



Banzer in Trouble:

## **Why Bolivian Coalition Split**

***Eyewitness Report  
of Worker-Student  
Revolt in Athens***

***How U.S. Left  
Responded to  
Watergate Scandal***

# Morgentaler Acquitted on Abortion Charge

Nearly four months ago Henry Morgentaler, a Canadian physician, was arrested and charged with having illegally performed an abortion. On November 14 he was acquitted of that charge after a three-week trial that marked a defeat for Canadian abortion foes.

Lis Angus, reporting for the Trotskyist fortnightly *Labor Challenge*, commented on the symbolic nature of the trial:

"Testimony and arguments in the trial which went to the jury today [November 12] have gone far beyond the question of whether Dr. Morgentaler actually performed the abortion he is accused of—which is not disputed by the defense. The defense has succeeded in turning the tables on the Crown to in effect put the abortion law itself on trial. The defense has argued for a woman's right to abortion, forcing the Crown to try to justify the present restrictive law."

Morgentaler's acquittal eliminates the first of a total of thirteen charges against him. If convicted, he could have faced up to life imprisonment and automatic expulsion from the medical profession. □

## Alberto Corvalan Reported Sentenced to Death

A report cabled November 28 from Berlin to the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinion* indicated that Alberto Corvalan, son of Chilean Communist party General Secretary Luis Corvalan, and his wife have been sentenced to death. The report originated with the civil-liberties organization Amnesty International, which stated that Alberto Corvalan and his wife had probably been sentenced around November 15, although official junta sources have not yet disclosed this information. It is also unknown whether the sentences have been carried out.

## Schedule

This is a reminder that our last issue of the year will be dated December 24. It will contain our index for 1973. There will be no issues for December 31 and January 7. We will resume our regular weekly schedule with the January 14 issue.

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# The Athens Revolt of November 14-17

Athens

## The Beginning

Very few student leaders or political figures regardless of political affiliation could have imagined that in November 1973 the student revolt would break out so violently and that so many people would be drawn into it. Everyone was expecting something to happen, but no one believed things would go so far. Consequently, nobody, from the right all the way through the two Communist parties (pro- and anti-Kremlin), had made the slightest preparation for such an eventuality.

Nevertheless, such a revolt was the natural result of the passionate hatred for the dictatorial regime that had instituted intolerable intellectual repression of the students and intelligentsia and political repression of everybody, especially the working class. Political leaders hoped that the revolt would be deferred or that it would not be very serious, bourgeois leaders because they had no idea how it would end, leftists because they wanted first of all to organize themselves to be able to control the revolt. These people did not anticipate events in order to take a correct position during their development, but rather tried to "politicize" the masses by making a series of deals.

But great events do not occur according to anyone's choosing, and history has never adapted itself to any party's tactical considerations. On the contrary, it is the party that must adapt its tactics to the reality of historical development if it is to be able to follow this development in a correct way. What is certain is that once again the masses were shown to be further to the left than their leaders. And, unfortunately, we saw again what happens in the absence of a revolutionary Marxist party tightly linked to the masses and capable through its correct theory, predictions, and adequate tactics of broadening and deepening the rising mass struggle and,

guiding it down the road to the seizure of power.

As long ago as September it was predictable that the storm would burst. On September 25 some 1,500 students wanted to hold an assembly at the Law School, which was closed that day. So they held a demonstration beginning at the Law School and marching down the two main streets in the center of Athens (Panepistimiou and Stadiou). The police were not especially violent. The people did not take part, but nevertheless offered moral support to the students.

At the time, the standard of living of the laboring masses had been slipping ever lower, prices had been rising enormously, and the people's discontent because of the economic situation and the lack of democratic rights was on the rise.

The regime wanted to present itself in a "liberal" light, so it named as prime minister Spiros Markezinis, a rightist former collaborator of Marshal Papagos. The aim of this maneuver was to stabilize and legitimize the junta's rule by holding elections, but the people were not taken in by the plan.

Popular sentiment was clearly shown on November 4, when, after a memorial mass for former Prime Minister George Papandreou, a violent demonstration took place. For the first time since 1967, some 4,000 persons threw up barricades and hurled stones at the police. The police moved in and arrested nearly thirty persons. Seventeen of them were tried, but the sentences were not severe.

In an attempt to put the brakes on the student mobilization, Minister of Education Sifneos stated that elections to the student union would take place on February 15. But instead of quieting the students down, Sifneos's promises spurred them on. To calm them down, he issued discharges to the students who had been drafted last February in retaliation for their activities against the regime. Still, the students did not quiet down, and the very militant students who had been

drafted were able to rejoin the others.

On November 13 Sifneos made a surprise visit to the Polytechnic University in Athens, where the administration called on the leaders of the official student unions in the departments (who were elected more or less fraudulently), and the elected committees of the departments that really represent the students, to meet with the minister. The committees demanded that elections be held as soon as possible. After first trying conciliatory tactics and then resorting to threats, Sifneos refused.

The students gathered in the courtyard and began to protest. The administration then gave permission for general assemblies to be held in all the departments on the following day, November 14.

## The Occupation

At a November 13 general assembly the students of the School of Economics and Commerce denounced the decisions of the minister of education, the condition of education in Greece, the length of military service (twenty-four to twenty-eight months), and the nation's huge military expenditures that dwarf spending on education. The next day the school was closed.

Some students from this school, along with several students from the University of Athens (a total of 200 or 300 students), held a demonstration immediately and moved to the Polytechnic at about 2:00 p.m. They waited on the school grounds while general assemblies decided to hold a two-day strike to demand elections. As the assembly broke up some students still remaining in the building decided to occupy the school at 7:00 p.m. Students and passersby massed in front of the school to show their support and joined in chanting the slogans. The police, who are not allowed to enter the school without authorization from the administration and who did not want to appear violent, did not intervene. The students mimeographed leaflets and began





Athens cops attack demonstrators in center of city. Police and troops opened fire on unarmed demonstrators.

handing them out on the street. They denounced the dictatorial regime and called on students, high schoolers, and workers to fight with them.

At the Polytechnic, the students organized defense and provisioning for the occupation. They tried to put into operation the radio equipment in the electronics laboratory.

Beginning in the morning, a large number of students and high schoolers started converging on the school. By 10:00 a.m. some 3,000 persons were inside the school and there was a huge crowd on Patisson Boulevard outside. The police pushed the crowd toward the entrance to the nearby Athens Archeological Museum. Even there, people kept milling around in spite of police attempts to drive them away. The demonstrators kept regrouping and reorganizing themselves.

Inside the school, a coordinating committee was elected and was organizing as well as possible. Teams of defense guards were set up to protect the laboratories from provocateurs. There were also teams to take charge of provisioning, teams to defend the school property, and teams to prepare leaflets and proclamations. The radio equipment started functioning, and the students called on the people of Athens to revolt.

A search was made of the offices of the government representative at the school and of the police spies (who are

passed off in the school as custodians). It was quite a fruitful search, turning up many documents on the police activities.

The students outside at the entrance to the school grounds continued to chant and to destroy symbols of the regime. The main slogans were: Bread, Education, Freedom! For a People's Government! No to NATO! No to fascism! Workers, peasants, students! Americans out! The tone of the action was clearly leftist, which is only natural, since the leaders were leftists and everyone understood that the causes of the discontent were the junta's regime and the American imperialists.

A group of professors entered the school to make sure that everything was under control. Before leaving, they complimented the defense guard.

A "Journal of the Free Polytechnic" was put out and distributed outside the school grounds to passersby, who were flocking to the gates of the Polytechnic. By 6:00 p.m. there were 6,000 college students, high schoolers, and workers at the school. By 8:00 there were 15,000 people in front of the school grounds. Inside, everything was going well. A new committee was formed that included two workers representatives and a high schooler. All political tendencies were united for a common struggle.

News was coming in about workers going on strike. And 1,000 students had occupied the University of Patras and used the radio to appeal for popular support.

On Friday night [November 16] assemblies were organized. The forms of the struggle were discussed, along with the kind of regime that would replace the junta. We wanted a government of workers, students, and organizations that resisted the dictatorship, excluding bourgeois politicians who had been members of the last parliament.

These bourgeois politicians took positions on the events on Friday morning [November 16]. The rightists said they understood the causes of the revolt but did not share all the positions of the students. The center elements spoke more favorably of the students. The center-leftists declared full solidarity with the revolt, and the Communist party-Bureau of the Interior [the Greek CP out of favor with Moscow] solidarized itself with the revolt, although not very warmly.

It was understood that the bourgeois politicians were trying to use the revolt, whose breadth and intensity scared them.

It was learned that 2,000 students at the Polytechnic in Salonika had occupied their school and taken over the radio transmitter, but the mobilization of the people was not very deep. At the same time, there was word that demonstrations had broken out in the center of Athens, some of them involving clashes (although not very violent ones) with the police.

On November 14 at 4:30 in the afternoon the coordinating committee organized a press conference on the aims and forms of the struggle. It was attended by about sixty Greek and foreign journalists.

At 6:00 p.m. general assemblies of high schoolers, workers, and university students were held in order to better coordinate the fight. The number of workers outside the Polytechnic numbered tens of thousands.

## The Repression

At 6:30 p.m. the police attacked the demonstrators in downtown Athens. The workers fought back, and at 7:30 the police launched tear gas and set up loudspeakers on several buildings. Outside the Polytechnic three ambu-



ances launched tear-gas grenades at the people gathered there. The demonstrators constructed barricades, using the vehicles in the streets near the school, and started fires to neutralize the tear gas.

Many wounded were taken to the Polytechnic infirmary; some had been shot. The radio put out an appeal for doctors and medicine, broadcast advice on protection against tear gas, and called on the people to struggle.

Workers occupied the Athens city hall, attacked several public buildings, and fought bare-handed against the cops, who were shooting at them. There were many dead and wounded. The police attacked an ambulance and mistreated the wounded.

Throughout the downtown area and in the workers neighborhoods there were clashes resulting in many deaths. Four persons died in the Polytechnic infirmary, and at least thirteen persons were killed in the streets around the Polytechnic; most of them had been shot.

The demonstrators attacked the ministry of public order three times, the last time at 11:30 p.m., but they were repulsed. Many cops were surrounded at one street corner and shot their way out after first calling for reinforcements. The situation began to get serious for the government, and all of a sudden the tanks appeared.

The people had to fall back in face of the tanks, and by midnight the only resistance was at the Polytechnic. Half an hour after midnight the police launched tear gas into the Polytechnic, but the students held their ground.

At 1:00 in the morning the school was surrounded by police, tanks, and paratroopers who used tear gas and bullets to drive away the crowd in front of the school. Those inside the school appealed to the soldiers to solidarize with the struggle, shouting "Soldiers, you are our brothers!" The students held on in the school grounds, a few meters from the tanks. The coordinating committee tried to reach an agreement with the officers to allow the students safe-conduct from the school, but the officers demanded surrender.

At 3:00 in the morning the tanks attacked. They knocked down the gates of the school and crushed three persons under the main gate. The paratroopers entered the school and

forced everyone inside to leave but did not attack anyone. Outside, the police and the fascist groups attacked people leaving the school, clubbing them, beating them, and arresting some. People who live in the neighborhood opened their doors and hid the students.

The Polytechnic was taken, but the struggle went on. On Saturday [November 17] demonstrators fought the police and the army in downtown Athens. The cops and troops opened fire. A German reporter counted forty-four dead. Martial law was declared, but the fighting continued even on Sunday [November 18].

The revolt was finally crushed in

the blood of high schoolers, students, and workers. Many were arrested, but the people, and, we hope, left militants too, became conscious of their power and will continue the struggle for freedom, education, and social justice, for a socialist society.

One week later, on Sunday, November 25, Papadopoulos was overthrown by his own army and a new government was formed. The most important thing is that the revolt of the people of Athens triggered a sort of "civil war" among the reactionaries, which raises the hope that soon new revolts, better organized and more effective, will lead to the final victory of the people. □

## Two Volunteers Seriously Injured

# Rightists Bomb New York USLA Office

In the early evening of December 3 the New York office of the United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA) was demolished by a high-power bomb. Two volunteers working in the office at the time were seriously injured, 21-year-old Karen Clahassy, who suffered a fractured skull, and 23-year-old Caleb Murdock, whose arm was broken.

The device exploded at about 7:15 p.m., a time when there are usually large numbers of activists at work in the office. It was only fortuitous that most of them happened to be out when the bomb went off; the explosion's intensity was enough to have killed anyone standing near it.

It is not known who was responsible for planting the bomb. The USLA shares offices with two other civil liberties groups, the Political Rights Defense Fund (PRDF), which is handling the Socialist Workers party's suit against the Nixon gang, and the Committee for Democratic Election Laws (CoDEL), which has fought legal battles for equitable treatment for smaller parties and Black and Puerto Rican candidates in national and local elections. CoDEL has been the target of racist groups such as the Jewish Defense League in the past.

But it seems most likely that the bomb was set by right-wingers to in-

timidate the USLA, which has been in the forefront of activities in defense of the victims of the Chilean junta. In fact, Clahassy and Murdock had been working on a united demonstration to protest a December 5 concert to raise money for the Santiago gangsters. (The demonstration, although it took place in a driving rain, drew more than 1,000 participants, which exceeded the number of persons attending the pro-junta meeting.)

All the groups sharing the bombed office responded quickly to the attack. At a joint news conference held December 4 Judy White, spokeswoman for USLA, told reporters that "we will not be intimidated by these kinds of tactics." "This kind of violence is exactly what we are opposed to in Chile," she added.

White also demanded that the city administration and the police department move to arrest and prosecute the bombers. She pointed out that in past years there has been a series of right-wing bombing attacks against many groups in New York City and that the police have yet to arrest anyone in connection with these cases.

USLA, PRDF, and CoDEL have appealed for financial assistance to replace the more than \$8,000 worth of equipment lost in the explosion. The address is: 150 Fifth Ave., Rm. 311, New York, N.Y. 10011. □

## Nixon 'Buying Time' With Small Confessions

"At best," the *New York Times* warned in a December 9 editorial, "the President's recent speeches and disclosures, including those he made yesterday on his personal finances, have bought him a little more time."

"With the confirmation of Representative Gerald Ford as Vice President, however, the way begins to open up for a resolution of this crisis."

Repeating its call for Nixon's resignation, the *Times* asked Congressional Republicans to do the necessary arm twisting:

"President Nixon's credibility has dropped below the point of no return. It would take a miracle for him now to retrieve public confidence. The primary responsibility of the leaders of his own party in and out of Congress is to persuade him to recognize the true dimensions of his situation and to act upon that recognition."

With the confirmation of Ford as vice-president December 6, Nixon's position slipped still more. Most observers agreed that this guarantee of "continuity" would undercut some of the reluctance to dismiss Nixon.

Even the *Wall Street Journal*, which has consistently urged that the U. S. ruling class not be overly hasty in dumping Nixon, hinted cautiously in a December 7 editorial that it could learn to live with a President Ford:

"We are . . . impressed that Mr. Ford survived perhaps the most exhaustive investigation of his personal and political life that any potential President ever submitted to. Indeed, he came through so cleanly that, against any reasonable yardstick that may be applied to measure political honesty, Jerry Ford seems to qualify for relative sainthood. There is no quality that Americans place higher than honesty in their elected public officials, or so the opinion polls have always shown. And there is now in Washington no ingredient in shorter supply than certifiable honesty."

It is unlikely that Nixon's December 8 release of a lengthy financial statement will buy him much time, or anything else, with the U. S. public. The statement should be seen not as a Watergate "counterattack," but as the



FORD: Nominated for sainthood by "Wall Street Journal."

forced surrender of still another position by a beleaguered Nixon.

The information released December 8 indicated that Nixon had become a millionaire since he took office in 1969. According to his own figures, at least \$267,000 of this fortune was acquired by avoiding most taxes on his \$200,000 annual salary. For the three years 1970-72, Nixon paid a total of \$5,969—roughly the average that would normally be paid by someone earning \$15,000 a year.

The records showed that Nixon had saved himself \$235,000 by claiming deductions for donation to the National Archives of his vice-presidential papers, which had been assessed as worth \$576,000. There are strong indications, however, that this "gift" was not made before July 25, 1969, the date after which tax laws no longer permit such deductions.

In addition, one of the two accounting firms hired to look at Nixon's finances reported that Nixon should have paid \$32,000 in capital gains tax—he paid nothing—on profits of \$117,000 from the 1970 sale of part

of his San Clemente estate. (Even this figure may be underestimated: It can be argued that Nixon's profit on the sale was \$490,000. See *Intercontinental Press*, July 2, p. 804.)

Sounding rather like a bank teller caught by examiners with his accounts short, Nixon said he had asked the Joint Congressional Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation to decide whether these two transactions were proper. If the committee decided against him, he said, he would pay the extra taxes.

The December 8 statement also revealed that Nixon had paid no California state income tax since becoming president. Nixon claims that he is not a California resident—despite the fact that San Clemente is his legal residence and that he votes in California.

Still another item in the accounting showed evidence of a "gift" that might be denoted by a less polite term. In 1958, Elmer H. Bobst, then chairman of the Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Company, set up a \$25,000 trust fund for Nixon's daughter Tricia, most of it consisting of Warner-Lambert stock. Since it is unlikely that at age 12 she could have earned that sort of money on her own, it has been suggested that Bobst may have been trying to influence Tricia's father, who was vice-president at that time. Pharmaceutical companies were known to be concerned then by proposed legislation that would have established federal regulation of drug prices.

While Nixon's financial statement was at the center of attention, other Watergate matters, any one of which could suddenly explode in Nixon's face, continued to unfold.

On December 6, Judge John Sirica recessed hearings on the erasure of eighteen minutes of the June 20, 1972, tape of a potentially crucial conversation between Nixon and H. R. Halde- man. Sirica is awaiting the results of a study of the tape by technical experts before proceeding further. After two weeks of testimony by White House officials, the Nixon gang was still unable to come up with a convincing "innocent explanation" for the erasure. The lawyer for Rose Mary Woods,

Nixon's secretary, indicated that the official story—that Woods erased the tape accidentally while transcribing it—was an attempt to set her up as a scapegoat for someone else's cover-up.

"They're throwing her to the wolves," *Newsweek* quoted the lawyer as saying. "Just from the little I know, I could blow the lid right off the White House."

Trial for another member of the Nixon gang, former presidential appointments secretary Dwight Chapin, has been set for February 19. Chapin was indicted November 29 on four counts of lying to the Watergate grand jury concerning his connections with campaign saboteur Donald Segretti.

Special prosecutor Leon Jaworski was reported December 4 by the *Washington Post* to have asked the White House to turn over the tape recording of an April 19, 1971, telephone call from Nixon to then Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst. Kleindienst has said that during this call Nixon ordered him not to proceed



"SHE TRIED PUSHING A TAPE RECORDER BUTTON WHILE HOLDING HER FOOT ON A PEDAL AND REACHING BACK FOR A TELEPHONE—"

with an antitrust case against ITT, the giant corporation that had pledged \$400,000 toward Nixon's reelection.

Even the Senate Watergate committee, which for months has avoided

stirring anything up, began showing new signs of life. The committee began December 3 to take testimony in closed session from aides of billionaire Howard Hughes. The committee is known to be looking into the mysterious "campaign contribution" of \$100,000 that Nixon crony Bebe Rebozo claims he allowed to gather dust in a bank vault for three years. A Florida prosecutor, evidently investigating the same gift, has subpoenaed from Rebozo's bank the records of accounts held by Nixon, his brother, and a number of members of the Nixon gang.

The virtual certainty that there will be more scandals is behind the widespread belief—or hope—in Washington that Nixon's days as president are numbered. In the December 9 *New York Times*, James M. Naughton quoted the prediction of one Republican member of Congress:

"Ninety days. Ninety days, Gerry Ford will be President in 90 days." □

## Social Tensions Mount in Peru

# Teachers, Students, Trade Unionists Defy Junta

"The government suspended constitutional guarantees, declared a state of emergency, and imposed an eight-hour curfew to contain a wave of violence in the southern cities of Arequipa and Puno," José Calmet wrote in the November 22 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión* on the events touched off by the Peruvian teachers' strike. "In Arequipa . . . the violence culminated last night in an assault on two police stations. Two persons were killed and seventeen injured."

In the last two weeks of November, mass mobilizations in support of the teachers' demands for trade-union rights created one of the gravest crises in the history of the "progressive" military regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado.

These actions marked a resurgence in the militant high-school teachers movement after the strike of early fall 1971, which was broken by military repression, including the arbitrary de-

portation of the main union leaders. The Trotskyist peasant union leader Hugo Blanco, the most well-known revolutionary leader in the country, was deported at the same time for speaking in defense of the teachers' strike.

In this country of about 12,000,000 inhabitants, the teachers, numbering more than 100,000, form one of the largest and most impoverished layers of white-collar workers, and they are closely tied to the combative student organizations.

With the support of the students and sections of the workers, the strike in late November by SUTEP (Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educación del Perú—United Federation of Educational Workers of Peru) paralyzed the three major cities in the southern part of the country and apparently won the support of a majority of teachers nationwide.

In Arequipa a trade-union united front, the Comité de Defensa del Fuero

Sindical (Trade-Union Rights Defense Committee), called a general strike to demand the release of imprisoned SUTEP leaders, according to Calmet. Mass demonstrations in support of the action led to a violent explosion in the traditionally combative industrial city.

"The incidents occurred in the downtown area," Calmet reported, "near the markets and inside the university district. . . . Government offices were attacked, including the Banco de la Nación and SINAMOS [Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social—National Network for Supporting the Social Mobilization, the junta's organ for social work and propaganda]."

"The demonstrators threw up barricades and stoned the police forces, who fired in the air and launched gas grenades in an attempt to disperse them."

Reports in the carefully censored Peruvian press indicated that the strike



halted a wide range of economic activities throughout the southern region.

"It was reported that the material losses for the seven days of the strike were very high; losses caused by the paralysis of vehicular traffic were also grave. A shortage of fuel has developed in Puno, Cuzco, and Arequipa."

The strike leadership in Arequipa city imposed an effective control over the distribution of food, the Buenos Aires Trotskyist weekly *Avanzada Socialista* indicated in its November 29 issue. Food stores whose owners did not follow the discipline of the strike were sacked. An alliance developed between the unions and the farmers in the region, who distributed 50,000 liters of milk free to the strikers.

The regional council of the CGTP (Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú—General Federation of Peruvian Workers), Calmet went on to say, was going to join in the strike. Since the Communist party, which dominates the leadership of the CGTP, has been the most uncritical defender of the junta and its policies, the pressure from the ranks for supporting militant trade-union action in defiance of the government must have been considerable.

The junta left no doubt that it was determined to crush the latest "unauthorized" strike as it did the one in 1971. Among other things, it resorted to the "guerrilla" scenario that is now classic in Latin American countries. The minister of the interior announced: "The forces of public order have discovered that in order to exacerbate the conflict, the extremists intended to use arms and explosives stored in Puno and Arequipa." The local papers, Calmet noted, carried pictures of the "confiscated arms."

As the labor movement threatened to break loose from its tutelage, the government escalated its social demagoguery. On November 21, General Velasco promised to incorporate "suggestions" from the people into a projected law to put a section of the economy under "workers self-management." The "progressive" military chief promised "firmness" against both self-seeking capitalists and "extremists," but the warnings addressed to the

bosses and the militant workers were less than even-handed.

To the capitalists Velasco said: "We don't want to stand in the way of private enterprise, but neither can business ask us to vitiate the fundamental laws that define our revolutionary process and enable us to build



VELASCO ALVARADO: "Progressive" general imposes martial law.

a society that will be neither Communist nor capitalist, in which solidarity and full participation will be the most important things."

He noted, moreover, that Pope Paul VI and the Peruvian hierarchy had declared their support for his government's policy because of its "humanism."

But General Velasco's message to the strikers did not take a notably "humanist" tone. Here is the way *La Opinión's* correspondent summarized his remarks in the November 24 issue of the Buenos Aires daily:

"On the agitation unleashed by the extremists in Arequipa and Puno, using the leaders of the so-called Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Enseñanza en el Perú as the pivot, General Velasco Alvarado said: 'The men of the revolution are obligated to defend it with all the weapons at their command.'"

The government's favorite weapon, the reporters present could be expected to remember, has been deportation,

rather than the long jail terms favored by the previous regime. Perhaps because the junta has had the advice and help of the whole spectrum of the opportunist left, from the Communist party to the ex-Trotskyist Ismael Frías to the former guerrilla leader Héctor Bejar, it has been able to exercise its repression more skillfully than its predecessors, and temper it with a heavy dose of demagoguery.

"We have never deported any worker, any workingman," General Velasco said.

Even the junta's friends on the left are barely tolerated, one representative of the "revolutionary left" told Alberto Miguez (*La Opinión*, November 27).

"The revolutionary left is like the ugly child that is kept in the back room when visitors come. We live in an uneasy semiclandestinity, and from time to time we have to suffer some blow that is not expressly aimed at us [sic]. The military want to hide not only from foreigners but also from people in this country (unanimity of the officer corps is a utopia) that they enjoy a certain sympathy among us."

But open political opposition on the left is immediately and ruthlessly crushed. After deporting the teachers union leaders and Hugo Blanco, the junta has now gone to the point of expelling individual socialist intellectuals who raise any criticisms of the government.

The U.S. academic socialist journal *Monthly Review* made this complaint in its November issue about the treatment of two of its Peruvian collaborators:

"A communication from Lima, Peru, dated September 25th and signed by our good friend Anibal Quijano, author of MR Press book *Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru: A Study in Neo-Colonialism*, reported that the latest issue of the magazine *Sociedad y Política*, of which Quijano is the editor, had been confiscated. Early in October a letter from another friend in Lima brought the disturbing information that Quijano and Julio Cotler, a sociology professor at Lima's San Marco University and a member of the Editorial Committee of *Sociedad y Política*, had been summarily deported to Argentina. These acts on the part of the Peruvian military junta

against two of Latin America's most distinguished Marxist social scientists constitute a serious blow to the entire Latin American Left. The immediate cause was apparently the inclusion in *Sociedad y Política* of an editorial denouncing the brutal military coup in Chile and of an article by Cotler sharply critical of the Peruvian regime. At the same time, as Quijano emphasized in the communication mentioned above, the magazine had at all times scrupulously avoided any infraction of the press laws promulgated by the military junta itself. . . . Acts of this kind speak louder than volumes of official propaganda about the 'revolutionary' nature of the military dictatorship now in power in Peru."

The *Monthly Review* editors called for protests against the persecution of Quijano and Cotler.

In his article in the November 27 *La Opinión*, Miguez indicated that the

junta's recent repressive moves were a sign that its "native Bonapartism" was less and less able to contain the increasing social tensions in the country:

"It is clear that the government still lacks the necessary popular support and social base required to endure as a civilian national government."

Such a regime is unlikely to be able to resist the pressures as U.S. imperialism moves, in the wake of the Chile coup, to limit still more the room for "nationalist" experiments. On the other hand, its ability to maintain its control over the workers seems to be eroding rapidly. The last reports in the international press indicated that the recent struggle for trade-union rights has made a deep impact on at least the southern region:

"The streets of Cuzco are still being patrolled by the army," a dispatch

from Lima reported in the November 29 *La Opinión*.

"The students barricaded in the university district have not cleared out and have received food and clothing from local representatives of the International Red Cross.

"In Arequipa, 300 kilometers to the west of Cuzco, a curfew is also in effect. On Tuesday [November 27] a day of mourning was observed for the victims of last week's incidents. . . .

"All the workers and students wore black armbands and a black flag was raised in the university district. . . .

"In the banks the workers observed a minute of silence in memory of the events that occurred in the general strike of the Arequipa trade unions in defense of the teachers fired because of their activity in SUTEP, a union that the government does not recognize and calls 'ultraleftist.'" □

## Bolivian Regime Faces New Labor Militancy

# MNR Leaves Banzer's Coalition

By Gerry Foley

"A political and military crisis of serious proportions is threatening Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suarez," the *Christian Science Monitor's* Latin America correspondent, James Nelson Goodsell, wrote in the December 6 issue of the Boston daily.

"In recent days, Bolivia's largest political party [the MNR—Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, a conservatized populist party] withdrew its support of General Banzer's government and the nation's armed forces began showing signs of opposition to General Banzer.

"In chronically unstable Bolivia, such developments in the past have signaled serious trouble for the government in power—and the current developments appear to be no exception."

Following the MNR's withdrawal from the ruling coalition, opposition mounted in the military to the elections scheduled for June. Two top officers, the commander in chief of the army,

General Carlos Alcoreza, and the air force chief, General Oscar Adriazola, called publicly for postponing the planned return to parliamentary government for at least a year.

The Bolivian ruling class appears to be divided not only on how to meet the threat of a resurgent labor movement but between pro-Brazilian and pro-Argentine interests.

Ever since the workers movement began to revive in October 1972, the rightist coalition backing the junta has been tending to come apart. Now, with the rise of the Peronist government, the tensions have been increased by sharpening competition between Brazil and Argentina for access to Bolivia's natural resources. In this competition, the Argentine interests are apparently the weaker and must therefore base themselves on more disparate social forces.

Banzer's party, the FSB (Falange Socialista Boliviana—Bolivian Socialist Phalanx, a rightist party that developed under the inspiration of Span-

ish fascism) is linked to the petroleum and landowning interests in the caudillo's native province of Santa Cruz, which borders Brazil and has been under increasing Brazilian influence. The oil fields most attractive to investors are in this region.

Unlike the densely inhabited Indian high plateau, Santa Cruz has a relatively thin population of mostly European origin. In addition to the political conservatism of the province, racist antagonisms against the radical Indian miners of the highlands have at times fueled pro-Brazilian separatist tendencies. It was in Santa Cruz that the August 1971 coup that brought Banzer to power was based.

The MNR, on the other hand, represents more the small and middle bourgeoisie linked to the mining industry. It has also had a large popular following. Although the MNR's popularity has decreased sharply in the last period because of its association with right-wing regimes, it is still probably somewhat subject to the

pressure of the masses and the temptations of demagoguery.

When the MNR withdrew from the government November 27, *New York Times* correspondent Marvine Howe reported the following interpretation of the move in a dispatch from La Paz:

"It was generally believed that the party of Mr. Paz Estenssoro [the MNR] wanted to remove itself from a Government that was unpopular and to build up its own waning position before the elections are held."

Paz Estenssoro accused the Banzer government, according to a dispatch from Juan Javier Zeballos in the November 30 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*, of having been taken over by the "big private business interests." He said the MNR was not going into opposition but would "criticize any action that does not fit into the framework of the nationalist principles we support." Moreover, sections of the old populist party opposed even this halfway disassociation from the government:

"However, this withdrawal apparently was not total, since various sectors of the MNR not only resisted the decision of the leadership and the executive committee of the party but expressed their determination to continue supporting the government even if it meant disavowing Victor Paz Estenssoro. . . .

"Some ministers said that the MNR had only partially withdrawn because sections of the party remained firmly determined to help in the administrative and technical work that Banzer began with his new cabinet."

Apparently Paz Estenssoro has been hindered in his political maneuver by the reluctance of many members of his party to disengage even temporarily from the public trough.

At the same time that the coalition has been pulled apart, more and more cracks have appeared in the armed forces:

"The young officers, nurtured on the tradition of nationalism that has a long history in Bolivia, are looking with profound unease, expressed several times in public documents, at the developments that have turned the country into a powderkeg." (Emilio Sarmiento in the November 23 *La Opinión*.)

The Argentine capitalists apparently could hope to be the beneficiaries of

a nationalist reaction against the Brazilians, who are widely believed to have helped in the preparations for the coup and who have cast a shadow over the right-wing military regime in La Paz since its inception.

When General Banzer visited Buenos Aires to negotiate oil and natural gas concessions with the Peronist govern-



LECHIN: Reelected at miners congress.

ment, *La Opinión's* columnists hoped for a profitable victory for General Perón's "third camp" position, that is, a new, limited nationalist experiment based on an Argentine-led turn toward European and possibly Japanese capital.

In the November 14 issue of the Buenos Aires daily, Ted Córdova-Claire wrote: "In order to overcome the climate of unpopularity generated by a combination of a deteriorating economic situation and repression, and in view of the shakiness of the ruling coalition, . . . the Bolivian government is seeking an image that will strengthen its position. If the example of Brasilia has proved ineffective, the Argentina model seems more suitable [presumably this means concessions rather than repression, concessions that could be made through association with Perón's nationalist experiment]. . . .

"The truth is that, under attack from an ultrarightist sector of the Falange [some right-wing plots have been discovered in the last months]—which also has a regionalist character since its base is Santa Cruz—and which has defined itself as pro-Brazilian, the Banzer government has been driven more to the center. Reaffirmation of a nationalist policy fits in with the need for protecting Bolivia's principal gas and iron reserves from its powerful neighbor. A refractory geographical destiny has placed these riches within a few kilometers of the border with Brazil, which in the past seized the rubber plantations of the Bolivian Acre [Territory].

"The great champion of defending these resources is an old general, the Falangist Bernardino Bilbao Rioja. As a military leader, he was one of those who halted the Paraguayan advance toward the Bolivian oil fields in the Chaco War. Because of his moral authority, he has been able to say outright that giving iron and natural gas concessions to Brazil under the conditions projected . . . would mean treason to the fatherland.

"Brazil wants to buy all the Bolivian natural gas at a price unsatisfactory to the Bolivians, which would prevent the development of a Bolivian steel and petrochemicals industry. Furthermore, this arrangement would prevent Argentina from getting a supply of these raw materials that are so prized these days."

Córdova-Claire's article was headlined: "With the New Overture to Bolivia, Perón has Reestablished the Balance on the Continent." However, Argentine and Bolivian "patriotism" were not to combine as happily as expected.

"Banzer's Visit Ended Yesterday in a Climate of Marked Coolness," was the headline over Heriberto Kahn's article in the November 16 *La Opinión*. "Neither Perón nor his wife went to the airport and the planned telecast of Banzer's departure was canceled," Kahn wrote. The negotiations over natural gas and iron concessions had broken off.

The Bolivians had upped the ante, according to Kahn, in the hopes that they could get Argentina and Brazil to bid against each other, and as a way of improving Banzer's political image:

"The precariousness of General Ban-



zer's support among the Bolivian military is obvious. This obliges him to maneuver with extreme caution and not fall into concessions that might be cited against him in the future. A tough attitude almost always brings bigger political dividends."

Other commentators interpreted Banzer's refusal to accept Perón's offer as the result of an unfavorable relationship of forces.

"Nationalist movements with mass support are on the retreat," Enrique Alonso wrote in the November 17 *La Opinión*. "Social inequality—based on the Brazilian model—is spreading. Not a single one of our neighboring countries has a government anymore that is based on the democratic will of the people. And, like it or not, this points toward increasing tension with an Argentina whose leaders have been endorsed by 80 percent of the voters and enjoy the support, moreover, of a general consensus. And finally Brazil continues on its course toward its goal of becoming a sub-continental power already closely linked to Washington."

The implication of such arguments is that the Argentine bourgeoisie may try to bolster its competitive position by appealing to the labor movement and the sections of the ruling class in its neighboring countries that feel they can protect their interests more effectively through parliamentary rule and concessions to the workers.

Events have tended to bear out Kahn's interpretation that the Bolivians were playing a balancing game. The Brazilians, who after the failure of the negotiations in Buenos Aires expected that Banzer would accept their offer, were also disappointed.

On November 23 Banzer suspended the negotiations. "It turned out that the climate at the talks in Brasilia cooled," Rubén Herrero reported in the November 25 *La Opinión*. They were later renewed and produced a tentative agreement, but it is still not clear what the final result will be. These vacillations might, however, reflect the inability of a divided government to make definite decisions.

At the same time that the pressures from its competing larger neighbors have increased, the government faces an offensive by the labor movement. A few days before the decision in Brasilia November 23, the FSTMB (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mi-

neros de Bolivia—Bolivian Mine Workers Federation) held its congress and beat back the government's attempts to gain an influence over union policy. It issued a strong statement condemning the sale of the country's natural gas to Brazil and demanded a full amnesty for all political prisoners. It also threatened a general strike unless the mine workers got a 100 percent pay increase.

A national plenum of the factory workers union meeting in the same period raised the demand for a 300 percent increase in the minimum wage. The cost of living has gone up sharply since the government decreed new price increases for necessities in October.

*La Opinión* did not report whether the FSTMB also opposed selling Bolivian national resources to Argentina. Since the union reelected its old populist leader Juan Lechín, it is possible that the labor bureaucracy is orienting

toward a campaign for democratization based on an alliance with the pro-Argentine section of the bourgeoisie.

A report on the FSTMB congress in the Buenos Aires daily *El Mundo* (quoted in the November 29 *Avanzada Socialista*) noted that the militant union locals at the San José, Huanuni, Siglo XX, and Colquiri mines won acceptance of a resolution containing the following passage:

"Bolivia has been subjected to military coups with civilian support and to so-called socialistic experiments that have only exploited the workers for the sake of bourgeois nationalist objectives."

With the military and the bourgeoisie increasingly divided, the way seems to be opening for an advance by the still militant labor movement. What remains to be seen is whether any leadership is developing that can carry a new wave of the recurring struggles in Bolivia to a decisive victory. □

## 'Restoring Free Market' Fails to Resolve Crisis

# Chilean Junta Faces Economic Disaster

The accelerating unemployment in Chile, along with record inflation, has apparently begun to alarm even the officials of the ruthless Chilean junta, according to a report from Santiago by Fernando Martínez. In the November 24 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*, he quoted an official of the SENDE (Servicio Nacional del Empleo—National Employment Service) as saying:

"The most dramatic thing is that this figure [an increase of 2,700 persons looking for jobs between September 24 and October 27] has continued to mount. A week-to-week comparison speaks volumes. In the period September 24-29, some 300 persons registered with this office. In the first two weeks of October, it was 556 and 650 persons respectively. And then between October 21 and 27, it was 800. Since the first of November, more than a thousand unemployed persons a week have registered here. I don't know the figures in the provinces, but I assume that the problem there is as bad or worse."

Although the government official, like nineteenth century liberal econo-

mists, assured that the "temporary" rise in unemployment would be reabsorbed as capitalists responded to the restored free market, even the junta's supporters have had to admit now that these projections proved unreal.

"The government's main concern is the buying power of the sections of the population with modest means," a dispatch from Santiago in the November 15 *La Opinión* quoted the junta's Economics Minister Leñiz as saying.

From October to November, the government's own price index rose by 87.6 percent, the biggest inflationary jump in the country's history. Thus, with catastrophically mounting unemployment and drastic cuts in the buying power of employed workers, retail receipts have not risen as a result of higher prices but have continued to drop because of greatly decreased sales.

Like other belated defenders of "pure" capitalism, the junta's advisers have found out that even under the most repressive regime it is not always possible to wait for "economic equilibrium"

to be established by the "natural forces of the market."

"There is a consensus," Martínez wrote, "that the solutions originally expected will not come about. . . . Now it is thought that if the problem is not approached in a more direct, short-term way, social tensions will continue to mount, creating an atmosphere conducive to crime." Since



PINOCHET: Finds "restoration of free market" a bit difficult.

even before the coup, Santiago, like most other large Latin American cities, had a huge semiemployed population that had to survive as best it could, it seems clear that the "crime" the junta fears must be something quite serious.

In the critical first weeks after the coup, there was an appearance of economic improvement as business put their hoarded stocks on the market again. This brief glimpse of plenty quickly vanished in the gloom of a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, which has hit not only the working-class supporters of the popular-front regime but the petty-bourgeois layers that originally backed the junta.

In the first place, there were the political purges in the governmental offices and in education. Then there were mass firings in the state-controlled industries "to restore labor discipline." The thousands upon thousands of workers fired for political reasons al-

most certainly do not appear in the official unemployment figures. With the massacres and the concentration camps, they would not dare apply for government help.

"The ANEF [Agrupación Nacional de Empleados Fiscales—National Association of Public Employees] has sent the minister of the interior, General Bonilla, a note expressing their concern at the 'numerous layoffs in public services,'" Martínez wrote. "Some 25 percent have been laid off."

Even the side effects of a repression as massive and ruthless as that carried out by the junta have been

enormously costly. Because of the early curfew, which Pinochet says will be maintained for at least eight months, virtually all of the small service establishments, restaurants, and coffee shops have been forced to close. Because of the distortions of an underdeveloped economy, this category of workers is undoubtedly very numerous. According to Martínez, the closing of these establishments put 10,000 persons out of work, presumably in Santiago alone.

Ironically, the small proprietors and street merchants were originally among the most enthusiastic supporters of the coup. □

## After Helping to Save Hundreds of Junta's Victims

### Swedish Ambassador Expelled From Chile

"While Consuela Ferreira was lying half conscious after the operation, several plainclothes detectives forced their way into the clinic in an attempt to arrest her. Ambassador Edelstam was called by some doctors. He rushed to the clinic together with five embassy officials. He was also accompanied by the French ambassador, Pierre de Menthon, and later joined by a West German U. N. official."

This is the way the Copenhagen daily *Information* described the start of the incident that led to the Chilean junta's expulsion of the Swedish ambassador on December 4.

Consuela Alonso Ferreira (in reality Mirtha Fernández Pucurull, the widow of a Tupamaro leader slain in 1970), is a 31-year-old Uruguayan woman who took refuge in the Swedish Embassy in Santiago after the September 11 coup. When she was found to have uterine cancer, Ambassador Edelstam managed to get permission for her to undergo surgery in a Chilean clinic. But the junta broke its word and violated the protection of the Swedish Embassy. Nor did the police and soldiers of the bloodthirsty U.S.-backed regime respect the persons of the French and Swedish ambassadors. The police called an army unit to drag the semi-conscious woman away.

"The diplomats went into the ward

to stop the soldiers from taking the patient out on a stretcher," *Information* continued. "Edelstam and his secretary were pushed aside. The Swedish ambassador was knocked down and struck in the face. . . . Various patients suffered nervous collapse and fainted."

Once again, however, the junta was forced, despite its savagery, to backtrack under the pressure of international protest. The woman was allowed to leave for Sweden, where she was reportedly rushed to a hospital in grave condition.

In the same period, other extreme violations of international law occurred. On December 3, according to the December 6 *Le Monde*, three persons were wounded as they were entering the Panamanian Embassy. The soldiers on guard around the building opened fire on them after they were already behind the gate.

The ouster of the Swedish ambassador, who has saved hundreds of political refugees from death, torture, and prison camps at the hands of the junta, is an indication that the regime is still trying to close the few escape routes that remain for the political exiles trapped in the country. At the same time, the release of Mirtha Fernández Pucurull shows that continued international protests can keep these routes open. □

# London, Washington Keep Chains on Guinea

London

On November 2, 1973, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution recognising the independent state of Guinea. Ninety-three delegations supported the resolution, but seven, including those of the United States and Britain, voted against it.

Washington's backing for Portugal's claims to Guinea stems from years of mutual collaboration. In December 1971 the American and Portuguese governments signed a treaty at NATO headquarters in Brussels that gave the Pentagon use of air bases on the Azores in return for loans of \$400 million.

The Azores bases were used in the U. S. airlift of war materiel to Israel during the October war in the Arab East. The October 30 *Daily Telegraph* commented that U. S. support for Portugal in the vote on Guinea in the General Assembly was "in return for the use of the Portuguese Azores by United States aircraft taking war supplies to Israel." The *Daily Telegraph* stated that "American delegates are believed to be prepared to go as far as using their power of veto within the Security Council" to keep independent Guinea out of the United Nations.



CAETANO: Gets an assist from London and Washington.

British opposition to seating Guinea at the UN is no surprise either. Britain is Portugal's largest export market. Britain is also a big supplier of Portugal's armed forces and owns

much of the Portuguese economy. The record of collaboration with Lisbon was appropriately "celebrated" by the Tories and the Caetano government during last summer's six hundredth anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

British delegates to the UN General Assembly hid their real political opposition to the seating of Guinea behind a seemingly neutral and technical argument that Britain could not recognise a state that was not in effective control of its territory and population, a criterion apparently not met in Guinea because of Portuguese occupation of the capital, Bissau, and its maintenance of scattered military bases in the country.

The argument is fraudulent. The Tory government has recognised numerous states scarcely in control of their national territory or commanding the allegiance of their population—an outstanding example being the "Republic of South Vietnam."

In September 1973 two governments appealed to the world for recognition: the independent state of Guinea and the junta installed in Chile following the military coup that toppled the constitutionally elected government headed by Allende. It is noteworthy that while the American and British governments rushed to recognise the hangmen of Santiago, they rejected the aspirations of the people of Guinea to free their country from Portuguese colonial domination. □

## Behind the Watergate Scandal—X

# What the Crisis Means for the Left

By Allen Myers

As the Watergate scandal has unfolded, there have been numerous theories advanced to explain this unprecedented crisis. Some explanations—such as Nixon's claim that "distorted" reporting is the cause of the scandal—no longer persuade many persons, if they ever did. But other theories, for which there is perhaps even less supporting evidence, still have greater or lesser currency in the pages of the liberal and socialist press.

The immediately preceding article in this series (*Intercontinental Press*, November 26 and December 3) traced the origins of the Watergate crisis to the conflict between the myth of bourgeois democracy and U. S. imperialism's historical need to concentrate and centralize its power—a need that has been sharpened (and its fulfillment partially thwarted) by the continuing radicalization of U. S. society. The immediate dilemma of the U. S.

ruling class is the problem of striking the new balance between the required centralization and perpetuation of the democratic myth that will permit it to halt or deflect the radicalization.

The role of liberals in this search for a new balance is to reinforce the democratic myth by portraying Watergate as a departure from, rather than a logical extension of, historical governmental trends in the United States.



This requires a concentration on the personal infamy of Nixon and his gangsters, lip service to the idea of restoring the powers of Congress "usurped" by the president, and a studied blindness to the real purposes served by the activities of the Nixon gang.

## The Sins of Richard Nixon

In portraying Nixon's actions as a departure from U. S. traditions, the liberal press and politicians have sometimes accused Nixon of "totalitarian" plans and have even professed to see parallels between the White House gang and Hitler's stormtroopers.

In the August 11, 1973, issue of the *New Republic*, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau spelled out Nixon's alleged departures from traditional practices:

"Watergate has violated the principles upon which our system of government rests in four different respects. It has attacked American democracy directly by depriving the minority of a chance to compete on approximately equal terms with the majority. It has undermined American democracy indirectly by the use of two devices familiar from totalitarian systems of government. It has duplicated certain official, statutory investigative and law enforcement agencies with secret, unofficial ones, exempt from normal legal restraints; it has justified the disregard of constitutional and statutory restraints with concern for 'national security,' which in this context is a synonym for the 'national emergency' by which fascism justified the destruction of the democratic order. Finally its conservative pretenses have masked nihilistic destruction."

Morgenthau's indictment is exaggerated, but it does point to some aspects of Watergate that have alarmed liberals and important sectors of the ruling class.

When he speaks of "depriving the minority of a chance to compete . . . with the majority," it should be clear that Morgenthau is referring only to the Republican and Democratic parties—the tools by which the capitalist minority maintains a political monopoly against the overwhelming majority of the population. Within that context, it is true that Nixon attempted to inter-

fere with the normal process of electoral competition between the two parties. By trying to fix the 1972 election, Nixon undermined the credibility of the capitalist two-party fraud.

It is also true that Nixon used his own private political police as a means of manipulating the election. Unlike the official police, the first loyalty of Gordon Liddy's White House-CREEP undercover unit was to Nixon personally rather than to the ruling class as a whole. The same seems to have been true of the "plumbers," although most of their activities that have been disclosed—such as stopping "leaks"—serve ruling-class interests. (The loyalty to Nixon rather than to a cause is what Morgenthau means by "nihilistic destruction.")

But it would be a mistake to regard these White House undercover units as having posed an immediate threat to "American democracy." The plumbers consisted of a mere handful of operatives, and Liddy was provided with the relatively insignificant budget of \$250,000 for his group's activities. When these embryos were discovered, the ruling class decided to abort them before they got any larger, but there was no reason to think that a Nixon dictatorship was near birth. Nixon's invocation of "national security" has been primarily defensive, more an attempt to excuse the past activities of his undercover units than an effort to expand them.

The major ruling-class organs have been considerably more restrained than Morgenthau in evaluating these undercover operations. The *Washington Post*, which more than any other paper was responsible for breaking open the Watergate scandal, commented in a July 26 editorial on the plumbers and the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office:

". . . the critical question is whether the FBI was lax in its investigation of Dr. Ellsberg—for this charge forms the basic White House justification for establishing the 'plumbers' unit and for all that followed. The White House and Mr. Ehrlichman would have us believe that J. Edgar Hoover did not have his heart in this case and that the FBI was not up to the job. . . . In our view, the adequacy of the FBI's handling of the Ellsberg case is so central to Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony and to the President's extraordinary case for condoning the burglary of

Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist in the name of 'national security,' that the appropriate present and former officials of the FBI should be immediately called before the Ervin committee to give their testimony.

"This would not settle the constitutional issue in the case; the courts



SEGRETTI: One of Nixon's "dirty tricks" undercover agents.

will have to do that. But it would go a long way to show whether, in the performance of the FBI, the President to begin with had any good reason to establish his own secret police unit and to resort to so radical a concept of his inherent constitutional powers."

The *Post* editors are willing to concede Nixon the right "to establish his own secret police unit," provided only that appearances are kept up by Supreme Court approval and that there is a *real need* for such a unit. But there's the rub: Since the FBI is perfectly capable of carrying out whatever "national security" burglaries are required, Nixon stands accused of confusing concern for his own political fortunes with the larger class interests of the bourgeoisie.

## Who's in Charge?

The idea that the Watergate events are a reflection of a deep split in the U. S. ruling class has gained a good deal of currency on the left. Such a

view in effect gives a "left" twist to the liberal apology in which Watergate is an aberration in a usually workable and desirable system.

Usually this view derives implicitly from a theory advanced several years ago by "new left" theoretician Carl Oglesby. Oglesby argued that the U. S. ruling class was basically divided into two competing wings, "yankees" and "cowboys"—respectively Eastern "establishment" money and Southern and Western "new money" based on domestic oil, war spending, speculation in boom industries, etc. For many in the new left, this theory served as a bridge to the Democratic party. Liberal Democrats were the representatives of the yankees, who, according to this argument, had no material interest in continuation of the Vietnam war. Therefore it was advisable to campaign for a liberal Democratic president, who would end the war.

The U. S. ruling class does not hold monolithic views on any question except the desirability of maintaining its power, and Oglesby's generalization does have some validity in explaining some of the tactical disagreements that occur from time to time within the U. S. bourgeoisie. But it is not a sufficient explanation of the major conflicts in U. S. capitalist politics, and it seriously distorts the real relationships—usually with a view to apologizing for the yankees.

In reality, the political and economic power of the yankees is so great that in any major disagreement solely along cowboy-yankee lines, the outcome is predetermined. Discussing Oglesby's theory in the November issue of the Trotskyist monthly *International Socialist Review*, Dick Roberts provides the following figures:

". . . 99 of the 200 largest corporations are controlled by yankee ruling-class families described in Ferdinand Lundberg's *America's 60 Families* (1937)! The combined 1972 sales of these 99 corporations was \$288 billion [milliard]. Fully 39 of these 99 corporations are controlled by the Rockefeller, Morgan bank, du Pont, or Mellon interests. These four capitalist groupings—the most powerful in the world—accounted for 1972 sales of \$145 billion among the 200 largest U. S. manufacturing industries. That is, *almost one third* of the sales of the 200 largest U. S. manufacturing indus-



ROCKEFELLER: Leads Maoists to a startling discovery.

tries are controlled by only four interest groups, the 'established' pillars of yankee capital." (Emphasis in original.)

The same groups, Roberts goes on to show, similarly dominate banking.

"The attempt," Roberts continued, "to give an exact geographical identification of conflicting ruling-class interests in this country breaks down in various ways. Gulf Oil, for example, was originally a Texas firm but it was bought up by the Mellons in the first decade of this century through their ownership of the Mellon Bank.

"Furthermore, because of the relative strength of Eastern finance capital, the 'new money' firms of the post-Second World War period are increasingly being absorbed by the dominant banking groups. Wright Patman's House banking committee found out, as examples, that 6.2 percent of the common stock of United Aircraft and 8.7 percent of the common stock of Boeing were held by the Chase Manhattan [Rockefeller] trust department. Are United and Boeing still cowboy firms or are they now controlled by the Rockefeller grouping?"

These dominant sectors of the economy normally control both capitalist

parties. The United States has never had a president who represented cowboys as opposed to yankees; the last cowboy candidate, Barry Goldwater, lost the 1964 election by a greater margin than any Republican or Democratic candidate up to that time.

These facts make hash of reformist attempts to discover a "progressive" or "antimonopoly" bourgeoisie with which to ally: There isn't even a potentially "progressive" sector of the ruling class either able or willing to challenge the interests of the monopolists. (The liberal/reformist apologies usually muddle things even more by identifying the cowboys as the most monopolistic and powerful sector of the bourgeoisie.)

Such major divisions as have arisen in the U.S. ruling class in recent history have represented *tactical* disagreements, not conflicts of material interests between competing "progressive" and "reactionary" sectors of the bourgeoisie. This is why even such a profound dispute as that over the Vietnam war could be settled within the context of bourgeois democracy.

If there were a serious clash of interests between even approximately equal sectors of the ruling class, it would not be necessary to search for evidence of it in statistical tables or lists of campaign contributors: Such conflicts are settled in more dramatic ways.

## Nixon and the Military-Industrial Complex

The Communist party of the United States, after almost four decades of practicing class collaborationism, lost no time in incorporating the entire Watergate scandal into its usual schema according to which "progressive" capitalists are or should be Democrats, and "monopolists" are or should be Republicans. The U. S. Stalinists would have perceived a theoretical problem only if Nixon had been a Democrat.

The CP's most serious attempt at an explanation of Watergate was provided in the June 16 issue of the *Daily World*, the CP newspaper, by James E. Jackson, "National Education Director and member of the Political Committee of the Communist Party USA."

"Under the aegis of the Nixon Administration," Jackson wrote, "the mili-




tary-industrial complex forged to the forefront as the dominant category of the monopoly capitalist class. The union of personnel between the giants of industry along with aides from the military and the intelligence branches of the police—especially of the CIA and FBI—and the state apparatus distinguish the Nixon Administration from its predecessors. The domination of the state apparatus by the personnel of the monopolists has been brought to a high point of development. The narrow class interests of the monopolists have been given free reign [sic] to determine both foreign and domestic policies. The biggest corporations and the government interchange executive and administrative personnel in shifts, like a game of musical chairs. . . ."

Jackson's assertions to the contrary, the interlocking of government, corporate, and military personnel is no greater under Nixon than it was before he took office. The "game of musical chairs" has been going on for decades. In fact, if there is anything different about Nixon's top personnel, it is that they are less likely to come from high corporate posts.

Nixon has had few top advisers comparable to Eisenhower's secretary of defense, Charles Wilson, who contributed to political science the theorem "What's good for General Motors is good for the country"; Kennedy's secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, previously president of Ford Motor Company; McNamara's replacement under Johnson, Clark Clifford, a director of the du Pont family's Phillips Petroleum; Johnson's attorney general, Nicholas Katzenbach, currently a vice-president of International Business Machines; or Dean Rusk, secretary of state under Kennedy and Johnson, previously president of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Nixon, on the other hand, has tended to surround himself with lawyers (Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Kleindienst, Colson, Dean), advertising men (Haldeman), politicians (Laird)—in general, individuals lacking any *independent* influence within the ruling class.

In any event, the administration personnel is of secondary or tertiary importance at most. "The narrow class interests of the monopolists" are served without interruption from one administration to the next no matter who



NIXON: A "branch" of U.S. ruling class?

the president's advisers and cabinet officers may be. Jackson raised the question of the personnel of the Nixon gang only to help smuggle in his major point: "Under the aegis of the Nixon administration the military-industrial complex forged to the forefront as the dominant category of the monopoly capitalist class."

Who does Jackson think was in the forefront before the military-industrial complex obtained Nixon's patronage? Small shopkeepers perhaps? Farmers? Or does he perhaps have in mind that mythical sector, the "progressive" bourgeoisie? The sleight of hand with Nixon's personnel is designed to leave the impression that Johnson and Kennedy served a different master than does Nixon.

### Nixon's Backers

The Workers League, the U.S. followers of the British sectarian Gerry Healy,\* have applied Oglesby's theory

\*Healy, whose British followers recently changed the name of their organization from Socialist Labour League to Workers Revolutionary party, heads the "International Committee." Reactionary legislation in the United States outlaws organizational affiliation to international political groups, but the Workers League is in political agreement with this sectarian formation.

to the Watergate events without both-ering to credit the author. "Nixon's weakness," according to a resolution adopted at a Workers League national conference in August, "expresses the weakness of the capitalist class itself, which is deeply divided between the old capital of Wall Street and the big industrial cities and the capital based on the boom period."

Articles elsewhere in the Workers League newspaper, the *Bulletin*, make clear that "capital based on the boom period" is interchangeable with "cow-boys." In the November 16 issue, for example, the editors wrote:

"The growing list of secret donors shows better than anything else the intimate relations between this criminal Administration and the most reactionary conglomerates.

"Many of Nixon's largest donations were drawn from the powerful companies located in the South. . . ."

Many of Nixon's largest donations were drawn from the South. Many more, however, were drawn from other areas of the country. Nixon's support did not follow geographical lines. Since the *Bulletin* article referred to the "list of secret donors," presumably the authors were aware of the list of ninety-five largest contributors who gave prior to April 7, 1972, when it was thought that donations would remain secret. This list, which was published in the September 29 *New York Times*, included the following entries:

Walter Annenberg, Philadelphia publisher, \$250,000; Elmer Bobst, Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., New Jersey, \$100,000; William Burden, investment banking, New York, \$97,895; Brownlee Currey Jr., investment banking, New York, \$74,195; Shelby Davis, investment banking, New York, \$100,000; Christian de Guigne, Stauffer Chemicals, San Francisco, \$101,895; Frederick L. Ehrman, investment banking, New York, \$63,578; members of the Firestone family, Firestone Tire and Rubber, \$212,153; Mrs. Edsel Ford, \$50,000; Henry Ford 2d, \$49,776; Albert F. Gordon, stockbroker, New York, \$99,273; Gulf Oil, \$100,000; Armand Hammer, Occidental Petroleum, \$46,000; Abby Rockefeller Mauze, \$50,000; Otto N. Miller, chairman, Standard Oil of California, \$50,000; Seymour Milstein, Chase Manhattan Bank, \$65,000; John M.



Olin, Olin Corporation, New York, \$100,000; Spencer T. Olin, \$94,513; William McKnight, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, \$85,191; John D. Rockefeller, Laurence Rockefeller, and Nelson Rockefeller, total \$150,000; Richard M. Scaife, heir to Mellon fortune, \$1,000,000; W. Clement Stone, Combined Insurance Company, \$2,000,000; Arthur K. Watson, IBM World Trade Corporation, \$300,000.

The list of Nixon's contributors hardly indicates a division between "boom" capital and "old capital of Wall Street and the big industrial cities." The "most reactionary conglomerates" from which Nixon drew his support are a cross section of the U. S. ruling class.

In the process of assigning Nixon to the cowboys, the Healyites manage to misunderstand completely one of the major factors of the Watergate scandal, that is, what the ruling class objected to in Nixon's operations. In the May 28 *Bulletin*, the editors wrote:

"The men who financed these activities under CREEP, who paid for the bugging of Watergate and Donald Segretti's blatant attempts to break up the Democratic Party's campaign, and who paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in the cover up attempt to keep the Watergate burglars silent, are the most corrupt section of the American ruling class, the men who grew rich on the wheeling and dealing of the speculative boom."

We have already seen that yankee capital backed Nixon with the same enthusiasm as did new money. But do the Healyites really think that the U. S. bourgeoisie provided Nixon with \$60 million *in order* to finance Donald Segretti's "dirty tricks" and bribe the Watergate burglars?

The ruling class backed Nixon—overwhelmingly—in 1972 because it agreed with the policies he was trying to implement: wage freeze, "Vietnamization," detente with the Soviet Union and China, a "get tough" strategy rather than concessions to deal with the radicalization. Neither cowboys nor yankees thought they were paying for the Watergate burglary. On the contrary, when they began to learn what Nixon had been doing, they tried to chastise him for his excesses—a process that led to more disclosures than anyone had expected.

December 17, 1973

## Additional Discoveries

It may be wondered why Gerry Healy and his "International Committee" do not suggest that his U. S. co-thinkers take a closer look at reality. The truth is that the British Healyites have gone even further astray, dis-



BREZHNEV: Content to have "fascist" running U.S. government.

covering ruling-class divisions in the formal separation of branches of the U. S. government.

The October 27 issue of the British Healyite youth paper, *Keep Left*, which does not normally attempt humor, gave the following account of the meaning of the conflict over the secret White House tape recordings:

"So far Nixon has set his course firmly on a collision with two of the most important and powerful branches of the American ruling class—the legislature and the judiciary."

The Healyites have yet to provide an analysis of the economic function of those two "branches of the American ruling class," but *Workers Press*, the British Healyite paper, is obviously convinced that the divisions between them and whatever branch Nixon represents are deep. (Or is the president a branch unto himself?) In a November 8 *Workers Press* article on Robert Vesco's extradition hearings in the

Bahamas, Alex Mitchell wrote:

"Vesco is being brought back to America now because the judiciary and legislature are preparing to throw everything they can at Nixon in the coming days."

Are they really now? Absolutely *everything*?

The British Healyites have a well-deserved reputation for conspicuous inaccuracy in their reports and analysis of foreign events, which may explain why their reportage on Watergate is several times removed from reality. The position of the U. S. Maoists of the *Guardian* newspaper has a similar air of unreality.

Perhaps because Mao Tsetung has not publicly explained his Thoughts, if any, on Watergate, the *Guardian* has based its analysis on a slightly modified version of Oglesby's theory. According to Carl Davidson, who writes on Watergate for the *Guardian*, the U.S. ruling class is divided into two factions: a Kennedy-Harriman group and the Rockefeller group, the latter in an apparently shaky alliance with the cowboys. In the July 18 *Guardian*, for example, Davidson wrote:

"At the present time, however, the battle within and among the ruling circles is still unresolved. The historical forces in the U. S. that could constitute the center of fascist rule, 'the most reactionary sections of finance capital' in the form of the Rockefeller group and the Southern and Southwestern defense and oil industrialists, are now divided, with the regional groups laying [sic] low in the wings. On the other hand, the Kennedy-Harriman group is still without hegemony and has yet to re-constitute a ruling coalition with any degree of stability."

The question of fascism is discussed below. Here we need note only Davidson's "improvement" on Oglesby. By assigning Rockefeller to the cowboys, Davidson depicts a ruling-class alignment whose factions can be described in less unwieldy terms than those Oglesby uses. Their names are Republican and Democrat. The *Guardian* has discovered that there are two capitalist political parties in the United States.

## Is Nixon a Fascist?

Accepting the liberal argument that the events disclosed in the Watergate

scandal are an abrupt break from the norms of U.S. capitalism, both the CP and the *Guardian* have advanced the view that Nixon was moving toward fascism. Whether deliberately to confuse the issue, or because it doesn't understand the difference itself, the *Daily World* also accuses Nixon of plotting a military coup and uses the two terms "fascism" and "military coup" interchangeably.

The Nixon gangsters certainly incline toward totalitarian views, and it would do them too much credit to assert that not one of them is capable of supporting a fascist movement. But fascism is something considerably more tangible than the ideas in the heads of gangsters.

Historically, serious fascist threats have arisen only in periods of the sharpest social, economic, and political crisis. In such times of crisis, when the working class is driven onto the path of revolution, fascism attempts to mobilize the petty bourgeoisie as the last line of defense of capitalism. Its goal is to smash every independent organization of the working class, to replace the no longer viable institutions and methods of bourgeois democracy with naked force.

Leon Trotsky, who more than any other revolutionary leader contributed to the scientific explanation of fascism, described the class relationships involved:

"In the various countries the decrepitude and disintegration of capitalism are expressed in diverse forms and at unequal rhythms. But the basic features of the process are the same everywhere. The bourgeoisie is leading its society to complete bankruptcy. It is capable of assuring the people neither bread nor peace. This is precisely why it cannot any longer tolerate the democratic order. It is forced to smash the workers by the use of physical violence. The discontent of the workers and peasants, however, cannot be brought to an end by the police alone. Moreover, it is often impossible to make the army march against the people. It begins by disintegrating and ends with the passage of a large section of the soldiers over to the people's side. That is why finance capital is obliged to create special armed bands, trained to fight the workers just as certain breeds of dog are trained to hunt game. The historic function of fascism is to smash the working class,

destroy its organizations, and stifle political liberties when the capitalists find themselves unable to govern and dominate with the help of democratic machinery.

"The fascists find their human material mainly in the petty bourgeoisie. The latter has been entirely ruined by big capital. There is no way out for it in the present social order, but it knows no other. Its dissatisfaction, indignation and despair are diverted by the fascists away from big capital and against the workers." (*Whither France?*)

I have been able to discover only one attempt by the CP to provide a "scientific" description of what is "fascist" about the Nixon regime. This was in the article by James Jackson cited above, in which the party's National Education Director draws on the theoretical contributions of Georgi Dimitrov to buttress his case.

Dimitrov's theories were presented at the Seventh (and last) Congress of the Communist International in 1935. Prior to Hitler's seizure of power, Stalin had made it an article of faith that Social Democracy and fascism were "twins" since they both, in the last analysis, served as instruments of bourgeois rule. After this criminal sectarianism had smoothed the path to power for German fascism, Stalin decided that the way to stop fascism was by making the working class a junior partner in an alliance with the "progressive bourgeoisie."

Dimitrov's job was to justify this turn without saying anything that might cast doubt on the infallibility of the author of the preceding disaster — a task requiring more diplomacy than theoretical clarity. That makes Dimitrov an ideal guide for the CP and the Maoists, both of whom want to fight fascism, which is not presently threatening, in alliance with the capitalists who will be its intended beneficiaries when it does become a real danger.

In order to explain the peculiar fact that Nixon's "fascism" is difficult to distinguish from bourgeois democracy under his predecessors, Jackson cited Dimitrov's report to the Comintern Congress:

"The development of fascism, and the fascist dictatorship itself, assume *different forms* in different countries, according to historical, social and economic conditions and to the national

peculiarities, and the international position of the given country. In certain countries, principally those in which fascism has no broad mass basis and in which the struggle of the various groups within the camp of the fascist bourgeoisie itself is rather acute, fascism does not immediately venture to abolish parliament, but allows the other bourgeois parties, as well as the



HARRIMAN: Bulwark against "transition to fascism"?

Social-Democratic Parties, to retain a modicum of legality." (Emphasis in original.)

A fascism with "no broad mass basis" is not fascism at all: The bourgeoisie certainly is neither strong enough nor brave enough to send its own members into a frontal assault on the working class.

Moreover, if those sectors of the bourgeoisie favoring a resort to fascism were engaged in "rather acute" struggle against one another, they would find it difficult enough to impose their common view even on the rest of their own class. Dimitrov's hypothetical conditions would make it impossible to establish a "fascist dictatorship."

But in Jackson's view, fascism is so powerful that it can be instituted by a mere handful of conspirators.



He writes:

". . . A determined center of the ruling monopoly capitalists plotted an underground route to the institutionalization of a particular Americanized modern version of fascism as the effective governmental form. This Trojan-horse route to fascism was to be accomplished without fascists and without a fascist party."

Jackson felt it necessary to warn the "ruling monopoly capitalists" that a fascist order—even one lacking fascists and including all the elements of bourgeois legality—was not really in their best interests:

"A domestic political situation characterized by advancing and enlarging democracy rather than its repression is a more proper atmosphere for the development of a flourishing trade, scientific and cultural relations with the socialist community of nations, and [it] accords with and facilitates the development of international relations of co-existence.

"In today's world, peaceful coexistence, and its concomitant opportunities for the development of trade, is no longer a choice but a compelling necessity for the business needs of U. S. monopolists. It is also the widely acknowledged imperative for securing and safeguarding world peace."

It is unlikely that Jackson's assertion about the need for "peaceful coexistence" to be tied to "enlarging democracy" in the United States sounded very convincing to the monopolists. That Nixon's "fascist" proclivities were no great obstacle to "peaceful coexistence" could have been deduced from the front-page headline of the very same issue of the *Daily World*, which proclaimed: "BREZHNEV DUE TODAY FOR WIDE-RANGE TALKS."

Brezhnev in fact seems to prefer things the way they are in U. S. government. *Pravda* has largely confined its miniscule reportage on Watergate to quotations from Nixon's defenders. The November 12 issue, for example, carried the following two-paragraph dispatch datelined New York:

"U. S. Secretary of Commerce [Friedrick] Dent sharply criticized circles and organs of the press in America that have been making rude attacks on President R. Nixon in connection with the 'Watergate Affair.' 'This unseemly, scandalous campaign,' he said, 'is greatly damaging the country.'

"Dent stressed that only a few con-



McGOVERN: A precedent for "Guardian."

gressmen were supporting calls for impeaching the president because 'there are no grounds.' Those who are trying to cut short the president's term Dent called 'a vengeful and irresponsible group.'

### 'One Divides Into Two'

The *Guardian's* opinion of Nixon's "fascism" is a bit more difficult to pin down. In the July 18 issue, Davidson argued that "most of the bourgeoisie" regarded the Nixon gang as "incompetent" and were determined to "hit back hard" because Nixon had tried to institute fascism "prematurely." At other times, the *Guardian* seems to regard a fascist coup as a much more immediate threat.

On one question, at least, Davidson is completely unambiguous: The Harriman-Kennedy faction of the bourgeoisie—read "Democrats"—is the main bourgeois opposition to fascism. In the July 18 article, he wrote:

"Whether the reformist 'carrot' or the repressive 'stick' are in the limelight, however, the essence of imperialist rule remains the same—reaction all along the line. . . .

"But it would be a mistake to view the two 'alternative' sets of hegemonic coalitions as equally capable of

making a transition to fascism in the United States."

Davidson puts "alternative" in quotation marks to give himself a left cover: *He* certainly sees nothing to choose between the two hegemonic coalitions (Republicans and Democrats). But his argument runs in the opposite direction. If the Democrats are less capable of "making a transition to fascism," doesn't that make them a real alternative to the fascist Republicans?

The *Guardian* has had experience at discovering "objective" differences between the two parties to give a "Marxist" cover to opportunism. During the 1972 election campaign, for example, it used the following shame-faced formula to indicate its support for McGovern:

"We do not oppose the growing trend of those among the masses who intend to vote for McGovern—just as we do not oppose any action which objectively assists the struggle of the Vietnamese people." (*Guardian* editorial, August 23, 1972.)

In the November 7, 1973, *Guardian*, Davidson enlisted the aid of both Dimitrov and Mao Thought to explain why the two parties are not equally capable of supporting fascism:

"Fascism is the ultimate expression of the rule of monopoly capital where, as Dimitrov states, it substitutes for the bourgeois democratic form of its class dictatorship 'the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital.'

"Monopoly capital, however, is not undifferentiated and it would be incorrect to view all sections of it as equal partners in fascism's development. This would view the growing fascist threat as an evolutionary process of 'two merging into one' rather than as a movement characterized by a struggle of opposites where 'one divides into two.'"

Davidson ignores the fact that a bourgeoisie divided by the question of fascism can very quickly merge into one again when a fascist bid for power provokes civil war between the capitalist class and the workers and their allies. This is a point of practical as well as theoretical interest, as the betrayals of the bourgeois republicans in the Spanish Civil War demonstrated.



It is true, however, that if the question of fascism were seriously raised by any sector of the capitalist class, it would initially cause deep divisions within the bourgeoisie. The absence of such divisions, which would pose life-and-death questions for the capitalist class and would be fought out with weapons more forceful than newspaper editorials, is one more indication, if any were needed, that however one characterizes the threat posed by the Nixon gang, it is not currently the threat of a fascist seizure of power.

But does Davidson's assertion that the two capitalist parties are not "equally capable of making a transition to fascism" perhaps have some validity for possible future fascist threats?

It is true that the two parties are assigned different functions by the ruling class. For open attacks on the living standard of the working class, attempts to take back past concessions, etc., the Republican party is usually the preferred instrument. Reforms and concessions are usually assigned to the Democratic party, in order to perpetuate the myth that it is a "friend of labor." The resulting larger measure of working-class support is also the reason that the Democratic party is generally given the job of launching potentially unpopular imperialist wars.

But even in the unlikely event that a serious move toward fascism left the present lines of party division essentially unchanged, there is no guarantee that the Republican party would be the fascist vehicle. Since fascism necessarily depends on demagoguery to win mass support from the petty bourgeoisie and even from backward layers of the working class, the Democratic party could well be the first choice of the profascist bourgeoisie.

### The Nixon 'Coup'

The Healyites do not share the Stalinist illusion that Nixon represents a fascist threat. Instead they interpret the liberal apology for Watergate to mean that Nixon is plotting a "military coup." Apparently acting on the theory that the essence of revolutionary strategy is to shout louder than anyone else, the Healyites work themselves into a greater frenzy over this alleged danger than the Stalinists do over

"fascism." At times the *Bulletin* seems to regard Nixon's "dictatorship" not so much as a threat but as an accomplished fact.

The first issue of the *Bulletin* to appear after Nixon fired Archibald Cox and put forward his phony "com-



HAIG: Gives Healyites nightmares.

promise" on the White House tapes reached a new level of hysteria. Under a huge headline reading "WE WILL NOT ACCEPT DICTATORSHIP!" the *Bulletin* carried a statement of the Workers League Political Committee that included the following assessment:

"Declaring that he will not be paralyzed by Watergate, Nixon has acted to break up the bourgeois democratic government as it has existed under the constitution for nearly 200 years and to destroy the constitution itself.

"● What once was the Executive branch of government has been eliminated over the weekend and replaced by Nixon acting as dictator. Nixon's dismissal of Cox and Richardson had all the characteristics of a palace coup.

...  
 "● Nixon stands in contempt of court, openly declaring that he is above the law and will not submit to its decisions.

"● Nixon has already defied Congress for a long period of time, not only by refusing to cooperate with its independent investigation of Watergate, but by vetoing its legislation and impounding its appropriations.

"Having in practice abolished the three branches of government, Nixon maintains relations only with the military, whose representative, General Alexander Haig, is the leading adviser in the White House and the man responsible for carrying out Nixon's orders."

It was one of history's more short-lived "dictatorships," it must be observed. On October 23, the same day the statement appeared, Nixon's lawyers announced that he would obey the ruling of the "abolished" judiciary, and members of the "abolished" Congress began impeachment proceedings that may really abolish Nixon's presidency.

But Nixon's forced retreat did nothing to relieve the Healyite proclivity for panic-mongering. They continue to see military conspirators in the White House shrubbery. Particularly sinister, in the view of the *Bulletin*, is Haig's presence as a top adviser to Nixon. In the November 16 *Bulletin*, in an article titled "Is Gen. Haig Running the White House?" David North warned that Nixon has "turned increasingly to the military as his principal base of support in remaining in the White House."

"Even those with access to the White House find it difficult to pinpoint the exact scope of Haig's responsibilities," North wrote. "It is known that while in Washington, Nixon confers privately during most of the day with only three people: Haig, Henry Kissinger, and Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler.

"Of these, Haig has the most independent authority. It is Haig who carries out all of Nixon's orders."

It would be helpful to know how much "independence" is involved in the "authority" to follow orders, but the Healyite theoreticians are too busy dealing with more pressing problems. Having noticed that Nixon's "dictatorship" is a bit shaky, they decided to suck an explanation from their thumbs. In the November 6 *Bulletin*, editor Lucy St. John wrote:

"In the face of a massive movement of the trade unions, major sections of the capitalist class are now openly

moving to get a government that can deal with the working class."

Unfortunately there is at present no "massive movement of the trade unions" except in the pages of the *Bulletin*. (St. John's article was pushed off the front page by a report of a "civil war" in the state of Kentucky that consisted of attempts to break a strike involving 150 miners.) What the union leaders are doing in regard to Watergate is really not worth all that impassioned rhetoric.

### From the Rear Balcony: Thunderous Applause for Meany

In the 1972 election, the AFL-CIO bureaucrats, for the first time in the history of the federation, refused to endorse the Democratic presidential candidate. George Meany and his fellow labor fakers effectively gave their



MEANY: Back to the Democrats.

support—although not a formal endorsement—to Richard Nixon's reelection.

The Watergate scandal and the clear indications that influential capitalists were considering throwing Nixon overboard caused the bureaucrats to change their course back to the Democratic party, a change made easier for Meany by the decline within that party of the too "radical" McGovern influence.

To prove the sincerity of their reconversion, at the AFL-CIO's October 22 convention the bureaucrats voted to demand Nixon's resignation or impeachment, and they have begun mailing out large quantities of weekly "indictments" of the criminal in the White House.

Meany's maneuver is so transparent that it is difficult to imagine anyone misjudging what was involved in it. Nevertheless, the U. S. Healyites managed to do just that. In the October 12 *Bulletin*, the editors wrote of the upcoming AFL-CIO convention:

"It is only their [the bureaucrats'] open collaboration with Nixon in supporting the sellout of every contract in accordance with the wage controls coupled with silence on the Watergate conspiracy that has kept Nixon this long. Refusal to act against Nixon now would amount to the greatest betrayal in the history of the labor movement."

Even if it is charitably assumed that the *Bulletin* editors meant only "the history of the U. S. labor movement," a refusal by the bureaucrats to continue their journey back to the Democratic party would not have been a betrayal at all, let alone one deserving the adjective "greatest." Having thoroughly frightened themselves with the specter of a "military coup," the Healyites worked themselves into a position of trying to provide a left cover for Meany's class-collaborationist maneuvers. If they did not provide Meany with much real assistance, it is only because the *Bulletin's* influence in the union movement is limited to convincing the occasional worker who reads a copy that "socialists" are more prone than other people to suffer from hysteria and delusions of grandeur.

### Dumping Nixon

The AFL-CIO bureaucrats' demand for Nixon's resignation or impeachment indicates that raising such a demand is not in and of itself an act of revolutionary audacity. But this does not mean that revolutionary socialists can or should be indifferent to the question.

Watergate has already undermined the credibility not just of Nixon but of capitalist government in the United States. Nixon's forced resignation or impeachment would be a confirmation

of the widespread belief that the government is not to be trusted—just as Agnew's resignation was for many the proof of an already prevalent suspicion that "politicians are crooks."

Nixon's removal would add an unsettling precedent to U. S. capitalist politics. It would raise in the masses the idea that their democratic rights ought to include the right to get rid of unpopular presidents or other officials without waiting until the next election. (This is a right that the bourgeois authors of the constitution—wisely, from the viewpoint of their interests—deliberately denied to the people.)

From the standpoint of the ruling class, the best outcome of the Watergate scandal would be for Nixon to apologize for his transgressions, promise to do better in the future, and then finish out his term. This would mean that Nixon had succeeded to some degree in covering up the extent of his crimes and winning public acceptance for the idea that the president should be given considerable latitude to decide what actions "national security" requires.

Socialists, on the other hand, have every reason to encourage the idea, which would gain legitimacy from Nixon's dismissal, that presidents do not have the right to operate in secrecy, evade the rules of democracy, spy on opposition political groups, etc.

A similar attitude applies to the proposal, raised by some liberals in Congress, that Nixon's successor be chosen in a special election. Even given the extremely limited nature of the democracy involved in bourgeois elections, they are obviously a more democratic method of selecting presidents than the procedure being used to put Gerald Ford in line to replace Nixon.

But if socialists have every reason to favor Nixon's removal, it is equally important not to exaggerate the gains that would result. It is well to keep in mind that if Nixon had resigned in September, he would have been replaced by Spiro Agnew. Watergate poses the question of which bourgeois representative, not which class, will rule. If Nixon is fired by his masters, his replacement, however chosen, will still be the paid agent of the class and system that brought us Watergate.

Influential sectors of the ruling class



are in favor of getting rid of Nixon precisely because they hope that doing so will help them put over the myth that Watergate was an aberration and that "the system works." Nixon's personal fate is seen as trivial at most. The main question is how to restore confidence in their system of government.

That is why socialists cannot pose Nixon's removal or the method of his replacement as the central question. To do so only helps the ruling class hide the real issue: the fact that capitalism is incompatible with real democracy.

### Calming Hysteria With Illusions

The ruling class deliberately lies when it claims that removing or otherwise punishing Nixon and his gang will stop Watergating. Can there be any excuse for "socialists" who make even more extravagant claims as to what will be accomplished by impeachment or a new election?

By making Nixon's removal the central question and not posing any real alternative to Watergating, those who believe that Nixon is a fascist or potential dictator place higher reliance in bourgeois parliamentarism than the bourgeoisie itself does.

It is difficult to imagine any sophisticated apologist for capitalism arguing that a fascist president would quietly step down from his office when asked to do so by one half of the House of Representatives and two thirds of the Senate. But in the *Daily World* one can read editorials proclaiming:

"Fulfilling the indictment of Nixon, his impeachment by the House, and his conviction by the Senate, is the task of the people.

"The democratic rights of the people, the Constitutional process, the people's peace and security and welfare are imperiled. The people must liquidate the crisis by ousting Richard Milhous Nixon as President of the United States."

The people, however, do not vote or otherwise participate directly in the impeachment process. So on October 26 the *Daily World* editors spelled out what they had in mind:

"The petition campaigns which urge the House to impeach the President, and the Senate to convict him, are the

central means for enlisting the power of the American people to remove the peril to world peace and our security. Neither the House nor the Senate can be relied on, without the mass intervention of the people, to defend the Constitution, to protect our democratic processes, to defend even the Congress itself.

"The major instrument for such intervention is, at this time, the campaigns petitioning the House to impeach the President, and the Senate to convict him of the abundant 'high crimes and misdemeanors' of which he is guilty before the entire nation."

Fascism can be stopped by petitions! It is difficult to imagine that the U.S. Stalinists take themselves seriously — or it would be if their cothinkers in Chile had not confined their efforts to forestall the military coup in that country to speechmaking and circulating petitions "against civil war."

What all this talk of impeachment and petitions is about, of course, is preparation for beating the drums for liberal capitalist candidates in the 1974 elections. As the CP political committee spelled it out in an October 22 statement, "Let every Congressman and Senator know that their stand on this issue is a decisive factor in the 1974 election."

The CP of course is enthralled by the idea of being able to support a liberal Democrat for president in 1974, two years before they could have hoped to do it again under normal circumstances.

The Healyites also have been shouting as loudly as they can for new elections ever since last May. In the May 28 *Bulletin*, the editors issued marching orders to the labor movement:

"The American labor movement must now use its tremendous power to demand Nixon's immediate resignation and the scheduling of a new election.

"The Watergate scandal has exposed the 1972 election as a complete fraud forced on the American working class only through deception and illegal manipulation. The disclosures surrounding Watergate add up to one thing: Nixon and his henchmen, backed up by a thoroughly corrupt section of American big business, plotted during the 1972 election to deprive workers of their basic democratic rights."

The Workers League may not have noticed, but the 1972 election was not the first one that was fraudulent. All the elections conducted by the U.S. ruling class are based on deception and manipulation. Moreover, this deception and manipulation is carried out not just by "Nixon and his henchmen" but also by the Democratic party and its backers, who are no less "thoroughly corrupt" than Nixon's.

Watergate has made it easier for revolutionists to explain these facts. Such an explanation cannot begin with a complaint that 1972 was an exception that can be corrected by having the bourgeoisie schedule new elections.

The major task that Watergate poses for socialists is education. The Watergate disclosures have ripped away some of the facade that normally conceals the realities of capitalist government, giving socialists a chance to reach a broader and more receptive audience with a coherent explanation of what Watergate means and the socialist alternative to it.

### The Socialist Alternative

A good example of how this educational task can be carried out is provided by the Socialist Workers party (SWP), the U.S. Trotskyist organization. In addition to explaining the meaning of Watergate in its press, the SWP has reached out to layers who may never have read a revolutionary newspaper but who are now willing to listen to a socialist explanation of what Watergate reveals. This has been done through the medium of a lawsuit against Nixon and eighteen of his subordinates.

Socialists have always been confronted with the need to defend their organizations and members against legal frame-ups and have long realized that the best defense is a political one that takes the issues to the public and mobilizes the broadest possible support for the rights of the intended victims. In its suit against the Nixon gang, the SWP has gone beyond the usually rather narrow limits of such a defense campaign.

The suit attacks the "right" of Nixon and his successors to wiretap, burglarize, infiltrate, and harass political groups, and it seeks to outlaw such specific witch-hunt tools as the attorney general's "subversive list."

More important, however, is the fact



that the suit serves as a vehicle for carrying the revolutionary-socialist explanation of Watergate throughout the country. The Political Rights Defense Fund (PRDF) has been established to support the suit and to help mobilize public opinion against all aspects of government "dirty tricks."

Speakers for PRDF and the SWP make national tours explaining the issues at stake. The suit has already won wide support from a variety of organizations and individuals all over the country.

The SWP suit provides socialists with

a platform from which to explain the lessons of Watergate: that Nixon is neither a "fascist" nor a "dictator" but a loyal servitor of a ruling class whose needs cannot be reconciled with democracy, that only a working-class government can put an end to Watergating.

Such a working-class government is not going to be the result of special elections in 1974. But the educational campaign now being conducted by the U.S. Trotskyists is an important and necessary step toward its eventual formation. □

## Kim Drops Demand for Pullout of U.S. Troops

### Korean 'Reunification' Talks Shelved

The debate over "reunification" of North and South Korea, which threatened to break out in the United Nations at an embarrassing moment for the Seoul regime—just as student demonstrations continued to escalate—has been averted through a series of diplomatic maneuvers. On November 20 it was announced that Pyongyang and Seoul had agreed to shelve their separate motions before the UN, in effect sanctioning, at least for the time being, a continuation of the status quo.

The South Korean resolution, backed by Washington, Tokyo, and other imperialist centers, called for the admission to the UN of two separate Koreas (neither are now officially represented), thus legitimizing the existence of the U.S. puppet regime in Seoul. The other motion, which had received the backing of the Fourth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned States, held in Algiers in September, called for the "peaceful reunification" of the two parts of Korea, the dissolution of the UN command, and the withdrawal of the 42,000 U.S. troops presently stationed in South Korea under the UN banner.

In the interests of keeping the surface waters of détente as smooth as possible and to avoid fueling any more anti-American sentiment in Asia, Washington opted to avoid a diplomatic showdown on the question of its military presence in South Korea. The Japanese imperialists, who have sizable investments in South Korea, also have a long-term interest in main-

taining the Seoul regime, whether or not it is an official member of the UN.

But the imperialist backers of the Seoul resolution were not the only ones interested in avoiding a diplomatic confrontation. Both Peking and Pyongyang, which have their own bureaucratic interests to safeguard, also considered it advisable to accept the status quo.

While Pyongyang could not but oppose the two-Koreas resolution—which flew in the face of its long-established diplomatic posture of "principled" opposition to the presence of U.S. troops was quite another matter.

Even as late as the November 10 issue of the *Pyongyang Times*, President Kim Il Sung had called on the UN General Assembly to "strip the U.S. imperialist aggressor troops in south Korea of the 'U.N. forces' helmets and make it withdraw." But he switched to a different song just a few days later. David Winder, reporting from the UN to the November 20 *Christian Science Monitor*, noted that Chinese Ambassador Huang Hua had borrowed a phrase from Kim Il Sung to the effect that U.S. troops should be withdrawn at the "earliest possible date," rather than "immediately."

Even such mild phraseology proved too much for the backers of the Seoul resolution, so Kim agreed to drop all mention of the U.S. troops in the

compromise agreement that was read on the floor of the General Assembly on November 20.

Secret connivance between Washington and Peking evidently helped pave the way for this compromise agreement. On his way from Peking to Tokyo during his November diplomatic tour, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stopped for a few hours in Seoul to reassure President Park Chung Hee that Washington had no



KIM: Backs off and then claims victory.

intention of withdrawing its military forces from South Korea. The November 20 *Christian Science Monitor* reported "informed sources" as speculating that "China tacitly approves the continued presence of American troops in South Korea and fears that Japanese forces might come fill the vacuum if American troops left.

"This was one of the messages that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger brought to Seoul in his 4.5-hour visit here Nov. 16."

While the Kremlin may not have had a direct hand in the compromise, it too would favor such a tacit agreement. The November 30 *Washington Post*, reporting on Brezhnev's trip to India, mentioned his proposal for an international conference to discuss a collective security system for Asia. "Brezhnev said the need for such a

system was a natural outgrowth of the detente between the Soviet Union and the United States," wrote the *Post*. Such a "security system" would have to include Korea.

Part of the UN agreement also included the dissolution of UNCURK (the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea). Kim Il Sung will probably try to claim this as one of the fruits of his diplomatic line, thus justifying the entire agreement. In reality, there was very little opposition to the disbanding of UNCURK, no matter what happened to the two Korean resolutions. Even Washington agreed to its dissolution after the Australian delegate indicated his opposition to its continuation. Under such circumstances, had the future of UNCURK actually come up for a vote, Washington would have lost.

The disbanding of UNCURK in no way affects the U. S. military presence in Korea. Even if the UN banner were removed, U. S. troops would still remain under the bilateral security pact Washington has with Seoul.

Before the agreement was announced, one African ambassador, who supported the Pyongyang resolution, said that it would be "better to come back next year and fight again than dilute the resolution." Kim, however, in the tradition of Stalinist diplomacy, did not present the compromise agreement as a "dilution." According to the November 23 issue of the Tokyo English-language *Daily Yomiuri*, "North Korea did not insist on the dismantling of the UN command and the pullout of the U. S. troops. It nevertheless claimed that the [UN] decision represented a victory for North Korea." □



PERON: Presses his anticommunist witch-hunt into high schools.

## Peron Carries Witch-Hunt Into High Schools

### Students Resist Repression of Militants

[The following article was published in the November 29 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, weekly paper of the Argentine PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party), an organization in sympathy with the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

With only a few weeks remaining before the close of the academic year, in a number of high schools we have seen attacks launched against the compañeros most active in this year's struggles. This offensive is also aimed at rolling back the gains that have been won by all students—ending the repression, the ousting of Lanusse-appointed rectors, etc.

There are rumors circulating in the high schools that these "little affairs" were inspired by the Ministry of Education, right after the notorious circulars started going around.

We feel that this should serve as a warning. All high-school students

should take stock of things and discuss what is happening, so that they can respond as did the Belgrano High School students who mobilized all together to defend the activists and the gains of the student movement.

\* \* \*

Since the end of October, at Belgrano High School, student activists have been called down for "disciplinary hearings." They have been asked questions such as: "Did you take part in Chile solidarity meetings or Trelew commemorations?" "Do you regard yourself as a student leader?" And so forth. At the end of these sessions they are urged to apply to "a high school in the provinces."

This isn't all. The vice-rector appointed by the Lanusse dictatorship, ousted this year by the students, has been reinstated.

The students held an assembly and decided to march to the Ministry of Education, where they presented a petition signed by the whole student body demanding an end to the "disciplinary hearings" and opposing reinstatement of the old vice-rector.

The Ministry officials told them to wait. In front of all the students, the Belgrano High School rector promised to try to end the "disciplinary hearings" and pledged that if he got an order from the Ministry to expel the activists, he would resign.

\* \* \*

*Report to a Comrade from the JSA [Juventud Socialista de Avanzada—Vanguard Socialist Youth].*

*Q. What is the problem?*

A. Since the start of November there have been plainclothes cops in the Mitre High School. On November 5, a meeting of student representatives was called outside the gate (for the first time, they were refused permission to hold a meeting on the school premises). It was decided to demand that the rector pull the cops out.

*Q. And then what happened?*

A. On Tuesday, November 6, six student activists, four of them elected representatives, were prevented from entering the high school. The rector didn't give an explanation but only said that they couldn't come back until the following Monday.

The two cops who had been stationed at the school door followed us, and when we went to a cafe to discuss what to do, two patrol cars parked at the corner. They began to come after us, but we ran and they couldn't catch anybody.

Q. What did the rector do?

A. He called the parents in. But they defended the students' democratic right not to be deprived of a year's credit and backed up their kids. They protested against the presence of police in the high school and forced the rector to ask the police department to remove them.

Q. What was the result?

A. We activists were readmitted, and the rector told us to watch our step, because "there are informers in the school." He also told us that we had been readmitted as a way of "protecting" us because things were getting "very rough."

Q. What's the situation like now?

A. The repression is continuing. There are individuals going around the Mitre High School in plainclothes who aren't students, and none of the students know who they are. And outside, there are uniformed cops.

Q. What are you going to try to do now?

A. We are going to try to defend our compañeros and keep them from getting expelled. □

control of the executive branch." And he continues: "The only thing that preserved this executive authority . . . was precisely respect for the constitution." This was the case, he says, because the UP "won the elections as a result of a three-way split of the political forces in Chile, managing to slip in through the breach opened by the cleavage between the old Alessandrista right wing (PN) [Partido Nacional—National party] and their cronies, and the Christian Democracy [CD]—an opening that was not fortuitous, since it reflected sharp differences between these two blocs." "In any case," Petkoff adds, "the complex situation that for so long kept the country's powerful political 'center' outside the rightist bloc is the reason why the armed forces were unable to act earlier."

So, in Petkoff's opinion the only possibility left was to win over or neutralize the CD by making the necessary concessions, because "phrases about 'mobilizing the masses' against military coups are not without that pathetic air characteristic of everything whose day is past."

According to Petkoff, Allende was unable to win favor with the CD because of the "ultraleftists," who, he says, even captured the SP. Furthermore, he says, the "workerism" permeating the Chilean left led it to think in terms of a "proletarian revolution" (put in quotation marks by the scandalized Petkoff) "bound up with the stupid clichés about the petty bourgeoisie that come from a corrupted notion of Marxism." The total of these alleged errors is what was supposed to have enabled "the army, despite its incipient cleavages, to act as a single institution in the power vacuum that had arisen."

We do not agree with this analysis. To explain why, we need only note the facts that Teodoro fails to mention.

Since 1967 Chile has experienced a tremendous upsurge. In 1969, there were 3,024,000 man-days lost in "illegal" strikes and 931,000 in "legal" work stoppages. Alongside the workers struggles, the peasants mobilized, as did the homeless people, or semiproletarian elements, in shantytowns around the urban centers. Allende's electoral victory and its recognition by the bosses were essentially by-products of mobilizations that succeeded in paralyzing and

## Teodoro Petkoff Returns to 'Stages' Theory

# What Kind of Revolution for Venezuela?

By A. Vallejo

[The following article appeared in the November 6-19 issue of the Venezuelan Trotskyist paper, *Voz Socialista*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

"I personally think it would be a good idea to work together . . . but we have decided that for the time being we have to work only through the MAS [Movimiento al Socialismo—Movement Toward Socialism] so as to consolidate our strength." Besides such statements, we have listened to several MAS leaders stressing the need to organize the following that has been attracted to the socialist campaign and recently we have heard about the virtues of "centralism," as well as a few surprising warnings about the siren songs of ultraleftism, which without further explanation, has been denounced as the main political and practical enemy.

Beginning in the pages of *Voz Marxista*, and now in the pages of *Voz Socialista*, we have supported and encouraged those actions by the MAS that seemed to us to be correct. With the same frankness we say that it is wrong to counterpose the needs of strengthening a group organizationally to the requirements of unity in action. At the same time we would raise a word of caution. You can't shut yourself off from different views, nor can you "centralize" without discussing and giving a clear answer to the questions: "What kind of revolution does Venezuela need?" "What kinds of organization will be called for to achieve it?" "How can they be built?" This is an open discussion that cannot fail to take up Teodoro Petkoff's article "And After Chile?"

Since Allende took office through an electoral process that left the organs of the bourgeois state intact, Petkoff says, "the UP [Unidad Popular] had only one card to play—con-



dividing the bourgeois forces. So it was important to take note of the contradictions within the bourgeois ranks to be able to take advantage of them. These divisions could not be exploited, however, without it being kept in mind that all the bourgeois forces, whether or not they favored a coup, were still exploiters, and that in the last analysis they would fight together in defense of private property. Moreover, you couldn't mix up the electoral base of Frei's party—the middle classes and backward sections of the working class—with its *capitalist* leadership and program. The CD as such could never be regarded as an ally in the struggle against capitalism.

Revolutionary Marxists are fully aware of the need for making tactical compromises and retreats when the relationship of forces calls for it. What is impermissible is presenting a disadvantageous deal as a victory, and this is what invalidates the comparison between Lenin and Allende. Of course, the Bolsheviks took many steps backward, but it never occurred to them to regard these retreats as victories, and this is why, for example, they survived the Brest-Litovsk agreement. . . . From the beginning the UP did just the opposite, concealing the truth, promising a "peaceful road," and assuring that the army could play a progressive role.

The image of Allende surrounded by "hotheads" is illusory. The UP and the Communist and Socialist parties in particular resisted the growth of organs of workers and people's power. This was denounced by their own rank-and-file militants in the cordones [organs of workers management in local industrial concentrations]. Altamirano's verbal leftism was only an old tactic of his for keeping the powerful Socialist left wing behind his conciliatory leadership.

Following its ultraleft "binge" in 1970, the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left] tried to make an opportunist-type readjustment, by bending to Allende and the SP. Here is what one of the main leaders of the MIR said at the end of 1972: "In building a new state and a new society, the armed forces can in fact play a major role by protecting the workers and the country's

security." (*Punto Final*, November 7, 1972.)

The tragedy was that the working class was unable to go forward consciously toward establishing dual power and building up a mass campaign directed at the ranks of the army, in order to win at least part of it over and keep the putschist officers from making the decision for the uniformed services as a whole. The working class could not do this because there was no party that could bring together their vanguard, which was the only means by which the strength of the various revolutionary-left nuclei could have been made effective. The advances and retreats of the workers, without leadership but



PETKOFF: Rediscovered the theory of two-stage revolution.

impelled by their class instinct to seize the factories and form the cordones industriales, helped create a situation where the capitalist reaction could take advantage of the desperation of the petty bourgeoisie.

There was a lack of firmness in the face of the economic and institutional power of the bourgeoisie, which created economic chaos while Allende pacified the workers. There was no leadership recognized by the masses able to understand that it was faced with a revolution that, despite its democratic and anti-imperialist character at the outset, must advance toward a workers and peasants government or else end in defeat.

What Teodoro overlooked was not unimportant. But he was obliged to

skip over some things in order to justify the "turn" he proposes for Venezuela.

Petkoff's "conclusions," taken together with recent statements by Pompeyo Márquez and José Vicente [Rangel], constitute a revision of the fundamental principles of a revolutionary line.

In the first place, they reject the necessary role of the proletariat, whose "virtues" are not heaven-sent and do not emanate from the pages of *Capital* but stem from the position that the proletariat occupies in the process of production. In place of the proletariat, they substitute the activity of a multi-class "revolutionary organization." As Petkoff acknowledges, "Hence we must reformulate the old Marxist category of the dictatorship of the proletariat, envisaging a class lineup characterized by the dominance of a new social bloc." He argues that this is made necessary by the fact that the workers are in a minority. Thus he covers up the fact that in Russia in 1917 they were an even smaller minority than in Venezuela today.

Moreover, the dictatorship of the proletariat (which at the same time means socialist democracy for the workers and people, for all those formerly oppressed) becomes necessary because the workers are the only class that can lead a struggle to abolish classes and the state, because they do not defend privileged interests, nor, as a class, can they acquire any.

In the second place, this approach cuts our struggle off from the world revolution, proposing as the only guarantee of the development of socialism in Venezuela "the kind of management of strategic areas of our economy that can provide a solid foundation for building socialism." This is the "theory" of *socialism in one country* raising its head again, and here Trotsky's remarks retain their validity: "Building socialism is inconceivable except on the basis of the class struggle on a national and international scale." This results from the fact that one of the roots of the crisis of capitalism lies in the forces of production breaking out of their national boundaries. Because of this, said Comrade Lenin, "the socialist revolution begins on the national level, expands into the international arena, and is completed in the world arena."

Of course, conceiving of revolutions

as "national phenomena" (in the style of Pompeyo Márquez) brings back the "stages" that Compañero Teodoro used to abhor, and so he says: "We see the rhythm of building socialism as falling into two sharply distinct stages. . . ." Presumably, during one of them it is all right to collaborate with progressive or critical bourgeois elements, or with influential intermediaries, as José Vicente [Rangel] said in *Pro Venezuela!*

In his day, Teodoro rose up to be the spokesman of the leftist cur-

rents that were in ferment both inside and outside Jesús Faría's [Venezuelan Communist] party, taking positions that drew a clear line between him and the old reformism. Now, Teodoro would appear to be redrawing the lines of demarcation, although heading in the opposite direction from the one he followed four years ago. This is not the first time in the past few months that he has done so. Nor has he been alone in this course. It may also be that the sectarianism guiding part of the MAS's activity

is a "defensive" reflex action to conceal the fact that it is carrying out a sharp political turn. In any case, we socialists must keep our eyes open to see what else Teodoro has to say to us and what kind of a MAS will be left after Teodoro's redefinitions.

We end this article in the same vein as we began it. We are taking a stand in this discussion because we are in favor of unity in action, serious debate, and building an authoritative revolutionary leadership of the workers and popular masses. □

## Interview With East German Oppositionist

# Wolf Biermann—Poet, Balladeer, Political Activist

[The following interview with the East German dissident poet and balladeer Wolf Biermann was published in the October 22 issue of the West German weekly magazine *Der Spiegel*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

*Question. Mr. Biermann, your new recording "Don't Wait Around for Better Times" has just been released by CBS, the largest record company in capitalist America; and other Biermann albums are supposed to be in the works. As a communist songwriter and enemy of monopoly capital, how could you bring yourself to do this?*

*Answer. It was so difficult that I've had all my previous recordings put out by Wagenbach, although it's a capitalist company too, or let's say, a left capitalist one.*

*Q. What do you expect to gain from your CBS contract?*

*A. It's become evident that I can't reach the record-buying public through the kind of distribution setup a book publisher like Wagenbach has.*

*Q. So, you just want a bigger run for your records?*

*A. I want to reach out to strata on different social and cultural levels with my songs; they convey my ideas.*

Songs are a more democratic art form than poetry. And records are a more popular medium than books. A young worker would much rather go into a record shop than a bookstore.

*Q. Why didn't you go back to that record company in the Federal Republic again—Philips, the one that produced one of your first LP's?*

*A. My relations with Philips have been poor for quite some time. They refused to do one of my songs—a song about Vietnam—which I considered essential.*

*Q. Censorship?*

*A. They wanted to censor me. And if I won't allow my own comrades here to do that, then I'm certainly not going to let them do it in the West.*

*Q. And CBS lets you do what you want?*

*A. I wouldn't do anything for them otherwise. I decide what gets recorded and when and how.*

*Q. But Wagenbach has just voiced doubts over Radio Free Berlin whether CBS would dare release your new song about Chile.*

*A. CBS is going to release a single in the next few weeks, a solidarity record with the new song about Chile*

and my Che Guevara song. By the way, on the question of whether a capitalist monster in the Federal Republic is more appealing than one in the U. S. A., that's like asking who Brezhnev would rather kiss on the cheek, Brandt or Nixon. It would be most appealing to me if the album were produced by VEB-German records [the East German enterprise]. That would really be like fraternal embrace.

*Q. Wouldn't VEB have to obtain rights from CBS?*

*A. I've never had a contract yet in the West where all rights weren't left open for the socialist countries. Incidentally, a determining factor in my choice of CBS was also that everywhere I turn in the book publishing world, I have the same experience: The GDR bureaucrats resort to anything, including refusing permission to publish other GDR authors, to pressure German publishers not to put out my works.*

*Q. Is this pressure effective?*

*A. It works with many publishing houses.*

*Q. What does all that have to do with records?*

*A. I can't possibly go to a record company that buys up classical recordings cheaply in the GDR and uses*

them to turn a good profit in the West. Outfits like that can be blackmailed, and at my expense, too.

*Q. Is there any proof of that?*

A. Yes, in the publishing business it started in 1967 with the Rowohlt Anthology of literature from the GDR. The editor, Dr. Brenner, let herself be quite openly blackmailed into rejecting my poems after they'd already been accepted, because otherwise they wouldn't have let her use other GDR authors.

*Q. Any other examples?*

A. The *Klassenbuch* by Enzensberger last year is an even worse example.

*Q. Did he at least ask you beforehand if you would understand not being included in this otherwise quite comprehensive "Political Reader"?*

A. No way. He's smart enough to stay off thin ice like that.

*Q. You're always referred to as Biermann the Outcast. Is that really the way you are? Rejected and cut off?*

A. Ever since the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the SED [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands—Socialist Unity party of Germany, the East German CP] in the winter of 1965, when I was an open proponent of de-Stalinization, I have found that I no longer fit into the landscape. Ever since then I have not been allowed to perform publicly or to publish anything. Even my love poems were cut out of anthologies in the next editions. So far nothing has changed on this score.

*Q. But haven't you ever tried to have an informal engagement anywhere before an audience, say with help from friends?*

A. Tried, yes. Three young, highly qualified nuclear physicists, all communists, were abruptly fired from the GDR Rossendorf Atomic Center. That happened just before the decision against me was handed down, as a matter of fact. They were fired because they had rented a modest hall in a village near Dresden so that I could



BIERMANN: "Only fear" is that he'll be forced to go West.

give a performance. Anyone who tried that kind of thing again today wouldn't get off so lightly.

*Q. And what about during the World Youth Festival? A lot of people gave impromptu performances there. Why didn't you?*

A. But I *did*, in the Alexanderplatz.

*Q. And what happened?*

A. Nothing could have happened because no preparations had been made. I was not even prepared myself.

*Q. But you just happened to have your guitar with you?*

A. No, that's just it. All I had was an umbrella. It was next to last evening of the festival around 11 p. m. in front of the World Clock, where you can see what time it is in all the countries of the world that we're not allowed to visit. I was just hanging around . . .

*Q. And of course a crowd gathered that recognized you.*

A. Right. In no time there was a circle of people around me and they drew me into a conversation. They had found out somewhere about the existence of a song about Che Guevara.

that I had written especially for the festival. They wanted to hear it. I was scared shitless. I held up my umbrella, to show that I didn't have a guitar with me. But they wouldn't let me go. So with an unsteady voice and my knees shaking, I sang.

*Q. What were you afraid of?*

A. I was afraid that some graying professional youth in blue shirts who were standing duty around the Alex in a sort of well-organized ideological defense guard might provoke a fist-fight.

*Q. But nothing came of it?*

A. No. This small incident summed up in miniature what my whole situation really amounts to. It's an example of the kind of thing that gets me into trouble.

*Q. And of what protects you, too.*

A. Right. The spectacular character of my performance was my best protection.

*Q. Did you get over your fear?*

A. I'm convinced that it turned out to be the best concert I've ever given. The people appealed to me directly to give them what they needed! An elemental process with great political beauty.

*Q. So, you didn't sing just the one song?*

A. Well, first there was a discussion about why I'm not allowed to perform here and when the people will finally be able to hear me again.

*Q. They wanted you to answer that question?*

A. Yes, it was mainly the people from the West who asked it; people from the East helped answer it. They shouted out over everyone's heads: "Hey, man, he's not allowed to; what kind of a dumb question is that?"

*Q. But everybody could see what you could do.*

A. Well, I wasn't allowed to do it, but I finally took to heart something



I wrote myself: Take the liberty; otherwise you'll never get it.

*Q. You weren't molested by Biermann haters?*

A. Oh, sure. For example, an older comrade from the GDR suddenly started screeching: "This is how the counterrevolution always begins. It's always the artists, just like in Poland, Hungary, and Prague. We can't let this fellow Biermann perform here. That kind of business shakes the foundations of the whole GDR. You can already see it here on the Alex."

*Q. Did the foundations shake?*

A. There was a burst of laughter and that took the wind out of his sails. Then an elderly member of the FDJ [Freie Deutsche Jugend—Free German Youth] tried to salvage the situation. "Don't be silly," he said. "It won't shake anything; our republic isn't that weak. On the contrary, if this Biermann were to try to perform anywhere around here, nobody would listen to him." This provoked another salvo of laughter.

*Q. How about the zealots of the DKP [Deutsche Kommunistische Partei—German Communist party, the West German CP], did they laugh too?*

A. Pretty soon the discussion was almost entirely dominated by them. One young DKP comrade criticized me, saying that my song "Soldier, Soldier in Gray Uniformity" was pacifistic and devoid of class content besides.

*Q. The GDR officially sent you to sing that song to the Easter March Movement [the CP-dominated group that holds the Easter peace march in West Germany].*

A. Another sympathizer of the DKP asked me, "Comrade, don't you have anything to say about the National People's Army [the East German army]?" So I sang the song "My Son, You Ask If You Should Be a Soldier." There is a line in it that goes, "My son, some gents are arming for war against the workers states, so my advice to you is to join our army."

*Q. One of your early songs.*

A. Right. My comrades in the DKP also accused me of having these songs published by the class enemy. I answered that I felt it was a real shame that these songs were put out in the West. But unfortunately I'm not the one who should be ashamed. I can only choose between the alternatives that I have, and not the ones I would like to have.

*Q. How long did all of this go on?*

A. Probably close to two and a half hours. At the end everyone called for an encore of the Che Guevara song. I sang it again, this time without any fear or trembling and with a powerful voice. At that point I realized that it was actually an advantage not to have a guitar, because that would have distorted the political character of the situation and given it a phoney concert-hall atmosphere.

*Q. That was your first appearance . . .*

A. . . . in eight years.

*Q. So, it had the effect of a political demonstration.*

A. It was an occasion where the songs played the kind of role for which they were intended.

*Q. Have you ever promised anyone here that you would make some compromises if the ban against you were lifted?*

A. Right after the Eleventh Plenum eight years ago I had a conversation along those lines with Bruno Haid, an old Communist who was later deputy minister of culture. Right after that I put together a manuscript with selections that were certain to be within limits acceptable to my comrades in the government.

*Q. And just what are these limits?*

A. Well, there was the ballad of the drainpipe layer Fredi Rohsmeisl, which was sometimes permitted and sometimes banned. . . . I left that one out.

*Q. It didn't do any good?*

A. Of course not. You just have to understand that our society hasn't yet

had the practice in governing and that its methods of rule aren't as flexible as in bourgeois societies. Here you don't have the same broad spectrum of half-way measures that bourgeois society can draw upon, by which it can let people run around shouting anything they want and ignore them at the same time.

*Q. You're supposed to have once sent one of your songs directly to Walter Ulbricht.*

A. It was one against the war in Vietnam. I recorded it on tape myself and sent it to him, but that didn't do any good either.

*Q. Is that the usual way of doing things? This time you've sent your Che Guevara song to Erich Honecker.*

A. I don't know if it's customary. This last time I sent my appeal to the Youth Festival song committee. The copy I sent to Honecker was only for his information so they couldn't just shove it aside.

*Q. Is it conceivable that the decision to allow Biermann to appear sometime in the near future could be deliberately made by any lower authority?*

A. They won't make any formal decision, but they might let a change take place in fact. And I wouldn't be at all opposed to it, if that's how they wanted to ease me back inconspicuously into the so-called cultural life of the GDR.

*Q. Have the chances of that happening gotten better now?*

A. On the one hand, the conditions for it have improved. On the other, I have to look at my prospects in the light of the overall political process, since this is a political case. It is conditioned, after all, by the relaxation of tensions between West and East, which, in my opinion, is likely to mean a step-up in domestic tensions in both East and West respectively.

*Q. Do you mean that your chances have gotten worse?*

A. Not necessarily. Perhaps the tensions will increase in a favorable way, in a way that's positive for society.

If things move in that direction—which I would call a revolutionary one—then that will bring about conditions in which I will be allowed to sing. Of course, I can very well envision relapses into the darkest periods of our past. I have a very good memory, one that they worked hard on.

*Q. Does this mean that you're concerned about your personal safety?*

A. My personal safety is a very, very variable factor. When the masses begin to move, as we say over here, the so-called prominent ringleaders receive the honor of being singled out for punishment and made into examples.

*Q. Even if that goes against the rule of not making martyrs?*

A. That depends on the political overhead. Incidentally, regarding my personal safety, my case is dangerously deceptive, from a political point of view. People who don't understand things could draw the conclusion that anyone here in our country can shoot off his mouth just like Biermann and still be well-fed and live in a heated apartment and even talk about it with people from *Spiegel*.

*Q. Just what are your differences with the higher-ups in the party today?*

A. These differences have nothing to do with me as a person. They revolve around the heated discussion over the future of socialism. They represent differences inside the communist movement, especially within the countries calling themselves socialist. Class antagonisms, class struggles, are what are being fought out, not only with arguments and slanders . . .

*Q. . . . but with tanks as well, as we saw in Prague.*

A. Yes. In any case it's not the stubbornness of one conceited poet that's causing problems. The problem is that it is not enough for me just to stand on our side, the progressive side, in a posture of classical opposition to the old capitalist order. We arrived long ago at the stage where on the basis of socialist property relations the contradictions between progress and reaction in the society have

ripened.

*Q. So that in order to sing about them a lone singer needs the capitalist market.*

A. I'm not one of those solitary poets who sits in an easy chair chewing on his nails and contemplating the world. The truth of the matter is that I am one of the least isolated persons in the GDR. That is precisely the logical and paradoxical consequence of the ban they placed on me.

*Q. Can anyone visit you who wants to?*

A. Yes, and I can move about freely in the GDR. Traveling outside the country is a bit difficult.

*Q. You were in Hamburg recently.*

A. I was there to visit my grandmother, who is close to death.

*Q. And about whom you've composed two songs.*

A. Two ballads.

*Q. But you wouldn't have granted an interview like this in Hamburg?*

A. No, anything I have to say, I say from here. It would also have violated my comradely word of honor. It was a private visit.

*Q. What advantage do you see in remaining in your living room recording songs and writing poetry that will be published only in the West?*

A. That's a very one-dimensional way of posing the question. My principal audience lives in the GDR. I believe my songs and poems are circulated here more intensively through manuscripts and tape recordings than they are in the West. Of course, I don't get any money for that.

*Q. What do you live on?*

A. On the royalties that I get as composer and author from the performance of my songs in many western countries. According to an international agreement these royalties are channeled through the Association for the Protection of Producers' Rights in the GDR, of which I'm a member.

*Q. And what kind of exchange rate do you get, one to one?*

A. Yes, and I get part of it in the form of so-called coupons which I have to spend in the Intershop.

*Q. You're one of the privileged few.*

A. The same songs that would get any young person here into big trouble, which would get them arrested, to put it bluntly, if they tried to reproduce and circulate them—those same songs are what enable me to go into an Intershop and buy a bottle of Cognac for 14 or 15 marks that would cost any other GDR citizen up to 80 marks in a store.

*Q. Formally speaking, you're supposed to go through the procedure of obtaining permission from the GDR for everything you release in the West. How does that work?*

A. I haven't discussed that topic with the people who issue the permits in ages.

*Q. In other words you have the greatest possible latitude regarding what you put out in the West.*

A. I get only as much liberty as I take.

*Q. Speaking of liberty, don't you think the historic step forward—as you call it—taken by the GDR is wiped out by the fact that this was done at the expense of all the freedoms that were won in the French Revolution and in the German Revolution of 1848?*

A. No. It's true that we don't enjoy the gains made by those bourgeois revolutions. But, then, that isn't what I'm politically concerned about, either. You see, I'm against this thing that Westerners call liberalization in the East. It's a political side-effect of the better and better business deals between the East and the West.

*Q. Would you say that liberalization is a purely economic phenomenon?*

A. No, I wouldn't put it that way, but I think that modern Stalinism, computerized Stalinism—where you get a hole punched in a card instead

of one shot in the back of your neck —has liberalization as its political philosophy.

*Q. But isn't it true that the very socialist bureaucracy that you satirize is resisting liberalization with all its might?*

A. Actually only in the most superficial way. As I see it, even people like Sakharov and Brezhnev differ only in that they have different conceptions on how far the liberalization should go and how fast—which can be dangerous for Sakharov, these days, of course.

*Q. Do you see any better alternative?*

A. In my opinion the correct, the progressive, the revolutionary alternative would be what we express by the slogan of socialist democracy. The progress of socialist democracy in the socialist countries will be decisive in determining the chances for anti-imperialist, anticapitalist developments in the West.

*Q. The kind of socialism you describe sounds more like Dubcek socialism than anything else. Do you see any similarity between it and the present-day reality in the GDR?*

A. The so-called Dubcek disease exists as a revolutionary tendency in all the socialist countries, and therefore in the GDR, too. In this sense the invasion of Czechoslovakia was counterrevolutionary in the most basic, direct sense of the word.

*Q. Have you really never—not even because of that—considered returning to the West, as a communist protest singer?*

A. My whole sensibility and way of thinking is highly specialized and geared to this phase of the revolution, after the first big step has been taken. I mean I've spent the greater part of my conscious life in this society where the first important, and yet insufficient, step has been taken.

*Q. OK. That may be true for yourself. But what about the others who leave the country, wall or no wall?*

A. That's the question I sing about

in my new album in the song about Flori Have,\* who I'm sorry to say fled to the West. Is it justified to skip out? Naturally, many people consider it. After all, you can be a communist anywhere—here in these bureaucratic confines or in the bourgeois amphitheater. Anyway, I couldn't go to the West without serving as living proof that life in the GDR is unbearable.

*Q. Rudi Dutschke is a native of the GDR, like you.*

A. He was a frustrated Christian

\*The son of the East Berlin dissident Professor Robert Havemann.

over here. Those evil communists prevented him from having a proper relationship with the good lord, so he left. It was under the influence of bourgeois society and its barbarous conditions that he became a socialist. That's precisely why he was able to survive the transition from East to West without splitting his personality.

*Q. Then it must be quite a disturbing thought for you that someday they may present you forcibly with the freedom to go to the West.*

A. That's my only fear. It'd be all over for me. I think I would stop writing altogether. □

## DOCUMENTS

### Ivan Dzyuba's 'Recantation'

[On November 14 the official Soviet news agency, TASS, reported that Ivan Dzyuba, a leading Ukrainian oppositionist, had recanted his views. (See *Intercontinental Press*, December 3, p. 1406.) Dzyuba is best known for his book *Internationalism or Russification?*, a critique of the bureaucracy's nationalities policy. He was arrested in April 1972, held incommunicado for eleven months, then tried behind closed doors and sentenced to five years in prison and five years in exile. The TASS release said that because of his recantation, Dzyuba had been "pardoned."

[Dzyuba's recantation appeared in the November 9 issue of *Literaturna Ukraina*, an organ of the Ukrainian Writers Union, from which Dzyuba was expelled in March 1972.

[Dzyuba's change in views may have something to do with his health (he suffers from cirrhosis of the liver and tuberculosis) and the Kremlin's history of denying adequate medical care to political oppositionists serving time in the Kremlin's prisons.

[For the information of our readers we reprint below the text of Dzyuba's *Literaturna Ukraina* article. The translation from the Ukrainian is by Marilyn Vogt.]

To the Editorial Board of the Newspaper *Literaturna Ukraina*. A Statement.

In April 1972 I was arrested on the charge of conducting anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation and in March 1973 I was sentenced by the Kiev Oblast Court to five years deprivation of freedom.

Since then I have given much thought to where I am and how I got there. Now I clearly understand that over the course of several years, in taking an unhealthy interest in isolated defects or approaching complex phenomena from a one-sided point of view, I have shown an incorrect understanding of the contemporary state of relations among the nationalities in the Soviet Union and have viewed the national situation of Soviet Ukraine in the blackest of colors. I even made public attacks on the nationalities policy of the Communist party. All this culminated in the book *Internationalism or Russification?*, which I wrote in 1965. It set forth serious misconceptions about a number of national problems and about the international nature of our socialist society, dealing with them in a perverse manner. The book was in essence an attack on the nationalities policy of the party.



I disseminated this work along with a number of other documents, some of which were anti-Soviet, among my acquaintances; I admitted this at the investigation preceding the trial, since I had come to understand the harmfulness of these actions.

Even as I was under investigation, I had the opportunity to become acquainted with materials that allowed me to see the extent to which the above-mentioned work was being used in the ideological battle against our Soviet country. I realized that I had brought harm to the ideological interests of my society. This realization was painful to me because our socialist country is dear to me. That is why I have made a decision that capsulizes my inner development over the past few years: to unequivocally condemn my mistakes and to dissociate myself once and for all from the errors of my past. I was not thinking of the severity of my punishment, but of much more—a choice affecting my entire life: whether to reconcile myself to being labeled an enemy of my own socialist society and of my own Soviet people, and thereby sacrifice myself, my past, and my future to their enemies; or to preclude that possibility by actively affirming my right to be called a Soviet citizen by making up for, if only partially, the damages I have inflicted.

Therefore, I began a work that I see as an extensive critical analysis of *Internationalism or Russification?* while I was still under investigation. Upon my request, it was made possible for me to obtain the necessary literature from home as well as individual publications from scientific libraries. At the moment, I am continuing my work on this book.

In it, I want to convincingly lay bare the unsound and erroneous character of a number of fundamental propositions of that previous work and at the same time set forth my present views on these questions in highly principled opposition to the ideology of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. I doubt that my new work will appeal to Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists abroad. I can assure them that I shall no longer give them cause for joy and shall attempt to deprive them of any possibility of profiting from my past mistakes. The enemies of Soviet Ukraine, the class enemies

of the Soviet people, are my ideological and political enemies and will be treated accordingly.

The Ivan Dzyuba who let himself become the talk of the town and who wasted years of his life straddling the political fence is no more and will not again exist. In his place is a person pained by a knowledge of unpleasant mistakes and wasted time, who wants and thinks of one thing only: to work incessantly so as to make up for lost time and to bury his errors.

All that has happened has led me to conclude that we cannot forget that we live in a world of intense ideological and political class warfare in which there is no "neutral territory" where one can be "partly" for the Soviet government and the policies of the Communist party and "partly" against them. The inexorability of reality will sooner or later force a definitive choice.

We must understand that being a real citizen and patriot today is synonymous with being a resolute Soviet person, a patriot of socialist society and of the Soviet Union—an internationalist. Contemporary historical reality dictates that the only way to

work for the good of the Ukrainian people is to devote one's talent and efforts to Soviet Ukraine, to our common Soviet Homeland, to the task of communist construction. Speaking from these convictions, I appealed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for a pardon. I am thankful that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet had confidence in me: I shall try to make good this trust by the rest of my life and work.

I want to say the following in conclusion. All that I underwent in connection with my arrest and trial was for me a great civil and personal tragedy. However, it did benefit me insofar as it became an extraordinary if painful catalyst for those processes of reexamination and reinterpretation of my views and positions which had begun earlier but, unfortunately, very belatedly.

As regards my plans for the very near future, I can say the following: I want to realize an old intention by working for a long period of time in an industrial enterprise so as to breathe the air of the workers collective and to enter into its life.

I. Dzyuba  
November 6, 1973

## CORRESPONDENCE

### More on Chile Solidarity March in London

Editor:

With reference to the report published in your issue of November 19 on the Chile demonstration held in London on November 4, it is necessary to make a few additions. Without them, the intervention of the International Marxist Group (British section of the Fourth International) could possibly be misunderstood. They are as follows:

1. While we supported the slogans mentioned by Holms in his report, nonetheless our main intervention was based on the following chants or slogans: "Armed Road, Only Road," "One Solution, Revolution!" This was in clear contradistinction to the slogans of the Communist party, which in effect supported the strategic line of the Popular Unity. Furthermore our slogans, related to our concept of intervening to create a revolutionary pole of attraction, were taken up by a number of militants not organised in our contingent.

2. The main political points in my speech, which Holms omits to mention, were:

(a) To point out that the Chilean army had not been neutral and it had been a dangerous illusion to imagine that it was so. Similarly that the British, French, and Italian armies were *not* neutral, but constituted an essential part of the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie.

(b) To quote from Fidel's speech to the effect that if every worker and peasant had been armed, the coup would not have succeeded.

(c) To criticise "certain left groups" (International Socialists and Socialist Labour League) for not participating.

It is necessary to reiterate these points to illustrate that participation in united actions with the CP does *not* mean the obscuring of *our* politics, as the IS and the SLL claimed in order to justify their sectarian refusal to participate in the mobilisation. Their participation would have enormously strengthened the impact of the revolutionary movement on the demonstration as a whole.

Fraternally,  
Tariq Ali  
Tokyo, Japan, Nov. 22, 1973