

Soviet Dissidents Sentenced in Moscow Frame-Up Trial

The Mounting Rightist Threat in Chile



Ernest Mandel: What Future for the Inflationary Boom?

U.N. Body to Study Puerto Rico Issue

The United Nations Committee on Colonialism voted August 30 to keep the issue of Puerto Rico under "continuous review." The vote of the twenty-four-member committee was 12-2, with nine abstentions and one member absent.

In a resolution, the committee called on the United States government to refrain from measures that might obstruct "the full and free exercise by the people of their inalienable rights to self-determination and independence, as well as economic and social rights."

John Scali, chief U.S. delegate, promptly attacked the vote as "ludicrous." The island colony, he asserted, had achieved self-governing status and should be dropped from the list of colonies that the committee annually reviews. The United States and its junior partner, Great Britain, pulled out of the Committee on Colonialism in 1971.

The committee agreed to take up the question of Puerto Rico in response to a motion submitted by Cuba, which has been trying for years to get the world body to discuss it. There now appears to be a possibility that the issue will be debated in the General Assembly itself when it opens its session September 18.

A week prior to the vote, the committee, in an unprecedented move, heard testimony from representatives of the Puerto Rican independence movement. It did so, reported Kathleen Teltsch in the August 31 *New York Times*, "despite strenuous lobbying against this move by the United States." Supporters of independence for the colony had been holding daily pickets in front of the United Nations, demanding that the question be placed on the agenda.

Juan Mari Brás, general secretary of the Puerto Rican Socialist party, and Rubén Berrios, president of the Puerto Rican Independence party, denounced "the United States and its government for violating international law and the United Nations Charter by maintaining a colonial-type system in Puerto Rico . . . demonstrating absolute disdain for the right of self-determination of nations." □

In This Issue

FEATURES	1000	The Inflationary Boom and Its Coming End —by Ernest Mandel
	1006	Trotsky's Coyoacan Home to Be Made Into Museum
PUERTO RICO	978	UN Body to Study Puerto Rico Issue
CHILE	979	Counterrevolutionaries Step Up Pressure —by Gerry Foley
	984	Why the June 29 Coup Attempt Failed —by Eduardo Gonzales
	985	In the Aftermath of the Attempted Coup —by Hugo Blanco
U.S.A.	986	Viet Vets Acquitted in Gainesville Trial
	1003	Nixon Still Unable to Keep Lid on Watergate —by Allen Myers
	1007	Trotskyist Convention Is Largest Ever
FRANCE	987	Alain Krivine Released—Challenges Marcellin to Debate—by Jon Rothschild
	989	Growing International Support for Ligue
SOVIET UNION	991	"Confessions" Used in Frame-Up Trial of Yakir, Krasin—by Marilyn Vogt
ARGENTINA	995	PST Selects Presidential Ticket
	995	Why PST Is Participating in Election
	996	CP Throws Support to Peron
	997	Rallies Commemorate Trelew Massacre
INDOCHINA WAR	998	Nixon Threatens New Cambodian Bombing
BRAZIL	999	Exiles Defend Ligue Communiste
GREECE	1002	Dictator Seeks Support With Amnesty
TAIWAN	1005	Chang Tzu-tsai Given Prison Sentence
MOROCCO	1008	More Than 300 Oppositionists on Trial —by Joseph Krasny
DRAWINGS	979	Salvador Allende; 981, Carlos Prats; 982, Luis Corvalan; 987, Raymond Marcellin; 991, Pyotr Yakir; 992, Viktor Krasin; 993, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn; 994, Leonid Brezhnev; 1003, Nixon; 1004, Spiro Agnew; 1005, Elliot Richardson—by Copain

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

COPY EDITOR: Lawrence Rand.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Candida Barberena, Gerry Foley, Allen Myers, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders, David Thorstad.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.
TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Ruth Schein.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemenee, 75004, Paris, France.

TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright © 1973 by Intercontinental Press.

Counterrevolutionaries Step Up Pressure in Chile

By Gerry Foley

"Because we are sure that there is going to be another bosses' strike. The strike was called off but not ended, the rich said on Sunday night [November 5, 1972]. We heard them clearly. They said that this strike was only a skirmish, and that the fight is continuing. We heard them clearly over the radio. Either the drones are going to leave the honeycomb or they will come back to rule the country with blood and fire. It is us or the rich. . . . There is going to be another bosses' strike, and the government is handing the plants back to the fascists so that they can make another try. . . .

"The big problem is that we are in those plants and we are not going to give them back. The government said for us to make these plants produce, and we did, and now we are not going to give them back. What is the government going to do? Shoot us? . . .

"They didn't drive the rich out of the enclaves where they were holding the trucks. Are they going to drive us government supporters out of the plants? What a dilemma, *Compañero Presidente!*"

This editorial in the November 9, 1972, issue of the left Socialist paper *Aurora de Chile* presented the dilemma of the Allende government very clearly. The new peak in the prolonged crisis of a regime regarded not so long ago by the pro-Moscow Communist parties as a showcase of the peaceful and electoral road to socialism has fully confirmed this analysis and its predictions. An inexorable process of polarization between the capitalists on one side and the workers and poor farmers on the other has drastically reduced the room for class-collaborationist maneuvers.

From the moment the popular-front government was brought to power by the rise of the workers movement, the bourgeois parties have been steadily stepping up the pressure on Allende to force the Unidad Popular (UP—Popular Unity) to retreat and to demobilize and disappoint the masses. The objective of the main bourgeois

political strategists has been to wear away the popular hopes inspired by the UP victory, while at the same time keeping Allende in power as the best means of holding a rein on the popular strata supporting his reformist government.

Despite the capitulationism of Al-



LENDE: Will present crisis bring about his downfall?

lende and the Communist party, which forms the real leadership of the UP, the bourgeoisie's war of attrition involved escalating risks.

In the first place, sectors of the ruling class and the right have shown a tendency, in view of the rise of mass mobilizations, to become panicky and to go too far. The assassination of the commander of the armed forces, General René Schneider, on the eve of Allende's inauguration reflected these dangers. The murderers represented a rightist faction in the army. As the tensions have grown, it has apparently become more and more difficult to make sure that only the right amount of pressure is brought to bear against Allende.

On the other hand, the assaults of the right against the UP regime have provoked responses from the workers that Allende could not control and that went further and further toward irrevocably undermining the bases of the capitalist system. This two-sided process showed up clearly in the first full-scale test of strength between the government and the bourgeois opposition in the October 1972 "bosses' strike."

While Allende capitulated, bringing the heads of the armed forces into his cabinet and making his government dependent on these supposedly "impartial patriots," the workers and youth mobilized to keep the economy functioning, and in the process significantly widened the area of social control. At the same time, more democratic and active organizations developed among the workers—the cordones industriales (assemblies of rank-and-file workers in local industrial concentrations).

The latest rightist offensive began on July 25 with the opening of a new bosses and professionals' strike spearheaded, as in October, by the truck owners. The far right tried to give the maximum intensity to the campaign against Allende by launching a wave of terrorist acts, beginning with the assassination of the president's aide, Captain Araya, on July 27.

The new escalation was initiated by the abortive uprising of the Second Armored Regiment on June 29, which may have represented simply an outburst by panicky rightist officers, like the assassination of Schneider, or as the propopular-front weekly *Chile Hoy* suggested (see further on), possibly the first in a series of limited military rebellions designed to slowly tighten a noose around the neck of the government.

In any case, the tank regiment's assault on the presidential palace touched off a working-class mobilization similar to the one that responded to the rightist offensive in October. Workers staged a new series of plant

seizures, and the cordones industriales were strengthened. This is described in an adjoining article written in late July by Hugo Blanco, who is living in Santiago, Chile.

Blanco's report was written before the truck owners unleashed their strike. Following the June 29 putsch, *Chile Hoy* noted an increasingly blood-thirsty tone in the conservative press, reporting July 27 that in Chile's major bourgeois daily, *El Mercurio*, for example, Héctor Precht Bañados wrote an article entitled "Anti-Communist Satisfaction," in which he said, among other things: "Traveling through anti-Communist countries like Brazil offers profound satisfactions for those of us who have had to put up with the Communists for almost three years. In the first place, you find the Communists in their proper place, in hiding."

In the same issue of *El Mercurio*, an editorial seemed to advocate an "Indonesian" solution, as *Chile Hoy* saw it: "The editorial was entitled 'The Communists Set Jakarta Plan in Motion.' The historical truth was nothing less than this: 'The Reds, instigated and equipped from Peking, tried in September 1965 to take over the country by liquidating the military high command, which they considered their main enemy.' But the plan failed, *El Mercurio* explained, and 'then the anger of the people was aroused, and a general crackdown on the Communists started up, which was all-embracing and spontaneous and horrible.' But it really wasn't so horrible because, thanks to this opportune repression, Indonesia 'is one of the leading nations in southern Asia. . . .' Its population is so large that no one even notices that in 1965 the 'spontaneous' repression caused the 'death of hundreds of thousands of leftists.' Thanks to this purge, 'the economy has been stabilized and order prevails.' The message is quite clear."

But not just the classical right (to say nothing of the growing fascist element) seem to be thinking in stark terms; *Chile Hoy*'s report continues:

"On the following day [Sunday, July 1], Eduardo Frei [former "center-left" president of the country] spoke in his capacity as president of the Senate. After denying any participation by the 'democratic sectors' in the rebellion of the Second Armored Regiment, he noted that as a result of this event 'the occupation of factories and

ranches was ordered. The cordones industriales, with which they are trying to surround the city, were strengthened. And what is graver still, the certainty exists that arms were distributed. Strategic deployments were made and orders were issued as if Chile were on the brink of a civil war."

The former Christian Democratic president warned, according to *Chile Hoy*: "'The constitution of a popular power means in fact creating a parallel army,' which has to be crushed, 'before it is too late.' This was the response of the noted 'democrat'—who waited in silence to see how the June 29 attempted coup would turn out—to the dialogue that President Allende offered to his 'opponents.'"

Despite the rightist attempt to overthrow the government by armed force on June 29, and despite the multiplying acts of terrorism by the fascist Patria y Libertad, Chile's "democratic armed forces" turned their main attention toward crushing in the egg the "parallel army" of the workers. The "arms control" law that was passed with relatively little protest by the opposition-controlled parliament at the height of the October crisis suddenly emerged as seemingly the most important statute in the code.

Even *Chile Hoy*, which in October and November had praised the "people's army" as "patriotic," was shocked by what seemed to be at least overzealousness on the part of the military in enforcing this law. The popular-front weekly offered some mild criticism in a civic spirit.

"A year ago . . . the left members of parliament warned that the rightist opposition was trying to assign to the armed forces a role for which they were unsuited and unprepared. These warnings were confirmed dramatically early Sunday morning when about two hundred airborne troops, supported by three helicopters, four trucks, two buses, and two vans and aided by the light of flares, raided the Cementerio Metropolitano just hours before army troops carried out an equally spectacular raid of the offices of DINAC [Distribuidora Nacional—National Distribution System] in Valparaíso. On Friday, also in Valparaíso, marines stormed into a boys school so violently that the high command later apologized to the principal." (*Chile Hoy*, July 13.)

The airborne troops that raided the

Cementerio Metropolitano were on a ruthless "counterinsurgency" mission, as indicated by the account the groundskeeper's wife gave to *Chile Hoy*:

"My husband was going out to the privy when he was arrested by the military. They also took me out of the house, and we barely had time to dress. Then they took out the children (they have seven) who had not had time to put their shoes on. There were twenty of us lying for some time in the mud and rain. They were not people that the military found when they arrived inside the cemetery but neighbors who came to see what was happening. From the noise, you would have thought an airplane had crashed. But afterwards we realized that it was helicopters landing in the cemetery. All those who approached were forced to lie down in the mud with their hands behind their heads. We were there for a very long time, and when we complained of the cold, they kicked us."

The popular-front weekly noted reprovingly: "After six hours of this intensive operation, the men of the Chilean armed forces withdrew. In this space of time they had done almost as much damage to the image of their institution (the same thing happened in Valparaíso) in the eyes of the people as the soldiers did to the army's image in the previous unfortunate incidents in El Salvador (1966) against the miners and in José María Caro (1963) against the homeless people."

Using the army for such repressive tasks, *Chile Hoy* warned, would "only separate the soldiers—who are trained to operate on the basis of brute force—from the people.

"Of course this is precisely what the right wants today."

But the armed forces command very quickly showed its readiness to use "brute force" not only against civilians but also against their own enlisted men in order to prevent anyone from taking too seriously the talk about the "democratic traditions" of the Chilean army.

The use of "brute force" was especially salient in the navy, where, according to the August 24 *Chile Hoy*, rightist officers had been preparing for months to play a key role in toppling the Allende government. The plan reportedly consisted of two parts. The first was to use the navy to block the shipment of provisions and sup-

plies over water and thus complete the blockade imposed by the transport industry. The second was to support a series of small risings such as the June 29 mutiny.

"These plans were jeopardized, however," the pro-UP weekly noted, "by the situation among the sailors and petty officers. For months it had been clear that the majority sentiment was running against a coup and in favor of loyalty to the government. In practically all units of the three zones into which the navy has divided the Chilean coast—Valparaíso, Talcahuano, and Punta Arenas—events have been taking place that are peculiar for a country where both the left and right have cultivated the idea that the armed forces should be 'apolitical' and strictly 'professional.'

"Rightist officers have been delivering harangues, especially to the petty officers, using exactly the same language as politicians like Onofre Jarpa [head of the increasingly neofascist National party] and Eduardo Frei. That is, the government does not intend to rectify its policy. Not even the most energetic appeals have any effect, and the only 'solution' is to overthrow it.

"In these same harangues, which were particularly frequent in July, it was said that the essential first step was to destroy the mass organizations of the left, especially the cordones industriales and the comandos comunales [municipal commands] through using the arms control law."

After the June 29 coup and the start of the popular mobilization it touched off, the naval officers made special efforts to separate the sailors from civilians. They ordered that only commissioned officers should carry weapons. Supplies of arms were hidden. At the end of the first week in August, a large-scale repression was launched to eliminate "sedition," that is, opposition to the rightist plotting.

The arrests of "extremist" sailors and navy yard workers were described in the August 24 *Chile Hoy* by Pedro Enríquez, their lawyer. Enríquez is a member of the MIR [Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left]. He had handled the defense of the student federation against the repression carried out by the Frei administration. Concerning the sailors, Enríquez said:

"The charge of subversion and extremism raised against these sailors

and workers by the naval authorities will not stand the least examination. Let us just note that, starting August 5, 1973, about one hundred sailors and workers were arrested and savagely tortured. On August 14, the head of the naval tribunal in Talcahuano, Don Fernando Jiménez Larraín, found them guilty of 'dereliction of military duty' according to Paragraph 3, Article 299, of the Military Code of Justice, a clause that is used when no other definite infraction can be lodged. To make myself clear: When you can't charge them with anything else, you can find them guilty of dereliction of military duty, which covers infractions from not getting a haircut up to and including violating a regulation.

"The truth is quite different from these claims. From the time that they learned Allende had won the presidential elections, the reactionary sectors of the armed forces began to prepare to stage a coup at the opportune moment against the constitutional



GENERAL PRATS: Out of cabinet but not off political stage.

government. These putschist preparations were widely noted by the sailors and workers, both on large ships like the *Blanco Encalada*, the *O'Higgins*, and the *Prat*, and in the various navy yards.

"This prompted some petty officers and sailors, as well as some workers, to talk about refusing to let themselves be used for a coup against the legal government and—if one

occurred—to oppose it. These conversations reached the ears of those involved in the putschist maneuvers, and they used their influence in the commands and among the reactionary officers to cook up a monstrous farce about 'subversion' and 'extremism' in the ranks of the armed forces.

"The only offense committed by the sailors and workers who were beaten up and put on trial was that they professed leftist ideas and were ready to oppose a coup against the constitutional government. This is what they said to the tribunal, and that is why the authorities haven't been able to charge them so far with anything less vague than 'dereliction of military duty.'"

In its physical intimidation of the imprisoned sailors and naval yard workers, the Chilean military did not seem notably inhibited by its much touted "democratic traditions." Essentially the same methods were used as those made familiar by the Brazilian military dictatorship in particular. This is the account that eight of these prisoners gave Enríquez:

"They took us one by one to the so-called Cuartel Borgoño, where they violently forced us at gun point to strip completely. Since we weren't quick enough, in their opinion, they kicked us and beat us with their rifle butts. Then they took us to a place where there was a drainage pit or, as they called it, a 'swimming pool.' It was filled with mud, excrement, gravel, and slime. They forced us to splash around in it.

"Then after a long period of this kind of softening up, they took some of the men, bound hand and foot, and propped them up against a wall, while one beat them with his fists, concentrating on the stomach. Others were forced to prop themselves up against a wall or on the ground with their arms and legs far apart. Then we were in just the right position for them to kick us in the mouth and stomach until we could not hold ourselves up any more. When we fell, they kicked us all over.

"Finally we were submerged in an oil drum filled with muddy water and excrement. They threw us in head down and held us by the legs. When they thought we might die if they kept on with such treatment, they took us out. At last, when they thought that our physical and moral resistance was broken, they asked us questions. If

anything in the answer didn't suit them or fit in with the models offered by some officers, we were thrown into the drums again to 'soften us up' once more."

Reports of "subversion" in the Chilean navy were mentioned in the international press, but an informant in Valparaíso told *New York Times* correspondent Marvine Howe that there was no need to worry about leftist influence in the fleet:

"The Miristas'—radicals from the Movement of the Revolutionary Left—were trying to infiltrate the enlisted men but it isn't a real problem because the navy has American instructors and is solidly anti-Communist," the agent for a steamship line said."

Furthermore, the popular-front government was clearly incapable of combating the conspiracies of the rightist officers in the only effective way, by organizing the enlisted men to defend their democratic rights and involving them in the process of class struggle going on in the country. In fact, instead of going to the aid of the sailors and workers persecuted by the rightist plotters against his regime, Allende echoed the false charges against them. Enriquez complained:

"In my opinion, the relationship of forces among the officers in the armed services, especially the navy, is unfavorable to the left at the present time. Clearly, the great majority of the officers in this branch are against the government and the left. I think that the policy officially promoted by the government toward the armed forces bears some responsibility for this. The regime has tried to quarantine the officers from the class struggle in conditions where this has only favored the advance of reactionary sectors, which have been able to carry out their plans undisturbed, almost without opposition.

"It has become a virtual taboo in the traditional left parties to do any work with a correct orientation aimed at the armed forces, especially that portion of them that is the people in uniform. One example will suffice. While the workers in the navy yards and the sailors suffered and continue to suffer the most bestial repression in memory for identifying with the left, when Dr. Allende swore in his so-called 'National Security Cabinet,' he disavowed these workers, saying that they were ultraleftists linking up



CORVALAN: Pledges to keep bourgeois armed forces "strictly professional."

with the ultraright. Saying such things about workers and sailors who are ready to oppose a coup against the government seems, to say the least, gravely mistaken."

Not only Allende was determined to keep the armed forces quarantined from the class struggle. The best organized, most homogeneous, and politically most consistent party in the UP government, the Communist party, on which the popular-front president has come more and more to lean, was, if anything, even more outspokenly in favor of such a policy. CP General Secretary Luis Corvalán put it this way in a speech quoted extensively in the July 31 issue of *Chile Hoy*:

"Because the workers took some immediate security measures against the recent attempted coup and maintained these precautionary measures, some reactionaries have begun to send up a howl, thinking that they have found a new issue to use to drive a wedge between the people and the armed forces. They are claiming that we have an orientation of replacing the professional army.

"No sir, we continue and will continue to support keeping our armed institutions strictly professional."

Despite the efforts of Allende and the Communist party, however, the mass mobilizations provoked by rightist attempts to undermine the UP's social reforms have inevitably had

an impact in the armed forces. A soldier interviewed in the July 20 issue of *Chile Hoy* indicated one avenue by which the class struggle has penetrated into the army. "Take my case, for example. Since I am a bachelor, the army doesn't give me enough to live on to make it through the month. If we in our neighborhood had not organized a JAP [juntas de abastecimiento y control de precios—supply and price control boards—are popular organs controlling distribution in the neighborhoods], we would perish from hunger. There is an order that says we can't take part in the JAPs, but what would we get out of obeying such an order? Many have disregarded it."

Thus, the reasons for the nervous and violent mood of the officer corps and the bourgeois politicians are clear, and with them the reasons for the lengthening shadow of the gun over Chilean political life.

Under the threat of the June 29 coup, the workers carried their mobilizations and independent initiatives another long step forward. The tendency to create a "parallel army" is inherent in the situation; it is the logical and essential next step for the Chilean workers, and it goes hand in hand with splitting the ranks of the military. Unless an effective popular force is created quickly, the bourgeoisie is likely to lash out suddenly and desperately to crush the workers movement and impose a "Brazilian" or even an "Indonesian" solution. The workers seem already to have advanced further than the bourgeoisie can tolerate.

It is the situation itself that inspires the fears of the bourgeoisie. There is still no real revolutionary party in Chile that can initiate the process of organizing a workers army or splitting the ranks of the armed forces. The MIR's defense of the political rights of enlisted men could have an important impact and lead to serious work within the armed services. But so far this organization has conspicuously failed to raise slogans to prepare the way for arming the masses and creating a popular army. Its demands for giving the right to vote and better treatment to soldiers are not a sufficient program for work in the army, and time is rapidly running out.

Under the pressure of events, an understanding of the need for a revolutionary offensive seems to be becoming more widely understood. In

the Cordon Industrial Vicuña Mackenna, where a group of Chilean Trotskyists is active, statements pointing in the right direction were issued around the time of the coup by representatives of several left parties, including the Chilean section of the Fourth International. The council of the cordón itself issued a program for a counteroffensive.

In particular the representatives of the left groups (see *Intercontinental Press*, June 30, p. 929) called for popular control of all production and distribution, creation of a popular militia, and placing defense in the hands of the organized working class. But there is still no party that can take up this example and spread it throughout the cordones and throughout the country.

Nonetheless, the process of polarization has advanced so far that it does not seem that the bourgeoisie and the reformists can maintain the formulas for class collaboration that they adopted during the rise of the UP government and in the October crisis. The first condition set by the Christian Democrats for accepting a "dialogue" with Allende was that representatives of the military be brought back into the cabinet so as to guarantee "observance of the constitution."

On August 10, the popular-front president complied and installed a "cabinet of national security" including most importantly General Prats, the commander of the armed forces. But the entry of the military into the government and the threat of martial-law measures against the truck owners did not resolve the situation as it did in October, not even temporarily. The military were not accepted as impartial arbiters by important sections of the UP, especially the SP left wing, which is most susceptible to pressure from the masses, or by important sections of the right. The military cabinet was seen much more clearly as a betrayal by the workers. It could not deliver what the rightists wanted. On the other hand the right, emboldened by Allende's repeated capitulations, would accept nothing less than complete surrender, which Allende could not grant. Under these pressures, the military cabinet collapsed.

On August 18, the holder of the most sensitive post, air force General César Ruiz Danyau, resigned as minister of transport. He had not moved very energetically against the truck

owners.

"The military has taken a very placid, almost courteous attitude toward the truckers," *Le Monde's* correspondent noted in a dispatch in the August 18 issue of the Paris daily. It carried out one arms search near Santiago. "In the rest of the country it has not yet intervened." Despite the entry of the armed services commanders into the cabinet, the Christian Democrats continued to support the new "bosses' strike."

Le Monde's correspondent wrote: "The truck owners association feels that it has the support not only of the rightist political organizations (the National party) and the extreme right but also the Christian Democratic party, which has declared that it supports the action 'without any reservations.'"

Allende depended entirely on the army to restore order: "The president of the Chilean trade-union federation, Figueroa (CP), and the general secretary, Calderón (SP), have offered Allende the support of the workers both in organizing surveillance of key points in cooperation with the army and in taking over and putting back into operation the trucks that have been stopped and sabotaged by their owners. So far Allende has preferred to rely exclusively on the military apparatus." (*Le Monde*, August 18.)

At the same time, Allende could not accept his gold-braided transport minister's demands for complete surrender to the truckers. On August 18 Ruiz resigned both his ministerial and military positions. At the same time, Allende fired his under secretary of transport, Jaime Faivovich of the SP, as the truckers had demanded. But Frei suddenly took a new attitude toward the presence of the military in the cabinet, accusing the UP of "skillfully and impudently using the armed forces so as to make them take the responsibility for the economic, political, and social disaster facing Chile."

In an editorial August 25, *Le Monde* offered this explanation for Frei's about-face: "Once involved with the responsibilities and compromises of power, the army rapidly politicized. The right wing of the Christian Democracy is now strongly calling for returning the armed forces to 'neutrality,' but a month ago Frei's friends were not opposed to a massive entry of military men into the cabinet. They even made this a condition for a 'dialogue'

with the chief of state. Doubtlessly they had hoped that these centurions would effectively oppose the growth of the revolutionary wing of the Unidad Popular."

Ruiz's resignation sparked discontent in the air force that threatened to lead to a new coup. "It is evident that the deep division of Chilean society is being increasingly clearly reflected in the military institution," wrote Enrique Alonso, a correspondent of *La Opinión*, in the August 21 issue of the Buenos Aires daily.

Alonso also pointed out why Allende could not accept Ruiz's demands for a "friendly settlement" with the truckers. "For the leaders of the CUT it was getting harder and harder to hold back their rank and file who wanted to 'leave the factories to restore order in the country.'"

On August 25, Prats himself was forced to resign to "preserve the unity of the army," as he put it. The resignation of Admiral Montero, the last service head in the cabinet, was announced at the same time. Montero alone resumed his post as commander of his branch of the armed forces.

Speaking to a group of progovernment students on the night of August 25, Allende explained that Prats had resigned after recognizing the wives of several high officers in a protest demonstration in front of his house.

"The fall of Prats prevented a split in the military, and a split in the military means civil war," Alonso remarked tersely in the August 28 *La Opinión*.

But it immediately became evident that Prats's resignation did not mean his withdrawal from the center of the political stage. In fact, his political importance seemed to grow: "From the moment of his resignation," Alonso wrote, "his home has become a real Mecca for all the major forces in the left spectrum who come to congratulate him for his patriotism and to express their solidarity."

"This vast political movement must naturally have some outcome, and many analysts suppose that Prats will not remain within the moral and professional bounds of the armed forces, but in a near or relatively near future will fill some role of real importance."

Although Allende was able to put together a new national unity cabinet in the last days of August by bringing in lower-ranking officers, the formula did not seem very promising,

as the *New York Times* noted in an editorial August 31: "It is by no means clear, however, that these men will be able to succeed—where their commanders in chief in the previous Cabinet failed—in ending the strikes and violence, restoring public order and confidence and shoring up Chile's battered democratic institutions."

The bourgeois offensive continues unrelentingly. But the objective of the main capitalist leaders apparently is still a limited one, judging from a statement by Frei quoted in the *Times* editorial: "For Chile to emerge from the present crisis, a change of Government is required, not a change of President . . ."

The meaning of this, as the *Times* noted, was clear enough: "To survive personally and dissolve the present crisis, Dr. Allende must cutback sharply on his drastic socialist program and get rid of the ministers who have

persisted in pushing it by means that circumvent the Congress. In return for these actions, Mr. Frei implied, the Christian Democrats would cooperate with Dr. Allende to turn the country back from the brink of civil war."

But the mouthpiece of American imperialism was not optimistic: "There is no evidence so far that Dr. Allende is either willing or able to accept any such conditions." In face of such deep divisions, the traditional answer of the Latin American bourgeoisie is to put a demagogic Bonaparte in power. The UP and the CUT bureaucrats have obligingly built up the image of General Prats as a likely candidate for "savior of the nation" if, by their failure to organize the masses effectively against the rightist plotters in the army, they have not prepared the way for an "Indonesian" or "Brazilian" outcome to the present crisis. □

of the constitution and the established government.

The explanation for this failure of large layers of the armed forces to respond to the incitement to a coup on June 29 does not lie, as the government claimed, simply in the "loyalty" of the armed forces or the excellence of the military—nor in the mobilization of the masses in defense of the government, as the reformist bureaucrats of the Popular Unity parties and the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores—Workers Central Union] would now like to have people believe. In spite of the masses' desire to come to the defense of what they consider to be their government, they did not mobilize early in the developments.

Although President Allende, in an effort to discourage any attempt by any section of the armed forces to rally to the call for a coup, called on the workers to "defend the government and turn out armed with whatever they have," the workers did not turn out. Disoriented by the absence of a leadership that could show them what to do, they remained unable to act. Once the masses began to emerge from their stupor and to react to the danger, they saw themselves once again held back by their own reformist leadership.

The CUT, instead of taking advantage of Allende's appeal by issuing an urgent call for a general strike, thereby mobilizing all the workers, limited itself to transferring its headquarters to a Santiago factory district and issuing instructions to all union leaders to order their rank and file to "occupy all the factories, plants, universities, and public buildings," and to form watchdog committees to protect the occupations. In this way, the workers were handcuffed and kept well under control, "until further orders," in the occupied factories and plants.

Nor did the comandos comunales [municipal commands] or the cordones industriales [assemblies of rank-and-file workers in Santiago industrial concentrations] concretely respond during this emergency, in spite of the fact that it is out of these mass bodies that the present vanguard of the Chilean process is developing.

Soon after the threat—both from the coup and from the independent, spontaneous mobilization of the work-

Chile

Why the June 29 Coup Attempt Failed

By Eduardo Gonzales

Santiago

The authors of the June 29 coup embarked on what was a desperate course of action, hoping that the bulk of the armed forces, faced with the accomplished fact, would be drawn in and the government overthrown.

What gave this rebellion an adventurous and desperate character was the fact that a few days earlier the government had discovered the preparations for the plot and had begun to take measures to head it off. Several of the plotters had been arrested.

Confronted with this state of affairs, one of the officers in charge of the Second Armored Regiment brought out its troops and tanks under pretext of rescuing one of the arrested officers who was being questioned by government intelligence services, and in this way deceived the soldiers who supported him.

It is clear that Lieutenant Colonel Souper, who led the tanks and troops to the Moneda Palace and then laid siege to it, was incited to this desperate move by those who had been pre-

paring the coup—the most reactionary sectors of the bourgeoisie, represented by the National party and the fascist organization Patria y Libertad [Fatherland and Freedom].

These sectors of the Chilean far right have been holding the trump card of a coup and the setting up of a Brazilian-type regime in their hand for a long time, but once their game was discovered they decided to play on the secret hope of winning the backing of the armed forces, at least of those who were already compromised in the affair.

In spite of the confusion that reigned during the first moments of the coup, and in spite of the fact that it began at a time that is hardly the usual one for such plots [during the early morning rush hour], the participants' intended aim of drawing in their comrades-in-arms met with no response. Not a single concrete case is known in which this occurred. Rather, the effect that was achieved was the complete opposite: The bulk of the armed forces remained "loyal" to the defense

ing class—had been completely eliminated, the government, the CUT, and the Popular Unity called a rally at the Moneda to repudiate pressures for a coup. In his speech to the gathering, Allende called attention to the "loyalty" of the majority of the military, and especially of General Prats, who was in charge of the operations to crush the adventurist group.

Despite the initial disorientation of the Chilean masses and the efforts of their reformist leaderships to hold them back, they were prepared to make short shrift of the fascist threat. This was reflected in the June 21 demonstration in the streets of Santiago and in the Moneda rally confronting the Patria y Libertad fascists. On June 21, more than 700,000 workers demonstrated their support for the government, demanding more power to the people; on the evening of June 29, an equal number of demonstrators demanded that Allende dissolve parliament and put the plotters up against the wall. On June 29, the Chilean masses first looked on, stupefied, as the events unfolded, and then saw themselves powerless and shackled by their leaders.

Although the coup was something that had been in the air for some time, and was therefore foreseeable, neither the government nor the reformist bureaucracy prepared or organized the masses in time to stand up to it. Only at the last minute did they call on the workers, and they did so most timidly, very careful not to lose their ironclad control, mobilizing from above in a bureaucratic fashion. In spite of the fact that the plot had been uncovered a couple of days earlier, the government, as well as the CUT and the Popular Unity, were very careful not to reveal all the details, observing near total silence about the plans for a coup.

This time the coup failed, revealing that the armed forces are not yet as a whole agreed on overthrowing the government and setting up a fascist-type regime. It also revealed the weakness of the reformist regime and how little it is inclined to seriously rely on the workers to thwart, once and for all, the threat of a coup.

The most lucid sectors of the bourgeoisie and the armed forces are aware that overthrowing the government in this way, in the present conditions of crisis and of working-class

upsurge, would immediately lead to a confrontation with the mass movements, and that these movements would have freedom of operation, with their reformist leaders and the Popular Unity government no longer holding them back. For imperialism and the bourgeoisie as a whole—aside from the most desperate of the reactionary sectors—the Popular Unity government and the CUT are for now the

only guarantee of the continued existence of the capitalist system in Chile. The Chilean bourgeoisie knows that the capitalist system in Chile is leaking on all sides and that they will have to grant those reforms that are required to prevent them from being swamped for good—until such a time as conditions arise in which it is possible to liquidate the Chilean experiment and crush the masses. □

Workers Mobilize in Chile

In the Aftermath of the Attempted Coup

By Hugo Blanco

Santiago

On June 29 desperate sectors of the right attempted a coup d'etat here.

In view of the gravity of the situation, the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores—Workers Central Union] found itself forced to call for seizing the factories as a preventive measure.

The working class carried this out. In the face of the rapid response by the workers, many of the plotters stayed under cover and the putsch was quickly put down.

Many workers took advantage of the occasion to demand that their places of work be added to the nationalized sector.

Another important consequence of this attitude on the part of the workers was the strengthening and partial arming of their defense committees.

The workers guarded their places of work day and night. Some factories have already been intervened, and not a day passes without at least another one being taken over.

There are very interesting cases such as the Luccetti noodle factory and the Loncoleche powdered milk plant in the Vicuña Mackenna Cordón. They were seized while the tanks were at the gates of La Moneda [the presidential palace]. The cordón strongly supported these take-overs, considering that these plants were essential to popular consumption. Now the distribution of their products is controlled by the workers, fundamentally by the cordón's distribution body as well as the one of the homeless people's associa-

tion. Thus the cordón has won its demand that the interventors of both factories be persons in whom it has confidence.

The case of the Vinex factory is also very important, but for another reason. The workers had already taken it over before June 29. They demanded that the manager of this state-owned factory be fired. The majority of the workers as well as the trade-union leaders belong to the same party as the manager—the Socialist party.

Faced with government procrastination in solving the problem of the Vinex factory, the cordón decided to appoint the interventor itself, naming one of the employees of the plant, who was nominated by the trade union and approved by the rank and file. This is the first case in which the cordón has assumed this kind of responsibility, and with the help of the cordón the Vinex factory has started to sell the wine it produces.

In the Cerrillos Cordón many take-overs are also being carried out and the organization of defense committees is moving ahead steadily. The factories in the vanguard of this cordón are Textil Artela and Cristalerías Toro. Because of the scarcity of glassware, the latter is considered strategic. And Textil Artela, which is on strike, wants the factory confiscated by the state and put under the direct administration of the workers. The comando revolucionario de huelga [revolutionary strike committee], which was form-

ed to lead the union in the conflict, is in agreement with this.

By comparison with the other cordones, the Cerrillos Cordón has the advantage of being closely linked to the peasant organization in the area.

In the other cordones in Santiago we have also seen the same agitation, as in Panamericana Norte and Macul, where factory seizures have become the order of the day recently.

Another combative sector is the hospital workers, who during the days when the curfew was in force held all the hospitals and were ready to treat the compañeros who fell wounded.

I should also note the seizure of ENDESA [Empresa Nacional de Electricidad — National Electricity Company], which controls the distribution of electricity to Santiago and Valparaíso.

In the rest of the country, similar things are happening, although to a lesser degree, as in Concepción and Valparaíso, for example.

The right began to send up a cry of alarm over the first seizures and the setting up of the first defense committees, and, although they are continuing to do so, their tone of protest has begun to drop to a lower register.

The armed forces, especially the navy and the air force, have begun to carry out raids, looking for alleged arsenals. Sometimes they find arms; other times not.

The parties of the revolutionary left, including the left wing of the SP, have stepped up their campaign aimed at the ranks of the armed forces and are trying to strengthen popular power.

The tension has dropped in Chile but the present "calm" is very relative. It is expected that the right will attempt another coup. The sectors of the right that favor a "constitutional" solution are constantly shrinking.

On the other hand, the situation of the UP leadership becomes more difficult every day. Because of the coup, it had to appeal to the masses. Allende called on the workers to come with "what they had," just as CUT called for taking over factories as a preventive measure and alerted the defense committees.

Although, in his speech on the afternoon of the coup, the president gave credit for crushing the uprising to the

armed forces, the generals did not want to enter the cabinet unless Allende promised first to clear out the factories and other things like that. In these conditions, an acceptance by Allende would have meant a complete surrender to the right and a break with the masses, who are far from being

beaten and are more than ever demanding new advances. The new cabinet is almost the same as the last. This doesn't mean that the government isn't still looking for a deal, but this is becoming more and more difficult.

Popular power is growing and the confrontation is coming ever closer. □

Another Frame-Up Exposed

Vietnam Vets Acquitted in Gainesville Trial

Another government frame-up directed against members of the antiwar movement collapsed August 31 when jurors in Gainesville, Florida, voted to acquit eight members and supporters of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). The defendants, known as the "Gainesville 8," had been accused of conspiring to disrupt the 1972 Republican national convention.

The jury took only three and a half hours to reject all charges against the eight. The government case was so weak that defense lawyers called only one witness, a chemist who testified that "incendiary devices" allegedly manufactured by the defendants were considerably less incendiary than an ordinary match.

In a September 1 editorial, the *New York Times* called the verdict "another deserved rebuke for the Administration in its effort to prosecute antiwar activists by infiltrating their ranks with undercover agents and provocateurs."

Of twenty-seven witnesses called by the government, seven were undercover provocateurs and informers. Under cross-examination, they were forced to admit that the only suggestions of illegal actions had come from government agents. One had even offered to buy machine guns for the VVAW!

The frame-up effort against the veterans contained virtually all the elements that the Watergate revelations have shown to be the stock-in-trade of the Nixon gang. The case was directed by Guy Goodwin, who heads the trial section of the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department.

Goodwin's past efforts in this field include the trial of Philip Berrigan and six others on charges of conspiring to kidnap Henry Kissinger, and the unsuccessful frame-up of antiwar activists in Camden, New Jersey, for destroying draft records.

One of the police provocateurs who testified during the trial, Pablo Manuel Fernandez, has direct links to the Watergate gang. In May 1972, Fernandez was part of a "vigilante squad" of counterrevolutionary Cubans flown to Washington in order to assault an antiwar demonstration addressed by Daniel Ellsberg. The squad included four of the burglars later arrested in the Watergate break-in.

Another undercover agent, FBI former Emerson Poe, had originally been listed as a defendant and participated in defense strategy meetings after Goodwin gave the court a sworn statement that no agents were included among the defendants.

Another government effort to spy illegally on the defendants was exposed at the end of July when two FBI agents were caught with wiretapping equipment in a closet adjacent to the room where the veterans and their lawyers were meeting.

Earlier, the home of defendant Scott Camil had twice been burglarized, and someone had broken into the office of his attorney and removed his file.

Even the jurors may have been subjected to illegal spying. During the course of the trial, five of them sent a note to the judge saying: "Perhaps the jury has become paranoid. But three-fourths of our home telephone numbers have been acting strangely." □

Alain Krivine Released—Challenges Marcellin to Debate

By Jon Rothschild

Alain Krivine is free. On August 2 a Paris court ruled against a government appeal of a ruling granting Krivine provisional release that had been issued July 10 by Judge Alain Bernard, examining magistrate in the Krivine case.

Krivine is scheduled to be tried in the fall for violation of the "loi anticasseurs" (antiwrecker law), a piece of witch-hunt legislation that allows the government to prosecute any leaders of an organization that sponsors a demonstration at which violence occurs. Specifically, Krivine is charged with responsibility for the clashes between antifascist demonstrators and police protecting a fascist rally that took place June 21 in Paris. After the demonstration, the Pompidou regime outlawed the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International, and arrested several leading members of the Ligue.

Although Krivine was released on bail, Pierre Rousset, the other ex-Ligue Central Committee member being held in jail, was denied provisional freedom. Rousset's "crime" is that he was present in the Ligue's headquarters on the morning of June 22, when cops ransacked the building. In the course of a "search," police claim to have found weapons (two out-of-service rifles brought into the hall by persons unknown and other implements commonly used to defend leftist headquarters against fascist attacks).

Rousset and twenty-two other Ligue members were charged with responsibility for the weapons. But Rousset's case was severed from the others; they were released, he was jailed.

The government at first scheduled Rousset's trial for August 24, an unusual date deliberately selected so that the trial would occur during the vacation period. According to the August 26-27 *Le Monde*, the court later granted a request for postponement presented by Rousset's attorney. The new date for the trial was set as August 31.



MARCELLIN: Threatens to repress "hundreds of little Krivines."

On August 3, the day after his release, Krivine held a press conference at the headquarters of the Société Internationale d'Éditions (International Publishers), the building that formerly served as headquarters for the Ligue. At the press conference, widely reported in the French press, Krivine challenged the regime to try to enforce its ban on Trotskyism. He said that the members of the ex-Ligue had no intention of being driven underground.

"We do not want to reconstitute the Ligue secretly," Krivine said. "We will continue to express ourselves legally. But we think it would be melodramatic to get into a situation where several thousand militants would have to go underground."

Krivine said the ex-Ligue had submitted an appeal against the dissolution decree, and that the Council of Ministers would have to rule on it sometime in October. But in the political sense, he added, the government's aims had already been defeated.

The dissolution decree was pushed for most vigorously by Raymond Marcellin, the racist, profascist minister of the interior. Marcellin's aims, Krivine said, were four: to crush the Trotskyists; to isolate them from the population; to weld together the police as a quasifascist force; and to bring the courts into line behind his policies. On all four points, Krivine said, Marcellin had been stopped:

"The situation of the Trotskyists in France has never been better; their ties with the working class, and particularly with the members of the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor, the country's largest trade-union federation, dominated by the Communist party], have never been so good. The positions taken by the Communist party, the Socialist party, and all the unions [in solidarity with the ex-Ligue] were a complete defeat for Marcellin. A real break in the political situation, independent of the reasons for the change in the CP's position, has taken place. And this constitutes a decisive achievement in the relations between the left and the far left. A totally new situation has been created.

"The police," Krivine continued, "have never been so divided. And finally, a not inconsequential section of the courts has shown that it refuses to become a rubber stamp for the police."

Krivine continued to go after Marcellin. He charged that the minister of the interior, who had discussed the case against Krivine in an interview published in the Paris newspaper *France-Soir*, had violated the secrecy of the investigation (supposedly guaranteed by law) by presenting to the press a few pieces of the "meager evidence" against Krivine.

Marcellin would regret this, Krivine suggested. The trial, he said, would be transformed into "a public trial of repression in France and of public enemy number one as far as democratic rights are concerned, namely the minister of the interior." Krivine also said that he would present to

the examining magistrate a tape recording of all the conversations of the police commanders held on the night of June 21. This tape, he said, would reveal "juicy" things about the cops' behavior.

To demonstrate that the French Trotskyists would not be silenced by a Marcellin, Krivine announced that *Rouge*, formerly the newspaper of the Ligue and now a "paper of communist action," would organize a meeting in Paris during September that would be "unprecedented in size."

Krivine concluded with one more swipe at Marcellin. The minister of the interior, he said, had made a "big mistake": "He failed to understand that the government simply hasn't got the forces to carry out his policy."

Krivine then challenged Marcellin to a national face-to-face television debate, "a public confrontation on democratic rights, repression, and the police."

Marcellin, only several hours after the press conference, rushed to the airwaves to "answer" Krivine. The burden of Marcellin's reply was that he does not go around debating jailbirds. "It would be a bad minister of the interior," he said, "who would discuss with a man who is under indictment, out on bail, and under the supervision of the court. There is no way that Krivine is going to get me into such a debate."

But he added—and asked the press to take note—that he would answer the points Krivine had made in the press conference.

"He claims," Marcellin said, "that the government made a mistake when it dissolved the Ligue Communiste. First, I would like to assert—and in the clearest manner—that it is not possible to allow violent groups to develop, groups that are organizing in order to act in the streets, violently, as they did on June 21."

Marcellin next took on Krivine's charge that the government was trying to isolate the Trotskyists from the population. This was not true, Marcellin said, because the Trotskyists already were isolated. As proof, he indicated that in the legislative elections last March the Ligue got only about 2 percent of the vote. He asserted that the Ligue had no support among the population. He left open to speculation why it was that a minister of the interior who does not debate jailbirds

who are insignificant anyway would take more than ten minutes on national television to answer the political points raised by the isolated individual.

Marcellin went on to claim that the police were not at all divided. (An issue of the newspaper of the largest policemen's union, which had appeared shortly before Marcellin spoke, contained an article by one of the union's top leaders complaining about the regime's use of the police in political repression. It asked, among other things, "Have the French police become a blind instrument of repression charged with putting down indiscriminately any demonstration, no matter how peaceful?") And he went on to claim that it just was not true that the Interior Ministry ever put any pressure on the courts.

Marcellin next complained that if the CP and SP supported the Ligue, so much the worse for them; and he further asserted that the meetings across France in solidarity with the Ligue were failures—which is about as true as the assertion that the Interior Ministry doesn't pressure courts.

Upon finishing with his "refutation" of the jailbird, Marcellin left the domain of political argumentation and concluded his remarks with the following pronouncement:

"I will repress all violence even, should it be necessary, if I have to put a few hundred little Krivines out of commission."

However, the little Krivines that the little Marcellins have been arresting have not been charged with fomenting violence, but with selling *Rouge*. In Paris, police have made no attempt to interfere with *Rouge* sales. But in smaller towns and cities, tests of the government's ban have occurred. The August 10 *Rouge* described a few instances.

In Rouen on August 5, *Rouge* sellers were rounded up and taken to the police station. Among those seized was Jean-Marie Canu, the Ligue's local candidate in the March elections. A response was organized quickly. A joint communiqué was issued by several organizations protesting the arrests; a delegation of journalists went to the police station. *Lutte Ouvrière* and *Rouge* got ready to organize some joint action. Then the police commissioner decided to release those taken in.

In Avignon *Rouge* was absent from the kiosks. A *Rouge* correspondent reported that at one outlet, a passing police inspector had confiscated all available copies.

In Chartres *Rouge* sellers were arrested and taken to the police station for an intensive interrogation. Two *Rouge* supporters were charged with selling the paper without a peddler's license, which by law is not required for newspaper street sales.

In Gagny, where the stubbornness of the police is notorious, a running contest went on for more than a month between revolutionists selling *Rouge* and cops roping them in. On July 15 the police ordered *Rouge* sellers off the streets. They refused. There were no arrests. The following Sunday, July 22, ten sellers were arrested immediately as they unfolded their display. On July 29, about 100 cops were patrolling the markets. After about ten minutes of sales, four distributors were taken away. Their places were taken by fifteen new sellers, eight of whom were arrested.

By August 5, the cops had apparently given up, perhaps as a result of the legal victory of Krivine's release. *Rouge* was sold with no police interference.

Apart from fighting to continue sales of *Rouge*, the main aspect of the ex-Ligue's defense during August has been preparing for the trial of Pierre Rousset. In an interview published in the August 23 issue of *Politique-Hebdo*, Krivine was asked why he was released but Rousset was not.

"Several things disturb me about Pierre Rousset's case," Krivine answered. "The quickness of the trial date, the separation of his case from that of the other twenty-two comrades charged with the same thing. It is possible that the regime is trying to make a scapegoat out of Pierre Rousset, who is already under an eight-month suspended sentence for an act of solidarity with Latin American revolutionists.

"In fact, we learned the date of his trial too late to have enough time to organize a real campaign around it; and it is possible that the government is trying to get Rousset because he is less well known than I am. If Pierre Rousset, who has already been in jail for two months now, is sentenced to more than two more months in prison, his suspension will be lifted. [He would

then have to serve eight months in jail in addition to his sentence on this case.] This situation necessitates—

right now, and even more so if there is an appeal—a rapid mobilization of all antifascists." □

party), SP (Socialist party, a Maoist group), and RCB (Revolutionair Communistische Bund—Revolutionary Communist League, a Trotskyist organization supporting the Fourth International).

Worldwide Condemnation of Pompidou Regime

Growing Support for Ligue Communiste

In Sri Lanka, the Lanka Sama Samaja party (Revolutionary), Ceylon section of the Fourth International, issued a statement July 12 strongly protesting the dissolution of the Ligue Communiste by the French government and the arrest of Ligue leaders Alain Krivine and Pierre Rousset.

The statement, which was handed to the French ambassador in Sri Lanka, concludes: "In the name of true liberty, equality and fraternity, the L. S. S. P.(R) calls upon the Government of France to restore legality to the Ligue Communiste and to order the release of Alain Krivine and Pierre Rousset."

In Colombo on July 19 nearly 200 worker militants and youth attended a public meeting called by the LSSP(R) to protest the ban on the Ligue. The main speaker was Bala Tampoe, secretary of the LSSP(R), whose speech was summarized in the July 20 issue of the *Ceylon Daily News*.

The Communist League, Indian section of the Fourth International, has issued a statement protesting the ban on the Ligue: "The Communist League . . . condemns this undemocratic action with utmost indignation and has asked its state committees to protest against this by joint actions with left and democratic parties and workers and student-youth organizations. Let the Pompidou regime know that the arbitrary actions of its political police do not escape notice internationally.

"Withdraw the ban on the Ligue Communiste.

"Let us act on the slogan of the international working class: an injury to one is an injury to all."

In Venezuela, a letter demanding the restoration of legality to the Ligue was delivered in July to the French ambassador in Caracas. The letter was signed by Rafael José Nery, rector of Venezuela's Central University; Federico Alvarez of the Venezuelan Communist party; Alfonso Ramírez, editor of *Voz Marxista* (published by sup-

porters of the Fourth International); José Vicente Rangel, socialist candidate for the presidency; several university professors; and leaders of the MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo—Movement Toward Socialism).

In the August 1 issue of the Caracas newspaper *El Nacional*, a quarter-page advertisement, paid for by the university, reprinted the letter and the list of signatories along with details of the developments in France and the growing international defense campaign.

In the Netherlands a statement protesting the dissolution of the Ligue and demanding an end to the ban and the release of Krivine, Rousset, and all political prisoners was sent to the French and Dutch governments. The statement was signed by twelve organizations: BVD (Union of Conscripts), CRM (Committee of Revolutionary Marxists), FJG (Federation of Social-Democratic Youth Groups), Federatie Vrije Socialisten (anarchists), HTS-unie (technical schools students union), KEN-ml (a Maoist group), KB-PL (Communist League-Proletarian Left), PPR (Radical Political party), PSP (Pacifist Socialist

In Dublin, a solidarity meeting in July attended by eighty-five activists heard speakers from the Provisional republican movement, the Socialist Workers Movement, the Official republican movement, and the Revolutionary Marxist Group (RMG—Irish supporters of the Fourth International).

A joint statement issued by Sinn Féin (Kevin Street), People's Democracy, and the RMG cited the international cooperation by the capitalist ruling classes in repressing social movements, as exemplified by the role of Britain in Ireland and around the world. "To this type of [capitalist] solidarity we must oppose working class internationalism; the ban of one organization is a setback for all the Left on an international scale."

In Canada, prominent parliamentarians, labor leaders, and other individuals attending the July 19-22 federal convention of the New Democratic party (Canada's labor party) responded to the ban on the Ligue by signing an open letter to Pompidou. The letter recalls the experience in Canada of the imposition of the War Measures Act in 1970, and says: "It is the traditional view of organizations and political parties of labor, and of democrats and civil libertarians, that 'an injury to one is an injury to all.'" The letter calls for the release of former members of the Ligue, the dropping of charges against former members, and the immediate rescinding of the ban.

In Québec, some forty persons



Meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in solidarity with Ligue Communiste, was addressed by Bala Tampoe and attended by more than 200 persons.

attended the founding meeting July 20 in Montréal of the Comité Québécois Contre la Répression en France (Québec Committee Against Repression in France). The group will fight for the lifting of the ban on the Ligue and the dropping of all charges against former Ligue members. The meeting was sponsored by the following individuals (organizations listed for identification only) and groups: Henri Gautrin, president of the Québec New Democratic party; Henri Gagnon of the Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec (Federation of Québec Workers); Michel Chartrand of the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux (Confederation of National Unions); François Lalonde, president of the Front Etudiant Québécois (Québec Student Front); the Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière (part of the League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière, Canadian section of the Fourth International); the Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes; and the Groupe Marxiste Révolutionnaire.

The Québec Communist party sent a letter to the meeting solidarizing with "all those who denounce the banning of the Ligue Communiste by the French Council of Ministers." The letter states that the Québec CP believes the dissolution of the Ligue to be "an integral part of a plan of attack on the democratic rights of the French workers movement."

In Britain, the Ad-Hoc Preparatory Committee for the Defence of the Ligue Communiste has published as part of its campaign a brochure that includes a letter urging individuals and organizations to sponsor an autumn conference that would establish a broad defense committee. The brochure also contained a copy of an Open Letter to Pompidou and the list of signatories so far, which included six members of Parliament; John Gollan, national secretary of the Communist party of Great Britain; and various well-known intellectuals and trade-union leaders.

In Australia, the campaign in support of the Ligue has been gathering momentum. A petition initiated by the Socialist Workers League (the Australian sympathizing organization of the Fourth International) is being circulated in the radical and labor movement. It has already been endorsed by leaders of almost every political organization to the left of the Labor

party, leaders of most of the major trade unions, prominent academic figures, and activists in the various movements. The several hundred signatories include three of the central figures in the ruling Labor party: Jim Cairns, minister for overseas trade and secondary industry—the third most senior minister in the federal cabinet; Moss Cass, minister for the environment and conservation in the federal government; and Bob Hawke, federal president of the Labor party and president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions.

On August 1, some 230 persons attended a public meeting at the Sydney Trades Hall to protest the repression of the French Trotskyists. Sponsors included the Communist League; the Communist party of Australia; Friends of Palestine; International Group; Miners' Federation of New South Wales; Socialist Labour League; Socialist party of Australia; Socialist Workers League and the Socialist Youth Alliance (sympathizing groups of the Fourth International); University of New South Wales Students Union Council; and the New South Wales Young Labor Council. More than \$300 in cash and pledges was raised in response to an appeal for funds to aid the defense work, and another \$200 had been raised during a speaking tour of Australia made by Tariq Ali. Plans are under way for launching a public appeal for money to defend the Ligue. The meeting ended with resolutions of support for the Ligue and for Krivine

and Rousset, and with a call for a demonstration to be held August 10.

In Melbourne some 150 persons attended a public meeting held on August 16 to demand the lifting of the ban on the Ligue and the release of Krivine and Rousset. The meeting was sponsored by the Communist League, the Communist party of Australia, Plumbers and Gasfitters Union, Seamen's Union, Socialist Labour League, Socialist party of Australia, Socialist Workers Action Group, Socialist Workers League and the Socialist Youth Alliance, Spartacist League, Worker Student Alliance, and the Young Labor Association of Victoria. Several prominent labor movement figures added their names to the list of sponsors. Over \$170 was collected for the international defense fund. The meeting ended with passage of a resolution supporting the democratic rights of the Ligue and its imprisoned leaders and calling for the repeal of the reactionary legislation under which the Ligue was outlawed.

An indication of the growing support in Australia for the international defense campaign is the resolution recently passed by the Canberra Trades and Labor Council: "Council opposes the undemocratic action of the Pompidou government in France in banning the Ligue Communiste, a French working-class organization. It considers actions against such groups as a denial of basic democratic liberties and . . . a threat to the labor movement as a whole." □

Anti-Marcos 'Plot' Collapses in Court

"Having earlier alleged many conspiracies, Marcos now seems to feel under pressure to prove one of them," Harvey Stockwin wrote in a dispatch from Manila to the August 20 *Far Eastern Economic Review*.

On August 27, the Filipino dictator took a hesitant step toward "proving" one of the alleged conspiracies by bringing Senator Benigno S. Aquino to trial before a military court. Aquino, a leader of the bourgeois opposition Liberal party, had been held in a military prison for eleven months.

Aquino was accused of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. When brought before the court, Alice Villadolid reported in a dispatch to the *New*

York Times, Aquino refused to defend himself and instead attacked the Marcos dictatorship for its suppression of civil liberties.

Although news media did not carry Aquino's statement, word of it "filtered out." Apparently embarrassed by the incident, Marcos "created a committee to reinvestigate the charges" against Aquino.

Marcos may have decided that it would be easier to "prove" some other "conspiracy." One possibility would be the alleged plot to assassinate the dictator.

The central defendant in that case is former Liberal presidential candidate Sergio Osmena. Osmena has taken refuge in the United States, so there would be little danger of his disrupting a "trial" by his presence in court. □

'Confessions' Used in Frame-Up Trial of Yakir, Krasin

By Marilyn Vogt

With the frame-up trial in Moscow of Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, two prominent opposition activists, Stalin's heirs have escalated their methods in the drive to repress the Soviet democratic movement.

They have revived the method of trial by "confessions," the central method used by Stalin in the notorious Moscow "show trials" of 1936-38. This method had been denounced by the bureaucrats during the so-called "de-Stalinization" period.

How unreliable and dubious the "confessions" of Yakir and Krasin are is shown by the fact that the trial was completely closed, the only reports on the proceedings being pre-digested ones issued by the Soviet Foreign Ministry's press department and by TASS. No independent observers were admitted.

According to the July 18 *Washington Post*, the rumors of Yakir's "recantation" and interest in his case had prompted thirty-two correspondents from thirteen countries to appeal jointly to the Soviet Foreign Ministry for the right to attend and observe the trial. Their appeal was returned unanswered and they were not admitted.

The Kremlin bureaucrats obviously feared that the defendants would repudiate their "confessions" if outside observers were present at the trial.

Before Yakir was arrested, in June 1972, he stated: "If they beat me I will say anything. I know that from my former experience in camps. But you will know it will not be the real me speaking."

From the time he was fourteen years old, in 1937, until the post-Stalin amnesty of 1954, Yakir lived through the torments of Stalin's camps and prisons. He suffered these years of imprisonment that, as he indicates, left their cruel mark on him, not because he had collaborated with any anti-Soviet organization, but because he was related by birth to an "enemy of the people." He was the son of Iona Yakir, one of the top Red Army generals whom Stalin executed for al-

legedly serving Hitler, the Mikado, and Trotsky.

Since the mid-1960s Pyotr Yakir has been an outspoken critic of the Kremlin's retreat from "de-Stalinization." In 1969 Yakir was a key figure in the formation of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the



PYOTR YAKIR

USSR, a loose-knit committee of people representing a wide range of views who worked in defense of arrested dissidents. After repeated KGB warnings and harassment, Yakir was arrested June 21, 1972, during a KGB crackdown in Moscow.

He had been held by the time of the trial for over fourteen months, in violation of a Soviet law that specifies a nine-month maximum for pre-trial confinement. If he actually made these "confessions," he was forced to confess. He was broken by vicious physical and psychological pressures inflicted on him by the KGB.

The real target of the trial, which opened August 27 and lasted five days, was the entire democratic opposition. The Kremlin especially aimed at stopping the flow of unauthorized writings critical of bureau-

cratic rule, chiefly the *Chronicle of Current Events*. For more than eighteen months the bureaucracy has focused on eliminating prominent activists in the hopes of getting at the *Chronicle*, which had been the principal means for linking up the numerous opposition currents.

The confessions allegedly made by Yakir and Krasin have "implicated" Andrei Sakharov, a physicist who played a major role in the development of the Soviet hydrogen bomb; and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Nobel prize-winning novelist, both of whom have refused to be intimidated into silence by KGB harassment.

Yakir's codefendant in the trial, Krasin, from whom the KGB has reportedly extracted a similar "confession," is also a former inmate of Stalin's camps. He was an active member in the Initiative Group. Because of his activities in defense of arrested dissidents, Krasin himself was arrested in 1969 and was sentenced to five years exile, convicted of being a "parasite." In 1971, however, efforts by his defense attorney won his release, on grounds of his poor health. Krasin was rearrested September 12, 1972. Rumors that he had "recanted" began to circulate in early 1973.

Yakir and Krasin were tried under Article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code, which covers "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Each was sentenced to three years imprisonment and three years exile. Their alleged confessions were calculated to conjure a picture of the two defendants as the key figures in a foreign-inspired anti-Soviet conspiratorial and subversive network.

According to the official TASS reports, Yakir and Krasin admitted to having had ties with foreign anticommunist organizations such as NTS (Narodno-Trudovoi Soyuz—Popular Labor Alliance, reportedly based in Frankfurt, Germany) for whom they acted as agents, delivering abroad false reports and rumors about what was going on in the Soviet Union and receiving "anti-Soviet" literature

from abroad for distribution within the USSR.

Allegations of ties with NTS have been used before by the bureaucrats to convict activists of "anti-Soviet" activity, e. g., in the trials of Aleksandr Ginzburg and Yuri Galanskov in 1968 and Vladimir Bukovsky in 1972.

The August 29 *Daily World*, newspaper of the American Communist party and one of the few sources of information about the trial, elaborated on the charges. Under the lurid headline "Two on trial in Moscow admit ties with former Nazi killers," the *Daily World* claimed that Yakir had admitted:

— that he (and Krasin) had worked with the NTS.

— that the chairman of the NTS was a "teacher on the Jewish question" in Germany and had "collaborated with the Nazi forces when they invaded the USSR in 1941."

— that NTS urged Yakir to read a book by a Soviet citizen who "went over to the Nazi side in World War II."

— that the "so-called 'democratic dissident movement' in the USSR is fake and is nonexistent."

— that "the program and tactical principles of the so-called 'democratic movement' were drafted by NTS." (The *Daily World* quotes Yakir as saying, "I know that the program was drafted by one of the NTS leaders. It was inside the NTS that the term 'democratic movement' was born.")

— that the Initiative Group consisted merely of the NTS supporters in the USSR.

The official report of the indictment in *Izvestia* August 29 added that the two defendants had been paid by Western correspondents for providing false information and that the NTS and other right-wing groups had provided Krasin and Yakir with documents from which publisher's information had been removed, the documents then being circulated in samizdat, some in the *Chronicle of Current Events*.

Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov were included in this flimsy construct in the following manner: According to the August 30 *New York Times*, a TASS report stated that Andrei Sakharov "was said at the trial to have met Mr. Yakir 'at farewell parties for Western newsmen who were being expelled from the Soviet Union.'" The August 31 *New York Times* review of the

TASS reports of the trial stated: "According to testimony attributed to Mr. Yakir, Mr. Solzhenitsyn was a regular reader of the *Chronicle* and copies were systematically passed to him for evaluation. The briefing officers at the courthouse quoted testimony to the effect that Mr. Solzhenitsyn had expressed approval."

In other words, the total content of the "confessions"—the results of months of interrogation and torture of Yakir—amounts to this:

1. Yakir had contact with the NTS, which contains profascist elements. Even if he actually had such con-



VIKTOR KRASIN

tact, there is no evidence that Yakir in any way supported the views of NTS.

2. Yakir received literature from NTS. The NTS organ *Posev* publishes the full texts of samizdat articles in Russian, including the *Chronicle*. It is known that these printed versions of the typed samizdat items do make their way back to the Soviet Union. If Yakir did in fact receive literature from NTS, it most likely consisted of printed copies of samizdat items, which would make possible a much greater distribution than reproduction by the usual samizdat method of typing out carbon copies. If the writings of the opposition could be printed in the Soviet Union, samizdat authors would not be forced to rely on foreign printing presses.

3. Yakir met Sakharov at a social function.

4. Solzhenitsyn read and approved of the *Chronicle of Current Events*, hardly a surprise to anyone.

5. As regards the money that was supposedly passed to Yakir and Krasin in return for their "lies" about the "fake" opposition movement, the bureaucrats made only one attempt to explain what this money was used for. *Izvestia* stated that Krasin's "additional earnings" became so great that he was able to quit his job. This is an apparent reference to the fact that Krasin was not employed during part of 1968 and 1969 while he was studying for his master's degree and working as a free-lance technical translator for the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Technical Information. It was during this time that he was arrested for being a "parasite," as a reprisal for his opposition activities. His wife stated that during this period she was supporting the family by working as a translator.

Many of Yakir's statements are available in English, including his open letter to the twenty-fourth party congress: "Toward a Return to Stalinism? Letter to Leaders of Arts, Science, and Culture in the Soviet Union," his statement "For a Posthumous Trial of Stalin," and the numerous protest statements he signed. They speak for themselves. Yakir has consistently advocated democratization in the Soviet Union and defended arrested opposition activists. He needed no NTS to tell him that what he was part of was a democratic movement.

The earlier reports of Yakir's "recantation" stated he had turned names over to the KGB and had described activities of other movement activists. The manner in which the bureaucrats' reports of Yakir's and Krasin's "confessions" have "implicated" Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn (the only two dissidents known to have been named) would be laughable if not for the ominous forebodings raised by any identification of these two figures in the KGB-fabricated conspiracy.

Both Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn have steadfastly refused to compromise their roles as outspoken opponents of the repressive policies of the Kremlin bureaucrats. Both are too respected internationally for the bureaucrats to get rid of them quietly.

Sakharov, a member of the Soviet Academy of Science, was first politically active as a member of the Moscow

Human Rights Committee, which he was instrumental in forming. Since the repression of dissidents was escalated on a massive scale in January 1972, Sakharov has spoken out more and more as an individual. Throughout 1972-73 he initiated numerous statements in defense of arrested dissidents and against the confinement of political prisoners in mental hospitals. KGB harassment of Sakharov and his family has intensified throughout this period. He was called in for KGB interrogation in March 1973 and attacked in the Soviet press for the ideas expressed in his book *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*.

In an interview in July with Olle Stenholm, a Swedish radio correspondent in Moscow, Sakharov sharply criticized the bureaucratic rule of the Kremlin, which "only strives to maintain the existing system." He gave examples of the many and great privileges enjoyed by the bureaucrats and condemned the absence of any semblance of democracy in the Soviet Union. On August 15 he was called in for questioning by Deputy Prosecutor General Malyarov. The dialogue between Sakharov and Malyarov, as reconstructed from memory by Sakharov, was published in full in the August 29 *New York Times*. In it, Malyarov warned Sakharov to cease his activities:

"Malyarov: By [the] nature of your previous work you had access to state secrets of particular importance. You signed a commitment not to divulge state secrets and not to meet with foreigners. But you do meet with foreigners and you are giving them information that may be of interest to foreign intelligence agencies. I am asking you to consider this a serious warning and to draw your own conclusions . . . Any state has the right to defend itself. There are appropriate articles in the Criminal Code, and no one will be permitted to violate them.

"Sakharov: I have been listening closely and I will certainly bear in mind every word you said. But I cannot agree that I have been violating the law. In particular, I cannot agree with your statement that my meetings with foreign correspondents are illegal or that they endanger state security."

On August 21, in direct defiance of Malyarov's warning, Sakharov



ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN

held a news conference with Western correspondents in his apartment, where for ninety minutes he discussed the threats and harassment directed against him and his family, condemned the detente, which he claimed was aiding the bureaucracy's effort to increase its military strength, and stated that "the world would become helpless before this uncontrollable bureaucratic machine." Manifesting a serious misconception of the intentions of Western capitalist governments, he urged the Western countries to make democratization a precondition for economic agreements with the Soviet Union.

On August 29, *Pravda* published a condemnation of Sakharov's statements that was signed by forty of the 250 members of the Soviet Academy of Science. Echoing Malyarov, they stated: "We hope that Academician Sakharov gives thought to his actions." Their remark that "in recent years Academician Sakharov has withdrawn from scientific activity" may mean that the bureaucracy is preparing to prosecute him as a "parasite."

This intensified harassment coincides with the bureaucrats' attempt to link Sakharov to the alleged foreign, "anti-Soviet" conspiracy by constructing ties, however feeble, between Sakharov and Yakir.

In his writings in the late 1960s

and early 1970s, Sakharov stated he was a socialist. He now states that he is not. He equates the Stalinist regime with socialism and condemns both. This is a regrettable product of the intense pressures on him. It also attests the distorted view of Marxism projected by the Soviet bureaucrats and the disastrous political disorientation, even of persons as educated as Sakharov, that can arise when a people is denied access to its own history for decades.

But Sakharov's statements make clear what he stands for: democratization of Soviet society to make it provide the benefits to humanity that official propaganda claims it provides.

Simultaneously with the Yakir-Krasin trial and Sakharov's defiance of Kremlin threats, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has expressed his determination to defy bureaucratic repressive measures in spite of threats on his life.

In a statement dated August 21 addressed to Internal Affairs Minister Nikolai A. Shchelkov, Solzhenitsyn disclosed that his four-month-old application for residence in Moscow to live with his wife and two sons had been denied. His statement condemned the internal passport system introduced by Stalin in 1932, which has allowed the Soviet authorities to control the place of residence of every Soviet citizen.

"I want to remind you that serfdom in our country was abolished 112 years ago and, it is said, the October Revolution wiped out its last remnants," reads his statement.

"It would seem that I, like any other citizen of this country, am neither a serf nor a slave and should be free to live wherever I find it necessary, and no one, not even the highest authorities, should have the proprietary right to separate me from my family."

On August 28, seven days later, Solzhenitsyn granted an interview to correspondents from the Associated Press and the Paris daily *Le Monde* in which he confirmed his intentions to defy bureaucratic decisions in spite of direct official threats on his life.

First, Solzhenitsyn vowed to continue publishing abroad. Only one of his books, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, and four or five of his short stories have been published in the Soviet Union. His other major writings, *Cancer Ward*, *First Circle*, and *August 1914*, were refused pub-

lication there. The decision of the Soviet rulers, implemented May 27, 1973, to join the International Copyright Convention was a direct threat to Solzhenitsyn because Soviet restrictions on foreign publishing rights for Soviet authors would have precluded his works being legally published abroad.

In addition to vowing to continue publishing abroad, Solzhenitsyn said he would continue circulating his writings in samizdat.

Second, he reaffirmed his intention to move to Moscow.

Third, he spoke out in defense of Sakharov and some of Solzhenitsyn's own close friends and associates who have been harassed or arrested because of contact with him.

After revealing various threats to his life from the authorities, Solzhenitsyn stated:

"If I am declared killed or suddenly mysteriously dead," he stated, "the world can conclude that I have been killed with the approval of the KGB or by it."

He vowed that if he is killed or disappears, his "literary last will and testament will irrevocably come into force and then the main part of my works will start being published. . . . If the officers of the KGB track down and confiscate copies of the harmless *Cancer Ward* in all provincial cities . . . what will they do when my principal and posthumous books stream out all over Russia?"

The bureaucrats issued a quick response to the Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn press conferences in an August 30 open letter from thirty-one prominent Soviet writers condemning both Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn.

Among the signers was Mikhail Sholokhov, Nobel prize-winning author of *And Quiet Flows the Don*. Sholokhov has previously sided with the bureaucrats against dissidents. But the thirty-one signers also included Konstantin Simonov and Valentin Katayev, who had not previously lent their names to support the Kremlin's repression campaign.

All these recent measures by the Stalinist bureaucrats are a continuation of their effort to stifle dissent. Since January 1973 there have been further waves of arrests in the Ukraine directed at pockets of opposition to Russification in the universities. The resentencing of Andrei Amalrik and Pyotr Grigorenko, the July 16 deci-



BREZHNEV: Escalates repression.

sion by the Supreme Soviet to deprive Zhores Medvedev of his Soviet citizenship, the continual reprisals against dissident authors like Vladimir Maksimov, and the adherence to the International Copyright Convention are concrete evidence that the Kremlin regime fears any voice of opposition because these voices reflect growing mass discontent over continued bureaucratic rule. For the bureaucrats no compromise with democracy is pos-

South Korea

Park Said Ready to Free Kidnap Victim

The South Korean dictator Park Chung Hee is reported ready to allow the return to Tokyo of Kim Dae Jung, who was kidnapped and spirited away to Seoul in early August. Kim, who ran against Park for the presidency in 1971, has been under house arrest in Seoul.

The kidnapping, presumably carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency, Park's secret police, has been condemned in Japan by both the government and opposition parties. No one takes seriously the Park regime's pretense of noninvolvement in the kidnapping.

The Japanese government has de-

sible.

Stalin's heirs must stamp out the *Chronicle*, which has symbolized the far-reaching opposition currents and served to unite these currents. They must rid themselves of prominent critics, however mild, who serve to bring an international focus on the crimes the bureaucrats commit in order to preserve their power and privilege. The Yakir-Krasin trial is a warning to Soviet citizens of the fate that awaits those who dare to communicate with foreign correspondents.

This repression is not, as the U.S. bourgeois press is claiming, a campaign directed at preventing Soviet citizens from having contact with the West that would "shatter the image of decadence and oppression" under capitalism. The failure of the Soviet press to provide full coverage of the Watergate crimes—a prime example of "decadence and oppression" under capitalism—gives the lie to this ridiculous claim.

More information on the glories of free enterprise is not what the bureaucrats fear. What they fear is the flow of information and communication that exposes the Kremlin's crimes and serves to establish links between the democratic movements in the Soviet Union and those in the Eastern European workers states and between these groups and their left-wing supporters abroad. □

manded that Kim be returned to aid in the investigation of the kidnapping. Park, according to a September 1 *New York Times* report, is willing to permit this if Kim promises not to engage in anti-Park political activity in Japan.

"When the Tokyo police officials have finished questioning Mr. Kim, he will—according to the supposed arrangement—then go to the United States. . . .

"In effect, the South Koreans are reportedly suggesting that everyone go back to where they were . . . and act almost as if the incident had never occurred." □

Argentine PST Selects Presidential Ticket

The Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST — Socialist Workers party) called a special convention at the end of July. Its main purpose was to determine the party's response to the new election campaign occasioned by the resignation of President Héctor Cámpora and the declaration of the candidacy of Perón. The election is scheduled for September 23.

The convention was described by the August 1-8 issue of the PST's weekly, *Avanzada Socialista*, as a "work session." This was shown, it said, "by the fact that the discussion of electoral tactics took up only three of the thirteen hours of the entire session."

Three points were on the agenda: party activities, the international situation, and the national situation. The last was broken down into three points, dealing with political questions and the election, the youth, and the unions.

The proceedings went on under portraits of Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky, and banners reading: "For a world party of socialist revolution," "Solidarity with the persecuted members of the French Communist League," "For a socialist Argentina," and "For the nationalization of Códex and Standard Electric."

A major decision of the gathering was to announce the candidacy of party leader Juan Carlos Coral for president and José Páez for vice-president. Páez is a union leader from Córdoba and was a leader of the now banned SITRAC (Sindicato de Trabajadores Concord — Concord Workers Union).

Following the PST convention, the party offered its ballot status to a possible presidential slate consisting of Agustín Tosco, head of the Córdoba Light and Power Union, and Armando Jaime, a peasant leader from Salta. Although considerable support developed for such a ticket, Tosco and Jaime decided in mid-August not to run. Therefore, Coral and Páez remain the PST's ticket.

Avanzada Socialista provided the

following summary of the PST convention proceedings:

"The report on party activities was presented by Arturo Gómez and traced the progress and advances of all aspects of party life. Its general line was approved, and it was decided to refer it to all party centers so it could be discussed and definitively approved. Under this point, certain forms of party organization were discussed, and it was agreed that the main activity of the coming period will be the training of solid Marxist cadres, with an aim toward forging a Leninist combat party.

"The international reports were presented by Compañeros Mario Doglio, Nahuel Moreno, and Maria Encabo, and the subsequent discussion touched on various questions. This point initiated the international discussion within the party. Although no resolution was adopted, steps were taken toward a characterization of the sit-

uation and tasks on an international scale, and an orientation for party work was set. This is a discussion that remains open and is being carried on in the party centers.

"With regard to the national situation, we are publishing Compañero Coral's report separately. [See article below.] Following discussion, the report was approved, the Coral-Páez presidential ticket was chosen, and the party executive committee was authorized, in line with Article 15 of the party statutes, to implement any changes in electoral tactics that might be called for by the changing and unstable political situation prevailing in the country. In addition, the convention approved a proposal by Compañero Grano to issue a call to all class-struggle and socialist forces, which was sent to the press.

"This was a gathering marked by workers democracy, in which clear resolutions were adopted that arm the party to continue the struggle."

The gathering also adopted, by acclamation, a statement of solidarity with the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International, which has been declared illegal by the Pompidou regime. □

Report by Juan Carlos Coral

Why PST Is Participating in Election

[The following is the conclusion of the report by Juan Carlos Coral to the special convention of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST — Socialist Workers party) at the end of July. Coral's remarks were published in the August 1-8 issue of the PST's weekly, *Avanzada Socialista*, from which they have been translated by *Intercontinental Press*.

[Coral's speech dealt with the current situation in Argentina. "He explained," reported *Avanzada Socialista* in an introduction, "the plunder to which it has been subjected by imperialist penetration: growing indebtedness, the maintenance of the old oligarchic structure of the large, rural landholdings, and the exploitation of the working class to a critical point. He then showed how the workers movement responded to this exploi-

tation in a combative, class-struggle way, beginning with the Cordobazo." Coral's concluding remarks follow.]

* * *

Thus, in the logic of these events, and in face of this combative, class-struggle response of the workers, the bourgeoisie had to respond with the only alternative remaining to it: the broadest alliance of classes that the country has ever known, in which the dominance of international finance sectors is taken for granted, but which also involves the landed oligarchy and the national bourgeoisie. Naturally, this alliance has taken shape under the leadership of Perón as the great Bonapartist leader who assumes the luxurious role of arbitrating conflicts between sectors of the bourgeoisie, and



JUAN CARLOS CORAL

enjoys the support of the working class.

While he was in Madrid, Perón was a kind of reservist for imperialism; from that vantage point it was easy for him to fill the role of a workers and people's leader. On another plane, he sent his tape-recorded blessing to all sectors of the [Peronist] movement: Osinde and Rucci, Galimberti and López Rega. All of them had Perón's blessing—naturally, with special encouragement to the youth and the combative sectors, since this was the way to keep high the expectations of the workers and people for this fake revolutionary leader.

But when the moment for assuming power arrives, a position has to be taken on all the concrete problems. And Perón now stands, as he really is, before a working class that lived through eighteen years of expectations and heroically intervened to bring about his return.

With regard to the archaic latifundia setup, he responded with a diplomatic tax on the potential income of the land, maintaining the old, privileged structures. With regard to the problem of the country's loss of capital stock through the free outflow of profits on foreign investments, Perón responded by imposing a ceiling of 12.5 percent—a ceiling that is not even being observed now that nothing stands in its way. With regard to the question of nationalizing the banks, which we called for, he responded only by nationalizing bank deposits, which

made it possible to direct credits toward sectors that had an interest in receiving them.

Finally, with regard to the whole gamut of superexploitation suffered by the workers, the response was the wonderful wage increase of 20,000 pesos [US\$1 equals approximately 1,000 pesos], which is not an increase but simply brings wages back to the level they were at during the first months of this year.

But through our party the working class is also preparing its response to this bourgeois policy. Its response is the revolutionary mobilization of the masses and the conquest of power by the working class along the lines of our revolutionary program.

This response consists of discrediting all utopian, reactionary illusions about national revolutions. For our economy is nothing more than one element within the organized pole that is the world capitalist economy. There is no possibility of freeing ourselves from imperialism without escaping from the confines of the capitalist system. There is no possibility of saving oneself from imperialist exploitation through Third Worldist formulations or references to national revolution; this can only be done by changing the relations of production—that is, through socialist revolution, through permanent revolution, as we can see from the examples of Russia, Cuba, and Vietnam.

We will carry out this political response with one instrument—a party of cadres who are perfectly disciplined and conscious of the fact that they will provide the leadership for the rev-

olutionary process that is approaching.

And we, *compañeros*, must now solve the problem of using these new elections to bring all these elements together. At a time when all the other forces are caught up in their own maneuvers and cannot get out, we—if we respond immediately—will be setting an example in organization and conviction. We will reflect not confusion, which is their stock-in-trade, but clarity, which is ours.

It is not a question here of preparing the party to carry out an electoral function but of putting the elections at the service of building the party. During this period, as during any other, we will have to carry out the three-pronged revolutionary task described by Lenin: agitate among the masses, propagandize for our ideas, and educate the cadres. It is in this sense that we must intervene in the elections.

What I want to point out in conclusion is that at this stage we must be conscious above all else of the urgent need to educate our cadres. For it is certain that the instability of this latest attempt at an alliance between the classes, the instability and decrepitude of the bourgeoisie and the ruling classes in the government, opens up for us a revolutionary perspective. And when this moment arrives, it is the strength of our organization and the ability of the cadres of our party that will determine whether this revolutionary crisis will end in a tragedy, like the Spanish revolution, or in a historic revolution, like the Russian revolution of 1917. □

In Exchange for Government Posts?

Argentine CP Throws Support to Peron

The Argentine Communist party, meeting in its fourteenth national convention, voted by acclamation August 23 to support the ticket of Juan Perón-Isabel Perón in the election scheduled for September 23. This capitulation to Peronism did not come as a surprise, but had been carefully prepared by the CP leadership over the preceding month.

On July 27, a CP delegation met

with Minister of the Interior Benito Llambi and discussed a number of questions, among them the coming election and the CP convention. The delegation reportedly stressed that the CP gathering would be attended by many foreign guests, including representatives of workers states and CP leaders from Latin American countries in particular. Presumably, the CP delegation suggested that Perón might

find support among the foreign guests for his much-touted scheme for bringing about a "third-world" realignment — especially in Latin America — under the guidance of the Peronist regime.

There were no immediate indications as to what deals, if any, were discussed at the meeting. Within a couple of weeks, however, it became clear that the CP had decided not to contest the Peronist ticket itself, nor even to support any other ticket. In the March elections the CP supported the Oscar Alende-Horacio Sueldo ticket fielded by the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria (APR — Revolutionary People's Alliance).

Indirectly, an advance sign that the CP would support Perón in the election could be detected in the theme of the convention itself: "For a liberated homeland, on the march toward socialism."

Another indication of the impending support was the sharp criticism August 14 by CP leader Rubens Iscaro of Córdoba union leader Agustín Tosco, who was considering running for president on the ticket of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST — Socialist Workers party). "His alleged candidacy," said Iscaro, a member of the party's executive committee and national secretariat, as well as a participant in the July 27 meeting with the minister of the interior, "which is being clamored for by a narrow group as far as its political significance is concerned, is no solution to the political problem facing us. On the contrary, it lends credence to an erroneous concept of how to achieve a broad front of anti-imperialist and democratic forces. I hope that Tosco's political abilities will lead him to realize that a step of this kind will not aid the political process." Tosco thereafter decided not to run.

Once the CP convention had formalized the decision to support Perón, Peronist sources indicated that he was prepared to offer the Stalinists posts in his new Council of State, according to the August 24 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*. A meeting between Perón and a CP delegation was expected to take place in the near future.

The class-collaborationist resolution adopted by the convention argued for

supporting the Perón-Perón ticket in predictable terms:

"A conspiracy exists among the right wing, the landed oligarchy, big capital, and the foreign monopolies to regroup their forces with the backing of the CIA. Yankee imperialism has moved onto the offensive in Latin America, especially in the southern cone, as is indicated by the events in Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil. One of its aims is to close up the democratic opening in Argentina.

"The turn to the left by the working class and the popular masses is irreversible. What is particularly noteworthy is the high level of political

consciousness and combativity attained by the youth. . . .

"Conditions are ripening in Argentina for a front to struggle against dependency and for national liberation. By itself, the Justicialist [Peronist] movement will not be able to resolve the deep crisis that is afflicting the country and that provides it with a historic responsibility: either to help bring about the democratic and anti-imperialist unity of the Argentine people and thereby to insure a course of transforming the life of the nation, or to torpedo this unity, which will only make things easier for imperialism and the domestic forces of reaction." □

Police Attack March in Buenos Aires

Rallies Commemorate Trelew Massacre

One year after the August 22, 1972, massacre of sixteen Argentine guerrillas in Trelew, commemorative rallies and demonstrations were staged throughout the country. While the Peronists tried to use the occasion to rally support for the presidential candidacy of Juan Perón in the election scheduled for September 23, other forces demanded that those responsible for the massacre be uncovered and punished.

Minister of the Interior Benito Llambi instructed the country's governors to authorize the memorial meetings, providing they were held in areas that could be tightly controlled.

Even before government authorization was officially granted, however, a number of meetings were held. One, in Rosario, was attended by the three survivors of the massacre.

In Bahía Blanca, an armed clash occurred between groups of young people putting up posters of the Trelew dead and others tearing them down.

"In La Plata," reported the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión* August 21, "a commando of the self-styled Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP [Revolutionary Army of the People]) occupied the premises of an airplane club. After bringing the employees under control, they forced a civilian pilot to commandeer a plane, and

from the air leaflets were dropped over the center of the city inviting the population to come to the meeting that will take place in Plaza San Martín in memory of the guerrillas who died at Trelew.

On the eve of the commemorations, the Peronist-led coalition, the Movimiento Nacional Justicialista (Justicialist National Movement), officially joined in with a statement rendering "respectful and emotion-filled homage to all the Argentines who, whatever their beliefs or affiliation, paid with their blood for their faith in a better Argentina."

The Peronists, who have been seeking to isolate and put an end to guerrilla activity, attempted to "balance" the rallies by commemorating not only the Trelew massacre, but also the decision of Eva Perón in 1951 to give up the vice-presidency — a decision she had made on August 22.

"Both dates," stated Rodolfo Puiggrós, inventor of the University of Buenos Aires, explaining the institution's decision to declare August 22 a day of mourning, "constitute some of the highest expressions of the will of the people to struggle, which is today directed toward achieving national liberation and reconstruction."

A further indication of the Peronist movement's determination to co-opt

the date for its own political purposes was the fact that the large Buenos Aires rally called by the Peronist Youth was conceived of as a frankly pro-Perón campaign rally. The Peronist Youth described the rally in the Atlanta stadium (which drew 60,000, according to the organizers, 30,000, according to the authorities) as one of "active support to the candidacy of General Perón: an emotional homage to all those who have fallen during eighteen years of struggle, and an indelible remembrance of Compañera Evita on the new anniversary of her resignation."

The slogan for the rally was "Fatherland, Yes. Colony, No." The Peronist Youth Statement concluded with the thought: "They died so that the Fatherland could live. Evita lives. Perón for President."

While the Peronists tried to focus the actions on Perón's bid for election, others recalled that despite several months of a Peronist regime, no serious attempt has been made to discover and punish the authors of the Trelew massacre.

The main slogan for the meeting called by the Federación Universitaria de Buenos Aires (FUBA—University Student Federation of Buenos Aires), for instance, was "Do not forget, and struggle relentlessly until all those guilty of the Trelew massacre are uncovered and punished." The student group called for the creation of a parliamentary commission "to investigate the crimes of the military dictatorship."

The call for an investigation of the massacre was also a demand of a Buenos Aires rally in Plaza Congreso called by various leftist groups, among them the Juventud Socialista de Avanzada (JSA—Young Socialist Vanguard), the Partido Comunista Revolucionario (PCR—Revolutionary Communist party), the Association of Psychiatrists from the Federal Capital, and the ERP. According to the August 23 *La Opinión*, the rally, which reportedly drew some 10,000, was held "under heavy police guard" and "in an atmosphere of great emotional tension."

The Paris daily *Le Monde* reported August 24 that following the rally, some 2,000 demonstrators attempted to march to the government palace to demand an investigation into the massacre. "But the march was inter-

rupted by police, who used tear-gas grenades, to which the demonstrators responded with Molotov cocktails and fire bombs."

La Opinión offered the following account:

"Following the meeting in Plaza Congreso, a column that broke away from the gathering marched down Callao toward Corrientes, and before reaching the intersection of the two streets, was blocked by the police. At this point, Molotov cocktails were hurled, and shots could be heard coming from snipers located, it would appear, in the upper stories of the Opera

confectionary. A patrol car belonging to Group I of the police guard was also set on fire; the arrival of reinforcements made the demonstrators retreat in order to regroup their forces and march up Corrientes to the east.

"When they reached Montevideo, another confrontation with the police took place. Gunfire could be heard, and demonstrators overturned and burned another police car. After a period of charges and various incidents, security forces gained control of the situation and arrested about 100 persons." □

Pentagon Shows Saigon the Way

Nixon Threatens New Cambodia Bombing

On August 15, the U.S. bombing of Cambodia came to a "halt" in line with a legislative amendment approved by Congress June 30, the result of a compromise between Nixon and Congress. Intensive bombing of Cambodia continued right up to the last minute, indicating Nixon's reluctance to acquiesce in the decision.

The bombing halt marked the end of 160 consecutive days of bombing during which more than 240,000 tons of bombs were dropped. Between January 28 and August 11, some 35,410 sorties were flown, at a cost of \$422.8 million, according to the Pentagon. During the last four and a half years, just over half a million tons of bombs were dropped on Cambodia, including those dropped during the secret bombing campaign of 1969-70. Some 7.5 million tons of U.S. bombs were dropped on South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia during the nine-year air war, reported Michael Getler in the August 15 *Washington Post*.

The end of the bombing leaves the crumbling Lon Nol regime dependent on its 250,000-strong army and its small air force. According to an Associated Press dispatch in the August 15 *New York Times*, "well-informed sources" in Saigon claim that the Thieu regime recently flew several thousand soldiers of Cambodian descent to

Pnompenh. It is unlikely that this will contribute much to saving Lon Nol.

Despite the bombing halt, up to 400 fighter-bombers and 175 B-52s will remain on call in Thailand, on Guam, and aboard carriers, prepared to resume raids "if Congress authorizes them." Defense Department "guidance" sent to U.S. field commanders allows military assistance and "humanitarian" air operations to continue in Laos and Cambodia, including "noncombat flights" to deliver military assistance and "humanitarian supplies" to territory controlled by "the duly constituted governments of Laos and Cambodia." "Unarmed reconnaissance flights for the purpose of gathering intelligence" will be permitted over Laos and Cambodia. If reconnaissance planes are fired upon, Congress would have to change the law before military retaliation could be undertaken, according to the Pentagon.

In a statement issued August 15, Nixon reiterated his denunciation of Congress, already expressed in an August 3 letter to Congressional leaders, for forcing the bombing cut-off: ". . . by its action Congress has eliminated an important incentive for a negotiated settlement in Cambodia and weakened the security of Cambodia's neighbors in Southeast Asia and has eroded the structure of peace in Indochina laid down in the [Paris

cease-fire] agreements of January 27." Nixon accused Congress of undermining "the prospects of world peace by raising doubts in the minds of both friends and adversaries concerning the resolve and capacity of the United States to stand by international agreements when they are violated by other parties."

Nixon's statement contained a strong warning to the North Vietnamese leaders against extending aid to the Cambodian rebels. He said he would take "appropriate action" to deal with any threat to "stability" in Indochina and to the "settlements reached after so much sacrifice by so many for so long."

Nixon's stress on the "North Vietnamese threat" and Congress's alleged "abandonment of a friend" was repeated by Cambodian ambassador Um Sim at a Washington press conference August 21, where he stated that the Lon Nol regime would request the resumption of combat aid if Hanoi should increase its direct involvement in the Cambodian war. Thus the stage is clearly set for the resumption of full-scale U.S. bombing of Cambodia should the liberation forces, who already control more than 80 percent of Cambodia, move to deal a final blow to the Lon Nol regime.

On August 16, in reply to questions raised by the Senate Armed Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements Jr. explained how the Saigon regime could help Pnompenh offset the effects of the bombing halt by the use of Saigon's U.S.-supplied military equipment: If such equipment were openly used in support of the Lon Nol regime, this would be a violation of U.S. law and Washington could not replace any materiel destroyed or used up. But if Saigon merely "defends" itself inside Cambodia against North Vietnamese "sanctuaries" allegedly threatening Saigon, use of U.S.-supplied equipment would be "legal" (and the equipment replaceable).

In a letter to Senator Symington dated August 14, Clements explored the question of whether Saigon would be regarded in violation of U.S. law if it directly helped out Pnompenh knowing that expended materiel would not be replaced. He concluded that it would not, and that in any case Saigon could claim it was using equip-

ment supplied before 1971 when the relevant law was enacted.

The hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee have produced further revelations about the secret bombing of Cambodia carried out by Nixon in 1969-70. A top secret Pentagon memorandum, dated November 20, 1969, was released to the committee on August 9. It specifically approved falsified reporting of the secret B-52 raids in 1969, and was written by General Wheeler, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it was personally initialed by then Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. Both Wheeler and Laird originally denied all knowledge of any falsified reports. The documents provided for B-52 strikes against clandestine targets inside Cambodia, with other B-52s attacking normally assigned targets in South Vietnam and Laos. "Strikes on these latter targets," the memorandum said, "will provide a resemblance to normal operations, thereby providing a credible story for replies to press inquiries."

A total of 3,630 B-52 sorties were secretly made over Cambodia between March 1969 and May 1970, and more

than 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped. A 1967 Pentagon memorandum released to the committee authorized similar cover strikes in Laos.

At an August 10 news conference, Laird explained that he had not sanctioned "the falsification of any Air Force, Navy or Defense Department records," but had merely authorized "a separate reporting procedure" for the bombing raids.

This "reasoning" was repeated by Nixon in an August 20 speech to the national convention of the right-wing Veterans of Foreign Wars. He acknowledged publicly for the first time that he had approved the secret bombing raids in Cambodia, and justified them as having been necessary to protect American lives. He added that if he were faced with the same situation again, he would make the same decision. "The stakes are high," he said. "We could cop out as many suggest in the Senate and House and the press. We could cop out, but if we do, our children will live in a very dangerous world."

To this threat of "renewed" U.S. aggression, the Veterans responded by giving Nixon a "peace award." □

Brazilian Exiles Defend Ligue Communiste

Campanha, a newspaper published by exiled Brazilian revolutionists residing in Chile, has added its voice to protests against the Pompidou regime's banning of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International. An article in its August 5 issue traced the brief history of the Ligue since its founding in 1969 and noted the broad support it has received from other political organizations in France since it was banned.

In conclusion the article called on the Latin American left to express solidarity with the French Trotskyists: "The right of the working class and its vanguards to organize was never a gift from the bourgeoisie. It was won, and will be defended, by the class struggle. It will always have to be wrested from the bourgeoisie and its repressive apparatus, wherever capitalism has implanted its exploitative system. The entire French

left responded to the government's move, while demonstrations against the ban on the Ligue were staged throughout the whole world. Germany, Belgium, and England were some of the countries where the organized vanguard and the working class demonstrated in support of the Ligue and for the right of the working class to form its own organizations and parties.

"It is precisely in defense of this same, fundamental right that we are daily struggling. For this reason, regardless of whatever differences we might have with the Ligue Communiste, particularly with regard to the problem of how to build an international party, we defend the right of the people and their vanguard to organize, and we call on all Latin American organizations to express their militant solidarity with the French compañeros." □

The Inflationary Boom and Its Coming End

By Ernest Mandel

At the beginning of this year, in taking account of the change in the economic conjuncture that occurred in 1972, leading to an upswing in all the imperialist countries except Italy, we wrote on January 7 that in spite of the "energy crisis," the expansion of East-West trade, and the reappearance of shortages in the Western food industry, the current "boom" would not last very long. (See *Intercontinental Press*, January 29, p. 88.)

Today, a mounting chorus is predicting a recession by 1975, if not 1974. One after another, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (which includes the governments of all the imperialist countries), the British weekly *The Economist*, and the West German weeklies *Die Zeit* and *Der Spiegel* have alluded to this prospect. And all these Cassandra voices add an especially somber note to their disturbing (for the capitalist economy) prognostications: Since the current boom phase for the first time involves *all* the imperialist countries (again, with the exception of Italy), they fear that the coming recession likewise will hit simultaneously throughout the imperialist world.

It is the well-known *generalized recession*, whose inevitability we predicted in 1969, that is now haunting the imperialist world.

Generalized Inflation

It is true enough that the bourgeois experts emphasize inflation as the root cause of the disease, as the origin of the threats weighing on the international capitalist economy. But this diagnosis contains a healthy dose of hypocrisy, and a healthy dose of ignorance as well.

First of all a healthy dose of hypocrisy: What economist can be ignorant of the fact that the current "boom," far from being threatened by inflation, is rather the most immediate and direct product of inflation? Take a look, for example, at what

happened in the United States and in Great Britain (to take only two examples) during the recession of 1969-71 and at how these two countries were able to get out of the recession. There was a rapid expansion of the money supply, which in the United States reached nearly 10% in six months and in Britain reached 20% in a year, without any significant increase in material production. *Inflation as a means of "overcoming" recession* was the officially declared policy of the bourgeois governments, the central and private banks, and the monopolies of these countries. Without this inflation, the current "boom" would never have taken place.

And also a healthy dose of ignorance: A permanent inflation that goes on for more than a quarter of a century cannot fail after a certain point, to exhibit the classical acceleration phenomena that economic theory has analyzed so many times.

To condemn this or that "technical error" or this or that minister, to blame "trade-union egoism" or "inflation mentality," is to replace explanation with exorcism.

When there is a wealth of means of payment, a search for "real values" is inevitable. So long as this involves only *objets d'art*, it remains marginal to economic life. But when gold (whose free-market price *doubled* in one year and now stands at two or three times what it was two years ago) is caught up in the vortex then the economic effects are rather more serious. When there is "revalued" gold and "devalued" paper money, Gresham's law comes into play: Bad money drives good money out of circulation. "Bad money" is above all the dollar, which is less and less hoarded, is therefore circulated more and more, and is in turn subjected to the implacable law of supply and demand, thus progressively depreciating.

Cumulative Effects of Inflation

But the hunt for real values is much

more serious when it touches two key sectors of economic life: real estate and raw materials. In a climate of permanent inflation, buying of land and raw materials becomes increasingly *speculative*, independent of the immediate needs of the market.

On the New York raw materials exchange the number of speculators has grown ceaselessly during recent years. Getting a "seat" on the exchange now costs several hundred thousand dollars. Price rises on the exchange are becoming dizzying: In the past year, under the double lash of speculation and the economic upswing, prices have risen 93 percent.

But a rise in prices of real estate—and therefore in rent—and of raw materials inevitably has repercussions on the retail prices of all commodities and on the cost of living. Inflation, which had already persisted throughout the 1969-71 recession, and which was accelerated in order to provide an escape from the recession, is now being amplified by its own cumulative effects. Annual increases in consumer prices are reaching from 3 or 4 percent to 6 or 8 or even 10 percent.

The cumulative movement of inflation has structural effects on interest rates. Now that governments are trying to moderate the inflation of credit somewhat, interest rates are climbing to exceptional levels: a discount rate of 11.5% in Great Britain; a 12% rate for Eurodollars; a rate of 30% for overnight interbank loans in West Germany. The experts are sighing: Credit restrictions are strangling the "boom." And the "pundits" reply: Inflation inevitably produces deflation.

Deeper Causes of the Inevitable Decline of the Cycle

While inflation no doubt *partially* has some effects of its own, nevertheless the autonomy of the credit cycle in relation to the cycle of production and sale of commodities must not be

exaggerated. Inflation does not "automatically" produce a change in the business cycle. It is the internal forces of the expansion that become exhausted and that, by running down, produce the recession. By turning the credit and inflation spigot on or off at the appropriate or erroneous moment, bourgeois leaders can intensify or reduce the gravity of the recession a little. They can hasten or retard the time of its outbreak. But they can no more ensure a permanent boom than they can prevent a recession from breaking out in the long run.

What ties together the credit cycle and the production cycle is the ebb and flow that governs the capitalist business cycle: fluctuations in the average rate of profit.

For the capitalist economy, the 1969-71 recession was the most serious one of the postwar period. Unused productive capacity was extremely pronounced. By the same token, once inflation allowed for an upturn, growth could be rapid. The rate of profit went up sharply in the United States and in Germany. Accumulation of capital was powerfully stimulated. So the inevitable happened. Fresh excess capacity appeared; new openings were supersaturated. New declines in the rate of profit appeared on the horizon.

Finally, bankruptcies were cropping up in the German construction industry, threatening to drag down a few banking houses as well. Tight credit policy and high interest rates have been blamed for this catastrophe. But the deeper cause lies in the fact that for the first time since the end of the second world war, while housing units are being built at the rate of 500,000 a year in the Federal Republic of Germany, there are now more than 100,000 newly constructed units that have been neither bought nor rented at the existing prices, that is, at discounted rates of profit.

Another example: Everyone is expecting a change in the market prices of raw materials. "Speculation cannot keep prices going up interminably," the pundits say. The more basic explanation: Having had their appetites whetted by the dizzying rise in prices and profits, trusts with monopoly control of many raw materials have stepped up their investments and have set up the inevitable overproduction. For the copper industry alone, an

excess capacity on the order of 46 percent is expected by 1978. Under such conditions, it will not be necessary to wait five years for the price of copper to begin to fall.

The Fall of the Dollar: Boomerang 'Weapon' of American Imperialism

One of the most die-hard legends circulating among the strategists of the Café du Commerce and other generally well-informed circles is that the "free fall" of the dollar is a diabolical war machine invented by American imperialism in order to cut its competitors in Europe and Japan down to size. Thanks to the continual depreciation of the dollar (which, in the space of a few years, has lost one-third of its value relative to the Deutsche mark and a quarter of its value relative to the yen), American commodities are supposed to become newly competitive.

It cannot be denied that during the last few months American imperialism has scored some points on the trade level, thanks to the devaluation of the dollar. The fate of the Concord, Sabena's buying cheaper American planes instead of French Dassault planes, is eloquent testimony to this.

But for several years we have predicted what would happen in an epoch of capitalism in which *movement of capital* is more decisive than *movement of commodities*: American imperialism would lose on the level of capital and property what it won on the level of sales of commodities.

With the latest devaluation of the dollar, a veritable rush for American stock was touched off among the European bourgeoisie. The same bloc of stock could be had for 15, 20, 25, or even 35 percent less European currency than it would have taken several years ago, taking account of Wall Street fluctuations.

And what bourgeois individuals can do, capitalist companies can obviously do on a much grander scale. In its July 14, 1973, issue the weekly *Economist* published an article with the appropriate title "A Good Time to Buy America?" British Petroleum bought the American oil company Sohio; Plessey absorbed Alloys; British-American Tobacco absorbed the huge New York department store Gimbel's for a mere \$200 million. Nestlé

bought out Stouffer Foods from the Litton Industries conglomerate for \$100 million; Saint-Gobain acquired the firm Certainteed. And this list is far from exhaustive.

As for Japanese imperialism, it went through an expansion of capital exports that drove American capital out of a good part of the East Asian market and is disputing important American game preserves like Brazil and Mexico. In South Korea and Taiwan, Japanese trusts are setting up huge complexes in steel, petrochemicals, and ship building. In Brazil they are investing more than the United States is. The Fuji Bank estimates that export of Japanese capital will reach \$3.5 to 4 thousand million for 1973 alone, and it anticipates an *annual* rate of \$25 thousand million by the end of the 1970s.

But once again, it is an extrapolation that imprudently ignores conjunctural fluctuations, structural crises, social tensions, and revolutionary explosions.

Even on the commercial level, the devaluation of the dollar has proved to be a poisoned gift for American imperialism. The fall of the dollar has allowed, for example, Japanese capitalists to snatch up greater and greater fractions of current raw materials production at considerably lower prices (in yen) than those American industry has to pay in dollars. The dizzying rise in raw materials prices is no doubt partly a function of that competition.

An Accumulation of Explosive Material

It could be concluded that American imperialism should be interested in a profound reform of the international monetary system. But all the debates are turning on the overhead cost of this reform. None of the imperialist powers is prepared to foot the bill for the others. U.S. imperialism cannot guarantee an end to the inflation of the dollar, which threatens to provoke an economic crisis of overproduction of unparalleled gravity in the United States itself. But without halting this inflation, how can the convertibility of the dollar be reestablished? And unless convertibility is reestablished, little effective reform of the

international monetary system will be possible. And the "solution" would be a return to a system of quotas, of barter, and even of the partial economic autarky that would threaten to suffocate international trade, as during the 1930s.

The crisis of the international monetary system and the exacerbation of interimperialist contradictions that it reflects are today combining with the threat of a recession that will be closer to a generalized recession in all the imperialist countries than any other since the second world war.

But to this accumulation of explosive material for the capitalist system in the economic domain is being added some explosive material in the social domain that is even more threatening to Capital.

The coming recession will break out at a time when the European working class is taking big steps forward in organized forces, combativity, and class consciousness. Never in the past have we seen such a *simultaneous* upsurge of workers struggles in Italy, in Great Britain, in France, in Spain, and now, although at a slower pace, in West Germany; that is, in *all* the key capitalist countries of Europe.

The example of the Lip factory is symbolic in this respect. By its present militancy and consciousness, the European working class is resolved — to a higher degree than in 1929 or in 1932 — not to tolerate the reappearance of massive unemployment. During recent years it has demonstrated that it is capable of preventing Capital from making it bear the costs of inflation. And it is preparing also to prevent Capital from making it bear the costs of the coming economic crisis.

Thus, the elements of an exceptionally serious social crisis are coming together on the European continent. For the European proletariat and for all humanity, this crisis cannot be resolved in a positive manner unless power passes out of the hands of the bourgeoisie, incapable under the present relationship of forces of applying its own class solutions, and into the hands of the working class, which will be capable of bringing its own revolutionary socialist solutions to the crisis.

August 4, 1973

300 Prisoners Freed

Greek Dictator Seeks Support With Amnesty

"I do not repent, nor am I ashamed of what I did," Alexandros Panagoulis told reporters as he left prison August 21. "It is others who commit crimes."

Panagoulis, who had been held under inhuman conditions since his 1968 attempt to assassinate George Papadopoulos, was one of more than 300 political prisoners freed in an amnesty decreed to mark the Greek dictator's inauguration of himself as "president." In conjunction with the amnesty, Papadopoulos declared an end to martial law, which was still in effect in Athens Province more than six years after it was first imposed.

Panagoulis and other prisoners still bore the marks of their torture in the dictatorship's dungeons. In another act of "generosity," Papadopoulos amnestied the torturers for any "crimes committed during the exercise of their duties."

Papadopoulos's attempt to repair the dictatorship's public image followed the propaganda failure of the July 29 referendum that "approved" the dictator's decision to abolish the monarchy and declare himself president for an eight-year term. Even though it was announced in advance that a majority No vote would be ignored by the dictatorship, the colonels' regime was unable to produce the desired results without the most blatant rigging of the returns.

Journalists reported that in many areas a Yes vote was assured by a refusal to provide voters with negative ballots. Early returns gave the Yes vote as over 90 percent, and many polls outside the main cities reported unanimity in favor of the dictatorship. Realizing that such figures were incredible, the regime later reduced its overall margin to 78.4 percent.

Most Greeks, it would seem, remained less than impressed with this "democratic" charade. When Papadopoulos was inaugurated as head of the "presidential parliamentary republic" August 19, Bernard D. Nossiter of the *Washington Post* reported that "only a few thousand Athenians and

tourists" turned out to observe the ceremony.

While Papadopoulos was staging the referendum farce, Greek workers were increasingly turning their attention to the mounting inflation that is cutting into their wages. A number of illegal strikes and slowdowns have been reported throughout the summer. At the same time, university students in Athens are said to be planning to resume their demonstrations in the fall.

While dressing up the facade of the dictatorship, the amnesty also enabled Papadopoulos to begin mending his relations with the military, which were severely strained by last May's coup attempt by high-ranking naval officers. Fifty-six officers accused of complicity in the plot were freed by the amnesty.

That plot involved the navy almost exclusively, but there are reports of friction between Papadopoulos and his army backers, who fear that attempts to provide a civilian cover for the dictatorship mean that they will be forced to step aside.

"Papadopoulos could stumble over his very first step," Nossiter wrote in an August 23 dispatch from Athens. "Some of the ex-colonels have made tidy fortunes in office and are reluctant to leave. One is said to have told Papadopoulos bluntly: 'George, we came into this together and we are leaving together.'"

Caught between the popular hatred for the dictatorship and the dwindling support from his former backers, the new Greek "president" seems very unlikely to complete his "elected" term of office. □

Think You Have Problems?

Denver residents are reported increasingly concerned about the Pentagon's decision to continue storing 4,500 tons of deadly nerve gas within crashing distance of the Denver airport. In a well-publicized announcement four years ago, Nixon "renounced" the use of weapons such as nerve gas in warfare: Maybe he is keeping the stuff around just in case the residents of Denver get out of hand. □

Nixon Still Unable to Keep Lid on Watergate

By Allen Myers

After conferring with his lawyers August 30, Richard Nixon announced that he would appeal a ruling requiring him to turn over tapes of White House conversations to the judge directing the grand jury investigation of the Watergate burglary.

The day before, Judge John J. Sirica had rejected Nixon's claim that he has unlimited authority to withhold the tapes from the grand jury. Sirica ordered that the tapes be turned over to him so that he could decide which were relevant to the investigation and which could legally be withheld.

Nixon's appeal makes it virtually certain that the Supreme Court will eventually rule in the dispute between Nixon and his own special prosecutor, Archibald Cox. But whatever the courts may finally decide, Nixon's frantic attempts to conceal the evidence have probably done nearly as much to convict him in the public mind as the tapes themselves could do.

This was reflected, among other ways, by the response to Nixon's long-awaited "definitive reply" to the charges against him. Prior to the nationally televised August 15 speech, polls showed that 74 percent of the U.S. public thought Nixon to be involved with the Watergate burglary or its cover-up. After the speech, a poll showed the figure virtually unchanged at 73 percent.

An 'Unconvincing Performance'

Contrary to expectation, neither the speech nor a written statement issued in conjunction with it really attempted to refute the charges against the boss of the Watergate gang. Instead, Nixon called for an end to the Senate Watergate hearings. "The time has come," he said, "to turn Watergate over to the courts. . . ." The appeal was less than convincing in view of the fact that Nixon spent a major portion of the same speech defending his refusal to cooperate with the courts by handing over the White House tapes.

As usual when he is up to some-

thing dishonest, Nixon tried to cloak his withholding of evidence under a noble-sounding principle, in this case the right of privacy:

"... The law has long recognized that there are kinds of conversations that are entitled to be kept confidential, even at the cost of doing with-



NIXON: Needs "bulldozer" to face the press.

out critical evidence in a legal proceeding. This rule applies, for example, to conversations between a lawyer and a client, between a priest and a penitent, and between a husband and a wife. In each case it is thought so important that the parties be able to talk freely to each other that for hundreds of years the law has said that these conversations are 'privileged' and that their disclosure cannot be compelled in a court.

"It is even more important that the confidentiality of conversations between a president and his advisers be protected."

As a number of commentators were quick to point out, Nixon's list of

examples omitted the confidentiality of conversations between a doctor and patient, which might have called to mind the Nixon gang's burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Nixon also neglected to explain why, if the conversations with aides must be secret, he had taped them in the first place.

It was not surprising that Nixon's attempt to defend himself drew generally unfavorable reviews. The *New York Times*, for example, commented in an August 17 editorial:

"President Nixon's speech on the Watergate scandals and the supplementary statement issued by the White House are as remarkable for what they omit as for what they contain. In essence, they constitute a concession by Mr. Nixon that he has no detailed defense to offer against the damaging testimony before the Senate Watergate committee. In place of a rebuttal, he offers an omnibus denial and a plea for the public to turn its attention to other pressing public issues. It is a sad, disappointing and wholly unconvincing performance."

Nixon's effort was such a flop that when the Secret Service announced August 20 that it had discovered a "possible conspiracy to assassinate" Nixon, it was commonly assumed—probably accurately—that the announcement was nothing but an attempt to win sympathy.

When, on the same day, Nixon gave his press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, a violent push in full view of television cameras, there was wide speculation that Nixon was losing all self-control under the strain of the Watergate scandal.

Nixon's August 22 press conference—his first in more than five months—was seen as a desperate attempt to repair the damage done by his August 15 speech and the August 20 incident.

"The accumulated stresses were so great," *Newsweek* magazine reported in its September 3 issue, "according to one Administration insider, that when his aides first broached the idea [of a press conference], they 'practically had to push him out there with a bulldozer.'"

Nixon was said to be "jubilant" after the conference, apparently because he was able to evade hostile questions for fifty minutes without being caught in an immediately obvious lie. This moderately successful performance is not even the beginning of the end of

his Watergate-related troubles, however.

The Senate committee, now in recess, is scheduled to resume its hearings September 17; and when it does, further embarrassing disclosures are a certainty. Republican Senator Robert Dole of Kansas has announced that he will introduce a resolution requiring the Watergate committee to hold all its sessions in secret, but with the present widespread distrust of all levels of government, the resolution is given almost no chance of passage.

A more likely way of covering up Nixon's guilt is to rush the hearings to a quick conclusion, either by restricting the number of witnesses called or by limiting questioning, which would allow the culprits to put their denials on record without being seriously cross-examined. Committee chairman Sam Ervin has announced that he hopes to complete the hearings by November 1, even though the Senate originally gave the committee until mid-February to complete its tasks. The committee vice-chairman, Howard Baker, is also in favor of bringing the hearings to a quick conclusion, according to the August 27 issue of *Newsweek*:

"Baker has hitherto reserved judgment on the evidence accumulated through 37 days of hearings. But he has lately seemed to be drifting back toward his first allegiances to his party and his President, and last week he told *Newsweek's* Nicholas Horrock that Watergate is 'essentially over' — that it no longer represents a critical threat to Mr. Nixon's survival in office. Baker, who had supported the committee's demand for the White House tapes, now predicted that the senators could arrive at a finding of fact without them. He told Horrock that nothing now on the record or in the committee's files is strong enough to support an impeachment proceeding—and Baker believes that a clear majority among his committee colleagues accordingly favors rushing the remainder of the hearings to an early conclusion."

But while the Senate hearings may or may not be headed for an early end, Nixon and his gang are finding themselves enmeshed in one new scandal after another.

Lining His Pockets

Another congressional body, the

House Government Activities Subcommittee, is investigating the expenditure of federal funds on Nixon's properties in San Clemente, California, and Key Biscayne, Florida. After the subcommittee chairman, Jack Brooks of Texas, publicly charged the Nixon administration with a "systematic effort" to impede the investigation, the White House on August 6 released the latest in a long series of accountings of such federal spending.

The first story, put out last May, was that the government had spent \$39,000 for Nixon's "security" at San



AGNEW: "In real trouble."

Clemente. Later versions gradually raised the expenditures at San Clemente and Key Biscayne to nearly \$2 million. The August 6 announcement gave the total "security" expenses as \$10 million.

Items covered under the classification of "security" included golf carts, flagpoles, paving for a driveway, a helicopter pad, den furniture, a new heating system, landscaping, fertilizer, and a swimming pool cleaner.

There are further embarrassing questions concerning the San Clemente property and how Nixon acquired it. According to a White House statement of May 25, Nixon acquired six acres of the twenty-nine-acre estate through a series of complicated but obviously profitable deals with his friend and patron, millionaire Robert Abplanalp.

(See *Intercontinental Press*, July 2, p. 804.)

On August 27, the White House released a detailed audit of Nixon's real estate dealings. (Reporters discovered that three former associates of the auditing firm who had been convicted of fraud were pardoned by Nixon last December.)

The audit revealed, among other things, that Nixon has been lying about his San Clemente operations since he acquired the property in 1969. The lies concerned the amount of Nixon's personal investment, the portion of the property that he retained, and the date of the resale to Abplanalp.

The audit disclosed for the first time that Abplanalp had a partner when he bought his portion of the San Clemente property from Nixon. The partner was another millionaire and Nixon crony, C. G. "Bebe" Rebozo, who, like Abplanalp, also owns a house in the Key Biscayne compound that is rented to the government.

In an August 31 editorial, the *New York Times* raised some questions about Nixon's San Clemente deals that may explain the secrecy and lies:

"Mr. Nixon made a substantial profit when he sold the San Clemente land to Mr. Abplanalp and Mr. Rebozo. In 1969, he bought a house and two parcels of land totaling 28.9 acres for a combined purchase price of \$1,500,000. In 1970, he sold 23 acres to his two friends for \$1,249,000. The difference between the two figures is \$251,000. But since the acres which the President kept are not only the improved portion of the lot but are also the choice ocean-front land, they and the house were worth much more than \$251,000 in December 1970. So it would seem that Mr. Abplanalp and Mr. Rebozo paid considerably more for the unimproved land than Mr. Nixon had paid for it a year earlier.

"Does the President's original 1970 tax return record this profit, either as capital gain or as straight income? If it does not, here may lie the explanation for the secretiveness with which the White House surrounded these financial transactions between the President and his two wealthy friends."

At a news conference August 31, Brooks charged that documents related to the San Clemente property had been altered. Philip Shabecoff re-

ported in the September 1 *New York Times*:

"Specifically, Mr. Brooks questioned the dating on attachments to the sales agreement that contained the legal description of the parcels of property reserved to the President and those transferred to the B. & C. Investment Company, the company organized by Mr. Abplanalp and Mr. Rebozo.

"His staff discovered, Mr. Brooks reported, that the surveying company, the South Coastal Engineering Services Corporation, had on Jan. 8, 1971, erased the original date on the attachments and substituted the Dec. 15 [1970] date. . . .

"The Texas Democrat said at first he did not want to 'hazard a guess' about why the changes were made, but then he appeared to suggest that putting a 1970 rather than 1971 date on the agreement might have something to do with President Nixon's taxes."

It is to be hoped that Brooks will guard carefully any documentary evidence in the possession of his subcommittee. Files related to the activities of the Nixon gang and its friends have a way of disappearing. The August 23 *New York Times* reported that the Washington office of the American Broadcasting Company had been burglarized August 10 in an operation for which the police had so far found no clues. The items taken from the office included tape recordings and a folder concerning a Miami bank, the records of which have been subpoenaed by the Senate Watergate committee. A prominent associate of the bank happens to be C. G. Rebozo.

The Agnew Connection

Nixon's financial operations have been overshadowed for the moment by the announcement that Vice-President Spiro Agnew is under investigation for possible bribery, conspiracy, extortion, and violation of tax laws in connection with kickbacks from engineering companies during Agnew's terms as Baltimore County executive and governor of Maryland.

The charges fill a certain logical gap in the previous situation of the Nixon gang, since Agnew had been virtually the only prominent member not implicated in some crime.

It has been noticed that Nixon's endorsement of Agnew since the charges became public has been something



RICHARDSON: Unexpected opportunity to rid himself of a rival.

less than unqualified. At his August 22 press conference, for example, Nixon expressed confidence in Agnew's performance of his duties as vice-president, but said it would be "improper for me to comment" on the charges.

The decision as to whether to present evidence on Agnew to a grand jury and on the question of whether Agnew can legally be indicted without first being impeached is supposedly being left to Attorney General Elliot Richardson. Under normal circumstances, this would mean that the whole matter would simply be swept under the rug.

But in the present situation, which is far from normal, it may well be

that such an obvious cover-up would be more damaging politically to the Nixon gang than allowing Agnew to be indicted. Moreover, Richardson has been cultivating an image of independence from Nixon and is known to have presidential ambitions of his own, which would be advanced by the removal of Agnew as a rival for the 1976 Republican nomination.

The disarray in the Nixon gang is indicated by reports that some of Agnew's backers think Nixon is behind leaks to the press about the investigation.

"The mystery as to who was leaking what to whom," the September 3 *Newsweek* reported, "encouraged speculation bordering on the paranoid among Agnew's people. Some went so far as to guess that the whole case had been concocted and then made public with the blessings of the White House to reduce the heat on the President and to drive Agnew from office as well. 'The whole thing is a bag job,' said one Agnewite. 'Everything that has happened thus far is aimed at putting pressure on Agnew to resign'—or become a candidate for impeachment ahead of the President.

". . . Presidential domestic adviser Melvin R. Laird, for example, made a special call to Illinois Rep. John B. Anderson, chairman of the House Republican Conference, to warn him—as Anderson recalled it—against getting 'out front with any statement' on Agnew 'until we know more.' . . . Almost simultaneously, Nixon agents were warning California Gov. Ronald Reagan privately that Agnew was 'in real trouble.'" □

Chang Tzu-tsai Given Prison Sentence


Chang Tzu-tsai, the Taiwanese architect accused of participating in an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Chiang Kai-shek's son and heir, Chiang Ching-kuo, in New York in April 1970, was sentenced by a New York court August 7 to up to five years in prison.

"A deplorable act that cannot be excused by political motives," the court ruled.

Chang was originally found guilty of the attempted assassination by a New York court in May 1971, but he skipped bail and fled to Sweden.

When the Swedish government decided in 1972 to extradite him to the United States, he went on a hunger strike. This impaired his physical condition such that when two New York policemen came to escort him out of Sweden by plane, he became sick on the plane. His condition made continuation of the trip so dangerous that British officials took him into custody en route on September 4.

Chang was returned to the United States last summer after a British court turned down his request for political asylum. □



Part of the patio in the home of Leon Trotsky. The photograph, taken in 1940 shortly after Trotsky was assassinated, shows the entrances to some of the rooms used by Trotsky's guards and secretaries. Construction of additional rooms on the second floor had not been completed at the time of the tragedy.

The two blockhouses in the background were built after an assault on the place carried out on May 24, 1940, by members

of the Mexican Communist party under the leadership of David Alfaro Siqueiros.

In that attack, the bedroom of Leon Trotsky and Natalia Sedova was machine-gunned. In the darkness, the would-be assassin did not see that the revolutionary couple had rolled under one of their beds. They escaped without a scratch. However, one of the guards, Robert Sheldon Harte, was kidnapped by the assailants and murdered a few days later.

Trotsky's Coyoacan Home to Be Made Into Museum

The Mexican government granted permission August 15 to convert the home of Leon Trotsky in Coyoacán into a private museum.

The Mexico City daily *Excelsior* reported that the decision was made in response to petitions filed by Trotsky's grandson Esteban Volkow Bronstein. He is to serve as curator.

When Trotsky was assassinated by a Stalinist agent in 1940, the home was acquired by the Mexican government. Officials of the Cárdenas administration informed Natalia Sedova, Trotsky's companion, that title to the

property would be made over to her. However, this was not done before Cárdenas left office, and the subsequent administrations likewise failed to take action.

When Trotsky first moved into the house, which is located at Avenida Viena 19 in the outskirts of Coyoacán, the surrounding area consisted of open fields and scattered homes, mostly of poor workers.

In recent years the area has been built up. The streets have been paved and a highway now comes close to the home. For a time it appeared

that the building might be razed to make way for an industrial plant or housing development. Efforts were begun to save the site because of its historical interest, and these now appear to have succeeded.

For many years Natalia Sedova kept Trotsky's study and living quarters as they were at the time of the assassination. After her death in 1962, Trotsky's grandson kept up the place, living in an adjoining apartment with his wife and four children.

According to terms made public by Octavio Senties of the Department of

the Federal District, Volkow will be in charge of conserving the memora-

bilia and maintaining the home as a private museum. □

SWP Plans Further Growth

U.S. Trotskyist Convention Is Largest Ever

Nearly 1,500 persons attended the largest convention in the history of the U. S. Trotskyist movement August 5-11. The twenty-fifth national convention of the Socialist Workers party (SWP), held in Ohio, drew participants from twenty-seven states as well as observers from many foreign countries.

The convention also set a record in terms of the amount of discussion that preceded it. In the three months before the convention, any member of the SWP had the right to submit articles or resolutions on any subject to the party's internal discussion bulletin. Thirty-five bulletins containing 240 articles and covering 1,033 pages were published.

In addition, during the three months prior to the convention, the SWP published another 323 pages of the present discussions in the Fourth International. The SWP is prevented by reactionary legislation from belonging to the Fourth International but is in political solidarity with it and participates in the international discussions.

The written discussion was supplemented by debate and discussion in each branch of the SWP. Many branches held such discussions two or three times a week during the pre-convention period. Delegates to the convention were then elected on the basis of the number of votes in each branch for the different political perspectives advanced. Three of the seventy-five delegates elected represented minority tendencies that advanced positions opposed to those of the outgoing national leadership. On all major points of the convention agenda, representatives of the minority were given equal time with the reporter for the majority.

Four days of the six and a half days that the convention lasted were taken up with debate and discussion on international questions, many of which are also being discussed within

the Fourth International. In order to provide for an even richer discussion, the convention delegates voted to extend speaking rights to many of the international observers who were present.

The international questions discussed included the perspectives for the Trotskyist movement in Latin America, the strategy and tactics for building revolutionary-socialist parties in Western Europe, the role of Trotskyists around the world in defending the Vietnamese revolution, and the extent to which that revolution has been restrained by Stalinism.

Representatives of each branch also met during the convention for a more detailed discussion of opportunities for organizing antiwar actions and actions demanding freedom for political prisoners of the Thieu regime and amnesty for draft resisters and deserters in the U. S.

The delegates approved a three-pronged expansion drive "to reach the widest possible audience with our socialist program."

One aspect of this drive will be the attempt to obtain 15,000 new subscriptions to the revolutionary-socialist weekly *The Militant* and 2,500 to the monthly *International Socialist Review*, while expanding street sales of *The Militant* to 9,500 weekly.

The second area will be the use of socialist election campaigns to spread

the party's position. The SWP is already running numerous municipal campaigns and will have the opportunity in 1974 to field congressional candidates.

The third major focus will center on the Watergate scandal, attempting to build a broad civil liberties campaign against government secret-police operations. The SWP and Young Socialist Alliance have filed suit against Nixon and the Watergate gang, challenging the government's use of spying, burglary, and other undercover activities against them.

The delegates also noted that there are increasing opportunities for socialist activity in the trade unions. A major task for every branch will be support to the United Farm Workers Union (UFW), which is under attack by grape growers and the Teamsters union bureaucracy. "The UFW," the reporter pointed out, "is a product of the radicalization, closely tied to the Chicano movement. This attack is a challenge to the unions, to the Chicano movement, and to the entire left."

A number of factors attested to the steady expansion of the SWP since its previous convention in 1971. One was the presence of representatives from organizing committees in St. Louis and Pittsburgh, where new party branches will soon be chartered.

Another indication was provided by the statistics on those attending the convention. Three-fourths of those present had been members of the SWP for less than five years, and for 38 percent this was the first convention they had attended.

The SWP is also a young party: 55% of those attending—and 86% of the voting delegates—were less than twenty-five years old. □



Convention closed with singing of the "Internationale."

More Than 300 Oppositionists on Trial

By Joseph Krasny

[The following article appeared in the August 10 issue of *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the French Trotskyists. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

"He tore the blindfold off me and said, 'Take a good look. I am Dlimi, Colonel Dlimi. It's been a long time since I tortured anyone. But I'll start again on you with pleasure.' Then he himself raised the bar I was tied to, bound hand and foot (the 'parrot's perch' torture), crushed out cigarette butts on me, and then indicated his satisfaction to my torturers by inviting them to have a banquet in my presence."

We are in Kenitra, in the little room called the "peace tribunal," renamed "military" for this occasion. The speaker is Omar Dakhroum, the second of 157 (157!) defendants, and he is telling about the torture he was subjected to. In the audience, no one is surprised. Torture has long since been the method of governing in the country of Hassan II. And at the highest level, too; for Colonel Dlimi is none other than the head of the Moroccan political police, the successor of the notorious Oufkir.

In Morocco in the summer of 1973 to be on trial is an honor. From Kenitra to Marrakesh, passing through Casablanca, three tribunals will be functioning for several months. The mockery of justice is steaming ahead full blast; more than 300 persons are being tried.

The first trial, at Kenitra, opened on June 26. The defendants were for the most part members of the UNFP [Union Nationale des Forces Populaires—National Union of Popular Forces], the traditional left organization of which Ben Barka was one of the leaders. The second began a week ago in Casablanca. The eighty-one defendants, of whom six are out on bail and thirty are still at large, are dissidents of the UNFP or the PLS

[Parti de la Libération et du Socialisme—Party of Liberation and Socialism, the former Moroccan Communist party]; they are Maoists and far-leftists. Finally, the third trial will be held in Marrakesh in coming weeks.

Why are these trials, which come after the 2,500 arrests since last March 3, going on?

The Moroccan monarchy has never recovered from the two attempted coups (at Skirat in 1971 and at Kenitra in 1972) that were engineered by dissident factions in the army. The main pillar of the Hassan II regime is crumbling. The unshakable loyalty of the Moroccan army came to an end with these two putsch attempts. Today the police, with Dlimi at their head, are rushing to fill the breach.

But the regime's social base is narrower than ever. Reduced to a mere watchdog guaranteeing imperialist exploitation, especially American and French, Hassan's little kingdom feels threatened.

To regain control over the situation, the regime has resorted to a policy that has two sides that are really one and the same. First, to eliminate all those who challenge the existing regime, putting into practice the astounding principle proclaimed in 1972 by Hassan himself:

"God has placed the king on the throne to safeguard the monarchy. In order to effect this safeguarding, the royal court will not hesitate, if necessary, to exterminate the one-third of the population holding nefarious ideas in order to save the healthy two-thirds."

Parallel with this massive repression, confidence is being placed in foreign capitalists. The "Moroccanization" of French interests is a simple readjustment from which both France and Morocco profit. It satisfies the Moroccan comprador bourgeoisie by cutting down on the 100,000 French nationals in Morocco, but it also favors the large imperialist French companies by granting them exorbitant privileges.

In this sense, Pompidou's France is

taking part in the current repression. Whereas the United States backhandedly encouraged Oufkir's attempted coup, French imperialism sees Hassan as the best guarantor of its interests. Hence the numerous military accords between the two countries and the sending of "special advisers" to the Moroccan police. We have no doubt that these gentlemen are giving instructions in the niceties of torture.

The aim of the trials is simple: to strike above all at those who refuse to come to terms with the regime, those who reject all compromise solutions and who insist on their desire to overthrow the regime. In this regard, at the Kenitra trial the defense fell into the trap laid by the prosecution: The defense wanted especially to demonstrate that the leading bodies of the UNFP, a legalist and reformist party, were hostile to the armed uprisings of March 3, 1973, in which some members of this party participated. In this sense, the defense catered to the desires of the regime, which would like to make use of the traditional opposition (the Istiqlal [Independence]-UNFP), in order to broaden its social base.

On the other hand, during the trial that just opened in Casablanca, the accused, for the most part members of the Progressive Front, a far-left organization, reaffirmed their struggle for socialism, while at the same time refuting the charges brought against them; they thus made no concessions on the principles of their action. They are clearly affirming the aims of their fight against a regime that is composed only of torturers and assassins.

Some of these militants face the death penalty. Others may get life imprisonment. The silence surrounding their trial must be broken. To a large extent, the verdicts handed down in the three trials will depend on international protest. It is up to us to make Hassan back down, for we can expect no "clemency" from him. Any doubts about this can be dispelled by a declaration given by the Moroccan minister of "justice":

"When it is a matter of a plot against the state, there is no more legality; all exceptional measures are justified. Today all the police in the world know how to make a suspect tell what he knows, everything that he knows, and nothing but what he knows." □