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CHILE

Mass Executions



Vorster's Police Gun Down Miners

Eleven African miners at the Western Deep Levels gold mine in Carletonville, Western Transvaal, were gunned down by police September 11. Twenty-seven others were wounded and fifteen arrested. The workers were demonstrating for a wage increase.

In the wake of the massacre, Lesotho, the country enclave from which a large number of the 16,000 workers at the Carletonville mine are recruited, suspended further recruitment.

Asked why the police has used bullets against the miners rather than other "riot control" measures, Prime Minister John Vorster said that "all other possible methods" had been used before opening fire—"persuasion, tear-gas grenades, and clubs."

Colonel L.M. Loots, divisional inspector of police for Western Transvaal, was more blunt. Asked to justify the high loss of lives and small extent of property damage, he replied: "Sometimes property means more than lives. Our duty is to protect property and lives, not only lives."

The same day as the Carletonville massacre, police attacked a demonstration of African miners from the West Rand Consolidated Mine in Krugersdorp near Johannesburg. Twenty-five miners were hospitalized, according to the September 14 issue of the Paris daily Le Monde.

"A black life is regarded as being very cheap in South Africa today," said Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of Kawzulu in response to the shootings.

Stanley Uys reported in the September 14 Washington Post that 800 students at the University of Cape Town had passed a resolution "noting that the university's chancellor, Harry Oppenheimer, was also chairman of the Anglo-American Corp., which controls the Western Deep Level mine, and expressing the belief that 'the cause of this disaster is inadequate wages and absence of workers' organization.'"

The resolution called on Oppenheimer to consider resigning as chancellor if he and the Chamber of Mines failed, in Uys's words, "to do their utmost to promote genuine trade unions among all their workers and to raise all workers' wages."

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Political Prisoners Fall Before Firing Squads

By Gerry Foley

Reports now filtering out of Chile point to a slaughter of historic proportions, comparable only to the massacres in Indonesia in 1965 or the atrocities of the Hitlerites.

"An American doctor who was in Santiago during the coup that overthrew Marxist President Salvador Allende said yesterday in this city that anywhere from 5,000 to 25,000 Chileans were executed," the New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario* reported September 24.

"Dr. Philip L. Polakoff said that there was 'widespread massacring of civilians and torturing of prisoners by the junta."

In its September 18 issue, the Italian leftist daily *Il Manifesto* described a savage onslaught on one of the major plants in the industrial suburbs of Santiago:

"The Sumar textile plant was one of the last to surrender after the coup d'etat. Although it was attacked by heavy artillery and bombed from the air, the workers held out until Friday [September 14], for almost five days. When the putschist troops finally entered the shops, bodies were lying all over the floor. (Even the correspondents of the Western press spoke of 500 dead). Then there was a handto-hand struggle inside, a last desperate attempt to hold the factory. Then the survivors were flushed out and taken with their hands in the air to the stadium, together with other workers, teachers, and students who were caught with arms."

Il Manifesto reported a telephone call with a correspondent in Santiago who said: "Now it's practically nothing but a massacre. Thousands of Communists, comrades, workers, have been killed."

Two American graduate students released from an improvised prison in Santiago, Adam and Patricia Schesch, reported, according to a September 23 AP dispatch: "We personally saw the shooting of 400 to 500 prisoners in groups of 30 to 40, at the National Stadium, where we were being held."

Foreigners were singled out for special treatment, Adam Schesch said: "One of their military junta's tactics is a pogrom against foreigners. There have been beatings of Europeans, Latins, and others."

It was evident from every source that the antiforeign pogrom was reaching demented extremes. The fact that the generals were apparently prepared to pay the political and diplomatic cost of the excesses against hundreds if not thousands of foreign nationals indicated that (1) they were ready

Hugo Blanco Reported Offered Asylum in Sweden

We have just received word that Hugo Blanco, the exiled Peruvian revolutionist living in Santiago, has been offered asylum in Sweden. The September 24 issue of the Stockholm daily Aftonbladet reported that Blanco had taken refuge in the Mexican Embassy in Santiago. The Swedish ambassador to Chile. Aftonbladet reported, had "managed to talk the Chilean officers into letting Blanco" travel to Stockholm via Mexico. Blanco is expected to leave Chile "in a few days." The report originated with Aftonbladet representatives in Chile.

to resort to the most savage slaughter, in the Indonesian pattern; (2) they needed a scapegoat for large-scale terror

No foreigners were safe. New York Times correspondent Marvine Howe reported that an American film-maker suddenly disappeared, apparently taken by the military:

"'I don't know why they came,' Mrs. Hormon said in tears. 'Maybe some neighbors denounced us, although we have only been here six days.'

"Mrs. Hormon showed pamphlets that had been distributed in her neighborhood saying 'Chileans, do not be afraid to denounce your foreign neighbors, who have come here to kill Chileans.'"

The fate of many other foreign residents has already created a scandal in Latin America, although it has been barely mentioned in the U.S. press. "Hundreds of Bolivians expelled from Chile arrived in La Paz on Tuesday [September 11]," an AFP dispatch reported in the September 20 Clarin. "They had been exposed to all the inclemencies of weather [the Southern Hemisphere winter in the high Andes] and left without food. Housed in a railway car, women, youths, and children arrived at the La Paz Central Station yesterday completely disoriented. With tears in their eyes, they told about the way they had been sent back to Bolivia."

The junta claimed that the Bolivians had decided "spontaneously" to leave Chile and had not been subjected to "bad treatment."

About a thousand Bolivians were reportedly expelled this way. The La Paz religious station Radio Católica Fides denounced the deportations as "inhuman," according to a UPI dispatch in the September 21 El Diario, because most of them were "humble people, including peasants." Some had lived in Chile for as long as seventeen years.

The embassies in Santiago were packed with foreign political exiles seeking shelter from the xenophobic terror, as well as with Chileans now forced to seek refuge from a military dictatorship in their own country.

"In Santiago as well as the rest of the country, they are shooting down people indiscriminately," Manuel Meijido reported. The correspondent for the prestigious Mexican paper Excelsior fled Chile September 19 and gave this description of the reactionary terror going on in the country to La Razón:

"I have the most direct and reliable information that there is a perfectly well-prepared list of 13,115 foreigners and all the members of the GAP [Grupo de Amigos Personales — Group of

Personal Friends, Allende's guard] and the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left]. . . . All are in effect condemned to death.

"Now the worry of many diplomats and many foreigners in Santiago is how far the extremism of the Junta Militar will go. . . . It is reaching unheard-of lengths. On Monday [September 17], the Argentine Consulate was raided. . . .

"On Friday [September 14] they sent two Carabineros into the home of the Mexican ambassador.... There is no telling how far things will go."

From one report, in particular, it seemed that the military commanders were determined to stage a deliberate slaughter of foreigners, perhaps with the idea that their corpses would support their story about exiled leftists forming a guerrilla army to impose "red terror" on Chile.

This is the way a business correspondent from the Caracas daily El Nacional described the death of a young compatriot in Santiago, according to an Agence France-Presse dispatch in the September 20 Le Monde: "Without giving the reasons for the arrest of Maza Carvajal [a twentytwo-year-old electronics student], the reporter . . . told how the young man was taken to an industrial district to be shot on the spot, in front of workers and students. The commander of the firing squad ordered him to flee: 'You are a foreigner, you are a Venezuelan. You can save yourself.' . . . When he refused, the soldiers dragged him up against a wall and shot him, telling the witnesses that he was an 'example.'"

Reports from recently escaped exiles indicated that the popular-front president himself fell victim to the indiscriminate terror unleashed by the military.

A government press officer, Jorge Uribe, who was in La Moneda when the military attacked, told Siempre reporters in Mexico City: "Allende ran toward a window and fell wounded." Apparently he was cut down by the withering barrage the military directed at the historic building. A member of the GAP who managed to escape with Uribe (he was called just "Ramón") said: "El compañero presidente was in bad shape when the soldiers came in shooting. They finished him off. They kicked the Negro Jorguera,



Chilean army tank patrols streets of Santiago on September 12, the day after the military coup.

who was wounded, in the face, and stomped him to death."

In the same issue of Siempre, León Garcia wrote that troops machine-gunned the entire staff of the MIR magazine Punto Final in their offices, as well as the journalists of the Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina.

Furthermore, even the New York Times report on the 7,000 prisoners the junta admits it is holding in the National Stadium in Santiago shows that the repression has extended to relatively broad layers of the population.

"About 150 Chilean and foreign newsmen were taken on a tour of the National Stadium today and shown some 800 of the prisoners at a distance," Howe reported from Santiago September 22. "The newsmen were allowed to shout questions at the prisoners sunning themselves in the bleachers behind an iron barricade but could not converse with them. The prisoners appeared to come mostly from the working class.

"Asked if they were Communists or Socialists, several answered simply, 'We are workers.'" In this context, the junta's recent moves to block all paths of escape for the bulk of the estimated 14,000 political refugees in the country are an ominous sign of its intentions, not only toward the exiles but toward the Chilean people. On September 23, the dictatorship announced that it would no longer honor safe-conduct passes out of the country granted by foreign embassies. Furthermore, persons who have taken refuge in embassies that do not have treaties of asylum with Chile will no longer be allowed to transfer to embassies that do.

In a September 23 dispatch, Marvine Howe reported a senior embassy official as saying:

"There's been a definite hardening of the junta on the question of political asylum in the past few days."

If the junta's determination to eliminate the left-wing exiles gathered in Chile has been "hardening" in the last few days, when the world outcry against the savage repression has been growing, this can only be the result of behind-the-scenes encouragement from the other Latin American regimes and, most importantly, the United States. The only objective can

be to seize the occasion to deal a lasting blow to the entire Latin American left.

Therefore, the attempts in various countries to start a campaign on behalf of the victims of the terror assume special importance.

In the United States a newly formed Chile Emergency Committee (135 W. 4 St., N.Y., N.Y. 10012) has put the blame for the coup squarely on the United States and demanded that Washington stop the terror unleashed by its carefully trained and nurtured hangmen. In a full-page statement in the September 23 New York Times, the committee said:

"In this year of the 25th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we appeal to all peoples to intercede for the welfare of those persons endangered by the military regime in Chile.

"We specially appeal to the governments of Argentina and Peru to offer full asylum to all persons seeking refuge from Chile; we appeal to the Mexican government to broaden its offer of asylum to include the foreign political exiles residing in Chile.

"We appeal to the United Nations to guarantee the human rights of all persons in Chile, especially political prisoners and foreign exiles.

"We appeal to the Congress of the United States to use every means at its disposal to repudiate the military junta; to assure the safety of the foreign exiles residing in Chile; to refuse all economic and military assistance appropriations; and to investigate charges of U.S. involvement in the coup."

The statement was signed by a broad range of supporters, from Congresswoman Bella Abzug to the writer José Yglesias.

In the September 20 Le Monde, Jean-Marie Domenach compared Chile to Spain of the 1930s. It was a test. "A refusal to help or simply look at what is happening would be signs of a weakening of our conscience and our vital forces."

Some more days at least will probably have to pass before the full extent of the reactionary terror in Chile can be ascertained definitely. But there are already indications that the objectives of the generals and their backers in Washington may have been more ambitious than any observers at first suspected. The United States

and Latin American capitalist regimes may have conspired to turn what the Stalinist and Social Democratic reformists believed could be the showcase of the "peaceful road to socialism" into the slaughterhouse of the Latin American left and an "example" of defeat and devastation that could intimidate the radicalizing masses not only in the countries of the "Southern Cone" but throughout the world.

The generals sealed off the country while they carried out their butchery. Correspondents were kept off the streets under pain of being shot on the spot. The airports were closed. A tight censorship screened all the news on wire services.

Most of the representatives of the Latin American and world press who went to cover the coup were kept bottled up in Argentine border towns for about a week after the event.

According to an Efe dispatch from Mendoza in the September 13 issue of the Barcelona daily La Vanguardia Española, the Argentine authorities took rather extensive measures to close the border:

"The Argentine police have established a fifty-kilometer no-man's-land along the frontier with Chile and stated this afternoon that anyone crossing this line with arms in hand would be shot on the spot."

Furthermore, the Argentine authorities offered their facilities to another power interested in the coup in Chile, according to Juan Manuel Francia in the September 20 issue of the Buenos Aires weekly *Panorama*: "Reliable sources informed *Panorama* that thirty-two combat and reconnaissance planes from the United States landed in El Plumerillo on September 7, of which fifteen flew back to their bases in the afternoon of Wednesday, September 13."

With the coup barely two weeks old, there were already rumors of a split in the bourgeois political world and even in the armed forces over how to proceed to "restore discipline."

"According to the Venezuelan daily Ultimas Noticias, the ex-president of the Christian Democratic party, Renán Fuentealba, and his colleague Rodomiro Tomic, the leader of the left wing of the party, are under arrest," the Buenos Aires daily Clarin reported September 21. "The Christian Democrats expressed their support imme-

diately for the authorities that emerged from the coup d'etat. The Christian Democratic standard-bearer in the last elections [Tomic] had protested strongly against this position."

In Panorama, Francia wrote: "The Christian Democratic party seems already shaken. It was former deputy Bernardo Leighton who offered a plea of habeas corpus on behalf of the jailed ministers. Leighton, Radomiro Tomic, and Renán Fuentealba-the three ex-presidents of the Christian Democratic party-voted their disapproval when the party came out with the document demanding the resignation of all the authorities elected by popular suffrage. Nine other Christian Democratic leaders joined with them in a motion that called for resuming the dialogue with the Allende government."

Fuentealba was one of the most outspoken partisans of the tactic of wearing down the Allende government by forcing it slowly to retreat. In this way, the leader of the Christian Democratic liberal wing argued, the supporters of the UP would become gradually disillusioned and fall back into passivity. And then, with the working class demobilized, the bourgeois parliament could return to business as usual. The Christian Democrats could then maneuver with the Communist and Socialist parties to produce a "progressive" governmental formula that would be attractive to the workers without encouraging them to engage in any "adventures."

Shortly before the Allende government was toppled, there were reports that the Fuentealba wing of the Christian Democrats and the UP had agreed on a formula that offered a peaceful way out of the increasing polarization of class political forces in the country. The UP was said to have agreed to support Tomic for president in 1976 as the head of a new, enlarged coalition for national unity and progress.

The radicalization of the working class and the poor, however, was apparently too deep and too rapid for the decisive sectors of the bourgeoisie to be willing to wait for a longerrun peaceful solution. And once the bourgeoisie opted for a military takeover, the most ruthless elements inevitably came to the fore, and they presumably were not unwilling to apply coercion also against the waver-

ing elements within their own bloc. Within the junta itself, most reports gave a primary role in the coup to General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán, who according to an AP dispatch in the September 21 El Diario is linked to the southern landholding interests and is determined to establish a long-term military dictatorship. General Pinochet, the nominal head of the junta, according to the same report sympathizes with the Christian Democrats.

The only newspapers allowed to publish in the first days after the coup were the rightist El Mercurio and La Tercera de la Hora. "The Christian Democratic paper La Prensa appeared today for the first time," a correspondent for the Milan daily Corriere della Sera reported from Santiago September 20. "It ran gaping white spaces, replacing the comments that evidently did not meet with the censors' approval."

According to the September 19 Le Monde, the strident El Mercurio, which constantly accused the Allende government of violating the freedom of the press (a charge that was taken up by the Inter-American Press Association, which listed Chile in its year-end report for 1972 as a country where the freedom of the press was increasingly threatened), printed lists of the names and addresses of "wanted Marxists"—presumably as a public service. Some other bourgeois institutions as well rose to the occasion. "According to good sources," the same report said, "a medical college in Santiago also drew up lists of some colleagues with the following recommendations: 'Drop from membership,' 'Arrest,' 'Shoot.'

Once it set out to bring the working class back under control, the military evidently had to impose harsh discipline on some of the most fervent petty-bourgeois supporters of the coup. "Most merchants who had been selling under the table at black-market rates have reduced their prices, sometimes by 50 percent or even two-thirds in order to conform to ceilings imposed by the junta," *Le Monde* reported September 21. "This speedy compliance followed rumors that three merchants had been executed for illegal profiteering."

In short, in order to be able to play a demagogic game in the present conditions in Chile, the military has had to show its determination to use



Chilean riot cops in action. When tear gas proved insufficient, artillery and bombs were called in.

ruthless force. By demonstrating extreme cruelty in some instances, moreover, it can afford to make reassuring gestures of liberality in others. For example, when the junta announced that males were forbidden to wear long hair and females pants, these being the mark of "extremists," the youths flocked to the barber shops, forming long lines outside. When the government announced later that it wouldn't consider doing anything so foolish as dictating dress codes, the lines didn't get any shorter.

In the face of continuing resistance to the coup and the white terror, the military seemed to have decided to play its ruthless arbiter's game for an extended period. First of all, in order apparently to free its hands, it dissolved the fascist terrorist organization Patria y Libertad [Fatherland and Freedom] on September 16.

Next, the military sought to establish its position as a kind of supreme judge standing above politics.

"The junta has shown increasing signs that it expects a lengthy tenure in office and envisages a permanent role for the armed forces in the government," New York Times correspondent Jonathan Kandell wired from Santiago September 21.

"Congress has been suspended indefinitely since the day of the coup and today a Government spokesman said that even non-Marxist political parties would soon be placed in 'indefinite recess.'

"'The main function of the parties is in Congress anyway,' said the official. 'There will be no need for political reunions [meetings] or party gatherings, and demonstrations are already forbidden.'"

The first week and a half after the coup was marked by the military's attempts to establish itself as a benevolent despot dealing "justly but firmly" with all sections of the "nation."

Admiral Toribio Merino announced in Valparaiso September 19 that a "white book" was being prepared that would list all the "crooked dealings" of the Allende regime. He pledged, according to the September 20 Clarin, that "incredible things will appear in

its pages. He said, comparing himself to the 'grafters' of the constitutional government, that in forty-five years service in the navy he had only been able to acquire a 1960 model car, an old house, and about 15,000 escudos (approximately US\$50) in savings.

"Holding up this probity for emulation, the admiral called on Chileans to initiate an 'era of sacrifice' because — he said — the country's economy had been thrown out of kilter." According to the September 21 Clarin, the admiral announced that the country had been "plundered by thieves." This campaign went hand in hand with reports that the military authorities were finding hoards of currency and food at the headquarters of the left parties and in the homes of left leaders."

The demagogy of the military was obvious. But the bureaucratism of the ousted reformist government and especially of the Communist party threatened to give it some force. The Chilean rightists, who have shown so much interest in the example of Indonesia, would not be unaware that resentments against the bureaucratic privileges and the opportunism of the Communist party among layers of the poor helped to fuel the massive pogroms that followed the 1965 coup.

As for its economic program, the junta has said that it intends to solve the problems that exist by "increasing productivity." According to the September 21 Clarín, the new minister of commerce, General Rolando González, has assigned a team of experts to study ways of getting the economic life of the country back onto the basis of "liberal principles."

At the same time, Clarin noted, "The junta has promised that the legal situation of the factories taken over by the state and workers under the previous administration will be studied carefully and with the help of experts. González, for his part, gave assurances that the participation of the workers in directing and managing the factories would be maintained. As for the agrarian reform, official sources offered no specifics. But the impression was that the advances made in the last ten years would be maintained."

The managers of the state factories, however, some of whom were elected by the workers, were told to relinquish their posts to military appointees, and were threatened with trial before a military tribunal if they did not do so.

A statement by Pinochet that all economic measures would be strictly according to the law was interpreted by *Clarin* to mean that "the plants whose status was disputed may be returned to their former owners," which, in fact, is more or less what the CP former minister Millas called for but was unable to get the workers to accept.

So far the measure that has probably most directly affected the workers is the abolition of the state distribution agency and the JAPs [Juntas de Abastecimiento y Precios—Supply and Price Control Boards], the neighborhood groups that assured equitable

form of price control (which obviously cannot be maintained for very long).

As for the petty bourgeoisie, who formed the mass base for the campaign against the Allende regime, it is not clear what effect the junta's economic measures have had on them. They may, in fact, be impressed by the dramatic drop in prices the junta has achieved by methods "the Marxist tyrant" would never have dared use. But it will not be long before it is apparent that military terror cannot solve the profound deficiencies of the economy.

In the case of the workers, it is not very likely that the junta's demagogy has won many "hearts and minds."



A demonstrator murdered by the white terror. One of thousands.

distribution of necessities and prevented price gouging. They were especially hated by the merchants and by the poor petty bourgeoisie, who resented the fact that because of better organization the workers' neighborhoods had a better supply of the necessities. The JAPs, undoubtedly, were also obnoxious to the military because they were one of the most widespread forms of organization in the working class areas and potentially a very powerful form of direct economic democracy. It was apparently to compensate for the elimination of the JAPs that the military imposed its despotic

It could not very well denounce the previous regime as a Marxist cancer destroying the country and at the same time convince anyone that it intended to preserve the achievements of the popular-front government. Moreover, it did not exactly come in like a benefactor with its massive terror bombings and strafings of public buildings, factories, and working-class neighborhoods. Nor presumably was the patriotism of the rightists who announced "if we have to destroy Chile to save it, we will do so," very convincing to the layers of the population that supported the popular front.

World Protest Mounts Against Chile Coup

The New Zealand Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners, which is sponsored by a wide range of individuals and organizations, issued a statement September 13 denouncing the military coup in Chile. The statement said in part:

"The NZLA Justice Committee calls on the New Zealand Government to denounce this abrogation of basic democratic rights. We demand the release of all those arrested by the military junta, and full political and civil rights in Chile, and the bringing to justice of the generals responsible for the murdering of President Allende and those others who have died as a result of this coup."

A statement denouncing the coup and calling on all supporters of civil liberties "to vigorously protest the mounting wave of repression in Chile" was issued September 13 by the United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA).

In the statement, USLA drew special attention to the fate of the thousands of political refugees who had been granted asylum in Chile by the Allende regime. It pointed out that public protests in defense of political prisoners in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and other Latin American countries had won victories for human rights, and urged all North Americans to take immediate action to defend democratic rights in Chile. USLA called for immediate protest demonstrations at Chilean embassies, consulates, and trade offices and for telegrams of protest to the Chilean ambassador. The statement ended with the slogans: End the terror of the Chilean military dictatorship! Stop the arrests and the reprisals! Hands off the political refugees! Free all Chilean political prisoners!

A letter issued by USLA September 18 gave further information on the situation of the political prisoners in Chile. It referred to Minister of the Interior General Oscar Bonilla's statement that "the armed forces overthrew the Marxist government of Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens because more

than 10,000 'extremists' from other countries had entered Chile," and pointed out that 10,000 to 15,000 political exiles are facing the main brunt of the repression. "If deported, these exiles face certain jailing, torture and perhaps even death at the hands of the regimes they fled," continued the letter.

USLA urged its supporters throughout the U.S., who had already responded to the emergency campaign with demonstrations, press conferences, and protest meetings, to prepare for a prolonged campaign to defend the victims of repression in Chile. As an initial focus, USLA proposed that signatures of prominent individuals and organizations be obtained for telegrams to General Pinochet, demanding information on the whereabouts of and guarantees for the physical safety of the following individuals who were resident in Chile: Carlos Altamirano, secretary-general of the Chilean Socialist party; Pedro Enriquez, lawyer for the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria - Movement of the Revolutionary Left | Pablo Neruda, Chilean poet; Hugo Blanco, Peruvian revolutionist and peasant leader; Theotonio dos Santos, Brazilian economist; Ruy Mauro Marini, Brazilian political scientist; Ernani Maria Fiori, Brazilian philosopher; Mario Pedrosa, Brazilian art and social critic; Walter Achugar, Uruguayan radical film distributor; Gustavo Berghart, Uruguayan director of Latin American studies at the Sorbonne; Elsa Peñavda Hernández. widow of Dominican revolutionist Homero Hernandez; Juan José Torres, former president of Bolivia, and Juan Lechin, Bolivian trade union leader.

In Britain on September 16 more than 5,000 persons marched through London to the Chilean Embassy to protest the military coup. The demonstration, organized by Liberation (formerly the Movement for Colonial Freedom) demanded that the British government sever all ties with the new regime and refuse to grant it recognition.

Participants included the Communist party, the Labour party, the Young Communist League, the Labour party Young Socialists, the International Marxist Group (IMG — British section of the Fourth International), the International Socialists, numerous trade-union branches and trades councils, as well as large numbers of Chileans and other Latin Americans.

The previous evening more than 300 persons attended a public forum on Chile called by the IMG. Tariq Ali and Robin Blackburn analyzed the causes of the defeat suffered by the Chilean people at the hands of the military.

Calls on the Tory government to refuse recognition to the army junta in Chile and to cut off all economic relations with Chile have come from many quarters in Britain. Labour Weekly, official newspaper of the Labour party, ran front-page banner headlines in its September 14 issue demanding: "'No' to U.K. ties with Chile." Ron Hayward, the party's general secretary, asked the Parliamentary Labour party to press the British government not to recognize the military regime and to suspend all economic aid to Chile. Hayward continued:

"It is difficult to express the sense of horror and anger which the British Labour movement feels as the aspirations of the working people of Chile, shared by so many others around the world, have been destroyed at the hands of a few arrogant and ignorant officers acting at the behest of those who believe that their right to rule is unchallengeable. The tragedy of Chile has implications for all of us who are intent on restructuring society, whether in Latin America or in Europe."

Labour party National Executive Committee member Judith Hart M. P. was among the speakers at the September 16 rally. But party leader Harold Wilson has maintained total silence on the events in Chile.

Demonstrations also took place in many other cities, including Manchester, Glasgow, and Birmingham. Plans are being made to step up the campaign to prevent any attempt by the Tory government at collaboration with the Chilean generals, and to ensure that political asylum be granted to Chilean workers and revolutionists fleeing the terror in Chile.

Was Allende's Chile Socialist?

[The following article was published in the August 30-September 7 issue of Avanzada Socialista, weekly newspaper of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party), just prior to the Chilean military coup that overthrew the Popular Unity regime of Salvador Allende. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.

The workers are all wondering if what Chile has is socialism. This is a regime of tremendous political instability, in which the masses have been exposed for three years to the danger of a reactionary coup of the worst kind, capable of sweeping away with a stroke of the pen the colossal but fragile gains won under the Allende government; this is a regime in which the masses appear to be at the mercy of the "legalistic" goodwill of the military, for they lack powerful political and defense organizations of their own.

This is a regime in which the bourgeoisie retains ownership of most of the factories and means of distribution and through them continues to exploit the workers. This is a regime in which the military forcibly ejects the most combative workers and starving peasants from the factories and lands that they have occupied, a regime that subjects the masses to hardships comparable to those of previous oligarchic and imperialist governments. This is a regime in which the parliament, the supreme court, and key administrative posts are in the hands of the bourgeoisie and in which an oligarchical-imperialist constitution remains in force. Is this regime socialist?

Myth of the 'Chilean Way'

The bourgeoisie and imperialism on the one hand, and the reformist coalition of the ruling Unidad Popular [Popular Unity] on the other, both agree that the regime is socialist. The bourgeoisie does this in order to cast socialism and Marxism in a bad light; the reformists, and especially the Communist party—the main force in the government—do so in order to show the validity of their theory of a peaceful road to socialism, by stages—a "Chilean way."

We must categorically deny this view, which only sows confusion. What defines socialism is political power in the hands of the masseswhereby the bourgeois army is disarmed and the workers are armed; and economic power also in the hands and under the control of the masses whereby the sources of wealth and the means of distribution are expropriated and the economy as a whole planned. At the head of these accomplishments must be a workers and people's or peasants government, supported by the big mass organizations (like the soviets in Russia) through which the workers exercise power, by means of a direct democracy that is much superior to that of a bourgeois parliamentary system.

This is not what is occurring in Chile. True, the masses have taken enormous strides forward, forcing the reactionary and military forces three vears ago to accept a program of nationalizations, partial expropriasocial improvements, tions. democratic concessions. With the development of the cordones indus-[bodies of representatives of workers in a particular industrial areal, it is possible that there are incipient forms of organizations similar to the soviets in Russia. And there are minority revolutionary movements that are calling for arming the masses and have begun to carry out political propaganda among the soldiers. But these economic and political advances are being held back by the Unidad Popular government itself, which emphatically says that "the masses must not be armed."

Example of a Revolution ary Leadership

There was a stage following the 1917 socialist revolution in Russia during which the situation became desperate. The country was devastated by civil war, and hunger reached intolerable dimensions. At that point Lenin, in order to get economic development going, proposed making certain concessions to the bourgeoisie.

He spoke to the workers and explained that the New Economic Policy was a necessary evil, full of dangers, that involved taking one step backwards in order to be able later to take two steps forwards, and that at that point more than ever the workers soviets had to be kept on a struggle footing. Lenin made all these warnings at a time when the tsarist army had been disarmed and the proletariat armed, when the old tsarist state apparatus had been completely dismantled and replaced by a new workers state, and when the masses were organized on a large scale into armed

Just compare the words of the great Russian revolutionist with the confusion-ridden frauds of the Chilean reformists!

While Lenin said that "the only guarantee of the revolution is the worker with a rifle in his hands," the Chilean Communist party says that "the interests of the developing revolutionary process are not in conflict with the existence of professional armed forces in our country that operate on the basis of the constitution."* This is the pretext the reformists use not to arm the masses by carrying out Leninist work in the armed forces. And not only this, but they also call on the military outright to co-govern.

Even in Absence of a Workers and Socialist Government, Defend Allende Against a Reactionary Coup

Neither the guns of the reactionary forces, nor the exploitative and

^{*}Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chilean Communist party, August 12, 1973, published in the daily El Siglo. The CP's policy of calling on the masses to place faith in the army is characteristic of the Communists not only in Chile. During the Torres period in Bolivia they did the same thing with regard to the Bolivian army, and now they are also doing it in Peru. This flows directly from a reformist policy of the CP, and not from any special characteristics of the Chilean military.

hunger-producing bourgeoisie; and neither imperialism, which plunders Chile, nor the reformists, who waver from one side to the other, are following any "Chilean way." The former speak the universal language of counterrevolution, while the reformists mumble the equally universal language, called Menshevism in Russia, that leads toward turning the masses, unarmed and defenseless, over to the counterrevolution.

Socialism will be achieved in Chile; of that there need be no doubt. But it will be arrived at, not through this "Chilean way" of the modern Mensheviks, but through the universal language of revolution, by breaking up the armed forces of the reactionaries, by expropriating the oligarchy, imperialism, and all the exploiters, by planning the economy under the direct

control of the workers, and by relying for support on the "worker with the rifle in his hands."

This does not mean that we now join the bourgeois reactionary, and fascist organizations that, starting by overturning the government, hope to crush the masses.

As long as the workers, while developing their own independent organizations (among which the main one is a revolutionary party like that of Lenin and Trotsky), are not able to overcome the reformist government and impose a workers and peasants government, it is obligatory to defend the reformist government of Allende against a reactionary and fascist coup. For while it is possible for the forces of reaction to destroy reformism, it is not yet possible for the revolution to do so.

mediate payment of salaries; recognition of the provisional committee and the affiliation with SMATA; and guarantees that there would be no reprisals by the bosses. Eighty hostages were held inside the plant, among them executives and members of the board of directors.

The entire automobile workers movement in Córdoba, the students, and the organizations of the revolu-



RUCCI: Fiat workers hit him hard.

Struggle Ends After Four Days

Cordoba Workers Occupy Fiat Plant

[The following report of the occupation of a Fiat factory in Córdoba, Argentina, near the end of August was published in the August 30-September 7 issue of Avanzada Socialista, the weekly newspaper of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST — Socialist Workers party). The translation is by Intercontinental Press.

The confrontation between the Fiat workers in Córdoba and the tradeunion bureaucracy does not date from yesterday. Ever since a class-struggle leadership arose in SITRAC [Sindicato de Trabajadores Concord - Concord Workers Union and SITRAM Sindicato de Trabajadores Materfer — Materfer Workers Union], the workers have ceased to put up with the preponderance of the bureaucrats. The military dictatorship, the bosses, and [José] Rucci [head of the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo-General Confederation of Labor)] this class-struggle leadattacked ership mercilessly. Their unions were banned at bayonet point. San Sebastián, minister of labor under Levingston and

decreed that the Materfer and Concord workers had to join the Unión Obrera Metalúrgica [UOM—Metallurgical Workers Union]. This is being continued under the Peronist government and labor minister Otero.

But the workers want to be affiliated with SMATA [Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor del Automóvil — Union of Automotive Machinists and Allied Trades] — a union that, unlike the UOM, has a class-struggle, combative leadership in Córdoba. Up to now, the resistance of the Materfer and Concord workers has prevented the UOM bureaucrats and goons from consolidating an organization in those plants.

The occupation of the Fiat Concord plant on August 21 represented a big step forward in this process. The sparks that set off the explosion of worker indignation were the nonpayment of wages at the middle of the month, and the statement from the UOM indicating that 1,800 workers had voted in the elections it organized, whereas in reality not even 300 had done so.

Thus a general assembly was called in which it was decided to take over the plant, making three demands: imtionary left mobilized in support of the Concord workers. What follows is a chronicle of the occupation and of this moving expression of solidarity.

First Day of Occupation

All the SMATA factories are abandoned at 2:00 p.m. and 6:00p.m.; Grandes Motores Diesel [GMD—Big Diesel Engines], which is a subsidiary of Fiat, does not even begin work because of the failure to meet the payroll. There are work stoppages in the automobile outlets. In the afternoon, the sixty companeros of the Delegate Corps at IKA (Santa Isabel) quit work and come to Concord.

At 7:00 p.m., two minibusloads of students arrive. A delegation of the PST and the JSA [Juventud Socialista de Avanzada—Vanguard Socialist Youth] also arrives at Concord with banners and placards. The Perkins

workers on both shifts quit work; the afternoon shift arrives at the Concord gates with a big sign that says "Perkins Is Here." They receive the biggest applause from the Concord workers.

Second Day of Occupation

Early in the morning the police put up a barrier of armored cars and patrol cars and prevent anyone from getting near the plant. Relatives who bring food cannot get through. At 10:00 our vice-presidential candidate, Compañero Páez, arrives and is arrested by the police. Compañero Gregorio Flores vigorously denounces this act of repression over a megaphone.

At noon, 300 workers from Perkins march on Concord. Pressure begins to be exerted on the police, with some hand-to-hand struggling taking place. One officer says, "One has to know how to lose," and shoots his tear gas pistol from an armored car. It is a signal for a retreat. The barrier has been penetrated. Everyone rushes toward the factory fence and gates.

The SMATA Delegate Corps again decides to stage a two-hour work stoppage per shift that is to be observed in all the plants. Within the student movement, the Juventud Socialista de Avanzada stands out as an agitator for solidarity actions with Concord.

It is August 22. The CGT has called a meeting in honor of the Trelew martyrs. Our party and youth group, Socialist Groups, the Revolutionary Socialists, Acción Proletaria [Proletarian Action], and rank-and-file sectors of the Peronist movement attempt to link the meeting to solidarity with Concord. First there is a march on the legislative building, and from there it proceeds to Concord. It is led by the PST and the JSA. Upon reaching Plaza Velez Sarsfield, more than twenty minibuses are "taken" and, filled to capacity, they leave for Ferreyra. Once again, faced with the assault of 1,500 compañeros, the police pull back in disorganized fashion and retreat. Chants resound: "Let's get rid of the union bureaucracy" and "SMATA, right on; hit Rucci hard."

Minutes earlier, Compañero Páez had arrived at Concord after just being released; at the request of the workers, he speaks. When the demonstration arrives, he welcomes it on behalf of the compañeros of the Concord Commission. The first thing he does is pay homage to those who died at Trelew.

Next a compañero from the Commission speaks. He expresses thanks for the solidarity, joins in paying respects for Trelew, and denounces [Governor] Atilio López, who is proposing negotiations on the basis of firing twenty militants named by the bosses and ending the occupation. Then, Salamanca, general secretary of SMATA, says: "Atilio López and Tosco [head



PAEZ: Arrested during August take-over of Fiat plant in Cordoba.

of the union of gas and electric power workers] must say where they stand. SMATA has already taken a stand, for in this case there can be no doubt: Either you are for the workers or you are for the bosses."

Other speakers follow. Flores points out that López does not deserve the confidence that the Córdoba workers movement has placed in him. Rubén Regnone of the Materfer Commission expresses solidarity and says that the armed thugs of the UOM and the plainclothes police who are loose in that plant have prevented any concrete measures of support for Concord from being taken.

All night long on the other side of the gates a bonfire is burning. Therevolutionary songs that are sung there testify to the continuing sense of solidarity.

Third Day of Occupation

At noon, more than 1,000 workers from GMD, Perkins, and Thompson Ramco again break through the police barrier and reach Concord. The plant sirens are blown to welcome them; various speeches are made. Then minibuses and trucks on Route 9 are "expropriated," and there is a march to Kaiser Santa Isabel, where a rally of 8,000 workers from both shifts is held. Salamanca calls for solidarity with Concord, and says: "López told me vesterday that he doubted that 10,000 auto workers would support the compañeros. We must show him that this support does exist."

His words are greeted with thunderous applause. A caravan of 5,000 workers marches toward the governor's office. From there 3,000 go on to Ferreyra. As the caravan goes past the bullpen, the police attack with gas and bullets: The demonstration disperses, and only small groups reach Concord.

During the night, the police reinforce their barriers.

Fourth Day of Occupation

The Concord workers are in high spirits and in a mood for struggle. More than 1,000 workers gather in a general assembly in the morning. Salamanca and the Commission report on the negotiations: The company agrees that it will pay what it owes and not take reprisals; the provincial government agrees to arrange a meeting with the minister of labor to discuss the question of union affiliation.

In a completely disciplined fashion, a vote is taken to end the occupation. And thus closes another episode in the heroic struggle of the Córdoba workers movement, which can take pride in having fought a battlewell.

Blame It on Storks?

The Sri Lanka Ministry of Education, which is firmly opposed to sex education in the schools, is reportedly trying to work out a way of making children "aware of population problems" without at the same time violating its own taboo.

French Government Fails to Demoralize Lip Workers

By S. Triton

[The struggle of the workers of the Lip watch factory in Besançon to prevent dismantling of the plant and massive layoffs was not crushed by the police invasion of the plant on August 14. (See Intercontinental Press, September 17, p. 1011.) While the workers lost control of the factory, which they had been operating for nearly two months, they have maintained their movement and are continuing to get support from workers all across France.

[When the police retook the factory, the government moved the conflict into a stage of drawn-out negotiations with strikers' representatives, apparently hoping that the workers would become exhausted and would finally accept a "settlement" involving extensive layoffs and partial dismantlement of the plant.

So far, this has not worked. Central in keeping up the workers' morale and in holding the government back from further repression has been the national solidarity movement. The major target date of this movement is September 29, when a nationwide march on Besançon is scheduled, a march that the bureaucrats of the Communist party-dominated CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail -General Confederation of Labor) are proving reluctant to build. The following article on the state of the negotiations and of the September 29 march appeared in the September 14 issue of Rouge, French Trotskyist weekly. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.

SEPTEMBER 11 — At last, that does it. The regime has found a way to rid itself of the Lip conflict. Having driven the workers out of the factory, it now hopes to drive them out of the heads of millions of other workers. Day after day, on the airwaves and in the papers, the poison of negotiation is being spread.

Saturday [September 8] the negoti-

ating session was longer than usual, and already people began to shout victory: "The Lip Conflict Is Well in Hand," "Decisive Meeting Today," shrieked the headlines. In short, everything is set up so that each worker watching television or listening to the radio will be convinced that the Lip affair will be settled very soon and that there are just a few remaining details to be ironed out.

In reality, Giraud [the government-appointed "emissary" to the Lip workers] is pulling off a giant hustle. He wants to give the impression that he's negotiating in good faith. "I took a step toward the workers so that they in turn could take a step toward me, unless they want to look unreasonable," he says. To the question of No Dismantling, he answered with judicial slickness: It's always possible that one employer who sells out to other companies may raise enough French capital to replace the Swiss capital of Ebauches S. A.

As for the question of layoffs, he had up to now deliberately been vague. At one point he declared that his dearest wish was that everyone should have a job; at another he said that there would be no layoffs, only to assert a few minutes later that there would be. And now he announces that 325 persons will not be rehired! Such is the "good faith" of this baby-faced negotiator - a miserable hypocrite who is in fact nothing but a puppet of the regime whose changing promises are most doubtful. He claims in newspaper interviews that Charbonnel [the minister of scientific and economic development has given him a free hand; but everyone knows that he must give his masters regular reports.

During all these negotiations, the Lip workers have held to their goals: no layoffs, no dismantling. But it is clear that on the question of dismantlement, the discussion has gotten more and more complex. It has gotten to the point where only judges and lawyers can follow what is going on. The re-

sult has been that more and more it is trade-union officials and lawyers who are negotiating rather than the representatives of the strikers themselves. At the general assembly on Monday [September 10] it was said: "We, we simple workers, often do not understand the judicial formulas; fortunately, we have the federation representatives."

There is therefore a real danger that the strikers will not fully understand the judicial formulas proposed and that they will not see all their consequences. All the more so since it appears that Giraud is quite well informed about what is going on among the strikers, even at Arc-et-Senans [site of the negotiations].

That is why, against those who are speaking at every turn of "great steps forward" and "final negotiations," it must be made clear that up to now the decisive problem of maintaining the gains already won has not even been broached. Giraud's most recent statements show that he is not ready to give in without pain and misgiving. The main points still remain to be discussed. Even the possibility of reaching an agreement is not yet achieved. And a breakdown in the negotiations cannot be ruled out either. That is what was reported at yesterday's general assembly.

The only guarantee of success is the mobilization of the Lip workers and the extension of solidarity on a national scale.

The Lip workers know this. This Tuesday [September 11] many of them accompanied their negotiators to Salines d'Arc-et-Senans. Every half hour, one of the members of the delegation came outside to report on the state of the negotiations. The workers know that only by acting themselves will they achieve victory.

An enormous effort is being made to popularize the struggle. The third number of *Radio-Lip*, the cassette-recorded news bulletin put out by the strikers, has just come out. It is available on request from the Jean-Zay

factory in Besançon. [Jean-Zay is a local school in whose gymnasium the Lip workers are continuing to produce watches to support themselves.] Lip-Unité is more than ever playing its role as a strike newspaper. It now has a press run of 30,000 copies, and it is further reproduced by the thousands by local solidarity committees and trade unions. Just in the past two weeks, ninety information and solidarity meetings have been held throughout France, with Lip workers present.

But more must be done. Action must be taken to mobilize the energies of the whole working class.

The September 7 Paris meeting at the Invalides was openly sabotaged by the leaders of the trade-union federations [see following article]. It came off as a miserable little thing compared to what the solidarity movement needs.

Far from discouraging the strikers, the September 7 action only strengthened their determination to assure the success of the planned march on Besançon. For it is clear that this march is the only thing that can constitute a suitable objective for the solidarity movement.

Viewed as a gathering of the Larzac type [a national convergence in support of the peasant struggle in Larzac], the September 29 action will be for all workers in struggle (and will not be, as the September 11 l'Humanité suggested, merely a "regional demonstration"). The proposal to hold the September 29 march some six miles outside Besançon was rejected. Everything is planned to take place in the city itself; there will be assembly points in various places, if possible, and then a central rally.

Not all the organizing details have been set yet. That is why there is a big job of preparation to be done in Besançon. Yesterday, during a working session, eleven commissions were set up and assigned to various tasks: an assembly commission to find good spots, others to manage parking, traffic, provisioning, materials, stands, housing, reception, first-aid, the sound system, the platform, entertainment, popularization, child care.

But it is not only the Lip workers who are mobilized for this technical preparation. A call has gone out to everyone in the region who can lend a hand. The electrical workers will help with the sound system, child-care workers are coming in, hospital employees for first-aid.

The September 29 day of action can be a demonstration such as has not been seen for a long time: a gathering assuring the participation of all workers in struggle; not some slipshod parade or traditional meeting, but a convergence of tens of thousands of demonstrators in Besançon, where today beats the very pulse of the working class.

The task of revolutionists is to make September 29 a success. But already there are grounds to fear that the union leadership will not do the job. Already, local sections of the CGT that have telephoned Besançon have been told that it was not that necessary to show up on September 29.

The march on Besançon is thus also a fight against silence and passivity. The Lip workers have put out a national call. Since yesterday, though, radio stations have been boycotting the news or pretending that it is only a regional demonstration that is being planned.

That is why each worker, without being taken in by soporific or lying declarations, must now begin preparing for this march. There are a thousand ways to do this. Just as much imagination must be shown in the solidarity movement as the Lip workers have shown in their struggle.

There must be discussions on the September 29 action in every union local, meetings to listen to Radio-Lip, mimeographing and massive distribution of Lip-Unité, massive leafletings announcing the date of the march, and careful preparation for the action itself: car caravans, collective train tickets, signing up volunteers, and so on.

More than ever: All for Lip and Lip for all! \Box

The September 7 Action in Paris

How Bureaucrats Sabotage Lip Solidarity Movement

[The leaders of the Communist party, the Socialist party, the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor], and the CFDT [Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor] have been systematically downplaying, and even sabotaging, the movement of solidarity with the Lip workers.

[One example of sabotage was provided by a solidarity action held September 7 in Paris. The following article, describing the preparation for the action, appeared in the September 14 issue of the French Trotskyistweekly, Rouge. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]

September 7 in Paris. About ten thousand people were there. Fewer than at the demonstration in Besançon. The preparation for the demonstration was sabotaged by the very people who were supposed to be organizing it.

Even though the Lip strike enjoys extraordinary solidarity from the whole working class, everything was done to limit the size of the Paris demonstration. First of all, the place: at the Invalides, in an isolated area in Paris. And the time: at 5:30 p.m., which prevented thousands of workers from going to it, since no instructions to stop work had been issued. And the day: exactly in the middle of two actions that had been planned for a long time, Séguy's meeting at the Palais des Sports and the festival of l'Humanité [Communist party daily newspaper].

And the form of the action: a meeting, not a demonstration. The preparation: announced only two days in advance, united leaflets put out at the last minute, and hardly distributed.

The leaders of the trade-union federations treated the workers of Besançon like the fifth wheel on a wagon. On Tuesday, September 4, it was announced to them at a general assembly that there would be a demonstration, and even a march, in Paris at the beginning of the following week. That very night, after the discussions, they found out from the radio that it had been decided to assemble at the Invalides.

The only other thing was to hold a general assembly the next day to sign up workers for cars that were supposed to take off for Paris. They drove about 300 miles to attend a fifty-minute meeting, with no podium and a miserable sound system. The trade-union leaders, in a hurry to get it over with, started exactly on time, which practically never happens.

Up to the last moment, the Lipworkers were not told that there would be no demonstration. That was when, seeing themselves surrounded by cops, the workers asked what route they were supposed to take. They were granted a favor: They would be escorted to their cars. But for this piece of charity, top-level negotiations were necessary, the URP-CFDT [the Union des Républicaines de Progrès—Union of Republicans for Progress—is the ruling government coalition] making itself the strikers' embarrassed intermediary.

And further, no discussions between the strikers and other workers were prepared. A delegation from Cerisay was there, for example. This was discovered purely by accident. In short, everything was done to avoid contacts and discussions. Séguy and Maire [heads of the CP-dominated union federation and the CFDT respectively] were no doubt afraid of contagion.

At the Invalides on that day, there were two kinds of solidarity in evidence: Those who spoke of the "giant steps" made in the negotiations, even proposing that the talks be moved to Paris, and who sold little stickers screaming "Today Paris, Tomorrow Courneuve"; and on the other hand, the revolutionists, who shouted: "Lip fights for all the workers," "Today Paris, tomorrow Besançon," and "Government of goons, no! Government of workers, yes!"

The Lip workers got the message. At the general assembly on Monday [September 10] criticisms were made.

The position taken by the Action Committee was heartily applauded:

"The confederations did not turn out



Part of the September 7 solidarity action in Paris. Bureaucrats of the trade-union federations have systematically played down Lip solidarity movement.

for the first demonstration that they organized in Paris. When they want to do more, they can. Now, it is a sure thing that the choice of location at the Invalides, the lack of a podium, the very close-knit, strict union defense

guard, left us no possibility for action. We had the feeling of being cattle herded to Paris. And then, when we had been led there, we were told to load back into our boxcars and get back to Besançon."

One of Every Two Workers Is a Woman

Traditional Sex Roles Shaken by Lip Strike

[One of the most notable features of the Lip struggle has been the role played by women, who are half the work force at the factory. The following article on how the strike and factory occupation has affected the women workers appeared in the September 14 Rouge. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]

In the strikes that happened "before," there were some layers that didn't go along. In the watchmaking industry, workers on the assembly lines, most of them women, have been the most reluctant to walk out.

The "daughters of the conveyor belt" were very different "before." They had a "more haughty" air; they seemed "less like workers." The assembly line jobs might not be the most highly skilled work at Lip, but nevertheless,

the labor there is cleaner, and you have to be very dextrous to put together the tiny watch parts. You wear a white smock to work. It's quite different from working in the region's clothing plants. It's even better than being a saleslady; it's really having a "profession." To be a worker at the Lip assembly line was to be envied. In spite of the wages, the lowest in the factory, you felt privileged.

There were no ties with the other departments of the factory, the workshops (quality control, testing) where there were mostly men, like in the machine department, the arms department, the machine-tool making department. It was in those departments that the unions were really entrenched. Nearly all the union delegates, moreover, came from the machine department

In the assembly department at a

watch factory, there was a "different" environment. A greater dependence on foremen, more warnings, more joking around (about being caught in the rest room smoking or putting on makeup, for example).

Above all, politics did not exist on the assembly line. In the other departments, if a leaflet was passed out, the workers would sit and read it at their machines before even starting work; but this was out of the question on the assembly line. Leaflets had to be kept in pockets, very often getting thrown away unread.

Even this time, it was harder to mobilize the assembly line, especially at the beginning, when a slowdown was started. But what came to be called self-defense against liquidation of the factory threw the entire plant into action. The strike is an active one and the women have been participating just as much as the men in all the actions that have been launched since the beginning of the struggle. Numerically, just as many women are participating; and just as many in terms of initiative too. They are there to continue production (all the more so since it is the department in which they are a majority that has been kept going, first in the factory itself and later [after the police reoccupied it] in secret locales).

In the team responsible for stockpiling and sales, it is a woman who plays one of the most active roles. The sale of the watches is also carried out mostly by women. Is this the traditional female role of saleslady? Surely not; not when it is denounced by the government as "illegal."

Present, and active in all the forms of action engaged in, the women are making their mark on this strike. Sometimes in unexpected ways: for example, in what has since become part of the Lip legend, the "clean up the city" initiative. It started during a general assembly when a woman rose to speak against writing slogans on the walls of the city of Besançon, which as everyone knows is a historic place. Was this a conservative, housewife reaction? Hardly, when you take into account that what came out of the discussion was a far more radical way of popularizing the strike and of making its impact felt in the city than the old writing-on-walls gambit.

They kept the walls clean, because they felt like it; instead, they descended on the downtown area every day with the strike bulletin. They drove around with cars equipped with loudspeakers, talking directly to the inhabitants. The many women in the popularization teams, still in their white smocks with the Lip badge, "made quite an impression."

This time, there have been just as many women as men in the delegations that are sent to other cities, to other plants for solidarity meetings; women, young and not so young, who no one would have thought could speak out have been taking the floor. At Lip, public speaking is considered one of the most difficult tasks, since no one is used to it. And it is there that the women have been especially appreciated. (It has a sort of shock value. People sit up and listen.)

But these meetings in which women are playing a new and important role make their silence in the general assemblies that much more striking.

"If you are a woman," says Monique, one of the Lip strikers, "you are much more likely to be attacked in a debate if you are awkward or if you make a mistake. And it is perhaps even worse if you speak with self-assurance. It is less acceptable for a woman to know how to assert herself in a debate, because everyone expects her to speak timidly or submissively."

At Lip, everywhere that new forms of struggle have been thrown up, women have been present and fully active. But wherever the traditional forms have been maintained, the traditional differences have continued to manifest themselves.

The family is a brake for the women. This has not been shown so clearly, because the actions generally go on during normal working hours and because "kids can be taken care of just as before." But nighttime guard duty or traveling about the country or to Paris creates problems. The women are left behind because "it's not worth disrupting their households."

During five months, "feminist" demands have not been raised. Even the meetings planned by the Groupe d'Action Avortement et Contraception [Abortion and Contraception Action Group] and by militant physicians from Paris have not generated much interest and have not been well attended. It is vaguely known that one or two abortions have been performed during the strike, but this has not been

considered something that concerns the whole movement.

Surprising? Why should it be? The mobilization of women at Lip, where they are half the factory, took place around demands raised by the strike, not around problems specific to women. What's the use of raising the traditional schemas of feminism?

The forceful entry of women directly onto the political scene around demands in the labor movement is a radical way of advancing their liberation. It means asserting politics—that is, power—is not a male monopoly. Can anyone imagine for a minute that this will not profoundly alter women's traditional position?

What is happening at Lip in this regard? "In a struggle," says Monique, "there are those who change and there are those who do not change as much." But already the differences between the assembly department, where the women work, and the rest of the factory are in the process of disappearing. With the development of the self-discipline necessary for managing production, it will no longer be possible for "little chiefs" to rule the place as before. Never again will leaflets or newspapers go unread. Can anyone think that some new foreman on the assembly line could force leaflets back into pockets? Does anyone believe that these women, who have taken up all the tasks of the strike, could ever again be told: "You've gone as far as you can go as a woman. No more wage increases for you"? Does anyone believe that the women who have learned to speak in public will keep their mouths shut at the general assemblies any more? Already, they do so less and less.

In the meetings of the working commissions, and even in those of the Action Committee, where the weight of traditional habit is lessening, women are getting up to speak. Can anyone think that this will not change things outside the plant, in a family, for example, where it is the woman who is on strike and carries the movement's message to her husband, who works in some other factory and has never participated in such a movement?

At Lip, at Cerisay, at St. Dié, as at Bregille last year, as at Troyes and Thionville, women, by throwing their full weight into the struggle, are politicizing themselves and are changing the traditional relations that bind them to society.

Greece After the Junta's Amnesty

[The following interview appeared in the September 14 issue of *Rouge*, French Trotskyist weekly. The introduction is by *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

Our comrade T. Psaradellis, a militant of the Fourth International, became known in the revolutionary vanguard through his exemplary behavior before the military courts of the Athens dictatorship. An activist from the age of eighteen, he joined the Fourth International at twenty. He was a machinist in the textile industry and participated actively in the workers mobilizations of the 1960s. After the 1967 coup d'etat, he continued his struggle underground.

He was first arrested in 1967 and was tortured, but was released for lack of evidence. He was again arrested in May 1969 on charges of stealing and possessing explosives. "They kept me in a police station," he explained upon his arrival in Paris, "after having beaten me for days on end. It was easy to escape. I caught a boat for Mytilene and from there I made it to Turkey in a stolen rowboat; it took eighteen hours of rowing.

"The Turkish authorities placed me under surveillance in an isolated place some 300 kilometers from Ankara. I slipped out twice to try to reach Bulgaria and Eastern Europe. After one failure, I made it on the second try. I got to Bulgaria—where I was imprisoned. After being dragged around from prison to prison, I was put on a train that was supposed to be taking me back to Turkey. When I saw some Greek cops, though, I realized what was up. I jumped out of the train and ran for about 40 kilometers, but I was finally caught."

During his trial, Psaradellis defended himself in an exemplary manner:

"I stand here as a representative of all the workers. I am fighting for all the oppressed exploited of the world; I struggle with them. I am a worker. I belong to the Fourth International. I admit these facts that I am charged with." To the judge, who asked why he had been thrown out of Bulgaria, Psaradellis answered: "That is between me and the Bulgarian bureaucrats."

Psaradellis was sentenced to thirteen years in prison. He managed to escape again and reached Italy, and then France, in 1972. Today, after the amnesty [issued by the Athens junta], his fight goes on.

Rouge. How did the release of the political prisoners come about?

Psaradellis. First of all I would like to stress that not everybody was released. There are still twenty-two political prisoners in the dictatorship's jails; three of them are young militants. The others are older political prisoners sentenced before 1967 under an antispying law.

Many of them have spent ten or fifteen years behind bars. Among those held is a man named Nicolopoulos, sentenced in 1969 for espio-



T. PSARADELLIS

nage; he had managed to get to France, via Belgium. But French authorities refused him political asylum and, after holding him in prison for three months, sent him back to the colonels. He was sentenced to fourteen years in prison. There is also a woman, sentenced to ten years, who did not get amnestied.

The Communist party has made token protests over this. But a militant campaign must be waged to win their release.

The demonstrations that took place when the prisoners were released were very encouraging. Thousands of persons came to show their solidarity. That will encourage the mobilization of the masses against the dictatorship.

Rouge. How do you explain this concession by the junta?

Psaradellis. The colonels' junta had to respond to a new situation. The 1967 coup had deeply traumatized the masses by decapitating the workers organizations and setting up a terrorist dictatorship.

Today we are seeing a new rise of struggles that is clearly showing that the masses are moving out of their lethargy. The junta felt itself in trouble and had to move ahead to counter Karamanlis, who had started to maneuver for installing a more stable Bonapartist regime around the person of the king and throwing the colonels out.

This is why they organized the referendum [on abolishing the monarchy] and declared an amnesty for political prisoners.

These maneuvers enabled the dictatorship to keep control of the situation for the time being. But the regime will rapidly be confronted by new mobilizations, by new struggles.

Rouge. Can you give us any news about recent, little-known struggles?

Psaradellis. There were of course spectacular student struggles this year. On the campuses there were countercouncils elected to boycott the rump councils set up by the colonels.

In the factories, the general attitude of the Communist party and the far left is to boycott the official unions. But for the moment, there are only a few attempts at setting up action committees and general assemblies of workers. The official, scab unions recently demanded a 30 percent wage increase. That looks like a lot, but in fact it should have been more like 100 percent. Wages have been frozen for five years, while prices have risen at a fantastic rate. The black market is flourishing and merchants have to pay higher than official prices. The government called on the unions to maintain order and granted a 15 percent increase.

or- Interview With Hugo Blanco

But there have been several important strikes: those of the typographers, the streetcar drivers, and even the airline pilots. (The government tried to cover that one up, claiming it was a protest against skyjacks.)

The workers are fighting not only around economic demands, but also for the free election of union delegates. Finally, in certain neighborhoods where people have been evicted to make way for a refinery, for an airport, and for university housing, popular committees have been set up; there were street demonstrations; the surveying equipment was busted up. This too is an indication of an awakening.

Rouge. And what about the revolutionary vanguard? No doubt the release of the political prisoners will allow it to rebuild quickly?

Psaradellis. Unfortunately, no. Most of the militants released were broken by the 1967 coup and the repression that hit them and their organizations. It is mostly fresh militants who are again taking courage and are in turn launching the struggle. But police surveillance is still very tough. We have heard that the arrested streetcar drivers had to walk a police gauntlet. It is true that martial law has been lifted. There are no more sentences of twenty years and more being handed down by military courts. This will help in the construction of a revolutionary organization.

For the moment, no organization has emerged out of the far left. There are mostly just discussion groups. There are many Marxist books being published.

But the crisis of the Communist party is sharpening. The CP (Bureau of the Interior) [the faction of the CP that fell out of the Kremlin's favor] is totally disoriented. Its members don't know what they're supposed to do. The pro-Soviet CP (mostly in exile) is more homogeneous. It has a radio station, the "Voice of Liberty."

This crisis of the CP opens up more possibilities for our comrades to regroup the revolutionary vanguard.

New Liquor Tax Coming?

A British scientist has discovered that the human intestine converts sugars into alcohol. The amount produced daily is equal to that contained in one quart of weak beer.

'Workers in Front Lines in Latin America'

[The following interview with Hugo Blanco was obtained in Santiago shortly before the coup by Birgitta Nyblom, a correspondent for *Dagens Nyheter*. It was published in the August 27 issue of the Stockholm daily. As of September 24, there is still no word on Blanco's whereabouts. The translation of the interview is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

"I received an offer, in an indirect way, from the military regime in Peru to work in the land reform," reports Hugo Blanco, the peasant leader from the highlands who was freed in early 1971 after seven years in prison.

"I was very glad to. But I made one condition: The land reform would have to be carried out in line with what the peasants wanted."

That was the last Hugo Blanco heard about the offer.

Half a year after he was released from prison he was deported to Mexico. He was kept in jail there a short time.

Following intense negotiations with the Peruvian ambassador, Hugo Blanco was issued a legal passport instead of the false one he had been sent with. He traveled to Argentina, and was held in prison there for three and a half months.

"Prison conditions were awful," he says. "Physically, they were better than in Peru, but morally speaking they were much worse. The hostility of the guards was terrible."

Hugo Blanco has been in Chile since the end of last year, thanks to the general secretary of Chile's Socialist party. He happened to visit Argentina, and obtained a transit visa.

Hugo Blanco's residence permit in Chile runs out in January, and he does not know what will happen then. When he himself applied, he couldn't get a visa to any Latin American country.

"But you could go to Sweden!"

"But Sweden is so far from Peru," he replies. "And things are probably too quiet for me to be able to live there." Hugo Blanco laughs. He is home-sick.

"What I want most is to be able to return legally to Peru."

Just as in Mexico and Argentina, a condition Hugo Blanco must observe in Chile is that he not take part in, or make statements about, the country's political affairs. Helives with his ten-year-old son in one room and a kitchen in Santiago, and earns a living writing articles.

A while back, Hugo Blanco requested permission from the Peruvian embassy to make a short visit to his home town in Cuzco, since his mother was seriously ill and had asked him to come. He was to make the trip secretly and allow himself to be under surveillance the whole time.

The police in Cuzco checked with his mother and verified that she was near death.

But Blanco did not receive permission to make the trip.

"That was a heavy blow for me," he says. "My mother was the one person I loved most."

Hugo Blanco is not yet forty years old. It is ten years since he was taken prisoner in the town of Zurite, and two years since he was deported from Peru. What happened during the half a year that he was out of jail, in Peru?

He reports that he was forbidden to return to Cuzco and the valley of La Convención, where he organized the peasants. He was allowed to stay in Lima, but was not allowed to leave it.

"The government thought I should stay in the capital city of Lima, after I had been a peasant leader. I would be like a fish on dry land there!

"But as a matter of fact, it is in the workers movement, in Argentina and Peru, that I got my training," says Hugo Blanco. "I was a local peasant leader in the mountains. But the government characterized me—this is what they said when I was put in prison—as a national leader, which I was not.

"This only worked to the government's disadvantage. The report about me as a national leader only meant that as soon as a group of workers got involved in a struggle, they asked about me and invited me to give a speech about imperialism or some other subject. Then they could discuss methods of struggle with me."

As a result, Hugo Blanco was arrested for twenty-four hours during a miners strike. The same thing happened during the teachers strike in September 1971. He was on the way to the drugstore when he was arrested.

"But," says Hugo Blanco, "one should not exaggerate the situation in Peru. They put people in jail for a while. Some are killed, others deported. Then comes a softening up. Peru does not have a regime like those

HUGO BLANCO

in Brazil or Bolivia. Proof that there is not a total state of repression in Peru is that the regime now neither puts us in prison nor kills us—it deports us."

Hugo Blanco is a Trotskyist, a member of the Fourth International. He has noticed that within the workers movement some people have a thirdworld orientation of working in the slums—what are called "barriadas" in Peru, and "favelas" in Brazil.

"I met people in Peru and Mexico who carried out this kind of work. In Chile, on the other hand, I don't know any. I think that it is an inappropriate form of work.

"Instead, mass movements must be

organized, particularly within the working class. For me, the struggle of the workers in their factories is the most important. You can see this in a practical sense in Chile. You can also see it in Peru."

"But what about the valley of La Convención?" I wonder.

"I believe that what I did in La Convención was correct, for the peasant movement was in the vanguard at that time. But now the situation is different. The working class is in the front lines—in Peru, Argentina, Chile, and in Latin America as a whole."

In Peru, the land reform is still being implemented on the government's terms. The tenant farmers are no long-

er treated like serfs. The ranches are being run as cooperatives by free farmers—that is the model.

It is successful along the coast with its rich sugar plantations. But the project has rough going, and meets with reluctance, in the backward mountainous areas of the Andes. This is where the Indians live, in a society where things are traditionally owned and used collectively.

The Indian peasants, whom Blanco worked with, have neither the work nor the influence that go together with land ownership. They haven't even got shoes on their feet yet.

In reality 70 percent of Peru's peasants have not been affected by the land reform. \Box

Third Attempt at Coalition Government

Washington Expecting Gains From Laos Agreement

A week before representatives of the Pathet Lao and the Vientiane proimperialist regime formally signed an accord to establish a coalition government, James M. Markham of the *New York Times* described an incident that was to prove symbolic of the latest Laotian "compromise."

Phoumi Vongvichit, the chief Pathet Lao negotiator, and other rebel leaders were invited to a royal ball in Luang Prabang by King Savang Vatthana.

"To everyone's astonishment," Markham wrote, "the chief Pathet Lao delegate crouched on his haunches in obeisance before the King—more deeply than anyone else. Diplomats and others who read the tea leaves saw this profoundly respectful gesture as a sign that the Marxist Pathet Lao would respect the institution of kingship once in the Government."

It required no reading of tea leaves to predict that the Pathet Lao, despite the lessons of past experience, would be equally respectful toward all the institutions of the Laotian state.

The new agreement, which was formally signed September 14, calls for formation of a third coalition government between the two sides. Basically similar governments set up in 1957 and 1962 were quickly blown to pieces

by right-wing generals supported by the CIA.

The collapse of the 1962 Geneva accords—despite "international guarantees"—was followed by a decade of war and savage U.S. bombing. The new pact nevertheless calls for the "Provisional Government of National Union" to "establish a political program based on the 1962 Geneva accords." The latest attempt to "compromise" between the interests of imperialism and those of the Laotian people is not likely to be more successful than the one signed in 1962.

Although it controls an estimated 80 percent of the country, the Pathet Lao made large concessions in order to obtain Vientiane's agreement to the foredoomed coalition. The September 14 protocol provides that Souvanna Phouma is to continue as prime minister in Vientiane. Each side has one deputy premier.

More importantly, Vientiane retains the ministries of defense, interior, and finance—that is, control over the instruments of state repression and the means to pay for them. The proimperialists will thus be in a position to enforce their views when it is impossible to achieve the "unanimous decision of the two parties in all important matters" called for by the agreement.

The agreement also specifies that Vientiane and Luang Prabang are to be "neutralized" by the formation of mixed police forces and the stationing of equal numbers of troops from each side. But the number of Pathet Lao forces permitted—1,400 in Vientiane and 700 in Luang Prabang—is not sufficient to constitute anything but a bodyguard for the Pathet Lao ministers. Even if the proimperialist forces are reduced to an equal number within the two cities, they will be stationed near enough to be moved in to "restore order" should that prove necessary.

Finally, the protocol establishes a National Consultative Political Council, which is supposed to cooperate with the coalition government in organizing elections. This provision, like the prohibition on "arms and military materials from foreign countries," will be observed precisely to the degree that U.S. imperialism decides it is worth observing.


That Washington expects the agreement to benefit its interests was suffi-



SOUVANNA PHOUMA: To continue as prime minister in Vientiane.

ciently indicated by its response to the attempted coup August 20. On that day, a rightist ex-general who had been exiled in Thailand, Thao Ma, led a small force that seized the Vientiane airport, the National Bank, and a radio station, from which he broadcast an appeal to the military.

Although rightist generals had been publicly grumbling about the terms of the accord in order to force further concessions from the Pathet Lao, the



New York Times map shows U.S. version of Laotian situation last February.

army declined to back Thao Ma. While Souvanna Phouma waited in the residence of the U.S. ambassador, U.S. diplomatic officials scurried about the city urging military commanders to remain loyal. Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent Norman Peagam quoted reports that the U.S. chargé d'affaires had even gone to the airport "to reason with the rebels."

Obviously, the Nixon administration judged that the relationship of forces was unfavorable for an immediate resumption of open hostilities. Washington can afford to wait and see what further concessions the Pathet Lao may grant in the process of trying to make the coalition government actually work.

This is all the more true in view of the position of the Soviet bureaucrats, who made it clear that they favor the establishment of a coalition government to preserve the status quo. The Soviet military attaché in Vientiane acted as procurer for the agreement by bringing the Pathet Lao delegation and five influential generals together in a convivial party September 6. The gathering, in which vodka reportedly served to smooth over any awkward pauses in the conversation, was later described by Souvanna Phouma as "very cordial." The September 8 New York Times added:

"The idea behind the meeting — which reportedly received midwifery assistance from the United States Embassy — was to bring together the two groups that eventually will have to carry out the bulk of the accord and soften the distrust that has accumulated during 20 years of war."

For the Kremlin theoreticians and those who follow their "peaceful coexistence" line, a little thing like decades of aggression is no reason to "distrust" the honorable intentions of U.S. imperialism.

Sri-Lanka CP Expels Two 'Soft-Liners'

The rift in the pro-Moscow Communist party of Sri Lanka that has been visible since December 1972 reached a new stage in mid-September. First, on September 13, three party "hard-liners," including its general secretary, S. A. Wickremasinghe, were expelled from the United Front government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Then, four days later, the Wickremasinghe faction, which controls the party Central Committee and Politburo, expelled two leading "soft-liners" from the party. They are Pieter Keuneman, who is housing minister in the government, and B. Y. Tudawe, vice-minister of education. The reason given for their expulsion was their alleged "antiparty" activities.

The Wickremasinghe faction favored the CP distancing itself slightly from the repressive policies of the Bandaranaike regime. The Keuneman faction gives uncritical support to the government.

On September 14, the day after the hardliners were expelled from the United Front, Keuneman sent a letter to Wickremasinghe in which he accused the hard-liners of "appeasing and bowing to the threats and pressures of ultraleftists and opportunist elements within the party." He warned that he intended to "take the necessary initiatives to rally all honest Communists." Asked what the "initiatives" would be, he replied, "Wait and see."

"Political observers were certain that a new Communist party will emerge or, more startling, some leading hard-liners would join Mr. Keuneman," according to the September 20 issue of the weekly Ceylon News.

The Evidence So Far: Nixon's Undercover Gang

By Allen Myers

[This is the second part of an article summarizing the gangster activities of the Nixon administration. The first installment appeared in last week's *Intercontinental Press.*]

Conspiracy in Justice Department

I don't think [leftists are] capable of putting [a conspiracy] together. But they do talk together. There's a great deal of intercourse between the leadership of some of these groups . . . which are opposed to our constitutional form of government.

—Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian, quoted in the May 31, 1971, Newsweek.


They'll present evidence about the comings and goings of priests and nuns. Informers and FBI infiltrators will make all sorts of allegations putting a sinister cast on their movements. How can you refute that? That's the insidious part of a conspiracy charge.

 Attorney William Kunstler commenting on the Berrigan case indictment.

Many of the defendants whose lawyer's offices were burglarized by the Nixon gang were victims of frame-ups concocted in a unit of the Justice Department that Nixon reactivated in late 1970. This is the Internal Security Division, which was headed by Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian. During the 1972 campaign, it was Mardian who authorized the sending of Justice Department spy reports to the Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP), where they were used by Watergate burglar James Mc-Cord in planning CREEP's undercover activities. Mardian himself later joined the campaign committee, where, according to his own testimony, he sat in on discussions about destruction of evidence following the arrest of the Watergate burglars.

Mardian's deputy in the Internal Security Division was Guy Goodwin, the official to whom FBI provocateur Larry Grathwohl reported. Goodwin heads the Special Litigation Section, which is in charge of courtroom proceedings in the various frame-ups.

Whatever his failings in terms of legal skills (virtually all of the con-



BERRIGAN: Victim of frame-up organized in Justice Department.

spiracy prosecutions directed by Goodwin have resulted in acquittals) Goodwin has shown no lack of zeal in carrying out his political assignments. When members of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War were indicted in July 1972 in a conspiracy frame-up, Goodwin swore in court that no government agents or informers were among the defendants. In reality, one of the defendants was an informer who continued reporting the defense

strategy to the FBI for more than a year.

The first big case for the Justice Department red squad was that of the Reverend Phillip Berrigan, a pacifist priest, and five other persons accused of conspiring to blow up heating tunnels in Washington, D.C., and to kidnap Henry Kissinger. Berrigan was in prison at the time of the phony "conspiracy." Goodwin's original indictment was so full of holes that it had to be redrawn in the summer of 1971, but even this didn't help. When the case came to trial in 1972, the jury deadlocked (with a majority for acquittal) and the Nixon gang did not dare to bring the defendants to trial a second time.

In what has become a typical pattern, the chief prosecution witness against Berrigan and his codefendants was an informer who had acted as a provocateur, urging the defendants (all of them pacifists) to obtain weapons, etc.

The charges against the Berrigan case defendants had originally been aired by J. Edgar Hoover before a congressional committee. Hoover said that the "plotters" were members of "an anarchist group on the East Coast, the so-called East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives." It was soon revealed, however, that while there had once been a group by that name, only one of the defendants had ever belonged to it, and the group itself had long ceased to exist. The need to cover the FBI director's blunder may have contributed to the selection of the Special Litigation Section's next big case.

On the night of August 21, 1971, federal agents arrested twenty-eight persons in Camden, New Jersey, after they had destroyed files in the local office of the draft board. A press release issued the next day by Hoover and Attorney General John Mitchell proclaimed that the arrests had "broken the back of the East Coast conspiracy."

Once again, when the case came to trial, it was revealed that the only real conspiracy had been hatched in the Justice Department.

Robert Hardy, a provocateur paid by the FBI, admitted that when he infiltrated the group in June 1971, it had already abandoned plans for the draft-board raid. On instructions from his FBI contacts, Hardy urged the defendants to revive the plan, and he quickly became a leader. Hardy said that he repeatedly told the FBI that the whole "conspiracy" depended on him. Rather than trying to prevent the raid, he said, the FBI's strategy was to "make sure the defendants commit as many crimes as possible and destroy draft files."

The night of the raid, the defendants were allowed to spend two hours in the building destroying files before they were arrested. Present on the scene was none other than Guy Goodwin. "He [Goodwin] knew people by their first names," one defendant later recalled.

Hardy had originally been told by his FBI contacts that the defendants would be arrested on the night of August 14 during a practice run. When Hardy asked why the arrests were not made as planned, one FBI agent told him that "someone at the little White House in California" wanted the raid to take place. "We checked," one of the defendants told a reporter for the revolutionary-socialist weekly *The Militant*, "and Haldeman and Ehrlichman and all the advisers, the whole crew, were out there on August 14."

Goodwin and the red squad had done too thorough a job in setting up the "conspiracy." Because of the overwhelming evidence that the government had created the "crime," the Camden defendants were acquitted on May 20, 1973.

Goodwin's other big case, the trial of eight members and supporters of VVAW on charges of conspiring to disrupt the Republican national convention, appears to have been hastily thrown together in July 1972 in order to justify the Watergate break-in and other undercover activities of the Nixon gang by claiming that they were necessary to "protect" the convention from "violent" demonstrations. In the usual pattern, the only advocates of "violence" turned out to be paid government agents.

The acquittal of the VVAW defen-

dants on August 31, 1973, is not, unfortunately, likely to put an end to this kind of prosecution. Even when the government is unable to jail the defendants, such prosecutions allow



GOODWIN: Enjoys his work, even though he's not very good at it.

it to hamstring opponents by tying up their time and resources in defense efforts.

The indefatigable Goodwin is presently reported to be directing grand jury investigations in Detroit, San Francisco, Cleveland, and Madison. It is safe to assume that these juries will be presented with "conspiracies" that, on closer examination, also turn out to have been stitched together by the Justice Department and paid provocateurs.

The State Versus Ellsberg

At about the time the unit was created, Daniel Ellsberg was identified as the person who had given the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times. I told Mr. Krogh that as a matter of first priority, the unit should find out all it could about Mr. Ellsberg's associates and his motives. Because of the extreme gravity of the situation, and not then knowing what additional national secrets Mr. Ellsberg might disclose, I did impress upon Mr. Krogh the vital importance to the national

security of his assignment.

— Nixon's May 22 statement on Watergate.

Perhaps the clearest example of the extent to which the entire machinery of government can be mobilized against a single enemy is provided by the Nixon gang's two-year campaign against Daniel Ellsberg.

When the first installment of the Pentagon Papers appeared in the *New York Times* of June 13, 1971, the Nixon gang at first appeared relatively unconcerned. Since the documents covered U.S. policy in Indochina only up to 1968, it was felt that any disclosures in them would reflect badly only on the Democratic party. Within two days, however, the White House attitude had been reversed 180 degrees.

The reason for the shift was the realization that if material on Nixon's predecessors could be leaked to the press, his own secret war plans could not be immune to similar leaks. Precisely this threat was what the *New York Times* wanted to imply.

Publication of the papers came on the heels of the militarily disastrous invasion of the Laotian panhandle. To influential sectors of the U.S. ruling class, more serious than the military defeat was the threat of a confrontation with China that the invasion had created. The Pentagon Papers had been available to liberal members of Congress for months. Their publication was a carefully considered escalation of pressure on Nixon. As Joseph Hansen wrote at the time in *Intercontinental Press*:

"The publication of the Pentagon documents probably gave Nixon the feeling—after he had thought it over—that a pistol had been pointed at his head."

Max Frankel wrote in the June 20, 1971, New York Times that the government "wished to salvage only a precedent for future restraint and perhaps some evidence for later criminal prosecution of the sources, the newspapers, or both."

On July 1, 1971, White House special counsel Charles Colson conducted a telephone interview with Howard Hunt, who was later to gain fame as one of the Watergate burglars. Colson's office was known in the White House as the "office of dirty tricks,"

and his conversation with Hunt was a discussion of dirty tricks that could be used to "get" Ellsberg.

Colson—without telling Hunt—taped the conversation. The tape eventually found its way into the possession of the Senate Watergate committee.

On September 6 of this year, Colson told the Washington Star-News that in the discussion "we were trying to figure out how to recoup lost political ground."

Colson began by telling Hunt:

"This thing could go one of two ways. Ellsberg could be turned into a martyr of the New Left—he probably will be anyway—or it could become another Alger Hiss case, where the guy is exposed, other people were operating with him, and this may be the way to really carry it out. We might be able to put this bastard into a hell of a situation and discredit the New Left."

Hunt readily agreed with Colson's suggestion that "we should go down the line to nail the guy cold," and with his observation, "this case won't be tried in the court, it will be tried in the newspapers."

Colson sent the tape to H.R. Haldeman along with a memo saying that "Hunt's background, politics, disposition, and experience" qualified him for White House employment. Colson told the *Star-News* that Haldeman suggested that Hunt meet John Ehrlichman, and "if Ehrlichman likes him, go ahead and hire him."

Hunt met Ehrlichman and was hired on July 7. The same day, Ehrlichman called Robert Cushman, deputy director of the CIA, and asked him to assist Hunt in his work. Along with his fellow Watergate conspirator Gordon Liddy, Hunt was assigned to the undercover "plumbers" unit that Nixon had set up earlier in the year.

At the end of July, a number of Nixon gangsters met with two influential members of Congress to discuss holding witch-hunt hearings to discredit Ellsberg. David Young, who with Egil Krogh directed the "plumbers" unit, explained in an August 26, 1971, memo to Ehrlichman:

"The plan then was to slowly develop a very negative picture around the whole Pentagon study affair . . . and then to identify Ellsberg's associates and supporters on the new left with this negative image." The "scenario" would be developed, Young explained, by the three officials who met with the congressmen to work out the strategy: Robert Mardian; J. Fred Buzhardt, then general counsel at the Defense Department, now a special White House counsel; and William B. Macomber, then a deputy undersecretary of state, now ambassador to Turkey.

Young went on to explain that the scheme would be combined with the "planting" of negative information about Ellsberg in the press.

It is not difficult to figure out where this negative information was expected to come from. On August 11, Young



EHRLICHMAN: Hid bugging records in his office safe.

and Krogh had sent Ehrlichman a memo recommending "that a covert operation be undertaken to examine all the medical files still held by Ellsberg's psychoanalyst covering the two-year period in which he was undergoing analysis." Ehrlichman approved this recommendation, adding the qualification, "if done under your assurance that it is not traceable."

The "covert operation" took place on the night of September 3, 1971. Using equipment supplied by the CIA, Hunt and Liddy directed a break-in of the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's former psychiatrist.

Apparently the burglars were unable to find sufficiently "negative" information, for the planned congressional investigation was never held. Meanwhile, Nixon and Ehrlichman were busy concealing material that would later become significant in the Ellsberg trial. In July 1971, Mardian learned from William C. Sullivan, then deputy director of the FBI, of records of the wiretaps on reporters and government officials that Nixon had ordered more than two years earlier after the *New York Times* printed its story about the secret bombing of Cambodia.

One of the members of the National Security Council whose phone was tapped was Morton Halperin, a friend of Ellsberg. During part of the time that the tap was in place, Ellsberg stayed at Halperin's home and a number of his telephone conversations were recorded.

Mardian testified before the Senate Watergate committee that when he learned of the existence of the wiretap logs, he flew immediately to San Clemente and discussed them with Nixon. Nixon ordered him to get the logs from Sullivan and turn them over to Ehrlichman, which he did.

Since Ehrlichman appears to have been in overall direction of the campaign to get Ellsberg, the choice of him as recipient for the wiretap records strongly suggests that Nixon realized their relevance to the Ellsberg case.

In any event, in May 1972, Judge William Byrne, who presided over the Ellsberg trial, ordered the government to turn over all wiretap records of Ellsberg. This was not done. The logs remained hidden in Ehrlichman's office and became public knowledge only a year later, after Ehrlichman had "resigned" his White House position

Meanwhile, Ellsberg was subjected to some considerably less subtle undercover operations. At the beginning of May 1972, Hunt arranged for a gang of ten Cuban counterrevolutionaries to be flown from Florida to Washington for the specific purpose of physically assaulting Ellsberg as he addressed an antiwar rally. Four of these thugs were later arrested inside the Democratic National Committee offices in the Watergate.

Nixon, in his various statements on the Watergate scandal, has been forced to keep pushing back the date on which he says he first learned of the break-in at the psychiatrist's office. The latest admission is that he knew of it in mid-March of this year, well over a month before Judge Byrne was informed.

In a transparent attempt to persuade the judge that he should not reveal the break-in, Ehrlichman was instructed to meet with Byrne at the beginning of April and offer him appointment as director of the FBI. Ehrlichman met Byrne twice, on the first occasion with Nixon himself present. After this preparation, Byrne was finally informed of the break-in.

The Gusano Connection

Eduardo [Howard Hunt] represents the liberation of Cuba, the anti-Communist symbol. It represents the government of the United States in one form, in its covert form.

-Watergate burglar Bernard L. Barker, in testimony to the Senate committee.

The May 1972 assault on Ellsberg permitted a glimpse of one of the most carefully hidden of the Nixon gang's weapons against dissent: gangs of right-wing thugs who are used in attempts to intimidate left-wing opposition to the government.

Many of these thugs are Cuban counterrevolutionaries, known as *gusanos* ("worms" in Spanish) to the Cuban people. Many of them have past experience in carrying out counterrevolutionary tasks for U.S. imperialism. Most of the Watergate burglars, for example, participated in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. In his testimony to the Senate Watergate committee, Bernard Barker—a former member of Batista's secret police—referred casually to the "hundreds of Cubans [who] have been helping in Africa, in Vietnam, and in other areas of the world."

Although the government's support for these right-wing gangs is carefully concealed—as a "national security" matter, of course—in the wake of Watergate there have been several disclosures that reveal the connections.

In April, May, and June 1970, gusano terrorists carried out a series of armed arson attacks in Los Angeles against the Haymarket, a radical bookstore; the Socialist Workers party campaign office; and the Ashgrove, a coffee house that was often used by radicals. Although at least a dozen persons participated in the attacks, the only ones arrested were three gusanos caught on the scene of one of the crimes. Della Rossa later wrote in *The Militant*:

"Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney Stephen S. Trott, who was the prosecutor in the case of three of the terrorists involved in the attacks, has now revealed in discussions with this reporter that the terrorists had been approached prior to their arson raids by a man claiming to be with the CIA. . . .

"Trott's disclosure that the CIA was involved in the terrorist activities was



MARDIAN: Equally adept at destroying or inventing evidence.

corroborated by interviews with Sergeant Charles Loust of the Los Angeles Police Department's Criminal Conspiracy Division and Edward Gritz, who was the attorney for the three gusanos. Gritz says he was aware that someone claiming to be from the CIA had approached a number of Cubans in Los Angeles in the spring of 1970. 'My clients were used by someone,' he said. 'I know who it is but I can't reveal the information.' Loust revealed that a Cuban had approached Los Angeles Cuban counterrevolutionaries in May 1970 to 'fight Communism and get Cuba back."

It does not really matter whether the man who recruited the Los Angeles

terrorists was working for the CIA, CREEP, FBI, or some other organization. The gusanos understand that their activities serve the same cause no matter what agency—or even private individual—is footing the bill. Indeed, in his testimony to the Senate committee, Barker seemed scarcely able to comprehend the question of who he thought his employers were when he assaulted Ellsberg or broke into the Watergate.

"Who did you think your backers were?" he was asked.

"Sir," Barker replied, "I was not there to think. I was there to follow orders, not to think."

Of course the government does not recruit gusano terrorists exclusively. In the June 24, 1973, New York Times, Steven V. Roberts described a case in which the FBI had actually founded a right-wing paramilitary organization in San Diego, California. The group, which called itself the Secret Army Organization, was established in 1971.

Robert wrote that, according to a leader of the terrorist group, "Howard Godfrey, the F.B.I. informer, was one of the six founding members and contributed the money used to print the group's recruiting literature. . . .

"In addition, Godfrey was considered a 'firebrand' within the organization and took a 'more militant line' then most members."

Godfrey later admitted in court that he was riding in a car in January 1972 when another member of the Secret Army Organization fired into a house occupied by persons planning demonstrations at the Republican national convention later that year. A woman was hit by the shot, which shattered her elbow.

After the shooting, Godfrey took the gun that had been used and turned it over to his FBI contact. The latter hid the gun for six months, until after local police had arrested the man who fired the shot.

Roberts also summarized reports in a San Diego radical newspaper to the effect that members of the SAO had met with a man named Donald Simms and discussed with him plans to kidnap radicals who might disrupt the Republican convention. Two members of the group are said to have identified photos of Donald Segretti as the man they knew as Simms. Segretti, who

has been indicted in Florida for his role as a CREEP undercover agent, is known to have used the name Donald Simmons when recruiting his agents.

Kidnapping of leaders of radical groups, it will be recalled, was a feature of the espionage plan presented in January 1972 to Attorney General John Mitchell by Watergater Gordon Liddy.

The meeting of "Simms" with the Secret Army Organization terrorists occurred in the summer of 1971. Liddy's plan would therefore appear to have incorporated elements of undercover operations already approved at high levels of the Nixon gang. This would explain Liddy's surprise when Mitchell vetoed his original plan because of its expense.

Putting the Lid Back On

It is my honest belief that while the president was involved, he did not realize or appreciate at any time the implications of his involvement. And I think that when the facts come out, I hope the president is forgiven.

—John Dean's testimony to the Senate Watergate committee.

During the course of its hearings the vice-chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, Howard Baker, has been so adept at wrapping an aura of mystery around the obvious that he is already being touted as a potential presidential candidate in reward



NIXON: Expecting to be "forgiven" by Watergate committee.

for his efforts. On any occasion, Baker is ready to furrow his brow and express his perplexity over a phrase he first raised near the end of John Dean's testimony.

"The central question," Baker ago-

nized for the television audience, "is simply put: What did the president know and when did he know it?"

The answer, which the Senate committee can be counted on to avoid at all costs, is that Nixon knew as much about the Watergate affair as he wanted to know. In view of the fact that the break-in was only a minor event in the Nixon gang's operations, he probably did not concern himself with the details until the affair started to become a scandal. For the senators to admit this, however, would be to acknowledge that Watergate-style operations are a necessary part of capitalist rule.

It is therefore not surprising that the committee shows every indication of preparing to "forgive" Nixon to the extent of bringing the hearings to a close as rapidly as can be done without raising widespread suspicion of a new cover-up. While the possibility remains that some unexpected disclosure will force a change of plans, the hearings are not likely to make public much additional information other than to provide details of activities that are already known.

Whether or not the rulers of the United States succeed in putting the lid back on, most of the damage has already been done. Millions of persons have been given a glimpse of the nature of capitalist rule, a glimpse they will not soon forget. "Watergate" has become almost a synonym for "Washington."

Fifty Years of Stalinist Treachery

Watchdogs for Capitalism in Europe and the U.S.

By Milton Alvin

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When the war ended in Europe the Communist parties of France and Italy emerged as huge mass organizations. However, they did not follow an independent political line but subordinated the interests of the workers they represented to the advantage of the French and Italian capitalists both of whom were faced by a revolutionary upsurge.

In 1945, as the German armies retreated, a huge uprising of workers and Italian Resistance fighters swept the northern part of the country. About 150,000 armed

contingents, largely under Stalinist control, took possession of Milan, Turin, and other large cities.

Workers councils were formed and for a short time were the real power in the industrial parts of north Italy. However, the conservative policy of the Stalinist leaders soon left nothing of this promising movement. By the end of June, 60 percent of their arms had been turned over by the Resistance to Anglo-American forces. The Resistance organization then dissolved itself, having no further functions to perform.

Warned by Soviet leaders not to grab for power, the Italian Communist party leaders took posts in the capital-

ist government. There they dutifully supported positions that were designed to save Italian capitalism.

In 1947, when their services were no longer needed, the Stalinist members of the government were unceremoniously booted out. Ever since, Italian Stalinist leaders have confined their activities to parliamentary maneuvering like capitalist politicians. This, of course, has not gained the workers a single atom of benefits.

Similar developments took place in France. At the end of the war the Communist party turned out to be the largest in the country. Its representatives rushed to enter the government formed by General Charles de Gaulle. They supported all the major aims of the new government, their general thrust being to prop up the weakened capitalist system.

The Stalinists advocated the restoration of the prewar order, class peace, more production, and even speedup. For this they were publicly complimented by de Gaulle.

The CP leaders opposed strikes. They traveled to parts of the country where workers went out, and tried to convince them to go back to work without achieving any gains.

With Stalinist approval, the French Resistance was absorbed into the regular army. Thus it ceased to be an independent force. In the French army Resistance fighters were given poor arms and kept under careful watch until the regime was sure of their subservience.

When French capitalism thought it no longer needed the Stalinists in the government, they were shown the door, just like their Italian counterparts. Also like the Italians, the French Stalinists have engaged in parliamentary maneuvers since the end of the war, making alliances with reformist socialists and bourgeois politicians at the expense of the workers.

The Stalinist leaders cooperated fully with Washington and London in 1945 in forming the United Nations and sowing illusions in all countries that this instrument of imperialism would guarantee peace. Lenin called the predecessor of the UN, the League of Nations, a "thieves' kitchen" and refused to have anything to do with it. Stalin, on the other hand, as an extension of his class-collaborationist people's front policy, brought the Soviet Union into the League. In becoming a principal sponsor of the United Nations in 1945, Stalin was merely continuing his policy of the 1930s, which was the very opposite of Leninism.

Following the end of the war Stalin kept control of the East European countries that were occupied by the Red Army as it advanced to Germany. Eventually capitalism in these countries was toppled, mainly by military-bureaucratic means. Their economies were nationalized to a large extent, but workers political parties other than those adhering to Moscow were prohibited. The purpose of these steps was to create a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and West Europe intended to help keep invaders out of the USSR.

The dictatorships clamped upon the countries in this buffer zone had little or no support from the indigenous peoples. The revolution was brought to them "on the points of bayonets," a method that is no part of Marxism. Deeply resented, even though capitalist property relations were destroyed, the effects of this kind of revolutionary transformation poisoned relations between the USSR and East Europe.

In Germany (1953), in Hungary (1956), and in Czechoslovakia (1968), Soviet armies were used to put down uprisings. In each case the people fought for democratic rights and the right of self-determination. At the same time they wanted to retain the new property relations established in their countries.

The Stalinist charges that these revolts were designed to restore capitalism were outright lies. The rebels sought to make political revolutions while retaining the planned economies. The repressions served to exacerbate relations between the victims and the Soviet officialdom.

Yugoslavia and China became notable exceptions to the defeat of the postwar revolutions. In both countries, partisan and insurgent forces took the field against capitalist rulers and were successful. Subsequently both countries took steps to replace capitalist property relations through nationalization. To the extent that the Communist parties of these two countries fought without Soviet aid and without Moscow's permission, they departed from their previous practices. However, it did not take them very long to develop their own brands of Stalinism.

Both the Yugoslav and Chinese CPs believe in the theory of socialism in one country. Both support economically privileged bureaucratic castes. Both have dictatorial regimes that allow no democratic rights, criticism, or opposition. Both are narrowly nationalistic and support capitalist states in other countries. Neither one has ever made any serious effort to form or help organize a revolutionary communist international to replace the one Stalin liquidated.

In the Chinese and Yugoslav revolutions no help was received from the Soviet Stalinists, who supported their enemies, at least diplomatically. Stalin made an agreement regarding Yugoslavia with Churchill during the war that, of course, did not include a revolution but looked to retention of the monarchy that existed before the war. His agreements with Roosevelt and Churchill for the postwar period included his recognizing the Chiang Kai-shek regime as the only legitimate government in China.

The Stalinists played a particularly treacherous role in the 1940s in Greece, where mass armed forces under Communist party control were in position to win power as in Yugoslavia. Stalin refused them any help and stood by as British troops destroyed this promising revolutionary development. This was in strict accordance with agreements made by Stalin with Churchill regarding Greece, agreements the Greek people knew nothing about.

In the United States in 1945 the Stalinists expelled Browder, their leader since 1929, making him the scape-goat for liquidating the party during the war. The hapless Browder thought he was carrying out Moscow's orders as he had for sixteen years, but someone was needed to take the rap and he was the logical choice as Stalin's best-known American disciple.

The new line from Moscow called for reorganizing the party; and with Browder out of the way this was done. However, the harmful effects of the party's jingoism during the war period continued to haunt it.

Anti-Communist campaigns in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) were carried on until all the unions under CP influence or control were forced out. The CP put up a poor fight for the place of these unions in the CIO. At one convention CP delegates voted for a redbaiting resolution in an effort to relieve the right-wing pressure. This only whetted the appetites of the red-hunters. The Stalinist method of fighting against red-baiting by joining the red-baiters was an outstanding failure.

Two prominent leaders who remained in the CIO with their unions were Michael Quill, head of the Transport Workers Union and Joe Curran, head of the National Maritime Union. These well-known Stalinists deserted the CP like rats from a sinking ship. They made their peace with the right-wing CIO leaders Philip Murray and Walter Reuther by becoming virulent red-baiters.

Many other Stalinist union officials followed their lead and broke with the CP in favor of keeping their union jobs.

In 1948 the United States government, as part of its witch-hunt policy that accompanied Truman's launching of the cold war,' fired James Kutcher from his clerk's job with a Veterans' Administration office in New Jersey. Kutcher was a veteran of World War II who had lost both legs in the fighting in Italy. He was charged with membership in the Socialist Workers party, which he did not deny but openly avowed. In his eight-year fight for the right to his job even though he belonged to the SWP, which was listed on the attorney general's "loyalty list," Kutcher got no support from the CP.

Yet at that very time many Stalinists were being fired from jobs, and their leaders were indicted and tried under the same law (the Smith Act) that had been used against the leaders of the Minneapolis Teamsters union and the Trotskyists in 1941. Their position on the Kutcher and Minneapolis cases, as well as their other betrayals, made it difficult for them to get any support for themselves. They were completely isolated and without friends. While part of this may be attributed to the cold war atmosphere, the main reason was the shabby record they had accumulated over a period of years.

The Stalinists refused to draw the indicated lessons from their experiences in class-collaboration politics. In 1948 they made a bloc with Henry Wallace, a prestigious Democrat and vice-president under Roosevelt, who was in favor of a less belligerent policy towards the Soviet Union than President Harry S. Truman was following.

The Stalinists, Wallace, and others formed the Progressive party and ran Wallace for the presidency in the 1948 elections. The new party received relatively few votes and the effort was looked upon as a failure. Wallace was not slow to ditch his CP friends. On July 16, 1950, only a few weeks after Truman intervened in the civil war in Korea, Wallace came out in support of the imperialist aggression.

By the time of the 1948 campaign the American Stalinists had accumulated a twelve-year record of opposing independent working-class politics and supporting one or another capitalist party. This was particularly evident in the CIO, where from its birth in 1935 the CP bitterly fought every attempt to secure support for the formation of a labor party, an idea that enjoyed wide popularity among rank-and-file unionists.

The failure of the Wallace candidacy even to get a fair-sized vote taught the Stalinists nothing. They kept the Progressive party alive and in 1952 ran Vincent Hallinan for president. This effort was even less successful than the one in 1948. American politics simply had no need for a third capitalist party.

After the Hallinan campaign, the Progressive party had very little left in it besides the Stalinist contingent. The CP leaders decided to liquidate it. In the discussion that accompanied this step, they concluded that it had been a mistake to leave the Democratic party in the first place! Since then they have given the Democrats open or back-handed support in much the same way they supported Roosevelt.

During the late 1940s and thereafter the CP was made the principal victim of the witch-hunt. Its response to various disclosures that the party was riddled with FBI agents was to expel a good number of its members merely on the basis of vague suspicions.

Trials in which CP leaders were defendants, and hearings conducted by congressional witch-hunters, revealed that well-known party leaders had turned against it. Louis Budenz, a prominent CP figure and for years editor of the party's paper, the Daily Worker, turned up as an "expert" on alleged disloyalty on the part of the Communist party. Another highly publicized "expert" was former CPer Whittaker Chambers, whose testimony was instrumental in convicting Alger Hiss as a "perjurer" and sending him to jail. Hiss, a liberal Democrat, was convicted despite support from some sections of the Roosevelt administration which he had served. There was hardly a trial or hearing of one kind or another where the stable of informers led by Budenz was not trotted out to testify against the CP.

The Stalinists graduated an extraordinary number of stool pigeons and professional informers. As they surfaced during the McCarthy witch-hunt period, they damaged the CP to a considerable extent. With the exception of those FBI agents sent into the CP, the rest were products of the Stalin school and its treacherous politics. Budenz, Chambers, and the others merely changed masters; their political method remained the same.

The American CP declined precipitously in membership and influence in the 1950s. Its position in the unions was completely destroyed. An entire generation of young radicals who had entered the CIO at the behest of the CP in the 1930s and had made a mark there deserted the CP in the 1950s, demoralized by the combination of Stalinist betrayals and imperialist pressures. They had never been taught how to cope with either one.

Much the same took place in the Black community, where the CP never recovered the losses it suffered during the war when it turned its back on the completely justified struggle of Blacks for better jobs.

On top of everything else, in 1956 the Communist party was on the receiving end of a hard blow delivered by Khrushchev in his secret speech at a Soviet CP congress. In this lengthy exposure, Khrushchev disclosed some of Stalin's crimes. Unable and unwilling to acknowledge the scope of Stalin's frame-ups and murders of revolutionaries, as well as his counterrevolutionary politics, the CP began to lose its moral authority with its own membership. Splits and individual departures reduced the party membership to a small fraction of what it had been at its peak.

(To be continued)

Solidarity With the Chilean Workers!

[The following statement was issued September 19 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

With the defeat of the Bolivian working class in August 1971, Chile became the epicenter of the class struggle in Latin America. The international revolutionary movement followed events in Chile knowing that a test of strength was inevitable. This test of strength-prepared by the increasingly bitter partial confrontations of the past two years and foreshadowed by the unsuccessful coup of June 29-came dramatically on September 11. The armed forces launched a criminal attack on the working class, its organizations, and its long-standing and newly won gains, an attack against the most basic democratic rights. This new manifestation of the barbarism of the so-called national ruling classes and imperialism has been marked by the death of thousands, and no doubt even tens of thousands, in Santiago and other parts of the country. Once again these rulers have shown-through rivers of

blood-that all political, judicial, and human considera-

tions are subordinate to the ferocious and intransigent

Once again there has been a tragic confirmation of the danger to humanity from capitalism in its death agony; once again a confirmation of the shamefully mystified nature of the "principles" and "values" of a society of exploitation and oppression! Once again a confirmation of the catastrophic consequences for the working class that lurk behind the illusory and irresponsible perspective of a "peaceful" and "democratic" transition to socialism in a world in which for more than half a century there have been on all continents local and generalized wars, revolutionary convulsions, bloody repressions, and fascist and military dictatorships!

The Unidad Popular Program and the Dynamics of Mass Mobilization

defense of their threatened interests.

The Unidad Popular schema was presented by its supporters as the prelude to a stage in which the passage to socialism would be on the agenda; it foresaw reformist action within the framework of the capitalist system. That is why the coalition included political formations of bourgeois origin. What is worse, it sought collaboration with sectors of the bourgeoisie and the party representing these sectors and reaffirmed its complete fidelity to the existing constitutional system. That is why the key layers of the bourgeoisie—which had already sanctioned a moderate reformist course under Frei's presidency—decided to give a green light to the Allende experiment in the framework of the conditions laid out during the negotiations that followed the September 4, 1970, elections, con-

ditions that included the unaltered maintenance of the military apparatus. To symbolize the relative continuity of the reformist undertaking, the Unidad Popular did not propose a new agrarian reform, but limited itself to applying in a more systematic and rapid fashion the reform enacted by Frei. Nevertheless, the victory of September 4 and Allende's accession to the presidency were felt by the broad masses to be a defeat of historic dimensions inflicted on the class enemy. In fact, a new relationship of forces was created, more favorable than ever before to the working class, the peasants, and the radicalized petty bourgeoisie.

The carrying out of the reforms promised in the UP program and the blow dealt to imperialist property in the mining industry were additional stimuli to the mass movement. Quite rapidly, the mass movement showed a tendency to clash with the reformist framework upheld by Allende and his coalition: The workers wanted to expropriate the factories that were supposed to remain in the private sector; the peasants interpreted the agrarian reform in their own way. The dynamic of the class struggle was rapidly unfolding according to the logic of basic class interests, breaking the preestablished schemas.

Even the sectors of the bourgeoisie that had initially been favorable to the UP began to become alarmed, as they became alerted to the dangers threatening their interests as exploiters, not the "freedom" of the Chilean people or basic democratic rights. After many crises, they clearly went over to the opposition. The right wing of the UP left the government and quit the coalition. The Christian Democrats adopted an increasingly aggressive attitude, going so far as to engage in obstruction and sabotage. As conflicts became increasingly acute, action by fascist squads and instigation of a reactionary revolt among petty-bourgeois layers became the political instruments used on a greater and greater scale. Imperialism primarily American imperialism - made its own contribution through blackmail, threats, and financial and economic pressures and maneuvers of all kinds.

The situation thus emerged as an absolutely clear counterposition and delimitation of antagonistic forces, with the petty-bourgeois layers divided and vacillating. At that point the bourgeoisie, frightened by the dynamic of the mass movement, abandoned the reformist project. The proletariat struggled to widen the breaches opened in the system and to establish its power. The Unidad Popular, while desiring an agreement and desperately seeking a compromise, could not accept the capitulation demanded by the bourgeoisie, which would have meant breaking with the masses, thereby bringing on defeat.

The Bourgeoisie Chooses the Road of a Military Coup

The basic failure of the Christian Democrats' plan to force Allende to capitulate through a series of partial confrontations leading to the progressive erosion of his mass base was highlighted by the outcome of the struggles of October 1972, by the results of the March 1973 elections, and by their inability last June to mobilize more than a small percentage of the El Teniente miners in a campaign of demagogy and sabotage. For the Christian Democrats, and for the whole bourgeois front, this failure once again posed the problem of fundamental strategy. Could they afford to keep playing the game of respecting constitutional norms and using the mechanisms of the state apparatus to thwart or even to paralyze Allende's actions, or would they have to move to a coup d'etat?

The failure of the June 29 coup-leaving aside the possible mistakes and technical hitches-reflected the bourgeoisie's persisting indecision, its internal differences, and the hesitation of the armed forces themselves. But Colonel Souper's coup triggered a significant mass mobilization. The masses attained an unprecedented level of radicalization. More than 1,000 factories were occupied by the workers, who, making use of the full potential of the cordones industriales, the organs of proletarian democracy thrown up by the October 1972 struggles, organized their own political control and defense, and proclaimed their will not to return to the owners even the factories theoretically included in the private sector. At the same time, mass consciousness took a qualitative leap forward, as the workers grasped the necessity of arming themselves to deal with new reactionary attacks.

The Chilean bourgeoisie soon understood that the situation had come to a crucial turning point. It had sustained a very severe blow against its economic power; it saw that the outlines of a situation of dual power were emerging and that embryos of workers militias were being formed. With the agreement of the leaders of American imperialism, it decided to abandon partial confrontations in order to move to a major test of strength, to abandon utilization of all the "legal" tricks and obstructive maneuvers in order to turn to the use of arms. The July-August negotiations were probably aimed either at gaining time or at testing, one last time, whether it was possible to force Allende to step down peacefully.

Since Allende could not and would not step down peacefully and since the mass movement did not ebb, the coup was unleashed with all the determination and ferocity required, from the standpoint of defending the interests of the exploiters, by a very explosive situation and an extraordinary mass mobilization.

The Chilean working class opposed the coup d'etat with a courage and spirit of sacrifice that will go down in the history of the international workers movement. They defended the factories arms in hand against the military's attacks; pockets of resistance cropped up even in the center of Santiago and in its suburbs; groups of soldiers and sailors of working-class and peasant origin would not obey the criminal orders of their officers and heroically rebelled. Despite the massive use of measures of extermination, despite the veritable massacres, the resistance has not been completely broken. The working class and democratic public opinion on all continents quickly expressed its indignation and condemnation of the coup on an unprecedentedly massive scale.

The Latin American workers movement, which in the

month of July suffered a coup in Uruguay, has suffered a defeat of great dimensions. If the new military regime consolidates itself, this defeat will weigh heavily on the relationship of forces throughout the continent.

The Lessons of a Tragic Defeat

For three years the Communist and Socialist parties throughout the world held up the Chilean example as proof of the validity of their theories on the transition to socialism. The tragic experience of the Unidad Popular bears a series of essential lessons. These lessons should have been drawn from innumerable experiences in the past, notably in Latin America from the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala by a mercenary army in 1954 through the coup fostered by the imperialists and the Brazilian gorillas that placed Banzer in power in Bolivia in August 1971. The Chilean proletariat has paid a very high price for the fact that these lessons were learned only by vanguard elements that were not yet in position to determine the course of events. It is the duty of revolutionists to struggle so that the heroic sacrifice of thousands of Chilean workers and militants should not be in vain, so that the reformist and opportunist mystifications imposed on the masses by the traditional bureaucratic apparatuses should be definitively destroyed.

The Chilean events of the past three years demonstrate just how illusory is the perspective of a "democratic, antioligarchic, and anti-imperialist stage" of the revolution in which the national bourgeoisie can participate, from the standpoint both of objective facts and of political possibilities. No bourgeoisie can go beyond absolutely limited reforms or attack the basic interests of imperialism. Further, no bourgeoisie is inclined to move even to a reformist course unless it is assured of being able to strictly control the process and to crush any independent dynamic of the mass movement. The Peruvian military regime is a classic illustration of this.

The Chilean events show that labor reformism, even under broadly favorable conditions, leads rapidly to an impasse. Even the reforms actually carried out threaten to be challenged and emptied of all content unless they are generalized. Such a generalization leads inevitably to a threshold that cannot be crossed without breaking the mechanism of the capitalist system itself. And further, partial measures attack many bourgeois interests without destroying them; they inevitably provoke reactions by forces that continue to command powerful resources and allies. Once again, it has been proven that the petty bourgeoisie cannot be won over by a conciliationist attitude; an anticapitalist perspective must be offered to combat in the most determined fashion the maneuvers of the ruling class.

The Chilean events show the absurdity of the plan of a transition to socialism without the destruction of the entire state apparatus, the apparatus that the ruling class has organized and structured to be as efficient as possible in guaranteeing the maintenance of its system of exploitation and oppression. This is not to deny the tactical need to utilize every legal possibility or to exploit exceptional circumstances such as those created by the elections of September 4, 1970, in Chile. What must be understood is the absolute and urgent necessity, in a situation of

mass revolutionary upsurge, of building revolutionary organs of proletarian democracy, elements of dual power, instruments of struggle for the conquest of power, and embryos of qualitatively new political structures of a workers state that will issue from the revolution.

The Chilean reformists systematically denied this necessity; they contented themselves with promoting organs with altogether limited functions, devoid of any real independence from the "constitutional" state organs. Under the impact of dramatic experiences, the workers, especially during the past year, had rediscovered these fundamental needs and had formed organs rich in revolutionary potential, such as the cordones industriales. But their initiatives were developed too late; they were not generalized; and worse, they were often partially deprived of their content by the maneuvers of the bureaucracy, which was determined to remove from the cordones their potential to become Chilean soviets and, after having devitalized them, to integrate them into the reformist constitutionalist strategy.

And finally, the Chilean events show once again that the premise that it is possible to exerthrow the capitalist regime without revolutionary violence, without armed struggle, is the most shameful of mystifications and the most suicidal of illusions. It is of primary necessity to understand that when the crucial moment of the confrontation for power comes, armed conflict, independent of the specific forces involved, is inevitable in every case and that, to repeat Lenin's expression, "the military question is the central political question."

The working class must systematically prepare itself within such a perspective, rejecting all spontanéist illusions and understanding the necessity, on this point too, of centralized action. It must understand that a purely defensive attitude prepares defeat when the crucial time arrives, and it must seize the initiative from the enemy.

"The experience of other countries, above all in Latin America," said a resolution on Chile passed by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International in December 1971, "from the invasion of Guatemala in 1954 to Banzer's coup d'etat in Bolivia last August, has shown that the working class must consider its own self-defense as an elementary task. The lesson is written in letters of blood the blood of workers, peasants, and students. Any illusions in the 'good will' of the foe must be rejected as suicidal. In view of the nature of the government and the relations between the Unidad Popular coalition and the broad majority of the masses, the task facing the workers and peasants is to arm themselves, to form political and military instruments of self-defense, to organize a genuine popular militia, to disseminate revolutionary propaganda among the soldiers. Not to begin along these lines would mean in practice depending on the 'democratic loyalty' of the army and the specialized repressive bodies. It would mean incapacity to respond to the need felt by increasingly broad sectors of the masses, alerted by the events in Bolivia. Allende's proclamations, according to which the Popular Unity will meet any reactionary violence should it occur, constitute nothing but demagogic bragging, since they involve nothing practical. In place of relying on spontanéism and improvisations, the necessary instruments must be put together now to prevent the class enemy from achieving a crushing material superiority when the inevitable confrontation comes about. Against any possible misunderstanding, the revolutionary Marxists stress that it is not against Allende, but against the threats from the right, and to answer any attack from the forces of bourgeois repression, that the workers and peasants must place on the agenda the crucial problem of arming themselves."

The Chilean reformists disputed these elementary truths. The fact that many of them have added their names to the long list of martyrs of the workers movement neither eliminates nor moderates their heavy historical responsibility. The absence of a revolutionary party capable of playing a leading role on a mass scale has been proven once more to be a decisive factor for the proletariat.

". . . Chile will not prove to be a historic exception," affirmed the December 1971 United Secretariat resolution; "the capitalist system in Chile will not be overturned without the decisive intervention of a revolutionary party, the conscious vanguard of the masses. The tasks pertaining to such a party cannot be left to the Chilean Communist party to carry out. This party, bearing the stamp of a long Stalinist tradition, is the instrument of an indigenous labor bureaucracy and relatively conservative layers of the proletariat that have not been mobilizing in the current crisis with the same dynamism as the younger generation. It has maintained all its traditional concepts, not cutting in the least way the umbilical cord tying it to the Soviet bureaucracy. The tasks of the revolutionary party cannot be left to the Socialist party either. While the SP has gained a wider hearing, particularly among the younger workers, and has, in the organizations it controls, adopted positions to the left of those of the Communist party - a genuine cesspool of reformism-it does not have the structure of a combat party, it does not have solid and continuous links with the masses it influences, and is more a conglomeration of tendencies and groups than a homogeneous formation, and, in the final analysis, bears the characteristic traits of a centrist organization. In any case, it is necessary to reject any concept based, explicitly or implicitly, on the hypothesis that, thanks to the dynamism of the revolutionary process and the power of the mass movement and thanks to the weakening of the bourgeoisie and its very likely continuing decomposition and a situation in which imperialism would be compelled to renounce military intervention, the proletariat can come to power even without a genuine revolutionary Leninist party. It is likewise necessary to reject the variant derived from the hypothesis that an ersatz revolutionary party might prove sufficient, that is, some kind of front in which the revolutionists assemble together, or a cartel in which different organizations of the far left join up."

Struggle Against the Military Dictatorship! Organize Militant International Solidarity!

A military coup d'etat in a situation like that of Chile during recent months could not be imposed bloodlessly or by limited repressive action. All signs confirm that there has been courageous and tenacious resistance from the proletariat; it is not excluded that sectors of the army—The rank and file of which is made up of sons of workers and peasants doing their military service—might revolt

against the orders of reactionary officers, thus setting in motion a civil-war dynamic.

The resistance has developed heroically and has not been completely crushed. But the possibility of a revolt in the army has not materialized, or has not materialized sufficiently to create the preconditions for immediate civil war.

The question of struggle against the military dictatorship is on the agenda. It is the duty of the revolutionary vanguard to carry out the necessary turn as quickly as possible. The problem of armed struggle is no longer posed in the same terms as it was after September 1970. The prior orientation—centered on the arming of the masses—remains fundamentally valid in the event of a civil war in which the worker and peasant forces occupy certain regions of the country. In that eventuality, the revolutionists would launch on a world scale the slogan of formation of international brigades.

It is necessary now to build an active campaign of solidarity throughout the world in the best traditions of the mobilizations for Vietnam.

Chile must be defended against the barbarism of the

putschists and their "national bourgeois" and imperialist masters!

For immediate, massive, and militant solidarity with the Chilean proletariat! Halt the criminal hand of the assassins! Demand the reestablishment of the Chilean people's elementary democratic rights! Demand the immediate release of all political prisoners! Defend the right of asylum for political refugees from the other countries of Latin America and their right to travel to any country of their choice! Extend political and material aid to the heroic resistance of the Chilean workers!

Imperialism and the so-called national bourgeoisie are cynically hailing the coup that they have inflicted on the Chilean workers and peasants and on the workers and peasants movement throughout Latin America and the whole world. But the enormity of the crime and the heroism of the resistance will have incalculable repercussions. The Chilean events will press forward the maturation of revolutionary consciousness, as did imperialism's criminal war in Vietnam and the heroic Vietnamese popular struggle. Capitalism will pay for its current success in Chile—a historically ephemeral success—with a dramatic deepening of its own contradictions.

Statement by Chilean Revolutionists Prior to Coup

[The following statement by the Central Committee of the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR—Revolutionary Socialist party), Chilean section of the Fourth International, was adopted September 1, days before the military coup that overthrew the government of Salvador Allende. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]

1. The national political situation is taking a crucial turn toward a definitive solution of the question of power. The need to bring an end to the period of instability is resulting in important changes in the political arena that are altering the relationship of forces between antagonistic classes, as well as bringing about modifications within those classes. This will lead to a confrontation within a very short period of time.

2. The UP [Unidad Popular — Popular Unity] government, as it was constituted in September-November 1970, has exhausted its possibilities. At the present time it conforms to the needs of neither the proletariat nor the bourgeoisie. In spite of its obvious rightward evolution, and in spite of the concessions it has granted, it does not satisfy the demands of imperialism

and the national bourgeoisie; the bourgeoisie takes advantage of these very concessions to push for the government's complete capitulation—as a first alternative—while at the same time organizing to forcibly overthrow it

3. Toward this end, the exploiters are using all means, legal and illegal. They have divided up their tasks among the various sectors: To outright terrorism is added partisan political pressure through mass mobilizations, strikes by union sectors they control, and attempts to split the workers movement itself with the aim of strengthening their social base. At the same time, they are stepping up their work inside the armed forces in order to push them into carrying out a coup d'etat.

4. The bourgeois class is on the political offensive at the moment, and is exerting its aggressiveness even outside its own parties. This reflects a crisis of bourgeois leadership. The bourgeoisie finds itself driven on by the absolute necessity of combating and crushing the workers movement, and by the inadequacies of its traditional political structures. This contradiction hastens its realignment and increases political, economic, and social instability, thereby creating the basis for a preponderant role for the armed forces, which are looming as

the only solution to this crisis of leadership.

5. Caught up in this offensive, the government, from one concession to another, has changed its character; it is losing its possibilities for progressive action and, by turning to the right, is becoming objectively separated from the masses that supported it. Its features of Bonapartism sui generis are evolving, giving it the characteristics of a bureaucratic-military government. This accentuates its separation from the workers and peasants as a whole.

6. The workers and peasants movement is going through a stage of extraordinary development that is giving an indication of the real power it has at its disposal. Important sectors of national industry—the most decisive sectors—are under its control. It is proceeding by various means to expropriate private property; in manufacturing plants and agricultural firms, it is combining forms of workers control over production with direct administration, and it remains firmly determined not to return them to the former owners.

7. This situation shows how vigorous the offensive of the workers is—an offensive that is putting its stamp on the entire period. While a general political mobilization has not yet

taken place, it is clear that preparations for it are being made on the basis of the substantial levels that have been attained. What we are experiencing is a stage during which forces are being accumulated within the workingclass movement, one of the main characteristics of which is the military preparations that are spontaneously occurring among the rank and file, at the very heart of the class, in the factories, in the peasant committees, and in the cordones industriales [assemblies of rank-and-file workers in a local industrial concentration]. The determination to advance the socialist revolution raises the level of consciousness among the workers, who are preparing to stop the bourgeois offensive arms in hand.

8. The radicalization that is under way - the increasing maturity of political consciousness, which is a direct product of action by the masses - is opening up a chasm between the struggling masses and their reformist leaderships; this chasm is widening day by day. Broad vanguard layers with links to the workers as a whole are quickly coming to understand both the need to destroy imperialism and the national bourgeoisie, and the urgency of building a genuine revolutionary leadership. The reformist leaderships are attempting to obstruct this positive evolution by temporarily staving off the unleashing of a forthright antibourgeois offensive, which, by its very dynamics, would also put an end to the illusions that the present government is still able to muster.

9. There is a visible lessening of the possibilities of politically controlling the masses by means of the reformist leaderships. The ranks of the workers parties are being greatly affected; as an integral and decisive part of the workers movement, they already cannot reconcile their approach with that of their own leaders, and they are threatening to open up a struggle within their own parties. Healthy revolutionary currents are searching for an organization, pointing the way to political shifts that will create the prerequisites for the formation of the revolutionary party.

10. It is the interaction of all these phenomena that is inevitably leading to a confrontation between the classes within an ever diminishing period of time. It is a life-and-death necessity

for imperialism and the national bourgeoisie first to contain, and then to crush, this workers movement that is in practice expropriating them. The bourgeoisie understands clearly that even a capitulation by the government that did not yet reflect agreement on an offensive against the workers movement would not be enough. It is this determination that will decide how much time the bourgeoisie grants to the present government before throwing all its forces into overthrowing it.

11. It is these social and political factors that make the solution to the question of power, of spreading the revolutionary process, and of the triumph of that process possible only in the arena of armed struggle. Now the broad masses of industrial workers and peasants are preparing for struggle with this fundamental understanding. The class struggle is spreading within the armed forces; there too a breach has been opened between the ranks and the leadership. The troops, sensitive to their class origins, are joining in the general mood of the workers, and are unleashing contradictions within the repressive bodies of the bourgeois state.

12. The Partido Socialista Revolucionario places its participation in this process of armed struggle at the center of its activities; it does so with complete clarity and determination. The possibility of being a decisive nucleus in the formation of the party of the socialist revolution, and of working for the victory of that revolution, is inconceivable without involvement in preparing

and carrying out armed struggle. For us it is not a matter of substituting ourselves for the class but of participating without reservation in order, united with the broad masses, to lead the inevitable armed confrontation in which the most active sectors are already involved, having responded to the initiative of the working class.

13. Let us reaffirm the tasks laid down in the August 10 resolution of the Political Bureau:

a) Crush the bourgeois counterrevolution, and particularly its most active focus—the truck owners' strike. Support the initiative taken by the cordones industriales and the comandos comunales [municipal commands] to requisition the vehicles of the strikers.

b) Reject any deal and all dialogue with the enemies of the workers.

c) In order to crush the bourgeoisie and go beyond the reformists the power of the workers and the people must be strengthened in its genuine, rankand-file form: the cordones industriales and the comandos comunales. No return of factories to their former owners. Continue the expropriation of the national bourgeoisie.

d) Build revolutionary unity as a tool for moving forward in the revolutionary process. Concretize this unity on all levels with the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria — Movement of the Revolutionary Left], MAPU (G) [Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (Garretón) — Movement for United Popular Action (Garretón)], and advanced sectors of the PS [Partido Socialista — Socialist party].

Growing Dual Power in Chile on Eve of Coup

[Intercontinental Press has received the following article, which had been scheduled to be published in the September issue of Revolución Permanente, organ of the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR—Revolutionary Socialist party), Chilean section of the Fourth International. It has been translated by Intercontinental Press.]

The revolutionary upsurge of the workers movement has witnessed a notable increase in political class consciousness since the victory over the attempted coup d'etat on June 29. This is expressed not only in the occupation of more than 500 factories in Santiago and others in the rest of the country, but essentially in the arming of the proletariat, which is now a generalized phenomenon among vanguard sectors of the working class.

The embryos of workers and popular power that have arisen, essentially in the form of the cordones industriales [assemblies of rank-and-file workers in local industrial concentrations], have gained in strength to the

point that dual power exists in many plants between the bourgeois class and the working class. What is more, a duality of power has arisen in the plants belonging to the state sector of the economy-between the working class and the bourgeois state apparatus, represented by the interventors. The workers who occupied the factories during July and August have not only moved against the real power of the bosses in the privately owned plants, but have expelled the interventor bureaucrats from various plants of the state sector. A struggle must be waged to give political expression to this dual power in order to begin the struggle for the definitive conquest of power.

At this point, workers power is being expressed through the vehicle of the cordones industriales. As the August 9 statement of the Vicuña Mackenna Cordón states: The cordón is popular power.

The most effective way to crush the bourgeoisie and go beyond the restraints imposed by the reformists is for the proletariat to openly move onto the offensive by strengthening the power of the workers and the people. We call for a struggle for all local power to the cordones and comandos comunales [municipal commands, which must requisition trucks, execute the fascists by means of the Popular Tribunals, organize the distribution of food through the JAP Juntas de Abastecimiento y Control de Precios - Supply and Price Control Boards], and solve the problems of health in collaboration with the FENATS workers and left-wing doc-

It is urgent that coordination be given to the embryos of local power by calling a people's assembly as soon as possible. This assembly must not only discuss the taking of political power, but also prepare to do so.

For in the final analysis, it must be clear that the struggle is not one merely of crushing fascists of the ilk of Kornilov in the Russia of 1917, but in a fundamental sense to get ready to struggle for an alternative power to the present, capitulating government. A clear strategy for taking power must be put forward, and it must avoid being derailed by minor, conjunctural questions that have generally turned certain organizations

on the revolutionary left into mere left-wing pressure groups trying to pressure the traditional left.

The workers cannot continue down the aimless path onto which they have been led by the reformists' sellouts. They cannot continue to act on the defensive, waiting for the bourgeoisie to force Allende to resign, or leaving it up to the military to decide on carrying out a coup d'etat, but must organize to begin the struggle to take power. The proletariat and the organizations of the revolutionary left, of the revolutionary sectors of the MAPU Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria - Movement for United Popular Action] (Garretón-Aquevedo) and of the SP, must take the political initiative, overcoming the lack of revolutionary leadership through revolutionary unity, in order to put forward a strategy for power and to prepare, in a serious and responsible way, to begin the armed struggle for the conquest of proletarian political power.

Armed struggle must be begun not when the proletariat is entering a period of retreat, which can happen in the face of massive repression by the armed forces, but in a period of full, revolutionary upsurge by the masses, as at the present moment. The dangers of "foquista" or "militarist" deviations will be overcome not only by the organizations of the revolutionary left understanding the errors committed by the guerrilla groups of Latin America, but by the massive character that the armed struggle in Chile will acquire with the involvement of thousands of proletarian men and women in the Revolutionary Army of the People. The determination of the proletariat will be a catalyst in hastening the present crisis within the armed forces, by helping the soldiers and sailors to decide to pass over to the cause of socialism. Forward, Workers: To the Attack!

Unaffected by 'End' of Martial Law

Turkish Generals Continue Show Trials

Despite the announcement that martial law will be lifted, the Turkish generals are continuing to hold military trials of their political opponents, including civilians. According to a report by John de St. Jorre in the September 16 London Observer, the end of martial law "will not affect the course of these trials."

Most of the trials are being held in Selimiye Barracks at Scutari. The generals have lumped together defendants from the most varied backgrounds. St. Jorre described one of these spectacles:

"The largest and most important of these began in May and could easily run on for another six months, possibly much longer. . . . There are 255 defendants—25 of them women, one of whom died during the proceedings—and 100 lawyers. The roll call took three-quarters of an hour to read, the book-length 599-page indictment several days. The military prosecutors are demanding 10 death sentences and a total of 3,000 years' imprisonment.

"For the Turkish authorities it is something of a show trial. The defendants include the sole survivor of the Mahir Cayan guerrilla group—responsible for kidnapping and killing the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul in 1971 and murdering three British NATO technicians—several members of the Marxist Turkish People's Liberation Army, and Yilmaz Guney, Turkey's Humphrey Bogart."

The article went on to make it clear why bourgeois opinion in Europe has been somewhat critical of the repression. It seems that "respectable" critics of the generals have been put in the dock along with leftists:

"As in most of the current military trials in Turkey, there is a wide cross-section of defendants. Many of them are from rich and bourgeois families including a significant number of Army and Air Force officers, but there are also a number of poorer people. The Army, determined to crush the wave of terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare that hit Turkey three years ago, spread its nets wide and in doing so caught up many peaceful, law-abiding dissenters as well as avowed revolutionaries."