

Intercontinental Press

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Asia

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Baluchistan-New Bangladesh?

Papadopoulos Overthrown:

***New U.S. Puppets
Try to Close
Floodgates in Greece***



**Reporter's Eyewitness Account
of Body Count in Chile's Streets**

20,000 'Naxalites' in Indian Prisons

Amnesty International, the London-based group that investigates treatment of political prisoners around the world, is compiling a report on the Naxalite (Maoist) prisoners being held in India, reported the November 9 English-language Japanese *Asahi Evening News*. The report indicated that more than 20,000 Naxalites are in prison in the states of West Bengal, Bihar, Andra Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. Some 7,000 are being held under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act in West Bengal alone. In addition, "thousands more have been accused of various crimes and sentenced, or acquitted only to be re-arrested on other charges and detained once more."

Most of the Naxalites were arrested more than three years ago and many have been held without trial since then. Reports of ill treatment in prison are frequent.

A letter smuggled out of a prison in Bihar charged: "We have been in jail without trial for three years. From the start our detention was illegal by Indian law, because we were interned without ever being presented in court, despite the law that accused persons must be produced in court every 15 days."

Male Naxalite prisoners, the letter continued, have spent two years "in iron bar fetters for 24 hours a day—one iron ring on each ankle each attached to a 20-inch iron bar and the two bars connected to another bar extending to the waist. The prisoners cannot sit, bathe, sleep or eat in a normal way—not to speak of physical exercise." □

No Escape

A Polish-U.S. scientific group has bad news for anyone hoping to escape the perils of modern life in some remote setting. According to a United Press International dispatch, the researchers found visible deposits of pollutants in ice on Himalayan peaks. "You could see the precipitate was thick and dark," the group's leader said, "particularly in those samples of ice which have accumulated in the last 25 years."

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'Obscure General' Ousts Papadopoulos in Athens Coup

By Gerry Foley

"The Nixon administration had considerable forewarning of the coup d'etat that replaced George Papadopoulos with Lieut. Gen. Phaidon Gizikis," David Binder wrote in the November 26 *New York Times*.

"'We were not surprised,' said an official who has closely followed the military dictatorship since it took over the civilian government in April 1967."

The official said that there had been rumors of an impending coup since the summer, when the ousted head of the junta began trying to win a political base for the regime by making democratic and economic concessions. Important sections of the officer corps were known to be opposed to a return to civilian rule.

"The military men were afraid Papadopoulos would blow it," the unnamed official said, "and that is why they moved against him."

The new junta seemed even more closely identified with Washington than the toppled military dictator, who aroused Nixon's displeasure by refusing to let Greek bases be used in U. S. logistical support of Israel during the October War.

"The new leaders appointed as Premier Adamandios Androutsopoulos, an American-trained lawyer who is said to have close American connections," *New York Times* correspondent Alvin Shuster cabled from Athens November 25, the day of the coup.

As for the new president, General Gizikis, he is still a question mark. An obscure career officer, he reportedly has had strong ties with the king but did not go along with the abortive royalist rebellion that was crushed on May 22, 1973.

The reported strong man behind the junta, General Dimitrios Ioannidis, is the head of the military police, a branch of the armed services in which U. S. "technical aid" agencies, such as the CIA, usually take the most direct interest. He avoided becoming involved in the political maneuvers of the Papadopoulos regime, preferring

to maintain close contacts with the lower officers.

On the day of the coup, according to a November 25 report from Peter S. Mellas, *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent in Athens, Ioannidis explained that he had taken the initiative in removing Papadopoulos in order to forestall a coup by the younger officers. In the 1967 putsch, in fact, the colonels stole a march on the generals, who were also plotting a takeover.

Mellas noted the colorlessness of the new junta:

"The new Cabinet includes only two former politicians, Kostas Rallis and Tryfon Triantafylakos, neither particularly prominent. It also includes several former generals."

The *Monitor* correspondent stressed the political indeterminateness of the regime:

"The impression is that relatively younger politicians who command special respect and popularity chose not to participate until they have a more clear indication as to the specific direction of the new regime.

"Brigadier General Ioannidis has been trying to convince worthwhile politicians to participate in the Androutsopoulos government without specifically outlining his intentions."

General Ioannidis has been particularly ambiguous on the question of restoring parliamentary rule:

"Although he [Ioannidis] has been reassuring them [the politicians] that he is basically interested in rescuing the Army from the predicament into which Mr. Papadopoulos has led it and in paving the way for a true democracy, some skepticism remains since General Ioannidis' Army Police does not have a record of either liberal thinking or democratic philosophy."

In the first declaration, the new junta indicated that it was canceling the plans for elections in 1974 and intended to take the country back to the "good old days" of iron-fisted dictatorship:

"The nation was returning toward

the same forms and the same habits that made the armed forces revolt in 1967," the statement said. "The aim was to deflect the armed forces from their national mission and use them for an electoral travesty in order to humiliate our people."

This statement also is ambiguous. Since elections under the aegis of the Papadopoulos junta seemed to have been rejected by the major political forces in the country, the formulas of the ousted government no longer offered any possibility for achieving a stable bourgeois political solution. Notably, in his first speech, General Gizikis did not mention the elections or the "old politicians" but put all his stress on "national unity."

As an officer with good connections in royalist circles and a record of loyalty to the junta, General Gizikis would seem eminently qualified to serve as a bridge between the traditional conservatives and the CIA-trained "modern" rightists backing the military dictatorship. Thus, his appointment could pave the way for the kind of right-wing parliamentary solution that has been talked about for some time.

Such a course was anticipated by the statement November 21 of six former ministers of the Center Union, the liberal bourgeois party that was supported by the Stalinists in the period leading up to the April 1967 coup. The six—Stalios Allamanis, Emmanuel Kathris, Constantine Mitsotakis, George Bakatselos, Charilaos Rentis, and Kostas Stefanakis—called for a government of national union under Constantine Karamanlis, the conservative strong man who presided over the transition from the counter-revolutionary dictatorship of the civil war to the limited parliamentarianism of the 1960s.

Only Karamanlis, the six liberals said, "could achieve the necessary fraternal relationship between the people and the armed forces, which also constitute an essential part of the nation."

The U.S. radio network CBS reported November 25 that the ex-premier was flying back to Greece.

Obviously frightened by the power and momentum of the student-worker revolt November 13-17, the military probably feels that it has to try to chasten the restive population before going ahead with any more political experiments. Because of the strategic importance of Greece, it is also likely that Washington is determined to see that a firm grip is kept on developments.

But in the present situation repression and threats of going back to the old dictatorial forms of rule are extremely dangerous for the conservative forces in Greece.

The voice of one of the most farsighted sections of American imperialism, the *New York Times*, was quick to issue a warning in an editorial November 26:

"It has been noted that Lieut. Gen. Phaidon Gizikis, the new President, has been a strong supporter of the North Atlantic Treaty alliance and that Adamandios Androutsopoulos, the Premier-designate, is an old friend of the United States, where he practiced law for 12 years. Neither the United States nor NATO, however, could take comfort in any government change in Athens that signaled another retreat from democratic values and which might provoke serious new disturbances inside Greece."

In particular, the *New York Times* seemed impressed by the breadth of the upsurge in Greece: "What began as student protests erupted into an anti-Government explosion encompassing such usually disparate elements of Greek society as trade unionists, businessmen, professionals and artists."

The November crisis has shown that a whole spectrum of forces in Greek society are convinced that the military regime cannot continue. But the driving force in the November 13-17 revolt, whose power has evidently sharpened the tensions in ruling circles, was the workers and students.

Even under renewed censorship the Greek press made clear that the student revolt had spread to key sections of the working class. Of the 866 persons arrested in the clashes, according to the November 20 issue of the Athens daily *Apogevmatini*, 475 were workers. Some 49 were students of the Polytechnic Institute, where the rebel-

lion centered; 268 were students from other universities, and 75 were high-school students.

According to the November 24 issue of the Amsterdam weekly *Vrij Nederland*, the revolt spread throughout the Greek capital:

"Since they concentrated all their attention on the Polytechnic, the foreign correspondents could not see what was happening in the other neighborhoods of the sprawling city (Athens has a population of 3,000,000). So, from the outside, it appeared that there were only 50,000 demonstrators. But on the basis of reliable information we have been able to obtain, it can be said with confidence that the entire city went onto the streets.

"Fifty thousand demonstrators could not have marched in one place and at the same time barricaded all the streets kilometers away from the Polytechnic, or turned over hundreds of buses to block the streets over which the tanks would have to come to reach the downtown area. . . .

"Moreover, the strikes that began occurring on Wednesday of the previous week, shutting down a dozen factories, all theaters and movie houses, as well as public transport, were not simply protests but political actions of enormous importance that unfortunately did not get sufficient attention in the press."

Also, the military was not united in the face of the revolt. The *Vrij Nederland* reporter noted "the insubordination of some military governors, like those in Epirus and Arkadia, who were unwilling to declare martial law in their areas."

In the November 25 issue of the Rome weekly *Espresso*, Mino Monicelli stressed the youth and determination of the most militant sections of demonstrators:

"To judge from the attack on the city hall, it was the very young who were in the forefront. Among the eleven persons killed, two were boys of 16 and one was a girl of 17. They were respectively 10 and 11 when the 'gorillas' carried out their putsch in 1967. And now they are dead and we can't ask them what they wanted. The 'gorilla' regime was all they knew, and they died to throw it out. . . .

"On Friday night [November 16] I saw these boys and girls face mon-

strous M-48 and M-113 tanks without flinching. I was on the balcony of a house in Patissia Street; a woman near me was on her knees praying that no blood would be shed. For two nights I saw them hanging on to the gates of the Polytechnic in the glare of spotlights, not more than six yards from the soldiers in the tanks who were loading heavy-caliber bullets into the machine guns of three enormous M-113s. From inside the building a megaphone encouraged the students: 'Don't be afraid. More than 1,500 demonstrators are coming to help us. The soldiers are our brothers. They will not attack.'

"The test of strength lasted a quarter of an hour. At 2:15 a.m., the tanks yielded, the barrels of their machine guns lowered. At 2:40 the soldiers tried again. They advanced with bayonets fixed. Shots could be heard, fired into the air . . . but the boys and girls held their ground. The megaphones kept blaring slogans, songs by Theodorakis, national hymns. The soldiers retreated a second time." Finally, the officers were able to rally their men for a final assault. But most of the students escaped.

"Many of the soldiers, even though their bayonets were fixed, called to us: 'Get away quick; we don't want to harm you,'" a young woman told *Le Monde's* correspondent J.-C. Guillebaud. They had no difficulty finding refuge: "Almost all the people living in the area sheltered students that night."

In view of these powerful upsurges and the danger of the balance of forces shifting in the eastern Mediterranean, the Greek military and their U.S. backers will try hard to get the lid back on. But, in a concentrated and more explosive way, the Greek crisis seems to resemble the student-worker rebellions that began in Argentina in 1969 with the protest about the food in the University of Corrientes cafeteria and led to the two Córdoba uprisings, irresistibly undermining the military dictatorship.

"I have the impression," the *Corriere della Sera* correspondent Mario Cervi wrote from Athens November 18, "that the incidents at the Polytechnic have given the organized resistance an unexpected demonstration of the fragility, or at least the vulnerability of the regime." □

Military Still Hunting Oppositionists

Eight years after the military coup by General Suharto that resulted in the massacre of more than 500,000 members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist party [PKI], the government is still carrying out repressive operations against suspected leftists and groups of Communist party members hiding out in the rural areas of Indonesia. The Japanese English-language *Mainichi Daily News* reported on November 5: "An estimated 29,000 Communists are still being sought in the central Celebes according to the local military commander, Lt. Col. M. Rusli. . . ."

"Rusli, who commands mopping-up operations in the Celebes, said 11,000 former members of the Communist Party or pro-Communist organizations were either held in custody or had been released after investigation in the central part of the island."

Henry S. Hayward, in a dispatch from Djakarta published in the August 2 *Christian Science Monitor* wrote: "Memories of August 1965 [the month of the military coup] are still extremely strong in Indonesia. . . ."

"In 1965, [Foreign Minister Adam] Malik pointed out, the Indonesian Communist Party had 2 million members here, so the strong presumption is that some still must survive covertly. He feels they would attempt to make a comeback if conditions ever seemed right."

One Western source in Djakarta told Hayward, "They are still vigilant, still deeply concerned about any Communist activity here. The police and military are absolutely ruthless on Communist suspects. There's no question of going through the legal process on that matter: Suspects are picked up and held indefinitely."

Saville R. Davis, reporting in the June 11 *Christian Science Monitor*, observed that "several tens of thousands" of political prisoners were still being held in Suharto's concentration camps. Other estimates indicate that the number might exceed 100,000.

These political prisoners are classified into three categories: The "A" pris-



SUHARTO: "Mopping up" after bloodbath takes more than eight years.

oners are accused of having taken part in the so-called Communist coup in 1965, which was used as a pretext for the massacre. The 15-20,000 "B" prisoners are held on suspicion of being members or sympathizers of the Communist party. Many of those in the "A" or "B" category have been shipped to isolated islands, such as Buru, to fend for themselves. And without any supplies of food on these barren islands, hundreds have died of starvation. The prisoners in the "C" category were not even considered

Communist "suspects." Davis reported that most of these have been released over the past few years.

In the context of the current economic difficulties, including a shortage of rice, Suharto has good reason to fear renewed political activity. A full-blown resurgence of struggles against the military regime by the Communist party does not seem too likely in the near future, but spontaneous actions by workers, students, and other sectors of the population are quite possible.

As Hayward noted in his Djakarta dispatch, "even to a casual visitor it is apparent that the classic conditions for the growth of communism still exist here—poverty, lack of opportunity and upward mobility for the masses, overpopulation and overcrowding, unemployment, tolerance for official corruption, and inadequate education facilities." The continued witch-hunt against the Communist party is thus also designed to intimidate the entire population.

Not only does Suharto feel threatened at home, but the insurgency in neighboring Malaysia has prompted him to send Indonesian security forces there to help crush the uprising. The October 8 *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported that about 1,200 armed guerrillas and another 20,000 active sympathizers were operating in Sarawak, which borders on Indonesian Borneo, or Kalimantan. Clearly the fear of a linkup between the North Kalimantan Communist party, which is leading the guerrilla activities in Sarawak, and the beleaguered Indonesian Communist party is another factor contributing to Suharto's continued use of naked force. □

Maneuvers to Control the Key Outlets

Imperialist Oil Strategy in the Arab East

[The following article appeared in the November 16 issue of *La Gauche*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Revolutionnaire des Travailleurs (Revolutionary Workers League), Belgian section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental*

Press.]

* * *

Oil blackmail. Petroleum warfare. In the Western press there is no lack of "indignant declarations" characteriz-

ing the current crisis. The secretary general of NATO even stated that he considered the cutoff of oil supplies from the Arab states as the equivalent of a declaration of war. And that could justify armed intervention. Moreover, it is known that elite American troops recently have been training in desert warfare.

In truth, for capitalist industry the stakes are high. While Arab oil currently accounts for only about 6-8 percent of American oil imports, the upper limits of U.S. production are such that in spite of the exploitation of the Alaskan deposits, coming years will see a big increase in imports of Arab oil (to as much as 40 percent of total oil imports by 1980).

As for Europe, it gets about 65 percent of its oil from the Middle East, and even if it seeks to broaden its sources (the North Sea, Nigeria, etc.), it will be impossible for it to get by without the petroleum of the Arab-Persian Gulf.

In fact, while production from Arab countries now accounts for about 30 percent of world oil production, the same countries hold nearly 60 percent of total world reserves. So the stakes, which are already high today, will rise still higher during the next ten or twenty years.

But to really understand imperialism's "oil strategy," we have to look at the various stages of production, transport, and marketing (refining, distribution).

Until 1970 some 90 percent of Middle East oil production was controlled by seven giant companies. They are called the seven sisters and they account for about 60 percent of total world oil production. Of the seven, five are American: Standard Oil of California, Exxon, Texaco, Mobil, Gulf; one is British: British Petroleum; and one is Anglo-Dutch: Royal Dutch Shell.

Since 1970, there have been some nationalizations, by Libya and Iraq among others, and it is planned that the Arab states will control 51 percent of production within a few years.

The consequences of this measure can be minimal if the governments in Europe and the United States can make sure of the maintenance of "loyal" regimes. That is the basis of American imperialism's whole Middle

East policy, which is aimed at securing leadership for Saudi Arabia. The Anglo-French-Israeli attack of 1956 and the Israeli attack of 1967 were aimed at isolating Egypt and depriving it of the preponderant role it was playing under Nasser's management, and at dealing a death blow to the progressive nationalist regime in Syria.

It can be stated that this policy has been fully successful. The rightward turn of the Arab world under the leadership of Saudi Arabia's King Faisal is implacably under way.



FAISAL: Saudi king slated by U.S. imperialism to be "reasonable" Arab leader.

That it continue is the second requirement of European and American policy. While the social and political evolution now under way in the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen [South Yemen], in Dhofar, and in Muscat and Oman does not represent an immediate threat to the outlets for Arab oil, American imperialism nevertheless understands that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. The strategy? First, launch armed attacks against South Yemen and support the Sultan of Muscat, Faisal's army and some Libyan experts doing their bit. And then, control the strategic points.

There are four main oil outlets in the region:

1. The Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz that command the gulf.

Surveillance of the gulf and the straits has been assigned to the Iranian regime, which in 1972 occupied several islands at the mouth of the gulf. American bases maintained in the region help to fulfil this mission.

2. The mouth of the Red Sea. The "security" of the entrance to the Red Sea is guaranteed by the Ethiopian government, an important pawn of imperialism in East Africa. The United States maintains, among others, a military base in Kagnew, Ethiopia. Further, the Israeli army is installed on certain islands off the coast of North Yemen. Because of the importance of access to the Red Sea, Egyptian troops recently took control of the Bab el-Mandeb straits at the extreme southern end of the Red Sea.

3. The far north of the Red Sea. One part of this outlet, the Suez Canal, is blocked, which strongly hinders the European oil companies, which must sail their oil around Africa. But it also hampers movement of the Soviet fleet between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. So we can see who is interested in reopening the Suez Canal to navigation.

The other outlet in the northern end of the Red Sea is the Elat-Ashkelon pipeline on Israeli territory. Its capacity is scheduled to be doubled. It transports not only Iranian oil, but also petroleum products originating in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the closing of the pipeline because of the blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb cannot have great consequences for the supply of oil to Israel. The Egyptian oil wells in the Sinai now being operated by the Israeli occupiers produce almost all the oil used by the Zionist state. Only a very small part of Israel's oil needs are supplied through the port of Elat. Hence, nearly all the oil arriving in Elat is piped through to Ashkelon and loaded on tankers for Europe.

4. Finally, part of Saudi Arabian and Iraqi production is transported through pipelines leading to Lebanese and Syrian ports. The recent war partially cut off this necessary supply source for the Europeans (deliveries of Saudi Arabian oil through the pipeline were reduced by half; the terminal at the Syrian port of Tartus was destroyed). But aside from the cur-

rent conflict, it has been crucial for U.S. imperialism to establish tighter control over this region. Definitive liquidation of the Palestinian resistance is an indispensable condition for this "pacification."

Such is the strategy of American imperialism in the Middle East. The major roles in the area are assigned to Israel and, more recently, to Iran. But the role of "reasonable leader" of the Arab world has devolved on Saudi Arabia (the same role that is played, perhaps on a more modest scale, by Ethiopia in East Africa), which has been integrated into the general picture. The strengthening of the military potential of these countries can leave no doubt about this.

And the whole structure, naturally, rests on the basic principle of peaceful coexistence between Washington and Moscow.

Because the recent Egyptian-Syrian initiative shook up certain plans, it has become urgent for Washington (and Moscow) to reestablish calm in the Middle East. The hectic voyages of Nobel War Prize winner Henry Kissinger (Moscow, Cairo, Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Amman, Peking) testify to that.

For the partial oil cutoff, while it scarcely bothers the United States (at least directly), was not greeted with great enthusiasm by Washington's European allies. Nevertheless, although small divisions may appear, the interests of the North American and European capitalists overlap sufficiently for them to agree on a common strategy.

Moreover, from the imperialist point

of view, the spectacle of the Arab states defying the authority of the world's great powers must in no way be encouraged, for it could trigger a growing mobilization of the Arab masses, despite the fact that the Arab regimes are not aiming at any such thing.

It has been noted recently—and the figures demonstrate it—that the oil companies are experiencing a profit bonanza. In Europe and the United States profits for 1972 went up by 60-80 percent in comparison with 1971. The boom of the Petrofina company during the last two or three years is one example (although the oil discoveries that company made in Angola have something to do with its growth).

Taking account of the devaluation of the dollar, and in spite of the price adjustments obtained by the oil-exporting countries, a metric ton of crude oil cost 930 francs in 1972 as against 1,040 francs in 1971. What explains the increased profits while the buying cost has declined is that distribution prices have gone up, under the pressure of the Belgian Petroleum Federation. Anything that is thought to be scarce will be expensive, so it is quite lucrative for the oil companies to start talking about an oil shortage. Furthermore, it might be recalled that in 1968 the Arab oil-producing states received \$0.70 on each barrel of oil, while the oil companies' profits and the fiscal income of the consuming states was running at about \$6.

Because European capitalism is more severely affected by the reduction in the export of Arab oil, it will

seek to exacerbate competition among the oil-producing states by turning to various countries like Iran (look at the Ibramco business, for example, or the visit of four Belgian government ministers to Iran), but it will also try to affect a "benevolent neutrality" in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This in no way involves challenging the existence of the Zionist state, but rather seeking a new status quo. No doubt Israel will have to make certain concessions—like reopening the Suez Canal, which both Europe and the Soviet Union desire—that would allow the Arab states to recoup some of their lost prestige among their own peoples by presenting the new status quo as an Arab victory. The huge diplomatic square dance that has just begun is aimed at finding just such a compromise.

The utilization of the "oil weapon" by the Arab feudal and bourgeois classes is limited to one goal: to establish an international relationship of forces more favorable to them in order to make gains internally in relation to the Arab masses. If that objective is achieved, the oil spigots will open up again. Until that happens Europe may get a little chilly, but it won't freeze.

As for the rights of the Palestinian people, a theme the Arab leaders talk about often enough, they will no doubt once again be used as bargaining chips and will be sold out. But then again, how can these rights ever be granted without the triumph of the socialist revolution in the whole Middle East, in the Arab countries and in Israel as well? □

A Part of SWP Electoral Activity

Campaigning in the United States for the Arab Side

By Dave Frankel

One week after the outbreak of the latest Arab-Israeli war, 30,000 pro-Zionist demonstrators rallied at New York's City Hall. One of their main chants was "Arab blood must flow!"

The American Jewish community, numbering about six million, was swept with chauvinist hysteria, as during the 1967 war. One advertisement

after another appeared in major newspapers. "Israel is fighting for her life," "Aggression in the Middle East," and "In support of Israel's right to security and peace" were typical headlines in these advertisements.

One, sponsored by the AFL-CIO bureaucracy under guise of "Black" opinion, compared Israeli Jews to Blacks

in the United States. "We appeal to our government," it said, "to provide Israel with whatever support it requires to defend itself in this hour of need. The irresponsible actions of the Soviet Union—which has armed, trained and is now inciting the Arab states—make such American support mandatory."

While Israel expects to raise \$1-1.2 thousand million from the sale of bonds and from private donations in the United States, it is getting twice that amount from the Nixon administration. A \$2.2-thousand million legislative bill for arms to Israel is already before Congress, and Pentagon spokesmen say the total cost of arms to Israel may well rise to almost \$3 thousand million. Others put the cost as high as \$5 thousand million.

A Racist Campaign

The Zionist hysteria, the U. S. arms airlift, and Nixon's nuclear alert were accompanied by a racist press campaign.

In its October 26 editorial the American Trotskyist weekly, *The Militant*, wrote: "News reports persist in discussing 'the myth that Arabs can't fight.' That they could have taken such a myth seriously is a small indication of the imperial arrogance of the U. S. rulers. But the difficulties of its client state in the Middle East have made the propagation of such racist poison more important than ever for the U. S.

"A recent television newscast was typical in this regard. It showed Israeli troops dancing a hora, followed by Israeli wounded at a field hospital. Finally, it turned to a Syrian hospital—where wounded Israeli prisoners were shown! Israeli wounded were portrayed as human beings—Arab casualties were converted into statistics.

"Involved here is conscious preparation for U. S. intervention in the fighting. This racist campaign aimed at the Arab peoples must be answered!"

A Changing Climate

As in 1967, the war became a major issue in the United States. It was front-page news throughout its course, and the general atmosphere in the United States was one of pro-Israeli chauvinism. However, there were also important differences from 1967.

The surprise of the war itself, along with the first Israeli setbacks, forced the news media to give more attention to what was being said by the Arabs. In those circles there really had been a myth that Arabs couldn't fight, and the performance of the Arab armies was an important factor in changing

the tone of U. S. news coverage and in cutting across much of the racist anti-Arab prejudice prevalent in the United States.

In 1967, for example, *Life* magazine declared its support for Israel in a full-page ad in the *New York Times*. The Israelis, it declared, were "patriotic, brave and skillful soldiers, brilliantly led." As for the Arabs, *Life* sternly admonished, "Was there ever a people so bellicose in politics, so reckless and raucous in hostility—and then so unpugnacious in pitched combat—as Nasser's Egyptians?"

Pete Hamill, a liberal columnist of the pro-Zionist *New York Post*, wrote in 1967 that Nasser "seems to be running for most likely politician since Mussolini to end his career hanging upside down in a gas station."

This type of racist baiting was generally much less in evidence in the current conflict. Although the coverage was still clearly pro-Israeli, considerably more space and weight were given to the Arab side.

In the population as a whole, other factors were also at work. The experience of Vietnam has instilled a healthy distrust and skepticism in the American people concerning foreign military adventures. The prolonged occupation of Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian territory by the Israelis and their constant raids into the Arab states, have also had an effect on popular consciousness in the United States.

How Blacks Saw the War

This suspicion of Israel is particularly strong in the Black communities. A poll published by the *Detroit Free Press* found that 58.8 percent of those queried in that mostly Black city were against the U. S. arms airlift to Israel. Among the comments printed in the *Free Press* were: "Didn't Vietnam teach us anything?"; "Next thing it'll be our boys"; and "The Israelis are nothing more than territorial imperialists."

In New York City, of 35 Blacks interviewed at random by *The Militant*, only two were for backing Israel. Twelve said they had no opinion, and the rest supported the Arab side. One student from Hunter College expressed a common view when he said, "The Israelis came and grabbed the Arabs' land in 1948. And they still hold it today—illegally. It's the

same thing that went down in southern Africa. Portugal, the British, and some other Europeans took over African land in South Africa, Mozambique, and the rest of that area. It's the same kind of thing, so I've got to be opposed to it."

Another of those interviewed said, "I don't think the U. S. should be involved in helping Israel at all. You see, I spent a year in the 'Nam [Vietnam] and I'd hate to see any bloods [Black youth—"brothers"] gettin' sent to fight in Israel of all places."

A third Black said, "I just don't think we should be the world's policeman."

Although anti-Zionist sentiment in the United States is still clearly a minority trend, it is a growing one, and most Americans have no desire to see the United States involved in a war on behalf of Israel. A Gallup poll published October 16 found that 25 percent of the American people had "no opinion" on the Arab-Israeli war, 22 percent favored neither side, and 6 percent favored the Arabs. "The dominant mood of the public is clearly that the United States should not get involved in the struggle in terms of sending American forces," Gallup concluded.

A later Harris poll showed that 69 percent of the population was opposed to sending U. S. troops to the Middle East "even if Israel were threatened by Russian armed force," while 46 percent thought it was right to send aid to Israel.

What the Trotskyists Did

The American Trotskyists in the Socialist Workers party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) responded to the outbreak of war immediately. On October 9, two days after the war began, a teach-in was organized by the YSA, the Iranian Student Association, and the Organization of Arab Students at the University of Texas in Austin. It drew 350 people—a rather large number for a pro-Arab meeting. The largest meeting reported in *The Militant* during the 1967 war was an SWP forum of 200 in New York.

Two days later, on October 11, a teach-in on the war was attended by 250 students at Boston University. Among the speakers was Donald Gurewitz, SWP candidate for school board in Boston.

The same day, 250 people organized by the Palestine Support Coalition at the University of Washington marched through Seattle in support of the Arab struggle. A similar demonstration in Boulder, Colorado, was covered in the *Denver Post*. Underneath a large photo of the action, the paper said: "Blacks, Indians and socialists take up the Arab cause. . . ."

A day earlier 150 students attended a teach-in at Wayne State University in Detroit, and on October 14 the Arab community there organized a demonstration of 3,000. The SWP municipal candidates in Detroit participated with a banner demanding "U.S. — Hands Off the Middle East!"

This was typical of the SWP response. In the following weeks SWP and YSA activists helped to organize and build meetings in defense of the Arab people on dozens of campuses. More than 500 students heard SWP spokesman Paul Boutelle and an Arab student debate two pro-Zionists at San Francisco State College. Meetings of around 300 were held at San Diego State College, Boston University, the University of Pennsylvania at Berkeley, the University of California at Berkeley, and Queens College in New York. SWP or YSA members spoke at all these meetings, and at many of the meetings they were successful in forcing Zionist representatives into debates, where their lies could be exposed and answered.

In some cases, the confrontation with the Zionists took other forms. On October 23 a meeting of 250 at Brooklyn College was attacked and broken up by dozens of right-wing goons from the Jewish Defense League (JDL). James Mendieta, the SWP candidate for Brooklyn District Attorney, was beaten by six club-wielding JDLers following the meeting.

This was the most serious incident of Zionist gangsterism directed at the SWP during the October War. A response was prepared immediately. A second meeting was organized and widely publicized. Sponsorship from Black, Puerto Rican, Dominican, Arab, and other students was obtained, as well as from individual supporters of civil liberties. A joint defense guard was organized with these forces, and the JDL was prevented from disrupting the meeting. The meeting drew more than 300 and

was a resounding success.

Sponsorship of meetings by Black, Puerto Rican, and Chicano groups was widespread, as was participation of their members in defense guards. Most of these groups saw Israel as a colonial state, identified with U. S. imperialism and in league with many of the same forces that oppose their struggles in the United States.

Trotskyist activists participated in other meetings, including one of 250 at Portland State University, 200 at Ann Arbor, Mich., and 200 at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale.

Smaller campus meetings were held throughout the country, in addition to forums sponsored by the SWP in its own headquarters.

Arabs Speak Out

The war provoked a strong reaction in the Arab communities. On previous occasions these communities have been intimidated by what seemed to be overwhelming pro-Zionist sentiment and by government repression against political activists, the U. S. immigration authorities being particularly vicious in this respect.

In addition to the Detroit demonstration of 3,000 already mentioned, October 14 saw rallies of 2,000 in Los Angeles, 1,000 in Boston, 700 in Brooklyn, and 300 in Chicago. All were organized by Arab community groups. Fred Halstead of the SWP spoke at the demonstration in Chicago.

The SWP was seen by Arab activists and the left in general as the foremost defender of the Arab struggle in the United States. Arab students took bundles of *The Militant* to sell on their campuses, and many small Arab stores also displayed *The Militant*.

Throughout the height of the war, *The Militant* was on a circulation drive. More than 10,000 copies of the first issue to deal with the war, headlined "Behind Israeli Aggression," were sold in street sales.

Two weeks after the war began the SWP distributed a hard-hitting pamphlet, *Roots of the Mideast War*. This was followed by an educational bulletin, *Israel and the Arab Revolution: Principles of Revolutionary Marxism*, by Gus Horowitz. A third pamphlet for mass distribution also came out.

This one, *War in the Middle East: The Socialist View*, consisted of a collection of articles.

In its campaign around the Middle East war, the SWP utilized its municipal election campaigns to good effect. The war broke out a month before the elections, and the SWP was fielding candidates in twelve cities. Defense of the Arab revolution was made a key plank in the election campaigns, and SWP candidates spoke at teach-ins and debates, issued statements to the press, and spoke at campaign street meetings.

A typical example of how the campaigns were used to get radio and television time occurred in Atlanta. SWP mayoral candidate Debby Bustin exposed and denounced secret training of Israeli troops at U. S. bases. Her charges received major news coverage in this important Southern city, and reporters from two of Atlanta's three major television stations followed up with further interviews.

The War and the U.S. Left

The SWP's response to the war stands in sharp contrast to that of the rest of the left in the United States. Although other groups engaged in sporadic activities in various cities, *no other left-wing organization in the U. S. even attempted to carry out a coordinated national campaign at a time when there was a major threat of a new imperialist war.*

The major activity of the Communist party was to insert a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* on October 21. "Egypt, Israel and Syria Can Live," the headline said. The text explained that "the world is ready to defend the pre-June 1967 borders in the Mid-East. It will never back annexation of Arab lands. Return of the occupied lands is the only way Israel can maintain its own lands. It will mean a just, immediate and lasting peace."

As for the Social Democrats, the national chairman of the Young People's Socialist League, Carl Gershman, who is also a leading light in the Social Democrats, USA, took to the lecture circuit to support Israel. "Israel's right to survive is undebatable," Gershman insisted during a debate with SWP candidate Donald Gurewitz in Boston.

The sectarian fringe groups in the

United States generally declared their neutrality in the war. Typical was the International Socialist group, which bolstered its position by saying, "Both Zionism and the nationalism of the regimes of Sadat, Khadaffi, and Hussein are counter-revolutionary forces which must be overthrown." Seizing on the fact that neither side in the war had a revolutionary socialist leadership, they abstained from supporting the struggle of the oppressed Arabs against the Israeli spearhead of U. S. imperialism.

While the Maoist *Guardian* supported the Arabs, it did nothing beyond writing an editorial or two. It

didn't even bother to organize a forum.

The American followers of Gerry Healy also supported the Arab side in their newspaper, but the support was largely verbal.

In contrast to these performances, the SWP has gained new respect and authority among radicalizing forces, particularly Black, Chicano, and Puerto Rican youth. In addition, through common activity it has been successful in drawing Arab-American and Arab students closer to the ideas of Trotskyism. The anti-Zionists in the United States are still in a small minority, but the trend is growing. □

of speech. A leaflet, distributed after the first meeting was disrupted, condemned the JDL hooligans and called upon all students and faculty members to likewise condemn their action.

The effect of this leaflet was to put pressure on the JDL to attempt to justify its hooliganism. The JDL was not able to attract much support on this basis. Some Zionists on campus began to differentiate themselves, criticizing the JDL, which they had not been willing to do before.

In conjunction with the Umoja Society and the Puerto Rican Socialist party, the YSA issued a special leaflet for Blacks and Puerto Ricans, appealing for support of the democratic rights of free speech and assembly. The leaflet explained the role of Israel in countering the Arab and African revolutions.

The school administration came under pressure to do what it could to ensure that the meeting take place.

Thus the political atmosphere on the campus shifted. Interest in the meeting broadened beyond the circles favoring Zionism. This greatly facilitated organization of physical defense.

About 350 persons attended the meeting. In addition to the two speakers scheduled for the first meeting, a representative from the Palestine Liberation Organization spoke.

The JDL tried to disrupt the meeting. However, their heckling and shouting had no effect on the audience. This was particularly noticeable among the other Jewish students. The JDL could not deliver on its vow to break up the meeting. Before hundreds of students, they finally left rather than face the pro-Arab speakers in the question-and-answer period.

The meeting helped educate a key layer on the campus as to the nature of Zionism and the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. It presented an important lesson on how united efforts can establish the right to be heard in face of threats of violence. Jewish youth opposed to the JDL gained confidence in their right to express their ideas. Black, Latin, and Arab students in particular saw that the JDL could be defeated politically with the right approach.

Through the coverage in the campus media, tens of thousands of students learned about the Arab struggle and became acquainted with the issues involved. □

Score Political Victory Over JDL

How Anti-Zionists Gained Hearing at Brooklyn College

New York

For many years the influence of Zionism has been heavily felt at Brooklyn College in New York City. In particular, the Jewish Defense League, an ultrarightist pro-Zionist organization rooted in the racist hatred of sections of the Jewish petty bourgeoisie for Blacks and Puerto Ricans, has been quite strong on this campus. The international base of the JDL, in fact, is located in New York City and especially Brooklyn College.

In 1970-71, through various front organizations, the JDL collected almost \$40,000 at Brooklyn College alone. JDL activists number in the hundreds and have frequently attacked Black and Latin students in addition to interfering with radical activities on campus.

In 1971 the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) became active on the Brooklyn College campus as part of the antiwar movement. Part of the YSA's activity was aimed at countering the JDL's hegemony and raising the question of Zionism and the Arab revolution.

At a debate in the spring of 1973 on the question of Zionism, anti-Zionist speakers were able for the first time to open a dialogue on the problems of the Middle East.

Another outstanding event was a

pro-Arab meeting October 24. The scheduled speakers were Dr. Mohamed Mehdi, chairman of the Arab-American Relations Committee and a national figure in the anti-Zionist movement; and Mark Friedman, a student and member of the Young Socialist Alliance. The meeting was co-sponsored by the Umoja Society (a Black group), the Dominican Students group, the Puerto Rican Socialist party, the Dar-ul Islam Muslims, and the Young Socialist Alliance.

Members of the JDL and their supporters broke up the gathering. One person was hospitalized. The JDL vowed never to allow Dr. Mehdi to speak on the campus.

The YSA responded by organizing another meeting with the same speakers. The International Student Organizations joined the sponsors. Additional endorsers, who supported the democratic right of the meeting to take place although they did not necessarily agree with the viewpoints of the speakers, included scores of faculty members, the majority of the student government and campus organizations, and prominent individuals. The campus newspapers and radio station also agreed to support the right of the meeting to take place.

In preparing for the meeting, the YSA stressed a single issue—freedom

Nixon Caught in Watergate Minefield

By Allen Myers

Commenting on "Operation Candor"—the White House name for Nixon's latest campaign to conceal his responsibility in the Watergate scandal—the *New York Times* observed November 20:

"Speeches, news conferences and meetings with Governors all have their usefulness in many situations. But Watergate is not a normal situation. If Mr. Nixon wants to bear witness in his own behalf, he may testify under oath in the only appropriate forums—a court of law, the Senate Watergate committee, or an impeachment trial by the Senate."

Testimony by Nixon under oath would doubtlessly be entertaining, but he is not likely to grant the wish of the *Times* editors, since doing so would confront him with the choice of confessing or adding perjury to his other crimes. He has avoided perjury so far only because he has never commented on Watergate under oath.

Nixon's position has become so precarious that he cannot afford to tell the truth even to his supporters. On November 20, Nixon answered questions on Watergate at a meeting of Republican governors held in Memphis. Although by all accounts Nixon provided no new information, the governors dutifully emerged from the private gathering to tell reporters how impressed they were by Nixon's "candid" answers.

Nixon assured the governors that there would be no more "bombs" in the Watergate affair to undermine his credibility further.

"The president was asked," Governor Winfield Dunn of Tennessee told reporters after the meeting, "if there were any other bombs waiting in the wings and the president said if there were, he is not aware of them. If there is any information waiting to be revealed, it is information he does not have. And I think that's about as frank and honest a statement as anyone could give."

Less than twenty-four hours later, Nixon's lawyers exploded a new "bomb" by informing Judge John

Sirica that an eighteen-minute portion of one of the subpoenaed White House tape recordings is mysteriously blank. White House special counsel J. Fred Buzhardt said that Nixon had been told of the "bomb" November 14.

The most likely explanation of Nixon's lie to the governors is that he



BORK: Willing to give new special prosecutor all the "protection" given to his predecessor.

thought he desperately needed even the one day's headlines produced by their favorable comments. Their reaction when they learned of the blank tape, on the other hand, added little to the more general public response.

Buzhardt told the court that the tape of a June 20, 1972, meeting between Nixon and H. R. Haldeman, then chief of the White House staff, was interrupted for eighteen minutes by an "audible tone" that completely covered both voices. June 20 was just three days after the Watergate break-in. June

20 was also the date of Nixon's telephone conversation with John Mitchell, his campaign director. The tape of that conversation is one of three that Nixon has declared "non-existent."

On June 19, 1972, John Dean, according to his own later testimony, interviewed Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy. The next morning, Dean met at the White House with Mitchell, Haldeman, Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, and Nixon's domestic adviser, John Ehrlichman.

"This was their first opportunity," special prosecutor Archibald Cox had written in the subpoena, "for full discussion of how to handle the Watergate incident, and Ehrlichman has testified that Watergate was indeed the primary subject of the meeting.

"From there, Ehrlichman and then Haldeman went to see the President. The inference that they reported on Watergate and may well have received instructions, is almost irresistible."

The destruction of the evidence on the June 20 tape would seem to have occurred very recently. "Rose Mary Woods, the President's personal secretary," John Herbers reported in the November 25 *New York Times*, "testified earlier that when she transcribed the tape in September at Camp David she had difficulty in making it out because of noise interference and other problems. But she made no mention of the long blank."

There are other "bombs" with short fuses hidden away in the closets of the Nixon gang. The Senate Watergate committee is reported to be planning to call former Secretary of the Treasury John Connally and Nixon crony Bebe Rebozo to testify about cash contributions to Nixon's reelection from, respectively, the dairy industry and billionaire Howard Hughes. In both cases, evidence has already surfaced that both the dairies and Hughes had the clear impression that they were buying specific favors with their gifts, and if Nixon ever said or did anything to remove that impression, it is one of the best-kept secrets of recent history.

There is also an investigation going on into ITT's promise of a \$400,000 campaign donation in exchange for a favorable antitrust ruling and the related question of how many members of the Nixon gang perjured themselves during Congressional

hearings on the affair last year.

Another potential "bomb" concerns Robert Vesco, the financier who secretly donated \$200,000 in an effort to buy an end to investigations into his financial dealings. Mitchell and former Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans are facing trial in the Vesco case and Vesco himself is in the Bahamas, where he is fighting a request for extradition to the United States.

In the November 25 *New York Times*, Wallace Turner reported a new development that may link Vesco and the Nixon gang to heroin smuggling. According to Turner, a former undercover narcotics agent has told a Senate subcommittee that a smuggling investigation was abruptly called off when he repeated information from an informant that Vesco was providing \$300,000 to buy 100 kilograms of heroin.

Another area that represents a minefield of dangers for Nixon is the still secret operations of the White House "plumbers" unit. In testimony to a Senate committee, Archibald Cox made references to a number of such operations that he was investigating at the time he was fired.

Indications are that some of the plumbers' secrets concern previously unreported illegal wiretapping. In the November 25 *New York Times*, John M. Crewdson quoted an "associate" of Henry Kissinger as saying that Kissinger had expressed the belief that even he was tapped in early 1969.

"Mr. Kissinger . . . reportedly made the remark shortly before he was confirmed as Secretary of State in September," Crewdson wrote. "When the associate, a former White House official, pressed Mr. Kissinger as to who he believed might have ordered such surveillance, the Secretary replied, 'At least now you know the plumbers don't work for me.'"

The conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported November 22 that both Cox and his successor, Leon Jaworski, had been informed by the White House of "genuine national security information" related to the operations of the plumbers and that Cox "delayed indictments in the plumbers case while devising a plan for prosecuting without revealing the secret information." Jaworski, they continued, "was convinced that the matter should not be

divulged and did not reveal details to his staff. But unlike Cox, he ordered the prosecution to move against the plumbers without delay."

It remains to be seen how much diligence Jaworski will display in this area. Like Cox, he can be fired if he threatens "national security." Under regulations issued by Acting Attorney General Robert Bork, Nixon cannot fire the new prosecutor without the agreement of nine Congressional leaders. But Bork, who got his job by agreeing to fire Cox, can rescind those regulations if the Congressmen balk at covering up for Nixon. In the case of Cox, a federal judge has ruled that Nixon and Bork acted illegally in firing him, but the decision has not put Cox back in the special prosecutor's office.

So far, however, Jaworski and Bork appear to be getting along quite well. Congressman J. J. Pickle charged November 20 that the two were preventing a proper investigation of the ITT case by each of them claiming that the other had jurisdiction in the matter.

Nevertheless, the confidence of the White House gang appears to have reached a low ebb. In the November 24 issue of the liberal weekly *New Republic*, John Osborne wrote that among the White House staff there "was a fear amounting to an assumption that the worst of the Watergate scandals were yet to break upon the President and them. The numbing succession of scandals and allegations of scandal that had already struck was enough in itself to account for the assumption that the crushing sequence couldn't have ended and was never going to end. But a related and, for the President and for the morale of the Nixon establishment, a more disastrous factor underlay the tensions and anxieties. The clear though unacknowledged fact was that confidence in the President's integrity and wisdom had all but vanished among his own assistants."

Even prior to the announcement that the June 20 tape was now "inoperative," Nixon's public standing had hit a new low. Pollster Louis Harris reported November 22 on the results of a survey conducted November 12-15:

"President Nixon has lost so much credibility over his handling of the Watergate tapes that the number of Americans who think he should re-

sign has risen sharply to 43 per cent of the entire adult public. This call for resignation is up from 36 per cent in October, 31 per cent in September, 28 per cent in August, and only 14 per cent last May. Forty-seven per cent still feel President Nixon should not resign, although this is down from 75 per cent in May."

On the question of the two "non-existent" tapes, only 23 percent of those questioned in the Harris poll believed Nixon and 55 percent thought he was lying.

The U. S. ruling class is in no mood for any more of Nixon's "bombs," but Nixon is unable to stop them from going off. Osborne reported that according to one insider, Nixon's situation is expected to get worse rather than better:

"Counsellor Melvin Laird, the former congressman and secretary of Defense who joined the White House staff in July and is saying that he's quitting as soon as Gerald Ford . . . is confirmed by majorities of the House and Senate, contributed to the apprehension of dire things to come with an argument that he is using on senators and representatives. He tells Republicans and Democrats alike that they've got to confirm Gerald Ford without delay because another Watergate crunch, maybe worse than any yet experienced, is coming soon. He is saying that a confirmed Vice President ought to be in place when it does, ready to help the President withstand it. Laird doesn't quite say in addition that a Republican Vice President has got to be in office, ready to replace Mr. Nixon when and if he resigns or is impeached and removed. But that's the impression he leaves."

It was only about three months ago that Laird was providing similar warnings to members of Congress about not being too vociferous in defending Spiro Agnew. □

Health Protection

The California Air Pollution Research Center is reported unable so far to figure out what pollutant caused widespread damage to lettuce crops in southern California several months ago. The pollutant destroyed large parts of the crop in four counties and damaged other vegetables as well, including endives, beets, parsley, and spinach.

News dispatches do not indicate whether the center is also looking into the effects on persons who ate vegetables that survived the pollutant.

Plumbers and Presidents: The Roots of the Crisis

By Allen Myers

[This is the conclusion of an article on the historical origins of the Watergate scandal. The first installment appeared in last week's *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Watergate and the Radicalization

... I think it is time in this country to quit making national heroes out of those who steal secrets and publish them in the newspapers.

— Richard Nixon, May 24, 1973.

* * *

The preceding brief outline of U. S. capitalism's tendency toward a continually strengthened executive should not be seen as a linear process or as one in which there are no opposing forces. During periods of upsurge, the working class and its allies can slow or even temporarily reverse the trend toward concentration of capitalist power. In some cases the same phenomena that spur the ruling class toward greater centralization may contribute equally to demands from other sectors of the population for greater democratic rights, less governmental interference in their lives, an end to imperialist adventures, etc.

Such an attitude in broad layers of the population can in turn require, from the viewpoint of the ruling class, greater secrecy, undercover attacks on its political enemies, a general escalation of Watergating. Jeb Stuart Magruder, the former deputy director of CREEP, used basically this argument to justify his participation in the Watergate affair. Magruder told the Ervin committee:

"During this whole time we were in the White House, and during this time we were directly employed with trying to succeed with the president's policies we saw continuing violations of the law done by men like William Sloane Coffin [a professor under whom Magruder studied in college]. He tells me my ethics are bad. Yet

he was indicted for criminal charges. He recommended on the Washington Monument grounds that students burn their draft cards and that we have mass demonstrations, shut down the city of Washington. . . .

"So consequently, when these subjects came up, although I was aware they were illegal we had become somewhat inured to using some activities that would help us in accomplishing what we thought was a cause, a legitimate cause. . . .

"For the past year, I have obvious-



MAGRUDER: A question of "ethics"?

ly had to consider that and I understand completely that that was an absolute, incorrect decision. But that is basically, I think, the reason why that decision was made—because of that atmosphere that had occurred—and to all of us who had worked in the White House there was that feeling of resentment and of frustration at being unable to deal with issues on a legal basis."

Nixon expressed the same attitude more forcefully when he told an aide

to have thugs remove a lone demonstrator standing across the street from the White House.

For roughly fifteen years, U. S. society has been going through a profound process that is ultimately responsible for Magruder's feelings of frustration. Broader and broader layers of the population have begun to question and reject the traditional values and beliefs of U. S. capitalist society. Old attitudes have been challenged in every field: political, social, economic, cultural, sexual, philosophic, educational. This radicalization has transformed the face of the United States. The apparent monolith of reaction of the early 1950s has become a society in which literally millions have demonstrated in the streets their hatred of one or another facet of capitalist misrule.

The radicalization in the United States began first in the nationally oppressed Black population, and was inspired in part by the process that pushed Washington into the role of world cop: the colonial revolution in the decades following the second world war.

Black Americans who saw the emergence of formally independent states in Africa realized that they had been taught lies about the history of that continent—and therefore presumably about their history in this country as well. They saw African diplomats served in Jim Crow restaurants. More importantly, they saw that the white colonizers could be defeated despite their immense military superiority.

And of course it was easy for Blacks to see the hypocrisy of the rhetoric about "democracy" used to justify Washington's imperial wars. In his autobiography, Malcolm X described his encounter with a draft board during the Korean War. He had applied for exemption as a conscientious objector:

"They asked if I knew what 'conscientious objector' meant. I told them that when the white man asked me to go off somewhere and fight and maybe die to preserve the way the white

man treated the black man in America, then my conscience made me object."

The civil rights movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s soon drew in students, both Black and white, who had many of their illusions about the American Way destroyed by police clubs and firehoses—as did, for that matter, thousands who only read about events in their newspapers or witnessed them on television.

Students and other young people in conflict with authority on one question naturally began to doubt conventional wisdom in other areas. The Cuban revolution, the Bay of Pigs, and the "missile crisis" forced many to confront for the first time the reality of imperialism and its possible costs.

With the growth of the movement against the Vietnam war, millions of Americans began to learn that "their" government could not be trusted to tell them the truth, that it lied not just occasionally but constantly, as a matter of deliberate policy.

Lyndon Johnson's "credibility gap" was to contribute to the uncovering of the scandals of the Nixon gang. The antiwar movement, particularly the students, realized that the government could not be believed and began conducting its own research. Generally this centered on the involvement of campus organizations in the war. The students exposed seemingly innocuous research projects as covers for the development of weapons. Anthropologists and sociologists were discovered investigating ways of deflecting the hatred of Asian peasants for corrupt governments, cataloguing the political views and weapons available to remote villages, or listing geographical features that might pose obstacles to tanks.

The effects of this widespread distrust and the efforts of radicalized young people to discover the truth should not be underestimated. Reaching even into the government bureaucracy, they made it increasingly difficult for the government to keep anything secret. Bureaucrats who opposed a particular policy—for whatever reason—discovered that a "leak" in the right place could often be more effective in forcing a change than hours of argument within the bureaucracy.

This situation has sometimes produced spectacular results. Neither the Mylai massacre nor the Pentagon Papers would have become public knowl-

edge without the previous radicalization and its effects on the secrecy of government. Mylai was exposed because of the investigations of Seymour Hersh, at that time a reporter for an obscure news service with no national influence, and because low-ranking army lawyers involved in the case were unwilling to cooperate with the Pentagon in covering it up.

Daniel Ellsberg was himself one of the intellectuals whom Washington hires in large numbers to help it evaluate and plan imperialist strategy. When he became disillusioned with the government's seeming inability to "learn" from its experience in Vietnam, he began by sending portions of the Pentagon Papers to liberal members of Congress. When that produced no results, he tried the *New York Times*, which published them in order to push Nixon closer to its own line on the Indochina war.

The governmental trend toward centralization is also contradicted by every democratic victory that has been won by radicalizing layers of the population. Civil rights legislation, the eighteen-year-old vote, the right to abortion, etc., are all concessions won from the ruling class in opposition to its needs for greater regimentation of U. S. society—as the continual attempt to roll back such concessions testifies.

The radicalization has severely undermined some of the most powerful of traditional ruling-class methods of control. Wartime patriotism, racism, and red-baiting have become less and less effective precisely because the radicalization is based on opposition to the results of those policies. Both Johnson and Nixon were therefore required to use more secretive and illegal methods of dealing with enemies.

Writing in the October 1973 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach offered some insights, from the standpoint of the ruling class, into the connections between the radicalization, Watergate, and U. S. imperialism's foreign policy. Katzenbach is not merely a commentator on bourgeois affairs. Presently a vice-president of International Business Machines (IBM), he was attorney general in the Kennedy administration. His influence in Washington is indicated by the fact that he was one of the twelve men who, at a secret meeting in March 1968, turned U. S. war strategy onto the track of "Vietnamiza-

tion" and issued Johnson his walking papers.

We will take a closer look at Katzenbach's article below. Here it is necessary to consider only his explanation of the need to replace more traditional methods of control because of the effects of the radicalization. The "policy" to which he refers is the cold war "containment" strategy of Washington as world cop:

" . . . for much of the past 25 years there has been a tendency to equate dissent or criticism with disloyalty, with subversion, with being a Communist 'dupe.' Obviously this repression of dissent reached its peak after the 'loss' of China and during the era of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. But appearing to follow the Communist line has been a political risk for critics during most of this period. And, again because of its 'national security' premise, the policy has bred a host of questionable practices relating to security clearances, systems of classification of information, lists of subversive organizations, and snooping by security agents into the background, beliefs and associations of many citizens. It is not too long a step from security practices of the past to the ridiculous beliefs of the Watergate 'plumbers' and their creators, and to the acts they sought to justify in the name of national security. Indeed—and I think this is a major part of the problem—very little of the protest activity associated with Vietnam would have been tolerated in the 1950s, and repressive measures might well have been accepted by the general public not so long ago."

Is there a hint of regret for lost opportunities in that last remark?

Katzenbach contends that less secrecy and more honesty by Johnson could have won broad public support for the Vietnam war, thus reducing the need for Watergate-style operations. This seems a highly dubious proposition. But he is certainly correct about the shift in attitudes characterizing the radicalization and the rise of Watergating.

In large part, then, the Watergate scandal is a fairly direct product of the present radicalization of U. S. society. Both the objective logic and the particular effects of the radicalization have tended to pose a sharper and sharper conflict with the expanding requirements of U. S. imperialism.

The U. S. ruling class selected Rich-

ard Nixon as its president—and gave him its almost unanimous endorsement a second time in 1972—because of his strategy for resolving the conflict by containing or rolling back the radicalization. Nixon's attempt to implement this strategy was an important contributing factor to the Watergate affair, and it therefore deserves a closer examination.

Nixon's Strategy

You see these bums, you know, blowing up the campuses.

— Richard Nixon, May 1, 1970.

* * *

Although there are many possible tactical combinations and variations, the U. S. ruling class has basically only two strategies available for dealing with the radicalization: a hard-line, repressive approach and the liberal effort to co-opt or deflect the radicalization in a reformist direction. In the recent period, the first approach has been represented by Richard Nixon, the latter by the liberal Democrats, particularly in the election campaigns of Eugene McCarthy, Robert Kennedy, and George McGovern.

The question of which strategy is predominant is a very important one for the ruling class, and has become more important as the radicalization has continued to spread. As George Breitman explained in the September 8, 1972, issue of *The Militant*, in the context of analyzing the upcoming presidential election:

"Every class society rests on domination through a mix of coercion and persuasion; the greater the proportion of persuasion, the cheaper it is for the ruling class, and the more secure its position generally is. The decline of confidence that many millions have in the capitalist system, the widespread disbelief and mistrust in the government, the suspicion and/or rejection of the traditional political parties, the loss of authority by the institutions that represented and symbolized authority, the questioning of time-encrusted values, procedures, and prejudices—these are not minor matters or mere conversation pieces for the intelligent capitalist but problems of major proportions with which they have been grappling for several years. What else produced Lyndon Johnson's decision not to run in 1968 except

the conviction that he had become too discredited to even get a hearing from millions of alienated Americans?"

The radicalization has not yet been joined by the working class acting as a class. But millions of workers have already been affected by the changing attitudes, "the questioning of time-encrusted values, procedures, and prejudices." For the ruling class, it is obviously imperative to stop or deflect the radicalization before the working class moves massively through its own organizations.

Nixon's hard-line strategy was evi-



AGNEW: "When you've seen one city slum, you've seen them all."

dent from the very beginning of the 1968 election campaign, with its emphasis on "law and order" and the hostile, even insulting attitude toward radicalized layers. (Asked why he was not campaigning in a Black ghetto during one campaign stop, Spiro Agnew answered, "When you've seen one city slum, you've seen them all.")

Nixon soon discovered, however, that declaring "I will not be affected" by antiwar demonstrations not only did not stop the demonstrations, but if anything made them larger. Frame-up prosecutions of radicals as often as not ran aground on juries who had learned not to believe the lies of government and police. In his most direct confrontation with radicalized youth, in May 1970, Nixon—as well as most of the ruling class—was surprised by the scope of the opposition and was forced to beat a hasty retreat.

Moreover, the "new majority" that Nixon claimed to be patching togeth-

er from bits and pieces of "middle America," which was to be the political base for his confrontation with the radicalization, proved to be an illusion. That Nixon himself did not believe in it for long, if ever, is indicated by the efforts of the White House gang to manipulate the elections. Its nonexistence was demonstrated as early as November 1970, when Nixon and Agnew loudly intervened in the congressional election with a "law and order" theme (including a stage-managed "stoning" of Nixon's car in California) and only produced an unexpectedly large swing to the Democratic party.

Despite these setbacks, Nixon persisted in his hard-line strategy, still with the substantial backing of the ruling class. But the emphasis of the strategy necessarily shifted from frontal confrontations to more devious attacks of the sort that have been exposed by the Watergate scandal.

Again, it should be emphasized that Nixon was not striking out on his own when he authorized the various Watergate-style programs. The infamous 1970 secret spy plan, for example, was drafted by a committee recruited from the highest levels of the state "security" apparatus. It consisted of the directors of the FBI, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the heads of the spy groups of each of the armed services, in addition to a White House aide representing Nixon. These are the "nonpartisan" bureaucrats who stay on in their jobs no matter which party holds the presidency and who are entrusted by the ruling class with the defense of the interests of the entire class rather than any particular sector of it.

Nixon's undercover operations were perfectly permissible, and in fact desirable to the ruling class, so long as the targets were the antiwar movement, Black nationalists, etc. Nixon's crime was that in order to secure his own reelection, he turned these weapons against the representatives of sectors of the bourgeoisie. And, perhaps even more serious, he was caught in the act.

Some of the liberal bourgeoisie incline to be charitable about Nixon's personal failings, attributing his excesses primarily to the failure of the ruling class as a whole to work out a satisfactory means of ensuring public support for imperialist policies.

This was the contention of Katzenbach, in the article quoted above, when he wrote:

"Continuing and widespread public concern over our relations with other countries is really a phenomenon of the last 25 years. Measured in terms of even our relatively short history as a nation, we have not had much time to gain experience or adjust our political institutions to this new state of affairs."

Katzenbach indicated that he could understand the feelings that led Nixon beyond the bounds of the permissible. Of the widespread opposition to the Indochina war, he wrote:

"There is nothing subversive about all this—although it may appear so to a President thoroughly committed to the importance and rightness of a particular course of action. Vocal and widespread dissent may easily frustrate his policy; damage our national security as he perceives it; severely limit his capacity to lead; and encourage the view that such opposition is truly subversive, the work of our enemies, and something to fear and even seek to repress."

Katzenbach believes that Johnson was affected by the same pressures. His remarks are worth quoting at some length for their view that the centralization required by imperialism may have gone a step too far and become counterproductive in some instances:

"... as the [Vietnam] war dragged on, and as opposition to it became increasingly vocal, the [Johnson] Administration's motivation subtly changed. It saw the opposition as making an already difficult task more difficult; as stiffening the resolve of the enemy; as making the search for an honorable peace infinitely more complicated. Information withheld, promulgated half-truths, propagandizing the good news—all of which were to a degree misleading—were now justified by the necessity to minimize the degree of opposition so that peace could be more rapidly achieved. And so the credibility gap widened farther, and trust and confidence eroded faster. Ironically, the fact that the statements of the government were less and less believed probably gave the domestic opposition a strength it never could otherwise have achieved.

"Mr. Nixon—prior to Watergate—recouped some credibility for the Pres-



Part of crowd of 500,000 antiwar demonstrators in Washington in April 1971. Nixon's strategy for dealing with radicalization included "getting tough" with protest movements.

idency. He did not, however, do so by frankness and candor. His technique was to reduce the levels of U. S. troops and casualties; to seek to focus attention on other matters by his China initiative; and to continue to dissemble and to restrain discussion on Vietnam. His excessive views of presidential power, his seeming disdain for congressional views, and his moving the center of decisions from the State Department to the White House all have tended to reduce public discussion and, consequently, public opposition. And to a completely unprecedented degree he has conducted his foreign policy secretly. He regained considerable trust and confidence in the Presidency, not because his statements were believed, but because many of those naturally in political opposition grudgingly admired the initiatives toward China and Russia and respected the brilliance and competence of Mr. Kissinger.

"Unhappily, secrecy in foreign affairs—and particularly in the atmosphere we have lived in for the past 25 years—is easily rationalized. Yet the reasons seldom have much to do with the rationalizations. In recent years, at least, the real motive has been precisely to avoid the difficulties inherent in our political system and hopefully to present the public with triumphant *faits accomplis*.

What initially stemmed largely from confrontation between a growing vocal minority in Congress and the President, as well as increasing public demonstrations, was converted into constitutional principle by Mr. Nixon. In his Administration, neither the Congress nor the public has been informed about foreign affairs except at a level of high generality, and even then without the opportunity for discussion. Indeed, not even the bureaucracy has been consulted or informed. And this in turn has led to a failure to consult with, and inform, our allies abroad, culminating in the insult to the Japanese with respect to the change in our China policy."

Katzenbach's array of arguments illustrates at least two dilemmas for the U. S. ruling class.

One is the fact that the centralization of power it wants and demands multiplies the possibility of that power being misused—either deliberately, for personal considerations, as with Nixon's operations against his Democratic opponents, or because of errors of judgment, which can originate in the reduced obligation to take into account the views of varied bourgeois sectors. (This danger is reflected in the complaints of the capitalist press about Nixon's "isolation" from Congress and other sources of bourgeois opinion.) Compared with the second

dilemma, this problem is trivial, and is more than offset, from the standpoint of the major capitalists, by the gain in efficiency produced by centralization.

The major problem is referred to rather obliquely by Katzenbach's complaint that Nixon has attempted to convert the awkward necessity for secrecy into a "constitutional principle." Here he touches on a dilemma that is at the heart of the crisis of Watergate, a crisis still far from resolution.

Death Agony of a Myth

The investigation of this select committee was born of crisis, unabated as of this very time, the crisis of a mounting loss of confidence of American citizens in the integrity of our electoral process, which is the bedrock of our democracy.

—Sam Ervin, May 17, 1973.

I love my country. I venerate the office of the president, and I have the best wishes for the success of the present incumbent of that office, because he is the only president this country has at this time.

—Sam Ervin, July 23, 1973.

* * *

In an August 24, 1973, editorial on the then unsettled legal contest over the secret White House tapes, the *Washington Post* described the basic issue as "the extent to which the presidency is circumscribed by the Constitution and the laws of the United States." Previously in U.S. history, the editors pointed out, the government had been able to avoid the issue:

"Thus, the question, as framed, pretty much asks the courts how much of the absolute authority of a monarch the framers of the Constitution meant to strip from the new office of the Presidency they were creating. Up to now this question has been shrouded in a useful kind of vagueness in which limits were assumed by Presidents and not pressed too hard by others. Recent events, notably the secret incubation of the Vietnam war and the Watergate crisis have changed some of that. The President and his lawyers by advancing arguments that amount to a form of Constitutional extremism have almost insured that

some of that useful vagueness will be dissipated by the courts."

The *Post* editorial was entitled "King George III and the Nixon Tapes." This theme of a king is one that has been mentioned with increasing frequency as the Watergate crisis unfolds. The *New York Times*, for example, has referred to "almost monarchical" and "monarchical" views of the presidency allegedly held by Nixon.

The frequent allusions to constitutional debates of the eighteenth century are understandable if not completely relevant, for the Constitution has come to symbolize a key ingredient in the "mix of coercion and persuasion" that has been remarkably successful for the U.S. ruling class over the past two centuries.

A major component of the persuasion that has reduced the expense to the bourgeoisie of maintaining its rule has been the carefully nurtured myth of bourgeois democracy—the twin illusions that (1) the masses, through their vote, can have a decisive influence on government policies, and (2) there are constitutional principles, laws, or traditions that can guarantee the maintenance of democratic liberties under capitalism. While there have been expansions and contractions of the democratic rights actually enjoyed by the working class in different periods of U.S. history, the ruling class has generally not considered it necessary or desirable to introduce measures that completely undermine these illusions.

The concentration of executive power necessary for the efficient operation of imperialist adventures was, for a long time, largely compartmentalized and isolated, at least so far as appearances were concerned, from "the democratic process." Events like the Palmer raids and the McCarthy witch-hunt were portrayed, and largely believed to be, aberrations from the norm, whose chief component was overzealousness in defending "democracy" against a foreign threat.

Even during the worst periods of reaction, "free elections" continued to be held. Presidents might send thousands of troops around the world in an effort to suppress revolution, but they normally sought formal congressional approval or were able to provide such actions with the cover of an alliance or treaty ratified by the

Senate. While they might in reality ignore the wishes not only of the public but of Congress as well, they did not proclaim the right to do so as "constitutional principle," but preferred to preserve the "useful kind of vagueness" recommended by the *Washington Post*.

The Watergate scandal demonstrates that the centralization needed by U.S. imperialism has finally come into direct and open conflict with that democratic myth.

When Nixon's agents were caught breaking into the offices of the Democratic National Committee, the "third-rate burglary" did more than undermine public belief in the legitimacy of capitalist elections in the United States—although that in itself was a serious blunder in the eyes of the ruling class. Beyond that blunder, the incident and the subsequent disclosures have confronted the ruling class with the growing incompatibility of its drive toward centralization and the maintenance of the myth of bourgeois democracy, particularly in a period when wide layers of the population have already begun to question that myth.

The contradiction is not a mere temporary crisis in the "credibility" of the Nixon administration. For half a century, democratic illusions have served as an ideological complement and support to U.S. imperialism's drive toward world hegemony. Now the very successes of imperialism and the effects of the radicalization have combined to turn the complements into contradictions. The present crisis of the U.S. ruling class centers on the effort to find a new combination or balance of these now essentially irreconcilable elements of its rule.

In a September 17, 1973, editorial "assessing the damage," the *Wall Street Journal* indicated what it thought the ruling class had already lost as a result of Watergate. Even though their view was based on the erroneous assumption that the "height of the Watergate affair has probably by now passed" and that Nixon was "likely to recover surprisingly well," the editors were of the opinion that "the damage will prove both extensive and enduring."

The still unsolved problem that most worried the *Journal* editors was the inability to turn back the radicalization even after more "tangible" difficul-

ties had been dealt with more or less satisfactorily:

"We are at last at peace abroad. Despite inflation's dangers, we are more prosperous than ever before. While our black citizens have not achieved equality, they have made prodigious progress toward it. Our cities have by and large weathered their financial crises. Even Watergate, especially given the alacrity [sic] with which it was exposed, is in a sense a testimony that our institutions are bulwarks against tyranny.

"For all of this, ours is clearly a troubled land. The troubles lie in the intangibles, in matters of self-confidence, morale, a sense of fitness and legitimacy. A decade of political assassinations, grueling combat, burning cities, riotous campuses, public incivility and disappointed expectations have left us sick in spirit, doubting in mind."

Watergate, the *Journal* continued, had shattered ruling-class optimism:

"For a few brief moments, before Watergate and again before its enormity became known, it was possible to imagine that Richard Nixon would help us to work out of this sour mood. In his first term he had set right many of the tangibles, and in his second the intangible fruits of this effort should have been harvested. . . . If his foes could then learn that American society is such that even with Richard Nixon it could find peace and progress, then some measure of national harmony could be restored.

"Watergate has destroyed that chance. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that Watergate has revealed the chance as illusory."

The editorial concluded with the somber prediction: "At a minimum, Watergate has postponed for four more years the time in which we might come to peace with ourselves."

It was only a month later that the events surrounding the firing of the Watergate special prosecutor demonstrated that the crisis was even deeper than the *Wall Street Journal* editors had feared.

Some sectors of the ruling class are, as could be expected, less pessimistic about the results of Watergate, seeing many aspects of the scandal as essentially accidental in a historical sense. And, in fact, there is no question that the crisis has been complicated by factors that cannot be considered his-

torically inevitable: Agnew's vulnerability to criminal charges and Nixon's shady financial dealings are two obvious examples.

Highly dubious, however, is the claim of accident for what the liberal press likes to call Nixon's "dictatorial" or "monarchical" tendencies—by which it means the use of police-state tactics against bourgeois critics, the ignoring of its advice, and the manipulation of the state apparatus for personal political advantage. In a May 24, 1973, editorial, the *Washington Post* illustrated this view by comparing Johnson and Nixon on their uses of "national security" powers:

"Presidents of the United States over the past couple of decades have been granted by the people considerable license to invoke national security needs as a justification for all manner of activities that otherwise would not be permitted and which certainly would not be permitted to go on in secrecy. This is an enormous trust, and from time to time our Presidents have abused it. You could argue—and many people do—that President Johnson abused it in the course of escalating the American Vietnam involvement. But nobody argues that he abused it for small or personal or political reasons: the dissembling was undertaken, he believed, to fulfill a genuine, if unpopular, national security imperative abroad. Whether he was right or wrong, that is a distinction of some importance. For what we must reluctantly suspect now is not just that Mr. Nixon's campaign and government appointees abused the prerogatives of White House power, but that the President himself is invoking the sacred and serious national security claim frivolously and to ends for which it was never intended."

But as others, such as Katzenbach, have pointed out, "the sacred and serious national security claim" carries with it a tendency toward its "abuse," including its invocation against bourgeois critics. And persons less impressed than the *Post* editors by the posthumously viewed virtues of Lyndon Johnson might recall that the phoney "Tonkin Gulf Incident," while it undoubtedly served the wishes of the majority of the ruling class, also occurred at a time remarkably favorable to the development of Johnson's reelection campaign.

At the other end of the spectrum of

bourgeois opinion are the less sophisticated sectors, who argue in effect that the scandal would go away if it were ignored. This attitude was expressed bluntly by Edward Gurney, Nixon's chief defender on the Watergate committee, in a letter to the governor of New Hampshire. Gurney gave the following evaluation of the Ervin committee:

"The only concrete contributions we have made have been to force down the stock market, up the price of gold, devalue the American dollar, hurt the economy, and destroy the confidence of people in the American political system. These are certainly concrete contributions but about as useful as a block of concrete tied around a swimmer's neck."

Gurney, however, may be learning the hard way that capitalist politicians are likely to have to carry that "block of concrete" for some time to come. In one of the less important but highly fitting by-products of Watergate, Gurney has acknowledged that he is under investigation in connection with possibly illegal contributions from businessmen in Florida.

Whether Nixon is eventually forced from office or is whitewashed and retained, the political crisis symbolized by Watergate will not be quickly resolved. The death agony of the myth of bourgeois democracy entails a continued decline in the authority of the capitalist government. This will complicate and undermine whatever measures the ruling class decides are necessary to deal with the problem of Nixon's "credibility."

In the longer run, Watergate has contributed a new element of instability into U. S. politics. It is easy to foresee, for example, that widespread demands for impeachment are a likely response to any unpopular action by future presidents.

And it is to be hoped and expected that disillusionment with the realities of capitalist government will win a widening audience for the socialist alternative. □

Judicial Privilege

An Englishman arrested for making a "rude gesture" at two judges passing in a car explained to the offended jurists:

"I humbly apologize. I did not intend to offend your lordships. I thought it was the mayor's car."

The judges accepted the explanation and released the offender.

Imperialism and Allies Rushing Financial Aid to Junta

"The sharp contraction in sales brought about by the massive markups decreed by the Chilean military junta in accordance with its 'real-prices' policy has provoked growing concern in those sectors that might have been expected to benefit from such a policy," Marcelo Rivas reported in the November 4 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*.

This concern was voiced, in fact, by the Santiago *El Mercurio*, the dean of the reactionary press in Chile and a strident supporter of the campaign to oust the popular-front government of Salvador Allende. One of the only two papers allowed to publish by the junta for several weeks after the coup, its pages were filled with the names, addresses, and descriptions of "dangerous Marxists." In fact, a member of its managing staff, Fernando Leñiz, is the junta's minister of economics.

The removal of the "Marxist tyranny" apparently caused some unexpected problems that disturbed the reactionary paper.

"There is a noticeable drop in the enthusiasm of consumers, as well as a slowdown in the circulation of money." Moreover: "The return to economic realism will put a series of medium and small businesses in a precarious situation. Some of them will undoubtedly have to shut down, causing disturbances in the various professional associations." Consternation in these professional associations, the *gremios*, would also be upsetting to the junta, since they are its main organized support.

A split over price policy showed up early in the bloc supporting the junta, Rivas wrote. "There were two tendencies on the question of dealing with inflation and the dislocation of the economy. The first called for a gradual readjustment, more or less similar to the one put into practice by the conservative former president Jorge Alessandri (1958-64), who ordered progressive annual wage cuts of 50, 25, and 10 percent, which were acceptable in the medium run but at the same time reduced the problem of inflation without cutting the buying power of the population too sharply.

"The second tendency was to carry out a drastic markup, setting prices at their highest free-market level as a means of solving the economic problems rapidly through severely cutting back on buying power and the circulation of money."

Now the economic situation seems likely to widen this split:

"The results of this second alternative, which is the one the military junta finally decided to take, do not seem to be to the liking of the sectors linked to the government or supporting it. A sharp contraction in demand has alarmed the medium-scale and small industrialists as well as the merchants with limited capital and small-scale operations. The low volume of sales is decapitalizing these sectors, which face the threat of bankruptcy. On the other hand this would benefit the powerful concerns, which, according to past experience with the free enterprise system, will be reinforced by buying out small, failing businesses. This will lead to the kind of monopolistic situation the government says is unacceptable."

By its nature the military junta cannot avoid favoring monopoly capitalism. But a sudden increase in small-business failures could be politically very dangerous for it. And at the same time that the small-scale traders and industrialists are being threatened with bankruptcy because of the contraction in sales, the popular strata are being driven to desperation by severe cuts in an already low standard of living.

"The sudden drop in purchasing power and the specter of hunger have caused a dramatic shift in attitude toward the junta, even among anti-Marxist residents of the poblaciones," *New York Times* correspondent Jonathan Kandell wrote November 7 from Santiago.

"Dozens of the same housewives and workers who expressed cautious or enthusiastic support for the junta . . . a month ago are now openly critical of the new Government's economic policies.

"The food problem has already

overshadowed the widespread fear and anger among supporters of the late Marxist President Salvador Allende Gossens."

The foot soldiers of the rightist campaign against the popular front are rapidly being alienated. Kandell quoted one housewife as saying:

"I marched in every women's demonstration against Allende and I welcomed the coup against the Marxists. But if the military does not do something about food prices, I am willing to go out and march again."

The only apparent alternative for relieving the immediate economic problems, Rivas wrote, is an expansion of consumer credit. "But the merchants say that since they are being 'bled white' by the present sluggish buying and cannot offer consumers even short-term credit, it is the banks and the big suppliers that have to set up such a system."

Thus, the junta's chances for slowing down the erosion of its support seem to depend on infusions of credit from the big banks and businesses that closely interlock with imperialism.

Faced with the prospect of civil war or revolution in Chile if the junta should suddenly lose its grip, international capitalism has been offering help.

"It has been announced that the International Monetary Fund will grant a credit of \$80 million to the Central Bank of Chile," *Le Monde* reported November 15. "Moreover, several other U.S. banking institutions are offering Chile credits of \$20 million to get the country out of its present difficulties."

The Brazilian dictatorship has been quick to offer its solidarity. "Brazilian air force planes regularly bring much needed aid to Chile," the November 19 *Der Spiegel* reported. "In return, the Chileans turn over the Brazilian exiles who found refuge under the Allende regime to Rio de Janeiro. The exiles are flown back to Brazil on the same planes that bring the aid."

Even the Latin American government that, except for Cuba, made the warmest statements of solidarity with the Chilean popular-front regime has

not held back from helping the junta in its time of need:

"Argentina granted Chile a loan of \$10 million that will finance the importation of machinery for small and medium mining operations," *La Opinión* reported October 31.

The junta has promised concessions to the workers: "Economics Minister

Leñiz has announced that there will be no more price hikes until wage readjustments are studied in January," Rivas wrote in the November 4 *La Opinión*. "This is the first time he has accepted the possibility of wage raises in the short run."

But it remains to be seen if the junta and its backers can halt the economic decline in time to prevent a disastrous

erosion in the regime's political support. Furthermore, they cannot get the economy going again with a sullen and terrorized labor force. The generals would almost certainly have to make some concessions in their methods of rule, which on the other hand would give the workers a chance to reorganize. And they have some scores to settle. □

The Junta's Target: Chilean Workers

Daily Body Count Along Avenida Departamental

[The Swedish journalist Bobi Soulander was one of the foreign journalists most roughly treated by the Chilean junta. He was arrested and held in the National Stadium for more than a week before being expelled from the country. Since returning to Sweden, he has been writing a series of articles on the repression he witnessed. The following article is from the October 28 issue of the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Almost every morning dead bodies turn up lying along the Avenida Departamental on the outskirts of Santiago. They appear near bus stops, where they can best frighten people. Their faces are smashed in with rifle butts so that they are unrecognizable. They wear the cheap, worn clothing of Chilean workers.

The political persecution in Chile is far from over. It has only changed its form, shifted so as not to be so visible to the world. And it has reached a new level among the poor and the ordinary people.

The junta isn't looking for officials in the Allende government any more. They are dead or deported. Now the Popular Front politicians are missing or in prison. So the political persecution has another target. It is the Chilean workers who are being persecuted.

The Departamental is a long industrial road through Santiago's factory belt, and it passes through campamento after campamento in the working-class slums.

The first dead bodies didn't show

up along the road until one morning a few weeks after the military coup. They had been dumped there at night during the curfew period. They were picked up by a passing garbage truck.

Since then, the appearance of such bodies has been a continual occurrence. One morning there were five men lying there in overalls with safety glasses around their necks. Two days later there were two men with their feet tied together. They had obviously been dragged behind a car. I myself saw a man who had been placed in a sitting position on an embankment. He had been shot in the neck with the gun pointed upward so that his face was blown away.

Who killed them? Why? And where did they come from?

The first question can be answered with an ironic "don't know." Only the military and the police know. Only they can move around at night when the curfew is on.

As for the second question, Raúl, a friend, can answer it.

He lives in a campamento along the Departamental, with his wife and ten children. In Allende's time, he was a member of the campamento governing board and head of the health committee. He has never made a secret of the fact that he has been a Socialist party member for decades.

In front of his house, he hung a picture of Salvador Allende with Fidel Castro. He thought it was funny. In the era of the spiffy Allende, it was the only picture he had seen of Fidel wearing a tie.

The police arrested Raúl on a Saturday night. They came into his cam-

pamento in a truck and dragged him out of bed. He staggered out carrying his trousers and his shoes and was knocked down and beaten in the street while his children screamed. Finally he was hauled onto the back of the truck with several others. When he asked for a shoe he dropped, the policemen hit him in the eyes and in the testicles with the barrels of their guns.

Raúl was held in the police station for four days. He was tortured for an afternoon, and given the electric shock treatment. When I talked with him, he still had the burn marks on his lips and heels. The police wanted to know where he had hidden Carlos Altamirano, one of those with a half-million escudos price on his head.

"I don't know what you want from me," Raúl answered. "I have only seen Altamirano in newspaper pictures."

He was thrown into a cell with three others. One of them was wearing the same kind of trousers and the other had the same last name. In the middle of the night, his two cellmates were taken out.

In the morning his wife, Carmen, learned that three bodies were lying along the Departamental. One had the same kind of trousers on that her husband was wearing. Another had a payslip with the name Gómez, the same last name as Raúl's.

Carmen ran the whole way to the bus stop. She was relieved to see that none of the bodies was Raúl's. But she was also convinced that she would never see him again.

When Raúl came back to the campamento, he found out that his job was gone. When Carmen and one of

their girls was arrested a little later and held in an army barracks for two days, he gave up.

He fled from the campamento and thus lost both the hovel he lived in and the right to one of the new houses that are being built for families in the neighborhood.

Raúl Gómez, a man who considered himself rich when he was getting about \$100 a month in wages, no longer has any hope. He has no job, no home, no future, not even guarantees of his life.

He is a typical case.

Tens of thousands like him, laborers, slum dwellers, and wage workers in the nationalized factories go in fear of their lives. They know that sooner or later, depending on how long the repression lasts, they are going to lose their jobs and their homes.

It is against them that the repression and the pogroms are aimed. A worker in Chile who openly supported Allende and socialism in the past three months knows what can happen to him.

He is a marked man, like a Jew in Nazi Germany.

In Escotilla Tres, Entrance Ramp No. 3 in the National Stadium, the military junta demonstrated this on a massive scale.

This ramp was the "cell" where all the newcomers landed. A month and two days after the coup, I met eleven workers from Chena in the small suburb of San Bernardo.

They were almost bubbling over and happy to have come to the National Stadium. They thought their lives were saved.

"We don't know how many workers the military shot in Chena. We only heard shooting and found in the roll call that people had disappeared."

"You didn't see anyone shot, then?" I asked.

"See? We had blindfolds on all the time." Rómulo, a truck driver, said that he sat in Chena sixteen days blindfolded!

Chena was the military's shooting gallery in San Bernardo. It sits on a hill and is surrounded by barbed wire. There are no buildings, just sheds open on all sides. There is no water and no toilets. And people were held prisoner for weeks there!

A month after the coup, the new methods of repression could be noted in the National Stadium. The first

question fellow prisoners asked a newcomer was where he was the day he was arrested—at home, on the job, in the street.

The second question was equally certain. Where were you taken?

If the answer was the National Stadium, they shrugged their shoulders.

He hadn't had anything to complain of yet.

But if the answer was "the Fifth Precinct," the "airbase in Colina," the "Tacna barracks," then a third ques-



PINOCHET: Presides over daily slaughter of Chilean workers.

tion was automatically asked. "How much did they beat you?"

Some didn't have to be asked. The three boys from the René Schneider campamento came in with bandaged eyes, swollen lips, and cauliflower ears.

And in the morning inspection, when people could finally take off their clothes and unwind a little, they pointed out the ones who had gone through the barracks and the precinct. Their arms were beaten raw and they had ugly bruises on their backs.

And they were glad to be in the National Stadium, with the International Red Cross and the UN Refugee Committee. Now they only faced questioning, in the bicycle-racing track building.

A month after the coup, almost all of the people coming into Escotilla Tres were workers and poor. They were the new victims of the new methods of repression. And the roundups were so indiscriminate that the results seemed almost ridiculous.

For example, there was the line of

newcomers that appeared suddenly in one morning inspection, dominated by five boys in shiny green uniforms with the name of the Savory glass factory on the back.

They had been taken off the job four days before and softened up at a military post.

There were also examples of the monumental stupidity and ignorance underlying the repression. Many of those who came in had been arrested because they had 100-centavo notes in their wallets—worth about a tenth of a cent after the inflation of the Allende period.

"The police told me that this bill was the secret sign of the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left]," one of them told me. "Like a lot of other people, I saved one as a curiosity. Never in my life have I had anything to do with the ultraleftists like the MIR."

There was a Japanese who had been mistaken for a Brazilian. There was a retired air force noncom who had been going around in civilian clothes but wearing his old service revolver.

And there was a grumbling, ill-tempered old Spaniard. He was the economics secretary to the cardinal in Chile and a personal friend of Pope Paul VI.

The military junta has issued an order that all unregistered guns in the country should be turned in at the churches. So now he was accused of having "stolen the said weapons from the churches and turned them over to extremists."

He came in, in shirtsleeves. He had left his coat at his worktable when he came in to the police station to answer the false charge. The prisoners stole a blanket for him and gave him the warmest place to sleep, in the ladies restroom.

So, Escotilla Tres was a "safe harbor." The only thing that could happen to you after you got there was two or three interrogations, which might be rough.

Then came the decision—trial before a military tribunal or release.

For a Chilean worker in the National Stadium there is no difference between trial or release. He can never expect anything more than "conditional freedom." That means that every night he must be in his house and if anyone comes looking for him

he has to turn himself in immediately to the authorities.

And staying "home" in a campamento, where informers keep a constant eye on people who have been in the National Stadium, can mean ending up face down along the Avenida Departamental.

The military "search" these campamentos in raids for weapons and political leaders. They are appointing informers as the new leaders and renaming the settlements. "New Havana" is now called "New Dawn," and "Ho Chi Minh" is called "Happy Valley." The settlement of "Three Bullets" got

the name "Virgin Maria."

And if you get through the military's "house-by-house searches," there are still the night raids, when the police come. The police know their districts well. They do not come looking for weapons. They know that there aren't any. They go directly after the people they want.

But even if everything goes all right at "home," there is still the problem of making a living. Workers are sent out of the National Stadium with the notation "Marxist" on their work permits. They have no chance of finding work in today's Chile. □

unist and Socialist), who sold out countless struggles to the bosses in the name of helping out with "the war against fascism," aided Perón in his plan of winning support from the workers. He promoted unionization, especially of the new workers coming from the interior.

So, with the bosses divided and big sectors of the workers movement behind Perón, the 1946 elections were held, which the general won by a narrow margin. The workers movement, which tipped the balance toward a victory for Perón, won big gains that it still remembers today.

Perón played a positive role for the country in opposing the penetration of U. S. imperialism, the rising colossus. At the same time, he defended capitalist order without impinging fundamentally on its economic structure (he did not expropriate the oligarchy). In the trade-union sphere, he followed the same line. He pushed unionization but the state held the top echelons in an iron grip through the trade-union bureaucracy that Perón himself appointed. This enabled him to keep the workers movement hitched to the bosses' policy.

But by the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, this anti-imperialist orientation was already beginning to shift. Perón supported U.S. imperialist intervention in Korea, hosted President Eisenhower's brother, Milton Eisenhower, and signed the OAS agreements and a whopping petroleum contract with Standard Oil.

Compañeros who recall Perón's first term in office should now realize that things have changed. Perón did not win the current election by a narrow margin but by the largest percentage in history. The situation this time is that the bosses (despite their various shadings of difference) supported General Perón, and they are not divided as in 1946. Their current unity is reflected in the Pacto Social, which represents agreement in the economic field.

Peron 'Not the Same As in 1946'

Imperialism and Argentine Bosses United Behind Peronist Regime

[The following article appeared in the November 8 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, weekly paper of the Argentine PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores — Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The thousands of workers who voted for General Perón did so with his previous administrations in mind and in repudiation of the past eighteen years of deprivation and sell-out to imperialism. However, in 1973, General Perón is not going to reenact his earlier governments. Instead he is going to throw his weight behind the Argentine bosses' plan known as the Pacto Social [Social Pact] in order to get it firmly under way.

For decades, the Argentine oligarchy and bourgeoisie were partners and allies of British imperialism. But since the start of the postwar period British imperialism has been on the decline throughout the world, and it has adopted a policy of making an orderly retreat from its domains in the face of the onslaught of the new yankee imperialist colossus.

Confronted with the expansionist policy of U. S. capitalism, big sectors

of the Argentine oligarchy saw better prospects in selling themselves to the new colossus. Grain firms like Bemberg and important sectors of industrialists and the oligarchy went over to the United States. This led to a division in the two traditional Argentine political parties, the Conservative and Radical parties, giving rise to pro-U. S. and pro-British factions.

The June 4, 1943, coup d'etat was an attempt by nationalist sectors of the army to prevent the regime from falling into the hands of the pro-U. S. oligarchy.

The dispute between these sectors was reflected in the different positions they took on the war. While the pro-U. S. wing pushed for Argentina's entry into the war, the pro-British wing proposed neutrality, under cover of which it could continue to supply Argentine beef to Britain.

Colonel Perón became the leader of the proneutrality wing, representing a new tactic to resolve the situation, seeking the support of the workers movement. And he won this backing as the result of an exceptional economic situation. The large reserves piled up during the war enabled him to make concessions to the workers. Today this situation has been reversed and our country has accumulated a \$6 thousand million debt to imperialism.

Moreover, the betrayals by the old workers movement leaderships (Com-

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On the political plane this unity is represented by the FREJULI [Frente Justicialista de Liberación—Social Justice Liberation Front, the Peronist electoral front] and the Hora del Pueblo [Hour of the People, a meeting ground between the Peronists and other bourgeois parties]. Even the "gorilla" Manrique himself wished Perón well! (In Mendoza the Manriquista representatives supported Peronist congressmen against Martínez Baca [the liberal Peronist governor that the right-wing Peronists are trying to purge].)

Last week, the Church fathers shifted their support to Perón. We are not referring to the humble Third World priests, but to the top echelons of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The Casa Rosada greeted Monsignors Tortolo, Primatesta, and Zarpe with big smiles. What a far cry from September 16, 1955, when the Church and the "gorillas" were spearheading the pro-U. S. coup d'etat.

What is it that impels the vast majority of the bosses to support Perón? What has inspired the Church fathers to consecrate this miracle? There are various factors involved, but the decisive one is the bosses' fear and panic that the working class may continue along the road of the Córdoba uprisings. The bosses are uniting to keep the demands and mobilizations of the workers from accelerating the crisis of the capitalist system, because in the workers and popular struggles the proletariat has been forging a movement conscious of its strength, a movement that can raise demands and fight, and even bring down, the most repressive dictatorships.

Fear of this happening is what unifies the bosses and even inspires U. S. imperialism itself to send Perón its best wishes.

Perón has an instrument at his disposal that other Argentine bosses cannot use with the same facility—the trade-union bureaucracy.

The plan to put a damper on workers struggles requires the kind of union leadership that lends itself to this role—the hated trade-union bureaucracy. On November 2, in a nationally broadcast speech at the headquarters of the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor], Perón stated:

"The Argentine trade-union organization has a staff of honest and capable leaders."

Was it "honest" and "capable" leaders who signed the Pacto Social behind the workers' backs? How about the leaders who papered the streets of Buenos Aires with statements of support for the Sassoon bosses against striking workers? Do they deserve congratulations?

The "honesty and capability" that Perón grants these leaders mean that they are faithful servants of the bosses, not of the working class they claim to represent. Last week [Labor] Minister Gelbard relied on this "honesty and capability" to say: "What need is there for wage increases? These are not fundamental measures." Of course they are not fundamental measures. Fundamental measures would involve beginning the expropriation of the imperialists and the oligarchy! But isn't there a crying need for wage increases? Do Mr. Gelbard and the bureaucracy, who, with General Perón's support, have frozen raises in the last two years' contract negotiations, believe that a 100,000-peso [about US \$102]

minimum monthly wage is just?

Compañeros, is General Perón's present government the same as his previous administrations? We do not think so.

The bosses are not divided as in 1946 but are united despite their differences around the Pacto Social supported by Perón. The Peronist trade unionists are not a mighty emerging force sweeping everything before them but an obstructionist leadership hated by all the rank-and-file workers. The economic situation does not permit Perón to make concessions to the workers, unless he expropriates imperialism and the oligarchy (something he is not ready to do in a thoroughgoing way). For the time being, U. S. imperialism does not regard Perón as an enemy; rather the two are exchanging good wishes.

This is why we cannot place any trust in the present government in a belief that solutions will come from the top. To achieve solutions to the most compelling problems, instead of relying on the government, we must organize ourselves and mobilize. □

Chilean Trotskyist Held at Pisagua

Junta to Try Hector Gutierrez

Héctor Gutiérrez, a member of the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR—Revolutionary Socialist party, the Chilean section of the Fourth International) is to be tried by a military tribunal for "ideological" crimes. Gutiérrez, a Chilean national, had been a visiting professor at the Universities of Mexico, Havana, Chicago, Lima, and Rome. At the time of his arrest immediately after the coup, he was employed as a professor of demography at the School of Public Health at the University of Chile.

He was first taken to the National Stadium, but now it appears that he may be transferred to Pisagua, a small, isolated port town in the north where nearly 300 prisoners are being held. Pisagua is where many leftists of various tendencies were held prisoner (and died either from executions or the living conditions) under the regime of Gabriel González Videla,

from 1946 to 1952.

Gutiérrez's wife, who also taught at the School of Public Health, has been fired. She is being allowed to collect her husband's paycheck from the university, through the authorization of a social worker, until Gutiérrez is convicted. However, 50 percent of his salary is being deducted "voluntarily" for "national reconstruction." Gutiérrez has been allowed only one visit with his wife and their infant daughter since he was taken prisoner at the time of the coup.

The United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA, 150 Fifth Avenue, Room 311, New York, N. Y., 10011), in a report on the Gutiérrez case, called for action to be taken immediately to stop his possible execution, obtain his release, and secure for him a guarantee of safe-conduct out of the country. □

Baluchistan: The Next Bangladesh?

By Ernest Harsch


"All the conditions are present to transform Baluchistan into a new Bangladesh," wrote Jean-Pierre Vientot in the November issue of the monthly *Le Monde Diplomatique*. The October 10 Japanese English-language daily *Asahi Evening News* quoted an official of the National Awami party, which has a strong base in Baluchistan, as saying that the "makings of a new Bangladesh are there. There are freedom-fighters in the hills—several thousand of them. The army has been sent against them."

The analogy with Bangladesh has not been lost even on Pakistani governmental officials, as the clashes between government troops and Baluchi nationalists have continued to mount. The governor of the province of Baluchistan has declared that between 6,000 and 20,000 guerrillas are active there and in March, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sent one third of the Pakistani army—80,000 men—to Baluchistan to put down the resistance. One official in Quetta admitted that more than 100 soldiers had been killed in the past three months, while Attaullah Mengal, vice-president of the National Awami party, charged that about 400 Baluchis had died in the government attacks.

Baluchistan, a largely arid and mountainous region, is the largest and most sparsely populated province in Pakistan. More than one million Baluchis live in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan and in parts of the province of Sind, while 750,000 more live across the border in Iran. In addition, the Pathans, who comprise the second largest nationality in Baluchistan, also spill over into Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP), where they are the majority, and into large parts of Afghanistan. Both the Baluchis and Pathans, many of whom still follow tribal traditions and live in almost inaccessible areas, have a long history of opposition to the various central governments that have

administered the region.

In 1955, when Ayub Khan dissolved the four provinces of West Pakistan into the "One Unit" as a means of strengthening his hold over what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), the Baluchis responded with small-scale guerrilla ac-



BHUTTO: Ordered up a rebellion in district of Baluchistan.

tion against the central government. The four provinces were restored in November 1969 by the Yahya Khan regime.

The general elections of December 1970 gave the National Awami party (NAP) majorities in the provincial assemblies of Baluchistan and the NWFP. The NAP, which favored greater autonomy for Baluchis, Pathans, and Bengalis, became the principal bourgeois opposition to Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) after Bhutto took over from Yahya in the wake of Bangladesh independence.

The NAP's calls for autonomy for Baluchistan and the NWFP, and the development of nationalist activity raised fears in the capital, Islamabad,

that the Bangladesh experience might be duplicated in the remaining section of the Islamic state. Early in 1973, Bhutto decided to take actions against the NAP and to strengthen the federal government.

In February, Abdul Qayyum Khan, Pakistani minister of the interior, organized a rebellion against the NAP regime in Lasbela, a district in the southern part of Baluchistan. Attaullah Mengal, who was then prime minister of Baluchistan, quickly organized a militia and crushed the central-government-sponsored uprising. A few days later, a cache of arms was "uncovered" at the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad. Bhutto charged that the weapons had been destined for the NAP forces in Baluchistan. He used this as a pretext for removing the NAP governors of Baluchistan and the NWFP and replacing them with two pro-Bhutto men.

A state of emergency was declared and thousands of suspected NAP members and sympathizers were arrested. The October issue of *People's Front*, the newspaper of the Democratic party of Baluchistan (Iranian), reported that more than 3,000 NAP members as well as 5,000 other Baluchis had been arrested. In addition, many have fled across the border into Afghanistan to escape the terror.

The Pakistani army, while not yet carrying out large-scale massacres as it did in Bangladesh, has razed entire villages, poisoned drinking wells, killed sheep and other livestock, raped women, tortured prisoners, and killed suspected leaders of the resistance. According to the November 6 *Asahi Evening News*, Ajmal Khatak, a former general secretary of the NAP who is now coordinating the Pathan and Baluchi resistance from Afghanistan, reported that the Islamabad forces have also used napalm against villages suspected of being in sympathy with the nationalists.

The NAP, most of whose leaders are tribal chiefs or landowners, never intended to break away from the federal government or to mobilize the masses of Baluchis and Pathans against it. The October 10 *Asahi Evening News* quoted one NAP leader as saying: "We were never secessionists. But Bhutto is driving us into this position." The June 2 Karachi *Sun* further underlined the defensive

posture of the NAP: "Khan Wali Khan [president of NAP] repeated his allegations that every method was being adopted to push the people of Baluchistan towards taking the course of separation. . . .

"He said President Bhutto was taking the country towards disintegration. The people must act now to prevent him from doing any harm to the country."

Aijaz Ahmad, writing in the May-June *Pakistan Forum*, described the conflict between the NAP and the regime in Islamabad in these terms:

"The modern state as it is presently organized in Pakistan does not wish to emancipate the Baluchistani masses; rather, it wishes to help in their subjugation by the more developed feudalisms of Punjab and Sindh and by the bureaucratic capital of Karachi, who will all accept the Baluchi Sardars [tribal chiefs] as junior, acquiescent partners but not as equal competitors. This is the hub of the centre-province conflict. The masses are not a party to it. The refusal of the Sardars to accept that secondary role does mean, however, a conflict and contradiction between the national ruling class and this particular segment of it. The Sardars have to mobilize the masses here against the encroachment on their indigenous privilege."

The NAP leaders would be more than willing to put the brakes on the growing Baluchi and Pathan movements for national self-determination if the Bhutto regime were willing to call a halt to the fighting, release the political prisoners, and allow Baluchistan and the NWFP a greater degree of autonomy. A planned civil-disobedience campaign, which had been scheduled to begin last June 15, was postponed indefinitely in the hope of opening negotiations with Bhutto, reported the July 26 *Christian Science Monitor*. Walter Schwarz of the London Observer (News) Service reported October 10 that some NAP leaders were prepared to accept a new coalition government with Bhutto's PPP if he acceded to their demands.

But so far Bhutto has shown no signs of willingness to compromise, and the conflict continues to escalate week by week, threatening to go beyond the control of either Bhutto or the NAP.

Should the resistance to Bhutto's at-

tacks spark a real mass uprising, the shah of Iran would be prepared to intervene militarily to help crush it. Tehran and Islamabad are both members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the shah has been building up his military strength in the region for the past few years.

In his *Le Monde Diplomatique* article Jean-Pierre Viennot described the shah's interest in Baluchistan: "The existence of an autonomous, democratic regime in Pakistani Baluchistan would inevitably have repercussions in Iranian Baluchistan. . . . Furthermore, Baluchistan occupies a strategic position along the Gulf of Oman that



SHAH: Ready to "protect" Pakistan's rule with troops.

is regarded as a 'security zone' by the Iranian government, which claims the right to intervene with arms against any revolutionary movement, as it has already done in the Sultanate of Oman."

The shah himself said, according to Viennot: "If Pakistan breaks up, a new Vietnam could develop. We must act so as to keep Pakistan from coming to pieces. That would be a terrible catastrophe, a Vietnam-type situation of newer and greater dimensions. I am frightened at the mere thought. If that should occur despite everything, the least that we could do, in our own national interests, would be to take protective measures in Baluchistan."

Such "protective measures" are already under way. Two giant military bases are under construction at Chah Bahar and Jask in Iranian Baluchistan. The \$600-million military base at Chah Bahar will be the largest of its kind in the Indian Ocean.

The May *People's Front* reported that Tehran had sent five divisions—80,000 men—into Iranian Baluchistan: "Sparsely populated Baluchistan today gives the look of a vast army camp. Most of these troops are robbing and looting foodstores and sheep or goats from poor Baluch herdsmen. Their behaviour with Baluch inhabitants is such as if they were an enemy force." The June 7 Karachi *Leader* also reported that three military encampments had been built at Kharan, Turbat, and Khuzdar in Pakistani Baluchistan with the aid of Iranian troops.

Peking, which backed Yahya Khan against Bangladesh in 1971, also is supporting Bhutto and the shah against any possible secessionist developments in Baluchistan. *Hsinhua* reported on June 19 that Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei said on a visit to Tehran: "His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah once said that the situation both east and west of Iran constitutes a very strong warning to Iran and that the nation has to strengthen its defences in view of the prevailing situation in the region. It is necessary and understandable for Iran to take measures to strengthen her defences for safeguarding her security, independence and sovereignty."

Whatever the political and military efforts on the part of Islamabad, Tehran, and Peking to stabilize the region, the situation is already reaching beyond the limited goals of the NAP leadership. In 1972, when the NAP ruled both Baluchistan and the NWFP, the Kissan-Mazdoor party (KMP—Peasant-Worker party) organized peasant uprisings and land occupations.

Much of the land tilled by the peasants is tribal property, but the *sardars* (tribal chiefs) have been trying to get title to the land. The *sardars* also collect a traditional *shishak*, or feudal tax, from the peasants working the tribal land.

In Kalat, in southern Baluchistan, the Kissan-Mazdoor party organized the peasants and agricultural workers to resist the expropriations of tribal land and to stop payment of the shi-

shak. The strongest resistance came in those areas where the NAP governor and chief minister collected their tribal taxes.

Aijaz Ahmad, in "Baluchistan's Agrarian Question," in the May-June *Pakistan Forum* described the response of Governor Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo to the peasant movement: "The retaliation of the provincial government was swift, partly because the locale of the resistance affected the two chiefs of the Baluchi state. The provincial militia, the Baghis [terror squads], and police came into action in early June [1972] killing, strafing, using mortar and deploying various other forms of terror. More than four hundred cultivators and rural workers were arrested in the first haul at Jhal Jao. Thousands of others have been driven out of Jao, Avaran, and other places; the Sardars and their clans have appropriated literally miles of cultivable land. It is their government in Baluchistan, and this particular drive for appropriation is no different than what has been going on in Baluchistan ever since the NAP government came to power."

Besides the KMP a number of Baluchi nationalist groups to the left of the NAP have also emerged. Allied with the Democratic party of Baluchistan (Iranian) are the People's Democratic party of Baluchistan and the People's Democratic party of Sind, both of which describe themselves as Marxist-Leninist. Though they seem to agree with Mao's concept of a "people's army" based in the countryside to carry on the struggle, they openly reject the Maoist label because of Peking's positions on Bangladesh and Baluchistan.

The NAP itself has split, the dissidents forming the NAP-Revolutionary Group, which criticized the NAP's sardar leadership. Similarly, the NAP student wing, the Baluchi Students Organization (BSO), suffered the break-away of the BSO-Awami Group, which charges that the NAP has "renounced its socialist and revolutionary ideas and transformed itself into a social-democratic party representing the interests of the tribal chiefs and the big landholders."

Should a compromise between Bhutto and the NAP be worked out, there are sections of the Baluchi nationalist movement that have indicated in advance their opposition to any deals with Bhutto that disregard the

rights of the Baluchis and Pathans to self-determination. An editorial in the October *People's Front* spelled this out clearly: "Any talk of a peaceful solution to the problem, while Bugti remains Governor and political workers are in jails and uniformed stooges of Bhutto-Tikka and Aziz Ahmed are roaming our land, is just a deception."

Bhutto, however, remains the main obstacle to any compromise. His intransigence, for the moment, may very well drive the NAP leaders further than they originally intended to go,

In Reply to a Talmudist

Footnotes to Wohlforth's Footnotes to Footnotes in Trotsky Volumes

By Naomi Allen

Tim Wohlforth a leader of the Workers League, is dissatisfied with the footnotes in the *Writings of Leon Trotsky (1929-40)* series issued by the revolutionary publishing house, Pathfinder Press. He is so dissatisfied in fact that he devoted two articles to the subject in recent issues of his newspaper, the *Bulletin*.

Wohlforth deplors the "tendency . . . to introduce in the form of footnotes distortions and what amounts to political polemics against Trotsky." If the purity of footnotes appears hardly to be a burning question, keep in mind that the Workers League is one of the sects on the fringes of the Trotskyist movement whose chief occupation is sniping at the Socialist Workers party and the Fourth International.

Wohlforth's thesis is that the American Trotskyist movement was born with a congenital defect—its leadership, "particularly James P. Cannon." Consequently its theoretical bankruptcy was demonstrated from the start, provided you have sharp eyes. Trotsky, according to Wohlforth, was able to hold the American party together while he was alive. But the seeds of its later "degeneration" become apparent upon proper analysis of Trotsky's role forty years ago in two SWP factional struggles.

In the recently published volume *Writings of Leon Trotsky (1932)* Wohlforth found fresh material to illustrate his thesis. He chose as his first

just as the events in Bangladesh led to its secession even though Mujibur Rahman had sought only autonomy for East Pakistan.

Furthermore, the contradictions that have emerged in Bangladesh between the relatively weak ruling class and the masses of peasants and workers are already quite evident within the Baluchi nationalist movement. The development of a struggle for independence could thus boil over into a struggle against the Baluchi sardars and landowners themselves. □

item the case of B. J. Field.

Field visited Trotsky in Turkey, where he provided the exiled leader with some useful economic data. Trotsky recognized Field's positive qualities, but the New York intellectual was under a cloud. He had violated discipline and had been expelled from the American Trotskyist movement.

Trotsky wrote to his American co-thinkers, urging them to find a way for Field to reestablish himself with the movement. Field later rejoined only to be expelled again in 1934 for breaking discipline while in the leadership of an important strike.

Wohlforth writes that "Trotsky was concerned that Cannon was proceeding administratively towards intellectuals in the party rather than politically struggling with them to develop the party as a whole. . . . He objected to Cannon's organizational methods regarding Field."

But Trotsky's letters on Field to the American leadership, which have been included in this volume, are enough to convince any objective reader that Wohlforth is projecting his own desire to "struggle with intellectuals." Trotsky recognized that Field's membership in the Communist League of America (predecessor of the SWP) was "made more difficult or impossible . . . because Field, who during his past has not yet developed the capacity for a leading role in a revolutionary organization, nevertheless is pushed

onto that road because of his intellectual qualities. . . . As the League remains yet a small pioneer organization, it thereby feels itself compelled to take sharper measures to protect its own existence."

Trotsky indicated his understanding and acceptance of the disciplinary measures, and reassured the leadership that he was not trying to go over their heads and ignore their decision.

The editors of this volume of Trotsky's writings added a footnote providing more information on this episode. The footnote quoted from Cannon's book *Speeches to the Party*, in which he recalled "'the happy day when we got that letter,' because for him it meant that in the Left Opposition the relations between national sections and the international leadership would not resemble [those] developed in the Comintern after Lenin."

It's not clear what Wohlforth objects to in this footnote. He would obviously have preferred it if the editors had not included Cannon's evaluation of that episode; but how the evaluation constitutes a "distortion" of Trotsky's views, or a "political polemic" against them is not explained. Instead, Wohlforth turns to Cannon's views on correct structure for an international, as expressed further on in *Speeches to the Party*, and polemicalizes on that.

Wohlforth's next item is a factional dispute in 1932 between a group headed by Cannon and one headed by Max Shachtman. At issue in this dispute were not principled or even tactical differences, but rather frictions and conflicts that at the time appeared to be largely personal in nature.

Trotsky, who did not hesitate to pin responsibility for political errors, and who did so unsparingly when he felt the situation called for it, attributed the dispute instead to the objective difficulties faced by the American group. In a March 7, 1933, letter (*Writings* 32-33), he pointed to the political quiescence at this stage of the depression, which did not permit mass work or expansion and which resulted in "all sorts of personal antagonisms." He argued that the dispute would only be resolved "by broadening and deepening the mass work," for which new openings were appearing, and by recruiting fresh forces into the organization.

In a note to a subsequent article by Trotsky on the same subject, the editors included information on the out-

come of the dispute: The frictions were resolved by mutual consent and the groups went on to collaborate effectively until 1939, when Shachtman developed serious disagreements with the SWP's program and split from the party.

The editors quoted from a 1942 reference to this factional dispute in Cannon's book *The History of American Trotskyism*. Cannon recalls that the factional fights of the early Opposition "weren't fully comprehensible to the membership because the great political issues which were implicit in them had not yet broken through. However, they were not mere personal quarrels, as they so often appeared to be, but, as is now quite clear to all, the premature rehearsal of the great, definitive struggle of 1939-40 between the proletarian and petty-bourgeois tendencies within our movement."

Wohlforth, a former follower of Shachtman, finds this footnote particularly reprehensible. To cite Cannon's judgment in retrospect nine years later "amounts to political polemics against Trotsky!" The editors are using footnotes to distort Trotsky's meaning, just as the Stalinists employed footnotes to distort Lenin's meaning!

Wohlforth declares that "the great political issues" inherent in the struggle were not fully comprehensible to Cannon either at the time and that "the dispute broke out in 1932 because of the inability of Cannon to break down the divisions within the party, to train trade unionists as Marxists, as well as to break middle class sections from the middle class."

Wohlforth is entitled to his view, but it bears absolutely no resemblance to the view expressed by Trotsky on this question. Out of consistency, Wohlforth ought to maintain that the "great political issues" were not fully comprehensible to Trotsky either. (As Wohlforth points out, Trotsky only traced the roots of the Shachtman tendency back to 1937.) By offering his own subjective judgment on this episode, isn't Wohlforth publicly engaging in "what amounts to political polemics against Trotsky"?

Wohlforth's first example of "distortions" and "polemics against Trotsky" went astray. The second turned out to be self-incriminating. We leave to the reader to judge the outcome of the third.

Writings of Leon Trotsky (1932) includes Trotsky's 1926 speech "Pil-

sudskism, Fascism, and the Character of Our Epoch," together with an introduction to the speech that Trotsky wrote in 1932. In a note on page 390—not the "longest of any in the entire *Writings* series," as Wohlforth mistakenly says—the editors included part of a letter by Isaac Deutscher, who was once a young leader of the Polish Opposition in 1932 and who wrote the well-known three-volume biography of Trotsky. In a passage whose authorship is clearly identified, Deutscher takes issue with Trotsky's characterization of some of the leaders of the Polish CP as "Menshevik-types."

Wohlforth is appalled. Permitting a difference of opinion to be expressed for the sake of clarification and debate? That never happens in *his* organization. But it has been known to happen in the publications of Pathfinder Press before: Trotsky's *In Defense of Marxism* includes as an appendix "Science and Style," by James Burnham, an avowed anti-Marxist, audaciously subtitled "A Reply to Comrade Trotsky." *The Spanish Revolution (1931-39)* includes not only Trotsky's letters to Nin, but Nin's letters to Trotsky! The editors apparently felt that those interested in studying Trotsky would appreciate having this directly related material available. If Wohlforth had anything of worth to contribute in this field, the editors, one must imagine, would not have hesitated to refer to him in a footnote. Of course, Wohlforth would scorn that kind of immortality. His objective is much humbler. In this instance, he only wanted to cast a bit of mud on the admirable job Pathfinder Press has done in assembling and publishing Trotsky's writings.

In a letter to Diego Rivera, dated September 23, and contained in *Writings* 37-38, Trotsky characterized the sects of his time, which were the spiritual forebears of Wohlforth's Workers League:

"They follow us step by step. They borrow some of the elements of our analysis. They distort these elements without limit and counterpose them to the rest. They correct us. When we draw a human figure, they add a deformity. When it is a woman, they decorate her with a heavy mustache. When we draw a rooster, they put an egg under it. And they call all this burlesque Marxism and Leninism." □

French Abortion Group Holds Conference

[The following article on the first national conference of the Mouvement pour la Liberté de l'Avortement et de la Contraception (MLAC—Movement for Freedom of Abortion and Contraception) appeared in the November 16 issue of *Rouge*, weekly French Trotskyist paper. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The first national conference of MLAC was held November 10-11.

How was MLAC founded? After the issuing of the manifesto of 343 women [who declared that they had had "illegal" abortions] and after the Bobigny trial [of a young woman and her mother on charges of having arranged an illegal abortion], MLAC was born of an active challenge to the regime. In February 1973, 330 physicians declared publicly that they had performed abortions by the Karman method free of charge. It was then the public response to demands for abortion that made the full depth of the social problem come out into the open.

But at the same time that the demand arose, the necessity for coordinating and politicizing the struggle became felt. Members of popular family-planning groups and of the official Family Planning system, revolutionary militants, and members of the CFDT [Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Federation of Labor, the country's second largest trade-union federation] responded to a call put out by physicians who had performed abortions.

Agreement was reached on the basis of a charter that posed the problems of abortion and contraception from a class viewpoint without making any concessions to petty-bourgeois illusions.

Immediately after the founding of MLAC the Grenoble affair occurred. [Dr. Annie Ferrey-Martin was arrested on charges of having performed abortions.] The week of mobilization then organized by MLAC enabled the movement to get a start in many new

cities and to raise the demand of free abortion and contraception on demand for all.

The first national conference took place in Grenoble, the very city that kicked off the enormous mobilization to defend Annie Ferrey-Martin.

Was this symbolic? Undoubtedly it was, because it was a relaunching of action that was discussed by the 300 militants at the conference, representing about fifty cities including about twenty groups from the Paris region. Fifteen groups from Choisir [Choice, an abortion organization] responded to MLAC's call to assert their opposition to Choisir's national leadership and indicate their agreement with the militant class-based view delineated by MLAC.

Workshops were held on four points:

— A campaign around the proposed new law on abortion.

— A campaign for sex information in schools.

— The strategy and future of MLAC.

— Child-care centers.

The general discussion brought out how closely the future and strategy of MLAC are tied to the sort of action MLAC would press for during the parliamentary debate on the new law and beyond.

Since last May, local groups have proliferated and have reached a growing audience. None of them were able to restrict themselves solely to performing abortions without going under, not only because of the great demand, but also because of the realities of all the forms of oppression imposed on a daily basis by the capitalist system.

Each concretely came to the understanding that life must be changed, that social relations must be changed. But how? There are so many nagging questions—precise or confused—that cannot be put off until after the revolution. There were so many speeches that, while stressing the necessity for a real linkup with the workers and their struggles, demonstrated the weaknesses of the leaderships of the workers movement.

The absence at the conference of trade unionists participating in and

leading MLAC groups in the factories showed how far we still have to go.

As well founded as it may be, the fear of co-optation was bandied about by the very ones who are most susceptible to it, those who favor the immediate satisfaction of the demand for abortion over "political" action, which is supposedly "co-optable."

From the so-called wildcat abortions to the system of model child-care centers, the real danger was the same in all cases: the regime's tolerance. Can this pitfall be avoided by broadening the field of activity of the MLAC groups to include the struggle against sexual repression, by teaching people to make love better, as some people argued? Apart from the fantastic heterogeneity among MLAC militants on these questions, the problem would still remain. Do we want a Netherlands-type situation in which a repressive law stays on the books but in practice is not enforced, thus opening the door to all kinds of money-grubbing schemes?

That sort of co-optation is real and it bears watching. Are we just talking about abolishing the 1920 law? No, we will not present the regime with any more gifts like "wildcat child-care centers" or "wildcat abortion centers." We demand that these child-care centers and equipment for them be provided.

At the end of two days of discussion, agreement was unanimous on the necessity for taking the offensive against the regime again and of launching an immediate campaign.

Far from subordinating ourselves to the dates of the scheduled parliamentary debate, and without submitting or defending any particular bill that might be on the floor for debate in the National Assembly, we want to express our demand massively and publicly: Free abortion on demand!

We will not let the government hide its reactionary and repressive policy by refusing any new debate. We will denounce the government. We will utilize the performing of abortions and the mobilization of the masses to sharpen the offensive weapons of our struggle.

There will be a week of mobilization December 3-10.

On December 3 there will be press conferences in all cities to publicize our demand and to indict the regime for the number of illegal abortions,

their social causes, the lack of child-care and social facilities, the absence of contraception.

Throughout the week there will be public initiatives at hospitals, neighborhoods, and factories.

The week will culminate on December 9 and 10 with meetings and demonstrations in order to continue the

campaign.

Toulouse is already preparing a six-hour nonstop meeting for free abortion and contraception on demand.

A national campaign committee has been set up and will meet Sunday, November 18, to coordinate and decide on target dates.

The struggle has only begun. □

Marcos Proclaims Himself 'Revolutionary Hero'

Martial Law Regime in Philippines Fails to Crush Popular Resistance

By Antero Nanhaya

Manila

After somewhat more than a year of despotic military rule, Ferdinand Marcos has launched an intensive propaganda campaign depicting himself as the nation's "revolutionary hero," and comparing himself with Lenin, Mao Tsetung, Sukarno, and Castro. Choruses of adulation from his coterie of sycophants are aired on all radio and television stations. September 21, the anniversary of the signing of the martial law decree, was designated "Thanksgiving Day" and made an official holiday.

Songs pirated from the radical movement, with new lyrics praising the regime, are broadcast incessantly on the radio, and the name of a new newspaper, *Ang Bayani* (The Hero) mimics the title of the organ of the New (Maoist) Communist party of the Philippines, *Ang Bayan* (The Nation). These and other crude attempts to exploit the popularity of the resistance movement are implicit admissions of its appeal and latent strength.

The mock referendum last July 27-28 that gave the dictator a Yes vote of slightly more than 90 percent was partially for foreign consumption. Failure to vote was punishable by fine and imprisonment and the fearful populace knew it was futile to write No on the numbered ballots. Every local official was made to understand that he would lose his position if a substantial No vote should turn up in his area, and the "counting" was left to them. Final tabulation in Manila was handled by a lieutenant of Marcos. *Newsweek* magazine's reportage of the event caused the August 6 is-

sue to be banned from the country despite its proimperialist slant.

Behind the facade of tourist buses with military escorts, thousands of po-



MARCOS: New "revolutionary hero" of the Philippines.

litical prisoners languish without charges or trials. The only trial held was that of progressive newscaster Roger Arienda, who was sentenced to twelve years at hard labor. A scheduled show trial of opposition Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. backfired and was canceled when Aquino refused to defend himself but made a dramatic ap-

peal in the military court that leaked and was widely circulated underground.

Raids and arrests continue in greater Manila. Troops cordon off working-class sections after the midnight curfew, searching homes and detaining all males for identification and fingerprinting. A national ID card system reminiscent of such reactionary strongholds as the Union of South Africa and Taiwan is being prepared under the supervision of the Public Safety Division of the U.S. Agency for International Development and its International Police Academy in Washington. Drunken, swaggering police and soldiers commit cruel abuses against the terrorized populace. A 23-year-old honor student, Lilia R. Hilao, was raped and then tortured to death with hydrochloric acid by a constabulary unit commanded by Colonel Bienvenido Felix when she refused to divulge the whereabouts of her brother, who was wanted for radical activities.

Rice, the food staple of the population, is scarcer than at any time in Philippine history. Black marketeers sell the grain at 8 pesos (US\$1.19) per ganta (2 liters), the price having tripled since only last April. In Manila when rice is available at all, people must wait long hours on line to purchase a day's supply at inflated prices. This despite the fact that the nation boasts the most advanced technology in tropical rice production and hosts the heralded International Rice Research Institute, funded by Rockefeller and Ford.

Fighting in Mindanao and adjacent islands continues unabated. The Muslim revolutionaries are tactically superior to the government troops and Christian mercenaries and are well prepared for a protracted guerrilla struggle. In Cotabato Province, the rebels have killed more than 800 government troops in the last twelve months. A surprise attack on Tarragona in Davao Oriental Province resulted in the deaths of fifty-two constabulary troops.

Morale in the army is low as favoritism decides which soldiers are sent into the rebel areas. In combat regions, the troops frequently get drunk and fire their guns indiscriminately, hoping to be disciplined, preferring a "month in the stockade to

a day in the mountains."

Captured Muslim towns and villages are completely razed in a policy of "collective punishment." Marcos has declared an amnesty for rebels who surrender, but the few who give up are usually killed in vengeance by the troops. In Lebak, Cotabato, 1,000 civilians caught in a cross fire sought protection from the army, and the young men, numbering about 100, were led away and shot. Two weeks of heavy bombing failed to dislodge rebel positions in Lebak, Parang, Carmen, and Sultan Kudarat, all in Cotabato. On Basilan Island, the civilian population, seeking refuge in the

mountains and coastal mangrove swamps, is being decimated by air bombardment. Fighting continues around the Goodrich rubber plantation, also in Basilan.

If conditions deteriorate further, the army may take over from Marcos in a palace coup. Such a move might well be led by General Fidel Ramos, commander of the Philippine Constabulary. Ramos, a second cousin of Marcos, enjoys considerable prestige with junior officers and would be readily acceptable to U.S. imperialism, which is often embarrassed by the blunders, inefficiency, and extravagance of the Marcos regime. □

Krasin trial, who had been held without trial since January, was also released shortly after Yakir and Krasin were. At the trial, she had testified that she had helped Yakir type parts of *The Chronicle of Current Events*, the leading underground opposition journal.

The writer Andrei Amalrik, best known for his book *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*, has had his sentence of three years in prison converted into three years in exile, even though he has not renounced his views.

Amalrik had already served one three-year sentence and was scheduled to be released in May 1973, but he was rearrested and retried for carrying out dissident activities among his fellow prisoners. Subsequent international protests over the Amalrik case undoubtedly had some influence in easing his conditions of imprisonment, although the bureaucrats announced that the change was solely for reasons of health.

But while the Stalinists have given reprieves to those dissidents who have recanted, they have also continued their repression against those who continue to attack the privileges of bureaucracy.

An article in the November issue of the Soviet monthly journal *Man and Law* hinted that Andrei Sakharov's citizenship might be lifted if he tried to go abroad. Sakharov has received an invitation from Princeton University to spend a year there as a visiting scholar.

Meanwhile, Sakharov's wife, Elena Bonner, was threatened by the secret police, whose agents hinted that she might be interned in a mental hospital. Interrogators from the KGB visited her three times in November, trying to get information linking her to *The Chronicle of Current Events*. "I refused to give evidence," she said. "I was told that I am probably mentally ill and this would explain my refusal to talk." One of the interrogators also alluded to the possible fate of her two children. Her daughter has already been dismissed from a university and her son lost his job as a communications engineer last summer.

In addition, the KGB agents questioned her about her involvement in smuggling the prison diary of Eduard S. Kuznetsov abroad for publication.

Dzyuba Reported to Have Recanted

Kremlin Intensifies Repression of Dissent


The Soviet bureaucracy has apparently succeeded in forcing another leading dissident to "recant" his views. The official Kremlin press agency, TASS, reported November 13 that Ivan Dzyuba, the 42-year-old author of *Internationalism or Russification?*, a Marxist critique of the bureaucracy's nationalities policy, had "unequivocally condemned" the positions he advanced in the book.

One of the leaders of the opposition movement in the Ukraine, Dzyuba had been arrested in January 1972 at the beginning of a Kremlin crackdown on dissent. Along with a number of other Ukrainian oppositionists, he was held incommunicado until March 1973, when he was sentenced to five years in prison and five years in exile.

Dzyuba suffers from tuberculosis, and many militants in the democratic movement feared that he would not survive his sentence. Deprivation of medical care for imprisoned political opponents is a terror tactic that has been widely used by the Kremlin.

TASS reported that Dzyuba had been pardoned after his alleged recantation and added that Dzyuba had promised to write a book refuting the ideas he advanced in *Internationalism or Russification?* There has been no confirmation of the TASS report from independent sources.

While putting maximum physical and psychological pressure on opposi-



ELENA BONNER SAKHAROV

tionists to renounce their views, the Kremlin has also apparently moved to reward those dissidents who capitulate to bureaucratic blackmail. A November 1 Reuters dispatch from Moscow reported that Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, who "confessed" to "anti-Soviet crimes" during a frame-up trial last September, had been released from prison. Each had received a sentence of three years in prison and three years in exile. A Moscow appeals court later reduced the sentences to just over one year for each defendant. Since they had already served a year of preventive detention during which they were forced into "confessing," they were turned loose.

Irina Belogorodskaya, one of the prosecution witnesses in the Yakir-

Kuznetsov was arrested three years ago for allegedly conspiring to hijack a plane to Israel. He was given a death sentence, which was later commuted to fifteen years at hard labor after international protests over the case. The KGB interrogators hinted to Elena Bonner that Kuznetsov's death-sentence might be reinstated if she refused to cooperate.

The secret police are reportedly now

carrying out an investigation of Gavril G. Superfin, who has done research for Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and Viktor A. Khaustov for alleged "anti-Soviet" activities in connection with publication of *The Chronicle of Current Events*. Another dissident, Yuri A. Shikhanovich, a former Moscow University mathematician, is also expected to be brought to trial early in December. □

Shah Charges 'Foreign Links'

Two Kurdish Nationalists Executed

[The following news item was released by the Organization of Kurdish Intellectuals of Iran.]

* * *

On Thursday, November 1, 1973, two more Kurdish patriots were shot dead by the shah's firing squads in Sanandaj, the center of the Kurdistan province in western Iran.

This news appeared in the semi-official papers *Etelat* and *Kayhan*. The complete text of the report read:

"Two persons accused of setting up a network and having links with foreign elements were executed at dawn today.

"The authorities had received information that a civilian, Aziz Mostafa Zadeh, had set up a network in Baneh Town together with some others, including Mohamad Sadiq, and had links with foreign elements, giving away news and information concerning the country.

"The security forces put these people under surveillance and when Mulla Qadir Werdi, another accomplice, returned from a secret trip abroad, accompanied by Mohamad Sadiq, they clashed with the security authorities. They were both wounded and captured, Mulla Qadir Werdi later dying in Baneh Hospital. At the time they both had in their possession a Colt pistol and ammunition, which were seized by the security forces.

"During the interrogation process, it was learned that Mulla Qadir Werdi had sent one of his confidants (Mohamad, son of Sadiq) to Baneh as a contact and had hidden him in the

home of Aziz Mostafa Zadeh, and there they together worked to gather information in order to pass it on to foreign agents. Therefore, Aziz Mostafa Zadeh and his collaborators were put under arrest.

"The dossier, after being sent through the normal procedure, was then sent up to the Military Court of Appeals and according to the verdict of the appeals court, Aziz Mostafa Zadeh and Mohamad, the son of Sadiq, were condemned to death, and each of their collaborators was sentenced to imprisonment. The court's sentences were carried out early this morning."

□

It should be stated here that according to this semiofficial news, it is impossible to ascertain any single idea about their motive in setting up such a network, and there is no information about what took place behind the closed doors of the court.

The shah's regime has long experience in diverting the realities away from the public and doesn't hesitate to put down any single cry for freedom. But despite this rigorous attempt, with the aid of a well-oiled propaganda apparatus, the realities will not remain hidden forever.

This new wave of bloodshed, which has taken place in total secrecy, cannot forever deceive the public, and it will be followed by great concern from the freedom-loving people elsewhere, and should rouse the voices of wrath from freedom-loving people and progressives in their protest against the brutality and crimes carried out by the archenemy of all the Iranian peoples.

The reality of this news is that these two martyrs were members of the Kurdistan Democratic party of Iran, and Mulla Qadir Werdi, whose name has been mentioned in connection with this incident, was a member of the central committee of that party. He was killed on Thursday, March 22, near Baneh Town. Following that incident several other militants were injured and many Kurdish patriots were arrested.

The two new martyrs were among those detainees. The Iranian regime is intent on carrying out its slaughter in silence and as a result has announced the murder of the patriots without mentioning their political motives.

The Kurdistan Democratic party of Iran has a long history of struggle against the shah's regime and will continue the struggle together with all combatants of Iran. The Iranian peoples, despite their various nationalities, are facing the same enemy, and will, hand in hand, crush the monarchist-fascist regime of Iran.

Aziz Mostafa Zadeh and Mohamad Sadiq are among the hundreds of Iranian patriots executed in recent years by the shah and his fascist regime. It is the clear duty of all freedom-loving people to urge the Iranian regime to publish the names and fate of arrested Kurdish patriots, to make public the names and sentences passed on all detainees. □



Famine Toll in Ethiopia May Reach 100,000

According to a United Nations report, between 50,000 and 100,000 people have died during the first ten months of 1973 from a famine afflicting Wallo Province in Ethiopia. In Chad, Upper Volta, the Sudan, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal food shortages have been taking their toll for four years. The badly organized and sporadic relief programs initiated by various charitable organizations have hardly begun to meet the needs of the millions of Africans in the famine areas.

Besides the staggering toll in human lives that has already been taken, losses of crops and the decimation of the livestock in Wallo Province promises to push the Ethiopian casualty figures even higher. About five million Ethiopians live in the famine-stricken region and many of them are trying to flee to areas where relief supplies are more available. The lack of organization of the government relief efforts and the poor quality of the roads make distribution of the supplies even more difficult in Wallo.

Until the end of October, the regime in Addis Ababa gave no indications that famine conditions were so widespread. Now that the extent of the famine has become known, it has begun "investigations" to determine why the famine was ignored for so long. The regime has suspended the acting governor general of the province, Sololeman Abraham, charging that he was responsible for the cover-up.

But some sources put the blame even higher. According to the November 9 *Le Monde*, Mr. Burgess, a spokesman for the Christian Famine Relief Committee, charged that the minister of tourism helped play down the extent of the famine so as not to "discourage" tourists. He also said that the province governor—who happens to be Emperor Haile Selassie's son—refused to accept relief funds contributed by students in Addis Ababa. A spokesman for the West German section of the World Organization Against Hunger charged that Haile Selassie's conduct was "irresponsible and inhuman" and called on the international relief

organizations to struggle against his "ill-conceived national pride."

The regimes in the other famine-stricken African countries have been equally slow to act. In May, René Dumont, a French agronomist who had just completed a tour of the region, blamed the governments of Chad, Niger, Mali, Upper Volta, Mauritania, and Senegal for not acting more quickly. He said they knew in September 1972 that harvests would be insufficient but did not ask for aid until February 1973, when food stocks were already completely exhausted. All this despite the experience of four previous years of famine.

Peter Dunn, writing in the November 3 *New Zealand Herald*, described the hypocrisy of Selassie's "national pride": "Today, as the skeletons totter in their thousands toward the pitifully few relief centres, Addis Ababa, the capital, is full of new prestige buildings; and the country still maintains the biggest standing army in Africa."

The kind of "aid" that Selassie is interested in receiving is hardly of the variety that will help famine victims: From 1953 to 1970, the Addis Ababa regime received more than \$160 million in military assistance from the Pentagon, which is about two-thirds of Washington's total military allocation to Africa. The Pentagon also maintains a strategic communications base at Asmera and has sent "advisers" to help Selassie crush the eleven-year-old rebellion in the province of Eritrea.

The determination of the Ethiopian regime to keep the lid on any news of the famine was highlighted in May when seventeen students were killed in Dessye, capital of Wallo Province, for protesting government inaction against the famine. An investigation is also being launched to "place the blame" for the killing of the students. "Official sources in Addis Ababa," reported the November 18 *New York Times*, "said that the students were shot by the police in a demonstration following the refusal of the acting governor general, Sololeman Abraham, to meet with them to discuss

the famine. According to the official sources, at least six were killed immediately, others were put to death later, and an unknown number were wounded."

Besides attempting to cover up the famine, the regime has also blamed it on purely "natural causes," denouncing any attempts to "exploit" the situation by hinting that the government bears heavy responsibility for the situation.

But the real underlying causes have little to do with "nature."

Ethiopia's land is worked primarily under a sharecropping system, where the tenant farmers—about 150,000 in Wallo Province alone—pay exorbitant rents to the absentee landlords. In addition, Peter Dunn reported in his November 3 *New Zealand Herald* article, "the burden for the tenant farmer has been increased by the dues and personal services he is obliged to give to local officials. This activity has been illegal since 1944 but as the local judges are frequently substantial landowners themselves, many overlook the rights of tenants with impunity.

"Poor communications and landlords whose absence creates unbridgeable gaps in the bureaucrats' lines of communications have only exacerbated the grim consequences of prolonged drought."

Jean de la Guérevière in the November 9 *Le Monde* drew a direct link between this landholding system and the famine: "Since they must pay exorbitant rents to the landlords (in Wallo Province, 50-75 percent of the harvest), the peasants are hardly encouraged to raise their productivity. What's the use of starting an irrigation project on some property when the landlord won't sign a lease and can evict the peasant at will?"

The regime's unwillingness to carry out agrarian reforms that would minimize the chances of recurrent famine and its reluctance to publicize the present one may just be related to the fact that the majority of the members in the Ethiopian parliament are landowners. □

Food for Thought

A study in California has found that drinkers are less likely than teetotalers to have heart attacks. The day's news probably doesn't upset people so much if they're too drunk to understand it.