

**CHILE:  
There Was  
No  
Revolutionary  
Party**

# A 'Working Woman' With Royal Lifestyle

Marjorie Merriweather Post, a multi-millionaire who got rich selling breakfast food, died September 12 at the age of eighty-six.

The *New York Times*, in an obituary, called her a "rich working woman." She worked hard at amassing wealth, and achieved some measure of success at it—her fortune was estimated at more than \$200 million.

She got her start in business from her father, who left her the Postum Cereal Company, which she built into the General Foods Corporation. In addition to teaching her the value of a dollar and how to run the company, her father, who conducted contests among his workers for the best garden, taught her a love for flowers.

Her lifestyle was in harmony with her success. She acquired many estates, threw lavish parties, and hired a domestic staff of forty. Her butlers would work all day prior to dinner parties centering tables. They used yardsticks to measure precisely the placement of dinner plates, napkins, silver, and candleholders.

Her parties on the 316-foot yacht, *Sea Cloud*, which could accommodate up to 400 people, once prompted Norway's Queen Maude to exclaim, "Why, you live like a queen, don't you?"

She anticipated some inconvenience as the wife of the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1937-38, so she had 2,000 pints of frozen pasteurized cream and twenty-five refrigerators shipped ahead to the American Embassy in Moscow.

Like some other rich folk, she collected art. Her American Indian collection, said to be one of the world's finest, included totem poles, stuffed animals, and war bonnets worn by Geronimo and Sitting Bull. It took two servants four hours every day just to dust it.

She was known for large donations to the Salvation Army, the Red Cross, and the Boy Scouts. She once said, though, "By God, there is a bottom to my pocketbook—even if people don't think so." If there was, she does not appear to have ever seen it.

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## The Coup in Chile—What Happened and Why

By Gerry Foley

"Permit me, on this solemn occasion . . . to voice our people's thanks to the armed forces and to the Carabineer Corps [riot police], which abide by the constitution and the rule of law." (Salvador Allende speaking at his inauguration as president of Chile in November 1970.)

From the very beginning of his presidency, Salvador Allende placed his fate in the hands of the military high command, which he thanked for allowing him to take office. The struggles of the workers and poor strata that brought him to power were not mentioned.

In order to get the votes of the Christian Democratic parliamentary bloc, which he needed in order to be confirmed as president-elect, Allende signed an agreement pledging that his regime would leave the military and police intact. The size of the armed services was not to be altered, nor any officers appointed who had not passed through the official academies, that is, who were not certified products of the bourgeois military machine.

No other armed forces, such as workers and people's militias, were to be permitted. In addition Allende "guaranteed" not to interfere with the press, radio, or judiciary.

In attempting to reassure the bourgeoisie, Allende left intact forces that would seek, as soon as the opportunity presented itself or as soon as they felt their vital interests were endangered, to crush the rising working-class movement at any cost. This conciliationism threatened ultimately to expose the Chilean workers and poor, and the left parties in particular, to one of the most savage repressions in the history of the country and to deal a brutal blow to popular movements throughout the continent. It threatened to make this "island of democracy" into a deadly trap for persecuted militants from all over Latin America who found Allende's Chile one of the few places of refuge left.

Far from reducing the political power of the military, Allende promoted

it. As the society became increasingly polarized by class struggle, his class-collaborationist government turned more and more to the armed forces, specifically to the high command, in search of a neutral force and a guarantor of "legality."

Since the Unidad Popular (UP—Popular Unity) coalition was committed to "constitutional change" and the "peaceful road to socialism," what alternative, after all, did it have to depending on the legal armed forces of the bourgeois state to defend it against the growing sabotage and subversion of the bourgeoisie and imperialism? The Communist party, in particular—the most politically consistent and dominant force in the coalition—was convinced that the military could play the essential arbiter's role.

Some months before the UP's victory in the 1970 presidential elections, Communist party General Secretary Luis Corvalán said that his party opposed proposals to arm the masses as being "equivalent to showing distrust in the army," which, he claimed was "not invulnerable to the new winds blowing in Latin America and penetrating everywhere." (See the January 1, 1970, issue of *Drapeau Rouge*, the organ of the Belgian CP.)

Corvalán's confidence, moreover, remained unshaken. In a speech quoted in the July 31 issue of the pro-UP weekly *Chile Hoy*, he said: "They [the reactionaries] are claiming that we have an orientation of replacing the professional army.

"No sir, we continue and will continue to support keeping our armed institutions strictly professional."

### Allende Arms the Executioners

The UP government had an opportunity to prove its faith in the armed forces. When the navy high command cracked down on enlisted men and petty officers who were overheard saying that they would not obey orders to overthrow the government, Allende came down hard in support of mil-

itary discipline. Even some bourgeois journalists felt that this put him in a strange position.

For example, the September 11 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde* published a dispatch from Pierre Kalfon in Santiago: "Not least ironic in this affair is that it is Allende himself who has demanded this prosecution [of those accused of inspiring insubordination in the navy]. So, we have come to the paradox that for encouraging the loyalty of the sailors who refused to rebel against the regime, political leaders defending respect for the constitution are being prosecuted by the president of the republic on behalf of putschist officers, and they face a minimum sentence of ten years in prison."

As for the naval officers, they were not interested in any legal niceties. "The Socialist party organized a debate in the studios of the Valparaíso television station," Marcel Niedergang reported in the September 13 *Le Monde*, "and the wives of the tortured sailors came to testify. A group of navy men broke into the studios and arrested all the participants. The commander in chief of the Valparaíso naval base refused flatly to offer any explanations or justifications."

At the same time, Allende offered new guarantees and concessions to the bourgeoisie: "It seems that, to the indignation of his left wing but with the approval of the Communist party," wrote Kalfon from Santiago immediately before the coup, "Allende is ready to introduce a constitutional reform strictly defining the three sectors of the economy (public, mixed, and private) and restoring to their owners a number of factories occupied by the workers."

The leader of the class-collaborationist front was prepared to make other concessions: "He also yielded on an important point," Kalfon continued: "He agreed to expel the Socialist party, CP, and MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria — Movement of the Revolutionary Left] elements from the University of Chile



television network (Channel 9), which they had seized more than seven months ago and made into a voice of the left."

Two reporters for the New York Maoist weekly *The Guardian* watched the evacuation of the television station and wrote this account in the pro-Allende publication: "Workers shouted 'treachery' and many broke down in tears of rage as they peacefully abandoned the building. The 'workers' channel' was a major tool for popular education and agitation for nine months and its return to the bourgeoisie was, in the words of Socialist party secretary Carlos Altamirano, 'a great defeat for the revolutionary process.'" Only a few days after this capitulation, Allende would have a desperate need for this means of communication that he had turned over to an increasingly aggressive bourgeoisie.

Despite these concessions, however, the military escalated a campaign of intimidation against the workers in several areas and in at least one case met much firmer opposition than it got from Allende. Kalfon wrote:

"In the evening of September 7, a military search operation (carried out by the troops of the air force) in a working-class suburb of Santiago gave a foretaste of the kind of confrontation that could occur in Chile if the army decides to move on a large scale against the factories occupied by the workers.

"Most of these factories are in what they call here the 'industrial belts' [cordones industriales], that is, the urban zones where a rather serious organization coordinates the mobilization of the workers with that of the inhabitants of the poor neighborhoods. The air force claims that it did not try to go into the Sumar plant, an important textile factory. But the factory guard seems to have been wounded precisely for opposing the entry of the soldiers.

"The fact is that after a few minutes a heavy crossfire started up between the workers in the factory and the military. The troops who had blocked off the district found themselves surrounded in turn by a crowd of militants coming to the rescue of the workers. Rather than continue a battle that threatened to become bloody, the military opted for retreat."

After consulting with the heads of



Allende supporters celebrate election victory. Popular support for UP was abundant, but revolutionary leadership was lacking.

the armed services, Allende decided that it was a wiser course not to go to the factory himself to see what happened. He was in a very difficult position.

### The Generals 'Enforce the Law'

Kalfon's report continued: "As the armed forces—essentially the air and naval arms—have proceeded to carry out the searches authorized by the 'arms control law' [passed in October by the votes of the bourgeois opposition in parliament; the UP deputies abstained and Allende did not veto it], many supporters of the Unidad Popular are coming to wonder if the June 29 coup was as much of a failure as believed. Since that day, in fact, the army seems to have been progressively dropping the neutrality that was its pride and has been choosing to launch its 'mop up' operations against worker and peasant areas rather than among the bourgeoisie, which, nonetheless, does not make any bones about the fact that it is ready to 'go the limit' to overthrow President Allende."

In the September 13 *Le Monde*, Niedergang wrote: "In recent days confrontations, often armed, have been multiplying in this city between work-

ers and military patrols searching for arms held by civilians. One would have expected that the arms control law would have permitted an effective struggle against the authors of the terrorist attacks. In the last few weeks, more than five hundred attacks attributed, not without grounds, to the far-right Fatherland and Freedom movement have destroyed roads, aqueducts, high-tension towers, factories, and agricultural installations.

"It was obvious that the heads of the armed forces were seeking first to eliminate the 'workers self-defense groups' and dismantle the armed networks set up in the shantytowns and in certain big state-controlled factories by Miguel Enríquez's MIR and by the Socialists who follow Carlos Altamirano."

The fact was that under the cover of the legality of the Allende government itself, the military still being so desperately courted by the head of the class-collaborationist coalition had already begun a coup designed to crush the essential support for his regime.

The workers had not armed in response to calls by any left-wing party. To whatever extent they had armed, they had done so essentially in response to the escalating



violent attacks by the bourgeoisie on the key points of the economy and on the most militant sectors of the workers movement. Although the MIR, a very small party, had raised a number of correct demands for mobilizing the workers to take direct control of the economy and, unlike the UP parties, had warned about the putschist intentions of the military, it never concentrated on the need for arming the workers. Its formulations in this regard were vague and timid at best.

And as for Altamirano, unless he changed his mind at the last minute, his attitude did not seem to differ very much from that of Allende and the CP. He outlined his views in an interview published in the August 23 issue of the Buenos Aires weekly magazine *Panorama*. When asked if the participation of the armed forces in the cabinet meant that they were allied with the UP government, he answered:

"It's not an alliance. The armed institutions are only offering their collaboration to prevent the probable consequences of a truly grave situation. After the defeat of the putschists on June 29, the right is again trying maneuvers designed to create a climate that would encourage hare-brained schemes by minorities. On this occasion also, they will fail. The incorporation of the uniformed services into Compañero Allende's cabinet means that the entire Chilean people stand united against the reactionaries." The August 30 issue of *Panorama* described Altamirano's program as "EMA-Trabajadores," that is, an alliance between the armed services and the workers.

The rightists in and out of the armed forces were, of course, not concerned with any "consequences." In early September a leader of the bourgeois opposition was openly saying, according to Marcel Niedergang in the September 13 *Le Monde*: "If we have to destroy the country to save it, if we have to kill 20,000 Chileans, we'll do it." But presumably the military chiefs appreciated Altamirano's confidence in their determination to avoid "a truly grave situation." Such expressions greatly bolstered their political position.

### **A Class Collaboratorist to the End**

If Altamirano became more skeptical at least of the intentions of the

military, Niedergang stressed that Allende "remained an optimist to the bitter end. Only a few hours before the military uprising on Tuesday [September 11], he declared smiling to the journalists who were interviewing him in the corridors of the presidential palace: 'We are soon going to get over this crisis.'"

"To the leaders of the political parties belonging to the ruling Unidad Popular coalition, he declared emphatically: 'We are going to seek a dialogue with the forces of the opposition. This is the only solution.' But only a few Radicals [liberals] and Communist party members, knowing only too well what they would lose with the establishment of a new military government, even a temporary one, supported him in this desperate and pathetic offer of a dialogue involving concessions so great that if it were achieved it would have condemned to death the experiment initiated in November 1970."

By September 11 Allende was leaning almost exclusively on the Communist party, which was described in *Le Monde's* editorial September 13 as one of his greatest assets in his program of "peaceful social change." It was ". . . a Communist party strictly faithful to the Soviet Union and one that throughout the forty difficult years of its history has rarely been found wanting in moderation."

By the second week of September, Allende's "peaceful road to socialism" was obviously running into deep water. All forms of the bourgeoisie's resistance to the reforms of his regime were converging.

The shortages caused by the economic sabotage of the native bourgeoisie and the imperialists, as well as the government's indecisiveness and bureaucratism, were reaching catastrophic proportions. Supply was hampered by a prolonged strike of truck owners determined to bring the government down. Finally the delivery of wheat to Santiago was cut off altogether by rightist terrorist attacks. Allende was forced to admit September 7 that only a "three or four days' supply of flour remained."

Large sections of the petty bourgeoisie, driven into a frenzy by the malfunctioning of an economy torn by a class struggle that Allende would not lead but was increasingly unable to contain, were mobilized by the right

in wave after wave of attacks on the regime.

On September 5, about 150,000 middle-class women gathered in front of the Catholic University and called on Allende to "resign or commit suicide." This was the only way, they chanted, to avoid civil war. Fascist commandos were active in the demonstration.

In the parliament, the September 7 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión* reported, "the Christian Democrats, leaning more and more to the right, proposed removing, on the charge of violating the constitution, ministers who do not respect the laws of the country."

"Once again, then, the Christian Democrats and Nationalists, or the center and right, are united in opposition to Allende, after a period in which the Christian Democracy had modified its policy, seeking to get Allende to return to 'liberalism.'"

At about the same time, the provincial leaders of the Christian Democratic party voted for ousting the government.

For some time—another sign that the class polarization was reaching a critical point—the advocates of patience on the bourgeois side had been withdrawing from the scene. As in the period of the civil war in Russia, the most ruthless leaders of the reaction were coming to the fore.

Allende's last bridge to the military was cut August 27 when Admiral Montero resigned from the cabinet and from his post as head of the navy. The naval officer corps would accept no replacement but Admiral Toribio Merino, a well-known rightist. At the same time, in the main bourgeois party—the Christian Democrats—the man who ordered the massacre of the striking copper miners in the late 1960s was taking firm control.

"Could Salvador Allende have been unaware," Niedergang asked in his September 13 article, "that the real leader of the opposition, Eduardo Frei, the former chief of state and now president of the Senate, was no longer bothering to conceal that he saw as the only recourse a resort to arms?"

But Allende continued to proclaim: "There will be no coup d'état and we will avoid civil war." As a solution to the conflict, he offered a plebiscite to determine the will of the majority of the Chilean people, a pro-

posal that under the circumstances was rather reminiscent of the CP-sponsored petition against civil war launched some time ago.

### Bitter Early-Morning Awakening

Very rapidly, the time came when the reality of class society could no longer be denied.

On September 11, in the early morning hours, the navy seized the port of Valparaíso. At 7:00 a.m., according to the September 13 *Le Monde*, Argentinian radio monitored a broadcast proclaiming that a military junta had replaced the Allende government. The new regime was headed by General Augusto Pinochet of the army, whom Allende had appointed commander in chief only a few weeks before; General Gustavo Leigh, commander of the air force; José Toribio Medina, the commander of the navy; and César Mendoza, head of the Carabineros. In short, all those forces that Allende had praised at his inauguration for allowing him to take power had now risen up to take it from him.

Some 3,000 persons were arrested in Valparaíso alone, according to the September 13 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Razón*. They were imprisoned on warships in the harbor. That is, according to this report, the navy seized one prisoner for every five of its total personnel, or almost 1 percent of the entire population of the port city.

Thus, it seems, if the report is not exaggerated, that the commanders of the fleet must have moved with a ruthlessness unprecedented in Chilean history to restore "discipline" among the ranks of pro-UP sailors and navy yard workers who had already been abandoned to reactionary persecution by the government they sought to defend.

At 7:15 a.m., the military gave the Carabineros guarding the presidential palace a few minutes to evacuate the area. Meanwhile, Allende, who had apparently just been informed of the coup, rushed to the palace from his home. According to the September 12 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *Clarín*, the UP government had been expecting a coup for ten days, that is approximately since the resignation of Admiral Montero. So, even when it knew that a coup was coming, it allowed the putschist officers in the navy

to crucify its supporters and turned a key television station over to a bourgeoisie obviously intent on overthrowing the government by violence.

Furthermore, the MIR had issued a statement giving the general scenario of the coup, as a report in the September 8 *La Opinión* showed. The uprising was decided on in late August. All that was left to be determined was whether it would install a new civilian government or an open military dictatorship. The Christian Democrats favored the former, the Nationalists the latter. Probably the actual events would have to show which alternative was most realistic for the bourgeoisie.

At 7:50 Allende went on the air to reject the junta's demand for his resignation. Apparently he had not been immediately informed of the naval putsch in Valparaíso. At 7:57, he went on the air again, announcing that "a small group of naval officers" had taken over the port city. He called on the workers to mobilize to defend the government. As he launched his appeal, aircraft buzzed the palace.

At 8:10 the right-wing stations as well as those seized by the military broadcast an ultimatum to the pro-government stations to go off the air or face bombardment from the air and ground. Allende managed to make a second appeal to the workers, but by 9:30, the military was in complete control of the airwaves. The government radio went silent after a brief air attack on the palace. Apparently the putschists had been able to seize most of the country's radio and television installations in the first minutes of the coup.

At 11:00 a.m. the junta warned that anyone committing acts of "sabotage" would get the "maximum penalty." At 11:30, the Communist party broadcast over an unidentified radio that the "Chilean masses are prepared to make the supreme effort to defeat the armed forces that have risen up against the government." A few minutes later, military radio announced that the Communist party headquarters in Santiago and Valparaíso had been "searched." The CP offices, like those of all the left parties and publications, were sacked.

At 12:30 military aircraft and tanks began bombarding the presidential palace. A dispatch in the September

12 New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario* claimed that Allende's appeals for support from the people had been in vain:

"Control of the communications media was an important factor in the Chilean rebellion, with the military taking full advantage of it. Transmitters favorable to the government were silenced and the airwaves were filled by the communiqués of the military."

### Scattered Resistance

The September 12 *Clarín* reported that the "network loyal to the government" was silenced by strafing from the air. But it said that an hour after Allende's appeal "a great movement of people was observed on the principal arteries." Civilians were reportedly blocked from reaching the center of the city by a military cordon.

By early afternoon, the ANSA wire service reported from Santiago that "heavy gunfire was heard in the center of the city, where fighting was in progress between snipers and army units trying to dislodge them from the buildings where they had taken up positions.

"In the meantime, a station supporting the government that did not yield to the ultimatum to cease broadcasting was bombed. Civilian casualties are said to have occurred as a result of the bombing."

A September 12 UPI dispatch from Santiago reported:

"Indoctrinated and heavily armed Marxist snipers are still persisting in a completely suicidal attitude, refusing to obey the peremptory warnings of the chiefs of the ruling junta that they will be shot if they do not cease."

It is still not clear how much of the shooting and bombing in Santiago actually had a military objective and how much was intended to intimidate the population. According to *Clarín*, Allende was left without any support from the official armed forces. "Allende found that the only ones who obeyed his orders were a small parapolic group, the GAP [Grupo de Amigos—Group of Friends, ex-guerrillas, who, after opposing participation in the elections that brought Allende to power, pledged to defend his government]. They went out in the street carrying machine guns and small arms but



were rapidly cut down after a brief burst of fire."

The armed forces were obviously taking no chances in the center city area. UPI correspondent Steve Yolen wrote in a dispatch printed in the September 13 issue of *Los Andes*, a daily published in Mendoza, not far across the Argentine border: "I have just gone through the six longest hours of my life. There were times when I thought they would be the last."

"The office has been completely destroyed by the impact of at least 400 bullets of all calibers.

"At one point there were so many bullets that the office was filled with dust and pieces of plaster, so that we couldn't see from one end to the other.

"But this was nothing in comparison to the fifteen minutes when the presidential palace, which is a little more than a block from our offices, was bombarded. Air force planes flew over us and dropped their bombs. I counted up to twenty heavy bomb blasts. . . .

"Every time one of us got up the courage to look outside, the soldiers fired."

The shooting continued on into the night and became even more violent in the industrial suburbs and poor neighborhoods. "No official version of these confrontations has been issued," *La Razón* reported. "But persons connected with the UP have described these armed clashes as being in fact 'massacres.'"

Forty-five bombs were dropped on the presidential palace, according to *Clarín*, of which seventeen were on target. Everyone in the palace had to take refuge in the cellar. Shortly after the first attack, the building was bombed again and machine-gunned.

"After these two air assaults, infantry troops stationed in the area around La Moneda since 9:10, backed up by tanks and armored cars, launched an attack on the palace. They encountered no resistance except from the GAP. However, the resisters took up positions inside and—at first—were able to hold off the attacks. At 4:10 the junta issued a communiqué saying that it had also bombed Allende's home on Thomas Moore Street and that if La Moneda was not evacuated, they would launch an all-out assault. An hour later, the Junta Militar broadcast an announcement that President Allende had decided to surrender the



United Press International photograph shows interior of burned-out presidential palace in Santiago after military assault.

palace and had asked a five-minute cease-fire to inform the defenders.

"The Junta Militar refused the request on the grounds that some snipers were shooting at the troops from nearby buildings and they demanded an immediate surrender. Seconds later it was officially reported that Allende had surrendered La Moneda."

Immediately after this announcement, the junta issued a statement of its "principles": "We want to restore Chile to her proper place as a free and sovereign nation. We want to prevent any sinister dictatorship from being imposed on our fatherland. We Chileans must begin a hard and strenuous struggle to restore normalcy to our betrayed fatherland, without hatreds, without divisions, and without resentments. The conquests that the people have achieved will be zealously maintained."

The junta also promised that "constitutional order" would be restored "as soon as possible and after a few problems have been solved."

Then came the festivities: "When the president's surrender was reported, small groups gathered in the area to lead demonstrations supporting the position of the armed forces, singing the national anthem and dancing Chilean folk dances."

### The Compromiser Is Eliminated

It was only after this solemn declaration of principles was broadcast and the carefully planned demonstrations of popular joy had begun that the military-controlled radio announced the death of President Allende. It was reported that he and his press secretary Augusto Olivares had been found dead in the building, where, it was claimed, they had committed suicide. Both were supposed to have shot themselves in the chest.

The only nonmilitary witness was Juan Enrique Lira, the chief photographer of *El Mercurio*, a rightist daily, who was taken to see the president's body. According to this dubious source, Allende shot himself in the mouth and his body was lying on the sofa of the palace dining room. The weapon was supposed to have been an automatic carbine, a present from Fidel Castro.

Allende's wife told newsmen in the Mexican Embassy, where she took refuge, that she believed her husband took his own life. But she was not with him when he died and was not allowed to see the body. On the other hand, the Chilean ambassador to London told the press that the president had assured him that he would not commit suicide under any circumstances.



There are precedents in Latin American history for such a suicide. The Brazilian populist dictator Getulio Vargas tried, like Allende, to balance between the pressure of the masses and imperialism in order to achieve some capitalist development of his country. Defeated by the insuperable contradictions, he preferred committing suicide to being overthrown.

In Allende's own country, President José Manuel Balmaceda tried at the end of the nineteenth century to nationalize the nitrate fields being taken over by the British imperialists. When the congress and the navy, which were controlled by proimperialist interests, rose up against him, he chose to take his own life rather than lead a revolutionary struggle against the betrayers of the Chilean people. As a bourgeois politician, even in that early stage of imperialist development, Balmaceda was incapable of taking such a course. In the last days of Allende's government, rightist demonstrators insistently reminded him of this precedent.

On the other hand, it seems that the bourgeoisie only united behind the plan for a military take-over shortly before the coup. The Chilean capitalists have been divided over how to handle the UP government since Allende unexpectedly won the 1970 elections. Certain bourgeois interests, the national capitalists, were at least initially favored by Allende's reforms. And for the first part of his term, it seemed that the main sector of the bourgeois political leadership was determined to slowly wear out the UP government rather than incur the danger of a violent overthrow.

The continually rising militancy of the workers, despite the capitulations and failures of the Allende government, apparently convinced this section of the bourgeoisie to turn things over to the hard-liners, but the MIR revelations about the different plans for the government to be installed after the impending coup indicate that this division was not entirely overcome. It seemed, moreover, to manifest itself even after the coup, when the Christian Democrats demanded that an autopsy be performed on Allende's body.

The most determined reactionaries involved in the coup may have seen killing the president as desirable to eliminate any temptations of compro-

mise on the part of the more flexible elements. It is also possible that Allende was killed in the savage shelling of the center city area and the military was anxious to conceal how indiscriminate the shooting was. Newsphotos did show very heavy damage to the presidential palace.

The Christian Democratic party issued a statement on September 12 backing the armed forces, in which it maintained that they "did not seek this power, and their traditions in-



AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE: The "gorilla" takes over.

pire confidence in us that as soon as they finish the tasks they have assumed in order to avert grave dangers, they will return the power to the sovereign people." The statement was signed by Patricio Aylwin, president of the party and one of the leaders of the right wing. But, according to the September 13 *La Razón*, the leader of the wing that had been inclined to compromise with the UP, Radomiro Tomic, was "opposed to the text of the document."

The soon denied report that a civilian president was about to be appointed could also be an indication that the bourgeoisie is not entirely united on what precise course to take now. It is clear that the Chilean ruling class has launched a war against the workers that cannot help but prove extremely costly, whose ultimate outcome, as even their well-wishers in

the U.S. capitalist press admit, is doubtful.

In any case, the junta refused the request for an investigation of Allende's death. The most prominent practitioner of the "peaceful road to socialism" in recent years was buried September 12 in a secret ceremony in a cemetery outside Santiago as the sound of tank cannon and bombs in the industrial suburbs threatened a massive terror against the workers movement, which he could not lead to victory.

## The Price of the Defeat

"The estimates of the dead, of necessity unofficial, have mounted horrendously," ANSA reported September 12. "Yesterday they were talking about two thousand; this morning some sources indicate four thousand." On September 13, an AP dispatch from Santiago estimated the dead at 500 to 1,000. A strict curfew was maintained for forty-eight hours after the coup in Santiago and lifted only for the daylight hours on September 13 and 14.

Only fragmentary reports of the resistance to the coup have yet come out of the country, which remained largely cut off from the world four days after the military launched its attack. But the armed opposition seemed persistent if scattered, unorganized, and apparently hopeless.

"Six hundred leftists surrendered after a gunfight at the technical university near downtown Santiago, unofficial sources said," according to a September 12 AP dispatch. "In another brief skirmish, soldiers moved in and occupied the large state-owned textile factory in this capital."

The next day, when the curfew was lifted for the daylight hours for the first time, AP reported: "Just as the break in the curfew began a new flurry of shooting broke out in downtown Santiago and only a handful of pedestrians ventured into the streets. . . . Exchanges of gunfire broke out again tonight in scattered parts of the downtown area after the curfew took effect."

A UPI dispatch in the September 13 issue of *La Prensa*, a daily published in Buenos Aires, reported shooting in the working-class neighborhoods. It also claimed that workers in the industrial suburbs had attacked po-

lice stations in those areas but had been driven back by the army with some casualties. The junta issued communiqué after communiqué threatening execution of anyone found with weapons.

However, on September 15, according to an AP dispatch of that date, the military claimed to have executed only three men, none of them in Santiago. One "extremist" was allegedly executed in Valparaíso; another in Puente Alto, twelve miles southeast of Santiago. The third was a policeman who had supposedly killed two of his superiors. The fact that one of the three persons the army admits executing was in the naval center of Valparaíso and another was a presumably mutinous policeman (who took more than his share of officers with him) suggests that the putschists faced opposition within the ranks of the armed forces.

While there are as yet no reports of large-scale executions or a generalized slaughter in the working-class neighborhoods, it is clear that a very extensive roundup of activists and leaders of the workers movement has been in progress since the first moments of the coup and that many militants are in grave danger of torture or death. Besides the 3,000 reported imprisoned in Valparaíso, hundreds were reported arrested in Santiago, in particular, members of the MIR and political refugees from other countries.

The putschists seemed to concentrate especially on the political exiles, trying to create a specter of a foreign "extremist" force to justify overthrowing the legally elected government.

"Last night, the military chiefs said that they had moved against Mr. Allende because he had allowed 10,000 extremists to enter the country from abroad," AP reported September 15 from Santiago. Most of the political refugees in Chile are Brazilians who have fled from a regime infamous for torturing and murdering all potential opponents of its arbitrary rule.

Many Uruguayans have also taken refuge in Chile since this other "island of democracy" in Latin America fell under a military dictatorship in June. The military has already issued a list of its most wanted foreigners. It includes, according to the September 13 *La Razón*, two Brazilians, ten Argen-

tines, six Bolivians, one Netherlander, one Belgian, one Ecuadorian, one Spaniard, and one Pole. Of those identified, none qualified as a guerrilla commandante. One was Ted Córdoba Claire, a Bolivian, and the correspondent of *La Opinión*. Another was Carlos Núñez, a correspondent for the Montevideo weekly *Marcha*.

Thus, it seems that at best the Chilean coup will be followed by the kind of massive jailing of socialist, trade-union, and intellectual leaders that followed the Banzer coup in Bolivia and that this will take on still graver proportions corresponding to the size of the country and the greater complexity of the society.

### How Far Will Repression Go?

The organization of the working class reached its highest forms yet in Latin America in this relatively developed country in the months extending from the first reactionary offensive in October 1972 to the recent coup. During the October crisis, the workers and students kept the economy of the country running for several weeks. Facing each new challenge from the right, the workers seized more and more of the basic installations of the economy and moved closer and closer to reorganizing production on the basis of direct democracy. Thus, in the weeks before the coup, rather extensive bases of workers power were already rooted in some key industrial areas and poor neighborhoods.

It is hard to believe that the Chilean armed forces alone, which in addition to the 15,000 naval personnel include only 25,000 in the army and 8,000 in the air force, can destroy such highly developed and extensive organizations of the working class and batter it back into passivity.

Moreover, the kind of mass fascist movement that could do this also does not yet seem to exist. It is true that by taking advantage of the failures and indecisiveness of the UP leadership, the right was able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of the urban petty bourgeoisie against the government, including sectors of the poor population. But a disciplined fascist movement does not yet seem to exist on a mass scale.

The Nationalist party and its surreptitiously cultivated commando groups might be able to create such

a fascist movement rather quickly, but with the fall of the UP government, the economic insecurities and privations that enraged the petty bourgeoisie are now the responsibility of the right. And it is extremely unlikely that, barring unforeseen massive aid from Washington, the new government will be able to solve the economic problems created by a long period of social upheaval, imperialist blockade, and bourgeois economic sabotage. In fact, because of the enormous costs of the military take-over and repression, these problems are apt to grow substantially before the situation improves.

Furthermore, there are no indications as yet that the junta has unleashed its fascist supporters against the left, as Banzer did, for instance, much less against the working-class neighborhoods and strongholds. The repression seemingly is being carried out exclusively by the army and the police. Although the junta has struck ruthlessly at selected points, it seems reluctant so far to launch an all-out campaign to crush the organizations of the working class.

Moreover, the organs of U.S. imperialism seemed to regard the military take-over as a limited operation and to be skeptical that it could solve the problems the defenders of the status quo face in Chile. In the *Wall Street Journal* for example, Everett G. Martin and Robert Keatley wrote:

"The left is also large in Chile and it will probably oppose with violence the military's effort to rule calmly. Marxist parties have been strong in Chile for 40 years, and some previously belonged to coalition governments. [That is, the Chilean workers, unlike their Brazilian class brothers, are well organized and have a long tradition of political struggle which they have maintained through previous defeats similar to the present one.] They won't react kindly to a take-over by the military and its relatively conservative friends; for them, it will conjure visions of ITT and the CIA, a plundering Uncle Sam and exploitation of the masses — the cartoons that are so often political reality for activists."

The removal of the class-collaborationist UP regime might even open the way for a greater threat:

"In fact the Allende government itself was under increasing attack from radical elements that claimed it was



moving too slowly along the path to socialism.

"Also joining the violent opposition may be once-landless farm workers who, tolerated if not always encouraged by the Allende government, have seized acreage from big property owners, who were the main supporters of many earlier governments. The farm workers, too, have grown disenchanted with Mr. Allende's reluctance to aid them and may fight hard to keep what they have taken."

Thus, nothing is really settled yet, according to this view:

"The result for a nation already polarized by the radical Allende solutions for Chile's assorted and growing problems could thus be a long period of strife and bloodshed—even if the ultimate, civil war, is avoided."

To sum it up, the new Chile was not a very good investment risk:

"Violence and instability seem certain to hinder production in the years just ahead—unless the generals get a better grip on things than expected—just as the turmoil of the Allende years created serious problems in both farms and factories. Chances of foreign investment seem nil, while domestic investors may also hold back even in such key sectors as food production."

The *New York Times* expressed similar apprehensions in its September 16 issue in its main editorial of the week on the situation in Chile:

"The Allende Government did substantially improve the lot of Chileans on the lowest rungs of the economic ladder. It gave many workers and peasants a greater sense of national participation than before. These are gains the military rulers promised in their first communiqué to preserve—a pledge they will find it dangerous to neglect. . . .

"The traditionally non-political armed forces intervened not primarily because of Dr. Allende's socialism but out of fear that a polarized Chile was lunging toward civil war. What cannot be clear for some time is whether the violent destruction of an elected Government, albeit a minority one, will make that ultimate catastrophe less likely or even more probable."

### U.S. Imperialism Responsible

"Satisfaction not unmixed with a certain embarrassment," was the way *Le*

*Monde's* September 13 editorial described the mood of official circles in Washington when the Allende government fell. There is no doubt that, whatever the direct role of American governmental agencies in the actual coup, U.S. imperialism was responsible in the last analysis for bringing down the Allende government. Its economic blockade created the lion's share of the shortages that fueled the petty-bourgeois revolt, in particular the shortage of spare parts for trucks. Its refusal to sell wheat to the Allende government when a desperate shortage developed just before the coup seems to have been the final step in this policy.

The officer corps that carried out the coup were trained and nurtured by U.S. imperialism. "In 1973," a study of the Chilean army in the September issue of *Le Monde Diplomatique* noted, "Chile remains, along with Venezuela, the main recipient in Latin America of U.S. aid for training officers. For this, it is to receive a million dollars. Finally, Chile has just been put on the list of countries that can buy F5E supersonic jet planes on credit. How can one fail to think that this cooperation can offer the opportunity for ideological penetration, whose fruits the United States doubtlessly hopes to gather one day?"

The Chilean armed forces are known to be among the most pro-U.S. in Latin America. Here again the class-collaborationist president was not only unable to move against this proimperialist fifth column but encouraged it. One of his last official acts was to agree to joint maneuvers between the Chilean fleet and the U.S. Navy in the hope that this gesture would arouse more friendly feelings toward his regime in Washington.

The deepening radicalization in Chile, combined with the revival of the workers movement in Bolivia and the workers upsurge in Argentina, was obviously becoming a serious threat to the interests of U.S. imperialism in Latin America. Among other things, by recognizing Cuba the Allende government set in motion the undermining of the U.S.-imposed diplomatic blockade of the first workers state in the Americas.

Appropriately, one of the junta's first acts was to break diplomatic relations with Havana. This action was underscored by an attack on the Cu-

ban Embassy during the coup and on a Cuban merchant ship off the coast.

However, the leading circles of U.S. imperialism seemed to understand very quickly and clearly that the coup threatened to create an even more explosive situation in southern Latin America. For the first time, the master planners in Washington are confronted with the problem of how to devise a way to crush a well-organized and highly conscious industrial working class. From their standpoint, if the U.S. capitalist press is any indication, the prospects do not look too bright. The Indonesian or Brazilian solution that the Chilean capitalists more and more openly hankered for in the period before the coup just does not seem like a very realistic perspective.

### Was Allende Too Radical?

It could be hoped in some circles that the bloody overthrow of the Allende regime will inhibit the workers movement in other countries from setting its sights too high. In particular, Juan Domingo Perón, the bourgeois demagogue charged with keeping the lid on the workers upsurge in neighboring Argentina, was quick to hold up the fate of Allende to the radical youth as an example of what happens when you try to go too far too fast.

As far away as France, the Gaullist *La Nation* pointed to the fall of Allende as a warning of the perils of voting for the Union of the Left, which also promises a "peaceful road to socialism."

Neither Perón nor *La Nation* seemed to realize that the workers and radicalized youth might draw some rather different conclusions from the failure of the Allende experiment. The coup in Chile was not, after all, the first overthrow of a government committed to "peaceful social change." In fact the scenario was much the same in Guatemala in 1954, when a U.S.-sponsored plot overthrew the CP-backed Arbenz government. Che Guevara, who was an adviser to that regime, drew some lessons from his experience that were put to good effect in Cuba. The revolutionary government destroyed the bourgeois army, and a popular militia played a major role in defeating the imperialist attempt to



overthrow the Castro government at Playa Girón.

Perón himself was overthrown by a coup in 1955. He escaped Allende's fate by making a quick getaway. The Argentine military is still run by officers who backed rightist governments for the two decades following Perón's fall. Might not the radical youth who rallied around the old caudillo as a symbol of thwarted anti-imperialism conclude from the failure of Allende that the Argentine military also will ultimately block any significant social reforms, and that Perón has already proved himself an even less effectual leader than Allende?

Nor is Perón the only advocate of the "peaceful road" to social change that may be discredited by the failure of the Allende experiment. In the last three months, the two most powerful Communist parties in Latin America have proved unable to mount any serious resistance to military coups. The Chilean CP, the largest in Latin America, has 100,000 members, almost twice the number of personnel in the armed forces of the country. It is the most disciplined political organization in Chile and deeply rooted in the working class. And yet it not only could not organize an effective defense against the coup, but it encouraged the capitulationist policy that led inevitably to grave defeats for the Chilean workers.

The Uruguayan CP, which complete-



CORVALAN: CP leader who wanted "professional" armed forces.

ly controls the national trade-union federation, called a general strike that paralyzed the country when the military took over. But it could not lead a revolutionary struggle against the bourgeois state and thus allowed the strike to collapse, without projecting any political alternative to the Bordaberry government.

Furthermore, the fall of the Allende government shows the hollowness of the CPs' claim that a reformist policy is necessary to win over the petty bourgeoisie to the side of the workers. It was precisely the UP government's reluctance to move to reorganize the economy decisively on a socialist basis that enabled the right to rouse the petty bourgeoisie against the workers.

The failure of the government to move rapidly to take control of the big ranches and industrial establishments, as well as the big transportation and distribution combines, enabled the bourgeoisie and the imperialists to sabotage the economy and create the shortages and hardships that drove the poor but individualistic petty bourgeoisie into a frenzy against the government.

Trying to respect the essential property interests of the capitalists, the Allende regime could not base itself on a mobilization of the workers, which alone could have kept up and increased production in the transitional period and was the only force that could ultimately block the attempts of the bourgeoisie and imperialism to overthrow the government. At times, the Allende regime even came into sharp conflict with workers and peasants who, encouraged by the idea that at last they had a government of their own, carried their struggle against the exploiters to the point of seizing the means of production. The government's compromises did not reassure the industrialists and property owners, who were frightened and enraged by the militancy of the workers and the landless. The capitulations only encouraged the vested interests to arm openly in defense of their property and to plot with impunity against the regime.

At the same time, the government's refusal to repudiate the national debt to the imperialists and its agreement to pay what was in fact compensation to the expropriated imperialist companies deprived the country of capital

desperately needed to develop the country.

As a result of its "evolutionary" approach, the government was unable to unite the decisive masses of the population behind a clear program for reorganizing the economy. Because of its refusal to expropriate the big capitalists, it did not have sufficient control of economic life to offer any solution to the problems of the petty bourgeoisie. Furthermore in the absence of a plan for transforming the capitalist system as a whole, the government's policies tended to conflict in important areas.

For example, Allende's agrarian reform, it turned out, did not fit in very well with his policy of appeasing the army, as a study in the September issue of *Le Monde Diplomatique* indicated: "The army is tending to become an outgrowth of the middleclass. According to a study carried out seven years ago, 42% of the officers graduating from military school came from the big bourgeoisie, 39% came from the rather comfortable middle class, and 19% from the straitened petty bourgeoisie. Some 65% of the higher officers came from the middle class; among them, however, a large number were linked to the upper class. In many cases, in fact, a young officer with no personal fortune takes the opportunity of an assignment in the south to marry the daughter of a landowner. One of the most unexpected results of the agrarian reform was to reduce the dowries of the brides of young officers." Such small examples could be multiplied many times, since in the context of imperialism most of the major economic interests interlock.

### What Was Lacking in Chile?

The collapse of the latest and most prominent attempt to find a "peaceful road to socialism" in Latin America marks the culmination of a certain cycle in the development of the revolutionary movement that extends from the fall of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala through the Cuban revolution.

Both sides of this experience were represented by the young former guerrillas who died heroically in a futile defense of a capitulationist government.

Inspired by the Cuban revolution, these young radicals armed themselves to fight imperialism and its native

lackies. But they were unable to deal any serious blows to the system through their own military action. In particular they were surprised by the resurgence of reformism and unable to combat it. They could only try to firm up the will of a reformist government by serving as an armed body-guard for the head of a government that was not only incapable of defending itself but which inevitably armed its executioners. At the last, fighting for a legally elected government, they found themselves almost as alone in the face of the bourgeois repressive forces as they had as isolated guerrillas.

But when the September 11 coup came, the forces were in existence that could defeat imperialism and its local supporters. The organized workers in control of the plants represented probably the most formidable revolutionary force yet seen in Latin America. They were not entirely unarmed, although their arms were almost certainly insufficient. The coup had been expected for some time and it had been necessary to defend the key economic installations from previous right-wing offensives.

What the workers lacked above all was a centralized political leadership that, understanding the realities of class struggle, could have marshaled their economic and physical power against the reactionary forces. In the absence of this, the coordinated and carefully calculated strike of a relatively small military force threw the workers off balance. Resistance was heroic but scattered and without a perspective. The military was able to concentrate its strength at will against the most advanced sections of workers. Otherwise, less than 50,000 soldiers could never have intimidated hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of determined workers in control of the vital centers of the economy.

A revolutionary party able to give leadership to the resistance could have completely changed the outcome. Without this, the military force of the former guerrillas was insignificant. The final irony was that they died defending a government that had irrevocably condemned itself to death, when they were needed to help form the nucleus of a government based directly on the workers that could have really fought imperialism and dealt it a decisive defeat. □

## Responsibility Laid to U.S. Imperialism

# Reactions to the Chilean Coup

By David Thorstad

The overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende provoked a quick response throughout the world, especially in Latin America. Most of the demonstrations and pronouncements expressed outrage at the coup. Many placed responsibility for it with Washington.

The governments of Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina declared three days of national mourning in memory of Allende. "Our country is still suffering the effects of the floods and the earthquake," said Mexican President Luis Echeverría, in reference to two natural disasters in which more than 1,000 persons died in August. "The death of Doctor Allende only increases the grief of the people and the government."

In Argentina, the coup was regarded with hostility. The addition of another right-wing military regime in the southern cone of the continent is considered a menace to Argentina, which is already surrounded by regimes in Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay that are closely linked to its main rival for influence, Brazil.

Juan Perón told reporters that he considered it "a calamity for the continent that a government elected by the people should be overthrown by military forces." He called Allende's alleged suicide a "valiant act" and said it was "the recourse of someone who has no other way out." Asked whether he thought Washington had anything to do with the coup, he replied: "I could not prove it but I firmly believe so because I know this process and I think it could not be otherwise. Reports yesterday [September 12] claimed that there was celebrating in the State Department."

The Brazilian government moved quickly and, on September 13, became the first to recognize the Chilean military junta. The president of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies termed Allende's overthrow as "a triumph for democracy."

The Peronist bloc in the Chamber of Deputies in Argentina submitted a

statement condemning the coup. The statement, which was adopted unanimously, expressed solidarity with "the Chilean people" in the face of the attack "launched by imperialism."

However, in spite of the sharply critical official stance (which contrasted with the restrained response to Juan Bordaberry's coup in Uruguay), an unidentified spokesman for the Argentine foreign ministry said September 15 that the government would "surely" extend recognition to the new junta.

While the military regime in Peru issued no immediate statement, the progovernment newspaper *Expreso* ran a banner headline: "CIA Coup Triumphs in Chile. They Killed Allende." The paper eulogized Allende ("He died facing forward, the way heroes die") and warned that his death, "whether he committed suicide or was murdered, will return to accuse those who are really responsible for the tragedy of Chile."

President José Figueres of Costa Rica called Allende "a noble idealist who died like a man."

The Cuban regime denounced the coup and requested an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council. It charged that Chilean troops had fired on the Cuban Embassy in Santiago, wounding a Cuban diplomat, and that the Chilean air force and navy had attacked and damaged a Cuban merchant vessel, the *Playa Larga*.

The first act of the Allende government had been to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba. One of the first acts of the junta was to break off those relations.

Fidel Castro, on a visit to Hanoi, said that "the imperialist government of the United States is not aiming only at the Chilean people, but also at the revolutionary government of Peru and at the popular government of Argentina," according to a report in the September 14 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*. "The United States," Castro added, "is now attempting to isolate, harass, and at-



tack the revolutionary and popular governments of Peru and Argentina, but in no way will Yankee imperialism be able to prevent the growing movement of rebellion among the peoples of Latin America."

The Communist party-led Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos (CGTP—General Confederation of Peruvian Workers) also claimed that the Chilean coup constituted a direct danger to the Peruvian military regime: "The CGTP believes that this coup is also aimed at Peru, since imperialism will try to do in our country what it is today doing in Chile, and what it did earlier in Bolivia."

The Colombian Senate observed a minute of silence in memory of Allende. It condemned the coup, which it said was "fomented by the American monopolies."

Spontaneous demonstrations were staged in many Latin American countries, including Mexico, Argentina, Puerto Rico, Costa Rica, Peru, and Venezuela. The most energetic and widespread wave of protest appears to have occurred in Argentina.

"In the capital and in most of the big cities in the country, spontaneous demonstrations took place, bringing together political adversaries united by a common opposition to the coup in order to express solidarity with the Chilean people, who are torn and face the threat of civil war," wrote Philippe Labreveux from Buenos Aires in the September 13 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*.

"This explains the rapidity and sharpness of the reactions in political circles that are usually slow to make known their point of view."

From the very outset, the coup provoked daily demonstrations throughout Argentina. Although the Argentine press did not generally provide figures on the size of the protests, they appear to have been sizable. They were spearheaded by the Peronist Youth and various groups of the Left.

According to the September 13 issue of *La Nación*, thousands of young people, filling three city blocks, marched through the center of the capital the previous day.

A march in Córdoba reportedly grew from 1,200 to 2,300 as it wound its way through town.

The Buenos Aires daily *La Razón* (September 13) described the demonstration in Rosario:

"The Argentine and Chilean flags were carried at the head of the big column of marchers, which stretched out for more than eight blocks. The enthusiasm of the participants in the demonstration was expressed in the portraits of Perón, Eva Perón, Salvador Allende, Che Guevara and Fi-



PERON: "Calamity for the continent."

del Castro, and in large banners. Among the banners that stood out the most because of their size were those of the FAR [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—Revolutionary Armed Forces]/ Montoneros and the Frente Estudiantil Nacional [National Student Front], which had the largest contingents. The Revolutionary Socialist party, the Popular Socialists, the Peronist Youth, the Communist Youth, and the Partido Intransigente [Intransigent party] took part in the demonstration; they called attention to themselves through their particular songs and chants.

"Strains of the Peronist march could be heard, as well as chants like 'Allende and Perón—the same heart,' 'You can feel it, you can feel it, Allende is here,' 'Chilean brothers: Don't lay down your flags for we are prepared to cross over the mountains to help you,' 'Chile at war—accept the support of our Montonero people,' 'Out

of Chile, out of Argentina, Yankees out of Latin America,' 'Allende, our brother, the people remember you arms in hand,' and 'Support, fighting support to Chile, which is struggling with the working class in the front ranks.'

"The various groupings tried to retain their cohesiveness throughout the march, and at one point, one group tried to take over the front of the march, giving rise to a certain amount of struggling and exchanging of blows among young people."

Other reactions in Latin America included a telegram to Allende's widow from the former president of Venezuela, Rómulo Betancourt. "I share your grief at the tragic death of Chicho [Allende]," he said. "You know that the differences that separated us for thirteen years because of our differing approaches to Latin American policy did not prevent us from maintaining personal friendship and mutual respect since 1940."

The two main Puerto Rican independence organizations, the Puerto Rican Socialist party (PSP) and the Puerto Rican Independence party (PIP), sharply condemned the coup. The PSP called Allende's death "an assassination planned within the context of a strategy of consolidating fascist power in Chile. Allende was murdered by the fascist right, under the guidance of Yankee imperialism."

PSP spokesman Manuel Maldonado Denis said that the Chilean events show that "the peoples must take power into their own hands by taking the road of revolution."

The Federación de Universitarios Pro Independencia (FUPI—Federation of Pro-Independence University Students) organized protest meetings at the University of Puerto Rico.

In New York City, some 1,000 persons joined a march September 15 from Union Square to Times Square to protest the overthrow of the Allende government.

Demonstrations were also staged in cities across Europe, among them Paris, Frankfurt, Rome, Hamburg, Cologne, and Munich.

In Italy, reported *New York Times* correspondent Paul Hofmann from Rome September 14, the reaction was strong, "largely because some groups here have favored the formation of a coalition including the Communists that would be similar to the deposed Allende Government." Some interest in



such a coalition has been shown by sections of the Christian Democratic party of Premier Mariano Rumor.

"The Christian Democratic party," Hofmann wrote, "Italy's strongest, is showing uneasiness over the strategy of Chile's Christian Democrats, who opposed President Allende. The two parties have had frequent contacts, and former President Eduardo Frei Montalva, the leader of the Chilean Christian Democrats, attended the national convention of the Italian party last June.

"This week, the Italian party condemned the military coup that overthrew President Allende, asserting that it was difficult to understand how Chilean Christian Democrats could expect an early return to constitutional and democratic methods."

President Tito of Yugoslavia saw the Chilean coup as proof of the need for unity among "nonaligned" countries. Speaking at a rally in eastern Croatia September 14, he said: "We have lost one of the most faithful members of the nonaligned movement. We have lost Chile. As a result of international reaction and imperialism, the legitimate Government has been overthrown and a great man, a great comrade, President Allende, has been murdered by hiring generals."

*Le Monde* took a dim view of the coup in an editorial September 13: "This is an especially gloomy hour for liberals and democrats in Latin America. The controversial but noble figure of President Allende had contributed toward giving Chile an international standing well above its actual importance. And the death of democracy in the most democratic country in South America is occurring in a bitterly ironic way at the very time when the new American secretary of state, Mr. Henry Kissinger, is talking about normalizing relations with Cuba and beginning a constructive dialogue with a Latin America that is too often ignored, scorned, or exploited."

Soviet commentators blamed "international imperialism" for the coup, but did not mention the United States by name. The government newspaper *Izvestia* blamed unidentified "imperialistic circles," and a brief statement by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party September 13 denounced "the actions of reactionary forces in Chile." □

## U.S. Companies Hedge Their Bets

# Nixon Regime Pleads Innocence in Chile

For three years the Nixon regime and the U. S. ruling class worked to strangle and undermine the Unidad Popular government. But after the military coup, Washington and Wall Street were forced to mute their obvious satisfaction with the fall of Allende.

The ambiguity stemmed from two factors. First, in light of the well-known history of North American interference in Chile, the Nixon administration had to spend the lion's share of its public relations time in dampening charges that the coup was planned or assisted by Washington.

Second, the fact that the Chilean bourgeoisie had been unable to demoralize the working class into passivity and was forced to engineer the coup was a reflection of the workers high level of militancy. And under these conditions, the U. S. ruling class was simply not sure that the Santiago junta would be able to stabilize the situation.

Both concerns were reflected in the editorials of leading capitalist newspapers. ". . . it is essential that Washington meticulously keep hands off the present crisis, which only Chileans can resolve," advised the *New York Times* on September 12. "There must be no ground whatsoever for even a suspicion of outside intervention."

And on September 16, in an editorial piously titled "The Chilean Tragedy," the same board of directors wrote: "The traditionally non-political armed forces intervened not primarily because of Dr. Allende's socialism but out of fear that a polarized Chile was lunging toward civil war. What cannot be clear for some time is whether the violent destruction of an elected Government, albeit a minority one, will make that ultimate catastrophe less likely or even more probable."

Official Washington clearly grasped the importance of keeping a low profile in the days immediately following the coup.

Initially, the White House and the State Department declined to make any comment on the situation. But Dan Morgan, writing in the September

12 *Washington Post*, reported administration officials as saying privately that while the U. S. welcomed the departure of Allende, "this could be offset if the country was plunged into a civil war. . . ." They also expressed concern that "Chilean nationalists" would blame the United States, particularly because of the earlier ITT affair.

At a September 12 news briefing in Washington, both Gerald L. Warren, White House deputy press secretary, and Paul J. Hare, a State Department spokesman, said it was "inappropriate" for the government to comment on a situation viewed as an "internal Chilean affair." Hare went so far as to say that the administration hoped for a resumption of "democracy" in Chile and that it was in no hurry to recognize the new regime.

Apparently Washington is waiting for the situation to stabilize, and for other governments to recognize the junta, before itself taking that step: "We will try to make taking up relations not significant in the timing, to glide in, so to speak—not the first and not the last—so that no one can infer a special meaning," said a high-ranking official, as reported by David Binder in the September 15 *New York Times*. Another official, masking Nixon's contempt for principle in the usual cloak of "pragmatism," stated that "we will have to work with the generals and it makes no sense to issue some moral statement about democracy."

At a September 13 news conference—the second in as many days—Hare and Warren spent some time trying to explain away several incidents that suggested that Nixon had at least had prior knowledge of the coup. There had been reports that four U. S. Navy ships en route to Chile to participate in joint maneuvers with the Chilean navy had been suddenly ordered to veer away in order to avoid giving an impression of intervention. The problem was that the ships apparently changed course *before* the actual start of the coup.

Another strange incident was the two-day trip to Washington of Na-

thaniel Davis, U.S. ambassador to Chile. Davis was called to Washington on August 29, and was expected to stay a while. Instead, he returned to Santiago after just two days. "The purpose of the visit was not to report on any coup attempt," Hare said. "He [Davis] returned to Chile immediately after seeing the secretary of state-designate [i.e., Henry Kissinger] because of the tense situation there and the desirability of having an ambassador in the country during this period."

Hare did not add that this was to the best of his recollection at this point in time.

In addition to explaining the incidents of the naval vessels and the capital-hopping ambassador, Hare and Warren had to account for a piece of information leaked by their loose-mouthed colleague Jack Kubisch, assistant secretary of state. The September 13 *Washington Post* had reported that at a September 12 briefing (closed to the public) of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kubisch, while repeating denials of U.S. involvement, revealed that "the highest levels" knew of the impending coup the night before it occurred and decided on a "hands off" policy; that is, not to inform Allende.

Warren explained that the U.S. government had been receiving rumors of unrest in the Chilean military for more

than one year and that "sometimes they mentioned specific dates and sometimes they did not. . . . Our embassy had instructions in the event that any elements came to them with plans for an uprising not to have anything to do with it, and these instructions were followed carefully."

Some specific dates mentioned were September 8, 10, and finally 11; "and this, as you know, turned out to be correct," Hare incisively observed. He added that there was no way of being sure that a coup attempt would be made on any of these dates, and that no efforts were made to warn the Allende government or to discourage the military from making the attempt.

Not surprisingly, a spokesman for the Santiago junta came to Nixon's defense, asserting on September 13 that the generals had kept Washington in the dark.

The first reactions of the big U.S. corporations whose "properties" had been seized by Allende were equally as measured as their government's. According to Michael Jensen in the September 12 *New York Times*, most of the companies concerned warned that it was too early to assess the prospects of resuming operations in Chile. But they are clearly watching developments closely. An ITT spokesman said his company's action would depend upon "what government emerges and what its position is going to be." Officials in the auto, chemical,

and communications industry did not rule out the possibility of returning. The Ford Motor Company was particularly interested because of the favorable market for automobiles in Latin America — its \$7-million assembly plant was taken over in 1971.

But even if the new government welcomes investment, this may not be enough to attract it. One chemical company executive said, "We don't know what condition our old plant is in now, but more important we don't know what shape the economy is going to be in." And a U.S. official warned against the idea that a new regime might restore nationalized property: "They haven't got any money anyway," he explained, "and all parties support nationalization. So any Anaconda shareholder who thinks he is going to get his money back is going to be disappointed."

An exception to the general "wait and see" attitude of most of the big companies, who are ready to move in once they can be sure that both the political and the economic situation is favorable to them, was a copper company official who said "there's no way we'd go back in." The price of copper in the commodities markets rose rapidly under the impact of the coup. But amidst rumors that some Chilean copper mines had suffered bomb damage, the value of copper shares was not immediately affected. □

## Three Years of Financial Warfare

# How U.S. Tightened Economic Screws on Allende

"The Chilean economy," Joseph Novitski reported in the *New York Times* a full month before the Chilean congress formalized the election of Salvador Allende in 1970, "went from expansion to recession almost overnight, according to the outgoing Government."

From the moment of its election in 1970 until it was toppled by military coup, the Unidad Popular regime was subjected to an economic squeeze by U.S. imperialism designed to undermine the popular support for Allende by creating economic chaos and shortages of necessary goods. The over-

night recession referred to by Novitski was created by encouraging wealthy Chileans—who needed little encouragement in any case—to send their funds abroad. During the first two weeks of September 1970, the Chilean central bank was forced to supply Santiago banks with 688 million escudos [at that time approximately \$30 million] to cover unexpected withdrawals.

Six years earlier, Washington had indicated the extent of the stakes it considered involved by spending \$20 million to secure Eduardo Frei's victory over Allende in the 1964 presi-

dential election. Considered as an insurance premium, the sum was relatively small: According to U.S. Department of Commerce data, at the end of 1968, U.S. corporate holdings in Chile were valued at \$964 million. During that year, U.S. corporations averaged a profit of 17.4 percent on invested capital. For mining enterprises, the major area of investment, the rate was 26 percent.

Some of the backroom maneuvers of the corporations and the Nixon administration against the UP government have been documented because of the failure of International



Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) executives to shred incriminating evidence before it fell into the hands of columnist Jack Anderson. When the Allende government seized ITT's subsidiary, the Chilean Telephone Company (Chilteleco) in October 1971, additional evidence was discovered in the files.

As early as February 1970, more than six months before the popular vote for president, ITT cabled instructions to Chilteleco to compile a list of the leading U.S. corporations in Chile. The information, it was later revealed, was needed in order to put together a united front of the major corporations. During the succeeding months, ITT representatives were regularly in touch with the CIA to discuss ways of preventing Allende's election, and Harold Geneen, president and chairman of the corporation, even offered the CIA \$1 million to help defeat Allende.

An ITT internal memo of September 30, 1970, discussed the "unfortunately heavy probability that Allende will take office in November" and complained that "immediate and effective action" to "exert pressure on Allende" was not likely by the Nixon administration. For the longer run, the memo expressed optimism about the prospect of "silent pressure" through the "drying-up of aid and instructions to U.S. representatives in the international banks to vote against or abstain from voting on Chilean loans." This optimism was to prove well founded.

William R. Merriam, an ITT vice-president, later told a U.S. Senate subcommittee that in February 1971 he assembled a committee representing U.S. companies with major investments in Chile to work out a joint anti-Allende strategy. Included were representatives of the Anaconda and Kennecott copper corporations and the Bank of America. "We have these ad hoc committees all the time in Washington. It's just a form of life," Merriam testified, and there is no reason to doubt his word.

When the Chilean government took over foreign copper holdings in July 1971, the concerted strategy was already well under way. Although Allende promised "compensation" for the property seized, Anaconda and Kennecott pushed for immediate payment, and the Nixon administration used Chile's foreign debt (\$3,000 mil-

lion, \$1,700 million of it owed to the United States) as a club to enforce the demand.

As ITT had "hoped," U.S. representatives on international credit agencies blocked loans to the UP government. World Bank officials admitted in September 1972, for example, that no new loans had been granted to Chile since Allende's election.

Even with the most generous of intentions, the UP government was simply unable to pay the full amount of the "compensation" demanded by the copper corporations. The inability was aggravated by a decline in the world market price of copper. In December 1972, Finance Minister Orlando Millas estimated that this decline had cost Chile \$187 million in 1971 and 1972.

Chile's foreign-exchange reserves, which totaled \$335 million in November 1970, dropped to \$100 million by the end of 1971 and only \$80 million a year later. In August 1972, Chile became the first country in the International Monetary Fund to exhaust its Special Drawing Rights completely.

Meanwhile, throughout 1972, Kennecott conducted a campaign in courtrooms around the world, tying up Chilean copper exports with lawsuits seeking to have shipments declared Kennecott's property. The campaign continued even after Allende agreed, in February 1972, to pay a Kennecott subsidiary \$84 million and made a down payment of \$5.7 million.

Partially in response to this Kennecott campaign, Canadian and Dutch banks suspended all credit to Chile in October 1972.

When Allende spoke to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1972, he complained of the "financial strangulation" of the Chilean economy caused by a U.S.-organized economic blockade. While complete figures on Chile's foreign trade are not available, the U.S. Department of Commerce reported on August 3 of this year that U.S. exports to Chile had declined 50 percent since Allende took office.

Allende complained particularly of Chile's inability to purchase food, medicine, equipment, and spare parts. The blockade on spare parts is a particularly insidious form of U.S. imperialist control over underdeveloped



FREI: Chilean Christian Democrat was boosted by imperialist money.

countries. Every time any part of a machine made in the United States—which means virtually all machinery in a country like Chile—wears out, the entire machine becomes useless.

The results of this economic warfare could be seen not only in shortages—such as the lack of truck parts that was one issue in the prolonged truck owners' strike—but in a galloping rate of inflation. Between May 1972 and May 1973, prices in Chile rose at a rate of 238 percent.

As long as the UP government refused to repudiate the national debt or to take serious measures against U.S. imperialist interests, Nixon could afford to take his time and gradually build up the economic pressure. By March of this year, when negotiations on the refinancing of Chile's debt to the United States were broken off without results, Washington was reported to be insisting on the payment of \$700 million for nationalized properties before it would consider an extension of the repayment period.

For Chile there was no way out within the limits of the capitalist system that the Unidad Popular respected to the end. □



## Salvador Allende—Bon Vivant With a Fatal Flaw

"I studied eighteen years to become president, so you might say I have a super doctorate on the subject, and I'm enjoying it," Salvador Allende observed to a reporter in 1971, eight months after assuming office. "It is hard, but you must be aware that life's sweetest sorrows are those brought about by the possession of power."

Both the power and the sweet sorrow ended for Allende with the coup d'etat September 11. He died in his office in the Moneda presidential palace—a suicide, according to the official version; murdered, according to some of his supporters.

Allende had run tenaciously for the presidency over the years. It was his fourth try, in 1970, that brought success. Shortly before the end of that campaign, he looked back on his previous three failures and observed: "If I lose this time too, I'll just keep trying until the day I die. And if I don't make it then, my epitaph should read: 'Here lies Salvador Allende, a future president of Chile.'"

Salvador Allende Gossens was born July 26, 1908, into a family of the middle bourgeoisie in the port of Valparaíso. His family had a history of involvement in politics—his grandfather, his father (a wealthy lawyer), and his uncles were members of the Radical party. His grandfather became a senator and held the post of vice-president of the Senate.

It was as a medical student at the University of Chile in the capital of Santiago that Allende became involved in politics. This was during the dictatorship of General Carlos Ibañez, from 1927 to 1931. Allende was expelled from the university and thrown in jail twice for his political activities. He was elected vice-president of the student federation in 1932, the same year he received his degree.

After receiving his degree, he worked as an assistant in morbid anatomy. The job was hard work, he told Italian film maker Roberto Rossellini in an interview published in the October 18, 1971, issue of *Africasia*. "I performed 1,500 autopsies. I know

what it is to love life, and I know the causes of death. That is why, after working as a doctor, I devoted myself in Valparaíso to organizing the Socialist party."

Together with other student leaders, Allende became a founding member of the party in 1933. Four years later he was elected a member of the Chamber of Deputies.

During the next thirty-three years he made a name for himself by ini-



SALVADOR ALLENDE GOSENS

tiating welfare legislation. He successfully introduced more than one hundred bills, most of them dealing with social security, health, and women's rights.

In 1939, Allende became minister of health in the popular-front government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda. He attained a national reputation as head of the relief effort that year for the victims of a major earthquake that killed some 20,000 persons.

Following the disaster, he published a book, *Sociomedical Problems of Chile*, in which he linked health problems of the poor to the capitalist system.

In 1945 he was elected to the Senate, and in 1952 he ran his first campaign for the presidency. He received only six percent of the vote, and later minimized the campaign as being "a mere salute to the flag." He also ran in 1958 and 1964, before winning the plurality that elected his Unidad Popular coalition on September 4, 1970.

Allende was regarded as something of a *bon vivant*. A fastidious dresser, he early earned himself the nickname "el pije," or the Dandy. He was a wine connoisseur, and reportedly retained a taste for Scotch at \$30 per bottle. As president, he was still kept on the membership list of the posh Prince of Wales Country Club in Santiago, although he had stopped going there. Peter Young, a reporter who interviewed Allende a few months after he was elected, claimed that "if he hadn't gone into politics, friends say, he would have made one hell of an auto racer."

Despite his taste for the finer things in life, wrote C. L. Sulzberger in the March 31, 1971, *New York Times*, Allende lived in "simple circumstances" prior to becoming president. "Even today his hobbies are unpretentious. He likes to play checkers. He occasionally rides. And he enthusiastically sails a little 'snipe.' When he can, he attends detective movies. But essentially he is a very social animal and adores feminine company.

"The notable gap is literature. Allende hardly ever reads, even cutting to a minimum the state documents he peruses. He far prefers oral reports and, being restless by nature, likes to have dozens of visitors and conferences every day. He can in no sense be called an intellectual, and the impression is that his knowledge of Marxist-Leninist doctrine is cursory."

He had a particularly weak grasp of the nature of the capitalist state, believing that the workers could take it over and use its apparatus to dispossess the bourgeois class—peacefully. "As for us," he told Rossellini, "we had already stated that we would

make a revolution by legal means. We had stated that we would change the capitalist system in order to open up the way to socialism, for we knew perfectly well that you can't impose socialism by decree. The result is that, in view of the Chilean situation (this is a country where, by tradition, civic consciousness plays an important role, where the army retains a clearly professional character and is an institution with a well-defined content

and weight, and where the Chilean parliament has been functioning for 120 years!), the only possible path is the electoral path. Thus it is within this context that we can change the existing institutions. The constitution itself provides for this."

This failure to understand the nature of the state and of the need for its revolutionary overthrow not only helped to miseducate the Chilean working class and peasantry; it was

also, in the end, the cause of Allende's downfall. It seems ironic in the wake of his overthrow by the military to recall his belief, expressed in an interview with Sulzberger in March 1971, that there was no danger of a military coup in Chile. "I have absolute confidence in the loyalty" of the armed forces, he said. "Our forces are professional forces at the service of the state, of the people, not at the service of an individual man." □

## Tortured for Refusing to Cooperate

# How Chilean Sailors Reacted to Plans for a Coup

[The following is the text of a special supplement of *Independencia Obrera*, a Chilean factory workers paper, dated September 4—just one week before the military coup that overthrew the Popular Unity regime of Salvador

Allende. It was published by the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR—Revolutionary Socialist party), Chilean section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

of discontent through difficulties in the supply of goods, seemed ready for implementation at the beginning of August. The ships, which normally are equipped to remain at sea for thirty days, received supplies that would make it possible to stay out an additional sixty days. Of the main units—the Prat, the O'Higgins, and the Admiral Latorre—two, the Prat and the O'Higgins, were in bad condition. The latter had a priority in the ASMAR [Astilleros y Materiales de la Armada—Navy Dockyards and Materials] schedule, but was held back to help repair the Prat, which is more powerful and useful for patrolling or attacking.

## Repression Against the Sailors Who Oppose a Coup

In this special issue, *Independencia Obrera* is presenting the *compañeros* a summary of the seditious events that occurred in the Chilean navy, and the heroic resistance of the sailors who opposed a coup and struggled to democratize the navy.

We denounce the reformists of the Unidad Popular [Popular Unity], who are doing *nothing of substance* to free the sailors who opposed a coup. We call on the revolutionary left, on the cordones industriales [assemblies of rank-and-file workers in Santiago industrial concentrations] and the co-

mandos comunales [municipal commands] to support, *in deeds*, the defense committee for the imprisoned sailors that has set up headquarters in the Federación del Metal, Cienfuegos 51.

In addition, we call for assemblies in the factories to draw up statements of support to the imprisoned *compañeros* and to pressure the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores—Workers Central Union] into calling a general strike on behalf of the patriotic sailors. FREE THE IMPRISONED SAILORS!

The O'Higgins was to remain stationed outside Talcahuano [near Concepción], ready to control the situation in the important harbor, which contains some of the most important industrial centers in Chile. An important role in bringing about this change of plans for repairs fell to Rear Admiral Ismael Huerta (former minister of public works and transportation in the civilian-military cabinet that was set up following the October [1972] strike), who has been much quoted by the right wing as a violent opponent of the UP's plans to reform education by creating the ENU [Escuela Nacional Unificada—Unified National Education]. This conspirator, who had even been part of a UP cabinet, went to Talcahuano to discuss the operation with Admiral Wood, head of ASMAR. However, at

## Forces Favoring a Coup Surface

According to information gathered by the revolutionary left, the Chilean navy (in the form of its top body of officers) had worked out a plan aiming at overthrowing the Popular Unity government. This plan had two points:

1. Using the fleet to control, from the coast, all supply systems in the country that use maritime routes and

roads near the sea;

2. Conspiratorial contacts with rightist elements in the air force and the army. The idea was to move into action in response to limited uprisings by these two branches, such as, for example, the one that broke out June 29 in the Second Armored Regiment.

The entire plan, from the agitation in favor of a coup to the fomenting

the end of June it had already become clear that the officers lacked confidence in their subordinates, especially in the sailors. After June 29 [when an initial coup attempt failed], an internal circular ordered only officers to be allowed to carry arms.

### Stopping the Coup

There was a real basis for all this lack of confidence: As a result of the plans of the reactionary officers to carry out a coup, the petty officers and sailors began more and more frequently to gather in groups to discuss the seditious proposals of their

superiors.

This had a dual effect. On the one hand, it slowed down the implementation of the seditious plan in general. But, on the other hand, it set off a repression against elements that were not prepared to take part in coup-related adventures. Thus began the repression in El Belloto naval air base, in Las Salinas Naval Engineering School, in the Second Zone (Talcahuano and Concepción), in Valparaíso, in the cruisers Prat and O'Higgins, and in the ASMAR precinct. *In all parts of the country there were massive raids and arrests. Tortures and beatings followed.*

## Interview With an Arrested Sailor

The following interview with Sergeant Juan Cardenas Villalobos, was made by his lawyers and his wife. He is thirty-seven years old, and has spent twenty years in the navy. He was interviewed after being held incommunicado for several weeks. Of the 200 who were arrested, he was beaten and tortured the most.

*Question. When were you arrested and under what circumstances?*

*Answer.* I was arrested on August 6, at 3:00 a.m., in the "Blanco Encalada" here in Valparaíso. They took me to Las Salinas Naval Infantry School (Miller Regiment) in Viña del Mar. There they started to beat me and torture me, and kept on throughout the rest of the night (from 3:00 until 8:00 or 9:00 the next day).

*Q. Who did the beating?*

A. They were all officers in the naval infantry corps.

*Q. No soldiers?*

A. No, no soldiers.

*Q. What happened on August 13?*

A. They took me before prosecutor Jiménez in order to bring me face to face with other sailors. *I said only that we were opposed to the coup d'etat, and that we would not back up anyone who attempted one.* I again insisted that I had been beaten and

that I wanted my statements put in the court record. The prosecutor refused. I said that it was not necessary for me to prove that I had been beaten, since he could see the marks on my body, that I was no longer resisting, and that I would attempt to commit suicide if the beatings continued, and that the blows were only being directed at my head. The prosecutor just moved me to a different place of detention.

*Q. What happened then?*

A. They took me to the infirmary. After seeing me, the orderly said, "I will not get mixed up in this. This man should be seen by a doctor. I refuse to look after him." He didn't want to see Blasert and Lagos either. After the orderly refused to attend to us, the person in charge of the prison did not want to bring us to the Naval Hospital, in order to avoid news of the events from getting around.

*Q. What happened the following day?*

## Down With the Infamous Law!

Today, just as in 1948, a new infamous law is being used against the people. As yesterday, the bourgeoisie shields itself by using the law to fight the workers struggling for socialism.

At the initiative of the DC [Democracia Cristiana — Christian Democracy], Congress approved the Law on

A. I was taken before an officer called Bilbao, whose rank was that of commander. *He was the administrative prosecutor. Among other things, he said something I will never forget: "If there is a coup d'etat, no leader of the left will remain alive."*

*Q. Then what happened?*

A. We were taken to a naval infantry camp near Borgoño fort. When we got out, they began to beat us immediately. One of the prisoners, Pedro Lagos, had a brain contusion and lost consciousness. A sailor by the name of Salazar had his eardrums broken. We were submerged in a pool of filth. We were kicked while we were being beaten. The gunner Salazar pointed out one of the men who were doing the beating; he was called Luis Guerrero. Pedro Lagos pointed out another, whose nickname is "Duck-face." One man from the Engineering School had his teeth kicked out and everything. (This man was subsequently released for lack of evidence.)

*Q. Who was in charge of the operations?*

A. Captain Koeller. He harangued us about supposed irregularities on the part of the government.

*Q. Do you recall anything else?*

A. Captain Koeller gave me many opportunities to flee. In this way they would have an excuse to kill me. Once I was left alone, sitting down. I immediately thought about the possibility of escaping, but I refrained when I saw several rows of soldiers with machine guns. Among them was Captain Koeller.

(It should be noted that this is the same Koeller who had troops occupy COSAF and MARCO CHILENA.)

Weapons Control at the end of last year. And what happened then?

The UP abstained in Congress when the law was voted. Only the revolutionary left opposed it. President Allende did not veto it, as he could have. Now the UP hypocritically laments



the "application" of the law that it helped get approved.

In this way a vicious and criminal persecution of the workers was begun. Raided plants and outraged workers, trampled underfoot, remained in the wake of the troops.

### A Tragic Example

The brutal repression of the workers at the Austral wool factory in Punta Arenas was a big shock to the people. There the operation carried out by the armed forces resulted in tragedy. One worker, Manuel González Bustamante, was mowed down by machine gun fire. Two days later, another compañero, Guillermo Calixto, who was fatally wounded by the military gunfire, died. And what justification was there for such criminal actions? None! For the troops went away with their hands empty. They did not leave with any of the weapons stockpiles that the right wing claims that the workers have.

The people demand that the government abrogate the infamous law. To accomplish this, an active and massive mobilization of the popular organizations, the cordones, and the comandos comunales will be required. Assemblies should be called in every factory in order to discuss and approve the following:

1. Punishment of those guilty of the death of the workers in Punta Arenas. Together with the working class, the PSR demands the immediate removal from the army of the murderer and

conspirator, General Manuel Torres de la Cruz, commander in chief of the army's Fifth Division, who led the entire operation in Punta Arenas.

2. *Solidarity with the imprisoned sailors.* Let us struggle for the unconditional release of the patriotic sol-

diers and sailors!

3. Formation of a *front against the infamous law* by the revolutionary left and the people. Get the cordones and comandos comunales to take the initiative, struggle, and resist the new infamous law.

## Our Tasks in the Present Situation

The attitude of the sailor compañeros is something to make Chile proud. They are heroes of the working class, heroes of the people.

They have provided an example to the country's sailors, soldiers and carabineers as to how they should act in defense of the people. The officers, bent on a coup, looked on in horror; they saw that their troops were beginning to cease being a machine for crushing the workers.

Their fear led them to act in a beastly fashion; they wanted to show the soldiers and sailors who did not open fire on the people that they themselves would be shot. The working class has the floor now; we workers must show that we will not leave the soldier, sailor, and carabineer compañeros who come over to our side stranded.

We must show them that we are with them just as they are with us; in this way the example of the sailors can be spread throughout all the barracks and ships in Chile.

We know that while a coup is being prepared, the reformist leaderships tremble and make compromises. We know that they are not defending the sailors.

It is we who are defending them.

We demand that the CUT mobilize all the workers in defense of the sailors who heeded the CUT's call for opposition to a coup.

The unions must hold general assemblies to approve joining the solidarity committee.

In factories where reactionaries and reformists put a brake on such action, compañeros of the left must form solidarity commissions of all workers who are conscious of their obligation to defend the sailors; these commissions should join the solidarity committee.

The cordones must organize meetings in support of the sailors. They should demand that the CUT call for a general mobilization.

We must do our duty the way the sailors are doing theirs. □

### Highlights of 'Intercontinental Press' Coverage

## The Chilean Showdown As It Unfolded

Ever since the inauguration of Salvador Allende as president, *Intercontinental Press* has closely followed the fortunes of the Unidad Popular's attempt to bring socialism to Chile by parliamentary means.

For understanding the crisis that brought victory to the Allende coalition in the 1970 elections the article "Behind Allende's Electoral Victory," by Alfredo Garcia, published in our October 5, 1970, issue, is the most thorough.

Garcia traces the development of the main bourgeois parties and outlines the general political situation, dealing

with the status of the trade-union and peasant movements and the strengths of the big reformist parties.

The initial reaction of the U. S. government and the main imperialist corporations to the Unidad Popular election victory are described by Les Evans in an article entitled "Nixon Weighs Possible Alternatives to Allende," published in the October 12, 1970, issue. Evans showed that the U. S. government considered encouraging a coup against Allende soon after his inauguration.

In early 1972, right-wing forces in Chile began to step up their activities

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Soldiers of the Chilean army. The force Allende relied on to make the bourgeoisie follow its own rules.

against the UP government and the Chilean workers. The article "Reaction Opens Offensive Against Allende" (May 15, 1972) outlines the crest of the first big rightist upsurge and the changes it caused in the government. The article also notes the increasingly important role of the Communist party in the UP.

The next major confrontation was the October crisis of 1972. Two articles are informative on this precursor of the 1973 bourgeois offensive: "Allende Declares 'State of Emergency'" by Gerry Foley (October 23, 1972), which describes the circumstances that prompted the first truckers strike; and "Chilean Army Moves to the Fore as Crisis Undermines Allende" by David Thorstad (October 30, 1972), which deals with Allende's increasing reliance on the armed forces to put down the rightist offensive.

"Workers Move Forward as Allende Retreats" by Gerry Foley (December 4, 1972) analyzes the outcome of the "Chilean October," dealing especially with military representation in the new cabinet and the actions taken by the workers themselves to counter the truckers strike, such as factory occupations, take-overs of production, etc. The article also describes the attempts of the militarized cabinet to roll back these gains.

During the recent months, *Intercontinental Press's* coverage of the developing Chilean showdown has been strongly enhanced by on-the-spot dis-

patches from Hugo Blanco, the exiled Peruvian Trotskyist leader who has been living in Santiago.

Of Blanco's articles, four especially stand out as sources of facts and analysis that are vital to understanding the last months of the Allende regime. They are:

—"Chilean Workers Organize Distribution" (April 23, 1973). This article describes the effects of imperialist sabotage of the Chilean economy—the low agricultural and industrial production, the burgeoning black market, and so on. More important, it describes how the crisis in the economy made clear to growing numbers of workers the necessity of taking production and distribution into their own hands and organizing to defend themselves.

—"Fascist Threat Mounting in Chile" (May 7, 1973). Here Blanco describes the organization and activities of the fascist *Patria y Libertad* and its "Black Commands": the terrorization of the workers and left-wing activists and the disruption of production.

—"The Teniente Miners' Strike and the 'Threat of Civil War'" (July 2, 1973). In this article Blanco points out the weaknesses of the leaders of the left-wing organizations: their inability and unwillingness to mobilize the workers against the rightist threat. This was especially shown by the UP parties and the MIR in their blanket denunciation of the miners strike as

"fascist."

—"In the Aftermath of the Attempted Coup" (September 10, 1973) dealt with the rise in workers combativity in Santiago after the June 29 attempted coup by a section of the military. As Blanco noted at the end of this article, written in mid-August, "Popular power is growing and the confrontation is coming ever closer."

In "Counterrevolutionaries Step Up Pressure in Chile" (September 10, 1973) Gerry Foley describes the gravity of the situation for all forces: the UP, the rightists and the military, and the workers and peasants.

In addition to coverage of the news from Chile, *Intercontinental Press* has also published several of the documents of the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR—Movement of the Revolutionary Left). These are: "The Policy of the MIR in the Countryside" (serialized in two parts, April 17, 1972 and May 1, 1972); "MIR Weighs Record of Unidad Popular" (March 13, 1972); and a speech by MIR General Secretary Miguel Enriquez, "For Unity Against the Reactionary Offensive" (January 10, 1972). Also available is the statement of the Fourth International "Chile—the Coming Confrontation" (February 21, 1972).

Any or all of these articles are available for \$.50 per copy from *Intercontinental Press*, P. O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, NY 10014. □

# The Evidence So Far: Nixon's Undercover Gang

By Allen Myers

## Introduction

*Important national security operations which themselves had no connection with Watergate have become entangled in the case.*

*As a result, some national security information has already been made public through court orders, through the subpoenaing of documents and through testimony witnesses have given in judicial and Congressional proceedings. Other sensitive documents are now threatened with disclosure. . . .*

— Nixon's May 22, 1973, statement on Watergate.

\* \* \*

Richard Nixon's frequently expressed concern for the secrecy of "national security information" is well founded. Despite the best efforts of Nixon and his subordinates, the exposure of the Watergate cover-up has led to a flood of disclosures of illegal government activities against opponents of the administration.

Except for the fact that it touched off the politically damaging disclosures, the break-in at the offices of the Democratic National Committee on June 17, 1972, was a relatively trivial incident. While the public has been permitted to glimpse only a small part of the Nixon gang's undercover operations, enough has been revealed to make it indisputable that the methods of Watergate are an inseparable part of the machinery of the U. S. government. Burglaries, wiretapping, provocations, and murder are the rule, not the exception.

As Nixon has pointed out in his own defense, he inherited Watergate-style operations from his predecessors. His fault, in the eyes of a section of the U. S. ruling class, is that in order to secure his own political fortunes, he turned the weapons of government repression against the loyal opposition — and got caught doing so.

Neither is the expansion of undercover activities that has occurred a result of any of Nixon's personal characteristics, although no one can deny that he is admirably suited to direct a gang of thugs and provocateurs. The operations of the Nixon gang have been conditioned by the developments of the class struggle, first and foremost the growth of mass opposition to the war in Vietnam.

The background to the Watergate break-in is thus far more significant than the event itself. Neither is it very important, except as it contributes to the distrust of capitalist government, whether Nixon knew in advance of the break-in or whether John Ehrlichman is a bigger liar than John Dean. The significance of the Watergate-related disclosures lies in what they reveal about the everyday methods of capitalist rule in the United States.

In the mountain of articles in the press and testimony to grand juries and the Senate Watergate committee, there is already far more evidence

"They needed their own secret police to watch the secret operatives they hired to organize phony demonstrations against themselves..."



Herblock in the Washington Post

than could be mentioned, much less adequately summarized, in any reasonable amount of space. What follows is an attempt to outline and illustrate, on the basis of the evidence so far available, the overall pattern of the Nixon gang's operations.

Except where otherwise indicated, the facts cited are based on the sworn testimony of witnesses or participants, or on charges that have not been denied by those concerned.

## Secrecy and Security

*In citing these national security matters it is not my intention to place a national security "cover" on Watergate, but rather to separate them out from Watergate—and at the same time to explain the context in which certain actions took place that were later misconstrued or misused.*

— Nixon's May 22 statement on Watergate.

\* \* \*

Nixon won the November 1968 presidential election with only 43.4 percent of the popular vote — the lowest percentage for a winning candidate in more than half a century. In a race featuring three candidates with significant bourgeois support, Nixon's plurality over Hubert Humphrey was only 510,000 votes out of more than 73,000,000. Still another vitiation of Nixon's "mandate" is the fact that only 61 percent of the eligible voters went to the polls.

The campaign occurred in the context of mass public sentiment against the Vietnam war, which had forced Lyndon Johnson to abandon his plans to run for reelection and to begin negotiations with the Vietnamese liberation forces. Humphrey was defeated by his identification with Johnson and the war; as he cautiously began to take a verbal distance from Johnson's war policies in the last days of the



campaign, his rating in public opinion polls rose rapidly. A "bombing halt" declared by Johnson November 1 nearly won the election for Humphrey.

Nixon, attempting to capitalize on this antiwar sentiment without committing himself to anything, claimed that he had a "secret plan" to end the war—a statement that was to return to haunt him as the war dragged on.

A U.S. president traditionally enjoys a public-opinion "honeymoon" during the early months of his administration, before the hopes deliberately fostered during the campaign turn to disillusionment. In Nixon's case, the honeymoon was exceptionally short.

In fact, Nixon's very inauguration was portentous. Antiwar groups brought more than 12,000 persons to Washington for three days of protests and workshops during the official ceremonies. Many GIs were included, indicating that the antiwar movement in the military had not been derailed by illusions about Nixon and that it would continue to grow.

By the beginning of April, the antiwar movement was able to mobilize several hundred thousand demonstrators in cities across the country. On April 6 200 active-duty GIs led a march of 100,000 in New York City.

A month earlier, Nixon had begun implementing one aspect of his "secret plan" by launching secret bombing raids against Cambodia; during the next fourteen months, B-52s were to drop 104,000 tons of bombs on that country. At about the same time, he ordered a secret expansion of the air war into northern Laos. These raids, which continued into 1972, were reported as attacks on the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" in the Laotian panhandle.

Another aspect of Nixon's war plan was an equally closely guarded secret. This was the sending of small units of infantry into combat in Laos and Cambodia, a practice that had begun under Johnson. An article in the July 25, 1973, *Washington Post* revealed that these infantry operations occurred in Laos from late 1965 until February 1971 and in Cambodia from 1967 until the end of June 1970. A law that Nixon himself signed in December 1969 made it illegal for him to order such operations in Laos.

On May 9, 1969, Nixon's secret plan suddenly threatened to become

public. On that morning, the *New York Times* carried a front-page article by William Beecher that began: "American B-52 bombers in recent weeks have raided several Vietcong and North Vietnamese supply dumps and base camps in Cambodia for the first time, according to Nixon Administration sources, but Cambodia has not made any protest."

Nixon and his defenders have tried to claim that the secrecy surrounding the Cambodian air raids was necessary to prevent the Cambodian ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, from pro-



LAIRD: Helped to defend secrets such as Mylai massacre.

testing against them. In reality, Nixon's chief concern was to keep his escalation of the war a secret from the U.S. public. As recently as his May 22, 1973, Watergate statement—before the secret raids were reported in the press—Nixon was still trying to keep them secret, long after the CIA had engineered Sihanouk's overthrow.

It is now known that immediately after the publication of Beecher's article, Nixon ordered the wiretapping of reporters and administration officials in an effort to find the source of the leak. In his May 22 (1973) statement, he made it sound as though he had been concerned with leaks of "diplomatic" information:

"By mid-1969, my Administration had begun a number of highly sensitive foreign policy initiatives. They were aimed at ending the war in Vietnam, achieving a settlement in the Middle East, limiting nuclear arms, and establishing new relationships among the great powers. These involved highly secret diplomacy. They were closely interrelated. Leaks of secret information about any one could endanger all.

"Exactly that happened. News accounts appeared in 1969, which were obviously based on leaks—some of them extensive and detailed—by people having access to the most highly classified security materials.

"There was no way to carry forward these diplomatic initiatives unless further leaks could be prevented. This required finding the source of the leaks.

"In order to do this, a special program of wiretaps was instituted in mid-1969 and terminated in February, 1971."

It has since been learned that the Nixon gang was at that time in possession of other "security" information that it was trying desperately to keep secret. In March 1969, a former soldier named Ronald Ridenhour wrote to Nixon, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and more than twenty liberal members of Congress, describing what he knew about the Mylai massacre of unarmed Vietnamese civilians in March 1968.

No one—including the news media to which Ridenhour later offered the story—showed any interest. But the conspiracy of silence included so many persons from the very beginning that there was good reason for Nixon to fear "leaks."

With the limited information available to the public, it is not possible to know with certainty whether the desire to cover up the Mylai massacre specifically contributed to Nixon's decision to bug high officials of his own administration. What the attempted cover-up does show, however, is the kind of information that is kept secret under the label "national security."

Nixon did not wait until the publication of Beecher's article to gear up his administration for undercover operations. As early as March 1969, John Ehrlichman, then counsel to the president, approached John Caulfield and asked him, in Caulfield's words,

to set up "a private security entity in Washington for purposes of providing investigative support for the White House."

Caulfield, who was later to achieve fame in the Senate Watergate hearings, was at that time a New York City cop. From 1955 to 1966, he had been in the Bureau of Special Services—the "red squad." He first met Nixon during the 1960 presidential campaign, when he was assigned as a bodyguard during the president's visit to New York. The two appear to have impressed each other. Caulfield worked temporarily for Nixon's campaign in 1968, and it must have been Nixon who suggested to Ehrlichman that Caulfield could conduct undercover operations for the White House.

Caulfield proved reluctant to venture into private enterprise by setting up the proposed "private security entity." Instead, he suggested that he join Ehrlichman's staff, and Ehrlichman agreed.

Caulfield also recommended that another member of the New York Bureau of Special Services, Anthony Ulasewicz, be hired to assist him. Ehrlichman flew to New York for a secret interview with Ulasewicz, was favorably impressed, and hired him. Ulasewicz was not put on the official White House payroll, however. Instead, he was paid \$22,000 a year by Herbert Kalmbach, Nixon's personal lawyer, from funds left over from the 1968 campaign.

Most of the Caulfield-Ulasewicz operations that have been made public involved looking for embarrassing material on potential Democratic presidential candidates. They also broke into the house of *Washington Post* columnist Joseph Kraft in order to put a tap on his telephone.

The methods used against the antiwar movement and the left were considerably less gentle. While the liberal heroes of the Senate Watergate committee have been reluctant to look into this area, information has surfaced from other sources to indicate the tactics employed.

### Sabotaging the Antiwar Movement

*It was not until I joined the White House staff in July of 1970 that I fully realized the strong feelings that the President and his staff had*

*toward antiwar demonstrators—and demonstrators in general. . . .*

*The White House was continually seeking intelligence information about demonstration leaders and their supporters that would either discredit them personally or indicate that the demonstration was sponsored by some foreign enemy. . . .*

—John Dean's testimony to the Senate Watergate committee.

*I will tell you, my husband made the comment to me, looking out the Justice Department it looked like the Russian revolution going on. . . .*

*I don't think the average Americans realize how desperate it is when a group of demonstrators, not peaceful demonstrators, but the very liberal Communists move into Washington.*

—Martha Mitchell in a November 21, 1969, television interview.

\* \* \*

In March 1971 a group of unknown persons made off with the files of an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania. Copies of the files distributed to the press proved that FBI employees regularly acted as provocateurs and sometimes carried out the illegal actions themselves. One document from the files noted:

". . . there have been a few instances where security informants in the New Left got carried away during a demonstration, assaulted police, etc.

". . . while our informants should be privy to everything going on and should rise to maximum level of their ability in the New Left Movement, they should not become the person who carries the gun, throws the bomb, does the robbery or by some specific violative, overt act becomes a deeply involved participant."

The career of one of these "security informants"—Tommy Tongyai, also known as Tommy Traveler—was described in detail in an article by Ron Rosenbaum published in the June 1971 issue of *Esquire* magazine.

Tongyai's operations as a provocateur covered parts of both the Johnson and the Nixon administrations, thus providing evidence of the bipartisan nature of such "security" efforts. Tongyai began spying on a small antiwar group at Keuka College in Penn Yan, New York, in the fall of 1967. The

evidence indicates that at first he acted on his own but that the FBI hired him in the spring of 1968.

As soon as he had established his credibility with the students, Tongyai began pushing provocative actions. One student told Rosenbaum:

"Tommy began coming to meetings about curfew with us and started telling us the way to handle it was to take over the Dean's office and occupy the President's house. He said it seriously. We couldn't believe it. I mean it was curfews. He told us we had to do something that will attract national attention and get national coverage. 'Something big like at Columbia,' he was always saying."

With a cover job as a traveling salesman, Tongyai established himself as a "regional traveler" for Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). As soon as he had achieved this authority, he began to talk about "shooting pigs." He carried a loaded pistol in the glove compartment of his car.

"S.D.S. people at the University of Buffalo," Rosenbaum wrote, "remember Tommy as the crazy who told them he wanted to organize a gun-toting 'regional terrorist committee' to retaliate against right-wingers."

Tongyai's activities were not confined to SDS or the antiwar movement:

"At Hobart [College], Clarence Youngs, a black student, remembers Tommy first approaching him in 1969 about the time of the black students' armed protest at Cornell, and 'telling me that the blacks on campus weren't together because we hadn't taken over any buildings and hadn't burned anything down and that just sitting around was letting the Administration make fools of us.'

"In March of 1969,' Youngs remembers, 'right after Easter vacation, he told me he could show us how to use explosives and that anytime we needed guns or dynamite he could get it for us.'"

Tongyai took several Hobart students to a deserted field for practice with his M-1 rifle.

Another activity Tongyai attempted to organize was the kidnapping of a congressman who spoke at Hobart in January 1970. A few months later, he tried to talk Clarence Youngs into dynamiting a schoolwide meeting: "He said that would be enough to shake



everybody up, and that it wouldn't kill too many people."

At the end of April 1970, Tongyai finally persuaded two Hobart freshmen to carry out a "militant" action—fire-bombing the campus office of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The two students were arrested a few hours after throwing Molotov cocktails through the windows of the office.

There is strong circumstantial evidence that Tongyai planned for the fire-bombing to kill a large number of students. Local police had planned to be at the scene and arrest the two before they could throw the fire-bombs, but Tongyai had told the sheriff that the action was scheduled on the following night. The ROTC office was on the ground floor of a dormitory. Immediately after throwing the bombs, the two students ran inside and pulled the fire alarms to alert the residents. Three of the four alarms didn't work. It was later discovered that someone had removed the fuses from them.

The period of Tongyai's greatest activity, the fall of 1969, witnessed the largest upsurge of mass antiwar activity that had yet been seen. The October 15 Moratorium and the November 13-15 demonstrations in Washington dwarfed even the largest of previous actions.

Nixon had attempted to buy time for continuing the war by announcing the first of his "phased withdrawals" on June 8, but the announcement had little effect on the mass antiwar sentiment. It did, however, have an unexpected influence in further reducing the morale of GIs in Vietnam, who saw no reason to risk their lives in a war that Nixon was promising to end.

The rapid deterioration of morale was symbolized August 24 by the "mutiny" of Company A. An entire company of U.S. troops in Vietnam refused to go into battle—and the capitalist press, in attempting to minimize the incident, explained that such refusals were not uncommon!

As it became clear that the October and November protests would be gigantic, liberal members of Congress tried to place themselves in the leadership of them while the Nixon gang escalated its attempts to discredit the antiwar movement. (It was at this time that White House chief of staff

H.R. Haldeman ordered 24-hour-a-day surveillance of Senator Edward Kennedy, one of the liberals who gave verbal support to the protests.)

Most of the effort of the Nixon gang concentrated on red-baiting and violence-baiting the movement. Vice-President Spiro Agnew was trotted out to denounce Nixon's critics as "impudent snobs." On October 14, 1969, he publicly demanded that the antiwar movement "repudiate" a telegram of solidarity from the North Vietnamese.

In the month between the two protests, attacks on the New Mobilization Committee (NMC), which sponsored the November 15 demonstration, reached a frenzy. A *New York Times* correspondent wrote that "the Nixon Administration has carried out an extensive campaign larger than any attempted by former President Johnson to undercut the effectiveness of the dem-



HALDEMAN: Ordered spies to follow Kennedy 24 hours a day.

onstrations and mobilize public opinion in support of his Vietnam policy."

Part of this campaign, the correspondent continued, involved "encouragement of the reactivation of the militant right, which would step up American military efforts against Communism around the world."

The "militant right" was not able to "reactivate" in time or in sufficient numbers to interfere seriously with the

demonstration (although the American Nazi party did unsuccessfully attack the NMC offices), but some of its subsequent activities were later to be disclosed in the Watergate revelations.

The Nixon gang also fed red-baiting stories to friendly columnists, who then trumpeted the charge that "Trotskyites" were masterminding the protest. The nationally syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, for example, wrote on November 12:

"The steering committee [of the New Mobilization Committee] began eclipsing the executive committee in recent weeks under the leadership of the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party and its fast growing youth arm, the Young Socialist Alliance. Fred Halstead of the Socialist Workers Party took over planning for a march calculated to end in violent confrontation."

In reality, it was the Nixon gang that was doing everything possible to provoke a "violent confrontation." On November 4, a Justice Department official issued a statement denying a permit for the November 15 march. The statement was given to reporters by the man assigned to negotiate the parade route with the demonstrators—an associate deputy attorney general named John W. Dean 3d.

Dean told the press that "reliable reports" indicated that some of the demonstrators "may be planning to foment violence." He added, "A militant group is attempting to bring street gangs to Washington."

Although Nixon was eventually forced to back down and grant a permit for the march, everything possible was done to preserve the threat of violence to the last moment. This included sending John Dean "duck hunting" in the middle of negotiations with the demonstration leaders.

One of the goals of the Nixon gang's provocations was to divide the movement itself. An FBI agent named Robert Wall later disclosed that FBI agents had forged a letter to the NMC over the signature of the Reverend Douglas Moore, leader of the Washington Black United Front. The letter, sent shortly before November 15, demanded that the NMC pay the Black United Front \$1 for each demonstrator who came to Washington. The FBI then sent another forged letter



filled with racist epithets to Moore, and signed it with the name of an NMC leader.

While the Nixon gang's "dirty tricks" campaign was unable to prevent more than 1 million persons from demonstrating in Washington and San Francisco on November 15, it did succeed in reining in its ruling-class critics. Many of the congressional liberals who had endorsed the October 15 Moratorium joined in the red-baiting of the New Mobilization Committee, as did such liberal newspapers as the *New York Post*.

On November 13, 1969, Agnew went on national television to deliver a thinly veiled threat against the networks, which he accused of paying too much attention to "the minority of Americans who specialize in attacking the United States."

The television networks, he said, "can make or break by their coverage and commentary a moratorium on the war. . . . As with other American institutions, perhaps it is time that the networks were made more responsive to the viewers of the nation and more responsible to the people they serve."

As a result of Agnew's warnings, the networks dropped their plans to provide live coverage of the mammoth demonstration. The press got its revenge two days later, however, by publishing the story of the Mylai massacre.

The protest march itself proceeded without the violence in the streets predicted by Dean—despite the efforts of the Nixon gang. Police used a demonstration of 2,000 persons led by the Weatherman faction of SDS the night before the main march as a pretext for attacking with tear gas, obviously with the intention of intimidating those planning to protest the next day.

On November 15, a group of about 6,000 broke off from the main rally of 800,000 for a separate protest outside the Justice Department. After a few rocks and paint bombs had been thrown at the building, police spread tear gas over an area for blocks around, deliberately gassing participants in the major rally as it was breaking up.

It is now evident that the "reliable reports" cited by Dean in predicting a violent demonstration came from



AGNEW: Led attack on antiwar movement and television networks.

informer-provocateurs like Tommy Tongyai, who vigorously advocated a confrontation with police in Washington.

"Students at Auburn College and at Hobart," Rosenbaum wrote in the *Esquire* article, "remember Tommy appearing before them just prior to the November 15, 1969, moratorium in Washington. Tommy advised them that the moratorium itself was 'liberal bullshit,' but that the Weathermen were going to march on the South Vietnamese Embassy . . . and burn it down or blow it up. Tommy counseled people going to Washington to stick with the Weathermen 'because that's where all the good violence will be.'"

### Weatherman for the FBI

*In the spring and summer of 1970, another security problem reached critical proportions. In March a wave of bombings and explosions struck college campuses and cities. . . .*

—Nixon's May 22 statement on Watergate.

\* \* \*

The ultraleft binge of SDS, which contributed to the fragmentation and

rapid demise of the organization, made it relatively easy for provocateurs to do their dirty work. The murderous activities of a few of these agents have come to light in the wake of the Watergate scandal.

In the May 20, 1973, *New York Times*, Seymour M. Hersh described what is known of the role of Larry D. Grathwohl, "one of the most militant and outspoken members of the radical Weathermen organization during its peak period of bombing and other violence in late 1969 and early 1970."

Grathwohl's father-in-law and other sources told Hersh that the "radical" was an FBI employee. Grathwohl is reportedly preparing a book entitled *The Bombers: I Was a Weatherman for the F.B.I.*

"Mr. Grathwohl," Hersh wrote, "was said to be widely known among the Weathermen for his skill in making bombs and fuses, as well as his penchant for carrying a revolver and straight razor."

Grathwohl joined the Weathermen in Cincinnati in 1969.

"Sources said Mr. Grathwohl immediately began giving lessons in bomb-making and the use of delayed fuses to his Weathermen associates, and—utilizing a special munition he manufactured—participated in the bombing of a public school in a suburb of Cincinnati in the fall of 1969. 'They didn't think it would work, and it did,' one source said. 'They were kind of scared of him.'"

"Over the next few months, the sources said, Mr. Grathwohl began traveling around the country on Weathermen activities. The sources also said he participated in the planning for the bombing of a police facility in Detroit, took lessons in strategic sabotage in Madison, traveled to Cleveland with Mark Rudd and Linda Evans, two Weathermen leaders, and eventually appeared in Buffalo, Washington and New Haven."

Grathwohl's father-in-law told Hersh: "He went to those communes, he went underground. He was even in New York when that house blew up there." This was a reference to the March 6, 1970, explosion of an alleged "Weatherman bomb factory" that killed two members of the group.

Hersh's sources indicated that Grathwohl was under the direction of Guy

Goodwin, the chief prosecutor of the Justice Department's "red squad."

"In whatever city he would hit," one of the sources told Hersh, "he would be assigned an agent. And whenever he couldn't get anywhere with the local agent, he would go to Goodwin. Within five minutes after Larry placed a call, there was a return [call] from Goodwin."

Another FBI provocateur, Charles Grimm, was exposed after he had created a "riot" on the campus of the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa during the May 1970 student upsurge that followed the invasion of Cambodia. In his book *Cops and Rebels* (New York: Random House, 1972), Paul Chevigny writes:


"Grimm admitted to witnesses that he burned Dressler Hall on the Tuscaloosa campus on May 7, 1970, an event which prompted university officials to request more police assistance. On May 14, 1970, he threw three Molotov cocktails into the street in front of an apartment building occupied by students, which attracted a crowd and subsequently brought the police. The same night, he met local and state officials at a Holiday Inn, although what he said to them is not known. At least one student was beaten that night, and at a meeting on May 16, Grimm urged students to avenge that beating."

On May 18, Grimm stood on a balcony of the student union building and threw a bicycle pedal, a softball, and a brick at police gathered in front of the building. American Civil Liberties Union attorneys who investigated the incident later wrote in their report:

"After the objects were thrown, Major John Cloud of the Alabama Highway Patrol declared an unlawful assembly in that area. Approximately 45 students were arrested that day in and around the Union Building pursuant to Cloud's orders. Grimm has admitted throwing the objects and we have interviewed two witnesses who saw him throw one or all of the various missiles."

Reporters taking a second look at the May 4, 1970, killing of four students at Kent State University by the Ohio National Guard have uncovered evidence that still another FBI provocateur may have fired on the troops, touching off their murderous assault

September 24, 1973



ROGERS: "Publicly humiliated" for being too easy on the enemy.

on the student demonstration.

In the July 11, 1973, *Christian Science Monitor*, Trudy Rubin quoted two witnesses who had seen the FBI agent carrying a pistol at the scene and who said the pistol had been fired.

### Surrounded by Enemies

*This memorandum addresses the matter of how we can maximize the fact of our incumbency in dealing with persons known to be active in their opposition to our Administration. Stated a bit more bluntly—how we can use the available federal machinery to screw our political enemies.*

—John Dean in an August 16, 1971, memo to H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman.

\* \* \*

FBI provocateurs are only one of the Nixon gang's weapons against its political enemies. White House papers turned over to the Senate Watergate committee prove that any and all departments of the government were and are regarded as means of intimidating opposition.

J. Anthony Lukas, in the July 22, 1973, *New York Times Magazine*, wrote that as early as July 1969 the

Nixon gang was "pressuring" the Internal Revenue Service to be more responsive to the political needs of the administration. The Dean papers indicate a feeling in the Nixon gang that Democratic party holdovers in the IRS bureaucracy were not sufficiently cooperative.

This may or may not have been the case when the intended victim was a prominent Democratic politician. But the IRS cooperated fully with the Nixon gang in respect to non-ruling-class opponents, setting up the Special Service Group to conduct special investigations of the taxes of antiwar, nationalist, and leftist groups. A September 19, 1970, memorandum from Commissioner of Internal Revenue Randolph W. Thrower reported that the IRS had already conducted politically motivated special screenings of 1,025 organizations and 4,300 individuals.

The disclosure that the Nixon gang kept an "enemies list" that included prominent opponents in the two major capitalist parties naturally created some indignation, particularly among those who found their own names on the list. Interestingly enough, however, the furor was much greater than that occasioned by an earlier disclosure that the Nixon gang regards most of the population of the United States as an enemy. The difference in the reaction may be due to the evidence that Nixon's predecessors shared this evaluation.

In March 1971, in the aftermath of leaks disclosing that the army had been spying on legal civilian activities, Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert J. Froehle admitted to a Senate subcommittee that the Pentagon kept dossiers on 25 million Americans. Froehle testified:

"The DCII [Defense Central Index of Investigation] contains about 25 million index cards on personalities and 760,000 cards on organizations and incidents. On an average day, 12,000 requests are processed and 20,000 additions, deletions and changes are made."

The DCII was established in 1965 as the Defense Department's central file for "counterintelligence." Army spying against civilians was apparently escalated in the spring of 1968 in accordance with a plan approved at the highest levels of the government's

spy system. In February 1971, Congressman Ogden Reid charged that the plan had been sent to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Treasury Department, the Justice Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Subversive Activities Control Board, and the General Services Administration, among others.

Froehlke's testimony indicated that such prominent figures of the Johnson administration as Secretaries of Defense Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford and Attorney General Ramsey



MITCHELL: No visa for troublesome ideas.

Clark had been aware of the details of the Pentagon's spying on civilians. As for Johnson's role in setting up the spy operation, Froehlke said he "didn't think it proper" to look into the matter.

As the Watergate scandal has unfolded, the Nixon gang has desperately tried to maintain the fiction that only low-level officials are involved in the government's undercover war on political opponents. The reality is that the enemy to be "screwed" by the government is often selected at the highest levels, even when the enemy is a single individual.

An unusual confirmation of this situation was provided in the fall of 1969, when two members of the cabinet disagreed on how to handle an

enemy. The decision in the dispute almost certainly would have been made by Nixon himself.

On October 18, 1969, the Belgian Marxist economist and Trotskyist leader Ernest Mandel was prevented from entering the United States for a scheduled debate with liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith. After protests by faculty members of more than fifty universities, including two Nobel laureates, Secretary of State William Rogers recommended that the ban on Mandel be lifted. But on November 26, Rogers's recommendation was overruled by Attorney General John Mitchell.

This highly unusual public breach in the administration was called a "public humiliation of the State Department by an Attorney General" in a *New York Times* editorial, which went on to observe: "While the battle of the visa began at low levels of routine bureaucratic hurdles, it has culminated in a contest of conflicting authority and ideology at the highest stratum of the Administration."

The dispute did not, of course, represent a conflict of "ideology" between Rogers and Mitchell, but it did provide invaluable evidence on the question of who directs the government repressive apparatus.

### Murder of Black Militants

*We wholeheartedly commend the police officers for their bravery, their remarkable restraint and their discipline in the face of this vicious Black Panther attack and we expect every decent citizen of our community to do likewise.*

— Chicago prosecutor Edward V. Hanrahan after the December 4, 1969, police murders of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark.

*One official . . . described the most serious issue facing the Nixon Administration in mid-1970 as "the black problem." He said intelligence indicated that Black Panther leaders were being covertly supported by some countries in the Caribbean and in North Africa. Some Government officials also believed, he said, that Algeria, which was vocal in its support of the Black Panthers in the United States, might become a main overseas base for the Panthers.*"

— *New York Times*, May 24, 1973.

\* \* \*

The willingness of the U.S. government to blow up or gun down radicals, demonstrators, or innocent bystanders in order to discredit mass opposition movements and destroy leftist organizations has been most murderously evident in the repeated police assaults on the Black Panther party.

As with many of the undercover attacks already discussed, the federally directed campaign against the Panthers has been a bipartisan effort, involving both Democratic and Republican administrations.

Between the beginning of 1968 and the end of 1969, no fewer than thirty members of the Black Panther party were murdered by police.

Perhaps the most notorious case occurred in Chicago on the night of December 4, 1969. In the middle of the night, cops armed with shotguns, revolvers, and a submachine gun shot their way without warning into an apartment occupied by nine Panthers.

Mark Clark was gunned down through the door of the apartment as he was about to open it. Fred Hampton was murdered as he lay in bed. Four other Panthers were wounded in the assault.

The cops claimed that they had knocked on the door in order to carry out a search for which they had a warrant and that when they entered they were fired on by a woman with a shotgun. They described for the press a "fierce" gunfight that never occurred. One cop told reporters:

"There must have been six or seven of them firing. The firing must have gone on 10 or 12 minutes. If 200 shots were exchanged, that was nothing."

A grand jury report released more than six months later revealed that at most one shot could have been fired by the Panthers—if a gun that the cops said they found in the apartment was not actually brought in by the cops themselves.

"By contrast," the grand jury report stated, "the officers also testified to the shots which they fired in the apartment. This testimony, together with the physical evidence recovered, indi-



cates that they fired from 82 to 99 total shots. Of these, the grand jury has received in evidence 55 projectiles and has accounted for 82 expended shells positively identified as having been fired in police weapons. Moreover, there are numerous bullet holes, marks and fragments in the walls and furniture that are consistent with this testimony."

The pretext for the murderous raid was a search for "illegal weapons," which the police said they had learned from an "informant" were being stockpiled by the Panthers. The grand jury report showed that this phony charge originated in Washington. The May 16, 1970, *New York Times* reported:

"... the initial information that the Black Panthers were thought to be stockpiling weapons in Chicago had come to the Chicago officials from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This disclosure was the first official substantiation of charges by black leaders that Federal officials had played a part in the investigation that led to a raid on the apartment and the fatal shooting. According to the grand jury, the two F. B. I. tips were routine transmittals of information from a 'confidential source.'"

As we have seen, the Nixon gang never lacks "confidential sources" to provide it with whatever "reliable information" it desires.

At least one other federal agency has been involved in directing local police forces against the Panthers. On February 9, 1970, the *New York Times* reported that the mayor of Seattle had "turned down a Federal proposal for a raid on Black Panther headquarters in Seattle because he did not want to popularize the Panthers' cause. He also said that such raids smacked of gestapo-type tactics."

According to the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, the proposal came from the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the Internal Revenue Service. This unit of the IRS is one of the government's major secret-police agencies.

Mayors of other cities would seem to have been less hesitant than the mayor of Seattle. In 1970 alone, police attacks on Panther headquarters occurred in Birmingham, Detroit, New Orleans, Philadelphia, and Toledo. These assaults were combined with legal frame-ups such as the murder

charges against Bobby Seale and Ericka Huggins in Connecticut and the "bombing conspiracy" indictment of twenty-one Panthers in New York City.

## The 1970 Spy Plan

*The real threat to internal security is repression. But repression is an inevitable result of disorder. Forced to choose between order and freedom, people will take order.*

— Tom Charles Huston

*We have had many crises in prior years, but none within the memory of living Americans which compares with this one. A number of factors contributed to it—war, inflation, unemployment with resulting poverty; a deterioration of our environment; an atmosphere of repression; and a divisiveness in our society to a degree of intensity that has not been equaled in the past hundred years.*

— Former Chief Justice Earl Warren, May 15, 1970.

\* \* \*

The April-May 1970 campus rebellion that swept the United States after Nixon's invasion of Cambodia and the murder of students at Kent State and Jackson State Universities was completely unprecedented, the first general student strike in U.S. history. Conservative estimates put the number of students involved at 5 million.

The student rebellion occurred, moreover, in the context of indications that the radicalization was beginning to have its effects on the working class. This was symbolized most graphically on March 18, 1970, when 200,000 postal workers defied federal injunctions and walked off the job in the first strike in the history of the U. S. Post Office.

The unexpected explosion of antiwar activity increased the already deep divisions within the U. S. ruling class. Nixon, the *New York Times* wrote in a May 17 editorial, "has misjudged the depth of American aversion to the war. This opposition has exploded not only on the campuses but within his Cabinet, in the usually mute State Department bureaucracy and among such solid citizens as 1,000 'establish-

ment' lawyers who plan to travel from New York to Washington this week to urge 'immediate withdrawal from Indochina.'"

John W. Gardner, who had been a member of Johnson's cabinet, told a national television audience: "... while each of us pursues his selfish interest and comforts himself by blaming others, the nation disintegrates. I use the phrase soberly: The nation disintegrates."

The "disintegration" extended even into Nixon's secret police agencies. Three years later, in his May 22 Watergate defense, Nixon complained:



HOOVER: Severed diplomatic relations with CIA.

"... the relationships between the F. B. I. and other intelligence agencies had been deteriorating. By May, 1970, F. B. I. Director Hoover shut off his agency's liaison with the C. I. A. altogether."

Nixon, unfortunately, provided no information on the subjects in dispute between the CIA and the FBI. But his inability to keep the two agencies pulling in the same direction is an indication of the extent to which his own authority had been eroded even within the government.

On June 5, 1970, Nixon met with Hoover and the directors of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. "We discussed," Nixon said in his May 22 (1973) statement, "the urgent need for

better intelligence operations." We can be certain that Nixon expressed a need for "better intelligence" to forewarn the government of explosions like that of April-May.

As a result of this meeting, a working group was set up that included the four agencies mentioned, the spy groups of each of the armed services, and Tom Charles Huston, a White House "speechwriter" representing Nixon.

Huston had begun his political career at the University of Indiana seven years previously by acting as publicity agent for the local prosecutor's unsuccessful attempt to railroad three members of the Young Socialist Alliance into jail. In 1965 he became national chairman of the ultraconservative Young Americans for Freedom. In 1966 he endorsed Nixon for president, and he was rewarded with a job in the White House in 1969.

Huston must have felt that he was in the reactionary's heaven when he sat down with the interagency committee to work out ways of defending "freedom" by repressing Nixon's opponents.

On June 25, the spymasters sent a forty-three-page report and recommendations to Nixon. In a covering memorandum to H. R. Haldeman, chief of the White House staff, Huston cautioned:

"We don't want the President linked to this thing with his signature on paper. . . . All hell would break loose if this thing leaks out."

The recommendations — all of which were subsequently approved by Nixon — covered six areas:

1. The National Security Agency was to be authorized to tap international telephone calls to or from the United States.

2. Electronic spying on U.S. radicals and foreign diplomatic offices was to be expanded.

3. Both "legal" and illegal mail coverage was to be authorized. (The former involves recording the name and address of persons who write to the person under surveillance; the latter includes opening and reading the mail.)

4. Burglaries were to be carried out against foreign embassies and domestic radicals.

("Use of this technique," the report noted, "is clearly illegal: it amounts

to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion. . . .

("Surreptitious entry of facilities occupied by subversive elements can turn up information about identities, methods of operation, and other invaluable investigative information which is not otherwise obtainable. This technique would be particularly helpful if used against the Weathermen and Black Panthers.")

5. The FBI was to increase its spy operations on campuses: "The campus is the battleground of the revolutionary protest movement. It is impossible to gather effective intelligence about the movement unless we have campus sources. The risk of exposure is minimal, and where exposure occurs the adverse publicity is moderate and short-lived. It is a price we must be willing to pay for effective coverage of the campus scene. . . ."

6. In the field of military spying on civilians, the recommendation was that "present restrictions should be retained." The document did not indicate what those "restrictions" were, but as we have seen above, they were not so stringent as to prevent the Pentagon from compiling dossiers on 25 million persons.

In his May 22 statement, Nixon implied that the recommendations were approved on July 23 and rescinded on July 28, 1970. But Huston wrote a memorandum on July 15 outlining Nixon's approval, and no one has yet produced one canceling the expanded spy operations. On the contrary, documents turned over to the Senate Watergate committee show that Huston and other White House aides discussed implementation of the approved recommendations in August and September of 1970. Copies of the report are also known to have been circulated in the Justice Department at the end of 1970.

In any case, it is clear that the spy plan was put into operation, whether under the authority of Nixon's approval in July or of some later secret instruction.

There have been, for example, a number of disclosures of burglaries of Nixon's opponents, the best known being that carried out by the "plumb-

ers" in the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in September 1971.

Many of the burglaries that have been discovered involved raids on the offices of lawyers defending persons framed by the Nixon gang.

The home of Scott Camil, one of the defendants in the unsuccessful attempt to frame members of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) on charges of "conspiracy" to disrupt the 1972 Republican convention, was twice burglarized. The office of Camil's lawyer was also broken into, and her file on Camil was removed.

The New York office of the Legal Defense and Educational Fund of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was burglarized on the same weekend that the "plumbers" carried out their Los Angeles raid on the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The Legal Defense and Educational Fund was at that time handling several political cases, including one involving Bobby Seale. Watergate burglars Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy are known to have flown to New York under assumed names that weekend.

The office of Charles Garry, a San Francisco lawyer for the Black Panthers, was broken into twice during 1971 and files were taken. *Newsweek* reported in its June 11, 1973, issue: "The [Senate] investigators have been told specifically that burglaries were committed in connection with the Seattle Seven, Chicago Weatherpeople, Detroit Thirteen and Berrigan cases."

It has also been revealed that Chilean diplomatic offices in the United States were broken into in 1971 and 1972, and that the FBI has been carrying out similar raids for decades.

(To be continued.)

## A Blow to Theology

An unidentified flying object that hit the ground in Georgia, burned a hole, and then vanished in a cloud of steam, has been tentatively identified as "a small meteorite or a piece of space hardware" by a chemist who analyzed the soil where it struck.

The chemist's verdict conflicted with the views of the person who saw the small, flaming object land, who said that he thought it was "brimstone from heaven to show people God can burn the earth."

## How Stalin Paved the Way for German Invasion

By Milton Alvin

### II

After the debacle in Germany Stalin made another sharp turn, this time toward alliances with both the Social Democrats and liberal capitalists. Known as the people's front or popular front, the turn marked the first time that those who considered themselves to be communists advocated alliances with capitalist political formations. The new policy led to more defeats, especially in Spain and France.

In 1935 a popular front alliance in France won an electoral victory that put Socialist leader Leon Blum into office as premier. With CP support he proceeded to break a huge strike wave conducted by the French workers at that time. The workers were occupying factories, raising red flags on the roofs, and calling for soviets. A promising revolutionary development was once more cut short with the full approval of the Stalinists.

A similar alliance in Spain came into office in 1936 after about five years of sharp struggles that followed the overthrow of the monarchy in 1931. An uprising by fascist generals triggered a three-year civil war beginning in 1936.

Workers organizations responded to the fascist threat by seizing arms and forming military detachments based upon unions and political parties. Almost the entire regular army supported the fascists. The quick movement of the workers into the line of fire stopped the fascist advance.

The People's Front government compelled the military detachments of the workers to place themselves under its orders and to give up their independent existence. The Stalinists were drawn into the government and gradually displaced other elements in influence. Changes in the government reflected a steady shift to the right. Many of those who were fighting the fascists but disagreed with the Stalinists were imprisoned. Some of these were murdered by Soviet secret police who established themselves on Spanish soil.

The prestige of the Soviet Union was loudly touted because they were furnishing arms to the People's Front. However, these were paid for by the Spanish government, which had sent its gold reserves to the Soviet Union for safekeeping.

Great damage to the Spanish revolution was done by the People's Front policy compelling peasants to return lands they had seized in the early days of the war. Workers who had taken control of factories were made to return them to their capitalist owners. The fascist base in Morocco from which the generals' rebellion was mounted was left intact when the People's Front refused to give that Spanish colony its independence.

These conservative and self-defeating policies were designed to save the capitalist system in Spain. They were imposed upon the workers and peasants by the Stalinists and their allies, who were anxious to show the British, French, and American capitalists how antirevolutionary

they really were.

As a result, the difference between the fascists and the People's Front became obscure to the workers and peasants and they grew discouraged.

The heroic struggle put up by the Spanish masses ended in a terrible defeat, the results of which have lasted more than a third of a century. People's frontism proved to be a complete failure as a way to fight fascism.

During this same period the American Communist party began for the first time to support capitalist candidates in elections. This was the form people's frontism took in the United States. In 1936, although it ran a presidential slate of its own, the CP raised the slogan "Defeat Landon at all costs." Landon was the Republican candidate. This policy was a not too subtle way of telling people to vote for the Democratic candidate, Franklin D. Roosevelt.

From that time on the Stalinists have followed the policy of seeking alliances with liberal capitalists, openly or covertly, depending on the circumstances.

In 1936 a series of show trials was held in Moscow, the chief defendant Leon Trotsky being tried in absentia. Most of the other defendants were prominent Bolsheviks, former Soviet leaders and Lenin's co-workers. The verdicts of the courts found all of them guilty of monstrous crimes, and almost all were shot. Several were imprisoned and others committed suicide or disappeared without explanation.

The trials signaled the start of a purge that was carried to every nook and corner of Soviet society. Thousands were executed, most without trials, and hundreds of thousands were imprisoned in concentration camps. When the purge died down, the entire leadership of the 1917 revolution was gone with the exception of Stalin, who ruled as an absolute dictator in the Kremlin, and Trotsky, who was living in exile in Mexico.

A commission of inquiry, headed by the eminent American philosopher and educator John Dewey, after a thorough investigation declared the Moscow Trials a frame-up and found Trotsky not guilty of the crimes with which he was charged. This did much to confirm widespread suspicions that there was no substance to the charges against the victims of the purge in the USSR and that the entire operation was carried out as a counter-revolutionary political move.

As the decade of the 1930s drew to a close, the world was astonished to learn that Stalin and Hitler had signed a pact that had been concluded secretly at the same time that widely publicized Soviet negotiations for an agreement with France and England were taking place. Trotsky had predicted this but his voice was heard by relatively few people.

The pact with Hitler disoriented millions of workers who were sympathetic to the Soviet Union, especially German workers living under the Nazi heel. Immediately after



the pact was signed, World War II broke out with Hitler's invasion of Poland. This was soon supplemented by Stalin's invasion of the same country.

The Soviet government had a right and even a duty, of course, to maneuver among the imperialist powers as part of the defense of the workers state. In the days of Lenin and Trotsky this was part of Soviet foreign policy. But Stalin's pact with Hitler represented something different from that.

It provided not only for the swallowing of a part of Poland by the USSR but also for supplying raw materials very much needed by Hitler in his war against England and France. Molotov, Stalin's foreign affairs minister, informed anxious supporters of the Soviet Union that the pact was "sealed in blood."

The excuse used by the Stalinists that the pact gave the Soviet Union the time needed to prepare for war proved to be false. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union twenty-two months later, it turned out that Stalin had used the time not to prepare for war but to prepare the Soviet people to believe in Hitler's promises.

Stalin refused to heed many warnings he received that Hitler was about to attack the Soviet Union. He paid no attention to Trotsky's predictions. He paid no attention to the massing of German armies near the Soviet borders. Stalin described these signs as provocations designed to get Germany and Russia to fight each other. He ordered his generals not to respond to the first Nazi assaults, claiming they were attempts by a few German generals to provoke a war on their own and without Hitler's orders.

As a result the Soviet armed forces were caught by surprise. A large part of the Soviet air force was destroyed on the ground and several million troops were killed, wounded or captured. Vast areas of the Soviet Union were taken by the Nazis and before the war was six months old, Hitler's armies stood poised before Moscow and Leningrad.

This was the fruit of the Stalin-Hitler pact, which was supposed to keep the Soviet Union out of the war long enough to make the necessary preparations. Only the determined response of the Soviet soldier and civilian masses to defend the conquests of the 1917 revolution finally defeated the Nazis despite Stalin's misleadership.

In the United States, following the Stalin-Hitler pact, the Communist party raised the slogan "The Yanks Are Not Coming." Criticism of Hitler and fascism was played down and blame for the war was assigned to British and French imperialism.

That this was a temporary shift in line became clear after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. The slogan was hastily altered to "The Yanks Are Not Coming Too Late." This amendment signified the return of the Stalinists to the Roosevelt camp, where they remained for the duration of the war.

In August 1940 Stalin finally succeeded in assassinating Leon Trotsky. An agent of the Soviet secret police secured entry to Trotsky's household in Mexico by posing as a sympathizer of the Fourth International. He killed Trotsky by driving the point of a pick into his brain. A previous attack in May, led by the Mexican painter David A. Siqueiros, had been unsuccessful.

The murder of Trotsky removed the last living link be-

tween the associates of Lenin and the revolutionary Marxist movement. All the others had already died or fallen victim in the purges of the 1930s. However, two years before his death Trotsky founded the Fourth International. As the successor to the Third International, this organization, to which revolutionary parties and groups in many countries belong, has carried on the work begun by Marx and Engels.

In 1943, as a gesture to his American and British allies, Stalin decreed the liquidation of the Third (Communist) International, which had been formed in 1919 through the joint efforts of Soviet leaders and many revolutionaries from other countries. He ordered its dissolution without asking for approval from the many Communist parties that made up the organization. In the United States the CP leaders inferred that this was a way of telling them to shut down their party. They accomplished this by setting up the Communist Political Association, which was described as an educational organization.

The war period saw the American CP stoop to some of the most vulgar and disgusting displays of chauvinism, scabbing, and strikebreaking ever seen in this country. In 1941, when leaders of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers party and the Minneapolis Teamsters union were charged with being Marxists and conspiring to overthrow the United States government by force and violence, the Stalinists demanded they be tried as fascists. The frame-up of the defendants resulted in convictions and jail terms; but organizations representing millions of workers gave support to the victims. The Stalinists did all they could to block support; unwittingly, however, they did considerable damage to themselves.

The Stalinists unveiled a completely reactionary program within American unions. They demanded more production and piece-work wages. They supported Roosevelt's job freeze, his wage freeze, and a no-strike pledge made by almost all union officials.

When the coal miners carried out a series of strikes, the Stalinists, with Roosevelt's approval and aid, toured the mining towns urging the workers not to support their own union. This strikebreaking effort failed miserably, as it deserved.

Prominent CP spokesmen, such as Harry Bridges, president of the International Longshoremens Union, advocated the wartime no-strike pledge for the postwar period. Earl Browder, head of the CP, offered to shake hands with J.P. Morgan, leading banker and symbol of American imperialism.

When the March on Washington Movement was formed by Blacks in 1941 in an effort to exert pressure upon Roosevelt to give Black workers better job opportunities, the CP tried its best to dissuade them, demanding that all efforts be channeled into "winning the war." However, Blacks saw the war as a chance to improve their position and they disregarded Stalinist exhortations. This betrayal cost the CP much of the support it once had in the Black community. Its influence dwindled in the years that followed until it was hardly visible.

The reactionary and treacherous policies of the Stalinists also cost them dearly in the unions, where their influence was eroded during the war years. The full effect of these developments only came to light several years later.

(To be continued.)