

Peron Opens Attack on 'Trotskyists'



Nixon's Watergate Defenses Collapsing One by One

Shah Sets Sights on Dominating Arab-Persian Gulf



U.S. Cities Being Buried in Garbage

If U.S. cities do not soon become uninhabitable from other causes, they may be buried in garbage. According to a study by the National League of Cities and the United States Conference of Mayors, 46.5 percent of the cities will run out of space in which to dump their trash within five years.

The study said that cities are accumulating trash at the rate of 250 million tons a year. This includes 28,000 million bottles, 48,000 million cans, 4 million tons of plastic, 30 million tons of paper, 100 million tires, and 3 million automobiles.

The amount of trash accumulating in cities was reported to have doubled in the last twenty years. Much of the increase would seem to be caused by the growing practice of wrapping products in packages designed to make it difficult for consumers to judge the quality and quantity of the contents. The study said that 90 percent of all packaging is discarded and predicted that its contribution to the trash accumulation will have increased 63 percent between 1958 and 1976.

Little is being done to recycle products, the study found. Cities are now spending \$6,000 million a year to destroy trash containing metals worth \$5,000 million.

"The markets for recycled materials," the report said, "are severely limited due to Federal policies which favor the use of virgin materials and discourage, even penalize, the use of recycled materials." It cited such factors as depletion allowances for extracting raw materials, tax structures that favor miners, and transportation rates that discriminate against scrap materials.

The problem does not have a very high priority in federal environmental programs. Although cities spend 50 percent of their environmental funds on trash disposal, only 1 percent of Nixon's environmental budget for 1974 is devoted to the problem. □

In This Issue

ECOLOGY	722	U.S. Cities Being Buried in Garbage
ARGENTINA	732	Peron Opens Attack on "Trotskyists" —by Gerry Foley
	725	PST Opposes "Social Truce"
	726	Positions Taken by Political Parties During May 22 Meeting With Campora
	727	Lessons of March on Villa Devoto Prison
	728	20,000 Celebrate First Cordobazo
	729	May 25: Buenos Aires Took to Streets
INDOCHINA WAR	731	Indochina "Peace" Talks Bugged Down
WEST GERMANY	731	Bonn Marchers Demand Right to Abortion
CHILE	732	New Workers Bodies Challenge Reformists —by Hugo Blanco
	733	How Workers Organize Production
	734	Latin Student Gathering Sets Revisionist Course
GREECE	736	Junta Shaken by Extent of Navy Plot
IRAN	737	Shah's Courts Kill 8, Threaten 7 More
	744	Shah Sets Sights on Domination of Arab- Persian Gulf—by Dianne Feeley
U.S.A.	738	Nixon's Defenses Falling One by One —by Allen Myers
EGYPT	742	Sadat's "Internal War" on Students, Workers —by Jon Rothschild
POLAND	747	Workers Challenge Bureaucratic Rule
NEW ZEALAND	749	Labour Regime Closes New Zealand to PRG
REVIEWS	750	The First Years of the Fourth International —by Allen Myers
DOCUMENTS	751	Petition in Defense of Democracy in Ceylon
	751	Press Conference of the ERP
	752	Republican Found Dead in Long Kesh Cell
DRAWINGS	721	Shah; 724, Jose Rucci; 732, Salvador Allende; 735, Juan Velasco Alvarado; 736, George Papandreou; 740, Archibald Cox; 741, John Mitchell; 742, Anwar el-Sadat; 749, Edward Gierek—by Copain
	721	Cartoon by Robert V. Engle/Newsweek

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

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Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

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Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

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Peron Opens Attack on 'Trotskyists'

By Gerry Foley

"'Get the Trotskyists!' This is the watchword in the Peronist ranks and among the government's allies," correspondent Philippe Labreveux reported in the June 6 *Le Monde*. "Hardly had ex-President Juan Perón sent out the word from Madrid, where he is preparing for his final return, than the trade unions, the youth groups, and several other organizations of the national Social Justice Movement launched a chorus of virulent attacks against 'extremists' of all stripes."

The blast from "el líder," according to Labreveux, was part of an operation aimed at curbing the guerrilla movements and the left wing of the Peronist movement and harnessing them to the new government. Such attacks obviously set the stage for asserting tight control of the mass movement and for isolating the more militant opposition groups.

The immediate target of Perón's attack was apparently the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Army of the People], which refused to go along with Cámpora's call for a truce and has expressed its determination to continue its commando operations.

Perón made a statement referring to "Trotskyist provocateurs," according to the May 30 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*. He did so in response to reports in a Spanish monarchist magazine that far-left groups had participated in an attempt early May 26 to storm the Villa Devoto Prison in the Argentine capital. Two youths were killed when prison guards opened fire on the crowd; one was a Peronist. The leadership of the Juventud Peronista (Peronist Youth) blamed members of the ERP, among others, for provoking the incident.

In a news conference June 8 in Buenos Aires, however, leaders of the ERP denied that their organization was involved in the attack on the prison. In the June 9 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *Clarín*, their statements were summarized as follows:

"The ERP had absolutely nothing to do with the attempt to take the

Villa Devoto Prison in the early morning of May 26. They claimed that the shots came from inside the prison and from a cellblock. They do not exclude the possibility of an attempt



PERON: Sends the word from Madrid.

to force the door of the prison, but they don't know what the source of it was."

Furthermore, the four spokesmen—Roberto Mario Santucho, Jorge Benito Urteaga, Enrique Haroldo Gorriarán, and Jorge Molina—denied that the ERP was Trotskyist:

"The ERP is not Trotskyist. It has an anti-imperialist and socialist program, and includes Marxists, Peronists, and Christians. Of its members, 38 percent are workers, they said.

"The Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores exercises leadership and defines itself as Marxist-Leninist. It was linked to the 'Fourth International' but 'we have moved away.'" [Emphasis in original.]

Another guerrilla group that has

continued its operations since the election is the August 22 ERP, a split-off from the ERP. The August 22 ERP, however, has given political support to the Peronists. It called for a vote for Cámpora and the other Peronist candidates in the March 11 elections. (For a translation of their statement on the elections, see *Intercontinental Press*, March 26, 1973, p. 348.)

Since the elections, the ERP and the Peronist guerrilla organizations have tended to diverge. "The Peronists, while they have not failed to point up the contradictions existing in the FREJULI [Frente Justicialista de Liberación—Liberation Front for Social Justice], have obviously closed ranks around the elected authorities," a commentator noted in the May 29 issue of *La Opinión*.

In his article in the June 6 *Le Monde*, Labreveux stressed the ties of the Peronist and non-Peronist organizations in the preelection period. "But for conscientious guerrillas, reconversion is not easy, and all the more so because the Peronists of certain clandestine groups and the Trotskyists of the ERP have carried out joint actions and, it is believed, help each other, particularly by supplying arms and money to cells that need them without making any ideological distinctions.

"It seems improbable, therefore, that the Peronist guerrillas will turn over their arms to the government and abandon clandestinity."

Nevertheless, the centrifugal pressures seem to be very great. The Peronist guerrilla groups, the Montoneros and the FAR [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—Revolutionary Armed Forces] held a press conference the same day as the ERP. The spokesmen of the two organizations, Mario Eduardo Firmenich for the Montoneros and Roberto Quieto for the FAR, took a stern and threatening tone toward their non-Peronist erstwhile comrades in arms.

"We tell the ERP," Firmenich said, according to the June 9 *Clarín*, "that in our country you have to accept the historical experience of our people, which is Peronism." Both spokesmen said that they had invited the ERP to reflect and to test their position with the masses.

The *Clarín* report continued: "They said that if the ERP or any other organization calls for revolutionary unity, 'it must realize that the only

unity possible is around the Peronist movement.' But they did describe as 'so-called commands' those groups that are attacking the ERP from a McCarthyite position."

But more importantly, Firmenich and Quieto stressed that their organizations "form part of the Peronist movement, whose leader is General Perón. Therefore, we follow the strategy formulated by General Perón." So, it is hard to see how anything but a head-on collision is possible between the Peronist guerrillas and the ERP, which announced its determination in its news conference to continue the fight until the "final triumph," the "socialist revolution." The latter is clearly not part of the "strategy formulated by General Perón."

The Peronist guerrilla spokesmen said, however, that they hoped the ERP would follow the path of the August 22 ERP. "The position of the August 22 ERP indicates that it is on the way to linking itself more and more closely to our movement."

The statement of the two Peronist groups, according to a June 8 AP dispatch, included a vow to "destroy any guerrilla groups that opposed the Cámpora Government." But no such pledge was mentioned in the *Clarín* report.

Attempts to isolate the non-Peronist guerrillas have taken many forms; however, some of them having the distinct air of provocations.

"The confrontations between the guerrillas and the Peronists was marked for the first time by violence," the New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario-La Prensa* reported in its June 8 issue, "when a bomb exploded last night on the grave of a guerrilla belonging to the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo . . . , Víctor Fernández Palmeiro, who died as a result of wounds received in a shoot-out when he assassinated Rear Admiral Hermes Quijada April 30.

"Shortly before the bomb exploded, a Peronist group burned an ERP flag in front of the parliament building."

A UPI dispatch in the June 6 *El Diario* reported: "A group calling itself the Peronist 'Comando Supremo de Seguridad' [Supreme Security Command] announced yesterday that it had kidnapped twenty-one 'prominent' communist leaders and threatened to kill them unless the leftist Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo . . . , which is



JOSE RUCCI

apparently divided, sets free all the persons it still holds."

Despite this announcement, the dispatch noted, the Communist party in Rosario, where the kidnappings were supposed to have taken place, has not reported any of its members missing. It is not clear, though, how broad the organization's definition of "communist" is. Since its threat was aimed at the ERP, it is evident that not just Communist party members are meant.

International pressure is obviously being put on the Cámpora government to liquidate the guerrilla activity as soon as possible.

After the latest kidnapping of a British industrialist, a UPI dispatch in the June 8 *El Diario* quoted the queen's ambassador as saying: "If law and order are not secured, I think that many will not be encouraged to come to this country. I hope the government creates an atmosphere of tranquillity." Since the Peronist government has announced its intention of attracting European capital, it seems unlikely that it would take such an expression of impatience lightly.

But the Peronist leadership has its own urgent domestic reasons for isolating and eliminating "extremists," and the guerrillas are the indicated place to start. As Labreux noted in his June 6 article:

"Perón's offensive against the Trot-

skyists, and more broadly against the 'extremists' in his own movement who advocate the establishment of a socialist regime, has been favorably received in those trade-union circles that are favorite targets of the guerrillas, considered by them to be 'traitors to the working class.' José Rucci and the leaders of the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor] are beginning to raise their heads. Once again they feel protected and even favored by Perón, who sent them a warm message of support last week on the occasion of the special convention of the labor federation.

"This meeting, scheduled several months ago and to which were invited about sixty foreign delegations, was obviously designed to boost the prestige of the Argentine CGT, 'one of the best organized and most experienced in the world,' according to Perón. All of a sudden, the trade-unionists are declaring themselves more vigorously than ever 'not Yankees and not Marxists, but Peronists.' This is true to such an extent that the Cuban representative Agapito Figueroa, who proposed paying homage to Ernesto Che Guevara, was hissed, and he found himself unable to finish his speech."

At the present time, the CGT bureaucrats are especially anxious to silence criticism from the left.

"Strengthened by Perón's support, the leaders of the CGT are now going to be able to conclude the negotiations initiated with the CGE [Confederación General Económico—General Confederation of Business] and José Gelbard, the minister of finance, with a view toward establishing a 'social truce' and launching a plan of economic stabilization. This austerity program will seek to assign the sacrifices necessary for straightening out the country's finances. But freezing prices and, to a certain extent, wages threatens to provoke serious discontent, or at least disappointment. If it had not been for Perón's endorsement and the assurance that he will neutralize their enemies, the trade-unionists would doubtlessly have hesitated to expose themselves to new pressures from their rank and file or attacks from the 'extremists' while the memory of the assassination of Dirk Kloosterman, general secretary of the automobile workers union, is still fresh in their minds."

With the great popular hopes invested in the new regime and the massive and enthusiastic support it is enjoying in its first days, the Peronists are in a position to exert strong pressures against the guerrillas. Perón's triumphal return, planned for June 21, when his supporters predict he will be met by two million people, will offer an excellent occasion for attacking any groups *el lider* considers dangerous to the new regime of "peace and progress."

Furthermore, Perón has been giving some thought to the problem of isolating the non-Peronist left groups within mass mobilizations. In his remarks on the violence at Villa Devoto, he said, according to the May 30 *La Opinión*:

"Although some incidents occurred such as those mentioned, it was a great day [when the government took office]. However, this is a good experience for the future, because we must keep in mind the objective of controlling such groups in new mass gatherings."

Labreux speculated, moreover, about pressures from other sources on the non-Peronist guerrillas to moderate their attitude toward the new government:

"It is not excluded that the Cuban leaders, who have just renewed diplomatic relations with Argentina, have recommended prudence to the principal strategist of the Trotskyist guerrilla movement [Santucho]."

Nonetheless, the ERP pledged in its June 8 news conference to continue operations "against the armed forces, counterrevolutionaries, foreign exploiters, and Argentine capitalists." It noted, moreover, that "the causes of social exploitation and the political-economic dependency have not disappeared or even been touched by the new government."

The day before the news conference, however, the ERP released retired rear admiral Francisco Aleman, whom it had held for sixty days. Two days previously it had released its other captive, police commander Jacobo Nasif, held for forty days.

"A communique of the leftist group said the officers were freed after it was ascertained that political prisoners liberated by the new Peronist government of President Campora were in good health," a June 7 AP dispatch reported. "The leftists also issued a

letter in which Aleman admitted responsibility for certain misdeeds."

On the same day that Aleman was released a British industrialist, Charles A. Lockwood, was kidnapped. However, it has proved impossible so far to ascertain whether Lockwood was taken by guerrillas

or by common criminals. It remains to be seen, then, whether the ERP is continuing its former activities. Likewise uncertain is whether Perón and his followers will broaden their attack on "Trotskyism." The next few weeks should clarify the terms of the conflict. □

Tells Workers, 'Don't Let Down Your Guard'

PST Opposes 'Social Truce' in Argentina

The Peronists invited all the Argentine parties to a second meeting in the Nino restaurant in Buenos Aires on May 22. The first meeting took place shortly after Perón's arrival in the country before the elections and was closed to the press. The PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party) refused to attend this gathering on the grounds that it was opposed in principle to secret political negotiations. The party agreed to participate in the second, since it offered the possibility of discussing the future of the country in the presence of the press and therefore in front of the Argentine people. The PST set forth its positions in an editorial statement in the May 23 issue of its weekly paper, *Avanzada Socialista*.

In the first place it hailed the Peronists' promises to restore political democracy:

"We agree fully with the proposals to guarantee and broaden the liberties and rights granted by the constitution, involving full respect for minorities.

"We hold this position not because at this stage we find ourselves temporarily in a minority. In the revolutionary left, our party is distinguished by its adherence to profoundly democratic principles, which lead us to struggle uncompromisingly for liberation from authoritarianism in all fields, against bureaucratic domination in the unions, imperialist domination of the nation, and capitalist exploitation of the society."

The first step toward the establishment of democratic liberties, the statement said, should be full amnesty for all the political prisoners and com-

plete restitution to workers victimized for their trade-union activities.

Next, the statement called for broadening the area of political democracy:

"We think that in order to extend democratic freedoms changes must be made in the constitution and sanctioned by the sovereign will of the people, that the constitution must be made into an adequate framework for the period of transition to socialism. Calling a constituent assembly is, therefore, one of the most urgent tasks of the new government."

To reverse the decline in the buying power of the workers that occurred under the military dictatorships and conservative governments that followed the overthrow of Perón, the PST called for an immediate across-the-board raise of 50,000 old pesos [about US\$50], and a minimum wage of 150,000 old pesos a month, as well as a sliding scale of wages to compensate for inflation.

Instead of relying on European capital to replace U.S. capital, the PST maintained, the only way to develop the country is through the development of an internal market by raising the living standard of the workers and through internal saving. This requires establishing a state monopoly of foreign trade and repudiating the foreign debt which now totals US\$7,000 million.

"This debt has been contracted by illegitimate or dictatorial governments that had no right to mortgage the future of the entire nation. Strict currency control and nationalizing the banks and foreign trade . . . will enable us to stop the foreign monopolies—both European and American—from draining off the national wealth of the country and the labor of the

workers with impunity as they are doing now."

The statement also called for nationalizing the foreign monopolies. But it stressed: "The workers must be the ones to supervise their functioning. Administration by state-appointed functionaries has proved totally inefficient."

At the Nino meeting, Juan Carlos Coral, the presidential candidate of the PST, repeated these demands, and added:

"We must forcibly repatriate the \$8,000 million that has been taken out of the country through the looting of foreign entrepreneurs and Argen-



JUAN CARLOS CORAL

tine financiers; we must block the monopolies from shipping any profits out of the country."

The PST also demanded a deep-going agrarian reform to solve the problem of four decades of stagnation in the rural economy.

Although the PST statement promised the party's support for all positive measures by the new government, a pledge that was repeated by Coral at the Nino meeting, it expressed basic criticisms of the regime inaugurated May 25.

"If the class alliance advocated by the Peronists led to the great defeat of 1955 for the working class and the country, the cycle may be much shorter this time." The favorable in-

ternational conditions for Argentine national capital achieving a certain freedom of maneuver within the framework of the imperialist system no longer exist, the statement explained. In fact, this time the very conservative forces that originally opposed Perón's reforms are supporting the new government and especially its call for a "social truce."

"Our doubts about the process that began on May 25 are motivated by class feelings and are only the political expression of the doubts of the workers, who see that the same institutions, parties, and personalities that opposed Perón in 1946 and overthrew him in 1955 and collaborated with the succeeding regimes are today supporting Dr. C ampora and acclaiming his recent appeal."

The PST warned emphatically against any "social truce."

"Political instability, social tensions,

struggle, and violence are the results of the economic system we live under. Therefore, we cannot agree to any truce with the Sociedad Rural [the big landowners organization], the CGE [Confederaci n General Econ mica—General Business Federation], the Uni n Industrial Argentina [Argentine Manufacturers' Association], or the monopolies, unless they stop exploiting the workers and the country. Hence our position and our advice to the workers must be brief and to the point: Don't let down your guard while the oligarchy and imperialism are still intact. And this means fighting for the profound structural changes that alone can bring peace to the society."

In his speech at the Nino, Coral pointed out that only a government directly representing the workers would be able to implement consistently the basic changes the PST calls for. □

Interview With Nahuel Moreno

Positions Taken by the Political Parties During May 22 Meeting With Campora

[The following is an interview with Nahuel Moreno, a leader of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party), on the May 22 meeting in the Nino Restaurant in Buenos Aires called by President H ctor C ampora and attended by all the country's political parties. The interview was published in the May 30 issue of the PST's weekly, *Avanzada Socialista*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. What was the stand taken by the various organizations at the Nino Restaurant?

Answer. On the one side, there were the pro-Peronists or out-and-out servile forces like Alende, Ramos, Sandler, and, though he voiced greater concern, Sueldo. All they did was praise the sound judgment, the wisdom, and the profundity of C ampora and Per n.

The newspapers said that they raised objections or made criticisms,

but we saw no opposition, only advice.

On the other side, there were the sectors that put forward ideas. Aside from C ampora, these were the Radicals, Thedy, Bravo, the Sapag, the Communist party, and our party.

Q. What was the position of the bourgeois parties?

A. The Radicals put forward a consistent, bourgeois-type position, underlining the need for democratic free play so that the bourgeoisie could work out its differences and paralyze the violence that is going on. They claimed that this has been the position of the Radical party for years.

Thedy, along with Bravo, maintained that unity and a truce on social and political struggle were *indispensable* and that the organizations on which national unity would be based had to give credit to important sectors of the armed forces that deserved it, that is, Lanusse.

Sapag called for federalism, which would serve the interests of the bourgeoisie in the provinces.

From the point of view of the right, these were the most enthusiastic supporters of the truce and Campora's five points.

Q. What about the left-wing forces?

A. On the left (and this must be clear in view of the false reports that appeared in the bourgeois press), both the Communist party and our party rejected the five points and the truce.

The Communist party put forward its traditional position of national uni-

ty with the progressive bourgeoisie, which it calls only "progressives" because it can't bring itself to call them by their real name. Still, it must be said that within this general approach, without beating around the bush, it did in fact reject the five points and, basically, the proposals on a "truce" and those for "national reconstruction."

Our party's position is clearly laid out in the document that we issued and in the speech by Companero Corral. □

Sectarian Approach Taken by Peronist Youth

Lessons of March on Villa Devoto Prison

[The following article analyzes the events outside Villa Devoto Prison in Buenos Aires May 25 that brought about the release of all the political prisoners. Some 50,000 persons surrounded the prison, forcing newly installed President Hector Campora to declare an immediate pardon. (See *Intercontinental Press*, June 11, p. 691.)

[The article was published in the May 30 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST — Socialist Workers party). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Following the mobilization in the Plaza de Mayo, the Peronist Youth initiated a march that was crowned with a clear triumph: the release of the Villa Devoto political prisoners and the presidential pardon.

The next day, it continued by organizing other street demonstrations in which all the political youth organizations participated.

This positive outcome, which serves as an example of what mobilizations can achieve, must not allow us to forget errors that prejudice the winning of new gains.

The problem of the prisoners, like that of the nationalizations or the rehiring of militants that have been fired, is not a task for the youth alone, however important the youth sector

may be. It is a problem that belongs to all sectors that claim to be anti-imperialist and revolutionary.

The Peronist Youth Refuses to Coordinate the Struggles

For months the Peronist Youth has consistently refused to undertake joint actions with the various left-wing currents in order to bring about the release of the prisoners. It proceeded with the same sectarian approach in the case of the march on Villa Devoto: It refused to organize it in common, or to state the time and place, thereby forcing those who wanted to take part to first go to the Plaza de Mayo and go along with the organization and program of the Peronist Youth. We who are not prepared to cast our principles aside found ourselves obliged to go as individuals. Other left-wing groups submitted to this criterion and played a regrettable role. First, they got lost in the Plaza de Mayo. Second, they formed a small group. And finally they ended up chanting or going along with Peronist slogans.

The Peronist Youth had no difficulties in allowing the left-wing groups that acted in such a fashion to join in. This is all a step forward, since on other occasions this has not happened. For this reason, its attitude of allowing various sectors to join its march, even though only under its own leadership, is a positive move.

Lack of Political Coordination Facilitates Desperate Adventures

At Villa Devoto, two companeros were killed, shot from inside the prison when they attempted to break down the doors. A delay in releasing the last batch of prisoners brought on this action, which was desperate and unnecessary in view of the fact that they were being freed as a result of the pressure that was being exerted.

Two days later, the Peronist Youth put out a statement blaming "provocateurs" for the deaths, accusing them of having disrupted what was an act of support to the government and pointing out that they were not going to allow any repeat of this kind of thing.

This is a very dangerous statement. First of all, it is true that this assault on the prison doors was, on this occasion, unnecessary, and more than that a desperate adventure. But along with pointing this out, it is necessary to condemn, before anyone else, the police, who do not hesitate to indiscriminately open fire on our youth. Who gave this criminal order?

Oddly enough, many of the prisoner companeros for whom the Peronist Youth mobilized were arrested for actions that were as adventurist as the ones that the Peronist Youth are now condemning. How is it possible, within the space of one day, for the "provocateurs" and not those who shoot them down to become the enemy?

Second, the march on Devoto, like the mobilizations the following day, were not acts of support to the government. We respect the fact that the Peronist Youth sees it that way, and we accept the fact that this is their approach. But in fact the actions were, and must be, joint actions to free prisoners who come from different organizations. For this reason the actions needed to be coordinated and organized by agreement on common slogans and objectives. Not doing this increased the possibility that one or more tendencies would carry out a desperate or provocative action.

Finally, the statement that in the future it is not going to allow this type of action shows the sectarianism of the Peronist Youth. It does not understand that it is not a mass organization, that it cannot claim to be an organization representing any

major section of the population. It does not understand that it is only a tendency of the youth, and one, moreover, that is heterogeneous, and lacks any clearly defined program and goals. The Peronist Youth does not understand that, whatever its positive intentions may be, it will be completely impossible for it to impose any anti-imperialist, revolutionary measure (nationalizations, elimination of the union bureaucracy) without acting in a coordinated fashion with left-wing sectors and the working class, of which we are a part. An example was the beating they took outside the Nino [restaurant] when they attempted to confront the armed bands of the union bureaucracy.

By not understanding this, the Peronist Youth, and many of its honest militants, fall into the same domineering approach used by the union bureaucracy: They refuse to discuss democratically and coordinate actions in a

framework of mutual political respect.

The action on May 26 outside the Congress could have been an example of such an approach, yet again the Peronist Youth resorted to the same method. This time it refused to mobilize, and as a result the participation of its members was very poor.

These examples do nothing to aid in carrying out the immense task facing the youth. There are soldiers who are still being held prisoner and there are thousands of activists who have been fired and who must be rehired. It is these immediate tasks, together with the nationalizations and workers control, that are waiting to be carried out. We must continue along the path opened up by the youth of the capital and Greater Buenos Aires in order to win the release of the prisoners and the abolition of the repressive laws. To do this, unity of action agreed upon loyally and democratically will be necessary. □

much less with the meaning of the Cordobazo."

The Córdoba uprising had nonetheless been celebrated, stressed *Avanzada Socialista*, by the spontaneous militancy demonstrated in Buenos Aires when C ampora took office, bringing the mass upsurge that started in the provincial cities at last to the Argentine capital itself.

In C ordoba, the anniversary could not go uncelebrated, and demonstrations marked a still rising militancy and political consciousness.

More than 20,000 workers and students gathered in a rally at the corner of Arturo M. Bas and the Boulevard San Juan. From 10:00 a.m. groups from the various trade unions began showing up.

"Just after 12:30, a SMATA [Sindicato de Mec nicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor—Union of Automotive Machinists and Allied Trades] contingent arrived, with 2,500 *compa eros* marching behind red flags and pictures of Lenin, Trotsky, and Mao carried by the left tendencies.

Peronists Try to Tone Down Militancy

20,000 Celebrate First Cordobazo

The C ordoba uprising on May 29, 1969, was the culmination of a series of explosions in the provincial industrial cities of Argentina that were touched off initially by brutal government repression of a student protest.

The pitched battles in the center of the Argentine automotive industry marked the beginning of the end of the military dictatorship, showing the capitalists unmistakably that the policy of naked repression had failed to intimidate the workers and students and was creating the conditions for a generalized revolutionary explosion. The junta set a conciliatory course, which led it, after a new uprising in C ordoba in August 1971, to decide to turn power back to a civilian government.

Appropriately, the fourth anniversary of the Cordobazo came just four days after the installation of the new civilian government. But although this uprising started the process that brought him to power, the new president, H ector C ampora, devoted to it only a sentence in a two-and-a-half hour inauguration speech.

"How could the direct beneficiary of the process opened by the Cordobazo make such a crying oversight?" the May 30 issue of *Avanzada Socialista* asked in a special supplement on the anniversary of the rising. The weekly organ of the PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—Socialist Workers party) continued:

"We think that in politics there are no accidental lapses of memory, or as Mart n Fierro [the hero of the Gaucho epic of the same name] said, 'forgetting is a kind of remembering.'

"C ampora is doing the same thing as the CGT [Confederaci n General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor], the Juventud Peronista [Peronist Youth] itself, and the capitalist parties. None has marked the anniversary by proposing militant demonstrations.

"Their call for a 'social and political truce' is contrary to the meaning of the Cordobazo struggle. Anyone who is for this truce cannot be for the Cordobazo. Anyone who is for unity with all the sectors of exploiters cannot identify with this anniversary,

"At about 1:00 we saw the demonstration coming from Ferreyra with 1,500 more *compa eros*. There were the flags of the Sindicato de Perkins [Perkins Plant Union], SITRAC [Sindicato de Trabajadores Concord—Concord Plant Workers Union], an immense PST banner, and the banners of the Frente de los Trabajadores [Workers Front] and other trade-union and political tendencies."

The most impressive sign of growing worker militancy was the participation of workers of the Concord and Materfer plants. These workers walked out of their plants "in spite of the armed opposition of the Uni n Obrera Metal rgica [Metalworkers Union], which is the union recognized in both plants by the government but not by the workers. At Concord the strike was led by a new council of shop stewards, which ousted by force the council imposed by the bureaucracy. On Tuesday, a new mass assembly had to choose between two conflicting motions: The first was to march to the rally; the second was to stop work for just half an hour. The first won by a very large majority.

"At Materfer, the activists faced up determinedly to the armed goons of the Uni n Obrera Metal rgica, shut down the factory, and led their *compa eros* in the march to the rally.

"The column formed up at Perkins, where the people took the lead, stopping buses, trucks, and cars to transport the workers to the rally, which was about five kilometers away. All these vehicles came covered with banners and flags."

Cuban President Dorticós was the keynote speaker. He was greeted with "an indescribable clamor." As Fidel's representative evoked the memory of Che Guevara, "a Cuban and Argentine revolutionist," the crowd shouted: "Cuba va del brazo con el Cordobazo!" (Cuba marches arm in arm with the Cordobazo.)

Responding to the mass of workers, Dorticós said: "Yes, compañeros, Cuba marches arm in arm with the Cordobazo; Cuba followed it very closely and was aware of its great importance for the working class and the people in general." Cuba's official representative added: "I want everyone here to swear to continue the fight against imperialism until we wipe it out."

A different kind of reception was given to Atilio López, a cool one, although he is one of the most popular lieutenants of Perón in the union movement. In the first place, he was expected to make some important announcements but as it turned out he had nothing to offer. In the second place, he tried to convert the rally into a mere celebration of the new government's taking office: "Today is a day of joy because we can say that four days after coming to power the people's government has set out on the road to liberating us."

Representatives of the guerrilla organizations spoke, but the speaker for the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Army of the People] was met with whistles from the Peronists, who tried also to drown out what was said by singing their party songs.

The speech of René Salamanca, general secretary of SMATA, a leftist union independent of the Peronist bureaucracy, was also jeered by the Peronist party faithful. Salamanca called on the workers to remain mobilized until national and social liberation were won.

But when a representative of the conservative labor group, "The Sixty-two Organizations Loyal to Perón," tried to speak, the class-struggle union tendencies and the left joined in a chorus to drown him out.

A Peronist deputy who promised that the newly elected representatives would carry out their promises was met with shouts of "Que cumpla el diputado, que cumpla el concejal, si no la clase obrera los va a hacer cagar." ("The deputies and councilmen had better keep their promises, or else the working class will make them crap in their pants.")

Although the ceremony was supposed to end with the rally, about 4,000 participants led by the class-struggle unionists from Perkins and the left marched to the center of the city. When they reached the downtown area, they were addressed by a woman member of the PST, who told them that one of the accomplishments of the Cordobazo was its having opened up the way for the development of the class-struggle union tendencies, which was started by SITRAC-SITRAM. The latest continuation of this process, she said, was the rise of the new leadership at Perkins, and she called on these leaders to address the crowd.

* * *

On the day after the anniversary of the Cordobazo, the bureaucratized Peronist union federation, the CGT, opened its convention. The PST issued the following statement:

"This convention is the opposite in every way of what was represented by the rebellion of the people of Córdoba in May 1969.

"The Cordobazo changed the history of the country, ushering in a new stage of struggles that won concession after concession from the capitalist system and the military dictatorship. This convention will only try to limit the workers mobilizations and make a deal with the bosses, represented essentially by the Confederación General Económica [General Business Federation].

"The Cordobazo had at its head the most self-sacrificing fighters of the working class and of the people, and it meant the direct exercise of democracy by the masses who occupied the city. In this convention, the most select bureaucrats in the country, undemocratically appointed and for the most part repudiated by the workers, are meeting to discuss an agenda unknown to the workers.

"The Cordobazo was an example, an impetus, and a road to which all the exploited must turn. This convention of the CGT is the synthesis of all that we have to eradicate in the workers movement—bureaucracy and antidemocratic methods.

"This is why the CGT did not call for commemorating the 1969 rebellion nor dedicate this convention to the memory of those who died in it. The mobilization of the working class will lead sooner or later to returning the CGT to the workers, and then the memory of these fallen compañeros will permeate the building on the Azopardo [CGT headquarters] as a continual call to struggle." □

Organized Workers Movement Stayed Home

May 25: Buenos Aires Took to Streets

[The following article on the May 25 inauguration of Argentine President Héctor Cámpora was published in the May 30 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

What went on May 25 in the Congress and outside the government house, in the demonstrations in the downtown area, and in the column

of thousands of persons who went to Devoto Prison to free the prisoners, were scenes like nothing Buenos Aires has seen in the last seven years. Nevertheless, the main actor in the great demonstrations of the Peronist movement and of the resistance to the dictatorship—the organized workers movement—was absent. Its absence was reflected in the slogans, in the objectives, and in the strength of the popular mobilizations.

When all the rest of the country was being shaken by rebellions in

the interior, beginning with the Cordobazo, political activists were asking themselves the question: "When is Buenos Aires going to join in?" Thus we saw rebellion after rebellion, a chain of mobilizations in the streets that stretched from Tucumán in the north to General Roca in the south, while in the streets of the capital reigned a social peace that was imposed by the menacing presence of the repressive forces and by the apparatus of the trade-union bureaucracy.

This May 25 we saw the chiefs of the repression making a retreat, negotiating with the Peronist Youth, and handing over to them the task of maintaining order with a crowd that they could not control. We saw how the church was unable to do its *Te Deum*, how the military could not stage its parade. We saw the heads of the armed forces helplessly enduring the insults of people expressing their hatred for the armed branch of the exploiters. We saw the banners of the guerrilla organizations that were mercilessly hunted down until only yesterday waving outside the Congress, at the Pink House, and even on the walls of Villa Devoto Prison. We saw a column of thousands of demonstrators surrounding the prison, freely carrying on a dialogue with the prisoners, and getting the Peronist leadership to agree to free them.

We also saw how the forces of repression, even as they were retreating, did not refrain from firing their weapons and producing new victims among the people's fighters.

What is new is this: After long years, though still on a small scale, the people in Buenos Aires began to make use of the only method by which the workers and the people can attain the goals they have set for themselves—active mobilization and taking to the streets to debate in action the question of who holds power. This is how the workers and students in the interior won an end to the wage freeze, the introduction of democratic freedoms, the calling of elections, and the agreement to go along with a Peronist victory. This is how the military dictatorship was defeated. And this is the way the struggle must continue if new gains are to be won at the expense of imperialism, the oligarchy, and the bosses.

But the great shortcoming of the meeting and the demonstrations was the absence of the organized workers movement. Most of the participants were not workers but students or persons from the middle class. Unfortunately, there was nothing like the huge worker actions of the Peronist movement, such as the one in 1946 when the working class won the Christmas bonus and other benefits and filled the streets of the city.

The contingents of participants from the unions were pitiful. The steelworkers numbered less than 2,000; they were practically lost in the crowd. There were fewer than 1,000 textile workers. The turnout from most of the unions amounted to no more than a poster surrounded by a handful of people.

The union bureaucrats limited themselves to calling a few assemblies and renting buses. But this is not enough nowadays to mobilize the workers. After so many years of betrayals and sellouts, no one is prepared to take to the streets just because some executive board says it should be done. And even less if the mobilization does not set itself the goal of obtaining solutions to the most pressing problems of the working class: wages, high prices, unemployment. In addition, the workers do not have complete confidence in a government they supported with their votes but whose candidates were not selected on the basis of any consultations with the rank-and-file workers.

Imagine what would have happened if a million workers had taken to the street demanding an immediate increase in wages, nationalization of the monopolies, and the rehiring of all the *compañeros* who were fired for leading the struggles that ended up by bringing down the dictatorship. Imagine if the hundreds of workers who are occupying the EMA and Lozadur factories had been present, demanding solutions to the problems they face, and if the personnel at Citroën and Peugeot, and the packing-house workers, had mobilized to demand the rehiring of those who were fired. Imagine thousands of other examples like these, examples that are occurring every day.

But this did not happen. The workers limited themselves to following the events on television—with great joy, but passively. This was reflected in

the slogans at the action: They ridiculed the gorillas and the military, and urged long life to "Uncle Cámpora," but there were none directed against the bosses and the oligarchy or pressing for working-class goals.

Lessons of May 25

The Peronist Youth did not attempt to fill this gap by raising issues for which it has itself been fighting, with the exception of the demand for freeing the political prisoners. Thus, between the sabotage (conscious or unconscious) of the bureaucracy and the absence of an organization to put forward a workers program, the net result of the mobilizations—in spite of the fact that they pushed the problem of the prisoners much further than seemed to be in the official script—was to give a blank check to the Justicialist government. It is a blank check that the workers did not sign—not the municipal workers who have embarked on a course of struggle, nor the state workers in Santa Fe with their barricades, nor those in San Luis, who twice occupied the government house.

These mobilizations are pointing to what is coming inevitably: more and more struggles by the exploited against the bosses, imperialism, and leaders who have sold out. If we are to be prepared for this, the good and bad sides of May 25 must be pointed out. On the positive side: It showed that the streets belong to the people when they decide to take them over with their own forces, and that just as the mobilization won the release of the political prisoners, many additional goals could have been achieved by continuing along this path. On the negative side: The working class is still not making itself felt because of the failures of the union leaderships and because there is still no recognized organization that expounds its needs and knows how to present them in a clear and concrete way.

From now on there will be a new field of struggle for the workers of the capital and Greater Buenos Aires who, since the Cordobazo, have been struggling for their demands on the factory level. Like their class brothers, the workers in the interior, they will now take to the streets in their struggle

for nationalizations, to impose workers control over the books and to find out company profits, to win an immediate wage increase, to get rid of the traitorous leaderships ensconced in the unions, and to get those who

have been fired rehired.

In order to prepare for these future and imminent struggles, the workers must organize and fortify a powerful organization—the revolutionary party of the Argentine working class. □

Thieu, Sihanouk Disturb Nixon's Plans

Indochina 'Peace' Talks Bogged Down

Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho unexpectedly broke off their talks in Paris June 9 without issuing a communiqué or signing a new document on "implementing" the January 27 Vietnam cease-fire agreement. Kissinger flew back to Washington. He was expected to return to Paris June 12 to continue his talks with the North Vietnamese negotiator.

By all accounts, the break in the discussions resulted from a repeat of last year's performance by Saigon dictator Nguyen Van Thieu, whose objections to a proposed agreement served as Nixon's excuse to delay signing it in order to launch massive air attacks on North Vietnam and force additional concessions from the Vietnamese liberation fighters.

Thieu is reported to be objecting to allowing the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam to exercise political control over the areas it holds militarily. That is, he interprets the January 27 agreement as requiring the PRG to sit by while he runs the entire country for the benefit of U.S. imperialism.

Meanwhile, the puppet army is continuing its attacks on areas held by the PRG. On June 10, fighting in South Vietnam reached its highest level since mid-February. The largest battle was reported near Lai Khe, thirty-five miles north of Saigon, where Thieu's forces, backed by tanks and planes, attacked a section of highway held by the PRG since the 1972 offensive.

An indication of the extent of Thieu's violations of the cease-fire agreement was provided by Fox Butterfield in a dispatch to the June 10 *New York Times*. He wrote that "almost all of the 300 villages that the Communists took over at the end of January, shortly before and just after the peace agreement, have been recaptured by South Vietnamese Government troops."

Nixon is under considerable pressure to come up with an agreement to offset several Congressional votes against the bombing of Cambodia and the widespread opposition to the continuation of the war that those votes reflect. Prior to the opening of the latest talks June 6, administration spokesmen implied that the Kissinger-Tho negotiations would settle all outstanding problems if Congress only "held firm" and allowed Nixon to go on bombing. A failure now to reach any agreement at all would increase

the likelihood of Congress passing legislation leaving no loopholes for continued bombing.

While there have been recurrent rumors in the U.S. press of future negotiations between Norodom Sihanouk and the puppet "government" in Pnompenh, Sihanouk has repeatedly said that no such talks are in prospect.

Reuters reported June 4, however, that in an interview in Algiers Sihanouk said he had made peace proposals to Nixon through an unnamed African government. Sihanouk said his proposals called for U.S. recognition of his government and withdrawal of its support to Lon Nol. He added that he was willing to be lenient with Nixon's Cambodian employees:

"So far as the traitors of Phompenh are concerned, about ten of them—including Lon Nol—could be transported to a Western country, it doesn't matter which. They have enough money in foreign banks. As for the other traitors, we promise a general amnesty." □

Demand Repeal of Paragraph 218

Bonn Marchers Demand Right to Abortion

More than 2,000 persons demonstrated in Bonn June 2, demanding repeal of paragraph 218 of the criminal code, which outlaws abortion. Bonn was chosen for the demonstration because the Bundestag is considering proposals for the reform of the abortion law.

The demonstration was called by a wide range of women's groups and political organizations. The action was seen as a response to a vocal "right to life" movement organized by the Catholic church. Pointing to such features of West German society as unwanted children in orphanages and unsuitable living conditions for children, the call to the demonstration asked: "When have these self-appointed defenders of the life of the unborn ever defended existing life?"

A leaflet distributed by the Gruppe

Internationale Marxisten (GIM—International Marxist Group, German section of the Fourth International) to build the action pointed out that the proposals for reform were the result of the struggles of the women's movement:

"When we fight the abortion law, we are fighting the right of the state to control our lives. It is only because of the untiring struggle of women that the parliament now feels forced to liberalize paragraph 218. We cannot rely on the rulers to 'give' us legal abortion; they know too well what is at stake."

"It is the duty of every revolutionary organization," the leaflet concluded, "to show its solidarity with women and to support their struggle. Only a strong women's movement can free women from their oppression." □

New Workers Bodies Challenge Reformists

By Hugo Blanco

Santiago

The cordones industriales [assemblies of rank-and-file workers in a local industrial concentration] are new bodies that have emerged from the rise in combativity on the part of the Chilean workers. They involve workers in a particular area by organizing them on a geographical basis, rather than in terms of the branch of industry they may work in. (See *Intercontinental Press* June 11, p. 706.)

The reformists, especially the Communist party, have taken a hostile attitude toward these bodies from the very start. The reason is clear: They are dynamic bodies that elude the control of the Central Unica de Trabajadores [CUT — Workers Central Union], whose leadership is reformist — for the most part Communist. The reformists accuse the cordones of being "illegal," "unconstitutional," etc.

Nevertheless, the reformists have had to change their tactics as the workers have ignored their evaluation and have begun to regard the cordones as their own vanguard organization, around which they unite during critical moments. In recent months, the reformists have been talking about the cordones, but by referring to them as bodies that ought to be under the authority of the CUT.

Now that the Chilean process initiated by the Popular Unity is in a state of retreat, the cordones are standing out as the main focus of resistance. In view of the seriousness of the situation Chile is going through, preparations are being made for a meeting of all the cordones industriales and the comandos comunales (Community Commands—bodies that involve squatters and peasants as well as workers) in Santiago Province.

The Cerrillos Cordón is planning to hold a community meeting prior to the provincial meeting. It was during a meeting called to help organize this meeting that the new tactic of the CP toward the cordones could be seen in action.

The report by the president of the

cordón went more or less as follows: "The cordones are nuclei of popular power and must be developed because the government is locked into the framework of bourgeois institutions, which prevents it from thoroughly confronting the bourgeoisie; as for the state bureaucracy, it leaves much to be desired, and we can state that it is in the service of the bourgeoisie.

"Beginning September 4, 1970, there



SALVADOR ALLENDE

has been an intensification of the class struggle, but in spite of this the government has made concessions to the bourgeoisie. The cordones must be restructured and reorganized and must extend their activities and their propaganda and struggle to take control of the economy out of the hands of the bourgeoisie by nationalizing the monopolies and introducing the direct distribution of goods.

"The perspective of civil war is being constantly posed, and the only way to avoid it is to prepare for it, not to go around collecting signatures [a direct reference to the approach of

the CP]. Preparations for civil war must be made."

The position of the CP, expressed by CUT delegates and certain union leaders, hinged around the following points:

"We have major organizations that cannot be ignored. The CUT is the body of all the workers, and it must be represented in the cordones. . . . Parallel organizations are being created out of a desire not to be under the jurisdiction of the CUT. . . . We agree that the meeting should take place, but the statutes and norms of the CUT must be respected. Let the CUT issue the call for the meeting and we will put out the publicity for it. . . .

"Attendance should be restricted to union representatives; the comandos comunales, the JAP [Juntas de Abastecimiento y Control de Precios—Supply and Price Control Boards], students, etc., should be excluded. . . . It is true that the community CUT is not functioning, but it is not necessary to create parallel bodies. . . . The community CUT should be reorganized and the representatives of other groups should join in discussions with the CUT."

Workers representatives who were not from the CP responded:

"The cordones are not trying to be parallel bodies. The cordones industriales and the comandos comunales sprang up in the face of the inactivity of the CUT. . . . What did the leaders of the CUT do in October? [This is a reference to the national crisis brought on by the bosses' strike]. . . Without consulting anybody the CUT approved the plan for the Social Sector of the economy [a plan drawn up by Minister of the Economy Orlando Millas (a CPer), which includes giving back to their former owners many factories that were taken over by the workers and have been temporarily nationalized]. . . .

"All the mass organizations must take part in the meeting. There must be an effort to achieve unity among all the squatters, peasants, and workers, because there are even workers who are not in the CUT. . . . We must struggle for the solid unity of all the workers against the bosses. We must struggle together with all the exploited to build real power of the people. . . .

"It is true that the bosses are preparing for civil war, but the only way

to prevent it is for us to prepare for it. . . . Extremism is bad, but there will be extremism as long as there is reformism. . . . There is no reason to get alarmed over talk about a bureaucracy since we all know that there is one. . . ."

Then representatives of political parties took the floor. Basically, there was agreement among the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria — Movement of the Revolutionary Left), the MAPU (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria — Movement for United Popular Action), the PSR (Partido Socialista Revolucionario — Revolutionary Socialist party, Chilean section of the Fourth International), the Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left), and the PCR (Partido Comunista Revolucionario — Revolutionary Communist party) on the following:

"Workers control and popular power must be developed. Confronted with a vacuum of leadership, the working class filled it by creating the cordones. All organizations of the people must take part in the meeting because the problems that are going to be taken up affect everyone. Signatures alone will not be enough to deal with the preparation by the bosses for civil war; the workers must be prepared to meet this eventuality."

The Socialist party (whose positions depend largely upon which delegate happens to be representing it at any given time) defended the "government of the workers," although it admitted that it had shown a lack of decisiveness. It agreed that all popular organizations should take part in the meeting "because there must be a deepening of the mobilizations and of the revolution."

In general, the CP put forward the following line: "Only union leaders should be invited to the meeting. The CUT is the only body representing the workers. The cordones must not hamper the work of the CUT. Civil war must be avoided because it can be avoided. More must be produced in order to solve the problem of the supply of goods. There must be more voluntary labor."

The president of the cordón then spoke again: "The battle for production can only be won if workers control is extended to all factories—for example, to those that supply raw materials to many of the factories that have been taken over. Take as example the FENSA and FANTUSI factories: One is closed down and the

other on the verge of being closed because of a shortage of raw materials due to the bosses' boycott.

"The cordones came into being as an expression of the will of the class. All popular organizations must be invited to the meeting because production and distribution concern peasants and squatters just as much as industrial workers. . . ."

"In Maipú there is a shortage of agricultural products because, of the sixty existing ranches, only five have been expropriated. . . . The aims of the cordón are not limited, and for this reason all the workers and the exploited in general must take part in the meeting."

The maneuvers of the CUT and CP

representatives came to nought. The gathering decided by acclamation to organize the meeting along the lines proposed by the executive board.

In spite of this, there is not much reason for optimism. The statements of the cordones have, generally speaking, always been correct, but unfortunately they now only involve vanguard sectors which will tend to grow increasingly smaller unless a thoroughgoing campaign is undertaken to involve all the rank and file. The problem is not one of making fine statements; it is one of organization and propaganda. It is to be hoped that the next meeting of the cordones will be an important step toward overcoming this weakness. □

A Look at a Worker-Run Plant

How Chilean Workers Organize Production

[The following interview with leaders of the worker-run Perlak factory in Santiago, Chile, was obtained for *Intercontinental Press* in May. The translation from the Spanish is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. Your factory is considered to be in the vanguard of the Cerillos Cordón [a cordón is an assembly of rank-and-file workers in a local industrial concentration]. What does it produce?

Answer. While in the hands of the bosses, it produced canned tomatoes and containers for canned goods. Now that it has been intervened and the workers take part in running it, we also produce high-protein children's foods at a cost that is much lower than that of the imperialist companies like Nestlé. We view this as a way of supporting our people, but unfortunately our product is not publicized the way it ought to be.

Q. How is the plant run?

A. Since it was intervened on June 30, 1972, it has had an administrative council composed of three production workers and two office workers, all elected by the rank and file. As you

know, in most of the industries that have been intervened, the administrative council has no executive power; this is generally in the hands of the interventor, who is appointed not by the ranks but by the authorities.

In our case, however, the administrative council is part of a coordinating council, which also includes a union commission (consisting of three members each from the production workers union and the office workers union) and the executive boards of the nine different sections (with five or six members per section). Each section holds weekly meetings.

This coordinating council has executive authority. Yet important matters are decided in general assemblies.

Q. How do you view the involvement of the workers in the plants that have been intervened?

A. In our view, it is inadequate, since the agreement between the government and the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores — Workers Central Union] stipulates that final decisions do not rest with the workers but are taken by officials who are not elected by the ranks. We are for workers management in the state-owned industries.

Q. Why was the factory intervened,

and how did the Cerrillos Cordón come about?

A. From the moment the Popular Unity government took office, the bosses began to boycott production in glaring fashion. Tomatoes, which are the main raw material that we use, must be purchased in the spring and stocked for the entire year. Annually, the factory used to buy 7 to 7.5 million kilos. Then it went down to 5 million, and in January 1972 to only 3 million kilos.

We already knew what a decrease in production meant for us because in October 1970 they stopped making containers, and the result was that fourteen compañeros were laid off.

In view of this, we decided to take over the factory. At the time there were 160 compañeros; today there are more than 200. All the workers agreed on the take-over — not just those who support the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria — Movement of the Revolutionary Left], the Socialists, and the independents, but even the Communists, in spite of their party's line. Representatives of every sector spoke during the take-over.

The week we took over the firm, an order came down to evacuate it. However, at that point, two other struggles were going on in the zone — the one at Polycrón, which began before ours, and the one in Las Américas Aluminum, which began afterwards. In order to deal with these problems, the workers in the factories in the area organized the "Workers Command of the Cerrillos Cordón" on June 27, 1972, in response to a call issued by the Socialist party. On June 30, the government had to intervene the industry.

This is the most active of the cordones. The Vicuña Mackena Cordón came into existence in August, the Macul Cordón following the bosses' strike last October, and subsequently those of the Central Railroad Station and Panamericana Norte.

Q. What were the activities of the cordón prior to and during the bosses' strike?

A. Before October, we had to take over the ministry offices, demanding the dismissal of an interventor, protesting against the attempt to turn companies back to their owners, and

supporting the Vicuña Mackena compañeros, who were involved in a struggle.

During the October strike, the cordón organized people's markets. The workers organized to guarantee the supply and distribution of goods, and the vigilance committees for the protection of the industries were strengthened. There was a great deal of intense organizational activity on the part of the neighborhood committees, the housewives' committees, etc.

Q. What did the cordón do in response to the Millas Plan to return to their former owners certain firms that had been intervened?

A. The problem of the Millas Plan went hand in hand with some other ones. On or about January 15 of this year, there was a change of interventors that we refused to accept. About the same time, on January 18 and 19, there were two new take-overs in the cordón. We demanded that the Millas Plan be withdrawn, that the Communist minister who proposed it resign, that the Copihue canning plant be intervened, and that a Communist interventor who had dismissed compañeros be removed.

Throughout all this there was a quite obvious class unity among the

workers that overcame their political differences. Along with revolutionary leftists could be seen Communists and even Christian Democrats opposing the Millas Plan. It was also significant that the sight of Allende defending the plan did not succeed in getting the workers to remain silent. They criticized the president's position.

Q. How does the Cordón operate?

A. Unfortunately, it has gone through periods of activity and inactivity, surging forward only during conjunctural periods, just like the other cordones. We are attempting to introduce a certain regularity into its operations by holding weekly meetings. The cordón involves fifteen unions in the zone; they are represented by their leaders.

We are planning to send commissions to nearby shantytowns and peasant areas.

We are also considering the idea of holding cordón meetings inside the factories as a way of interesting the workers more in the operations of the cordón.

There is no denying the fact that something is lacking that is keeping the cordón from really making itself felt among the ranks. We must discuss this problem and find out what it is. □

Interview With Peruvian Student Leader

Latin Student Gathering Sets Revisionist Course

[The following interview with a Peruvian student leader, whose identity is withheld for security reasons, was obtained May 18 for *Intercontinental Press* in Santiago, Chile. The translation from the Spanish is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. Why are you in Santiago?

Answer. I am one of five members of the delegation sent by the Federación de Estudiantes del Perú [FEP — Peruvian Students Federation] to the fifth Congreso Latinoamericano de

Estudiantes [CLAE — Latin American Students Congress], which is being held here May 13-19. The FEP has been a member of the CLAE ever since the first CLAE was held around 1930. I remember that the FEP also took part in the third CLAE, which was held in Uruguay at a time when Cuba was still not taking part. The fourth CLAE was held in Havana, and the head of the FEP delegation then was Rolando Breña, who has now been deported by the Peruvian military junta.

Q. Is the FEP taking part in the present congress?

A. No, the Peruvian delegation is not a participant. The permanent working committee, made up of the Cuban Students Federation, the Presidents' Council of the Chilean Students Federation, the Panamanian Students Federation, and others, did not invite the FEP, which is an organization involving practically the entire university student population in Peru. Instead, they invited SINAMOS [Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social — National System to Support the Social Mobilization], which is a governmental body with paid officials that is dedicated to manufacturing mass support for the government. The delegation is headed up by Antonio Onel, a state official.

We arrived on Sunday, May 13, and immediately went to the Gabriela Mistral Building, which is where the congress is going on. At that point we were told by the permanent working committee: "No one invited you." To which we replied that we did not need any invitation since we were founding members of the CLAE.

We were then told quite flatly: "We know that you are representatives. We know what your thinking is. We do not want there to be any disagreements in the CLAE. We are laying down four conditions for participation: (1) unconditional support to the Cuban revolution and its leaders; (2) unconditional support to the Chilean popular government and the Chilean revolution; (3) unconditional support to the Peruvian revolution led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado; (4) unconditional support to the USSR and its leaders, and recognition of the fact that the USSR is the vanguard of the international Communist movement and the socialist camp."

So there was no room for discussion, and they had us thrown out by the congress "security" people.

In any case, our arrival caught them by surprise, since they thought that the repressive measures that the Peruvian government is taking would make it impossible for us to come.

Q. Which delegations are attending the congress, and which are not?

A. There are delegations from Panama, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, which support the conditions that have been laid down. The delegation from Chile is not representative, according to the Coordinating Committee of Chilean

Students. The Argentine University Federation, the Brazilian University Confederation, and the Ecuador University Students Federation were not admitted. The Uruguay University Students Federation did not come; only a front that agrees with the required conditions did. A doctor is representing Mexico, since there is no university federation in that country.

It should, nevertheless, be pointed out that there are a few delegations that are fighting the reformist positions from the inside: Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and the Bolivian University Confederation. The dele-



JUAN VELASCO ALVARADO

gate from Nicaragua decided not to give the report on his country and instead to use the allotted time to read the letter from the Peruvian delegation. He was stopped halfway through it.

Q. What is your impression of the fifth CLAE?

A. It is not representative of anti-imperialist students, as it claims to be, but is a revisionist congress.

It is not a congress that will aid the struggles for national liberation in Latin America, but rather a congress that reflects the revisionist line of supporting the proimperialist national bourgeoisies in order to hold back struggles for national liberation.

It is a congress that has abandoned

the policy of internationalism for one of peaceful coexistence.

The congress is being held in order to develop strategic unity on dividing the revolutionary and anti-imperialist student movement in every country.

Just to give an idea of the kind of atmosphere in which the congress is going on, we can point out that no journalists are being allowed inside, and people have to go through six checkpoints before they get in. No one is allowed to leave the site of the congress. There is a "guide" who keeps an eye on each delegate. In spite of all these measures, we are managing to break through the barriers and communicate with participants who are waging the struggle.

Q. Could you say something about the struggles of the Peruvian people during the recent period?

A. There has been an escalation of repression.

Two weeks ago, the Frente Popular de los Intereses de Moquegua [Popular Front of Moquegua Concerns] declared a strike of indefinite duration (it lasted five days) in support of the Toquepala miners. The Frente Popular de Defensa de los Intereses de Arequipa [Popular Front to Defend Arequipa Concerns] followed suit, as did those in Puno (for three days), Cusco (one day), and Madre de Dios (one day). These are organizations of production workers, white-collar workers, teachers, students, peasants, etc.

In the north, the Piura regional branch of the SUTEP [Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Enseñanza del Perú — Peru Union of Educational Workers] showed its solidarity with a one-day work stoppage. At the same time, land seizures were carried out by peasants who are opposed to the government.

In the port of Chimbote, the Fishermen's Union, which is one of the most important unions in the country, had been taken over by SINAMOS and the Central de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana [CTRP — Workers Central Union of the Peruvian Revolution], which was artificially organized by the government. The workers threw both of them out and joined the strike. That week, the uniformed police, the Policia de Investigaciones del Perú [PIP — Investigative Police of Peru], and goons from SINAMOS and the

CTRP attacked the union headquarters. One person was killed, and more than fifty fishermen were arrested.

This Tuesday [May 15] there was to be a nationwide strike by SUTEP, the Federación de Empleados Bancarios [FEB — Bank Employees Federation], and the FEP. The strike was called for two reasons: first, to repudiate the presence of Nixon's special envoy, William Rogers, and second, to demand the observance of democratic rights and the return of the compañeros who have been forced into exile—Blanco, Breña, Ricardo Napurí, and Cuentas [general secretary of the Toquepala Miners Union, who had been deported a month before this interview].

At the moment, constitutional guarantees have been suspended in Moquegua, Arequipa, and Puno.

A warrant is out for the arrest of the general secretary of the Puno SUTEP, Augusto Lipa.

Forty student leaders from all over Peru are in prison, mainly in Arequipa, Puno, and Cusco.

There are leaders of SUTEP and peasants from Piura in prison. The SUTEP's general secretary, Zevallos Gámez, is in jail. Antonio Zapata, leader of the Liga Comunista [Communist League], was deported a week ago.

Other prisoners who belong to the Communist League are an architect, an economist from the Pacto Andino [Andean Pact], and eight youth leaders who are not over twenty years old.

Some of these things happened while I was in Peru; the others I subsequently learned about. □



PAPANDREOU: For king and Communists?

Washington Wondering Who Is 'Right Horse'

Greek Junta Shaken by Extent of Navy Plot

"It was a perfect police state until earlier this year," an unidentified Athenian politician told *Newsweek* magazine. "Then came the student demonstrations and the economy began to turn bad. But even these events did not panic the regime. They didn't care as long as they had the support of the armed forces. Now they don't know about the armed forces and they are really frightened."

The arrest of more than 200 naval officers following the smashing of an attempted coup on the night of May 22-23 indicates a deep division within the Greek armed forces, one that has even Papadopoulos's supporters wondering about the dictator's future.

The regime has charged that the naval officers planned to seize the island of Syros and from there demand the resignation of the government. But the June 11 issue of *Newsweek* reported that the plotters had far more ambitious plans:

"The plot . . . called for the navy to seize the island of Crete. Several air-force units were scheduled to fly to an airfield on the newly secured island and announce that they had joined the coup. After that, former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis was to have issued a statement from his Paris

exile calling on the junta to resign."

The West German weekly *Der Spiegel* reported in its June 4 issue that the plotters had counted on support of twenty-three of the navy's most modern ships, including "more than half of the larger warships." The magazine indicated that the navy officers had also won backing from elements of the air force:

"In the view of the [naval] officers it would have been difficult for the regime to allow the best part of its navy to be attacked and sunk. But to meet this risk as well, the navy secured a promise from air force units at the military airfields of Tatoi, Elefsis, and Tanagra that in an emergency no ship would be bombed."

John K. Cooley, in a dispatch to the May 29 *Christian Science Monitor*, also indicated that the plot had been even wider than the regime has admitted:

"There were unconfirmed rumors in Athens May 27 that several more Greek warships, including submarines, had sailed from their bases and refused orders to return. Athens government spokesmen denied this.

"But sources said Tekelia and Elefsis air bases—the latter close to U. S. military and naval installations—

were occupied by special commando forces hand picked for loyalty to Mr. Papadopoulos."

Presumably to offset the military defections with a show of popular support, Papadopoulos promised, in his June 1 speech abolishing the monarchy and creating a "presidential parliamentary republic" with himself as president, a plebiscite on this decision no later than July 29 and parliamentary elections sometime before the end of 1974.

The effect of the plebiscite will be to allow the dictatorship to present opposition to the monarchy—which is widespread—as support for itself.

Not only is the now unemployed Constantine II personally unpopular, but he and his royal ancestors have always shown more loyalty to their British sponsors than to "their" kingdom. The first of the Glucksburg monarchs, George I, was handpicked by the British government in 1863 after a popular rebellion had toppled his likewise handpicked predecessor. The British deposed George's son Constantine I in 1917 because of his pro-German sympathies. And the present Constantine's uncle, George II, returned from London after World War II behind British bayonets and bombs.

None of this will necessarily prevent Constantine from becoming a symbol for the opposition to Papadopoulos, particularly the bourgeois and class-collaborationist sectors of the opposition. In the June 4 *Christian Science Monitor* Cooley speculated hopefully that "Such politically diverse opponents of the colonels as former minister Andreas Papandreou, now a university professor in Toronto, composer Mikis Theodorakis, and the various factions of the illegal Greek Communist Party might rally to the monarchist opposition."

In the present world situation, however, Constantine will be looking for support not to British, but to U.S. imperialism, which has backed Papadopoulos ever since the 1967 coup. Papadopoulos and the bourgeois opposition are now competing at convincing Washington as to their ability to make Greece a reliable NATO "partner."

In a June 2 reply to Papadopoulos — which was read in English and later translated into Greek — Constantine alluded to the present division in the military by expressing his concern that the armed forces "remain fully capable of fulfilling their responsibility to the Atlantic alliance."

The virtual decapitation of the navy and the reports of disaffection in the air force have obviously reduced Papadopoulos's usefulness to U.S. imperialism. Washington will be weighing the dictator's chances of reasserting his control against Constantine's chances of returning to power without opening the opportunity for independent intervention by the masses.

Newsweek described in its report some of the reevaluations going on in the U.S. State Department: "... some U.S. experts were more than a little disturbed by the latest turn of events. In return for keeping its only remaining naval base in the eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. has funneled large amounts of military aid to Athens and conferred a certain amount of respectability on the Athens junta. 'Now,' commented one American analyst, 'we know that the Greek armed forces are deeply unhappy and are therefore an uncertain element. And we are far from certain that Papadopoulos will go through with the plans he announced for elections. In short, we are no longer sure we are on the right horse in Papadopoulos.'" □

Shah's Courts Kill 8, Threaten 7 More

Seven Iranians are on trial for their lives in an "open" trial, according to the June 2 air-mail edition of the semi-official Teheran daily *Ettelatt*. The paper gave their names as Akbar Izad Panah, Nematallah Ayouz Mohammadi, Raheem Banani, Manouchehr Nahavandi, Akbar Kanani, Kourosh Yektai, and Simeen Nahavandi.

The six men and one woman are charged with carrying ammunition, trying to kidnap former U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, armed robbery, car theft, and actions against the security of the state.

The new trial follows the execution of eight persons in Ahwaz, an Arab region in southern Iran. The eight were tried in military court on charges of espionage and treason.

The announcement of their execution by firing squad in the May 28 *Ettelatt* was the first mention of the trials.

The newspaper said that Asoud Maleki, Jari Maleki, Amer Maleki, and Alak Maleki were found with arms in Dashtemeeshan as the army was making the rounds of its southern posts in early April. The four were accused of mining and damaging the road leading to the Taleye army post. *Ettelatt* said that a number of unidentified persons, apparently soldiers, had been killed by the mines.

Abdol Amir Rashedi, Shenaveh Rashedi, and Mahmoud Hoveyzavi were also accused of mining army roads and injuring rural police. In addition, they were charged with contact with foreign agents and providing military information to them. Ghareeb Nourizadeh was accused of contact with foreign agents, providing them with information, and assisting their entry into Iran.

Two more people were executed June 4 in Ahwaz on charges of spying. After their execution, the shah's press reported their names as Abd Mousavi and Yakoub Mousavi. Five other defendants in the same group were given long jail sentences.

In another incident, Colonel L. Hawkins, a U.S. adviser who had been in Iran for ten months, was shot and killed in front of his house in

Teheran June 2 by two persons who escaped on a motorcycle.

U.S. Ambassador Richard Helms — a high CIA official in 1953, when the agency engineered the overthrow of the Mossadegh government, and director of the CIA for seven years before his present assignment — described the killing as a "meaningless murder!"

The shah's officials claimed that the group that had killed Hawkins was involved in the preceding attempt to kidnap the U.S. ambassador. Since this is one of the charges against the seven currently on trial, the government wants to link the two incidents in order to create an atmosphere favorable to further executions.

The World Confederation of Iranian Students issued a statement May 27 in Frankfurt, West Germany, on the report that the seven are being tried in an "open" court. The confederation pointed to the shah's past record of excluding from trials not only reporters and international observers, but even the immediate families of the accused. The confederation called on all international civil liberties organizations to send observers to the current trial.

At a conference of Amnesty International in Geneva May 15, a representative of the confederation addressed the 1,500 participants on the shah's systematic torture of political prisoners. The purpose of the conference was to launch an international campaign against the torture of prisoners. □

And Now the Manzanazo

In a vocational high school in Rosario, Argentina, the principal found the excuse he was waiting for. One of the most prominent student activists, a certain Alberto, had committed a punishable offense.

Passing the school kitchen, Alberto saw an apple. He picked it up and ate it, and was thereafter expelled as a thief. That happened in April, according to the June 7 *Avanzada Socialista*.

That was the start of the Manzanazo, the Apple uprising, that forced the administration to its knees. All the students went on strike, demonstratively eating apples.

Nixon's Defenses Falling One by One

By Allen Myers

"We don't want the President linked to this thing with his signature on paper . . ." presidential assistant Tom Huston wrote to White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman in July 1970. "All hell would break loose if this thing leaks out."

"This thing" was a comprehensive plan of illegal espionage and harassment directed against U. S. citizens and foreign embassies. The plan was prepared by the Interagency Committee on Intelligence, a top-level espionage group set up by Nixon in June 1970.

In his May 22 statement on Watergate, Nixon referred briefly to the plan, admitting that he had approved it but claiming that he had rescinded his approval five days later because of objections from J. Edgar Hoover, then director of the FBI.

The plan and related papers were among the documents that presidential counsel John Dean removed from his office safe and turned over to the Watergate grand jury when he was fired by Nixon April 30. Three of the papers were obtained by the *New York Times* and published June 7.

'This Technique Is Clearly Illegal'

The first meeting of the interagency committee took place in the White House on June 5, 1970. Present at the meeting in addition to Nixon, Huston, Haldeman, and Hoover were John D. Ehrlichman, Nixon's top domestic adviser; Admiral Noel Gayler, director of the National Security Agency; Lieutenant General Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and Richard Helms, director of the CIA.

The group's recommendations were sent to Nixon in early July. On July 15, Huston wrote a memorandum announcing that all the recommendations had been approved. These included expanded spy operations in five areas: wiretapping of international telephone calls; "electronic surveillance" of U. S. radicals and foreign

embassies; illegal opening of mail; "surreptitious entry"; and use of undercover agents on campuses.

The committee made no bones about the fact that their proposals were illegal. "Covert [mail] coverage is illegal and there are serious risks involved," one section noted. "However, the advantages to be derived from its use outweigh the risks."

Of "surreptitious entry," the committee's report said:

"Use of this technique is clearly illegal: it amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion.

"The F. B. I., in Mr. Hoover's younger days, used to conduct such operations with great success and no exposure. The information secured was invaluable. . . .

"Surreptitious entry of facilities occupied by subversive elements can turn up information about identities, methods of operation, and other invaluable investigative information which is not otherwise obtainable. This technique would be particularly helpful if used against the Weathermen and Black Panthers."

In his July 15 memorandum, Huston wrote:

"The President has carefully studied the special report . . . and made the following decisions:

"National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 6 . . . is to be interpreted to permit N. S. A. to program for coverage the communications of U. S. citizens using international facilities [i. e., telephones].

"The intelligence community is directed to intensify coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the internal security. Also, coverage of foreign nationals and diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the intelligence community is to be intensified.

"Restrictions on legal coverage [of mail] are to be removed, restrictions on covert [illegal] coverage are to be relaxed to permit use of this technique on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest.

"Restrains on the use of surreptitious entry are to be removed. The technique is to be used to permit procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material and against other urgent and high priority internal security targets.

"Coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups is to be increased. All restraints which limit this coverage are to be removed. Also, C. I. A. coverage of American students (and others) traveling or living abroad is to be increased."

Carrying Out 'Rescinded' Plan

Last week's *Intercontinental Press* listed a number of elements of this plan that were carried out—despite Nixon's claim that he "rescinded" his approval on July 28, 1970. *Newsweek* magazine reported in its June 4 issue that "Some six months after the plan was officially pigeonholed . . . copies were distributed within an interdepartmental intelligence unit set up by Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian—later a top Nixon campaign aide."

"I Am Authorized To Say, 'What Whale?'"



Newsweek to the contrary, assistant attorneys general do not "set up" inter-departmental units. The spy outfit the magazine refers to—the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department—was reactivated after a lull of several years on the orders of Richard Nixon, who put Mardian in charge of it. (See *Intercontinental Press*, June 14, 1971, p. 550.) Mardian, according to the June 11 issue of *Newsweek*, "possessed a rare emergency phone line to the President's office" during his term as head of the Internal Security Division.

The same article also described further elements of the "rescinded" plan that were put into operation:

"Senate probers . . . have been told by high Administration officials that illicit methods — including burglary and unauthorized wiretaps — were widely used to try to stop sensitive leaks, to monitor the domestic left and gather information for the prosecution of cases against radicals. The investigators have been told specifically that burglaries were committed in connection with the Seattle Seven, Chicago Weatherpeople, Detroit Thirteen and Berrigan cases. They are also looking into allegations that Administration operatives broke into the Brookings Institution, a respected Washington think tank, looking for information on former National Security Council staffer Morton Halperin."

Mardian was also reported to have described additional activities of Watergate burglar G. Gordon Liddy—who in turn implicated Nixon himself:

"In their own extensive post-Watergate conversations, according to Mardian, Liddy said it was he who whisked ITT lobbyist Dita Beard out of Washington to a Denver hospital in the thick of the 1972 controversy over an offer by the company to help underwrite the Republican convention. Liddy, according to Mardian, further acknowledged taking part in the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office; he claimed that it had the 'express approval' of the President."

According to newspaper reports, other illegal activities mentioned in the 1970 plan were under the direction of John Ehrlichman. Some of these spy operations were apparently ordered at the very beginning of the Nixon administration in 1969.

In the June 6 *New York Times*, Seymour M. Hersh quoted "officials knowledgeable about the Watergate investigation" as saying that Ehrlichman had ordered at least two illegal wiretaps and had authorized "detailed planning for a number of White House-ordered burglaries."

The officials told Hersh that two of Ehrlichman's agents in these operations were John Caulfield and Anthony Ulasewicz. Caulfield and Ulasewicz have admitted carrying an offer of executive clemency from John Dean to Watergate burglar James McCord in an effort to prevent him from implicating higher-ups.

"Both the prosecutors and the Senate Watergate committee," Hersh wrote, "are known to have received full accounts of the . . . activities from Mr. Dean, Mr. Caulfield and Mr. Ulasewicz."

Both Caulfield and Ulasewicz have testified publicly before the Senate committee without being asked about these activities.

When Thieves Fall Out

As it becomes more and more clear that high-ranking government figures are likely to go to jail, various members of the Nixon gang are trying to shift the blame to their accomplices or are making deals for a light sentence in exchange for their testimony against others.

On June 9, it was reported that Herbert Kalmbach, formerly Nixon's personal attorney, had agreed to testify against Ehrlichman and Haldeman. Kalmbach was the custodian of a \$500,000 secret cash fund, part of which went to pay political saboteur Donald Segretti. Kalmbach reportedly destroyed campaign finance records illegally and was involved in raising the funds used to buy the silence of the Watergate burglars after they were caught.

Kalmbach is now said to be willing to testify that Ehrlichman and Haldeman instructed him to collect the secret pay-off funds.

Earlier, on May 24, the Watergate prosecutors leaked the information that Jeb Stuart Magruder, deputy director of the Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP), had agreed to plead guilty and testify for the prosecution. Magruder is reported to be able to testify that John Dean and former Attorney General John Mitchell

were involved in planning the Watergate break-in and the subsequent cover-up.

Mitchell has also been implicated in sworn testimony by Ehrlichman, who on May 22, 23, and 24 gave a deposition in the Democratic party civil suit against CREEP. The deposition was made public June 5.

Ehrlichman said that he had been told by either Magruder or Dean, but probably the latter, that Mitchell had specified three offices to be bugged from a list of possibilities worked out by Gordon Liddy. He also said that Mitchell had "vigorously criticized" Liddy when it turned out that a tap installed in the Democrats' Watergate office in May 1972 was not working properly, and that Liddy had therefore organized another break-in in June, during which the burglars were caught.

According to Ehrlichman, he was ordered by Nixon in late March of this year to conduct an investigation of the Watergate cover-up. Pressed by the lawyer for the Democrats, Ehrlichman provided in his deposition some new information linking Nixon to the Watergate break-in. He said that at a meeting in April of this year with Paul O'Brien, a lawyer for CREEP, O'Brien warned him that Magruder's testimony might implicate Nixon.

According to what O'Brien had heard from Magruder, the latter had fired Gordon Liddy in March 1972. Liddy complained to Gordon Strachan, whose official position was that of aide to Haldeman. Strachan called Magruder and told him to rehire Liddy because "the President wants this project to go on."

Elsewhere in his deposition, Ehrlichman indicated that Strachan had considerable authority from and easy access to Nixon:

". . . he had almost free run of the Committee to Re-elect the President and to accumulate information. There would be substantial periods of time in which no claim was made on him at all for information and then there would be other times when he would be very, very busy providing information which either the President or Haldeman or somebody wanted with relation to the campaign operation."

Nixon's Alibi Exposed

Still another member of the Nixon

gang inadvertently provided evidence exposing one of Nixon's alibis for the Watergate cover-up. In his May 22 statement, Nixon claimed that "elements of the early post-Watergate reports led me to suspect, incorrectly, that the C.I.A. had been involved" and that because of this he had issued instructions that the investigation not be allowed to reveal undercover CIA activities.

A Senate subcommittee has been investigating the attempts to use the CIA in the cover-up, and in May it was given a number of memoranda from Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, the deputy director of the agency. The memoranda concerned Walters's conversations with top administration figures in the days following the arrest of the Watergate burglars. The memos, which were published in the June 4 *New York Times*, make it quite clear that the only "security" of concern to everyone involved was the security of Richard Nixon's reelection campaign.

"On June 23," the first memo began, ". . . on request I called with director Helms on John Ehrlichman and Robert Haldeman at Ehrlichman's office at the White House, Haldeman said that the 'bugging' affair at the Democratic National Committee headquarters . . . had made a lot of noise and that the Democrats are trying to maximize it.

"The F. B. I. had been called in and was investigating the matter. The investigation was leading to a lot of important people and this could get worse. He asked what the connection with the agency [CIA] was and the director repeated that there was none.

"Haldeman said the whole affair was getting embarrassing and it was the President's wish that Walters call on Acting Director [of the FBI] L. Patrick Gray and suggest to him that . . . it was not advantageous to have the inquiry pushed, especially in Mexico, etc."

(In a later note attached to the memoranda, Walters said Haldeman had not actually used the phrase "the President's wish" but that this idea had merely been "implicit" in the discussion.)

The reference to Mexico proves that as early as six days after the arrest of the burglars, Haldeman and Ehrlichman knew that CREEP had paid the Watergate team for their opera-

tions. (The funds were passed through a Mexican bank in an effort to conceal their origin.) And although the conclusion is being studiously avoided by all the "investigators," their knowledge of CREEP's involvement makes it a virtual certainty that Nixon was also aware.

Haldeman and Ehrlichman had everything to gain and nothing to lose from telling Nixon. Although both of them organized various other illicit operations, they were not involved in the Watergate planning. They had no



COX: Wants secret hearings.

reason to protect Mitchell and other CREEP officials. On the contrary, it is well known that there was a continuing feud between the Mitchell and the Haldeman-Ehrlichman wings of the Nixon gang. Exposing Mitchell's blunder to Nixon would have been a great victory for them in their intra-bureaucratic battle.

If Haldeman and Ehrlichman did not inform Nixon of CREEP's role, it was only because they were not in the habit of telling him things *he already knew*.

Tracing the Cover-Up

Last September 21, when the Nixon gang still thought the whole Watergate scandal could be swept under

the rug, Attorney General Richard Kleindienst said:

"I think the investigation that has just concluded itself has probably been one of the most intensive that the Department of Justice and the FBI has ever been involved in. Some 1,500 persons were interviewed, some 1,800 leads were followed, 333 agents were involved, 14,000 man-hours, 51 of 59 FBI field offices were involved."

The Justice Department and the FBI appear to be considerably more adept at compiling statistics than uncovering evidence when members of the Nixon administration are involved. The "investigation" was so inadequate that its supervisor, Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen, is now reported to be under investigation himself by the new special prosecutor, Archibald Cox.

Some of the leads that the Justice Department didn't follow have been described in testimony before the Senate Watergate committee.

On June 4, Robert Reisner, who was assistant to Magruder at CREEP, testified that political espionage reports had been prepared for John Mitchell and had been sent to Haldeman's White House office. He also told the senators that he had not been questioned by the prosecutors or FBI until after he was subpoenaed by the Senate committee.

On June 6, former CREEP treasurer Hugh Sloan testified that Magruder had on several occasions asked him to perjure himself regarding payments to the Watergate burglars. He informed the prosecutors of this last July. When the burglars were put on trial, the prosecutors used Magruder as one of their major witnesses. The *Washington Post* reported June 7 that another CREEP official who has not yet publicly testified has also told Senate investigators that he informed the prosecutors of attempts by Magruder to solicit perjured testimony.

Furthermore, Herbert L. Porter, former scheduling director of CREEP, admitted to the senators June 7 that at the Watergate trial he had lied about the reasons for employing the burglars. He also said that the prosecutors had never asked him about whether he had been pressured to perjure himself.

It remains to be seen how far the Ervin committee will go in investigating the pressures that were put on

Petersen. This could obviously be a fruitful subject of inquiry.

Role of the Ervin Committee

The Senate Watergate committee is itself subjected to some conflicting pressures inherent in its assigned task, which is to uncover enough information to convince the public that there is no whitewash, without disclosing the fact that Watergate-style operations are an inseparable part of capitalist politics. The pressures and difficulties of their job are increased by the efforts of the members of the Nixon gang to save their own necks.

The June 11 issue of *Newsweek* disclosed that Nixon himself had met with one of the committee members in order to plan a disruption of the hearings if things got too revealing. The magazine reported that Republican Senator Howard Baker, the committee vice-chairman, had conferred with Nixon when the committee was being organized:

"The subject, according to Senate sources, was 'how the committee should be handled,' and a briefing paper for their discussion had been drawn up by John Dean, then still the President's counsel. One of the scenarios then in circulation among White House aides suggested asking former New York Sen. Kenneth Keating, now the ambassador-designate to Israel, to serve as minority counsel to the Ervin committee. The plan, *Newsweek* learned, was to have a formidable 'friend' on the panel; if the Democratic majority seemed to be taking too partisan a line, this man could denounce the committee's tactics on national television and then stage a dramatic walkout."

For reasons unknown, Nixon did not get Keating appointed as counsel to the committee. But he did get Archibald Cox as special prosecutor, and that seems to be almost as good.

On June 4, Cox asked the committee to delay its hearings for one to three months because, he said, the publicity attending them might make it difficult to bring some of the culprits to trial. When this request was rejected, Cox asked the Watergate grand jury judge to order the committee to hold its sessions in secret, or at least without radio and television coverage. The judge is scheduled to rule on this request June 12.

Nixon of course might be willing

to send his entire staff to prison if in exchange he could get the Senate hearings off millions of television screens. It is not thought likely, however, that the judge will approve Cox's suggestion.

The committee for its part plainly intends to keep its investigation limited as much as possible to the "dirty tricks" practiced against the Democrats during the 1972 campaign and to ignore far more important questions of corruption and the government's domestic and international spying and provocation network. In the June 9 *New York Times*, David E. Rosenbaum described Ervin's plans:

"As the Senator explained his intentions in an interview, the committee will try to determine whether the 1970 intelligence plan led to the Watergate break-in. But it will not go into the substance of the plan, he said.

"Similarly, the relationship between the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and the Nixon Administration will be investigated only as to its effects on the 1972 election."

Riding Out the Storm

In the other house of Congress, there appears to be even less intention of rocking the boat. On June 6, Republican Congressman Paul McCloskey Jr. attempted to open a "full discussion" of Nixon's actions and the pos-

sibility of impeachment. McCloskey had barely begun his speech when a Nixon backer demanded a quorum count. A majority of the House could not be found and the session was adjourned.

The fact that a majority of the representatives were unwilling even to allow the question of impeachment to be discussed is sufficient indication that the U. S. ruling class still hopes and expects that Nixon will be able to ride out the storm. But calls for Nixon to resign—which have come from figures such as Senator William Fulbright, Governor Patrick Lucey of Wisconsin, Congressman Henry Reuss, and former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford—indicate that the final outcome of the scandal is not regarded as settled beyond question.

In the June 10 *New York Times*, R.W. Apple Jr. wrote of "the judgment, now heard everywhere in Washington, that [Nixon] either condoned improper and perhaps [sic] illegal practices or was so unaware of what was going on around him that he was guilty of total ineptitude."

It is not difficult to determine which of those possibilities is the more likely. The real problem for the U. S. ruling class is to decide whether the increasing recognition that Nixon is a crook is doing more damage to the institutions of capitalist rule than would be done by going through the bitter process of dispensing with him.

Despite the best efforts of Cox and the Ervin committee, the Watergate scandal is still not under control. No one, including Nixon himself, can be certain that new disclosures—perhaps from a subordinate trying to save his own neck by accusing the boss—will not touch off a wave of revulsion sufficient to capsize Nixon. □



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Sadat's 'Internal War' on Students, Workers

By Jon Rothschild

Citizens of Cairo, denied a free press, the right to organize political groups, and the right to hold meetings freely, frequently express their political attitudes through *nikaat*, humorous anecdotes, often at the expense of political officials. One of the most popular of the *nikaat* currently making the rounds was described by correspondent Said Khayatt in the May 28-June 10 issue of the fortnightly *Afrique-Asie*.

It seems that President Anwar el-Sadat is throwing a party at his villa at Gizeh. Naturally, attendance is by invitation only and the entrance is closely guarded by soldiers. Along comes Abdel Halim Hafez, Egypt's most famous male singer. He has forgotten his invitation. "Prove to me who you are," demands the guard. Hafez sings a few bars. "All right," says the guard, "you're Hafez, go on in." A few minutes later comes the famous dancer Nagwa Fuad, who has also forgotten her entry card. Challenged, she dances a few steps. The guard, satisfied as to her identity, lets her pass. Then, along comes Sadat himself, who, unaccountably, has also mislaid his invitation. He is stopped by the soldiers on duty. Infuriated, Sadat declares that he is the president. "What can you do to prove to me who you are?" the soldier asks. Sadat, a bit confused, shrugs. "Nothing," he admits. "All right," replies the guard, "you're Sadat; go on in."

A better description of the regime would be hard to find. Late last March, when Sadat proclaimed himself premier, named himself military governor general, and declared the opening of "the stage of total confrontation" (see *Intercontinental Press*, April 16, p. 428), he said he would give himself two months to break Egypt out of the internal and external impasse it found itself in. Sadat's unfulfilled promises, as Khayatt pointed out, have become part of Egyptian folklore. So there was no major outbreak of dissatisfaction when yet another of the president's self-imposed deadlines quietly expired.

But the impasse is real and its effects are no less pressing. The domestic situation has continued to deteriorate; there is still no prospect of freeing the Sinai peninsula from Zionist occupation. Having appropriated all power to himself, Sadat stands de-



SADAT: Moves from "total confrontation" to internal war.

prived of potential scapegoats. He is therefore under unusual pressure to accomplish something. Unable to do so, he has turned toward a combination of diplomatic bluster and intensified repression, the latter reaching such a pitch that some student militants in Egypt have begun referring to Sadat's "internal war."

The Internal Crisis . . .

A measure of the Sadat regime's precarious position has been the durability of the student movement. Last December and January, major confrontations between the students and the government resulted in a wave of arrests of student activists and some of their supporters in the trade unions and in cultural and journalistic sectors.

The student upsurge was initially not as broad as the one that took place about a year earlier, in January 1972. But it was clearly deeper and has engendered a more profound political radicalization.

Sadat broke the mobilization with arrests, but the movement continued to make its presence felt throughout February and March, even producing a clandestine daily newspaper. The students put forward a broad, if somewhat imprecise, program demanding real mobilization of the population against Zionist aggression, elimination of state control over the press, abolition of one-party rule, institution of free elections, and elimination of the privileges of the immobile bureaucracy.

But more than that, they advanced demands in support of the trade-union movement, especially in support of the workers in Helwan, an industrial area that has been in the forefront of action against the regime on the economic front. They appealed to the workers to "integrate the trade-union struggle into the political struggle."

Two factors seem to have prompted Sadat's turn to extended repression. The student movement did not sink back into inactivity, as it had after the January 1972 upsurge. And the economic situation has created a crisis situation that increases the possibility that the workers, who have been passively sympathetic to the students, will take to action themselves.

In his *Afrique-Asie* report, Khayatt described the Egyptian economic situation as "catastrophic." It does not seem to be an exaggeration. An Associated Press dispatch printed in the April 7 *Christian Science Monitor* reported that the price of meat has risen 25% during the past year. It is illegal to buy meat three days of the week. Milk has gone up 50% and fish 100% in the past year. The price of most vegetables has doubled.

According to official statistics, the general cost of living rose by more than 12% in 1972. For the previous four years it had averaged 5% a year.

The economic crunch on the workers and peasants contrasts sharply with the situation of the government bureaucracy. When the workers received an average 8.8% pay increase in the most recent general pay rise, the People's Assembly (parliament) voted the bureaucracy, whose living standard is already inordinately high, a 15.7% increase.

Rationing and shortages have given rise to a vast black market. In the last four years, according to statistics released by the regime itself, \$180 million worth of commodities have been smuggled into the country for black-market sale. The Ministry of Economics reported that 33,000 automobiles have entered the country without any currency transfer during the same period.

One of the centers of the Cairo black market is Shawarbi Street, where various sorts of items, mostly smuggled in, are sold at inflated prices. Last winter, as a concession to student and worker demands, the regime vowed to eliminate the traffic in such goods. But earlier this year, the Shawarbi Street merchants took the regime to court and won! The market is again flourishing. After the decision, the Shawarbi Street merchants held a victory parade. The main banner expressed thanks to "the President, Justice, and Allah."

And the Internal War

Unable to deal with the problems that threaten to set off an active opposition movement extending beyond the student milieu, Sadat has taken the line of vigorously suppressing any signs of resistance to the regime's internal policies.

The May 28 issue of the Beirut weekly *el-Hurriah* published a report from Cairo describing some aspects of Sadat's repressive campaign. According to the report, at least 200 students are being held in jail. Many of these were arrested during the December-January demonstrations. The government had promised to release them within two weeks of their arrest.

The arrests are said to be continuing. Students are seized in "relatively small groups." In this way, Sadat has avoided triggering a broad militant response of the type that erupted last December when he made the mistake of arresting a large number of students at once. The government has also instituted the practice of torture,

an attempt to force the prisoners to "confess" to having violated the "national unity law," the catch-all repressive legislation under which most of the arrests are made. Student militant Nabil Subhy, *el-Hurriah* reported, has been transferred from prison to a hospital for nervous disorders, where he will undergo "electric shock therapy." Earlier, Subhy had been tortured; according to the report, his fingernails were torn out in an effort to get him to confess.

Many of the prisoners are women. Most of these are held in the Qantara Prison in Cairo and have received the same torture treatment as the male prisoners.

Two of the best-known Qantara inmates are Safinez Kazim and Siham Tewfiq. (Kazim's husband is the poet Ahmed Fuad Nagm, a supporter of the student movement who has also been imprisoned.) When the other prisoners protested the brutal treatment Kazim and Tewfiq were being subjected to (beatings, etc.), the prison administration intensified the regimen, eliminating exercise time, stopping visitation rights, and cutting down food supplies.

El-Hurriah's report also confirmed a report, which had appeared in the April 19 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde* but had been denied by the regime, that the old concentration camp at the Kharga Oasis in Upper Egypt that had served as home for 3,000 Communist party members from 1959-1964 has been reopened. Money for operating the camp has been included in the government's budget.

El-Hurriah further reported that forty-six students are scheduled to be tried soon. The charge is that they "opposed the socialist order" of the Sadat regime! The May 23 issue of *Le Monde* reported that fifty-three prisoners are scheduled to stand trial before the State Security Court on charges that they engaged in subversive activities. There is no indication whether the groups overlap.

But the "internal war" is not limited to arrests and torture. A more broad-ranging repression is going on as well. Journalists, whom Sadat has described as the second "subversive focus" after the students, have been subjected to a sweeping purge. Khayatt reported in *Afrique-Asie* that many reporters have been fired, charged with being "counterrevolu-

tionaries." Most of them have not been told which specific views of theirs qualify for that designation. Attempts to get clarification on this from the state prosecutor have been unsuccessful.

Cultural life in Egypt has also felt the sting of the internal war. The majority of plays produced this year were either shut down or censored, Khayatt reported. And the restrictions are in no way limited to plays about Egypt. Peter Weiss's *Marat-Sade* was closed down after two weeks of performances. The government explained that the play was suspected of making allusions to the Sadat regime.

Given the virtually total leadership vacuum that afflicts the Egyptian opposition movement, it is possible that Sadat may be able to wage his internal war for some time without meeting determined organized resistance on a mass scale. But it will not be possible for him to do this indefinitely. Contempt and disgust for the regime—expressed so clearly in the Cairenes' *nikaat*—is growing at least as fast as the repression.

Sadat's last resort in the event of a major confrontation with the student and worker masses is the officer corps, which stands prepared to extend the current repression to direct military rule. There is but one problem. "The officers are more afraid of us than they are of Israel," a soldier told Khayatt. "They don't even dare give us arms, because they're afraid we'll turn them against them." In large part, the outcome of the present internal war may well depend on whether the officers' fears prove to be justified. □

May Day in Greenland

This year the first May Day demonstration in the history of Greenland took place in Godthaab. A focus was the problem of a minimum wage, around which a struggle is being organized by the Groenlands Arbejder Sammenslutning (GAS—Workers Association of Greenland). The struggle to organize the Greenlanders has been hindered by the Danish union's lack of solidarity.

On the eve of the May Day demonstration, Godthaab's statue of Hans Egede, the Danish missionary who introduced Christianity into Greenland, was doused in red paint. The following was painted on the bottom of the statue: "Wasn't he the one who stole our soul? Why should we continue to honor him?" □

Shah Sets Sights on Domination of Arab-Persian Gulf

By Dianne Feeley

In a speech to the U.S. Senate in May, William Fulbright expressed concern that the U.S. government might move to take over oil-producing Arab countries either directly or through "militarily potent surrogates" — Israel or Iran.

Both these countries have played pivotal roles in the Arab East, siding with U.S. imperialism against any revolutionary activities. Israel's military power is well known. But although the strengthening of the shah's armed forces has been accomplished with far less fanfare, Teheran's military buildup has been no less real. The May 21 *Newsweek* characterized the expansion of the shah's armed capabilities as "the world's biggest military buildup since the American deployment in Vietnam."

U.S. imperialism's preoccupation with the Arab-Persian Gulf region is well-founded. The area contains 60-75 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. Further, the narrow Strait of Hormuz, at the eastern end of the Gulf, has been called Europe and Japan's "oil jugular vein." Every twelve to sixteen minutes an oil tanker passes through the Strait, heading for the Indian Ocean, and thence to West Europe or Japan.

When British imperialism withdrew its forces from the area in 1971, U.S. imperialism, acting in large part through the shah's regime, moved to establish tight control.

The shah's expanding military power in the gulf area has been paralleled by rising interest and involvement by the Teheran government in areas further east as well. This has taken the form of closer relations between the shah and the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime in Pakistan.

The shah's first significant military move in the gulf came on November 30, 1971, when the Iranian army took control over three islands commanding the western approach to the Strait of Hormuz — Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Mussa. The total Arab population of the islands was about

450. On Greater Tunb the entire population was expelled; three Arabs were killed resisting. (See *Intercontinental Press*, December 13, 1971, p. 1090, and February 7, 1972, p. 117.)

The shah proceeded to build military bases on two of the islands, thus fortifying his hegemony in the gulf.

In an interview with *Newsweek* senior editor Arnaud DeBorchgrave, the shah explained his military expansion: "Not only do we have national responsibilities but also a world role as guardian and protector of 60% of the world's oil reserves. . . . The Nixon doctrine says the U.S. will help those who help themselves. That's what we're doing."

Washington's Complicity

And, indeed, the Nixon administration is backing the shah to the hilt. Already more than 11,000 Iranian officers and soldiers have received military training in the U.S. It is acknowledged that more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel are now stationed in Iran. This represents one of the largest military "aid" programs in Asia. Three generals direct the operations, which include training the Iranian army, "advising" the rural police force (responsible for patrolling 80 percent of the country), handling air force cargo, as well as organizing the maintenance of the sophisticated armaments and planes purchased from the United States.

In addition to advising the infantry, the U.S. military is assigned to two naval bases, Khurramshahr and Abadan, which border on Iraq, near the Arab-Persian Gulf. There are also more than 300 U.S. "civilian personnel" working to train pilots and mechanics in the use and repair of helicopters.

Washington has had a military assistance agreement with Teheran since 1949. About \$800 million in military aid has been given. But since 1968, when the British government announced its intention of withdrawing

its military forces from the Arab-Persian Gulf, Washington has stepped up arms sales to Iran.

In early 1973 the U.S. Defense Department announced the biggest single arms deal ever arranged by the Pentagon—the shah would buy \$2-3 thousand million in the latest military equipment. More than half of the package consists of several hundred helicopters and interceptors. Iran's 1973 military budget represents a 45 percent increase over 1972. Announcement of the arms deal touched off demonstrations at universities throughout Iran. (See *Intercontinental Press*, March 26, p. 346.)

The shah's troops were called in, the universities were closed, and, according to *Le Monde*, at least sixteen people were killed.

Nixon's ties to the shah's regime were strengthened by the appointment in January of Richard Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as U.S. ambassador to Iran. A leading administrator of the CIA in 1953, when a CIA-engineered coup overthrew Dr. Mossadegh's government and returned the shah to power, Helms was to utilize his past in his new position as ambassador.

As right-wing commentator Joseph Alsop wrote in the *Washington Post*, "Helms has two jobs. The first job is to assure the U.S. of an adequate supply of Iranian oil—and therefore non-Arab oil—in case of political difficulties with the Arab oil-producers. The second job is to give added toughness, direction and support to the Shah of Iran's effort to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf."

The United States is the world's largest oil consumer. Currently it imports 8-11 million barrels a day from the Middle East, about 10% percent of its total consumption. But by 1980 that proportion is expected to rise to 25 percent. In addition to its involvement in the gulf as an oil-consuming state, the U.S. regime is committed to protecting the invest-

ments of the giant oil companies that reap a 55 percent return on petroleum investment in the Middle East.

In fact, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran, the three largest oil-producing countries in the gulf—among the most repressive governments in the world—have been militarily well equipped by Washington. In May the Pentagon announced the sale of \$500 million in arms to Saudi Arabia and acknowledged a similar sale it is working out with Kuwait, in addition to the \$2-3 thousand million worth of arms going to Iran.

Lee H. Hamilton, Democrat of Indiana, told the House of Representatives that Saudi Arabia has an ongoing program with the United States Navy involving the expenditure of more than \$600 million for American equipment and training. The June 1 *New York Times* reported that Hamilton "mentioned \$1-billion [billion] pending in additional United States sales to Saudi Arabia, and a \$500-million Saudi cash outlay for the Saudi Army." Hamilton also said that Kuwait was about to sign contracts involving the expenditure of close to \$600 million for American arms and services.

A year and a half ago the December 4, 1971, London *Economist* noted: "Iran is being equipped with American aircraft, British tanks . . . to be the defender of Western interest in the Middle East." The close relationship that has developed between the shah and the Nixon administration has been amply illustrated by the shah's readiness to supply the Thieu regime with Phantom jets when Nixon was unable to make a quick enough delivery. In addition, the shah exchanges intelligence reports on military developments throughout the Middle East with both the United States and Israel. The shah's military maneuvers in the gulf are part of this pattern.

The shah's support to the Zionist state of Israel is seen in his supplying Israel with most of the oil it needs and providing Israeli tankers with naval protection in the Arab-Persian Gulf. Hundreds of Iranian military personnel have been given advanced training in Israel. The May 8 *Wall Street Journal* reported, "There are rumors that some Iranian investment was involved in Israel's new pipeline, which substitutes for the Suez Canal

in moving oil from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean."

The Shah's Presence in the Gulf

The shah's plan to control the Arab-Persian Gulf includes establishing a checkpoint in the twenty-six-mile-wide Strait of Hormuz. Iran and Oman would exercise "joint control," but given the shah's superior military force, Teheran would be the dominating party. This move may well set the stage for undercutting the oil-producing Arab states' demands for a greater share of oil profits. As Neil Ulman, reporting in the May 4 *Wall Street Journal*, remarked: "Talk of America's energy crisis has been widely reported and read in the Middle East and used to explain why the U.S. might want Israel and Iran to grab Arab oil on its behalf."

In addition, Iran's military presence is designed to damp revolutionary activity throughout the gulf as well as stop shipments of arms to such groups as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arab Gulf.

Only recently the shah sent nine helicopters and at least a company of marines to help Oman crush revolutionary activity in its oil fields, according to a May 21 *Newsweek* report. Estimates on the number of troops sent to Oman vary from the frequently quoted figure of 300 to the *Los Angeles Times* report of 2,900. (December 7, 1972). In addition 80 percent of Iran's infantry is deployed along Iraq's frontier. Clashes are frequent between the shah's forces and Iraqi troops.

Of this general situation the shah commented in his interview with De-

Borchgrave: "Some of the regimes on the other side of the gulf may be overthrown by extremists and the subversive activities now going on. If [the Dhofar rebellion in Oman] ever succeeded, just try to imagine what we would be faced with . . . right in front of the Strait of Hormuz. At first a few rifles. And then naval guns and missiles. . . . I cannot tolerate subversive activities—and by that I mean anything that is imposed from the outside. . . . If [the Iraqis] started at breakfast, they could probably take over Kuwait by lunchtime. But if the Kuwaiti government resisted and asked for my help, they would get it instantly."

Iranian Oil

As the fourth largest oil-producing country in the world, and as the second largest in the Middle East, Iran produces 5.8 million barrels a day. The shah, upon returning to power in 1953, signed a twenty-five-year agreement with the Western oil consortium that produces 92 percent of Iran's oil in an operating territory of 30,000 square miles in southern Iran. Members of the consortium include British Petroleum (40%), Shell Petroleum (14%), Gulf Oil (7%), Mobil Oil (7%), Standard Oil of California (7%), Exxon (7%), Texaco (7%), Compagnie Française des Pétroles (6%), and the Iricon group (5%). That group is composed of American Independent Oil, Atlantic Richfield, Charter Oil, Continental Oil, Getty Oil, and Standard Oil of Ohio.

Although the terms of the agreement do not expire until 1978, in early 1973 the shah "demanded" that the consortium either hand over its opera-



tions in 1978 or arrange a new, twenty-year supply contract. Not surprisingly, the consortium opted for the new contract, and only details and the actual signing remain. Under the new agreement, the consortium will still hold exclusive right to the bulk of crude oil coming from Iran. The shah will withhold a part of the oil produced both for Iranian consumption and for export, and under the terms of the old pact, the operating territory will be reduced by 30 percent.

The shah's government will assume primary responsibility for running and financing the petroleum operations, while the consortium will continue to provide operating services and technical assistance. The May 25 *Wall Street Journal* reported that the companies have also agreed to the shah's insistence on expanding production to 8 million barrels a day by 1976.

The consortium spokesmen pointed out that the finances of the new agreement were comparable to those worked out by the other gulf states last January. The shah's oil consultant in Teheran added that the pact would provide long-term stability, insuring "the continuous flow of crude oil to the markets supplied by the oil companies."

Shah's Front on the Indian Ocean

The shah's policies are closely linked to those of the U.S. government, and thus reflect the Moscow-Washington and Peking-Washington detentes. Iran recently signed a \$600 million contract with the Kremlin to supply the Soviet Union with natural gas. And the shah's wife visited China last year, where she received a far more lavish welcome than did Nguyen Thi Binh, foreign minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

But when the shah visited the Soviet Union, he reportedly told Premier Kosygin that it would be wise to halt operation of the Soviet naval ships in the gulf. While the shah is willing to work out profitable financial agreements with Moscow and Peking, he is also beginning to expand his sphere of influence even beyond the Arab-Persian Gulf into the Indian Ocean. Recently the shah worked out an arrangement with the island of Mauritius, situated off Madagascar, where-

by Iran has port facilities in exchange for an undisclosed amount of aid. The Soviet Union also has fuel and water facilities on Mauritius, as well as a naval base at Berbera, in Somaliland, on the Gulf of Aden.

In addition, the shah is building two giant military bases on the Indian Ocean, at Chah Bahar and Jask. The \$600 million army, navy, and air force base at Chah Bahar Bay in Iranian Baluchistan will be the largest of its kind in the Indian Ocean. Although the shah insists it will be finished by 1975, the American contractors estimate it will take at least three to four years to complete.

These huge bases are to perform internal as well as external functions. They are situated in Baluchistan, an area inhabited by 750,000 Baluchi tribespeople who are united by culture and language with one million Baluchis who live in Pakistan. They are mainly farmers or nomads. Although most of rural Iran is extremely poor—half of all villages are not accessible by road, life expectancy is forty-five years, and the illiteracy rate is high—Baluchistan is one of the most poverty-stricken areas of the country.

As a direct result of the Bangladesh national struggle, the Baluchi nationalist movement is gaining strength. And a Baluchi movement for self-determination would not only hinder the shah's attempts to become a power on the Indian Ocean; it could well unleash the struggles of the other oppressed nationalities living in Iran—Arabs, Kurds, and Azerbaidzhanis.

The Link With Bhutto

With such a potentially explosive national situation, it is no wonder that the shah considers Pakistan's safety as important as his own. The shah speaks of the Bengalis' struggle for national independence as the "dismemberment of Pakistan" and has repeatedly pledged his support to Rawalpindi if other national groups within Pakistan attempt to form their own nation-state.

The shah has taken steps to cement close ties with Bhutto, including expanding Pakistan-Iran trade and channeling Iranian investment to Pakistan. At a May 9-14 conference with Bhutto (the second one to be held

in 1973), the shah emphasized the importance of Bhutto's visit to Teheran by ordering a horse-drawn coach—usually reserved for visiting royalty—for the Pakistani president. The two rulers decided to "expand and systematize" their ties in the areas of defense and economic development.

Given the fact that as recently as January 28 news agencies reported that Pakistani troops were pursuing a force of "up to 500 Baluchi rebels" into the mountains not far from the Iranian border, the development of the two military bases in Iranian Baluchistan puts force behind the shah's pledge. It is also possible to understand the shah's plan to provide roads, schools, jobs, and housing for Baluchistan, in an attempt to establish more effective control over the area—to "Persianize" Baluchistan.

But wherever the shah turns, nationalist demands for self-determination spring up. His determination to wipe out the revolutionary movement in Oman is closely related to his own security problems. There are 50,000 Baluchis working in the small gulf states, and if they link up with the revolutionary movement in the gulf states or if the Baluchis living in Pakistan are able to win the struggle for self-determination, the effect would be far-reaching. In addition to upsetting the balance of power in the Arab-Persian Gulf, such a development would give added momentum to national struggles in Iran.

Nixon's Last Option

In Nixon's message on the "energy crisis" in April 1973, he spoke of the need for "mutual cooperation" rather than "destructive competition or dangerous confrontation." By cooperation he means support to the shah's plan and forcing the Arab countries into line. But the stakes are so high that there are other options. Peter Grose, a member of the *New York Times* editorial board, outlined a Western security pact modeled on the cold war strategy of a quarter-century ago. "Walter J. Levy, an American petroleum consultant who has gone further than anyone in designing an Atlantic-Japanese energy partnership," Grose wrote, "argues that neither the Common Market nor Japan nor both units together could amass enough

leverage, without United States participation, to break the stranglehold which the oil producing countries could soon acquire on the industrial

societies."

Nixon is apparently not prepared to use that option at this point. The regimes in Israel and Iran have thus

far been able to do Washington's work. But this weapon lies in the American arsenal, should Nixon's friends prove unreliable in the future.□

After Two Years of 'Gierekism'

Polish Workers Challenge Bureaucratic Rule

[The following article appeared in the June 1 issue of *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Convoked two years after the Gdansk and Szczecin revolts, the Seventh Congress of Polish trade unions (held November 13-16, 1972) had as its aim drawing a balance sheet on the "new social policy" and tracing out the perspectives for trade-union work for the coming years.

Kruczek, the president of the unions, declared at the opening session: "Our activity embodies dialectical unity among three sections of concern—increasing production, educating the workers, and improving the workers' living conditions. During the past two years, we have concentrated especially on improving the conditions of life and work. Now, without neglecting this, we must intensify our work in the areas of productivity and education."

That's the program: educate the workers, because they are ill-bred; make them work harder, because they are lazy.

And this is the balance sheet: we have spoiled the workers.

The president of the unions is not the only one to have drawn such a balance of the last two years of Gierekism. The Polish press, seconded in this regard by the Western bourgeois press (*Le Figaro*, for example), is singing the praises of the "realistic and humanistic" policy followed since 1970. In Poland, this is a question of Gierek and his bunch "creating a climate of confidence." In France, it is a matter of presenting the industrialists with an enticing image of "Polish

socialism" and of alerting them to the possible openings.

As for the [French] Stalinists, embarrassed by Czechoslovakia, they added Poland to their propaganda arsenal during the election campaign.

Nevertheless, in all these cases, one thing is "overlooked"—and that is that the "new regime" originated after about a hundred workers were killed and more than a thousand wounded in the streets. Wage increases are fondly pointed to, the much more attractive shops are described; but a lot less attention is paid to looking at what is going on in the Polish factories and how broad layers of the population are actually living.

According to official statistics, during the period 1971-1972 real wages grew by more than 12%, as compared to only 1.3% in 1970 (and 10% over the five-year period 1965-1970). More than 4 million Poles (that is, 40% of all persons employed in the nationalized sector) got wage increases. In a general sense, the income of the population increased 10% in 1972 alone (increases in wages and social benefits, retirement funds and various other allocations, increases in income for the rural population). For 1973, the plan calls for 6.6% wage increases. That means that the 17-18% wage increases planned for the whole 1971-1975 five-year period will probably be attained by the end of 1973.

Because we do not believe in the spontaneous "kindness" of the bureaucrats, we must ask the question: What does this wage hike result from?

Because we are aware of the breadth of the crisis into which the bureaucratic management of the Gomulka team threw the country, we must also ask: Is the present improvement of living conditions good enough?

Let us look at the facts.

The general figures cited above,

which are often used as proof that there has been a significant rise in the standard of living, do not completely take account of the social inequalities that still exist in Poland. In the specialized press, in certain publications with limited press runs that are not meant for distribution to the broader public, we find the image of a poor Poland.

They even speak of "areas of misery," or, since it is very difficult to give an exact picture of these, they try to sketch out a "panorama of misery."

For obvious reasons, the data we have are fragmentary. The many people whose living conditions are bad do not form a well-defined social layer. There are certain occupational categories with especially low wages: workers, particularly unskilled workers, some of whom are newly arrived from the countryside, schoolteachers, nurses, persons employed in small factories, students. It is especially from this milieu that we often find people who resort to what has been called "occasional prostitution." There are also people who cannot find work; or people who have no housing and, because they have to find someplace to live, lay out the better part of their wages for extremely high rents. (The housing shortage today stands at about 1 million units.) Sometimes there are people who get relatively good salaries, but who have many children.

According to official statistics, during 1971-1972 there were 22,000 persons who were not able to find work in their fields; of these about 100,000 were youths who had been trained for various administrative tasks, 80,000 were technicians, 30,000 were schoolteachers, and about 10,000 were women who had received no professional training.

There are presently 500,000 families of unskilled workers that have six or more children and whose per capita income stands below the necessary minimum. This minimum is officially set at 800 zlotys a month (about US\$50). Nevertheless, in a good many cases "below the necessary minimum" means 200 zlotys. By way of example, we might point out that a kilo of sugar costs 12 zlotys; a kilo of butter, 70 zlotys; a kilo of pork ribs, 60 zlotys. A half million children cared for only by their mothers (unmarried, widowed, or divorced) are in the same situation.

Of 3.5 million retirees, 2.5 million live on benefits that total between 600 and 1,000 zlotys [a month].

In the absence of exact laws governing their situations, those who are victims of workplace accidents and their families often find themselves in a very bad way materially. Nevertheless, on this point, as well as on the situation of certain peasant families and agricultural workers (those employed by state firms), there are no official statistics.

As to the positive column of "Gierekism," it does partially exist. But it is the fruit of the workers mobilizations.

The Workers Mobilization

Starting on December 12, 1970—the date on which a rise in food prices averaging more than 8 percent was abruptly announced—and for the following two months, the Polish workers in struggle were confronted by the central bureaucratic regime, first the Gomulkaists and then, after December 19, the Gierek team.

February 15, 1971, marked a great workers victory on a national scale: The Lodz strikers forced the new leadership to rescind the price increases and to decide on a freeze on food prices for the coming two years. But this victory was in no way followed by a return to normality. On the contrary, 1971 and 1972 were marked by social tensions that were expressed through many pinpoint actions of a local character—but big enough so that the press (at least certain periodicals) were forced to take notice. Also it is obvious that many of these actions went by unreported.

In the course of these two years, many "work stoppages" (the official terminology) were reported in nearly

all the big Polish industrial centers. All these strikes were directed against low wages—in Rybnik, Silesia, the miners asked for a 25% increase; the textile workers in Lodz asked for 20%; there were strikes against the lack of cafeteria facilities (out of 6 million Polish workers, only 10% are able to eat in factory cafeterias); there were strikes against bad working conditions that often cause accidents, against the insufficient space in the workers' apartments, against the housing shortage, or against the unjust allocation of the apartments controlled by the factories.

Toward the end of 1972, the workers at the tire factory in Olsztyn organized a strike that all but turned into a riot. In face of the intransigence (or perhaps impotence) of their leaders, they took to the streets.

The Olsztyn strike clearly points out the following fact: *In the bureaucratized countries, each "work stoppage," regardless of its initial limited or local character, contains the germ of the threat of a generalized confrontation with the central regime and the repressive forces.* For this reason, the Polish workers use this weapon with caution, even if they have finally achieved the change that strikes are no longer denounced as "violations of socialist legality." Thus, during 1971-1972, the workers mobilization sometimes retained a "legal" character.

On several occasions Polish journalists have reported the formation of "informal groups" within the official trade unions. Rank-and-file union members—and sometimes even members of the factory council—have formed groups that address demands directly to the managers *without going through the normal hierarchical channels.*

These attempts to set up little "wildcat" unions within the docile bureaucratized official unions have had some success. In a chemical factory near Sochaczew and in a paper factory in Jeziorno, these "informal groups" won wage increases for some classifications of workers. In Zyrardow, in a big textile plant, such a group forced the managers to accelerate modernization of the machines, because the production quotas imposed on the workers were impossible to meet with the old equipment, and this had a bad effect on the workers' wages.

The shipyard workers in Szczecin and the miners in Rybnik chose another form of "legal" struggle by instituting court cases against the managers. In Szczecin they formed a group of about twenty persons; in Rybnik they started with about fifty and persisted with about thirty "diehards" to demand payment of quite considerable sums that were due them for overtime pay and bonuses. In both these cases, the workers won the trials, which lasted about two years, during which time they came up before many judicial bodies. It is impossible here to go into detail about the complexities of this procedure or into the measures of intimidation the workers were subjected to—we leave that to the reader's imagination.

The bureaucracy did not sit around passively during these two years of workers mobilization. The partial work rules instituted recently are aimed at breaking the workers solidarity and at dividing the workers in their work places. We can mention here the formation in factories of "good labor" brigades and "disciplinary brigades" (the latter do not get bonuses, get less pay for the same work, are forced to perform various tasks without pay, have to work extra hours, and also do not receive certain social benefits).

Thus, the management is able to transfer any worker who is too active or too "demanding" into one of these "disciplinary brigades" (that is, whenever attempts to corrupt such a worker by transferring him or her into a "good labor" brigade fail).

More general attempts to use the unions as simple cogs in the policy of the state and the Communist party are another "classical" means of trying to break the workers struggles. But in this area, the workers are beginning to draw some lessons from what has happened.

The most recent wave of strikes proves this, *for it was organized at the very moment that the congress of trade unions was meeting in Warsaw.* The movement began a few days before the congress opened and extended to nearly all the big Polish industrial centers. Gierek and Jaroszewicz (president of the council of ministers) had to go to Szczecin and Gdansk to discuss with the strikers, just as they had had to do two years before.

The workers demands dealt with the

functioning of the unions. Everywhere the workers also asked that the freeze on food prices be maintained. On this point, they got total and immediate satisfaction—the freeze was extended for another year.

Indirectly, this latest strike wave was the reason that the new labor code (whose elaboration has already been going on for fifteen years) could not be adopted by the congress. Strengthened by what was going on in the factories, some of the congress delegates threatened to walk out of the meeting hall if there were a "vote" on the labor code. (They knew perfectly well that the results of the vote were prearranged.)

Labor Code and Working Conditions

The labor legislation presently in force dates from the 1930s; that is, it is the same labor code as the one governing relations between the workers and the Polish bourgeoisie.

From the viewpoint of the bureaucrats, the new labor code—now in its ninth version—must bring a legal sanction to the state of affairs that has existed for several years. The following proposals, contained in this code, delineate working conditions in Poland and are now the subject of determined discussions between the workers and bureaucrats:

- A 46-48 hour workweek. The workers are asking for a five-day forty-hour week. That's impossible, the bureaucrats say, because production would fall. Yes, the workers reply, that's possible, but the answer is to organize production better and to modernize outdated factories.

- On paid vacations. 14 days after one year's work; 20 days a year after six years; 26 days after ten years. The workers are demanding the same paid vacations as nonmanual workers, that is, 24 days after one year. (At the beginning of 1971 the workers won elimination of the differential between manual and nonmanual workers on the matter of sick leave. The number of workers who dare to call in sick has significantly increased since then, and the bureaucrats are complaining.)

- The manager decides on firings. The workers are demanding that the manager's decision not be valid unless prior agreement is given by the factory council.

- The code remains hazy on the terms of disability pensions and workers compensation for on-the-job accidents. The workers are demanding that these be clearly defined.

The workers are also demanding that cases in which they have to pay



GIEREK: Workers still not under control after two years.

for damages to machinery and tools be clearly defined. (As of now, they have to pay for damages that occur

because of the defective character of equipment.)

- Finally, the code stipulates that conflicts between the workers and the management cannot be brought to court. The workers have objected, for obvious reasons.

The workers won a partial victory in preventing passage of the new labor code: They stopped current working conditions from receiving legal sanction.

It must nevertheless be stressed that the very many strikes (often victorious) as well as the actions of a "legal" type are—except in Yugoslavia—unprecedented events in the "people's democracies." During the 1970 revolt, the workers demanded changes in the unions—free elections of delegates, more autonomy in relation to the state and the party. These changes were not won and recently, during the congress, the bureaucratic union hierarchy asserted its desire to bring union activity further under the pressure of these two apparatuses.

The response the Polish workers have given and are giving in practice is clear. By trying either to outflank the official unions from inside or to directly lead a struggle outside them, the workers are showing that they have become conscious of two points: that it is necessary to wage an organized struggle against the bureaucratic regime, and that it is necessary to wage it in an autonomous way, independently of the official organizations. □

Labour Regime Closes New Zealand to PRG

New Zealanders will not now have the opportunity to hear the views of the leaders of the Vietnam liberation movement.

According to the May 18 issue of *Socialist Action*, fortnightly newspaper of the Socialist Action League, the Wellington Committee on Vietnam announced May 9 the cancellation of a projected visit by representatives of North Vietnam and of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam. The cancellation resulted from the Labour government's "hostile attitude and humiliating visa conditions."

Prime Minister Norman Kirk had demanded that the PRG representatives apply to Saigon for passports or travel as North Vietnamese if they wished to visit New Zealand. He said that the gov-

ernment had "no intention" of recognizing the PRG, which he considers to be a "political movement" that does not "possess the trappings of government." The allegiance of millions of Vietnamese to the PRG is conveniently ignored by Kirk, as is the wish of millions of New Zealanders that the Labour government break off relations with the Saigon regime.

The Australian Labor government has taken a different attitude. *Socialist Action* quoted Dr. Jim Cairns, minister of overseas trade, as saying that he looked forward "to the formalisation of our communications with the Provisional Revolutionary Government." The Vietnamese representatives have been addressing large meetings in Australia under the sponsorship of a committee headed by Dr. Cairns. □

The First Years of the Fourth International

Intended as the first of a series of volumes documenting the history of the Fourth International, this book covers the first four international conferences of the Trotskyist movement: the 1933 preconference of the International Left Opposition (ILO), the 1936 International Conference for the Fourth International, the founding conference of the Fourth International in 1938, and the FI's emergency conference in 1940. A fifth section includes selected documents from the years 1933-35.

During this period the central political question placed before the world working class was the struggle against fascism. The inability of the Social Democracy and the Stalinized Communist International to understand fascism, much less lead a fight against it, led the European proletariat from defeat to defeat, culminating in the imperialist slaughter of the second world war.

The 1933 preconference of the ILO met in February, only a week after Hitler had been installed as chancellor of Germany. At that time it was still not imagined that the German Stalinists and Social Democrats would simply lie down before Hitler without offering the slightest resistance. The preconference addressed an appeal to the German working class, stressing that the situation could still be saved by a united front to fight the fascists before they consolidated their power:

"The victory over fascism is still possible. Whoever tells you that all is lost, that the struggle is now in vain, is betraying you. You can still conquer. But in order to achieve victory, to avoid defeat, the whole working class must unite in the struggle against the reaction.

"This is possible on one condition: that all the organizations of the German proletariat—the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the trade union organizations, the factory councils, etc.—undertake the joint struggle against fascism."

But with the failure of the German CP to put up any fight against Hit-

ler's consolidation of power, and the ratification of its line by the Third International, the Trotskyists concluded that it was no longer possible to

Documents of the Fourth International: The Formative Years (1933-40) New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973. 448 pp. \$3.95, £1.65.

reform the Stalinized parties. New parties and a new international were needed.

The second section of *Documents of the Fourth International* provides important texts from this period, beginning with the July 1933 call for a new German Communist party and concluding with the July 1935 "Open Letter to All Revolutionary Proletarian Organizations and Groupings," signed by representatives of future sections of the new international in Canada, France, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

Also included in this section are examples of the tactical orientations adopted as part of the strategy of constructing the Fourth International. Perhaps the best known are "The Declaration of the Four," which represented an attempt to win to revolutionary socialism several European centrist groupings then moving away from Stalinism; and "Resolution on the French Turn," which approved the tactic of entering those Social Democratic parties in which there existed a left wing that could be won for the Fourth International.

Trotsky had hoped that the July 1936 conference of the International Communist League, as the ILO was called after it ceased to operate as a faction of the Third International, would be the founding conference of the new international. The participants, however, were reluctant to take the step, and they dubbed the meeting "for the Fourth International" rather than "of the Fourth International."

Trotsky, then in Norway, was unable to attend, but he wrote three of

the documents adopted, including the major resolution, "The New Revolutionary Upsurge and the Tasks of the Fourth International."

This conference was sandwiched between the revolutionary upsurge of the French and Belgian workers in June and the infamous Moscow frame-up trials, the first of which opened in August. In the period leading up to the founding conference of the Fourth International in September 1938, Stalin's agents carried out against Trotsky's followers the sentence of death passed against him in Moscow. Among the victims was Leon Sedov, Trotsky's son.

Two months before the founding conference opened, Rudolph Klement, who was responsible for its organization, was murdered in Paris, and documents in his possession were stolen. Because of this situation, the participants met under tight security conditions and the conference proceedings were limited to a single day.

Despite these handicaps, the thirty delegates from eleven countries accomplished the tasks before them, proclaiming the foundation of the international and adopting the Transitional Program, which has remained the basic programmatic document of the Fourth International to the present day. In addition to this document and many other resolutions that were adopted the minutes of the meeting, never previously published, are included in Part 4, devoted to the founding conference.

Seeing the imminence of the new imperialist war, the founding conference provided that the International Executive Committee of the international would be transferred to the Western Hemisphere when war broke out in Europe.

Following this transfer, an emergency conference was held in New York in May 1940. The emergency concerned not only the new world war, but also the internal life of the international. It was necessary for the conference to beat back attempts on the part of a minority in the Socialist Workers party in the United States to revise the international movement's analysis of the class nature of the Soviet Union.

Among the documents in Part 5 is the conference manifesto, the last programmatic statement drafted by Trotsky before his assassination only three months later.

The seven years covered by this volume were a period of historic events, abrupt shifts in the political situation, and enormous opportunities and challenges for all tendencies in the working-class movement. The doc-

uments in this book—many of which have never before been printed in English, except in internal bulletins—provide an invaluable record of the response of the Fourth International.

—Allen Myers

DOCUMENTS

Petition in Defense of Democracy in Ceylon

[We reprint below the text of a petition being circulated in Europe, Canada, the United States, Japan, and Australia by the British-based Ceylon Solidarity Campaign (CSC). The organization asks that signed petitions be returned to it by mid-July so that they may be forwarded to the Human and Democratic Rights Organisation in Ceylon, which is circulating a similar petition there. Petitions should be sent to Ceylon Solidarity Campaign, 9 Dennington Park Mansions, London N.W. 6, England.

[The CSC also publishes a bulletin containing news of the struggle for democratic rights in Ceylon. It may be ordered from the same address. Single copies are \$.25, a subscription (six issues) \$1.50.]

* * *

We set out below five demands to which the Human and Democratic Rights Organisation in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) has been collecting signatures on an island-wide and international scale to be submitted to the Prime Minister.

1. Stop the import of arms, and cut the expenditure of a million rupees a day on the police and the armed services, instead of extracting more and more money from the people by increasing the prices of essential commodities.

Provide the second measure of rice on the ration, as well as sugar, flour and other essential commodities, at prices that the masses of the people can afford to pay, and restore the free measure of rice to all wage earners who have been deprived of it.

2. End the Emergency. Restore all democratic rights and civil liberties that have been suppressed or sub-

jected to arbitrary control under the Emergency regulations.

Repeal all laws for the suppression or restriction of the human and democratic rights of the people, such as the Public Security Ordinance and the Criminal Justice Commissions Act, as well as the new law to curb the freedom of the press.

3. Stop arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and prevent torture of arrested persons on the "4th floor" (C.I.D. headquarters) or anywhere else.

Release the thousands of political prisoners still being held arbitrarily

in custody and stop police harassment and re-arrests of those released.

4. Compensate all persons who have suffered injury or loss of property at the hands of the police or the military, and the dependants of those who have been killed by those forces.

5. Restore the fundamental rights of workers to strike.

Reinstate all persons who have been deprived of their employment by reason of "essential services" orders or other Emergency regulations.

We think that the signature campaign in support of the above demands will serve to bring together large numbers of the working people, students and unemployed youth of our country who are opposed to the suppression or restriction of human rights and democratic freedoms by the Government, on grounds of "public security", and to drastic cuts in mass consumption, on grounds of "austerity". This will be an important step towards the mobilisation of the people in their own defence. Your signature to this campaign will lend help and confidence to the people in Ceylon who are fighting in the face of a ruthlessly repressive government. □

Press Conference of the ERP

[The following is a translation by *Intercontinental Press* of an article that appeared in the June 9 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *Clarín*.]

* * *

A news agency, an English-language Buenos Aires daily, the assistant manager of a Madrid daily, and *Clarín* attended a press conference held yesterday by the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo where four of its most prominent spokesmen talked with the journalists for about three hours, explaining the line of the guerrilla organization.

The substance confirmed what has previously been said by the ERP on its position at the present stage. The ERP takes a stand of independence with respect to the government, while not attacking it; of defending democratic rights in the immediate future,

offering its entire militant capacity in defense of the parliamentary system in the event of an attempted military coup, and, at the same time, of confrontation with the capitalist enterprises, imperialism, and the "counter-revolutionary armed forces."

Roberto Mario Santucho, 37, born in Santiago del Estero; Jorge Benito Urteaga, 27, San Nicolás; Enrique Haroldo Gorriarán, 31, San Nicolás; and Jorge Molina, 30, Santa Fe, were those who talked with the journalists. Santucho, in a friendly and deliberate tone, took the lead throughout most of the interview.

The liberation of Rear Admiral Francisco Aleman and Commander of the Gendarmes Jacobo Nasif was "a compromise of our organization with the people; both chiefs of the Armed Forces were released upon confirmation of the release from the jails of the prisoners belonging to all the

armed organizations and of all the political prisoners."

The causes of the exploitation of the workers and of dependence [on imperialism] "have not disappeared nor will they be affected in the least way" by the present government.

The ERP will not cease its activities with the conquest of democracy but



ROBERTO SANTUCHO

will continue until "workers and popular power has been gained in Argentina." The final victory will be the "socialist revolution."

To continue the struggle is in accordance with "the sentiment of the people, who demonstrated this on May 25 when the masses prevented the [military] parade from being held that was supposed to seal the national accord."

The present parliamentary government is not in conflict with the people and will not be attacked. But the army is preparing "constantly to attack the working class and the people."

"Paramilitary groups and fascist civil commands, which will act when they see a favorable opening," are being organized.

"We do not support the government of President Cámpora, because his measures do not go against the system. We disagree with the truce." "We cannot hope for the Army to join in with the people."

There is a unity between mass operations and guerrilla activity; there is no opposition between the two.

The anti-Trotskyist declarations threatening the organizations of the left are "typical of paramilitary commands." They are convinced that the use of the name of Peronist organizations is fraudulent. In this sense,

the ERP is confident of the unity of the guerrilla organizations and of the solidarity of the revolutionary and progressive—"intermediate"—forces of Peronism and other sectors.

The ERP had absolutely nothing to do with the attempt to take the Villa Devoto prison in the early morning of May 26. They claimed that the shots came from inside the prison and from a cellblock. They do not exclude the possibility of an attempt to force the door of the prison, but they don't know what the source of it was.

The ERP is not Trotskyist. It has an anti-imperialist and socialist program, and it includes Marxists, Peronists, and Christians. Of its members, 38 percent are workers, they said.

The Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores [Revolutionary Workers party] exercises leadership and defines itself as Marxist-Leninist. It was linked to the "Fourth International," but "we have moved away."

The ERP suffered two splits. In the capital, the "August 22" ERP was ex-

pelled for organizational reasons. In the province of Buenos Aires, the ERP "Fracción Roja" [Red Faction] was expelled for political differences.

At present the ERP is not holding anyone kidnapped. It did not make any threats against Otis [Elevator] or General Motors.

Some of the Trelew "war criminals" have been listed. The ERP will observe the trial and will reject "any judicial farce."

The government will find itself in conflict with the reactionary forces if it takes broader popular measures, and it will find itself in conflict with the people if it concedes to the pressure of the corporations. "If a coup is attempted, we will stand in the front ranks against the authors, in defense of democracy and freedom."

With regard to the processes under way in Latin America, they define the government of Salvador Allende as "progressive, popular, anti-imperialist, although not revolutionary"; and that of Velasco Alvarado as "not consistently anti-imperialist." □

Republican Found Dead in Long Kesh Cell

[The following article is reprinted from the June 8 issue of the Provisional republican paper, *An Phoblacht*, published in Dublin.]

* * *

A 22-year-old Republican prisoner was found hanged in one of the cages in Long Kesh internment camp. He was Patrick Joseph Crawford, single, from Beechmount Avenue, in the Lower Falls area, Belfast.

Crawford, who was found dead during the afternoon, was one of several men detained near the Border earlier this year. They protested that they were going south on a fishing trip, but soldiers who stopped their bus claimed they found only three fishing rods.

A British spokesman said that a detainee had taken his life by hanging and said foul play was not suspected. There would be a thorough investigation by the camp governor, he said.

Crawford, an orphan, was reared by the nuns at Nazareth Lodge in Belfast.

A similar statement was released when Wolfe Tone (1798) was found in his cell with a deep throat wound. It was stated that Tone had committed suicide—No foul play was suspected—Later, when other facts and evidence came to light, it was found that Tone had been murdered.

In 1936 Sean Glynn, Limerick, was found dead in his cell in the Curragh Glasshouse [the Dublin government's camp for political prisoners]. He too, it was stated, had taken his own life. No foul play suspected.

Whether Patrick Crawford was murdered or whether he took his own life, his death, as Sean Glynn's death, indicts the Prison System.

Long Kesh Cages and the Curragh Glasshouse have one thing in common—They are both designed to break the prisoner's will, crush his nerves, shatter his mind and make him into a cabbage or drive him insane in the attempt.

The Irish People must demand the release of all Political Prisoners, North, South and overseas, and the withdrawal of British Crown Forces from Ireland. □