

Nixon Aids Israeli Aggression



Why Spiro Agnew 'Copped a Plea'

First Days of the Coup:

A Chilean Refugee Tells the Story

**Israeli Courts
Ban Marxism**

**Harold Wilson
Blocks 'Lefts'**

Shah Arrests 12 in 'Kidnap Plot'

The shah's secret police have arrested a group of filmmakers, writers, and reporters and charged them with plotting to kidnap or assassinate a member of the royal family. According to the October 3 air-edition of the Teheran daily *Ettelaat*, the accused intended to carry out their plan during a ceremony at the children's film festival scheduled to occur late in October. The shah or his wife are to present the awards at the festival.

One of the accused, Reza Allamehzadeh, was to have received the award for best children's filmmaker.

Ettelaat claimed that the accused had "confessed" and gave this version of the "plot": "As soon as Allamehzadeh was to have approached to receive his award, Samakar, one of the other members of the group, brandishing a pistol, was to attempt to kidnap the crown prince Reza or any other member of the royal family who happened to be present, and if necessary to assassinate him."

Supposedly, the accused planned to demand an airplane to take them out of the country, with an unnamed foreign ambassador as hostage. The purpose of the alleged operation was to secure the freedom of some of the more than 4,000 oppositionists held in the shah's political prisons. *Ettelaat* reported that if the demand had not been met, the hostage "would have been killed."

The accused are scheduled to stand trial at a later date, presumably after the process of collecting "confessions" is complete. The group consists of ten men and two women who, according to the regime, adhere to "Marxist, anarchist ideology." They are:

Reza Allamehzadeh, Abbas-Ali Samakar, Tyfour Bathaie, Rahmat-Allah Jamshidi, Karamat Daneshian, Skokouh Farhang, Ebrahim Farhang, Maryam Etehadih, Morteza Syahpoush, Farhad Ghaysari, Manouchehr Moghadam-Salimi, and Khosrow Golsorkhi.

The government-controlled press carried identical accounts of the arrests and the alleged plot, indicating that the official story was handed out by SAVAK, the secret police. □

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Israeli Regime Escalates Its Aggression

By Jon Rothschild

On October 11, the fifth day of the October War, Israeli war minister Moshe Dayan took a tour of the just-reoccupied Golan Heights. Leaning languidly against a bunker, in the manner of a gunslinger in a U.S. western movie, he told television reporters: "We are going to teach the Syrians that the road that leads from Damascus to Tel Aviv also leads from Tel Aviv to Damascus." In the background, Dayan's tanks were forming up. On the sides of many of them was painted the slogan: "Damascus express."

Two days earlier, Major General Aharon Yariv, Israeli chief of staff, had held a news conference in Tel Aviv. Its purpose was to make excuses for the fact that Israeli troops had not yet "broken" the Syrian or Egyptian armies and to swear vengeance.

Speaking of the Syrian front, he said: "And we are going to press and we are going to push and we are going to bomb and we are going to punish as much and as long as we can until the other side does understand the rules of the game."

Yariv did not bother to enumerate just what rules the Syrians had so abysmally failed to understand that they had to be enlightened by pressing, pushing, bombing, and punishing. So it might be in order to explain them. As they were established in 1948, reaffirmed in 1956, and hardened up in 1967 and the following six years, the rules of the game are these: The Israeli army shall dominate the Arab East; the Israeli air force shall bomb at will civilian and military targets, while the Arabs shall be unable to defend themselves; the Israeli military machine shall be invincible; the Israeli regime shall periodically and more or less constantly humiliate the Arab world; the Zionist regime shall determine its own borders, which in principle extend from the edge of the Sinai to the banks of the Euphrates, and in reality extend from the westernmost position of the Israeli tank corps

to the easternmost one. These are the ground rules for implementation of the underlying Zionist program, which is to maintain and expand a state for all the world's Jews at the expense of the Arabs of Palestine and the entire



DAYAN: Takes his bombs and napalm down the road to Damascus.

Arab world. The operation of the rules is effected through the policy of establishing "accomplished facts" by whatever means necessary and defending those facts in the name of Western civilization and Jewish survival.

The Syrian army—and the Egyptian army too—had violated those rules. The Arabs had defended themselves, and with a degree of initial success that surprised the Israeli ruling class and most of the world as well. In the October 14 *New York Times*, Drew Middleton, resident military expert, made a chilling observation on the overconfidence of the Zionist armed forces: "The Israeli attitude was likened by experienced [U.S.] officers to that of the American forces when they first went into action in Vietnam."

'The Arab Is a Man Again'

"Arabs have had an inferiority complex toward Israel for years, and that was a definite plus for Israel," said the political officer of a Western European embassy in Tel Aviv as quoted by the October 12 *Wall Street Journal*. "Now the Arabs have seen that they can score advances against Israel. Even if the Arabs don't hold the ground that they gained, a whole new situation has been created here in the Middle East. The Arab, in his own eyes, is a man again."

The essence of that observation—minus, of course, its chauvinist tone—was echoed throughout the Arab world during the first week of the October War.

"On Saturday, Oct. 6, at 1:30 P.M., the Egyptians and Syrians stopped gazing at their lost lands and went across the cease-fire lines," Cairo-based correspondent Henry Tanner wrote in the October 14 *New York Times*. "War is never pretty or something to be exalted. But the depth of the humiliation and frustration in which the Arabs had been immersed could be gauged only by someone who saw the joy that gripped simple [sic] young Egyptian soldiers as they rode their trucks across the pontoon bridges on the Suez Canal."

In the October 10 *Le Monde*, J.-P. Péroncel-Hugoz, the Paris daily's Cairo correspondent, quoted an Egyptian intellectual commenting on the first three days of the fighting: "It's too good to be true, but it *is* true. After three days of war, not only are we still on the east bank of the canal, but our forces are still advancing into Sinai." The observation, Péroncel-Hugoz reported, is to be heard throughout Cairo.

The October 8 issue of the Beirut daily *an-Nahar*, one of the most prestigious newspapers in the Arab world, carried a story prominently featured in the center of the front page with the headline: "Israeli Expert: For the First Time We Are Engaged in a De-

fensive War." The story reported a news conference held by Chaim Herzog, former chief of Israeli intelligence and now a military spokesman, in which he observed that for the first time, the Israeli army had not struck first and did not have the initiative.

Herzog's statement was revealing enough in that it tacitly admitted, among other things, that the June 1967 war had not been a defensive fight for Israeli survival, which is what the Zionist leaders claimed at the time, but an aggressive action against the Arabs. But the Arabs do not need to get that information from *an-Nahar*; they know very well the character of the 1967 war. The point of *an-Nahar's* story was to stress the fact that even a legendary Zionist military figure had to admit that his army was not invincible.


There is no doubt that the initial Arab advances, and the ability to hold the line in Sinai and give the Israeli army a major battle in Syria, represent important psychological (and therefore political) victories for the Arab world. The effects of that victory will be felt for a long time to come, both in the Arab countries and in Israel. That victory will stand up regardless of the ultimate outcome of the war. It has, however, been a victory won at great cost; and its cost is likely to increase dramatically as the war goes on.

After the first week, the major fighting had been confined to the Syrian front, where by October 14 the Israeli armored and artillery units had moved within range of the Syrian capital, Damascus.

But the Syrian armed forces—even more than the Egyptian—had surprised the Zionist command in the tenacity and high quality of its defense of the Golan Heights and the road to Damascus.

The Syrian Front Resists

Although exact information has been difficult to come by because of censorship imposed in the warring countries, most reports indicate that Syrian tanks moved into the occupied Golan Heights in the afternoon of October 6. The size of the force is not clear. Most Western military analysts estimate it at about 850 tanks, out of a total Syrian tank force of 1,170. Israeli military spokesmen, obviously inter-



New York Times map indicates (1) pass through which Jordanian troops allegedly entered Syria to join front; (2) Sassa, town on the road to Damascus around which Israeli armor is camped; (3) Damascus, Syrian capital; (4) approximate location of Sinai front as of October 13, and (5) area of concentration of Egyptian missile defenses. Also shown, in northern Syria, are Latakia, Baniyas, Tartus, and Homs, cities that have been bombed by Israeli planes.

ested in inflating the size of the Syrian force involved, have claimed that Syria's real tank reserves are close to 2,000 and that well over 1,000 tanks were committed to the battle for Golan.

Whatever the size of the force, it was sufficient in the first day of the fighting to drive Israeli troops off the greater part of occupied Golan. The Syrians moved forward cautiously, in a well-organized manner.

The Syrians preserved the initiative through October 7, repelling Israeli counterattacks and withstanding intense Israeli air attacks aimed at breaking the Syrian advance. The Israeli counterattack began at full force on October 8. It was led by a furious

air assault that was directed not only against the Syrian tanks in Golan, but also against Syrian targets beyond Golan.

Initial statements by Israeli military officials indicated that the Zionist leaders expected the Syrian army to break and run under the force of the air and ground attacks. Of the three Arab armies attacked by Israel in 1967, Syria's fared the worst, seemed to be the poorest in leadership and technique. The Zionist command apparently made the mistake of allowing their ingrained racist ideology to outweigh an appreciation of reality. Their initial counterattack was launched with insufficient power, and the Syrian defenders were able, if not to repulse it, at least

to hold their ground. The Israeli response was to intensify the air attacks in an attempt to maul the Syrian ground forces and terrorize them into a disorderly retreat that could be turned into a rout.

By October 9 Israeli commanders were describing Golan as a "vast graveyard" of Syrian tanks. By nightfall, the Zionist command reported that all but "small remnants" of the Syrian forces had been driven beyond the 1967 cease-fire line. "Nonetheless," Terence Smith wrote in the October 10 *New York Times*, "heavy artillery battles continued into the night. As darkness fell, brilliant fires could be seen burning all along the eastern ridges of the [Golan] heights. Every few seconds there was a sudden brilliant flash, apparently from exploding artillery shells. Israeli warplanes continued to roar overhead. . . . The problems have come at night, when the Syrians have regrouped and counterattacked."

Major General Mordechai Hod, Israeli commander on the Syrian front, claimed October 9 that Israel had enjoyed "complete air superiority" since October 7, but he admitted that Syrian surface-to-air missiles supplied by the Soviet Union were taking a heavy toll of Israeli planes. Hod said that some 400 Syrian tanks had been destroyed in the first day and a half of the Israeli offensive.

But despite the Israeli air and ground assault, which may have been the most intensive tank attack in military history, the Syrian soldiers continued to resist, inflicting heavy casualties on the Israeli troops.

"The Syrians are much better as a fighting army than they were in the Six Day War," an Israeli soldier told reporters from the *Washington Post*. "They did not run away without their shoes this time. They came back, but they have no airplanes."

"An Israeli officer, pointing out that the Syrian forces had come close to reaching the cliffs overlooking the Sea of Galili," Charles Mohr wrote in the October 12 *New York Times*, "praised the tenacity of the Syrian troops. 'They moved and fought at night, which surprised us,' he said, adding: 'They fought in small units well and they continued to fight when they were badly hurt and isolated. Even men in immobilized vehicles were heard on the radio continuing to fire on us.

They were much better than in the past. I think we Israelis are going to be more humble.'

"Then the Israeli officer smiled and added, 'for about a week.'"

On October 10 the Zionist forces pushed past the 1967 cease-fire line at two points, regrouping for a march on Damascus. On October 11 they struck out along the road to Damascus, which lies some thirty-eight miles from the cease-fire line. By that point, the Israeli intelligence expert Chaim



MORDECHAI HOD: In charge of Israeli terror bombing.

Herzog was claiming that the Syrians had lost about 800 tanks. He upped the original estimate of the Syrian force involved in the Golan battle to 1,400 tanks, which, according to the estimate of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, is 230 more tanks than the Syrian army possesses.

The Israeli march on Damascus was accompanied by intensive terror bombing of Syrian cities. The ports of Latakia and Tartus were hit by Israeli planes. The town of Baniyas, an important juncture on an oil pipeline running from Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea, was bombed. The industrial city of Homs was bombarded by Israeli planes on October 10 and 11. The city of Damascus had already been hit by Israeli planes on October 9 in a raid that was clearly designed

to cause large civilian casualties. The Soviet cultural center in Damascus was bombed, as were residential areas around it. The civilian death toll in Damascus was estimated at about 100. Syrian officials reported that the two-day bombing of Homs cost about 400 civilians dead.

The October 13 issue of the Milan daily *Corriere Della Sera* reported that heavy Israeli bombing of Syria—both within and without the Golan Heights—had cost thousands of Syrian casualties. *Corriere's* correspondent on the Syrian front spoke of the Golan as a "frightful graveyard of men and vehicles" created by the "death from the skies" unleashed by Israeli planes. An Israeli tank driver was quoted as saying: "Tomorrow [October 13] we will be sipping champagne in the Ummayad Mosque in Damascus."

But the Israeli march on Damascus has been far slower than the Zionist leaders had expected. The Israelis were not in the Ummayad Mosque on October 13. Instead they were camped around the town of Sassa, almost exactly half way between the 1967 cease-fire line and Damascus. Juan de Onís, *New York Times* correspondent in Damascus, reported October 13 that reliable sources in Syria said that Syrian troops were "fighting spiritedly in organized fashion and showing no indication of a disorderly retreat."

It appeared by October 15 that Iraqi troops that had entered the fighting on the Syrian front had engaged the Israelis in a furious tank battle while the Syrians withdrew to defend Damascus itself. Late on October 14 the Israeli command announced that its long-range artillery, dug in around Sassa, was shelling the suburbs of Damascus. As of October 15 it appeared that the Israelis had decided against moving all the way to the city and would content themselves with bringing the center of Damascus within artillery range and delivering the "lesson" to the Syrians from afar.

The Syrian army, while unable to prevent the Israeli advance toward Damascus, had managed to acquit itself well enough to force the Israeli command—at least temporarily—to reject sacking the city as too costly. There is almost no doubt that the original Israeli plan was to pursue Syrian troops at least to the outskirts of Damascus if a 1967-type rout



Israeli soldiers guard a group of Arab detainees at an identification center in the occupied Arab territories.

could be effected. Thus, Israel had achieved military victory in the sense that additional Syrian territory was in Israeli hands, but the basic Zionist goals—annihilation of the Syrian army and mass terrorization of the Syrian population—had still not been achieved.

And the Sinai Front Holds

If the determined resistance of Syrian forces in Golan was a setback for the Zionist state, the advance of the Egyptian forces in Sinai was something approaching a trauma for the Israeli command. The Egyptians had established eleven pontoon bridges across the Suez Canal on the afternoon of October 6. By the afternoon of October 7, the Israeli command was already reporting that all but two of the bridges had been knocked out by the Israeli air attacks, that the Egyptian soldiers on the east bank of the canal were trapped, and that hundreds of Egyptian tanks and thousands of soldiers would be soon destroyed by Israeli counterattacks.

Egyptian communiqués denied the Israeli claims, asserting that the Arab forces had repaired damage to the bridges and that troops and tanks were continuing to pour across the

canal. By October 9 the Egyptian command was reporting that its troops had advanced nine miles into Sinai along most of the 100-mile-long east bank of the canal. Cairo reported that many Israeli prisoners had been taken and that the Israelis had been forced to abandon the Bar-Lev line—the front-line dug-in Israeli position several miles east of the canal. It was also reported that Egyptian naval vessels had sunk four Israeli patrol boats in a battle in the Mediterranean.

"While confirmation of the Egyptian figures has been impossible during the first three days of the fighting," William Dullforce reported in the October 10 *Washington Post*, "the general tenor of their communiques during that period has later proved to be substantially accurate, Western military experts here say."

And further: "The Israelis seem to have been surprised by the ingenuity and determination of the Egyptian attack, one expert surmised."

On October 9, General Yariv admitted that Israeli troops had in fact abandoned the Bar Lev line. Israeli military commanders began to speak of a "war of attrition" in Sinai. "We are not dealing with an enemy in flight," Chaim Herzog told Israelis in a radio address. "The Arab armies

are fighting in a very orderly manner." Yariv claimed October 9 that the Egyptian advance into Sinai had been halted, but that any Israeli counterattack would be slow in coming. "We have redressed the situation," he said, "but there is still a way ahead of us and we still have a lot of fighting."

"It is not going to be a short war," he added.

The Israeli command responded to its inability to destroy the Egyptian bridgeheads by bombarding the city of Port Said at the northernmost end of the canal. On October 9, 10, and 11 Israeli military activity was confined to probing Egyptian strength, moving up massive reinforcements for an eventual counterassault, and large-scale bombing, both of Egyptian troops crossing the canal and of airfields in the Nile delta in lower Egypt. Into the bargain, the Zionist command took the opportunity to inflict some civilian casualties on Egypt.

"In spite of the absence of any Egyptian strikes against Israeli territory, the Israeli Air Force the last few days has been subjecting Egyptian territory to heavy bombing," Henry Tanner reported from Cairo October 13. "The raids had caused 500 casualties among Egyptian civilians up to Thursday [October 11], according to a statement by Foreign Minister Mohammed H. el-Zayyat in New York. Dr. Zayyat's figures have not been announced locally, but the newspaper *Al Ahram* said yesterday that many Egyptian civilians had been killed.

"Similarly, Egyptian officials said yesterday that many Egyptian military casualties in the Sinai were victims of bombing by napalm. In Cairo hospitals, many military patients reportedly are being treated for napalm burns."

Tanner was among a group of Western reporters taken to the scene of an Israeli air attack October 11 on the main highway from Cairo to Alexandria. "The correspondents saw a bridge, a bus, a cafe, several taxis, a truck, water buffaloes and donkeys that had been struck by the planes. No military objective was in sight.

"The correspondents were taken to the hospital at Benha, the nearby town where some of the wounded had been taken, including a 5-year-old girl with heavy burns all over her face, arms

and legs. She had been on the bus with her family.

"Local officials said that 30 persons had been killed in the bus, 12 in the cafe."

Despite the bombing, the mood in Cairo was reported to be calm and confident. Egyptian troops continued to cross the canal, and by October 14 the number of Egyptian troops on the east bank was estimated by Western intelligence experts to be between 75,000 and 100,000; the number of tanks was said to be several hundred.

On October 14 the Egyptian command reported that a massive Egyptian offensive had pushed further into Sinai, inflicting many casualties on Israeli troops. Tel Aviv denied the claim, asserting that "human wave" attacks by Egyptian troops had been systematically repulsed. There was no independent confirmation of either announcement.

All that was certain was that the fighting in the Sinai would be costly and difficult for both sides. Whether the Egyptian forces were merely trying to maintain a defensive line or were aiming at advancing into Sinai was not clear.

Why Sadat Moved and What He Wants

What the Egyptian forces will try to do in Sinai is dependent not only on the unfolding military situation, but also on the political aims the Sadat regime had in opening the bridgeheads in the first place. It is above all quite certain that Cairo, which stood by in September 1970 without intervening to prevent King Hussein's slaughter of Palestinian fedayeen in Jordan, is not fighting to assert the rights of the Palestinian people.

Egyptian government spokesmen, especially Foreign Minister el-Zayyat have stressed again and again that destruction of the Zionist state is not the goal of the Sinai campaign. Military communiqués from Cairo have been totally free of threats to the continued existence of Zionism and there has been no call issued by Sadat to the Egyptian people to prepare for a final confrontation with the Israeli state.

El-Zayyat, who is in New York City participating in United Nations business, said on U.S. television that the

Egyptian troops would continue fighting until the Sinai peninsula was liberated from Israeli occupation. But even that is likely an overestimation of Sadat's goals.

Sadat moved troops across the canal because he had no choice. The factors determining that decision lie essentially in the domestic situation in Egypt, that situation being in turn heavily influenced by the three-year-old standoff on the Suez Canal.

The continued Israeli occupation of the Sinai and the absence of any apparent possibility of redressing the situation has been one of Sadat's prime concerns. The effect of the stalemate has been severalfold. For one thing, the morale of the Egyptian army had been steadily declining.

"Abandoned to a cease-fire that was dragging on and on," wrote Eric Rouleau in the October 9 *Le Monde*, "and discouraged by the absence of any solution, whether military or negotiated, indignant about the life-style being led in the capital by a bustling bourgeoisie granted great privileges by the regime, the troops' morale seemed to be well below that of Nasser's army on the eve of the six-day war. President Sadat did not hesitate to confide to a French diplomat: 'I have no illusions; our soldiers dream of only one thing: going home.'"

While the Egyptian army was becoming increasingly disgruntled at Sadat's inaction, the Zionist armed forces were increasing their strength, aided by both massive U.S. aid and by an unprecedented spate of military expansion inside Israel itself.

As the standoff dragged on, the Zionist regime was moving increasingly toward outright annexation of the territories conquered during the 1967 aggression. "The application of General Dayan's policy of establishing so-called accomplished facts, which is referred to by his opponents as 'rampant annexationism,' was accelerating," Rouleau wrote. "The Golan, taken from Syria, has been practically integrated [into Israel]. The economic development of certain regions of Sinai, the establishment of kibbutzim, the immense urbanization under way at Sharm el-Skeikh [at the southern tip of the Sinai peninsula], the impending creation of a new urban center called Yamit in the Raffah area [in northeast Sinai] all indicated that Mrs. Meir's government intended to

appropriate broad sections of Sinai. The electoral platform of the ruling Labor party, adopted last August, called for various other measures that would have amounted to multiplying Jewish agricultural and industrial implantations throughout the occupied territories, especially in Gaza [north-east Sinai], in the West Bank [of the Jordan], and in the area around the former Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, which was formally annexed just after the six-day war."

While the Israeli regime was bolstering its armed forces and increasingly moving toward annexation of the conquered territories, Washington and Moscow seemed to be remaining aloof. Ever since 1970 the Egyptian regime had been looking to "great power intervention" to impose a settlement that would have returned the occupied territories but left the Palestinians in their refugee camps.

In the middle of 1972 Sadat made a shift in his diplomatic posture. He expelled Soviet military advisers from Egypt in a clear overture to U.S. imperialism. He began granting interviews to American magazines and newspapers, seeking to drum up popular support in the United States for a policy shift in Washington.

While extending the olive branch to U.S. imperialism diplomatically, and while opening Egypt to U.S. investment, Sadat also tried to develop additional means of pressuring Washington. That was done by effecting the "reconciliation" with the Hashemite regime in Jordan and with the arch-reactionary, anti-Nasserite Faisal regime in Saudi Arabia. The aim was to create a solid front of pressure on Washington, utilizing the threat to withhold oil deliveries to the West as the major weapon.

But despite all this—and despite various noises about peace in the Arab East from Henry Kissinger—there was no pressure from Washington on Tel Aviv to offer any concessions to Sadat that would have allowed him to sign a settlement with sufficient face-saving concessions to win popular acceptance in Egypt. Sadat's diplomacy remained stagnating at dead center.

At the same time, Sadat's internal situation was deteriorating rapidly. Since coming to power in 1970, he had undone many of Nasser's popular reforms. That earned him the

loyalty of the Egyptian bourgeoisie and of certain layers of the officer corps with aspirations of transforming themselves into bourgeois, but it eroded his support among workers, students, and peasants.

The first sign that Sadat's credibility among Egyptians was drastically declining came in January 1972, when students in Cairo went on strike and confronted police in the center of the city. Despite the ensuing repression, the student movement was not crushed, and it exploded again at the beginning of 1973. This time, the government repression also struck at leftist intellectuals and at the growing layer of trade-union militants hostile to the regime.

By the middle of 1973, popular support for the Sadat government had declined to the point that Sadat had become little more than a target for derisive humor among the masses of people. The people demanded real action to recover the occupied territories; they demanded the elimination of the bourgeoisie's special privileges; even within the ranks of the army, discontent was high—an especially dangerous development in a country in which the army plays a major role in the administering of the state.

It was in that general context that Sadat gave the order to cross the canal. "The risks," Roland Delcour wrote in the October 9 *Le Monde*, "were no less enormous if the Egyptian forces should suffer a new setback. But the dangers of prolonging the immobility and decay of the internal situation were doubtlessly greater still. President Sadat preferred to plunge ahead."

The October 14 *New York Times* reported that "well-informed Arab sources" said that the Arab strategy is aimed "primarily at forcing the United States to choose between unconditional support of Israel and pressing Israel to accept a political settlement restoring the occupied lands for which the Arabs are fighting."

It follows then that Sadat will at least attempt to hold his position in the Sinai, to move it forward if militarily possible, but will fight to the end against Zionist attempts to force Egyptian troops back to the west bank of the canal. If the Egyptian troops are victorious, or if they are able to

engage the Israeli army in a protracted and costly war, Washington might be forced to pressure the Zionist rulers to negotiate a settlement that would return most of Sinai to Egypt—such is Cairo's assumption.

Zionist Objective: Extend the Aggression, Punish the Arabs

What the Zionist regime would like to do in the October War is certainly no secret. From the moment the first shots were fired, Israeli military leaders have stressed it: The Arabs must be pushed back to the 1967 lines *and beyond*; the Syrian army must be destroyed; the Egyptian army must be at least crippled for years to come, if not totally demolished.

The reasons for the Zionist objectives stem directly from the character of the Zionist movement and its state. The Zionist state is a foreign implantation in the Arab world. It was founded on the basis of expelling the native population from Palestine and depends for its existence as a Zionist state on perpetuating that expulsion.

The Zionist state stands in conflict not only with the Palestinian Arabs, but with the entire Arab world. Because of that, it must keep the Arab world divided, backward, and weak. How else could it maintain itself against the much larger Arab nation?

The essence of Zionist policy in the Arab East therefore consists of carrying out permanent aggression. In "peaceful" times this takes the form of dispossessing Arabs from their lands, thus denying the Palestinian Arabs the most elementary democratic right: the right to a country. Whenever the Zionist ruling class finds an opportunity to escalate the aggression, it seizes it, as it did in 1947-48, 1956, 1967, and throughout 1968-73, with its continual raids on Lebanon and Syria.

It is commonly asserted among Zionist leaders that while the Arabs can afford to lose many wars, Israel cannot afford to lose even one. Usually, the underlying thought is that for Israel to lose a war means for the Israeli population to be exterminated, which is arrant nonsense. But in a sense there is some truth to the Zionist assertion. A military victory for the Arab states—even a significant

partial one—would be a major step forward for the Arab masses, would be seen by them as such, and would therefore have the effect of strengthening the revolutionary movement in the Arab world. Moreover, it could not but have deep effects among the Israeli-Jews themselves, impelling them to seek alternatives to Zionism.

The desire of the Zionist ruling class to spare no effort to drive the Egyptian and Syrian armies back, and to inflict disastrous casualties on Arab armies and civilians, stems not from some personal baseness among the Zionist leaders (although that is surely not lacking), but from the exigencies of the maintenance of the Zionist state itself. There is no way that the Israeli ruling class can allow the Egyptians to remain in the Sinai. And there is little doubt that from a military standpoint, the Israeli armed forces have the power to push the Egyptians back eventually.

The problem for the Israeli rulers lies in the costs the necessary military effort will entail. Internally, there is no sign that any significant section of the Israeli-Jewish population would oppose a massive expenditure of lives and equipment to recapture the Sinai. All that is necessary is the preparation of the population for a relatively protracted war, which is the reason for General Yariv's somber-sounding press conferences.

The Israeli offensive in the Sinai will involve the most massive armed mobilization in the brief history of the Zionist state. No effort will be spared; no brutality forgone. For as long as the U.S. ruling class is willing to supply planes and equipment, the Zionist state will drive on in Sinai. The Israeli air force will do all it can to establish air supremacy over Sinai. Thus far, Soviet-provided surface-to-air missiles have been effective in limiting Zionist terror from the air. If it proves necessary, the Zionist commanders will go so far as to draw Egyptian SAMs off the front lines by striking at population centers deep in the Nile valley, whatever the sacrifice in planes. Western intelligence sources already estimate that the Israeli army has lost nearly 2,000 soldiers dead and perhaps as many as eighty combat aircraft. The Zionist regime will not hesitate to expand that figure in the interests of recapturing Sinai.

The battle in Sinai will be a long

one. And it can be stated with certainty that for as long as it goes on, Zionist atrocities against the Egyptian people will reach new heights.

The only factor that could prevent Israeli reconquest of Sinai would be a decision in Washington not to continue to resupply the Zionist war machine—or at least to threaten not to resupply it. In that event, the Israeli ruling class would have no choice but to curtail its aggression. But so far, U.S. imperialism has met every Zionist request for fresh military assistance. On October 15 the U.S. State Department acknowledged that a massive airlift to replace Israeli planes lost in the October War was under way. The U.S. ruling class in its entirety remains committed to preserving Zionist hegemony in the Arab East and will remain so committed.

If the Arab resistance were strong enough and a world movement of solidarity with the Arab revolution were big enough to prevent U.S. imperialist aid to the Zionist state, and if that combination of factors resulted in preventing the Israeli forces from reoccupying the Sinai peninsula, it would be a political defeat of vast proportions, both for Zionism and for imperialism in the Arab East. There is no doubt that the Zionist ruling class and the U.S. imperialists will resist such an outcome with all their might.

Political Repercussions of the October War

But even when the Israeli army reestablishes its control over Sinai—which is the overwhelming likelihood—the political complexion of the Arab East will be qualitatively altered. The effect of this war will be to weaken both the Zionist regime and the Arab regimes, to the advantage of the Arab revolution. For even assuming the worst occurs, if the Israeli regime achieves yet another crushing military victory, it will be faced with rising anti-Zionist sentiment from its own population.

A similar development took place after the 1967 war. Just after the war ended, Moshe Dayan announced to the Israeli people that permanent peace was at hand. The Israeli government, he explained, was simply "waiting for a phone call from Nasser." The Zionist victory was so over-

whelming, he claimed, that the Arab regimes would have no choice but to capitulate.

The small group of revolutionary anti-Zionists in Israel answered Dayan immediately. "You will get no phone call from Nasser," they predicted. The social revolutionary process under way in the Arab world would not be defeated by the Israeli army's defeat of Nasser's forces. The Palestinian Arabs would not disappear. Tel Aviv's 1967 victory was followed by an unprecedented development of the Palestinian resistance movement and by a concomitant leftward mobilization throughout the Arab world. The conflict, the Israeli revolutionists insisted, was permanent and would be so as long as the Zionist state continued to exist.

Dayan did not get his phone call from Nasser. And when the chauvinist hysteria prevailing during the war had abated somewhat, the anti-Zionist movement experienced a not insignificant growth.

The same process will undoubtedly be repeated this time—only on a much larger scale. The immediate aftermath of the war may see a strengthening of the overtly annexationist wing of the Israeli ruling class at the expense of the "doves," who are willing to return a tiny percentage of conquered land to the Arabs in exchange for a settlement. But such shifts are of no great import. They represent only minor squabbles within the Zionist camp.

For increasing numbers of Israeli youth, however, some deeper questions will be posed. How many times must wars take place until there is peace? How many Israeli-Jews must die for the preservation of Jewish exclusivity? The pondering of such questions will surely lead a larger number of youth to the realization that there will be no peace in the Arab East as long as the Zionist state exists, and to the realization that Zionism represents the interests not of the Israeli-Jewish masses but of the Israeli-Jewish ruling classes.

On the Arab side also, the October War will have salutary effects on the growth of revolutionary forces. Initially, Sadat may recoup some of the support he had lost since 1970, but the moral victories that have been won by the Arabs will only increase

the determination of the Arab workers and peasants to have done not only with Zionism, but with imperialist control of the Arab world, and with the local ruling classes' domination as well. After the major effort Sadat has made to liquidate the results of the Israeli aggression of 1967 fails to achieve its goal, some questions will be asked by the Egyptian workers, peasants, and students as well as by the Israeli masses. Why is it that the Arab governments cannot adequately defend Arab lands? What kind of society is necessary to ensure a real defense? Is the Arab inability to defeat Zionist aggression perhaps related to the domination of Arab societies by the existing ruling classes?

On both sides of whatever border the Zionist armies are able to impose, the answers to those questions will lead in a similar direction. Peace will come to the Arab East only when Zionism has been destroyed, when imperialism has been driven from the region, and when the local Arab ruling classes and the regimes they control—from Sadat's to Qaddafi's to el-Assad's—are destroyed by the revolutionary action of the workers and peasants. Peace will come to the Arab East when socialist revolution triumphs in the Arab East, and not before.

The October War has shaken the region out of a three-year-long torpor. The resulting changes will bring closer the end of the prevailing system of class and national domination. The Arab masses have already proven that Zionism can be fought and that they are prepared to make any sacrifice to fight it. And that is a victory that no amount of Israeli pressing, pushing, bombing, and punishing can erase. □

Romantic Interest

The CIA is reported to have gone into the computer-dating business in Venezuela. Customers of "Operation Amigo," which operates out of a Caracas luxury hotel, are asked to fill out questionnaires in order to be matched with compatible dates. The information—including such items as "leisure-time activities" and political affiliation—is then added to CIA files.

Nixon Moves to Aid Israeli Aggression

By Ernest Harsch

"The Defense Department refused to confirm or deny a report by the Norfolk Ledger-Star that a Boeing 707 with Israeli markings on its tail section was loaded with missiles and bombs at the Ocean Naval Air Station at Virginia Beach, Va., today. The newspaper quoted witnesses as having said that while the arms, among them Sparrow and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, were being loaded, the Israeli markings were covered with paper and masking tape." (*New York Times*, October 11.)

"The plane took off immediately after loading. U. S. government sources say it is likely that there will be other arms airlifts to Israel including artillery, shells, bombs and tactical missiles." (*Washington Post*, October 11.)

Pentagon officials claimed that these shipments of arms and military supplies to Israel from the United States and from American bases in Great Britain and West Germany constituted only "a minor effort." But while the U. S. government has tried to create the public impression that its military support to Israel is limited, it has quietly stepped up arms shipments and has placed the U. S. Sixth Fleet on full alert in the Mediterranean.

The October 14 *New York Times* reported that in addition "the United States is preparing to ship jet fighter planes to Israel to replace some of those lost in the first week of the Middle East war. . . .

"Shipment of the planes—primarily F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers, a type that is the backbone of the Israeli Air Force—is expected to begin in the next few days."

The decision to send replacement aircraft was made by the highest circles in Washington. John Finney commented, in an October 13 dispatch to the *New York Times*, that the "step is being taken with unusually tight secrecy by the Administration, which is deeply concerned about the repercussions it could have on American relations with oil-producing Arab

states as well as on Soviet actions in resupplying Egypt and Syria.

"State and Defense Department officials who had maintained that no decision had been made on shipping additional planes today refused, obviously on White House instructions, to discuss publicly any aspect of arms shipments to Israel.

"The clear indication was that a decision had been made but that there would be no public confirmation by the Administration.

"Although the United States has been supplying Israel with ammunition and air-to-air missiles on a relatively small scale in recent days, with the munitions transported by Israeli planes, it deferred until today a decision on shipping heavier equipment, hoping that military and political considerations would not demand such a step."

Previously the Pentagon and the White House had been hoping that the Israelis would be strong enough to dislodge both the Egyptian and Syrian forces without the need for heavy and extensive shipments of U. S. arms. But the tenacity of the Egyptians in the Sinai and heavy Israeli losses of planes and tanks prompted Washington to reaffirm its military support to the Zionist state, however much it may try to make that support seem "limited."

The October 9 *Wall Street Journal* restated what the U. S. position has been since the founding of the state of Israel: "U. S. interests include its long-term commitment to the security of Israel, a commitment which has become important to U. S. political credibility in the world at large. . . . If [the U. S.] should renege, or even seem to be hedging on its commitment to Israel for the sake of oil, there would be very serious damage to the U. S. image and most likely further demands from the Arabs for further appeasement."

Senator Edward Kennedy was even more succinct when he spoke before the Conference of Presidents of

Major Jewish Organizations October 10. He said that the United States "has pledged to assure the people of Israel the arms they need. . . . In the past we have stood by that pledge. And I say that we will stand by the pledge today and tomorrow and for however long it takes for all nations to accept the existence and the independence of the state of Israel."

That pledge of support will become more and more crucial as the Israelis continue to take heavy losses. An October 14 *New York Times* report revealed that Israel had already lost seventy-five to eighty planes. In addition, the Israelis informed the Pentagon that they had lost over 500 tanks.

Should the war continue much longer, the immediate role of the United States as Israel's military warehouse can only increase. In the October 11 *New York Times* John Finney wrote: "Within Administration circles there is a growing belief that the Israeli forces, which were equipped to fight a short, decisive war, cannot fight a protracted one against the numerically superior Arab forces without the assurance of some resupply by the United States."

And should fresh supplies of military equipment prove insufficient to break the resistance of the Egyptian and Syrian armies, the saber-rattling of the U. S. Navy in the Mediterranean poses the threat of direct U. S. intervention. Since the fighting began on October 6, the U. S. Sixth Fleet has been put on alert "within a few hours steaming time" of the Arab East. The aircraft carrier *Independence* and the helicopter carriers *Guadalcanal* and *Iwo Jima* have been added to the fleet, the size of the United States Marine force attached to the fleet has been doubled, and the aircraft carrier *Franklin D. Roosevelt* has left Barcelona in the direction of the Arab East.

An October 13 Reuters dispatch from Paris indicated the possibility that some U. S. planes were already involved in some aspect of the war. It stated: "A Syrian Embassy spokesman said today that a Phantom jet bearing United States Air Force markings and piloted by an American who had fought in Vietnam was shot down yesterday over Damascus.

"Earlier, the Arab League offices here issued a statement saying that the Syrian Government had announced

shooting down United States planes piloted by Americans."

To give some diplomatic cover to the arms shipments to Israel and to help prepare public opinion for the possibility of direct U. S. involvement in the fighting, the U. S. government has tried to use the Soviet airlift of arms to the Arabs as justification for its own military support to Israel. In a statement clearly aimed at the Kremlin, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned at a press conference on October 8: "We will react if relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots. . . . The Soviet Union cannot disregard [the principles of détente] in any area of the world without imperiling its entire relationship with the United States. . . . Detente cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East."

An editorial in the October 11 *Washington Post* called on Nixon to "consider carefully some response, perhaps in the form of an offsetting offer to resupply Israel if the need arises, by way of informing all parties that this country is not indifferent to the incendiary and provocative performances of the Soviets in the current Mideast conflict. Detente cannot work if Moscow is permitted to believe that it can encourage war-making by the Arabs while piously giving lip service to its interest in building a durable peace in the world."

The Nixon administration hopes that these threats will cause the Kremlin to limit its military support to the struggles of the Arabs to recover the occupied territories. And Nixon has every reason to be hopeful: The October 9 *New York Times* reported that "Mr. Brezhnev's comments in Moscow today were regarded as in keeping with the apparent Soviet desire to avoid a confrontation with the United States."

"Mr. Brezhnev said that although the Soviet Union supported Egypt and Syria, calling them 'the victims of aggression,' his country 'has been and remains a convinced supporter of a fair and stable peace in the Middle East and of guaranteed security for all countries and peoples of the area.'"

The *Christian Science Monitor* had by October 12 already noticed signs of "restraint" on the Kremlin's part. It reported: "Administration officials say that the Soviet airlift of equip-



KISSINGER: Puts the screws on Soviet bureaucrats.

ment to the Arabs Thursday [October 11] was less intensive than earlier this week and had in fact quieted down 'very substantially.' Fewer planes

Greece

Students Stage Demonstration in Athens

Athens

More than 1,000 students staged a rally at the Law School of Athens September 25. Declaring the meeting illegal, university officials locked the doors, barring students from entering unless they had to take examinations.

Students inside the building managed to get out to join the rally. The demonstrators marched into the center of the city, blocking traffic as they sang resistance songs and chanted slogans.

Among the slogans were "Down With the Junta!" "Yankees Go Home!" "No More Chiles!" "Long Live Allende!" "Academic Freedom!" "Repeal the Decree for the Induction of Radical Students Into the Army!"

shuttled across the Mediterranean to Syria and Egypt. . . .

"If the slowdown continues Friday, these officials indicate, this could point to a deliberate Kremlin decision to exercise restraint and this would have a significant effect on developments in the Middle East and on efforts to bring about a cease-fire."

But despite the Soviet bureaucracy's interest in maintaining "peaceful co-existence," the determination of U. S. imperialism to back Israel to the hilt poses the threat of nuclear confrontation. In a press conference on October 12, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pointed to just such a danger. "The reason why we believe that a long-term settlement in the Middle East is so important is the danger that the Middle East may become in time what the Balkans were in Europe before 1914," he said. "That is to say, an area where local rivalries that have their own momentum will draw in the great nuclear powers into a confrontation that they did not necessarily seek or even necessarily start."

The danger, however, comes not from the Soviet Union, but rather from Washington's determination to guarantee the military hegemony of the Zionist state and to serve as quartermaster for its permanent aggression against the Arab world. □

Other slogans were directed against inflation.

The students appealed for solidarity from people in the streets. Construction workers on jobs responded by saluting with their fists and echoing the slogans.

Foreign youths visiting Athens as tourists joined the demonstrators. They were greeted warmly for this display of international solidarity.

Plainclothes policemen attempted several times to break up the demonstration by driving their cars through the marchers, but failed.


Near Clauthmonos Square large numbers of uniformed police, clubs in hand, met the demonstration head on and broke it up.

Both the police and the capitalist press reported that no arrests were made. The truth was otherwise. After the demonstrators dispersed, plainclothes cops combed the central areas, arresting many youths who the police thought might have participated in the action. The excuse was a "checkup" on identity cards.

Among those seized in this way was Jiannis Felekis, a Trotskyist released from prison a month ago after serving four years and four months because of his radical political views.

The secret police of the Third Police Division of Athens held him for eight hours. He was punched in the face and abdomen and kicked in the legs by his interrogators. They threatened to "really" injure him and send him back to prison.

Some of the students were so excited over the rally that they felt it might be



Athens students demonstrating against the dictatorship.

the beginning of a "Greek May." That appears to be too optimistic a view.

However, it is true that tension is rising among the masses. Even sectors of the bourgeoisie, hit by inflation, are dissatisfied. Leaders of the trade unions, although appointed by the junta, find it necessary to talk about the need for strike action to meet the pressure from the ranks for a 35 percent wage increase. (The bosses are offering 8 to 10 percent.)

Prices in the recent period have gone up 100 percent and in some instances 200 percent. No slowdown in the skyrocketing cost of living is in sight.

All these facts are well known to the students, and they are counting on the workers and other sectors of the oppressed to move into action. A primary problem, however, is to build a solid, consistent revolutionary organi-

zation.

It will not be easy for Papadopoulos and his American backers to reduce the pressure, although they are trying to do so by brightening up the regime with some parliamentary whitewash. □

Songfest Ends in Street Demonstration

Athens

A concert of radical songs, conducted by the Greek musician Stavros Xarhakos, ended with the audience of some 25,000 youths marching through the streets of Athens October 1.

The Panathinaikos football stadium, where the songfest was held, was packed by 8 o'clock, an hour and a half before the program was to begin. When the concert came to an end at 12 o'clock, the audience flowing into Alexandra Avenue continued to sing and chant and clap hands.

Slogans began to replace the songs: "People's Republic!" "People—Revolution!" "Yankees Go Home!" "Power to the People!" "Viva Allende!" "Viva Chilean People—Venceremos!"

Some of the slogans referred to the current effort of the military dictator-

ship to camouflage itself with democratic trappings: "Markezinis—Puppet!" "Markezinis—Corporal!"

Spyros Markezinis is an old-time bourgeois politician named by Papadopoulos to be premier and head of the civilian cabinet that replaced the military junta October 8.

On Alexandra Avenue squadrons of police attacked the demonstrators with fists and clubs. They also used squad cars, driving them at a high rate of speed in pursuit of groups of youths, chasing them even on the sidewalks. This was the first time in Greece that the police have used this tactic.

The demonstrators nevertheless managed to proceed the full length of Alexandra Avenue, many of them reaching Omonia Square and other central points. □

Ireland

3,000 Commemorate First Derry March

London

On Saturday, October 6, more than 3,000 persons from various parts of Northern Ireland participated in a commemorative march sponsored by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA).

The demonstration marked the fifth anniversary of the first civil rights march in Derry on October 5, 1968. That protest was viciously attacked, bringing the plight of the Catholic minority to the attention of the entire world.

The commemorative march started from the Creggan Estate, wound through the Bogside, and ended at Free Derry Corner to hear speeches from representatives of NICRA.

The demands of the demonstration included:

1. The immediate and total end of internment in any form.

2. Legislation by Westminster conceding that every political party has the right to work within the law for the attainment of its political objectives of human and civil rights, especially the ending of the Emergency Provisions Act.

3. Phased withdrawal of British troops and strictly observed restriction of their role to peacekeeping pending their ultimate withdrawal.

4. Democratic reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the judiciary.

5. Disbanding of the Ulster Defense Regiment (which replaced the notorious B Specials) and amnesty for all political prisoners and rent-and-rate strikers. □

How Israeli Courts Declared Marxism Against the Law

[Among the most persistent myths about the nature of the Israeli regime prevalent in the West is that the Israeli government grants full democratic rights to its citizens, or at least to its Jewish citizens. In fact, when it declared its "independence" in 1948, the Zionist state left intact a series of "emergency and defense regulations" that had been passed by the British government during the period of its mandate over Palestine.

[The emergency regulations give the regime the right to imprison persons without charge or trial, to restrict individuals to their villages (or even smaller areas), to declare any section of the country off limits to persons who lack security clearances, and to carry out various other repressive measures purely by decree. These regulations have been consistently used against Arabs.

[In 1973, however, the Zionist state turned the regulations against Jewish anti-Zionists. The case involved was the "espionage and sabotage network" allegedly discovered by the Shin Bet, the Israeli secret police. In December 1972 about forty persons were arrested on charges stemming from this "network." Several of those arrested were anti-Zionist Jews, the first Israeli-Jews ever to be charged with working for the Arab "enemy" for ideological rather than monetary reasons. There followed a series of frame-up trials, conducted in Haifa during the first half of 1973.

[One of the more celebrated defendants was Rami Livneh, a member of the Revolutionary Communist Alliance (often known as *Struggle*, the name of its newspaper). Livneh was charged with having met with a "foreign agent" (actually, a member of a Palestinian organization) in 1970 and with possession of illegal "enemy" (that is, Arab) literature.

[Since the government had no evidence that Livneh had committed any crime, it decided to extract a "confession" from him by torturing his Arab friend, Shawki Khatib, and by informing Livneh that until he "talked," his friend's ordeal would continue.

Livneh signed a "confession" that he repudiated in court. Several of the defendants in the trials also charged that they had been tortured.

[All the defendants in the Haifa trials were found guilty. Livneh was sentenced to ten years in prison on June 24.

[The import of the Haifa trials was not only their effect on the defendants themselves, but also the fact that the Israeli courts in effect declared anti-Zionist *political programs* to be illegal. The following article examines the way this was done and looks at some of the implications. It appeared in the August issue of *Matzpen-Marxist*, monthly organ of the Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen-Marxist), the Israeli Trotskyist group.

[We received the article in French translation and have translated it into English. Because of its length, we are serializing it in two parts. The concluding installment will appear in the October 29 issue of *Intercontinental Press*.

[Readers who find the Alice in Wonderland character of Israeli justice intriguing can obtain further information on the Haifa trials from the Israeli Human Rights League, c.o. Dr. Israel Shahak, 2 Bartenura Street, Jerusalem, Israel. The full text of Rami Livneh's statement to the court (parts of which were published in the August 6 issue of *Intercontinental Press*) is available from the Human Rights League, as is Livneh's testimony about the torture of the prisoners.]

* * *

In many ways the trial of the last batch of defendants in the Haifa series of frame-ups was a caricature of the trials that went before. What had been hidden in the earlier trials came out openly in the last one; what had been shrouded in a veil of objectivity stood out unadorned; what had been only suggested was openly declared. In other words, the court showed itself for what it really is: just one more element of the state's repressive ap-

paratus. This court conducted an antitrial, even according to the concepts and norms of bourgeois justice, and it proved publicly that it is incapable of acting within the framework of its own legality.

How was this so?

Bourgeois-democratic jurisprudence supposes and affirms that the court is a neutral element that should judge between two equal parties, the defense and the prosecution. Further, it is clearly affirmed that the accused is innocent until proven guilty.

But in this trial the judges placed themselves squarely in the camp of the prosecution, assisted the witnesses for the state when they began to falter in their lying and shameful declarations; and, when the judges made a decision in favor of the prosecution, they scarcely even bothered to present any arguments. "The prosecution has its reasons and we accept them as such," the judges said when the defense asked the court to strike one of the counts of the indictment that was based on the "emergency regulations" and to replace it with one from the penal code that dealt with exactly the same offense but entailed a much less severe penalty.

Then, the court found the defendants guilty on all counts. In the course of the trial, when it turned out that the defendants could not be convicted on some count, the judges moved to strike it from the indictment so that the court would not have to find the defendants innocent of any charge. The show had to be complete; no loose ends. The "confessions" given to the police had to be complete and had to touch on all the counts of the indictment (the confessions being the only "evidence" the prosecution was able to lodge against the defendants); the court was obliged to assert that the agents of the security service are angels, model law-abiding citizens; and in the finest tradition of the frame-up trial it had to find the accused guilty on all counts.

It was quite obvious that the trial was not mounted in order to get at the truth, but rather "to alert us to

the fact that the road from ideology to the criminal application of ideology is not a long one"; and for that reason "the main point of this trial is in the first place educational." (So wrote Z. Tal in the February 25 issue of *Yediot Aharonot*.)

The epitome of this judicial farce came with the hysteria that seized the judges when they heard Rami Livneh's last declaration before the verdict: "The day will come," Rami said, "when those responsible for this trial, along with those responsible for all the crimes of this regime, will be called to account for these crimes that they have committed in the name of the laws that they have passed or adapted and which are contrary to the interests of the majority of the people. And when the people judge these criminals, nobody will be able to hide behind the argument that he was only following orders."

The hypocritical reaction of the judges proved more than anything else how right Rami Livneh was. In effect, the judges felt themselves compelled to proclaim that Rami Livneh was not on trial for his political ideas but for his acts and that "the very fact that he was able to make such a grave and extremist declaration before this court without anything being done to him for it can only prove how deep democracy in Israel is." And then without batting an eye, the same judges sentenced Rami to ten years in jail for "contact with an enemy agent."

So. Nothing was done to Rami for his extremist words. And in Israel we have a real democracy in which a trial takes place without foul play.

* * *

The legal basis of the charges against the Haifa defendants was basically the emergency regulations of 1945 and the law on state security. At one time Dov Yossef, a former minister of justice in Israel, said of these unfortunately well-known emergency decrees: "The main question is whether each of us is to be subject to an *official terrorism* . . . or whether individual liberties will prevail here. Will the administration be able to pry into the life of each individual, depriving him of the most elementary security? It would be enough for a decision to be made in an office for a man's fate to be sealed."

Another famous jurist declared after these decrees were published: "The regime established on these regulations has no parallel in any civilized nation. Even in Nazi Germany there were no such laws. . . . It is true that we are assured that these decrees will be applied only against criminals and not against the whole population, but the Nazi governor of occupied Oslo also declared that nothing would happen to citizens quietly going about their business. No government has the right to pass such laws."

Just and courageous words. But for those who may not know, the coura-



MEIR: "Democracy" requires keeping anti-Zionists in prison.

geous lawyer who said them in the 1940s is in 1973 the Israeli minister of justice, Yakov Shapiro, under whose authority the Haifa trials took place; and it was he who determined under which "democratic law" of Israeli "democracy" the defendants would be tried.

Another weapon in Shapiro's judicial arsenal was the law on state security, another Israeli innovation in law and justice. While the norms of classical justice say that a man is innocent until proven guilty, according to the state security law the defendant is guilty until he has proved his own innocence.

How true it is that "progress comes from Zion!"

The hypocrisy and spirit of vengeance characteristic of all sensation-

alist trials came through continuously during these trials. This became obvious through an apparently secondary point: All the accused were indicted on the basis of their own confessions, with no additional evidence. Some of the accused affirmed at the trial that their confessions were extorted under pressure, intimidation, and torture. But the judges did not accept these affirmations in any case. In regard to Rami Livneh, for example, the judges said:

"The accused asserted that he was beaten, that his interrogators threatened to take reprisals against his wife and children, that he was brought to see Shawki [Khatib] and [Subhi] Na'arani in order to make him talk, and further, that Shawki Khatib, his best friend, was tortured to make him [Livneh] talk. . . . According to the inquiry of these witnesses [agents of Shin Bet], it appears that the accused refused to offer his version of the facts during the entire period between his arrest (December 12, 1972) and January 3, 1973." (From the trial record, p. 551.)

In other words, Rami Livneh refused to "confess" during the police interrogation and during the whole period of his imprisonment. In this he was trying to assert his right, guaranteed by law, not to speak before the trial. For if Rami Livneh had really committed a crime, as the security service claims, and if there was proof that he had done so, then why should he have to confess? Why could he not exercise his most elementary right: not to speak before the trial? If the police and the security service agents did not employ such illegal methods of "interrogation" as humiliation, threat, and torture, what's the difference if the accused confesses at the police station or at the trial? Obviously, these are purely rhetorical questions.

Rami could not have been convicted except on the basis of "confessions" that were extorted from him by means of pressure and torture. And if he hadn't been convicted, the whole show would have been ruined.

During the trial, Rami Livneh affirmed: "The charge presented against me in this court is based on false confessions extracted by pure extortion. The Shin Bet agents, whose profession is terror, lies, and violence, and who act in the name of the state apparatus, worked just like their Por-

tuguese, French, Belgian, Spanish, Greek, and American colleagues. After nine days of interrogation, which was full of beatings and throughout which I defended my right not to make any declarations but in court, they took the most horrifying course one can imagine. They took my friend who is as close to me as a brother could be [Shawki Khatib]; they tortured him with electricity and cold showers, and simply announced to me that they would not stop until I was ready to talk. I talked. I told them I was ready to say whatever they wanted—and I truly 'incriminated' myself; I signed whatever they wanted me to." (Page 380 of the trial record.)

If the court had accepted Rami Livneh's description, it would have had to find him innocent, because apart from the "confessions" there was no material evidence against him. But obviously, that was impossible, because it would have destroyed the whole spectacle of the frame-ups. That is why the court rejected Rami's arguments about the torture, justifying its ruling in a manner that completely exposed the hypocrisy and bias of the court: Here is what the judges said:

"We watched Shawki in the witness stand and we got the impression that he was lying in a shameless manner in his testimony. During all his testimony he stood with his eyes lowered, not daring to look at us, or even at the defendants in the dock. . . . We are therefore of the view that Shawki's story about torture and electricity has no truth to it and we reject it. Consequently, Livneh's version of the torture that Shawki supposedly suffered is a fabrication. We believe in our hearts that Livneh made this story up to slander the agents of the security service; we have heard testimony of the deep hatred the accused feels for the agents of the security service. We will not dwell in detail on all the calumnies the accused has hurled at the court. . . . We do not believe the accused when he speaks of humiliations, blows, and threats." (Page 553 of the trial record.)

In other words, since Shawki Khatib did not look them in the eye, and since Rami Livneh does not like Shin Bet, the honorable judges find it obvious that their testimony about torture is nothing but lies and slander. Their "confessions" are valid and may

serve as the (only) basis for finding them guilty. We can only admire the perspicacity of the judges, both as to their profound understanding of criminal psychology and as to their objectivity and lack of bias.

* * *

But as serious as these facts are, they are only anecdotes in the context of a much more tragic spectacle. The real horror lies in the totality of the draconian laws and judicial precedents that the judges set in the course of convicting the Haifa defendants.

There can no longer be any doubt that today "as soon as a decision is made in an office, a man's fate is sealed." Because the Shin Bet agents—whom we are not entitled to hate—will be able to wring whatever they want out of anybody—by their own means, which the court has recognized as valid. Moreover, considering the antidemocratic significance of the trials, it is also obvious now that the most elementary democratic rights that exist under any so-called democratic system have been annulled.

The real scandal of the Haifa trials is that *all* opposition can now be legally forbidden. Any person who struggles against the regime, or even against some aspect of the regime, must know that he is not in jail only because the regime is not yet interested in arresting him; and that the moment that "in an office the decision is made, his fate is sealed."

Let's take an apparently banal example: the charge against Rami Livneh that he was "in possession of the newspapers of a banned organization." That is a crime according to the emergency regulations, which so many "liberal and left Zionists" supported so long as they were used "only against the Arabs." Rami explained that these newspapers "came to me through the Israeli postal system from a Swedish man who had visited the country, from whom I had requested political material on the Middle East.

"On this occasion, I would like to confess to some further actions of mine similar to this.

"Before my arrest, I and my friends used to spend our time in the Hebrew University library reading the newspaper *el-Hurriyah*, which is freely available there. *El-Hurriyah* is a newspaper published in Lebanon, a coun-

try defined by Israeli law as an 'enemy country.' It was the organ of the Palestinian organization Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DPFLP]. Furthermore, we used to photocopy important articles on the spot, a service rendered every student at a cost of 40 agorot a page [about \$US 0.10]. We even translated some of them.

"Some months before being arrested, I committed a similar crime by buying in Jerusalem a copy of the newspaper *el-Arabi*, a literary review that also prints political articles and is published in Kuwait, which is also defined by Israeli law as an enemy country. Anyone can purchase either newspaper in Haifa or Nazareth as well, at any newsstand. . . .

"There is no doubt that those newspapers are sold freely and that anybody can freely see the organ of the DPFLP at the University library. There is no doubt that these facts are known to the prosecution, and certainly there is no doubt that they are known to the Shin Bet. The attempt to incriminate me with the accusation of having such newspapers—an accusation for which the maximum penalty is ten years—is amazing in its idleness and daring."

That was Rami Livneh's comment. And here are the arguments by which the judges found him guilty:

"The question here is two publications of the DPFLP, the organization of Nayef Hawatmeh, which were found during a search of his [Rami's] home. The witness [a Shin Bet "specialist"] admitted that it could be that such newspapers are available at the Shiloakh Institute [a Middle East research institute], but he was not sure that these newspapers are on sale in bookstores. . . . That is why we have no choice, and must render a guilty verdict on this infraction of the law, even though it is the least serious of all the charges. It may have been better not to have included it in the indictment." (Pages 559-561 of the trial record.)

Long live Israeli justice! Glory to the court that advises the prosecution on what should or should not be included in the indictment! But since the charge got included anyhow, there is "no choice" but to find him guilty of this crime too. A "crime" that bears a maximum sentence of ten years. The judges knew very well that the

"expert" from the security service was deliberately lying when he said he wasn't "sure" that these newspapers were sold in bookstores, let alone the fact that all sorts of newspapers from "banned organizations" are freely sold on newsstands. But according to the time-honored tradition of frame-up trials, the Israeli court had to protect the entire scenario and preserve its "educational character."

* * *

The main charge against Rami Livneh was "contact with a foreign agent." According to the Shin Bet, this "foreign agent" was a Palestinian student who entered Israel legally under the Summer Visits; Rami met with him to hold political discussions.

Rami told the court: "The notion of contact as a crime is quite interesting. In none of the countries considered as 'enlightened' by the prosecutor's spiritual fathers does contact in and of itself constitute a security offense. Even in England during the second world war a man could be tried for having contacts with a foreign agent only if he had aided that agent in some active way. The notion that contact in itself is a criminal offense is a thoroughly antidemocratic one that flatly dispenses with the most elementary democratic rights by erecting a taboo; a taboo according to which there are untouchables with whom one is not allowed to speak, with whom one cannot even sit in the same room without having to denounce them to the authorities. Such a taboo belongs to the feudal era.

"The man I had met (three years ago!) has been described by the prosecutor as a 'foreign agent.' Yet even the prosecution itself recognizes that the man was introduced to me as a Palestinian connected with the Palestinian resistance movement. If what the prosecution means to say is that the man was an agent for a foreign state, then I did not know, could not have known, and still do not know it. And it has yet to be proven.

"Yet if the argument is that the man is a foreign agent *by the fact of his being connected* with the Palestinian resistance movement, then there is nothing that could symbolize more clearly the quality of the Zionist movement's approach to the Palestinian movement, an approach that is to be

understood from the casting of the *foreign-agent* concept upon one who is connected with a movement whose whole foundation is the belonging—the Zionists would say the attachment—of the dispossessed Palestinian-Arab people to the country of its birth.

"Many things could be said about the Palestinian resistance movement, but it is impossible to attach to it the label of 'foreignness'—not to this land and not to this region." (Pages 373-74 of the trial record.)

Moreover, not only is mere contact a crime in Israel—even if you didn't do anything and even if you reject the propositions of the "foreign agent"



HAWATMEH: His publications are dangerous reading.

—but also, according to the norms of Israeli democracy (the "only democracy in the Middle East"), it is not up to the prosecution to prove your guilt; it is up to you to prove your innocence. And how? That is a question to which we can find no answer. In any case, the defendant is supposed to give a convincing explanation of the reasons for his meeting. Rami Livneh tried to do this. He said:

"I met a man who was presented to me as a Palestinian socialist. I went innocently to meet with him to discuss politics—and that's all. Our meeting took place in broad daylight at a spot that many people pass by: next to the entrance to the French Hospital in the center of Nazareth. The attempt to describe it as an under-

ground meeting would be funny were it not for the fact that it is an attempt to incriminate me before the law, to sentence me to a heavy prison term, and to harm the political work of the Revolutionary Communist Alliance (Struggle). . . . I did not have the faintest knowledge of any hidden tasks or goals that he [the "agent"] allegedly had—if in fact he had any—as detailed in Paragraph 9 of the indictment. As far as I knew then—and as far as I know today—the man I met was not an agent; and certainly he was not a foreigner. I do not say that he was an agent provocateur sent to trap me, although that is also a possibility. . . . And the second meeting, which actually never took place, has, like the first one, a reasonable explanation. Such meetings between Israelis and Palestinians to clarify political positions have taken place by the dozens and by the hundreds in this country and abroad. Moreover, the results and summaries of such meetings have been published, and no one has ever been tried for that. The Bologna conference that took place recently is just one example. . . .

"I vehemently reject the government's demand that it be informed about the political activity of its opponents. I never for a moment considered informing the authorities about the political discussion I had with this man, and I do not for a moment consider reporting future political discussions. . . . Even if the court argues that this man was a foreign agent, I had no way of knowing that, and in fact I do not know it now. And this is apart from the fact that my explanation of the meeting is completely reasonable." (Pages 380-82 of the trial record.)

But Rami didn't have a chance; for the honorable judges had already explained what they considered a "plausible explanation" when they ruled on the indictment of Meli Lerman.

During the Meli Lerman trial the defense affirmed that "it has not been proven that the accused had had the intention of doing anything with the aim of attacking the security of the state." To this the judges answered:

"We cannot accept this argument, for the following reasons: The accused himself explained in his confessions that the aim of his organization, the Revolutionary Communist

Alliance, is the overthrow of the regime, that it sought, at some point, to make an armed revolution in Israel to take power, and that it would be necessary to resort to such methods because the regime would not be prepared to give up. When a member of such an organization meets a member of the Fateh organization, who is, as we have already said, a foreign agent, it cannot be reasonably affirmed that he only had the intention of exchanging political ideas and that he did not have the intention of doing anything that could attack state security. The argument that the intention was only to exchange political ideas between the two organizations cannot serve as a reasonable explanation."

Put more simply, if you belong to a revolutionary organization and you meet a Palestinian (whom the Shin Bet agents admit they have never heard of until they hear his name in your confession) who is obviously a foreigner and a Fateh-member to boot (he's Palestinian, after all), then it can logically be concluded that he has become a "foreign agent" and that you are lost. The prosecutor doesn't have to prove a thing. It is up to you, the accused, to come up with a plausible excuse for the meeting. But, as we have seen, a defendant who defines himself as a Marxist does not have and cannot have a plausible excuse. That is what the honorable judges ruled.

Catch 22?

Not really; just day-to-day reality in the Middle East.

* * *

But more than that, the attack on Marxist concepts was not limited to the sole fact that a man holding Marxist positions cannot have a "reasonable explanation" for a meeting with a man the authorities in their infinite wisdom define as a foreign agent. Many of the accused in the Haifa frame-up trials were indicted for belonging to a banned organization and for having had the intention of attacking the security of the state *only because of their Marxist world outlook and because of their socialist aspirations.*

That is, they were indicted because they believed, as do all Marxists, that socialism cannot be achieved without revolutionary violence and that the

ruling class has never renounced and never will renounce its privileges solely because socialists win a majority in an election. That is why they were indicted for having had the *intention* to carry out an "armed revolution" and a "brutal" revolution.* Because of this they will be locked up for years in prisons of the only democracy in the Middle East.

Theodore Shanin, a professor at the University of Haifa, testified for the defense as an authority on revolutionary theories. He tried to show the absurdity of the prosecution's arguments and the lies that filled the pages of the Israeli press while the trial was going on. He analyzed the concept of "revolutionary violence" in Marxist-Leninist theory and explained that it means the counterviolence of the masses against the ruling class when the latter opposes the seizure of power by the majority.

The Zionist court rejected Theodore Shanin's argument as "irrelevant" and affirmed that it was not interested in a political-sociological exposition. But it did not hesitate to make use of the testimony of an "expert" from the security services; testimony replete with the most incomparable gems, like this one:

"The DPFLP, founded by Nayef Hawatmeh, is a leftist extremist organization. It incites people in a leftist spirit. I believe that Lenin and Marx were too far to the right for this organization and that it is further left. . . . Nayef Hawatmeh has formed a small group whose aim, objective, and rea-

*The story of how the accusation came about that the defendants favored a "brutal" revolution in Israel is perhaps the most astounding and revealing of all the "anecdotes" about the Haifa trials. In the Arabic language, there is no vocal equivalent of the sound represented by the English letter "p." Consequently, when the Arabs borrow foreign words that begin with that sound, they commonly substitute the sound represented in English by the letter "b": *bulees*, for "police," etc. The adjective "proletarian" is thus pronounced something like *brulitaria*. An enterprising linguist from the Shin Bet apparently mistook this for the English word "brutal"; thus, the fact that the defendants openly proclaimed their desire for a "brutal dictatorship" that could be established only by a "brutal revolution" was duly entered into the indictment. Nor correction was ever made. — IP

son for being are war by all means and everywhere, even outside Israel, against the state of Israel and against every Jew as such. . . . There is the left and there is communism. There is the conception of Marx and Lenin about communism and the construction of a communist society. It is my understanding that further to the left there are the conceptions of Mao Tse-tung, and still further to the left there are the conceptions of Matzpen in Israel, for example, and other groups of this nature."

On the basis of the testimony of this "expert" the court sentenced and imprisoned the defendants in all the Haifa trials.

The objective observer cannot but salute the "expertise" of the Shin Bet agent's testimony and the devotion of the judges, who, with a stroke of the pen, declared all Marxists in Israel to be outlaws and made Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky into notorious anti-Semites and all those who defend their ideas into criminals. Thus, Israel well deserves full membership in the club of enlightened countries like Spain, Portugal, the colonels' Greece, and South Africa.

As for the nonobjective observer—especially if he is a Marxist, or an anti-Zionist, or even simply a democrat—he cannot but recognize how right Dov Yossef and Shimson Shapiro were when they said that "the main question is whether each of us is to be subject to an official terrorism . . . or whether individual liberties will prevail here" and that "no government has the right to pass such laws" and that "even in Nazi Germany there were no such laws."

(To be continued.)

Only 'Perhaps'?

Tunisian newspapers have just printed the text of an August speech by President Habib Bourguiba to a group of writers. The speech included the following modest assessment of his own abilities:

"The vicissitudes of my life are a rare example in the history of the world. I must reveal to you as well as to the people another aspect of the personality of Bourguiba. Not only is he a man of political genius who has triumphed over French colonialism, but he is also perhaps a great poet. When I have been called to God, these oratorical meetings will take an elegiac tone to weep for the great man I have been."

Why Spiro Agnew 'Copped a Plea'

By Allen Myers

With his resignation and plea of nolo contendere—no contest—to felony charges October 10, Spiro Agnew became the latest, but certainly not the last, member of the Nixon gang to drown in the Watergate flood.

Ironically, the charge which Nixon's chief "law and order" spokesman declined to contest—in a move that is the legal equivalent of a guilty plea in criminal cases—was income-tax evasion, the same charge that ended the career of Al Capone, who was the most notorious gangster in U.S. history, until the rise of the Nixon gang.

Agnew was caught with his snout in the trough: Prosecutors in Baltimore had amassed evidence that he regularly received kickbacks totaling perhaps as much as \$500,000 from engineering firms in Maryland during his terms as Baltimore County executive, governor of Maryland, and vice-president of the United States. Confronted with the evidence and unable to suppress it, Agnew "copped a plea." In a deal with Attorney General Elliot Richardson, worked out on instructions from Nixon, Agnew was permitted to plead to the one charge and was promised that he would not have to serve time in prison.

Also included in the deal was a "Dear Ted" letter from Richard Nixon attesting to Agnew's good character. Presumably the former vice-president can use it as an employment reference.

"As Vice President," Nixon wrote, "you have addressed the great issues of our times with courage and candor. Your strong patriotism, and your profound dedication to the welfare of the Nation, have been an inspiration to all who have served with you as well as to millions of others throughout the country."

In reality, Agnew was a paypatriot of the sort typical of all levels of capitalist politics in the United States. The cash payoffs he received from Maryland corporations were not "extortion," as some have charged. They were

simply his share of the income of the circle of contractors for whom he was the political representative. The kickbacks were the wages of a faithful employee.

Probably the only thing more common in U.S. politics than such payoffs is the hypocritical pretense that they are exceptional. Agnew said as much himself in his court appearance, observing that "my acceptance of contributions was part of a long-established pattern of political fund-raising in the state." He should have said "in the country."

In normal times Agnew's acceptance of payoffs would have been overlooked. As far back as 1968, his profitable relations with Maryland capitalists was not even much of a secret. When Nixon chose Agnew as his running mate, the *New York Times* complained in an editorial that

Agnew's ties to land speculators and a bank involved "clear and repeated conflicts of interest."

In 1968 Nixon explained his selection to the press in the following words:

"I know Ted Agnew well. We have had long and tough discussions. We have examined each other's ideas, debated issues and tested each other. He has real depth and genuine warmth. Having watched his performance as governor of Maryland for two years, I was deeply impressed by his tremendous brain power, great courage and unprejudiced legal mind. He has vigor, imagination and above all he acts. Under pressure, he is one of the best-poised and controlled. . . . He has the attributes of a statesman of the first rank."

In reality, if Agnew differed from the ordinary politicians whom the corporations hire by the hundreds, it was only in the fact that he was even less distinguished than most.

He was selected by Nixon primarily because he was a virtually anonymous figure, too insignificant to arouse hostility from any influential faction of the Republican party or to attract the limelight away from Nixon



himself. Despite the tradition in the capitalist press of treating the candidates of the two largest parties with respect if not reverence, the *Washington Post* said in an editorial at the time that "given enough time, Nixon's decision to name Agnew as his running mate may come to be regarded as perhaps the most eccentric political appointment since the Roman emperor Caligula named his horse a consul."

Like all the hired politicians who, by accident or design, achieve "national stature" by being sent to Washington, Agnew was allowed to audition for the role of spokesman for a broader sector of the ruling class.

Analyzing Nixon's 1968 election victory in the November 18, 1968, *Intercontinental Press*, Joseph Hansen wrote:

"Nixon was attractive above all to the petty-bourgeois layers, who cling to the past, who are worried by the challenge of the [Black] ghettos to their prejudices and their property holdings, and who would like to see a re-run of the Eisenhower decade in color television."

It was basically the same sectors who formed the most enthusiastic audience for Agnew. Possessed of a "statesmanlike" physical appearance, well-tailored clothes, and a speech writer gifted at coining alliterative and largely meaningless phrases, Agnew became the spokesman for Nixon's attempts to galvanize the "silent majority" into action against the antiwar movement, the rise of nationalist sentiment among oppressed minorities, and the entire radicalization. Wherever the "old values" were threatened, Agnew led the crusade against "permissiveness," "subversives," "negativism," "crime in the streets," and freedom of the press.

He once attempted to describe his "political philosophy" to reporters:

"I had a fellow say to me the other day, 'How come you have changed your stance from that of liberal to conservative?' and I said, 'Well, I really haven't; it's just that I've stayed still while literally thousands of people have rushed past me in a wild dash to the left.'"

But although Agnew became a hero to the terrified petty bourgeoisie for whom "staying still" is the height of political wisdom, he never convinced those who matter to take him seriously. When the subject turned to possible

successors to Nixon in 1976, no one could doubt Agnew's loyalty and obedience to his masters. The same traits hardly made a prominent consul of Caligula's horse, even though the horse had the added virtue of never sticking its foot in its mouth.

Agnew's real status in Washington is perhaps best indicated by the fact that he was almost the only member of the Nixon gang not involved in a major way in the Watergate scandal. The Nixon gang probably never thought him capable enough to be worth asking for help nor discreet enough to merit confidences that he might very well inadvertently disclose



RICHARDSON: Nixon's "Mr. Clean" noticed a peculiar odor.

to the Des Moines Chamber of Commerce.

Although he had been frozen out of the Watergate crimes, it was Watergate more than anything else that led to Agnew's downfall. Under normal circumstances, the Baltimore grand jury would never have been allowed to hear charges against the vice-president. It is possible, in fact, that when Agnew's cronies first mentioned his name to the prosecutors, they thought that they were ensuring their own protection rather than implicating a friend.

But in the post-Watergate atmosphere, the normal rules were inoperative. Nixon had already been forced to dump his two top staff members, an attorney general, a former attor-

ney general, a former secretary of the treasury, and an FBI director, to name only a few of the sacrifices. Nixon was having trouble enough defending himself without organizing another cover-up, and underlings in the Nixon gang, having seen that indictment was the likely reward for unsupervised initiatives, were not going out on a limb without direct orders. Attorney General Elliot Richardson delicately referred to this fear of being caught at more cover-ups during a news conference October 11: "We have had, unfortunately, over recent months a sense that there has been a cover-up, in some situations, of facts which the public was entitled to know."

Nixon's unwillingness to come to the vice-president's defense seems to have created a feeling of betrayal in Agnew and his supporters, particularly as it began to appear that the Nixon gang, even though embarrassed by the Agnew scandal, was not above using it to divert attention from Watergate. Prior to Agnew's resignation, the conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote October 5:

". . . signs crop up almost daily to feed the deepest suspicions in the House of Agnew against the House of Nixon. It was presidential counselor Melvin R. Laird who first tipped off a Republican congressional leader not to get out front defending Agnew. It was the White House that telephoned Senate Republican leader Hugh Scott, urging him to call a Republican conference to warn senators against getting out on a pro-Agnew limb.

"Some Agnew backers actually believe the whole case against Agnew was concocted by Mr. Nixon as a device to take the Watergate heat off himself. That, of course, is demonstrable nonsense.

"But no longer is there any doubt at the highest levels of the Agnew camp that the White House—led by Mr. Nixon—has played dirty pool against the Vice President. Agnew personally made that clear privately to California friends last weekend."

Even after Agnew had resigned, Senator Barry Goldwater declared of Agnew: "I believe he was treated shamefully by persons in responsible government positions."

Without Nixon's support, Agnew's attempts to save himself were doomed to be ineffectual. On September 25, he appealed to the House of Repre-

sentatives to hold what would have amounted to impeachment hearings on the charges against him. If the House had agreed, Agnew would have had the advantage of a jury familiar with the norms of "political contributions" and therefore a little more sympathetic; but even among Republican members only a handful showed any interest in taking the case—a sure sign that Nixon was not twisting any arms on Agnew's behalf.

Deprived of any aid in Washington, Agnew tried to rouse his special con-



AGNEW: Left with nothing but a "Dear Ted" letter and several hundred thousand dollars.

stituency. In a speech to the National Federation of Republican Women in Los Angeles September 29, he leveled an attack on Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, accusing him of leaking information to the press and of attempting to frame Agnew to compensate for his own failure last year to investigate the Watergate affair properly:

"Now people will say to me: 'Why should a Republican Department of Justice and Republican prosecutors attempt to get you?' Well I don't know all the answers, but I will say this, that individuals in the upper professional echelons of the Department of Justice have been severely stung by their ineptness in the prosecution of the Watergate case. They have been

severely stung that the President and the Attorney General have found it necessary to appoint a special prosecutor and they are trying to recoup their reputation at my expense. I'm a big trophy."

"If I hear him right," James Reston wrote in the October 7 *New York Times*, "he [Agnew] is saying that he is being made the victim of a political financial system that is common to both parties in most states, that his predecessors and successors in Maryland and elsewhere have solicited funds from contractors and consultants who were given government building contracts, that their contributions were used for political, and not for personal purposes, and that after Watergate, this 'common practice' was under attack and that he was being made the fall guy for Watergate and all the other dirty tricks, which he was not involved in."

Except for the facts that Agnew did use the payoffs for personal enrichment and that this is an equally "common practice," Reston seems to have heard Agnew correctly. The argument went over well with the National Federation of Republican Women, who cheered and waved banners reading "Agnew for President," especially when Agnew proclaimed: "I will not resign if indicted! I will not resign if indicted!"

Buoyed by this response, Agnew had his lawyers seek the power to subpoena reporters and government officials in order to investigate the source of the leaks about his case.

But the September 29 speech was received with considerably less enthusiasm by the Nixon gang, since the attack on Petersen clearly implied rather strong criticism of Richardson and Nixon as well. Neither could Nixon have looked forward to another bruising battle with the press, even if the only administration figure directly involved were Agnew. Finally, who knows what Agnew's lawyers might have discovered if they had questioned White House staff members about the leaks?


Agnew's speech to the National Federation of Republican Women thus amounted to a public demand that Nixon choose between Agnew and Richardson's Justice Department. Nixon announced his choice at an October 3 press conference by driving the last nails into Agnew's political coffin.

Asked "whether there is any substance to Mr. Agnew's charge that

this is a frivolous investigation, that it's a frame-up and it is, in fact, a smear," Nixon responded: "As far as the charges are concerned, they are serious and not frivolous." He then went on to volunteer an endorsement of Petersen under the guise of defending Agnew's civil liberties:

"The vice-president's complaint . . . is that leaks that have come out on this particular matter have convicted him in advance. . . .

"As a matter of fact, in the strongest terms, I have spoken to the attorney



NIXON: Let Justice Department have its "big trophy."

general about this matter. He shares my view. He has taken personal charge of the investigation with regard to leaks.

"And incidentally, he has assured me . . . that the assistant attorney general, Mr. Petersen, whom as you recall I praised rather highly in my 22nd of August press conference in San Clemente, was in no way . . . involved in the leaks involving the vice-president."

"If I did not support Mr. Petersen's handling of the investigation," Nixon said in response to another question, "he would have been removed by this time."

That, for all practical purposes, was the end of Agnew. A few days later, it was reported that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which has never

been noted for diligent pursuit of high-ranking tax evaders, was conducting a detailed investigation of Agnew's net worth. Agnew surrendered and made a deal on essentially the same terms he had refused in early September. Agnew copped a plea and got off, as Tom Wicker put it in the *New York Times*, "with a \$10,000 fine, a suspended [three-year] sentence and a 'Dear Ted' letter from the President."

Throwing Agnew overboard has removed what had become a source of daily embarrassment, but it has not solved any of Nixon's problems even on the superficial level of "image." It will not stop inflation or the deepening radicalization against which Agnew railed. It will not "restore confidence" in the Nixon gang on the part of a disillusioned public. And it will return Watergate to the center ring in the scandal circus.

There are questions about Nixon's income taxes too, including unadmitted reports that he paid a total of only \$1,670 in 1970 and 1971—the average tax on earnings less than one-twentieth of Nixon's known income. The Senate Watergate committee is reported to be looking into additional secret income: a gift of \$100,000 said to have been made by billionaire Howard Hughes through Nixon's friend C. G. Rebozo.

On October 12, the same day that Nixon was attempting to put a "new face" on his administration by announcing Agnew's successor, a federal appeals court in Washington stole some of his headlines by slapping the old face. In a 5-2 decision, the court upheld Judge John Sirica's earlier order to turn over to him the secret White House tapes sought by Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox. This decision is certain to be appealed to the Supreme Court. If Nixon loses there, he will be faced with the choice of turning over the politically sensitive tapes or openly flouting the court's decision, which would be certain to raise widespread demands for his impeachment. Now that a new precedent has been established with the resignation under pressure of a vice-president, it can be expected that there will be less public resistance to new precedents regarding the president—even if, as expected, Congressman Gerald Ford is confirmed as Agnew's successor.

Nixon selected Ford for much the same reasons that he originally chose



Agnew. Ford has never been influential enough to make serious enemies, and as a longtime member of Congress he has numerous friends in both houses, which should assure an easy confirmation. He is even less likely than Agnew was to be seen as a possible competitor by presidential hopefuls in either the Republican or Democratic party.

Ford is regarded as a "good soldier"—that is, he follows orders, whatever they may be. As for his competence, Lyndon Johnson once said that Ford was "the only man I ever knew who can't chew gum and walk at the same time." Nixon himself once pointedly remarked that Ford had been a college football player in the days before the players' heads were protected by padded helmets.

"... Mr. Ford has few visible qualifications as a potential President," the *New York Times* commented in an October 13 editorial. "He is a routine partisan of narrow views and long but limited experience. He has no executive experience. His expertise in foreign affairs is confined to unswerving adherence to Administration policy, especially on the Indochina war. If he were ever to become President, he would be a totally unknown quantity."

The mediocrity that caused the *Times* to complain is precisely what recommended Ford to Nixon. While there is not at this moment any major sector of the ruling class favoring the messy business of impeachment proceedings against Nixon, his appointee serves him, as Agnew did, as a buffer against the future.

"In other circumstances," Max Frankel wrote in the October 14 *New York Times*, "in other years, other Presidents may have found it possible to divert, suppress or ensnarl in legal complexities the charges of extortion, bribery and tax evasion that were developed against Vice President Agnew in Maryland."

"But Mr. Nixon, it now appears, worked hard to shove his under-study down the plank, to obliterate the ghastly symbolism of his transgressions. For the President himself still faces demands for an explanation of the way huge sums of money were handled in his behalf, of his private gain in business dealings with cronies, and of his income tax returns. The President himself may yet face the Agnew agony over how long the nation's business can be beclouded by legal maneuvers to vindicate one man."

The prospect of Gerald Ford as the official chieftain of U. S. imperialism will doubtlessly give pause to any sectors of the ruling class inclined to push Nixon into facing that "agony." The lack of the relatively simple parliamentary method of replacing a discredited government complicates the political crisis of the U. S. bourgeoisie, a crisis that for the moment finds its expression in the attitude: Caligula's horse is dead! Long live Caligula's horse! □

Paper Sees Threat to British Liberties

Just when things looked darkest, the conservative London *Daily Express* has come forth with a stirring defense of British liberties against the threats emanating from the other side of the British Channel:

"Diversity is the strongest root of liberty. It is the job of politicians in Britain to defend diversity within the European Community. The officials in Brussels are bent on securing what is called 'harmonization': so many ounces of meat to a string of sausages; so much coloring in Turkish Delight. Who do those people in Brussels think they are? They have not been elected. They have no experiences of the businesses they are trying to govern. They should be put in their place. . . ."

It's not that we want to see British liberties impinged on or to defend bureaucracy, but will someone please explain just who votes and how often to elect the persons who now direct these threatened British businesses?

A Postscript—Chile

By Milton Alvin

[The following is an addition to the series of articles on the history of Stalinism that appeared in the September 17, September 24, October 1, October 8 issues of *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Stalinism could not complete its fifty-year history without one more major defeat—the one in Chile brought on largely by its treacherous politics.

Three years ago the Communist party and the equally treacherous Socialist party formed yet another class-collaborationist alliance with the capitalists in Chile and produced a government of so-called Popular Unity, headed by Salvador Allende. In reality this was nothing more than another people's front of the kind that has led the workers to numerous defeats in the past.

The Popular Unity government made a few concessions to the workers and peasants, including the nationalization of some industries, but left the bulk of the economy in the hands of capitalists.

The government staggered from one crisis to another as inflation, which was already a scourge before Allende took office, continued to ravage the country. Soon virtually everyone was dissatisfied: the workers with inflation eating away more of their real income than wage increases would offset, the petty-bourgeois elements caught between inflation and government regulations, and the capitalists fearful of more nationalizations plus a real uprising of the working class.

Allende, backed by the leaders of the Communist and Socialist parties, insisted upon legal and parliamentary ways of building socialism. Once more this turned out to be a utopian dream. They did not touch the real institutions, the repressive instruments of the capitalist state—the police, the armed forces, the courts, prisons and legislature.

Without abolishing these and creating new institutions based on workers and peasants organizations, the road to socialism remained blocked.

Instead of putting the generals in jail, the Stalinist-Social Democratic bloc put them in the cabinet. They did not dissolve the army and police, and build armed workers militias and new police forces as did the Bolsheviks after 1917 and the Cubans in 1959-1960.

The Stalinists and Social Democrats served up fairy tales about how the generals "never interfered" in politics, how they remained "loyal" to whatever government was elected, and how

Interview With Militant of MIR

Plans Future Fight—Calls for Solidarity

[The following interview was given October 1 in Chile by a leader of the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left). It was published in the October 5 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. Had you expected this coup d'etat? What are the first lessons you have drawn from it?

Answer. The coup d'etat that took place September 11 was politically on the agenda. We were prepared for it both politically and organizationally.

And we prepared the sections of the working class and peasantry over which we had direct influence.

We never ceased to denounce the illusions of the reformist strategy, illusions that could only disarm the Chilean masses in the full sense of the term. From this standpoint, the September 11 coup only confirmed our analyses and our perspectives in the most tragic way.

A coup was on the agenda in the near future after June 29. At that time it became clear that a section of the army was ready for anything to take

there was "nothing to worry about" from that quarter.

In the cabinet the Stalinists and Social Democrats sat cheek by jowl with the generals. The latter resigned when the crisis reached an acute stage. They then carried out their murderous coup. The Stalinist and Social Democratic misleaders foresaw nothing and as a result led the unprepared workers to another terrible defeat.

Let the present generation of revolutionists carefully study the experience of Chile and learn the necessary lessons. The most important of these is the counterrevolutionary role of Stalinism and the Social Democracy.

Workers! It is time to have done once and for all with Stalinism and the Social Democracy! It is necessary to declare: *Not one more time!* □

on a constantly widening popular mobilization.

From that time, the concern of the military chiefs and those who were brought into the government could be boiled down to one thing—maintaining the discipline and cohesiveness of the armed forces, the last bulwark of the bourgeois order and the imperialist order. The majority of the officers were in favor of a coup.

Parallel to this, throughout these last months we have seen a mobilization and a growth of consciousness on the part of the Chilean workers that is completely new and out of all proportion to what had occurred previously.

This is a phenomenon that, according to what you tell me, was widely discussed in the revolutionary press throughout the world. So I won't go into this aspect at length, although in the last period it has been the fundamental factor. In practice, by their concerns, by their enthusiasm, whole sections of the Chilean working class were beginning to break from the orientation of the reformist leaderships.

While the bourgeoisie and imperialism could tolerate reformism to a certain extent, such a development could not long continue. The apparatus of production was passing more and

more into the hands of the workers.

This mobilization not only made the coup inevitable. It made a confrontation inevitable—it is important to stress this—a massive, general confrontation.

Q. What did you do to assist the birth of this proletarian power and consolidate it?

A. All our members participated fully in the process of the birth of a popular power and in many cases played the decisive role in consolidating it. But they are far from being the only ones who did so. The members of the Socialist party also played a major role in many cases. But inasmuch as this was a phenomenon of extraordinary breadth, especially in the *cordones* [organs of workers management in local industrial concentrations], you can't just speak in terms of adding up the organized forces. In fact, it was a completely exemplary phenomenon of consciousness developing in masses of workers. In this context, wherever it was possible our propaganda, agitational, and organizational work was always aimed at accelerating and consolidating this process. I would like to add that at the same time we gave top priority to our work in the army. That is the main accusation hanging over us today, and especially over Miguel Enriquez.

Q. Regarding this work in the army, without going into details that would be out of place in a public interview, were there important splits or signs of opposition in the army at the time of the coup d'etat?

A. Rumors have been circulating constantly about this since September 11. In fact, while there was no decisive split in the armed forces as a whole, you would have to be blind not to see the shadings of differences between the different sectors. In the ruling junta, there is no doubt that the representatives of the navy and the air force are the extremist elements. The long-run importance of these differences should not be underestimated, because they will not fail to come into resonance with the very real cleavages within the bourgeoisie.

It is certain that sectors of the ruling class will have disagreements with the

policy of the junta. For the moment, the reaction in bourgeois circles has been an almost unanimous sigh of relief. But at what a price!

Don't forget that quite a few sectors in the orbit of the Christian Democrats in particular have a long tradition binding them to bourgeois "legality." And all this has been swept away by the coup d'etat—to say nothing of the "excesses" which seem to bother some of these gentlemen.

Something more indicative of the state of things in the armed forces is the fact that certain regiments have not really participated in the day-to-day searches and repressive operations. This does not mean that they are dissident. But it does represent, let us say, a tactical precaution by the junta to avoid opening potential splits.

To answer the specific question you raise, I can pass on the fragmentary information we have on the situation in the army. It indicates that at the start there were quite a few cases of soldiers or noncommissioned officers refusing to obey orders. All were immediately shot! At least a dozen such cases have been reported directly or indirectly. There must, therefore, be many more of them.

This makes work in the army very difficult, if not virtually impossible in certain cases. On the other hand, in the event of a political and military offensive by the revolutionists, one that could offer a real alternative, there is no doubt that a not inconsiderable number of noncommissioned officers and soldiers would be on our side. On several occasions during the searches soldiers, noncoms, and even officers have, let us say, closed their eyes when they found weapons. "All we ask is that you don't use them against us," they say.

Given this situation, we are being careful in the coming period not to carry out any irresponsible actions that could help to weld the armed forces into a monolithic bloc, and we are working toward increasing modest but significant forms of resistance inside the army.

Q. You talk about perspectives for work, for a political and military offensive by the revolutionists, but one of the things that is most striking is the lack of any visible signs of such an offensive.

A. That is true. At least on the surface there are no signs of resistance. But we must be clear-headed about this. Because of the weight of the reformist illusions, especially because of the blind policy of the reformist leadership, the Chilean workers have lost a battle and this defeat has cost them dearly, very dearly.

Piecing together the reports we have been getting from all the suburbs of Santiago and from the rest of the country, we have to estimate the number of those who lost their lives in this battle at no less than 25,000. According to our information, the same figure is circulating in the top military circles. And every day this number mounts.

On the day of the coup, the workers gathered massively at the workplaces they had been occupying, often for several weeks. In many factories they defended themselves heroically, disputing every foot of ground, against the military, who were determined to "take back the factories." But the relationship of forces was too lopsided. The military were armed to the teeth with modern equipment, often using tanks and sometimes airplanes. Facing this, the workers had very few weapons, almost none in certain cases. The military functioned as a coordinated, centralized force, executing a plan carefully worked out in advance. The workers in the different plants, the different cordones, had no centralized direction; they were not even coordinated among themselves. Nonetheless, it took almost five days, sometimes more, for the military to reduce the cordones industriales in Santiago.

In the provinces, things developed generally in the same way. This explains the large number of deaths in the first days. In certain places, it was a real massacre. In one of the largest factories in Santiago, they took more than 200 bodies out of the basement. In such conditions, a retreat was inevitable.

Q. You characterize what is happening now as a retreat and not a crushing defeat?

A. Yes, there is no doubt about this because despite the extraordinarily high number of victims, the repression was by no means selective in most cases. It is true that too many comrades, trade-union and political

activists, died at their posts. This must be understood and made known abroad.

But the revolutionary organizations, and ours in particular, have not been destroyed. Despite too heavy losses, essentially our structures and our apparatus remain absolutely intact. From this standpoint, we were consistent with our analyses, and the measures we took have borne their fruit. The military are aware of this and the thought obsesses them. Their victory communiqués are tinged by an unspoken fear. They are exhibiting seized arms without convincing us. They have been trying to demoralize us by giving the impression that they have carried out massive roundups of our cadres. But they know that all this is false. And this is a decisive factor in the period that is opening up, one that enables us to talk of a revolutionary offensive in time.

Q. What about the other left organizations, especially the parties of the Unidad Popular?

A. Although I have had some contacts with the CP, the SP, and the MAPU [Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria—Movement for United Popular Action, a breakaway from the Christian Democrats], I should not make any hasty judgments and just offer you my personal opinion, let us say.

As for the MAPU, although it is a small organization, I think I can say that its structures also have not been too badly damaged.

As for the CP, it seems that a lot of its intermediate cadres have disappeared or been arrested. One thing is certain. The rank and file of the party, especially in Santiago, is completely disoriented. In a single blow, their illusions about peaceful roads to socialism have collapsed. What is more, the structures of the CP seem profoundly disorganized, and although the leaders of the CP participated in the battles in the cordones, a great many of the members have no precise directives and have been totally left to themselves.

As for the SP, the situation is relatively complex in view of the complexity of the currents running through the party when it was in power. The structure of the SP itself did not help prepare it to face such a situation.

But a number of members and revolutionary currents within the SP had their own structures and organized cadres that stood up well against the repression and are preparing for the struggles to come. Here also, our responsibility is very great.

Q. How does the MIR envisage assuming these responsibilities?

A. We are for forming a Revolutionary Front, which we think should include the UP parties and ourselves. The task of this front should be to prepare the counteroffensive as rapidly as possible against the present regime, a political and above all a military offensive.

We hope this front will see the light of day very soon. We will make all the necessary efforts to accomplish this. We are also thinking, after the necessary debates and discussions in our ranks, of proposing a real political and military plan for this front so that it can lead the counteroffensive to victory. But the orientation of such a front must be clear and must incorporate all the lessons of the past.

From this standpoint, such a front must be for us the framework in which, maintaining the greatest possible unity in action, we continue to wage more than ever a struggle against reformism, about which the Chilean workers have just learned such a tragic lesson.

Already, even in trying to form such a front, we are running up against conceptions of a reformist type. While the CP members with whom we have had initial discussions on this subject have expressed their agreement with the idea of unity and notably unity with us (which is something new), while they have expressed their agreement that a rapid counteroffensive is needed to prevent the present disorientation in many sectors from turning into profound demoralization, they nonetheless do not agree with the character and objectives of such a front.

Some have advocated and continue to advocate the idea of a broader front including certain sectors opposed to the military. Concretely their perspective would be to include sectors of the Christian Democracy, if not the Christian Democracy in its entirety, in such a front. This is an old orientation, a classical one, in the same logic as the policy the CP always advocated within the UP, that is, an alliance

with the Christian Democracy against the right and the fascist extreme right. It seems today that under the pressure of a number of its members and especially those in the Communist Youth, the CP has shifted in recent days and agreed to participate in the kind of revolutionary front we are proposing.

But setbacks are not excluded, and in any case, we hold no illusions. In the framework of such a front or any other structure, the fight against reformism is going to remain one of our top priority tasks for a long time. We are optimists about this.

In any case, without going in for any big speculations, it is evident that after what the Chilean masses have experienced, the left is going very quickly to undergo big shake-ups and a real regroupment. And on this level, for our part, we are firm optimists. Of course, such shake-ups will not come as the result of the masses automatically drawing conclusions from the coup d'état. These changes will depend essentially on the capacity of vanguard sectors to respond to the situation as soon as possible in practice and in action. They will depend on their capacity to deal blows to the enemy.

But here again what I have told you about our organization should inspire optimism.

Q. You have spoken about the massacres that followed the coup d'état, but the repression has continued for three weeks without letup. Every night during the curfew from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the neighborhoods are searched, people are arrested, tortured; they disappear, they are murdered. Just yesterday, I saw with my own eyes the bodies of five persons recently killed lying on the banks of the Rio Mapuche in the middle of the city. Do you have any over-all, national picture of this situation?

A. This is the most urgent, the most dramatic problem. The repressive forces are carrying on their work now in a more discreet way but on a very large scale. I don't know how to describe it. It is gruesome, unbelievable. Every day, all you have to do is take a walk in the early morning through the streets of Santiago to see it. Bodies are lying here and there, especially on the banks of the river; this is the work that is done during

the curfew! There are search parties and the pursuit of known activists and political cadres, though they have had little effect. In the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois neighborhoods especially, you find denunciation and informing. Without any questions being asked, without any evidence, any denunciation leads almost certainly to imprisonment in the National Stadium, where more than 5,000 prisoners (even more today) are being held, when it doesn't lead to death. I won't go into this particularly unspeakable aspect of repression; you have as much information about it as I do.

The papers and the radio call constantly on the population to inform; everyday they repeat the telephone numbers to call and announce enticing rewards.

In the shantytowns, as well as in the factories, there were many massacres when the population showed a certain resistance. And this is continuing.

I saw one example in a Santiago shantytown. A group of youths seized a fire department vehicle, took the uniforms from the firemen who were in it, put them on, armed themselves, and started driving around the sub-

urbs. As soon as they saw any soldiers, they opened fire, killing several here and there. When they were caught, they were taken back to the neighborhood and executed on the spot. The inhabitants, who had been forced to gather on the execution site, were cynically machine-gunned down. The body count? Several dozen, several hundred dead? Will we ever know? This is an example that you should take to your comrades so that everyone abroad will understand concretely what is happening here.

Let's be very clear about this. This anecdote is not an isolated example. You have been able to take account of this quite concretely. Still today it is impossible to walk in the poor neighborhoods of Santiago without finding bodies in corners here and there.

As for the climate of xenophobia the junta is trying to develop, it is beyond the ordinary imagination. We must mobilize abroad on this question. Our Bolivian and Brazilian comrades especially, exiled political activists or mere residents, are in constant peril of their lives. They have become the junta's Jews.

Just because they have an accent,

they are turned in by their neighbors. On a mere denunciation, they are arrested and taken to the stadium; often they disappear.

This story must be told; a hue and cry must be raised about it. A campaign must be organized because there is a danger that a curtain of silence will be lowered over it. Still today, the junta is threatening severe penalties—and we have seen what such threats can mean in the mouths of hangmen like these—against any journalist or any person who spreads "alarmist" reports outside Chile about the repression and the position of foreigners in the country.

Everything must be done to get out as much news as possible. The reports that you have brought us about the reactions to the coup d'etat and about the campaigns in progress are an extraordinary encouragement to our struggle. Your presence here in such a difficult time has had an inestimable value for us, since right now we are so completely isolated from the rest of the world. Take our most fraternal greetings to the comrades of *Rouge*, and tell them that we are certain that they in France will be firm supporters of our revolutionary struggle, which is only beginning. □

Interview With Chilean Refugee

Workers Resisted Coup, But Leadership Was Lacking

[The following interview was given by a refugee from Chile to a correspondent of *Intercontinental Press* September 30 in Buenos Aires.]

* * *

Question. What happened in your factory when the coup started?

Answer. I went to work on the day of the coup just like any other day. By about 9:00 in the morning, a comrade came around to tell us that the presidential palace had been surrounded by tanks again. This had happened before on June 29. So we all stopped work and went to listen to the radio to see what was happening. We heard Allende speaking. He seemed to be saying good-bye, a very

emotional and populist farewell. I and all the other comrades in the factory felt that he was saying good-bye to life, too, because he seemed to be saying that it was all over.

The president told the people to resist and not to falter. But we didn't know what to do. We knew the coup was coming, but the leaderships of the political parties and even the leaderships of the cordones didn't have a line on how to fight it.

So the leaders of the union in our factory went out to make contact with the leaders of the cordón and the other plants. Then the interventor came. (He was an official sent in by the government to keep the factory running. There had been a big battle between the workers and the management and so the government sent him in as

kind of an arbitrator.) He told us what the situation in the city was like. He said that a fight had started and that we should keep calm and wait to see what happened. We were to stay in the factory and fight if necessary. On the other hand, he said that the workers who wanted to go home could leave—especially the women.

So only the vanguard stayed, the ones who wanted to resist, who wanted to defend the factory. We organized a defense committee, a food committee, a medical committee, and so on. I organized the communications committee. Then I went into the city. I wanted to find someone with military experience because none of the workers had any and we had no way to fight. I hoped to find somebody to teach us, to tell us what to do, be-

cause we were getting no leadership, either from the cordones or from any party. We were lost. The CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores—United Federation of Workers] didn't make any announcement over the radio or anything, so we had to do something.

But when I got to the city, a battle was going on. It would have been suicide to try to go on and risk getting caught in the cross fire between the military and the snipers.

So I went back to the factory and stayed there. None of the comrades could contact any of the leaders of the cordones. So we were really without any direction, without any help. The only communication was with nearby factories.

By 3:00 in the afternoon, the military decreed a curfew. I discussed the situation with some of the comrades and we decided that I should leave because there was an air force base right near the factory and there was a danger of air-borne infantry coming in. We would not be able to resist because we did not have anything to resist with. I left because I was a foreigner and so it was dangerous for me to stay and dangerous for the comrades, too. There was no point in it.

So, I went to spend the night at the house of a friend who also worked in the factory. All night long we heard gunfire. We were very tense, and we got especially nervous when we heard about the death of Allende. The junta announced it over the radio. (By 9:30 in the morning the military had already taken over all the radio stations. The only news we got was from them.) They said that Allende was dead, that he committed suicide. This shocked the girls I was with. It shocked them very much. We knew Allende was a very weak man and all that. But he was still a leader; he was the great leader in Chile.

We didn't know what to do. So we just stayed in the house. In the streets, even though it was a proletarian neighborhood, many, many Chilean flags went up. This was supposed to be a sign that Chile had been "liberated," liberated for the right, of course. There were a lot of people in the neighborhood who supported the coup. I was very surprised at this and we were afraid somebody would denounce us.

Q. Didn't the military get the people to put flags up by intimidation? We assumed that people did this because they were afraid of the consequences if they didn't.

A. It was not so clear. The ones who put flags up agreed with the right. The ones who supported the left didn't. What we felt was that there was chaos. We did not know what to do. We didn't hear any news. We were desperate.

The next day I went to the factory because I thought the curfew had been lifted. I found out that it hadn't when I got there and they told me.

About 280 people worked in the factory and there were about 30 on defense. It was a very weak defense; they were not armed.

Then they told me to go to a meeting in the factory across from ours. There were more people on defense there—about 80. The work force was normally about 260, more or less the same as in ours. But here the mood was more combative.

But in this factory the defenders were not armed either. It was a bottle-making plant, a place where they make glass.

They started to make Molotov cocktails with the bottles but not very many.

When we arrived at the meeting, some comrades from our party, the PSR [Partido Socialista Revolucionario—Revolutionary Socialist party, the Chilean section of the Fourth International] were leading it. They explained that the Cordón Vicuña Mackenna was fighting very hard against the military and that the Cordón Cerrillos should do the same thing but that it was totally disorganized. There was no leadership. So the workers had had to take it into their own hands to organize the cordón and factories for armed defense against the military.

At this very moment, the military burst in. They had been watching us from the air. They arrested all of us and took us to the air force base that was quite nearby. The women were separated from the men. There were about four women and eighty men. The men were taken to a runway and made to lie on the ground while they were searched.

About an hour later, we were all released because they had about eight

different versions of the meeting. The military could not figure out what it was about, whether it was just a meeting to calm the people or what. We came to the conclusion that they were more lost than we were.

They were very worried by the armed defense at other factories that were already engaging in gun battles against the military. So we think they were much more interested in those factories that were already fighting against them than they were in us, who were just starting to organize.

I was kept there one day, since I didn't have any documents. During this time, I had a chance to see how they worked. I saw officers, soldiers, and medics. Some were very depressed by the outcome of the coup. They hoped that everything would go off very quickly and that there would be no resistance.

Also, I saw something very interesting. This was the base of the four airplanes that bombed La Moneda. The planes were English; I don't know what they are called. But the pilots were not Chilean. I would say they were Yankees. I could not hear them talking, but North Americans have a very typical look. The only other possibility is that they were English, but I don't think so because the English aren't the ones for that sort of thing; they are very bureaucratic.

When my comrade finally brought my documents, we were allowed to leave. We left in the midst of a gunfight. The workers in the factory across from the base were shooting at the military. But they surrendered a few minutes later because the armed forces had weapons that the workers didn't have.

There were about 500 men at the base. They left very often in trucks to fight against two shantytowns opposite the base. In one, called La Legua, there were very combative people. This shantytown put up a hard fight; they had some weapons that they had received from the government.

From the base I was able to see the fight in La Legua. I could see that many, many people were being killed, including soldiers themselves. The military had helicopters with .50-caliber machine guns and they could just gun the people down from the air. But even so the people in this shantytown fought the military for

three days. I would say they fought very hard and that many soldiers were killed, too.

In La Legua, I was told, they had some way to make "Miguelitos," that is, nails made to puncture tires. So they stopped one or two police vans and killed about 160 cops. The people of this shantytown were mostly what is called marginal, largely unemployed. It was not a proletarian neighborhood.

When I left the base, I didn't go back to the factory because there were a lot of troops surrounding it.

Q. What information do you have about other areas?

A. The Cordón Vicuña Mackenna was the best organized before the coup. Many factories, I would say eight or ten, fought very long and very hard. This cost the lives of many, many people. At one factory, for example, the workers put up a hard fight, but when they saw the soldiers surround the plant and realized they could not hold out, they surrendered and turned over their guns. The military shot them down on the spot, in view of another factory that was about to surrender. But when the workers there saw this, they started fighting again. In the group that were executed, there were about sixteen women. So there must have been about 160 men, because women were usually about 10 percent of the work force.

The Sumar factory had gotten some guns from the government, and it also put up a hard fight. All the people there were killed. In general, in all the factories where there was resistance, everybody was killed. They were executed right on the spot. At Sumar, a synthetic fibers plant, there was an explosion. This factory wrote a heroic page in history and a sad one, too, because all the workers are now dead.

Q. You said that the CUT did not issue any statements or instructions after the coup. Did it issue any statements at all?

A. Not after the coup. Before, they called on the workers to resist in the factories. And I would say that they share the responsibility for the extermination of the vanguard that was concentrated in the plants. Everybody

knew a coup was coming, and we didn't think it was a good idea to try to put up a fight there because we knew that if the military came in they would kill everybody. The workers would be trapped like rats because they had nowhere to run. But the CUT said to resist in the factories and so the vanguard is now dead.

Q. How did you come to work in your factory and how long did you work there?

A. I worked in the factory about two weeks. I went to work there as a result of the activity we were engaged in. This factory was occupied after the first coup on June 29, as were all the other factories. The workers there went on strike. And we started to work with them, organizing them, helping them, putting out a strike bulletin, raising funds, and making contact with other factories. I was involved in this. Finally the government intervened the factory. Then the workers asked me to come and work inside the plant and so I took a job there.

Q. How are the cordones organized and what has happened to them since the coup?

A. The cordones were set up to provide a centralized leadership for groups of factories. They were to coordinate work in the factories and give special help to those that had trouble or went on strike. Another objective was to help organize the distribution of supplies.

Generally, the cordones were led by the Socialist party. They were run in a bureaucratic way and the masses of the workers were not involved. The ranks were never consulted; all the decisions were made by the leadership. It was always the same leaders who took charge of things. The ranks were never encouraged to participate.

We tried to promote participation by the rank and file. We thought it was vital for them to feel that they and not just the leaders were making the decisions. I think things could have developed differently if such participation could have been achieved. As it was, it was only the trade-union leaders who were brought together in a centralized organization. They tried to widen the organization by bringing in the people of the shantytowns, stu-

dents and peasants to participate in the meetings. But the main participants were always students from the shantytowns. They could not broaden the cordones enough.

Q. What is the situation of the cordones now?

A. I would say they don't exist anymore. Not as organizations. So the people don't know what to do. The only place people are coming together is in the separate party organizations. For example, in the shantytown we are familiar with, the members of the Communist party, the Socialist party, and the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria — Movement of the Revolutionary Left] are still trying to carry on resistance against the military. Even in this situation where the military control everything, they are trying to do something because they are desperate. They are not defeated. They want to do something, but they don't know what to do.

There are still a lot of guns around. Most of those in the hands of the people were given out by the Socialist party. The Communist party had a lot of guns but they were all in the hands of the bureaucrats. They did not distribute them among the rank and file. The ranks did not have any military instruction. No defense committees were formed. They don't know how to use guns. But they do have guns; they have more guns than people.

There was a rumor going around when I left Chile that the people were going to fight this week. They were going to call a general strike and then start fighting. So there is some vanguard left. But I don't think this will happen because the people are afraid of the military. They are afraid they will be fired or executed.

Q. How did you finally get out of Chile?

A. Since I had not had my papers changed, I was still considered a student. So I was allowed to leave without any difficulty. But before I did, my house was searched and we were treated very badly by the cops. I also got a chance to see that the military have differences among themselves.

Q. What is your opinion about the

political conditions before the coup and what were the alternatives?

A. I would say the crunch had to come. It was something nobody could avoid. The class struggle had reached such a pitch that I would say that from their point of view the military had no choice but to act as they did. The people and the workers also realized that a decisive confrontation was inevitable. In the last few mass

meetings, such as the one on September 4, they asked Allende to arm them because they saw a coup coming.

But the reformist parties refused to see this. They blinded themselves to it. They called everybody ultraleft who warned that a crunch was coming.

The only way the coup could have been prevented was if the proletariat had developed its own power. If it had moved toward this, it would at least have been able to fight the mili-

tary on something like more equal terms. They could have taken the initiative from the military and not let them pick the time and place for the fight. At the end, there was no middle ground. Even the military commanders who were against a coup had to withdraw. The class struggle was too sharp. There was no room for negotiating. It was the bourgeoisie or the workers. The one who struck first would be the victor. □

Confused About Nature of Allende Government

Why Chilean MIR Did Not Win Leadership of Workers

[The following article is from the October 3 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly paper of the PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party, an Argentine organization that maintains fraternal ties with the Fourth International). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left] warned many times that there were no "peaceful roads" to socialism. It criticized the Allende government's vacillations and concessions to the Christian Democrats. It sparked many mobilizations. And in the period before the coup, it was the only current that developed a campaign—although an insufficient one—directed at the army, trying to turn the soldiers against the putschists.

Nonetheless, the MIR was unable to win the leadership of the working class away from the Communist and Socialist parties in order to keep the workers from being defeated. Why? Was it because victory was only possible through a "prolonged war" and there was no time to form an "armed wing" to carry this out? We think that the MIR failed because it held on to ultraleft deviations and because along with these it committed a series of opportunist vacillations and errors typical of the guerrillaist currents.

Although the MIR warned about the reactionary nature of the "capitalist

state" and its apparatus, it did not uphold the Marxist position—that is, the only consistently revolutionary position—in regard to the army. Not only did it fail to remind the masses of the army's role as the repressive arm of the exploiters and draw their attention to this, but it made centrist-type statements that broached the possibility of winning the armed forces, or large sectors of the officer corps, for supporting the revolution.

For example, a month before the coup, these compañeros said in their paper, *El Rebelde*: "Today the bosses and the reactionary officers are carrying out an elaborate maneuver to bring about a clash between the armed forces and the people. . . ." As if the armed forces and the overwhelming majority of their officers have not always been in conflict with the people!

Before this, in a press conference May 22, Miguel Enríquez, one of the top leaders of the MIR, said that "some sectors of the Unidad Popular and the government . . . rather than recognize that there are some bad officers prefer to say that there are bad peasants. . . . They do not have the moral courage to admit that bad officers and bad policemen exist and criticize them."

The Chilean experience has shown once again in a tragic way that what Miguel Enríquez should have explained to the workers was that, "bad" or "good," the immense majority of the officers defended the interests of the exploiters, heading up repressive squads.

Furthermore, the MIR's vacillations helped to confuse the masses about what kind of government the Allende regime was.

Following the press of the MIR, we see that it constantly denounced the Allende government's concessions to the Christian Democrats and the right. Following the thread of these denunciations, you can see that the Allende government did not fundamentally alter the capitalist structure of Chile (most of the factories, the land, wholesale and retail trade, etc., remained in the hands of capitalists) and that it used all means including repression to resist the advances of the workers toward changing the property relations (e.g., the land occupations). It left intact the armed forces and the police, the jails, the courts, the laws, and the constitution, all instruments of capitalist exploitation. Likewise, Allende subordinated himself to a parliament dominated by the opposition and even made room for the military in his cabinet.

However, in the face of all these facts showing that under the UP government Chile remained capitalist, the most that the MIR was able to denounce was the existence of "reformist sectors in the UP and in the government." That is, it didn't even define the government as a whole as reformist and still less as bourgeois.

That is, the MIR never pointed out clearly to the masses that the Allende government was not their government, that while it was correct to make demands on it to carry out certain

measures and to defend it from the right, they should not place any confidence in it. The MIR never clearly pointed out that the masses should rely only on their own mobilizations, create their own organs of power and their own army — workers militias — in order to go on from this to take power in fact.

For years the MIR worked among peasants, the unemployed, etc., rather than in the workers movement. While it corrected this error, it nonetheless continued to follow incorrect guidelines that resulted from its insufficient confidence in the capacity of the working class.

Thus, instead of firmly supporting the cordones industriales [organs of workers management in local industrial concentrations] (which developed, in spite of being boycotted by the UP and the unions, as embryonic forms of workers power), the MIR insisted that the cordones should subordinate themselves to the comandos comunales [municipal commands], which were made up of neighborhood fighters, housewives, etc., and never became more than peripheral organizations of the MIR.

Capitulating to the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores — United Federation of Workers], the MIR opposed setting up a coordinating committee of all the cordones. Nor did it try to promote the formation of workers militias based on the cordones, limiting itself to forming small armed nuclei in the comandos comunales that it controlled.

Thus, its final slogan, "soldiers, don't follow the orders of putschist officers," which we supported, was insufficient because the MIR was not in a position — and it didn't even raise the idea clearly — to get the masses of workers to bring their full pressure to bear on the soldiers to win them over to opposing the putschists.

The reasons that we have pointed out here are the ones that we think prevented the MIR from becoming the revolutionary party of the working class that could have won the workers away from the traitorous leadership of the reformists. These reasons are what prevented them from becoming the indispensable tool that the heroic vanguard of the Chilean workers needed, and need, to prepare for and to win the fight against the national and foreign exploiters and their armed forces — the revolutionary party. □

Demagoguery at British Labour Party Conference

Wilson Heads Off Challenge From 'Left'

By Tony Hodges

London

From a glance at the press headlines one might have gotten the impression that the British Labour party had moved mountains at its annual conference, held in Blackpool, the first week of October. "Marxist Challenge to Party Leadership," announced the *London Times*. "Wilson Rides High on Takeover Tide," said the *Manchester Guardian*. And the *London Evening Standard*: "Socialist Britain Limited."

It is true that the deepening radicalization that has marked recent British politics made a distinct impression at the Labour party conference. Debate hinged around the big issues of program and strategy that are facing the British labour movement: nationalization of industry, wage controls, the Common Market, the coup in Chile, and party democracy.

But it is false to conclude, as the bourgeois press has, that the party adopted a militant socialist program. With the cooperation of the "left wing" of the party brass, leader Harold Wilson managed to steer the conference away from pinning him down to a clear socialist program.

Prior to the conference it did not seem that Wilson would have it all his way. In June the party's National Executive Committee (NEC) had adopted a draft program for a future Labour government that angered Wilson by including a commitment to nationalize twenty-five of Britain's one hundred largest firms. The parliamentary wing of the party adamantly opposed including that definite pledge in the party's election manifesto.

Wilson threatened to veto the NEC proposal, thus reopening the long-standing controversy in the party as to whether final authority rested with the delegates at the annual conference or with the party's parliamentary wing. Up to the conference the party's "left wing" had insisted that the parliamentary wing should be forced to comply with decisions made by the conference.

Two days before the opening of the

conference, the left-wing NEC agreed unanimously to a "compromise" formula on the question of nationalizations. The essence of the compromise was to eliminate any definite commitment to nationalization (especially the specific proposal to nationalize the twenty-five companies) and at the same time to place before the conference a vague resolution intended to placate the party's grass-roots support.

And then Wilson delivered a rousing speech to the delegates that seemed to go beyond even the plan to nationalize the twenty-five companies, but in reality adroitly avoided any specific pledge.

The nationalization proposals Wilson outlined to the conference included land required for development and redevelopment; underground and underwater minerals; registered and unregistered ports; shipbuilding and ancillary industries; the aircraft industry; sections or firms in the pharmaceutical, construction, and road haulage industries; and industries denationalized by the Tories. The NEC proposals would also allow nationalized industries to compete with private industry and to manufacture for export. An Industry Act would be proposed to allow a Labour government to issue directives to individual firms about prices, profits, investments, overseas trade, and industrial relations.

The same act would provide for compulsory purchase of individual companies and shelter companies from purchase by foreign interests. The proposals include the establishment of a National Enterprise Board with the power to take a controlling interest in "relevant companies in profitable manufacturing industries."

Just to be sure that delegates at the conference would not get the impression that the proposals discussed at the conference would necessarily be included in the party's election manifesto, no vote was taken on the NEC document or even on the proposals contained in Wilson's speech.

This is how an October 3 editorial of the *London Times* saw Wilson's victory: "Mr. Wilson's response has been characteristically tactical. He has wriggled clear of the commitment to take 25 companies into public ownership through the projected national enterprise board. . . . There will be no vote at the conference on the policy document as a whole so that it will not become official party policy. The resolutions passed by the conference are sufficiently loose in their phraseology to permit a good deal of room for manoeuvre. Once the conference is over there will be the first of a series of joint meetings between the Shadow Cabinet and the National Executive Committee to prepare a manifesto setting out the party's policy for the next election. This might include no more than a selection of the public ownership proposals. . . ."

"So there are a number of sieves," the *Times* concluded, "through which the heady wine of the left would have to pass before it became the staple drink of a future Labour administration, and there are voices to be heard in the corridors of Blackpool suggesting that the proceedings there have only a slight bearing upon what such a government would actually do."

After letting Wilson off the hook over nationalization, the left did him another turn by quashing moves to increase party democracy. In a closed session of the conference David Skinner, a delegate from North East Derbyshire Constituency Labour party moved a resolution declaring that "the Parliamentary Labour Party must accept conference decisions as party policy and that the National Executive Committee shall refuse candidature endorsement to any Labour MP refusing to be so bound." Skinner, saying that previous conference decisions had been "thrown in the dustbin," demanded that the party conference become the real decider of party policy.

James Margach, writing in the October 7 *London Sunday Times*, described how left-winger Michael Foot saved the day for the Parliamentary Labour party: "Mr Foot has been the idol and darling of the Left for so many years that he is now worshipped as the unquestioned leader in all things. But fervent Left-winger though he is in all policy, social and human issues of liberty and human rights, he is first a great Parliamentarian,

his truest love and passion, for without a sovereign Parliament, he fears, the people are lost. His speech at the secret session on Tuesday afternoon, when he successfully beat off militant demands that Labour MPs must obey conference decisions, was a classic of of its kind."

Foot argued that "our party is a democratic party, not a totalitarian party" in his defense of the right of Labour MPs to flout conference decisions. Skinner's resolution was heavily defeated.

The myth of a fighting socialist program went out the window in two further debates: wage controls and the Common Market. The conference took no decisive stand against wage restraints and voted down a resolution advocating opposition to the European Economic Community (EEC).

The debate on wages clearly showed that a Labour government would attempt to work out a "voluntary" agreement on wages with the unions. Shadow cabinet member Dennis Healey explained that "during the coming months we must discuss this problem with the trade union wing of our movement to see if we can reach voluntary agreement on a voluntary policy for incomes that takes account of taxation."

At first it seemed as if the left union leaders would oppose this line of thinking. Hugh Scanlon, general secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) and a leader of the left, took the floor to give this warning to Wilson: "We utterly reject any attempt by this or any other Government to freeze wages, and we also reject any direct interference by Government with the principle of free collective bargaining." Hardly had Scanlon spoken these words than he humbly withdrew the AUEW's resolution against all forms of wage controls by having it remitted to the NEC (a euphemism for avoiding a vote showdown).

Michael Foot was up on the platform once again to fend off the challenge to the leadership posed by a strongly worded motion calling for total opposition to the EEC. This resolution, from the Southampton Test Constituency Labour party, declared its "opposition on principle" to British membership in the EEC on the grounds that it was against the in-

terests of the British working class and was set up solely to advance the interests of big business. The resolution went on to state: "The fight for a socialist Britain is part of the fight for a socialist united Europe which alone can meet the needs of European workers."

"Conference therefore instructs the NEC to convene a European conference of Labour, to plan and put forward a campaign of opposition to European big business, with a socialist alternative."

The conference took Michael Foot's advice and voted down this radical motion, though only by a very small majority. Labour policy remained the same: to renegotiate the terms accepted by the Tories for British membership and to place the new terms before the electorate in a referendum. With the help of the parliamentary left, the leadership was successful in avoiding any definite commitment to pull out of the EEC.

Despite the ability of the party leadership, both left and right, to wriggle out of embarrassing commitments on the major issues before the conference, the conference debates did reflect the strong leftward pressure on the party from the unions and the constituency parties. This was shown particularly by the large minority vote in favor of complete opposition to the Common Market. Both the AUEW and the Transport and General Workers Union, Britain's two largest unions, swung their bloc votes behind the resolution.

The left pressure was also evident in the debate on foreign affairs. Though a motion demanding withdrawal from NATO was defeated, the platform suffered a reversal when the conference carried a resolution in favor of unilateral nuclear disarmament, the withdrawal of U.S. polaris missile bases, and a £1,000 million cut in military expenditures.

An emergency session was scheduled on the coup in Chile. Delegates were particularly angered by news that Chilean Communist party leader Luis Corvalán, held under arrest by the Chilean military, was in imminent danger of execution. The conference voted unanimously to send a telegram to Prime Minister Heath demanding that he intercede on Corvalán's behalf.

Present at the conference were Ala-

Intercontinental Press

varez Bunster, Allende's former ambassador to Britain, and Carlos Parra, a leader of the Chilean Radical party. An emergency resolution passed by the conference condemned the coup and the British government's recognition of the new regime. The resolution demanded the recall of the British ambassador from Santiago; withholding of all aid, loans, and credits to the new regime; British assistance to refugees from the political terror; and waging of a campaign throughout the British Labour movement to restore Chilean democracy. However, no mention was made of the national demonstration to be held in support of the Chilean people on November 4 by the Chilean Solidarity Campaign.

A strong motion was passed on Southern Africa. It called for a future Labour government to withdraw investments from South Africa, strengthen sanctions against Rhodesia, and grant diplomatic and financial support to the liberation movements in Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portuguese Africa.

For the first time in its history, the Labour party scheduled an entire session to discuss women's rights. The conference voted for legislation that would repeal or revise all laws that discriminated against women, make discrimination on the basis of sex illegal, and establish an antidiscrimination board.

The sharpening of the class struggle was reflected in the conference not only by the nature of the topics discussed but also by the flights of rhetoric used by the top leaders of the party as they tried to adapt to the new mood of the party. The party bureaucracy was well aware of the intensity of feeling in the unions against runaway inflation and the successive attempts of both Tory and Labour governments to regulate wages. And it was only too conscious of the discontent that had been aroused by the dismal performance of the Wilson government prior to its 1970 election defeat.

Anxious to rekindle the enthusiasm of the party ranks and prove his commitment to radical policies, Wilson was forced to appear as a devoted enthusiast of broad nationalization while conveniently skirting the twenty-five companies issue. In a similar

vein, he lashed out at any talk of an alliance with the Liberal party. Referring to the Liberals as the alternative Tory party, he said there would be "no electoral treaty, no political alliance, no understanding, no deal, no arrangement, no fix." And to further prove his leftist credentials, he took some heavy sideswipes at the far right of the party leadership, old colleagues like Roy Jenkins, the former deputy leader of the party and a strong advocate of the Common Market and the mixed economy.

The *Guardian* in an October 4 editorial explained Wilson's manoeuvres: "Mr Wilson's mood at present is to



WILSON: "Wriggling clear" of Labour party commitments.

prove himself a dedicated Socialist. His practice while in office was to be a pragmatist. . . . If he were to get back to Downing Street, the odds are that he would act cautiously, which is what worries Labour's left."

The *Guardian* continued: "He will probably not let the National Enterprise Board take over a host of industrial companies without thought on how to run them. He will probably not abandon all wage restraint. He will probably not walk out of Europe. And he will probably not spurn tacit or open Liberal support, which on this approach is unlikely to be denied him. Just at present, however, he is talking himself into a Socialist limbo."

Perhaps the wildest demagogue of them all was Tony Wedgewood-Benn, the party's spokesman on industry and trade. "The crisis that we inherit when we come to power will be the

occasion for fundamental change," he told the delegates, "and not the excuse for postponing it." Benn lashed out at the power of the multinational companies. "If we do not control or own them," he warned, "they will control and own us. That is the challenge we face." Benn hinted at the idea of direct election of workers representatives to the boards of nationalized industries.

It was this rhetoric that frightened much of the bourgeois press. The *London Times* headed its October 3 editorial "Giving Way to the Left." It was greatly concerned that the party ranks should not take this radical-sounding speechmaking too seriously. The editorial complained of the possibility of a revolution of expectations being generated and noted that the demands of the left of the party are meeting with "less effective resistance than in the past from the centre and right, where the case for some increase in public ownership is apparently conceded."

The October 6 *Times* said that "if a future Labour government is to serve the nation effectively, the party will have to shed the spirit of Blackpool."

Two commonly held views of the Labour party are proved erroneous by the events of the Labour party conference. One view, the more common of the two, is to hold that the party's left will mount a serious challenge to the capitalist system, thus rendering unnecessary the task of constructing a revolutionary Marxist party. This theory was thoroughly discredited by the abject capitulations of the leaders of the Labour "left" at Blackpool. They spoke and voted in collaboration with the Wilson leadership against the socialist policies needed on wage controls, the Common Market, and nationalization.

The other myth to take a knocking was the sectarian theory that revolutionaries should steer clear of the Labour party. This conference demonstrated beyond doubt that as the radicalization builds up in Britain, it will be reflected inside the Labour party, and that the job of British revolutionaries will not be to stand on the sidelines but to enter the battle to break the ranks of the party from their present misleaders, both left and right. □

An Appeal to the Wrong Address

By Marilyn Vogt

Second of Three Articles

Sakharov's analysis of the meaning of the détente between Washington and Moscow was incorrect.

He opposed the détente because he believes that through the trade agreements and the technological assistance that flow from it the bureaucracy will be able to strengthen its hand against the opponents of bureaucratic rule and solve the Soviet Union's economic difficulties without loosening the grip of bureaucratic management.

The Kremlin rulers also believe this. It is part of the schema of "peaceful coexistence" advanced and practiced by Stalin, a notable case being the détente with Hitler on the eve of World War II.

Sakharov's statements amounted to an appeal to American imperialism to withhold economic agreements unless the Soviet rulers grant concessions toward democratization. The form of his appeal was a vaguely worded warning that the détente would only enable the Kremlin to become a more formidable military threat to the outside world.

Moscow is not an expansionist military threat to the imperialists, and the imperialists know it. However, the *Wall Street Journal* took advantage of Sakharov's statement and a similar one by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to register a plea for increased U.S. military expropriations in its September 19 editorial: "The way for the West to preserve the détente is to keep the military strong."

The U.S. ruling class and its government will not let the Soviet bureaucracy's repression of workers democracy interfere with the détente. In fact, it needs this bureaucracy's cooperation to help it hold back workers struggles around the world.

Henry Kissinger—architect of the détente and now the U.S. Secretary of State—summed up the ruling class's views. He said he sympathized with Sakharov's situation "but argued that the United States should not let concern with Soviet domestic policies inter-

fere with the trend toward accommodation," according to the September 10 *New York Times*.

Kissinger said that as "painful" as the Sakharov case is, "I feel nevertheless that we must proceed on the course on which we are."

Sakharov may well be naive about American "democracy." It is to be expected that some dissidents in the USSR might entertain illusions about the reality of democracy in the capitalist West. The Soviet people, walled off from the outside world, have been deprived for decades of accurate information and revolutionary Marxist analysis of events. They are highly distrustful of what the Kremlin chooses to publish. The lies of the bureaucrats on so many subjects make it seem likely that democracy may after all be practiced in the West. They have no way of checking their deductions against reality, or of reading revolutionary publications that offer accurate analyses.

In a recent interview reported in the *Baltimore Sun* September 10, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn described what the Kremlin's processing of news means to Soviet people. "It means daily spittle into your ears and eyes, it is an offense and degradation of a human being to a robot's level. . . . It means that grown persons are reduced to infants: swallow what your mother has already chewed for you. . . . And many world events must not be made known to our people at all. . . . Moscow and Leningrad have paradoxically become the most uninformed big cities in the world."

Since this suppression of information is done in the name of socialism, it is little wonder that Soviet dissidents mistakenly idealize the "democracy" in the capitalist countries.

The détente has actually led the Kremlin to exert greater efforts to stop the flow of underground news in samizdat publications. No détente in the struggle on the home front against those who would bring fresh air into Soviet society!

In December 1971, two months after it was announced that Nixon planned to go to Moscow for a summit conference, the Central Committee of the CPSU passed a resolution to stop the flow of samizdat and especially the samizdat journals *Chronicle of Current Events* and *Ukrainsky Visnyk*.

The resulting crackdown, initiated in January 1972 with the trial of Vladimir Bukovsky and a wave of secret-police searches and arrests, has been described in previous issues of *Intercontinental Press*.

The Kremlin had a special problem with respect to Sakharov and those who are active in the Human Rights Committee, which he helped to found. These people represent a wing of the top level of the Soviet technical and cultural intelligentsia.

They recognize that bureaucratic regulation has stifled developments in many branches of the Soviet economy and culture, especially those in which they are immediately involved.

The advocates of democratization from this elite sector have legitimate grievances. They want an end to the bureaucratic interference that is hampering scientific, technological, and literary developments. However, in the course of their struggle, they have found that the bureaucracy, instead of granting them greater freedom, has in fact taken reprisals against the individuals who are demanding democracy, through censures, demotions, firings, forced emigration, arrests, and confinement.

In the process of defending political victims from their own ranks they have been forced to defend the rights of all layers of the population, particularly other arrested political activists who do not come from the elite—people who are fighting for broader democratization and for the rights of oppressed nationalities in the Soviet Union.

Sakharov and those who have worked with him in the Human Rights Committee do not call for workers democracy. But to the extent that their activities are in support of greater democracy for all, they threaten the interests of the bureaucratic caste.

Sakharov is one of the few representatives of this group who has not been silenced by the current crackdown. As long as he continues to advocate democratic reforms, other dissidents will defend him against the top bureaucrats in the Kremlin. □