the needs of the great masses of the Argentine people.

Perón, through his "Social Pact," has asked for and received from the trade union bureaucracy a two-year pledge of "social peace," in which the working class is supposed to sit back and accept without complaint or protest every measure taken by the government. Perón has already imposed wage controls and other austerity measures on the workers.

Despite the Peronist domination of the labor organizations, many workers cannot and will not wait two years, and have been taking action for an improvement in their living conditions. During the week the PST convention took place, there were two factory occupations in Buenos Aires. While such struggles are usually around economic demands, they tend to become politicized due to the "Social Pact" and other forms of government intervention into the economy.

Some of the most important strug-

gles today are undertaken by the students. In the high schools, where Peronist domination is weaker, these struggles have often been led by the Juventud Socialista de Avanzada (JSA — Socialist Youth Vanguard).

The PST and JSA's proletarian internationalism and uncompromising opposition to class-collaborationism make them a strong pole of attraction for revolutionary-minded youth. The JSA, a sympathizing youth organization of the Fourth International, is rapidly becoming the largest Marxist youth group in Argentina.

The outcome of all these struggles will be of great importance for the rest of Latin America. Argentina, following the defeats of the working class in Chile and Uruguay, is one of the few Latin American countries today where the workers have the right to organize and act and where revolutionary socialists can speak freely.

While there are scattered acts of repression by the police and goons at the service of the union bureaucracy, at this stage Perón's government is relying on maneuvers with the working class for the benefit of the bosses. The regime has, under fire, granted small economic concessions to the workers.

The PST and the JSA form the only tendency on the left that has understood and taken advantage of these contradictions of the Peronist policy. Their aim is to promote and lead a break of the working class away from Peronism and toward independent working class struggle, both in the factories and in the political arena.

## Erroneous positions

In a closing speech to the congress, Nahuel Moreno, general secretary of the PST, contrasted the PST's analysis of Peronism to the erroneous positions taken by other tendencies on the left.

He recalled how the PST had been severely criticized by the rest of the left for taking advantage of the opportunity to operate legally—something that all groups now do, including the ultralefts and even guerrilla organizations.

During the March elections the ultralefts raised the slogan "Neither coup nor election—revolution!" However, elections were held and no amount of shouting otherwise by the ultraleft and guerrilla groups could alter that fact.

The PST participated in the two

national elections to provide an independent working-class political choice to the Argentine people.

Moreno explained how the Communist Party had earlier termed Perón a fascist and later, when they saw Perón was going to win, switched to support for Perón and his capitalist government. The CP, in its search for a "revolutionary" general representing the "progressive bourgeoisie," has now found him in Perón.

In the second elections not only the CP but some of the ultraleft organizations changed their tune and wound up giving either open or backhanded support to Perón.

The Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores - Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (PRT-ERP - Revolutionary Workers Party - Revolutionary Army of the People), a leading guerrillaist group, has succumbed to the pressure of left Peronism by joining and playing a leading role in the Frente Anti-Imperialista para el Socialismo (FAS - Anti-Imperialist Front for Socialism).

The FAS is a left-nationalist and populist formation with a class-collaborationist perspective. It is moving toward unity with a popular-front formation backed by the CP.

Moreno observed that the prospects for future growth of the PST were good if it continued to link itself with the workers in the fight against Peronist policies and the trade-union bureaucracy. The presence of hundreds of worker-militants at the congress attested to the PST's success in doing this.

## Worker delegations

Working class militants throughout the country were invited to attend the congress, and many did so. Represented by delegates to the congress were factories in Tucumán and, from Mendoza, the building trades, steel workers, auto workers, insurance union, newspaper union, and postal union.

Also among the guests introduced to the convention were a steel worker from Tucumán, whose fellow workers raised the money for his transportation on the condition that he report back to them; the president of the student center of the Catholic University now on strike in Tucumán; two members of an opposition faction in Chrysler; a militant from the



PERON

Córdoba auto union SITRAC-SITRAM; two workers who led a victorious strike at Perkins Truck Factory in Córdoba; a bank worker from Mendoza; and the entire internal commissions of a hospital and of gas workers from Mar del Plata. (Internal commissions are the executive committees of the factory committees elected in all major Argentine plants.)

Workers from the following places in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area were introduced to the convention: the internal commission of a glass works; a delegation from another glass works, one that was on strike and had just beaten back a police attack; a representative from the largest textile factory in Latin America; the teachers union; Mercedes-Benz; leaders from two banks on strike; and a leader of the construction workers in Neuquén.

These worker delegations were announced on the first day of the congress and more were introduced the next day.

The revolutionary fervor and enthusiasm of a party deeply immersed in the class struggle was manifested not only in the reports and discussions, but also in the colorful and spirited chants of the delegates and guests. "Workers fight, workers to power!" and "It will be wonderful when we bury the bosses and put the workers in power!" were two of them.

The trade-union report outlined con-

tinued efforts by the PST to mobilize the working class against the "Social Pact," the government, and the union bureaucracy that supports it.

Other campaigns projected at the congress were a campaign of solidarity with Chile; one against the dictatorships in Paraguay and Uruguay; and a campaign for complete amnesty for political prisoners in Bolivia.

The congress concluded with a rally where greetings were heard from the worker delegations and international guests. Several of the workers who gave greetings announced they had decided to join the PST.

## Pakistani Nationalizations

Partially as a result of the world energy crisis, the Pakistani regime in early January nationalized the banking, shipping, and oil-distributing industries. This follows an earlier wave of nationalizations in 1972 which affected basic industry and the insurance business.

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said just prior to the nationalizations that the cost of oil imports for Pakistan in 1973 had risen from \$60 million to \$350 million. The rise in oil prices, plus the damage caused by recent flooding, appear to have created difficulties for the Pakistani economy that the ruling class has been unable to deal with. So Bhutto, behind a shroud of "socialist" rhetoric, stepped in to help out and manage the economy for them.

Although the Pakistani regime has taken over all the shares of the banks, it has only acquired controlling interest in the shipping and oil industries. Bhutto has promised compensation for all the nationalized concerns.

Typical of the flamboyant verbiage of the Bhutto regime were the remarks of Finance Minister Mubashir Hasan, who said that prior to the nationalizations "industrial and financial power got concentrated in the hands of a few robber barons."

How concerned Bhutto really is about ending inequality can be ascertained by the fact that foreign banks were exempt from the nationalizations. His desire to stabilize the Pakistani economy stops far short of stepping on the toes of his imperialist masters—and for good reason, since their support helps keep his regime in power and helps him suppress the aspirations of the oppressed Baluchis and Pathans to self-determination.

The \$30 million in military aid that Bhutto has gotten from Washington since 1971 underlines this support. □

# Nixon Hit by Bribery, Spying, Blackmail Scandals

By Allen Myers

"President Nixon's explanations," Clifton Daniel wrote in the January 10 *New York Times*, "have tended from the beginning to confirm the allegations made against him. For example, his income tax returns showed that he had paid very little tax on a very large income, had taken questionable deductions, and had given very little to charity.

"Somewhat the same thing was being said today by the President's opponents about the I. T. T. and milk price 'white papers' issued yesterday [January 8]. They confirm that the President had, in fact, intervened to halt an antitrust prosecution of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and to raise milk price supports.

"All that was denied, in essence, was that these actions were taken in return for political contributions. But the evidence to support the denial—documents and tape recordings—was withheld."

Daniel's description of Nixon's defense strategy was quite accurate. Throughout the course of the Watergate scandal, the head of the White House gang has issued a series of statements essentially confirming the charges that have been made but attempting to explain them away by putting a favorable—and unwarranted—interpretation on the events. This was the case with the January 8 white papers, which constituted a denial but not a defense.

## Favors for ITT

The white paper on ITT admitted that Nixon had phoned then Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst on April 19, 1971, and ordered him not to appeal an antitrust action against the giant conglomerate to the Supreme Court. (The case was then settled out of court after ITT pledged \$400,000 to help pay for the Republican convention.) This admission only confirmed information that

Kleindienst had earlier provided to the Watergate special prosecutor and that had been reported in the press. The white paper continued:

"The Justice Department, on April 20, 1971, requested and was granted a delay in filing the appeal which was due that day. On the following day, April 21, 1971, Mr. John N. Mitchell, the attorney general, advised

eral's recommendations, the President reversed his decision of April 19, 1971, and authorized the Department of Justice to proceed with the case in accordance with its own determinations."

"Legislative repercussions" was a gentle way of saying that if the case had simply been dropped, it would have been obvious to everyone that the fix was in. It had been more than twenty years since the Justice Department lost a merger case in the Supreme Court.

Presumably it was the desire not to be put forward as the one responsible for the fix that led Kleindienst to threaten to resign if Nixon's order were not revoked. This threat, which helps throw light on what really happened, was not mentioned in the White House account.

It is unlikely that ITT officials had expected the Nixon gang to go quite so far as to completely drop the case. In fact, what they were asking for was precisely what they got: a delay in the filing of the appeal to allow more time for negotiating the favorable settlement they eventually achieved. This was revealed in 1972 in hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee.

"In its statement," the *New York Times* reported January 10, "the White House did not note that it was I. T. T. that first suggested to Mr. Kleindienst that an extension on filing be applied for and that an interagency group be set up to review Government antitrust policy. . . . Lawrence E. Walsh, attorney for the corporation, thought that the Supreme Court might rule against the mergers, and his strategy was to gain time to negotiate a settlement.

"The strategy worked. Mr. Griswold testified that after the Government appeal had been filed, I. T. T. counsel received a number of extensions to file its response."

Contacted by the *New York Times*, Griswold said that he had not been



KLEINDIENST: Declined to be responsible for ITT case fix.

the President that in his judgment it was inadvisable for the President to order no appeal to the Supreme Court in the Grinnell [the name of one of the corporations ITT had taken over] case. The attorney general reasoned that, as a personal matter, Mr. Erwin N. Griswold, solicitor general of the United States, had prepared his brief for appeal and would resign were the appeal not to proceed. The attorney general further feared legislative repercussions if the matter were dropped entirely. Based upon the attorney gen-

told of Nixon's decision to allow the appeal until near the end of the extension period. "I didn't get authorization until about May 15, 16 or 17," he said. The delay in informing Griswold assured ITT the full delay of the appeal that the corporation desired.

The white paper also neglected to mention a meeting—three days before Nixon's order to Kleindienst—between ITT president Harold Geneen, Secretary of the Treasury John Connally, and White House economic adviser Peter G. Peterson. ITT obviously believed that this meeting was an important factor in winning the delay, for on April 22, 1971, William R. Merriam, an ITT vice-president, wrote to Connally: "We are certain that you and Pete were most instrumental for the delay."

In defending himself, Nixon also made it more likely that his old friend Mitchell will be indicted on another perjury charge. (He already faces a perjury indictment in connection with a secret contribution from financier Robert Vesco.) Mitchell has denied under oath playing any role at all in the ITT antitrust case.

### The Dairy Payoff

In order to deny charges that he ordered an increase in federal milk price supports in March 1971 in exchange for large campaign contributions from dairy cooperatives, Nixon had to contradict one of his public statements of only a few months earlier. At an October 26 press conference, Nixon claimed that he deliberately refrained from learning the names of contributors until after the election:

"In terms of campaign contributions I have had a rule. . . . I have refused to have any discussion of contributions. As a matter of fact, my orders to Mr. Stans were that after the campaign was over, I would then send notes of appreciation to those that contributed, but before the election, I did not want to have any information from anybody with regard to campaign contributions."

But the January 8 white paper admitted that in August 1969 one dairy group had given \$100,000 to the secret fund maintained by Herbert Kalmbach, Nixon's personal at-

torney. Prior to meeting with Nixon on March 23, 1971—two days before the price-support increase was announced—dairy lobbyists pledged an additional \$2 million to Nixon's reelection fund. (According to the information available, it appears that the dairies actually forked up only \$437,000 of the total pledged.)

"One member of the staff," the white



LAIRD: Spying on the boss?

paper admitted, "Charles W. Colson, asserted in a memorandum to the President that AMPI [Associated Milk Producers Incorporated] had pledged \$2 million to the 1972 campaign. . . . That memorandum was attached to a presidential briefing paper for the courtesy meeting between the President and the AMPI representatives in September of 1970. It was suggested in the memorandum that the President acknowledge AMPI's support. . . ."

"Another reference to fund-raising was in a letter addressed to the President on December 16, 1970 from Patrick J. Hillings, a former congressman who had succeeded Mr. Nixon in his congressional seat after the latter

had been elected to the Senate. At that time, Mr. Hillings was a member of a Washington, D.C., law firm that represented the dairymen in the nation's capital. . . ."

The white paper went on to describe the March 23, 1971, meeting:

"The President opened the meeting by thanking the dairy leaders for the support they had given to administration policies and praised them for their activism in pursuing goals which were important to them. The remainder of the meeting was taken up with the dairy leaders pleading their case for higher supports and with other administration officials expressing concerns about overproduction and higher retail prices. There was no mention whatsoever of campaign contributions. . . ."

"Prior to this meeting, a staff memorandum was prepared as a briefing paper for the President. That paper briefly noted that the dairy lobby—like organized labor—had decided to spend political money and that Pat Hillings and Murray Chotiner were involved. There was no suggestion that the President should give special treatment to the dairymen. . . ."

Ordinary citizens who have never had the opportunity to discuss personally with the president why they should be given \$126 million in federal funds and allowed to rake off perhaps as much as an additional \$500 million from the general public (the estimated benefit to the dairies from the support increase) may find it a bit difficult to credit the assertion that there was no "special treatment" involved in the meeting, let alone in Nixon's decision to raise the milk price support.

The lobbyists themselves were obviously convinced that the meeting with Nixon and its results were determined by their campaign contributions. One of these lobbyists wrote of these gifts in a March 29, 1971, letter, "I can assure you that . . . [the contributions] played a major role in this administrative decision."

And the president of Mid-America Dairymen Incorporated later wrote of the March 23 meeting:

"The facts of life are that the economic welfare of dairymen does depend a great deal on political action. If dairymen are to receive their

fair share of the governmental financial pie that we all pay for, we must have friends in government. I have become increasingly aware that the sincere and soft voice of the dairy farmer is no match for the jingle of hard currencies put in the campaign funds of politicians. . . .

"We dairymen as a body can be a dominant group. On March 23, 1971, along with nine other dairy farmers, I sat in the Cabinet Room of the White House, across the table from the President of the United States, and heard him compliment the dairymen on their marvelous work in consolidating and unifying our industry and our involvement in politics. He said, 'You people are my friends and I appreciate it.'

"Two days later an order came from the U. S. Department of Agriculture increasing the support price of milk to 85% of parity, which added from 500 to 700 million dollars to dairy farmers' milk checks. We dairymen cannot afford to overlook this kind of economic benefit. Whether we like it or not, this is the way the system works."

The white paper's only defense of Nixon against the implication of bribery was the unsupported assertion that he did not allow the generosity of the dairies to influence his decision. The statement claimed:

"The President's action took several factors into account:

- intensive congressional pressure;
- the economic merits of the case itself, as presented by the industry leaders in the meeting with the President, and as weighed by the President's advisers;

- traditional political considerations relating to needs of the farm states."

The white paper argued, in effect, that Congress would have passed legislation raising price supports and that Nixon therefore decided to order the increase himself in order to win votes in the dairy states. As with the ITT paper, Nixon's defense could result in charges of perjury being brought against one of his underlings: Clifford M. Hardin, who was secretary of agriculture at the time of the support increase.

At the beginning of 1972, Ralph Nader filed suit against the Nixon administration, asking the courts to

reverse the milk price increase because it had been granted illegally. In response to the suit, Hardin filed a sworn affidavit denying some of the facts that Nixon has now admitted. In a dispatch from Washington to the January 11 *New York Times*, Philip Shabecoff described Hardin's testimony:

"Mr. Hardin's affidavit filed at the United States District Court here last March 12, said that he had reconsidered his earlier decision to hold the price support line and had ordered an increase solely 'on the basis of statutory criteria.'

"The affidavit . . . specifically denied that any considerations other than those provided by law were involved in Mr. Hardin's actions.

"The law requires that decisions on price supports be made by the Secretary of Agriculture solely on the basis of supply, costs and farm income—exclusively economic criteria."

In the previous day's issue, Shabecoff wrote that "a lawyer familiar with the milk litigation, Kenneth Guido of Common Cause, said that the White House admission of political considerations should be enough to win the case for Mr. Nader.

"Mr. Guido also asserted that now that the White House has disclosed that Mr. Nixon was informed of the campaign pledges before he raised price supports, a simple denial that the pledges influenced the decision probably would not satisfy litigants and investigators.

"Mr. Guido said that the President probably would be asked to substantiate the denial with documents and perhaps even to submit to questioning on the reasons for his decision."

## Plumbing and Blackmail

Still another scandal involving the notorious White House "plumbers" spy unit has begun to unfold in the pages of the press. It has been known since at least last July—when John Ehrlichman in testimony before the Senate Watergate committee made cryptic reference to a plumbers operation "unrelated to Watergate"—that another scandal involving the group remained undisclosed. At the time, Sam Ervin and Howard Baker, the committee chairman and vice-chairman, were reportedly briefed on the matter by the

White House and had agreed to keep it secret in the interests of "national security."

The "national security" secret, according to reports in the *New York Times* and other papers, involved spying and counterspying directed by different high-level members of the Nixon gang against each other. Seymour M. Hersh reported in the January 12 *Times*:

"The White House investigative unit known as the plumbers uncovered evidence in late 1971 that a 'ring' of military officers was attempting to relay highly classified information of the China talks and other matters to officials in the Pentagon, well-informed sources report.

"Some of the officers were assigned to the National Security Council.

"The secret inquiry, headed by David R. Young Jr., then a co-director of the plumbers, was said to have determined that at least two military officers had participated in apparently illegal activities—including the ransacking of classified files and the unauthorized photocopying of documents—in an apparent attempt to keep high Pentagon officials up-to-date on White House negotiations."

Various sources, Hersh reported, disagreed on the importance of the classified material involved. But all accounts made it clear that the highest levels of the Nixon gang had parodied James Bond's spy-movie capers. Hersh's informants told him that then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was suspected of being connected with the "spy ring." It seems that this was the only way Laird could find out what the administration he belonged to was doing:

"The sources said that Mr. Young and Henry A. Kissinger, now the Secretary of State and then head of the National Security Council, suspected that reports on the White House's negotiations with China, North Vietnam and the Soviet Union were being leaked to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

It is known that in the case of earlier leaks to the press, Kissinger requested wiretaps on a number of government officials, including members of the National Security Council and his own staff. In the case of the Pentagon "spy

ring," did he also request and obtain a tap on Laird?

The *Washington Post* reported January 12 that Young had asked the FBI to tap the phone of Charles E. Radford, who was an aide to Admiral Robert O. Welander. Welander at that time was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and liaison between the National Security Council and the Pentagon, but was subsequently transferred to sea duty.

Hersh reported in the January 13 *New York Times* that Young "had also concluded that Mr. Radford was responsible for relaying details of the National Security Council's deliberations on the India-Pakistan issue to Mr. Anderson [columnist Jack Anderson], who began publishing the sensitive material in December.

"Far more important, these sources said, was Mr. Young's conclusion that Mr. Radford had, apparently with authority from higher military officials, been relaying equally sensitive documents to the office of Admiral Moorer."

"An angry President Nixon," the *Chicago Tribune* reported January 13, "wanted to fire Adm. Thomas Moorer after White House spies told him that military spies were spying on Henry Kissinger. It is not known what changed President Nixon's mind, but the answer appears to lie in facts surrounding the investigation still being kept secret by the White House as a national security matter."

Whatever those secrets may be, they are sufficiently embarrassing to Nixon to have been a subject of blackmail. Hersh quoted "well-placed sources" in the January 13 *Times* as saying that an unnamed government official had tried to get a better job by threatening to reveal details about the spying and counterspying within the Nixon gang. "President Nixon rejected the unidentified official's demand, but did not order him discharged, the sources said. . . .

"Another source said that the official may have been involved himself in the passing of unauthorized materials to the Pentagon, but this could not be confirmed. All agreed, however, that a serious 'blackmail' attempt had been made."

"Two informed sources," Hersh added, "expressed dismay at the White House's apparent bowing to the



NIXON, KISSINGER: Someone may be listening.

alleged blackmail threat. 'Why didn't they just arrest him and get it over with?' one fully informed source asked.

"It was this specific information, they said, that was regarded by President Nixon as too damaging to release publicly when the plumbers' activities became known. 'The President always felt that this was dynamite,' a source said.

"A White House official, in confirming today [January 12] the broad account, suggested that Mr. Nixon believed its public disclosure would put the 'whole military command struc-

ture on the line.' He did not amplify on the remark."

The new disclosures undoubtedly concern only a small portion of the undercover doings of the White House gang. The new scandal may well lead to further disclosures, just as the Watergate break-in and cover-up led to the revealing of some of the operations of the plumbers unit.

The perspective is for what must appear to the U. S. ruling class as an unending chain of more and more damaging scandals. That prospect will add to the already widespread ruling-class sentiment that some way must be found to get Nixon out of the White House.

There appears to be a growing belief in Washington that Nixon is holding on to office primarily as a means of avoiding criminal prosecution. Warren Weaver Jr. reported in the January 13 *New York Times* that influential persons are discussing a way to get around this problem:

"A proposal that Congress grant President Nixon immunity from criminal prosecution if he decides to resign is under discussion in Washington political and social circles.

"The idea is that such Congressional action would remove from the President's mind any obstacle to leaving the White House based on concern over possible subsequent prosecution as a private citizen." □

## Government Admits Harassment and Wiretapping of U.S. Trotskyists

The U.S. government admitted January 7 that it has engaged in harassment and surveillance of the Trotskyist movement since at least 1945. Papers filed in a federal court in New York acknowledged "electronic surveillance" of members of the Socialist Workers party (SWP) from 1945 to 1963 and a campaign to disrupt the party's activities begun in 1961 and allegedly ended in 1969.

The admission came in a legal reply to a lawsuit filed by the SWP and the U.S. Trotskyist youth organization the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). The SWP and YSA are suing Nixon and other present and past

government officials for \$27 million in damages for violation of the rights of the SWP, YSA, and individual members of the organizations.

"The Government said," Farnsworth Fowle reported in the January 11 *New York Times*, "that the 'basic purpose' of the disruption program had been 'to alert the public to the fact that S.W.P. is not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky.'"

The reply denied engaging in illegal surveillance of SWP and YSA members during the 1972 and 1973 election campaigns.

The government, Fowle reported,

"acknowledged knowing of only one such wiretap—in 1972, on the Los Angeles home of James P. Cannon, then national chairman. The tap was placed on the basis of a report to the bureau by the local police, the Government said."

Government lawyers also filed a memorandum arguing that the complaint should be dismissed on the

ground that the court had no jurisdiction over him. John Ratliff, a member of the legal staff of the Political Rights Defense Fund, which was formed to seek broad support for the SWP and YSA suit, said that attorneys for the SWP and YSA would oppose that motion because Nixon is the "chief conspirator and ultimate authority for the illegal and unconstitutional acts"

carried out against the organizations.

Commenting on the government's admissions, Linda Jenness, the 1972 SWP candidate for president, told a press conference that the shift from past denials of harassment was due to the fact that the government is no longer "in a position to get away with the amount of lying" that it had previously. □

## Painter, GPU Agent, Assassin

### 'New York Times' Does a Whitewash on Siqueiros

When the Mexican painter David Alfaro Siqueiros died January 6 at the age of 77, the *New York Times* made use of its obituary to rewrite the history of an event in which Siqueiros played a leading role: the May 24, 1940, attempt on Leon Trotsky's life by agents of Stalin's GPU.

"He [Siqueiros] was a flamboyant and volatile Communist," wrote the *Times* reporter, "who was said to have had a hand in an abortive attempt to assassinate Leon Trotsky, Stalin's implacable enemy, in May, 1940.

"One widely believed version of the episode had Mr. Siqueiros leading a machine-gun attack on Trotsky's villa near Mexico City and spraying Trotsky's bedroom with bullets as the aged revolutionary and his wife huddled under the bed.

"Although the artist denied any active involvement in the plot, he found it prudent to flee Mexico for several months. Arrested on his return, he was tried and acquitted in 1941 on the charge of directing the attack on Trotsky's home. By then, Trotsky had indeed been assassinated, a crime for which Stalinist agents have been widely blamed."

There is reason for the "version" that Siqueiros led the machine-gun attack to be "widely believed." Not the least reason is that Siqueiros himself admitted it.

The *Times* portrayed the murderous assault as an "episode" by overlooking some facts and inventing others. Omitted is the fact that Robert Sheldon Harte, an American bodyguard of Trotsky, was kidnapped by the attackers and later murdered. His body was


found buried in the garden of a house rented by Siqueiros.

Notwithstanding the *New York Times* account, Siqueiros was neither tried nor acquitted for his part in the attack.

Siqueiros went into hiding immediately after the assault and was arrested about a month later. Before being questioned in court, he was allowed to read the testimony of all the other participants and witnesses.

He then claimed that he had been in charge only of "exterior operations" in the assault. With a bold disregard for consistency, he also claimed to have "ordered" the machine gunners not to shoot to kill. The aim, he said, was only to intimidate Trotsky.

Although Trotsky had in the meantime been murdered by another GPU agent, Ramón Mercader, the judge took Siqueiros's every word—including his denial of a role in Harte's



Plaque on wall of Trotsky's Coyoacan home commemorates victim of raid led by Siqueiros.

murder — as incontrovertible truth. He reduced the charges against Siqueiros to housebreaking, unlawful use of police uniforms (the attackers wore stolen police uniforms), robbery of two cars that the GPU agents used for their getaway, and damaging property (with machine-gun bullets).

However, Siqueiros was never tried even on these reduced charges. Released on bail, he skipped the country, going to Chile with the aid of the Chilean Stalinist poet Pablo Neruda. Shortly after his arrival there, he was arrested as a fugitive by Chilean police, but was released after the intervention of the Mexican ambassador.

A little more than a year before his death, Siqueiros made a more detailed confession of his role in the attack on Trotsky and the murder of Harte. This came in an interview with Norberto Valentini of the Dominican weekly *Ahora!* Valentini's report was printed in the October 9, 1972, issue of that magazine. (For a complete translation of the interview, see *Intercontinental Press*, November 13, 1972, p. 1238.)

"Those days," Siqueiros told the Dominican reporter, "were days of grimness and suffering. We had just come back from the Spanish civil war in a very depressed state. In the Soviet Union the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky had undermined the unity of the international Communist movement. We felt that our ideals had been compromised. We thought that ideological unity had to be restored around the Kremlin ruling class. Stalin was worried that in his exile in Mexico Trotsky might be the center of another chauvinist movement aiming to substitute itself for Soviet power. So he ordered a high official of the NKVD, Leonid Eitingon, to organize Trotsky's physical liquidation and granted him unlimited means.

"But the leader of the Mexican Communist party, Laborde, proved reluctant to support this act of violence and in practice refused to help carry it out. Finally, Laborde and his people were expelled and the party was left under our control."

"On May 24, 1940, we said that it was time to break from our inertia. I got hold of an army major's uniform and disguised myself as an officer. Twenty of my companions disguised themselves as soldiers. We took

the police guarding the Coyoacán fortress by surprise and immobilized them. We captured the American Sheldon Harte, who was Trotsky's personal guard, and broke into the patio of the house. I confess that at that moment I was paralyzed by emotion.

"I had taken part in various clandestine operations and was used to danger. I had participated in political struggles in Central and South American countries. But despite this, I had never found myself faced with the necessity to kill anyone in cold blood. But even so we fired about three hundred shots from the patio into the bedroom where we thought Trotsky was sleeping."

### 'When a Wife Refuses...Her Wifely Duties'

## The Shah of Iran Speaks Out

The Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci has acquired a reputation for getting world leaders to speak rather more freely than is their wont. In fact, some of the subjects of her interviews have complained that Fallaci tends to embellish a bit. It is with that forewarning that we call our readers' attention to the latest Fallaci interview. It appeared in the December 1 issue of the liberal American weekly *The New Republic*. The interview was with the shah of Iran.

Fallaci's subject expressed himself on a staggering range of issues: the nature of monarchical rule, sex, women, democracy, socialism, the nature of the Soviet Union, Israel, the energy crisis, Muammar el-Qaddafi, and the possibility of world war III. In just six pages.

The mortal mind boggles before any attempt to summarize: Let the King of Kings speak for himself.

*On monarchy:* "Where there's no monarchy, there's anarchy, or an oligarchy or a dictatorship. Besides, a monarchy is the only possible means to govern Iran. If I have been able to do something, a lot, in fact, for Iran, it is owing to the detail, slight as it may seem, that I'm its king. To get things done, one needs power, and to hold on to power one mustn't ask anyone's permission or advice. One mustn't discuss decisions with anyone.

The *New York Times*, which carries on its masthead the slogan "All the News That's Fit to Print," apparently considers it unfitting to speak evil of the dead, even when that evil is undisputed truth. Or could some other motive be involved in the falsification?

The *Times* editors are normally quite happy to present unvarnished pictures of the crimes of the Soviet bureaucrats when doing so can help to discredit socialism. But when it is a question of a conflict between the bureaucracy and a real revolutionist, then the *Times* is considerably more "understanding" — to the point of covering up for assassins. □

Of course, I may have made mistakes too. I too am human. However, I believe I have a task to carry out, a mission, and I intend to perform it to the end without renouncing my throne."

The shah exaggerates. It is not true that he consults with no one. "It must be terribly lonely to be a king instead of a man," Fallaci observes.

"A king who doesn't need to account to anyone for what he says and does is unavoidably doomed to loneliness," shah answers. "However, I'm not entirely alone, because a force others can't perceive accompanies me. My mystical force. Moreover, I receive messages. I have lived with God beside me since I was five years old. Since, that is, God sent me those visions."

"Visions?" asks the wary Fallaci.

"Visions, yes. Apparitions."

"Of what, of whom?"

"Of prophets. I'm really surprised you should ignore [be ignorant of?] this. It is common knowledge that I've had visions. I've even put it down in my biography. As a child, I had two visions: one when I was five and one when I was six. The first time, I saw our Prophet Ali, he who, according to our religion, disappeared to return the day he would save the world. I had an accident: I fell against a rock. And he saved me: he placed himself



between me and the rock. I know because I saw him. And not in a dream: in reality. Material reality, if you see what I mean. I alone saw him. The person who was with me didn't see him at all. But nobody else was supposed to see him except me because . . . Oh, I fear you don't understand me."

Fallaci admits that she doesn't. He has an explanation for her density, though. She's "not a believer." He is: "I believe in God, and that I have been chosen by God to perform a task. My visions were miracles that saved the country. My reign has saved the country, and it has done so because God was on my side."

*On democracy:* Here we may be brief. Fallaci suggests that the shah is "a very authoritarian king." Not so, he declares. There is more democracy in Iran than almost anywhere else. Fallaci is incredulous. "Maybe I explained myself badly, Your Majesty," she suggests. "The democracy I was referring to is the kind we consider such in the West, a regime that allows everyone to think as they wish and is based on a Parliament where even

minorities are represented."

The shah: "But I don't want that kind of democracy! Haven't you understood that? I don't know what to do with that kind of democracy! I don't want any part of it, it's all yours, you can keep it, don't you see? Your wonderful democracy. You'll see, in a few years, what your wonderful democracy leads to."

Fallaci persists: "Well, at that, maybe it's a bit chaotic. But it's the only possible choice if one is to respect Man and his freedom of thought."

Shah: "Freedom of thought, freedom of thought! Democracy, democracy! With five-year-olds going on strike and parading in the street. Is that what you call democracy? Freedom?"

*On women:* Here the shah is at his most incisive. Fallaci broaches the subject from a personal angle: "Your Majesty, is it true that you've taken another wife?"

"A stupid, vile, disgusting libel," says the king.

"But, Your Majesty, you're a Moslem. Your religion allows you to take another wife without repudiating Em-

press Farah Diba."


"Yes," the shah concedes, "certainly. According to my religion, I could, so long as my wife grants her consent. And, to be honest, one must admit there are cases where . . . When a wife is ill, for instance, or when she refuses to perform her wifely duties, thereby causing her husband unhappiness . . . Let's face it! One has to be a hypocrite or an innocent to believe a husband will tolerate that kind of thing. In your society, when something like that occurs, doesn't a man take a mistress, or even more than one? Well, in our society, instead, a man can take another wife. So long as his first wife agrees and the court approves. Without those two conditions on which I have based by law, however, the new marriage cannot take place. So can you believe that I, my very self, would break the law by marrying in secret?"

Fallaci is perplexed. She observes that the shah's name has often been associated with women. "And now," she says, "I'm beginning to suspect women have counted for nothing in your life."

She has struck a nerve. The shah holds forth: "I fear your suspicion is justified. Women, you know . . . Look, let's put it this way. I don't underestimate them, as shown by the fact that they have derived more advantages than anyone else from my White Revolution. I have fought strenuously to obtain equal rights and responsibilities for them. I have even incorporated them in the Army, where they get six months' military training before being sent to the villages to fight the battle against illiteracy. Nor should one forget that I'm the son of the man who removed women's veils in Iran. But I wouldn't be sincere if I asserted I'd been influenced by a single one of them. Nobody can influence me, nobody at all. And a woman still less. In a man's life, women count only if they're beautiful and graceful and know how to stay feminine and . . . This Women's Lib business, for instance. What do these feminists want? What do you want? Equality, you say? Indeed! I don't want to seem rude, but . . . You may be equal in the eyes of the law, but not, I beg your pardon for saying so, in ability."

"Aren't we?" asks Fallaci.

"No." And the proof: "You've never produced a Michelangelo or a Bach.



SHAH with the uninfluential Empress Farah: God is his chief minister and adviser.

You've never even produced a great cook. And don't talk of opportunities. Are you joking? Have you lacked the opportunity to give history a great cook? You have produced nothing great, nothing! Tell me, how many women capable of governing have you met in interviews such as this?"

Fallaci mentions Golda Meir and Indira Gandhi. "Hm," says Shah. "All I can say is that women, when they are in power, are much harsher than men. Much more cruel. Much more bloodthirsty. I'm quoting facts, not opinions. You're heartless when

you're rulers. Think of Caterina de Medici, Catherine of Russia, Elizabeth I of England. Not to mention your Lucrezia Borgia with her poisons and intrigues. You're schemers, you're evil. Every one of you."

Finally, on the Shah's place in the hearts of his people. Fallaci: "When I attempt to talk about you, here in Teheran, people withdraw into a fearful silence. They don't even dare to utter your name. Your Majesty, why is that?"

Shah: "From exaggerated respect, I should suppose." □

organize demonstrations, other sectors continued their protests. On December 18, about 200 members of the Democratic Unification party, a small bourgeois opposition party, held a rally in downtown Seoul demanding that the government resign. On December 24 a group of thirty intellectuals and religious leaders began a campaign to collect one million signatures on a petition calling for a new constitution. On January 8 the main parliamentary opposition, the New Democratic party, decided to join the movement for constitutional reform.

In order to head off the expanding demands for democratization, Park announced on January 8 the new "emergency" measures. These measures prohibited "Denial, opposition to and misrepresentation or defamation of the Constitution, and any effort to revise or repeal it; advocacy or instigation of any action prohibited by the emergency measure or communication about such actions by any means; and criticism of the emergency measure itself." Any violator could be arrested without warrant and tried by court martial. The national police were put on round-the-clock alert.

One day before the emergency declaration, nine well-known writers were arrested in Seoul for participating in a meeting that discussed reform of the constitution. They included the poet Kim Chi Ha, novelists Ahn Su Gil and Lee Ho Chul, literary critic and Harvard graduate Park Nak Chung, and writers Park Yun Hee and Ahn Nam Chul. □

## South Korea

### Park Intensifies Repression

After a month of making partial concessions to the democratic opposition movement in South Korea, President Park Chung Hee has again resorted to repression as a way of stifling the growing dissent. He announced on January 8 that anyone criticizing the constitution or calling for its amendment would be arrested, court martialed, and imprisoned for up to fifteen years.

In December Park had ousted Lee Hu Rak, the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), and removed KCIA agents from campuses and newspaper offices as a concession to student demonstrations and increased calls by journalists, church leaders, intellectuals, and parliamentary opposition figures for an end to dictatorial rule in South Korea.

But these concessions did not stop the protests. Reporting from Seoul in the December 17 *New York Times*, correspondent Fox Butterfield observed: "Instead, protests against the Government have continued. And some critics have been emboldened to attack the President himself—for the first time since Mr. Park seized virtual total power last year—and to demand changes in the Constitution he pushed through in October, 1972." Butterfield quoted one opposition politician as saying: "The Government's promise to stop C.I.A. spying is only a temporary tactical retreat, and we are not going to stop until we get

some fundamental institutional change like a new constitution."

Although KCIA agents were removed from newspaper offices, the regime introduced a new set of restrictions on the press. The "reforms" introduced by Park could not be criticized, questions of "national security" or "important diplomatic matters" could not be discussed, and articles "causing social unrest or undermining economic stability" could not be published. The regime also closed all schools and universities early for the three-month winter vacation.

Although the students were locked out of their schools and could not

### Kremlin Attacks 'The Gulag Archipelago'

### Soviet Dissidents Defend Solzhenitsyn

As the Stalinists in the Soviet Union, Europe, and the United States began their slander campaign against Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn for the publication in Paris of his latest book, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956*, a group of Soviet dissidents released a statement in the author's defense.

The physicist Andrei Sakharov, mathematician Igor Shafarevich, and writers Vladimir Maksimov, Aleksandr Galich, and Vladimir Voinovich said in a statement on January 6:

"We are sure that there are no bases in law for the prosecution of Solzhenitsyn for the publication abroad of his new book, 'The Gulag Archipelago,' just as there are no bases for prosecution of anyone for similar actions."

The oppositionists' defense of Solzhenitsyn came after attacks calling his book an "anti-Soviet slander" and saying it contained "dirty things." While the Stalinist press cranked out its classical vituperations, most of the attacks

steered away from mentioning what Solzhenitsyn's book dealt with: the political terror of the Stalin years. Those attacks that took up the question of Stalin's crimes treated it as if it were simply a matter of historical interest.

Shortly before the publication of *The Gulag Archipelago*, Boris Pankin, the head of the new All-Union Copyright Agency, told reporters that the Kremlin would sue foreign publishers if they continued to publish the works of Soviet dissidents without the approval of Moscow. The statement in defense of Solzhenitsyn's right to publish his works called the agency "a weapon of our censorship in all the outside world, directed at the suppression of freedom of exchange of information and spiritual values between peoples."

The statement by Sakharov and the other dissidents made the same charges that Solzhenitsyn raised in his book: "It is surely impossible to deny that there actually were mass arrests, tortures, executions, forced labor, inhuman conditions, conscious extermination of millions of people in the camps."

Although much of the Western press—for its own sensationalistic reasons—has come out in defense of Solzhenitsyn's right to publish his book abroad, the statement by the five Soviet dissidents will be much more important in helping to defend him. Sakharov and the others realize that the attacks directed against Solzhenitsyn are also directed against the entire movement for proletarian democracy in the Soviet Union. The solidarity among the dissidents—although they have different views on socialism and the way to struggle against the Stalinist deformation—has been a strong factor in helping it resist the repeated attacks against it.

Another instance of this solidarity followed the January 9 expulsion of Lydia Chukovskaya, a well-known Soviet author and a friend of Solzhenitsyn's, from the Soviet Writers' Union. Both Andrei Sakharov and Vladimir Maksimov issued statements in her defense. Chukovskaya was expelled for having come to Sakharov's support when he was being publicly attacked in the Soviet press last fall. She had also previously come to the defense of Solzhenitsyn and other Soviet dissidents. A writer of children's stories, Chukovskaya is best known

outside of the Soviet Union for *The Deserted House*, a semiautobiographi-

cal account of her experiences during Stalin's purges. □

## Moscow Seeks to 'Stabilize' Indian Subcontinent

### More Soviet Arms to Gandhi Regime

When Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Soviet Communist party, visited New Delhi for a series of talks with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in late November, he made a number of references to a projected "Asian collective security plan." While no formal military agreements were made public—indeed, representatives of the New Delhi regime played down the concept in their public declarations—indications are that plans for closer military cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi were actually laid out.

The January 4 *Christian Science Monitor* reported that the Kremlin had agreed to supply the Gandhi regime SAM-6 antiaircraft missiles. An article in the New Delhi *Hindustan Times* declared: "The Soviet deal should bring India's air defense system on par with the most sophisticated existing in Asia."

The talks in New Delhi were a direct consequence of the détente between Moscow, Washington, and Peking. The Kremlin's prime interest in propping up the Gandhi regime is to secure a stable Indian subcontinent by sending military aid to enable New Delhi to intervene against revolutionary developments, both in India and in neighboring countries, and by providing economic aid to ease India's growing domestic crisis. As the December 3 *Far Eastern Economic Review* noted: "Regardless of the response to [his] requests, the economic stability of India is highly relevant to Brezhnev's grand strategy of a stable subcontinent."

The fifteen-year development agreements announced after the Brezhnev-Gandhi talks are designed to help such a stabilization. The economic pacts include stepped-up trade between the Soviet Union and India, the construction of joint iron and steel projects, and the production and refining of oil, natural gas, and coal. Soviet oil and fuel aid is particularly important for India, since it has already begun to feel the pinch of the Arab oil cutbacks. A general strike in No-

vember in New Delhi was directly sparked by a shortage of kerosene and other goods.

Besides talking to Gandhi, Brezhnev apparently offered some advice to his allies in the Indian Communist party. The December 23 issue of *Holiday*, an independent leftist weekly published



GANDHI: Gets military, economic, and political aid from Kremlin.

in Dacca, touched on Brezhnev's discussions with the CPI: "It is said that the comrade from the Kremlin urged upon his Indian fraternal party members that they should in no case disturb Mrs. Gandhi's government and should do all they could to raise production."

That this tightening of economic and military relationships between Moscow and New Delhi is also in the interests of Washington, which is willing to let the Stalinists partially take over the role of policing the subcontinent, was expressed in an editorial in the December 17 *Washington Post*: "No American friend of India will be alarmed if India gets real help from somewhere else." But, of course, this does not mean that Washington is withdrawing its "aid." Just two weeks

after Brezhnev's visit, Washington wrote off India's rupee debt to Washington, equal to \$2.2 thousand million.

The SAM-6 missile deal appears to be only the first part of Moscow's increased military aid to New Delhi. According to the November 28 *Le Monde*, Moscow had already been the principal supplier of planes, armored vehicles, and bombs to the Gandhi

regime. The report also noted that Moscow had promised to help develop India's arms industry so that it could produce its own ammunition, rifles, artillery, tanks, and even Mig-21s. In addition, New Delhi has requested help in producing Mig-23s. The fifteen-year agreement to bolster India's industrial capacity undoubtedly was concluded at least partly with the view of developing India's arms industry. □

ber 15 protest in Jogjakarta, 350 miles from the capital. The *Sinar Harapan*, a Jakarta newspaper, reported that 3,000 students demonstrated for four hours against high prices, gambling, and the domination of Chinese businessmen. The students also tried to hijack a train to take the demonstrators to the capital.

Though the student actions in Jakarta itself have not yet reached significant proportions, and no well-organized student groups have emerged thus far, the regime's sensitivity to their potential is quite evident. As the December 10 *Far Eastern Economic Review* noted: "The main question . . . under consideration here is: Will the unrest among the students explode as in Thailand?"

One response of the regime to the students was to make an appearance of listening to their demands. General Sumitro, deputy commander of the armed forces and commander of KOPKAMTIB (Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), was sent to "talk" with them. In an interview concerning the meeting, he said: "I got the feeling that we can solve our problems not by fighting, but by frank exchange of views. They want to know — we can provide the answers. I say 'thank you' when you are going to criticize me. But 'come down to earth, my friend, integrate with the people, don't ape foreign models.'"

The Suharto regime is not known for its aversion to physical repression when verbal persuasion doesn't work. The 1965 massacre of more than 500,000 members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist party is sufficient proof of that.

Although no widespread crackdown has yet been unleashed against the students, a few have been arrested and questioned. The military command also charged that "a group of nonstudents and irresponsible persons" had infiltrated the student movement "with intent to seek popularity and publicity, which can lead to anarchy."

At the Asiawide student conference held in Bangkok, Thailand, in late November, plans were mapped out to hold protests in several Asian countries to greet Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka when he visits those countries in January. Jakarta is scheduled as one of the stops on his itinerary and plans for protests have already been discussed among the Indonesian students. □

## Suharto Worried

# Indonesian Students Stage Protests

Following the example of their Thai and South Korean counterparts, students in Indonesia have begun to take to the streets. Demonstrations, though small, have increased since November, worrying the government of President Suharto enough to impel it to hold a series of meetings with the students in an attempt to head off further protests.

In the January 2 *New York Times* Sydney Schanberg reported from Jakarta: "Over the past few months, demonstrations have proliferated — with the students protesting against excessive foreign investment in and influence over the economy, corruption and 'obscene consumption' at top levels of Government, official favoritism to Chinese businessmen at the expense of Indonesians, and, in sum, the widening gap between the very few rich and the very many poor in this Asian country of over 120 million people."

A slogan at one of the demonstrations read: "Foreign investment benefits only a small group of people." Jakarta itself is a graphic example of the resented economic inequality. While the downtown section of the capital boasts new luxury hotels, skyscrapers, and apartment buildings, the vast majority of Jakarta's inhabitants live in slums. A full 85 percent of the city's 5 million people lack electricity, clean water, and sewers. Two thirds of the population make less than \$75 a year. In such a context, the demands raised by the students could very quickly gain wide support.

An oil-rich country, Indonesia has in the past few years become a prime



SUHARTO

target of imperialist penetration, principally by American and Japanese interests. In addition, Japan, which still uses more wood than any other advanced capitalist country, views Indonesia's vast forests as a rich source of timber. According to the December 11 Tokyo English-language *Daily Yomiuri*, some of the student demonstrations have been specifically directed against Japanese investments.

An example of the uneven growth of the student movement is the Decem-

## 'Darkest Recess of Political Power'

"Though a state may admit that it holds political prisoners," write the authors of the Amnesty International report on torture, "it will never admit that it uses torture. The confrontation between the individual and the limitless power of the state, between the torturer and his victim, takes place in the darkest recess of political power."

In this comprehensive report, Amnesty International undertakes to direct some light into the "darkest recess." The report has the aim of "arousing public opinion to the danger which threatens the citizens of every country, however long its tradition of civilised conduct. For nothing is clearer from the record which follows than that once one group of citizens has been set on one side as licensed to torture, and another as a group so far beyond consideration as human beings that any brutality can be inflicted on them, the fatal step has been taken. The group of victims is rapidly enlarged while, at the same time, the apparatus of the state moves in to protect the torturers from punishment or, even, from enquiry."

More than half of the report is devoted to a country-by-country survey of allegations of torture around the world. Amnesty does not pretend that its survey is exhaustive; on the contrary, the authors point out that regimes that maintain their power by the systematized use of torture may be more capable than a democracy of concealing their crimes:

"... in the countries where torture is used the collection of evidence on the practice becomes difficult, if not impossible. The atmosphere of terror and intimidation created in that way prevents enquiry, from inside or outside the country concerned."

Despite such difficulties, Amnesty has compiled a depressingly long list of countries in which torture is practised by those in power. It would appear to be most widespread in Latin America. Costa Rica, the report notes, "is the only Latin American country from which Amnesty International has received no allegations of torture."

This is hardly fortuitous. Not only are most of the governments in the region extremely unstable, but the area is also, perhaps more than any other, the special preserve of U.S. imperialism. While Amnesty finds no evidence that torture is systematically used as an administrative policy in the United States, the report again and again notes the most institutionalized use of torture in countries where the regime is a special client of Washington: Bolivia, Brazil, Greece, Paraguay, South Vietnam, etc.

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*Report on Torture* by Amnesty International. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1973. 224 pp. £1.50.

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Torture, the authors note in their introduction, "is not simply an indigenous activity, it is international; foreign experts are sent from one country to another, schools of torture explain and demonstrate methods, and modern torture equipment used in torture is exported from one country to another."

Torturers who want the "best" equipment naturally tend to shop for it where technology is highly advanced. In July 1972, the London *Times* revealed that the Pakistani military attaché in the United States was purchasing "instruments of torture." Bhutto's government denied ordering the purchase, claiming that it had been authorized by Yahya Khan. But nobody denied that torture instruments were available for sale in the United States.

The internationalizing of torture and its increased use are not difficult to trace to the needs of imperialism threatened by the revolt of its subjects, whether they are rebelling directly against the imperialist oppressor or its native puppet. If torture is more widespread in South Vietnam than in Northern Ireland, the reason is not any British "tradition of civilized conduct" but the greater advancement of the Vietnamese revolution.

In the era of the death agony of imperialism, torture takes on a new function. Whereas historically it was

primarily a means of extracting information or confessions, it is now chiefly a weapon of intimidation.

"The deliberate infliction of pain by one human being on another to break him is a special horror," the authors write in their introduction. "It is significant that torture is the one form of violence today that a state will always deny and never justify. The state may justify mass murder and glorify those that kill as killers, but it never justifies torture nor glorifies those that torture as torturers."

"And yet the use of torture has by all indications increased over the last few years. The continual limited wars of our time—civil wars, colonial wars, and territorial wars—account for part of this, but an increasing proportion is accounted for by states who use torture as a means of governing. Torture in those countries plays an integral role in the political system itself. Its function is not only to generate confessions and information from citizens believed to oppose the government; it is used to deter others from expressing opposition. For those who govern without the consent of the governed this has proved to be an effective method of maintaining power. To set torture as the price of dissent is to be assured that only a small minority will act. With the majority neutralised by fear, the well-equipped forces of repression can concentrate on an isolated minority."

There is very little effective defense of torture victims available at present, Amnesty concludes. The United Nations and other international bodies cannot be expected to oppose the practice seriously when their member governments themselves make use of it. The pressure of public opinion may sometimes be helpful, but this is difficult to mobilize when the victims are little known and the government involved denies and conceals its use of torture.

A potentially very powerful means of publicizing cases of torture and mobilizing world opinion against it does exist. The governments of the degenerated and deformed workers states have the means at their disposal for a powerful international campaign against the brutalities of decaying capitalism.

But such a campaign would require clean hands on the part of the governments of the workers states and a devotion to the interests of the oppressed

rather than to diplomatic deals with their oppressors. Both these prerequisites are lacking.

The use of torture, particularly psychological torture, against Soviet dissidents has been well documented by such samizdat publications as the *Chronicle of Current Events* and is summarized in the Amnesty report.

It is therefore not surprising that the Soviet bureaucrats are prepared to overlook similar or even more bar-

baric measures on the part of potential diplomatic friends. The report describes the case of Greece:

"Relations [between Moscow and Athens] began to improve in the 1960s as part of the general détente, but it was with the advent of the Colonels that the Soviet bloc made a special effort to improve relations with Greece. Russian policy has shown a marked preference for this regime and economic, political, and cultural relations

have expanded.

"While the media in the Soviet bloc have been critical of the Greek regime, particularly at its outset, the most astonishing aspect was that the line among party members in Eastern Europe is that the Colonels 'have done many things.' Most shocking has been the action of the Bulgarians in returning escaped Greeks who asked for political asylum."

—David Burton

## DOCUMENTS

### Position of LCR-ETA(VI) on Assassination of Carrero Blanco

[The following two items dealing with the assassination of Franco's premier, Carrero Blanco, appeared in the January 4 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly, *Rouge*. The first consists of extracts from a declaration released December 21, the day after the assassination, by the united Political Bureau of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria-Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (VI) [Revolutionary Communist League-Basque Nation and Freedom (VI)] a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International created by the fusion of the LCR and ETA(VI).

[The second is an interview with one of the members of the LCR-ETA (VI) explaining more fully the organization's position on the assassination and appealing for international support against Francoist repression. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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That repression was the basic policy of the Carrero government had become obvious to the workers and students.

That the intensification of repression has not been able to block the mass movement, whose rise has continued since the Burgos trial, leads us to think that the execution of Carrero, in its turn, far from putting a brake on the combativity of the workers and popular masses, will constitute an encouragement to extending the struggle against the dictatorship. It has revealed the vulnerability of the repressive apparatus in the person of one

of its key men at a time when the attack on the masses and the vanguard was getting tougher and more open.

Especially at first, terror and consternation shook the bourgeoisie. Certainly, the dictatorship did not disappear with Carrero and it is not through a succession of executions of individuals that it will be possible to overthrow it. But the masses will be able to understand that if one individual action could have such effects, it will not be possible to contain massive and organized revolutionary violence by any measures.

The effects that this event will have within the ruling class are obvious. While it could have been imagined with some reservation that Carrero might have been able to fill the vacuum that will be left when Franco dies, today the breadth of solutions for the regime is quite limited.

Carrero's threefold quality as a Franco confidant, a man perfectly at home in the state apparatus (whose cohesion is basic to succession), and one who commands the prestige of not being linked to any faction of the bourgeoisie made him the man

most able to assure the transition to post-Francoism. None of the candidates for succession can claim such authority within the various factions of the ruling class. The contradictions within the ruling class will now become more acute and manifest themselves much more openly.

Finally, both in the encouragement to the masses that the execution of Carrero Blanco represents and in the objective effects his disappearance will have within the ruling class, the consequences of the attack appear positive to us.

For this reason our support to the action is total.

There will be those who say, and correctly, that the execution of Carrero will immediately involve an intensification of Francoist repression in an attempt by the regime to return the blow it has suffered. But it would be pure opportunism to present this fact as an "argument" to condemn the action, because that would amount to hiding behind the current weakness of the vanguard as a pretext for refusing to take on the revolutionary tasks that the crisis of the dictatorship poses with a burning urgency. □

### Interview With Member of LCR-ETA(VI)

*Question. First of all, what were the immediate reactions after the liquidation of Carrero Blanco? It seems that there was a mixture of amazement and the beginnings of panic with-*

*in the regime in the first few hours after the assassination.*

*Answer. Yes, that's true. The initial reactions clearly showed a paralysis*

of the regime, which was struck dumb. And it's interesting to analyze this, because it's a foretaste of what will happen when Franco dies, which everything indicates is not very far off.

We must say that on the technical level the attack was of impressing perfection, and it is understandable that it shocked a regime that, after more than thirty years of rigid control, believes itself invulnerable and eternal. In fact, the first official statement simply rejected the notion that there had been an attack. The communiqué claimed it was a gas explosion!

Then, several different hypotheses about who was responsible for the attack floated around, and it is interesting to see how various factions within the regime came to suspect each other. Confidence reigns! The Spanish Communist party also wanted to give credence to the version that the hard-line wing of the regime had done it in order to get control of the situation. But that doesn't make sense. Carrero Blanco was no liberal. On the contrary, he appeared as the guarantor of the continuity of Francoism after the death of Franco.

In any case, what is clear is that the entire apparatus of the dictatorship was seriously shaken and that no faction of the regime could or knew how to take the initiative in offering an immediate response to the attack.

The army, naturally, came forward to keep the situation under control, but the bourgeoisie went through several hours, and even several days, of uneasy waiting.

Some anecdotes are interesting. In the bourgeois neighborhoods there were mothers who dashed to get their children out of private schools; some banks had to shut down because people were running to get their money out; and there was this one factory where the managers just took off when they heard the news.

And we must also note Franco's silence and his absence from Carrero Blanco's funeral.

*Q. There has been talk about a powerful Francoist demonstration at the funeral. Was that a mass mobilization? What were the reactions in the poor neighborhoods?*

*A. It's true that the liquidation of Carrero Blanco did not make the workers take to the streets, but it cer-*

tainly didn't cast any pall over their New Year holidays. The attack was very popular. In the workers neighborhoods everyone saw it as a violent and spectacular blow against the dictatorship.

As for the character of the funeral demonstration, there's nothing surprising in the fact that the regime is able to bring 20,000 or 30,000 people out on the street. All the administration personnel, among others, were mobilized officially. The fact that it was limited to Madrid and that even there it was not larger shows the narrow social base of the regime. The Francoist demonstrations just after the Burgos trials were bigger.

But there was another difference between this demonstration and the one around Burgos. At the funeral the far right couldn't do anything but blow off steam by booing Tarancon, the archbishop of Madrid, who is regarded as a representative of the liberal wing of the church hierarchy. But it did not take the initiative the way it did when a policeman was killed during this year's May Day demonstration in Madrid.

To return to the reaction of the workers and the popular masses, the liquidation of Carrero Blanco did not trigger street demonstrations against the dictatorship. If it had taken place within the framework of a mass mobilization like the one during the Burgos trials, it could have powerfully stimulated them. But today, because of the role of the CP, the mobilization against the trials of the leaders of the workers commissions has remained on a very insufficient level, except in Barcelona. On December 20, the very day the trial opened, the attack precipitated such a heavy police concentration in downtown Madrid that demonstrations could have easily taken place in the poor neighborhoods. But nothing had been seriously prepared. The CP has sabotaged any real mobilization and the revolutionary organizations have been pretty severely hit by the repression in the recent period.

But it would be false to claim that the attack that liquidated Carrero Blanco prevented the development of a mobilization against the workers commissions trials or that it got no response among the workers.

*Q. On December 21 you took a position in a public declaration that said this: "Both in the encouragement*

*to the masses that the execution of Carrero Blanco represents and in the objective effects his disappearance will have within the ruling class, the consequences of the attack appear positive to us. For this reason, our support to the action is total."*

*A. Yes. It is important to fully explain our position. In this case our support goes beyond simply recognizing the unconditional right to use violence, terrorism included, in the struggle against the Francoist dictatorship, one of the bloodiest ever known, and in defense of militants against repression. That is only the absolutely necessary starting point, but it is independent of our evaluation of the well-foundedness of the action, of its consequences, and of the differences we can have with the organization that carried it out.*

Given the attack on Carrero Blanco, we take a position of positive, active support by affirming that the effects of this action are positive and favor the development of mass struggles, which alone will bring down the dictatorship by culminating in a revolutionary general strike.

More than anyone else Carrero Blanco was the incarnation of Francoist terror. His execution was greeted very favorably, all the more so in that it occurred in the context of the struggle against intensified repression. In the six months since it was formed last June, the Carrero Blanco government had built up an imposing roll of repression: heavy prison sentences against the leaders of the workers commissions, the death penalty demanded against the anarchist militants in Barcelona, the assassination of revolutionary nationalist militants in the Basque country.

Nobody thinks that by liquidating Franco's ministers one by one you can bring down the dictatorship, not even the comrades of the ETA(V) who do have a militarist conception of the confrontation with the state apparatus. But the workers saw an incitement to struggle in this blow against the very heart of the regime, a blow that showed the regime's vulnerability and deprived it of the key element in the succession operation.

The disappearance of Carrero Blanco weakens the regime and exacerbates the clashes among the various factions of the bourgeoisie, which, faced with the rise of mass struggle, is incapable

of assuring a painless transition to post-Francoism, to Francoism without Franco.

That the repression is going to be intensified is obvious. That is only a reflection of the deepening crisis of the dictatorship.

In this sense, the mass response to the intensification of Francoist terror must take on an offensive character and prepare to overthrow the dictatorship.

*Q. In supporting the execution of Carrero Blanco, you are supporting an action carried out by the ETA(V). Nevertheless, not only do you have deep programmatic differences with these comrades, you also reject their conception of armed struggle against the dictatorship.*

A. Certainly. Our break with the militant nationalists of the ETA in August 1970, which was when we set up the ETA(VI), was based on a deep programmatic difference and on an understanding of the impasse the militarist activism of our organization had led to. The ETA(V) conceives of the struggle against national oppression as a national liberation struggle and not as a basic element of, and tightly overlapping with, the general class struggle throughout the territory of the Spanish state for the overthrow of the Francoist dictatorship and the establishment of a federated socialist republic.

Its petty-bourgeois nationalist ideology has sometimes led it to take reactionary positions and to deny the class oppositions that exist in Euzkadi [Basque country] itself. But the precipitous development of workers struggles has revealed the flagrant contradictions of its conceptions. Today the ETA(V) is trying to link its armed actions to mass struggles. But in reality its activity remains almost purely military. There is no serious work of propaganda, agitation, and organization in the factories, universities, and poor neighborhoods.

ETA(V) conceives of the overthrow of the dictatorship as a process of direct confrontation between the state apparatus and the revolutionary organization, whose courageous actions evoke the sympathy of the masses and trigger their mobilization. At bottom, this is a putschist conception that propagates the illusion that the audacious action of a small group of

revolutionists can overthrow the dictatorship without basing itself on the organized violence of the working class and the popular masses.

We think that the minority armed initiatives of the vanguard must serve the objective of contributing to the organization of the self-defense and violence of the masses by being conjoined to current mass struggles.

*Q. It has just been announced that Arias Navarro will very probably be nominated as head of the government. So it won't be the military, but the minister of the interior who will succeed Carrero Blanco. That's a whole program for . . .*

A. Yes, but it's not exactly the same as if Marcellin were named prime minister of France! It confirms the hardening of the regime, confirms that the only program it has is to intensify the repression in an effort to block the rise of mass struggles that directly endanger the dictatorship in the coming days: during the succession operation, when the international recession comes, etc.

To understand that the regime has been brought up short and for the moment deprived of any alternative, you have to keep in mind the difficulties with which the succession operation had been prepared and the role Carrero Blanco was to play in it.

For thirty-three years Carrero Blanco had held high posts, as a real confidant of Franco. In fact, he was considered more of a Francoist than Franco. Since he was not directly linked to any faction, he seemed capable of more or less playing the Bonapartist role that will be left vacant by Franco's death and of maintaining a certain balance between the various factions of the bourgeoisie.

Arias Navarro is not capable of playing such a role. He has no political ability, no authority. All he is, is chief cop.

Now we have to see what government is going to be set up. The balance among the various factions (Falangist, Opus Dei, . . .) will no doubt be the same as it was in the government formed last June. And the policy of repression will be strengthened.

What the selection of Arias Navarro clearly shows is that the regime is falling back on its past, on its "known quantities," the police and the army. It's trying to brush aside temporarily

all the problems that it has been facing for the past ten years and that will burst forth brutally when Franco dies, or even before. So this government has no future. It's only a short-term, stop-gap solution.

*Q. As far as repression goes, we didn't have to wait long to find out what the government's policy is. The verdicts in the workers commissions trials have just come down. The leaders of the workers commissions were sentenced to huge prison terms, twelve to twenty years. And the trial of the anarchist militants of the MIL [Iberian Movement for Liberation] is supposed to open very soon.*

A. These militants face the death penalty. When they were arrested, one of them defended himself and killed a cop. Their trial was to have been held in December, but was postponed. The prosecutor has asked for two death sentences and the present government is not inclined to be lenient. More than ever, only mass mobilizations can save them.

This is also the case with the ETA(V) comrades who are exiled in France and have been accused of responsibility for the attack. You've seen the hysterical press campaign demanding their extradition.

It is very important for you to develop a powerful mobilization in France, as you did during the Burgos trials, in order to prevent the French government from delivering the ETA(V) comrades to the executioner and to oppose any measure of extradition, expulsion, or house arrest of Basque revolutionary militants in France.

We want to take advantage of this opportunity to issue a solemn appeal to all revolutionary, workers, and antifascist organizations to mobilize to prevent a new fascist crime. The anarchist militants of Barcelona must be saved! The Basque revolutionary militants must be saved!

We know that the traditions of antifascist struggle are solidly rooted in the French working class and that it has already been known to line up with the Spanish proletariat at decisive moments. We are confident that it will again rise up against all the crimes of the Francoist dictatorship and will thus become a decisive force contributing to its revolutionary overthrow. □