



Pentagon Throws Its Weight on Scales

Thai Students Topple Government

Nixon Challenges Watergate Critics

Chilean Generals Continue Repression

Kissinger Gets Prize —For Bombing?

In a display of humor and irony rare among government officials in any country, the Norwegian parliament's five-member Nobel committee announced the selection of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for the Nobel Peace Prize. There was no confirmation of a rumor that Kissinger's close friend Richard Nixon was a runner-up for the Nobel Prize for Literature, based on the clarity and honesty of his many speeches and writings.

The committee also decided that Kissinger should share the prize with Le Duc Tho, chief negotiator for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This is known in U.S. military parlance (apparently the language of the committee) as "covering your ass."

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, well-known for his efforts at ensuring peace and quiet in the Philippines, wasted no time in cabling his congratulations to Henry Kissinger, calling the award a "fitting tribute" to Kissinger's erstwhile efforts at ushering in "a new era of peace [sic]."

There were, however, some who missed the humor in the Nobel committee's selection. The Socialist Election Union, for instance, which holds sixteen seats in the Norwegian parliament, released a statement saying that it was "shocked that the peace prize has been given to Richard Nixon's henchman. This has scandalized the Nobel Peace Prize as a peace-promoting means.

"We consider the sharing of the award with Le Duc Tho as an attempt to hide the Nobel committee's kneeling before American imperialism."

Even the *Washington Post* failed to get the joke. It stated in an October 18 editorial: "The foundation of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy . . . was the Christmas bombing of Hanoi. It was followed by a savage new burst of administration-authorized bombing of Cambodia."

It seems that those who take the Nobel Peace Prize seriously didn't appreciate the committee's sense of irony. Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite, probably would have. □

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Nixon Supplies and Guarantees Israeli Aggression

By Jon Rothschild

On the afternoon of October 22, when a cease-fire in place voted by the United Nations Security Council was supposed to go into effect, the Israeli armed forces were holding some 400 square miles of Egyptian territory west of the Suez Canal. Israeli troops were posted astride the road linking Ismailia to the city of Suez further south; the road from Ismailia to Cairo was within range of Zionist artillery.

The Israeli armed forces held that position only because of the virtually unlimited aid provided them by their imperialist guarantors in Washington. Nixon claimed that the staggering amount of equipment sent to Israel was aimed at maintaining the "military balance" in the Arab East. By military balance he means Israeli hegemony. On October 19 he asked the U.S. Congress to fork over \$2,200 million for more military aid to the Zionist state. The traditional pattern of selling arms was broken. The new, "emergency" aid was to be a gift.

"The United States," Nixon said, "is making every effort to bring this conflict to a very swift and honorable conclusion, measured in days, not weeks. But prudent planning also requires us to prepare for a longer struggle."

Just how much longer may be gauged by the amount of U.S. equipment funneled into Israel during the second week of the October War.

The Pentagon's Airlift

American "resupply" of the Zionist war machine began in earnest on October 14, when the State Department announced that a large-scale airlift was under way. The immediate U.S. concern was to replace the Israeli Phantom jet fighter-bombers that had been shot down by Egyptian surface-to-air missiles. By October 19, at least twenty-five Phantoms (some sources reported twenty-eight) had been flown directly into Israel by U.S.

pilots who dropped off the planes, changed into civilian clothes, and boarded passenger planes out of Israel. The quick delivery of the Phantoms is believed to have fully replaced all the Phantoms lost by the Israeli air force as of that point in the war.

The Phantom is the backbone of the Israeli air force and is a necessity in any Zionist military advance.

The October 20 *Christian Science Monitor* reported that about fifty A-4 Skyhawks, subsonic bombers heavily used by the Israeli military, were en route to Israel by sea. An undisclosed number of Skyhawks had been flown in by the procedure used to deliver the Phantoms.

Israeli ships were reported loading giant 53-ton M-60 tanks for transport east. Six M-60s, according to the *Christian Science Monitor*, had been flown in by U.S. C-5A transport planes. The C-5A is the largest U.S. transport plane available. It can carry two M-60s each trip. The October 16 *Washington Post* reported that 150 M-60s were on the way to Israel.

"The earliest American shipments," Dana Adams Schmidt wrote in the October 20 *Monitor*, "included electronic devices needed to counter the radar-guided Soviet missiles. These had been designed to cope with the Russian weapons known in Vietnam. Pentagon officials say they can be adapted in the field to the SAM 6, which was not used in Vietnam, and the massed deployment of the smaller SAM 7's which the Egyptians are using in Sinai."

In the October 18 *New York Times* Leslie Gelb reported that additional equipment on its way to Israel included "the air-to-air Sidewinder heat-seeking missile, television-guided Wall-eye missiles used against ground targets, cluster bombs for use against both troops and armored vehicles, and Shrike missiles, which can be employed against the Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missiles."

The Pentagon admitted that it was

flying an average of twenty cargo flights into Israel each day, carrying a total of 700-800 tons of material. But the Pentagon figures did not include the American combat aircraft flown into Israel, or the equipment being carried in on U.S. ships, or the equipment being transported by Israeli ships and planes. So even if the Pentagon's official figures on the U.S. airlift were truthful, which is hardly likely anyway, the actual tonnage of U.S. aid to the Israeli forces far exceeds the level of 800 tons per day.

Nixon's move on October 19 to ask Congress for \$2,200 million in military aid was a major escalation in U.S. support to the Zionist state. The prewar level of aid stood at about \$300 million to \$500 million worth of materiel per year, and it represented weapons sold to Tel Aviv. The new figure would include both grants and sales, but White House spokesman Gerald L. Warren said it would be mostly grants.

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, speaking to an AFL-CIO biennial convention in Bal Harbour, Florida, told the union bureaucrats that "supply of consumables or equipment can be expanded to whatever level is required—in order to prevent a serious imbalance in the region."

U.S. Aid and the Military Situation

Far from maintaining any balance, the U.S. aid was designed to preserve Zionist superiority and was instrumental in enabling the Israelis to turn around the military situation in the Sinai. Assured of unlimited U.S. supplies, the Zionist leaders were able to commit their forces to an all-out effort to undermine the Egyptian position on the east bank of the Suez Canal, while holding a significant chunk of Syrian territory as well.

On October 16 Israeli tank units drove a wedge through the Egyptian lines on the east bank south of the city of Ismailia, which is about midway along the 100-mile length of the canal. A "task force" of undisclosed strength crossed the canal and established a bridgehead on the western bank. For three days, the Israelis moved troops and tanks across the canal, reinforcing and securing the enclave. At the same time, intense


tank battles were raging in the Ismailia area on the east bank, apparently an Israeli effort to prevent Egyptian troops from moving south to attack the newly opened wedge.

On October 19 Israeli General Shlomo Gazlit told reporters at a Tel Aviv news conference that the task force was engaged in knocking out Egyptian surface-to-air missile sites and that Israeli planes were "completely free" to operate in the central sector of the canal front, even behind the Egyptian lines.

The October 20 *New York Times* reported that the task force was believed to number more than 10,000 troops and 200 tanks. By October 20, Israeli Major General Uzi Narkiss was claiming that the Israeli task force held a square-shaped area south of Ismailia that extended twenty miles into Egypt and twenty miles along the west bank of the canal. He said the enclave was "enlarging and deepening." Narkiss claimed the task force had eliminated Egyptian surface-to-air missile sites in the vicinity of the enclave and that some missiles had been captured and returned to Israel for inspection by intelligence officers, and presumably for delivery to Washington.

By October 21 the Israeli command was claiming that the western bridgehead extended twenty-four miles along the west bank, just about one-fourth the total length of the canal. On the same day Major General Azzedin Mokhtar, an Egyptian military spokesman, acknowledged that the Israelis were holding two positions on the west bank, at Deversoir and Serapeum, north of the Great Bitter Lake. Also on October 21 an "authoritative [Egyptian] Government source" charged that U.S. equipment was being landed at el-Arish in northeast Sinai. The el-Arish equipment was presumably for use both by the Israeli force on the west bank of the canal and by the Israeli tanks and troops massed in the Ismailia sector of the Sinai front on the east bank.

Drew Middleton, military expert of the *New York Times*, wrote October 22 that the Israeli force on the west bank of the canal seemed to be intent on destroying Egyptian supply dumps, depots, air bases, and gun and missile positions between the canal and the Nile River. "This area is the base



New York Times map indicates (1) Syrian front, where Israeli troops are outside Sassa; (2) El-Arish, where Egyptian officials say U.S. aid to Israel has been landed; and (3) west bank of canal, where Israeli task force is dug in.

of Egyptian military strength," he wrote. "It extends north to the Ismailia-Zagazig highway and south to the Cairo-Port Suez road. Built with Soviet help after the 1967 war, it was intended as the supply and staging area for any offensive eastward. If the Israelis were able to wreck it, Egypt's position in any negotiations would be appreciably weaker."

An unidentified Western officer described the indicated procedure: "The bombers go in and neutralize the area. Then you get combat engineers there with explosives. It would take years to

restore it. It's not just supplies that the Israelis would be after, but the underground depots, the gun and missile emplacements, the aircraft shelters. If they get into it, they'll smash it so the Egyptians won't recognize it."

The Israeli strategy appeared to be to put maximum pressure on the west bank, presenting the Egyptian command with the alternative of allowing their central rear areas to be demolished or withdrawing their forces from the east bank of the canal to defend the west bank.

"At the moment," Middleton wrote

October 22, "the consensus of Western military experts is that Cairo intends to fight it out on both fronts [the east and west banks] for 48 hours. By Wednesday [October 24], however, the Israeli bridgehead may be developed to the point where the command must make its decision."

By late October 21 it appeared that the Israeli army was poised to deliver the final thrust. The Syrian front had been relatively quiet for nearly a week, Israeli artillery still posted outside the town of Sassa, twenty miles from Damascus. Most of the Israeli troops committed to combat were on the Sinai front.

The Cease-Fire Resolution

The Israeli plans were interrupted October 22 when the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution (with the Chinese delegation not participating) calling for an immediate cease-fire in place. The terms of the resolution were apparently worked out by Henry Kissinger, who had flown to Moscow October 20 to talk to Kremlin chief Leonid Brezhnev.

The three-paragraph resolution specified no details about the cease-fire (troops reinforcements, construction of dug-in lines, etc.) except to ask that "all military activity" be terminated.

The second paragraph called on the "parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts."

The third paragraph stipulated that "negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

Paragraphs two and three may safely be regarded as largely meaningless. Security Council Resolution 242, which was passed in November 1967 and calls for Israeli withdrawal from the territories conquered in 1967 and Arab recognition of the Zionist state, was not further elaborated in the October 22 resolution. The Zionist leaders have made it quite clear that they have no intention of withdrawing from most of the territories seized in the 1967 aggression, and nothing has occurred in the October War that is likely to force them to change that position.

The question is whether the cease-fire itself will in fact take effect and



U.S.-built Skyhawk bombers dropping Israeli bombs along the Suez Canal. Nixon is replacing all Israeli planes lost in October aggression.

if so how long it will hold. It seems most unlikely to last. The Israeli ruling class will seize any available opportunity to break it, and is likely to create such opportunities if none soon present themselves. That intention derives directly from Zionist aims in the October War.

The Zionist leaders have every reason to be satisfied with the situation on the Syrian front. They have extended their occupation further into Syria and hold positions that enable them to shell the outskirts of Damascus whenever they feel the need to deliver further bloody "lessons" to the Syrian people.

In the Sinai the situation is different. In purely military terms, the Israeli rulers can claim victory. If the present positions are maintained, they will have ceded a thin strip of desert to Egyptian troops, which are in no position to advance. In exchange they hold some 400 square miles of land west of the canal and are in position to shell the Ismailia-Cairo road, the route along which Egypt would have to resupply and reinforce its troops camped on the east bank.

But in political terms, the Zionist leaders have not achieved their goals. They had insisted over and over throughout the war that their intent was to demolish the Egyptian armed forces, to cripple Cairo's power to resist Israeli aggression for years to

come. The Zionist regime needs not just "normal" military victory, but absolute mastery over the Arab world. They have not convincingly achieved that during the October War.

It follows that the Israeli regime, which on the eve of the cease-fire seemed poised to deliver the coup de grace to the Egyptian army, will relaunch its aggression as soon as possible. The massive U.S. airlift, which will continue despite a cease-fire, assures the Zionist rulers of whatever supplies may be necessary.

The fact that Washington pressured its junior partner to stop short of its goals is doubtlessly related to the tenuous position Nixon found himself in after taking political steps that have brought widespread demands for his impeachment. Under such circumstances, he may expect to be able to divert mass disgust by appearing once again as the great peacemaker. But his message to Congress requesting \$2,200 million of military equipment to "prepare for a longer struggle" shows that U.S. imperialism remains committed to supporting any future Israeli aggression.

Temporarily, the Zionist regime may be forced to shelve its plans to destroy the Egyptian army. But if it can create a situation in which it could appear in a defensive posture, it will take its plans off the shelf. The October 22 cease-fire is thus likely to be of short duration. □

How the Arabs Were Driven Out of Palestine

By Jon Rothschild

Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples together in this country. . . . We shall not achieve our goal of being an independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is a Palestine, at least Western Palestine (west of the Jordan River) without Arabs. . . . And there is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighboring countries, to transfer all of them: Not one village, not one tribe, should be left.

—R. Weitz, Zionist leader, for many years head of the Jewish Agency's colonization department. Notation in his diary, 1940.

Abdel Hakim left with his battalion, which had a duty to perform in the battle of Deir Suneid. Before leaving, he gave me the sum of £1000, which had been entrusted to him. With this money I was to buy as much cheese and olives as I could. Our forward troops had no emergency rations to rely on in the front-lines, where they could not be served with hot meals. No one

had taken the trouble to think about providing the front-line troops with emergency rations. All that they had done was to send us £1000 and say: "Buy cheese and olives."

I bought all the cheese and olives I could lay hands on in Gaza. My heart ached at the thought of the soldier who was to attack fortified positions with his bare body and then sit in a hole like a mouse nibbling away at a piece of cheese. We bought all the cheese we could find with the £1000 they had thrown to us saying: "Do as you see fit." But my heart cried out with every beat: "This is no war."

—Gamal Abdel Nasser, memoirs of the first Palestine war.

. . . when the UN passed the resolution to partition Palestine into two states, the War of Independence broke out, to our great fortune. In this war, a twofold miracle occurred: territorial victory and the flight of the Arabs.

—R. Weitz, September 1967.

* * *

The Basic Goals and Outlook of Zionism

Zionist ideology is a multilayered structure, with mystification enveloping mystification enveloping mystification. At its core is the central delusion: that world Jewry constitutes a single nation and that this dispersed nation has suffered systematic oppression because of the dispersion.

Once that basic premise is accepted, some conclusions flow quite logically: The problem of anti-Semitism can be solved only by "ingathering the exiles" of the dispersed nation, thus removing the source of the oppression, and by establishing a Jewish nation-state, "as Jewish as England is English." Any form of struggle against anti-Semitism

that does not have as its goal establishing the Jewish nation-state is a utopian endeavor, misguided at best, disastrous at worst. The interests of all Jews as Jews unites them, transcending class divisions. Conflicts among Jews must be subordinated to the struggle against the universal Gentile oppressor.

Even before the beginning of large-scale Jewish colonization of Palestine, the Zionist movement's influence on the working-class movement in Eastern Europe, primarily in the Russian empire, was thoroughly reactionary. It urged Jewish workers to withdraw

from the class struggle and to unite with Jewish capitalists and the Jewish petty bourgeoisie against the *goyim*. And by abandoning the struggle against anti-Semitism as hopeless, it not only worked against the interest of Jews as Jews, but also indirectly strengthened the hold of reactionary ideology on the non-Jewish workers, anti-Semitism being one of the most important elements in the attempts of the Eastern European ruling classes to divide the working class and to direct the non-Jewish workers and peasants against the Jews as scapegoats.

The Zionist movement continues to this day to play its reactionary role in those senses. And this would be the case even if there had never been Arabs living in Palestine.

But the core of Zionist mystification dictates another set of conclusions as well: that the non-Jewish inhabitants of the land on which the Jewish nation-state is to be built must be dispensed with one way or another; that any means necessary to effect that task are justified, since the native inhabitants of that land are, by definition, part of the universal oppressor of the Jews.

As Weitz—and many other Zionist leaders too—so clearly insisted, the state of Israel could be constructed only if the Palestinian Arabs were displaced. Such displacement is integral to applying the Zionist program, and every sector of the Zionist movement, even the "extreme left" of it, has recognized the exigencies of carrying out the program and has acted accordingly.

Displacement of the Palestinian Arabs was a gradual process at first. But in 1948 it became a sudden one. How sudden is best indicated by one statistic: In early 1949, within the borders of the newly founded state of Israel, there lived about 133,000 Arabs. In November 1947, in the same stretch of land, there had lived more than 800,000 Arabs. That little alteration in population is the "mira-

cle" of which Weitz spoke in 1967. How the miracle occurred bears examination, because contained in the how is not only the root of the October War, but also a series of political lessons about the nature of Zionism, the nature of the Arab states, and the role of the "great powers" that retain full validity today.

The Zionist Colonization of Palestine

The Zionist colonization of Palestine was an unusual form of colonization, and it yielded unusual results. The Zionist leaders were not primarily interested in exploiting the labor power of the native population, in transforming the "natives" into a proletariat to be exploited by Jewish capital. The Zionist program called for "normalizing" the Jewish "nation." That meant creating a Jewish proletariat, as well as a Jewish bourgeoisie and a Jewish petty bourgeoisie in Palestine.

In more usual settler states, the *colons* displaced the indigenous inhabitants, destroyed the indigenous culture and society, and then transformed the indigenous population into a proletariat employed in an economic system owned and controlled by the settlers. In such situations, class domination and national domination are parallel, the owning class being almost entirely settler and the working class almost entirely "native."

But when the Palestinian Arabs were displaced by Jewish settlers, they were not reintegrated as workers in Jewish-owned economic establishments; they were simply driven away, excluded entirely from economic life (and of course from political life) in the Jewish sector. Their places were taken by Jews.

The gradual strengthening of this displacing colonialism went on under three slogans, which were the pillars of the Zionist movement in Palestine from the beginning of the colonization through the establishment of the Israeli state and beyond.

The slogans were: *kibush hakarka* (conquest of the land), *kibush haavoda* (conquest of labor), and *t'ozteret haaretz* (produce of the land).

Behind the fine-sounding words lay a rather more grim reality. Conquest of the land meant that as much land as possible had to be acquired (legally

or otherwise) from its Arab owners and that no land owned by Jews could be sold or leased or otherwise returned to Arabs. Conquest of labor meant that Jewish-owned factories and farms should exclusively employ Jewish labor insofar as possible. Arab labor was boycotted. In fact, the Histadrut, which today masquerades as a "trade union" in Israel, was formed for the purpose of creating a Jewish working class by imposing a boycott of Arab labor. In some cases, if Jewish capitalists balked at paying the generally higher wages demanded by Jewish



MEIR: As Meyerson, she was Abdullah's "friendly enemy."

workers (as opposed to Arabs), the Jewish National Fund would pay a stipend to the capitalists to make up the difference.

Produce of the land meant in practice the boycott of Arab production by Jewish settlers, who were supposed to buy produce only from Jewish-run farms and stores wherever possible.

To indicate that these three slogans were in fact the day-to-day practice of the Zionist movement in Palestine, it is enough to call on David Ha-cohen, a leader of Golda Meir's party who was an Israeli parliament member for many years and was the chairman of its Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee. In November 1969 Ha-cohen addressed the secretariat of the Mapai party, saying:

"I remember being one of the first

of our comrades to go to London after the first world war. . . . There I became a socialist. . . . When I joined the socialist students—English, Irish, Jewish, Chinese, Indian, African—we found that we were all under English domination or rule. And even here, in these intimate surroundings, I had to fight my friends on the issue of Jewish socialism, to defend the fact that I would not accept Arabs in my trade union, the Histadrut; to defend preaching to housewives that they not buy at Arab stores; to defend the fact that we stood guard at orchards to prevent Arab workers from getting jobs there. . . . To pour kerosene on Arab tomatoes; to attack Jewish housewives in the markets and smash the Arab eggs they had bought; to praise to the skies the Keriin Kayemet [Jewish Fund] that sent Hankin to Beirut to buy land from absentee effendi [landlords] and to throw the fellahin [peasants] off the land—to buy dozens of dunams [a land measurement] from an Arab is permitted, but to sell, God forbid, one Jewish dunam to an Arab is prohibited; to take Rothschild, the incarnation of capitalism, as a socialist and to name him the 'benefactor'—to do all that was not easy. And despite the fact that we did it—maybe we had no choice—I wasn't happy about it." (Reported in the Israeli daily *Haaretz*, November 15, 1969, and quoted in *The Other Israel—The Radical Case Against Zionism*, Arie Bober, ed., Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1972; paperback, \$2.50.)

One must assume that the Palestinian Arabs who were victims of that policy are supposed to be conciliated by Ha-cohen's heart-wrenching unhappiness, revealed forty or fifty years after the fact.

Taken together, the three planks of the program amount to the construction of a Jewish society implanted in Arab Palestine, a society that concurrently developed its own administration, press, and armed forces. It was supported initially by British imperialism, which saw it as a weapon against the Arab independence movement; and it in turn supported British colonial rule in Palestine until the Jewish enclave was large and powerful enough to demand independence for itself.

That point came in the aftermath of the second world war, specifically in 1947-48, when the Yishuv—the

Jewish community in Palestine—became the Zionist state of Israel.

Palestine Is Divided

A common misconception fostered both by Zionist propagandists and by the Western capitalist press is that the "first round" of the Arab-Israeli conflict began on May 15, 1948, the day after the proclamation of the founding of the state of Israel, when Arab armies from Egypt, Transjordan, and Syria invaded the new state with the objective of obliterating the Jewish population.

Apart from the facts that the 1948 war was hardly the "first round" and that the aggressive statements of the Arab leaders had exactly nothing to do with their real intentions or abilities, it is simply not true that the war started in May 1948. By the time the Arab armies entered Palestine on May 15, full-scale war had already been raging for at least one month; intensive civil war between the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs had been going on since November 1947.

A second misconception, which usually parades along with the first, is that the Zionist army was heavily outnumbered by Arab hordes and that the extinction of the Zionist state hung in the balance during the battles that raged from the middle of May until the end of 1948. In fact, at the height of the fighting, Jewish combat troops numbered at least 70,000 (some estimates run as high as 100,000), while the total forces committed to battle by the Arab states stood at not more than 40,000, and probably closer to 30,000.

Furthermore, the security of the Jewish state was firmly established by early June at the latest. The remainder of the fighting was over exactly how far the borders of the new state would extend and over the related question of how many Arabs would be left within those borders. In fact, the inability of the Arab leaders to match the Zionist state in the number of troops mobilized in any confrontation persists today, despite the population disparity. As for the Palestinian Arabs themselves, they played almost no role in the 1948 war, but were mostly passive bystanders whose fate was determined by forces not under their control, another condition that persists to this day.

The Yishuv emerged from the second world war considerably stronger, although numerically smaller, than the Palestinian Arabs. The rapid development of the Jewish economic sector in Palestine, the large number of Jewish immigrants that poured into Palestine during the 1930s and during the aftermath of the second world war, the training that Jewish youth in Palestine had received fighting with the



ABDULLAH: Connived with Zionist leaders to take over Palestine.

Allies, and the intensive development of the Yishuv's administrative structures (the precursors of the Zionist state apparatus) combined to place the Jews in a position not only to expand the area of Jewish control, but to challenge the British regime for control of a large portion of Palestine.

The Palestinian Arabs were in a completely different situation. From 1936 to 1939 they had participated in a revolt against foreign domination that had swept both Palestine and Syria and had tied up between one-third and one-half of the British army during those years. The defeat of the 1936 revolt—in large part a result of its semifeudal Islamic theocratic leadership—had left the Palestinians atomized, demoralized, exhausted, and unarmed.

With the end of World War II the Zionist movement began an extensive military campaign consisting largely of terrorist attacks against British occupying troops. The interests of British imperialism and the Zionist movement, so long in tandem, had diverged as the Zionist leaders began pressing for the overturning of the British mandate over Palestine and the establishment of an independent Jewish state.

"Inasmuch as the Arab masses remained virtual strangers at the periphery of the struggle," wrote Nathan Weinstock, a leader of the Belgian Trotskyist movement, in his *Le Sionisme contre Israël* (Paris: François Maspero, 1969), the best single book on the Arab-Israeli conflict, "the clashes that pitted the Yishuv against the British presence took on in certain respects the look of a revolt of colonists against the metropolis. The post-war Jewish-English conflict thus presents certain affinities with the Boer War."

In late 1947, the British government took the Palestine question to the United Nations, hoping to find some way of internationalizing but preserving its mandate. But the British, weakened by the war and facing a rising independence movement in other colonies, were unable to prevent the UN from divesting them of Palestine. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations passed a resolution by a vote of 33 to 13 (with the support of the Soviet and American delegations) calling for the partition of Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, that would maintain some sort of loose ties of an unspecified nature.

The partition resolution was a victory for the Zionist movement, as it allowed for the creation of the Jewish state. About 54 percent of the area of Palestine was allotted to the Jewish state. Inside that area there were some 498,000 Jews and about 407,000 Arabs. The Arab state was to be composed of about 45 percent of Palestine, with a population of about 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. The city of Jerusalem (105,000 Jews, 100,000 Arabs) was to be a separate international zone. The resolution called for British troops to be withdrawn from Palestine not later than August 1, 1948, and the two states were to come into existence not later than October 1, 1948. Each of the states was

to be composed of three disjointed but contiguous pieces "intertwined in a hostile embrace like two struggling serpents," as the British writer George Kirk put it.

The Zionist leaders realized that the partition, while a partial satisfaction of their demands, was inadequate. The Jews were only slightly more than 50 percent of the population of the Jewish state. Given the higher birthrate among the Arabs, the Jews would eventually be a minority in the Jewish state, even allowing for increased Jewish immigration. And that, naturally, was incompatible with maintenance of a state that was to be "as Jewish as England is English."

The partition, to a large extent, merely formally recognized an already accomplished fact in the sense that a separate Jewish community with a developing national consciousness and a well-structured state apparatus already existed in Palestine. But the fact was not yet accomplished enough, for the 400,000 Arabs obstinately remained in the Jews' allotted territory.

The immediate problem before the Zionist leaders was therefore twofold: to eliminate the bulk of the 400,000 Arabs in the area reserved for the Jewish state and to expand the borders of that state as far as possible, the partition being seen merely as a step along the road to Jewish conquest of all Palestine. They set out to achieve these goals in late 1947. They were aided in their quest by U.S. imperialism, the Soviet bureaucracy, the British-controlled League of Arab States, and the reactionary leadership of the Palestinian Arabs, who in any case were not even consulted about any decisions, partition or anything else. It is therefore not very surprising that the Zionists succeeded, talk of "miracles" notwithstanding.

The 1948 War Begins . . . in 1947

In November 1947, the Irgun Zvei Leumi, a Zionist military organization with several thousand members, abandoned its terrorist attacks on the British occupation authority and turned to meting out "reprisals" for anti-Zionist acts on the part of the Palestinian Arabs. The latter, lacking organized leadership and increasingly alarmed by growing Zionist strength in Palestine and by the impending UN partition resolution, were frequently

moved to express their opposition to the Zionist colonization in undifferentiated assaults on Jews. In this they were encouraged by the Palestinian theocratic leadership, the "old notables" centered around the former mufti of Jerusalem and his cousin Abdel Kader el-Husseini.

The Irgun took advantage of these incidents to launch a widespread "retaliatory" campaign, which consisted mainly of attacks on villages suspected of harboring those responsible for the anti-Zionist actions, and attacks on villages that were not suspected of being involved, just for purposes of "setting examples." The Irgun cam-



BEN GURION: Announcing the establishment of the Zionist state.

campaign had a double effect. On the one hand, it began the process—later intensified significantly—of terrorizing the Palestinian Arabs into what was to become wholesale flight. On the other hand, it incited Arab counterattacks against Jewish settlers, thus ensuring that the gulf dividing the Jews from the Arabs would widen and deepen.

An example was the Irgun bombing attack against Arab workers at the Haifa oil refinery on December 31, 1947. Six were killed and dozens wounded in the attack. Nineteen Jewish workers were killed and many were wounded when the Arab workers were incited by their own reactionary leaders to strike back.

The example of the Haifa refinery is an important one. The installation was one of the few in Palestine that employed both Jewish and Arab workers. It had been the scene of some collaboration between them, a development that was not to the liking of

the Zionists, the Arab reactionaries, or the British government. The Irgun's terror raid and the Husseini response ended the example once and for all.


By January 1948, the Irgun terror campaign—winked at by the Hagannah, the "official" armed forces of the Zionist movement—had done its work. The lines of the conflict were set; the possibility of Jewish-Arab cooperation was squashed; the Palestinian Arabs were on the way to learning what Zionist terror was to be like.

The events of the past twenty-five years make it hard for many people today to imagine that Jewish-Arab cooperation was even a possibility in 1947. But the truth is otherwise. The vast bulk of Jewish immigration to Palestine in the aftermath of the second world war was not an "ideological" immigration of committed Zionists arriving to expel the Arabs. It was instead composed of thousands of displaced persons who had barely survived the Nazi holocaust and had set out for Palestine because they had no alternative. In fact, the Zionist movement itself made no effort to force the U.S. government to open its doors to the refugees and even *opposed* the open door policy.

Here is an example of the Zionist attitude, from a letter from David Ben-Gurion to the Zionist executive dated December 17, 1938:

"Britain is trying to separate the issue of the refugees from that of Palestine. It is assisted by anti-Zionist Jews. The dimensions of the refugee problem demand an immediate, territorial solution; if Palestine will not absorb them another territory will. Zionism is endangered. All other territorial solutions, certain to fail, will demand enormous sums of money. If Jews will have to choose between the refugees, saving Jews from concentration camps, and assisting a national museum in Palestine, mercy will have the upper hand and the whole energy of the people will be channeled into saving Jews from various countries. Zionism will be struck off the agenda not only in world public opinion, in Britain and the United States, but elsewhere in Jewish public opinion. If we allow a separation between the refugee problem and the Palestine problem, we are risking the existence of Zionism." (Quoted in *The Other Israel*, p. 171.)

No separation was made. The refu-



assault on the Palestinian Arabs. By the end of 1947, Irgun and Haganah attacks on Arab villages had reached epidemic proportions, and the 1948 war was on.

Stage Two: Qawuqi's Entry and 'Plan D'

In January 1948 the Jaysh el-Inqadh (army of salvation, usually translated as Liberation Army) led by Fawzi el-Qawuqi entered Palestine across the Jordan River. Qawuqi's force numbered some 5,000 men, about 1,500 of them Palestinian. The force was under the direction of the Arab League offices in Damascus through which Qawuqi had to clear any action.

The entry of the Jaysh el-Inqadh was unable to turn the military situation around. Qawuqi, an archreactionary, was unwilling to mobilize the masses of Palestinian Arabs in the struggle against Zionism. The force was in any case ill equipped by the Arab League leaders, who viewed it solely as an adjunct to their diplomatic efforts to overturn the partition resolution. It was suited basically to static defensive action and confined itself to blockading the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road, thus isolating the Jewish enclave in Jerusalem, and conducting terror attacks against Jewish settlements.

The Haganah concentrated during the December 1947-March 1948 period on consolidating positions in the Jewish areas, solidifying lines of communication, and occupying the majority of the cities. In February and March the fighting intensified, as can be seen from the casualty statistics:

Between November 30, 1947, and February 1, 1948, a total of 864 persons were killed (427 Arabs, 381 Jews, and 56 Britons) and 1,941 were wounded (1,035 Arabs, 725 Jews, 181 Britons). During the month of February 1,378 persons were killed and more than 6,000 were wounded.

At the beginning of April 1948 the Haganah went over to the offensive. The offensive was known by the code name Plan D. Its stated objective was "to gain control of the area allotted to the Jewish state and defend its borders, and those blocs of Jewish settlements and such Jewish population as were outside those borders, against

gees were not offered asylum in the United States or Britain. The anti-Semitic alliance between imperialism and Zionism ensured that the refugees would be barred from the West and thus provided the Zionists with a not inconsiderable portion of the human material for their new state.

But there was another side to the problem of the refugees. If they had seen a possibility of cooperation with the Arabs in a fight for an independent Palestine, Zionism would have been almost as much in danger of extinction as if the refugees had been admitted to the United States. Ensuring hostility between Jew and Arab, crushing any sign of cooperation (as in Haifa), thus became a goal of the Zionist leaders. That objective was shared by British imperialism, whose aim was to maintain its rule in Palestine on the pretext that its enlightened soldiers were necessary to keep the

Arab and Jewish savages from slaughtering each other, a time-honored technique that has been used by London in areas closer to its own shores. The theocratic Palestinian Arab leaders of course saw nothing good in Arab-Jewish cooperation, and neither did the regimes in Egypt, Transjordan, or Iraq, each of which had been installed virtually on the points of British bayonets.

The result was a never ending series of racist murders, provoked in the first place by Zionist terror squads and answered in kind by Arabs incited by reactionary theocratic misleaders, with the British imperialists assisting now one side, now the other, maintaining a constant bloodletting.

The only local winners in this multi-sided game were the Zionist leaders, who held superiority in weapons and organization and used their superiority to transform the Jewish-Arab clashes of late 1947 into a full-scale terror

a regular or para-regular enemy operating from bases outside or inside the area of the Jewish State."

Thirteen military campaigns were waged under Plan D, eight of them outside the area assigned to the Jewish state. On April 1 Haganah forces started down the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road. Along the way they attacked Arab villages, driving the population out and dynamiting their houses to ensure that they would not return. Within one week, between 10,000 and 15,000 Arabs had become refugees.

Concurrently with the Haganah's campaign, the Irgun and the Stern Gang, another Zionist paramilitary outfit, stepped up their terrorism against Arab villages. On April 12 they hit the village of Deir Yassin, which had remained aloof from the war and had denied refuge to Palestinian Arab forces in an effort to avoid Zionist reprisals. But to no avail. The Irgun and the Stern Gang executed 254 of the village's unarmed inhabitants—men, women, and children—and threw the bodies down a well. Even the commander of the Irgun, Menachim Beigin, an off-and-on cabinet minister in the Israeli government, later admitted that the village of Deir Yassin was not a military target and that the massacre his gangsters committed there was designed to provoke panic among the Palestinian villagers, who had no means of defending themselves.

A similar massacre was committed on April 29 in Katamon, a section of Jerusalem. While the Haganah was waging its Plan D and the Irgun and Stern Gang were escalating their terrorism, the Haganah command was using all possible propaganda means of terrorizing the Arabs into flight. In Galilee, a heavily Arab area, the Haganah dropped leaflets signed by the district commander warning that "all people who do not want this war must leave together with their women and children in order to be safe. This is going to be a cruel war with no mercy or compassion."

During the first two weeks of May, attacks were launched on northern Galilee. Throughout April and early May, major cities were attacked and captured by the Haganah. On April 18 the town of Tiberias was taken; 5,000 Arabs were put to flight. Haifa was taken on April 22; more than 50,000 Arabs were forced to flee. One

week later Jaffa was taken; Acre fell early in May. When Abdel Kader el-Husseini's forces were liquidated in the town of Qastel, Palestinian forces ceased playing any role whatsoever in the fighting. El-Qawuqji concluded a "gentlemen's agreement" with the Haganah not to come to the assistance of his rival el-Husseini. In any case, by the middle of May, the Jaysh el-Inqadh was no longer an effective force, having run out of money and ammunition.

On May 14, 1948, the independence of the state of Israel was proclaimed. By that time, more than 250,000 Palestinian Arabs had become refugees; the Haganah was in possession of all the areas allotted to the Jewish state except Jerusalem and some sections of the Negev desert; and the weak, disorganized, and misled Palestinian forces had been eliminated completely from the fighting. And all this took place *before* the entry of the "outside" Arab armies.

The Entry of the Arab Legion

Militarily, the last opportunity the Arabs had to reverse the developing disaster in Palestine came when the Arab Legion, the British-armed and -trained force under the command of King Abdullah of Jordan (grandfather of King Hussein), entered the fighting on May 15. Simultaneously with Abdullah's entry, an Egyptian force moved in from the south and some Syrian forces attacked on the northern front. The numbers of opposing troops in the field were approximately equal. In general, the Arab armies held superiority in armor and heavy equipment.

The problem was political. The most effective Arab force was Abdullah's Arab Legion. It was able to drive the Haganah out of Jerusalem and inflict many casualties. But its aim was not to crush the state of Israel, and it never made any attempt to pierce the areas allotted to Israel. As was later discovered, Abdullah had been in secret negotiations with a member of the top leadership of the Zionist command, Golda Meyerson, who was later to change her name to Meir.

The essence of the Meyerson-Abdullah deal was that the Arab Legion would occupy and later incorporate into Transjordan the West Bank of

the Jordan River, which was supposed to become part of the Palestinian Arab state.

The substance of the agreement earned Meyerson and Abdullah the appellation "friendly enemies," a designation that is now applied in the Arab world to Meyerson-Meir and Abdullah's grandson, the butcher of Amman. It earned Abdullah his well-deserved assassination by a Palestinian.

The first phase of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 was ended by a truce that went into effect on June 11 and lasted until July 7. While the United Nations was busy trying to "mediate" the dispute, the Zionist leaders were busy consolidating their positions, obtaining new arms, and increasing the flow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine.

The number of new immigrants totaled 30,000. The arms came from the United States and Czechoslovakia, the Kremlin having decided to support the founding of the Zionist state, which Stalin apparently believed would reduce the influence of British imperialism in the Arab East. There is no evidence that any Arab government made any effort whatsoever to bolster its military position during the month-long truce. On July 9, when fighting resumed on a large scale, the Israeli army was able to throw nearly 100,000 troops armed with Czechoslovak and U. S. weapons into the field. The Arab forces were outnumbered by at least two to one.

The second phase of Arab-Israeli fighting lasted ten days. During that time, the Zionist forces added 1,000 square kilometers to their area of control. Fourteen Arab towns and 200 villages in the area allotted to the Jewish state were seized; 112 villages in the Arab district were taken. The road to Jerusalem was opened. By the time the second truce went into effect after the ten-day offensive, the Arabs had clearly lost the war.

The truce was supposed to be permanent. But in October, the Israeli army moved some 15,000 troops into the Negev and attacked the Egyptian army. New armed settlements—called Nahal—followed the troops into the Negev. A similar campaign was waged in central Galilee, where the tatters of Qawuqji's forces were wiped out. The Arab Legion and the Syrian troops on the northern front declined

to reengage the battle, allowing the Israeli forces to concentrate on the Egyptian army.

In December 1948 and January 1949 the Israeli army pressed into Gaza and marched south in the Negev to the Gulf of Aqaba. The fighting stopped on January 7. On February 24 an armistice was signed between Israel and Egypt; an armistice was concluded with Lebanon in March 1949, with Transjordan in April, and with Syria in July. The "war of independence" was over.

The Aftermath and Some Lessons

The Palestinian flight, which had already reached massive proportions by May 1948, increased twofold during the July-November period. An estimated 400,000 to 500,000 Palestinian Arabs were driven from their homes as the Israeli army bulldozed its way through Galilee and parts of the West Bank of the Jordan. More than 700,000 Palestinians left their homes between April and December 1948. Some of them left under pursuit by Irgun gangsters or Haganah "official" troops. (The difference in behavior between the two outfits was not easy to detect.) Others fled when Zionist forces approached their villages, the lesson of Deir Yassin having been well learned. Still others left simply because war had come to their villages, a war in which they were not participating. So they moved out of the way, as civilian peasants have always done when invaders enter their fields, hoping to return when the war went away. But this was a new kind of war. The peasants who fled their villages to avoid the war found that they could never go home, that their fields had become the property of the Land of Israel, that their houses were occupied by foreign settlers, that they had been declared "absentee landlords" and had been expropriated.

The Israeli state turned out to be 2,500 square miles larger than the state the UN had allotted to the Jewish sector. About 2,200 square miles of Palestine was annexed by Transjordan, which became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Palestinians were scattered across the Arab world, the majority of them settling in miserable camps in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, where they remain today.

The Palestinian Arabs had been by-



A Palestinian refugee camp. Most of the Palestinian Arabs driven out in 1948 still subsist in camps like these.

standers in the war that determined their fate. They were driven out by the Israeli army, betrayed by the Arab regimes, double-crossed by British imperialism, ignored by the Kremlin bureaucrats. And lurking behind the entire process, reaping maximum benefit, were the U. S. imperialists.

The fate of Palestine was determined by the social structure and regimes of the surrounding Arab countries. The Palestinian Arabs were unable to defend themselves against Zionist and imperialist aggression primarily because of the neocolonialist character of the regimes in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. The leaderships of those countries offered the Palestinians an insufficient military assistance and an anti-Jewish, reactionary political program designed to create the greatest possible unity in the Zionist camp. On May 15, 1948, for example, the day Arab armies entered Palestine, Az-zam Pasha, secretary general of the Arab League, issued a statement that was widely reported; it was picked up everywhere from the Cairo daily *el-Ahram* to the *New York Times*: "This will be a war of extermination and an unforgettable massacre that will be recalled along with the massacres

committed by the Mongols and the Crusaders." So spoke the leader of an organization that was simultaneously plotting the partition of Palestine between the Zionist state and the Kingdom of Transjordan.

The Palestinian Arabs paid for the racist, reactionary demagoguery, and they are still paying today, as are the masses of the whole Arab East.

The "miracle" of the Palestinian flight in 1948 was no miracle at all. It was an inevitable result of imperialist control over the Arab East and the bankruptcy of the Arab ruling classes.

The problem of Palestine as such was "solved" by the 1948 war. But the manner of solution only raised the problem to a higher plane. In place of the problem of Palestine, the Arab-Israeli problem was born. The October War is the latest manifestation of the problem, which will be resolved not solely in Palestine, but in the entire Arab East. The solution will come when the forces that created the problem — imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reaction, and the nationalist ideologies that bolster all three — are wiped out by the socialist revolution in the whole region. □

Arab Trotskyist Discusses the October War

[The following interview was taken October 10 in Beirut with a leader of the Revolutionary Communist Group, the Trotskyist group in Lebanon.]

* * *

Question. What is the meaning of the current fighting?

Answer. I must say first of all that the extent of the clashes has in general surprised the revolutionary left. For some time, we had foreseen that limited clashes might be engaged in so as to "firm up the ranks" of the Arab countries, strengthen the well-known "national unity," and appease the growing impatience of the masses. But the present war seems to be far-reaching.

The result has been two sorts of positions among the left. First, a new turn of the petty-bourgeois nationalist opportunists who utilize Marxist phraseology (or rather, Maoist phraseology), which has led them to glorify the very Arab armies that they used to criticize. And second, a confused position among some revolutionists who call the clashes now going on a stage-managed affair, a show prepared in advance by the two sides.

As for us, while we obviously reject the naivete of the opportunists, we also think that it is false to talk about the fighting as a "show." The war that is now going on is a serious one from a military point of view; that is incontestable. But all Marxists—and even all people capable of a minimum of critical thought—know that war is only the continuation of politics by other means. The question, then, is What politics are being continued? That is the nub of the problem.

The alternative is clear: Does the present war aim at the liberation of Palestine or at least at a step along that road? Or does it aim rather at creating the best possible conditions for applying the solution called for by the United Nations? In our view, there is no doubt that the present war is aimed at promoting the latter solution. And we categorically reject the UN resolution that calls for the with-

drawal of the Israelis to the pre-1967 borders under conditions that signify the liquidation of the Palestinian cause (recognition of Israel, "secure" borders, and so on).

Q. Could you describe the political situation that led up to the war?

A. The present war is the culmination of a very clear political evolution in the entire Arab East. The motive



HUSSEIN: Becomes more "moderate" in opposition to Palestinians.

force of this evolution has undoubtedly been so-called "Saudi" Arabia. The Saudis have been playing a ceaselessly growing role in the Arab region, and this is a policy for which it possesses the "means."

To hold the world's greatest oil reserves at a time when there is more and more chance of an energy crisis is to wield a considerable power that even U.S. imperialism can ignore only at peril. The results of the Saudi political offensive are as follows:

1. *Bending U.S. policy in a direction favorable to the Arab regimes.*

The Nixon government has abandoned its doctrine of "partial solution" (an Egyptian-Israeli agreement that would include opening the Suez Canal), which was unacceptable to Egypt in that it would amount to too flagrant a betrayal of the "Arab cause." The Nixon government seems resolved to accord some concessions to Syria as regards the Golan Heights—the principal stumbling block up to now—as part of the "peaceful solution." In fact, after six years, it seems to have adopted the Soviet-Arab interpretation of the UN's resolution No. 242. "Kissinger-style" diplomacy is today being extended to Arab problems.

This shift in U.S. policy is obviously tied to Saudi pressures, which were reflected inside the United States in the position taken by the oil companies and in David Rockefeller's activities. This same wing of the U.S. ruling class favors the policy of cooperation with the bureaucracies of the workers states. It also looks as if the Kremlin's efforts—especially the Nixon-Brezhnev summit last summer—have been another factor determining Washington's shift.

2. *The opening of Egypt to U.S. interests.* No one should think that U.S. imperialism would alter its position without getting something in return. If Faisal of "Saudi" Arabia has exerted pressure, he has also made some attractive offers. Since the bourgeois revival of 1971, Egypt has been the scene of struggle between two factions of the bourgeoisie, one representing U.S. interests, the other preferring collaboration with European imperialism. Until recently, the Sadat regime had opted for Europe, trying to line up France, Great Britain, and West Germany in his support.

Disappointed with the political potentialities of the European imperialists and supplied with guarantees from Faisal, he finally turned toward the United States. The best example of this is the business of the Suez-Alexandria pipeline (Sumed), which was a prize contested by a U.S. group and a European group. Very recently, the fight was decided; the pipeline will be

financed by Kuwait and "Saudi" Arabia; it will be built by a U. S. company, Kidder Peabody, the same outfit that has already set up the famous Intra Bank.

Apart from Egypt, there is also the case of Syria. Faisal's guarantees have also pushed the Damascus regime to participate in the Egyptian maneuvers aimed at promoting application of the "peaceful solution" (Waldheim's visit, the Cairo summit, and so on).

3. *Hussein's return to good standing.* This was the fruit of the combination of the Saudi efforts and the U. S. shift. The Jordanian regime put aside its overtly liquidationist schemes (the Palestinian-Jordanian United Arab Kingdom, for example) and agreed to be more cooperative vis-a-vis the leadership of the Palestinian resistance, two preconditions for the great reconciliation with Egypt and Syria.

That reconciliation took place. It consisted of the Cairo summit and the subsequent events, the release of prisoners from Jordanian jails and the projected return of "Palestinian forces" to Jordan.

Q. How do you see the development of the situation?

A. There still remain some problems to be resolved before the definitive application of the "peaceful solution," which, I might say in passing, still deserves that designation in spite of the current war, for it aims at establishing "peace" with the Zionist state.

For one thing, there is the Israeli factor. In Israel there is a struggle going on between the "moderate" faction, represented by Meir, and the "hawks," whose main figure is the unfortunately well-known Dayan. While the "hawks" are intransigent in their annexationism, the Meir faction is prepared to grant concessions to the Arab regimes and to make a rather significant withdrawal. Some months ago, Meir declared that Israel was inclined to withdraw from the Golan plateau and from Sinai while retaining the border heights in Golan and Sharm el-Sheikh in the Sinai, two strategic positions controlling the Syrian frontier and the Gulf of Aqaba, respectively.

The U. S. shift and the following pressure, as well as the relationship of forces established during the pres-

ent war—as they appear today—can only strengthen the arguments of the "moderate" Israelis.

There is also the Palestinian factor. The leadership of Fateh (I specify Fateh because it is the most important here; the Popular Front and the Democratic Popular Front will only follow along, and Saiqa is only a docile arm of the Syrian government) has indicated some uneasiness in regard to collaboration with Hussein—as well it might!

The Fateh leaders know what it would cost them to openly betray the Palestinian cause; the thousands of martyrs of September 1970 cannot be



FAISAL: Hoping "energy crisis" will make Nixon more reasonable.

forgotten so easily. But the Syrian sanction and pressure can only lead this leadership to modify its position. And it must be added that the current war has considerably strengthened—at least up to now—the prestige of the Egyptian and Syrian regimes and therefore the possibility of their supporting the application of the "peaceful solution."

It looks as though we are on our way to a solution involving an Israeli withdrawal that will roughly reestablish the borders of June 4, 1967 (that depends on the relationship of forces that comes out of the present war), probably with the "internationalization" of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and Sharm el-Sheikh. This will be accompanied by the transformation of the Palestinian resistance into a Palestine Liberation Army (as the Palestine

Liberation Organization was in the time of the unfortunate Shukhairy); and then, for a few years, there will be the sort of semipeaceful coexistence that was the rule after 1948.

All this is, of course, a personal estimate, and I do not pretend to be a fortune-teller and I cannot read Kissinger's mind.

Q. What is the position of the RCG on the war?

A. In the present war no Marxist can remain neutral under the pretext that this is an interbourgeois conflict. This type of puerile and sectarian argument is fine for ultraleftist dogmatists for whom only things that are pure are counted and the 99 percent of reality composed of impurities is ignored, as Lenin put it. We are not tempted by political schizophrenia.

Between the Zionist state, the military base of U. S. imperialism and the national oppressor of the Arab peoples, and the oppressed Arab states—even if they are bourgeois or feudal—we are on the side of the latter, with no hesitation. We are, in fact, the most resolute partisans of the war against Israel. And it is exactly from that standpoint that we make our criticisms.

Our support to the Arab states against the Zionist state, while it is unconditional in its anti-Zionism, is nevertheless not uncritical as regards the Arab regimes. That was true in 1967; and it is even more true today when the collusion of these states with "Saudi" Arabia and U. S. imperialism is flagrant.

This is what should not be misunderstood about our position: We are not opposed to the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the 1967 borders. On the contrary, we are for the total and unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist army to the pre-1967 borders. That would be a step forward that would be childish to reject. But I say "a step forward"; that is, the objective of withdrawal is not counterposed to the objective of the liberation of Palestine—it is in the service of that objective.

The "peaceful solution" is just the opposite. It entails a partial withdrawal and several conditions. What we reject in the UN resolution is not the withdrawal as such, but the conditions of the withdrawal. And this is

the crucial point that the Stalinists pretend not to see, since they are advocates of the "peaceful solution" at the Kremlin's command.

Unlike the opportunists of all stripes, we do not content ourselves with expressing solidarity with the Arab armies against Israel. We advance a body of transitional demands that allow for fueling our struggle

against all the established powers of the Arab region, for the Arab socialist revolution:

NO to the "peaceful solution"! NO to recognition of the Zionist state!

Total and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli army to the pre-1967 borders!

NO to a cease-fire! NO to intervention of the great powers to settle the

conflict!

Prolonged war until victory! Arming and training of the masses! Total boycott of imperialism!

Full democratic rights for the Arab masses!

Freedom of action for the Palestinian resistance within the Arab countries and freedom to operate from them! □

Justice in the 'Only Democracy in the Middle East'

Israeli Courts Declare Anti-Zionist Program Illegal

[In a series of frame-up trials conducted in Haifa during the first six months of 1973, Israeli courts in effect ruled that Marxism and any other form of anti-Zionism are illegal. The case involved an alleged "espionage and sabotage network" composed of Arab and Jewish members of the Red Front—a split from the Revolutionary Communist Alliance, an anti-Zionist group generally known as *Maavak* (Struggle), the name of its newspaper. Members of the Revolutionary Communist Alliance were convicted of such crimes as "contact with an enemy agent" and attacks on "the sovereignty of the state."

[The defendants in all the trials were found guilty solely on the basis of "confessions" that were extorted from them under torture. One of the most crucial aspects of the Haifa trials was the judges' declaration that a political program calling for the replacement of the Zionist state by a Jewish-Arab state was an attack on state sovereignty and therefore illegal.

[The following article is the second and concluding installment of an article describing the Haifa trials and analyzing their political impact that appeared in the August issue of *Matzpen-Marxist*, newspaper of the Israeli Socialist Organization, the Israeli Trotskyist group. The first installment appeared in the October 22 issue of *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The verdict against Hassan Agbarieh, who was accused of committing offenses against state sovereignty, was one of the most remarkable in the

Haifa trials. What the judges decreed was absolutely unequivocal: Whoever struggles for a democratic Jewish-Arab state and against national discrimination between Jews and Arabs is damaging the sovereignty of the state.

Only a racist court for which discrimination has the force of law could make such a judgment. Only the racist judges in the south of the United States during the nineteenth century or in South Africa today merit comparison with their honored colleagues Slonim, Friedman, and Fortuna, the representatives of Israeli justice in 1973.

In justifying the indictment of Hassan Agrabieh for attacking the sovereignty of the state, the honorable judges decreed: "The aim of the organization [Red Front] was to make a violent revolution to bring down the present state and replace it with a Jewish-Arab regime. The claim of the attorney for the accused was that such an objective was not an attack on the sovereignty of the state because the state is not attacked when the internal regime of the state is changed. We have studied the texts he cited, as well as other texts that discuss sovereignty from the viewpoint of international law. Our decision is that the changing of the internal regime—the principal aim of this organization—attacks the sovereignty of Israel even in the sense that international law attributes to this concept. In the book by Dinstein that has been cited it is said that the state ceases to exist as the state when the government ceases to exist as the government. We would cite here Paragraph 1 of the

proclamation founding the state of Israel May 14, 1948; it states in that paragraph that the members of the people's assembly proclaim the constitution of a Jewish state in Israel, that is, the State of Israel. If the regime were overthrown and a Jewish-Arab regime were constituted, as the accused himself advocates, this Jewish state in Palestine—Israel—would cease to exist. That is the reason we reject the reasoning of the defense lawyers." (Trial record, pages 542-45.)

In their haste to do their work well, the judges rejected not only the arguments of the defense lawyers, but the very declaration of independence they cited. As everyone knows, it says in that declaration of independence that "the State of Israel shall guarantee complete equality of social and political rights to all citizens regardless of differences in religion, sex, and race." Further on it says that "we invite all the members of the Arab people living in Israel to respect the peace and to lend a hand in the construction of the state on the basis of civil equality and on the basis of a corresponding representation in all its institutions."

In their guilty verdict the honorable judges demolished their own legality and made into criminals all democrats who want a representation corresponding to the size of the Arab minority, which today amounts to more than one-third of the people under Israeli domination.

But things are much more serious, for the decision of the judges is absurd both from the standpoint of bourgeois-democratic justice on which the judges base themselves and from the standpoint of international law, which the

judges did not bother to cite.

From the viewpoint of bourgeois-democratic justice, the only sovereign is the people. This conception took the place of the feudal conception that the sovereign rules by divine right and by heritage. The conception that the government is sovereign and stands above the people exists only in fascist countries: Nazi Germany, Mussolini's Italy, Franco's Spain. . . and the state of Israel today, "the only democracy [in the Middle East]."

As for the "citation" from Dinstein's book, it must be clearly affirmed that the judges purely and simply falsified and lied in a shameless fashion in order to find a legal fig leaf for their naked racism and their criminal participation in a frame-up trial that is a total provocation created out of whole cloth by the regime.

To prove this it is enough to cite the quotation from Dinstein's book in its entirety. Even those who lack a juridical education will see clearly that on the basis of this citation the judges should have found the defendants innocent:

"A change in government changes nothing insofar as the identity of the state is concerned. This is obvious in the case of a legal change in government effected according to local constitutional law. In democratic countries such changes take place once every few years and it is obvious that this in no way injures the continuity of the state. The United States remains the United States, whether the president is a Democrat or a Republican. In fact, from the juridical point of view, it is the same for a change in government that is illegal according to local constitutional law, by a revolution (which involves a basic change in the regime, as from a monarchy to a republic) or by a coup d'etat (which involves only a change in leading personnel, as the seizure of power in Syria by a new military caste). The revolutionary is a criminal from the standpoint of internal constitutional law (even if he becomes a national hero and the father of the new constitution if the revolution is maintained). General constitutional law does not defend the status quo in national constitutional life, and it accepts the possibility of revolution or coup d'etat. International law is concerned with the state; and the continuity of the state is not affected by

some change in government, unless this change involves significant territorial shifts. The October Revolution, for example—which is *the* revolution with a capital R of the twentieth century—in no way affected the continuity of the Russian state, even though it changed the name to USSR and it lost, at first, significant parts of its territory (which have since been recovered)." (Y. Dinstein, *International Law and the State*, p. 100.)

According to Dinstein, the October Revolution, *the* revolution of the twentieth century, was not an attack on the sovereignty of the Russian state. But to try to replace the regime of Zionist oppression with a Jewish-Arab regime is, according to the honorable judges, an attack on state sovereignty, and that is why they found Hassan Agbarieh guilty and sentenced him to a heavy prison term. What do they care about citations on international law? Their role is to protect by any means necessary the Zionist regime, a state exclusively for Jews, a state whose leading constitutional principle is systematic discrimination against Arabs.

"General constitutional law does not defend the status quo in national constitutional life and accepts the possibility of revolution or coup d'etat," affirms Dinstein. The honorable judges, on the other hand, must defend the status quo; that is their role, and they fulfill it faithfully. And they do so even if they have to consciously falsify, even if they have to accept as the only basis of guilt "confessions" extracted under torture, even if they have to set judicial precedents that are in conflict with the elementary norms of bourgeois justice itself and that demolish their own legality, even if the political significance of the trial and the verdicts is the establishment of "an official terrorism" that attacks not only revolutionary socialists, but also all sincere democrats who believe in equality of men without regard to nationality and race and who see it as their elementary duty to struggle against any form of oppression and discrimination.

We do not know what "objective observers" will say now, how they will justify the reasons the racist judges gave for convicting Hassan Agbarieh. Frankly, that doesn't interest us. Because anyone who persists after the Haifa trials in defining himself as an objective observer is either an imbecile

or a hypocrite. These two categories do not lie within the audience to which we address ourselves.

But "nonobjective" observers, especially if they are members of a revolutionary organization, or if they are anti-Zionists, or even if they are simply democrats, must immediately take up a struggle to expose the lies and provocations that came down throughout the Haifa trials. For if this is not done, they will be digging their own graves.

* * *

An oppressive regime always uses the salami tactic. Each step in the policy of oppression is conditioned by the breadth of the response touched off by the preceding step. At the beginning, the phony "espionage and sabotage network" was cooked up, and this was accompanied by an unprecedented witch-hunt in the mass media. That allowed the authorities to hang the label "spy and saboteur" on anyone who opposes the established order and calls for a common Jewish-Arab struggle. In the first stage, they liquidated the Red Front. The second stage was an attack on the Revolutionary Communist Alliance (Ma'avak), whose comrades were accused of contacting a foreign agent and of possessing newspapers of the Palestinian resistance. Other defendants were convicted for attacking state sovereignty, etc.

But that is only a beginning, because the authorities' repression did not touch off the necessary response. Apart from the limited activities of the anti-Zionist organizations, a broad movement of protest against political repression in general did not develop, nor was there a united front for the defense of those imprisoned in the "network" case in particular. The Communist party (Rakah), the entire Zionist left, the liberals, and the champions of democracy in Israel did not want to defend these suspects and held back from all action. A good part of them, above all the left Zionists, even joined the accusers and took part in the campaign of incitement against the organizations of the anti-Zionist left.

When the arrests first came down, and during the trial being carried on in the press and on the radio, well before the curtain went up on the great spectacle of the trials themselves, we

clearly asserted that what was under way was a provocation whose aim was to liquidate or to seriously strike at the whole anti-Zionist left and at any political organization trying to unite Jews and Arabs in struggle. We explained that this time had been chosen because of the rise of the class struggle in Israel and the estimation that this struggle would tend to intensify after the elections and the economic catastrophe we are expecting. We indicated that this attack was directed against the anti-Zionist organizations not because of their real strength, for they are still small and without great influence, but because they are the pole of attraction for a revolutionary alternative that will unite the Jewish workers and masses and the Arabs in a common struggle against Zionism and Arab reaction and for the liberation of the region from the imperialist yoke.

We insisted on the fact that this attack did not demonstrate the strength of the regime but, on the contrary, revealed its isolation and the aggravation of the contradictions that it cannot resolve. That is why the regime has to reinforce repression, must continue to attack individual democratic rights, and will do all it can to camouflage all these actions through trials.

Reality has confirmed these estimates. And the future developments are apparent. The emergency regulations and the other draconian laws that up to now have been used against Arabs who were not prepared to play the authorities' game have now been turned against the anti-Zionist left; and tomorrow they will be used against all oppositional elements. The sensationalist Haifa trials show that to the extent that the furious, mad attacks of the regime are not confronted by a broad and united public reaction, no political opposition, be it revolutionary Marxist, socialist, or simply democratic, will be spared.

And if political oppositionists can still walk around free, it is only because "the decision has not yet been made in some office." The moment it is made, the opposition's fate will be sealed.

Our main task today is to denounce these well-known draconian laws and emergency regulations and to publicly accuse all those who use them against the regime's opponents. It is a matter

of setting up a broad militant movement for the defense of the most elementary democratic rights; that is the only way to confront the repressive hysteria of the authorities.

We must broaden the campaign to denounce these laws that allow the government to send a person to prison for ten years for the simple "crime" of having a discussion or a meeting with another person. That is a "law that thought cannot uphold," in the words of Judge Aharon Cohen. These are the illegal "laws" that deny the elementary right to exchange ideas with another person. A law that allows a person to be imprisoned for seven years because he aspires to found a democratic regime, a Jewish-Arab regime, is an illegal law. A law that allows someone to be jailed for six years because of his Marxist ideas, because he believes that it is not possible to establish people's power, socialism, except by the use of counter-violence against the ruling class is an illegal law.

These are the laws that formed the basis for the Haifa trials. The judges Slonim, Friedman, and Fortuna tried and convicted people for their political ideas and their legitimate political activity. If they are not stopped now, the repression will intensify and the repressive apparatus will continue to eat away at basic individual democratic rights; political organizations that try to wage a real fight against the regime will be "legally" liquidated.

But the regime is mistaken if it thinks it can consolidate the Zionist system through a stronger and stronger repression. The very existence of the Zionist regime is based on expulsion, exploitation, repression, and discrimination, and this produces its antithesis: opposition to its policies. That is the dialectic of all repression, and the Zionist regime should have been able to draw that lesson from the fate of earlier repressive regimes, other regimes for which "the state was above everything" and the struggle against national and social discrimination was a criminal act.

Just as humanity refused to accept the claims of the Nuremberg law-makers, the legitimacy of the discriminatory laws in South Africa, and the constitutions of the Greek colonels or the Brazilian generals, it will not pass over in silence the trials con-

ducted in the "only democracy in the Middle East."

As for us, we have no intention of cutting back on or restricting our activity because of laws forbidding "contact," or reading newspapers, or defending Marxist ideas, laws that require people to be Shin Bet informers if they want to be good citizens.

We belong to the Fourth International—an international organization acting on the basis of Marxism—and that is a crime. Our aim is the overthrow of bourgeois regimes and in particular the Zionist regime: That is a crime. Not only do we have contacts, we belong to the *same organization* and we act on the same revolutionary program together with our Palestinian comrades and our Arab comrades of the entire region. Obviously, that is a crime.

Our common aim is to bring about a socialist Arab East, and that is why we are concentrating our efforts on building a Leninist revolutionary party on a regional scale, the indispensable instrument for driving out imperialism and its puppets: Zionism and the bourgeois Arab regimes. That has got to be a crime.

That is how we have defined ourselves and acted in the past, before the Haifa trials, and that is how we will continue to act.

If Zionist "democracy" cannot accept that, its attempt to liquidate us will show the whole Israeli proletariat that in its struggle against this "democracy" it has nothing to lose but its chains. □

Let Them Eat Chicken

The average person in Britain now eats less meat than he or she did twenty years ago, despite the fact that meat rationing ended in 1954. Figures released in October by the Ministry of Agriculture show that the average family is now able to provide each of its members with only 13 ounces of beef, pork, or lamb a week. According to the ministry, the figure in 1953 was just under one pound a week.

Reuters reported that the ministry blamed the decline in consumption on "rising prices, continuing supply problems and increased purchases by Continental buyers of British meat."

But lest anyone rush to demand the reintroduction of rationing, the ministry also pointed out that the average Briton now gets 6.5 ounces of chicken weekly, 14 times the 1953 figure.

Why Nixon Fired Watergate Prosecutor

By Allen Myers

By moving to suppress the Watergate investigation, Nixon has hurled a challenge at his liberal opponents in Congress and, at the same time, made the most damaging admission yet of his own guilt in the Watergate scandals. The closing down of the special prosecutor's office and the decapitation of the Justice Department reflect Nixon's belief that his ruling-class critics have no stomach for the messy business of impeachment and that he can therefore proceed to defy public opinion by once again covering up the entire affair.

As with everything he does, Nixon wrapped his latest crimes in half-truths, outright lies, and flights of rhetoric about "the national interest." Under the terms of an October 12 decision by a federal appeals court, Nixon had been required either to appeal to the Supreme Court or to hand over secret White House tape recordings to Watergate Judge John Sirica by October 19. Instead, he announced a "compromise" that would have reduced the Watergate grand jury's investigation to less than a charade.

Under the terms of the proposed "compromise," Nixon would himself have prepared a summary of the material contained on the secret White House tapes, and Senator John Stennis of Mississippi—one of Nixon's most devoted supporters in Congress, who in the past has publicly urged him to "tough out" the Watergate scandal—would then compare the summary with the tapes to make sure it was accurate. As part of the "compromise," special prosecutor Archibald Cox would have to agree not to subpoena any other White House tapes or "other Presidential papers."

In short, Nixon proposed that he prepare a statement attesting to his own innocence, that his good friend and supporter Stennis witness it, and that Cox close his eyes and pretend that he had been given all relevant information.

"To my regret," Nixon said in what

was probably the only truthful remark in the entire lengthy statement, "the special prosecutor rejected this proposal." After several more paragraphs about the "national interest" and his desire to avoid a "constitutional con-



COX: Fired.

frontation," Nixon then got down to the substance of the matter:

"... though I have not wished to intrude upon the independence of the special prosecutor, I have felt it necessary to direct him, as an employee of the Executive Branch, to make no further attempts by judicial process to obtain tapes, notes, or memoranda of Presidential conversations."

The "independence of the special prosecutor," in Nixon's view, consisted of the right to participate in the cover-up, not to expose it.

Cox immediately issued a statement hinting that he would ask the courts to hold Nixon in contempt because of his failure to obey the decision of the appeals court:

"In my judgment, the president is refusing to comply with the court decrees. A summary of the content of the tapes lacks the evidentiary value of the tapes themselves. No steps are being taken to turn over the important notes, memoranda, and other documents that the court orders require. I shall bring these points to the attention of the court and abide by its decision."

The next day, October 20, Cox held a news conference at which he detailed some of the Nixon gang's efforts to hamstring his investigation.

"It's my characterization," Cox said, "but all I can say is that my efforts to get information, beginning in May, have been the subject of repeated frustration. . . ."

"You will recall that the papers of many White House aides . . . were taken into custody and they're in a special room.

"And many of their papers were taken out of the usual files and put in something special called presidential files.

"Back in June . . . I asked that an inventory be made of those papers.

"I've never gotten it. I was told orally over the telephone a short time ago . . . that the inventory would not be furnished.

"There have been other papers that we've sought to get and while I must say I've been told I would receive them, the delays have been extraordinary.

"For example, I asked for all kinds of logs of many principal names in these incidents and I was promised them back in June. I still haven't the logs of meetings of the president with such people as Chapin, Colson, Gray, Hunt, Kleindienst, Krogh, LaRue, Liddy, Strachan, or Young. . . ."

"There are many pending letter requests. And I can't help reading the instruction not to seek subpoenas against that background, even though the instruction as it's written refers only to things referring to presidential conversations. And I think I'm entitled to suggest that the thing should be judged against that background."

In regard to Nixon's proposed "compromise," Cox pointed out that it would mean that "the real evidence is available only to two or three men operating in secrecy, all but one of them the aides to the president and men who have been associated with those

who are the subject of the investigation." He also raised objections to Nixon's proposal to delete "national security" information from the summary, since "national security" had already been used as a pretext for illegal wire-taps and the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Cox also raised the point that Nixon's summary would presumably not be accepted as evidence in a trial. This, of course, is one of the things Nixon had in mind, since everything he does to hamper prosecution of members of the White House gang not only removes another scandal from

"I think there is a question whether anyone other than the attorney general can give me any instructions that I have any legal obligation to obey."

Whatever the legalities of the question, the matter proved no obstacle to Nixon, who may have decided to get rid of Elliot Richardson, his attorney general, even before Cox spoke. Richardson, the day before, had committed the crime of exposing one of his boss's lies: Nixon had claimed that Richardson had worked out the "compromise" proposal, but a spokesman for the attorney general quickly told the press that Richardson was not responsible and was, in fact, opposed to the "compromise."

Richardson was summoned to the White House and confronted with the choice of firing Cox — and thus tarnishing his carefully nurtured image as the "Mr. Clean" of the Nixon gang — or resigning. With an eye already on the 1976 presidential elections, Richardson chose the latter course. In a letter of resignation expressing "deep regret," Richardson pointed out that in his confirmation hearings he had promised to appoint a special prosecutor "and give him all the independence, authority, and staff support needed" — a promise that would have proved difficult to reconcile with the firing of Cox.

Nixon's chief of the White House staff, Alexander Haig, was immediately ordered to telephone Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus. Ruckelshaus told the *New York Times* that Haig had only one question: Would he fire Cox? Ruckelshaus also said No and was told to hand in his resignation.

This made the third-ranking figure in the Justice Department, Solicitor General Robert H. Bork, acting attorney general. Bork spared Nixon the embarrassment of still another resignation by agreeing to fire Cox.

Within an hour, the FBI had moved into Cox's office with instructions to prevent Cox or his staff from removing anything, even their personal effects. Nixon's press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, appeared before reporters to make the cynical announcement:

" . . . the office of the Watergate special prosecution force has been abolished as of approximately 8 p.m. tonight. Its function to investigate and prosecute those involved in the Watergate matter will be transferred back

into the institutional framework of the Department of Justice, where it will be carried out with thoroughness and vigor."

The resignations of Richardson and Ruckelshaus were probably a factor that Nixon had not counted on: It is almost unprecedented in recent U. S. history for high-level officials to resign over anything that could even remotely be construed as a matter of principle, for the simple reason that the U. S. political system is designed to ensure that persons of principle do not reach high positions. The resignations of Richardson and Ruckelshaus,



RICHARDSON: Resigned.

public view but also makes it less likely that one of the gang members will try to save himself by implicating the boss.

Dissension in Justice Department

Cox appears to have been laboring under a delusion as to the limits Nixon would accept in the attempt to end the investigation. Asked what would happen "if you're fired by the end of this news conference," Cox replied:

"I was appointed by the attorney general. Under the statutes the attorney general and those to whom he delegates authority are in charge of all litigation, including the obtaining of evidence.



RUCKELSHAUS: Fired.

haus, both of whom have previously served the Nixon gang in a variety of positions, reflect their fear that in the confrontation provoked by Nixon little good will come to his loyal aides, whatever the outcome for the boss may be.

Why Nixon Moved When He Did

It has been an open secret for months that Nixon was awaiting an opportune moment to get rid of Cox and abolish the special prosecutor's office. The October 19 "compromise" proposal was plainly designed to force Cox to resign in protest or to "defy" Nixon and thus provide a pretext for firing him.

In his October 20 press conference, Cox said that when Charles Alan Wright, Nixon's attorney, had phoned him with Nixon's "compromise" proposals, Wright had begun the conversation with the words "You won't agree to these."

"... it was my impression," Cox told the reporters, "that I was being confronted with things that were drawn in such a way that I could not accept them."

A number of factors combined to make this seem the best time for getting rid of Cox. Among the most important were:

1. *The need to stop new prosecutions.* The delaying tactics of which Cox complained could not prevent indefinitely the indictment and trial of members of the Nixon gang, with all the attendant publicity that such trials would entail.

Egil Krogh, the former head of the White House "plumbers" unit, was indicted by Cox's grand jury October 11 on charges of perjury. His lawyers let it be known that his defense would be that he had been ordered by higher-ups to maintain secrecy in the interests of "national security." On October 19, John Dean pleaded guilty to a single charge of conspiracy to obstruct justice as part of a deal in which he promised Cox that he would testify for the prosecution in other trials. Cox was also known to be investigating such other matters as the illegal wiretapping of campaign aides to Senator Edmund Muskie.

The firing of Cox will put a halt to further investigations, perhaps result in the dismissal of Krogh's indictment, and probably make it impossible for the grand jury to hand down additional indictments before it expires in December.

"Mr. Nixon," Warren Weaver Jr. wrote in an October 20 dispatch to the *New York Times*, "was reported today to have been urged by senior political advisers over recent weeks to dismiss Mr. Cox and face serious political criticism, rather than endure the prospect of a long series of indictments of former White House and Administration aides."

2. *Continued distrust of Nixon.* The widespread belief that Nixon was guilty in the Watergate break-in or its cover-up—a belief shared by 72 percent of the U. S. public according to

a Gallup poll in early September—must have made it seem to Nixon that he had little to lose by firing Cox. A similar consideration was widely reported at the time to have been a major factor in Nixon's original decision to fight the subpoena of the tapes in the courts.

3. *Fear of the Supreme Court's decision.* It is a safe assumption that Nixon's lawyers advised him that there was little likelihood of the Supreme Court overturning the decision of the federal appeals court. In the scale of public opinion, the firing of



BAKER, ERVIN: Delighted.

Cox is not likely to be viewed as seriously as defiance of the Supreme Court, which in the democratic mythology of U. S. capitalism is painted as the final arbiter of governmental disputes.

In this connection, a Harris poll in late September found a majority of 51 to 34 percent believing that "Congress would be justified to begin impeachment proceedings" if Nixon refused to obey the Supreme Court's decision. Congressional liberals such as Senators Edward Kennedy and George McGovern had indicated that they thought impeachment likely if Nixon defied the Supreme Court. More importantly, Melvin Laird, Nixon's chief domestic adviser, told the press October 16 that he had given Nixon the same warning, although Laird added that he thought an impeachment move would fail to get the

necessary majority in the House of Representatives.

4. *Agnew's resignation.* The fact that the office of vice-president is vacant is an added argument against impeaching Nixon for his latest cover-up. While the talents of Nixon's nominee, Gerald Ford, are hardly likely to recommend him to the ruling class as a replacement for Nixon, until Ford is confirmed by Congress—probably a matter of a month or more—the next person in line of succession is Speaker of the House Carl Albert, an even less likely candidate.

After the scandal of Agnew's resignation and conviction for tax evasion, the last thing the U. S. ruling class wants is the turmoil that would be created by an all-out battle between Nixon and Congress, even if the latter were capable of such a battle. Nixon is counting on the Agnew scandal to moderate the response of his congressional critics.

5. *The Israeli aggression.* The reluctance of the ruling class to see Nixon seriously undermined is multiplied by the war in the Arab East and the dangers it involves for U. S. imperialism. Nixon emphasized this threat in his "compromise" proposal:

"... there are those in the international community who may be tempted by our Watergate-related difficulties at home to misread America's unity and resolve in meeting the challenges we confront abroad.

"I have concluded that it is necessary to take decisive actions that will avoid any possibility of a constitutional crisis and that will lay the groundwork upon which we can assure unity of purpose at home and end the temptation abroad to test our resolve."

Some days earlier, in the October 10 *New York Times*, John Herbers expressed the Nixonian logic without quite so much rhetorical obfuscation:

"Since the hostilities broke out... the atmosphere at the White House has been one of relief that the public was now wanting to know what he would do to bring peace rather than how much income taxes he paid or what his role was in the Watergate cover-up...."

"For the time being... the Middle East crisis is being cited by the President's supporters as an indication of how relatively unimportant are the wrongdoings of Watergate."

Role of Senate Committee

Nixon was able to test congressional reaction to his "compromise" proposal before unveiling it to the public. The audience for the dress rehearsal consisted of Senators Sam Ervin and Howard Baker, respectively chairman and vice-chairman of the Senate Watergate committee.

Nixon offered the committee the same deal that Cox refused, and Ervin and Baker accepted it after a forty-



MUSKIE: Cautious.

minute meeting with Nixon October 19.

Baker authorized a spokesman to tell the press that Nixon's "compromise" was a "good proposal" and "in the best interest of the country." "He's just delighted," the spokesman said of Baker's reaction.

Ervin, as a member of the "opposition" party, later made a display of independence when Nixon used the word "summary" to describe the information that would be given to the committee. But he quickly retracted his objections after a telephone call from the White House assured him that Nixon and Stennis would allow the committee to have "verbatim" portions of

whatever material they decided would not harm Nixon.

The effect of Ervin and Baker's approval, in addition to what it indicated about the mood of Congress, was to undercut Cox, allowing Nixon to paint him as unreasonable for refusing what the senators had accepted.

Baker's remarks the next day, in which he pretended that the committee would still press its attempts to get the full tapes, did nothing to offset this effect, although it did indicate that Baker might be having second thoughts about siding too openly with Nixon.

"The committee hasn't agreed to do anything but receive information," Baker claimed. "We have not agreed to give up any rights, we have not agreed to drop our lawsuit.

"I think the president did a fine thing in offering the tapes. I think we would have been extremely negligent and irresponsible had we not agreed to accept them."

Caution in Congress

The difficulty experienced by Ervin and Baker in adopting a consistent position was typical of congressional reaction to the unexpected turn in the Watergate scandal. Those members of Congress who spoke to the press were careful to express their "outrage" without committing themselves to doing anything.

Muskie, for example, said the scandal was "of such gravity and consequence to our form of government that the House of Representatives should consider holding hearings on the impeachment of the president," which is at least twice removed from calling for actual impeachment.

Kennedy offered his opinion that the "burden is now on Congress and the courts to nullify this historic insult to the rule of law and to the nation's system of justice." He did not indicate, however, whether he thought the "insult" should be answered by impeachment, legislation, judicial ruling, or prayer.

In the House of Representatives, John B. Anderson, chairman of the House Republican Conference, said that "obviously impeachment resolutions are going to be raining down like hailstones," but he had no recom-

mendations on how such resolutions should be received.

The editors of the *New York Times* displayed the same mixture of unease and caution. After accusing Nixon of "dictatorial misconceptions of his constitutional authority," defying the courts, creating a constitutional crisis, obstructing trials of the Watergate gang, concealing evidence "of criminal wrongdoings by his closest associates and perhaps by himself," and "a shocking breach of faith with the Senate and the American people," the paper's October 21 editorial concluded:

"The President is counting upon Senatorial courtesy toward Senator Stennis to immobilize the Senate and is counting upon the fighting in the Middle East to distract the public. . . . It is a clever and brazen scheme that cannot be allowed to succeed. If it did succeed, the public would rightly conclude that a few Washington insiders had connived together to hush up the Watergate case and allow the guilty to go scot-free. Now that Mr. Nixon has wielded his ruthless axe on all with the courage to resist, the nation confronts not a constitutional impasse but a grave crisis in the legitimacy of the President. The answer now must come from Congress as the only redoubt left for American democracy."

In short, editors and members of Congress alike were convinced that someone—not themselves—should come up with an "answer" to Nixon's fait accompli. Everyone was waiting to assess the public reaction before committing themselves to more than rhetorical flourishes. If the hints of impeachment go beyond the stage of talk or a pro forma investigation by still another committee, it will be because the public revulsion at the latest evidence of crime in the White House turns out to be far broader and stronger than Nixon expected. □

'Behind the Watergate Scandal'

Because of the need to cover developing stories on Chile, the Arab East, and Watergate-related affairs, we have been forced to postpone the background series "Behind the Watergate Scandal." The series will be resumed as soon as space permits.

Mass Student Upsurge Brings Down Thai Government

By Ernest Harsch

Two days after the student explosion that toppled the military regime in Thailand, Malcolm Browne observed in a dispatch from Bangkok: "Officials and diplomats in the region are already looking upon the student rising here as something only a little less momentous than the French Revolution."

The rapidity of the events, and to a certain extent their unexpectedness, took both American and Asian governmental officials by surprise. The October 17 *Washington Post* quoted the reaction of one U. S. congressional expert: "It is completely out of the pattern. The whole thing doesn't make any sense at all. The students have never had the clout to do this."

No less surprised were former Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn and ex-Deputy Premier Praphas Charusathien, who quickly resigned and fled the country, as the student demonstrations and the clashes with the police and military continued to escalate.

In the space of a few days, the Thai students, supported by most of the inhabitants of Bangkok, proved to the world that they did have the necessary "clout" to chase some of the top military leaders out of the country. The implications of a spontaneous uprising in the midst of Washington's largest military stronghold in Southeast Asia will not be lost on those interested in the continued domination of the area by U. S. imperialism.

John Foster Dulles had considered Thailand the biggest domino on the Southeast Asian mainland. Since World War II it has been the headquarters nation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and during the course of the Vietnam war it served as the base for the U. S. Seventh Air Force Support Activities Group, which carried out the massive bombings of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

There are presently about 38,000 U. S. troops stationed in Thailand and Washington pours in an average of \$70 million in military aid every year

(\$128 million in 1972). The October 16 *Washington Post* pointed out that "virtually all the tanks, helicopter gunships, machineguns and ammunition used against the demonstrators were American-built or supplied by the U. S. military assistance program." Much of this aid also goes to assist the Thai counterinsurgency operations against the guerrilla forces in northeast Thailand.

Since the signing of the "peace" accords in Vietnam, the U. S. military presence in Thailand has taken on even more strategic importance for Pentagon intervention in revolutionary situations in Southeast Asia.

The April 16 *Far Eastern Economic Review* described this shift of emphasis from Vietnam to Thailand: "In Thailand, two large organisations which ran things in Vietnam—the Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (MACV) and the 7th Air Force—have amalgamated themselves into the US-SAG (for United States Support Activities Group) at Nakhon Phanom airbase with most of the men who were running things in Vietnam. This organisation sees itself as being responsible for everything from monitoring the activities of the North Vietnamese along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to supporting the grave-registration teams. . . . A Thai newspaper also reported that the US 13th Air Force would combine with components of the 7th Air Force to form a large new organisation at Ubon airbase. Obviously, the Americans have plans for Thailand."

The snowballing of events that may very well threaten these plans was sparked when the Thai government arrested thirteen students and lecturers at Thammasat University for distributing leaflets calling for a permanent Thai constitution to replace the present temporary charter. The university students, as well as thousands of high-school students, immediately responded with massive protests that lasted for five days and assembled

more than 200,000 demonstrators. They demanded the release of the thirteen and the drafting of a new constitution.

Under this massive pressure, the government conceded that it would release the thirteen and would inaugurate a new constitution within a year. But the students put no confidence in the word of the government and about 40,000 occupied various government buildings throughout the night of October 13.

The next morning several thousand tried to take over the offices of the Public Relations Department and broadcast from its radio. The military forces, led by Thanom Kittikachorn's son, Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, then moved in to crush the uprising, initiating a massacre.

A report by John Burgess in the October 16 *Washington Post* described the events of "Bloody Sunday": "Most [of the demonstrators] were shocked and embittered by the brutality of the government forces, who had killed unarmed girls, high school students and passers-by with indiscriminate rifle and machinegun fire into crowds. Unofficial estimates from hospitals placed casualties as high as 400 dead.

"A column of tanks confronted the students when they tried to take over government buildings near Thammasat [University].

"Though tear gas was fired, the students ventured close to the tanks, apparently believing they would not shoot. But the tanks and soldiers opened fire with .50 calibre machineguns and M-16 rifles. A Huey helicopter armed with machineguns directed fire into the Thammasat campus. Scores of students were hit. Three young girls were seen lying in pools of blood.

"Through the afternoon the students attempted to fight back, using wooden clubs, commandeered buses and trucks and barricades. A driverless dump truck was sent careening into a tank. The soldiers replied with deafening

volleys of machinegun fire, much of it directed over the demonstrators' heads. But the numbers of dead increased steadily—all of them demonstrators.

"In the early afternoon, students laid out 50 bodies in symbolic defiance to the soldiers. Demonstrators set fire to three government offices and more than two dozen vehicles. Tankmen fired volley after volley of machinegun fire toward the students only 30 yards away.

"Ambulances manned by medical students careened through the streets to pick up dead and wounded. Several medics said that the troops occasionally shot at the ambulances.

"The fighting attracted thousands of spectators, many of whom were injured or killed themselves.

"People stopped newsmen on the street and pleaded with them to send accurate reports out of the country. 'Don't believe the government,' said a 35-year-old man who was taunting armed soldiers 20 yards away. 'Tell the Americans to stop sending guns to the Thai army.' A 15-year-old student, who was in a state of near shock, described with a faltering voice how several of his friends had been shot dead around him while walking near soldiers."

In this city of five million, the actions of the students against the military government quickly found a sympathetic response among the rest of the population. "The student demonstrations," reported the October 17 *Christian Science Monitor*, "were highly organized and they gained an extraordinary measure of popular support. Taxi and bus drivers offered free rides to those who wanted to go to demonstration sites. The supposedly politically indifferent Thais showed open enthusiasm over the ouster of Field Marshals Thanom and Praphas."

Seeing that the students would not back off and that the uprising might spread to the rest of the population, the government ordered the withdrawal of the armored vehicles and troops from Bangkok in the hopes of calming the demonstrators down. But the students continued to burn cars and buses and showed no signs of dispersing.

Four days after the ouster of Thanom, Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, the secretary general of the 100,-

000-member National Student Center, described the response of the rest of the population and the dangers that such support could have posed to the regime. "Without the support of all the Thai people," he told the *New York Times*, "we could have done nothing, but with that support the police and army could do nothing. The people would not have tolerated the continued shooting and killing of the students by the police and army. The country would have been plunged into total civil war and the army would have lost."

To head off such an eventuality, the ruling class felt it necessary to make even more concessions. In a speech broadcast on the night of October 14, Field Marshal Thanom announced his resignation as premier. The next day he and his long-time ally, ex-Deputy Premier Praphas Charusathien, fled the country. King Phumiphol Aduldet then announced the appointment of Dr. Sanya Thammasak, dean of Thammasat University, as the new premier.

Signs of the growing strength of the Thai student movement had already become visible earlier in the year.

During the summer, nine students had been arrested for ridiculing army leaders in a student publication; 20,000 demonstrators immediately turned out and forced the government to back down.

When U. S. Senator Barry Goldwater made a comment that the Pentagon should be able to bomb Thailand if it were necessary, "the National Student Centre of Thailand delivered a sharp protest note to the US Embassy in Bangkok, distributed leaflets in the city condemning the 'US imperialists,' and organised small demonstrations," reported the October 1 *Far Eastern Economic Review*. "Thai student leaders express dismay at their government's 'puppet' relationship with the US, and are angry that a more independent and realistic foreign policy is not pursued."

Besides the question of the U. S. bases in Thailand, the students have also reacted to the rampant corruption of the military. As Alfred W. McCoy pointed out in *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, "Government corruption is not just a problem in Thailand, it is a way of life." He then went

on to describe the careers of Thanom and Praphas. Both had been protégés of Sarit Thanarat, who formed the Revolutionary Group in 1958 and staged a coup against the previous military regime. To win the loyalty of the rest of the colonels and the other secondary military factions, it was necessary to buy them off. To raise the money required, Sarit reorganized Thailand's vast opium trade. (Much of the heroin that reaches the United States comes from the opium fields of Laos, Burma, and Thailand.) Both Thanom and Praphas helped to manage the opium trade for Sarit.

The long-term causes for the student unrest in Thailand, however, are much deeper than discontent with government foreign policy and official corruption. The July 23 *Far Eastern Economic Review* described the situation that university students find themselves in: "Today, a university graduate considers himself or herself lucky even to get a decent job. . . . The scarcity of new job opportunities presents the new graduate with a grim future. Further steep increases in the cost of living help to darken the horizon of Thailand's young hopefuls. Joining the Civil Service means taking a grossly underpaid job. A fixed income job in the private sector means a career no better than in the Civil Service, when the prices of rice, other foodstuffs and other essentials are spiraling upward with no end in sight. An acute housing shortage, labour unrest, rising petrol prices and growing pollution all combine to alienate the students from tomorrow's world, and in particular from the Government, which they claim is failing to tackle the problems and has failed to come up with any satisfying solutions to any of the crises."

The new government headed by Dr. Sanya Thammasak, which was quickly set up to head off the student explosion, faces the same crises that the old one did. The military is far from being powerless and the U. S. bases remain. While the students, in the initial flush of victory, put a considerable amount of faith in the new regime, its approaches to the problems that face Thailand may very quickly lead to disillusionment and the continuation of the struggles.

Immediately after Sanya had become the new premier, he used his in-

fluence to end the mobilizations. Speaking in a national television broadcast, he appealed for "calm." The October 16 *New York Times* reported that he "spoke for only two minutes, asserting that all the demonstrators had dispersed and that anyone who participated in rioting at this point would have to be considered an outside element."

The real power of the military has not been greatly diminished in the new Thai government. Daniel Southerland observed in the October 17 *Christian Science Monitor* that "the influence of the military had not been completely eliminated. The big issue at the moment still seems to be to what extent the military will cooperate with the government."

"So far, all signs are that the Army commander in chief, Gen. Kris Sivara, is closely cooperating with the new Prime Minister. General Kris emerged as a key figure following the departure of the country's two leading military men, former Premier Thanom Kittikachorn and Deputy Premier Praphass Charusathien."

But Kris Sivara's influence grew even before the overthrow of his two colleagues. In the October 1 *Far Eastern Economic Review* Jibdhand Kam-bhu reported on his promotion, in a reshuffle in the high command of the Thai armed forces, to commander in chief of the army: "Gen. Kris' promotion is a clear indication that the 'strongman' title—once held by Prapas—is now at least shared. Kris is not new to Thai politics. He rose to prominence during the régime of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A popular soldier, Kris steadily gathered support and influence in the army during his long military career. When the National Executive Council staged a successful coup d'état on November 17, 1971, to end Thailand's two-year-old experiment in parliamentary democracy, observers called Kris 'the man to watch.'"

With his two former compatriots now out of the picture, Kris is the most powerful military man in Thailand. Also appointed to the new cabinet, as defense minister, is Dawee Chullasaphya, who was promoted to his position as assistant supreme commander in the recent high command reshuffle. James M. Markham reported in an

October 16 dispatch to the *New York Times* that Dawee "is on good terms with both the United States Embassy and many of his fellow officers, and his appointment is seen as a sign that Premier Sanya wants to reassure both those important sectors."

If the military feels that the government of Premier Sanya is strong enough to head off any future mass mobilizations before they reach the same stage as the last ones, then it may be content to remain in the background. But General Kris is no stranger to military coups, should events go beyond an acceptable limit.

An October 16 dispatch to the *Los Angeles Times* noted the attitude of the new government toward the U. S. bases in Thailand: "The new foreign minister, Charoonpan Issrankul na Ayudhya, indicated that Thailand's foreign policy would not change."

This, of course, would be in line with the Pentagon's present plans for the country. Norman Peagam wrote in the October 1 *Far Eastern Economic Review*: "Henry Kissinger was recently reported as saying that it would probably take five to ten years before a 'substantial' US withdrawal from Thailand could take place, and Thai leaders have made it clear that, although their nominal policy is 'for American forces in Thailand to be reduced to the minimum,' they would like to retain a sizable US presence to 'deter and suppress threats from the other side.'"

While some of the leaders of the Sanya government would like to see the bulk of the U. S. military forces withdrawn from Thailand to make it easier to establish relations with the People's Republic of China, most of them think that it will be possible to both carry on a détente with China and keep the American bases.

An editorial in the October 18 *New York Times* said: "With the possibility of any fresh American interventions in Indochina steadily receding and with relations between Washington and Peking growing more cordial, any new government in Bangkok can be expected to accelerate efforts already begun to achieve a reconciliation with the Chinese. Among the early steps in this direction will probably be moves to speed up the recently interrupted withdrawal of American forces from Thai soil. These trends should

not be unwelcome to the majority of Americans, who desire complete United States military disengagement from Southeast Asia."

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the détente between Washington and Peking in stifling any revolutionary developments in Southeast Asia will determine the extent of the U.S. military presence in Thailand. If the Pentagon sees no immediate dangers posed to the continued domination of U.S. imperialism in that part of the world, then it may very well deem it possible to reduce the visible presence of U. S. forces in Thailand. Such a stable situation, however, does not now exist, nor does it appear that it will in the immediate future.

Washington will always be ready to intervene militarily if it thinks that such a step is necessary to maintain its domination. During the first days of the student uprising, the Defense Department announced that all U.S. forces in Thailand had been put on a standby alert. When it became obvious that the Thai ruling class was capable of containing the explosion, the alert was lifted.

Though most of the student leaders consider themselves political moderates, the momentum of the events they unleashed may very well turn them against the present government also, especially when it becomes clear to them that not that much has really changed. The workers of Bangkok and the peasants of the countryside (many of whom have been ruined by the drought of the past few years) share many of the same grievances the students have raised. The realization that it is possible to overthrow a government can be expected to spur them to take action themselves when they see that the new regime is incapable of solving the basic problems that face the people of Thailand. □

Hardship Case

King Constantine of Greece, who has been unemployed since the military dictatorship abolished the monarchy in June, has suffered another setback to his fortunes. The regime announced at the beginning of October that Constantine and his family would be paid only \$4 million in compensation for the seizure of 10,000 acres of their private estates. The properties have a market value of \$500 million. Constantine sold part of one estate for \$5 million last year.

Eyewitness Accounts of Raging Repression

By Gerry Foley

The officers of the Chilean junta gave their coup the code name "Jakarta." That proclaimed their intention to exterminate anyone not in harmony with their idea of the "Chilean national character." And despite their recent attempts to choke off the flow of information out of Chile, eyewitness accounts of the repression confirm that the junta's aim is to duplicate the slaughter committed by its Indonesian counterpart.

The junta has tried to crack down on journalists who have been too persistent in ferreting out the facts. For example, Philippe Labreveux, correspondent of the Paris daily *Le Monde*, was ordered arrested on October 15. Fortunately, he had already left the country two days earlier.

John Barnes of *Newsweek*, who managed to get into the Santiago morgue and see a large number of bodies with fatal short-range bullet wounds, was described by a junta spokesman as "the Dracula of journalism." Other reporters have noted that the number of persons announced shot "while escaping" was beginning to mount startlingly.

On October 2, the army claimed to have shot six "extremists" who tried to escape from the Pisagua concentration camp in the far north. The same day in another part of the country, two more "extremists" were reported shot while trying to escape. The reports stated:

"Three leftists died while trying to escape during an ambush of a naval patrol in a wooded section of Concepción Province and another one in Quillota, after being caught planting explosives on a railroad track, an army spokesman announced," according to the October 11 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*. The three members of the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria — Movement of the Revolutionary Left] who were gunned down in Concepción had been sentenced to terms of twenty-three to forty-five years in prison on various political charges. The

man killed in Quillota was a MIR trade-union activist. No military casualties were reported in either action.

In the October 13 *La Opinión*, the paper's correspondent noted:

"The summary executions of political prisoners 'trying to escape' seem to be multiplying in the provinces, according to papers in the Chilean capital.

"In forty-eight hours, at least nine persons were reported killed in the same circumstances, when purported 'extremists' were being moved from one prison to another."

One "extremist shot while escaping" got away and managed to talk to a reporter from the Stockholm daily *Aftonbladet*. His story was summarized in the October 14 *La Opinión*.

"The Brazilian linotypist Luiz Carlos lived in Chile, accompanied in exile by his wife, who left Brazil a virtual epileptic because of the tortures she suffered [at the hands of the military dictatorship in Rio de Janeiro]. He worked and lived quietly, while also going to school. He was picked up 'as a foreigner' during a police search, along with two other persons.

"He was taken to a place near the Resbalón Bridge on the outskirts of the city. The date was September 27. When they got to the river, they made the prisoners get out of the van. Right there, they liquidated one of the three.

"Since he was the next, the Brazilian fled toward the river. He was shot three times, once in the forearm, once in the shoulder, and a bullet grazed his head. He fell into the river and was swept away by the current. The shooting stopped, apparently because they thought he was dead.

"Luiz Carlos was able to reach shore. He went to a block of apartments, and knocked at several doors. The Chilean people are terrorized. Several refused to answer his calls for help. . . .

"Nonetheless, someone helped him. And once he was rested and revived,

he went to a nearby convent. From there he went to the Swedish Embassy, where the *Aftonbladet* correspondent interviewed him."

La Opinión commented: "Many persons have had the same experience as Luiz Carlos [but not the same luck]. The Swedish press ran pictures of thirty bodies washed up by the Mapocho River. *Dagens Nyheter*, a Stockholm morning paper whose correspondent, Bobi Sourander, was arrested October 11, documented the appearance of bodies every morning in the vicinity of the shantytowns around Santiago.

"The correspondent of the Barcelona paper *La Vanguardia* found the Spanish priest Alsina among a pile of bodies on a bank of the Mapocho. Alsina had nothing to do with politics.

"Often the bodies remain lying out in the open for several days. Why do they wait so long to pick them up, a Dutch journalist wondered. It is obvious that they are hunting down a lot of people, especially the youth in the slums."

A hundred bodies were taken out of the Mapocho River, *La Opinión* said. "A hundred bodies; and one of them moved."

Sourander was reportedly taken to the National Stadium to be held to face charges before a military tribunal. According to the October 21 *New York Times* the junta decided only to expel him from the country, but there is no report yet of his release.

High-ranking West European officials expressed shock at the junta's terror, which reminded some of them of the Nazi occupation. The chairman of the Dutch Labor party, André van der Louw, visited Chile as part of a delegation of the international Social Democratic organization. He described his impressions and those of other officials in the October 13 issue of the Amsterdam weekly *Vrij Nederland*:

"The Swedish ambassador was very somber about the situation. He is a regular visitor to the National Stadium, where the prisoners are held. Sometimes he goes there several times a day. He knows what kind of treatment they get. Not one of the 4,000 to 5,000 prisoners is treated well. But the Europeans come off best. They are not beaten. The Latin Americans have it harder. And the Chileans have the worst luck of all. Everybody sleeps on a cement floor. Often there are

150 persons to a room six by four meters. They are let out on the spectators' benches from one to two hours a day.

"At 11:00 they serve something they call coffee with a bit of bread. At noon and 5:00 p.m. there is soup with something in it—just enough to keep them alive.

"[The ambassador] has seen persons carried out of the stadium on stretchers. From this fact and the fact that many priests are always coming and going, apparently to give the last sacraments, he concludes that people are being killed in there."

The military was not content simply to "exterminate the Marxist vermin."

"What happens to those who are not summarily executed by order of secret military tribunals was told to us by Luisa Gazmuri, 28, in a small apartment in Santiago," a reporter wrote in the October 8 *Spiegel*:

"Luisa was an official of a left Catholic party and a clerk in the state planning board. She survived the treatment she got only because she was left for dead on the street and later hidden by the people of a slum neighborhood.

"They burned me on the breasts with red-hot wires and tortured me with a bottle and sharp instruments where a woman's body is most sensitive," Luisa wept. She cannot move without pain. 'A doctor told me the worst yesterday. I will never be able to have children.'"

One reason for the seemingly superfluous cruelty of the armed forces, *Spiegel* said, was the coup leaders' stories that the left was planning a slaughter of the military. Lurid stories about a planned "red massacre" inflamed lower officers. (The fact that this guerrilla plot was supposed to be called "Plan Z" seems to show the level of the military's reading.) "Jakarta" had been the slogan of the rightist advocates of a coup. The generals seemed determined to repeat the whole scenario of the Indonesian events, including the story about a leftist plot to assassinate the commanders.

More important than these scare stories, however, were probably the pressures of the situation the military found themselves in once they launched a bloody repression of the workers and poor who opposed the coup. In

order to restore "labor discipline" and suppress the hatred of huge sections of the population, they seemed to feel compelled to escalate the terror, whatever the cost.

For the shantytowns in particular, the military regime has meant only terror and ever increasing hardship.

"In most poblaciones," *New York Times* correspondent Jonathan Kandell cabled October 16 from Santiago, "the military Government has radically altered the delivery of food and medical services, formerly under Marxist control.

"Government warehouses that used to distribute food and household essentials at cheap, subsidized prices have been closed in favor of more expensive private groceries and other shops. . . .

". . . The clinic system created under the Allende Government to bring medical facilities into the poorest neighborhoods is being dismantled in favor of the large, central hospital system backed by conservative medical authorities.

"In Nogales, a población in the western outskirts of the capital, the clinic was closed down and its chief physician, Dr. Claudio Webbe, has been detained, in the national stadium, with several thousand other political prisoners."

There was one immediate result, a metalworker told Kandell. "There is no medical service around here at night anymore. And the hospital never sends ambulances to Nogales."

The living standard of the masses is being cut drastically in other ways. "Bus fares went up by approximately 300 percent," a UPI dispatch from Santiago reported in the October 19 issue of the *New York Spanish-language daily El Diario*. "[On October 15] the prices of such necessities as milk, bread, sugar, tea, cooking oil, and noodles went up, some by as much as 600 percent."

At the same time, imperialist and native bosses were given almost absolute power over the workers.

"Most Chilean companies that fell under state control in the Allende years were quietly placed back in the hands of their former private managers within two weeks after the military took over the government," Kandell noted in the October 20 *New York Times*.

"The junta has never officially an-

nounced the return of these executives, preferring to call them 'government delegates' empowered to manage the concerns until their final status is decided."

On October 12, the junta issued a decree not only outlawing strikes but ordering the firing of any worker who took part before the coup in any militant union actions that "prevented workers from going to work or fulfilling their professional duties." (*Le Monde*, October 14.) From now on all industrial disputes are to be settled by special tribunals including a representative of the armed forces, and their decisions "will not be subject to any appeal."

Regardless of the eventual cost of the junta's blind brutality, the military was evidently doing what the Chilean bourgeoisie expected from it. The chief justice of the Supreme Court, Enrique Urrutia Manzano, "indicated that he had no objection to the dissolution of Congress, the abolition of the Marxist parties, the suspension of other political parties or the imposition of press censorship," Kandell wrote in the October 18 *New York Times*.

Although the Supreme Court repeatedly denounced moves of the Allende government as illegal, the chief justice applied a different standard to the military coup, which he said had "the oldest legal basis in the world—self-defense."

Kandell continued: "According to Mr. Urrutia, the military was also forced to act because of 'economic and moral chaos.'"

"People were simply not working," he said. "I have a farm spread, and the people were not working the land nor in the neighboring cooperatives."

What was needed to restore "morality," according to the bourgeoisie and its unleashed watchdogs, was apparently the elimination of all political ideas. "We cannot let any Marxist publications come out and we will not permit any political periodicals, of the right or the left," Don Alvaro Puga, the new chief censor told Philippe Labreuveux, "until the country is mentally well again. Besides, we are fair. We banned both *Fiducia* and *Mensaje*, two Catholic monthlies, one of the left and the other of the right."

Puga, a former director of the landowners' station Radio Agricultura, has become a special adviser to the military censors in order, in his words,

"to keep them from making any errors that are too serious." He presides over the board that has been set up to take charge of purifying the country. Labreux described its operations in the October 13 *Le Monde*:

"On the door is a hastily written sign on a piece of white paper. It says 'Press Censorship.' The door opens. Half a dozen officers with close-cropped hair and clear eyes are working under Captain Arenas's direction with the enthusiasm of crusaders. They are checking through the production of the Chilean and foreign publishing houses. Nothing escapes them."

Among the books already banned are: Jack London's *The Mexican*, Pushkin's *Dubrovski*, Thomas Mann's *Mario the Magician*, Dostoevski's *White Nights*, as well as works by Joseph Conrad, William Thackeray, and a thriller by the French writer Mac Orlan.

The "moral tone" of the Chilean press has been notably altered. The papers are filled with lists of wanted "extremists" and notices of the following type, according to Johan van Minnen in the October 20 *Vrij Nederland*: "The Rotary Club of Chile pledges full support to the junta in a meeting attended by Minister of Defense Patricio Carvejal." "The Truckers union thanks the honorable junta for freeing the fatherland from the claws of Marxism."

Van Minnen also offered this example of the "purified" style of the Chilean press from the September 29 *Tercera de la Hora*: "The patriotic help of all citizens will make it easier to find the extremists that remain in the capital. They are foreigners without a fatherland and fanatical Chileans who seek nothing but hate and destruction. Turn them in, by calling in concrete information to the following numbers. . . . Citizens, help rid your fatherland of Marxist vermin."

But, Puga complained, some foreign journalists were making things difficult: "We have shown the foreign reporters things that are never shown in any war, the concentration camps. We have reported our losses and the executions. And, in spite of everything, we find a certain ill will. So you will understand that we are entitled to ask certain foreign journalists, to whom we have graciously extended our hospitality, graciously to leave."

Colonel Pedro Ewing, the junta's executive general secretary, was less than gracious when he said, according to an October 15 dispatch from *New York Times* correspondent Marvine Howe: "Unfortunately, almost all of the foreign correspondents are opposed to the junta, and infiltrated—I don't want to offend them—but possibly even paid by Marxists to distort the facts."

On October 15, the government issued an order expelling four foreign journalists including Labreux. At the same time, it moved ruthlessly to shut off all sources of information about the repression going on in the country:

"The armed forces announced the detention of 115 people accused of spreading false rumors," Howe reported, "and the pro-junta newspaper *La Patria* reported that the Government had banned all reports on shootings, deaths or prisoners that did not emanate from official sources."

Thus, it seems apparent that the junta intends to continue its massacre of "suspect elements" and probably keep on stepping it up. Only a few hundred prisoners have been reported released from the National Stadium, where somewhere between 4,000 and 10,000 political prisoners are being held. Obviously, the longer the tens of thousands of political prisoners are kept confined in such concentration camps throughout the country on starvation rations and in the hands of the trigger-happy military, the greater

the danger grows that these giant prisons will become actual extermination centers. In any case, the number of bodies appearing in the streets and the river banks continues to mount, presumably creating the kind of edifying moral atmosphere the generals feel is essential.

The junta has no answer but terror to the problems that face it and the class it represents. For the moment the attack dogs have been let loose and are doing what they were trained for. But despite all their efforts and intentions, it is unlikely that the generals can repeat the "success" of the mass murderers in Indonesia. The kind of terror needed to shut a country like Chile off from the world is difficult to imagine.

If socialists, as well as civil liberties organizations and all enlightened and humanitarian persons, keep up the outcry over the mass murder, torture, and concentration camps in Chile, the powers that feed the animals will certainly be forced to put a leash on them.

In the conditions of general public uneasiness following the Vietnam war, the Nixon regime can hardly afford to be seen by the world as the backer of a dim-witted killer government that is using concentration camps and mass slaughter to protect "our wonderful free enterprise system" and "old-fashioned morality" in a country not so different from the United States and still less from Western European nations. □

PST Calls for Unity to Defend Democratic Rights

Peron Intensifies Antisocialist Witch-Hunt

[Following the assassination of José Ignacio Rucci, the right-wing Peronist general secretary of the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor) on September 25, reactionary commando attacks were stepped up against the left wing of the Peron-

ist movement in particular and also against the socialist organizations. Parallel to this wave of attacks reputedly organized by right-wing "orthodox" Peronists and the trade-union bureaucracy, Perón himself launched a political offensive against the left in his movement. On October 1 he

issued a statement to a governors' conference in Buenos Aires declaring "war on Marxism," especially in the Peronist movement. It has become obvious that the "people's general" intends to carry out a massive purge and campaign of intimidation against the left as his first move in restoring "social discipline" in the country.

[The campaign has already gone beyond the Peronist left and led to a series of attacks on left-wing party headquarters. For example, at the end of September, the headquarters of the PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party, a group that maintains fraternal ties with the Fourth International) in Mar del Plata and in the Barracas district of Buenos Aires were attacked. In the first week of October, the PST central headquarters in Bahía Blanco was partially destroyed by two bombs.

[In the October 10 issue of its weekly paper, *Avanzada Socialista*, from which the following three articles are taken, the PST called for united opposition to the rightist campaign and analyzed the lessons of Perón's "right turn." The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Unite in Defense of Democratic Rights

Last week the document with "Secret Instructions for the Governors" was revealed. [For the text, see "The Blueprint for Perón's Purge," *Intercontinental Press*, October 15, p. 1167.] There is no room for doubt that it is a McCarthyite document, which, if put into practice, would affect not only the left parties and the JP [Juventud Peronista—Peronist Youth] but any person or political tendency or trade-union leadership that raised the slightest criticism of the government or the CGT. The document has obviously encouraged the extreme right groups that have gone on a rampage of attacks. According to this statement, any political or ideological difference with the Peronist leadership can be immediately labeled "Marxist," and "war can be declared" against it. We do not mean to exaggerate. We are only pointing out that experience throughout the world—as in the United

States, for example—shows us that such "witch-hunts" begin with attacks on "Marxism" and end up by gagging everybody who tries to make any criticism or freely express an idea that upsets those in authority.

In view of this threat, the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores calls on the compañeros of the Communist party and the other left organizations, on the Juventud Peronista, Peronismo Revolucionario [Revolutionary Wing of the Peronist Movement], the Juventud Radical [the youth of the liberal bourgeois opposition party], and on all parties and trade-union, student, and cultural organizations that support democratic rights to unite to stop this witch-hunt and defend democratic freedoms against all persecution or ideological discrimination. On these points, we call, as a first measure, for signing a joint public statement and starting up a public campaign.

* * *

Voting for Peron Boomeranged on the CP

The Communist party compañeros have probably read General Perón's statements last week. More important than these statements have been the acts that have been going on, which they have probably also noticed—the machine-gunning of a construction workers' assembly in the Córdoba CGT hall, assaults on various antibureaucratic leaders, attacks on headquarters of the JP and Unidades Básicas [Rank-and-File Units] of the Peronist left, the shooting up and fire-bombing of CP and of PST offices, and so forth. Besides this, they have probably taken a look at the economic policy General Perón intends to apply. If there were any illusions on this score, they were exploded by the president's speech to the general assembly of the bosses organized last Thursday by the CGE [Confederación General Económica—General Confederation of Commerce]. The Gelbard Plan, the Pacto Social, etc.—here you have the "programmatic guidelines" of General Perón's third term.

Compañeros of the CP, we think that these facts are sufficient indications of where things are going.

Therefore, we believe that the time has come for the compañeros in the CP—and the Juventud Peronista—to begin to draw some conclusions and realize that their support for Perón has not resulted precisely in the "irreversible" turn to the left that they hoped for.

In its editorial September 26, 1973, *Nuestra Palabra* claimed: "By demonstrating the will of the immense majority of the working class and the people, the September 23 victory placed an obligation on Perón's new government. It is committed to faithful fulfillment of the Programmatic Guidelines of the Social Justice Movement, which coincide essentially with the program of the APR [Alianza Popular Revolucionaria—People's Revolutionary Alliance, a populist electoral front with bourgeois liberals dominated by the CP], the Communist party, the left current of the UCR [Unión Cívica Radical—Radical Civic Union, the main bourgeois opposition party], and other political sectors." With incredible rapidity the facts have demonstrated the opposite. Lieutenant-General Perón has not "committed" himself to anything that *Nuestra Palabra* hoped.

In the same issue of the CP weekly, under the headline "A Conversation With Perón," there was an article recounting an interview that a CP delegation had with the Social Justice candidate, in which they said: "We raised (to Perón) the need for fulfilling the 'Programmatic Guidelines' that were promised to the people in the electoral campaign. This was all the more important taking into account that they largely coincided with the program of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria, our own party, and other parties, so that they represented the will of 85% of the electorate. Perón answered resolutely: 'Let them put my name to them.'" Now, compañeros, General Perón is putting his name to measures very different from the ones you thought he would.

In a few days, once again the reality has completely discredited the prognoses and the line of the CP. We don't know what *Nuestra Palabra* is going to say about this, but to us—as Marxists—it seems that when the reality contradicts a political line, what is aberrant is the line and not the reality. In other words, when General Perón does not do what you

hoped, it is not Perón who is making an "error" (or still less "betraying" or "double-dealing," as *Nuestra Palabra* will end up saying). Both in the past and today, General Perón has fought with exceptional loyalty for the interests of *his* social class. The only ones who are making a mistake here are you, comrades, in being naive enough to suppose—because, together with the JP, you got Perón some votes and tried to "put pressure on him"—that you are going to impose a program on him contrary to the one of restoring bourgeois "order," which he is now beginning firmly to implement. You gave him your votes and support. Now, naturally, General Perón is using those votes and that support for the purpose of carrying out his own policy and not yours.

Was this impossible to predict? No, since we predicted it. In the September 9 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, we addressed ourselves fraternally to the Communist *compañeros*, warning them that they were going to make a grave error. We asked them: "Do you think you are going to give impetus to a 'left turn' by supporting a rightist formula that is being put forward to block any such turn [i.e., the Perón-Perón ticket was part of a shift that removed from the government those figures most prominently identified with liberal and left policies]? Since when is putting your weight behind the right the way to move left? Are you trying to repudiate the Pacto Social by calling for a vote for the ticket that supports it?"

And it is no excuse, *compañeros*, to say as you did that you were voting "primarily for the programmatic guidelines" (*Nuestra Palabra*, No. 10) that the Social Justice movement promised in February. We have already asked you: "Has nothing happened in the time between February and August? Haven't the 'programmatic guidelines' gone into the wastebasket as another discard from the election campaign (of Cámpora)? Haven't you realized yet that Perón's program is the 'Pacto Social' and attracting massive investment of European capital. Isn't this what Perón *says* every day? Isn't this what the Peronist government *does* every day?"

Let's leave aside the fact that the least a party that claims to be Marxist must do is expose the antiproletarian and antipopular class interests

that lie behind the facade of the bourgeois parties' electoral "programs." Unfortunately, as a general rule, the CP does the opposite. It takes the facade for something real. Thus, in 1958, it voted for Frondizi [a discredited proimperialist liberal] and his "anti-imperialist program." Thus, up to the very day of the coup in Chile, it counted on an accord with the Christian Democrats because they were supposed to have a "noncapitalist program."

But let's leave that aside, because the most scandalous fact is that when you backed Perón, you *in fact* voted for him *unconditionally*. If that is not so, please tell us at what point in the election campaign—to justify the "programmatic support" given by the CP—did General Perón publicly and solemnly commit himself to applying the celebrated guidelines put forward in February. What public guarantees did he give on this point, apart from the ironical "Let them put my name to them" that *Nuestra Palabra* tells us about? Throughout the election campaign General Perón spoke very clearly. He can't be accused of trying to fool anyone, as was the case with Frondizi. A few days before the elections, for example, General Perón laid out in detail over television what he intended to do in the government. On that occasion, he said the same thing that he did in the bosses' assembly last Thursday. None of this has anything to do with the famous "programmatic guidelines." Why, then, if it was giving programmatic support to the Social Justice candidate, didn't the CP withdraw its backing immediately?

Compañeros, this "misstep" by your party is no accident. It comes from the same causes that led the Chilean workers movement to disaster. Putting your confidence in supposedly "progressive" sectors of the bourgeoisie leads inevitably to such results. And this is something that you can "put your name to" without any fear of making a mistake.

* * *

The JP Companeros Have the Floor

No sooner had the JP's celebrations of Perón's latest electoral victory died down, than its members' feeling of insecurity started growing again.

Grymberg was assassinated, and then there were attacks on their headquarters, people started shooting at them, they were threatened, and so on.

Talk started up about a war on Marxism and a purge of the movement. Today many of you *compañeros* are filled with apprehension about what fate awaits your leaders and your organizations.

You might tell us who do not belong to the "Movement" that we have no cause to poke our noses into this matter. But facts such as the fall of Puiggrós [the left Peronist chief administrator of the University of Buenos Aires] and the renewed persecution of class-struggle union activists affect the entire workers and students movement. For our part, we think that the fight we have waged shoulder to shoulder with you in the high schools, universities, and unions entitles us to tell you, despite our political differences, what our position is.

The announcement at the governors' meeting was an attack directed fundamentally against the JP. Its objective was to consolidate the trade-union bureaucracy and the most orthodox sectors of the Peronist movement. It represented a sharpening of the process that began with the ouster of Galimberti [a youth leader with a left-wing reputation who raised the idea publicly of forming a people's militia]. On that occasion, we said that his removal favored the bureaucracy and the right. You told us that it was "a tactic to avoid upsetting the military before Cámpora took power."

The subsequent events have been showing, however, that we were right. In succession came the Ezeiza massacre [rightist Peronist groups opened fire on the left-wing contingents in the rally at Ezeiza airport welcoming Perón home, and the "people's general" later put the blame for the slaughter implicitly on the left] and the resignation of Cámpora and those ministers you considered to have positive attitudes. Then Isabel Martínez was put on the ticket as vice-president, as proposed by Norma Kennedy [a notoriously right-wing Peronist leader]. Then came the appointment of Julio Yessi, the private secretary of López Rega [a well-known right-wing Peronist figure] as the representative of the JP.

Finally there came published directives saying, for example: "We will

not permit any commentary, jingles, or the use of any other means of communication against any of our leaders. Anyone who resorts to this sort of thing, or spreads it, or tolerates it will be considered an enemy of the Movement and expelled." Is the JP going to give up the fight for trade-union democracy now and stop denouncing the leaders who betray the rank-and-file workers? Is the JP going to cooperate with a move, for example, to expel Tosco from his union because he acknowledges being a Marxist?

After what happened in Uruguay and Chile, you have pointed out that there is an imperialist encirclement of our country. Then, how do you explain that instead of declaring "war" on the foreign concerns that rob and exploit us every day, Perón says that the fundamental task is to get rid of those who talk about fighting? In our opinion, the movement is encircled by the bourgeois and the trade-union bureaucracy, as well as the imperialists. You said that with Perón in power things were going to change. Perón says: ". . . I pledge not to change in the slightest the economic direction the country is taking." (*Mayoria*, October 5, 1973.) While the JTP [Juventud Trabajadora Peronista—Peronist Young Workers] is confronting the bureaucracy, Perón endorses Romero as Rucci's successor, saying: "This means that there will be a continuity of thought and action." (*Mayoria*, October 3, 1973.)

Do you honestly believe that anyone is going to defeat imperialism and the exploiters when he lets the monopolies, the Gelbards, and the bureaucrats get stronger every day? We are sure you do not.

You defend your participating in the Peronist movement, explaining:

". . . Perón needs the maximum support because we are isolated. We have to form a front where 80 percent of the political forces in the country stand in order to face up to imperialism." Through Firmenich, you proposed in the Atlanta rally to join in such a front with the UCR and the APR (Alende-Sueldo).

But in Chile didn't the Unidad Popular leaders also say that they had to form a front with the Christian Democrats, who claimed to be one thousand percent anti-imperialist democrats? Didn't they tell the workers

not to mobilize and raise demands against their bosses "because that is going to provoke the imperialists"?

When the moment of truth came, the bourgeois democrats "were not so democratic," and they gave the lead to the coup without saying a word against the barbaric repression launched against the Chilean people.

Compañeros, how different are the Radicales [the old petty-bourgeois liberal party] whose promilitarist direction is well known [they supported the coup against Perón in 1955]? Can Frondizi and Solano Lima be on the same side as the workers? We say, No.

Just as in Chile, when the fat is in the fire for the capitalist system, these types will turn openly against the masses.

But Chile also teaches us a lesson about the role played by the "constitutionalist," "patriotic" and "democratic" armed forces, or the "clear-thinking" military, as Gullo calls the Argentine army. We cannot fail to recognize that the attitude of General Cargano in Caracas [at the recent hemispheric "security" conference] and his attitude toward the foreign military missions are progressive and should be supported like any anti-imperialist measure, but that is a far cry from placing confidence in the armed forces.

We remember that in Chile also (according to the UP and the CP) there were "patriotic armed forces" and the people were called upon to put their trust in them. All this did was disarm the workers politically and physically, so that finally they were left defenseless facing a massacre.

You are the ones feeling the main weight of the rightist offensive. Perón is drawing a dividing line between those who struggle and those who are with the regime. What will the JP do? So far you have been retreating. You accepted the fall of Cárpora without raising any demands. You accepted the ticket with Isabel, even though you knew very well what it meant. You supported it wondering whether the thing to do would be to put up a joint ticket with Balbín [an old proimperialist liberal] and you ended up by agreeing to march under the orders of Rucci and Lorenzo Miguel when the workers did not come out. And you did all this without daring to ask Perón to give any guarantees.

We would venture to say that by these attitudes you left the door open for the most reactionary sectors of the Peronist movement, allowing them to gain strength because of the passiveness and complacency of the JP.

The result was the opposite of what you hoped for. Your leaders advised marching to the CGT headquarters on the 31st to demonstrate the weakness of the bureaucracy. Perón saw it; he wasn't looking in some other direction. But now what?

You are worse off than before the 31st. That's the whole truth. Where is the JP going? As we said in No. 75 of *Avanzada Socialista*: "If they adapt to Perón's policy and follow it, if they back away from the workers struggles, if they devote themselves to 'rebuilding the Nation' of the bosses, they will stay on good relations with Perón. But the JP will lose its most militant members, they will have no influence in the workers movement, and they will have abandoned all their revolutionary aspirations. If they take up their posts again in the struggle side by side with the workers, as they did during the occupations and conflicts, they will go back to being those youth viewed with a 'questioning' eye by their *lider*, and persecuted by the right and the bureaucracy. . . ."

You have already turned the cheek many times. Isn't it time to go to the heart of the matter? Hasn't the time come to realize that you were mistaken when you thought General Perón was coming back to build a Socialist Fatherland? Hasn't the time come to realize that the tactic of winning the leadership of the movement was completely mistaken? Hasn't the time come to recognize that this incorrect tactic is the logical consequence of a wrong strategy: the strategy of 'popular fronts,' or—as you call them—'people's movements' with 80 percent of the political forces in the country, including the APR, the UCR, and other components of FREJULI [Frente Justicialista de Liberación—the Social Justice Liberation Front]? Isn't it time that you realized that the road for building socialism lies outside the Peronist movement, in organizing a new party independent of any paternalist capitalist tutelage?

You can be a very important factor for this perspective of building socialism. Now you have the floor. □

From 'Convergence' to 'State Capitalism'

By Marilyn Vogt

Last of Three Articles

Sakharov believes that the only hope for democratization in the Soviet Union is for the bureaucrats to reform themselves. He appears to hold no belief in the possibility of democratization coming about as a result of a fight waged by masses of Soviet workers.

This view is reflected in the statements Sakharov has issued over the past five years.

In his long statement of June 1968—*Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom* (which was attacked in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* in February 1973)—and in the open letter of March 1970, which with Valentin F. Turchin, a Soviet scientist, and Roy Medvedev, a Soviet historian, he submitted to Soviet party and government leaders, Sakharov outlined his political and economic positions.

In the 1968 article, dealing with problems of world tensions (specifically the threat of nuclear war), hunger, and poverty, Sakharov set forth two general conditions that he thought would lead to solutions. First, democratization of the "socialist countries," i.e., Stalinized workers states. The absence of democracy, he stated, explained why these countries were lagging behind in areas of science and technology, educational advancements, labor productivity, etc. He set forth a program for gradual democratization that could be brought about, according to his scheme, over a period of a few years. He was appealing to prospective progressive bureaucratic elements to implement democratization as a means for providing the optimum possibilities for improving all areas of Soviet life and to allow the Soviet Union to play what Sakharov felt was its proper role as the international leader in solving world problems.

Second, he proposed that efforts by workers and the intelligentsia in the capitalist countries and the example of socialist countries would lead to a victory for the "leftist reformist wing of the bourgeoisie, which would imple-

ment a program of rapprochement (convergence) with socialism, i.e., social progress, peaceful coexistence, and collaboration with socialism on a world scale and changes in the structure of ownership."

The joint open letter of March 1970 (signed by Sakharov, Medvedev, and Turchin) concentrated on measures for democratization in the Soviet Union. The letter was in response to "menacing signs of breakdown and stagnation . . . in the economy of our country." It outlined many areas of the society affected by economic stagnation and attributed the stagnation to the "antidemocratic traditions and norms of public life that appeared during Stalin's period and have not been completely liquidated down to the present time." Sakharov joined with Turchin and Medvedev in laying out a program for gradual democratization which would "engender a surge of enthusiasm comparable to that of the twenties."

In March 1970, Sakharov still considered himself a socialist and couched his criticism and recommendations from that point of view. His proposals were formulated to appeal to the ruling layers of the bureaucracy, to be implemented for the good of the Kremlin as well as the Soviet people.

Recently, his views have changed. He still calls for democratization; he still sees the evils produced by the rule of a bureaucratic caste. But he now says he is not a socialist and that socialism does not exist. What he thought was socialism, he says, has turned out to be only "state capitalism—an extreme form of the development of capitalism," different from what exists in the United States only by the "degree of monopolization." (Interview with Andrei Sakharov, *Washington Post*, August 12, 1973.)

It is ironic that Sakharov's proposals, so bitterly attacked by the Kremlin press, are for peaceful coexistence and for alliances of workers with the left bourgeoisie in capitalist countries—the same anti-Leninist

ideas put forward by the Soviet "Communist" party ever since Stalin came to dominate it in the mid-1920s with his utopian program of "socialism in a single country." The Stalinism of the Third International in those years led to this notion becoming official CP policy all over the capitalist world, especially with the popular fronts of the 1930s.

Sakharov's perspective differs from official Stalinist "peaceful coexistence"—a rationalization for class collaboration—in only one key way. Sakharov sets as the precondition for peaceful coexistence and international cooperation the democratization of Soviet society.

The fact that the Kremlin refuses to grant a single concession toward democracy is what has led to Sakharov's current mood of pessimism and his statements against the détente to foreign correspondents.

By mid-September the Kremlin's anti-Sakharov press campaign had subsided. The September 12 *New York Times* published Sakharov's public statement responding to the attacks.

In it the physicist drew back from the implication in his previous statements that the Soviet Union is a military threat to imperialism and reaffirmed his commitment to the struggle for democratization in the USSR. He spoke out in defense of Soviet political prisoners, including Pyotr Griorenko, a dissident Communist who has been subjected to compulsory psychiatric treatment in Soviet prison hospitals since May 1970 because of his militant struggle for a return to Leninism in Soviet domestic politics.

Sakharov condemned the method employed by the Kremlin to discredit him. The campaign of "open letters" and articles he described as "an unscrupulous play on the antiwar feelings of the nation which suffered the most from the Second World War. . . . It is a deliberate distortion of my position."

Sakharov places no confidence in the possibility of the Soviet masses struggling to restore Soviet democracy. As a result he places confidence in an outright will-of-the-wisp: the capitalist liberals' "commitment" to democracy. He ends up in a hopeless situation.

But Sakharov's pessimism in regard to the Soviet masses is unfounded.

The Kremlin's repressive drive is already beginning to backfire. Instead of terrorizing the Soviet people into silence, as it was intended to do, the Yakir-Krasin frame-up trial and the campaign against Sakharov have stirred renewed protest from the democratic currents, as recent reports from the Soviet Union indicate.

The people who are presently defying the bureaucratic authorities represent a current of opposition to bureaucratic rule that goes far beyond the privileged intelligentsia. If only in a

distorted form, the intellectual dissenters reflect mass moods of unrest, as the struggles in the Ukraine have already demonstrated.

Genuine democracy—workers democracy—will only be achieved in the Soviet Union by the rise of a mass antibureaucratic movement that culminates in a political revolution.

This movement's international allies will not be the bourgeois politicians and press, but the revolutionary movements of the working class and its allies around the world. □

Military Repression Under Civilian Regime

Turkish Elections Reflect Continued Instability

In the October 14 Turkish general elections, the first since the military overthrew the Demirel government in April 1971, the reformist Republican People's party (RPP) won the lead. Final returns from 65 of the 67 electoral provinces gave the RPP 178 seats in the 450-seat National Assembly.

Demirel's Justice party, which had been strongly favored to win, gained only 145 seats.

The RPP thus failed to attain the 226 seats necessary to rule by itself. If Suleyman Demirel sticks to his previous pledge not to participate in a coalition with the RPP, the ruling class's effort to return to civilian rule will be plagued by instability.

Bulent Ecevit, general secretary of the RPP, would then have to seek a coalition with the Democratic and National Salvation parties, although they are also likely to refuse. Those parties, which hold the balance of seats in the assembly, are even further to the right than the Justice party.

Under Demirel's government, the regime was thrown into crisis by massive student and worker demonstrations, increasing combativity in the working class, and the growing strength of Kurdish separatists.

The military ousted Demirel, replaced him with a handpicked civilian cabinet, and imposed martial law. But despite large-scale arrests, torture, and killing, it was only partially successful in crushing opposition to the government. The steady decline in the standard of living fueled continued

unrest among workers, peasants, and students. Terrorist actions supposedly carried out by the Turkish People's Liberation Army and Dev Genç (Revolutionary Youth) multiplied.

In this atmosphere, the RPP, which had supported the military take-over, began to bend to the left. Bulent Ecevit led the way with a rhetorical prom-

ise of "bright days" for the country.

The decision by a sector of the ruling class to return to civilian rule was prompted by the military's failure to undercut the radicalization and by embarrassment at international condemnation of the brutal repression. (Turkey is seeking to become a full member of the Common Market, and a new "democratic" face would make its application more acceptable.)

But the military permitted elections only after passing legislation that will allow it to continue the repression under a civilian government. The military courts presently trying large batches of dissidents will finish their jobs and then be replaced by state security courts composed of civilian and military judges.

Some of those now on trial face the death penalty when they are convicted.

The RPP has said that it favors a general amnesty for those already jailed by the repression but, lacking a majority in the National Assembly, it is not likely to be able to pass such a measure over the opposition of the other parties. □

'Second War of Independence'

ERP, MIR, Tupamaros Sign Joint Pledge

A joint communiqué issued in Buenos Aires by the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Army of the People] and the Tupamaros pledged close collaboration between these two groups and the Chilean MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left] in a "second war of independence," according to a UPI dispatch in the October 1 issue of the New York Spanish-language paper *El Diario*.

The statement was reportedly not published by the Argentine press because of the government's ban on disseminating declarations by the guerrilla groups. It said that the three organizations were united "in this second war of independence, reviving the in-

destructible and centuries-old unity of our peoples who, in a united and coordinated way victoriously waged the first war of independence against Spanish colonial domination."

The communiqué also pointed to the death of Gerardo M. Alter as an example of proletarian internationalism. Alter was killed in September by the Uruguayan repressive forces. He was sent by the ERP to work with the Tupamaros, the statement said, "as a result of the ever closer fraternal relationship of our two organizations, united in the struggle against the enemies of our peoples, against imperialism and capitalism, against bourgeois nationalism, and against the oppressor armies." □