

# Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania


the Americas

Vol. 11, No. 35

© 1973 Intercontinental Press

October 8, 1973

50c



Hugo Blanco and Eduardo Creus:

## **Eyewitness Account of Repression in Chile**

## Military Catechism

If any French general felt a twinge of conscience after dumping radioactive fallout over defenseless civilians in the South Pacific, he can now rest assured that his actions reflected the highest standards of Christian morality, according to a lengthy document prepared by "groups of Christian officers" for the guidance of their co-believers in the armed forces.

The document, Flora Lewis reported in a September 24 dispatch from Paris to the *New York Times*, was prepared at the request of Monsignor Gabriel Vancel, Vicar of the Armies, and "is intended to provide definite answers for chaplains, other officers, government officials and private citizens who confront the question of conscience posed by the use of state force."

The profession of soldier, the statement maintains, is an honorable one: "When Christ was approached by soldiers of the Roman occupation army seeking salvation, he did not ask them to change their profession but to conduct themselves as believers."

For believers, the "realistic Christian position" is that nuclear weapons are "a lesser evil" although what evil they are lesser than is not very clear. At any rate, good Christians are expected to incinerate cities while maintaining "a point of view which will help the world evolve toward true peace, based on love and not fear."

The authors of the document take a forthright stand against torture, noting that it is not only "immoral" but also "ineffective."

The question of supporting one's officers when they decide to shoot down their civilian fellow-citizens is best resolved by having "confidence in the judgment of those who have the heavy responsibility of command."

Last but not least, conscription is necessary to provide the "moral education of 20-year-old men." Where else could they get such an education? □

### Chiang: Peking a Bore

"Life in Peiping [sic] is dull and bleak. There are no dogs or cats there, an American correspondent reported September 17." — *Taipei Free China Weekly*.

But we hear he had a hilarious conversation with a parakeet.

## In This Issue

- |               |      |  |
|---------------|------|--|
| FEATURES      | 1111 | The Global Struggle for Raw Materials<br>—by Dick Roberts  |
|               | 1125 | Behind the Watergate Scandal—What<br>Nixon Contributors Got for Their \$60 Million<br>—by Allen Myers  |
|               | 1132 | Fifty Years of Stalinist Treachery—<br>"Peaceful Coexistence"—An Obstacle<br>to Revolution—by Milton Alvin   |
| CHILE         | 1107 | Eyewitness Account of Repression in Chile  |
| FRANCE        | 1115 | Immigrant Workers Fight Racism With Strikes<br>—by Jon Rothschild  |
| ARGENTINA     | 1118 | Peronist Regime Maneuvers to Repress the<br>Left—by Gerry Foley  |
| NORTH KOREA   | 1121 | Kim Threatens to Break Off "Unification"<br>Talks—by George Johnson  |
| IRELAND       | 1123 | Northern Irish Prisoners Appeal From Long Kesh   |
| GUINEA-BISSAU | 1133 | Declaration of Independence  |
| DOCUMENTS     | 1134 | Origin of "Fraccion Roja" of Argentine PRT   |
| DRAWINGS      | 1118 | Jose Rucci; 1121, Park Chung Hee; 1122,<br>Kim Il-sung; 1123, William Whitelaw; 1125,<br>Richard Kleindienst; 1127, L. Patrick Gray; 1128,<br>Henry Kissinger; 1129, Charles Colson; 1129,<br>E. Howard Hunt; 1130, John Connally; 1131,<br>Edward Kennedy—by Copain |

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

COPY EDITOR: Lawrence Rand.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Candida Barberena, Gerry Foley, Allen Myers, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders, David Thorstad.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.

TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Ruth Schein.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemenee, 75004, Paris, France.

TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright © 1973 by Intercontinental Press.

## Eyewitness Account of Repression in Chile

[About a week after the bloody coup in Chile, the Peruvian revolutionist Hugo Blanco, who had been in exile in Santiago, was able to escape to Mexico. His exit was arranged by the Swedish government, which has offered him asylum. Blanco was accompanied by the Argentine Trotskyist Eduardo Creus and by a Brazilian comrade, Julião Bordao. On September 28, they gave the following interview in Mexico City to a correspondent of *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

*Question. How extensive has the repression been in Chile?*

*Blanco.* The military began their repression in advance of the coup, aiming to disarm and demobilize the people. They began raiding plants. For example, they raided an electronics plant in Arica in the North. In Santiago there were several raids, including one on a cemetery. All these searches were carried out under the cover of the so-called Arms Control Law, which was passed by the right-wing bloc in parliament at the culmination of the last offensive against the government in October 1972. The UP [Unidad Popular—Popular Unity, the class-collaborationist ruling coalition] did not actively oppose it, however. The UP deputies abstained and Allende did not veto it.

In the South, they raided the Lanera Austral factory, where they killed some workers. In the same area, the military launched a repression against peasants who demonstrated their opposition to the June 29 attempted coup. Some were dragged across the ground by helicopters or tortured in front of their families. Sailors who showed opposition to the coup were also tortured and imprisoned. All of this was part of the softening-up process that preceded the take-over. As a final test, in Santiago they raided the Cobre Cerillos factory in the Cordón Cerillos and the Sumar factory in the Cordón Vicuña Mackenna. Three days after these raids, they made their strike.

These escalating raids enabled the right to test the strength of the workers movement, its capacity to resist. They also started the process of selective repression aimed at decapitating the workers movement and the left parties. The strongholds of the left in the factory belts, shantytowns, and schools like the Universidad Técnica were hit, and vanguard militants were seized and imprisoned. Throughout this first phase of the repression, the military and the police had the acquiescence of Allende and the UP leadership.

When they launched their massive terror on September 11, the military were also aided by the faltering defensive line of the UP government. The UP government had called on the workers to maintain a constant guard on the factories. They did not call for seizing the factories but only for guarding them. They meant that the workers should continue working for bosses and even imperialists and that after doing back-breaking labor all day, carrying out the UP's order to produce more and win "the battle of production," they should stay on at night doing guard duty. Obviously this meant that those who did stay were mainly the vanguard. Most of the workers tired of this. So that it was essentially the vanguard that was trapped in the factories when the military launched its attack.

On the day of the coup, the military launched a massive strike against the factories and the shantytowns, seeking to massacre the vanguard. At the same time, they tried to round up all the leaders of the left parties as well as the UP ministers and deputies.

Next, the repression was directed against the intermediate cadres. The activists in the factories were fired, arrested, and murdered. The universities were closed. The University of Concepción, a well-known center of the far left, was shut down and formally abolished. The diplomas of its graduates were revoked. In the Universidad Técnica, the military carried out

a massacre on the first day of the coup, slaughtering about 600 persons. There was also a massacre at the Instituto Pedagógico.

There are reports that every fifteen minutes a body is cremated in Santiago. Many persons have seen bodies lying in the street. Murders have been seen in broad daylight. For example, if someone goes out for bread or something like that, he is likely to be bullied by the Carabineros [Riot Police], and anybody who protests is simply shot down. There was one occasion when the Carabineros started beating people in a food line and when some persons objected, the whole line was slaughtered.

The football stadiums have been turned into gigantic prisons in Santiago, Concepción, and Antofagasta. The island of Quiriquina has also been converted into a prison. Innumerable military tribunals have been set up. There are ten in Valparaíso alone, for example. There are a lot of executions going on, and the junta is threatening to punish any kind of resistance with death. Any act of sabotage in word or deed is supposed to be punishable by summary execution.

An all-embracing campaign of intimidation against the population began at 3:00 p.m. on September 11, when the junta gave the order that everyone was to remain in their homes, that no one could be on the streets. Many people could not get home. For example, I had to walk thirty-five blocks to get to my home. The next day there was a curfew around the clock. It was only lifted on Thursday [September 13] at noon. The people were kept imprisoned in their homes. It was certain death to be on the street.

While the military held the population pinned down and atomized this way, they carried out almost indiscriminate mass raids. They broke into the houses of everyone who had been denounced by some rightist or another, beat up whatever persons they found, tortured the inhabitants in front of their families, shot some on the

spot, and dragged others away to prison, where, needless to say, they continued torturing them. The troops destroyed everything they could not carry away. They were given free rein to take all valuables. This is the way the putschists egged on the soldiers to carry out the repression. They offered them booty.

The brunt of the repression was directed against the cordones [industrial belts] and the shantytowns. Massacres took place in the squatters' settlements of Lo Hermida, La Legua, and Nueva Havana. Many of the nationalized factories where organization of the workers had reached its highest level were razed. This happened to the Sumar and Cristalería plants in the Vicuña Mackenna Cordón and to the Cobre Cerillos plant in the Cerillos Cordón, as well as many other factories.

The armed forces were turned into a murder machine. Many persons were killed immediately on being taken prisoner, or the next day, as it occurred to the military. The objective of the repression was to clear the left out of all the factories and centers, by killing them, driving them out, and arresting them. In this way the workers movement was decapitated.

*Q. What is the situation now of the political exiles who found refuge in Chile under the UP government?*

*Blanco.* The campaign against foreigners is a very important aspect of the repression in Chile. Being pointed out as a foreigner, especially one from another Latin American country, can mean instant death. This campaign is obviously not the work of the Chilean bourgeoisie or the putschists alone. Most of the foreigners played no role in the government. This is obviously an action directed by the imperialists, by the CIA.

Chile has been turned into a trap. Or since the Chilean national anthem says that the country will be either the refuge of the oppressed or the grave of the free, perhaps we should say that it has been turned into a tomb.

Since Chile had opened its doors to political refugees, many revolutionists were concentrated there. Mainly

these were Brazilians. There were also Argentines, Uruguayans, Bolivians, Dominicans, Venezuelans, and others from the Central American countries. So the coup was an excellent opportunity for the imperialists to trap this entire vanguard. At the same time, it could piously wash its hands of the affair. The blame was on the junta. The imperialists and the other Latin American bourgeoisies could look on innocently. They were not the ones killing, jailing, and torturing this vanguard, only the Chilean junta. But this was really an international repressive operation by the various bourgeoisies, headed by the imperialists.

For example, the Uruguayan and Brazilian governments backed up the junta in this campaign by claiming that the persons from their countries who went to Chile had the objective of developing terrorist operations. Thus, they gave the junta carte blanche to murder the Uruguayan and Brazilian compañeros.

There was an enormous pogrom, similar to the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Leaflets were dropped from airplanes and helicopters. The radio stations called on the people to turn in all foreigners who had come to Chile to kill Chileans. That gave rightists who didn't like foreigners a chance to run to the nearest police station and sic the military and police on every one they knew about. There was a good probability that those arrested, especially if it was by the army or the air force, would be killed on the spot.

*Q. How were you able to get out of the country?*

*Blanco.* As soon as the curfew was lifted, I had to get out of my house. I took refuge in the Swedish Embassy and later in the home of the Mexican ambassador, which I was finally allowed to leave to come here to Mexico. But many Chileans who had taken refuge in the embassy and in the ambassador's house were not given exit permits, and in some cases only some members of families were allowed to leave. For example, there was the case of Alejandro Chileño Rojas. They gave visas to his wife and daughter-in-law and grandson. They are here in Mexico City. But he was not allowed to

leave. His crime was mainly publishing books. He worked for the Mantú publishing house.

The Mexican Embassy deserves special credit for getting refugees out. They are doing everything they can. But don't think that it is easy to get into the embassies. They are surrounded by police. The day before I left I saw them capture three persons who were trying to make it into the ambassador's home.

*Creus.* I would like to add one thing to what Hugo said about the repression. There were wholesale expulsions of activists, mainly from the factories of the nationalized sector that had been seized by the workers. The junta itself has said that 15 percent of the workers in these plants have been fired.

*Q. What has the Chilean experience shown about the theory of the "peaceful road" to socialism?*

*Creus.* This theory did not have much to do with reality. The class struggle never stopped. The workers occupied factories and the peasants took land without asking the permission of the UP. On the other hand, the rightists kept up a constant attack on the government. They pressured the government to use the police to repress the workers who wanted to advance the process of socialization. For example, on many occasions when the workers occupied the factories, it was the Allende government itself that cleared them out. On other occasions, it repressed the people in the shantytowns who were pushing for direct distribution of food and other supplies. Finally the repression of the right escalated, and they began attacks on factories and the poor neighborhoods while Allende was still in office.

In this whole process, the role of the Communist and Socialist parties was to act as a brake on the popular mobilization. Part of their policy was the "dialogue" with the right and the campaign for production. They did not tell the workers to organize so as to advance the process, but to work harder and harder, even in the factories that were still in the hands of the imperialists.

Although the masses were on the offensive throughout most of the UP government's term in office, they were

held back by their reformist leaderships. When the right went on the offensive in October, the reformists kept the masses in a strictly defensive position. The workers saw the need to arm and talked about organizing defense committees. But the Allende government said that there could be no armed forces but the Carabineros and the military.

*Q. Did opposition to this reformist policy develop in the Communist and Socialist parties?*

*Creus.* In the CP I saw only individual dissidents. In the SP there were dissident currents but in the end they capitulated to their reformist leaderships. The real effect of these left currents was to reinforce reformism. Militant workers joined the SP in the hope that they could win it over to a revolutionary line and they became trapped in a reformist structure.

*Q. How extensive was the resistance to the coup?*

*Creus.* There was no organized resistance. The workers wanted to fight. But in the absence of a genuinely revolutionary organization there could be no organized resistance. There was some resistance by snipers. There was some resistance by groups besieged in places like the Instituto Pedagógico, but they were slaughtered. They tried to put up a fight in the Universidad Técnica, but they were massacred. There was resistance in the shantytown of La Legua, but there was a massacre there like the one in Lo Hermida.

*Q. To what extent were the workers armed?*

*Creus.* The left organizations had a lot of guns. But these weapons were not in the hands of the workers. They were kept in special arsenals by the leaderships. This was another aspect of the bureaucratic organization of the left parties. Even if the leaderships had wanted to arm the workers, there was no organization suited to this task. There was the case of the governor of Talca, for example. He wanted to resist and did put up a fight with some persons but it was only a small group.

It was no good having guns, if they were not in the hands of the workers. And there was no organization to enable the workers to resist in an organized way. So, the resistance was minimal, the amount of weapons in the hands of the workers was minimal. But with the proper organization, the resistance could have assumed gigantic proportions.

*Q. Did any splits show up in the armed forces?*

*Creus.* There were two types of opposition to the coup. There was a sector of the officers who were against the take-over. It was led by Prats. But it was very weak. Nonetheless, this division could have been exploited by the proletariat if it had had a really revolutionary leadership. A reformist leadership could not take advantage of it. When Prats told Allende that the only way out was to fire sixteen generals, Allende said he didn't have the strength to do it. So, Prats and the other anticoup officers had to resign.

The common soldiers were another matter. Among them there were revolutionary elements ready to fight alongside the working class. There was murmuring in the armed forces against the putschist plans, rather than active opposition. In the absence of a revolutionary organization, such opposition could take only an isolated, atomized form. There was a case of a Carabinero who shot a lieutenant and a captain and called on the others to join him. But he was alone and so no one else followed him and he was killed. It is probable that such incidents occurred in many places but in a disorganized way.

The case of the sailors in Valparaíso shows how the reformists disorganized any opposition in the army. When the sailors manifested their disapproval of the June 29 coup and the military's plans for a take-over, the officers repressed them. And the government endorsed this repression. It approved it first by its silence and later explicitly.

*Q. There are some elements in the U.S. Communist party that accuse the revolutionary left of provoking the coup by promoting the nationalizations and a socialist policy. What*

*is your opinion of that?*

*Creus.* Those who provoked the coup were not the left, because the only thing that could have stopped the coup was the advance of the struggles of the working class, toward more nationalization, workers control, measures that would have strengthened workers power, including the arming of the proletariat. These measures, as well as encouraging the soldiers to resist the coup, are the only thing that could have blocked it. But instead of advancing this development, the UP leadership held all this back and even assisted the repression. So it is not the revolutionary left that provoked the coup but the reformist leaderships—fundamentally the Communist party, and also, of course, the SP leadership.

*Q. What about the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria - Movement of the Revolutionary Left]? What kind of an alternative did it offer to the reformist leadership of the UP?*

*Julião Bordao:* At no time did the MIR really seek to win the masses away from the UP's reformism. This is the key for assessing the MIR. In the period before Allende took office, the MIR's political line could be characterized as ultraleft. They raided banks and did all the things that are called urban guerrilla warfare. But at no time did they try to win the masses away from reformism. Instead they threw themselves into vanguardist actions.

Then when Allende was elected, the MIR changed its line, but they really just turned the coin over. From a policy of urban guerrilla warfare, they turned to capitulating to Allende, essentially to an opportunist line. Although they retained their organizational independence from the UP, they were drawn in fundamentally behind its policy. The line of the MIR in fact became integrated with that of the UP. They launched attacks periodically on the UP, but the central aspect was their support for it.

That is, just as they did not seek to win the masses away from the reformists in the first phase of their activity, so they did not do so in the second. They tended in fact to support the left wing of the Socialist party, helping it to keep the most militant

workers from going beyond the framework of the UP.

*Creus.* As the comrade says, the MIR was unable to build an alternative mass leadership. It should be noted that the MIR did nominally have a caucus in the union movement, the Frente de Trabajadores Revolucionarios [FTR—Front of Revolutionary Workers]. But this was only an appendage of the MIR and suffered from all its defects. The MIR was essentially a bureaucratic organization and the FTR also suffered from this bureaucratism. It was impossible by such methods to organize an independent workers vanguard.

The social base of the MIR was first of all peasants and then the inhabitants of the shantytown belts around the cities. They had very little in the workers movement. This led them in an opportunist way to underestimate the cordones industriales, which were the vanguard of the working class. They put their emphasis on the comandos comunales, which combined the shantytowns and some other sectors and in which the workers were included but in a diluted way. No real comando comunal existed; there were only embryos that were not even on the level of the cordones. We were not against the comandos comunales, but we thought that the fundamental thing was to strengthen the cordones industriales, which should have been the axis of the comandos comunales.

Along with their opportunism, it should be noted that there were spontaneous and adventurist attitudes in the MIR. At times they planned seizing factories and streets in sudden actions that were not prepared by previous mobilization of the masses and by discussion. This obviously led to failures. At times they tried to substitute the action of groups of their own members for that of the masses. For example, when they tried to take some factories back from the rightists who had occupied them while the workers were out, they wanted to have Mirista groups do it, instead of trying to organize the workers themselves, who were beginning to see the need to do this. This happened specifically in the AG factory.

As the comrade said, they failed to put up their own candidates in elections when they had the strength to do so. Instead they gave uncritical

support to the leader of the SP left wing, Altamirano.

*Q. What is the role of the fascist groups in the repression?*

*Creus.* Everybody is calling the junta a fascist government. We don't think that what exists in Chile is fascism. I don't say this to try to prettify the junta any or to minimize its guilt. This does not mean that it is any less barbarous; it could hardly be any more barbarous. The fact is that if the military has not established a fascist regime, it is not because it doesn't want to. Fascism, as we define it, is a mass movement. It involves political gangs repressing the masses. But there are only the embryos of this type of fascist gangs in Chile.

At present, the repression is being carried out almost entirely by the armed forces. If the fascists have been involved in any of this, we have no news of it. On the other hand, the fascists are playing a role by informing on leftists and by offering the junta trucks and everything it needs. But the repression, the massacres, is being carried out by the armed forces.

*Q. How great a defeat do you think the Chilean workers have suffered? How soon will they be able to recover?*

*Creus.* The working class has suffered a very grave defeat. The entire vanguard is being crushed. The leadership in the cordones and the left parties is being annihilated—not just the top leadership, but the intermediate leadership and now even the activists in the factories. The entire student body at the University of Concepción, for example, has fallen under the repression. It is a defeat from which it will take a long time to recover.

*Blanco.* This is a defeat of catastrophic proportions because it comes in the context of a series of defeats in Latin America. The coups in Uruguay, Bolivia, and Brazil, for example, have reinforced the reactionaries. Argentina is one of the few bulwarks left. In the present situation, it represents a great hope for a new rise in Latin America.

*Q. What can we do outside Chile to help minimize this defeat?*

*Blanco.* We have to develop a worldwide campaign to restrain the repression in Chile. In the first place, we have to stop the executions and killings, many of which take place every day. Secondly, we have to win more humane treatment for the prisoners and force the military to abolish its special tribunals. The demonstrations that occurred throughout the world in the wake of the coup had an immediate effect. A few days after the initial massacres, it was evident that they were trying to apply some restraint. So, I think that this campaign must be continued in order to save many lives from the slaughter that is going on every day.

The situation of the foreigners in Chile is extremely grave. The world has not seen such a hysterical pogrom since the years of Nazism. This is something that should interest not just the left organizations but all organizations that claim to uphold human rights.

The demand should be raised that the Chilean government give exit permits to all political exiles and give them safe-conduct passes out of the country. Chile has signed the Latin American treaty on asylum, and if it denies the right to leave to one single exile it is violating this treaty. So, we must demand that this treaty be respected and that the cordons around the Latin American embassies be removed.

At the same time, we have to fight to assure the exiles new places of asylum and keep them from being returned to their countries. For example, sending some Brazilians back to their country means just killing them in Brazil instead of Chile. The organizations that defend human rights

### Still Available

#### Complete Back Files (Unbound) Intercontinental Press

|      |           |         |
|------|-----------|---------|
| 1966 | 42 issues | \$25.00 |
| 1967 | 42 issues | \$25.00 |
| 1968 | 44 issues | \$22.00 |
| 1969 | 43 issues | \$21.50 |
| 1970 | 43 issues | \$21.50 |
| 1971 | 45 issues | \$22.50 |
| 1972 | 47 issues | \$23.50 |

P.O. Box 116  
Village Station  
New York, N.Y. 10014

Intercontinental Press

must campaign to get the exiles out and to a place where they will be in no danger. There are in fact Brazilians who have been forced to take refuge in their own embassy because in the face of the kind of terror the Chilean junta has unleashed, they preferred to die in their own country.

It should be pointed out that many of the Brazilians who were in Chile had never participated in the revolutionary movement but were studying, or working, or had some other non-political reason to be in the country.

But the fact that they have to escape from Chile—because it is a capital crime there now to be a Brazilian—means that they cannot return to Brazil, because going back under these conditions means that they would unquestionably be regarded as political criminals.

It is important to expose the junta's almost unprecedented campaign of terror against the population. Despite stories of armed resistance, what has been going on has been essentially a massacre of a defenseless people. □

Moreover, nationalization is increasingly taking place in the "neocolonies." Before Salvador Allende was elected president of Chile in 1970, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva had formed "mixed companies," in which the Chilean government owned 51 percent, of the giant U. S. copper companies Anaconda, Kennecott, and Cerro. Even more noteworthy is the increasing ownership of Middle East oil demanded by the Arab and Iranian governments.

Nevertheless, none of these developments contradicts Lenin's basic thesis. The overwhelming majority of raw materials in the underdeveloped world remain owned and controlled by imperialist monopolies. This is increasingly necessary from the standpoint of profits. And to the extent that one or another neocolony has succeeded in nationalizing or partly nationalizing foreign holdings, imperialism's drive to tighten its hold elsewhere has been all the more reinforced.

The increasing instability of U. S. oil holdings in the Middle East, for example, is certainly one of the factors that impelled Nixon to press for victory in Southeast Asia, with the potential reward of oil leases in the South China Sea. Moreover, it is a factor in Washington's détente with Moscow. The imperialists are hoping to gain Moscow's help in maintaining U. S. control of oil resources in the Middle East and at the same time are looking toward a long-term, possibly more stable, source of natural gas in the Soviet Union's Siberian fields.

## U.S. Imperialism and Chile

# The Global Struggle for Raw Materials

By Dick Roberts

The September 11 coup in Chile reconfirms a central tenet of Lenin's theory of imperialism: the *ever increasing* need of the advanced capitalist countries to monopolize sources of raw materials in the underdeveloped world.

Lenin wrote in *Imperialism* (1917): "The principal feature of modern capitalism is the domination of the monopolist combines of the big capitalists. These monopolies are most firmly established when *all* the sources of raw materials are controlled by the one group. And we have seen with what zeal the international capitalist combines exert every effort to make it impossible for their rivals to compete with them; for example by buying up mineral lands, oil fields, etc. Colonial possession alone gives complete guarantee of success to the monopolies against all the risks of the struggle with competitors, including the risk that the latter will defend themselves by means of a law establishing a state monopoly. The more capitalism is developed, the more the need for raw materials is felt; the more bitter competition becomes, and the more feverishly the hunt for raw materials proceeds throughout the whole world, the more desperate becomes the struggle for acquisition of colonies."

A number of aspects of the development of imperialism in the period after World War II seemed at first glance to contradict Lenin. Most of the colo-

nial possessions of Dutch, French, and British imperialism in Asia and Africa won formal political independence. Imperialist investment as a whole proceeded more rapidly in the advanced countries than in the underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, investment in the underdeveloped countries increasingly shifted towards manufacturing industries, rather than the agricultural and extractive industries that constitute sources of raw materials.

The net fixed assets of all U. S.-owned foreign affiliates in 1970 was \$69,012 million. Of this 51% were located in only six countries: Canada, 27%; United Kingdom, 11%; West Germany, 7%; France, 4%; and Belgium-Luxembourg, 2%. Mexico and Brazil occupy a special position in U. S. investment in the underdeveloped world. In 1970, Mexico had 2% and Brazil 3% of total U. S. foreign investment.

U. S. foreign investment in the rest of the world stood at \$29,862 million (44%). In terms of industries this broke down as follows: agriculture 1%; mining and smelting 4%; petroleum 42%; manufacturing 34%; public utilities 8%; trade 4%; finance 3%; insurance, negligible; other 4%. (*Implications of Multinational Firms for World Trade and Investment and for U. S. Trade and Labor*, Committee on Finance, United States Senate, February 1973, pp. 404-5.)

## Raw Materials Consumption

Central to imperialist strategy is the fact that the United States consumes more raw materials than can be domestically produced. The disproportion is growing. Harry Magdoff emphasizes this point in *The Age of Imperialism* (1969). "It is true," writes Magdoff, "that in recent years technical innovations have increased the utility of domestic ores. Nevertheless, the tendency to increasing reliance on foreign sources of supply persists, partly to get one's money's worth out of an investment already made, partly as a protective device to keep the lesser quality ore sources in reserve, and partly for immediate financial advantage where foreign ores are more economical. As specialists in the field see it, in the absence of a further break-

through in technology that would make the very low grade iron ore, derived from taconite and similar rock, decidedly cheaper than foreign ore, the prognosis is for increased reliance of our steel industry on foreign sources of ore. Thus, it is anticipated that about half of the iron ore to be consumed in 1980 will be met by foreign sources, and that by 2000 the import ratio will reach 75 percent."

Magdoff cites the example of the jet engine—a commodity whose usefulness to the imperialists goes far beyond commercial air travel. Of the six critical materials used in the jet engine, three are entirely imported: columbium from Brazil, Canada, and Mozambique; chromium from South Africa, Turkey, Rhodesia, the Philippines, and Iran; cobalt from Zaire, Morocco, Canada, and Zambia.

The physical dependence of the United States on foreign sources of raw materials is summarized in the following list adapted from *U.S. News & World Report*, December 4, 1972. Of the total world output of key minerals each year, the United States uses the following proportions:

|             |     |
|-------------|-----|
| Natural gas | 57% |
| Silver      | 42% |
| Lead        | 36% |
| Aluminum    | 35% |
| Petroleum   | 32% |
| Tin         | 32% |
| Nickel      | 30% |
| Copper      | 27% |
| Steel       | 19% |
| Coal        | 16% |

Thus, according to *U.S. News*, "with 5 per cent of the world's people, [the] U. S. consumes 30 per cent of world's minerals."

There is hardly a sharper expression of the fundamentally predatory character of imperialism. What is most important from the standpoint of the present discussion, however, is that dependency is increasing. A 1971 report by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U. S. Senate declared: "The United States consumes between 30 and 40 percent of the total world [nonfuel] minerals production. If present demand trends continue and unless future recycling and reuse augment supply, the U. S. demand for primary minerals is expected to increase an estimated 400 percent by the year 2000."

A projection of the increasing dependence on imported minerals adap-

ted from U. S. Department of the Interior data appeared in an article by Lester R. Brown in the November 5, 1972, *New York Times*. It is summarized in the following table showing minerals imported as a percentage of minerals consumed by the United States in the given years, with projected figures for the year 2000:

|           | 1950 | 1970 | 2000 |
|-----------|------|------|------|
| Aluminum  | 64   | 85   | 98   |
| Chromium  | —    | 100  | 100  |
| Copper    | 31   | 0    | 56   |
| Iron      | 8    | 30   | 67   |
| Lead      | 39   | 31   | 67   |
| Manganese | 88   | 100  | 100  |
| Nickel    | 94   | 90   | 89   |
| Phosphate | 8    | 0    | 2    |
| Potassium | 14   | 42   | 61   |
| Sulfur    | 2    | 0    | 52   |
| Tin       | 77   | —    | 100  |
| Tungsten  | —    | 50   | 97   |
| Zinc      | 38   | 59   | 84   |

Brown, a senior fellow with the Washington Overseas Development Council, wrote, "In per capita terms, Americans consume perhaps 20 times as much metallic ore as the average person living in the poorest countries.

"If the consumption levels of these countries should ever begin to approach those now prevailing in the rich countries, pressures on mineral supplies, particularly of the scarcer minerals, would quickly become a matter of global concern.

"For example, in 1967 the average American consumed approximately one ton of steel, while worldwide [per capita] consumption was 0.17 tons. To raise the present global population to United States consumption levels would require a sixfold expansion of production."

Brown, of course, finds such an expansion inconceivable. And it is inconceivable under conditions of monopoly rule. Yet it would be a different matter under social conditions in which world production was planned and run for the benefit of the world's population instead of the privileged few.

### Monopoly Control

It is not only a question of physical consumption—the *use value* of commodities—but also a question of who owns them. After all, one could argue, precisely because the U. S. need for raw materials is increasing, the neocolonies have an advantage. They could take over the companies and sell

the raw materials to the United States *in a seller's market*, with demand exceeding supply, and consequently at ever higher prices! However, monopoly profit rates in the extractive industries depend on the ability of the monopolists to exploit the labor of the underdeveloped countries and to sell the product under world market conditions in which production (and consequently prices) are controlled. Only through *cartelization*—the rigging of world production and prices by a few monopolists in each industry—can the monopolists suppress self-defeating cut-throat competition and maintain monopoly profit rates. And that requires private ownership and the political power to coerce governments.

For example, the ability of the U. S.-dominated international petroleum cartel to keep Japanese oil investment in the Middle East at a minimum, and consequently to keep Japan dependent on Western oil, is primarily a political not a monetary question.

Paul Sweezy described a "classical" situation in his 1958 study of the profit structure of Standard Oil of New Jersey. He restated the results of his investigation in his and Paul Baran's *Monopoly Capital* (1966). In 1958, the percentage distribution by region of assets and profits of Standard Oil (now Exxon) was as follows:

|                    | Assets | Profits |
|--------------------|--------|---------|
| U. S. and Canada   | 67     | 34      |
| Latin America      | 20     | 39      |
| Eastern Hemisphere | 13     | 27      |

"While two thirds of Jersey's assets were located in North America, only one third of its profits came from that region," Sweezy and Baran wrote in *Monopoly Capital*. "Or to put the point differently, Jersey's foreign investments were half as large as its domestic investments but its foreign profits were twice as large as its domestic profits. The indicated profit rate abroad is thus four times the domestic rate."

Moreover, we can be certain that if the study were repeated today, the results would be even more pronounced. That is because the percentage of Exxon's holdings located in the Middle East—where the ratio of profits to investment is highest—would be much greater than it was in 1958. Addi-



tionally it should be underlined that the *reinvestment* of the extractive industries' profits in the foreign nations where they are located is sufficient for the expansion that is undertaken in most cases. The ratio of profits to initial investment is thereby all the more increased.

Further, under the now prevailing conditions of intensified competition among monopolies of advanced capitalist countries for international markets, the monopolies' need for control of raw materials *will be exacerbated*. As control of markets for finished products is undermined by international competition, the monopolists have ever greater need for access to and control of sources of cheap raw materials. The search for these resources will take on a more rapacious and frenzied character. The underdeveloped world cannot escape the vicissitudes of intensified international monopoly competition. In fact, it will be forced, as always in the epoch of imperialism, to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of imperialist contradictions.


When to this is added the fact that the No. 1 bastion of imperialism, the United States, which already consumes 30% to 40% of the world's raw materials, aims to increase its share at the expense of its imperialist rivals as well as of the neocolonies, the explosive content of the struggle for raw materials is clearly revealed. "In the period of crisis the hegemony of the United States will operate more completely, more openly, and more ruthlessly than in the period of boom," Trotsky wrote in the 1928 "Draft Program of the Comintern." "The United States will seek to overcome and extricate herself from her difficulties and maladies primarily at the expense of Europe, regardless of whether this occurs in Asia, Canada, South America, Australia, or Europe itself, or whether this takes place peacefully or through war."

The interimperialist war that Trotsky foresaw in 1928 did not solve the central contradictions of imperialism that brought it about. They are re-emerging on a world scale. And since a new interimperialist war is virtually precluded because of the even greater hegemony of the United States today than in the 1920s when Trotsky was writing, it is all the more incumbent upon us to pay attention to the ways in which imperialism "resolves" its con-

traditions short of interimperialist world war.

## U.S. Investment in Chile

U.S. investment in Latin America has been on a sharp upswing since the early 1960s, as the graph from the September 12, 1970, issue of *Business Week* shows.



Before Allende was elected in 1970, Chile was taking its place alongside Mexico, Brazil, and to a lesser extent Argentina and Puerto Rico, as a rapidly expanding market for U.S. multinational investment. Second only to Brazil, Chile had received \$600 million in U.S. "aid" (primarily military hardware) during the six-year period of the Frei government.

In their contribution to *The Chilean Road to Socialism* (Dale L. Johnson, ed., 1973) entitled "Multinational Corporations and Chile," James D. Cockroft, Henry Frundt, and Dale L. Johnson wrote: "At the time Allende assumed office, more than one hundred U.S. corporations had established themselves in Chile. Among these were twenty-four of the top thirty U.S.-based multinational corporations. These included the major auto producers, four of the biggest oil companies, Dow and DuPont chemicals, International Telephone & Telegraph (ITT), and other big industrials. In recent years the ranks of the industrials had been joined by multinational banks and corporations operating in the service sectors."

The book value of these investments was nearly \$1 thousand million, with ITT's telephone company ranking highest, at \$200 million, according to *Business Week*, April 10, 1971.

Cockroft, Frundt, and Johnson describe the operations of another conglomerate, the Rockefeller International Basic Economy Corporation: "IBEC operates in thirty-three countries and in 1970 derived 60 per cent of its profits from Latin America, although only 33 per cent of its assets were in the region. In Chile, IBEC has a ready-mix cement plant, a petroleum-products manufacturing and marketing concern, a construction firm, a mining enterprise, and four investment and management companies. Through these investment companies Rockefeller interests have penetrated many Chilean firms. IBEC now participates in thirteen of the twenty-five largest Chilean corporations and controls over 50 per cent of the stock in three of them. In short, IBEC in Chile operates as ITT does everywhere: it grows by achieving financial control of more and more independent firms."

Thus the most powerful sector of U.S. finance capital, the Rockefeller empire itself, tries to solve the problem of overproduction of capital, of "superabundant capital" as Lenin called it in *Imperialism*, by swallowing up small manufacturing firms in Latin America. Finance capital, which has already monopolized the extractive industries, spreads into manufacturing and services.

That process will tend to weaken the indigenous bourgeoisies and tie them more closely to the imperialist power. Sectors of the "national bourgeoisie" are transformed into a rentier class. They relinquish their own firms for the "blue chip" securities of the American firms that have bought them out. This, by the way, becomes an added cause of the balance of payments deficits of the underdeveloped countries: The indigenous bourgeoisie invests more in the U.S. stock and bond markets than U.S. corporations invest in the underdeveloped countries.

In Chile, however, the economic centrality of the copper trusts still dwarfed the relatively small-scale incursions of foreign capital into the manufacturing and service industries. When the book value of all U.S. investment in Chile stood at roughly \$1 thousand million,

with ITT at \$200 million or 20%, the book values of the copper firms were: Cerro, \$15 million; Kennecott, \$80 million; and Anaconda, \$186 million. Thus, even in 1970 the interests of the copper firms amounted to 28% of total U. S. investment.

But this understates the case because these are figures *after Frei's 51% nationalization*. The April 10, 1971, *Business Week* stated: "The total U. S. investment in copper in Chile is generally said to be around \$600-million." So that in book-value terms the copper interests prior to Frei's nationalization came close to 50% of U. S. investment.

An ironic admission of the understated book values of these corporations came in Anaconda's claim in 1971 that "the new Marxist government of Chile has stolen \$1.2 billion [milliard] worth of mines and properties from the Anaconda Company."

The *Wall Street Journal* reported January 6, 1971, that "Anaconda stands to lose heavily by the expropriation. Its Chilean holdings have been valued at about \$400 million in three major mines. The company estimates that two thirds of its total annual copper sales of \$600 million come from Chile." The same article reported that a quarter of Kennecott's copper was mined in Chile. These two firms had reaped monopoly profits for decades.

In *The Chilean Road to Socialism*, the Chile Research Group at Rutgers University notes: "According to the U. S. Department of Commerce, in the period between 1953 and 1968 U. S. mining and smelting operations in Chile (about 90 per cent copper) earned \$1,036 million, while new investments and reinvestment of profits together totaled only \$71 million." A return of almost fifteen times investment. This is the typical monopoly profit rate in the extractive industries of the underdeveloped world (although the rates in petroleum tend to be higher).\*

\*It may be asked why, if the profit rates are so high in the extractive industries, the imperialists do not invest more in these industries? The answer is that monopoly profit rates depend on *restricted production*. An increase in investment does not produce a proportional increase in profits. Thus, the raw-materials monopolies tend to become closed off. They cannot provide extensive

An indication of the long-term importance of the Chilean copper companies in the world investment patterns of U. S. imperialism is the close ties of these companies to the central financial sectors of the American ruling class. Cockroft, Frundt, and Johnson observe: "The Stillman-Rockefellers First National City share control of Anaconda Copper with the Morgan interest group. Ten of the twenty-four top multinationals in Chile share directors with First National City Bank.

"The Morgan interest group has a strong presence in Chile through its ties to Kennecott Copper and other corporations present in the country. The Morgans [partners in the Morgan banking group] also have an interest in Anaconda copper (as well as another major copper producer not in Chile, American Smelting and Refining)." The third of the major copper firms in Chile, Cerro, was founded by the J. P. Morgan Co. in 1902.

In the period just prior to Allende's coming to power, the copper trusts had begun a large expansion program. Chilean copper accounts for 21% of the world's proven copper reserves. Given the long-term expectation of increased demand for copper, especially in the United States itself, the copper trusts were preparing to reap the profits. This is why in the last period of the Christian Democratic government an estimated \$500 million had been poured into the three copper firms aimed at expanding production from 685,000 metric tons in 1970 to a future capacity of "well over a million tons," according to the April 11, 1971, *New York Times*.

### Behind-the-Scenes Strangulation

Marxists are not "economic determinists" pure and simple. In fact, the level of class consciousness of the Chilean workers—and of oppressed peoples internationally—was more determinative of the specific history of Chile in the Allende period than the place Chile occupied in the sphere of U. S. imperialist investment.

From the outset Washington believed that it was too risky to directly inter-

outlets for "overproduced capital," which consequently tends increasingly to flow into manufacturing investments in the underdeveloped countries.

vene with U. S. military forces in Chile, given the world unpopularity of the U. S. aggression in Southeast Asia and the political sophistication of the Chilean masses themselves. The *New York Times* spelled out this opinion from the start. "There is no point in trying to minimize the importance of what has happened in Chile," the *Times* editors lamented on September 6, 1970, as they announced Salvador Allende's election victory.

"This result, unprecedented in the Americas and virtually without parallel anywhere, is a heavy blow at liberal democracy. It may mark the demise of the ailing Alliance for Progress, which was undertaken 'to improve and strengthen democratic institutions.'"

The words, of course, are the hypocritical jargon of liberalism, but the meaning is plain enough. In the same editorial the *Times* emphasized: "All the United States can do in this situation is to keep hands off, behave correctly and hope for the best. Dr. Allende is a Chilean, preferred by a plurality—though not a majority—of Chilean voters. . . . Whatever troubles Chile may face would only be compounded by even the appearance of American interference."

That analysis signified that world imperialism would resort to behind-the-scenes strangulation: The Chilean market was boycotted and its credit was cut short. But overt and covert "aid" to the Chilean military—where the imperialists' best hopes remained—was continued.

Lenin's central political message in *Imperialism* (and Trotsky's theme in the "Draft Program of the Comintern" cited above) was that the world imperialists, having "divided" international markets among themselves, do not bring humankind closer to peace. They prepare the ground for further war.

There cannot be a long-term perspective of "peacefully coexisting" with the oppressive system of imperialism. Whether one is talking about the relations between postcapitalist states and imperialism or between the neocolonies and the big powers—or between the workers of the advanced countries and their own ruling classes—the watchword must be "prepare for the final struggle." The Unidad Popular's failure to grasp this central principle of Leninism was its fatal error. □

## Immigrant Workers in France Fight Racism With Strikes

By Jon Rothschild

In an editorial published near the end of August, *Le Méridional*, mass-circulation daily in Marseille, the second largest city in France, had this to say about immigrant workers in southern France:

"We have had enough of Algerian thieves, Algerian thugs, Algerian braggarts, Algerian troublemakers, Algerian syphilitics, Algerian pimps, Algerian lunatics, and Algerian killers."

Around the same time, slogans like "Marseille will not be Harlem" and "Stop the brown threat" began appearing on the walls of the city. The pogrom atmosphere was more than just a mood. Between August 25 and September 19, at least eleven Algerians were murdered; Arab cafes were attacked; scores of Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians were assaulted. And concurrently with the series of "unofficial" acts of violence, the Pompidou government stepped up "legal" harassment of the immigrant workers—identity checks, expulsions, and so on.

The Algerian workers in France are supposed to be under the protection of the Algerian government and its affiliated agencies, the immigrants being citizens (formally, at least) of Algeria. But the Boumedienne regime has been less than militant in defending the rights (or even the lives) of its nationals. On September 5, for example, while the racist hysteria was already well under way, Boumedienne himself commented in an interview with the Paris daily *Le Monde*:

"We observed the greatest moderation when Algerians were murdered, so as not to incite hatred [!]. But there are situations that are hard to accept. It is a question of dignity.

"I tell you frankly: If the French government does not want our workers, let it say so. We will take them back. No doubt that would pose problems for us, but we have overcome much more difficult situations. If, on the other hand, France needs our workers, then the government is duty-bound to protect them."

The France-based organization (semiofficially tied to the Algiers regime) that is supposed to look after the rights of Algerian workers in France is an outfit called *Amicale des Algériens*, or Brotherhood of Algerians, generally known simply as the *Amicale*. In face of the racist attacks hitting immigrant workers in France, the *Amicale* has intransigently maintained Boumedienne's "moderation." Far from averting hatred, that moderation has fostered it.

So the Algerians (and the Moroccans and Tunisians) have turned elsewhere for support. On September 14, in response to a call issued by the *Mouvement des Travailleurs Arabes* (MTA—Movement of Arab Workers), Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians conducted a general strike in Paris—their first ever. Thousands of immigrants in various branches of industry (and some French workers, too) walked off the job to protest the wave of racism. The Paris strike came less than two weeks after similar actions in the Bouches-du-Rhône region in the south. The Pompidou government, already facing the struggle of the Lip workers, the Lip solidarity movement, and the antimilitarist movement both inside and outside the army, found itself confronted by yet another enemy: the hitherto relatively quiescent immigrant workers.

### Racist Campaign Is Launched

Much of the capitalist press—both in France and internationally—has maintained that the racist campaign began on August 25. On that day, Emile Gerlache, a Marseille bus driver, was stabbed to death by Salah Bougrine, an Algerian worker. Bougrine was assaulted and nearly lynched by a mob. Newspapers like *Le Méridional*, in concert with fascist groups, took the murder of Gerlache as the occasion to kick off a series of attacks on Algerians. On the very afternoon of August 25 a group was or-

ganized that named itself the *Comité de Défense des Marseillais* (Committee to Defend the People of Marseille); it just happened to have the same address as the Marseille headquarters of the Front National (National Front), the coalition of far-right and fascist groups that includes the formally banned *Ordre Nouveau* (New Order).

It is true that August 25 was the point at which the racist campaign first attained significant breadth. But to imply that the Gerlache murder spontaneously touched off a surge of racism would be far from accurate.

The September 21 *Le Monde* published a chronological account of some of the "incidents" that have marked the campaign against the immigrants. It begins this way: "June 9. The *Ordre Nouveau* movement, during its third national congress in Paris, announces a campaign to call upon Frenchmen to 'reject wildcat immigration.'"

*Ordre Nouveau's* decision was well-considered. Given the general leftward movement of French politics, the growth of the far left, and the weakness of the far right, the immigrant issue seemed the only one that offered real potential for intervening and trying to turn the political situation around. And further, the projected campaign fit in well with the usual tactics of the bourgeoisie, which still finds racism one of its most powerful weapons in opposing workers upsurges.

*Ordre Nouveau's* campaign bore fruit as early as June 12. On that day, in Grasse, about fifty immigrant workers demonstrating for better living conditions were arrested after being attacked by cops and a racist mob. On June 18, Minister of Labor, Employment, and Population Georges Gorse announced that he would take firm measures to "regularize" immigration by the end of September. On the same day, expulsion proceedings were initiated against Pastor Berthier Perregaux, a Swiss citizen who was Marseille representative of an immigrant aid committee and an activist in the *Comité de Solidarité aux Travailleurs*

Immigrés (Committee of Solidarity with Immigrant Workers).

The next major step in the *Ordre Nouveau* campaign was to have been a mass meeting in the *Mutualité* in Paris on June 21. But the meeting was confronted by an antifascist demonstration several times its size organized by nine far-left organizations, principally the *Ligue Communiste*, then the French section of the Fourth International. The antifascist demonstrators were attacked by police defending the *Ordre Nouveau* meeting. Violent clashes followed, and the Pompidou government took the occasion to outlaw the *Ligue*, adding in an attempt to appear impartial that *Ordre Nouveau* would be banned as well.

The massive campaign to defend the *Ligue* against government repression helped to mobilize public opinion against the fascist anti-immigration campaign and managed temporarily to thwart the *Ordre Nouveau's* plans.

But racism corresponds to a need of the French ruling class in the current political climate. Throughout the month of August, Minister of the Interior Raymond Marcellin continued to institute expulsion proceedings against immigrants, declaring on August 4: "I will continue to expel all foreigners who disturb public order."

Thus, August 25 was not the beginning of the racist campaign; it was only a turning point. An important one, though. In the middle of September, the *Amicale* released a list of Arab workers who had fallen victim to pogromist violence:

Laaï Lounes, a sixteen-year-old, beaten to death August 28; Abdel Ahab Hemahan, 21, died in Marseille August 29 after having his skull smashed; Said Aounallah, 27, shot to death in Marseille on the night of August 25-26; Rashid Mouka, 26, shot to death in Marseille August 25; Hammu Mebarki, 40, wounded August 26, died August 29 in Marseille; Said Ghililas, 40, attacked August 29 in Marseille, died the next day; Bensala Mekernek, 39, found seriously wounded, died September 29 in Marseille; Rabah Mouzzali, 30, shot to death August 25 in Perreux; Ahmed Rezki, 28, shot to death in front of his home in Metz August 29; Mohammed Benbourek, 43, found floating in a river near Maubeuge September 9; Said Ziar,



Gianfranco Gorgoni

Algerian immigrant workers live in slums like these. Strikes organized in Paris and southern France to protest racist violence were unprecedented.

43, arrested September 15 in Tours, found dead the next day (a physician called in by the police attributed the death to natural causes).

The list includes only murders. It does not deal with the many beatings or attacks on Arab cafes and neighborhoods.

On August 29 Yves Perche, regional delegate of the Front National from the Bouches-du-Rhone region, held a press conference sponsored by the *Comité de Défense des Marseillais* at which he announced that the committee had launched a national campaign to accumulate 10,000 signatures on a petition against "wildcat immigration." He said that more than 1,500 names had already been collected.

### Immigrant Workers Fight Back

The Pompidou regime, which made no effort to stem the racist campaign but supplemented it through its legal proceedings against immigrants, must have assumed that the moderation of the *Amicale*, so useful in the past, would once again serve to prevent the immigrants from acting in their own defense. That was a mistake. On September 3, North Africans through-

out the Bouches-du-Rhone area went on strike to protest "the racist campaign led by sections of the press aimed at isolating the Arab workers from the French population." They appealed to all antiracists to support their action. The strike was called by the MTA. The *Amicale* announced on the morning of September 3 that it had not signed the strike appeal because "this is a time for calm, not for agitation." It is "emotion and fear," *Amicale* claimed, "that the Arabs are now relating to, not strike appeals." And further, it appealed "earnestly to all Arabs to maintain calm and composure, to attend in normal fashion to all their responsibilities."

*Amicale's* appeal did not go over well. "At Fos," *Le Monde* reported September 4, "the strike was 100 percent effective, with about 3,000 North African workers on strike. It was also 100 percent in Aix-en-Provence."

"More generally, it was reported by an official source that some 60 percent of the 30,000 North African workers in Bouches-du-Rhone responded to the strike appeal."

The official estimate was almost certainly too low. "More than 30,000 were on strike," reported the Septem-

ber 7 *Rouge*, formerly the organ of the Ligue Communiste. "The strike movement spread from the Ciotat [where the MTA headquarters are] to Aix, to Fos, to Marseille, to Toulon. The breadth of the MTA-organized response to the racist wave surprised the traditional organizations.

"The Amicale des Algériens, which is devoted to keeping the workers under tight control so as to avoid disrupting French-Algerian diplomatic relations and which has protested the racist wave only verbally, was especially surprised. As was the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor], whose local leadership had declared in a statement published in the Communist party daily *Marseillaise* that it would give no support to a 'political maneuver that threatens to isolate the immigrants.'"

The size of the strike was particularly significant in that it was scarcely organized at all. The September 5 *Le Monde* reported that in Fos (where the strike was 100 percent effective) it was built by a handful of MTA members who hung up posters and started a telephone campaign.

"These strikes," wrote the September 7 *Rouge*, "were an initial response and, at the same time, a first step in consciousness. They marked a re-awakening, an embryo of organization. They are a political weapon of prime importance, but they did not offer much perspective for the future."

*Rouge* noted that the relative lack of organization was enabling the Amicale to recoup some its lost prestige. "After this first mass initiative, the next problem that must be confronted is that of the organization of the immigrant workers communities, the self-defense of their neighborhoods, and the strengthening of their solidarity with the French workers."

The MTA also realized the need for organization, being itself somewhat taken by surprise by the massive response of the immigrants to its strike call. On September 7 an antiracist meeting was held in Marseille sponsored by about twenty organizations, among them *Rouge* and the MTA. It was addressed by Alain Krivine, a central leader of the ex-Ligue Communiste, as well as by representatives of the MTA and several other immigrant workers solidarity groups.

About 700 persons, according to *Le Monde*, attended the meeting.

The next day, about 120 delegates representing neighborhood committees of the MTA met to discuss further action. They decided to call for a strike of immigrant workers in the Paris area on September 14. "We are striking against racism, not against the French workers," said a statement released by the meeting. The strike was to be highlighted by a 2:00 p.m. meeting at the Paris mosque "to pay homage to all victims of racism." The MTA appealed to French workers to join in the mosque meeting. Strike committees were set up to organize the action and to "make contact with French workers organizations."

The Paris strike, while not quite so solid as the ones in the south, was big enough to make an impact on the Paris economy. The September 15 *Le Monde* reported that nearly all foreign workers in the Citroën auto plants walked out, that most construction sites in Montparnasse were shut down, and that the giant Renault Boulogne-Billancourt factory was heavily affected. The number of strikers ran into the thousands.

In an interview published in the September 21 *Rouge*, a leader of the MTA commented on the strike's significance:

"If the strike movement had remained confined to Marseille, it could not have been considered as a long-term advance in consciousness. In Marseille the strike represented an immediate, activist response to the daily threat of attack in a city that is becoming for Arabs what the United States is for Blacks. In Paris, the mobilization required a higher level of consciousness. What occurred was a forceful, united demonstration against racism. What has been achieved is unity of all the Arab workers. That gives them more than their usual weight."

But it was more than just unity, important as that was. For about a year, immigrant workers had been conducting hunger strikes against repressive measures taken against them. "But that was not enough," the MTA leader told *Rouge*. "The hunger strikes demonstrated the absolutely desperate situation of the immigrants. But they were a defensive form of action. In Marseille, Paris, and Toulouse we have just now waged a battle for

the right to strike, for the right to be fully recognized as workers. That will enable the immigrant workers to look at themselves in a totally different light. It has created a relationship of forces so there can be unity with the French workers without paternalism.

"Against the expulsion orders, for example, or in the struggle against the Fontanet-Gorse memoranda [restricting immigrants' rights], no lasting success is possible without unity with the French workers, because these things involve direct tests of strength with the French regime. It is this unity in action that must be achieved. We are in favor of mixed committees of French and immigrant workers struggling for equal rights while mutually respecting differences."

The MTA is continuing its organizing drive. A main focus of activity at this point is trying to prevent the government from expelling immigrant activists from the country. Already two expulsions have been prevented by determined action.

"For the MTA," *Rouge* wrote September 21, "without the independent mobilization and organization of the immigrant workers around questions involving their own living conditions, all militant action and all political action with the French workers would be artificial. As an MTA leader explained, 'The risks are not the same. In a strike, a French worker risks being fired; but an immigrant risks expulsion from the country.' The strikes in Marseille, Paris, and Toulouse have lifted the brakes.

"And not only in France.

"As an MTA leader said, 'The Arab countries are going to have to learn to take account of the 1,500,000 immigrant workers in France.'" □

#### **Wait Till He Has to Feed Them Beans**

A California lion-tamer who was bitten by one of his lions during a recent performance explained that the incident happened because he could no longer afford to feed the animals beef and had been giving them chicken instead.

#### **Hustler Hustled**

A U.S. director of the International Monetary Fund was stopped outside the IMF meeting in Nairobi by two men who said they were police. After inspecting his wallet, the two "policemen" removed \$150 in currency, which they said would have to be "registered" at the police station. The two haven't been seen since.

## Peronist Regime Maneuvers to Repress the Left

By Gerry Foley

"We are firmly anti-Marxist. What happened in Chile shows that Allende fell victim to his sectarianism, to a tendency to excess in his policy. . . . I am sure that we will tame the guerrillas. Chile has taught us a lot of things. Either the guerrillas will stop disturbing the peace of the country or we will force them to do so with the means at our disposal, which, believe me, are not few. The Chilean events closed the last safety valve the Argentine guerrillas had. . . . I warn Cuba not to play the same game here that it did in Chile because in Argentina a rather violent action could be unleashed. . . . If the guerrillas are stubborn, the same thing will happen here as happened in Santiago. The ones who bear the responsibility for that were not the military but the guerrillas."

General Juan Domingo Perón, a lover of maxims, which make up the "doctrine" of his "social justice movement," apparently had not forgotten that "it's an ill wind that blows no one any good." The Chilean coup obviously emboldened him to turn sharply against his left-wing followers. Nor was he slow to launch this offensive. The above statements were made in an interview with the *Giornale D'Italia* on Monday, September 24, the day after he was elected president of Argentina, winning 62 percent of the vote. They were quoted in the September 27 issue of the Buenos Aires weekly magazine *Panorama*, which recognized them as a declaration of war on the left.

The start of the offensive was marked not only by the caudillo's hard words but by immediate repressive measures. On the same day that the "people's general" made these shameless statements, giving backhanded support to the bloody coup in Chile, the Peronist caretaker government, which by closing the Andean border probably condemned to death many supporters of a "brother anti-imperialist government," issued a decree outlawing the ERP (Ejército Re-

volucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Army of the People).

The ERP and the ERP-Fracción Roja (Red Faction of the ERP) are the only guerrilla organizations that refuse to give allegiance to Perón. Another group, the ERP-22 de Agosto (August 22 ERP) supports the government but has carried out some ac-



JOSE RUCCI

tions, such as the assassination of Admiral Quijada on May 1 and the raid on the offices of the Buenos Aires daily *Clarín* September 11, that have been condemned by the Peronist leadership. (Documents on the splits in the ERP are published elsewhere in this issue.)

The decree did not make clear whether only the ERP led by Roberto Santucho, reputedly the largest of the organizations using this name, came under the ban or whether all three groups were included. It was reported in the September 28 *Clarín* that the police were searching the newsstands for copies of the Santucho ERP's organ, *Estrella Roja*. The censorship

of guerrilla statements and publications had been abandoned in the wake of the enormous popular mobilizations that marked the Peronists' assumption of office May 25. It was now being restored in at least one case.

The decree, as quoted in the September 25 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*, prohibited "any proselytizing, indoctrination, propaganda, or dissemination of material, or any appeal for sustaining or expanding the disruptive activities of the ERP under this or any other name."

In the preamble, the ban was justified in this way: "Despite the repeated calls for peace and national unity that this government has made since taking office on May 25, invitations that have been concretized in a broad and generous amnesty, as well as by special pardons, there are some groups of persons who are determined to oppose the legal process that is under way and peaceful coexistence among Argentines."

At the same time that they promulgated a rationale and a law for repressing the militant left, the Peronist leaders put the appropriate agent in charge of the operation. On the same eventful Monday after the election, a new chief of the Federal Police was installed, Miguel Angel Iñiguez. He was described by *Panorama* as a "hard-line orthodox Peronist of the type whose thinking is summed up by the slogan 'Neither Yankees nor Marxists,'" that is, a right-wing nationalist-populist.

At his initial news conference, Iñiguez made his intentions clear. Asked by a journalist how he expected to succeed in wiping out terrorism where his predecessors had failed, he said, according to a UPI dispatch in the September 26 issue of the New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario*:

"Now that the people have expressed their desires in a kind of plebiscite, the kind of action that must be car-

ried out will take on a different character."

Perón's chief of police apparently hoped that the popular mandate and backing enjoyed by the new government would give the repressive forces the support of the population in smashing first the guerrilla organizations and eventually all the "disrupters of order." Moreover, he and his mentors could hope that the establishment of a military dictatorship just across the Rio Plata in Uruguay and the bloody coup in Chile would promote a mood of apprehension among the masses and arouse resentment of any violent actions that might seem to endanger the rehabilitated caudillo's "revolution in peace."

A dramatic event threatened immediately to give momentum to Perón's repressive campaign.

The day after the ERP was banned José Rucci, top Peronist labor leader and head of the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor], was assassinated.

Rucci was a prominent leader of the Peronist right wing who maintained control of the CGT by gangster methods, going as far as public shoot-outs with rival factions of the bureaucracy. He was suspected of playing a role in the development of the rightist goon squads calling themselves the JSP [Juventud Sindical Peronista — Peronist Trade-Union Youth]. These groups have not only whipped up a McCarthyite campaign against the left, but they opened fire on the left-wing contingents at the June 20 rally to welcome Perón home, causing a slaughter among the crowd.

"I just want people to know that if I am killed," Rucci said in a recent interview quoted in the September 26 *New York Times*, "it will be the work of filthy Marxists and Trotskyites. It will be the People's Revolutionary Army [that is, the ERP]."

The symbol as well as the head of the right-wing trade-union bureaucracy, Rucci had reason to fear that he would become the target of one of the many guerrilla groups that have specialized in the assassination of unpopular officials and capitalist agents. Another prominent rightist bureaucrat, J. Vandor, a leader of the metalworkers union and of the wing of the bureaucracy that was ready to cooperate with the dictatorship and

abandon Perón, was assassinated in 1969. Such violent events have been rather frequent in the recent history of the Argentine trade-union movement and sometimes quite obscure. It is still being debated, for example, whether Vandor was killed by leftist or ultrarightist commandos.

Rucci's personal fears may have focused on the ERP either because it has been the most active and well-known guerrilla group or because of its opposition to Peronist leadership. But the ERP's repudiation of Trotskyism has become widely known in Argentina, and so it is likely that his evocation of "filthy . . . Trotskyite" gunmen was intended to further the witch-hunt that was launched early in June by Perón's attacks on "Trotskyist provocations." Rucci obviously hated the Argentine Trotskyists, who have long been a strong antibureaucratic force in the trade unions.

In the campaign that preceded the March 11 elections, the trade-union bureaucrat was stung into a vitriolic outburst by the criticisms of the PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores — Socialist Workers party, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International).

"At the conference of the Confederación General Económica [General Economic Confederation] you once again made it your business to talk about the national leadership of the union movement, calling its heads bureaucrats," Rucci telegraphed the PST presidential candidate, Juan Coral. "Likewise, you had insulting things to say about the Peronist movement that were in the same vein as some recent remarks by Ernesto Sanmartino [a reactionary politician who supported the 1955 coup against Perón and opposed the elections from the right]." In the September 23 elections, Coral got almost 200,000 votes, which represent a significant nucleus of intransigent opposition to Peronist demagoguery.

The assassination that Rucci feared was reportedly carried off with the precision associated with the operations of the best-organized urban guerrilla groups.

"Witnesses said that the attack came as Mr. Rucci was leaving the house of a relative in the western residential district of Flores," a September 25 dispatch to the *New York Times* said. "As he was about to step into his

car two grenades were thrown from the roof of a nearby school and, almost simultaneously, he was struck by fusillades from an adjoining empty house and from an auto showroom across the street."

But even the government did not claim that the Santucho ERP carried out this assassination.

"Police sources reported," the *New York Times* continued, "that immediately after Mr. Rucci's death an anonymous telephone caller, identifying himself as a member of the Aug. 22 commando unit of the People's Revolutionary Army, the Marxist group, said his organization had 'executed' the labor leader."

The ERP-22 de Agosto, which campaigned in its own way for Perón's election, has an even more remote connection with Trotskyism than the Santucho organization. In fact, for all practical purposes, it must be considered part of the Peronist movement, as the writer of the *Times* dispatch apparently recognized:

"The assassination could trigger a ferocious factional fight in the Peronist movement. The deep hostility between the left-wing youth organization and the orthodox unions has erupted in violence at least four times."

This prediction seemed to have been borne out by the assassination on the day after Rucci's death of Enrique Grinberg, a prominent leader of the Juventud Peronista (Peronist Youth), the main organization of the Peronist left wing. After this, the September 28 issue of *Clarín* reported, rumors began circulating that Rodolfo Galimberti and Juan Manuel Abal Medina, the two most well-known leaders of the JP and the Peronist left, had also been assassinated. The rumors were denied but nonetheless they indicated a tendency to interpret the violent deaths of Rucci and Grinberg as part of a war between the right and left wings of the Peronist movement.

A guerrilla communiqué denying responsibility for Rucci's death was reported in a UPI dispatch in the September 30 *El Diario*. The communiqué was attributed to "the so-called Revolutionary Army of the People" with no more precise identification. The government banned a daily newspaper that published the statement and "applied drastic sanctions" against a television station that carried it.

Regardless of the political motiva-

tion of the assassinations, however, the climate of tension created by these actions seemed to strengthen the hand of the "peacemakers" at the top levels of the government and the Peronist organizations. In particular, it reinforced the position of Perón himself as the supreme arbiter. The wily old caudillo issued no statement on Rucci's death, claiming to be "numb with shock," but he became the focus of an extensive scenario of national mourning organized around Rucci's funeral.

"Argentina was virtually paralyzed yesterday by a thirty-hour strike declared by the CGT in mourning for the death of its general secretary and the country's top labor leader, José Rucci, who was assassinated yesterday by leftist guerrillas," a UPI dispatch reported in the September 27 *El Diario*. "The shock caused by the assassination has been so great that it has stirred rumors that Juan D. Peron . . . may take office before the scheduled date of October 12."

The September 27 *New York Times* reported:

"President-elect Juan D. Peron went to the funeral at the cemetery, where the police had difficulty in keeping an emotional crowd from mobbing him."

Grinberg's funeral, which took place the following day, was apparently not regarded by the government as an occasion of national mourning. It was marked by a rather broad gathering of the Peronist left, including the old Peronist guerrilla organizations. A communiqué from the FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias — Revolutionary Armed Forces) and the Montoneros (the Irregulars, named for the guerrillas who fought Spain in the war of independence) was read by Grinberg's wife. Although absent from these ceremonies, Juan D. Perón was still the hero of the event.

The Peronist youth leader Juan Carlo Dante Gullo said that Grinberg had "fallen in the struggle for the liberation of the fatherland," struck down by "sectors that do not want Perón or national liberation." A statement from the Brigadas de la Juventud Peronista proclaimed: "The death of Enrique Grinberg is one of a series of provocations by the native and foreign oligarchy aimed at endangering the National Unity in the stage of

National Reconstruction led by Lieutenant-General Perón.

"In spite of the attempts of this oligarchy, National Unity and Reconstruction will be carried forward by the thought and action of the Argentine people reflected in the doctrine of the Social Justice movement and in our sole leader Lieutenant-General J.D. Perón. Opposing the destruction of the Nation, General Perón offers National Reconstruction as an alternative to the civil war that the oligarchy is trying to unleash; the Argentine people respond with national unity."

Thus, in a guerrilla war between the Peronist groups of the right and left or between the anti-Peronist ERPs and the repressive forces, it seems that there can be only one winner—the Bonapartist "national savior" himself, Perón. In the present political conditions, and even more than ever after the grave defeats of the Uruguayan and Chilean workers, he may gain extensive political backing for severe repressive measures.

Peron's interim president, Raúl Lastiri, took Rucci's death as an occasion for announcing: "We will answer violence with violence, no matter where it comes from." But the whole experience of the Peronist government shows that the violence of the repressive forces will be directed fundamentally against the left.

A leader of the National Social Justice (Peronist) Movement, Julián Licastro, responded to Rucci's death by saying: "We are at war with the ERP." The ERP-22 de Agosto, however, claims to be fighting for Perón. And the Santucho ERP, while it does not accept the leadership of the "supreme commander," seeks to wage war only on the army and the repressive forces that maintained the anti-Peronist military dictatorship. But in the present situation, the ERPs' tactics may enable the Peronist leadership to bring the pressure of the masses, as well as the military and police apparatus, against them.

The PST has expressed concern about such a development. When the ERP attacked an army medical unit in Buenos Aires September 6, the PST's weekly paper, *Avanzada Socialista*, wrote: "The ERP's action could not have been more misguided. The general feeling of disapproval was obvious. Perón and the Peronist right

exploited it skillfully. Two arguments against the action were used as a pretext by Perón, both of which carried a lot of weight with public opinion.

"The first was that several of the guerrillas arrested [eleven activists were captured] had been amnestied by the Peronist government. The second was that at that very time General Carcagno was confronting the Yankee-Brazilian bloc in Caracas and that therefore it all seemed like a provocation aimed at weakening the nationalist position in this conference [on "hemispheric security"]."

*Avanzada Socialista* warned: "The compañeros of the ERP are right when they point up—as we do—that the government of national union that Perón claims to be building is no more than a new version of Lanusse's GAN [Gran Acuerdo Nacional—Great National Accord, a scheme for a broad class alliance under the protection of the military]. But Perón is not Lanusse [the head of the junta that turned power over to the Peronist government elected March 11]. Before now, the ERP had the benefit of neutrality or a diffuse sympathy on the part of the masses that arose from the general hatred of the Gobierno de la Revolución [Government of the Argentine Revolution, the dictatorship].

"But today the masses still believe to a large extent, although they are beginning to have their doubts, that the Perón government will benefit them in some way. Earlier it was a grave error to withdraw from the mass movement to submerge in the deep clandestinity of guerrilla warfare. Today it is simply suicide."

Not only were the socialist guerrillas in danger of being isolated and destroyed by Perón, the Trotskyist weekly warned, but by failing to offer a concrete political alternative to the Peronist nationalist-populist demagoguery, they risked seeing the wily old caudillo exploit their heavy personal sacrifices for his Bonapartist maneuvers. □

#### Mixed Blessing

"The president of the American Bar Association says that Watergate has badly hurt the image of all lawyers in the United States."—*Canadian Press*.

Yes, but on the other hand, it's provided a lot of them with clients.



## Threatens to Break Off Korean 'Unification' Talks

By George Johnson

Kim Il-sung, president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), is reported to have concluded that the U.S. puppet regime in South Korea headed by Park Chung-hee is opposed to the reunification of Korea.

According to Wilfred Burchett, writing in the September 5, 1973, issue of the *Guardian*, a New York Maoist weekly, Kim said that "after a year of dialogue between delegations from North and South Korea, he had come to the conclusion that 'in the final analysis the [Park] government did not want reunification.'"

It is remarkable that Kim had not learned long ago that the Park regime was opposed to reunification. After all, one of the major purposes of the May 16, 1961, coup that brought Park to power was to put down massive demonstrations urging unification.

In coming to power, Park was acting in the interests of U.S. imperialism, which, in order to keep a foothold for capitalism in Korea, set up the puppet state in the south at the end of World War II and later slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Koreans to maintain this foothold.

And Park has shown no sign of breaking with U.S. imperialism. To the contrary, he has fully proved his subservience to it by such acts as sending South Korean troops to Vietnam to assist Washington's attempt to crush the Indochinese revolution.

But in early summer of 1972, in anticipation of the détente between imperialism and the bureaucracies in Moscow and Peking, Park agreed in a drastic policy shift to talks between North and South Korea. On July 4, the two Korean governments issued a joint communiqué declaring their "common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the fatherland as early as possible." (See *Intercontinental Press*, July 17, 1972, p. 821.)

Park's changing his previous policy of refusing to do anything that even implicitly recognized the DPRK's ex-

istence did not result from any patriotic inspiration. He was still only toeing the diplomatic line of U.S. imperialism.

Any moves by Washington to come to terms with Peking—a necessity for Nixon if the Maoist bureaucrats were to pressure the Vietnamese leaders to



PARK: "Stupid person" who bested Kim in diplomatic maneuvers.

reach a settlement with imperialism—would have repercussions in South Korea. China, like North Korea, had been a "nonstate" to the Seoul government. To offset the expected resurgence of popular pressures in favor of unification, Park made the gesture of appearing to be open to discussions to that end with the North.

At the same time, Park moved to prevent any popular manifestations of sentiment for unification. On October 17, 1972, he declared martial law and dissolved the national assembly. Press censorship was intensified.

Thus, Park's game was clearly tied to anticipations of Washington's maneuvers to crush the Vietnamese revolution. Not only that: The Pyongyang regime's very willingness to play this game was itself a blow to the Vietnamese struggle, as a senior State Department official explained to *New York Times* correspondent Bernard Gwertzman on July 4, 1972:

"First China invited enemy No. 1, the United States, to Peking. Now North Korea has a friendly dialogue with enemy No. 2, South Korea, which has as many troops in South Vietnam as the United States. This must have a damaging effect on Hanoi's morale."

Kim Il-sung seems to have lacked sufficient sophistication to understand Park's moves, for he has only just now discovered that, as he told Burchett, Park had acted "only to deceive the South Korean people and to remain in office indefinitely."

Kim—who is described in North Korean publications as "the sun of the nation" and "the genius of revolution, the great master of ideas and theories, strategy and tactics [who] is at the helm of the world revolution" (*People's Korea*, May 2, 1973)—went on:

"What I cannot understand is why the United States picks up such a stupid person as [Park] and includes him in their baggage. Repudiated by his own people, detested by them, I simply cannot understand why the United States continues to put up with Park.

"The only explanation is that the United States continues to pursue irrational policies in South Korea. . . . Of what use is it to the United States to continue throwing away dollar aid to such people, as they did to Chiang Kai-shek in the past? . . . Why the United States insists on perpetuating such a regime and people like Park—when there are plenty of sound political personalities in the South—is beyond my comprehension."

While the Sun of the Nation may not be able to comprehend U. S. policy, it is clear enough to revolutionary Marxists that imperialists expect to get value for their dollar from whatever puppets they back. Park proved his worth when the U. S. State Department decided to pursue a "two Koreas" policy for membership in the United Nations. Understanding imperialism's need for détente and what that means for puppets like him, Park went along with the new policy.

The DPRK government is opposed to admission of two Koreas in the UN. Instead, Kim has proposed the establishment of the "Confederal Republic of Koryo." (Koryo was an ancient Korean dynasty.)

It is unclear what Kim has in mind by this. While Burchett writes only that this confederation "should represent both parts of Korea in the United Nations" [!], *People's Korea* of June 27 says the "Confederal Republic of Koryo is of great significance in speeding up the reunification of the country, while leaving intact the two systems in the north and the south for the time being. . . . A great national assembly should be summoned to build national unity and thereby to organize the Confederal Republic of Koryo."

Kim may be proposing a single state in Korea, one that would administer both the socialist property forms in the North and the capitalist ones in the South. If so, one may marvel at this new contribution of Kim Il-sung thought to the Marxist theory of the state.

But Kim's confusion is not limited to the nature of imperialism and the class nature of the state. He also has a soft spot for such South Korean bourgeois politicians as Kim Dae-jung, the opposition New Democratic party leader recently kidnapped from Japan by Park's Central Intelligence Agency. Kim told Burchett, "He [Kim Dae-jung] is certainly not a Communist. But he is not bad. He wants reunification. There are plenty like him in the South, plenty of responsible patriots who have the support of the overwhelming majority of the people." Nevertheless, Kim complained, Washington and the Tanaka government in Japan "prefer to support Park, who oppresses the people, amasses ill-gotten wealth and insists

on maintaining tension on the Korean Peninsula."

Does Kim Il-sung believe that Kim Dae-jung would *not* oppress the people, or amass ill-gotten wealth, or in any way *not* be a puppet of U. S. imperialism? Kim has demonstrated here his adherence to the Stalinist notion that assigns a progressive role to the national bourgeoisie.

Like Kim's other "teachings" about imperialism and the possibility of a single state representing two social systems, this can only mislead the Korean masses.

Another example of Kim Il-sung



KIM: "Genius of revolution" mystified by U.S. support to Park.

thought was provided by the reasons given by Kim Yong-ju, Kim Il-sung's brother and chief DPRK delegate to the North-South talks, for threatening to break off the talks. He said, according to the August 30 *New York Times*, that the North "would no longer negotiate with the 'hooligans' of the Southern team" following the abduction of Kim Dae-jung. Lee Hurak, who heads the South's team, is also chief of the CIA.

Such scum as Lee Hu-rak, however, did not become hooligans with the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung. They have been that all along, and the South Korean people who have suf-

fered under the repression of this secret policy agency have known it.

The illusions sown by the Kim leadership are especially damaging in view of the fact that opportunities for revolutionary struggle in the South appear to be opening up. In August, two clergymen were arrested who had helped organize slum dwellers in Seoul to resist government attempts to evict them. The ministers had allegedly distributed leaflets calling for a "revival of democracy" during an Easter service to 10,000 people.

This may be a sign of revival of the mass movement in South Korea. This revival may well be accelerated as the southern economy becomes squeezed. This is all but certain with the withdrawal of South Korean troops from Vietnam, for whose services the Park government was able to collect a high price from imperialism, both in direct payments and in contracts for war materials.

In addition, there is growing opposition to the Park regime among Koreans resident in the United States. According to the July 25 *Washington Post*, an anti-Park demonstration was organized by Koreans in Washington at an official social function of the Seoul government.

There is also ferment among the 600,000 Koreans living in Japan, a majority of whom lend allegiance to the DPRK rather than South Korea. According to the July 11 issue of *People's Korea*, a committee has been formed within Mindan, the pro-Seoul residents' organization, to oppose the "two Koreas" scheme. A joint meeting was said to have been held between members of Mindan and Choryun, the pro-DPRK residents' group in Japan, although how much of Mindan was involved is not known.

The leadership the Kim Il-sung grouping is providing for the struggle in South Korea is embodied in the Tong-il Hyong-myong Dang (Revolutionary party for Reunification), which the June 6 *People's Korea* calls "the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party of the South Korean people." The May 2 *People's Korea* quotes the Central Committee of this organization as vowing to carry out the "brilliant line of peaceful reunification put forth by the leader. . . .

"It is for the immortal feats of Comrade Kim Il Sung, the sun of sal-

vation for the world and people, that today mankind highly praises the

20th century as the Kim Il Sung era." It is not to be expected that such

sycophants will prove equal to the tasks at hand. □

## Call for Campaign to Fight for Amnesty

# Northern Irish Prisoners Appeal From Long Kesh

[There are still, by most estimates, well over a thousand political prisoners in Northern Ireland. Many of those shipped off to Long Kesh concentration camp and other prisons during the massive raids of Catholic neighborhoods in August 1971 and the following months were released, beginning in April 1972, after the introduction of direct rule from London and the promise of new reforms.

[But "enemies of the state," that is, of British rule, are still being interned in the imperialist enclave of Northern Ireland. And many persons interned without charge or trial have since been tried by the notorious Orange courts and sentenced to long terms on essentially political charges. Since the militant nationalist parties are outlawed in Northern Ireland and Catholics are denied the right to bear arms, possession of republican literature, a gun, or even one round of ammunition can result in a stiff penalty.

[The London and Dublin governments, which, to judge from the Littlejohn disclosures (see "Kenneth Littlejohn—Agent Provocateur," in *Intercontinental Press*, September 17, p. 1024), conspired to murder Irish citizens and destroy Irish property in order to frame the fighters against oppression in the North, claim to be negotiating a final "solution" to the problem of "violence." On the basis of their past record, they can be assumed to intend to step up their joint repression of the most dedicated defenders of the Northern ghettos.

[The political prisoners, however, demand a general amnesty as the least the British government could offer if it were interested in peace and justice in Ireland. This point of view is expressed, for example, in the September issue of *An Eochair* (The Key), the journal edited by the Official republicans in Long Kesh, from which we have reprinted the following articles. The paper costs 5p per issue (about 13 cents). Inquiries should be

addressed to Malachy McGurran, 56 Brownlow Terrace, Lurgan, Craigavon, Co. Armagh, Northern Ireland.]

\* \* \*

*British justice has taken another turn for the worse in Northern Ireland.*

First of all we had to contend with Internment without trial.

Next we had forced upon us the



**WHITELAW:** Insists political hostages should remain behind bars.

spectacle of a hooded "bogy man" [prosecution witnesses in trials, often soldiers, were hooded, allegedly to protect them from retaliation by the sympathizers of the accused] sitting behind a screen, condemning us out of hand.

But now the British Judiciary has reached an all-time low.

If a policeman or British soldier takes a dislike to anyone, all he has to do is charge the victim of his dislike with, say, riotous behaviour and that unfortunate will immediately be thrown into prison to await trial.

It is true that he or she may be granted bail in the high court, but the list of appellants applying to this court will be so long that many people will have been tried and acquitted before their bail application can be heard.

It goes without saying that these innocent people will have no claim to recompense for loss of earnings during their time of wrongful imprisonment. Anyway, what compensation can there be for a family to have a loved one imprisoned just to satisfy the whim of a sadist?

This, then, is a facet of British Justice, the justice which the English proclaim to be the finest in the world; I think it would be advisable to forewarn the people of Scotland, Wales and England herself that these repressive laws being used in their name against the people of Northern Ireland to-day, can, and most likely will be, directed against them to-morrow.

\* \* \*

The question of an amnesty for political hostages has been cropping up of late. Is an amnesty justified? . . . Mr. Whitelaw says "No," the S. D. L. P. [Social Democratic and Labour party, the bourgeois-nationalist parliamentary party] say "Yes," while other political parties and individual politicians are undecided.

British justice, which has been examined in another article in this paper [above], boasts that "justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done."

I doubt very much if there are many people in Northern Ireland who will agree that this is so. . . in fact, it is

my firm belief that most people here will refute this.

They will recall the Tynan murder squad and the beating to death of Samuel Devenney, in his own home and in front of his own children. They will also recall that a senior Scotland Yard detective was sent over to investigate and in his own words was "met with a conspiracy of silence within the ranks of the R. U. C."

Was justice seen to be done here?

The people of Ardoyne and the Falls Road well remember the night of August 15th 1969, when the R. U. C. and the now disbanded "B" Specials toured their areas in armoured cars firing machine guns indiscriminately into side streets.

Was this an example of British justice? If the Stormont government was a fair and just one, why then was it prorogued?

Has the British Army acted in a fair and impartial manner in this unhappy Province?

Could it be that they were less than fair in Derry City on Bloody Sunday when they murdered 13 innocent people?

Were they fair and just when on two occasions alone in Ballymurphy they murdered 10 men, women and children and then in cold blood shot down two Catholic priests who went to administer the last rites to the dying?

Were they acting fairly when they murdered a 13-year-old boy in the Clonard area of Belfast?

Did they seriously think that by murdering two people on the Shankill Road [a Protestant area] they would prove [themselves] impartial?

Are all the people who complain about inhuman treatment telling lies?

When one considers that these complaints have come from a very wide area including Derry, Newry, East Belfast, Shankill Road, Falls Road, Andersonstown and many other working class areas, then the only logical conclusion is that there must be a large degree of truth in these allegations.

Therefore it can be deduced that justice is neither being done nor is it being seen to be done. How then can any government—especially one which claims to be democratic—imprison those whose only crime was to (A) fight against a hopelessly corrupt and discredited government and (B) defend their homes and families

against a brutal military force?

The Westminster government refuses to bring the murderers within the ranks of the R. U. C. and the British Army to justice, while at the same time it introduces a more repressive bill to replace the notorious Special Powers Act so that they can imprison men, women and children who dare oppose these injustices . . .

There can be no return to stability until the 2,000 political hostages have been released. An amnesty cannot be one-sided . . . after all, justice must be seen to be done.

\* \* \*

Since it is a time when amnesty for political prisoners is becoming a strong issue, it is of interest to look back into history to see what were the circumstances surrounding a past amnesty of Irish political prisoners over one hundred years ago. This is the one granted to the imprisoned Fenians which started in the year of 1871.

After the failure of the 1867 Fenian rising, many members and a number of important leaders of the Fenian movement were imprisoned, getting severe sentences. Prison conditions in those times were harsh and inhuman.

To rescue these Irish revolutionaries from their plight of being left to the mercies of British Imperialism, an amnesty movement was founded in 1869 by George Henry Moore, Isaac Butt and a Fenian, John Nolan.

In that year, the people of Tipperary demonstrated their support for amnesty by electing O'Donovan Rossa as a member of parliament.

But the most remarkable support of all was given by British workers, and a remarkable man, Karl Marx, was instrumental in building up this support through the International Workingmen's Association, which had its headquarters in London.

On October 24th 1869, a mass demonstration was held in London demanding an amnesty for all Irish prisoners. Organised by the Reform League, this highly successful demonstration had the support of the General Council of the International. Commenting on a feature of the demonstration, Marx said, "A large part of the English working class has lost its prejudice against the Irish."

Thousands marched through Tra-

falgar Square to a meeting of 200,000 in Hyde Park. Under the guidance of Karl Marx, the General Council of the International won one hundred per cent support for the Irish prisoners and their cause from all the trade unions affiliated to the International. Here we had the solidarity of the working class of one country with that of another country whose right to independence it recognised.

The campaign for the release of the Fenian prisoners continued for several years and reached a new level on November 3rd 1872. A giant demonstration took place in Hyde Park and was organised by Irish members of the International along with British and other members. The attendance was estimated at 30,000 and an observer estimated it was combined of equal parts of Irish and British people.

These popular demonstrations along with other support brought enough pressure to gain amnesty for the Fenian prisoners. From 1871 onwards gradual releases took place. However, many of the leaders had certain conditions attached to their amnesty. They would have to go into exile and not return to their native land. Many of them went to the U. S. A., where they continued to work as earnestly as ever in the cause of their motherland. The lesson from this period in history is what can be gained through the solidarity of the British and Irish workers. To-day, such a solidarity of workers could succeed once again, this time, to smash internment, to bring about the release of political prisoners and eventually bring about the unity of our sundered country. □

### **Clerical 'Enemy' Shifted**

A Key Biscayne, Florida, minister who delivered an Easter sermon thought critical of Nixon has a new job. Last April, during church services at which Nixon was present, the Reverend John Huffman called on his congregation to cut themselves off from friends who had proven "untrue to Christian ideals." The sermon was widely interpreted as meaning that Nixon should fire high-ranking members of his gang because of Watergate. Reporters have noted that Nixon, formerly a frequent church-goer, has not been to church since that time.

Huffman now says that rumors that Nixon is behind his impending transfer to a church in Pittsburgh are "completely false."

## What Nixon Contributors Got for Their \$60 Million

By Allen Myers

*Everything is relative. With a family worth in those days better than \$450 million, what's a million or two, particularly when you can change the course of history to the principles for which you stand?*

—Multimillionaire W. Clement Stone explaining why he has given almost \$5 million to Richard Nixon's election campaigns.

*If you gave \$25,000, if you had a problem, you could talk to someone in the White House. I think I said, "What if I gave more?" And he said maybe the yardstick would be for \$25,000 you get to talk to somebody in the White House, a Cabinet officer or someone like that. For \$50,000 you get to talk to the president. I can't remember the exact amounts, really, but I remember something to the effect that with a very large contribution you can talk to the president—if you had a serious problem.*

—Meat-packing company executive Currier Holman describing the fund-raising pitch of a Nixon campaign official.

\* \* \*

The activities of the Nixon gang are financed from two principal sources. One is the federal treasury, which foots the bill not only for the FBI, CIA, etc., but also pays the salaries of many of the gangsters on the White House staff whose chief occupation is sabotaging Nixon's enemies.

The less "respectable" gang members—those who would cause embarrassment if linked to an official government organization—are paid from funds siphoned off from Nixon's campaign organization. The Watergate burglars, for example, were paid with campaign funds that had been routed through a Mexican bank in an effort to conceal their origin.

The stacks of \$100 bills distributed to Nixon's undercover agents were drawn primarily from the largest cam-

aign treasury ever amassed. For the 1972 presidential election alone—excluding money raised for congressional candidates—the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP) raked in at least \$60 million.

At least \$22 million of this was received before April 7, 1972, the effective date of a new law that required greater disclosure of the names of contributors. In the month prior to April 7, CREEP took in at least \$15 million, as wealthy donors rushed to make



KLEINDIENST: Perjury required to secure nomination as attorney general.

their contributions under the relative anonymity of the old law. The flood of money during this period was so great, according to the later testimony of CREEP treasurer Hugh Sloan, that CREEP officials often could not be spared to pick up contributions of less than \$50,000.

After April 7, 1972, CREEP reported the receipt of an additional \$38.6 million. This figure is obviously incomplete, since CREEP had already been convicted in court of several counts of failing to report contributions from this period.

Who donated these vast sums—and the lesser, but still staggering amount amassed by the Democratic party? (McGovern's campaign, which has been subject to considerably less scrutiny than Nixon's, reportedly took in some \$38 million.) What did they receive or expect to receive in exchange?

As the result of a lawsuit brought by muckraker Ralph Nader and of numerous post-Watergate leaks, many of the pre-April 7 donors' names have become known even though their gifts were not covered by the new law. CREEP has been ordered to turn over to a federal court a list, kept in the White House, of pre-April 7 contributors who gave more than \$1,000.

The available information on the wealthy contributors who donated large sums to CREEP makes it possible to discover certain patterns. The reasons for their generous gifts, it is safe to say, cover the range of human motivations extending from self-interest to greed.

For some donors, self-interest is an expression of class consciousness. The shell game of two-party capitalist politics in the United States runs on money. It requires the expenditure of millions of dollars to generate the illusion that there is a meaningful choice for the masses of Americans between the candidates of the two large parties. The expense of keeping the electoral machines well oiled is a necessary overhead cost for U.S. capitalism.

But wise capitalists invest not only with an eye to preserving their capital. The aim of investment is profit, and this applies to election contributions as well as to direct investment in industry or commerce. And, in fact, the returns on campaign investments are sometimes phenomenal. Officers of the Lockheed Corporation, to which Nixon gave \$250 million of government funds in 1971, claim that they invested less than \$100,000 in Nixon's reelection. Lockheed's rate of return in this case would seem to be something over 250,000 percent, a rate of profit certain to delight even the most critical board of directors.

The amount of Lockheed's profit on its investment may have been a little above average, although others even larger have been disclosed. As is true of the revelations concerning the Nixon gang's spying and sabotage operations, the disclosures concern only a small part of what has been going on out of sight of most viewers. The campaign-fund scandals that have erupted so far are exceptional only in that the participants were caught in the act.

### Money Solves Most 'Problems'

*Under existing laws, a large part of the money raised from the business community for political purposes is given in fear of what would happen if it were not given.*

— George Spater, chairman of the board of American Airlines.

\* \* \*

Campaign contributions by corporations in the United States are illegal—as are such other corporate practices as bribery, price-fixing, conspiracy, adulteration of goods, etc. All of these legal prohibitions are treated with approximately the same degree of respect: It is considered unnecessary and foolish to be caught violating them in full view of the public.

In the wake of the Watergate scandal, a number of corporations have not only been caught, but have had to confess publicly to making illegal contributions to CREEP. The confessions were motivated by the knowledge that "Rose Mary's Baby" had found its way into the hands of Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox.

As of this writing, three corporations—American Airlines, Ashland Oil Company, and Gulf Oil—have admitted making illegal donations totaling \$255,000.

The first confession came from American Airlines on July 6, 1973. Board Chairman George Spater said that the company had given \$55,000 to CREEP, plus an additional \$20,000 from unidentified "noncorporate sources." The contribution was requested by Herbert Kalmbach, Nixon's personal attorney, who later was to raise more than \$200,000 used to buy the silence of the Watergate burglars.

"I was solicited," Spater said in a

press release, "by Mr. Herbert Kalmbach, who said that we were among those from whom \$100,000 was expected.

"I knew Mr. Kalmbach to be both the President's personal counsel and counsel for our major competitor. I concluded that a substantial response was called for."

Spater seemed to feel—with some reason—that he had been the victim of some unobvious arm-twisting, followed by a double-cross. At the time he was approached by Kalmbach in November 1971, American Airlines was seeking approval from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the White House for a proposed merger with Western Airlines. The merger was opposed by United Airlines, one of Kalmbach's clients. American's contribution, as it turned out, was not "substantial" enough to accomplish its purpose: In July 1972, the CAB rejected the proposed merger.

Ashland and Gulf apparently gave exactly the prescribed amount—\$100,000 each. Ashland's contribution, according to Cox, was solicited by Maurice Stans, then finance chairman of CREEP and earlier Secretary of Commerce.

B.R. Dorsey, chairman of the board at Gulf, said his company had responded to "persistent requests."

"This pressure was intense and at the time it was thought to be irresistible by our Washington representatives," Dorsey said; but he refused to identify the person who had exerted the pressure. He added that Gulf did not, of course, expect any return for its \$100,000:

"The company was not seeking any special favors and did not have any corporate activity under government scrutiny.

"There was enormous pressure in the political system and the fact that others apparently also yielded is evidence of this."

There may in fact be some truth in the claim that some donors contributed more from fear of loss than from hope of gain. Thomas McBride, a special assistant to Cox, is reportedly collecting evidence of "extortion" by Nixon's fund raisers.

"Well-informed officials," Seymour M. Hersh wrote in the June 21 *New York Times*, "said that Mr. McBride had accumulated allegations indicating that Republican officials at one time drew up a list of corporations

and individuals 'who had problems with the Government' and solicited funds in late 1971 and early 1972 on that basis.

"Those 'problems,' the officials said, ranged from pending Federal income tax cases of individuals to cost overrun disputes and Securities and Exchange Commission difficulties of corporations."

After American Airlines made its public confession, the *Times* conducted a telephone survey of about 100 large corporations and found that about 40 of them had been approached for money by Stans or Kalmbach.

"The survey," Ben A. Franklin wrote July 14, "disclosed that the Stans-Kalmbach requests were customarily for \$100,000 but sometimes the request was for 1 per cent of the executives' combined worth, a figure that could have been higher than \$100,000.

"The *Times*'s list of companies that the two men were said to have visited . . . indicated that they had solicited most, if not all, of the prime defense contractors. The list also indicated that they had called on other companies in trouble with or awaiting rulings from government agencies and boards controlled by the Administration."

Executives of Litton Industries reportedly gave nearly \$100,000 after the conglomerate was approached by Stans early in 1972. At the time, Litton was involved in a dispute with the navy involving cost overruns and delays on a shipbuilding contract.

The major automobile corporations were also approached at a time when they were campaigning—ultimately successfully—for a delay in the imposition of air-pollution limits on engine exhausts. The Ford family gave more than \$110,000. Executives of the Chrysler Corporations kicked in a still secret amount.

Elmer H. Bobst, honorary board chairman of the Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Company, exceeded the usual quota of \$100,000. In the August 11 issue of the liberal weekly *Nation*, Tad Szulc reported that Bobst's gifts total nearly \$160,000. "He is no longer active in the affairs of the company, but Warner-Lambert is still awaiting an FTC [Federal Trade Commission] ruling on its 1970 merger with Parke, Davis & Co. If the merger is approved, Warner-Lambert will be the nation's third largest drug company. The Justice Department refused to enter the case at the

time despite recommendations from its antitrust division."

Maurice Stans resigned as secretary of commerce in January 1972 in order to become finance chairman of the Nixon campaign. But five months later, representatives of the carpet industry, who wanted a postponement of inflammability standards set by the Commerce Department, thought it wiser to discuss the matter with Stans than with his successor. They met with him in the White House, and shortly thereafter executives of two companies began a series of contributions to CREEP that eventually added up to more than \$200,000. The inflammability standards have still not been set.

Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson has reported that the owner of a hamburger chain who had given only \$1,000 to Nixon's 1968 campaign in-



GRAY: Conflicting testimony is best investigated after elections.

creased his contribution to \$225,000 in 1972. Just before the election, the Price Commission granted the chain a 10 percent increase in its cheeseburger prices.

There are several common methods of concealing illegal corporate contributions. One is to have subsidiary companies submit phony invoices in the amount of the planned contribution. (This method offers the additional advantage of allowing the campaign investment to be listed as a

business expense, thus reducing taxable income.) The American Airlines donation is thought to have been concealed by a phony invoice from a broker in Beirut.

Another common ruse is to have executives make contributions in their own names and then to reimburse them with "bonuses."

According to the records made public, "employees of Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing" were so enthusiastic about Nixon that they voluntarily got together and raised \$150,000 for his campaign. During election periods the Chrysler Corporation conducts a campaign among its executives, urging them to "support the party and candidate of their choice." The company collects the checks from the executives and delivers them to the Republican and Democratic campaign committees.

Chrysler's precaution of giving to both parties is a common one—and an exposure of the pretense that supposed "ideological" differences between the candidates determine the recipients. The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT), which has achieved more notoriety than any other company from its campaign investments, is another practitioner of "buttering both sides." A look at what has so far been uncovered about ITT's operations shows that wise investments not only can bring a substantial profit but can also purchase such valuable intangibles as a voice in foreign policy questions and the timely perjury of high government officials.

### What ITT Bought

*Senator Philip Hart: What did you think you were doing there [at the Justice Department], giving an economics course?*

*ITT director Felix Rohatyn: No, sir, I was trying to make a hard-ship case.*

—Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the ITT antitrust settlement, March 1972.

\* \* \*

Perhaps because of its size (annual sales more than \$7,000 million), ITT has had more difficulty than most conglomerates in keeping a tight rein on executives throughout its empire.

Some corporate officials have carelessly left memos unshredded, and

others—passed over for promotion, perhaps—have vented their feelings by talking to the press or congressional committees. As a result, ITT has suffered the injustice of a bad reputation for following the normal procedures of corporate-government relations.

Affidavits filed by former ITT officials show a pattern of corporate payoffs to the Democratic and Republican parties going back at least to 1960. For example, John T. Naylor, a former ITT vice-president, admits that in October 1960 he gave an illegal contribution to Robert Baker, then a Democratic Senate aide. (In a 1967 scandal, Baker was sentenced to prison on charges of fraud, theft, and tax evasion.)

Naylor said that he was instructed by William Marx, then an ITT senior vice-president, to make the contribution with his personal check and to recover the amount "by covering it up in your traveling expense account."

According to a report by Michael C. Jensen in the July 7, 1973, *New York Times*, Naylor quoted Marx as saying, "Hal [Harold Geneen, ITT chairman] and the board have it set up to 'butter' both sides so we'll be in a good position whoever wins."

Another former ITT executive provided an illustration of how strictly the law against corporate campaign contributions is enforced. He told Jensen that in 1965 he received a call from an ITT lawyer, warning him that the FBI would be coming to question him.

"He was told by the corporation that the questions would be restricted to a two-month period in 1960, he said, and that the F.B.I. would warn him that he need answer only in regard to that period.

"The interview took place as predicted, he said, with no apparent result. 'The F.B.I. would have gotten some different answers if they had broadened that period,' he said."

Obviously on good terms with U.S. spy agencies, ITT got together with the CIA in 1970 to see what could be done to prevent the election of Salvador Allende in Chile, or, failing that, to make his tenure a short one. According to his own testimony before a Senate subcommittee this year, John McCone—an ITT director who had earlier been head of the CIA—personally conveyed to Henry Kissinger and Richard Helms, then director of

the CIA, an offer to contribute \$1 million to the cause.

Unfortunately, many of the witnesses before the subcommittee developed memory lapses just when the testimony was getting interesting and no straightforward explanation was ever offered as to why Kissinger and Helms rejected ITT's generous offer. In the light of subsequent events, however, it seems likely that they informed McCone that an additional \$1 million would make no difference in the outcome of the plans already under way.

A central figure in the ITT-Nixon gang conspiracy against Allende was William R. Merriam, a vice-president of the corporation and head of its Washington office. In that capacity, Merriam was involved in another ITT scandal: the \$400,000 payoff to the Republican party in exchange for the favorable settlement of an antitrust case. Even after columnist Jack Anderson published an ITT memo describing the payoff arrangements, ITT and the Nixon gang managed an eventual cover-up of the affair.

This cover-up appears to be coming unstuck, however, revealing the complicity of virtually the entire Nixon gang down to Watergate conspirators Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt.

The affair began with ITT's takeover of the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, an acquisition worth an estimated \$1,500 million. The merger — the largest in U.S. history — was opposed by the Justice Department's antitrust division. Shortly before the case would have gone to trial, the Justice Department announced, on July 31, 1971, that the matter had been settled out of court. The "agreement" looked very much like a surrender by the Justice Department: ITT agreed to give up several small companies but was allowed to keep Hartford.

Nevertheless, the settlement appears not to have attracted much attention at the time, the enforcement of antitrust laws being normally even less stringent than other laws ostensibly designed to curb corporate powers. It was not until the following February, when columnist Jack Anderson published the now famous memo from ITT lobbyist Dita Beard to William Merriam, that the affair required the Nixon cover-up team to go into high gear.

The memo, dated June 25, 1971, described an arrangement in which ITT would donate up to \$400,000 to cover expenses of the Republican

national convention — at that time scheduled for San Diego, California — in exchange for a favorable ruling on the antitrust case. Mentioned as knowledgeable about the arrangement were Nixon, Attorney General John Mitchell, H.R. Haldeman, and California Lieutenant Governor Ed Reinecke. Beard indicated that only "mickey-mouse" objections by Richard McLaren, head of the antitrust division, were temporarily delaying completion of the agreement.

In his column Anderson added the charge that Richard Kleindienst,



KISSINGER: ITT's money not needed to overthrow Allende.

whose nomination as attorney general was then pending before the Senate, had lied when he earlier denied any role in the settlement of the case. Anderson quoted ITT director Felix Rohatyn as saying that he had met with Kleindienst, who was deputy attorney general at the time, on half a dozen occasions to discuss the case.

In the hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee that followed these disclosures, Rohatyn and Kleindienst confirmed this information, although both denied that there was any quid pro quo or that the matter was settled on any basis other than its "merits." McLaren, who had been appointed a federal judge in Chicago shortly after he was persuaded to see "reason," told the senators that he had been won over at a meeting with Rohatyn

— arranged by Kleindienst — in which it was explained that the loss of Hartford would not only be a "hardship" for ITT stockholders but might further unsettle an already shaky stock market.

Part of the evidence that "persuaded" McLaren, it turned out, was an "independent" study commissioned by White House aide Peter Flanigan, also known as "Nixon's ambassador to big business." The study was conducted by a partner of an investment firm that just happened to control 3,240 shares of ITT stock.

The press and public never got the chance to hear testimony from Dita Beard, however. In the middle of the hearings, she suddenly disappeared and then turned up in a sanatorium in Denver, allegedly suffering from heart disease, mental illness, and/or anything else that might conceivably make her testimony unreliable. In the wake of Watergate, it has been disclosed that Gordon Liddy arranged Beard's removal to Denver, apparently without consulting her first.

Charles Colson, head of the White House "office of dirty tricks," has also admitted that he then sent Howard Hunt, another Watergate conspirator, to "interview" Beard during her stay in Denver. Hunt made the trip wearing a disguise furnished by the CIA. What was said during the "interview" has never been made public, but Beard not long afterward denied the authenticity of the memo, even though its genuineness had earlier been confirmed by the FBI.

John Mitchell also testified during the hearings and, in the style that has become familiar in the Watergate affair, denied everything that had not already been proved against him, which at that point was not very much. Specifically, he denied the arrangement mentioned in the Beard memo and that he personally had played any role in the settlement.

The Judiciary Committee managed to hear a large number of witnesses who raised many suspicions without proving anything very definite. This investigative inability may in part have been due to the reluctance of Democratic senators to appear ungrateful for ITT's past and present favors to their party. As one Republican senator pointed out, ITT was still providing the Democratic campaign with telephone service despite a mammoth unpaid bill.



Because of a great amount of conflicting and improbable testimony, the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 30, 1972, turned over the transcript of the hearings to the Justice Department, requesting that it take action within thirty days on any possible cases of perjury.

Some might object that it was somewhat unrealistic to expect Attorney General Kleindienst to direct an impartial investigation to determine whether he and his predecessor had perjured themselves in order to conceal their participation in an illegal deal between a giant corporation and



COLSON: Headed White House "office of dirty tricks."

But the Nixon gang could not afford to hope that the ITT scandal would simply die of its own accord. For one thing, a subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee headed by Harley O. Staggers and a Senate subcommittee headed by Edward Kennedy were both showing interest in further investigations. In an election year, a more active cover-up seemed necessary. This was to require participation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which, as it later turned out, was already involved in the ITT case and such other CREEP fund-raising affairs as the Vesco payoff (see below).

The SEC is a "regulatory" or "watch-dog" agency that is supposed to keep an eye on Wall Street, make sure that the pirates there do not exceed the normal level of sharp practices, and generally maintain "public confidence" in the world's largest, most prestigious casino. After the July 31, 1971, settlement, the SEC began an investigation of charges that ITT officers had illegally taken advantage of their foreknowledge of the settlement to trade in ITT stock at a substantial profit.

The SEC had subpoenaed all ITT documents related to the antitrust case, but when Anderson published the Beard memo, Stanley Sporkin, who was in charge of the SEC investigation, noticed that the Beard memo was not among the documents that ITT had furnished under the subpoena.

In testimony to the Staggers subcommittee on December 14, 1972, Sporkin said that he had immediately contacted Joseph Flom, ITT's lawyer for the case, and asked if there were any other documents that had not been turned over to the SEC. Flom said he would call back with the information. Instead, the Nixon gang and ITT escalated the cover-up.

Early in March, SEC chairman William J. Casey received a phone call from John Ehrlichman, Nixon's top domestic adviser. Casey later told the House subcommittee:

"Apparently the ITT lawyers somehow[!] got word to Mr. Ehrlichman that the commission was pursuing them for additional documents. I guess he felt the commission was reaching out and poking into something."

Had Ehrlichman pressed him to curtail the investigation? Casey "wouldn't want to say," but he added: "I guess he raised the question whether this was necessary."

Casey said he told Ehrlichman that he was not going to interfere, which, if true, shows that he had enough sense not to take the rap for higher-ups in the Nixon gang. Casey did, however, later remove fraud charges from the complaint that was filed against ITT. (The case went to court June 16, 1972, and was quickly settled by a "consent decree" under which ITT did not admit the charges against it, but promised not to do it again.)

Casey was subjected to additional pressure during this period from Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy. Kennedy called, Casey said, to make what was essentially a "character ref-



HUNT: "Interview" persuaded Dita Beard to change her story.

erence" for a partner of an investment firm accused of violating federal laws in connection with the ITT case. Casey failed to indicate why Kennedy didn't make his "character reference" in public testimony. Presumably the crusading senator was too busy investigating Republican pressures on government regulatory agencies.

Several days after Ehrlichman's call to Casey, Flom showed up at Sporkin's office with copies of thirteen memos concerning ITT's relations with figures high in the Nixon gang. Sporkin said he urged Flom to give copies also to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which should have been done anyway under the terms of that committee's subpoena. According to Sporkin, Flom later said that the thirteen documents had been offered to Democratic Senator James Eastland, the chairman of the committee, but

the president of the United States. Against such unfounded cynicism, however, the Senate almost always maintains its faith in human nature, and particularly in the moral purity of cabinet members it has voted to confirm in their offices.

Patrick Gray, then acting Director of the FBI, was later to testify to the diligence and speed with which the Justice Department pursued the Senate committee's request. It was not until five months later, on December 5, 1972, Gray said, that the FBI was instructed to look into the case. In June of this year, when a new attorney general, Elliot Richardson, dumped the whole mess in the lap of Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox, no action had yet been taken by the Justice Department.

the latter had refused them!

On August 15, 1972, Kennedy wrote to Casey, asking if the SEC had any documents not available to the Senate because of ITT's wholesale shredding of documents after the publication of the Beard memo. If so, Kennedy said, his subcommittee would like to see them.

After receiving Kennedy's letter, Casey contacted the Justice Department, and on August 25 talked by telephone with Kleindienst, explaining to him what was in the thirteen documents. Casey says he told Kleindienst that the memos raised the possibility of obstruction of justice and perjury by witnesses at the earlier Judiciary Committee hearings.

Kleindienst asked for copies of the documents, and Casey had them made for him. He told the Staggers subcommittee that he "wasn't aware" of Kleindienst's public statement that he would "disqualify" himself from further involvement in matters concerning ITT.

Casey testified that it was decided to "carry on the investigation," although just what investigation he was talking about is not clear, since the SEC complaint had gone to court two months earlier and no results of any additional investigation were ever announced.

But the decision to "carry on" allowed Casey to write Kennedy on August 31, 1972, declining to turn over the ITT materials on the ground that to do so would interfere with a "pending investigation."

Three weeks later, however, on September 21, 1972, Casey received a letter from Staggers, asking for all the ITT materials. The request was repeated September 27. The Staggers subcommittee is supposed to oversee the SEC's functioning, and should it have subpoenaed the ITT documents, Casey would have had to comply.

On October 3 Casey therefore went to the White House to discuss strategy with John Dean. Dean had been promoted from the Justice Department in the summer of 1970 and given the title of special counsel to the president. He had taken over many of the functions of espionage planner Tom Charles Huston, who had been eased out of the White House after arousing the hostility of J. Edgar Hoover.

Casey said he was "surprised" when he arrived at the White House that

day to see that Dean already had copies of the thirteen "sensitive" documents. (Dean told the Staggers subcommittee in May of this year that he received the copies from Mitchell.)

According to Casey, Dean "pointed out the relevance of these documents" to the earlier Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Kleindienst's nomination. The relevance was that the documents indicated that a great deal of perjury had been committed during those hearings.

Dean then suggested that the ITT materials — the thirteen "sensitive" docu-



CONNALLY: Slowed court hearings.

ments and thirty-four boxes of records obtained earlier — be turned over to the Justice Department.

The next day, Casey called a meeting of the SEC. The commission met for ten minutes and voted to give the ITT files to the Justice Department. The materials were transferred October 6. In his later testimony, Casey was fairly blunt about the reason for the transfer:

"I don't think any of us have to be naive about this. There had been continuing efforts on the part of other committees in the Congress seeking the files not to examine our handling of the case but seeking particular documents. . . . The commission had to recognize that this was a particularly bad time for documents to be floating around."

The subcommittee heard conflicting testimony from Casey and Ralph E. Erickson, then a deputy attorney general, as to whether or not Erickson formally requested the files from Casey on behalf of the Justice Department. The dispute is of interest mainly to Casey and Erickson, since it could determine which of them might be charged with obstruction of justice.

Erickson did admit, however, that he met with Dean on October 3, after the latter had discussed the ITT files with Casey. Erickson said that Dean told him the files "would be helpful" to the Justice Department. If Erickson's testimony is true, he must have suspected that he was being set up as a potential scapegoat: He claims he told both Dean and Casey that he didn't want the files.

In any event, Casey and Erickson obviously did agree that one month before the election was "a particularly bad time for documents to be floating around." Erickson did not even trust the Justice Department staff. When the files were delivered October 6, the thirty-four boxes of records were given to Harold P. Shapiro, a deputy assistant attorney general in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department who was supposed to conduct the "investigation" of possible perjury during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. But the thirteen documents were delivered separately to Erickson, who hid them away in his office safe.

Erickson told the subcommittee he kept them there "for some time, a matter of weeks, probably two weeks, three weeks, I am not sure" before giving them to Shapiro. Despite Erickson's uncertainty, it is safe to assume that Shapiro did not receive the documents until after the election.

The cover-up looked as though it had been successful. The Justice Department "investigation" of course produced no results. The Staggers subcommittee, unable to obtain the ITT documents, had to content itself with notes made by SEC staff members at the time they looked through the thirty-four boxes of material.

Meanwhile, however, a Senate subcommittee headed by Frank Church of Idaho was conducting hearings on the influence of multinational corporations on U.S. foreign policy. These hearings led to the disclosure of ITT's attempts to prevent the election of Allende. They also resulted in Church obtaining directly from ITT copies

of some of the sensitive documents being concealed in the Justice Department. At the end of March 1973, Church made several of these ITT memos public, at about the same time that the Staggers subcommittee released some of the SEC notes.

This information, which received little attention at the time, being overshadowed by the anti-Allende campaign and the developing Watergate scandal, implicated some new names in the settlement of the ITT antitrust suit. These included two cabinet members and Vice-President Spiro Agnew. The April 2 issue of *Newsweek* summarized some of this material:

"In the summer of 1970, top ITT executives saw Justice antitrust chief Richard McLaren as a fanatic opponent of mergers who was charging toward a courtroom showdown against Administration policy. An Aug. 7 [1970] note from Edward J. Gerrity, ITT senior vice president for corporate relations, to 'Ted' Agnew — along with an accompanying memo — confirmed that Gerrity and the Veep [vice-president] lunched together on the same day that ITT president and Chairman Harold Geneen and William R. Merriam, then head of the ITT Washington office, conferred on the subject with White House assistants John Ehrlichman and Charles Colson. And the memo indicated that Geneen had previously had 'a very friendly session' with then Attorney General John Mitchell, who has publicly denied any involvement with the case. 'John made plain to him (Hal Geneen) that the President was not opposed to mergers per se,' said the memo. 'John said he would talk with McLaren and get back to Hal. . . .'"

Another letter, dated April 22, 1971, disclosed the involvement of then Treasury Secretary John Connally and Peter G. Peterson, a White House assistant when the letter was written and later secretary of commerce. The letter, from Merriam to Connally, refers to a thirty-day delay in court proceedings that followed a meeting between Connally, Merriam, and Geneen.

"We are certain," the letter said, "that you and Pete were most instrumental for the delay."

We can assume that Merriam was a good judge of the favors provided to ITT by Connally and Peterson. But there was an even higher official going to bat for the corporation: the head of the Nixon gang himself.

The unwilling source of this disclosure was Charles Colson, who wrote a March 30, 1972, memo to H.R. Haldeman that later fell into the hands of the Senate Watergate committee.

Colson's memo argued that the nomination of Kleindienst should be withdrawn because continued hearings by the Senate Judiciary Committee could result in the uncovering of the way the ITT case was settled. Colson then listed a number of memos floating around that could provide embarrassing evidence against the Nixon gang.



KENNEDY: "Character reference" for a friend.

Among them, Colson wrote, was a May 5, 1971, memo from Ehrlichman to Mitchell "alluding to discussions between the President and the Attorney General as to 'the agreed-upon ends' in the resolution of the ITT case."

"This memo," Colson added, "would once again contradict Mitchell's testimony [before the Judiciary Committee] and more importantly directly involve the President."

Another memo implicating Nixon was not such a matter for concern, Colson indicated: "There is also a memo to the President in the same time period. We know we have control of all copies of this."

The possibility of Mitchell being caught perjuring himself was a concern in still another document:

"There is a [Herbert] Klein-to-Halde-

man memo, dated June 30, 1971, which of course precedes the date of the ITT settlement, setting forth the \$400,000 arrangement with ITT. This memo puts the A. G. [attorney general] on constructive notice at least of the ITT commitment at that time and before the settlement, facts which he has denied under oath. . . . There is another memo of September, 1970, from Ehrlichman to the A.G. referring to an 'understanding' with Geneen and complaining of McLaren's actions. . . . This memo would once again contradict Mitchell's testimony."

Moreover, Colson warned Haldeman, there were ITT memos to worry about. A memo from an ITT public relations man to Merriam, for example, "suggests that Kleindienst is the key man to pressure McLaren, implying that the Vice President would implement this action. We believe that all copies of this have been destroyed. . . . A memo sent to the Vice President, addressed 'Dear Ted,' from Ned Gerrity tends to contradict John Mitchell's testimony because it outlines Mitchell's agreement to talk to McLaren following Mitchell's meeting with Geneen in August, 1970. . . ."

"Both Mitchell and Geneen have testified they discussed policy only, not this case, and that Mitchell talked to no one else."

The same memo, Colson continued, said that Ehrlichman had told Geneen "that the President had 'instructed' the Justice Department with respect to the bigness policy"—that is, that the administration would not oppose mergers only because a corporation was too big. Colson then warned:

"(It is, of course, appropriate for the President to instruct the Justice Department on policy, but in the context of these hearings, that revelation would lay this case on the President's doorstep.)"

In retrospect, ITT's \$400,000 campaign investment would appear even more successful than Lockheed's. In addition to its acquisition of the \$1,500 million Hartford Fire Insurance Co. ITT obtained the services of the president, vice-president, two attorneys general, the secretary of commerce, the secretary of the treasury, the chairman of the SEC, numerous presidential assistants, and countless lesser officials. It would have cost more than \$400,000 to put them all on the official ITT payroll.

(To be continued.)

## 'Peaceful Coexistence'—An Obstacle to Revolution

By Milton Alvin

### IV

In recent years a certain displacement of Stalinism has occurred. This was clearest in the case of the Cuban revolution. The Communist party in Cuba opposed the struggle led by Fidel Castro, the Cuban CP leaders having held posts in the Batista government in the past. Only near the end of the civil war did the Stalinists jump on the Castro bandwagon.

The Stalinists held that the revolution in Latin America would have to pass through two stages. The first was one in which the native capitalists, uniting the workers and peasants behind them, would win independence from U. S. imperialism and establish a democratic regime. At some unspecified time thereafter the workers and peasants would begin a struggle for a socialist society. This was an old theory going back to the days of the Mensheviks in pre-revolutionary Russia.

The Stalinists have used this theory in Latin America to justify their collaboration with capitalist political parties. The Allende regime in Chile, which is in the pattern of the people's fronts that were outstanding failures in the 1930s, is an example of what the Stalinists support. The people's frontism of the 1970s will prove to be the same kind of trap for the workers and peasants as it was forty years ago.

The civil war in Vietnam, which has been at the center of world politics for the past decade, once again reveals Stalinist treachery. This applies to all the various brands and is not confined only to the Moscow variety.

Both the Russian and Chinese Stalinists gave the embattled Vietnamese fighters very little of the kind of aid they needed. At the same time both Moscow and Peking welcomed imperialism's chief representatives, headed by Nixon, to their respective capitals. Toasts were exchanged and glasses clinked while U. S. planes poured bombs down on the Vietnamese people.

Undoubtedly Nixon cooked up some secret deals with both Moscow and Peking which led them to place great pressure on Hanoi to sign accords that contain clauses unfavorable to Vietnamese interests such as retention of the Thieu regime in the South.

Both the Soviet and Chinese Stalinists have supplied the capitalist regimes in Pakistan, Ceylon, and Egypt with money and military hardware in amounts that exceed by far what the Vietnamese have received from the same sources. The Chinese stood on the side of the Pakistani reactionaries while the Bangladesh people were fighting for their independence. Peking's rulers aided the present capitalist government of Ceylon when it was imprisoning thousands of young rebels who opposed the coalition regime in that country. The Soviet government has given Egypt enormous amounts of aid despite a ban on the Communist party of that country.

When the Sukarno regime took power in Indonesia, the

Maoists in China encouraged the Indonesian CP to support it. For years Sukarno did nothing for the impoverished masses. In Moscow not a word of criticism of the policy of supporting Indonesian capitalism was heard. The Indonesian CP repeated the fatal line followed by the Chinese CP in 1927 with hardly a change in details.

Neither the Soviet or Chinese Stalinist leaderships learned anything or changed anything in their policy after the terrible defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1927. The Indonesian CP was led into an unprecedented slaughter when reactionary generals overthrew Sukarno and killed an estimated 500,000 members and followers of the Indonesian Communist party. Once again class collaboration took a heavy toll and destroyed what might have been a revolutionary party.

In the 1964 presidential elections, the American Communist party supported Lyndon B. Johnson against Barry Goldwater. The latter advocated more aggressive U. S. intervention in the war in Vietnam, while Johnson pictured himself as a "peace" candidate. At that time American participation in the Vietnamese war was relatively light.

After Johnson's reelection, the CP announced that a victory had been won. However, Johnson settled himself in the White House for a four-year term and proceeded to carry out the most substantial parts of Goldwater's program. He escalated the war until more than a half million U. S. ground troops were in Vietnam, supported by hundreds of aircraft and the Seventh Fleet.

The huge intervention was met by widespread opposition. A mass antiwar movement developed that demanded the withdrawal of U. S. troops and recognition of the right of self-determination for the Vietnamese.

In some eight years of activity in the antiwar field the Stalinists sought to divert the movement again and again. At some stages they threatened to destroy its effectiveness to a considerable degree.

They tried to foist extraneous and unrelated issues on the movement that would have made it less attractive to those who opposed the war but were not necessarily in agreement on other questions. They split the movement into competing groups. They advocated that the U. S. government negotiate with the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front even though this implied acknowledgment of the right of American imperialism to intervene in the war. They constantly opposed the organization of the movement around the simple and correct slogans of "Out Now" and "Self-Determination for the Vietnamese."

The Stalinists opposed mass demonstrations in the streets, and in periods when such actions were being organized did all they could to undermine them. Not wanting to be left out, but uneasy about coming in, they and their supporters had to be dragged into demonstrations on almost every occasion. In the recent period they demanded that

Nixon sign a cease-fire agreement even though it contained clauses unfavorable to the Vietnamese as well as again bolstering Nixon's fraudulent claim that he had a right to intervene in Vietnam.

The Stalinists conveniently forgot Lenin's policy in a similar situation. When the new Soviet state was compelled to make concessions and had to sign a monstrous peace treaty with Germany in 1918, it was because it had no means to carry on any war. The German Social Democrats voted for this agreement in the Kaiser's parliament. For this, Lenin denounced them as scoundrels, explaining that they should have opposed the Draconian terms imposed by the German imperialists.

The Soviet Union had no choice but to sign, Lenin said, but the German socialists did not have to support the Kaiser. Similarly, the Vietnamese may have had no choice but to make concessions to the U. S. But this was no reason for antiwar Americans to approve Nixon's course or to hail a cease-fire containing unfavorable terms as a victory for the Vietnamese.

It was their duty to denounce Nixon for imposing the unfavorable terms.

Other important issues in America consistently get wrong answers from the Stalinists. This is explained by the fact that their main purpose is to settle for "peaceful coexistence" between the Soviet bureaucracy and world imperialism. Everything is subordinated to that. But their conception of peaceful coexistence is to subordinate the interests of the workers to those of the capitalists. This is a policy of treachery and betrayal, as many experiences over the years have demonstrated.

Instead of giving support to the new and promising women's liberation movement the Stalinists have found new merits in the nuclear family, a product of class society now undergoing decay that is a primary cause of oppression of women.

The CP opposes Black nationalism, which arose in the last two decades, and attacked Malcolm X, one of its outstanding spokesmen.

To Stalinists all forms of nationalism are the same. While Lenin explained that the nationalism of oppressed peoples is progressive whereas the nationalism of oppressors is reactionary, the Stalinists throw them both into the same bag. Their purpose in opposing Black nationalism, which is militant and potentially revolutionary, is obvious: Black nationalists cannot live in the Democratic party.

When the workers and students arose in a mighty upsurge in France in 1968, marked by the largest general strike in history, the French Communist party did all it could to dampen the uprising. They cooperated with French President Charles de Gaulle to defuse the movement by giving the workers a few wage boosts and agreeing to parliamentary measures to settle the rest.

This general strike provided an opportunity to deepen the struggle and social crisis and to extend it to a political level with the chance of a revolutionary solution. This the Stalinists wanted least of all.

Since the CP was in control of the main union organizations, they succeeded in blocking the movement and saving the de Gaulle regime from going down. In this way they repeated their performance of 1935-36 when in alliance with the Social Democrats and the capitalist Radical Socialist party in the people's front, they were a

principal factor in saving the capitalist system in France.

Stalinism on a world scale exists only to defend the ruling circles in the Soviet Union, who live on a level far higher than that of the workers and farmers. All of the Kremlin's political moves are designed to strengthen the position of the Soviet bureaucracy. Only the prestige of the 1917 Russian revolution, which the Moscow rulers and their supporters exploit, attracts new people to Communist parties. In like manner, although to a much lesser extent, people are attracted to Maoism because of the 1949 Chinese revolution. But this variety of Stalinism is no better than the original.

The world capitalist system would long ago have been replaced with socialism if it were not for the existence of Stalinism. By themselves the capitalists cannot save their system, which is historically outmoded, unable to satisfy the most elementary needs of the overwhelming majority of humanity.

In order to survive, the capitalist class must have the help of strong currents among the workers and peasants that support its hold on state power. This is supplied by world Stalinism and reformist socialism.

The Stalinist contingent is the more important part of this support, since it exploits connections to countries that have had revolutions. In this way it fools many well-intentioned but poorly informed people. For example, the loss of thousands of youth who were miseducated and then demoralized by Stalinism in past decades in the United States stands as a historical crime of enormous magnitude.

The continued existence of Stalinism is indispensable to capitalism. As soon as enough people realize that Stalinism is in the service of capitalism, the death knell will sound for both. □

## Declare Independence of Guinea-Bissau

Within two days of its declaration of independence, at least fifteen countries had extended diplomatic recognition to the government of Guinea-Bissau. The fifteen are Algeria, the Congo Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, and Upper Volta.

The declaration of independence was made known September 26 in a communiqué issued in Dakar, Senegal, by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde (PAIGCV—African party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde).

"The prime aim of the declaration," Reuters reported September 27, "is to speed the expulsion of Portuguese forces from the country and other Portuguese territories, according to the proclamation." The PAIGCV said that once the Portuguese are expelled, Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde islands would be united in a single state.

There are approximately 27,000 Portuguese troops in Guinea-Bissau. According to Aristides Pereira, who represented Guinea-Bissau at the recent Algiers conference of "nonaligned" countries, PAIGCV forces control about three-fourths of the country, which has an area of 14,000 square miles. □

## Origin of 'Fraccion Roja' of Argentine PRT

[In the spring of this year a split occurred in the Argentine guerrilla group the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP—Revolutionary Army of the People). The first public indication came when a group calling itself the ERP-22 de Agosto carried out a pro-Peronist action during the period preceding the March elections.

[In August of this year, the first issue of the paper *Combate* (Fight) appeared, expressing the viewpoint of a group calling itself the Fracción Roja (Red Faction) of the ERP. This grouping announced that it was the result of a split that occurred in the ERP about the same time that the ERP-22 de Agosto left. These splits reportedly were accompanied by corresponding splits in the PRT (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—Revolutionary Workers party), which voted to form the ERP at its Fifth Congress in 1970. The following articles from the first issue of *Combate*, dated August 15, describe the positions of the various groups and the events that led to the split.]

### Our Split With the PRT Leadership and Our Initial Differences

The Fracción Roja arose out of a crisis in the PRT that came at the same time that the split was developing, on other political bases, that led to a group operating under the name of the ERP-22 de Agosto.

This crisis reflected a series of conflicts within the PRT that sharpened in the political situation preceding the elections.

The compañeros who make up the Fracción Roja today began to put forward their positions within the PRT with the constructive aim of helping to overcome the deviations, errors, and contradictions that were hurting the party. They tried to present their views according to the Leninist tradition of the party, within the framework of internal discussion and respecting unity and discipline in action. They proposed, in accordance

with the statutes, that a period of pre-congress discussion be opened. All of this was blocked by the bureaucratic attitude of the national leadership, which in fact trampled on the statutes of the party and the principles of democratic centralism.

The leadership took a stubbornly hostile attitude toward the expression of any views that questioned their methodology or any aspects of their orientation. They ignored the positions put forth by major sectors of the rank and file, as well as the intermediate leaderships and the mass front. In this way a split was forced, for which the national leadership bears the entire responsibility, a split that demonstrated in practice that the group that was to become the Fracción Roja had the support of 80 percent of the activists and fighters in one of the largest regional organizations of the PRT.

The *initial differences* of the Fracción Roja with the present leadership of the PRT can be summed up in the following points around which the confrontation more or less centered.

#### a. *On building the revolutionary party:*

The compañeros of the Fracción Roja began by questioning a number of aspects of the leadership's methodology, such as its empiricism, liberalism, etc. And they showed the correspondence between these aspects of methodology and a certain conception of the party. Opposing the centrist conception of a broad, mass party, they revived the concept of a party of revolutionary cadres that could become the vanguard of the working class. They called for discussing a strategy and a tactic for building the party in Argentine conditions that would enable us to overcome the empiricism that had prevailed up till then. They defended democratic centralism as the method for building the party, for raising the political level of the membership, as well as the only guarantee of the unity of the party.

#### b. *On intervening in the working class:*

The compañeros of the Fracción Roja advocated that intervention in the working class and more particularly in its vanguard sectors be centralized and have definite priorities. They showed by concrete balance sheets that there were no real standards for this work and that this was leading to diffuse agitation in nonessential sectors of the workers movement. They also criticized the lack of tactics for this intervention and the leadership's counterposition of general postulates on "war and socialism" to a tail-ending policy sticking to immediate demands. They advocated adopting a program of struggle that would incorporate the method of transitional demands, in accordance with the Leninist tradition that Trotsky distilled in the Transitional Program.

#### c. *On the characterization of the period and building the Revolutionary Army of the People:*

The compañeros of the Fracción Roja began to question the characterization of Argentina as in a full-fledged revolutionary war, pointing out the difference between a prerevolutionary situation, which is a latent, more general confrontation, and an ongoing people's war. In these conditions it was wrong to consider the ERP already a mass organization as the leadership did. This was the source of many illusions, deviations, and errors in building the ERP. Thus, the program that the Fifth Congress of the PRT established for the ERP was overcome in practice and did not remain limited to a struggle "against the dictatorship and imperialism" but directly posed the question of socialism. The Fracción Roja continues to hold the conception of beginning right away to build the party and the Revolutionary Army as the strategic instruments for the working class taking power under Latin American conditions, but on the basis of criteria rather different from those of the present leadership of the PRT.

#### d. *On the tactic to take toward the GAN [Gran Acuerdo Nacional—Great National Accord, the military's plan for elections and bringing the Peronists into the government]:*

Another of the issues in dispute was the PRT's tactics in the preelection period. The errors that were made prevented taking any real advantage of the conjuncture. The leadership began to manifest some dangerous ten-

dencies toward opportunism, characterizing the Communist party and "progressive sectors" of the bourgeois parties as "strategic allies" and thus breaking with the conception of permanent revolution that was one of the foundations of the PRT's orientation. The *compañeros* of the Fracción Roja, like other *compañeros* in the party, opposed any kind of alliance with sectors of the bourgeoisie, advocating unity of the working-class and popular sectors.

e. *Defense of internationalism:*

The PRT leadership's bureaucratic measures against the *compañeros* who made up the Fracción Roja occurred in the midst of an out-and-out anti-Trotskyist campaign that led to a break with the Fourth International, of which the PRT up till then had been the Argentine section. Against this campaign, the *compañeros* of the Fracción Roja defended the need for a consistent international position, which would be reflected in concrete work to build the International.

When we were forced to leave the organization, being no longer able to put forward our ideas inside the PRT, the Fracción Roja was formed.

Far from being a usurpation, our name is a demonstration that we continue to demand the right to participate, along with other members of the PRT, in the Sixth Congress of the party. We call for a democratic and Leninist preparation of the congress that would permit the participation of the various factions.

We have full confidence that we were not the ones who trampled on the party statutes; rather it was the PRT leadership. Proof of this is the support we received of a large majority (80 percent) in the regional unit where we were able to express our points of view.

We call ourselves the Fracción Roja of the PRT and the ERP because we recognize the essential role that our party plays in the Argentine revolutionary left, and in our positions and our practice we identify with its fighting course of revolutionary struggle against the dictatorship.

For this reason, we will continue now from the columns of this paper to carry on a political discussion with the other *compañeros* of the PRT, the discussion that we began inside the party. This will enable the entire vanguard to get to know our positions

better. Here we have simply summed up the initial points as information on the political background of our break with the present centrist leadership of the PRT.

\* \* \*

### Lamentable Incidents

During our internal struggle in the PRT, the leadership distinguished itself by its complete lack of respect for democratic centralism, which led to splitting the party and our forming the Fracción Roja of the PRT.

Since the split, which was provoked by the leadership's fear of politically confronting a discussion that challenged them, it could be hoped that this leadership would stop operating on the level of mere chicanery and insults. The large number of comrades that broke with them might have made them think. After all, the PRT leadership continued to hold as one of its central objectives "unity of the armed organizations."

But this wasn't the case. The lack of respect for internal party democracy was compounded by a total lack of consideration for the elementary rules of workers democracy.

One of the first incidents, as well as one of the most lamentable, occurred in the Villa Devoto jail on May 25, 1973. As we all know, the jail was seized on that occasion by the political prisoners, who were expecting demonstrations for their release. The *compañeros* of Fracción Roja imprisoned there expressed their intention of placing a banner of ours with the other flags and banners of the organizations that had combatants in the Villa Devoto. The PRT leadership in the jail (made up, we might say in passing, of *compañeros* censured for their conduct in face of the enemy) threatened our *compañeros* physically, refusing to allow them to do any such thing.

As for the proposal made by the *compañeros* of the Fracción Roja of holding a discussion with the other organizations, the PRT made it known that it didn't care about the opinion of the other organizations, that it would keep the same attitude. This arrogant attitude, even ignoring the opinion of the other organizations, had appeared before when the PRT leadership made decisions unilaterally

in protests by the prisoners. It should be added that only among the Stalinists has anyone gone so far as to trample on democratic relationships among comrades imprisoned in the same jail.

Another of these incidents occurred in Córdoba. This one was really petty and ridiculous. When the city was covered with Fracción Roja posters on the *pacto social* [social accord, a class-collaborationist scheme] and on Trelew, the leadership of the PRT gave instructions to its members to go out on the streets and tear off *the part that said "Fracción Roja!"* When are they going to organize commandos to tear the ads out of a whole edition of *Clarín* or *Crónica*? The most disgraceful thing is that while the PRT leadership was promoting these actions in Córdoba, in Buenos Aires it was the JSP [Juventud Sindical Peronista — Peronist Trade-Union Youth, the goon squads of the right wing of the Peronist movement] that busied itself tearing up our posters, whose slogans were too much to the point not to be targets.

Another petty act was their taking the credit in *Estrella Roja* (the organ of the ERP) for seizing the guard post of Petroquímica Sudamericana at Olmos (in Buenos Aires province), as if this operation had been carried out by an ERP commando team. Even the bourgeois press published pictures that testified to the fact that this action was carried out by the Fracción Roja of the ERP.

But the most lamentable was certain PRT leaders acting like junior goons in Córdoba last July 8 on the occasion of the Plenario Nacional por la Recuperación Nacional [National Assembly for Recovering Our Economic Sovereignty]. In an incident involving a total disregard for workers democracy, a number of *compañeros* belonging to a class-struggle group were stopped from going in because they were members of the Fracción Roja. It reached the point that we saw "leaders" who were left alone in their regional organization, repudiated by 80 percent of the rank and file, take advantage of a momentary superiority in numbers to play cock of the walk. Inside the meeting itself, this thuggery went to the point that our *compañeros* were assaulted and even threatened with arms. Even persons only close to us got this kind of treatment.

Insults, threats, and thuggery, compañeros, are characteristics of the JSP and not of revolutionary militants. Nothing can be settled and nothing can be clarified by such methods; this can only be achieved through discussion and frank argument in the context of a common respect for workers democracy.

The only thing the PRT leadership will get this way is mounting criticism and reproval. Although it is a bad practice, you can still try to rule your own roost in an arbitrary way, despite the risks of splitting the party. But arbitrary leadership in the workers movement and in the mass movement in general is running into ever broader repudiation. This is what the PRT leadership has gotten already for the way it acted in the Córdoba *plenario*.

The same holds true for the way it has acted toward the compañeros of the ERP-22 de Agosto. In the wake for Compañero José Luis Castrogiovanni in the University of Buenos Aires School of Architecture, they destroyed a floral wreath sent by the ERP-22 de Agosto. But the most serious thing was the way they acted toward Compañero Víctor Fernández Palmeiro. After the split of the ERP-22 de Agosto with the present leadership of the PRT, the PRT leaders started to spread the rumor that he was an enemy agent because his escape from the Villa Devoto prison seemed very strange (as is widely known, Compañero Fernández Palmeiro got away by switching clothes with his brother, who went to visit him). What an outrage, and at the very time he was preparing to execute Admiral Quijada, the murderer of Trelew! The sectarianism of the PRT leadership went so far that after the execution of Quijada and the death of Fernández Palmeiro, they broke up a meeting of the Villa Devoto prisoners in honor of this fallen compañero!

\* \* \*

## Why We Keep On Fighting

The Fracción Roja will keep on fighting because it is waging a struggle for Workers Power and Socialism and because it understands that while the March 11 elections represented the popular will, they did not represent the real interests of the working class

and the people.

A government that frees the murderers of Silvia Filler, that carries out political raids and arrests, that represses the bearing of arms and the people's occupations of the factories and places of work, that allows fascist gangs to operate freely, that declares states of siege in Buenos Aires and Córdoba, thereby giving the army free rein to repress any attempt to prevent a coup d'etat, is not a workers and people's government.

A government that fails to investigate and punish the crimes of the dictatorship is not a workers and people's government.

Does the government believe that the contending parties—the working class and the people on one side and the bosses and the dictatorship on the other—are both partly right and so you have to overlook the faults of both? Does it think that the death of Valenzuela in Rawson when he tried to stop the escape of dozens of imprisoned compañeros who had been harassed and tortured has the same meaning as the deaths of our sixteen compañeros who were shot by the dictatorship in Trelew? Or does it want to investigate these crimes but finds itself unable?

Yes, the best assumption is that it wants to but cannot. Why then didn't it at least denounce the pressures it was exposed to? Why did it give in on July 13, denying that its decision was motivated by the pressures brought to bear on it, instead of denouncing the coup?

One explanation will suffice for all these unanswered questions—the GAN, the agreement of the whole bourgeoisie to carry on its exploitation and repression of the workers under a different form of government from a military dictatorship. To this end, the big bourgeoisie and imperialism decided to permit up to a certain point the existence of a bourgeois reformist government—a government that, without altering the foundations of the capitalist system, i.e., private ownership of the means of production, will carry out reforms to deceive the masses and divert them from their real revolutionary objectives.

But it is clear that they still maintain firm control over the key levers of power—the armed forces, the economy, etc.—and will retain that until

the exploited seize it from them by force. They will not give it up because of an election or because of the fear that the popular struggles might arouse in them. They will try by every means possible—deception or repression—to halt the revolutionary advance.

It is for this reason that the Fracción Roja has adopted guerrilla struggle as a strategy for taking power. Its strategic objective is Workers Power and Socialism, that is, the destruction of the bourgeoisie and its repressive forces, the taking of power by the working class and the establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, of the democracy of the workers councils.

Our objective, then, is not limited to struggling against the Military Dictatorship. Nor is it confined to acting as a means for pressuring reformist governments to radicalize.

It was not the existence of the Military Dictatorship that made large sectors of the vanguard take up arms. The dictatorship only sharpened the contradictions already existing in Argentina. The explosive dynamic of the class struggle, the result of the profound crisis in which Argentine capitalism is mired, makes armed struggle an immediate and unavoidable necessity. From this flows the importance of adopting a strategy for taking power through prolonged revolutionary war and to propose and put into practice, together with the workers, the political and organizational elements of this strategy, starting right *now*. The Fracción Roja—which will continue struggling to make it very clear that the Socialist Revolution and Workers Power will only be won by fighting against the system, no matter what form it takes, and by destroying the repressive forces that sustain it—is part of this program.

For all these reasons, any proposal or initiative that goes in the direction of disarming the vanguard militants and organizations or declaring a tactical truce is outright betrayal of the working class. Our fight will go on with ever greater determination side by side with the workers.

*There is no truce in the struggle between the exploiters and the exploited!*

*The banner of the socialist revolution must never be lowered!* □