

Nixon-Brezhnev TV Show: More than Just Horseplay

The Bloody Return of Juan Peron



The Chilean Miners' Strike and the 'Threat of Civil War'

Danish Parliament Votes Abortion Law

Copenhagen

Following many months of lively debate, the Danish Folketing (parliament) adopted Justice Minister K. Axel Nielsen's proposed law on abortion May 24. The vote was ninety-five to fifty-six.

The law, which will take effect in October, gives women the right to interrupt a pregnancy through the twelfth week. Abortions can also be obtained after that point, but only after permission is granted by the Danish Maternity Welfare Board. Its decision can be appealed.

The law retains the requirement that women under eighteen years of age have parental consent, although this requirement can be waived under certain conditions.

As the law was passed, some twenty-odd priests and preachers in full religious garb staged a protest meeting outside the parliament building. They chanted, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." About fifty persons, most of them from the press, gathered to watch the protest.

A few minutes earlier, the clergymen had demonstrated in the visitors' gallery while Niels Nielsen, a member of the Radical Left, warned from the speaker's stand that passage of the law would mean that "the idea of Communism had won out in Denmark."

The clergymen called the adoption of the law "a blacker day than April 9" (the day Hitler occupied Denmark). They also demanded a referendum on the subject of abortion, and promised that god would punish Denmark if the law were not turned down.

At the last minute, former Justice Minister Knud Thestrup, a Conservative, had attempted unsuccessfully to gather the sixty signatures of members of the Folketing required for a referendum to be ordered. Only forty-eight signed. □

Coming Soon

A coming issue of *Intercontinental Press* will feature an exclusive interview with James P. Cannon, a founding member of the U.S. Communist party and of the American Trotskyist movement. Don't miss "The Radicalization Then and Now."

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Not All Horseplay in Nixon, Brezhnev's TV Show

By Jon Rothschild

The key word was "momentum." The leading information organs of the U. S. capitalist class harped on that theme throughout Leonid Brezhnev's June 18-24 stay in the United States. While the visit might not produce any formal agreements that could not have been worked out at a lower level, they explained, the important thing about the Brezhnev trip was that it took place in such an amiable atmosphere, that it continued the momentum of détente.

Typical was R.W. Apple Jr., who wrote in the June 24 *New York Times*:

"The thing that has been different about the summit conference between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev has been its relaxed, if carefully staged, normality. For a week, the two most powerful leaders in the world bantered and bargained, announcing minor agreements, and politically major ones. Through it all, they behaved as if their summitry was the ordinary discourse of two nations who have in their arsenals enough nuclear power to destroy the world."

And further on: "The effect [of Brezhnev's behavior] was that of a man thoroughly at home in a foreign country, delighted to be with an old friend, hurdling language barriers with good spirits and threatening no one. . . . In a meaningful sense, therefore, the mechanics and the good-natured fluff of the meeting were really the substance."

The substance symbolized by the fluff is the Kremlin betrayal of the Indochinese revolution in exchange for promises of trade concessions. The agreements announced during Brezhnev's visit, while of little significance in themselves, were a token that both sides hope to continue and expand the relationship formalized last year by Nixon's visit to Moscow at the same time that the U. S. was mining the harbors of North Vietnam.

Brezhnev showed up at the White House (after one day's unofficial rest at Camp David) on June 18. "All the ceremonial stops had been pulled out," the June 19 *New York Times* observed. "The army's herald trum-

peters, with medieval-style banners hanging from their long silver horns, greeted the President with 'Hail to the Chief' and Mr. Brezhnev with fanfare. An Air Force band played the anthems, 'The Star Spangled Banner' and 'Glorious Soviet Homeland,' and the Marine Drum and Bugle Corps played a medley of service marches.

"An honor guard representing all the armed services was drawn up before the flags of all the states and territories. On the Ellipse, howitzers barked out a 21-gun salute—technically not merited by Mr. Brezhnev as a chief of party rather than a chief of state, but considered appropriate in this instance by White House protocol experts."

Nixon and Brezhnev walked up and down the honor guard "with Mr. Nixon putting his arm around Mr. Brezhnev, then Mr. Brezhnev reversing the procedure."

When this initial episode of hoopla drew to a close, Nixon and Brezhnev plunged into their first session of what finally totaled thirty-four and a half hours of secret talks. No specific information about what was discussed was forthcoming. A Moscow spokesman said "a good businesslike beginning" had been made; White House Press Secretary Ronald ("inoperative") Ziegler told reporters that the first Nixon-Brezhnev session had been confined to "a more general, philosophical level."

It went unreported what conclusions were thus reached. In any case, the two philosophers blew off steam that evening at a gala White House banquet that included the usual toasts, professions of mutual respect and admiration, and fluff (substance).

The following morning, June 19, came the next public relations operation. Nixon and Brezhnev attended a State Department ceremony at which four agreements were signed—each of which had been prepared long in advance and were held up for signing during the big visit. The agreements covered cooperation in transportation (railroads, bridges, aviation, shipping, auto traffic), agriculture (cooperation in research, development, pro-

duction, processing, and trade), oceanography (cooperation in research), and culture (both sides claimed to be in favor of it and agreed to spread it around).

Later in the visit, five other agreements were signed. Like the first four, they had been negotiated well before the summit meeting and their signing ceremonies were clearly nothing but means of keeping the détente in the news. Two of these were largely insignificant technical agreements aimed at loosening up the blocks to personnel flowing back and forth between the Soviet Union and the United States—an accord on taxation specifying that nationals of one country working in the other need not pay double taxes and an agreement slightly expanding airline traffic between the two countries.

The seventh pact was a commerce agreement in which a plan was set up to establish a Soviet-American Chamber of Commerce and to allot each country office space on the other's territory.

It must be admitted that by any reasonable standard, those agreements are fairly thin—at least on the scale of rapprochement between two "superpowers." So two additional pacts were hauled out as well. One was an accord setting the principles of further negotiations on limiting nuclear arms and further cooperation in exploring peaceful uses of atomic energy. The other, heralded by the newspaper of the American Communist party as a "ban on nuclear war," was the big "surprise" of the Brezhnev visit.

Each of the other agreements had been announced in advance. The "Accord on Avoiding Atomic War" had been negotiated in secret over a one-year period and was revealed only hours before the signing ceremony of June 22.

The accord is a brief affair, consisting of eight articles. In essence, the signatories agree that the "objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons." Both sides

agree not to act in ways that would exacerbate relations or provoke military confrontations; both sides agree to refrain from using force or the threat of force against each other, each other's allies, or third countries in general.

"The underlying significance of the accord, however," Bernard Gwertzman wrote in the June 23 *New York Times*, "lay not in any specific detail but rather in the growing willingness of the United States and the Soviet Union to put on paper their trust in each other's good intentions."

Just what sort of trust was involved became clear in the various press conferences on the accord. "Does Article II [renunciation of force against third countries] have any bearing," one reporter asked Henry Kissinger, "on our bombing in Cambodia or to the military supply of the Indochina belligerents by both the United States and the Soviet Union?"

"Obviously," Kissinger replied, "in interpreting this agreement, we could go around the world and see how it specifically applies to each individual country and to each conceivable situation.

"Let me answer first the Cambodia question. The military operations now going on in Cambodia were in progress when this agreement was being negotiated. And it was not raised as replying to that particular situation."

Kissinger, the *New York Times* observed, seemed to become "nettled" by some of the questions reporters asked about the agreement. He was asked, for example, "Is this document a renunciation of atomic war, and if not why not?" He began his reply by saying: "I'll take you along on future negotiations, to fill in the gaps that we need."

When another reporter asked, "Could you discuss the concept of not using nuclear force first against each other. Why wasn't that included?" Kissinger replied, "We can now discuss many things that individual members of the press corps would like to have as part of other agreements."

The reason for Kissinger's "nettling" was obvious enough. He was annoyed at the effrontery of a few reporters who dared to ask questions whose intent was to find out if the "atomic war" accord had any meaning at all. Questions like that would threaten to spoil the show and might

give people the impression that the accord was meaningless.

Leonid Zamyatin, Brezhnev's Ronald Ziegler, was also concerned about this. At a news conference attended by Ziegler and Zamyatin, the latter was asked whether the new agreement would forestall another Kremlin action like the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. He replied, "The Soviet Union always adheres to the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs of another country. It has always abided by its signature on agreements. If you imply by your question that external forces could be used for changing the existing system in a country, the answer is that we have always honored our obligations as allies. And this agreement does nothing to change the obligation of the United States towards its allies or to change the obligation of the Soviet Union towards its allies."

More simply put, the answer to the reporter's question was "No." The new "renunciation of force" agreement will not compel the Soviet bureaucracy to renounce its intervention against the workers' attempts to establish socialist democracy any more than it will compel U.S. imperialism to renounce its war against the Indochinese revolution in particular or the colonial revolution in general. That is not its purpose. Its purpose, to use Zamyatin's own phrase, is to guarantee the "existing system." It represents just one more statement by the U.S. ruling class and the Soviet bureaucracy that major shake-ups of social relations are a threat to "world peace."

Brezhnev himself hit on that theme in his June 24 television address to the U.S. population. "The improvement of Soviet-American relations," he said, "undoubtedly played its useful role in promoting the termination of the long drawn-out war in Vietnam. Now that the agreement ending the Vietnam war has come into effect and both our countries, together with other nations, are signatories to the document of the Paris conference on Vietnam, it seems to us to be particularly important that the achieved success be consolidated and that all the peoples of Indochina be given the chance to live in peace." He refrained from mentioning that while he was talking, U.S. bombs were falling on Cambodia.

But the television speech was not the only one that Brezhnev made aim-

ing at assuring the U.S. ruling class that the Kremlin bureaucracy has no interest in fostering social revolution. On June 22, he spoke to a meeting of U.S. businessmen on the subject of expanding Soviet-American trade, one of the main purposes of his visit. He spent most of his time explaining the rather strange notion that trade is a means of assuring peace, a concept he certainly did not learn from studying the writings of the founder of the party that his bureaucratic antecedents usurped and that he now unfortunately heads.

"The old Russian traders," Brezhnev told the representatives of U.S. capitalism, "used to carry their goods by sea to Persia, and sell them there and buy Persian goods and bring them back to Russia, and that was the basis for friendship, even in those days between those two countries [!] . . . So even then, trade supplemented policy and added to its effectiveness, and indeed, without trade, no relations, no normal relations between any two countries are possible."

And Brezhnev reached unusual depths of theoretical profundity explaining why: "After all, sign a protocol with some nation based on peaceful coexistence and not sell that nation even a single pencil or some technical equipment, or some consumer goods, and, of course, in the field of consumer goods it is the women who are most anxious for the development of that kind of trade because we men are all right, we can get by just wearing one old coat on our shoulders but the women want to change their clothes at least three times a day."

Brezhnev reportedly made a good impression on the businessmen. After the meeting, one who had attended remarked that Brezhnev could be "the world's supersalesman." But supersalesman or not, Brezhnev apparently did not succeed during his visit in convincing the U.S. ruling class to lift immediately the tariff barriers restricting Soviet-American trade. In that sense, his trip was not a total success. It may be assumed, however, that before too long, the potential economic benefits, the aid the Kremlin has provided and is continuing to provide in keeping the lid on the world revolution, and competition from other capitalist countries will impel the U.S. capitalists to drop those barriers. □

Bullets Cut Into Throng Hailing Return of Peron

By Gerry Foley

"Tens of thousands of persons began arriving yesterday from various parts of the country in free trains, buses, and other means of conveyance to welcome General Juan D. Perón," the Associated Press reported from Buenos Aires June 19.

"Official spokesmen say that they estimate two million persons will congregate tomorrow when Perón, President Héctor J. Cámpora, and a large retinue return from Madrid by a special Aerolíneas Argentinas flight. If this estimate is borne out, it will be the largest demonstration in the entire history of Argentina.

"The Peronist enthusiasts were caught up in a festive atmosphere, singing songs, chanting slogans, and waving Argentine flags and Peronist banners. There were hundreds of pictures of Juan Perón, of his venerated second wife, Eva Perón, and his present wife, Isabel Martínez."

On June 20, the day of *el líder's* return, *Le Monde's* correspondent Philippe Labreux reported:

"At the first light of dawn a veritable human sea poured down the highway that is the only access to the airport [of Ezeiza]. There were people from every walk of life, every age, Peronists and undoubtedly many curiosity-seekers. The crowd, estimated by the organizers at more than two million persons, was bubbling over with joy. The 'bombos,' the enormous Latin drums, accompanied slogans and chants. The many provincial delegations coming from every corner of the country lent a folkloric note. With the Argentine flags were mingled Bolivian and Paraguayan flags, representing the homage of two main foreign colonies.

"This demonstration, the greatest the country has ever seen, confirmed the former chief of state's following and fully backed up the result of the March 11 elections."

But the tumultuous welcome for the "absolute leader of the nation" did not proceed as planned. Events occurred that forced Perón to land at another

airport and go directly to the presidential residence of Olivos. Reports of what happened varied widely. But all agreed that the incidents occurred at the platform at Ezeiza from which Perón was to address the vast crowd that had gathered.

In Mendoza, Aldo Astorga, Abel Tello, and Godoy Cruz told the local correspondent of the Buenos Aires daily *La Razón* that they had gotten out of a bus in front of the local CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor] headquarters, near the airport, "when they saw a large number of youths advancing from a woods nearby. They all had the same armbands on their left arms; they waved weapons in the air and shouted hurrah for Perón. Their presence brought shouts of disapproval from part of the public near the platform. There was an immediate exchange of shots, which sent the crowd running in all directions, many throwing themselves to the ground.

"The ones wearing armbands, they added, moved threateningly toward the security forces and their vehicles but were repulsed and had to take refuge in a small wooded area nearby. The other group pursued them there but our informants did not know what happened then.

"They saw many people fall, they pointed out, and the number of victims was impressive."

The general secretary of one of the local units of the Juventud Peronista in Mendoza, Alberto Genty, praised the security guard at the stage for "efficiently handling the unexpected attackers." But his version was diametrically opposite, as we will see later, to the statement put out by the national leadership of his organization.

A member of the Córdoba delegation, in which one person was killed and several others wounded, told this story on his return to the Argentine automotive center:

"I saw a person try to put a banner on the stage. This provoked a reaction from those who were guarding the platform. After this, there was an exchange of words, and then blows, between the two groups—the one guarding the stage and the other one to which the individual with the banner belonged.

"Seconds later, from the trees, someone opened fire. This started a barrage. The fire was returned from the stage."

The Peronist from Córdoba noted that after the shooting began, the master of ceremonies tried to quiet the crowd, ordering the doves released that were supposed to signal Perón's arrival. The crowd was distracted for a few minutes but the battle continued. Heavy gunfire cut through the throng packed around the stage.

"While dozens of wounded in various hospitals in the capital and the greater Buenos Aires region were improving, with the exception of no more than ten hopeless cases," the June 22 *La Razón* reported, "the exact number of those killed in the confrontation Wednesday on the Ricchieri Highway has not yet been determined conclusively.

"The method adopted by the hospitals for registering the arrival of bodies left open the possibility that the number of fatalities was higher than the twenty persons estimated yesterday. . . .

"Most of the dead were mortally wounded by bullets of various calibers, but in two or three cases death has been attributed to suffocation, sharp blows, and other causes. The hospitals announced that they were releasing the names of persons who have died after admission, but there has been no accounting for the bodies sent directly to the various morgues."

In all, *La Razón* estimated, 430 persons were hospitalized. The shoot-out was followed by a panic, with hundreds of persons looking for missing friends and relatives.

"Many persons today, as in the two previous days, are going from hos-

pital to hospital, trying to find out the whereabouts of some of their relatives or where they are being treated, to see if they were victims of the events. In the Ezeiza clinic, they decided to post the names of the 246 persons being treated there on the walls of the business section in the Esteban Echeverría area of the city."

At the same time, groups of youths who claimed to be Peronists surrounded the hospitals and for a day after the massacre prevented journalists from ascertaining the number of wounded. *La Razón* did not explain what motives these groups had for keeping guard over the hospitals.

The right-wing *La Razón* published, apparently with approval, the version given out by the security forces. Their account was as follows:

"At 2:00 p.m. the head of the march entered Ward No. 1 of the municipality of Esteban Echeverría. The front lines carried flags, placards, and banners of the FAR [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—Revolutionary Armed Forces, a Peronist guerrilla group], the Montoneros [a Peronist guerrilla group named for the partisans of the war of independence], and the ERP 22 de Agosto [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—the August 22 Revolutionary Army of the People, a pro-Peronist split-off from the ERP].

"The column was preceded by an automobile in which a person was waving a saber to indicate the line of march.

"At 2:10, as it approached bridge No. 1, where the platform from which General Perón was to speak was located, the column split in two. In a pincer movement, it cut off the far left and right sides of the bridge from the rear. The maneuver began 300 yards from the rear of the bridge.

"At 2:15, the united column of the ERP 22 de Agosto, the FAR, and the Montoneros was continuing to move forward. In the center was a white Torino automobile.

"At 2:20, two Leyland buses drove up at the left side of the rear of the bridge, blocking off the ERP-FAR-Montonero column. The marchers in this column totaled about 3,000 persons. It is known that the column left the city of La Plata with no more than 500 persons and with no other placards than those saying 'Perón or death,' singing 'Perón, Evita, the

Peronist Fatherland.' In this way they hoodwinked the people in the towns between La Plata and Esteban Echeverría. Only when they reached a point 200 yards from the rear of the Esteban Echeverría kindergarten did they unfurl the banners of the FAR, the ERP, and the Montoneros. After reaching the sides of bridge No. 1, they dropped the slogan 'Perón, Evita, la Patria Peronista,' for 'Perón, Evita, la Patria Socialista.'

"At 2:30, the person commanding the column moved from the far left of the bridge to the center of the rear approach, about 300 yards from the bridge itself. Here he raised and lowered his megaphone twice. This was the signal to begin the hostilities. Immediately from the two Leyland buses stationed at the left side of the bridge volleys of machine-gun fire started up, aimed at the personnel guarding the place of honor from which General Perón was to speak. At the same time, in coordinated fashion, some persons opened fire from the ERP-FAR-Montonero column itself, which had occupied the far right and left of bridge No. 1.

"Coordinated with this, fire was opened from long-range weapons in the hands of snipers stationed in the trees in front and on both sides of the bridge. The security personnel on the stage and on the bridge, under the combined fire of machine guns and long-range rifles, went down on their bellies. Shouts were heard: 'The Trotskyites have us surrounded, it's hopeless.'"

Despite this presumably desperate situation, the authors of the statement hastened to add, the guards were able to regroup and repel the guerrillas.

"At 2:35, after the first minutes of surprise and confusion were over, the security forces on the stage began to drive back the combined ERP-FAR-Montonero attack. One of the Leyland buses started up and managed to escape. The other was hit by an incendiary grenade fired by the security forces. Later its interior was inspected, and it was determined that the buses were armored and had supports for firing machine guns. Long- and short-range arms were found inside, burned by the fire."

A dispute arose between the Peronist security forces and the Ministry of Interior over how "order" should have

been maintained and by whom. The statement in *La Razón* gave the side of the right-wing vigilantes:

"At 2:40, the security forces on the stage contacted the federal police in the area and asked for their cooperation. The answer was that by order of the minister of the interior they were forbidden to intervene and that they had to fall back and observe. . . .

"At 3:00, patrols from the security forces at the stage arrested snipers stationed in the trees. It is known that before the hostilities started, six persons wearing bullet-proof vests and carrying rifles with telescopic sights were arrested. This is the standard gear for assassinations."

The suggestion was that the "guerrillas" intended to take the life of "the supreme leader of the nation." This claim echoed an earlier allegation reported by a UPI dispatch in the June 15 *La Prensa-El Diario*: "A right-wing commando group warned the government that Marxist guerrillas planned to assassinate former presidents Juan D. Perón and Alejandro Lanusse. The warning was given only hours before the chief of state, Héctor J. Cámpora, turned over his office to the vice-president, Vicente Solano Lima, in preparation for his trip to Madrid to meet the supreme leader of the Peronist movement."

In keeping with their alleged desperate objective, the guerrillas were cast by the security forces in the role of depraved desperados.

"Those arrested were taken to the federal police headquarters in Ezeiza and to the first floor of the Hotel Internacional at the airport. Most of them had 'raviolis' of cocaine in their pockets, as well as other stimulants.

"It is known from the first interrogations that the snipers had radios by which they informed the rest of the ERP-FAR-Montonero column that 'their presence had been detected by Osinde's forces, and that it was not possible to wait for the arrival of the man (General Perón) in order to begin the operation (that is, the attempt on Perón's life).'"

Twenty-two "guerrillas" were reportedly arrested. The majority, according to the security forces' own account, were members of the ERP led by Roberto Santucho and of the FAR, although there was no mention in the rest of their story of any involvement of the ERP in the events.

Nor did the rightists try to explain why an organization left unmentioned in their detailed and presumably "complete" account came in for the largest number of arrests.

This curious discontinuity in the story given in *La Razón* raises some questions. Could the fact that the ERP is the only guerrilla group that rejects the authority of Perón have something to do with so many of its members being arrested? Did the right-wing Peronist vigilantes either take advantage of an accidental clash, or stage a deliberate provocation to go after special political targets? Because of their political positions, the ERP could be expected to be prime targets for the rightists. But, according to Orlando Senna, the correspondent for the Rio de Janeiro daily *Ultima Hora*: "The ERP played very little role in the Ezeiza incidents."

Moreover, the liberal and left-wing Peronist groups, in general, gave an account of the incidents strikingly different from that of the security forces. The Buenos Aires association of Peronist lawyers charged that the site for the ceremony was deliberately chosen to facilitate a provocation: "It was obvious that the place selected by the organizers of the event made the necessary security impossible, since it lacked the minimum conditions for accommodating the immense crowd that went there to welcome General Perón. Therefore, the provocation against the Peronist people can be attributed to Lieutenant Colonel Osinde, who, along with his cronies in the trade-union bureaucracy, used their hired goons to prevent the ceremony, which would have shown their complete lack of popular support."

The statement went on to say that the most aggressive of the group from the JSP (Juventud Sindical Peronista — Peronist Trade-Union Youth), who made up the bulk of the security force, were veterans of "the abolished Departamento de Investigaciones Policiales Antidemocráticas [Police Department for the Investigation of Antidemocratic Activities, the political police] and the Comando de Organización [Organizational Commandos] led by Alberto Brito Lima, a former employee of the trade-union clique. Equipped with long-range weapons, these goons fired on the public from the stage, as is shown by the pictures published in all the daily papers."

According to the Peronist lawyers "the maneuver orchestrated by Osinde . . . was aimed at separating the Leader from his people by any means because when this historic relationship is established it will topple all the schemes of the trade-union bureaucracy, who today more than ever are the chief tools of the imperialist and oligarchic interests."

The versions of many rank-and-file Peronists and members of the Juventud Peronista [JP—Peronist Youth] in Mendoza paralleled the lawyers' account. They said, as summarized by the June 22 *La Razón*: "From the first hours of daylight, contingents of the Juventud Sindical Peronista, in particular those belonging to the SMATA [Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor—Union of Automotive Machinists and Allied Trades] and the UOM [Metalworkers Union], had occupied the area around the platform and were brandishing their weapons, trying to keep other groups from approaching. This led finally to the attack against columns of demonstrators, especially those of the FAR, Montoneros, and the Juventud Peronista."

The JP Supreme Council also blamed Osinde's security force.

"Lieutenant Colonel Osinde was in charge of a gang armed with heavy weapons. This gang had the cooperation of a revived Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista [Nationalist Alliance for Liberation], a parapolice outfit known by the initials CNU (whose guilt in the murder of the Mar del Plata student Silvia Filler, among other things, has been proved), and the trade-union goons known to the entire Peronist movement for the savagery they displayed recently at the Nino restaurant and a few days ago in José Suárez in the ceremony commemorating the Peronists shot in 1956." (For a description of the shoot-out at the José Suárez garbage dump, see *Intercontinental Press* of June 25.)

The clash, the JP leadership suggested, was touched off by a fight for position. It blamed faulty organization and the fact that it had been excluded from the preparations. It also blamed deliberate ill will on the part of the security forces. "It would be natural to expect that if they had not wanted clashes, they would have planned where this column was to enter."

The carnage began when the guards moved to block the JP column from coming into the area of the speakers' stand.

"What happened then was a massacre, because the heavy arms lavishly displayed from the stand by Osinde's people included machine guns, Itaka shotguns, Mauser carbines, and FAL rifles. There are pictures of this arsenal."

Osinde's thugs staged a deliberate and brutal slaughter:

"The wounded were left unattended; they were left to bleed to death. In the Ezeiza Hotel Internacional an 'interrogation room' was set up where they tortured the compañeros brutally, and at this very moment they are trying to drag the wounded JP compañeros out of the hospitals." (Is this what the gangs of youth surrounding the hospitals, mentioned by *La Razón*, were up to?)

The JP leadership accused the right-wing Peronists, whom they denounced as "allies of the CIA," of trying to "stand between the people and the Leader." These rightists, they said, had taken advantage of Perón's eighteen-year absence to use the movement for their own advantage. As for the JP's own Peronist orthodoxy, they stressed, it was unimpeachable:

"Thus far the JP has proved itself to be an organization at the service of Peronist order. This was shown on May 25 and on many other occasions, when it adhered absolutely to the vertical chain of command, demonstrating its loyalty to the banners and to the leader of the national liberation."

As loyal Peronists, they lamented that the incidents had spoiled the triumphant homecoming of *el líder*.

"General Perón must regret deeply that he was unable to meet with us.

"The three and a half million compañeros who arrived from all points in the country feel the same sadness."

This theme was repeated in the newspaper accounts of the Ezeiza events, which stressed the disappointment of the thousands of rank-and-file Peronists who missed seeing the mythical "great leader" in person.

"Pointing to her feet, swollen after a long hike," reported the June 22 *Clarín*, "Marta, a Patagonian, repeated disconsolately over and over again, 'I came to see Perón, I came to see Perón.'"

The scattered crowds, moreover,

caused the Peronist organizations some serious problems.

"In the meanwhile about six thousand persons from the provinces camped the night before yesterday in the stadium of the Vélez Sarsfield club. Fatigue and hunger increased their discontent. The organizers had to make new efforts to keep down the resentment."

With the enormous and dramatic letdown of millions of supporters of Perón and the confusion and upset spread by fantastic rumors of bloody gun battles, CIA or "Marxist" infiltrators and commando groups trying to ambush the legendary "leader," the political climate in Argentina was obviously supercharged.

Among other things, the big trade unions and conservative Peronist organizations filled the papers with advertisements denouncing mysterious leftist infiltrators and accusing small groups of gunmen of trying to thwart the will of the people.

"It was a day of reunion, a people's fiesta," the CGT's statement said, "a festival of tribute to an illustrious Argentine. It had a real joy about it, emotion, love, peace, which was shared by millions of men, women, and children.

"But a minuscule group of genuine representatives of antinational forces, exponents of international anarchy, lackeys of both imperialisms ["Yankee and Marxist"], in a diabolic plot dictated by the sick mentality, characteristic of mercenary elements of the lowest sort, staged an armed attack on the people, who were getting ready to greet and listen to their leader."

In the midst of the mass hysteria and right-wing buildup around Perón's return and the events at the Ezeiza airport, the papers continued to report violent actions by small groups. These actions followed the pattern of earlier guerrilla operations, without it being clear, however, whether any guerrilla group was in fact involved. The day before Perón's return, for example, John R. Thompson, general manager of the Firestone tire company, and Juan Kurdt, general manager of the Silvana hosiery company, were seized by unknown persons. This brought the total number of kidnappings in Argentina this year to sixty.

In this climate of uncertainty, Perón went on national television and radio

June 21 to call for "national unity" and "peace."

The wily old demagogue was careful not to line up openly with the right and risk losing his influence over the militant youth too soon. He denounced "dark forces" and hidden enemies in such terms that the left Peronists could think that he was talking about their enemies.

Despite the vagueness of Perón's statements, his aim seemed clear. The insinuations about elements with secret aims, coupled with references to the "two imperialisms," were designed to begin isolating the guerrillas and the left Peronists in general. The old caudillo is not likely to be hasty in carrying out this operation. It is probable that it will prove extremely delicate and will involve subtle political pressures and negotiations with the Peronist guerrillas, as well as force and anticommunist demagoguery.

The new government's economic and political margins for maneuver are narrow, and the Peronist tops probably cannot afford to risk too rapidly disillusioning the movement's militant young supporters. Moreover, it is not yet clear how deep the differences are in the camp of "order" that were revealed by the JSP's accusations against Minister of the Interior Righi.

It is notable that the right-wing Peronist "comando" that issued the warning about an alleged plot against the lives of Perón and Lanusse also denounced Righi as a Communist. There have also been reports of police vigilante groups being formed to hunt

down guerrillas. It seems likely that important rightist elements do not intend to rely on the politicians to guarantee that the popular upsurge not go too far. It may take Perón some time to find a balance.

But the Peronists' deal with the military and the interests it represents, to say nothing of their hopes for attracting European capital, depends on their being able to guarantee a rather speedy return to "order."

By combining calls for peace with unofficial use of goon squads, Perón can isolate the guerrilla groups and cut them to pieces, thereby setting the stage for intimidating and crushing any revolutionary opposition that might try to push the popular upsurge out of the Peronists' bureaucratic control. The caudillo's popular support assures that the police will be able to get information about the revolutionary groups that they could not obtain under the military dictatorship.

In this situation, any revolutionary armed group operating outside the control and knowledge of mobilized masses will face unprecedented dangers, and will run the risk that its daring and sacrifices will only strengthen Perón's hand in imposing his "order" on the working class. But if properly led and inspired, the working-class mobilizations, prompted by the retreat of the dictatorship and the hopes aroused by the installation of a "people's government," can expose the demagoguery of Perón and Cámpora as well as check or destroy the goon squads of the trade-union bureaucracy and the right-wing Peronists. □

Bandaranaike Courting Foreign Capitalists

The Sri Lanka "United Front" government led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike is trying to encourage private investment by foreign capitalists, according to a report in the June 18 *Far Eastern Economic Review*. Correspondent B. H. S. Jayewardene wrote that investment has been opened in "industrial and mineral export industries, new industrial export industries, agricultural export industries, new agricultural exports, fisheries and tourism."

The government reportedly hopes

to attract foreign private investment totaling US\$120 million between 1973 and 1978. Among the attractions offered are an eight-year tax holiday, repatriation of profits, and a 65 percent premium on foreign exchange, and concessions on customs duties.

In order to reduce the red tape with which investors might have to contend, the government will handle all investments through the Ministry of Planning and Employment, headed by Bandaranaike herself. □

Argentina in Neo-Peronism's Hour—Mass Struggles and Revolutionary Organization

By Livio Maitan

1. The Argentine bourgeoisie had accepted the prospect of Peronism playing a new, major role within the framework of the GAN [Gran Acuerdo Nacional—Great National Agreement], that is, of a policy providing for substantial control by the military over a newly restored "constitutional" regime and, at the same time, involving a compromise between Peronism and other traditional political forces. This scheme, thought up by Lanusse, the most lucid of the heads of the military dictatorship, involved the isolation, if not the crushing, of the "extreme" points represented both by the armed struggle organizations and by the most combative working-class vanguards that had broken with the Peronist union bureaucracy.

In spite of rigging and distortions, the results of the March 11 elections basically showed that the wave of radicalization had reached an extraordinary scope, not only among the working masses but also among broad layers of the petty bourgeoisie. The GAN operation was literally swept aside, and the Argentine bourgeoisie found itself faced with a very clear choice: either to forcibly thwart the tidal wave by preventing Cámpora from assuming the presidency, or to play its neo-Peronist card. The former option would have inevitably resulted in the hegemony of the most reactionary wing of the military and would very likely have led to the breaking out of a civil war, characterized from the very start by armed resistance. This is why it decided, in spite of the desperate efforts of the ultras, to run the risk of a radical turn and reinstate Peronism in power.

2. The dramatic events that marked the entry of Cámpora into the Casa Rosada are indicative of the conditions in which Peronism is attempting once again to impose its hegemony. The most representative heads of the military dictatorship had to withdraw from the scene without being able in any way to mask their defeat. The mobilization of the masses and the initiatives taken by the armed organizations, having passed through the test of savage repression, forced the release of all the political prisoners. Allende and Dorticós were acclaimed by the crowds, while Rogers had to keep to the corridors. The edifice built up since Onganía took power in 1966 has completely collapsed.

The following question now arises: What are the Argentine bourgeoisie's chances for achieving some successes with the spectacular turn that it has been forced to make?

It goes without saying that the economic conditions in the Argentina of 1973 are in no way analogous to the conditions at the end of the second world war that created a situation favorable to the Peronist experiment. Nor is there any longer any possibility for Argentina to take the path followed by Brazil after the 1964 military coup. In the first place, it will be impossible within the context of a Peronist regime in any way to impose

on the working class what the gorillas, resorting to the most brutal violence, imposed on the Brazilian workers. Second, it would not be easy to find room in Latin America for two "subimperialisms," and there is every indication that Brazil offers American imperialism other guarantees than Argentina. Thus, a large-scale economic boom lasting for a number of years appears unlikely.

This does not mean that the bourgeoisie has no room at all for maneuver. There is room, and Cámpora and Company will attempt to use it to the utmost. First of all, they will be able to ease the pressure from North American imperialism by appealing to West European capitalism, which is on the lookout for new openings in its increasingly sharp competition with the United States. This also involves the possibility both of new investments, making the achievement of short-term results possible, and of substantially expanding the export of basic products like meat (in this area, the present evolution of the market is favorable to producing countries). At the same time, Argentina can play the card of an alliance with Latin American countries interested in thwarting Brazilian expansionism—countries that have already joined together in the Andean Pact. In this way, Argentine industry could, for a certain period of time and to a certain extent, assure itself of larger foreign outlets. In addition, measures of partial nationalization could bring about a certain rationalization of economic options, in the final analysis strengthening the positions of Argentine capitalism as a whole. North American imperialism itself, while placing its top priority on Brazil, will not be able to systematically sabotage the neo-Peronist experiment, given the danger of its rapidly wearing down, without any available alternative solution within the framework of the system. Finally, the new government will be able to reach agreement with some workers states that are obviously interested in the process of evolution going on in Argentina (Perón's planned trip to China is significant in this regard).

3. Judging from the electoral returns, the Peronists are taking power with a broader social base than they had in 1945-46. It is the attitude of broad layers of the petty bourgeoisie in particular that has changed as they have become increasingly radicalized.

Theoretically, this ought to guarantee Cámpora considerable room for political maneuver and prevent a too rapid erosion of support. But in practice, the difficulties and contradictions are enormous, and they surfaced during his first days in office.

Above all, one must not for a moment lose sight of the very profound evolution of the international context since 1945. In particular, the victory of a socialist revolution in Cuba, and the very existence of an American workers state, continue to draw incomparably sharper lines of division in the class struggle in Latin America.

On the other hand, the Argentine bourgeoisie has already lived through an experience with Peronism; it knows the limitations from its own point of view, it is aware of the dangers, and it has only opened up the road to power for the Social Justice movement as an extreme solution.

But in the final analysis, it is the attitude of the masses that will be decisive. And the new Peronist upsurge has been spurred on among adult generations of workers by the deterioration of the living conditions and rights of the working class following the downfall of Perón. Among layers of the youth, Peronism appeared, a little mythically, to be a radical, anti-imperialist solution with an anticapitalist thrust. Neither are prepared to be satisfied by demagogic statements or measures that are more theatrical than real, to put up with the consequences of an economic situation that constantly eats up their buying power, or to pay the costs of national "concord." From the very start, they will be much more critical than were the workers who brought Perón to power about thirty years ago.

At that time, the trade-union organizations were the main instrument that guaranteed Perón's hegemony over the masses. They in fact represented a historic conquest by the Argentine proletariat, which used them to improve its standard of living and make important gains. The present situation is radically different. The Peronist unions remain powerful, but they have become transformed into highly bureaucratized machines — even using goons against opponents — and they are largely discredited because of their opportunism and their repeated capitulations. During the past few years this has produced numerous crises, break-offs on different levels, and even genuine splits, with the creation of radicalized tendencies and plant unions or local organizations adhering to an antibureaucratic class orientation.

As for the Peronist youth movement, it has gained in influence among the radicalized petty bourgeoisie, as well as among young workers. It is largely inspired by an anti-imperialist outlook, and it is linked to the Peronist armed struggle organizations. The experience of the May days showed the extent to which this sector, despite repressive measures like the dismissal of Galimberti, is creating difficulties for the new president.

Finally, during the past few years, a large vanguard has arisen in the working class that has broken free from Peronism, or has never been under its influence. This is a vanguard that has developed in the most dynamic industrial sectors, particularly in Córdoba, epicenter of the class struggle. It has moved more and more openly into conflict with the traditional union bureaucracy, has rejected suggestions of the Perón myth, has matured under the impact of the Cuban revolution and the revolutionary struggle in other Latin American countries, has been influenced by the vicissitudes of the international Communist movement, especially of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Chinese events of 1966-69. The existence of this vanguard — the scope of which could not be deduced from the results of the March 11 election (on this occasion, it took various positions, ranging from tactical support to Peronist candidates like López in Córdoba or voting for the PST [Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores — Socialist Workers party], to abstention or casting blank ballots) — is henceforth an extremely important factor,

which represents the essential line of demarcation from the first Peronist experience. Although this vanguard is not yet in a position to play a decisive role or to put forward a short-term alternative, its impact in the struggles that are going on must in no way be underestimated. After all, it is this vanguard that has been the motor force in the Cordobazos and similar mobilizations, and in the battles in the leading factories. From its ranks emerged the militants who became part of the armed struggle organizations that have unquestionably contributed to deepening the political crisis in the country, stimulating the struggle against the military dictatorship, and bringing about the defeat of Lanusse and the operation for saving the GAN.

4. The new regime must face up to enormous problems. It has to define its economic plans and begin to put them into practice rather quickly, get at least large sectors of the organized working class to go along with these plans, and make concessions in the area of wages in order to guarantee compensation for the constant erosion of the purchasing power of the workers. It must put back on its feet a parliamentary apparatus that has suffered a prolonged vacation; reorganize the military, which has been weakened at the top by the defeat of the dictatorship; and consolidate the police apparatus, which has also been shaken by crises. It must give the Social Justice political movement more efficient and homogeneous structures and reestablish the authority of the central union apparatuses. The events prior to and following the elections have already indicated some of the difficulties and contradictions that carrying out these tasks involves for Cámpora and the Social Justice leadership.

In the course of the past few weeks, the crisis of the system has gotten worse, and there exists a power deficiency that is extremely dangerous for the ruling classes. Through the multipurpose ideology of Peronism, the bourgeoisie has succeeded in temporarily diverting the dynamism of the mass movement. But precisely to the extent that the masses regard the election of Cámpora as a victory, they feel a greater confidence in their forces and will tend, in a more favorable context than existed in the past, to bring their full weight to bear. They are not prepared to hand over a blank check to the new team in power, nor to wait too long for concrete results.

Analogous tendencies can be seen in other social layers. All those who supported the Peronist movement and contributed to the defeat of the military feel that the moment has come for them to impose their own demands, if necessary through combative mobilizations. In particular, struggles could develop on an increasingly broad scale in the universities and in the secondary schools.

It will be very difficult for the new regime to crush these movements through repression. It will try to take advantage of all room for maneuver that it has at its disposal through postponements, by mobilizing the union machines in its defense, by moving toward taking certain steps in response to pressure, and by taking a few spectacular measures (possibly with regard to North American imperialism). It will pump new steam into the myth of Perón, who tries to appear as a "father of his country" who stands above the fray. But this will not be enough to surmount the situation of conflict, which will continue and could even get worse.

This means that the Argentine bourgeoisie will not be

able to enjoy the relative stabilization that it will need if it is to carry out its plans. In other words, it will not be able "peacefully" and at the expense of the working class to reestablish the margins of accumulation necessary for an economic revival. This is why the installation of the "constitutional" regime and the accession of Cámpora to the presidency will in the last analysis be only an interlude that the bourgeoisie will have to call into question. Need it be recalled, moreover, that although the military has suffered a major defeat, it basically retains its apparatus and could try to take revenge as soon as it feels the situation has become favorable?

The main danger for the working class and the revolutionary movement at the present stage lies in the possibility of the dynamism and combativity of the masses being expressed only in sectorial struggles, without coordination and liable to peter out or result in marginal gains, or of their giving way to spontaneous explosions, risking isolation or repression, or, in any case, resulting in no real gains.

5. The central task of revolutionists in this stage is to gain a mass base, if only in a few epicenters of the class struggle. This goal can be achieved only by winning to the revolutionary organization or to its influence those vanguard cadres who have played a leading role in the struggles since the first Cordobazo (May 1969).

Any success of the revolutionary organization in this area will contribute to strengthening the mass movement as a whole, and therefore to deepening the crisis of the system and to fostering political maturity among broad layers of the workers and of the working people in general, freeing them from the influence the bourgeoisie continues to enjoy over them by means of Peronist ideology. At the same time, an effective integration into the masses will give the revolutionary organization more favorable conditions for meeting inevitable tests of strength and for confronting a possible new stage, during which clandestine activity and armed struggle again have priority, with increased effectiveness.

Applying such an orientation requires clarity on the following points:

I. Gaining mass influence through winning decisive cadres in the workers vanguard presupposes a hard and systematic battle involving the entire body of the positions of revolutionary Marxism, whatever the difficulties that might arise at any given stage. Any possible adaptation to the current level of the masses or broad layers of the masses could, on the surface, resolve the problem of establishing links with the masses. But it would inevitably lead to a tail-ending approach devoid of any perspective and revolutionary method.

II. Revolutionists must not for a single instant lose sight of the strict necessity of waging a battle to constantly clarify the nature of the regime that arose out of the March 11 elections, in other words, to demystify Peronism. This involves defining the prerevolutionary character of the period, the nature of the revolutionary process in Argentina, and the strategic objective of a struggle for power. It is not a matter of waging an abstract battle of loyalty to principles or of analytical rigor. It is a question of waging a political battle, the aim of which is to help broad vanguards of the working class and of the exploited masses to make the decisive leap from protest

and instinctive revolt to class political autonomy and revolutionary consciousness. There must be clarity on this point: If this goal is not attained, there is no real progress in the revolutionary struggle. On the one hand, any mass movement, including the broadest and most vigorous, would sooner or later find itself in an impasse, either by gradually wearing itself out or by succumbing to repression. On the other hand, any action by the political vanguard and the revolutionary organization, independent of its conjunctural impact, would in the last analysis be condemned to isolation, having at best only symbolic value.

III. Revolutionary Marxists must systematically underline the precariousness of the "democratic" interlude and the inevitability of armed confrontations. They must not only demystify all the parliamentary and "mass-ist/spontanéist" illusions, but also—more precisely—insist on the need to prepare to respond to the inevitable attacks of the enemy, whatever form they might take. This means that an underground apparatus must be maintained; that under no circumstances must the special apparatus be given up; that even during the stage of a democratic interlude the use of forms of armed struggle to counteract the repressive actions against the mass movements or the revolutionary vanguard must be envisaged.

6. Having made clear their basic orientation and their overall perspectives, revolutionists will not hesitate to get involved in struggles for even the most modest immediate demands. What is important is to seize the potential dynamic of these struggles and to make it understood, through experience, to those who take part in them.

Revolutionists will, in particular, have to provide a stimulus to struggles for wage increases, for the rights of the workers in a plant (against layoffs and repression by the bosses), and for elementary demands, not only in the factories, but also in the poor neighborhoods.

Nevertheless, they will have to put the stress on transitional demands, so as to stimulate the anticapitalist dynamic of the struggles. In the context of a prerevolutionary crisis, such demands go beyond the stage of propaganda and become the object of political campaigns and agitation.

Two examples: the struggle against inflation and the struggle for the expropriation of the imperialist companies.

The fight against the erosion of buying power, which has been the catastrophic lot of the Argentine working class for years, must involve a struggle for a sliding scale of wages and periodic readjustments of salaries that are inadequate and slow to catch up. A battle for a sliding scale, which implies control over the selling prices and cost prices by the workers and the popular masses, would have an unquestionable political impact in the present situation.

As regards the struggle against the imperialist industrial groups, revolutionists will oppose any discrimination favoring European capitalists, and at the same time they will demand expropriation without compensation, under workers control.

7. Revolutionary militants will be involved in the battle to renew and restructure the unions by deepening the differentiations that have existed for years, but have thus far produced only partial and uncertain results. They will organize or stimulate antibureaucratic tendencies at

the rank-and-file level with a view toward building a class-struggle movement on a national scale. They will have to avoid any identification with opposition tendencies that themselves originate in the bureaucracy. In a perspective of complete independence from the government and any economic or political organization of the bourgeoisie, they will put forward platforms in which demands felt by broad layers of the masses are the point of departure. It would, nevertheless, be incorrect either to identify the platform of class-struggle tendencies with the strategic or tactical orientation of the revolutionary organization, or to fail to take advantage of all legal possibilities.

In a situation of prerevolutionary crisis such as now exists, it is in the interests of, and possible for, revolutionists to support or give an impetus to the creation of democratic rank-and-file bodies. These bodies arise out of the need of the most combative worker and popular layers to break up the routinist functioning of the traditional apparatuses and to give a more immediate and effective expression to their own aspirations and better impose their will. They are instruments par excellence of revolutionary mobilization and can grow over into embryos of alternative power.

On all levels of their militant intervention, revolutionists will express their position against the Cámpora government with the utmost clarity. They will be able to give critical support to measures striking at imperialist interests, but their overall attitude will be one of intransigent opposition to the new bourgeois government. They will explain that the goal of revolutionists is the setting up of a workers and popular government, that is, a government that expresses the interests of the working class and the other exploited layers and excludes any participation of representatives of the bourgeoisie and of the oligarchic layers.

8. The perspectives of the present stage must not cause the overall conceptions of revolutionary struggle put forward by revolutionists since 1968-69 to be forgotten. The power of the mass movement and the results achieved by the defeat of the military dictatorship justify no illusions whatever of the possibility that the proletariat might acquire power "democratically" and "peacefully" within the framework of a constitutional regime consolidated over the long term. But they also do not justify any adherence—whether explicit or implicit—to an insurrectionalist-spontanéist conception of the struggle for power. Beyond conjunctural vicissitudes, it is an established fact for revolutionists that although this struggle, in Argentina more than in almost any other country of Latin America, will reach its culminating point in the insurrectional mobilization of the urban masses, the armed confrontation will not be limited to this mobilization, but will have to pass through preliminary, multiple, and prolonged phases. At the same time, any illusion to the effect that a limited, or relatively limited, vanguard nucleus can become the revolutionary party and gain hegemony among the masses during the very course of an insurrectional movement itself must be avoided.

In the second place, it does not necessarily flow from the recognition of the depth of the country's structural crisis, the power of the mass upsurge, and the precariousness of the neo-Peronist solution, that the conquest

of power can be projected on a short-term basis. Indeed, the following must not be lost sight of: (I) The downfall of the bourgeois regime in Argentina would be a historic catastrophe for imperialism. Hence the justified hypothesis of an intervention—either directly by American imperialism, or indirectly through Brazil or other countries—implying in any case a substantial aid to gorilla tendencies prepared to run the risk of a civil war. (II) In spite of the maturation that has occurred during the last few years, the broad exploited masses have not yet broken free from the grip of bourgeois ideology and of a bourgeois political movement. (III) There exists no revolutionary party with a mass influence, capable, within a relatively short space of time, of leading the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the armed struggle that will be necessary for the overthrow of the system.

If this analysis is correct, the primary task of revolutionists is to gather the forces and win the influence over the decisive layers of the exploited masses that is indispensable for the success of their struggle. This goal will be attained through a systematic intervention in economic battles, a generalized political intervention, and principled revolutionary propaganda. It will be attained by organizing and undertaking armed struggle. The priority choice—just as in the case of the priority choice between legal action and illegal action—is obviously linked to an analysis of a given period and a particular conjuncture.

9. A balance sheet of the armed struggle carried out during the past three years does not fall within the framework of this article. We will therefore limit ourselves to a few summary considerations.

In our opinion, the armed struggle initiatives taken between the end of 1970 and the first months of 1971 went in the direction of bringing about a convergence of armed actions and battles by important sectors of the proletariat, and therefore of a synchronization of armed struggle and the specific dynamic of the class struggle. Thus, certain episodes in which the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Army of the People] was the protagonist represented the highest stage of the armed struggle in Latin America since the Cuban revolution. Later, however, actions dictated by logistical necessities or aiming at freeing prisoners or punishing the dictatorship's torturers got the upper hand over actions linked to the battles and needs of the masses. In this sense, militarist deviations occurred, which in the final analysis prevented effective political and organizational capital from being gained from the prestige won through the spectacular initiatives and heroic sacrifice of numerous militants.

Nevertheless, the events of the past few weeks have shown that the armed struggle organizations are in no way isolated from the masses. They have been able to join in the big mobilizations, above all for the release of the political prisoners—something that they unquestionably contributed toward winning. In a more general sense, it cannot be denied that the decisive element in defeating the dictatorship was the mobilization of the masses since May 1969. But the battle of the guerrillas contributed to deepening the crisis of the regime, blocking the road to any plan to make a "Brazilian turn," and

crushing the GAN operation. At the same time, it played a role as a factor in politically maturing the vanguards.

At the present stage, priority must go to political action among the masses, and any armed struggle initiative must be subordinated to this necessity. This does not involve—as we have already stressed—any perspective of disarming. But it means that the problem of the struggle against repression and against possible attempts at a military coup d'etat must be posed on the level of the masses. In other words, on the one hand, the specialized detachments of the vanguard will be ready to intervene, in liaison with the mass movements, to insure their defense; on the other hand, revolutionists will systematically provide a stimulus to organize workers self-defense. On the other hand, they will avoid initiatives that, in practice, lead them to concentrate their efforts in a direction opposed to the priority flowing from the political analysis, that look like diversions to the masses, risk precipitating premature tests of strength in which the revolutionists would not enjoy the necessary support, and, in the last analysis, hinder the essential political battle to demystify Peronism.

10. A revolutionary orientation must shed the most complete light on the reformist or national-populist re-

gimes and tendencies in the different countries of Latin America. They must be rigorously analyzed and their class content brought out without any sign of concession or tactical hesitation, and without confusing possible support for specific anti-imperialist measures with overall support or with an acceptance of truces in political confrontation.

Argentine revolutionists will have to explicitly differentiate themselves from a series of positions taken by the Cuban leaders that are prejudicial to a consistent development of the struggle in Latin America. Solidarity with the Cuban workers state and a correct assessment of the historic thrust of the revolutionary action of its leaders must not lead to any soft-pedaling of criticism of attitudes like the exalting of the Velasco Alvarado regime in Peru, the unconditional support to the reformism of Allende in Chile, and the acceptance of concepts of the Soviet bureaucracy that the Cubans themselves criticized in the past. The Cuban government can legitimately develop political and diplomatic operations that it finds tactically useful, but there can be no question of subordinating the revolutionary struggle in Latin America in any way to such operations.

June 5, 1973

Cambodia Bombing Reaches New Levels

Nixon Continues War Despite 'Cease-Fire' Communique

"In the week since the Vietnam cease-fire was reaffirmed," Joseph B. Treaster reported in a June 23 dispatch from Saigon to the *New York Times*, "fighting across the country has dipped to about the same level as in late May. Little else has changed."

The June 13 communiqué worked out in Paris by Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho has changed nothing. As the agreement specified, both the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) and the Saigon puppet regime formally called on their troops to stop shooting on June 15. But the Thieu dictatorship has no intention of ending its attacks on liberated areas, and there has not been even a pretense of progress at settling such issues as demarcating zones controlled by each side.

"Most military men said they felt that a week was not enough time to tell whether a trend had developed on the battlefield," Treaster reported. "But Western attachés as well as Saigon Government officers suggested that despite reports of reduced military aid to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union and China, they believed that

Vietnam was in for more heavy fighting sometime in the future.

"Saigon has got the upper hand now, but I don't think the P.R.G. are going to accept being forced against the wall," said one Western officer. . . .

"They are going to find that they can't get a fair election, they can't get what they want in the delineation of zones and they're going to reach for the hand grenade," he said."

Statistics released by the U.S. Defense Department meanwhile showed the intensity of the war that Nixon is fighting in Cambodia. Figures indicate that more bombs have been dropped on Cambodia in the last four months than in the preceding three years. United Press International reported June 21:

"In the three years before the January cease-fire, American aircraft dropped 175,000 tons of bombs there [Cambodia], but in March, April and May of this year, 140,000 tons were dropped on Cambodia.

"The Pentagon has said the bombing this month is continuing at roughly the same rate as previously, so that by now the tonnage should have passed 175,000 tons."

The present rate of about 50,000 tons of bombs a month compares with 36,000 tons dropped on North Vietnam during the massive assault last December.

The bombing of Cambodia in fact approaches the level of attacks on all of Indochina during earlier periods of the war. In the June 5 *Boston Globe*, Thomas Oliphant provided figures comparing the bombing in 1973 with that in the 1966-72 period.

During the first four months of 1973, U.S. planes dropped 265,658 tons on all of Indochina, primarily Laos and Cambodia. The figures for the first four months of previous years were: 1966—148,741 tons; 1967—285,314 tons; 1968—447,127 tons; 1969—500,674 tons; 1970—414,166 tons; 1971—315,493 tons; 1972—286,690 tons.

"The enormity of the bombing's impact on Cambodia," Oliphant wrote, "can be underscored when it is noted that the tonnage total so far this year is far larger than the 160,800 tons of conventional bombs dropped on Japan during all of World War II." □

The Teniente Miners' Strike and the 'Threat of Civil War'

By Hugo Blanco

Santiago

JUNE 9—For some two months now, the reformists in the UP [Unidad Popular—Popular Unity] coalition, in particular the Communist party, have been shouting at the top of their lungs that there is an immediate threat of civil war prepared by the right and that it must be stopped by avoiding the creation of any problems for the government, by maintaining calm, by producing more, and by collecting signatures against civil war.

It is true that there is a powerful right-wing offensive and that it is becoming increasingly bold. It is true that the fascist organization Patria y Libertad [Fatherland and Freedom] is getting stronger. It is true that urban transport owners paralyzed services.

But all this is a far cry from the imminence of civil war. The overall aim of the right is to make the government retreat, and it is achieving this aim.

At the present time, when the working class is still strong, the right knows that the best tool for crushing the workers is not civil war but the reformism of the UP, which serves as a brake on struggles.

Of course, the dynamic of the class struggle in Chile daily is moving closer to violent confrontation between the classes. And the UP is, in reality, seeking to prevent it in the only way possible under the circumstances—by lulling the workers and making them retreat little by little. It is turning the working class, bound hand and foot, over to the clutches of reaction.

Faced with the rising cost of living, some sectors of workers, such as those in Public Works and the urban transport workers (who staged a strike, separate from the one of their bosses), have engaged in struggles for salary increases. The government branded them agents of the right, like those who take part in *tomas* [take-overs of factories, land, etc.]. The workers in the Public Works sector replied with

great clarity that they were prepared to take over *El Mercurio* (a far-right daily newspaper) and to move forward without regard for the parliament and the armed forces. Unfortunately, not all the workers are as clear on the matter as these compañeros. As a result, the right is taking advantage of this fact and is "supporting" certain strikes, thereby confusing the class even more.

This is what is happening in the case of the workers in the El Teniente copper mines.

These workers struggled for the nationalization of the mines together with their brothers at the Chuquicamata mine. They have pretty much always been the vanguard of the Chilean workers movement; thanks to them it won gains like the sliding scale of wages. It should also be pointed out that they voted 70 percent for the UP during the last elections.

Today they are defending the sliding scale of wages, which the government, though recognizing it, is trying to observe only grudgingly. The pettifogging arguments it uses to justify this approach are not worth mentioning.

The present strike, which began on April 15, holds serious implications for the working class. The miners are defending their standard of living and they are showing that they are not rightists but that they support the general process of change that is occurring.

The government and the UP have furiously torn into the strikers, branding them agents of fascism. In this, as in everything, it is the CP that stands out; it is organizing parades in Santiago against the miners, calling on the government to use a "firm hand," since in its view there is no difference between this strike and the bosses' strike last October.

The MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left] is tail-ending the

UP; although it criticizes the use of repressive methods and asks that they be replaced by methods of persuasion, it ends up qualifying the miners as "economists" and is against the strike. The position of the left wing of the Socialist party is even more capitulationist, more or less approximating the position of the government.

Every shade of opinion on the right is "supporting" the strike.

All this is undoubtedly confusing the masses. With the exception of the province in which the mine is located, even sectors of the proletarian vanguard are against the strike.

In the midst of all this, it is worth calling attention to the courageous position of the Partido Socialista Revolucionario [PSR—Revolutionary Socialist party], the Chilean section of the Fourth International. It is on the side of the miners. That this position is correct can be seen from the following:

Chile is a capitalist country. The nationalization of "basic industry," leaving derivative industry in the hands of private capital, involves nothing more than a kind of state capitalism. The number of factories that have been "taken over" by the workers and that the government has found itself forced to "intervene" is relatively small. Distribution remains 70 percent in private hands, and most of the remainder is also carried out with the aid of private concerns.

In this situation, all the efforts of the workers in the so-called Social Sector of the economy end up in the pockets of the capitalists.

The black market is full of products made by workers in the Social Sector at low cost. The difference between the production cost and the price obtained on the black market goes to the speculators.

The dollars earned by the efforts of the copper workers are sold at a low price to importers of essential consumer goods, machines, and raw materials. The consumer goods go to the black market. The machines and raw materials go at bargain rates to private factories, which nevertheless sell their products at a high price.

Thus the sacrifice of the miners is swelling the profits of capitalism.

As the PSR points out in one of its publications, only in a socialist

society, in which production and distribution in their totality are nationalized and administered by the workers, will anyone have the right to call on the miners to make sacrifices for Chile and not to be economist.

In view of the fact that inflation

is continuing at a galloping rate, as is the right-wing trend in the government, it is probable that we will soon see more strikes that will be dubbed "economist." This will aid the working class to see which side the government is on. □

Opposition Exploits It to Discredit Government

Miners Strike Poses Challenge to Allende

By David Thorstad

"Leaders and backers of Dr. Allende's Popular Unity Government rail incessantly against 'fascists and traitors' but they cannot obscure the cardinal fact about the present crisis: it was precipitated by a bitter strike against the state-owned Copper Corporation by workers at El Teniente mine, many of whom voted for Dr. Allende in 1970 and hailed his nationalization of copper.

"It was Marxist managers, not Yankee oppressors, who fired men for striking and brought strikebreakers to El Teniente. And it was a Marxist-led Government that ordered police to use tear gas and water cannon to break up a march on Santiago by 4,000 miners determined to press their case for a wage boost. To add to the irony, the 'bourgeois' opposition has impeached the Marxist Ministers of Mining and of Labor for violating the constitutional rights of the miners to strike."

As this editorial in the *New York Times* June 25 indicates, the imperialists can scarcely conceal their delight over the present crisis confronting the Popular Unity coalition in Chile.

The crisis developed out of a strike by workers at El Teniente mine, which accounts for a third of Chile's copper sales abroad. The strike, which began April 19, is costing Chile about \$1 million a day and has resulted in an estimated loss in foreign exchange of more than \$50 million.

The issue that set off the strike by the mine's 13,500 workers was the demand for a 41 percent wage increase, to offset rampant inflation, in addition to the escalator clause already included in their old contract. The government gave the workers a choice

of a blanket readjustment or sticking to the escalator clause. The miners say they are entitled to both.

"After several weeks of virtual shutdown at El Teniente," wrote Lewis Diuguid in the June 16 *Washington Post*, "the government offered productivity bonuses and a lump payment that it said would cost the state copper company more than the strikers' original demands.

"This offer split the copper workers into two factions:

"The majority of the unskilled workers and virtually all card-carrying members of the parties in Allende's ruling coalition voted to accept the offer and went back to work.

"Virtually all of the skilled workers backed up their leaders, who refused to vote on the government's offer. They have not worked since."

Production at the mine is now reportedly maintained on only one of the three daily shifts.

"Rancagua, where most of the miners live," Diuguid wrote, "clearly was in the hands of the strikers. Support for the strikers was impressive, and indicative of how anti-Allende forces have taken advantage of the workers' conflict to embarrass the government.

"Each morning, armed convoys of buses carrying strikebreakers go up to the mine. During the day, large numbers of strikers meet to argue about tactics and to receive food driven by truck convoy from sympathetic farmers to the south.

"The trucks are provided by the same owners who played a critical role in the nationwide strike last October."

The government has branded the strikers "fascists" and "traitors" and warned of the need to "avoid civil war."

In mid-June, the strikers voted to stage a march to Santiago in order to bring new attention to their cause.

On June 14, as the column of 4,000 to 5,000 marchers, led by a number of legislators from the opposition Christian Democratic and National parties, reached the border of Santiago Province, they were stopped by a battalion of national police. "The government said they had no permission to march," Diuguid reported, "and when they attempted to proceed they were cut down by tear gas and water cannon."

Although most of the marchers turned back, some 2,000 were said to have been smuggled into Santiago in private vehicles.

Two days of bitter street fighting followed among police, miners, opposition supporters, and supporters of the Allende regime. The clashes left one leftist student shot dead and seventy-six others wounded, according to Associated Press.

On June 15, Allende held a meeting with representatives of the strikers in an effort to reach agreement on ending the strike. Previously, he had refused any such meeting. He was immediately and publicly denounced by both of the main parties in the Popular Unity coalition—the Communist and Socialist parties. The joint statement denounced the "artificial nature" of the miners' dispute and warned that "this false union movement, planned and sustained by all the forces of reaction," represented an "openly fascist and seditious approach." The meeting with the strikers, it said, was a sign of "vacillations and weaknesses" that must be avoided.

On June 20, tens of thousands of physicians, teachers, and students went on a twenty-four-hour strike in support of the miners. The same day, a peasants' organization led by the Christian Democrats declared a forty-eight-hour strike in support of their own demands as well as the strikers'.

The following day, about half the country's 10,000,000 inhabitants were affected by a series of strikes, including a general strike called by the CP-led CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores—Workers Central Union)

as a show of support to the government.

According to Associated Press, Allende told a crowd of 1,000 progovernment demonstrators that he "would attempt to quash the opposition National party and outlaw the right-wing organization *Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland and Freedom). The way he would fight them, he said, would be to take their leaders to court.

The opposition has succeeded in turning the miners strike into a serious challenge to the Allende regime. Allende's handling of the strike, moreover, has given the opposition a handle in its effort to divide and confuse the working class. The presence of the miners in Santiago, noted Pierre Kalfon in the June 19 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*, makes it possible for the opposition "to use the theme of 'solidarity with the strikers' to mobilize a section of the population that usually shows little inclination to do anything about the misery of the workers." In the city's well-to-do neigh-

borhoods, "ladies in fur and young women in miniskirts are out collecting money for the strikers."

While the long-range strategy of the opposition is to bring down the Allende regime, the tactics it is following are not as unified as the government's high-pitched warnings about "civil war" might imply. While it is true that the far-right National party is openly calling for civil disobedience ("The price to pay for overthrowing a dictatorship is civil war," said its president, Onofre Jarpa), the approach of the Christian Democrats is less straightforward. Its tactic—which it is implementing in the miners strike—is to undermine and discredit the government, and cut it off from its base of support by spreading economic chaos.

The current wave of unrest has now reached the point that it is thought likely that Allende may again bring representatives of the military into his cabinet. □

annual wage boost over the life of the contracts dropped to 4.5% from 6.4% for all of 1972."

So wages were increasing at the rate of 4.5 percent in the period just before prices began shooting up at the rate of 9 percent. And these figures are for pay settlements in major industries. They do not include the vast majority of workers who are unorganized and whose pay increases are consequently even less.

Even Nixon had to admit that "wage settlements reached under the rules of Phase 3 have not been a significant cause of the increase in prices." It is the understatement of the year. Wage increases shrank throughout 1972, they continued to shrink in the first part of this year, they are still shrinking, and the result is the highest profits in U. S. history.

"Profits zoom in the first round" was the headline of the May 12 *Business Week* report on corporate profits in the first three months of this year. "Corporate profits continued their record-breaking ascent in the first quarter of 1973," said *Business Week*.

"Pegged at an annual aftertax rate of at least \$61-billion [milliard], this year's first-round figure is fully 23% ahead of the first-quarter rate in 1972, and 6.6% greater than the record \$57.2-billion rate of 1972's final quarter."

Profit increases in the auto trusts were: General Motors, 26 percent; Ford, 43 percent; Chrysler, 151 percent; American Motors, 345 percent.

The steel monopolies also picked up whopping profit increases: Bethlehem, 62 percent; Republic, 117 percent; and U. S. Steel, 157 percent.

Exxon, which is jacking up world oil prices and crowding in on the gas-station market, raked in a 43 percent increase.

The two biggest meat-packing firms were among the leaders in the profit grab: Iowa Beef Processors, up 106 percent; Missouri Beef Packers, up 178 percent.

Corporation chiefs continued to raise their personal takes. *Forbes* listed salaries of \$875,000 a year each for GM's Richard Gerstenberg and Henry Ford II. Philip Hofmann of Johnson & Johnson pulled in \$874,000, while ITT chief Harold Geneen got \$813,000.

As the Nixon administration once again imposes a supposed price freeze,

Workers Need Escalator Clause

Why Nixon's 'Price Freeze' Won't Work

By Dick Roberts

[The following article is reprinted from the June 29 issue of the revolutionary-socialist weekly *The Militant*, published in New York.]

* * *

Nixon's announcement of a new sixty-day "freeze" of prices was timed to blunt the news that prices are rising at the fastest rate in the postwar period.

● Consumer prices rose 9 percent in the last three months—even faster than at the peak of the inflation primed by Vietnam war spending.

● Wholesale prices rose by 2.1 percent in May alone, an annual rate of 25 percent. These wholesale prices will be passed on to consumers.

● Farm and food products rose at the rate of 43 percent in the last three months.

This all happens as workers' wage increases are shrinking.

Nixon arrogantly claimed in his speech that "real per-capita disposable income . . . has risen by 7.5 percent" since August 1971. Nixon continued, "This means that, in terms of what your money will actually buy, in the past year and a half your annual income has increased by the equivalent of four weeks' pay."

As the saying goes, "Figures don't lie, but liars can figure." Statistics for per capita disposable income reflect the personal incomes of capitalists, landlords, and corporation executives, as well as workers' wages. The bigger incomes have indeed been rising handsomely. But prices are now rising much faster than workers' wages. That means spending power is declining. The capitalists have been glowing over this for months. "Some of the best anti-inflation news," said the April 30 *Wall Street Journal*, concerns "the size of pay increases" in the first quarter of 1972. "The average

it is interesting to look back at the administration's January 1973 statement of economic policy. This is the "Economic Report to the President" prepared by the Council of Economic Advisers. It explained why the "Phase 2" controls were being dropped in "Phase 3."

"Last year's economic performance brought with it significant changes in public attitudes about inflation and in expectations about the course of the economy," the economic advisers proclaimed. "... doubts began to abate gradually as evidence grew that rates of wage and price inflation were indeed declining compared to the period prior to August 1971. Workers' cooperation in the wage control system was fostered by the realization that real wages were increasing. Strike activity fell and, relative to total time worked, was at its lowest point in almost 10 years. Although increases in food prices were troublesome during most of 1972, consumers could see a slower rise in the overall cost of living. Finally, although selling prices were constrained, so were costs, and business was able to enjoy some rise in profit margins in a setting of rapidly rising volume. These developments were all parts of a process that was one of the major objectives of the price-wage control system—the unwinding of inflationary expectations."

That report was published five months ago, in January. Throughout the report, the top economic specialists for the White House marveled at labor's cooperation. "... 1972 turned out to be a year of unusual industrial peace. . . . This outcome was a consequence of the public's strong support for the program and the cooperative attitude among workers and the leaders of organized labor. . . ."

"An economic background for wage decisions had been established which was much more conducive to moderation than had prevailed earlier."

The report provided statistics showing the first-year wage rate changes in agreements covering 1,000 workers or more. These tend to be the highest, since the first year is higher than the next, and these are major union contracts. In 1970 the mean increase was 11.9 percent; in 1971, 11.6 percent. It fell to 7 percent in 1972.

The economic advisers predicted an annual inflation rate in 1973 of 3

percent! By the end of the year, they promised, the inflation rate would be down to 2.5 percent!

On June 9, economic pundit for the *New York Times*, Edwin Dale, reported the gloomy attitude among Washington's economic advisers. "It is very hard to comprehend," Arthur Okun of the Brookings Institution and former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers said.

According to Dale, "Hardly an economist, in or out of government, dreamed that the inflation rate of the last three or four months would be as great as it proved to be. . . ."

It is all baloney.

Inflation is the irrepressible effect of the expansion of credit, above all through massive government deficits. Under today's conditions of intense world monopoly competition, any expansion of the economy—and of credit, which goes along with it—inevitably exacerbates inflation.

The stepped-up inflation of the past half year has been fueled by the record-breaking government deficits of 1971 and 1972. More than \$80 billion went for war spending alone each year. These deficits, in turn, were the necessary antidote for recessionary tendencies, which had been dragging the economy down, pushing unemployment up, and jeopardizing Nixon's reelection chances.

While the White House published its syrupy pack of lies in January 1973, *The Militant* expressed quite a different attitude about the prospects of the economy.

Frank Lovell wrote in the January 19 *Militant*, "Government manipulators of the economy are prepared to ride herd on all wage negotiations, running interference for the employ-

ers, forcing quick settlements within previously agreed-upon guidelines, leaving open questions of speedup on the job and general working conditions, and hoping that runaway prices and high unemployment will not provoke uncontrolled rank-and-file revolts in the union movement."

Events since January confirm the approach to these problems we favor. The capitalist government will not end inflation. Workers have to protect themselves against soaring prices through escalator clauses in their contracts.

Every rise in prices should be matched by a guaranteed rise in wages. Consumers committees should be established to watch over actual price rises, since government statistics are far from trustworthy.

A useful step in this direction was indicated by Ed Townsend, labor correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* in the June 18 issue. According to Townsend, "in letters going out Monday to AFL-CIO offices all over the country, federation leaders urge a massive monitoring of prices in the next 60 days, in cooperation with the government, to help combat price rises.

"During Phase 2, AFL-CIO had 30,000 volunteers out checking prices on a regular basis. The watchdog operation has been maintained since then in 30 major cities, but with a much smaller force. The numbers will be built up again as quickly as possible."

Alongside the watchdog operation, which should put no confidence whatsoever in the government "control" program, the AFL-CIO should make its central demand in the fight against inflation cost-of-living clauses in all contracts. □

Evelyn Reed Tours New Zealand

Thousands of people throughout New Zealand recently had the opportunity to become acquainted with the ideas of U. S. feminist and Marxist anthropologist Evelyn Reed.

At the invitation of the Young Socialists (the New Zealand Trotskyist youth organization), Reed made a two-week tour of New Zealand, giving lectures to hundreds of people in seven cities, as well as reaching thousands through interviews with several women's magazines and appearances on radio and television.

The New Zealand tour was part of a six-week speaking tour Reed made of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.

Reed lectured in Dunedin, Christchurch, Auckland, Palmerston North, Wellington, Nelson, and Hamilton, as well as addressing the May 4-5 Young Socialist Educational Conference in Wellington. The biggest audiences, totaling 800, were in Auckland, where Reed spoke at two public meetings and gave a lecture at the medical school there.

Nixon Planning 'Last-Ditch' Watergate Defense

By Allen Myers

John Dean, *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis wrote June 18, "has been the target of a venomous campaign of denigration carried on by White House flacks paid and unpaid. They have tried to paint him as unreliable, disloyal, slimy, the sort who crawls out from under a stone. . . .

"The reason for all this is no secret. Mr. Dean let it be known that he would not be a 'fall guy'; he decided to talk."

Most of what the "White House flacks" say about Dean's character is true, but that does not exhaust the subject: Dean is undoubtedly "slimy"; the Nixon administration has been filled with slimy characters. But, as Lewis went on to observe: "The important question about such witnesses is whether they are telling the truth."

In this respect, Dean has proved considerably less slippery than his former boss.

"... it is worth recalling in this particular affair," the *Washington Post* pointed out in a June 21 editorial, "that thus far, since his first venture to the prosecutors' office, Mr. Dean has in fact provided a wealth of previously unknown material that has checked out and that the White House has been obliged on a regular basis to revise and render inoperative its statements of the day or week before."

Nixon Versus Dean

The efforts to discredit Dean's testimony before it was given gained some extra time to operate when the Senate Watergate committee decided to postpone Dean's public appearance from June 19 to June 25.

Committee chairman Sam Ervin announced that the hearings would be postponed in order not to "distract" Nixon from his meetings with Soviet Communist party chief Leonid Brezhnev. The decision, he said, was made at the suggestion of Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield.

"A committee lawyer," David E. Rosenbaum reported in the June 19 *New*

York Times, "said that Senator Mansfield had informed committee members that he was under a good deal of pressure from other Senators to cancel this week's testimony. The lawyer said that the committee's members were under similar pressure.

"The lawyer said that he did not know and that the members themselves were not sure whether the pressure had been generated by the White House."

If it was impossible for the senators to discover the source of the mysterious pressure, it is nevertheless not very difficult to figure out whom the delay benefited. Among other things, it allowed the "leaking" of reports that Dean had dipped his fingers into some of the vast sums of cash that were floating around the White House and the offices of the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP). More importantly, it left Nixon free to pose on center stage with Brezhnev in a summit meeting that would otherwise have been overshadowed by Dean's testimony.

Dean, it is obvious, knows a great deal of very damaging information about the activities of the Nixon gang. He was interviewed by the Senate committee staff on June 16. A secret summary of his testimony, prepared by committee counsel Sam Dash, was obtained by several newspapers, including the *New York Times*, which published excerpts June 21.

The summary indicates that Dean is able to implicate the highest levels of the White House, and Nixon himself, in Watergate and various other crimes. It repeats earlier information already leaked to the press that last September Nixon had congratulated Dean on his apparently successful efforts to cover up the scandal. And it adds some new charges, among them that Nixon brought pressure on members of the House Banking and Currency Committee last fall to stop a proposed investigation of Watergate. Dean also said that he had documents

in which Nixon told the Internal Revenue Service to call off investigations of the tax returns of several of his friends.

Dean testified that the Nixon gang had tried to control the Senate Watergate committee itself through its Republican vice-chairman, Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee.

"On Ehrlichman's instructions," the summary said, "Baker was contacted by phone by Wally Johnson [an assistant attorney general]. Baker said he did not want any White House input into the decision of choosing the minority counsel. Word came to the White House that Baker was interested in an off-the-record meeting with the White House on Feb. 21 or 22. After the meeting, Dean had discussion with Haldeman and President.

"Dean said that the White House may have interpreted the meeting differently than did Baker. The White House thought Baker was going to assist them. The President said that Baker wanted [Attorney General Richard] Kleindienst to be liaison between himself and the White House."

Some of Dean's testimony has already been confirmed by Nixon himself. This was done in a summary of Dean's meetings with Nixon that the latter sent to the committee. Peter Osnos reported in the June 22 *Washington Post*:

"One of the charges reportedly made by Dean is that the President told Dean at a meeting shortly before the sentencing of the seven Watergate defendants March 23 that there would be no problem paying \$1 million to the conspirators for their continued silence. That money, Dean has supposedly told investigators, was to be in addition to \$460,000 paid to the conspirators that Dean contends the President knew about."

Nixon's summary admits that "Hunt [Howard Hunt, one of the convicted conspirators] was trying to blackmail Ehrlichman about Hunt's prior plumber activities unless he was paid

what ultimately might amount to \$1 million."

Nixon's story is that he rejected the idea of paying off Hunt: "The President said how could it possibly be paid. 'What makes you think he would be satisfied with that?' Stated that it was blackmail, that it was wrong, that it would not work, that the truth would come out anyway."

Thus, even by his own account, Nixon "rejected" the idea of buying Hunt's silence primarily because he thought Hunt wouldn't stay bought. But in fact, Hunt got the money he had demanded: \$72,000. Seymour M. Hersh reported in the June 22 *New York Times*:

"A number of sources confirmed today that on either March 20 or March 21—days on which key White House advisers were discussing Watergate with President Nixon—a package containing \$72,000 was delivered by Frederick C. LaRue [a special assistant to Nixon] to the office of William O. Bittman, Hunt's attorney."

Some of Dean's most damaging testimony may never be given to the committee, however. The senators were reported to have refrained from asking Dean any questions about his conversations with Nixon on the ground that to do so might violate an alleged "attorney-client" relationship between the two. But enough of Dean's information has already been leaked to the press to implicate Nixon in a wide assortment of crimes.

Dean has said, for example, that Nixon met personally in 1971 with dairy owners to work out the details of a \$322,000 contribution, in exchange for which they were granted a price increase for milk.

According to Dean's reported remarks, Nixon also made an illegal deal with Alabama Governor George Wallace in May 1971. Wallace agreed to run for the Democratic nomination for president rather than as a third-party candidate, and Nixon agreed to suppress a federal investigation of tax violations by Wallace's brother.

Dean is also said to have described a plot by "low-level White House officials" to assassinate the president of Panama. The June 18 issue of *Newsweek* reported:

"Dean's story is that the Administration suspected high Panamanian Government officials of being involved in the flow of heroin from Latin Amer-

ica into the U. S., and were also concerned about strongman Omar Torrijos's uncooperative attitude toward renegotiating the Panama Canal treaty. Thus, in Dean's telling, some officials found a Torrijos hit doubly attractive. The contract, he said, went to E. Howard Hunt, later a ringleader in the Watergate break-in; Hunt, according to Dean, had his team in Mexico before the mission was aborted."

Nixon Versus Haldeman and Ehrlichman

Nixon apparently is not counting on being able to discredit Dean's testimony. According to a June 18 *Wash-*

Sodom, Gomorrah... and Washington

Billy Graham, the evangelist known as the Nixon administration's "spiritual adviser," told reporters June 14 that it was "too early" to make a moral judgment about the Watergate scandal. Graham, who had earlier said that "permissiveness" was responsible for the mess, added that the affair "seems to be a judgment of God" on the U. S.

ington Post report by Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, based on "White House and other government sources," Nixon is preparing to throw overboard H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, formerly his top two advisers.

"The change in strategy," the reporters wrote, "is specifically designed to counter charges by former presidential counsel John W. Dean III that the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman all knowingly participated in the White House cover-up of the Watergate bugging and other illegal intelligence-gathering operations, the sources said."

The reporters' sources said that "the emerging White House position will acknowledge misjudgments on the President's part and indicate they resulted from misinformation and unauthorized action by Haldeman and Ehrlichman."

One source was quoted as saying, "If the Dean charges are too devastating, and there is no reason to

think they won't be, the President plans to come forward and acknowledge overwhelming negligence on his part, but will still deny criminal knowledge. . . ."

Another source in the White House told Woodward and Bernstein: "It's a last-ditch effort, but one he [Nixon] is entitled to as a citizen. There is a presumption of innocence provided by the system. If there is a case against him, it is going to have to be proved."

The story was indignantly denied by Nixon's press office, which only makes it all the more convincing. Independently of whatever Dean may say, there is already so much evidence against Haldeman and Ehrlichman that a failure by Nixon to disown them would be tantamount to a confession.

Jeb Stuart Magruder, the former deputy director of CREEP, has already publicly testified that the bugging plans were regularly sent to Haldeman's assistant and that he (Magruder) told Haldeman in January of his plans to commit perjury at the Watergate trial. Haldeman has admitted having control over a secret \$350,000 cash fund, part of which, according to investigators, was used for paying off the Watergate burglars.

The House Armed Services subcommittee is reported to be in possession of a memorandum linking Ehrlichman to the burglary in September 1971 of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Egil Krogh and David Young, two White House officials implicated in the break-in, are said to be ready to testify that it was explicitly authorized by Ehrlichman.

Nixon Versus the Evidence

Publicly, Haldeman and Ehrlichman have not abandoned their claim that they—and hence Nixon—were totally innocent in the entire scandal. The same is true of former Attorney General John Mitchell, another member of the Nixon gang who could easily implicate the boss.

As the evidence from other sources against Nixon mounts, their loyalty to the boss is put under increasing strain. There is little likelihood that any one of them would break so long as they believe that Nixon cannot be proved guilty except by their testimony. But if it appears that the boss

will be caught anyway, their sacrifices would seem rather pointless.

There is no question that evidence from other sources is piling up rapidly. Columnist Jack Anderson on June 19 was able to quote passages from a letter written by one of the dairymen involved in the 1971 milk industry payoff. He also reported two other instances in which businesses had given large sums in exchange for favors from Nixon.

Seymour M. Hersh reported in the June 21 *New York Times* that the staff of special prosecutor Archibald Cox is looking into complaints that CREEP "extorted" contributions from corporations:

"Well-informed officials said that [an assistant of Cox] had accumulated allegations indicating that Republican officials at one time drew up a list of corporations and individuals 'who had problems with the Government'

and solicited funds in late 1971 and early 1972 on that basis."

One of Hersh's sources said that many Nixon contributors "feel that they've been had" and were willing to cooperate with the investigators.

These revelations, and those still to come from other members of the Nixon gang, make it increasingly likely that the continued loyalty of Halde- man, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell will be insufficient to protect Nixon, while making them vulnerable to a charge of perjury. Moreover, each of the three must now be wondering whether one of the others is not likely suddenly to spill the beans in order to save his own neck.

Whether or not Dean's testimony breaks the united front of the top conspirators, Richard Nixon has the most dangerous part of the Watergate scandal still before him. □

public in a written statement May 25.

According to the statement, Nixon bought the 29-acre estate in two parcels in 1969. In July, he purchased 26 acres known as the Cotton property. His intention was to keep only a 5.9 acre tract that contained a mansion and various other buildings; the remainder was to be sold to a "compatible buyer."

Nixon's statement said the cost of the Cotton property was \$1,400,000, and that he paid \$400,000 cash and assumed a mortgage of \$1 million.

In September of the same year, it continued, Nixon bought the adjacent Elmore property, consisting of 2.9 acres, for \$100,000. He paid \$20,000 cash and assumed a mortgage of \$80,000.

To cover these down payments and improvements to the mansion costing \$123,514, Nixon's statement said, he borrowed a total of \$625,000 from Robert H. Abplanalp. The loan was granted without security other than Nixon's written promise to pay.

Abplanalp is the sole owner of a corporation that sells 60 percent of the entire world production of aerosol valves. His personal fortune reportedly reaches \$100 million. He is also the owner of two islands in the Bahamas frequently visited by Nixon.

For a highly successful businessman, Abplanalp seems to have done rather poorly on his business deals with Nixon. According to Nixon, on December 15, 1970, an investment company that Abplanalp had set up for that purpose bought all but the 5.9 acres of the estate that Nixon had originally intended to keep. The purchase price was \$1,249,000. No cash changed hands; Nixon's \$625,000 debt was canceled, and Abplanalp's company took over \$64,000 of the Elmore property mortgage and \$560,000 of the Cotton property mortgage.

The May 25 statement did not indicate how the original value of the entire 29-acre estate was divided between the land and the buildings, but it is possible to make a close estimate. Since the 2.9 acres of the Elmore property (without buildings) sold for \$100,000, the land of the adjacent Cotton property would also be worth about \$33,000 an acre. This means that Abplanalp paid Nixon \$1,249,000 for 23 acres that Nixon had bought only a year and a half earlier for about \$759,000.

From the standpoint of Nixon's

He Invested in Land, Businessmen Invested in Him

How Nixon Made Millions in Four Years

By Allen Myers

Almost from the beginning of his political career, Richard Nixon has been characterized as the sort of man "you wouldn't buy a used car from." Nixon was never actually involved in that line of merchandising; the 1952 disclosure of an \$18,000-a-year slush fund paid by wealthy businessmen indicates that he has generally dealt in less tangible but more valuable commodities.

At the time that slush fund was established, Nixon was only a U.S. senator. Not surprisingly, his rise in political office has been accompanied by a considerable increase of income from questionable sources. Evidence has become available in recent weeks indicating that since he became president, Nixon's personal fortune—not including his presidential salary—has increased by at least \$1 million. A large portion of this came from government funds.

On May 13, the Santa Ana, California, *Register* printed an article saying that Senate Watergate investigators were looking into the possibility that Nixon had used funds left

over from his 1968 campaign to pay for his estate in San Clemente, California.

The story was immediately denounced as "a total fabrication" by Nixon's press office. There are, it would seem, some dubious circumstances, although no one has yet produced documented evidence to support the charge.

The property was found for Nixon by a California real estate dealer named Francis M. Raine Jr. Raine is the brother-in-law of H.R. Haldeman, who was chief of the White House staff until forced to resign by the Watergate scandal.

Nixon's personal lawyer, Herbert Kalmbach, was left in charge of some \$350,000 after the 1968 campaign. He has reportedly testified under oath that much of it was put into trust funds controlled by Raine.

Following the appearance of the *Register* article, the White House promised a detailed accounting of how the San Clemente estate was purchased. This accounting was postponed three times, and finally made

finances, the whole deal looks even more peculiar. Again calculating the value of the land at \$33,000 an acre, the share of the estate still held by Nixon would have been worth about \$720,000 when purchased (\$178,000 in land and \$542,000 in buildings). To this would have to be added the \$123,000 in improvements, for a total value of \$843,000.

The May 25 statement claims that "net investment by the President" in the property was \$374,514, but Nixon's actual cash outlay was only about one-tenth of this amount. He claims to have paid out \$400,000 in a down payment on the Cotton property; \$20,000 down on the Elmore property; \$116,000 on the two mortgages, and \$123,514 in improvements, for a total \$659,514. But since he received \$625,000 from Abplanalp, Nixon's actual net expenditure was only \$34,514, plus whatever interest he paid on the Abplanalp loan and the mortgages. (In addition, at the time of the sale, Nixon would have owed \$340,000 on the remaining mortgage.)

In short, according to his own figures, Nixon owns an \$843,000 estate for a cash expenditure of \$35,000.

But Nixon's statements can never be taken at face value. When he purchased the Cotton property in July 1969, the White House press office said the price was \$340,000, not \$1.4 million, and that Nixon's down payment was \$100,000, not \$400,000.

Moreover, it is questionable whether the sale to Abplanalp ever took place. Property records in the county in which San Clemente is situated do not mention any division of the property. Nixon continues to use the entire 29 acres, and a wall has been built enclosing the whole estate, rather than just the 5.9 acres that Nixon says is all he retains.

The statement that Abplanalp bought 23 acres of the estate in December 1970 is also contradicted by past White House statements. Within the last year, both John Dean and John Ehrlichman, two of Nixon's top aides, told reporters for the *Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times* that Nixon was still looking for a buyer.

On June 12, nationally syndicated columnist Jack Anderson suggested that the "sale" to Abplanalp was noth-

ing but a tax dodge. Nixon, Anderson wrote, "got the deal approved by the local Internal Revenue office, but our tax experts insist the Nixons should pay taxes on the \$625,000. As they interpret the law, the tearing up of the personal notes—in other words, the cancellation of the debt—makes the \$625,000 taxable income."

Nixon is known to regard the United States as a "land of opportunity." It would seem that capitalist politicians have some opportunities not available to ordinary mortals and that the president has more opportunities still.

Presidential opportunities, in addition to friendship with multimillionaires, include having the taxpayers pick up the bill for improvements to one's property.

On May 26, Gerald Warren, Nixon's deputy press secretary, told reporters that the government had spent \$39,525 on improvements to the San Clemente estate. These improvements, he indicated, were mostly for "security measures"—such as asphalt pavement between the mansion and other buildings on the property.

The figure turned out to be a considerable underestimate. Two days later, the Associated Press reported that a study of construction permits showed that more than \$100,000 in government funds had been spent on the property. The dispatch noted that Abplanalp appeared to have benefited as well as Nixon: "While the White House would not specify which portion of the tract is now owned by Mr. Abplanalp, it was apparent that some of the federally financed improvements were on his land." Among the "security measures" uncovered by the AP were an electric heating system for the mansion and a beach cabana.

On June 11, the General Services Administration (GSA) confirmed press reports that the "security measures" included an additional \$76,000 for landscaping and \$9,000 for water and sewer lines.

Then on June 14, the GSA came up with a totally new estimate. Public funds expended on the Nixon-Abplanalp property were now listed as \$460,312.

This estimate lasted one week. On June 21, the GSA announced that federal expenditures for the property during the past four and a half years amounted to \$703,367. There is no

way to tell if this will be the final figure—and of course Nixon has several more years in which to devise new "security measures." In any event, contributions from Abplanalp and the government have parlayed Nixon's \$35,000 investment into a property now worth more than \$1.5 million.

The June 21 GSA statement revealed that Nixon has done even better with his home in Key Biscayne, Florida. Government expenditures there, the agency said, amount to \$1,180,522. "Improvements" and "equipment" totaled \$626,201, and "operation and maintenance" \$554,321.

Nixon has also done very well with his investments in two other properties in Key Biscayne. He bought one lot there in 1967 for \$30,000 and an adjacent one in 1971 for \$23,100. In December 1972, Nixon completed the sale of the two parcels of land to William E. Griffin Jr. at a total price of \$150,000. Nixon thus made a profit of \$96,900 on an investment of \$53,100.

Griffin, it turns out, is a lawyer for Abplanalp's aerosol valve corporation. He is also one of the founders of the Hudson Valley National Bank in Yonkers, New York, in which Abplanalp is one of the principal shareholders. When the bank's application for a charter was being considered in 1971, one of the examiners wrote that "there is no real need for an additional bank in Yonkers." He nevertheless recommended approval.

The bank's organizers visited the regional comptroller of currency on April 23, 1971, to argue their case for the new bank. Apparently unsure of his own legal abilities, lawyer Griffin took along an attorney who is a member of the same firm as Murray Chotiner, Nixon's long-time political lieutenant.

Like Nixon, Abplanalp has found investment in Key Biscayne more than usually profitable. After Nixon bought his house there, Abplanalp bought an adjacent property for \$150,000. He immediately leased it to the government to house Secret Service agents protecting Nixon. The annual lease, \$142,500, is nearly as high as the purchase price.

Whatever other benefits Abplanalp may have obtained from his dealings with Nixon have not been revealed. It seems unlikely, however, that Nixon has sold him any used cars.

French Communist League Holds Workers Conference

By Felix Lourson

[On the weekend of June 9-10 the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International, and the "mole groups," circles of factory supporters of the Ligue, held a national conference on revolutionary work in the organized working class.

[The conference, held in Rouen, was opened by Jean-Claude Laumontier, one of the local leaders of the Ligue. The first plenary session was addressed by Sally N'Dongo, president of the General Union of Senegalese Workers in France, who spoke on the conditions of the immigrant workers. Then there was a general report, "Work of Revolutionary Militants in the Factories." That evening, a film on the June 1936 events was shown.

[June 10 was taken up with reports on workers control and self-management. The conference then went into workshops to discuss concrete problems and experiences. In addition to the workshops organized by branch of industry, three workshops were held on women workers, immigrant workers, and antimilitarist struggles in the army.

[On the evening of June 10, visitors from Belgium, the United States, Spain, Italy, and Great Britain spoke.

[The conference was carried over into the morning of June 11, when Charles-André Udry, a leader of the Swiss Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Marxist League) and of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, spoke on the rise of workers struggles throughout Europe.

[Later, Alain Krivine, member of the Ligue's political bureau, spoke on the Ligue's progress in building a revolutionary organization.

[The article below, which appeared in the June 15 issue of the Ligue's weekly, *Rouge*, gives a general estimate of the conference, the first of its type to be held by the Ligue. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

There were many of us in Rouen on the June 9-10 weekend. More than had been expected. We had prepared for 500, but more than 800 showed up. Many young people (the average age was twenty-six) packed the meeting hall. Some of the comrades were in their fifties—former resistance fighters, old worker militants. The composition was a reflection of the workers vanguard that is today emerging in a break with Stalinism.

The conference was neither a religious ceremony nor a village fair. We want to learn, to discuss, and to exchange experiences. It was well prepared in advance; small preparatory pamphlets were distributed. They opened up discussion on the main points—strike committees, support committees, wage hierarchies, self-defense, workers control, self-management. Outlines of the reports were handed out in advance to make the work of the conference more efficient.

And really, this conference took place at a good time. The past few months have been rich in struggles in nearly all sectors. In the working class, there was a real impetus toward self-organization; the specific weight of the revolutionary militants has grown. The discussions that took place at the recently concluded Thirty-sixth Conference of the CFDT [Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor] on the question of strike committees and [CFDT head] Edmond Maire's anti-Trotskyist sallies demonstrate this.

So it was an impressive mass of struggle experiences that the several hundred militants brought to Rouen. All the participants were militants; many held positions in their unions. The time is past when the far-left organizations attract only a few disgruntled young workers isolated from their own milieu at the workplace.

The questions discussed were not

abstract. They were linked to the various difficulties that crop up everywhere. How to reinvigorate trade-union life? How to fight the reformists without getting isolated from the workers? There are no fully formed recipes for solving these problems. Once general principles are defined, the whole problem lies exactly in their tactical application. That was what most of the discussions were about after the opening report and in the workshops organized the next day on the basis of branches of industry.

Conference Statistics

680 workers
50 comrades from other sections and cothinkers of the Fourth International (U. S., Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, England, Luxemburg, Canada, Mexico)
In all 830 militants
55% members of the Ligue
45% sympathizers and members of the mole groups
65 cities represented
about 250 factories represented
average age: 26
63% members of the CGT
37% members of the CFDT
58 OS (semiskilled workers)

Branches of industry represented:
Metalworkers (including auto): 140
Health workers: 120
Government employees: 62
Postal and telegraph: 60
Social workers: 48
Chemicals: 45
Social security, banks, insurance: 43
Construction: 25
Publishing: 24
Railroads: 20
Gas and electricity: 20
Department stores, commerce: 18
Textiles: 8
Agriculture: 7
Munitions: 4
Transit workers: 4

But for many, a conference like this is also a breath of fresh air. Locked into day-to-day militancy, into the daily battles against the employers and the maneuvers of the bureaucrats, factory militants run the risk of retreating into the immediate reality of the factory and of becoming discouraged. At Rouen, this sort of isolation was broken. The reports tried to put each intervention into a general framework; the workshop discussions turned up common problems. Over meals, militants could talk to their buddies from Billancourt or Marseille, and so on.

It was also an opportunity to go beyond the national framework and to draw the lessons of the experiences of the European workers movement—the Italian delegates councils, the Eng-

lish shop stewards, the Spanish workers commissions. To discuss the conditions militants work under in a country like Belgium, where the trade-union leadership is totally integrated, to learn how the Antwerp dockers strike was betrayed.

This thirst for knowledge was reflected in the great attention paid to the film on June 1936 that was shown. And it was also reflected in a real run on the literature tables. Pamphlets on the balance sheet of the Renault strike were sold, works by Marx and Engels on trade unionism, the bulletin of the Belgian union tendency "Nouvelle Défense," but also works by Kollontai on the family and the emancipation of women. They all sold like hotcakes. More than 700,000 old francs [about US\$1,600]

worth of literature was sold.

This conference was useful and successful. But we will not shout victory. The road to a revolutionary workers party is still a long one. The difficulties of intervening in face of Stalinist domination, the very great tensions engendered today in constructing a revolutionary organization that intervenes in all spheres—all this will not disappear. On the contrary.

But the June 9-10 weekend will have allowed us to take stock of where we are and to examine the road we have travelled. It will have brought out the responsibilities of revolutionary Marxists. And perhaps it will also have contributed to doing away with the image of a wholly student far left, an image projected by the reformists. That itself would be a lot. □

Will the Autumn Be Even Hotter?

France—After the Elections and the Spring

By Pierre Frank

[The following article appeared in the June 8 issue of *La Gauche*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs (Revolutionary Workers League), Belgian section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

If an example were needed to illustrate the Marxist view that under a bourgeois system elections can't provide a reflection of the social relationships except one vastly distorted in favor of the bourgeoisie, no better one could be found than that of France in the weeks immediately following the March 4 and 11 legislative elections.

Less than two weeks after these elections a youth movement broke out—beginning with the high-schoolers, then joined by the university students and the apprentices of the technical schools—that clearly encompassed more than a half million young men and women, challenging in particular the bourgeois army and giving rise in Paris to the April 2 demonstration of about 300,000 persons, the largest street demonstration since May 1968.

At the same time, a strike of several hundred OS [ouvriers spécialisés—semiskilled workers], most of them immigrants, broke out at Renault. It finally drew several thousand workers into stoppages, raising at the same time the questions of the status of so-called foreign workers and the question of the structure of wages and the regimen inside the factories.

During these same weeks, an incident in Grenoble in which a physician was arrested and prosecuted was enough for the 1920 antiabortion law, still formally in effect, to be condemned to death in real life, as organizations and physicians openly proclaimed that they had performed abortions and would continue to do so.

And finally, the provocative words of the new minister of culture touched off significant street demonstrations by intellectuals, artists, etc. And it is not over yet.

The Game Preserve of a Mafia

Although the months preceding the elections saw only a few stirrings

break through the electoralist orientation of the policy set by the traditional leaders of the workers movement, once the elections were over, all that had built up in the way of discontent, hope, and desire for action took form, sometimes with enormous intensity. A tendency that had manifested itself only in a minimal way a few months earlier—the tendency of various social categories to take the law into their own hands—was accentuated in a more and more significant way.

As is known, the [Gaullist] majority emerged from the elections weakened on the parliamentary level. It was the UDR [Union des Démocrates pour la République—Union of Democrats for the Republic] that especially lost ground in this operation, for it no longer commands an absolute majority in the National Assembly. During the course of forming the new government it had been bandied about in official circles that "change within continuity," that is, making an "opening toward the center" might be in order. But once again, it turned out to be nothing but words, and it could

not be otherwise, for the regime is at present the *game preserve of a mafia*.

It is true that Pompidou had to remove Debré from the government, along with some other old Gaullist stalwarts, but this was largely for personal reasons. The men who compose the present government have two essential characteristics: first, they are dependent on Pompidou and are submissive toward him; second, they are the most reactionary pack to have governed France for at least a century. We have the everlasting minister of the interior, Marcellin, obsessed with the existence of an "international plot" and always asking for more and more repressive measures to the point that even some police get nervous. At Marcellin's side we have a Malaud, who complains that the ORTF [Office de Radiodiffusion et Télévision Française — Office of French Radio and Television] is not sufficiently governmental; and a Galley, minister of war, who before the elections was minister of transport and broke a strike of air-traffic controllers through measures that probably cost the lives of sixty-eight passengers on a Spanish plane, and who began his new functions with a speech to reserve officers the tenor of which belongs to a period about a half century back.

We see designated as minister of cultural affairs the academician Druon, a prolific but mediocre writer, famous for having his books ghost-written, who began his new functions by denouncing modern art in police terms and by promising to grant subsidies only to the most hackneyed art and to government flunkies.

Reestablishing 'Order'

The composition of the government expresses the desire to make use of the recent movements—which aimed not only at quantitative demands, but at changes that challenged the system itself—in order to create fear and thus get together a reactionary mass movement to confront the revolutionary upsurge, which is taking on a growing breadth. Thus, we can expect an attempt to mobilize some "strong-arm" currents, which may not be limited to miniscule fascist groups like Ordre Nouveau. This is an attempt to set forces of intervention not only against

the revolutionary vanguard, but against the broad laboring masses as well.

In the trade-union sphere, we have seen attempts in two directions. On the one hand, Pompidou held a meeting with Bergeron, the secretary of Force Ouvrière, that miserable trade-union federation that avers political neutrality toward such a government,



POMPIDOU: Heads the "game preserve of a mafia."

in order to give FO a little extra publicity. On the other hand, several UDR deputies asked, with a greater insistence than in the past, that the CFT [Confédération Française des Travailleurs — French Confederation of Workers], a supposed trade union composed of company goons in the factories, be recognized by the minister of labor as a "representative organization" of the workers, with all the benefits that would derive from such recognition.

In short, it appears that broader and broader currents within the bourgeoisie no longer believe that May '68 was only a passing incident and that they are looking for ways to reestablish "order."

Traditional Workers Organizations

What have the traditional workers organizations done since the elections? As for the Socialist party—which has been somewhat silent during the recent movements—at the Congress it has scheduled for June, we will see what lessons it has drawn. It is probable that it will remain on the axis that has allowed it to make an electoral comeback. The next congress of the CFDT [Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail — French Democratic Confederation of Labor] will also give some indication as to what its leaders want to do; it is probable that a pseudoleftist orientation will be maintained.

In this same period, the leaderships of the French Communist party and the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail — General Confederation of Labor] have exhibited a certain moodiness and have felt the need to effect some tactical maneuvers. At a meeting of the Communist party Central Committee, Marchais [head of the CP] said, in substance: For ten years now, we have been following the policy that led to the formation of the Union of the Left and its Common Program; now, after ten years, at the moment that we have attained this goal, it is not we the Communist party, but the Socialist party that is reaping the electoral profits. We are stagnating in the electoral arena.

It is probable that this indisputable observation has raised some problems in the top leadership of the CP. In his speech, Marchais vigorously defended the necessity of continuing more than ever the policy of the Union of the Left. But he did not say how this would be possible, how the masses could stay mobilized around an electoral program for elections that are to take place five years from now.

The recent movements (youth, OS, etc.) drove the Stalinist leaders into a corner. Among the youth, the attempt of the CP's high-school organizations to outstrip the committees elected by the high-schoolers—in which the Ligue Communiste, as is well known, played a leading role—was a fiasco. After that, the CGT leaders found themselves obliged in the course of the movement to make contact with these committees and to participate in demonstrations led by them. This could only have been a tem-

porary tactical turn, which was not extended when the movement receded. Nevertheless, the Stalinists felt the way the wind was blowing, and at the Young Communist conference that just took place, they simultaneously pronounced resounding words about socialism and denounced the "ultraleftists" — all the while encouraging their own youth (whose numbers were somewhat reduced) to make use of the enthusiastic, colorful forms of the far-left demonstrations. But it is quite difficult to bring off militant demonstrations around a flatly electoral policy.

In the recent OS strike, the union officials were forced to accept (reluctantly, and all the while carrying out various maneuvers) that representatives designated by the OS themselves should participate with the union leaders in negotiations with the factory management. We have not yet reached the point that the union bureaucracy will accept elected strike committees (it should be stressed that the CFDT leadership, as well as the FO leadership, is also hostile to this form of leading struggles), but it is a sign of the times in France that the bureaucrats may in certain cases already be constrained to maneuver around this question within mass movements.

In sum, the elections settled absolutely nothing. Through its most hard-line currents and through its government, the bourgeoisie is seeking to prepare for assembling more massive forces in anticipation of social conflicts in many spheres. It took only a few big movements after the elections for the Union of the Left to prove to be nothing but an electoral gimmick that offers no political perspectives for the battles that are ripening.

Among the masses, who since May 1968 have resorted to hard forms of action, there has now been added an ever-growing tendency to apply to their struggles forms of organization in which workers democracy begins to come through. This is a sign that the revolutionary upsurge is continuing.

"Hot, hot, hot, springtime will be hot!" That was one of the main war cries of the youth during the March and April demonstrations. It is possible that springtime may not be as

hot as the young demonstrators expected, but this will be only a postponement — and not for very long.

The autumn of 1973 could well be very hot.

May 25

Defendants Bound Over for Trial in London

Committee Formed to Defend 'Belfast 10'

The "Belfast 10" — the ten people arrested March 8 at Heathrow Airport and later charged with conspiracy to cause explosions in London — have now been committed for trial at Winchester Crown Court following committal proceedings that lasted two weeks at Lambeth Magistrates' Court. The trial is not expected to begin until September, reported the June 8 issue of *Red Weekly*, newspaper of the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International. Meanwhile "the prisoners must languish in conditions worse than those of Category A convicted prisoners."

The treatment of the Belfast 10 between March 8 and March 12, when they were charged, gives some indication of how the government plans to deal with them later. Nine of the ten were kept completely unclothed in Ealing police station. The police illegally denied solicitors and the mother of two of the women prisoners the right to see them. At present, two of the three women prisoners are held in Brixton, a male prison. This is entirely without precedent.

The ten were held for more than two months under maximum security before the committal proceedings opened. Massive security measures were taken both inside and outside the Lambeth Court. Armed police were placed on the roof of the court building; guard dogs patrolled the streets; all passing traffic was stopped and searched; six coach-loads of police were on standby; entry to the courtroom was restricted to a select few, who were required to show documentation to get in.

Blatant attempts were made to discourage relatives and friends of the defendants from attending the proceedings. On at least one occasion all women visitors were subjected to a "strip search," and two days later male visitors were forced to undergo a similar procedure. Even the nap-

pies of babes in arms were removed. These searches were personally ordered by an Irish member of the British Special Branch. Visits to the ten by relatives during the lunchtime recesses were made unnecessarily difficult. When these matters were raised in court, the magistrate, Sir Frank Milton, said they were "outside his jurisdiction as they concerned security issues."

On May 20, nearly 1,000 persons marched from Clapham Common to Brixton Prison to demand the release of the ten. A regular picket is held every Saturday outside the prison, organized by the Belfast 10 Defence Committee, set up after the arrests on the initiative of the Anti-Internment League.

The defense committee has organized a roster of persons willing to visit the prisoners, both to ensure regular visits for each prisoner, and to keep track of breaches of regulations by the prison authorities, who are being obstructive in the matter of visits.

The committee urgently needs funds to pay for printing, hiring halls, providing fares for relatives of the ten wanting to visit them, and for sending food and books into the prison.

The committee has established four subcommittees — welfare, finance, activities, and publicity — and would welcome anyone willing to help. The committee meets weekly at the General Picton, Caledonian Road, at 8:00 p.m. on Sundays. It can also be contacted by phone at 800-9392, or at 88 Roslyn Road, London, N15. □

Culture Notes

The San Francisco Board of Supervisors has voted to outlaw nude floor shows in bars and nightclubs. Protesting the decision, one club owner pointed out that the shows have become acceptable in San Francisco. They are, he told reporters, nothing but "an adult Disneyland."

Caamaño's Views as Reported by the PCD

By Gerry Foley

"For some time there were doubts that the body the armed forces showed to some journalists was that of Colonel Caamaño. You were one of the few Dominicans who saw him abroad. Can you describe the physical appearance of the military leader of the April revolution?"

The person who asked this question was Emma Tavarez Justo, the sister of Manuel Tavarez Justo, the young Dominican revolutionist who was killed in November 1963 while trying to set up a guerrilla foco in his native country. She was interviewing Narciso Isa Conde, the general secretary of the Dominican Communist party.

In the June 4 issue of the Santo Domingo weekly *Ahora*, the editors explain that the Dominican Communist party was the only group in the country to maintain contact with the hero of the 1965 uprising during the years he remained in seclusion in Cuba preparing for his ill-fated guerrilla landing on February 16 of this year. Isa Conde in particular claimed to have seen and talked to Caamaño twice during his enigmatic withdrawal from the public eye.

Through its interview with Isa Conde, *Ahora* hoped to clear up many of the questions about the abortive guerrilla operation that has had a sharp impact on the political life of the country, and on the left in particular. For those who claimed that the body displayed to journalists did not look like Caamaño, the Communist party chief said:

"Already on the first trip [1968] I noticed that he was a lot thinner but was strong and muscular. Evidently he had taken off a lot of weight. He told me that besides undergoing intense guerrilla training, he was exercising with weights. He wore a full black beard and dressed in olive green military clothing.

"In 1971 [on the second trip], he didn't have a beard. I found that he had lost some more weight; his face was much thinner than in the pictures taken during the revolution.

His baldness was more pronounced, and the peak of hair he had on his forehead had almost disappeared.

"There is no doubt in my mind. The picture showed the body of a Francis Caamaño much thinner than the people remember him and show-



CAAMAÑO: Tried to apply "foquismo" in Dominican Republic.

ing the effects of physical exhaustion and possibly rigor mortis."

The Communist party leader no doubt had his reasons for wanting to make it clear that the guerrilla experience was definitely over in the Dominican Republic. But it seems likely that a figure so obviously concerned with the credibility of his party both among bourgeois "progressives" and militant youth would be very cautious in making such pronouncements. Moreover, Isa Conde clearly felt that the time had come to make some very explicit criticisms of the attitude of Caamaño and the Cuban leadership.

During Caamaño's stay in Cuba,

Isa Conde claimed, the leader of the April revolution was formed in a rigid guerrillaist mold.

"The general prestige of the Cuban revolution, the ideas of the revolutionary government of Cuba, which established relations with him during his stay in Europe, the 'foquista' conceptions of the MR 14 de Junio [June 14 Revolutionary Movement] with which he had strong ties, the attraction that revolutionary figures such as Fidel and Che had on him, were factors that—combined with his natural military bent—inclined him toward the notion of the guerrilla foco.

"But the decisive thing was the climate, the activities, and the personalities that influenced him in Cuba."

A military officer from a rightist military family, Caamaño was shaken loose from his conservative loyalties, conceptions, and training by the mass popular uprising of April 1965 against U. S. imperialism and its client junta in Santo Domingo.

In the midst of an overwhelming mass mobilization that broke the authority of the military command and opened the arsenals, he went over to the side of the armed people, becoming the leader of the insurrection that decisively defeated the local conservative forces but was blocked from triumphing by the landing of a U. S. expeditionary force.

Although for weeks the insurgent population were in control of the Dominican capital, there was no revolutionary leadership to organize the people for a deepgoing, sustained struggle against the imperialist invaders. The main political adviser of the rebel military leaders, Isa Conde boasted, was his vacillating and opportunistic Communist party.

"From the first days of the April revolution, our political relations with Caamaño were very good. And since we were the only Dominican party that had stable and good relations with the Cuban revolution, it was easier for us to maintain these ties while he was in Cuba.

"Beginning with an accidental meeting in Félix María Ruíz Street at the time of the battle of Duarte Bridge, we established political relations with Colonel Caamaño that soon became stronger.

"The PCD [Partido Comunista Dominicano — Dominican Communist party] helped him all it could when

he headed the Constitutionalist government. It did not use denigrating epithets against him or the other compañeros, or call them capitulators when they were forced to negotiate with the Organization of American States [the U.S. invasion was organized formally under the rubric of the OAS, Washington's "regional security" alliance]. During the whole period of the war, our political contributions helped to provide the best solutions for the acute problems that arose."

While Caamaño may have found the PCD more "reasonable" and "practical" than the variety of ultraleftist and sectarian grouplets competing with it, the policy of the Constitutionalist government, unfortunately, did not show the effects of good political advice. It accepted a compromise that enabled the proimperialist Balaguer government to establish itself with apparent legitimacy, while Caamaño, the recognized leader of the insurgent people and the hero of the rebellion, agreed to leave the country for a diplomatic post in London.

The leader of the revolution left a still largely armed people only to return seven years later at the head of a band of twelve guerrillas completely isolated from the population, which was unaware even of their existence until it was too late to do anything to help them.

In fact, Isa Conde hints, Caamaño's respect for the Dominican CP was limited and uncertain. The Stalinists opposed his ideas for initiating revolutionary warfare but were unable to win him over to their perspective of reformist political activity. The fact that they had no revolutionary alternative to military adventurism may explain why despite many discussions and the examples of failure in those years of Cuban-sponsored guerrillas on many fronts, they were unable to divert Caamaño from his determination to establish a guerrilla focus in the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, the Constitutionalist leader's guerrilla orientation probably kept him from challenging the political concepts of the PCD, politics being the business of timid pen-pushers anyway, according to this school.

Isa Conde described his relations with Caamaño this way:

"In 1968 our initial and early meetings were very fraternal, but as dif-

ferences came out the conversations got tenser.

"Caamaño and the Cuban compañeros had an interest in getting the PCD to agree to take a subservient position. We resisted this. At times this conflict led them to act with a certain arrogance that was stopped short by our clear demands for respect as a revolutionary party.

"At times they acted toward us in a very friendly, natural, and modest way. On other occasions, they did not. Generally during the breaks we talked a lot and relaxed with demonstrations of good humor.

"On one occasion, Caamaño came to recognize the validity of some of our concepts that differed from his (on the need for avoiding a one-sided inclination to the guerrilla method). But in later meetings he returned to his former, essentially 'foquista,' position.

"The secondary frictions were overcome, and we agreed that both parties would set down their positions in writing.

"The common political formulations were very general and did not permit any concrete commitments. We established where we differed and on what general political lines we agreed. Despite the impossibility of any fundamental practical agreements, we considered it important to maintain political relations.

"In 1971, our meeting was very cordial but the evaluations we made of the political conjuncture were very different. Caamaño did not recognize the existence of a profound ebb in the popular struggle. He did not understand that the time was not favorable for military actions. He believed in the possibility of stimulating the process and promoting popular struggle through urban and rural guerrilla warfare. He did not agree that it was necessary to concentrate our effort on political struggle and lay out a line adjusted to the new circumstances."

Throughout his stay in Cuba, according to Isa Conde, there was very little change in Caamaño's outlook.

"There was no substantial change in his thinking during this time.

"The only thing was that he recognized the dangers of his prolonged silence. Rural guerrilla warfare became a longer-run perspective, and he put his emphasis on forming urban guerrilla forces like the Tupa-

maros preliminary to setting up the guerrilla focus."

The Dominican CP leader expressed some surprise and irritation that the "shift in Cuba's foreign policy" had no apparent effect on the "foquista" orientation of Caamaño and his advisers.

"Colonel Caamaño was treated with great respect and high regard in Cuba.

"All the Cuban compañeros who had dealings with him called him 'Comandante.' He had everything he needed to maintain himself and for his activities; his hosts never missed an opportunity to praise him and affirm their solidarity with him.

"For the Cubans, Caamaño was the center around which the entire Dominican revolutionary movement should unite.

"In large measure, he based his views on the theses of the Cuban revolution and the backing he got from it.

"The identity of political views between Caamaño and the Cuban leaders was evident. I could never see any differences between them.

"The Constitutionalist leader was very much under the influence of the 'foquista' conception of armed struggle and the ideas and formulations of the Cuban compañeros.

"They never intervened directly in our conversations. But in fact I had to argue on two levels—with him and with his hosts, who held the same positions.

"I have the impression that neither Colonel Caamaño nor many Cuban cadres were fully conscious of the progressive shift in Cuban foreign policy.

"The changes were made abruptly and had more of an impact outside Cuba than inside the country.

"The new tendency was reflected more in practice than in official statements. And by inertia the 'foquista' conception of armed struggle continued to hang on in the intermediate levels.

"The turn was a pragmatic one, not a self-critical one; and this prevented any substantial change in the 'foquista' mentality."

Caamaño's concentration on the military aspects of insurrection became so exclusive in fact that by the time he embarked on his ill-fated expedition, his existence was almost for-

gotten by the people he hoped to rally to his banner.

"In 1968 we explained to Caamaño the need for his breaking silence, for making periodic statements, for getting his ideas known, his political positions, his program.

"Colonel Caamaño rejected this suggestion, stating that he would address the masses only when he was fighting in the mountains. He overestimated the role of military activity and gave no importance to political propaganda. . . .

"In our 1971 meeting I proposed to him that he make a public visit to Vietnam as a way of beginning his reentry into political life. Although he recognized the dangers of his prolonged silence, he did not opt for this solution. The most I got was a promise to study the suggestion more attentively.

"In September 1972, in a letter explaining the situation in the country, I again reminded him of this point. Word for word, I wrote: 'Once again I remind you of the conversation we had a year ago about the negative effects of your silence. I still think the same thing.

"At that time you appreciated the dangers of prolonged silence for your political credibility and for the leadership you won in the April revolution. I think that as time passes this problem is becoming more complicated, and in this area your failure to exert any weight in the political life of the nation can lead to damage that will be difficult or impossible to repair. Pardon my repeated insistence, but I think this is an important matter.'"

But Caamaño could not be persuaded to take any political initiatives.

"The landing on Playa Caracoles indicates that Colonel Caamaño definitely disregarded our suggestion."

The blame for Caamaño's abortive landing, Isa Conde suggests, lies with the Cuban leadership's failure to explicitly disavow their former "foquista" orientation. They did nothing to reorient Caamaño, and when the time came for the operation they found themselves unable to refuse support previously promised:

"The responsibility for the fiasco should not be sought in the attitude of one of the parties (Caamaño or Cuba) but in a more complex relationship of ideological hegemony and dependence. There was joint respon-

sibility, although at the last moment one of the parties may have considered the action inadvisable and the other may have decided to carry it out despite the worst kind of conditions, demanding fulfillment of the original commitments."

The Dominican Stalinist chief apparently thought that the negative reaction to the latest guerrilla disaster was strong enough to permit him safely to deliver a slap on the wrist to the Cuban leaders.

"With the death of Colonel Caamaño, the Dominican revolutionary movement has lost a valuable asset. Leaders of this stature arise only in great moments of history, and who knows what it will cost to replace his potential?

"It was a hard blow. The effects of this tragic occurrence have been extremely negative. Among the people, there has been disillusion, pessimism, and skepticism. Among the revolutionary forces it has revealed serious defects. It has led to a questioning of the role of the Cuban revolutionary government in its relations with the Dominican revolutionary forces. It has led to the disorganization, weakening, and even the liquidation of some of the less solid detachments.

"On the other hand, the guerrilla foray touched off repressive and terrorist tendencies that could only be attenuated by the massive outcry at the murder of the journalist Goyito Garcia Castro and its implications."

The Stalinist spokesman obviously hoped to capitalize on the cynicism and demoralization produced by the guerrilla fiasco to defend his party's reformist perspective.

"Without wanting to, the supporters of the guerrilla movement could only facilitate the rightward movement of the regime, giving dominance to the most reactionary and repressive military sectors.

"The Aguila Feliz operation, planned independently of the guerrilla movement by the most retrograde and pro-U.S. sectors in the country, was aimed at abolishing the government's reformist aspects."

It is precisely these "reformist aspects," Isa Conde argued, that must be encouraged. "It is true that the PCD has been the only organization on the left to point out the aspects of the Balaguer government that fa-

vor reform and economic development." He went on to say that despite the PCD's sympathetic attitude to the positive features of the blood-stained rightist regime installed by the U.S. Marines, his party, of course, had not neglected to denounce the increasing domination of the economy by American imperialism.

In fact, the PCD general secretary exploited his own and his party's political connections with Caamaño and the Cuban government to the fullest in order to push the Stalinist reformist line.

More than one half of the interview, whose newsworthiness came almost entirely from Isa Conde's revelations about Caamaño, was devoted to "explaining" the Communist party policy. Moreover, the Stalinist spokesman could use the failure of Caamaño's gamble to good advantage to highlight the "reasonableness" and "practicality" of the PCD, while at the same time boasting of his connections with Caamaño to shore up the party's sagging credibility as a revolutionary force.

It is clear, however, that in the eight years since the April uprising neither the repression of the army, the police, and armed murder gangs nor the "reformist aspects" of the regime have been able to allay seething mass discontent or achieve a perspective of prolonged stability for the regime. New revolutionary forces will draw lessons from Caamaño's failure different from the PCD's reformist nostrums. And the leaders of the coming upsurge will almost certainly prove less interested in the Communist party's "political advice" and more concerned with organizing the masses in a deepgoing revolutionary way. □

Bugs as Dangerous as Termites

The *Far Eastern Economic Review* reports that diplomats in Peking are telling a story of Soviet security officers checking their embassy for electronic bugs. Their instruments indicated something on the second floor, where they found a brass plate screwed into place. "The plate was dutifully removed, and below it was discovered a brass pipe attached to a second pipe with an array of electric wiring. . . . With great effort they managed to unscrew the pipes. When they did, the chandelier on the ceiling below crashed to the floor."

Bourgeois Nationalism and the Elections

[The following article is translated by *Intercontinental Press* from the June 7 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party).]

* * *

Venezuela is one of the richest countries in Latin America. Because it is a big oil producer, for a number of decades it has been receiving an "injection" of millions of dollars, which has transformed it from an agricultural country into an essentially urban, capitalist nation.

But, on the other hand, it is also one of the poorest countries on the continent. It suffers from a tremendous and increasing number of persons who are "permanently unemployed": Of the thousands of young people who should be joining the work force each year, more than half cannot find a job. Caracas, the capital, is a microcosm of this stark reality. Its impressive superhighways, its tall skyscrapers and modern automobiles cannot hide the miserable slums surrounding it in which thousands of workers and jobless people live in flimsy tin and cardboard shacks, insecurely attached to the hillsides—until a tropical rain washes them away.

The End of Social Peace

The entire country has been geared to further the superprofits of the Yankee oil companies and a small group of local multimillionaires who pull the strings behind every government. The "social peace" that made it possible for them to enjoy their privileges was based on the total fragmentation of the workers movement (it is common to find three or four unions operating in the same factory), the existence of a caste of completely corrupt union bureaucrats (who run the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela [CTV—Venezuela Workers Confederation]), and economic stability which meant an inflation of only 1.7

percent between 1968 and 1970 (in Argentina it was thirteen times as high).

But the economy's present state of deterioration has prompted the workers movement to react, impelling it into struggle against the wishes of



RAFAEL CALDERA: Venezuelan president faces end of social peace.

the union leaderships. Within three years, "legal" strikes fell from 3,000 to 800, but "illegal" strikes went up from 1,000 to 38,000.

The student movement, which has a great tradition of struggle, is not silent either. One conflict after another is occurring among the secondary school students. Less than two months ago, Caracas was the scene of a demonstration by 10,000 students. And recently, during the visit of [U.S. Secretary of State William] Rogers, new

mobilizations shook many cities for five days.

Bourgeois Nationalism Advances

The Venezuelan bourgeoisie is joining the general process that is going on in Latin America: the emergence of bourgeois nationalist governments that are trying to maintain the capitalist system by adapting to the new situation, reflected in an upsurge in the mass movement; superexploitation by Yankee imperialism (which does not leave the local bourgeoisies with sufficient profits); and increasingly sharp competition between the Yankee and European monopolies.

In the past three years, the Venezuelan bourgeoisie has taken various steps along these lines: a new tax policy, nationalization of gas, state control over the domestic market in petroleum by-products, and the "Reversion Law," which provides for petroleum plants to automatically become state property in 1983.

This general process is being dubbed "Democratic Nationalism"—the equivalent of the "National Socialism" of the Argentine Social Justice [Peronist] movement.

Limitations of 'Democratic Nationalism'

These measures do not provide any thoroughgoing solution to the Venezuelan crisis, although it is obvious that this policy is not the same as the policy of handing over the nation's wealth to imperialism that was followed a few years back by Betancourt.

The limitations stand out clearly, in, for example, the fabulous oil deposits discovered not long ago in the so-called "Orinoco bituminous strip." The Yankees want to be sure that they remain under their control, and that they go into production as soon as possible; they are demanding guarantees for the capital that will have to be invested. The government stated that "no negotiations or conversations of any kind are under way," but the [U.S.] State Department itself revealed that secret negotiations between the two governments have been carried on since 1972.

Once again the national bourgeoisie has shown itself incapable of putting up a serious confrontation with its

imperialist partners. Even the demagoguery of the Christian Democratic president, who displays more bravery in words than in deeds, never even mentioned the possibility of a break with imperialism. The bourgeoisie knows that in any showdown it would be the workers on one side and imperialism on the other.

The Elections

This is the context in which an intense election campaign, scheduled for next December, is taking place. Two bourgeois parties are fighting for the votes of the people. And although both Acción Democrática [Democratic Action] (representing the most "hard-line" of the bosses) and the Christian Democrats of COPEI [Comité Organizado por Elecciones Independientes—Committee Organized for Independent Political Action] (who today portray themselves as nationalists) have their bureaucratic deputies in the central workers union, neither has anything in particular to offer as an alternative to what the Venezuelan masses have been going through.

Nor does Nueva Fuerza [New Force], which is made up of a bourgeois split-off from Acción Democrática and the Communist party. In spite of the socialist slogans that the CP demagogically raises, its basic policy is one of promoting class harmony.

The only organization that could be an alternative is the Movimiento al Socialismo [MAS—Movement Toward Socialism], which views the construction of socialism as an immediate task and rejects electoral alliances with the parties of the bosses. Its first action last year drew between 20,000 and 30,000 compañeros who wanted to support a socialist approach as an alternative to the old and corrupt bourgeois and reformist parties. Its candidate is J.V. Rangel, an independent deputy with an outstanding reputation as a fighter in the struggle against repression.

Alongside these positive points, there are a number of dangerously unclear aspects to the MAS. Its propaganda is not tied to conflicts that are occurring on a daily basis, and it is not clearly emphasizing the decisive role of the workers in the battle for power and the building of socialism.

These weaknesses of the MAS do

not justify the desertions of the ultra-leftists, who are calling for people to cast a blank ballot, thereby aiding the plans of COPEI and Acción Democrática to remain in the driver's seat.

An example of how revolutionary Marxists ought to act in a process such as the one Venezuela is going through is provided by the Grupo Trotskista Venezolano [Venezuelan Trotskyist Group], which publishes *Voz Marxista*. It is intervening directly in the class struggle by supporting

the mobilizations of workers and students and by putting forward a program that begins with the nationalization of oil under workers control. And at the same time, it is intervening in the electoral process by supporting the Rangel candidacy in an attempt to correct the deviations of the socialist campaign, to present the workers with an independent alternative, and to lay the basis for building a strong revolutionary, workers, and socialist party in the heat of popular struggle and political polarization. □

During Last Year's Wave of Arrests of Dissidents

Riots and Strikes Reported in Ukraine

[The following article appeared in the June 8 issue of *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

News filtering out of the Soviet Union little by little over the past year indicates that there has been a significant new outbreak of workers struggles in the south of the Ukraine, one of the most important industrial regions of the Soviet Union. Last June, 10,000 "rioters" took to the streets for two days in Dneprodzerzhinsk, a city of 270,000. The insurgents, many of whom were women, attacked and partially destroyed the offices of the KGB (political police) and the MVD (Ministry of the Interior.)

They destroyed all the political documents they could find, some files were burned, and portraits of Brezhnev and other leaders were torn up and destroyed. According to reports, the insurgents then took over the offices of the party and of the Komsomol (Young Communists); there also many documents were destroyed.

The KGB and the militia opened fire on the people, killing about a dozen and wounding about 100. According to some reports, the riot began when several young persons were arrested after having an argument with a militiaman. According to "official

circles," the events broke out when two drunks were arrested whom a third man was trying to take home. One of the two arrested then struck a match that set fire to the KGB headquarters!

In Dnepropetrovsk, one of the largest industrial cities of the Soviet Union, strikes demanding a rise in the standard of living took place last September and were repressed at the cost of many dead and wounded. A month later, riots again broke out in the city demanding better provisioning, better living conditions, and the right to choose a job instead of having it imposed. At the same time, new violent incidents took place at Dneprodzerzhinsk. More people were killed and there was a wave of arrests. These riots and strikes came at the same time that the Soviet bureaucracy was conducting mass arrests of Ukrainian oppositionists struggling against the Kremlin's nationalities policy. □

The Defeatists

The U.S. Air Force Academy plans to build a model prisoner-of-war camp to train future officers in "survival and resistance techniques."

The installation, which will cost \$244,000, will include guard towers, isolation cells, interrogation rooms, and a fence topped with barbed wire. Officials say that underclassmen will be exposed to POW life with upperclassmen as guards. The only unrealistic part of the training is that the prisoners will be held for only forty hours.

Trotsky's Writings on Britain

The publication of *Leon Trotsky on Britain*, which deals in depth with problems of the British revolution, is worth celebrating. For the first time Trotsky's writings on Britain in the important period 1925-1928 are available in a single volume. The book includes *Where is Britain Going?* and articles by critics of that work; Trotsky's replies to the critics; and a number of his writings on the general strike of 1926, the British Communist party, and the Anglo-Russian Committee.

In *Where is Britain Going?* Trotsky analyzed the change in the balance of forces in the capitalist world resulting from the ascent of the United States to the status of a great power. Further American expansion, Trotsky pointed out, could take place only at the expense of British imperialism. The intensification of competition on a world scale would compel the British capitalists, with their antiquated means of production, to attack the British working class. This would result in great social conflicts, Trotsky predicted, in which the British working class would be propelled toward socialist revolution.

The Labour party comes in for considerable discussion. Trotsky's criticisms of the Labour party leaders are both witty and profound. He singled out especially their notion that violence is alien to the British spirit. Britain's world supremacy, he pointed out, was gained through violence against both peoples abroad and the British working class at home; many of the gains made by the masses in Britain were likewise won through violent struggles. Every explanation given by the "left" leaders as to why revolution is not likely, desirable, or possible in Britain is torn to shreds.

Many of these old reformist views are still being put forward today, so Trotsky's arguments sound fresh and contemporary.

The publication of the book in 1926 caused considerable furor, as is shown by the criticisms included as an appen-

dix. H. N. Brailsford, editor of the *New Leader*; Bertrand Russell; George Lansbury, leader of the Independent Labour Party; and Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the Labour party, all roundly assailed the barbs from "a man from another world" (i.e., a Rus-

Leon Trotsky on Britain, with an introduction by George Novack. New York: Monad Press, 1973. 334 pp. \$3.45, £1.65. Exclusive distributor: Pathfinder Press, Inc., New York.

sian who could not comprehend British ways). What seemed to sting them most was Trotsky's forecast of their own future treacherous roles.

Yet within a year Trotsky was proved correct. Britain was hit by a general strike, brought about by a crisis in the coal industry. The General Council of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), hand in glove with the Labour party leaders, reacted exactly as Trotsky had predicted and called off the general strike, betraying the miners. The "left" acted as if paralyzed, as did the Communist party. They had been disarmed by the class-collaborationist line of the Comintern. The 1926 strike turned out to be not a prelude to a victorious struggle as Trotsky had hoped, but a lost opportunity.

One of the worst aspects of the defeat was the failure of the British Communist party to draw the necessary lessons from it. The responsibility for this belonged to Stalin. In 1925 he sponsored the formation of the Anglo-Russian Committee (ARC), a body composed of representative Russian and British trade-union leaders. The ostensible purpose of the committee was to coordinate and intensify the fight against reaction, against imperialist war, and against intervention by British imperialism in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

In 1926, when the TUC General Council betrayed the general strike and the miners strike, Trotsky and

the Left Opposition demanded that the Russians pull out of the ARC in the interests of the international class struggle. Stalin and the Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist party rejected the demand. Stalin sought to maintain the committee as a "permanent" bloc with the British trade-union leaders.

This policy enabled the labor traitors to strengthen their position and that of their bourgeois patrons, thus weakening the international position of the Soviet Union. The defeat in Britain, consequently, became a sharp issue in the struggle led by Trotsky against the rising Soviet bureaucracy.

Many radicals in Britain today fail to estimate correctly the present consciousness of the working class because they have not come to grips with the problem of the Labour party. They can learn some priceless lessons from Trotsky's consideration of this question. Following the historical materialist method of Marx and Engels, Trotsky goes back to the past century to establish the necessary framework.

When a period of intense capitalist development opened up from the 1850s onward, the earlier militant Chartist movement disappeared and trade-unionism came to the fore. It was based on struggling for concessions of an immediate nature—on wages, hours, working conditions, etc. As long as British capitalism was able to gain superprofits from a worldwide empire, the bourgeoisie could grant sufficient reforms and concessions to keep the working class relatively quiescent. The masses came to accept gradualism and peaceful change as articles of faith.

But with the development of inter-imperialist competition, the decline of Britain's world position, and the increasing inability of the Liberal party to provide significant concessions, the trade unions came to recognize that unionism was insufficient, that the working class needed its own political party, its own parliamentary representatives, its own press.

The creation of the Labour party was one of the consequences of the radicalization of the working masses, which in turn was a consequence of the decline of British imperialism.

However, the masses transferred their illusions and hopes regarding

parliamentarism from the Liberal party to the Labour party. They still remained imbued with Puritan and liberal traditions, despite the big step forward they had taken.

Trotsky showed how the Labour leaders poisoned the consciousness of the proletariat and paralyzed its will. Eventually new forces moved forward in the Labour party. Trotsky presented some remarkable insights into the danger these forces represented to the workers. We have only to look at the sorry record of the "left" MPs in the Wilson government of 1964 to see how accurately—how prophetically—Trotsky spoke.

Trotsky emphasized over and over again the crucial necessity of building a revolutionary Marxist party. Referring to the wasted opportunity in Germany in 1923, he said: "A Bolshevik party in Great Britain can only be built up in the process of a permanent and irreconcilable struggle against the centrism which is taking the place of Liberal-Labour policy."

The centrists, he explained, are in favor of revolution only in far-off countries, but are frightened to death of the British revolution, their chief concern being to maintain British traditions and institutions, the Labour party and Parliament. Hence the Bolshevik party's "main blow must be directed against this loathsome two-faced policy of the leftwingers."

Trotsky's writings on Britain played an important role in the struggle of the Left Opposition against Stalinism; in his introduction to this volume George Novack notes: "[Trotsky's] evaluation of the issues [the British general strike and the Anglo-Russian Committee] subsequently formed an essential part of the platform of the Russian Left Opposition. A clear recognition of their political significance in the struggle against Stalinism became mandatory for the original international cadres of Trotskyism.

"The events confirmed, it seemed to him, the growing instability of European capitalism under U. S. pressure; the ever-present potential of the eruption of class confrontations that could raise the question of power; the folly of putting faith in the capacity of the reformists to lead the workers' struggles or of making unbreakable blocs with them for that purpose; the inevitable vacillations of the centrist

elements whose temporary leftward swings enabled them all the better to leave the workers in the lurch at the next turn; the categorical requirement that Communists maintain their political independence and freedom of action through all tactical maneuvers; and the priority to be accorded to constructing the revolutionary Marxist party as the indispensable instrument of anticapitalist organization."

Today, British capitalism is in a much more advanced stage of decay than when Trotsky wrote the contributions contained in this book. In 1973 British capitalism is facing acute competition in the world market. Britain's entry into the European Economic Community has increased the pressure. Industry must be rationalized while profits are maintained. The only method open to the capitalist class is to attack the working class, its standard of living, its organizations; and this the Tory government, the most ruthless in decades, has tried to do through the Industrial Relations Act and the Immigration Act; through its wage policies; and through the Rent

Act and cutbacks in social services, education, housing, etc.

The drive against labor's gains has stimulated a wave of militant struggles by the working class that have taken forms forgotten for decades—sit-ins, occupations, flying pickets, massive solidarity actions, etc. This growth of militancy, in conjunction with the development of the struggles of other oppressed layers, poses acutely the problem of how to achieve socialism. The objective conditions are rotten ripe for revolution. Yet the key problem facing revolutionists in Britain today still remains the same as in 1925-28: how to break the ideological hold of reformism over the working masses, how to win them from their traditional leaderships to the revolutionary party, how to lead the class forward to victory. To this problem, Trotsky's basic analysis, made a half century ago, provides a clear answer.

This is what gives this compilation such extraordinary timeliness. It should be a "bestseller" among those who really want a socialist Britain.

— Mary Wilson

Demonstrators Picket High Commission

London Protest Against Ceylon Repression

London

The Ceylon high commission here was the scene of elaborate and extravagant celebrations May 22, marking the first anniversary of the Sri Lanka Republic, which was inaugurated one year ago under emergency regulations in effect since March 1971. Sponsors of this celebration of the present regime in Ceylon were the high commission and a number of reactionary Ceylonese organisations in Britain.

The festivities lost much of their propaganda value, however, through the presence of the Ceylon Solidarity Campaign and its supporters.

Demonstrators outside the commission carried wreaths with dedications in Tamil and Sinhalese and distributed literature condemning the Bandaranaike regime's murder of 25,000 young men and women between April and June 1971 and its present undemocratic and repressive policies.

What was to have been a smug, self-satisfied public relations stunt was

frustrated. Inside the high commission the main subject of conversation was the presence of the demonstrators and the reasons for their protest. The last thing the officials expected on this occasion was being asked to explain the repressive and murderous practices of the Bandaranaike government. □

It Means You'll Never Collect

A Pennsylvania official wants insurance companies to make the language of policies comprehensible. He objects to passages like the following from a health-insurance policy:

"The subscriber shall make available, or cause to be made available, to Blue Shield a request for any benefits claimed under this Agreement in a form or forms satisfactory to Blue Shield. Blue Shield shall have an obligation to provide benefits under the Agreement only after it has received such a request for benefits executed in such a manner as it shall require."