


## **Why Nixon Rattled the H-Bomb**



*Public Demands Impeachment:*

***Storm of Anger  
Over Watergate  
Shakes Washington***

*A Survivor's Account:*

***Conditions  
Inside Santiago's  
Prison-Stadiums***

## Study Women's History

London

A two-day history workshop on the social history of women attracted some 500 participants in London the week-end of October 20-21.

The workshop, entitled Family, Work, and Home, was organised by members of the Womens Liberation Movement and male sympathisers. The majority of the papers were given by women who were researching the history of women. They included The History of the Housewife, Imperialism and the Cult of Motherhood 1900-1914, Women Blacksmiths of Cradley Heath, Shop Girls and Clerks in Late Victorian London, and Women and Home in the Chinese Revolution.

This was the third history workshop to be organised specifically with the aim of writing women back into history. Discussion from the floor took place after each paper, and the attendance revealed that a large number of women and some men, all over the country, are involved in research on women's history.

The papers tried not only to deepen knowledge of women's past role in industry and agriculture in England, but also to come to grips with the ideology of motherhood in certain eras, the changing nature of housework and the consequent change in female status, the nature and role of the family in particular historical periods, and the changing position of women through social revolution.

The workshops on women originated from a series of history workshops that had taken place over a number of years in labour history, at Ruskin College, Oxford, the leading labour college in the country.

The historians presenting their work on female history were concerned not only with writing women back into history, but also with concentrating on the history of the majority of humanity, rather than the ruling minority. The final discussion of the week-end was on Marxism, Feminism, and Social History.

Some of the papers have been published and are available from the History Workshop, Ruskin College, Oxford, England. □

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# Why Nixon Rattled the H-Bomb

Both Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had some difficulty convincing reporters—and most likely broad sections of the population as well—that the U.S. government and the Kremlin actually had a confrontation on October 25. On that day, in the early hours of the morning, U.S. military forces were placed on worldwide "precautionary alert." The alert, Kissinger and Nixon said, was intended to dissuade Brezhnev from dispatching Soviet troops to the Arab East. On the following day, Nixon indicated that the clash could have led to a "nuclear confrontation."

Not everybody believed it. At an October 25 news conference called by Kissinger to explain the alert, Marvin Kalb, a leading correspondent of the Columbia Broadcasting System, directly expressed his doubts about Kissinger's version of the reasons for the alert: "There has been some line of speculation this morning that the American alert might have been prompted as much perhaps by American domestic requirements as by the real requirements of diplomacy in the Middle East."

Kissinger answered with irritation: "Marvin, we are attempting to conduct the foreign policy of the United States with regard for what we owe not just to the electorate but to future generations. And it is a symptom of what is happening to our country that it could even be suggested that the United States would alert its forces for domestic reasons."

When Nixon held his several times postponed Watergate press conference on October 26, he was also asked whether the confrontation with Moscow had been a real one. He was more emphatic than Kissinger.

It was, he said, a "potentially explosive crisis." He added that it was "the most difficult crisis" since the October 1962 confrontation between Washington and the Kremlin over Castro's attempt to defend the Cuban revolution with missiles.

There are three main reasons why Nixon had difficulty getting people to believe that the confrontation was real. First, there is an increasing ten-

dency in the United States to disbelieve anything Nixon says. Second, a major crisis with the Soviet Union seemed tailor-made for Nixon in his efforts to extract himself from the Watergate quicksands. Third, Nixon has made such propaganda capital out of the détente that many people believe that there is no longer any possibility of a real confrontation between Moscow and Washington.

The deepening distrust of Nixon is, of course, thoroughly justified. It is a big new element in American politics epitomized in the demand to impeach the president. And there is no doubt that Nixon did all he could to use the crisis in the Arab East to divert attention from Watergate and the movement to impeach him. But the notion that the détente has rendered clashes between Moscow and Washington anachronistic is dangerously misleading. This confrontation was real. Not only was it real, it may well occur again, for the factors that brought it about are still operative.

There are a number of indications that significant sections of the U.S. ruling class genuinely feared that a showdown with the Kremlin was developing in the Arab East. Clear evidence is provided by the editorial reactions of the *New York Times*, which is generally not especially friendly to Nixon and, in the current domestic climate, would have little reason to help him overcome his Watergate problems.

On October 25, for example, in an editorial written after the second cease-fire resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council but before the U.S. alert was announced, the *Times* wrote: "Certainly the last thing anyone should want to do is to throw Soviet and American troops into the present highly volatile situation, even in the guise of peacemakers, as President Sadat of Egypt suggested. The conflict must not be allowed to escalate into a confrontation between the United States and Russian forces.

"That danger will persist, however, until the cease-fire becomes effective."

On October 26, the *Times* editorial board said this about the events of

the previous day:

"By an ironic coincidence, yesterday's Soviet-American confrontation came eleven years to the week after its classic predecessor, the Cuban missile crisis. The two confrontations differed enormously, but in one essential they were the same: Richard M. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev had to contemplate the same kind of nuclear holocaust that John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev recoiled from in 1962.

"The gravity of yesterday's crisis is indicated by the fact that Secretary of State Kissinger had to remind the Kremlin publicly of what was ultimately at stake. 'We possess, each of us, nuclear arsenals capable of annihilating humanity,' he told the world—and Moscow. 'We, both of us, have a special duty to see to it that confrontations are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life.'

"That those fateful words had to be publicly spoken suggests how tenuous the Soviet-American détente still is."

And in an October 28 editorial, the *Times* noted that Nixon's assessment of the confrontation as "the most difficult" since 1962 "does not seem an unjust appraisal." By the following day, however, the *Times* had flopped into Nixon's camp, saying that the "military alert . . . may indeed have been the correct and prudent response to an external threat to vital American interests."

The fact is that Nixon did rattle his nuclear arsenal at the Kremlin. He himself referred to it in his press interview. The irrationality of the action is all the more reason for taking Nixon at his word.

Moreover, no other realistic interpretation can be given Kissinger's comments on October 25 and the alert issued to the U.S. armed forces.

The underlying reason for the crisis is that the United States and the Soviet Union stand in basic conflict because of their different social systems and the predatory character of U.S. imperialism. The détente was part of Washington's effort to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet rift and to enlist the aid of the Chinese and Soviet ruling castes in containing and smashing revolutionary movements on a world scale.

A common liberal speculation in the U.S. press was that since the Krem-




lin had stood by passively while North Vietnam was subjected to the heaviest bombing in human history, there was no reason to believe that Moscow would risk a confrontation by going out of its way to assist Anwar el-Sadat, who is not even a Communist. That speculation misses the point. The Kremlin allowed Hanoi to stand alone because the Soviet ruling caste saw no immediate threat to its narrow interests in the U.S. aggression there. It saw a greater potential threat in a successful social revolution in Southeast Asia.

But the Moscow bureaucracy is interested in the Arab East. That interest has nothing whatever to do with fostering social revolution in the region. From the simple standpoint of defending its own existence, the Kremlin cannot afford to see the Arab East, which lies just south of the Soviet Union, become the exclusive preserve of U.S. imperialism that it was at the height of the cold war. It will defend friendly regimes in the area against U.S. attempts to overthrow them, and it will seek to maintain a military presence in the region in pursuit of that defense. That is one of the reasons Moscow supplied SAM-6 missiles to Egypt but not to North Vietnam.

The October 25 confrontation occurred because Washington had allowed its Zionist ally to continue warring on Egyptian forces in violation of an agreement not to do so. This becomes clear when the chronology is examined. On October 22 the UN Security Council passed a cease-fire resolution sponsored by Moscow and Washington. The Israeli regime was not happy with the resolution. Its armed forces had seized some 400 square miles of Egyptian territory on the west bank of the Suez Canal, had cut the Egyptian forces in Sinai in two, and were threatening to destroy the Egyptian army, one of the main Zionist war aims.

Tel Aviv accepted the cease-fire because it had no alternative, given international pressure. But it broke the cease-fire almost immediately. Whether it did so with Nixon's agreement or on its own with Nixon's later acquiescence may never be certainly known. But what is known is that in the twenty-four hours following the breakdown of the first cease-fire, the Israeli troops on the west bank of the canal



New York Times map shows areas occupied by contending forces in October War at time of third cease-fire. Egyptian enclave at southern end of canal is the isolated III Corps.

expanded their enclave, moved south and surrounded the city of Suez, and then moved further south along the Gulf of Suez.

When the Israeli army reached Suez, the Egyptian III Corps, an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 troops dug in on the east bank of the canal, were cut off from their supply lines. As a military force, the III Corps was finished. It could not advance, and the Israelis would let it retreat to the west bank only if it surrendered.

The Egyptian UN delegation requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to deal with the Israeli violation of the cease-fire. On October 23, the Security Council passed a second cease-fire resolution reaffirming the first one. The second cease-fire took effect on the evening of October 23. This time the Israeli command was apparently willing to observe the resolution. They waited for the Egyptians to break the cease-fire by trying to fight their way out of the trap on the east bank of the canal. That would allow the Israeli forces to destroy the III Corps without appearing as the aggressor. The Egyptians could be cast as the villains for refusing to quietly die of thirst.

At first the Israeli tactic seemed to work. The second cease-fire did break down, apparently when the III Corps

attempted to break out of the encirclement; when the fighting began again, the Israeli army seemed to be moving toward destroying the Egyptian army. Sadat called for another emergency meeting of the Security Council; he also asked that Moscow and Washington send troops into the Arab East to enforce the cease-fire that they had imposed in the first place.

Nixon claims that on the evening of October 24, while fighting was going on, the Kremlin began taking steps to mobilize its troops to be sent to the Arab East, and that Brezhnev delivered a "very firm" note that "left little to the imagination as to what he intended." Nixon further claims he sent a similar note back to Brezhnev and ordered the worldwide U.S. military alert in order to back up his words.

Given that all U.S.-Soviet diplomacy takes place in absolute secrecy, there is no way to know definitely whether the Kremlin actually was planning to send troops to the Arab East. But it is virtually certain that Moscow said enough to convince Nixon that it was not about to tolerate the annihilation of the Egyptian III Corps.

Nixon's rattling of the H-bomb was designed to support the Israeli offensive and prevent the Kremlin from



intervening to save the Egyptian III Corps.

The confrontation went no further than that. The Kremlin backed down, in exchange for yet another Security Council cease-fire resolution. This one was passed on October 25; it called for the introduction of UN forces (excluding troops from the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great Bri-

tain, and China) to oversee the cease-fire. On October 26 the third cease-fire went into effect, and as of October 29 it seemed to be holding.

While the Moscow-Washington confrontation of October 25 was resolved short of armed clashes, there is no certainty that the settlement arrived at will last long. The Zionist state, serving as an imperialist spearhead in the

Arab East, constitutes a permanent source of crises that extend far beyond the area. Nixon has proved that he will risk nuclear catastrophe in his unyielding efforts to underwrite Zionist aggression. The next confrontation may not be so easy to control, especially in an area of the world where there are as many conflicting tendencies as in the Arab East. □

## Roots of the October War—The Israeli Aggression of 1967

# How and Why the Zionist State Expanded Its Borders

By Jon Rothschild

*We are a settler generation, and without the steel helmet and the cannon we cannot plant a tree or build a house. Let us not flinch from the hatred enflaming hundreds of thousands of Arabs around us. Let us not turn our heads away, lest our hands tremble. It is our generation's destiny, our life's alternative, to be prepared and armed, strong and harsh, lest the sword drop from our fist and our life cease.*

—Moshe Dayan, speaking at the funeral of a kibbutz member killed by Palestinian guerrillas in 1956.

Rabin: *It was not we who initiated the development that brought on the war. When Nasser, under Russian influence, decided that his prestige required some action to prove to the Arab world that he, Nasser, had not lost his power to aid the Arab world, when he started to concentrate his forces in the Sinai, he must have assumed that war might break out. But there is a difference between concentrating forces in order to get into a war and making a move that, while it might end up in war, is not aimed at war but at something else. I think this is what was at the basis of Nasser's thinking.*

Question: *You seem to think that Nasser made an incorrect calculation, that he thought he could get away without war, but was trapped.*

Rabin: *Yes, that's my evaluation.*

—Interview with Yitzak Rabin, Israeli army chief of staff during the

1967 war; published in *Haaretz*, December 22, 1967.

*The deployment of Egyptian forces in the Sinai and the general military activity there indicate that an Egyptian defensive formation was being built there.*

—Levi Eshkol, Israeli prime minister during the 1967 war, cited in *Yediot Aharonot*, October 18, 1967.

*During the last 100 years, our people have been in the process of building up the nation, of expansion, of getting additional Jews and settlements in order to expand the borders. Let no Jew say that the process has ended. Let no Jew say that we are near the end of the road.*

—Moshe Dayan in a speech to a group of American Jewish students visiting the occupied Golan Heights in July 1968; cited in the Israeli daily *Maariv*, July 7, 1968.

\* \* \*

The Israeli regime claims that on October 6, 1973, it was compelled to defend the state of Israel against Egyptian and Syrian aggression. The Zionist leaders have been vastly more successful than most rulers in utilizing the propaganda weapon of all-out falsification. But even for them, there are limits. Not even Golda Meir could avoid the fact that the fighting in the October War was taking place on territory that has been under Israeli military occupation since 1967 (at least

until Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal and moved further into Egypt than they had ever gone).


Claims that the Arabs committed aggression in the October War, then, rest on the implicit assumption that in June 1967 the Israeli army fought a defensive war aimed at stopping an Arab attempt to liquidate the Israeli people and on the corollary assumption that title to Sinai and the Golan Heights passed justly, if mysteriously, to Tel Aviv, which must maintain control over the territories in order to deter the Arabs from trying to repeat their earlier attempt.

Like most aspects of Zionist ideology, those assumptions are false. The territories on which most of the October War has been fought came to be occupied not because the Israeli state was defending itself, but because an Israeli invasion was launched as a result of the inherent position of Zionism in the Arab East.

The Israeli aggression of June 1967 was the Zionist ruling class's response to a set of interrelated factors. The primary ones were the rebirth of Palestinian consciousness and organization, the effects of that rebirth in Jordan, the radicalization of the Syrian regime, and the drive of U.S. imperialism to demolish the Nasser regime in Egypt.

### Awakening of the Palestinians

In 1948, after the founding of the state of Israel, the Council of the



A Fateh camp. Emergence of the Palestinian movement in middle 1960s was one reason Tel Aviv went to war in 1967.

League of Arab States, which was a creature of British imperialism, voted to establish a Palestinian "government in exile." The members of this so-called government, the functions of which were obscure, were mainly followers of the former mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin el-Husseini. El-Husseini had been installed in his position as mufti in the 1930s by the British mandatory regime, despite his dubious qualifications for the religious post. His political qualifications were rather more easy to discern. A slavish follower of London's policies and a notorious Jew-hater, he was useful in helping to prevent the development of a Jewish-Arab movement for an independent Palestine. In 1936, when he was forced by a massive Arab rebellion against British rule to go through some anti-imperialist motions, Husseini fell out of London's favor and was driven out of Palestine. He spent the war years in Nazi Germany, where he cultivated a new set of friends.

When it developed that Husseini had picked the losing side, his political future in Palestine became dubious. But he was to prove his usefulness to imperialism one more time. The British government allowed him to return to Palestine in the late 1940s. Once there, he became an active participant in Zionism's and British imperialism's drive to ensure maximum

hatred between Arabs and Jews. The mufti's gang was well suited to take its place in the Arab League after 1948 along with the other regimes then in power in the Arab East—King Farouk in Egypt, Nuri Said in Iraq, the Hashemite kingdom in Jordan, the Saudi family in Arabia.

But the shock waves of the 1948 catastrophe were to spread throughout the Arab East. Farouk was deposed in 1952 by Gamal Abdel Nasser's Free Officers Movement. In 1958 the Iraqi masses disposed of the Nuri Said regime and physically liquidated a not inconsiderable part of the old Iraqi ruling class. The radicalization in Syria became so deep that the weak Syrian bourgeoisie had to call on assistance from Nasser (by forming the United Arab Republic) to save the situation.

The 1950s were a time of social change in the Arab East, and the mufti's gang was fast becoming an anachronism. The Palestinians were not immune to the changes going on in the Arab world. They began to recover—slowly and tentatively—from the demoralization of 1948.

In 1964 the Nasserite leadership of the Arab League decided to dispense with the irritating Husseini. In January an Arab summit was convened under Nasser's auspices. It decided to set up a "Palestinian entity" that would

express the aspirations of the Palestinian people but would not be a government in exile. The task of establishing this entity was assigned to Ahmed Shukhairy, a wealthy Palestinian who had previously been deputy general secretary of the Arab League and Saudi Arabian minister for Palestinian affairs.

In May 1964, over Husseini's strenuous but unsuccessful objections, Shukhairy convened a Palestine National Congress which met in Jerusalem and voted to form the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO was to be financed by contributions from the Arab states and by a tax on Palestinians.

The charter adopted by the Palestine National Congress was conciliatory toward the reactionary Arab regimes. It adopted a resolution assuring King Hussein that it would exercise no regional sovereignty over the West Bank, which had been absorbed by the Hashemite kingdom during the 1948 war. It also disclaimed authority over Gaza, which was under Egyptian administration, and over the "demilitarized" zone along the Israeli-Syrian frontier. The executive committee was appointed rather than elected, a maneuver aimed at excluding more militant elements from the leading body. Shukhairy became the president of the PLO.

In *Israel and the Arabs*, Maxime Rodinson described Shukhairy as "a politician schooled in factional strife, rather muddle-headed, inclined to be carried away by his own words, with a taste for the grand gesture, and capable of making two equally shattering and totally contradictory pronouncements in the same breath." There is clearly some truth in that description, and there is no doubt that the Arab regimes founded the PLO and placed Shukhairy in charge of it primarily to canalize a small but reviving Palestinian movement.

But the temptation to regard Shukhairy as simply a new edition of Husseini should be resisted. The PLO, observed Nathan Weinstock in his book *Le Sionisme Contre Israël*, "evolved under pressure from its rank and file, despite the weakness of its leadership. It mobilized Palestinians who, under the impetus of their own dynamism, wound up threatening the stability of the Hashemite kingdom. Further, the PLO's military incursions into Israel—which the Jordanian au-



thorities tried to prevent, just as they had systematically repressed all attempts by the refugees to resort to sabotage across the borders—threatened to draw Israeli reprisals. Hence the break toward the end of 1966 between Hussein and the PLO. Jordan could no more tolerate the rebirth of a Palestinian national entity than could Israel. In spite of the attempts at reconciliation, the gulf between them [Hussein and Shukhairy] widened, for the Palestinians had no reason to respect the sovereignty of the Hashemites, who were cobeneficiaries of the liquidation of Arab Palestine in 1948."

The PLO was not the only manifestation of the resurgence of the Palestinians. In 1956 Palestinians in Gaza had founded an organization called Fateh (an acronym for Movement for the Liberation of Palestine), which in 1965 formed a military wing, el-Assifa, which began conducting armed operations against the Israeli border. Fateh called for the union of all Arabs in the struggle to "liberate the usurped homeland." While it explicitly acknowledged Hashemite sovereignty in Jordan, it suffered the same repression from Hussein that the PLO did, and for the same reasons. In September 1965 the Fateh leaders sent a message to Arab heads of state (then meeting in Casablanca) denouncing the repression it was suffering in Jordan and noting that el-Assifa commandos, upon returning from raids against the Zionist armed forces, were being shot down by other Arab soldiers in Hussein's army.

The relatively small-scale operations of the Palestinian commandos in 1965 and 1966 did not represent a military threat to the Israeli regime. The real threat was political. And it weighed not only on Tel Aviv, but on Amman as well. "For the Palestinians, who constituted two-thirds of the Jordanian population," wrote Weinstock, "the activity of the fedayeen seemed to offer for the first time since 1948 a perspective for winning back their homeland. In this regard, the first stick of dynamite planted in Israel raised an enormous hope among the refugees in the camps and among the Palestinian population on the West Bank."

### And the Zionist Response

In May 1965, under the pretext of retaliating for Fateh operations, the

Israeli army launched several large-scale military raids against Jordanian villages (Sjuneh, Jenin, Kalkilya). The Israeli attacks had the effect of aggravating the conflict between the PLO and the Hussein regime. In December 1965 several hundred Shukhairy supporters were arrested in Jordan. In mid-April 1966 a new wave of repression was launched against the PLO, Fateh, the Communist party, supporters of the Baath party, and pro-Nasserites. Hussein claimed the reason for the arrest was that some of the suspects were planning to carry out commando raids against Israel.

Despite the repression, Israeli "retaliation" against Jordan continued. In fact, only days after the April 1965 arrests, the Israeli army struck at two Jordanian villages. General Yitzhak Rabin stated in a press conference that "as long as there is no peace on the Israeli side of the border, there will be no peace on the Jordanian side either."

In November 1966 the Israeli army struck at the Jordanian village of el-Samu, supposedly to wipe out the base camps of Fateh commandos. The United Nations command in the area reported that the Israelis had blown up 125 houses, a dispensary, a school, and a workshop.

The Zionist argument that the Israeli raids were really aimed at eliminating "terrorists" is patently false. "In reality," Weinstock explained, "the el-Samu operation was aimed at the whole Palestinian population. The refugees were the backbone of the Palestinian organizations. By striking a heavy blow at these organizations, Tel Aviv hoped to teach the Palestinians that the guerrilla strategy would not pay off. Even so, this was only one aspect of the reasoning behind the Israeli policy of counterterrorism. Upon more careful analysis, it can be seen that the Palestinian commandos did threaten the Hebrew state. Not by their raids, which remained tiny in scope, but in the sense that they directly affected the security of the Hashemite kingdom, and thus, in the long run, the security of Israel as well. In the final analysis, the Israeli offensive was inspired less by the desire to dissuade the Palestinians than by the desire to contribute to maintaining the stability of the Jordanian regime. By means of the dynamic that

we mentioned earlier, the Israeli incursions furnished Amman with the pretext to repress the Palestinian movement under the cover of avoiding provocations. In short, Hussein was called upon to take energetic measures against the agitation of the refugees or else see the Israelis themselves occupy the West Bank."

The initial result of the Israeli raid was as Tel Aviv had expected. Hussein, with the assistance of Saudi Arabian troops, moved on the Palestinian commandos. But neither Tel Aviv nor Amman counted on the Palestinian response.

By moving against the fedayeen, Hussein revealed that he regarded his primary enemy as the Palestinians and not the Zionist army. The Palestinians responded. Within days there were violent clashes in the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, in Ramallah, and in Hebron between Hussein's Arab Legion and the Palestinian people. Thousands of persons took to the streets in demonstrations. The police and the Legion opened fire. The Palestinians called mass meetings throughout the West Bank. Strikes and demonstrations broke out in the refugee camps. Even Shukhairy reversed his earlier position. "To liberate Tel Aviv it is necessary to liberate Amman," he declared—from Cairo.

The U. S. government answered the Palestinian strikes by stepping up its military aid to Hussein. Tel Aviv responded to them by threatening to invade Jordan to assist Hussein. "Israel's policy," declared Prime Minister Eshkol, "consists of protecting and maintaining the status quo in the Middle East." If the situation "changes" in Jordan, he added, "Israel reserves the right to act."

### Preserving the Status Quo

The Israeli state's commitment to the status quo in the Arab East flows from the political exigencies of Zionism itself. The Israeli state is in permanent conflict with the Arab world, for reasons we examined in the article "How the Arabs Were Driven Out of Palestine" (*Intercontinental Press*, October 29, p. 1206). It maintains its hegemony in the Arab East largely because of the backwardness, weakness, and fragmentation of the Arab nation, and consequently it has a life-or-death interest in preserving



that backwardness, weakness, and fragmentation. That interest is wholly shared by Western (primarily U. S.) imperialism, whose political, economic, and military domination of the Arab East also rests on maintaining the Arab world in those conditions.

The Zionist-imperialist alliance that has existed ever since the founding of the state of Israel is based on that community of interest. More than once the Israeli army has been the advance guard of imperialism's military actions against tendencies toward modernization of the Arab East. The 1967 war was a classic instance. The primary target was the Syrian regime; a secondary target was the Nasser regime in Cairo. The rebirth of Palestinian consciousness was a constant threat to the Zionist state, for obvious reasons. But the Palestinian movement is only a part of a broader one: the unfolding development of the process of permanent revolution in the Arab world. By themselves, the Palestinians lack the power to bring down the Zionist state. As part of a generalized revolutionary movement in the Arab world, they have that power. And conversely, the emergence of any force in the Arab East—regardless of the specific character of its leadership or program—that seeks to limit imperialist penetration and to establish Arab sovereignty over Arab society tends to take up the Palestinian issue and to foster, even if not deliberately, the development of the Palestinian struggle.

The Zionist state gives an appearance of great strength. But the reality is that the Israeli-Jews are a small national minority implanted into a much larger Arab world. To maintain its domination, the Zionist state requires not just the elimination of any genuine revolutionary current, but the quashing of any motion, no matter how limited, toward social change in the Arab East.

Imperialism can normally afford to be somewhat more flexible. But the international context in which the 1967 war broke out must be kept in mind. In 1964 the Goulart regime in Brazil was overthrown by a military coup; in 1965 the Communist party of Indonesia, largest in the capitalist world, was massacred as the Sukarno regime was brought down; a coup in Ghana in 1966 deposed Nkrumah; the colonels' coup in Greece preceded

the 1967 war in the Arab East by only a few months. And to this series of right-wing overturns must be added the U. S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and, of course, the escalation of the counterrevolutionary war against Vietnam.

The Israeli aggression of 1967 fundamentally represented the application to the Arab East of this generalized imperialist offensive against the colonial revolution. Once again, imperialist policy coincided with the exigencies of preserving Zionist hegemony. Instability in Jordan, the rebirth of Palestinian consciousness and organization, and the pole of attraction represented by Nasser in the Arab world were already plaguing the Israeli ruling class during 1965 and 1966. The emergence of the left-wing Baathist regime in Syria after the February 1966 Damascus coup and the support extended by the Syrian regime to the Palestinian movement—even if strictly limited—brought Zionist patience to the breaking point. Throughout 1966 the Israeli regime waged attacks on the Syrian government. Nasser's position as paragon of the anti-imperialist forces in the Arab world forced him, against his desires and his better judgment, to come to the assistance of the Damascus government. The Israeli offensive against Syria thus became an offensive against Egypt as well. Its culmination came on the morning of June 5, 1967.

### Teaching 'Lessons' to Syria

The Syrian coup of February 1966 followed a long period of conflict in the country during which the masses threatened to go beyond the limits set by the Baathist leadership. When the left-wing Baathists consolidated their control after the coup, they were under heavy pressure to institute a broad program of agrarian reform and nationalization of industry. They adopted an anti-imperialist foreign policy. The regime imposed most of its domestic reforms from above, sharply curtailing the mobilization of the masses. But the workers and peasants were making their power felt. Once again, the Syrian bourgeoisie, faced by a domestic crisis it could not handle, began clamoring for foreign intervention—Jordanian, Turkish, even Israeli. The imperialist oil com-

panies, whose installations were nationalized, likewise grew uneasy. When the U. S. ambassador took a trip to the oil refineries at Homs, his automobile was attacked by a crowd of Syrian workers chanting "Assassin! Out of Vietnam!"

While the Damascus regime did not share Fateh's aim of destroying the Zionist state, its radical policies fostered Palestinian militancy, and the fedayeen were able to carry out some actions against the Zionist state from Syrian territory.

In April 1966 General Yitzak Rabin announced that if the Damascus government proceeded with a plan to develop the headwaters of the Jordan River, located in Syria, "the Israeli army will have to concern itself with this problem." After the April 1966 Israeli raids on Jordan, the Tel Aviv regime declared that it would hold Arab governments responsible for the operations of Palestinians conducted from their territories and added that Syria "remained" the main base of the Palestinian commandos. "The Israeli reprisal raids on Jordan," wrote *Le Monde's* correspondent André Scemama on April 2, "may be the prelude to an anti-Syrian action."

On July 14, 1966, Israeli planes bombed Syrian developmental installations along the border, allegedly in retaliation for fedayeen raids.

On August 15, 1966, Israeli military boats on the Sea of Tiberias were hit by Syrian planes seeking to deter the Israeli command. In "retaliation," Israeli jets pursued Syrian planes within a dozen miles of Damascus. Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol declared that his pilots had the "right of pursuit" and would utilize it.

Three weeks later, Rabin gave an interview to the official magazine of the Israeli army. "The Syrians are the spiritual fathers of the Fateh," he declared. And further: "The battle that Israel must wage in Syria in reprisal for the sabotage raids is therefore aimed at the Syrian regime."

In September Eshkol announced that from then on the Syrian government would be held accountable for any Palestinian raids on Israel, no matter what country the Palestinians were based in. In November, after the Israeli attack on el-Samu, Tel Aviv announced that the Damascus regime would suffer even more violent attacks

if it did not curb the activities of the fedayeen.

By the end of 1966, ruling circles in Israel (see, for example, the magazine *Israel Economist*) were speaking of the "pro-Soviet Cairo-Damascus axis" that represented a "pincer" against the Israeli state.

In early 1967, Israeli raids across the Syrian border multiplied. In April, the Israeli regime moved overtly to a policy of provocation. Eshkol authorized Israeli settlers to begin cultivating disputed land along the Syrian border. The "farmers" were accompanied by soldiers. Quite naturally, the Syrian army opened fire on the Israeli settlers. In "retaliation" Israeli pilots were ordered to pursue Syrian planes as deeply into Syria as they thought appropriate at any given time. In April 1967 Israeli bombers went as far as the suburbs of Damascus. General Rabin issued a statement in which he expressed hope that the Syrians "understood" the "lesson" of April. And he added:

"Israel, and not Syria, will in the future determine the form which military operations resulting from Syrian aggression shall take. On this occasion the Israeli Air Force was brought into action as a result of frontier incidents. It might in the future intervene in other circumstances."

On April 12, 1967, Eshkol declared that the Israeli armed forces would strike "when and how we want."

On May 10 the leading Israeli daily, *Haaretz* predicted the inevitability of a "direct showdown" with Damascus if the fedayeen's activities were not halted soon.

On May 11 the Associated Press reported that a high-ranking Israeli officer had threatened military occupation of Damascus if the Syrian regime did not check the Palestinian fedayeen.

On May 12 General Rabin declared that "no government in the Middle East can feel secure until the ardent revolutionaries in Damascus are overthrown."

In view of the hysterical Zionist ravings about the bloodthirsty Palestinian terrorists, it might be useful to cite the Israeli government's own statistics about the terrible threat to survival that the Israelis were supposedly facing. Between January 1 and June 5, 1967, the Israelis suffered a total

of one person dead from fedayeen raids. That figure includes raids originating from all Arab countries, not just Syria. The total number of at-



NASSER: Tried to impose an Egyptian "fact" on an Israeli "fact."

tempted terrorist raids — successful and unsuccessful — was as follows: 35 in 1965, 41 in 1966, and 46 in 1967. Successful acts of sabotage by Palestinian commandos numbered 27 in 1965, 30 in 1966, and 20 during the first five months of 1967. In 1966 ten Israelis died in fedayeen attacks, seven of them as a result of operations originating in Syrian territory. Of the forty-six operations of 1967, only thirteen originated in Syria. They consisted mostly of planting mines and, as indicated, they caused the death of one Israeli. These figures, we should note, come from two pamphlets produced by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *The Arab War Against Israel* and *Declarations and Documents — the USSR and Arab Beligerence*, both published in Jerusalem, 1967.

A little Jewish David facing a vicious Arab Goliath! A real peril to the survival of the Israeli-Jewish population! Clearly the basis for a war of national defense!

### The Egyptian Connection

It is no wonder that the Syrian leaders got the strong impression that the

Zionist ruling class was preparing an invasion of Syria and that the Zionist plans had exactly nothing to do with fedayeen raids originating from Syrian territory. The Damascus government dispatched an emissary to Nasser to ask for his aid. And it is likewise no wonder that Nasser took the Israeli threats seriously.

In 1965 Washington had curtailed grain shipments to Egypt that had been slated for delivery according to a plan whereby Egypt could pay in local currency. After much negotiation, Washington allowed the shipments to continue under more exacting financial conditions. At the end of 1966, even the limited program was ended. Cairo was forced to halt a number of development programs to feed its population.

U. S. imperialism's economic pressure was combined with political pressure. By early 1967 Washington was openly speculating about whether the Nasser regime could survive. Nasser could not help but draw some conclusions from the spate of coups that had been engineered by the CIA. On April 21 the colonels took power in Greece. On May 2 Nasser declared in a public speech: "The United States has placed itself at the head of the world counterrevolution." And he named the local allies of Washington: "Eshkol, Faisal, Hussein, the Shah of Iran, and that imbecile Bourguiba."

Nasser was forced to react to the Israeli threats against Syria. His prestige in the Arab world could not have survived the blow of allowing the Israeli army a free hand in Syria. But his response to the Zionist offensive was not to prepare for war, but to pose the threat of war in the hope that Moscow and Washington would intervene to stay Tel Aviv's hand.

On May 14, 1967, Nasser demonstratively marched two Egyptian divisions through the streets of Cairo and sent them into Sinai. That the move was not an offensive preparation was so obvious that even the Israeli command had to admit it. "The two divisions that he sent into Sinai on May 14," Rabin declared, "would not have been sufficient to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it."

Rabin called Nasser's move a



"bluff." And so it was. But it nevertheless set in motion a chain of events that Nasser could not control and that the Israeli rulers were able to use to give a defensive cover to their offensive.

On May 16, Nasser asked the United Nations to withdraw the "emergency forces" that had been posted along the Sinai frontier since the 1956 war. In an interview published in the February 29, 1968, *Le Monde*, Rabin recalled that Nasser had massed troops in Sinai in 1960 after an Israeli "retaliatory" raid on Syria. But that time he had not asked the UN forces to withdraw. "This time," Rabin said, "he needed to give his bluff more credibility. The propaganda of the anti-Nasser Arab states had pushed him to the limit by constantly accusing him of 'hiding behind the international forces.'"

When the UN forces moved out, the Egyptian army occupied the fort at Sharm el-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai peninsula. By May 21 the UN forces were totally withdrawn. That presented Nasser with a dangerous dilemma. The outpost at Sharm el-Sheikh commands the Straits of Tiran, leading to the Gulf of Aqaba, the narrow extension of the Red Sea that leads north to the Israeli port of Elat. When Nasser took over Sharm el-Sheikh, he came under heavy pressure to close the straits to Israeli shipping. Not to do so would have exposed the emptiness of his pledges to back up Syria in its hour of need.

On May 23 Eshkol declared that any attempt to interfere with Israeli passage through the Gulf of Aqaba would be considered an act of war. From that moment on, the outbreak of war was inevitable.

The reason, though, is not that the Israeli economy would have been seriously damaged by the closing of the straits. Only a small percentage of Israeli imports came through the gulf, and from 1949 to 1956, when the gulf had been closed to Israeli ships, no attempt had been made to interfere with other nations' ships sailing to Israel with supplies. Nevertheless, the Israeli rulers could not tolerate Nasser's act. Once again, the reason is political and derives from the very nature of Zionism. The gulf was opened to Israeli shipping by the Sinai

invasion of 1956. When Israeli troops were forced to withdraw from Sinai, they were guaranteed shipping rights in the gulf. Israeli access to the gulf was thus another Zionist fait accompli imposed on the Arabs by brute force. It was one of a long chain of faits accomplis that began with the initial Jewish colonization of Palestine.

In closing the Straits of Tiran, Nasser had done the unthinkable. Moshe Machover and Haim Hanegbi explained it best, in an article published in *The Other Israel*, a compilation of articles by Israeli anti-Zionists:

"By blockading the Straits, for the first time since the beginning of the Zionist colonization of Palestine, Nasser broke the continuity of the chain of faits accomplis, thus creating a situation that Israel could not accept. Even if negotiations between Israel and Egypt might have led to a reaffirmation of freedom of navigation in the Straits—as part of an agreement with Egypt—this would have set a precedent of relations not based on force. It would have created a precedent in which an Israeli 'fact' had been broken by an Egyptian 'fact.' This was a situation the Zionist leaders could not tolerate."

And they did not tolerate it. They went to war, sacrificing hundreds of Israelis and killing thousands of Arabs so that the Israeli "fact" could prevail over the Egyptian "fact."

Despite the impending battle, Nasser continued to make every effort to resolve the crisis through diplomacy. He continued to make overtures to Washington, offering to negotiate the question of Israeli access to the gulf. In fact, on June 4, the day before the war started, it was announced that Egyptian Vice-President Zakaria Muhieddin would visit Washington and U. S. Vice-President Hubert Humphrey would visit Cairo to discuss the crisis.

While the diplomatic maneuvering went on, the Israeli military buildup proceeded apace. The "activist" wing of the Israeli military was clamoring for war. On May 30 King Hussein traveled to Cairo for a reconciliation with his old enemy, Nasser. From the Israeli rulers' standpoint, the fact that their ally Hussein had been compelled to declare his solidarity with Egypt meant that the time to strike had come.

On June 1 a government of "na-

tional unity" was formed in Israel. The leading "activist," Moshe Dayan, took over the Ministry of Defense from Eshkol. Then it was only a matter of timing that had to be resolved.

## The War and Its Aftermath

That the 1967 war was initiated by Israel is no longer subject to the slightest doubt, if in fact it ever was. Even the trenchantly pro-Israeli Nadav Safran, for example, notes in his book *From War to War*: "The War between Israel and its Arab neighbors started on Monday, June 5, with a series of Israeli air strikes, which, within 170 minutes, all but eliminated Arab air capacity."

The first air strikes were against Egypt, and they so crippled Arab ability to fight back that it can be said that the Arabs had lost the war within three hours of its outbreak. The destruction of the Egyptian air force, which was caught on the ground, was immediately followed by the destruction of the Syrian and Jordanian air forces, which were no better prepared.

According to Safran, whose military analyses are usually exact, 410 Arab airplanes were destroyed on June 5. The Israeli air losses for the same day were 19 planes. Once the Israeli air force had mastery of the skies, the course of the land battles was determined, as Arab tanks, armor, and infantry became easy targets. It took five days for the Israeli army to advance to the Suez Canal. The offensive that conquered the West Bank of the Jordan took four days; a cease-fire with Jordan took effect on June 8. The Syrian front, which the Israelis had held with minimal numbers of troops while the fighting was going on in the West Bank, erupted seriously after the war with Jordan was over. The Golan Heights were overrun by June 11, when a cease-fire with Syria went into effect.

But even before the Israeli air strikes, the outcome of the war was never in doubt from the Israeli side. The March 19, 1972, issue of *Haaretz* observed: "Dr. M. Peled said that the thesis that in June 1967 Israel faced a danger of annihilation and that the state of Israel was fighting for its physical survival is 'a tale which was born and elaborated only after the war.' Dr. Peled, who was in the Army



general staff during the 1967 war, is now a professor of history at the Shilo'ah Institute. He further noted that in May 1967 there was no danger of annihilation to Israel: 'The Egyptians concentrated 80,000 soldiers, while we mobilized against them hundreds of thousands of men.'

And on June 8, 1967, Hanson Baldwin, *New York Times* military analyst noted: "Since the vaunted superiority in numbers of the Arab armies was never brought to bear on the fighting fronts, Israel probably had an overall numerical superiority in the troops actually involved and a clear-cut superiority in firepower and mobility in the actual battles."

The Israeli advance drove thousands more of Arabs out of their homes; many of the new refugees had already been refugees from the 1948 war. The Israeli offensive was aimed primarily at delivering a humiliating blow to the Arab armies and at expanding the borders of the Zionist state. The armed forces were not especially anxious to foster goodwill between the advancing troops and the Arab population. In fact, the aim was to terrorize the Arabs, and the Israeli army acted accordingly, using napalm and other antipersonnel weapons of U. S. design, bulldozing Arab villages out of existence.

According to United Nations figures, by September 1967 the number of Arabs driven from their homes by the Israeli offensive and the subsequent occupation stood at more than 350,000. There were 200,000 refugees from the West Bank (90,000 of whom had been refugees from the 1948 war), 110,000 from the Golan Heights (17,000 of whom were refugees from 1948), and 35,000 from Gaza and Sinai (3,000 of whom were refugees from 1948).

If the Israeli army had driven nearly all the Arabs out of the occupied territories, the 1967 war would have been one of simple expansion, more or less a duplicate of the 1948 war, but on a vaster scale territorially. But not all the Arabs left. R. Weitz, for years a leader of the Jewish Agency's colonization department, complained about that fact in September 1967. He noted that the 1948 war had produced a twofold "miracle": territorial victory and the flight of the Arabs. And he added: "In the Six Day War, there was one miracle: a tremendous territorial victory. But the general popu-

lation of the liberated [sic] territories remained 'stuck' in their places, and this may destroy the very foundation of our state."

Who remained "stuck"? The Arab population of occupied Gaza was about 356,000 in 1968; in the West Bank there were some 597,000 Arabs; in the Golan Heights there were about 6,400; there were another 68,000 in Arab Jerusalem; and 55,000 remained in the Sinai. The result was an Arab population of more than 1 million under military occupation. When to this is added nearly 300,000 Arabs residing within Israel's pre-June 1967 borders, the total Arab population under Israeli rule comes to about 1,385,000. The Jewish population of Israel was about 2,365,000 in 1969. That is, 37 percent of the total population under Israeli control after the 1967 war was Arab.

The far-reaching effects of the Israeli occupation on Israeli society itself were among the most important consequences of the 1967 war. They de-

serve to be treated separately.

As for the war's consequences in regard to the confrontation between the Arab states and Israel, it can be said that while the 1948 war liquidated the "problem of Palestine" only to have it reemerge on a higher level as the "Arab-Israeli problem," the 1967 war transformed the Arab-Israeli problem into a source of permanent military conflict and thus made the October War inevitable.

In addition to Palestinian refugees, there were now Egyptian and Syrian refugees. Instead of the denial of national rights to the Palestinians and a state of general confrontation with the Arab world, there was all that *plus* the abrogation of Egyptian and Syrian sovereignty through the occupation of Golan and Sinai.

In the flush of victory after June 10, 1967, the Israeli leaders told their people that peace was at hand. Instead, the Israelis had been given the seeds of yet another, far more costly, confrontation. □

## For the Defeat of Zionism

# Why Every Socialist Should Support the Arab Liberation Struggle

By Nathan Weinstock

[The following article appeared in the October 19 issue of *La Gauche*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs (Revolutionary Workers League), Belgian section of the Fourth International. Nathan Weinstock, a leading member of the LRT, is the author of *Le Sionisme Contre Israël* (Paris: Maspero, 1969), the best available work on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

[The translation of the article is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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1. The Zionist movement—whose end result was the creation of the state of Israel—had as its goal the establishment in Palestine, an Arab land, of a "Jewish state" under the protection of the great imperialist powers. That was the program adopted by the Zionist Congress held in Basel [Switzerland] in 1897, the official date

of the founding of *political Zionism* (as opposed to the earlier sentimental Zionism whose aim was to create a Jewish spiritual home in Palestine and only incidentally to implant a few agricultural villages there).

Such a nationalist ideology that directly coincides with imperialism's game obviously could take root only in the consciousness of those who despaired of defeating the anti-Semitism that permeated the societies of Eastern Europe (where the great majority of Jews were concentrated during the nineteenth century).

Initially, Zionism remained a minority current among Jews, restricted mostly to the young petty bourgeoisie squeezed out by the xenophobia of the rising local non-Jewish bourgeoisie. The great majority of the Jewish masses remained hostile to Jewish nationalism, in any case in its Zionist form, either out of religious

traditionalism or out of ideological conviction. The Jewish bourgeoisie was hoping for a liberal reform of the Tsarist empire; the Jewish workers movement—especially the Bund—was struggling for socialism, which would abolish the structural causes of anti-Jewish racism.

The inability of the world workers movement to prevent the victory of fascism and the Stalinist degeneration of the Third International had the effect of transforming the Zionist minority within the Jewish population into a nearly unanimous tendency. Moreover, the Jewish masses concentrated in Eastern Europe were exterminated by Nazism. As for the survivors, traumatized by the genocide and by the masked anti-Semitism in the USSR, which dashed their hopes for a socialist solution to the Jewish problem, they had no other means of salvation than to support the plan for setting up the Jewish state, a possible haven in case of renewed persecution; in short, Zionism seemed to assure their survival.

2. Exactly because the Zionist movement aimed at transforming an Arab land, Palestine, into a Jewish state, it necessarily had to come into conflict with the local population (in-

cluding, moreover, the Palestinian Jewish minority of the time). In fact, transforming Palestine into a land with a Jewish population implied either displacing or expelling the inhabitants (and in his diaries, the Zionist leader Herzl did not hide that) or, better still, setting up colonial relations between the Jewish immigrants and the Arab peasants.

This resulted in a program that necessarily would involve:

— the opposition of the Palestinian masses (the leaders could possibly be won over);

— getting imperialist protection for the settlers against the native resistance.

The whole history of the Jewish colonization of Palestine is the history of these processes. Zionist land purchases were accompanied by eviction of Arab peasants and they provoked a vigorous opposition that crystallized politically beginning in 1911. In order to implement the program of Jewish settlement, the Zionist movement relied on support from the dominant powers of the region, at first the Ottomans, then the British (during the period of the mandate), then the Americans and the Soviets in 1947-48, then Great Britain and the United States in 1956,

and the United States ever since then.

3. It follows that the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees and the succession of Arab revolts against the Zionist implantation derive from the Zionist program itself. As the fascist Zionist Jabotinsky lucidly pointed out in a work entitled *The Iron Wall*, there was no reason for the Palestinians to accept the fate that the Sioux had rejected. Hence, he wrote, differences among Zionists are secondary: "Among us there are no 'carnivorous' or 'vegetarian' Zionists. We all know that the Zionist program can be carried out only by force." The only serious divergence was over the question of whether the Zionists had to rely primarily on their own armed militia or on the military force of imperialism.

Hence the formation of various Jewish military units during the years between the two world wars and after the second (Haganah, the Irgun, the Stern Gang), which later fused into the Israeli army. These units were especially strengthened by the support of British colonial power during the great Palestinian revolt of 1936-39.

In the course of the six-month-long Arab general strike and rural guerrilla war, Dayan's militias aided the Royal Air Force and the British troops in raking through the Arab villages in Galilee and in guarding the Iraq Petroleum Corporation's pipeline.

The Israeli "war of independence" of 1948-49, which meant in reality Zionist military occupation of most of Palestine, rested on the same policy of force with the combined support of Truman and Stalin.

Likewise, the constant evictions of Arab peasants from the lands purchased by the Zionists between the two world wars—an inevitable consequence of pseudosocialist-Zionism, which aimed at emptying the land of Palestinians in order to have it worked by Jews—culminated in 1948 in the expulsion and flight (consciously fostered) of the majority of Palestinians from the Hebrew state.

Thus, from the beginning, the dispossession of the Palestinians by force was the main political axis of Zionist practice.

4. Zionist foreign policy has been conditioned by these basic facts. To survive as a state founded on the eviction of the native inhabitants,



TEL AVIV slum inhabited by Oriental Jews: An unpublicized face of the "promised land."



which in turn provokes hatred among the Arab masses and stimulates their anti-imperialist potential, Israel is compelled to rely on imperialist support and to make itself an instrument for imperialism against the Arab revolution. It must also seek imperialist support because of its economic unviability.

Thus, it carried out the Sinai campaign of 1956 (against the nationalization of the Suez Canal); it supported the French in Algeria; it supported the South Vietnamese government; it gave military assistance to Ethiopia; it recognized the Chilean junta, and so on.

Economically and structurally, the Zionist state has been incorporated into the world imperialist system. Each of the Arab-Israeli wars has been aimed primarily against revolutionary ferment in the Arab world: Nasserism in 1956, Syrian radicalism in 1967 and today, and the Palestinian resistance from 1967 up to today. And conversely, between Israel and the reactionary Arab regimes there has always been a tacit accord, symbolized, for example, by Tel Aviv's threats to invade Jordan if the regime there is overthrown.

Thus, Israel is a state that can survive in the Middle East only through military terror.

5. Israel's relation to the Arab revolution is very clear: Zionism is the unchained enemy of the popular masses whose awakening could upset the existing relationship of forces that favors Israel. The question is more complex in relation to Israel and the reactionary Arab leaders, who are basically favorable to the status quo (since Israel also protects their own stability) but are forced from below to up the ante of their anti-Zionism to win over the masses.

This is what explains the ambiguity of the positions of these regimes, which is reflected in the current war. The Syrian and Egyptian leaders are fighting for the implementation of the UN resolution that would restore the territories conquered by Israel in 1967 but would also recognize the right of Israel to exist as a Zionist state.

6. As an imperialist bridgehead and a colonial cyst, Israel must be combated by all revolutionists. In the global context, Cairo's and Damascus's struggle against Tel Aviv is an integral part of the freedom struggle

of oppressed third world peoples, even though the regimes in question are reactionary and petty-bourgeois, even though these two regimes tolerated the crushing of the Palestinian resistance during black September (Syria less than Egypt), and even though they muzzle the fedayeen in their own territory.

Furthermore, the policy of force that Israel must use to maintain itself leads to constant expansionism. The territorial annexations of 1967 have made Zionism a national question for the Egyptians and Syrians as well as for the Palestinians, because the liberation of their own occupied territory (Sinai and Golan) is now on the agenda.

Israel is too useful to the United States as the "Prussia of the Middle East" for Washington to tolerate its existence being challenged. Further, Israel's military superiority is such that only a general revolutionary process in the region can bring about its defeat. Given the oil interests of the imperialists, this struggle would develop into a protracted struggle comparable to the Indochina war, with a massive Israeli intervention. Tel Aviv has already tried to drive Syria back into the Stone Age.

The fact that for the first time Tel Aviv has not achieved victory in a lightning war results from several factors:

- For the first time, the Israelis did not launch a preventive war (as Golda Meir declared).

- The United States and the Soviet Union have tolerated this clash in order to compel Israel, which had become too independent, to be more reasonable in the framework of a settlement. (But the pro-Israeli lobby in Washington is in the process of changing the American position.)

- The Arab forces are conscious that they are fighting to liberate their own territory.

- For the first time the Zionist troops are fighting far from their homes and are therefore emotionally less concerned and committed. (The surrender of whole units in Sinai would have been unthinkable in 1967 or 1948.)

8. The colonial origins of the Hebrew state are reflected in its internal structure:

- Continuation of the emergency regulations passed by British colonialism, which give virtually absolute

power to the army.

- Systematized discrimination and oppression of the Palestinians inside the state's borders; they are denied any real right of organization.

- Attempts at any price to maintain a "sacred unity" so as to block any development of consciousness among the Jewish working class, the poverty-stricken and exploited Oriental Jews, the radicalized youth.

9. Since 1967 Israel has undergone a rapid process of South Africanization:

- Organized superexploitation of tens of thousands of Palestinian workers (including youth and children) who find themselves in a purely colonial situation, compelled to return each night to their reservations in the West Bank and Gaza after working all day in Jewish enterprises.

- Accelerated degeneration of the kibbutzim into collective societies resting on the superexploitation of the colonial labor force and assigned to paramilitary tasks (as in Golan).

- Rapid emergence of an Israeli big bourgeoisie that is breaking the former political equilibrium, which was based on the hegemony of the Zionist labor bureaucracy.

- Spectacular militarization of society, the generals possessing an unprecedented degree of independence from the civilian authorities, pressing a policy of their own, and methodically taking on the commanding posts of the country (in the economy, the universities, the political parties).

- Growing repression, which for the first time is falling as heavily on revolutionary Jews as on Arab militants.

- Frontal attack on trade-union and political rights.

- Degeneration of the moral fiber of Israeli society, installation of Zionist satraps in the occupied territories, tortures, witch-hunts against nonconformists.

10. There is no instantaneous solution to the conflict. To defeat Zionism requires a general struggle against imperialism and Arab reaction in the Middle East, that is, a rise of revolutionary struggles directed by a revolutionary leadership.

In fact, the Israeli problem is only one aspect of the general Arab revolution. Therefore, a revolutionary vanguard must be patiently forged uniting all the militants of the region,



including those of the national minorities (Kurds, Israelis). It is only in the framework of the revolutionary reunification of the Arab world in a red Middle East that the Israelis can harmoniously integrate themselves.

But before the question of the future of the Israeli community can be posed (let alone resolved), the Palestinians

must be able to reintegrate themselves into their homeland and exercise their right to self-determination; the Israeli working masses must opt for overthrowing the structures of colonial domination—that is, the Zionist structures—that constitute the specific form of capitalist domination of the country.

From this revolutionary perspective we support the liberation struggle of the Arab peoples, the fight of the Israeli vanguard against the colonial war of their leaders, and Jewish-Arab military unity against Zionism, imperialism, and Arab reaction in the struggle for a socialist future for the peoples of the region. □

## Fourth International Statement on October War

# For the Defeat of Zionism and Imperialism!

[The following statement was issued October 23 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

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For the twenty-five years that the Zionist state has existed in Palestine, the Arab East has been thrown into a permanent state of intermittent war. The whole responsibility for that situation rests on the role Israel plays as policeman for imperialism, combined with the particular aims of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine.

The fourth Arab-Israeli war of autumn 1973 is a new phase in the armed resistance of the Arab peoples to the counterrevolutionary policy of aggression systematically practiced by the Zionist state. Even though this war pits the armies of bourgeois Arab regimes against the Zionist armies, its character is that of a struggle against Israeli colonialism and expansionism. It follows that revolutionary Marxists affirm the legitimate character of the struggle of the Arab states against Zionism and call for their victory.

But any illusion about the ability of the Arab regimes to consistently confront Zionism and imperialism would be out of order. As far as Egypt, Syria, and the Arab states that are supporting them are concerned, the aim of the war is a compromise between Israel and the Arab regimes that would be less unfavorable to the Arab bourgeoisies and military bureaucracies; a compromise that would allow them to contain the mobilization of the Arab masses against Zionism and imperialism within limits acceptable from the standpoint of their own

economic and political interests.

Then recognition of the state of Israel, the Zionist colonial presence in Palestine, would become possible for the exploitative Arab owning classes, while at the same time the oppression and expulsion of the Arab people of Palestine would be maintained.

No peaceful solution and no measure appearing as such can ever be found to the Arab-Israeli conflict unless it recognizes the right of the Arabs of Palestine to take back their lands. The origin of the conflict lies in the denial of that right, and so does the root of future conflicts. Because the struggle of the Arabs of Palestine is a basically radical anti-imperialist and proletarian one, it is a permanent threat to the Arab bourgeoisies just as it is to the Zionist state. It requires the destruction of the Zionist socioeconomic structure and state and can be achieved only through the socialist revolution in the region, based on a common fight of the Jewish and Arab working masses.

All the Arab regimes and Israel, along with their respective military and financial supporters, oppose this solution, the only one that can possibly establish real and durable peace in the Arab East.

A so-called peaceful solution imposed by Washington and Moscow would mean acceptance of the Zionist state. Revolutionary Marxists oppose this mystification and denounce the intervention of the great powers in the Arab-Israeli conflict. No accord arrived at by Washington and Moscow can bring peace to the Arab East or to the world. The policy of so-

called peaceful coexistence can lead only to partial compromises between the interests of American imperialism and the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, compromises attained at the expense of the revolutionary struggle of the masses for socialism.

While revolutionary Marxists are obviously in favor of the unconditional and complete withdrawal of the Zionist armies from the territories occupied after the Israeli aggression of June 1967, they never separate that demand from the right of the Palestinians to regain their country. They denounce the attitude of the Arab regimes and of Arab reaction, which are prepared to compromise behind the backs of the Arab masses in general and the Palestinians in particular.

They call for the arming and organization of the Arab masses to transform the present war into a revolutionary offensive against Zionism and imperialism, for total freedom of action for the Palestinian resistance to operate from and within all Arab countries. They call for support to the struggle of anti-Zionist Jews within Israel, that struggle being an essential component of the struggle against Zionism. The Arab bourgeoisies have neither the right nor the ability to substitute themselves for that struggle, which must be waged jointly by the workers and peasants of the whole Arab East.

For the defeat of Zionism and imperialism!

Long live the struggles of the toiling masses of the Arab East!

Long live the socialist revolution in the Arab East!

# Storm of Anger Over Watergate Shakes Washington

By Allen Myers

"Something has happened," Congressman Clarence Long told the House of Representatives October 24, "the dam has broken . . . and the people are expressing long pent-up feelings."

The metaphor, if somewhat trite, nevertheless was an apt description of the almost unprecedented outpouring of public anger at Nixon's October 20 attempt to suppress the Watergate investigation by firing special prosecutor Archibald Cox and defying a court order to turn over secret White House tapes to Judge John Sirica.

By the time that Congress reconvened October 23 after a holiday recess, offices in the Capitol building had been swamped by a deluge of telegrams so large that Western Union was unable to keep up with it. As many as 160,000 telegrams were reported sent between the announcement of Cox's firing and October 23, when Nixon executed a partial retreat in announcing that he would hand over the tapes after all.

"One after another," James M. Naughton wrote in the October 28 *New York Times* of the October 23 session of the House of Representatives, "Republicans and Democrats alike reported the impact of Mr. Nixon's dismissal of Archibald Cox in staggering dimensions. Messages running 10 to 1 for impeachment, some said. Others described it as 50 to 1, a few at more than 100 to 1. No one could recall anything so lopsided, or so swift."

"I have never seen such an avalanche of angry telegrams," said Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. of Massachusetts, the House majority leader. "The Capitol required extra help on the switchboard over the weekend. The Western Union lines were jammed."

"I represent a district," Clarence Long stated, "which voted for Nixon by a 75 percent margin. Yet, yesterday, I received 239 telephone calls of which 200—5 to 1—were for impeachment. These calls came from people of all economic conditions and

political persuasions. Never has anything even approached this outpouring of sentiment in my district."

Democrat John F. Seiberling of Ohio reported: "Since Saturday evening's announcement by the White House, my offices in Washington and Akron have received over 750 telephone calls and telegrams about the President's actions. During my service in Congress, no other single event has produced such an incredible volume of communications from my constituents in a comparable period of time. The reaction indicates the gravity of the situation and the degree of the crisis of confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government.

"The common reaction combines shock, fear, and a sense of having been betrayed. Over 90 percent of the communications I have received have been critical of the President. A clear majority have demanded impeachment. . . ."

Nixon's abrupt retreat later that day did little or nothing to quiet the public outrage. By the end of the week, mem-

"Look—Nice Tapes—Okay, Boy?—Okay?—"



bers of Congress had received 250,000 telegrams, and nobody knew how many phone calls and letters.

In the October 25 *Washington Post*, William Claiborne reported the tallies made by various members of Congress:

- The Senate Watergate committee received 8,000 telegrams, only 10 of which supported Nixon.

- Cox's office reported 10,000 telegrams, "all but a handful" critical of Nixon.

- Democratic Congressman Peter Rodino of New Jersey received 400 telegrams, all of them demanding impeachment or criticizing Nixon, after Nixon's retreat on the tape issue.

- Prior to Nixon's retreat, Democratic Senator John Tunney of California reported that he had received 1,299 telegrams for impeachment and 1 against. By the end of the week, he had received 8,000 telegrams, most of them also apparently in favor of impeachment.

- Republican Congressman Paul Findley of Illinois received "several hundred" telegrams after October 23, only 6 of which supported Nixon.

- Republican Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, who is still publicly backing Nixon, reported that after Nixon's retreat on the tapes his mail was still opposed to Nixon by an 80-to-1 ratio.

- Republican Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland said that after October 23 the ratio of his mail demanding impeachment declined from 15-to-1 to 10-to-1.

- Democratic Senator Alan Cranston of California reported 2,800 telegrams favoring impeachment and 21 against before the October 23 announcement; by the end of the next day, the totals were 6,447 in favor of impeachment and only 197 against.

Public opinion polls reflected a similar disenchantment with the Nixon gang. A Gallup poll conducted October 6-8—before the firing of Cox and before the resignation of Agnew—found only 30 percent approval of Nixon's

performance in office and 57 percent disapproval. On the other hand, while support for Nixon had been declining from an approval of 45 percent in June, the figure favoring impeachment had hovered around 25 percent throughout the summer. But on the night of October 20, a telephone poll conducted for the National Broadcasting Corporation found a dramatic shift: 44 percent in favor of impeachment and 43 percent against. It is likely that the percentage in favor rose during the following days.

Faced with this storm of outrage, the members of the House—which under the U.S. constitution must initiate impeachment—introduced eight different resolutions on impeachment; one motion to censure Robert Bork, the acting attorney general who carried out Nixon's orders to fire Cox; and thirteen proposals for investigations, including eight bills with some Republican support to establish a Watergate prosecutor who could not be fired by the White House gang.


The impeachment resolution with the broadest sponsorship was introduced in the name of sixty-two Democratic members of the House. It resolved "that the Committee on the Judiciary shall . . . inquire into and investigate the official conduct of Richard M. Nixon to determine whether in the opinion of said committee he has been guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor which in the contemplation of the Constitution requires the interposition of the powers of the House of Representatives under the Constitution. The Committee on the Judiciary shall report its findings to the House of Representatives, together with such resolutions, articles of impeachment, or other recommendations as it deems proper."

This and the other impeachment resolutions were referred to the Judiciary Committee for "investigation." Such investigation is, of course, a long way from actually attempting to remove Nixon from office. Nevertheless, the events immediately before and after October 23 indicate that to a greater degree than ever before, the U.S. ruling class is forced to consider whether the continually mushrooming Watergate scandal may not make the continuation of Nixon's administration more of a liability than the awkward business of replacing it.

One important factor that will be taken into account is the now appar-

ently definitive break of the AFL-CIO bureaucracy with the Nixon gang. On October 22, the union federation's biennial national convention unanimously adopted a resolution demanding that Nixon resign and that Congress impeach him if he refuses. Following Nixon's retreat on the tapes issue, the bureaucrats indicated that their demand still stood.

Nixon's ability to secure the cooperation of the labor bureaucracy—especially the cooperation of the AFL-CIO—in imposing his wage-freeze policies was a major reason for the



FORD: Nixon's nominee forced to support impeachment investigation.

overwhelming backing of the U.S. ruling class that Nixon received in the 1972 election. George Meany, the federation's president, and his fellow bureaucrats are no less class-collaborationist in their outlook today than they were when they sat on Nixon's pay board and voted to roll back wage increases. But they are now looking for a Democratic politician with whom they can collaborate without being stained by scandal.

This means that the labor bureaucrats will feel compelled to offer at least verbal opposition to all of Nixon's economic policies. This verbal opposition in turn will encourage the already growing rank-and-file reluctance to follow "wage guidelines" that keep wages lagging behind the spiraling inflation.

Nixon clearly was unprepared for the response to his latest cover-up attempt. The abrupt reversal of his decision on the tapes was forced on him by the unexpected outcry and by members of his own party in Congress, who warned him that they would protect themselves rather than attempt to block impeachment if he defied the court order.

According to a report by Lou Cannon and Carroll Kilpatrick in the October 24 *Washington Post*, the warning was conveyed through Nixon adviser Bryce Harlow at an October 23 meeting with Republican leaders of the House of Representatives:

"Harlow's mission at yesterday's morning meeting with the GOP [Republican] congressmen had been to explain the reasons for Mr. Nixon's action in firing Cox. But he was met with a hostile group of Republicans.

"Rep. John Anderson of Illinois, leader of the House Republican Conference, told Harlow that it was necessary for the President to turn over the tapes if he wanted Republicans to defend him in the House. He was strongly supported by Rep. John Rhodes of Arizona and Rep. Leslie Arends, the GOP Whip."

A measure of the fears created in the Republican ranks is the fact that Gerald Ford, Nixon's nominee for vice-president, found it necessary to state that he would not oppose an investigation of the possibility of impeachment by the Judiciary Committee.

The conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote October 25 that "many Republican loyalists" were beginning to regard Nixon "not as a master politician sometimes insensitive to party interests but as a basic political incompetent, whose surprise moves derive from irresponsibility more than cunning." They quoted "a senior House Republican" as saying:

"Some of us are just getting tired of his crises, of his inability to run the government without another crisis."

Nixon's inability to avoid crises is not the result of personal characteristics, but of the political crisis of the U.S. ruling class that is symbolized by the name Watergate. The danger to Nixon is that the ruling class may decide to attempt to resolve that crisis by putting Nixon's head on the block. In weighing such a decision, Nixon's



past services will count for little, as Spiro Agnew could testify.

By the time he held his twice-delayed press conference October 26, Nixon's attempts to "tough it out" rang hollow. Despite the fact that only two days before he had put U.S. armed forces on alert around the world, implying an armed confrontation with the Soviet Union, most of the questions from the reporters—nearly all of them plainly hostile—concerned the Watergate scandal.

Acting more and more like a rat in a corner, Nixon lashed out at the press and the television networks, complaining of "outrageous, vicious, distorted reporting." The networks didn't make him angry, he said at one point, because "one can only be angry with those he respects."

His attacks on the press alternated with self-congratulatory posturing that was simply embarrassing. Asked how he was "bearing up emotionally under the stress of recent events," Nixon replied:

"Well, those who saw me during the Middle East crisis thought I bore up rather well, and . . . I have a quality which is, I guess I must have inherited it from my Midwestern mother and father, which is that the tougher it gets the cooler I get."

Nixon's "fury" during the press conference, the *New York Times* said in an October 28 editorial, "left no room for doubt that he still labors under the sense of persecution he revealed so graphically when he told reporters they would 'no longer have Dick Nixon to kick around' after his defeat for Governor in California in 1962.

". . . The performance raised new questions about whether Mr. Nixon does, indeed, have the steadiness under fire requisite of a President of the United States."

Nixon chose the press conference as the forum to announce that he would appoint another special prosecutor to replace Cox. This concession appears to be too little too late: Congress is likely to pass legislation appointing a prosecutor who cannot be fired by Nixon. Nixon would then be faced with the choice of vetoing the legislation—and thus possibly touching off another storm—or approving a prosecutor who could prove even more dangerous than Cox.

The appointment of such a prosecutor could well be seen by high-

level Nixon gangsters—Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, etc.—as a sign that Nixon was no longer able to protect them, as Anthony Lewis wrote in the October 25 *New York Times*:

"The prosecutor . . . will have to insist on every scrap of evidence. Witnesses able to incriminate the highest levels of the White House will know that the power to obstruct justice is fading. They will talk to save their own skins."



NIXON: "The tougher it gets, the cooler I get."

Potentially even more dangerous to the head of the White House gang is the impeachment investigation of the Judiciary Committee. Many of the resolutions listed crimes other than the defiance of the court order as cause for impeachment. Democrat Robert Leggett of California, for example, suggested that the committee look into the following charges: bribery, misprision of a felony, illegal wiretapping, perjury and subornation of perjury, obstruction of criminal investigations, and conspiracy against the rights of citizens. (Leggett later told reporters: "Just at a glance, I can see a prima facie case of commission of sufficient felonies in Mr. Nixon's record to imprison him for 173 years.")

Most of Nixon's crimes have been well known to the members of Congress for a long time. This does not guarantee, however, that the Judiciary Committee will conduct a whitewash investigation. On the contrary, if the members of the committee are convinced that most of the U.S. public is also aware of Nixon's crimes, they will be under considerable pressure to cover their past agreement with those crimes by avoiding any appearance of a whitewash.

A similar reaction can be expected from the Senate Watergate committee, which in recent weeks has confined its infrequent sessions to the questioning of the lowest-ranking "dirty tricks" practitioners it could find. The committee is known to be in possession of potentially explosive information concerning a \$100,000 gift to Nixon from billionaire Howard Hughes, and it will be under pressure to give the matter considerable public attention.

In short, Nixon is in a worse position than he has been at any point in the Watergate scandal—worse even than during John Dean's testimony to the Senate committee. His present vulnerability only makes it more likely that additional scandals will come to the surface.

Only one year ago, Nixon was re-elected with a share of the popular vote only slightly below the highest achieved in modern U.S. history and with ruling class support that approached unanimity. The slogan of the victorious candidate was "four more years."

Today, the Watergate scandal has brought him a degree of popular distrust that probably surpasses the revulsion against Johnson in 1968 and that causes the U.S. ruling class to regard three more years of Nixon with increasing foreboding.

More than once in the past, Nixon has proved his skill at defending his personal political fortunes by any means necessary. But those fortunes are now at a lower point than they have ever been before. The remarks of columnist Joseph Kraft in the October 25 *Washington Post* will seem more and more reasonable to the rulers of the United States as the Watergate scandal continues to unfold:

"The hard issue, the issue that will not down, is the apparent involvement of the President and his closest associates in the various scandals [linked]

with Watergate. Either Mr. Nixon has something to hide, or he likes confrontation and crisis for its own sake.

"In any case, there is now no rapport between the President and moderate opinion in the country. Mr. Nixon

can only stumble for the next three years. So it would be a blessing for all of us if a way could be found . . . to drive a bargain whereby Mr. Nixon withdrew to make room for some other leader." □

*coming from where I come from.*

—Peter J. Brennan testifying at hearings on his nomination as secretary of labor.

\* \* \*

## Behind the Watergate Scandal—V

# The Nixon Gang and the Labor Fakery

By Allen Myers

*Nixon is a victim of circumstances. When I was president of the [Teamsters] union I couldn't keep track of what was going on among two million members. The president is running a country of over 200 million people.*

—James Hoffa, commenting on the Watergate scandal.

\* \* \*

The operations of the Nixon gang extend into virtually every area of political activity in the United States. One of the areas of this undercover work that has been only partially exposed concerns Nixon's relations with the bureaucrats at the head of the union movement.

While Nixon has never indulged in the liberal hypocrisy of posing as a "friend of labor," he has friendly relations with sectors of the union leadership going back at least to 1961. In that year, Nixon bought a Beverly Hills, California, lot that had been mortgaged to a Teamsters pension fund for \$42,000. The developers—who included Texas oilmen Clint and John Murchison—sold the lot to Nixon for \$35,000 after paying off the mortgage. Nixon sold the lot two years later for \$86,000.

In 1961, Nixon was an unemployed former vice-president hoping to become governor of California. Since he was elected president in 1968, his relations with the union bureaucracy have expanded proportionally. Sectors of this bureaucracy have been persuaded to abandon their traditional reliance on Democratic politicians and to engage in mutual back-scratching with the Nixon gang. Some of the disclosures that have resulted from the

Watergate scandal link several of these labor skates—and through them, Nixon—to what is known as "organized crime."\*

Nixon's ties with parts of the labor bureaucracy, of course, serve a "higher purpose" than mere mutual enrichment. They are a part of the decades-long collaboration between union bureaucrats and government, which serves to dampen and contain the militancy of the working class. In this sense, there is nothing new about the Nixon gang's operations in the union movement. What is relatively novel is the exposure of the degree to which the relationship is regulated by factors such as blackmail and personal greed.

### Rewards for a Friend

*I'm as damned good as anybody. You never had a secretary before*

\*Most of the crime in the United States is quite well organized. The phrase is really used to distinguish less "respectable" criminals from such malefactors as high government officials and corporation executives. There are also some more-or-less characteristic differences in the methods of operation. Corporate gangsters, for example, tend to settle disputes by proxy fights, while "organized crime" prefers less subtle means, such as gunfights. "Organized" criminals normally ignore the law and depend on expensive lawyers to keep them out of jail; corporate and government criminals usually hire the lawyers in Congress, who then legalize whatever crimes their employers specialize in. In its involvement in both these areas, it will be noted, the Nixon gang has blurred considerably the normal dividing line between political and "organized" crime.

As is true in other fields, the Nixon gang has both enemies and friends in the union movement. One longtime friend is Peter Brennan, who was appointed secretary of labor three weeks after the 1972 election. Brennan, as president of the New York State and New York City Building and Construction Trades Council, had campaigned for Nixon in both 1968 and 1972.

It may be surmised that in Nixon, Brennan recognized a kindred spirit. His career in the union movement has been surrounded by the same smell of scandal that, on a larger scale, has characterized Nixon's.

Although he had spent more than fifteen years as head of the Building and Construction Trades Council, Brennan never worked as a "hard hat." He began his bureaucrat's career as business agent for Local 1456 of the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paper Hangers in New York. His office happened to be located in the headquarters of the Building and Construction Trades Council, and when his predecessor died in 1957, Brennan was selected for the post primarily because he knew the office routine.

At the same time, Brennan retained his control over Local 1456. Throughout the 1960s, the New York District Council of the Painters union was embroiled in a rebellion against the council president, Martin Rarbach, who was accused of accepting more than \$800,000 in bribes and kickbacks from contractors who needed the approval of Rarbach and corrupt city officials in order to work on city jobs. Rarbach's trial ended in a hung jury, but city officials and contractors charged in the case were convicted.

When the painters opposition ran against Rarbach for council president, however, Local 1456, under Brennan's control, voted ten-to-one for Rarbach.

It was during this same period that Brennan became known for his recreational activities. His favorite relaxation was playing golf with the chief

representative of the employers' association.

U. S. construction unions are notorious for being job trusts, exclusive clubs whose doors are opened only to relatives of members or those who can persuade union officials of their worthiness. The privileged few who are admitted to the union enjoy wages well above the average for comparable skills in other industries. The combination of these two factors tends to give construction-union bureaucrats a tighter control over the membership than that exercised in other unions. In May 1970, Brennan used this control to cement an alliance with the Nixon gang.

On May 8, 1970, in the midst of the massive antiwar upsurge that followed the U. S. invasion of Cambodia, a gang of several hundred well-organized construction workers launched a brutal attack on protesters listening to antiwar speeches outside the Federal Building in Manhattan. A businessman who witnessed the assault from a nearby office described it as follows in a letter to the newspapers:

"It started when many hundreds of construction workers marched in an orderly column, with American flags flying, from Broadway around the corner of Wall Street and down the street into a crowd of people assembled in front of Federal Hall listening to a speaker. The workers immediately began unprovoked assaults on those people. I saw people kicked in the face, punched up on top of parked cars and then pushed off, and otherwise beaten and abused. There was blood on the base of the statue of Washington . . . and in sundry other places."

The police department had been informed in advance by a construction worker that the attack was going to take place. The few cops who were on the scene did not intervene except, in a few cases, to aid the attackers. The executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union later stated: "Reports we have received make clear that police stood around passively and in some instances joined in the assault on antiwar demonstrators."

Witnesses said the attackers were directed by two men in business suits, one of whom was subsequently identified as the editor of a small ultra-rightist newspaper.

In the May 1973 issue of *Progressive*

magazine, Patrick Owens wrote of the incident:

"No one has ever investigated the hard-hat violence or Brennan's role in it. However, the number of men involved and the diversity of their crafts and their places of employment make it clear that high-level union involvement was essential. Men em-



ROCKEFELLER: Liberal governor backed Nixon gang against Black official.

ployed by different contractors and from different unions simply do not take off from their jobs and go on a head-bashing spree—as they did May 8 and subsequently—without sanction from some central authority."

For nearly two weeks after May 8, construction workers on the streets of New York carried out random assaults on anyone they suspected of being opposed to the war. The right-wing orgy reached its climax May 20 with a large prowar march and rally at which Brennan was the featured speaker. Some of the workers who participated told reporters that they were required to sign in at the rally in order to be paid for that day's "work."

Shortly thereafter, Brennan was invited to the White House. In a much-photographed meeting, Brennan presented Nixon with a hard hat and

received an American flag lapel pin in return.

The romance between Brennan and the Nixon gang did have its rough spots. In late February 1971, for example, as part of the "fight against inflation" Nixon suspended the 1931 Davis-Bacon Act, which requires contractors to pay "prevailing" wage rates on federal projects. The effect was to permit contractors to negotiate contracts with union or nonunion workers at rates below the union scale.

The question is not a minor one for the construction unions: In July of this year the *Christian Science Monitor* estimated that \$10,000 million worth of construction contracts has gone to nonunion workers in recent years. Brennan felt sufficiently threatened by Nixon's action to accuse him of "union busting," but his emotions did not move him to repent his earlier performance as a thug for the Nixon gang.

As the 1972 elections approached, the gang decided it was time to patch things up with Brennan. This task was assigned to Charles Colson, who, in addition to running the "office of dirty tricks," was in charge of relations with so-called special-interest groups: labor unions, religious groups, veterans, etc. The two assignments were complementary: Dirty tricks and undercover operations have proved useful in neutralizing trade-union enemies, or even persuading them to become friends. Colson was assisted in this by his deputy, Donald F. Rodgers, who is now a "labor consultant" to Nixon and a counselor to Secretary of Labor Brennan.

The White House gang of course had no intention of doing anything to benefit construction workers. But some of the favors they did for Brennan and bureaucrats like him were described by Seymour M. Hersh in the July 1, 1973, *New York Times*.

According to Hersh's sources, Colson and Rodgers put pressure on the Labor Department during the summer of 1972 to harass Black construction unions in New York that were seen as competitors by Brennan:

"The suggestion that the Labor Department begin harassing black construction union locals was . . . made last summer by Mr. Rodgers, sources said.

"He wanted the department to bring enough action against them so that



they could put the unions out of business,' the source added. Asked why such action would have been requested, the source replied, 'Because they were competing with white unions for construction jobs.'

"It could not be learned which black unions were to be targeted under the request reportedly made by Mr. Rodgers. One source quoted Mr. Rodgers as saying, after the Labor Department strenuously objected to his reported proposal, 'You've harassed unions all over the country—why can't you do something about this one?'"

Rodgers was also quoted as promising the white construction unions that even the government's demands for token desegregation of the unions would be relaxed after the 1972 presidential election.

In March 1972, Colson, Rodgers, and the New York Trades Council went all out to prevent the nomination of a Black Department of Labor official as the department's New York regional director. The official, Clayton J. Cotrell, was an opponent of the "New York Plan"—a proposal developed by Brennan and Rodgers to carry out token integration of the construction unions without altering their function as essentially all-white job trusts.

Cotrell was supported for the post by James D. Hodgson, then secretary of labor, and by Laurence H. Silberman, the under secretary.

"One source," Hersh wrote, "said that the initial objection made by Mr. Colson's office to the Cotrell appointment noted simply, 'You can't have this black regional director in New York because the building trades won't stand for it.'"

"Over the next two weeks, Governor [Nelson] Rockefeller of New York and John N. Mitchell, then the Attorney General, voiced objection to Mr. Cotrell, the source said, but Secretary of Labor Hodgson and Mr. Silberman refused to back down.

"At one point, the Labor Department officials were pointedly told by a high White House official, sources said, that the pending appointment of Mr. Cotrell could have adverse impact on the Republican political situation in New York.

"'Who does he think is running for President of the United States,' one White House source recalled Attorney General Mitchell complaining about

Mr. Silberman during a meeting on the issue, 'Richard Nixon or Larry Silberman?'"

Cotrell was finally appointed regional director when Silberman threatened to resign over the issue. One "well-informed official" told Hersh:

"Everybody in town knew that Colson was all over the Labor Department last summer trying to get things done. I also know as a fact that Larry [Silberman] put his job on the line over Cotrell."

"A Congressional source," Hersh added, "said that Mr. Silberman's



COLSON: "The building trades won't stand for it."

threat to resign prompted the White House to agree finally to the appointment of Mr. Cotrell. Another well-informed source said that Mr. Silberman did, in fact, submit a letter of resignation that was rejected by President Nixon, who then ordered Mr. Colson to drop his opposition."

Cotrell was not to last long in his new position, however. When Brennan became secretary of labor, one of his first acts was to dismiss all ten regional directors. Four of these were reappointed to their posts, but Cotrell was reduced two grades and assigned to a veterans' job program in Washington.

Hersh reported that Colson's office had also attempted to get Silberman to intervene in a Pennsylvania court case in the fall of 1972 on behalf of an AFL-CIO construction union. The

union had appealed a lower court decision to the state supreme court.

"One involved source recalled that Mr. Rodgers directly asked Mr. Silberman to attempt to influence the court to decide in favor of the construction union before the election. The source quoted Mr. Rodgers as declaring to Mr. Silberman, 'It's a Republican court; we ought to be able to get to someone.'"

As it turned out, Colson and Rodgers were unable "to get to someone" in this case, because Silberman refused the assignment. Conflicts between Colson and Silberman seem to have interfered frequently with the Nixon gang's operations in the union movement. (These conflicts did not reflect any basic opposition between Silberman and his employers, as we will see below in regard to the attack on the United Farm Workers Union.) But when the gangsters were not working at cross purposes, they proved that they could use to good advantage the government machinery under their control.

## Dealing With Enemies

*Senator Sam Ervin: Now, was not there a feeling there among some White House officials such as Mr. Colson, and perhaps among some in the Committee to Re-elect the President, that every person who was not backing their efforts to reelect the president or who dissented from the programs of the president was an enemy?*

*John Dean: I think that many people who were most vocal and could command some audience in their dissent were considered opponents or enemies, yes.*

—Senate Watergate committee hearings, June 28, 1973.

\* \* \*

The documents that John Dean turned over to the Senate Watergate committee make it clear that it is not necessary to be "vocal" in opposition to the Nixon gang in order to be included on the White House "enemies list." In some cases the list seemed quite capricious—including Nixon supporters and overlooking prominent opponents—presumably because of bureaucratic mistakes. A large num-

ber of persons were added to the list for the crime of contributing to Democratic party candidates.

Included were individuals and organizations—from politicians, reporters, and professors to the Third National Convocation on the Challenge of Building Peace and the Businessmen's Educational Fund. There was also a relatively small number of union bureaucrats: The list was about one-fourth the length of the roster of "enemy" corporate executives and businesspeople, a fact that speaks volumes about the level of militancy of union "leadership" in the United States today.

Most if not all of the trade-union enemies would seem to have been included on the list because of their support for one or another of Nixon's Democratic party opponents.

Perhaps the most prominent in this respect was Harold J. Gibbons, an international vice-president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) and, more importantly, head of the Central States Conference, one of the powerful regional Teamsters groupings. Gibbons was a "vocal" backer of George McGovern in the 1972 presidential campaign.

Among the Dean papers was a June 12, 1972, memo from Colson to Dean that proposed a covert attack on Gibbons.

"I have received a well informed tip," Colson wrote, "that there are income tax discrepancies involving the returns of Harold J. Gibbons, a Vice President of the Teamsters Union in St. Louis. This has come to me on very, very good authority.

"Gibbons, you should know, is an all-out enemy, a McGovernite, ardently anti-Nixon. He is one of the 3 labor leaders who were recently invited to Hanoi.

"Please see if this one can be started on at once and if there is an informer's fee, let me know. There is a good cause at which it can be donated."

Gibbons's 1971 tax returns were audited, *Time* magazine later reported, and Gibbons "said he had to pay a small additional tax on items involving travel expenses."

It was only after the elections, however, that the Nixon gang was able to get rid of this enemy. When Colson retired from the White House in December 1972, he joined a Washington law firm now known as Colson

and Shapiro. Colson's contribution to the partnership was a client paying \$100,000 a year: the IBT. The pro-Nixon union bureaucrats shortly thereafter found a pretext for throwing Gibbons out of his post with the Central States Conference: Gibbons was accused of "dual unionism" for helping to organize a small union of unskilled workers in St. Louis.

Gibbons was fortunate that there were no serious "discrepancies" in his tax returns. Had he been subject to



HUMPHREY: Benefited from seamen's money in 1968 campaign.

possible criminal prosecution, Gibbons might have found himself under irresistible pressure to switch his political allegiances.

This was what happened to Paul Hall, president of the Seafarers' International Union (SIU). Like many corporation executives, Hall believes in the wisdom of contributing to both major capitalist parties, and the SIU did so in the 1968 campaign.

The bulk of the SIU's contributions, however, went to Hubert Humphrey rather than Richard Nixon, and this fact was enough to get Hall in trouble with the Nixon gang. (The same law that makes corporate contributions illegal also prohibits donations from union funds.)

Hall and seven other SIU officers were indicted in June 1970 on charges

that they had illegally contributed \$40,000 from union funds in 1968 and had conspired to spend \$750,000 illegally between 1964 and 1968. Just where all this money came from has never been firmly established, but there were charges that large sums had been extorted from foreign sailors working on ships under the U.S. flag.

Hall has a long record, going back to World War II, of collaboration with capitalist politicians in Washington, and it must have been obvious to the Nixon gang that Hall could be more useful outside of prison than in it. While no one has yet publicized any letters or memos detailing the subsequent negotiations between Hall and the Nixon gang, the course of events makes it easy to surmise what was happening behind the scenes.

For nearly two years, the Justice Department dawdled over the case rather than bring Hall and his co-defendants to trial. Eventually, in June 1972, a federal judge dismissed the indictment on the grounds that the Justice Department's failure to specify the particulars of its charges deprived the defendants of their right to a speedy trial.

This did not necessarily mean the end of Hall's troubles, since the Justice Department had the right to appeal the judge's ruling to a higher court. But once again the government's lawyers procrastinated. Finally, in October, the Justice Department announced that it would not appeal the earlier decision.

Several weeks later, on November 2, Hall reciprocated the Nixon gang's attentions by having the SIU donate \$100,000 to CREEP. Hall put the union into debt for this contribution, borrowing \$100,000 on the same day from the Chemical Bank in New York. One suspects that the bank did not waste much time checking the SIU's credit rating: The chairman of the Chemical Bank's executive committee is Harold H. Helm, who was also a cochairman of CREEP's finance committee.

After this generous pledging of SIU members' money, Hall was invited to the White House just before the election to pose for photographs with Nixon.

While anxious to publicize the friendly relations with the SIU leader, the



Nixon gang was considerably more reticent about explaining the reasons. The *New York Times* of February 5, 1973, reported:

"Although Federal law requires a special report within 48 hours of any contribution of \$5,000 or more received in the last 12 days before an election, the seafarers' money was not listed by the Nixon campaign until its year-end statement last week to the General Accounting Office."

Hall has not been indicted for the

1972 contribution to CREEP, nor have campaign officers been charged for illegally concealing the \$100,000 gift. On the contrary, in December Nixon appointed Hall as a member of the National Productivity Commission and the Phase 3 Labor-Management Advisory Committee. From the standpoint of the Nixon gang, the SIU presidency was obviously well qualified to represent the "interests of labor."

(To be continued.)

CORFO (Corporación de Fomento—the state planning board). Another was put in the top spot in the CODELCO (Corporación del Cobre—the Copper Board, the body that manages the nationalized mines). In addition, the junta put a special inspector, national police Colonel Andrés Fernandes, over the Copper Board.

"Similar special military supervisors sit in every major customs office, in banks, in the state airlines, Lan and Ladeco, in construction firms and plants," *Der Spiegel* reported.

General Eduardo Cano runs the National Bank, and an infantry colonel, Hernán Sepúlveda Cañas, serves as mayor of Santiago. The chamber of commerce is under the command of a colonel, and even the national golf association has been put under the supervision of a military man, Air Force General Huberto Magliochetti.

Following this influx of military officers into the top position in every branch of public administration, the junta's Ministry of Justice announced October 26 that a complete reorganization of public administration was needed "to restore the principles of order, discipline and public morality."

With this, Marvine Howe commented in the October 27 *New York Times*: "New widespread dismissals of the supporters of the former leftist regime were generally expected as an immediate consequence."

Although this purge of the government apparatus probably forms part of the general terror against the left, whose hardships it will increase, the military will certainly take the opportunity to build a vast patronage machine, as a means of holding the loyalty of their rightist supporters and of satisfying the ambitions and greed of the lower-ranking officers.

At the same time, the junta has promised to give the economic and professional associations that organized mass pressure for Allende's overthrow a special role in administration, as a vehicle, according to General Pinochet, for giving citizens "responsible participation" in the life of the country.

These associations, said Jaime Guzmán, one of their leaders and a member of the junta's "constitutional committee," in an interview with Marvine Howe, are to function as the units of a new kind of "nonpolitical" administration.

## Chilean Military Rushes After Spoils

# Junta Installs Officers in All Key Posts

By Gerry Foley

Six weeks after the coup in Chile, some of the main lines of the junta's plan for governing the country seemed to be emerging more clearly. With the majority of the working class and the poor totally alienated from the regime and thirsting for revenge, the only reliable base for administration was apparently the military itself and the reactionary leaderships of the middle-class economic associations.

"The few papers still published in Santiago were, and had to be, all in agreement," *Der Spiegel's* correspondent wrote in the October 22 issue of the West German weekly magazine. "The junta could not have chosen a better man. *La Tercera de la Hora* praised his 'wealth of experience'; *La Segunda*, his 'practical preparation,' since he had gone through special courses in artillery, combat communications, torpedos, and torpedos and sonar, all in the U. S. A. *El Mercurio* summed it all up: 'The officer has outstanding qualifications for the post.'

"And so Rear Admiral Hugo Castro Jiménez became Chile's minister of education."

The junta's first minister of education, the rightist professor José Navarro Toba, *Der Spiegel* explained, was considered "too far left."

In his new post, Admiral Castro very quickly displayed a military decisiveness. He abolished the social sciences, since in his opinion there were no "non-Marxist books" available.

Even rightist politicians could not be trusted, since they had failed to halt the advance of the workers movement during the Allende regime. As one of the principal plotters of the coup told *New York Times* correspondent Jonathan Kandell not long after the military take-over, "frankly many of us gave a sigh of relief when the Marxists received such a high vote [in the March congressional elections] because we felt that no politician could run the country, and eventually the Marxists might be even stronger."

Now the military had its chance to show that it could do better and it was determined to assume all the prerogatives of "leadership."

"The military are convinced," *Der Spiegel* continued, "that they were prepared in the Chilean and U. S. military academies for every possible responsibility. Therefore, they are not only 'pacifying the country,' they are militarizing the administration, as a leftist engineer gone underground said, to an extent that 'not even a foreign occupation government would do.'"

In the period immediately after the coup, the military modestly occupied only the top posts in the government, the security forces, and the diplomatic corps.

"Then, when the generals thought they had consolidated their power over Chile, more and more posts in every sphere of public life were literally taken over by the military."

A general got the job as head of





CHILEAN JUNTA: Scramble for loot undermining compact of thieves?

"Gremialism [from *gremio*—guild, or professional association], as expounded by Mr. Guzmán, Howe wrote in the October 23 *New York Times*, "appears to be a combination of traditional liberal capitalism and a kind of corporatism similar to that practiced in Spain under Generalissimo Francisco Franco."

It seemed clear from Howe's report, however, that the gremios have more in common with "liberal" capitalism, that is, individualistic competition, than with the veteran generalissimo's "corporatism." Whereas the organs of Spanish fascism were built on the basis of a monolithic mass movement welded together by the pressure of a world crisis and a prolonged civil war, and on heavy social demagoguery, the gremios, as Howe explains, have developed primarily as lobbies, as groups devoted in practice and not in theory to defending the economic interests of specific groups in the petty bourgeoisie. They represent a myriad of conflicting interests, whose rivalry is certain to increase with the prospects for loot and advantage.

Likewise, handing over all the attractive posts in public administration to military officers threatens to generate rivalries that may eventually shatter the unity of the armed forces. According to Jorge Mastuche, an underground CP leader interviewed by *Der Spiegel's* correspondent, the rush of all the top officers for cushier jobs in civilian administration offers a hope for liberalization. This exodus would

leave active command to the junior officers "who are quite progressive." What is more likely is that resentments will develop among those officers unable to leave their barracks for the armchairs of government and corporate offices. And once the military

and the lobbies begin to fight among themselves over the loot, powerful social forces may erupt again that cannot long be suppressed by the most extensive terror, and still less when the regime depends on a compact among thieves. □

### 'Driven Like Cattle Into the Slaughterhouse'

## Inside Santiago's Two Stadiums

[The following account of conditions in the two stadiums in Santiago, Chile, is by a refugee now in Peru. The account was made public by the Peruvian section of the Movimiento Latinoamericano para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (Latin American Movement for the Defense of Human Rights). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

As the presidential palace started burning from the bombing, the military moved against the plants, universities, party headquarters, and private homes. One of these squads broke into my home, overturning furniture and bookshelves looking for arms and political material.

In the residential areas, the squads were guided by rightist activists, who in anticipation of the coup had col-

lected information on the leftists. At first, this fingering was directed against foreigners, whose valuables were stolen as they were driven out of their homes.

In the first days the tone was set by a spewing of fascist venom against foreigners. They were blamed for the climate of hatred that existed and were accused of being guerrillas who had come to Chile to murder innocent citizens. The questioning to which we were subjected left no doubt of this.

They were mainly interested in finding supposed arms caches, extremist organizations, and political leaders. Every period of interrogation was preceded by a session of several minutes in which the soldiers beat everybody indiscriminately with their gun butts. When this method failed, they didn't hesitate to tell us that we were going to be shot at once. They pointed to the bombing of La Moneda and the

murder of President Allende as examples of what they had the guts and toughness to do.

In the evening of September 11, we were turned over to a police patrol. The cops charged into the courtyard of the barracks yelling and shouting that we should be shot on the spot. The brutality of the army was mild compared to what we suffered at the hands of the police. In the police station, the beatings were much worse because the cops are trained to use their clubs scientifically.

The police station was filled up immediately with hundreds of persons, the great majority showing signs of torture such as bruises and broken bones.

On the following day, after we had been taken back to the army barracks, they announced that we were to be shot at 10:00 a.m. After being beaten again and forced to struggle along to the execution site with our hands tied behind our backs, we were lined up in front of a firing squad at a range of approximately forty yards. In the indescribable anguish of those moments when we were facing certain death, memories crowded on us of the past, our loved ones, and the fascist destruction of the popular liberation we hoped for. When the time was up, these murderers gave us a temporary reprieve that made our lives still more difficult. At 10:00 a.m. there was a new announcement. Water was brought for the prisoners. The captain proclaimed the generosity of the Chilean army. Along with giving us water, they asked us to tell them our last wish. Everyone swallowed their hopes, without giving the murderers any satisfaction. Our last moment would come at noon, the officer announced. These delays lighted a weak ray of hope, warmer than the pale winter sunlight filtering in through the windows, and more generous. It sent a glow through our chilled bodies.

New interrogations. Then we were to be taken to the cemetery, where we would be shot and our bodies cremated. Our real destination was the Chile Stadium.

This colosseum is meant to hold a maximum of 3,000 persons. It was used as a receiving center for all the prisoners. When we arrived, thousands of prisoners were huddling to-

gether in lines, trying to avoid the blows that the hundreds of soldiers and police guarding us were systematically dealing out. As night fell and it got darker, the blows came heavier and thicker as the guards tried to terrorize the crowd that they feared might rush its tormentors. The cries of the wounded, the shouts of the torturers, the grunts of those who were being beaten, and shots fired at individuals gone berserk enveloped us in an inferno worse than Dante's.

The prisoners were driven into the stadium in herds, like cattle into the slaughterhouse. Half stooping, hands on our heads, we began to move through the gates. Streams of blood running down the ramps drew our eyes to the bodies of humble workers, who were lying there murdered. The stadium was already filled with prisoners and charged with apprehension. A rough calculation made later showed the number of prisoners to be about 6,000.

Close to a majority of the prisoners were workers from the nationalized factories. The workers had been taken brutally out of the plants where they were concentrated, waiting in vain for directives or instructions from the left parties. Almost all the nationalized factories, the cordones industriales, and party headquarters had been hit. Men, women, and children huddled together; they couldn't comprehend such brutality.

The military operation had two basic objectives. On the one hand, they rounded up the most active section of the industrial workers, to prevent them from regrouping and to block a probable counteroffensive. This job was completed in a few hours. The raids and arms searches that had been carried out in the last two months had given the army experience in covering the cordones and workplaces, raised military capability in urban actions, and had created the psychological and political conditions for the fascist coup. On the other hand, the indiscriminate brutality against the workers had an intimidating effect and was combined with fascist brainwashing.

Then came five days of murder, torture, and anxiety. Two young Argentine workers from a nationalized factory were accused of killing a police officer. The army interrogated them but it could not confirm its sus-

picious. At 2:00 a.m. on Friday, the police themselves interceded vainly, trying to prevent the two from being murdered. Beaten until their torturers were exhausted, their fingers smashed against the pavement by rifle butts, their faces bleeding, their ribs broken, the two Argentine workers were taken into the basement where they were finally clubbed to death.

One brutally beaten prisoner could not stand any more and jumped off a roof. Mortally injured, he was finished off by gunfire. For three successive nights, cries came out of the underground torture chambers, filling the restless sleep of the prisoners with terror. Who can say how many perished?

The first long, chilling scream may have been produced by a blow on the arm, or maybe on the legs. The next is wilder, and more prolonged, heart-rending. A direct blow in the liver. It will be followed by others, endlessly, until life seeps away in pools of blood.

Suspected members of the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria — Movement of the Revolutionary Left), the Communist party, the Socialist party, MAPU [Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria — Movement for United Popular Action], managers of nationalized plants, trade-union or political leaders, activists — these were the prime targets for torture.

For the doomed, the first two or three days of torture and prison did not at all mean just crowding, hunger, cold, and dampness. Every sheltered corner of the stadium was a refuge, cramped but filled with proletarian solidarity. By the fourth day, the tension, the fever, the body, everything demanded relief. A slender ration of gritty lentils took the edge off hunger. For others, more unfortunate, torture was still in store, or they would spend thirty-six hours lying immobile on their backs, with their arms swollen, their shoulders sore, their chests collapsed, without drinking a drop of water, without being able to go to the bathroom, hardly breathing.

Some workers turned to telling each other about their lives and their hopes for their families. Each asked the other, if he survived, to take care of his family. Twenty or thirty years working side by side in the factory, and they had never felt such warmth and hope as in these few moments.

Abruptly, the conversations were cut off. The commandant of the concentration camp was visiting the prisoners. "The Marxist regime" defiled the Chilean flag by letting the poor people in the city fly it from their shacks in their land seizures. Besides, this was an "offense against private property." The flag was dishonored when the peasants invaded or took possession of an expropriated ranch, and this was "an offense against private prop-

erty." The Chilean flag was degraded when it was raised over the gates of factories expropriated from the monopolies, and this was "an offense against private property." No discipline on the job, a black market, parallel armies, freedom, democracy, etc., etc., etc., and the glorious Chilean armed forces decided to make a "pronunciamento militar," that is, a fascist coup against "totalitarian Marxism." "Chile's mountains will be leveled,

something that can never happen, before the Chilean armed forces can be divided by the Marxists," the commandant chanted. He forced us to repeat it after him.

On Sunday September 16 they started transferring people to the National Stadium under heavy guard. The next to the last group included Victor Jara (a well-known folk singer), Littré Quiroga, a functionary of the Unidad Popular, the historian Luis Vitale, and workers leaders. When we got to the National Stadium at 7:00 p.m., some prisoners told us about the terrible deaths of Victor Jara and Quiroga. With his hands shattered by the blows of rifle butts, half mangled, driven insane by beating, Victor Jara died singing.

On Monday September 17 the stadium was filled for the spectacle of terror. There were 12,000, perhaps 15,000 persons there. The basement rooms were filled. According to some of the soldiers, it was former functionaries in the Allende government, left-wing doctors, technicians, political and trade-union leaders, and hundreds of foreigners, especially Uruguayans, Brazilians, Bolivians, Argentines, and Central Americans who were in there. The subbasements were filled with hundreds of persons from the shantytown of La Legua, where the inhabitants had responded to the intimidation of the police by blowing up a van filled with cops. These people were tortured in gruesome ways; perhaps they were marked for death.

Workers predominated in the crowd in the stadium. You could tell what factories they were from by their overalls. They were joined by students, shantytown dwellers, foreigners, and others. Almost all the entrance ramps to the stadium were filled. The material conditions were similar to those in the Chile Stadium or worse. Everyone huddled in a single blanket. The meager, irregular meals started at 10:00 or 11:00 in the morning. A small cup of coffee with a drop of milk; with one, a half, or a quarter of a bread roll, or sometimes none. On the best days, we got some lunch at 4:00 or 5:00 in the afternoon. Beans with spaghetti or lentils, small portions, badly cooked, with a piece of bread. Little by little, hunger became



SOLDIERS in Santiago carry off books to be burned.

November 5, 1973



another torture. The soldiers sold us cigarettes at 200 to 400 escudos a pack (they cost 10 in the stores). Every cigarette was smoked by one to ten persons.

At night, we slept huddled together for warmth. Shots in the darkness told of the murder of prisoners. Abruptly in the night, soldiers or police shouted for such and such a worker from some factory. Generally we denied that he or she was there, especially at night and particularly when it was the police or air force that came looking. It was almost certain in such cases that the prisoners they were after were to be shot.

The interrogations continued; only now they resorted to more scientific procedures, having the technical assistance of Brazilian, Bolivian, and Uruguayan torturers.

The majority of the foreigners were deported, except for the Brazilian, Uruguayan, and Central American prisoners, the Caribbeans all being regarded as Cubans. People from these three areas were brought before military tribunals and many of them were murdered.

The tortures grew worse, as the military got desperate, not finding among the prisoners even a small part of the list of political leaders, trade-unionists, and political activists they were looking for.

It was apparent that in the crowd of prisoners there were representatives of all political ideologies, from the MIR to the Christian Democracy. The prevailing climate was one of deep uneasiness but also of hope in the capacity of the working class to take on the fascists as time goes on. A battle had been lost but not the war.

Some 8,000 to 10,000 remained, perhaps. We know nothing of their fate in recent days. The flame of liberty continues to burn in the resistance of thousands of workers now suffering under the weight of the fascist boot. In the words of a Uruguayan leader of the Confederación de Unidad Sindical Latinoamericana [Confederation of Latin American Trade Unions] who was also a prisoner:

"In my long experience of trade-union struggles, I have never seen a people beaten to its knees, and Chile will not be the first."

Those of us who saw the fascist beast unleashed and suffered its atrocities ask you to think about this ex-

perience and to build still stronger demonstrations of solidarity with the Chilean people. □

## Argentine Student Who Got Out Tells What Happened

### Terror in Chile's National Stadium

[Luis Llorente, an Argentine, was a student at the Instituto Pedagógico in Santiago, Chile. He was arrested and held in the National Stadium for two weeks along with thousands of resident foreigners. When he was released and deported to his home country, he described his experiences to the Argentine Trotskyist weekly *Avanzada Socialista*, which published his account in its October 18 issue. The text follows. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

After arresting me in my house, they took me to a nearby military post and began to ask me questions about everything. Then they tied my hands behind my back with wire, and when I complained of the pain because my circulation was cut off, they kicked me. They started saying that they were going to shoot me but finally I was taken to the National Stadium. During the entire trip they tramped up and down heavily on my feet.

When I went in, I saw a mass of people in very uncomfortable positions, lying on the ground in the mud, or leaning up against the wall with their arms and legs spread apart. They booted me up against the wall and forced me to kneel down with my chest resting against it. It was very uncomfortable. I stayed like this for several hours, until they took me to a cell four by five meters in size, where they finally stuffed in 170 foreigners.

The worst problem for us was not the lack of food, the absence of hygienic facilities, or the lack of blankets. The worst thing was not knowing what was going to happen to us. We wished that they would go ahead with our trials so that we would have some idea what was going to become of us.

Every night, from 11:00 on, we began to hear shouts. The police were

torturing compañeros, yelling at them: "Call Altamirano [the leader of the left wing of the Socialist party], get him to defend you, you Marxist shit . . ." and other insults. One night we learned that they beat the compañeros from La Legua, and that later on these compañeros were shot.

They took an Argentine compañero to the Ministry of Defense and tortured him there because they said he was a leftist. The compañero was arrested at home while he was playing a game of scrabble with a friend. Well, at the Ministry of Defense, they said it was a message in code. After torturing him, they left him for three days without giving him any water. He suffered so much from thirst that he asked them to kill him.

They took us out for questioning according to nationality. First they made us sweep the floor, and then they started. There was one who insisted on being called *Cazador de Hombres* [Manhunter], and he started out with a compressed-air gun, running it over our eyes and ears.

They beat one compañero on the back, telling him that all Argentines were Marxists. They asked another man the name of his wife. When he said "Gracie," they hit him in the throat. He said "Gracie," but he couldn't continue because they were beating him. They were making a game of it, enjoying it: "Tell me your wife's name, you son of a bitch." We saw a compañero who lived in a shantytown come out of an inner room holding his testicles and screaming. They had worked him over with an electric prod.

One man, who had been arrested with a compañera, was almost killed. They worked over every part of his body with an electric prod. They told him that they were raping the woman, and after using the prod they beat him. They hanged him by the hands

and feet from the ceiling, and when we got to see him, he was in very bad shape. When they just touched the pit of his stomach, he howled, screamed and wept.

I was able to hear stories from compañeros who had seen more horrible things. A Yugoslav compañera, for instance, was taken in for questioning and the officer hit her in the pit of her stomach with the butt of his gun. The compañera was pregnant, and immediately had a miscarriage. She lost the child and her whole body was covered with blood. They left her lying on a bench for four days without anything to eat or drink or a chance to wash herself. They put the remains of the placenta and everything else on top of her. Later they took her to the Yugoslav Embassy, but they didn't want to accept her there, so she was returned to the stadium.

One of their favorite tortures was to break parts of the body, such as arms and hands. They made many persons, especially workers, put their hands on a table, and then they beat on their fingers with a hammer. They crippled the fingers of these compañeros. When they came back from questioning their arms or ribs were broken and covered with blood. In one case, they carved the symbol of the UP into the back of a person with the point of a knife.

After the coup, we heard the military keep calling over the radio for the workers to go to their jobs. They said there would be no reprisals. So the people went to work and the police were there. Then the whole factory work force was taken to the stadium and run through the wringer there. They already had lists of everybody who had been involved in activity or was a leader. These compañeros were segregated from the rest and disappeared. They were put in the basements of the stadium. We heard their screams. They were calling for food and water, because they were given nothing. We got some watered milk, a plate of beans, and bread. Those in the basements got only what was left over from us. If there was nothing left over, they did not get anything to eat. They were never taken out into the sun. The basements filled up with water, and the compañeros slept lying in the water.

Together with us were Uruguayans,

Bolivians, and other Latin Americans. The Brazilians had been separated out, and the rumor was that they were going before a military tribunal. As for the rest of us, they said that they were going to send us to our

embassies. For us Argentines, this was nothing, but for the other compañeros being sent to the embassy was the same thing as death or prison. They refused to leave. Many of them are still in the stadium. □

## Factory Managers Fired

## Report Successful Strike in Ukraine

[Large-scale protests in the Ukraine continue despite the severe repression that has been carried out in that Republic by the KGB (Soviet secret police). The Kremlin's latest crackdown, initiated in January 1972 against dissidents throughout the Soviet Union, was especially intense in the Ukrainian Republic.

[Recent reports tell of another wave of arrests of opponents of Russification in the city of Lviv, in western Ukraine, in May 1973.

[The massive unrest in the Ukraine has been manifested in the movement of young workers, students, and intellectuals who have criticized the Kremlin's policy on nationalities—Russification—from a Leninist point of view. It has also been evidenced in large-scale protests and strikes by workers for improved living standards.

[Large protest demonstrations and strikes occurred in two southern Ukrainian cities in 1972. In Dneprodzerzhinsk in June, over 10,000 "rioted" for two days, destroying government offices and occupying the Komsomol (Young Communist) offices. Around a dozen people were killed and many more wounded by the militia.

[In September, there were large strikes for improved living standards in Dnepropetrovsk, one of the largest industrial cities in the Soviet Union. Many participants were killed and wounded.

[The strike described in the following news release from the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners is the most recent such event that we have received information about. Its size and the haste with which the workers' demands were met indicate the regime's fears.

[The Novochoerkassk incident referred to in the release was the June 1962 uprising against price increases in that industrial city in Rostov Oblast

in the Russian Republic. The internal security forces had to call in special troops and use tanks units to quell the protests.

[Before the Novochoerkassk protests could be suppressed, they had sparked uprisings in other nearby cities, including two in the Ukraine—Donetsk, a mining and industrial center; and Zhdanov, a port city on the Sea of Azov.

[The city of Szczecin, also referred to in the release, was one of the key centers of workers' strikes and demonstrations in Poland in the winter of 1970-71.

[The translation from the Ukrainian is by Marilyn Vogt.]

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According to news recently received from the Ukraine, the workers at the machine-construction factory near the Brest-Litovsk highway in Kiev conducted a strike in May of this year demanding higher wages. Around 11:00 one morning, over 10,000 workers declared a strike and demanded negotiations with the factory officials, who immediately sounded an alarm to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Within an hour, a member of the Politburo of the CC of the UCP made an appearance, and after talking with the workers' representatives, he promised to fulfill their basic demands. Around 3:00 p.m. the majority of the factory's directors were dismissed and within an hour the workers won their demanded pay increase.

The strike had an organized character and the population attributes its success to this fact; in effect, the regime was afraid that it would turn into a new Novochoerkassk, if not a Ukrainian Szczecin. □

### Exile Discusses Lessons of Chile Coup

[As a contribution to the debate on the causes of the defeat of the workers movement in Chile, the Argentine Trotskyist weekly *Avanzada Socialista* published a letter in its October 18 issue from an exiled member of the left wing of the Chilean Socialist party. The text is given below, followed by an article from the same issue commenting on another aspect of the fall of the Allende government. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

#### The Armed Forces and the Chilean Coup

I have followed closely the series that *Avanzada Socialista* has published on the tragedy of our revolutionary process. I cannot agree with all of the opinions of this fraternal socialist paper. But I agree on some important points. It is true that all revolutionists on this continent can learn a great deal from our errors. It is true that the bloody escalation by the Yankees and the reactionaries was made possible by our errors and vacillations and by the trust that there was in the armed forces and the police. And it is on this point that I would like to offer some assessments.

As in every revolutionary process, the question of what policy to take toward the armed forces and the police was decisive in Chile. On no other point, perhaps, were such gross errors committed, and for no other mistakes have we had to pay so dearly.

The lamentable thing is that conditions existed in Chile for winning over a large proportion of the soldiers, noncoms, and even officers to defending Compañero Allende's legally constituted government against the subversion and the coup. A split had begun to develop in the armed forces. What happened in Valparaíso and Talcahuano—although the most important—was not an isolated or an exceptional occurrence. The political struggle had penetrated deeply into the

armed institutions. The imperialists, the reactionaries, and the right-wing Christian Democrats exploited this very skillfully. As the ITT documents proved, the Yankees started inciting subversion even before Compañero Allende took office. The bourgeois parties, especially the PN [Partido Nacional—the Nationalist party, the classical right capitalist party] and Patria y Libertad [Fatherland and Freedom, the fascists] set about energetically trying to win the military to their side.

In the face of this, the left took an ostrich policy. It refused to see what was going on.

In the June 4, 1973, issue of *Chile Hoy*, Compañero Corvalán, the general secretary of the Communist party, said: "I am sure that whether or not representatives of the armed forces remain in the government, the military will continue to defend and respect the legitimately constituted regime. So, those who think that the military's exit from the cabinet will leave the door open for them to launch a seditious movement such as the one in October whenever they choose are miscalculating. If such a thing happens, they will again run up against the most determined kind of answer from the workers and the people and find the armed forces supporting the government of the country." It is now clear who miscalculated.

Idiocies like this were repeated every day. The policy of the UP [Unidad Popular—Popular Unity, the ruling popular-front coalition] was based on them. They confused the masses.

The implications of what Compañero Corvalán said are clear. If we are sure that the armed forces will continue to defend the people's government, why did we need to politically win over and organize the soldiers, noncoms, and the officers opposed to a coup? It was better not to make waves. From that standpoint, it was also unnecessary—or worse still, provocative—to organize the workers in militias under a centralized single command. Why should we do that if we

could trust the armed forces?

I haven't made this up. Because of the circumstances in which I had to get out of Chile, I don't have much documentation with me, but here is some evidence provided by the Santiago correspondent of *Nuestra Palabra* (the Argentine CP paper): "Both Altamirano (the secretary of the SP) and Corvalán (the secretary of the CP) assured that the unity of the workers, peasants, and soldiers was indestructible and that the left parties did not propose to create a People's Army opposed to the armed forces because they had confidence in the patriotic spirit of the soldiers and noncoms." (*Nuestra Palabra*, July 27, 1973.) Because of this confidence, the UP and the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores—United Federation of Workers] proposed forming only Comités de Protección y Vigilancia [Vigilance and Guard Committees] in the factories, which were isolated from one another, without a united command and—as a result—without any plan of operations. So, the putschists went coolly from factory to factory and from shantytown to shantytown, massacring the committees and the other defense organizations.

That is what the UP did. And what about the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left]? Its behavior was no better. And this must be explained because I have noticed here in Argentina that the MIR has been inflated.

In November of last year—after the truckers strike and after the first military cabinet was installed—one of the main leaders of the MIR and the FTR [Frente de Trabajadores Revolucionarios—Revolutionary Workers Front, the MIR trade-union group], Compañero Cabieses Donoso, wrote the following in the magazine *Punto Final*, (which reflected the views of the MIR): "The armed forces have a truly patriotic and democratic role to play alongside the people, supporting the workers in their struggle against the exploitation of the bourgeoisie. . . . In building a new state, a new society, the armed forces can really play a great role, protecting (sic) the workers and the security of the country. If this comes about—and it is what the working class expects in seeing the armed forces form part of



the government—there will be a possibility of superseding a worn-out and exhausted society like the present one, while keeping the enemies of the people at bay. Only events can confirm or rule out this possibility." (*Punto Final*, November 7, 1972.)

It is true that the MIR did come out with a correct slogan—"Soldiers, disobey your putschist officers"—although only after the June 29 military rebellion. But this went no further than words, since the MIR did not offer the working class as a whole any plan to *press for* such disobedience, *support it*, and *organize it*, effectively backing up the soldiers, noncoms, and officers who defended the legally constituted government.

By its opposition to a united workers front against the coup—which would include the CP; by its opposition to the unification of the cordones industriales [organs of workers management in local industrial concentrations], counterposing to them unreal organizations like the majority of the so-called comandos comunales [Municipal Commands]; and by its staging provocative, divisionist, and isolated actions such as "taking over streets and roads," the MIR diverted the working class from uniting to bring firm pressure to bear on the ranks and officers of the armed forces and the police.

In the rallies and demonstrations it held in Santiago, the UP managed to mobilize up to a million persons, the great majority of whom were workers, students, clerical employees, and poor peasants from the nearby villages. How many of these compañeros and compañeras had a sweet-heart, a brother, or some other relative who was a soldier, noncom, or even an officer? How many of them knew a policeman who lived in the same poor shantytown as themselves? Wouldn't things have gone differently if the parties, the CUT, and the cordones had united to set some very simple tasks for this million compañeros? For example, they could have asked them to get in touch with a relative or a neighbor, a soldier or noncom to win them over politically to opposing the coup and organize them to defend the legal government against any attempt at a military take-over.

The reactionaries sent their young women around the regiments, inviting

the soldiers, noncoms, and officers to parties in the Barrio Alto, where they were worked over politically by Patria y Libertad and organized to support the coup.

Why couldn't the CUT and the cordones do something like that? Didn't the Bolsheviks do it, for example, in the Russian revolution and with good results? Shouldn't the CUT and the cordones have made every working-class neighborhood into a place where the soldiers and noncoms, many of whom suffered from being away from their families, could have found a friendly welcome and a chance to unwind? Shouldn't they have applied a firm hand to break down the wall that separated the workers from the soldiers?

The Christian Democrats mobilized the wives of policemen to demonstrate for wage increases. What did the CUT do on this question? Nothing.

Did the CUT and the UP have a program of wage increases, better treatment, civil and political rights, a chance to go all the way up the ladder of promotion for the soldiers, noncoms, and officers? Did it mobilize and agitate for this program? No, it didn't raise a single demand, it didn't do anything.

By such measures—made easier by the UP's control of the executive branch—combined with firm and organized pressure of millions of compañeros, it would have been possible in large part to block the escalation of sedition. They talked about the "indestructible unity of workers, peasants, and soldiers." But that was false because nothing was done to forge such unity in practice, through fraternizing with the soldiers, taking up their demands, and—once a higher level was reached—organizing them to prevent a breakdown of the constitutional order by giving them support in forming, say, anticonspiratorial committees represented by delegates in the cordones and so on.

The much touted "unity of the people and the armed forces" was limited to the agreements that were made at the top between our compañero president and General Prats, while for three years the reactionaries were left with a free hand to win the armed forces and the police and to organize them for the coup. So these agreements were useless because the handful of officers and generals opposed to a coup were

left suspended in midair. A section of them joined the coup and another, like Prats, fell both painlessly and ingloriously.

When, as in Valparaíso and Talcahuano, a group of military men organized *spontaneously* against the coup, the government, the UP, and the CUT abandoned them to their fate. After this tragedy, what antiputschist military man (soldier or general) was going to risk his neck to defend a government that permitted repression of those who defended it and the constitutional order?

No firm action was taken to win the soldiers, noncoms, and officers. Nor was anything done to organize the workers to combat the coup. And both types of action are closely linked, because in order to bring over a part of the armed forces into the people's camp, the soldiers, noncoms, and officers had to be shown that the people were organized to fight and win. It had been demonstrated to the soldiers that "turning the gun in the other direction" was not merely a heroic but suicidal action (like the resistance of the Valparaíso sailors).

How, then, were the working class and the people prepared?

Think back again to the million compañeros who filled the Alameda in the UP rallies. Wouldn't it have been possible in three years time to organize 20 percent of these—200,000—in defense committees *led by a unified command* under a united committee of the cordones and the left parties? The CUT called for forming the Comités de Protección y Vigilancia on an individual factory basis. So these committees functioned without any unified command and we have seen what happened. The saddest thing, compañeros, is that we were not completely unarmed.

But what could a Comité de Vigilancia in one plant—in many places they even had bazookas and .30 caliber machine guns—do without any orders or any plan? Should we have left the factories to go to La Moneda, hole up in the factories, fight in the streets? With whom? How? With what plan? On the morning of September 11, over the radio the CUT gave us only one directive—stay in the factories, remain "on the alert and vigilant" and wait for "further instructions," which never came. When the legal radio stations of the MIR and

the UP were silenced, no one heard anything more from the leadership of the CUT and the parties.

To get a clear picture of what happened in Chile, the Argentine compañeros should imagine the Russian revolution without an Executive Committee of the Soviets and without a Revolutionary Military Committee under its command leading the Red Guard. In Chile, we had embryonic soviets—the cordones industriales—and also embryonic elements of a Red Guard—the Comités de Vigilancia, etc. But the CP, the right wing of my party, and the MIR as well, firmly opposed uniting the cordones under a single coordinating committee. As they saw it, this was "dual unionism with respect to the CUT." What is more, they were opposed to having this workers and people's power (which the cordones would have constituted if they had been united and had also included delegates from the shantytowns, the peasants, and the antiputschist military) organize a united command of the Comités de Vigilancia.

The UP opposed this because it always relied on the "professional generals" and on negotiating an agreement with the Christian Democracy. The MIR did so because underlying its policy it maintained its old guerrillaist, vanguardist conception divorced from the mass movement.

We lacked many things in Chile. The list was long, but everything we lacked can be summed up now in a single sentence. We did not have a revolutionary line and a revolutionary workers party that could have applied this line in a bold and timely way, as the Bolshevik party did in the Russian revolution—a party with a policy completely different from the reformism of the UP and its "guerrilla" complement, the MIR.

\* \* \*

### **The Middle Class and the Coup**

We think that to understand clearly what the Socialist party compañero says in his letter, we should take up an important question—the UP's policy toward the petty bourgeoisie.

From the compañero's letter, we see how the working class was not prepared to confront the coup and how the right threw itself totally into win-

ning over the armed forces. The compañero does not mention, however, an important point. If this seditious work in the armed forces was successful, it was not only owing to the passivity of the left but also to something more fundamental. The imperialists and the Chilean big bourgeoisie succeeded in bringing the middle class over to the side of subversion. It was on the basis of this massive shift of the middle classes that the CIA and the Chilean right won over the majority of the officers and isolated Prats and the other constitutionalist generals and officers.

The middle class in Chile acts as sort of a transmission belt to the armed forces because large sections of this institution, both the officers and the noncoms, come from the petty bourgeoisie. So, during the three years of the UP government, the middle class was the target of the imperialists, the oligarchy, and the monopolies, who worked by means of economic and social chaos (the economic blockade, the black market, shortages, and terrorist actions) to push it toward sedition and toward breaking down the constitutional order, and, through this, to impel the armed forces to carry out a coup. Facing this threat, what did the Unidad Popular do? It retreated.

The UP, did not adopt a policy of completely expropriating the oligarchy and the big monopolies, such as, for example, the big wholesale houses. Without this, it was impossible to prevent the development of a black market and economic chaos, since the fundamental levers of the economy remained in the hands of the plotters.

What did this have to do with a policy for winning over or neutralizing the petty bourgeoisie?

To get a clearer idea of this, let us take the example of the truckers, the spearhead of the subversive movement. The Confederación de Dueños de Camiones [Confederation of Truck Owners] is made up of small proprietors (the majority have no more than one truck). A section of the association (those that were in the leadership) were rightists affiliated to the Partido Nacional and the Christian Democrats. Another sector identified with the left and belonged to the SP, and the CP, and the Radical party. But the great majority of the organization (which had 45,000 members)

were independents who were mainly worried about earning a living. So, if a trucker's transmission broke, there was no way of getting spare parts in a short time. Spare parts were imported and held by the big bourgeois wholesalers who were promoting the black market and subversion, while the government failed to crush them.

The UP did not stop these scum, any more than it did the fascists like Villarín, the chairman of the Sindicato de Dueños de Camiones. The October strike cost the Chilean economy more than 300 million dollars. And Villarín, the one mainly responsible, was "punished" with three or four days in jail.

These economic problems brought the petty bourgeoisie to desperation and turned it into a culture medium for subversion.

The Unidad Popular did not adopt an audacious policy of expropriating the oligarchy and the monopolies and thus opening up the possibility of sharing the national wealth with sectors of the petty bourgeoisie. It seems to us that the petty bourgeoisie could have been neutralized if on the one hand the UP had met its economic demands at the expense of the big bourgeoisie, and, on the other, it ruthlessly crushed all the rightist leaders of the professional associations, such as Villarín, for example.

In failing to do this and, as a result, failing to neutralize the middle class, the Allende regime lost its unstable equilibrium, and the imperialists and the big bourgeoisie were able to divide and isolate the constitutionalist sectors among the officers of the armed forces and the police, a process that culminated in the September 11 coup.

The workers, for their part, were not prepared to confront this subversion and that's why it all ended as it did. □

### **You Know, Like Justice**

The city of Clarkstown, New York, recently established an "obscenity committee" to censor movies and cabaret acts. Appointed as chairman of the group was a blind man.

The blind censor explained, "I was selected to head this committee because of my organizational ability." As for his ability to judge material he couldn't see, he offered the opinion:

"Pornography isn't a case of seeing, it's a case of feeling."



## Gus Hall, a Prophet Scorned

The military coup in Chile confronted the Communist parties around the world with what for them is a familiar task—to explain away the disastrous defeat of a popular-front government which they have hailed and supported. Particularly ticklish in this instance was the role played by the Chilean Communist party in paving the way for the generals to seize power.

Gus Hall, the general secretary of the Communist party, USA, for whom this is old stuff going back to the mid-1930s, went about the dirty assignment in journeyman style. The October 4 issue of his party's paper, the *Daily World*, offered excerpts from a speech he gave in September 1970, immediately after the election of Allende.


"The Central Intelligence Agency," Hall is quoted as having said, "has its special Chilean department and frankly, the question is not whether they will try to overthrow the election mandate in Chile, the question is how and when. . . . They are discussing whether the preferable tactic would be to get the Chilean military—to promise them anything they want—to get them to take power. . . . The ruling circles in America are thinking about military rule—counterrevolution from the barrel of a gun."

The *Daily World* fails to explain why the Chilean CP scorned Gus Hall's clairvoyant warning. With a membership of 200,000 and a key position in the Allende government, the Chilean CP leaders ought to have been able to block the military coup forecast by Gus Hall.

The fact is that Gus Hall does not seem to have had much standing in top Stalinist circles outside of the United States. Luis Corvalán, general secretary of the Chilean CP, who has been arrested by the junta and now faces the possibility of a death sentence, followed a policy of strengthening the Chilean military and vowing confidence in its "loyalty."

Three months after the election of Allende, Corvalán wrote: "The Popular Unity bloc proposes to strengthen

the national character and professional orientation of the armed forces, working for 'their broad development on the basis of military technology and science with the perspective of contributing to the country's economic growth without prejudice to their main purpose: defense of national sov-



HALL: Three years of lobbying and agitation in Moscow?

ereignty and performance of other specific functions.' For this reason, the program says, 'we must assure the material and technical equipment of the armed forces. . . .'

"To be sure, we should not overlook the circumstances in which the armed forces were formed, and especially the fact that their professional training was in recent decades influenced by the Pentagon. This does not go to say, however, that they are loyal servants of the imperialists and the upper classes. Our ground troops and navy were constituted in the fight for independence. Privates and non-commissioned officers in all the three arms come from a poor social background and nearly all the officers from the middle strata. The oligarchy and the prosperous bourgeoisie have long

since stopped choosing a military career for their sons. . . .

"The attitude of the armed forces of the Dominican Republic during the U. S. invasion and the progressive nature of the military government in Peru show that a dogmatic approach to the army is no longer valid. The military establishment, too, needs change, but that change should not be imposed on it. It must be initiated by the military and based on their awareness of its imperatives." ("Chile: the people take over" by Luis Corvalán, in *World Marxist Review*, December, 1970.)

Two years later Corvalán reaffirmed this position in an interview. "Under the Constitution," Corvalán said, "the Army does not intervene in political controversies. But, of course, the Army consists of people. And people, whether in uniform or not, are members of society. The revolutionary process exacerbates the class struggle, and influences all citizens. It would be foolish to think that the Armed Forces are indifferent to the spirit of the times. The class and political diversity of Chilean society extends to them as well. But in spite of this diversity, the military have common morals: respect for the Constitution and law, and loyalty to the elected government. . . ."

"The present situation cannot continue indefinitely. However, in the conditions prevailing in our country changes cannot be effected according to the classical pattern of other revolutions. They can be effected only within the frame of the law, taking into account the evolution of the army's understanding of its role in the society the people wish to build.

"The reactionary demands that the Armed Forces should exceed their professional role have been unsuccessful. *The military do not seek political power.*" ("Two years after—what is happening in Chile," *World Marxist Review*, November, 1972. Emphasis added.)

The Communist party of the Soviet Union also seems to have scorned the prophetic Gus Hall. Less than one month before the coup, Vitaly Borovsky, writing in *Pravda* (as cited in the August 21 issue of *Soviet News*, an English-language weekly published by the press department of the Soviet Embassy in London), stated: "Reaction has tried hard to provoke a conflict



between the army and the people. Ultra-left elements, who by their provocative actions have helped set the military against the people, are, as always, playing a disgraceful part in this sinister affair.

"The plotters have tried to set the armed forces against the government and to transform the military men from being defenders of their country's interests into tools upholding the narrow and selfish interests of a handful of exploiters. . . .

"The military themselves cannot remain isolated from the people in such circumstances and cannot fail to heed their will. It is not without reason that the right-wing forces and the press have been conducting a malicious campaign against the officers *who are loyal to the constitution.*" (Emphasis added.)

However, Gus Hall now seems to have made a breakthrough in the Kremlin. The September 26 issue of *Pravda* stated emphatically:

"The opposition in Congress conspired with the reactionary commanders of the armed forces, who are closely linked to the Chilean oligarchy and have been educated in American military academies, special schools, and courses to repress the national liberation movement. Basing themselves on these commanders, for three years the reaction conducted subversive work among the officers. Despite the 'traditional political neutrality' ascribed to them, the armed forces of Chile were no longer isolated from the acute class struggle going on in the country."

As for Corvalán, he still believes that while some errors were made by his party, the general line was correct. Now being held prisoner by the generals, he has not had an opportunity, of course, to read the latest issues of *Pravda* or the recent issue of the *Daily World* that called attention to Gus Hall's 1970 forecast. In a brief interview that the military permitted him to have with an Associated Press correspondent, which was reported in the October 7-8 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*, Corvalán said:

"My conscience is completely clear, because, as everyone knows, we organized a revolution without violent action, without utilizing arms.

"We held that it was possible in this way to win the 1970 elections. Many

did not believe us, but we were right. Later we did everything we could to bring about changes in this country.

"I don't deny that we made some errors. We don't deny responsibility for these errors, but I do not know what the basis is for the accusation that we were following a subversive plan aimed at liquidating the armed forces, beheading the military institutions, and assassinating political figures and their relatives belonging to parties opposed to the Unidad Popular.

"If such plans did actually exist, I don't have any knowledge about them. I don't believe that any party in the Unidad Popular was engaged in such a project. They told me all about this here, and I solemnly condemn such plans, which are repugnant to me."

Corvalán said that the coup d'etat was staged at a "moment of instability" in the Unidad Popular.

"Things were clear. The circle was closing around us. It was necessary to have some way of getting out of it.

We favored a dialogue with the Christian Democrats."

The question that remains to be answered is how Gus Hall got *Pravda* to change its line. After his famous September 1970 warning, did he spend the succeeding three years in lobbying and agitating in Moscow and Santiago for a change in course? Did he battle for the road of armed struggle against the suicidal delusion that a peaceful parliamentary road to socialism is possible? Did he fight for constructing the revolutionary-socialist party that could have assured victory for the workers in Chile?

In drawing up the balance sheet of the defeat in Chile, Gus Hall's September 1970 warning must certainly be included. His contributions following that may be even more important. No doubt the *Daily World* will now find it convenient to cite the record at greater length—if anything can be found in the record. Of particular interest would be an explanation of why *Pravda* did not take Gus Hall's warning seriously until after the coup d'etat in Chile. □

## 'Voz Marxista' Becomes PST

# Venezuelan Trotskyists Hold Congress

[The following article is from the October issue of the Venezuelan Trotskyist paper *Voz Marxista*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The first national conference of the group in Venezuela that publishes *Voz Marxista* and adheres to the Fourth International, the world party of the socialist revolution, met September 21-23 in Caracas. The symbolic place of honor was given to the Chilean working class, to Hugo Blanco (the Trotskyist leader of the great peasant movement in Peru), and to Enrique Maza Carvajal (the young Venezuelan shot by the army in Santiago, Chile, during the coup). In addition to the capital, Caracas, five provincial cities were represented.

An international report, and an organizational report were presented to the conference, which also considered proposed statutes drafted by the outgoing leadership. Besides this, a central committee was elected and the conference adopted a name for the organization, the Partido

Socialista de los Trabajadores [PST—Socialist Workers party].

With slight modifications, the conference accepted the draft resolutions presented.

The first, "Theses on the National Situation," started from the world and Latin American context in which our country finds itself. It analyzed the condition of "a continually more dependent and backward capitalist country" that marks Venezuela. It demonstrated factually that only a socialist revolution, that is, the seizure of power by the working class and not a bourgeois-democratic "revolution," can extricate Venezuela from its underdevelopment.

The resolution defined the nuances and contradictions in the ruling class as well as the present situation of the proletariat and other exploited sectors, concluding with immediate, democratic, and transitional demands to mobilize the working people in their class struggle. Some of the demands were national liberation; full respect for democratic rights; end of unemployment, inflation, and capitalist exploitation; unity and democracy in the trade unions; unity of the workers, stu-

dents, and the people; a workers and people's government; a constituent assembly; and building "the only tool that can consistently advance these demands and bring them to their fruition in a workers and people's revolution—the Leninist combat party, the Socialist Workers party."

The second resolution, "The Venezuelan Left and Our Tasks," began by pointing out that today it is impossible to take the bourgeoisie and imperialism "by surprise," to take power with a blunt instrument such as the July 26 Movement was in Cuba in 1959-60. Imperialism and the ruling classes have empirically assimilated the lesson of the process of permanent revolution that occurred in Cuba. Therefore, we in Venezuela need a revolutionary Marxist party of a high caliber, of a Leninist type, rooted in the concrete struggles of the working class and the popular sectors.

The resolution gave a political characterization of the Venezuelan workers parties and organizations, showing concretely that the MEP [Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo—People's Electoral Movement] is a "progressive," reformist bourgeois party and not a workers party like the PCV [Partido Comunista Venezolano—Venezuelan Communist party], the MAS [Movimiento al Socialismo, Movement Toward Socialism, a centrist breakaway from the CP], the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left], etc.

It was pointed out that there has been no organization or group in Venezuela that proposed to create such a party of the Leninist type and that the most important task facing the Venezuelan working class is to build a revolutionary workers party, without which it will be impossible to take power. This party cannot be built by any illusory "shortcuts" (guerrilla warfare, electoralism, etc.). It is necessary to start from a correct program based on the rich experience of the world workers movement and the experience of our own people in particular, from the best contributions made to revolutionary Marxism by the First, Second, and Third Internationals, the Left Opposition in the USSR after Lenin's death, and the Fourth International, founded in 1938 by Leon Trotsky as the organic continuation of the method of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

In addition, we must apply the tactic of the workers united front and work to achieve joint actions with the other working-class organizations, in particular with the companeros of the MAS.

"The Youth Radicalization and the Tasks of the Party" was the title of the resolution adopted on the youth and student movements. It gave a political characterization of the student youth, placing the Venezuelan youth movement in the context of the world youth and student

movement. It estimated the present state of the struggles, organizational methods, and perspectives of the Venezuelan youth movement, whose potential is obvious when you consider that the majority of the population is under 20.

The document pointed out the necessity of building an independent revolutionary Marxist youth organization and defined the difference between this socialist youth organization and the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores. In this stage, the



TEODORO PETKOFF: A leader of centrist MAS split from CP.

resolution stated, the main emphasis in the party's work must be on the youth movement. The document concluded by projecting demands and slogans around which effective intervention in the youth and student movements could be organized and an independent socialist youth organization built.

Besides this, resolutions were approved on Latin America and Chile, as well as a call for solidarity with the Ligue Communiste, the French section of the Fourth International, in fighting the ban the French government issued against it. Ediciones Avanzada announced that in the near future it will publish all the resolutions adopted at the conference in a pamphlet.

Fraternal delegates from other sections and sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International gave greetings and congratulations on the founding of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores in Venezuela.

The conference applied to the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International, asking for the PST to be recognized as the Venezuelan section in the next World Congress. The sessions ended

with the singing of the "Internationale."

In founding the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, we do not claim yet to be a party. We are still the *nucleus* of this future socialist party of the Venezuelan working class.

Since 1961 we have propagated and defended the program of revolutionary Marxism in Venezuela and the Leninist principles of organization. In the years 1962-63, we published sixteen issues of *Voz Marxista*, until it was banned by the Betancourt government. In 1971, *Voz Marxista* began to come out again. Our development and growth since that time is part of the rise of revolutionary Marxism throughout the world in response to the crisis and the betrayals of Stalinism and reformism in general, and the incapacity of the centrist organizations born out of this crisis to offer a correct line for the proletarian and popular struggles or to organize on a Leninist basis.

The terrible defeat that the Chilean and Latin American people have just suffered from the military coup in Chile attests to the political incapacity of the reformists and centrists; they bear the responsibility for the defeat for which the working people whom they betrayed are now paying such a high price.

Therefore, more than ever, in Venezuela we are for building a real mass revolutionary workers party, without which it will be impossible to take power.

Undoubtedly this socialist party of the Venezuelan workers will include many of the activists working today in and around the existing organizations and formations of the Venezuelan left. But it is equally certain that this mass party will be based on the programmatic and organizational premises adopted in the PST's founding conference this September in Caracas. □

## Forecast: Cold

An environmental scientist at the University of Wisconsin believes that air pollution has already reached the point of reducing the world's agricultural output. An October 20 Associated Press dispatch quoted the scientist, Reid Bryson, as saying, "It would appear that we are at the end of an era—the era of surpluses and the era of benign climate.

"The evidence is now abundantly clear that the climate of the earth is changing and is changing in a direction that is not promising."

Bryson told two Senate subcommittees that since 1940 "something has intervened to make the earth cooler and to make the dome of cool air covering the polar regions increase in size." He said that increased air pollution since 1930 had made the earth's atmosphere less transparent, thus causing it to filter out more of the sun's rays.

# Unrest on the Campus in Puerto Rico

In reply to a renewed assault on campus autonomy marked by the dismissal of the president and four rectors at the University of Puerto Rico (UPR), students at the Río Piedras campus and several regional colleges went on strike October 15. Their main demand is student participation in the selection of the president, rectors, deans, and department heads.

So far the Consejo de Educación Superior (CES—Board of Higher Education) has refused to alter its reactionary stance.

Hermán Sulsona, the rector of the regional colleges, denounced the strike, claiming that "serious consequences" were entailed for all walks of Puerto Rican society. The CES, he said, could not delegate its power to appoint the most important administrators of the UPR as demanded by the students. The rector also opposed voice and vote for students in the CES.

One of the demands raised by the students of UPR is that they, in conjunction with professors and workers, be able to submit *ternas* (slates of three candidates), from which the president, rectors, deans, and department heads will be selected. Other demands include adoption of a new university law, a new set of campus regulations, and student-faculty control of the campus guards and their transformation into a traffic and safety patrol.

Nearly all the campuses in Puerto Rico's university system solidarized with the striking students, raising the threat of general strike action. When some 200 students staged sit-ins on the campus in Ponce, Sulsona suspended classes there.

Puerto Rico's major daily, *El Mundo*, reported October 21: "On Friday morning [October 19] the general police headquarters in Hato Rey received reports to the effect that three men had been seen running toward the School of Social Sciences building carrying 'rifles, carbines, machine guns, and other kinds of long arms.'" On the following day, *El Mundo* re-

ported that students claimed it was not they but the police who were being armed. "They explained that the students abandoned the campus a week ago, and they pointed out that entrances were sealed with chains and padlocks by the university guards."

Jimmy López of the General Student Council and the Strike Organizing Committee added that the students were still hoping to establish a dialogue with the CES. He said that false reports had been published that an end to the strike was imminent.

Meanwhile the Association of Puerto Rican University Professors (APPU) set up pickets in Río Piedras in sympathy with the UPR strike. The Workers United Front (FUT), a trade union with bases in Ponce and Mayaguez, solidarized with UPR on October 24.

In an action coinciding with the student demonstrations, the Brotherhood of Nonteaching Employees went on strike October 16. The union declared that the CES backed down on a wage agreement according to which nonteaching employees were to receive a

\$75 monthly wage increase retroactive to June 1.

University officials said that they could not pay the \$75 increase, alleging that a \$1-million error had been found in the university budget. They offered \$60 nonretroactive. In addition, they served a court order against the striking workers, contending that no employer-employee relationship exists between the Brotherhood and the UPR administration, and that no workers dispute is involved.

Federico Quiñones, president of the union, said that talks had reached a stalemate, that his union would accept nothing less than the amount previously agreed to, and that they were prepared to picket indefinitely as long as this demand was not granted.

Despite recurrent attempts to intimidate and harass striking students and workers, the CES is not gaining in the confrontation. In an October 24 editorial, *El Mundo* gave a clear indication of anxiety over the situation:

"Thus it is a vicious circle. It is exceedingly difficult for an interim president and four rectors to contend with the present crisis. In fact, the students argue just as correctly as the workers that it is practically impossible to reach an agreement with interim administrators. But at the same time, the crisis itself makes it practically impossible for new administrators to be chosen.

"It all appears to be the worst crisis yet in the University." □

## Record of the Military Regime

### Brazil's 'Economic Miracle' for the Rich

Since 1967, the per capita gross national product of Brazil has been growing at an average rate of 7 percent, a fact that has led to claims of an "economic miracle" by the dictatorship. The dimensions of this "miracle," however, are severely limited, as even President Garrastazú Médici acknowledged in 1970 when he said, "Brazil is doing very well, but the people are doing poorly."

The "economic miracle," nine and a half years after the military seized power, benefits only a tiny layer of the population—the generals, their

hangers-on, and the capitalists whom the coup was intended to protect—and foreign imperialist corporations.

Professor Brady Tyson of American University in Washington, D.C., has studied the dictatorship's record, particularly in terms of the economy. In a recent paper he described the scope of the "economic miracle" as follows:

"Brazil is creating a Scandinavian-size consumer economy superimposed on an Indonesian-size pauperized mass, presided over by a cruel and increasingly isolated army."

In 1960, Tyson wrote, the income



distribution of Brazil was similar to that of the United States in 1929—although the total income to be distributed in Brazil was of course much smaller. Under the military dictatorship, this inequality has been aggravated considerably:

"... in 1960 the poorest 40 per cent of the Brazilian population received about 11.57 per cent of the national income, but according to the statistics of the most recent research, this fell to 10 per cent by 1970. On the other hand, the richest 10 per cent had received 39.66 per cent of the national income in 1960, but had increased its share to 47.79 per cent by 1970."

On the basis of available statistics, Tyson believes that at most 30 to 40 percent of the population has experienced an increase in its real purchasing power, with the overwhelming bulk of this increase going to the top 10 percent. The proportional share of the national income has *decreased* for all but this top one-tenth of the population.

"When all is taken into account . . . probably less than 30 per cent of the Brazilian people have profited from the economic growth, about 20 to 25 per cent have suffered some decline in their real wages, and the rest of the population (perhaps 50 per cent) remain in the level of 'absolute poverty.'"

For the poorer sectors the decline has been extreme. Between 1960 and 1970, the real minimum wage declined an estimated 30 to 38 percent. In some cases, the decline has been even more rapid:

"Real wages in São Paulo for industrial workers dropped over 30 per cent from 1965 until 1971, though there has been a small recovery since. In 1971 it took a worker on minimum salary 113 hours and 26 minutes to earn sufficient buying power to buy his own minimum diet for a month, as determined by the official standards of minimum nutrition, whereas in 1965 it took a worker on minimum salary only 87 hours and 20 minutes to do the same."

It is important to note that the growth in per capita GNP is based *entirely* on increased exploitation of the existing work force. The economic growth has not followed the liberal model by increasing the size of the labor force. On the contrary, the num-

ber of Brazilians who are "economically active"—that is, involved in the monetary economy—has declined during the period of the "economic miracle."

"Even if the benefits of economic growth could be more evenly distributed among those already active in the money economy," Tyson wrote, "there remains the nearly 50 per cent of the population who live at best only on the fringes of the money economy at a near-absolute poverty level."

The beneficiaries of the "economic miracle" are also indicated by the type of industrial growth:

"... the emphasis of this growth has been on durable consumer goods (which must be considered 'luxury goods' in a nation such as Brazil—goods such as refrigerators, private automobiles, electric toasters, TV sets, etc.) and manufactured goods for export. In other words, the increase in domestic consumption has been very largely limited to the upper 20 to 30 per cent of the population, and there has not been a significant increase in the production of perishable consumer goods (clothes, processed foods,

etc.), goods that might have improved the quality of life of the lower 70 per cent of the Brazilian population."

The poor are required to pay for the "economic miracle" in other ways as well, such as industrial pollution. The dictatorship has publicly stated at international conferences that such pollution is "not a significant concern" for the underdeveloped countries. In this case, one must give the Médici regime credit for making its words and actions (or inaction) coincide: The smog problem in São Paulo is already worse than in Chicago.

Tyson provided more detailed information about São Paulo because this city is "often looked upon as the chief beneficiary of the process of economic growth in Brazil . . . and the center of the richest part of Brazil."

The average per capita monthly income in São Paulo is \$70, compared to \$40 to \$45 for all of Brazil. But 49.1 percent of the city's population earns less than \$35 monthly.

In October 1972, newspapers announced that the infant mortality rate in the city had reached 90 per 1,000 live births—the highest rate since records have been kept.

"Such an infant mortality rate," Ty-



BRAZIL: "Scandinavian-size consumer economy superimposed on an Indonesian-size pauperized mass."

son noted, "should not be surprising in a city of about 9,000,000 people, growing at the rate of nearly 500,000 people per year, in which 48.5 per cent of the people live in substandard housing, 60 per cent of the people are not served by a sewage system and 35 per cent do not have running water."

The situation of São Paulo is not merely a result of neglect:

"The problems of urban sprawl, decay and inadequate human support systems are worldwide and are bound to be more acute in a city as large and as fast growing as São Paulo. Nonetheless, the policies of the present

and to extract the savings necessary for industrial expansion from the urban workers—such policies have all contributed significantly to a quite obvious situation. . . . That fact is that the majority of the people of São Paulo have suffered a significant decline in the quality and standard of life during the past ten years, even though statistics show that their average purchasing power has risen."

The record of the Brazilian gorillas

in their nearly ten years of rule is not an accident but the result of deliberate policies, a result that requires as its corollary the brutality and torture for which the regime has become notorious. The Chilean gorillas, who are known to admire the Brazilian example of brutality, can be expected to attempt a similar "economic miracle" in Chile. Such "miracles" are a specialty of capitalist rule in the underdeveloped countries. □

## Argentina

### Class-Struggle Slate Makes Gains in Trade-Union Election

[The workers upsurge stimulated by the retreat of the military dictatorship that ruled Argentina for six years has touched off militant struggles throughout the country, even in the remote southwestern province of Neuquén. In an article in its October 18 issue, the Trotskyist weekly newspaper *Avanzada Socialista* described one battle in the fight against the Peronist trade-union bureaucracy, the fight whose outcome will determine whether the old populist demagogue Perón and his machine will be able to maintain their control over the organized workers movement and get the workers to submit to continued and stepped-up exploitation in the interests of "social cooperation." It was for this that the generals brought Perón back and on his success depends the stability of capitalism in the country. *Avanzada Socialista's* report of the Neuquén union elections follows. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

With the Chocón strike, the province of Neuquén lost its obscurity. The construction workers made their presence known, joining the rest of the activists who have been fighting the bosses and the bureaucracy throughout the country.

Since that time, many struggles have occurred, showing clearly that the construction workers are the indisputable vanguard of this southern province.

The conflicts at Menon and CASA—which culminated in the Cutralca re-

bellion—forged a new layer of class-struggle fighters. The innumerable mobilizations to win democratic and representative leadership in the local council could have led to ousting the bureaucrats, if it had not been for the desertion of one sector. After making a deal with Palma and the Peronists, these renegades turned to holding back the struggles in Neuquén, and in the last union elections, they ran for office on the Green ticket.

The class-struggle fighters, for their part, stepped onto new and unfamiliar ground, an electoral fight to win a militant leadership in the local UOCRA. This struggle, which arose around a situation in the union, quickly raised a political problem, since the Neuquén compañeros had to confront two bosses' parties operating through the other two tickets. The Red ticket, whose candidates controlled the union before under the name of the Blue and White slate [for the colors of the Argentine flag] was supported by the Sapagista bosses. The Green ticket was backed by FREJULI [Frente Justicialista de Liberación—Social Justice Liberation Front, the Peronist political umbrella] and the bureaucracy in the national UOCRA. The Gray ticket, which represented independent class-struggle activists and members of our current, had to confront all these forces.

In the elections, the Green slate won 1,500 votes. The Gray slate came in second with 840. And the Red got 402.

While the Gray slate did not win,



MEDICI: Everything is fine except the people.

government have had the effect of exacerbating all the problems of this city. Such policies as the priority given (though this is to be modified this year) to middle-class housing at the expense of low-cost housing, the tremendous investment in freeway construction in a city that already has more automobiles than any other city in the world except Los Angeles, in encouraging the rapid expansion of the industrial plant without any significant regulations against pollution . . . and, most importantly, the wage-and-price policies and controls that have been designed to concentrate wealth in the upper strata of society

*Intercontinental Press*



the number of votes it got shows clearly that the class-struggle tendency has become a major force in Neuquén.

So as not to get out of practice, the bureaucracy resorted to fraud. Lists of those qualified to vote disappeared in shops where the Gray slate was strongest. Gray slate ballots were "lost." Goons were used to interfere with campaigning. The Gray slate ballot watchers who traveled to the interior of the province were obstructed and ignored. This is the kind of crooked tactics that were used by the FREJULI slate, and this fact has to be kept in mind in assessing the 840 votes won by the class-struggle tendency.

It is true, too, that inexperience and weaknesses on the part of the Gray slate played a role, but this is secondary and correctable.

Other obstacles were put in the way not by the trade-union bureaucracy but by a left current whose "fight against the bureaucracy" came down finally to nothing but issuing statements. They supported the bureaucrats of the Green slate. We are referring to the JTP [Juventud Trabajadora Peronista—Peronist Worker Youth].

Why didn't these compañeros join with the class-struggle tendency instead of giving their support to a section of the bureaucracy? What happened is that on the political level the JTP remained tied to the Peronist bosses. Caught in a dilemma of having to choose between being loyal to the best fighters in Neuquén and supporting the Gray slate, or staying in the Peronist framework and supporting the bureaucracy, the JTP chose the second path, doing the opposite of what it preaches in its statements. So it ended up as a gear in the machine of the bosses and the trade-union bureaucracy.

Some compañeros who supported the Gray slate and did not realize how difficult it is to take on the bureaucracy may feel a certain bitterness at not winning the election. However, the perspectives are very good.

Let's take a look at a few facts. The elections were held a few days after the Peronist triumph in the national elections, and still the Gray slate won *more than half as many votes as the FREJULI union slate*. The Gray slate did not have the enormous machines that the other slates did,

with all their money, cars, and means of publicity. It was the first time they ran. They had no experience in this kind of activity. But the most important thing is that the Gray slate—made up of the best-known fighters in Neuquén, of the compañeros who were in the forefront of the struggles we mentioned at the start—were supported by 840 compañeros. This by itself is a victory, since these compañeros voted for a class-struggle program and candidates.

On the other hand, it should be clear that it is very difficult for a class-struggle tendency to win the leadership of a union through elections. The example of SITRAC/SITRAM [Sindicato de Trabajadores

Concord/Sindicato de Trabajadores Materfer—the Concord and Materfer plant unions] is instructive on this score. The Córdoba compañeros ousted the bureaucracy by mobilizations and later won the leadership of the unions in honest elections guaranteed by the mobilized workers themselves.

The Gray slate intends to carry on its day-to-day work of fighting the abuses of the bosses and putting militants in the leadership of the rank-and-file. This work offers great perspectives for the class-struggle tendency in Neuquén. Experience has demonstrated who is who—who is with the bosses and the bureaucracy, and who defends the rights of the workers and workers democracy. □

## Peruvian Committee Calls for Solidarity With Chilean Victims of Junta

[The following statement was issued September 18 by the Peruvian section of the Movimiento Latinoamericano para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (Latin American Movement for the Defense of Human Rights). Messages of support and contributions can be sent to MOLADDEH, Apartado 10149, Lima, Peru. The translation of the statement is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

We representatives of the Movimiento Latinoamericano para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, as well as militant trade unionists, students, and professionals, condemn the murder of Compañero Salvador Allende and thousands of patriots and political exiles, the tortures, jailings, bombing of universities and factories, brutal attacks on human dignity and freedom, and violation of fundamental rights being suffered by the Chilean people. We offer our solidarity to the resistance fighters and pledge to continue exposing the crimes of the fascists and the imperialists until these criminals have been defeated.

The fascist military coup in Chile, like the ones that occurred in Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia, demonstrates the desperation of the reactionary groups and the imperialists who, re-

alizing that the capitalist system has entered its death agony, are trying to prevent the advance of socialism, which means the liberation of the peoples and the conquest of human dignity.

The fascist dictatorship in Chile, which will prove short-lived, is being energetically condemned by all the peoples and heroically resisted by the popular forces led by the working class.

The Peruvian people cannot remain indifferent to the fascist massacre unleashed against its brother Chilean people. Therefore, we call on everyone to work with this movement to defend the human rights that are being violated today in our neighboring country to the south.

*Defend human rights!*

Signed: Ernesto More, José Russo Delgado, Rafael Dávila Cuevas, César Guardia Mayorga, Mario Villarán, Rosa Alarco, Alfredo Torero, Emilio Choy, Hildebrando Pérez, César Lévano, Julio Cotler, Washington Delgado, Ricardo Gadea, Juan Gonzalo Rose, Genaro Ledesma, Ricardo Tello, Félix Nakamura, Marco Martos, Alfonso Barrantes, José Bracamonte Vera, Pablo Paredes, Imelda Chang-Navarro, Octavio Ramírez del Risco, Oscar Venegas A. (480 signatures follow.)



## China Today—Report of a New Zealand Engineer

[Ken Dawson, a New Zealand engineer and member of the Socialist Action League, visited China for three weeks last April together with a doctor and an agronomist. He reported his observations in the following interview, which appeared in the October 5 issue of *Socialist Action*, a Wellington Trotskyist fortnightly.]

\* \* \*

*Question. First, could you give us some of your impressions about the progress China has made since the 1949 revolution?*

*Answer.* I have no doubt that there have been very significant advances, mainly in providing for the people. I also visited countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan, which I imagine resemble prerevolutionary China in their absolute poverty.

In China today no one is hungry and everyone has the essential needs of life, like clothing and shelter, although they haven't got much. Before the revolution there were hundreds of millions of people who were deficient in these areas.

Our party was shown through people's homes, and I also did a bit of walking by myself in Canton and Shanghai. Most of the living quarters in the cities are still prerevolution, and standards are pretty basic. One family per room is normal, with a kitchen shared between two or three families. Cooking here was done on coal stoves. Cold running water (outside) was also shared. Toilets would serve about ten to fifteen families, each family having its own pots for night-soil, which would be collected for use on the rural communes.

The homes were served with electricity, although it was only used for lighting because people don't have home appliances. Quite a few people had transistors though, which are cheap and readily available.

In some areas new blocks of flats have been built in which the living conditions are better. But I would imagine only high-up Communist party

officials would live in opulence.

*Q. Did you notice differences in the standard of living from one place to another?*

*A.* Yes, we did. The cities were all better off than the communes, except



MAO: His Thought still in control.

that in the countryside there is more living space, even though the houses there are more primitive.

Shanghai, I would say, is the center of prosperity. Other cities, Wuhan in particular, seemed less prosperous. The communes vary even more widely from the point of view of living standards, because they are forced to be self-sufficient. They don't get much help, and if they do need it they have to pay the government for it. The standard of living depends very much on the natural resources they have available and how clever they are in making use of them. If they haven't got many natural resources and started far behind in the first place—some areas were much better off than others

in 1949—they are still quite backward.

*Q. What are the conditions of work like?*

*A.* The normal working week is six eight-hour days. On communes it's the same but the hours can be longer during harvest. Overtime is also worked in the cities. Chinese workers don't get annual holidays, although they have had them on and off. They had them after the revolution, but they were taken away during the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958, when people were supposed to work day and night. When the "Great Leap" collapsed they went back to a more reasonable situation and holidays were allowed again. During the "Cultural Revolution" holidays were abolished again. Apart from Sundays there are only the eight or so statutory holidays: May Day and the like.

*Q. What advances have been made in the field of social services?*

*A.* I was quite impressed with the medical services. The whole idea is to get medicine out to the people, not to have the people come in to the hospitals. Normally people in the rural communes are treated by what are known as "barefoot doctors." These are not particularly well-trained people—they wouldn't be as well-trained as a lot of our country nurses—but the enthusiasm and dedication of most of them makes up for what they lack in training.

Regarding kindergartens, nurseries and things like that, I think the whole concept is to get the women out working, get as much labor power from them as they can. So kindergartens and crèches are very common. But they're not free. People have to pay a small amount to put their children in them.

I think they have made big strides in teaching people to read and write, and in the cities just about every child goes to school up to a certain age. In the communes it is not so easy

and sometimes children might be forced to leave school and go to work at a fairly early age.

Since the "Cultural Revolution," high school students cannot go to university directly. All graduating high school students must become either workers, peasants or soldiers. They state their preference and are then told which category they will join. Most secondary school leavers are sent to the communes, the growth of the larger cities being controlled according to a state plan for the development of large scale industry. Young people sent to communes are given a one-month holiday a year and a free trip home to see their relations. When they marry, these holidays and free trips cease.

The local administrative bodies, and "revolutionary committees," elect those commune members who will go on to higher education. As well as mental ability these students are supposed to have the "correct" political attitude. People with a critical mind would be at a disadvantage.

*Q. How egalitarian is Chinese society? For example, are there significant wage differences?*

A. There is not equality of access to material things, and there are no trade unions to struggle for better conditions. Everything seems to come from the top.

Wages vary a lot. Everywhere we went we asked how much people got. Top professional people, such as the professor in the Wuhan medical school we visited, were on very high salaries—many times the average income—and I would imagine top party officials are on much higher salaries again. In a Shanghai factory we looked at, the engineers were getting two to three times the salaries of the other workers.

The commune workers are on the lowest end of the scale. The poorest people in China are those who work on a poor commune. And they have no right to leave that place. They have to stay there and work. Those who live on these very backward communes don't know how well off people are on other communes, or Peking, because they are not entitled to go there. They just don't get a chance to see the difference.

Usually, we were given the commune workers' wages in yearly income, whereas the factory workers were quo-

ted in months. Quite often the factory workers were earning as much in a month as the commune workers were earning in a year.

*Q. How much control do Chinese people have over their own lives? Was there any evidence of democratic institutions and practices?*

A. Their lives are very restricted. Questions on these matters are a bit embarrassing and normally you get vague answers or no answers at all.

People are isolated from information and isolated from communicating with each other. Their world is very narrow compared with ours. They are told where to work. If you are born on a commune or you are sent to a commune you must stay there. You can't just up traps and go into Shanghai and take a job in a factory. We saw one of the official identity cards that I gather everyone carries. It has their photo, occupation and place of work on it. No doubt a man apprehended by the police in Peking whose papers showed he was a commune worker in Kwangchow Province would be deported, at the very least.

*Q. Did the people seem to be involved in making political decisions?*

A. I would say that they are not to any extent involved in national economic and political decisions. There is a sort of show of popular democracy at the basic level. There are all these groups that get together and make decisions in the workplace, but the sort of decisions they make are what you might call petty decisions. They are discussing—in a factory, for instance—techniques for doing things. Of course, in some capitalist industries here, workers are encouraged to do the same thing, because capitalists also realize that the worker is the person who knows best how to increase production.

In China there is worker participation to increase production, but not to determine the siting of factories, how much should be produced, what sort of equipment should be bought or made. All this is decided at very high levels, higher than anyone in the factories.

As an engineer, I was interested to know the ordering policy for machinery in the big factories we visited in Shanghai and Wuhan. In New Zealand

the engineers in the factory will have some considerable say in what's bought and where from. The top people in the factories we visited in Shanghai and Wuhan could only tell us that the decisions were made at a higher level in Peking, and they just accept what they are given.

*Q. How much information do the people have about developments in China as a whole? For example, you were there well after Mao's former deputy, Lin Piao, had been purged, but before his "errors" and his fate had been made public. Did they know anything about him?*

A. All of our guides got Lin Piao's name in their ear once or twice, but it was just like water off a duck's back. None of them were prepared to talk about him. Of course, Mao's Little Red Book is everywhere in China and I picked one up. When I got back to New Zealand I noticed that the one I had purchased a few years earlier had Lin Piao's introduction in it, whereas the one in circulation in China now simply has the introduction removed.

*Q. Do people know much about other countries?*

A. The children, and I would imagine a lot of adults, have a reasonable knowledge of geography and know where New Zealand is. But the whole of Chinese society is very introverted, not voluntarily but because of government policy. I think they know very little about their government's foreign policy and what they do know is given to them in a very bold way in the official news media, with no detailed explanation or the reasoning behind it.

*Q. How much of a Mao cult is there?*

A. Mao Tsetung Thought seems like the official religion, and for a Chinese to question any aspect of it would be to invite "reeducation."

However, some people make more of Mao Tsetung Thought than others. A lot of medical people we talked to (there was a doctor in our party) didn't say that they were guided by Mao Tsetung Thought, which is the official view. But for a medical person to say that they discovered such

and such, and Mao Tsetung Thought was no help in this whatsoever, would be to ask for "reeducation," particularly when you've got a political cadre sitting by you when you're doing anything official.

In all the hospitals, and the schools and factories, there is always some Communist party cadre to keep a supervisory watch on the "ideological" side of things. In some of the big hospitals we saw it was obvious that the well-trained doctors felt oppressed by the party cadres that had more authority than they did and could direct their work.

When we visited places we were always received in a room and given the traditional cup of tea. All these places have what they call revolutionary committees which run them — I don't think the word revolutionary is necessary because I can't see anything revolutionary about them — and these committees seem to invariably contain a specialist (for example, someone trained in medicine if it is a hospital) and a party cadre (who may be working in the institution). If you ask a question, it is put to the two of them and perhaps a couple of other people on the committee, and you can see in their answers that one disagrees with the other to some extent, and that the specialist might be getting an inadequate opportunity to present his or her case.

There is a de-emphasizing of the Mao cult compared with the "Cultural Revolution" period, which can be clearly seen in the white patches on walls where Mao Tsetung's picture has obviously been removed. Although we thought his statue and his portrait were still on a lot of buildings.

*Q. To what extent was there any literary, artistic or religious freedom?*

A. The range of books seemed extremely narrow, mainly Mao Tsetung Thought and books on the achievements of the revolution.

At one time, not many years ago, China had a terrific wealth of traditional theatrical art forms, but these have virtually been completely closeted, and there are now only eight "revolutionary ballets."

There is no religion in China, apparently, except for Mao Tsetung Thought. Any Buddhist or Taoist temples, or other religious buildings that

remain, have been converted into historical monuments, and no religious services are allowed to be held there any more.

*Q. What role does the army play?*

A. The army is everywhere. It seems to have a dual role. Besides the obvious function of an armed repressive force internally, and a defense force against outside attack, it is also a pool of mobile labor. As I said, Chinese people are very immobile. They don't get a chance to move around the country, and they live and work in one place, probably for the whole of their lives. But the army can be shifted around easily and you see them working on roads, building railways, and helping with the harvest.

Soldiers are used to guard a wide range of public buildings. It's a bit scary actually. For example, the Wuhan River bridge has got about twenty guards on it, all armed with machine guns. Armed soldiers guarded our hotels, and all the railway stations. I would say that every official state building in Peking would have an armed guard.

*Q. What about the position of women in Chinese society? Is there equal pay, for example?*

A. On the commune you are paid according to a system of work points. Women are given on the average two thirds of the work points of men. The work points are not just related to the work performed, but also to sex. Regardless of how good a worker you were, if you were female you just couldn't get into a certain work-point bracket.

In the cities there seems to be a fair amount of equality of opportunity, in the lower levels at least, inasmuch as on construction sites and in heavy industry women are working in the jobs that men are working in.

Every commune seems to have child care centers, and all factories. In Shanghai they have some fantastic child care centers, but again Shanghai is not typical — it has got the best facilities in just about every way.

*Q. What about the availability of contraceptives and abortion?*

A. Our doctor works in this field

and kept asking about it, much to the embarrassment of the people we asked. Sex seems to be a fairly taboo subject in China. It's sort of reminiscent of Victorian England.

It would seem that contraception is basically a woman's responsibility and that the methods used are pills and diaphragms. When we asked this question at the commune level the male "barefoot doctor" always seemed to be embarrassed and would call on some female person (maybe a nurse, a female vet or doctor) who was responsible for the health of the women so far as contraception was concerned. We never got the facts from a male "barefoot doctor."

We got some interesting information from our guide in Hangchow. He conveyed the impression of a very puritanical society. The doctor was asking about premarital sexual relations and illegitimate births and he answered to the effect: "We don't have premarital sexual relationships. It's just not done. It would be terribly frowned upon."

Yes, the guide said, abortion is freely available as a contraceptive method if other methods fail. (By the way, contraception is only available to married people.) Our doctor insisted that surely some unmarried women do become pregnant? All our guide would say on this was that if she did she would certainly have an abortion.

So it seems that there is the opposite criterion to here. Here if an unmarried woman becomes pregnant, she has to have the baby. There she has to get rid of it. Basically she hasn't got the right to choose in either case.

*Q. Does that mean that there are pressures on you to get married?*

A. Well, the pressures are rather against you getting married. A main method of population control seems to be late marriage. Our guide said that although the legal age for marriage is eighteen, the present policy is for people to be persuaded not to marry until they are twenty-five for women and twenty-eight for men. He told us that his brother worked on a commune where a young woman (twenty years old) had decided to get married. The revolutionary committee asked her to make a "self-criticism" and tried to prevent her from marrying. However, she was adamant. The



revolutionary committee had to agree to her marriage, but they managed to obtain a promise from her not to have any children for four years.

I also noticed that in the streets you rarely see young couples walking together. It seemed to be single sex groups. I think that this is largely because of the pressures against premarital sex and early marriage. If a twenty-year-old man was to walk down the street with an eighteen-year-old woman they could already be marked for "self-criticism."

*Q. What about homosexuality? Are there laws against it?*

A. No information was volunteered on this, but I understand the members of this year's New Zealand student delegation to China were told that homosexuality doesn't exist there, so I suppose it's pretty heavily sanctioned. The authorities seem to have a reactionary attitude to all sex outside marriage, be it heterosexual or homosexual.

## Unable to Compete With Police Clubs

## Opposition Quits Portuguese 'Elections'

The sixty-five opposition candidates withdrew from the Portuguese election "campaign" October 25, three days before the vote. Grouped together as the Democratic Electoral Commission, the opposition candidates said they had withdrawn because the election was a "farce."

The oppositionists objected in particular to the dictatorship's refusal to allow any discussion of Portugal's colonial wars in Africa.

Even before the withdrawal, it was expected that the official National Popular Action party of Premier Marcello Caetano would win all 150 seats in the national assembly. It is the only party allowed to function legally. The Democratic Electoral Commission was permitted to hold one meeting last March to draft its election platform; since then it has had to meet clandestinely.

Opposition election rallies have regularly been broken up by the police, particularly when they attempted to

*Q. To sum up, to what extent do you think China is a model or an example for socialists in the world today?*

A. I think China shows the importance of a socially owned economy for the development of an underdeveloped country, to enable it to provide for its people. There are, however, many negative aspects, because political power is in the hands of the top Communist party officials, who from my observations seem to have little interest in allowing democracy to flower, overcoming the inequalities in the society, or correcting some of the backward social attitudes which exist.

Many of China's failings are also due to the very difficult material conditions China has had to build on, and the impossibility of building a properly socialist society in a single country. Revolutionary developments in other countries can only help China and encourage the people to push aside those who are standing in the way of the full flowering of socialism. □

discuss the wars in Africa. In a dispatch to the October 26 *New York Times*, Henry Giniger described a typical incident:

"One such meeting in Lisbon . . . was ended after an hour by a burly police captain carrying a knout who ordered those in the small theater to disperse after two candidates had called for an end to the war, a return of Portuguese forces and an opening of negotiations with rebel leaders in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese [sic] Guinea.

"As at most Opposition meetings, the theater was ringed by policemen from the very start, and after hearing the audience chanting 'end the war,' they acted."

In an effort to make the opposition play out the farce to its conclusion, the Caetano regime issued a decree imposing a loss of "political rights" for five years on candidates who withdrew before the election.

This threat seems not to have

weighed very heavily on the opposition candidates as they considered their decision. According to Giniger, one of them summed up their view a few days before the withdrawal was announced: "You can't be deprived of what you do not have." □

## 'Three Marias' on Trial in Lisbon

The trial of the "Three Marias" opened in Lisbon October 25 and was then adjourned until January 31. The three defendants—Maria Isabel Barrero, Maria Veilho da Costa, and Maria Teresa Horta—are accused of "offenses against public morals" for having written a book, *Novas Cartas Portuguesas* (New Portuguese Letters), advocating feminism.

All three writers are well known in Portugal. The book for which they are on trial is an anthology of letters and articles attacking the oppression of women. It was published in an edition of 3,000 copies in April 1972 and declared illegal in June of the same year.

The dictatorship has apparently thought it best to avoid the political and social issues involved, preferring to accuse the authors of writing a "pornographic" book. The regime also intends to keep the trial proceedings secret: Shortly after the trial began the judge ordered the courtroom cleared of all spectators, including reporters and friends of the defendants. His pretext was that "improper words" would necessarily be used during the trial.

The defense of the Three Marias has become an international effort. At an international feminist conference held in the United States last June, women from thirty countries urged demonstrations at Portuguese embassies around the world protesting the trial.

A French edition of *Novas Cartas Portuguesas* is due to appear shortly and a U.S. edition is scheduled for next year. □

### Effective Protest

A west German border-guard helicopter was brought down, with about \$4,000 damage, when it became entangled in a kite string. The kite was being flown at a height of 450 feet by two boys who were protesting a law that prohibits flying kites higher than 315 feet.

## Japanese Rightists Linked to Kim Kidnapping

By Martha Winnacker

[The following article was prepared and distributed by New Asia News, which has headquarters in Tokyo.]

\* \* \*

### Tokyo

More than two months have passed since Kim Dae Jung, prominent South Korean opposition leader, was kidnapped from a Tokyo hotel and spirited away to Seoul. He remains there under house arrest while Tokyo tries to cover up and forget the incident.

The inaction of the government and the subdued tone of the press now are in striking contrast to the daily headlines, flurry of police activity, and the cancellation of an important economic conference that characterized the period immediately following the crime. Even the normally vociferous opposition parties have focused only on the issue of South Korean violation of Japanese sovereignty, leaving Kim himself to his fate.

As in the Watergate case, the silence has become as important as the crime itself in explaining what happened to Kim and what may happen to other dissidents. It now appears that Japanese rightists knew of the kidnapping plans and perhaps even aided them, a fact that throws light on the close ties between powerful Japanese economic interests and the repressive Park Chung Hee government.

Shaken by the "Nixon doctrine" and U.S. pressure for détente with the North, Park also faces internal resistance to his rule—seen most recently in early October student demonstrations in Seoul. Kim Dae Jung's success in rallying Koreans in the United States and (more importantly) in Japan to his anti-Park cause was a growing threat. Hints of tacit, semi-official support for Kim from highly placed Americans, embarrassed by the openly repressive nature of the regime, gave the threat immediacy: Kim had to be silenced.

During July, Park sent two envoys

to visit Kim in Tokyo and persuade him to return home to cooperate in a new political program similar to the platform on which Kim had run for president and won 46 percent of the vote in 1971.

Kim, however, was well aware that his strength lay among expatriate Koreans. If he had returned to Seoul,



TANAKA: Defends "sovereignty" but forgets Kim Dae Jung.

he would have been virtually in Park's hands, and he rejected the proposals. The kidnapping took place as he emerged from a meeting with Yang Il Tong, the second of the envoys, who is head of the New Democratic party in South Korea.

In the immediate aftermath of the crime, charges that it had been carried out by the South Korean CIA were raised in the Japanese press and even by as high an official as Justice Minister Isaji Tanaka. Within a few days the police had evidence that this was indeed the case—including the fingerprints of Kim Dong Woon, first secretary of the South Korean Embassy and reputed director of Korean CIA activities in Japan.

But it was almost a month later before this information was released to the public—after Kim Dong Woon and his family had returned to South Korea. From this point on, the story began to lose its front-page drama and the official hush-up began. The Japanese government wants to suggest that things have returned to normal, even though an important meeting on Japanese aid to South Korea has been delayed since September 9.

While Park's international standing declines, powerful Japanese interests find themselves increasingly tied to him. Japanese investment in South Korea has been growing rapidly since 1969. Through 1968, total Japanese private capital in South Korea was \$310,000; in 1972 it increased by \$112 million; and in the first six months of 1973, \$113 million more came in.

Plans for the future include \$5,000 million of Japanese capital to be invested over ten years in a program to develop chemical and heavy industries, with Japanese firms doing most of the construction. Oil refineries are also moving out of pollution-conscious Japan to find havens in South Korea. The success of the entire program, however, depends on Park's continued rule.

Koreans have not forgotten their thirty-six years under Japanese rule, and popular anti-Japanese feeling still runs high. The Park regime has outlawed expression of this feeling—along with all other organized popular movements. Campaigns against pollution by Japanese enterprises are as illegal as strikes for higher wages.

Thus, leading Japanese corporations, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, do not want to see the Kim kidnapping disrupt Japanese relations with the Park government. Nor do they want to see that government fall. The Kakuei Tanaka government cannot be expected to push Park hard enough to hurt the interests of its own most important and powerful supporters.

In addition to this general interest in helping Park to stay in power, there is evidence directly linking members of the Japanese right to the kidnapping. Fear of revealing this is another reason for the feebleness of the Tanaka government's efforts to rescue Kim.

The Tokyo Grand Palace Hotel, in which the kidnapping occurred, is controlled by Toa Sogo Kigyo, whose

president, Hisayuki Machii, has widespread right-wing and gangster ties. Machii, a Korean expatriate, also owns the Kampu Ferry Company, which runs between Shimonoseki and Pusan. He has been decorated by Park Chung Hee for "meritorious service." It seems hardly a coincidence that this hotel was chosen as the scene of the crime.

Machii is a disciple of Yoshio Kodama, a leading Japanese rightist with close ties to the Tanaka government and a war record of looting and espionage in China. Kodama, in turn, is close to former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi.

If Machii was involved in the kidnapping, it is highly likely that his superior, Kodama, and Kodama's friends were also involved or at least

aware of the plot. Indeed, one version of the affair now circulating among some knowledgeable sources has Kishi directing the plot with little or no aid from the Korean CIA.

The whole incident remains to be explained in detail, but it is already clear that disclosure might be as embarrassing for the Japanese government as for Park. Perhaps it would be disastrous for future Japan-South Korea ties.

The policy of keeping quiet in itself reveals the pervasiveness of Japanese interests in exploiting South Korea, the indifference of the government to the fate of Kim and the Korean people, and even the indifference of the opposition parties beyond their narrow concern for "national sovereignty." □

kidnapped from a Tokyo hotel August 8 and spirited to Seoul. Both the Japanese and U.S. governments, embarrassed by this flagrant breach of Japanese sovereignty, protested the kidnapping. Kim was released but remains under heavy police and CIA guard at his Seoul home.

The Japanese government was especially stung by press criticism and popular protests over the incident. The Japanese police admitted that they had found fingerprints of Korean officials at the scene of Kim's abduction.

In addition to the student protests, there has also been opposition to Park in religious circles. The government recently released Reverend Park Hyung Kyu, a minister who has led slum dwellers in resistance to forced relocation. He had been arrested for distributing leaflets at an Easter service of 50,000 persons calling for "the restoration of democracy." The minister was sentenced to two years in prison September 25, but was released after protests by church groups in the United States, Europe, and Japan.

Koreans in Japan and the United States also have protested against the Park regime. In Osaka a meeting of 1,500 Koreans was held September 23. It was sponsored by a committee to defend Kim Dae Jung composed of members of Mindan, the pro-Seoul residents' association. In the United States, demonstrations were staged in New York and Washington.

There are 600,000 Koreans in Japan, and perhaps 170,000 in the U.S. In addition, there are similar large numbers of Koreans in China and the Soviet Union.

South Korean students have a long history of militant struggles. In 1960 student demonstrations led to the downfall of an earlier dictator in South Korea, Syngman Rhee. This was recalled by the *New York Times* in an editorial October 7: "Remembering the fate of the late President Syngman Rhee, whose dictatorial regime was toppled by a student revolt, the present South Korean government and its supporters have reason to be apprehensive about last week's eruption of student protest." □

#### **We've Felt the Same, for Other Reasons**

"Sometimes he doesn't even want to get up in the morning."—Julie Nixon on her father's reaction to Watergate.

## **Park Dictatorship Under Fire**

### **Students Stage Demonstrations in Seoul**

By George Johnson

In defiance of martial law declared by the Park Chung Hee regime a year ago, 400 students from the National University College of Liberal Arts and Science demonstrated in Seoul October 2. Riot and plainclothes police arrested 150 students at the demonstration and dragged fifty more out of classrooms.

Two days later, 250 Law College students demonstrated. The police made thirty-one arrests.

Despite the arrests, protests have not stopped. The October 22 issue of *Newsweek* reported that "students at Seoul's College of Commerce boycotted classes and police scurried from campus to campus to head off anti-Park rallies."

According to the October 3 issue of *People's Korea*, the students are demanding an end to what Koreans call "intelligence" politics, including the abolition of the feared Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA has been one of Park's main instruments of rule since he assumed power in a coup d'etat in 1961. He has used the secret political police to crush all opposition to his rule.

The students are also demanding an end to South Korea's economic bond-

age to Japan, *People's Korea* reports. The demand for national economic independence has been advanced by South Korean students in many protest actions during the past fourteen years. The demand is directed against South Korea's status as a puppet state maintained by U.S. imperialism with help from Japan.

Discussion of unification with North Korea is a tabooed subject in South Korea. However, with the détente between U.S. imperialism and the bureaucracies in Moscow and Peking, Park modified his policy of rejecting any contact whatsoever with North Korea. Representatives of the two governments have met several times in Seoul, Pyongyang, and Panmunjom, but relations have not been extended beyond this. Park declared martial law to make sure that his willingness to talk with the diplomatic representatives of North Korea did not set off any popular movement to further break down the barriers between the two halves of Korea.

The current anti-Park demonstrations were set off in part by the CIA kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung, a political opponent of the Park regime, living in exile in Japan. Kim was



## Increased Exploitation of Immigrant Workers in Switzerland

[The following article appeared in the August 30 issue of *La Brèche*, fortnightly newspaper of the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Marxist League), the Swiss organization in sympathy with the Fourth International. It deals with what is increasingly becoming a central political problem on a Europe-wide scale: the status and role of immigrant workers. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

In German Switzerland, the immigrant workers are called *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers): people who stay only a short time before returning to their own countries. Apart from the fact that the general conditions reserved for these Swiss workers makes the word *guest* sound somewhat paradoxical, it must be added that this picture no longer exactly corresponds to reality.

It is no longer a question of temporary labor necessitated by exceptional circumstances (accelerated growth during the postwar period); on the contrary, today many immigrant workers occupy key posts in production, to such an extent that if there is a recession, the Swiss bourgeoisie may not be able to apply its old scheme of laying off foreigners first. This is just what the employers imply in their letter to Brugger,\* and the trend is backed up by the facts: In August 1972, some 40.5 percent of the immigrants involved in production held residency permits.

The corollary of this development is the entrance of the immigrant population into the Swiss political arena; the immigrants' deeper involvement in Swiss society makes them more sensitive to all kinds of socioeconomic problems that they had previously

tended to ignore, since the time they spent in Switzerland was relatively short.

### The Fears of the Bourgeoisie

This is making the bourgeoisie uneasy. An increase in the number of residency permits, says the above-mentioned letter from the Union Centrale, "would contribute neither to political stability nor to labor harmony in our country." And even though a residency permit does not by any means grant foreigners all basic political rights, the Union Centrale is floating the idea of a still more restrictive law: "It must be borne in mind that our residency law does not differentiate sufficiently from the rights of Swiss citizens." (Letter to Brugger.)

All the measures taken in the recent period for enforcement of immigration control by the immigration police are aimed both at muzzling this section of the working class and, if possible, at separating out those who are integrating themselves into the "moral and economic structures of the country" (as the 1931 law puts it) from those who are not. Moreover, if we remember certain witch-hunting statements, like the one from the textile employers (reported in *La Brèche*, No. 69), we can get a good idea of the bourgeoisie's "great fear."

It may be objected that this politicization of the immigrant population has been channeled through organizations within which the Communist parties play a dominant role, and that the Swiss bourgeoisie can use these organizations to ensure more or less direct control over the immigrant section of the working class. Moreover, the bourgeoisie can undertake a continuing dialogue with these organizations, with a view toward derailing possible struggles.

This is true, but only to a point: The hegemony of these organizations is far from complete; they are themselves under pressure from a rank and file that is tending to radicalize and is a long way from adopting

the *completely collaborationist* (not even reformist) position of the traditional organizations of the Swiss labor movement. And it is a fact that the immigrant workers' participation in political life during the past months has been *qualitatively higher* than in past years, when it was almost nonexistent.

### 1963-70: The Labor Market Tightens

But the political consequences of the presence of immigrant workers are not the Swiss employers' only worries. Let's take a quick look at some of the *economic* implications. After the postwar *laissez-faire* period, the first restrictive immigration measures taken by the Federal Council in 1963 corresponded to the desire to look after small, medium, and large companies.

The factory quotas then enacted enabled small and medium-sized firms, as well as declining sectors, to survive, but limited the expansion possibilities of the largest companies. A struggle was touched off within the bourgeoisie and was made even more acute by the Schwartzbach offensive, which ended in 1970 in a victory for large-scale, technologically advanced industry: While general limitation on immigrants was strengthened, both in response to Schwartzbach and in order to avoid upsetting the political situation, large-scale industry won the replacement of the factory quotas by *canton* [province] quotas, which was to foster the restructuring of the productive system in the interests of the big capitalist trusts.

But this victory for Sulzer, BBC, and others was soon to run into a new difficulty. The limitation on the total number of immigrant workers was to give rise—starting right during the 1969-70 recovery—to "pressures on the labor market" that created optimal conditions for winning wage raises. To be sure, during this period the employers sought to draw in new forces from the indigenous la-

\*Letter of the Union Centrale des Associations Patronales Suisses [Central Union of Swiss Employers' Associations] to the head of the Federal Department of Public Economy, February 26, 1972, published in the June 1973 issue of *Focus*.

bor supply, but they rapidly discovered that they had little to hope for in this direction. Factory closures were not producing enough surplus labor: From 1966 to 1970, 6.2 percent of existing firms shut down, but 1,308 new ones, about 8.8 percent, immediately opened up. Young workers are delaying their entry into production more and more, or are taking up retraining courses after a short period of activity. The retirement age is coming down, and lastly, various obstacles (cost of setting up child care, ideological impediments, and so on) stand in the way of increased utilization of women, according to the employers, although some modifications are being made in this area.

Under these conditions, the employers, hand in glove with the Federal Council, little by little turned to a policy of fighting wage increases, opposing the tying of wages to the cost-of-living index, and opposing any reduction in the work day—a policy that now amounts to an attempt to severely restrict wage increases.

If the employers have managed to get through this "difficult" period relatively easily, in the last analysis they doubtlessly owe this to the extreme collaborationist policy of the trade-union leaders, who took no advantage of this period to extract substantial gains for the working class.

A section of the employers also protested against any easing of restrictions on immigrant workers changing their locality, occupation, or canton, seeing this as an unfavorable factor, from their point of view, with regard to wage stability. On this score, the recent federal decree does not fully satisfy them. We will come back to this question.

### And in Case of Crisis?

Finally, the bourgeoisie is running into another problem: The future of the economy, as depicted in the letter to Brugger, does not look especially rosy: "Even if we have nothing to fear in the immediate future, nevertheless a crisis situation is not excluded."

Now, in the event of a crisis or a deep recession, the bourgeoisie would like to have the immigrant workers play their time-honored role as the layer that can be pushed around and laid off with no trouble.

But here the bourgeoisie runs into new problems:

1. The position of immigrant labor in the heart of the productive process makes layoffs a very risky undertaking, and Swiss workers would probably suffer the sad experience of being laid off along with the immigrants. "This," Vorort correctly comments in the letter to Brugger, "would make the social situation in our country still more explosive."

2. Competition on the European labor market is a fact, and in order to remain competitive the Swiss bourgeoisie is obliged to offer those advantages likely to attract or retain foreign workers; in the circumstances, this means liberalization in granting permanent residency and short-stay permits—which certainly runs counter to the original safety-valve role that devolved upon the immigrant proletariat. This requirement of competition on the labor market was well understood by the negotiators of the 1964 Italo-Swiss immigration agreement when they wrote:

"Since the shortage of workers, especially of skilled workers, is making itself felt more and more in all the European countries, we must see to it that our economy is able to retain those foreigners who have worked in our country for several years. . . . In these conditions, we could not take the responsibility for postponing any longer the application of the necessary measures, as this would prevent us from remaining fully competitive in the international labor market and would be prejudicial to our economy's productivity." (*Feuille Fédérale*, 1964, p. 1056.)

So we can see that the bourgeoisie finds itself in a very delicate situation. It must reconcile many antagonistic factors, not the least of which is a growing xenophobia fostered by the initiatives of the far right—not the subject of this article.

### The New Quotas of July 1973

This is the context in which the July 6, 1973, federal decree on the distribution of foreign labor was passed. (See Box 1.) This new decree, replacing the one of 1971, does not fully satisfy the large employers: The drop from 20,000 to 10,000 new year-round permits (only 5,000 of which can be issued immediately) is con-

sidered too heavy a restriction to allow for replacement of those workers with year-round permits who leave.

They likewise find fault with the measures relaxing the regulations on

### The July 6, 1973 Decree

- Establishes a maximum number of year-round workers (B permit) and seasonal workers (A permit) for cantons.
- Sets total number of B permits at 10,000; 5,000 of these to be issued immediately.
- Sets total number of seasonal workers at 192,000.
- No reduction in the number of permits for border workers, but permits to be granted only where there is six months previous residence in the border area.
- Effective December 31, 1973, year-round workers to be able to change occupation and canton after two years instead of three.

change of residence, occupation, or canton, which they describe as an "unfavorable factor from the point of view of cost increases." (*Journal des Associations Patronales*, July 26, 1973.)

It is clear that in taking these two measures the Federal Council finally had to take into account both the xenophobic pressures now being exerted and the pressure brought to bear on the mixed negotiating commission by the Italian trade unions.

On the other hand, the introduction of quotas by canton for seasonal workers too strengthens the position that large-scale industry won with the introduction of the March 1970 measures (allocation of year-round workers by canton). The former allocation of seasonal workers by sector benefited exclusively the traditional seasonal industries (hotels and construction): The new system introduces greater flexibility into the exploitation of seasonal labor by the various sectors of Swiss capitalism, while also tightening the bonds of this type of labor.

### Seasonal Workers: The April 1 Gimmick

In fact, the federal decree confirms a scandalous measure aimed at perpetuating the seasonal worker's status and at preventing him from obtaining

year-round status (which nonetheless is provided for in the agreements with Italy, for example).

What is involved here? In theory, seasonal workers who have completed nine full months in Switzerland five times (a total of forty-five months) can get a year-round permit. In reality, the immigration police had already stipulated—and this has been confirmed by this decree—that seasonal construction workers cannot enter Switzerland before April 1 and must leave on the last Saturday before Christmas, which prevents them from completing nine full months. Considering that some 70 percent of seasonal workers are employed in the construction industry, it is obvious that this measure is aimed at keeping the large majority of seasonal workers in their present status, excepting only those working in other branches of industry and those who have had an earlier entry authorized by the OFIAMT [Office Fédérale de l'Industrie des Arts et Métiers—Federal Office of Industrial Arts and Skills] or the cantons. (See Box 2.)

In the circumstances, the Federal Council indirectly is trying to give a new content to the concept of seasonal worker. Until 1950, the seasonal workers' arrival date was fixed at March 15 and their departure at November 30. But from 1957-58, in response to the technical modifications that enabled them increasingly to ex-

### Immigrant Workers by Status

(End of April 1973)

Permit	Change from 1972
C (permanent)	plus 36,300 (15.7%)
B (year-round)	minus 35,538 (9.8%)
Net Increase	763

A (seasonal)	minus 4,804 (3.1%)
Border	plus 5,885 (6.2%)

#### Total Number of Immigrants

A permit	148,013
B permit	327,950
C permit	267,300
Border permit	101,132

tend their working time into the colder months, the time limits were extended. At this point it became completely artificial to make any distinction between a seasonal worker symbolically interrupting his activity in Switzerland and

a year-round worker going to spend his holidays in his own country. And this situation placed the bourgeoisie in a weak position relative to the Italian negotiating team in 1964, which, under pressure from the Italian trade unions, demanded at least a modification, if not the abolition, of the seasonal worker status.

### Seasonal Workers Status: A Scandal

For the bourgeoisie, it is essential to maintain the seasonal workers status in a way that puts at its disposal a labor force with no rights at all, which can be cut back or made to work as required. In fact, the seasonal worker can neither change his place of residence nor bring his family in. He cannot rent an apartment and has to make do with barracks provided by his employer.

If disabled, he is entitled neither to the national health insurance job-training program nor to partial disability payments under the national disability insurance system. Neither is he entitled to special social security benefits. As soon as his contract is terminated, he loses his right to sick pay and to compensation for lost wages. To be sure, he gets benefits from health insurance in his native country, but these are woefully inadequate and include neither a per diem nor a hospital allowance.

Furthermore, he does not receive unemployment insurance during the compulsory seasonal break, even though he pays taxes like anyone else, including contributions to the funds for paying Swiss soldiers for loss of earnings.

Strangely enough, seasonal workers' tax contributions are worked out on the basis of their monthly income multiplied by twelve (!), and although the 1964 Italo-Swiss agreement provided for a more "accurate" calculation (maximum duration of eleven months, that is, 2,300 hours), it seems that this "recommendation" has remained a dead letter. Finally, during the first two seasons, only twenty-four hours notice of dismissal is given!

The policy of the bourgeoisie, which is trying to avoid various dangers, can be finally reduced to two major aims:

1. Primarily, to maintain the status of seasonal worker, while at the same

time making this mass of workers more broadly available to industry;

2. Then, to carry out the training of skilled workers only on the basis of strict criteria of selection, which can be used very precisely through the strengthening of the immigration police. These criteria would be both occupational (quality of work) and political (the immigrant's "behavior"). (See Box 3.)

### And the Swiss Trade-Union Movement?

The trade-union leadership has fully sanctioned this policy. In our pamphlet *Capitalisme suisse et travailleurs étrangers* [Swiss Capitalism and For-

#### Terms of the Permits

● A permit (seasonal): See text of article.

● B permit (year-round): renewable from year to year; can be refused. After one year, possibility of changing place of residence, but not occupation or canton. Freedom of movement after five years (two years since the July 6, 1973, decree, and one year beginning in 1976). After eighteen months, possibility of bringing family in (fifteen months for Spanish and Italian workers). These limits do not apply to skilled and professional workers. No unemployment insurance.

● C permit (permanent): authorizes an unlimited stay, with no restriction on movement. Granted to those who have held a B permit for ten consecutive years (five years for French, Belgian and Dutch workers). Permit includes recipient's family.

● Border permit: a work permit only, issued as a rule for one year. Worker is required to live in the border area; no possibility of changing occupation; no unemployment benefit.

eign Workers] we quoted trade-union statements, for example, that were favorable to this selection policy. In 1963, the FOMH [Fédération Suisse des Ouvriers sur Métaux et Horlogers—Swiss Federation of Metalworkers and Watchmakers] stated: "In its own best interests, management in all branches of industry, while systematically limiting the employment of foreign workers, must eliminate progressively all those whose job and



personal qualifications are inadequate."

At the moment, they still stand by this position, urging a reduction in the number of foreign workers admitted on year-round permits. (The Swiss Union Federation had proposed a ban on the admission of any more year-round workers, and a 5 percent reduction in the upper limit on seasonal workers.)

In addition, they address themselves neither to the problem of basic democratic rights for the established workers, nor to the necessity of completely abolishing the seasonal workers status, nor, lastly, to the problem of a common struggle of the Swiss and foreign workers. Quite the contrary; by stating, as did the union federation, "that the Federal Council has not paid sufficient attention to the internal political situation in its new regulations on foreign labor" (the communiqué *Lutte Syndicale* [Trade-Union Struggle], August 1, 1973), the trade-union leaders have adopted the nationalist concept of *überfremdung* [foreign penetration].

### Swiss and Immigrants: Same Fight!

Revolutionary tradition has always opposed all limitation, restriction, and selection of immigrant workers. All such measures institutionalize the divisions among workers and can only weaken them relative to the employers.

The argument that the entry of immigrant workers brings downward pressure on wages is valid only to the extent that the workers are not organized in instruments of struggle, which is what the unions are supposed to be, and to the extent that the policy of "labor peace" leaves the employers free to use against the workers any softening of the labor market.

But the limitations and restrictions, with the divisions that this creates within the working class, weaken the whole working class in the medium and long term in such a way that it will be paralyzed when faced by the employers. This weakening is unquestionably more "dangerous" than all the pressures on wages that an open-door policy might cause. As we stated in May 1970 at the time of the Schwartzbach initiative, "only a position based not on 'foreign penetration' but on the struggle for the de-

*fense of the common interests of the working class as a class would be capable of changing this reality."*

In order to smash one of the main instruments of class division used by the bourgeois class, it seems to us essential to struggle for the complete abolition of the seasonal worker status. This means not only struggling for this category of workers to win its basic democratic rights, but also struggling to limit the bourgeoisie's maneuvering room by depriving it of the artificial flexibility on the la-

bor market that it has sought to maintain through the seasonal workers. This is contained within the framework of a more general demand that can be formulated as follows:

*"The same political and trade-union rights for all who work in Switzerland."*

But going beyond this basic demand is a whole series of other demands that, while posing certain problems, lay the basis of the revolutionists' fight to unite the working class in Switzerland. □

## CORRESPONDENCE

### On Chile—A Possible Misinterpretation

Stockholm

Editor:

In the September 24 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, there is an article by Comrade Gerry Foley entitled "The Coup in Chile—What Happened and Why." One of the conclusions drawn by Comrade Foley is open to misinterpretation and can be taken for a serious political error. Therefore it has to be clarified. Among many revolutionists in Sweden, as in many other countries, this article is taken as stating the revolutionary Marxist point of view in relation to the bloody confrontation in Chile. Therefore I think a public rectification is urgently needed. The conclusion that I find in contradiction to the principles of revolutionary Marxism is the following:

"A revolutionary party able to give leadership to the resistance could have completely changed the outcome. Without this, the military force of the former guerrillas was insignificant. The final irony was that they died defending a government that had irrevocably condemned itself to death, when they were needed to help form the nucleus of a government based directly on the workers that could have really fought imperialism and dealt it a decisive defeat." (P. 1052.)

This can be taken for moralizing cynicism! An insult to those who died in the battles with the counterrevolutionaries!

Comrade Foley's proposal to those who took up arms and wanted to

fight is the following: Stop fighting, you are "needed to help form the nucleus of a government based directly on the workers"! This is nonsense. Those who died were defending their own lives. They were defending the working class. The counterrevolutionaries wanted to wipe out the political organizations of the working class. They wanted to jail or execute all leaders of the working class. In this struggle the workers of course were not neutral between the camp of Allende and that of Pinochet:

"The Bolsheviks did not remain neutral between the camp of Kerensky and that of Kornilov. They fought in the first camp against the second. They accepted the official command as long as they were not sufficiently strong to overthrow it. It was precisely in the month of August, with the Kornilov uprising, that a prodigious upswing of the Bolsheviks began. This upswing was made possible only thanks to the double-edged Bolshevik policy. While participating in the front lines of the struggle against Kornilov, the Bolsheviks did not take the slightest responsibility for the policy of Kerensky. On the contrary, they denounced him as responsible for the reactionary attack and as incapable of overcoming it. In this way they prepared the political premises of the October Revolution, in which the alternative Bolshevism or counterrevolution (communism or fascism) evolved from a historic tendency into a living

and immediate reality." (Leon Trotsky, *The Spanish Revolution*, pp. 296-97.)

Maybe Comrade Foley has the opinion that there was *no possibility* to win the battle. Maybe that's why he writes that the young former guerrillas "died heroically in a futile (!) defense of a capitulationist government." (*Intercontinental Press*, September 24, p. 1051.) But this doesn't change things:

"A revolutionary party will always prefer to subject itself to a defeat together with the masses, rather than stand aside moralizing, and leave the workers without leadership under the bayonets of the bourgeoisie. A party beaten in battle will root itself deeply in the hearts of the masses and will sooner or later take the revenge. But a party that has deserted the class at the moment of danger will never come to life again." (Op. cit., p. 132.)

Communist greetings, with a hope for a rectification.

— Göte Kildén

### Reply—

The sentences to which Comrade Kildén calls attention are from the final section of Gerry Foley's analysis of the coup in Chile. They appear under the subheading: "What Was Lacking in Chile?" Foley offered as his answer that what was lacking was a Bolshevik-type party.

In separation from the context, the sentences can be misinterpreted. We appreciate Comrade Kildén's calling our attention to this.

There was no intent, however, to insult those who fought in defense of their lives, their rights, or their gains under the Allende regime against the military butchers. Quite the contrary!

Foley's point was strictly *political*—that besides heroism, a correct policy is required. Without a correct policy, the lives of valuable cadres can be wasted. In Chile a fight should have been opened on another front long ago, a fight to construct the instrument that could assure success against the counterrevolution; that is, a Bolshevik-type party that would have taken as its axis of action the establishment of a workers and peasants government. Through articles and documents, *Intercontinental Press* has urged such a course since Allende's popular-front government came to power in 1970.

The quotations from Trotsky are pertinent in that they indicate the poli-

cy that a revolutionary party would have followed in Chile. Against the counterrevolutionary moves of the generals, a revolutionary party would have defended the popular-front government while opposing it politically. When the generals were defeated, it would have moved to topple the Kerenky of 1973 and replace his regime with a workers and peasants government. *But the Chilean workers lacked such a party.* They had no way of effectively applying the policy advocated by Trotsky and practiced by the Bolsheviks in 1917.

In Chile, because of the treacherous role played by the Social Democrats and above all the Stalinists, the task of building a revolutionary party was not undertaken. The Chilean workers were thus left disarmed politically. It must be added that those who thought that guerrilla war could be counted on to provide a shortcut, obviating

the need for a revolutionary party, must likewise share political responsibility for this failure. Insistence on assigning political responsibility, let it be repeated, does not deny the heroism of individual members of these currents who took up arms in a desperate struggle against the counterrevolutionaries; nor does it deny the positive role that their heroism can play in a future upsurge of the class struggle in Chile.

After seeing what happened in Chile, many who held illusions about Allende will now agree that the "peaceful, parliamentary road to socialism" proved once again to be a deadly trap. It is to be hoped that they will also draw the still deeper lesson—the need to build a revolutionary party in time. This was what Gerry Foley sought to stress in his analysis of the coup.

— Editor

## Rally Solidarizes With Ligue Communiste

London

A meeting held here October 8 in solidarity with the struggle to end the ban on the French Ligue Communiste was attended by more than 200 persons, including members of the Militant, Socialist Charter, and Workers Fight. The rally was sponsored by the International Marxist Group, the British section of the Fourth International.

The hall was lined with banners reading "Solidarity with the Ligue Communiste," "Defend the Ligue Communiste," and "Build the Fourth International." The decorations included posters of the PRT/ERP (Fracción Roja) of Argentina.

Pierre Rousset, a former member of the Political Committee of the banned Ligue Communiste, analyzed recent events in France, emphasizing in particular the importance of the growth of neofascist and racist groups. After outlining the events that led up to the ban on the Ligue Communiste, he described the massive wave of solidarity amongst the French workers that had forced the bureaucrats of the Communist and Socialist parties and the trade unions to express solidarity with the Ligue and to protest the ban.

Brian Slocock, editor of the *Red*

*Weekly*, the newspaper of the IMG, stressed the growing activities of the racists and fascists in Britain as an extra arm of bourgeois repression. Pointing to the need to take these forces seriously, he reported how the IMG had taken up a call by the Transport and General Workers Union to expose the nature of the fascist National Front and was now attempting to organize united-front picketing at the National Front annual conference the following weekend.

Slocock emphasized the tremendous value even a small demonstration would have in exposing the social role of the fascists and their connections with the government, the police, and the courts.

In introducing the discussion, the chair stressed that the meeting was not only to defend the Ligue Communiste but to initiate a campaign against the fascists and racists in Britain. After an announcement by the Ad-Hoc Committee to Defend the Ligue Communiste as to its activities, the discussion centered on the need to mobilize maximum forces for the picketing the following weekend and to sustain a continuous fight against the far right in Britain. □

*Intercontinental Press*