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***Nixon
Escalates
Threats
Against
Hanoi...***



***...Heads
for Cover
From
Watergate
Fallout***

French Youth Continue Struggle

Savoir Faire in Peking

"The presence of two British ministers, Peter Walker (Trade and Industry) and Michael Haseltine (Aerospace and Shipping), was supposed to be the icing on the cake of the British Industrial Technical Exhibition in Peking," wrote the Hong Kong weekly *Far Eastern Economic Review* in its April 16 issue.

Results were disappointing. In fact, the *Review* noted, "the cake would have been better served plain."

Instead of delivering the polite speeches expected at such occasions as trade fairs, Walker "chose to speak off the cuff and to attempt to be charmingly witty. In his first effort, wishing to compliment his Chinese hosts on the excellence of the food, he suggested that it would be a good thing if the Chinese Government were appointed caterers to the British Parliament. The embassy staff and the old China hands winced, but the interpreter partially saved the day by leaving out the word 'government.' Some even thought that he was going to move on to the subject of laundries."

Not quite. But Walker, who is reported to have resolved as a young man to become first a millionaire, then a member of Parliament, then a cabinet minister (he succeeded), was to do better later on.

In his speech opening the exhibition he announced that the new head of the Sino-British Trade Council would be the current Lord Nelson and quipped that Nelsons had a reputation for great attainments. He refrained from specifically mentioning the Opium War.

He then went on to note the large number of bicycles in Peking, observing that the contraption was a British invention and adding that he only wished the British had gotten "an exclusive right" for the sale of bikes in China. He refrained from requesting extraterritorial rights.

But the best was yet to come. He revealed to his audience that he had informed the Chinese Trade Ministry that Britain would be willing to buy £10 of goods from China for every Briton if "every Chinaman" would buy £5 worth of British goods.

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Nixon Threatens Hanoi to 'Save' Laos, Cambodia

In the brief space of four days, the Nixon administration has taken three major steps in the reescalation of the Indochina war. Between April 16 and 19, Nixon:

- renewed the bombing of Laos with strikes by B-52s and fighter-bombers;
- halted the clearing of mines from North Vietnamese harbors;
- resumed aerial reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam.

Both the logic of these moves and public statements by the Nixon administration indicated that the actions were a deliberate threat to Hanoi. Their message was: Acquiesce in U. S. attempts to roll back the Indochinese revolution or face the possibility of renewed bombing raids or other acts of war against North Vietnam.

On April 16 and 17, U. S. planes bombed villages and other populated areas of Laos around Tha Vieng, southeast of the Plaine des Jarres. The *New York Times* quoted the Pathet Lao radio as saying that "As the population of Xieng Khouang was joyously celebrating the traditional Laotian New Year, the aggressive authorities of Washington sent their B-52 strategic bombers, which made three sorties over villages 15 kilometers south of the city of Xieng Khouang, causing numerous losses in human lives and property." Several hours later, according to the radio, additional planes attacked the same area.

On April 17, U. S. naval forces abruptly halted the clearing of mines from Haiphong harbor. Removal of the mines is required by the January 27 Vietnam cease-fire agreement, but the work has been carried out at a snail's pace and is still far from completion.

The Nixon administration, perhaps embarrassed at being exposed for violating the January 27 agreement, did not announce the complete halt in mine sweeping until April 19, after it had already been denounced by Hanoi. A statement from the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry noted: "The government of the United States has deliberately retarded this work and until this day it has exploded

only three mines of the tens of thousands it was responsible for neutralizing."

Then on April 20, Pentagon offi-



SIRIK MATAK: "Nixon's favorite" to get foothold in government apparatus.

cials told reporters that U. S. planes had resumed reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam—again in direct violation of the cease-fire agreement.

Nixon spokesmen publicly threatened even more aggressive actions. For example, Bernard Gwertzman wrote in the April 21 *New York Times*:

"Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson said in an interview that the Administration was seeking by its latest actions 'to send a message' to Hanoi through means other than diplomatic protests.

"He said that Hanoi should interpret the moves as 'signals of possible retaliatory action.' He also said that Administration officials had in the past not foreclosed the possibility that the United States might 'invoke more extreme measures.'"

For the sake of domestic public consumption, Nixon of course attempted to justify his violations of the agreement by means of alleged North Vietnamese violations. This has been a continual propaganda theme since January 27. It is instructive, however, to look at the specifics of these charges. Gwertzman wrote in the April 22 *New York Times*:

"What the Administration accuses the North Vietnamese of is:

● Large-scale infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam. The Paris accord bars entry of additional troops into the South and permits only one-for-one replenishment of worn-out weapons.

● Failure to use their influence on the Cambodian insurgents to help bring about a cease-fire in Cambodia. Henry Kissinger claims he had an 'understanding' with Hanoi obligating them to do so.

● Failure to use their influence on the Pathet Lao to move promptly toward formation of a coalition government in Laos. The Laotian cease-fire of Feb. 22 envisages a coalition, but the North Vietnamese regulars in Laos do not have to leave until 60 days after the coalition is in place."

It would be difficult to imagine a blunter description of what Nixon means by "peace with honor." The North Vietnamese are being told that they must abandon the South Vietnamese liberation forces to the mercies of Nguyen Van Thieu, force the Pathet Lao into a junior partnership with the U. S. puppet regime, and force the Cambodian insurgents to settle with Lon Nol, the "mayor of Pnompenh," who appears in increasing danger of losing even that precarious post.

Nixon, it should be noted, is asking the North Vietnamese to do for U. S. imperialism what it has not been able to do for itself. His most immediate concern is undoubtedly Cambodia, where the thoroughly corrupt Lon Nol regime appears as likely to collapse from the weight of its own venality as from the attacks of the liberation forces.

After considerable arm-twisting by

U. S. diplomats, Lon Nol on April 18 announced preliminary moves toward setting up a "government" to include members of the "loyal opposition," most notably Sirik Matak, the Nixon administration's favorite. It was announced that Lon Non, Lon Nol's brother and the reputed strong man of the shrinking dictatorship, would be sent on a diplomatic mission to Washington.

If Nixon does finally force a reshuffling of the Pnompenh "government," it seems unlikely to accomplish much more than a redistribution of the available graft. "The corruption," Barry Kramer wrote in the April 16 *Wall Street Journal*, "reaches to the highest levels. Lon Non . . . is commander of the Third Division, and U. S. officials say a substantial amount of money is drawn for that division's ghost soldiers. Both brothers are known to have large bank accounts in France, Switzerland and Hong Kong."

Kramer quoted a U. S. embassy official as saying, "The corruption in Phnom Penh infects everything within 50 kilometers." The statement may have been an exaggeration: The influence of the puppet regime appears not to reach that far from the capital. Kramer, in fact, estimates that the "government" controls only 20 percent of Cambodia's territory.

In a long dispatch from Pnompenh to the April 22 *New York Times*, Mark Gayn wrote that the atmosphere there was "like Shanghai on the eve of Chiang Kai-shek's defeat."

Among other forms of corruption, Gayn reported, there is a lively traffic in U. S.-supplied armaments:

"According to knowledgeable Western sources, some generals at the front are selling their U. S.-supplied ammunition to the Communists, who promptly fire it back at the Government troops. The Communists also purchase from the generals the essentials their armed forces need, including rice and fuel."

The arms traffic also offers opportunities to the politically ambitious. Gayn described the example of Brigadier General Norodom Chantarangsey, a brigade commander who has become a virtual warlord over an area along Highway 4, covering "about 200 square miles, with 60 villages and 100,000 people."

Recently Lon Nol attempted to de-

tach some of Chantarangsey's forces for use elsewhere and was forced to back down when the general refused. "The reason Chantarangsey can enjoy such independence . . . is that he has been using his money to buy American arms from the neighboring generals, and it would not be safe to challenge him."

It is this gang of thieves that Nixon wants the North Vietnamese to prop up by using their "influence" over the Cambodian liberation forces. Even if they were so inclined, however, it is unlikely that Hanoi's "influence" reaches that far. Despite the Nixon administration's propaganda, which portrays the war as the result of "North Vietnamese aggression," even some U. S. bourgeois papers have begun to point out that the rebel forces are made up almost entirely of Cambodians. Malcolm W. Browne wrote in the April 21 *New York Times* of a surprising confession by U. S. officials in Pnompenh:

"Official American sources here said today [April 20] that since the Vietnam cease-fire three months ago, there has been no documented evidence that Vietnamese Communist troops are serving in combat roles in Cambodia."

"One source," Browne continued, "said that the Vietnamese influence on Cambodian insurgent forces was continuing to decline. That assessment has been corroborated in recent weeks by Cambodian officers in the field and by residents of villages in combat areas."

". . . It is clear, therefore, that American bombing has been intended not so much to drive out the Vietnamese as to sustain the feeble resistance offered by the forces of President Lon Nol to an indigenous insurgent army dominated by Communist-led units."

Browne might have added another motive for the intensive bombing: the attempt to terrorize the population of the liberated areas. Because of the fears of part of the U. S. ruling class that they are becoming involved in a new Vietnam war, some details on the terror raids are beginning to be discussed in public. Wells Klein, a consultant to the U. S. Senate subcommittee on refugees, recently reported on his study of the Cambodian situation and particularly the plight of the refugees. His remarks were inserted into the April 18 *Congressional Record* by Senator Edward Kennedy.

". . . the political and military circumstances of Cambodia today," Klein testified, "are frighteningly similar to those of Vietnam at the end of the Diem regime a decade ago. . . . These similarities—a rapidly deteriorating political and military situation, and an increasingly repressive government losing contact with the people—are compounded by a level of mounting human suffering which may shortly surpass the worst we have seen in Vietnam."

Klein estimated that of Cambodia's 6,500,000 population, some 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 have been displaced by the last three years of war.

Many of the refugees, he said, fled before the advance of the liberation forces—but not out of political motives: "It should be said at this junction that these refugees were, in no way, 'voting with their feet.' In very simple human terms, they were fleeing for their lives from bombing and the violence of war. . . ."

Klein added that the intensification of the bombing was increasing the flood of refugees: "Where once, ostensibly, American bombing was confined to the thinly populated areas of northeast Cambodia, today both strategic [i. e., B-52s] and tactical aircraft are being used in close support of government troops in the much more densely populated areas of the south and center. We have no figures on the number of refugees and civilian casualties created by this new wave of bombing. The number of aircraft and the number of sorties involved is a closely held secret. We do know, however, that the intensity of our bombing in Cambodia today, and in populated areas, is in excess of previous levels. As a senior American Embassy official in Phnom Penh stated with reference to the recent resumption of B-52 bombing, 'the cease-fire in Vietnam has released significant resources for Cambodia.'" □

South African Prisoner Freed From Solitary

A prisoner in South Africa's notorious Robben Island prison has been ordered released from solitary confinement, in which he had been held for nearly five months.

A judge in Cape Town ruled April 5 that prison officials had exceeded their powers by placing Kader Hassim in solitary confinement as punishment for submitting a list of prisoners' grievances to the authorities.

What Next in the French Youth Mobilization?

By M. Recanati

[The next target date of the current mass mobilization of French youth is May 1. For that day, the strike committees based in the high schools, universities, and CET (Collèges d'Enseignement Technique, technical education institutions) have called for huge demonstrations in conjunction with the country's trade-union federations. It is the first time that the Communist party and Socialist party trade-union leaderships have agreed to hold a united May Day demonstration with groups led by forces to their left, including the Trotskyists.

[The mobilization began in February, when high-schoolers launched actions against the Debré law, a "reform" of the military service system that abolishes deferments for students. The high-schoolers demanded repeal of the law, reestablishment of the deferments, and their extension to all youth.

[In March, the university students entered the fray, demonstrating against both the Debré law and a series of decrees creating a new diploma, the DEUG (Diplômes d'Etudes Universitaires Générales — General University Studies Diplomas), which are to be issued after two years of post-high-school study and are basically a means of getting students out of the universities and onto the job market as semiskilled workers as quickly as possible.

[After the university students, the apprentices of the CET joined the struggle, demanding repeal of the Debré law and denouncing the army-like regimen in the CET.

[On April 10, Easter vacations began in France. The regime evidently hopes that the youth mobilization, now supported by ever-growing numbers of workers, will run out of steam during the two-week break. The youth feel otherwise.

[The following article on the current situation in the movement and its prospects appeared in the April 13 issue of *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste. The Ligue,

French section of the Fourth International, has played a leading role in the mobilizations.

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

"The mobilizations of high-school, university, and CET youth on March 22, 27, and 28 and on April 2 and 4 are unprecedented in our country. Each successive day of action has demonstrated our movement's breadth, continuity, and determination to all those who hoped to see the movement decline. This power of youth in struggle derives from the exceptional unity that has been deeply developed around the slogans selected and around the united, nonexclusive organizational forms embodied in the democratic strike committees, coordinated on local, regional, and national levels.

"The regime made a pretense of ignoring the movement, then of distorting and fighting it. It made no real concessions, just resorted to some demagoguery. Fontanet's latest pronouncements raised the threat of repression against the movement, refused to give the slightest guarantee that repeal of the Debré law would even be considered, affirmed that the DEUG would go into effect in September 1973, and attacked the movement head on. This was a scandalous provocation.

"The regime's contempt for the youth is an intolerable insult. Who can deny the unanimity of our struggle? The regime's intransigence now compels us to take new steps in the escalation of our fight:

"The continuation of the mobilizations, on April 9 and after the Easter vacations, will show that the regime cannot turn provocateur with impunity as long as there exists among the population such unity around the current demands of the high-schoolers, technical-school students, and university students.

"By what right does the regime call upon the youth to do anything when all the youth are arrayed against it?

"We solemnly warn: We will not allow our movement to be defied and slandered; we intend to press on for complete satisfaction of our demands."

This extract from a resolution adopted by the national coordination of the student strike committees, which met at Jussieu on April 7, sketches out a program: In no case will the youth movement against the Debré law and its logical extension, the DEUG, disappear after the Easter vacations; nor will it be satisfied with vague promises about "bringing before parliament the new problems that have come up."

This movement is unprecedented. Not only have the youth never before mobilized in such numbers as in the past month. The students have even gone beyond May '68. For the first time in France, the CET apprentices have been organized and centralized; for the first time in France, it was possible to set off a general strike in the national education system on two consecutive occasions (March 22 and April 2) with mass demonstrations, around slogans and goals decided on by each high school, college, and CET.

Right after March 22, the bourgeoisie and its press were hoping for a drastic collapse of the movement. And wasn't it an encouraging sign that a few students were returning to class in some high schools? Then came April 2; the demonstrations were even more massive. Then, on the eve of the Easter vacation period, there was the April 9 demonstration, in which the trade unions partly took the initiative. Well, wouldn't that be the last bang of these fireworks displays that had already gone on too long?

Wrong again. More than 150,000 people took to the streets in Paris, many of them workers, and the high-school, university, and CET strike committees retained the initiative. Finally, the last hope: The vacations

should calm everybody down. There again, we can safely predict, the regime's hopes will be shattered.

This movement is deep. Progressively, as it has developed, it has gone beyond the issues that first triggered it off, and is now challenging the content of education in the high schools, the working conditions in the CET, and the function of capital's army among all the youth. And this movement also understands that, alone, it cannot win.

"The guarantee of our victory is the extension of our movement and its linking up with the workers to continue to demand repeal of the Debré law and to respond immediately to the regime's attacks." (Extract from the resolution adopted at the high-school coordination on April 7.)

For the bourgeoisie, to believe that the March-April movement was a flash in the pan would be to follow an ostrichlike policy. An irreversible situation had been created; the regime let it go for about a month, counting on a rapid decaying process. Now, conscious of its initial error, it is trying to strike back at the movement; but it knows that this runs the risk of accelerating the mobilization.

Because of the government's intransigence, the movement is now consciously posing itself the task of directly confronting the bourgeois state apparatus. It is not, as *L'Aurore* and *Parisien Libéré* pretend to believe, a matter of throwing up a few barricades in the Latin Quarter. It is a matter of deciding to carry the mobilization to its highest level, to proclaim ourselves ready to organize the draftees in effect to boycott the Debré law.

"We will continue the struggle—by carrying out our decision to boycott the Debré law, especially by organizing and uniting the future draftees so that the objectives of this law, militarization and selection of youth, may be defeated." (From the high-school resolution.)

It is also a matter of taking up the resolute support to all struggles inside the army itself. And we do not believe we are kidding ourselves when we predict that the soldiers will not remain indifferent.

Another decision has been made. That is to make May 1 a new target date for the movement. The interna-

tional workers' day falls one week after the high schools and universities return from Easter vacations. This is plenty of time to systematically organize new general assemblies in all the educational institutions so as to inform people about the mobilization and to prepare a huge contingent of youth in struggle to march in the demonstrations.

Will the strike continue? In each high school, college, and CET, this will be decided by general assemblies. New national coordination meetings have been called for April 28, three days after the schools start up. They will examine the situation and decide on the forms for continuing the movement.

"The strike at the universities must be maintained until the strike committees convoke new general assemblies everywhere (after Easter) to decide on the ways of carrying out the struggle.

"The strike committees, the local coordinating meetings, and the national collectives have the responsibility of

assuring the transition over the Easter vacations. The elected student collective will convoke a new national coordination on the basis of the discussions in the general assemblies." (The student coordinating body, April 7.)

Whatever attitude the regime may take, things are too far gone for it to reestablish the premobilization situation any more. The end-of-the-year expulsions, more and more numerous since 1968, did not prevent the outbreak of the recent mobilizations. Messmer's threat to prohibit all political activity in the high schools will have no greater effect. Remember how the Guichard circular was abrogated in action by the high-schoolers.

The postvacation reopening of the schools will be decisive. We are confident: We were not deluding ourselves when, in the midst of the legislative elections, we began to push for the development of a struggle against the Debré law, foreseeing that this could be one of the first big extraparliamentary mobilizations to confront the new government. □

Interview With French Student Leader

How the Negotiations With the Trade-Union Leadership Were Conducted

[Olivier Martin is a member of the Ligue Communiste and of the national coordinating committee of university strike committees. He was chosen to be on the negotiating team that met with leaders of the trade unions to reach agreement on holding a united demonstration, which took place on April 9. (See *Intercontinental Press*, April 23, p. 451.)

[The negotiations, unprecedented in France, involved the elected representatives of the high-school, university, and technical-school strike committees and the top leaders of the CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor, the country's largest trade-union federation, dominated by the Communist party), the CFDT (Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor, the Socialist-party-dominated labor federation), and the FEN (Fédération de l'Education Nationale—National

Education Federation, the largest teachers union).

[In the April 13 issue of *Rouge*, the Ligue Communiste's weekly paper, Martin was interviewed on the course of these negotiations. Below is the text of that interview. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Rouge. Who initiated the April 9 demonstrations and why?

Martin. The plan for the united demos came out of a CGT-CFDT meeting held Wednesday, April 4. But the high-school, university, and CET collectives had already proposed such a common action for the April 2 demos. The trade-union federations reacted each in their own way. The CGT refused to really throw itself into the mobilization; the CFDT sent a rather large delegation.

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After that, the two federations invited us on Thursday, April 5, to a meeting at the CFDT offices, where we met with, in addition to Maire and Ségué, representatives of the FEN, the two UNEFs, and UNCAL [Union Nationale des Comités d'Action Lycéens — National Union of High-School Action Committees, the CP-dominated high-school organization].

The CGT put forward a plan that would draw back from the demands of the high-school, university, and technical-school students and proposed united demonstrations "to create a relationship of forces that favors forcing the opening of a parliamentary debate on these questions."

Clearly, the CGT initiative was a response to a twofold concern:

It wanted to co-opt a movement that it couldn't control — by diverting it into parliamentary channels.

It wanted to put the brakes on the dynamic that had been set in motion toward May Day, which had already become established as an important target date for our movement.

In fact, what it wanted to do was reverse the head of steam that was building up, take charge of events, and prepare for a May Day that would be united, but under the control of the trade-union federations.

Rouge. How did you react to these proposals?

Martin. First of all we made it very clear that we had not been mandated to make any decisions "in the name of the movement." As elected delegates of the general assemblies and the coordinating bodies, we would have to report back to them on all proposals made. The three national coordinating bodies (college, high-school, and CET), which were to meet on April 7, would be the only groups entitled to make decisions.

Nevertheless, right from this first meeting, we went on record with our opposition to any attempt to channel the movement toward a parliamentary debate. Furthermore, we denied the claims of the two UNEFs and UNCAL to set themselves up as the leadership of the movement on the same level as the collective bodies elected by rank-and-file assemblies, which were therefore the only representatives of the youth in struggle.



One of the recent demonstrations of French youth. Next target-date for mass mobilization is May 1. Trade unions have called for united action on that date.

So the meeting adjourned without any decision being made.

Rouge. Nevertheless, the CGT and the CFDT announced the demonstration that same night.

Martin. That's right. Their communiqué even suggested that the "call to demonstrate" had been held up because of the bad faith displayed by the high-school and university strike committees, whose response they were still awaiting!

We reacted on Friday morning [April 6] by asking for a new meeting. There, we again explained that our decision would be made democratically by the national coordinating meetings. But we also asked for an explanation of the previous night's communiqué. Did the union federations mean to call for a demo without the strike committees?

The FEN and the CFDT immediately answered, saying this was out of the question. The CGT fell into line then, and Saturday's [April 7] *l'Humanité* changed their tone by explaining that "if the strike committees have not yet taken a position, it is because they have to consult the national coordinating bodies."

Rouge. What differences came up within the coordinating bodies?

Martin. The same debate went on in all three bodies. The question was how to reconcile the necessity of broadening out the movement to the workers with our rejection of any attempts at co-optation by the trade-union leaderships. And, what attitude to take on whether the two UNEFs and UNCAL should be co-callers of the demos?

Three positions were put forward. The first was argued by the comrades from Révolution [a split-off from the Ligue Communiste]. It was to refuse to consider a demo organized jointly with the unions as a means of extending the movement to the workers; they proposed instead organizing separate contingents that would join in at the end of the demos. But the union leaders had already made it clear that they would refuse to call a demonstration under those conditions.

The second position was defended by the delegates adhering to the AJS [Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme — Alliance of Youth for Socialism, the Lambertist youth group]. It was to

agree to any conditions proposed by the union leaderships. This was obviously a way for the AJS to polish up the image of "its" UNEF by throwing it forward as the leadership of a mass movement on the same plane as the coordination bodies.

The third position was put forward by the comrades of the Ligue Communiste and the Red Circles: a joint demonstration of the union federations and the high-school, university, and CET strike committees; categorical refusal to consider the two UNEFs and UNCAL co-callers of the demonstrations.

Rouge. Why this refusal? Isn't it a sectarian attitude?

Martin. Absolutely not. On the contrary, it was a matter of defending the unity and organizational independence of the movement against any attempts at splitting or co-optation. Already on March 21 UNEF-Renouveau [CP-led] and UNCAL had engaged in such maneuvers by calling for an "independent" demonstration, even though the demonstration had already been planned for March 22. [See *Intercontinental Press*, April 2, p. 360.] The stinging defeat they suffered that day was enough to deprive them of any right to represent the whole movement.

We don't deny that they are a political tendency within the movement, but we reject their claim that they are leading a movement in which their members are very much a minority and often discredited. To agree to place a "tendency" on the same plane as the leadership elected by all would be to destroy the democratic framework that has assured the development of the current struggles.

Rouge. What decision did the coordinating bodies finally make?

Martin. To do everything to organize joint demos with the union federations and the strike committees; to sign no joint call with any single tendency within the strike committees.

This position proved to have a strong majority in all three coordinating meetings. In the university meeting, it got 190 votes. The proposal to have a joint call with UNEF and UNCAL got 72 votes, and the

proposal to organize separate contingents got 63 votes.

In the high-school meeting, the three positions got 67, 33, and 11 votes respectively. In the CET coordination there was no hand count, because the majority was obvious.

Rouge. How did the trade-union leaders greet these decisions?

Martin. A new meeting was held on Saturday night [April 7]. We explained what the votes had been. The union leaders refused "to exclude the student and high-school union organizations" from the joint call. The CGT even clearly suggested that "the strike committees will never take the place of the representative union organizations."

Rouge. Was a break then inevitable?

Martin. In any case we could not have revoked the decisions of the coordinating bodies. We denounced the CGT's meddling in the youth movement and we resisted all pressure aimed at imposing UNCAL and the two UNEFs on us.

But everyone was aware of the importance of these demos, especially after the threats from Pompidou and Messmer.

So another meeting was held on Sunday. There, we put forth specific proposals: A text of a joint call that could be signed separately by all organizations that wanted to. And, it would be possible for each organization to add an explanatory note to this text. Finally, for the logistics of the Paris demo, we proposed that the first line of marchers be trade unionists, the second be the strike committees, and the third be the two UNEFs and UNCAL.

These proposals were rejected and we left the session.

But during the course of a final meeting, Sunday afternoon, the union leaderships explained that "in view of the circumstances (the government threats) they would accept [the strike committees'] conditions, but no precedent should be seen in this. This would be the first and last time that such an agreement would be achieved."

Rouge. Was this drawn-out "negotiation at the top" really necessary for

the movement?

Martin. Everyone knows that the youth cannot win alone. To open the way for political victory the youth movement must extend itself and create the best possible conditions for unity with all the workers.

We do not have a hard and fast conception of the way this indispensable extending of the movement can come about. On March 28, the "day of national explanation," the high-schoolers, students, and CET apprentices carried out "independent work": handing out leaflets at plant gates, discussions in the working-class neighborhoods, and so on.

But, when the movement reached a higher level, its social extension had to occur through an agreement with the formations in which the working class is organized. Not in order to fall in behind the union leaders, but to bring the workers around to demonstrating concretely the convergence of the youth mobilization and the workers struggles.

This reasoning proved to be correct. The number of workers at the April 9 demo far exceeded the number at the April 2 demo, which the trade unions endorsed but did not call for.

By achieving this agreement we showed that we would adhere to unity in struggle and we thereby prepared for the May Day mobilization.

Rouge. So would this be nothing but a question of tactics?

Martin. No. One of the first lessons to draw from the April 9 demonstrations and the long negotiations that preceded them is exactly that unity between the youth movement and the workers movement is possible. But this unity does not come out of bureaucratic agreements between college or high-school pseudo unions and the trade-union federations. It comes out of the mass mobilization of youth, who, by democratically electing a representative leadership, create the means of negotiating and of forging the convergence of struggles. □

Disturbing the Leisure Class

The Rhodesian government may claim to be unconcerned by African guerrillas, but the rules of one golf club permit players to repeat a stroke if interrupted by rifle fire or explosions.

The Unions, the Students, and the Current Mobilization

[Michel Field is a member of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International, and of the national high-school strike committee, the highest elected body of the current high-school movement. He was one of the student leaders selected to negotiate with the trade unions about the organization of the massive April 9 demonstration in Paris. (See *Intercontinental Press*, April 23, p. 451.) On April 3 he appeared on national television to debate Minister of Education Joseph Fontanet.

[The following interview with Field was obtained for *Intercontinental Press* in Paris on April 10, the day after the united demonstration.]

* * *

Question. First, what was the significance of yesterday's demonstration?

Answer. Yesterday's demonstration was an important step forward for the movement in that it broke the isolation the youth movement had generally suffered from. The youth had demonstrated in the streets alone several times—March 22 and April 2, for example. The turnout was very good—more than 200,000 demonstrators. But this was the first time since May '68 that the trade unions had called for a united demonstration; the first time the trade unions agreed to meet with the "ultraleftist" leaders who organized the strike movement in the high-schools and universities.

This is very important, because it means the movement is being extended to other layers of the population, especially to the workers, to the working class in struggle—in the Renault plants, for example, or at Peugeot, where the workers are occupying their factories. There is now a movement of workers in solidarity with the youth, and of youth in solidarity with the workers.

Q. How did the agreement with the CGT [Confédération Générale du Tra-

vail—General Confederation of Labor] to have a united demonstration come about?

A. This was very difficult, because the CGT demanded as a precondition for any demonstration that certain organizations led by the French Communist party, specifically the CP's high-school and student unions, have a privileged place in the demo. Since these unions are in fact only one tendency in the movement, it was out of the question for us to grant them any privileges.

The CGT made this a precondition, but in fact, our conditions were accepted, and it was on this basis—that no tendency, not the CP's or any other, would have any special privileges—that the demonstration was able to take place.

Q. Were there organizations within the high-school strike committees that were opposed to reaching an agreement with the CGT? If so, what was their concern?

A. There were various discussions held in the strike committees; they all took place democratically. On this point there were three positions.

One, which was held by a minority, the Lambertists, was that we should form a united front, regardless of conditions. The second position, held by the ultraleftists, was against any official contact with the trade unions. This was also a minority position.

And the third position, which our comrades of the Ligue Communiste put forward, was that we should go ahead with this demonstration with the trade unions, but should avoid any co-opting maneuvers and should put forth our own conditions. This third position got a majority.

Q. What are the demands of the high-school students at the present time?

A. The immediate demands, so to speak, are to repeal the Debré law,

that is, reestablish military deferments; some demands relating to freedom of choice on dates of induction, that is, the youth should be able to decide themselves at what age between eighteen and twenty-five they should go into the army; withdraw the decrees establishing the Diplômes d'Etudes Universitaires Générales [General University Studies Diplomas], which are a sort of "super-high-school" diploma to be given after two years of post-high-school study.

But, more deeply, beyond these demands is a general denunciation of the role of the army in capitalist society today, of the fact that the army is not some neutral force, but is used to break strikes, to carry out repression in the colonial world. In short, a whole series of criticisms that obviously will not disappear after these demonstrations, because they are very deepgoing.

Q. What organizational form has the high-school mobilization taken?

A. For the first time, the organization has been very democratic. The high-schoolers have controlled their own mobilization from beginning to end. In the high schools, general assemblies uniting all the students are formed. The general assemblies elect strike committees that are in charge of running the strike in the school. These strike committees send delegates to the various regional and national coordinating meetings, the only decision-making bodies of the movement, which decide things about the demonstrations—actions to be initiated, slogans, and so on.

Each delegate is mandated then to go back to his high-school general assembly to explain the discussions and the decisions that have been made. A national strike committee is formed out of these coordinating meetings. Its sole task is to put the decisions into practice—organize the demonstrations and so on.

So the form is completely democratic, one in which the various organizations, among them the Ligue

Communiste, participate but also follow the majority decisions made by the movement.

Q. What political groups play the greatest role in the leadership of the movement right now?

A. First of all the Ligue Communiste, which took the initiative by calling for the Committees Against the Debré Law as long ago as February, before the movement started. Then the other groups joined in—like Révolution, an ultraleftist group, and the Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme [Alliance of Youth for Socialism], a Lambertist group that had ignored and even opposed any high-school mobilization and which has just latched on to the movement, representing sort of the far right of the movement. But anyway, they're in it.

Q. Do the Communist students participate in these strike committees, and how are they received?

A. It varies. In some places CP high-schoolers and students have participated in the strike committees and have abided by the rules of the movement. But most of the time they have just tried to push forward their own groups—the UNEF and UNCAL—and when they do that, they are repudiated by the movement.

They tried to organize their own demonstrations, without even proposing them to the movement, and these resulted in big setbacks—not many demonstrators showed up. This was one of the considerations that forced the CP to make a big tactical turn and come into the movement, and this in part explains the attitude the CGT took yesterday.

Q. How widespread are the strikes in the high schools at the present time?

A. The movement affected nearly all the high schools. Tens of thousands of high-schoolers were organized into the general assemblies, the rank-and-file base in the schools, and into the strike committees.

The delegates that came to the national coordinating meetings represented all the provincial cities, all the Paris high schools; and in these high schools, a huge proportion of the students were on strike or otherwise active in the struggle.



Michel Field, member of the Ligue Communiste and leader of high-school struggle.

Q. I understand that there have been confrontations with both the police and the fascists. How great a problem is that for the student strikes?

A. The fascists have never attacked the movement head on because they are too weak in France today to get away with clashing with a movement as massive as the one going on now. They tried a few actions and some counterdemonstrations held the day after the big high-school demonstrations.

But these turned out to be failures, partly because they were much too small, and partly because antifascist militants made them understand that the time for them to demonstrate has passed and that the growth of fascist groups would not be tolerated.

As to the attitude of the police, that has gone along with the attitude of the government, which has been contradictory. On the one hand, it has let the movement develop; on the other hand, it has attacked it and at some points has tried to smash it. There was very severe repression as the March 22 demonstration disbanded, and our comrades in Strasbourg, where there have been serious clashes with the police, have been hit by repression too.

As to repression in general, it is now starting to come down heavily. The government is making threats, and the apprentices of the CET [Col-

lèges d'Enseignement Technique, technical education schools] and the high-school students are now being expelled and hit by repression.

Q. When it is decided in the high-school meetings to go back to school, how do the strike leaders respond to that?

A. If the high-schoolers decide the strike has to be stopped, then we stop the strike. But when that happens, it's not the end of the mobilization.

We have already decided to organize for this June, when the next batch of youth are scheduled to be inducted. We are planning either a mass refusal to submit to the Debré law or else an antimilitarist action within the army. The point is that even if the strike does not start up again, the high-schoolers will remain mobilized, will stay alert, especially to government attacks and to the repression the government is threatening to unleash against them.

Q. Would you compare the present student upsurge to May '68?

A. It is still too early to tell whether another May '68 will erupt. I think it won't. You can't expect history to repeat itself that way. May '68 was basically at the beginning a youth movement. But that is not the most

important thing. It was above all a prerevolutionary crisis with a great development of social struggles. Today, this development of social struggles has not yet taken place.

On the level of the youth alone, on that level, we can say that this movement is even more important than May '68—both as to the numbers involved (this time, we have had demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of high-schoolers, while in May '68 these demos had only tens of thousands), and, more important, as to the political level reached. This time, one of the basic pillars of the system, the army, has been challenged. And besides that, the movement's organizational forms have been much more democratic.

So, for the youth, the movement today is much deeper. As to the possible development of a social crisis, it is too early to tell how this will happen, but it is not likely that it will take the same form as May '68.

Q. Has the student movement in other countries, such as Belgium and Spain, been an inspiration for the student movement here in France?

A. Absolutely. Mainly the explosion in the Belgian high schools, which was over the exact same issue that the French students have mobilized around: draft deferments. In February some students from Belgium came to a meeting organized in France by the Ligue Communiste and the Red Circles, the Ligue's high-school organization, to explain about their struggle. Three weeks later the struggle in France broke out.

Really, the Belgian comrades opened up the way for us and showed us how to fight.

Q. How would you estimate the role played by the various groups in this movement?

A. It is indisputable that the Ligue Communiste and the Red Circles played a very important role, both in terms of the slogans they advanced, which were accepted most of the time by the movement, and in terms of their insistence on respecting the democratic organization of the movement.

There were also other groups—as I said before—leftist groups, groups representing the right-wing of the movement, groups that always had

an ambiguous attitude, a factional attitude, that put forward slogans that were not taken up by the majority.

In fact, the Ligue has really played the most crucial role in this mobilization. □

Charge Imprisoned Lawyers Were Tortured

Greek Junta Shuns Jurists' Commission

[Since January of this year, massive student demonstrations have taken place in Greece demanding an end to the repressive measures taken by the ruling junta aimed at silencing dissent in the universities. Draft deferments for students have been withdrawn, and hundreds of militants have been inducted into the army and many more have been jailed.

[During its nearly six years of existence, the Papadopoulos government has denied the most elementary democratic rights to those that it has incarcerated. Trial by jury and access to adequate defense and legal counsel have been denied to many of the thousands of political prisoners in Greece, and hundreds have been held in prison for years without ever having charges brought against them. This sort of treatment, which has been given to worker and student militants who oppose the junta, has now been extended to lawyers who attempt to defend them.

[The following statement regarding jailed defense lawyers is a joint press release, issued April 12, by the International League for the Rights of Man and the International Commission of Jurists, nongovernmental organizations affiliated to the United Nations.]

* * *

The incarceration of six Greek lawyers, held incommunicado for over a month without charge or access to counsel, was the subject of a joint mission of inquiry to Greece this past week of the International Commission of Jurists and the International League for the Rights of Man. Both organizations have circumstantial evidence that the lawyers were tortured. Four of the six recently defended Greek students at a trial.

A statement issued by the representatives of the two organizations reported that Greek officials turned down requests of the U. S. Department of State for interviews with the joint mission. "Instead, on April 7 the Greek

Government publicly denounced the efforts 'of foreign lawyers . . . to collect information' as interference in Greek internal affairs."

The detained Greek lawyers, declared the statement, "have, as yet, been charged with no crime, and spokesmen for the government have categorically and repeatedly refused to discuss either the reasons for or the circumstances of their detention except to issue, only after our arrival, a press release asserting that the six lawyers had engaged in 'subversive activities.'"

Representing the International Commission of Jurists in the commission of inquiry was Morris B. Abram, former U. S. delegate to the U. N. Human Rights Commission; representing the International League for the Rights of Man were Professor John P. Humphrey, former director of the U. N. Human Rights Division, and William J. Butler, Chief Counsel to the League.

Drawing attention to the recent defense of students by four of the Greek lawyers, the statement declared that freedom of counsel "to represent defendants without fear and without themselves suffering sanctions on that account" represents the most elementary respect for the rule of law.

The three jurists charged the Greek Government with violating the "rule of law" as embodied in its own Constitution and in international human rights instruments by its current actions.

"It is the clear duty of the Greek Government to release these lawyers or to charge and try them without delay." The joint statement scored the Greek Government for rejecting an opportunity "to state its position. . . . We regret that our efforts made in good faith to learn both sides of an important issue involving human rights and the Rule of Law have been resisted. . . . We came to Greece, as instructed, not to make accusations, but to seek the facts." □

Right Wing in Popular Unity Consolidates

By Hugo Blanco

Santiago

The events that have taken place since the recent changes in the cabinet indicate that a strengthening of the right wing within the government and the governmental coalition is continuing.

The Central Committee of the Socialist party held a plenary session March 28-31. Nothing spectacular came out of it, but it did unquestionably represent an advance for the party's right wing. To be sure, general statements were reiterated on the need to "stimulate and strengthen" the "new class organizations forged in the heat of the struggle," a reference to the *cordones industriales* [bodies of representatives of workers in a particular industrial area], the municipal commands, etc.; to the effect that the "people's power must continue to develop institutional forms that differ from those of the bourgeoisie and that in certain circumstances make possible the expression of opposition to bourgeois power"; on the deepening of revolutionary transformations; on the need to correct bureaucratic deviations; etc. Nevertheless, it is generally understood that all these statements were made only to soothe the party ranks and the left wing of the leadership, represented by the eternal conciliator, Carlos Altamirano.

The general tone of the plenum was marked by such statements as that "the popular government is the main instrument for continuing to move forward," that the development of the mass organizations must not hinder the government's action but help it, that "Popular Unity fully continues to be the political alliance that will make possible a deepening of the revolutionary transformations," and that "the Socialists continue to view their alliance with the CP as the basic axis of Popular Unity."

If we compare these statements with the atmosphere prevailing in the party in January and February, we can see a rapid retreat from leftist positions.

At that time, mass mobilizations were unfolding around the direct distribution of necessary goods, in addition to the powerful mobilization by the workers (especially the Cordón Cerrillos) against the Millas plan, in which the CP economics minister proposed returning to their owners many of the companies that have been intervened. These mobilizations applied so much pressure on the SP that there was open talk about a split in Popular Unity and the formation of a more militant left-wing front that, in addition to the SP, MAPU [Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria—Movement for United Popular Action], and the Christian Left, which are in the UP, would include the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left] and other smaller revolutionary groups; this would have constituted an open break with the CP and the other lesser groups in the right wing of the UP—the Radical party and API [Acción Popular Independiente—Independent Popular Action].

These illusions evaporated with the latest SP plenum. Moreover, among the resolutions before the plenum—read, ironically enough by Altamirano himself—one stands out. Toward the end, it stated: "The party takes a positive view toward the significance and importance of holding a National Congress of Popular Unity that will take a fundamental stand on the concrete application of the program, and the platform that complements it, in each front and in every part of the country." There can be no doubt that if this congress is held, it will unquestionably be under the auspices of the CP and Allende, and any agreements that are reached will revolve around how to meet the mass movement head on in close alliance with the Christian Democracy and the armed forces.

This consolidation of the right wing in the SP was reflected in changes in its Political Committee. Although these amounted to nothing spectacular that might provoke a split—Altamirano remains secretary general, for in-

stance—two pro-Allende figures, both graduates of the governmental apparatus and both softened by their tenure, were gently eased into the committee. They are Hernán del Canto, former government secretary general, and Rolando Calderón, former minister of agriculture. Another important addition is that of the right-wing cabinet member Clodomiro Almeyda.

The groundwork has now been laid for a triumph of the right wing in the next party congress, all the more so in view of the scattered state of the left and the absence of an organized tendency.

If the plenum of the SP turned out to be less heated than expected, the Communist party plenum, also held at the end of March, unfolded in the usual touching atmosphere of angelic harmony.

There was some mention of workers' participation in managing the factories, which has been going on for some time now, and of other "revolutionary" topics. But the main theme and axis of the plenum was the "battle for production." The CP is not concerned about leaving a major part of the economy in capitalist hands. As the masses are struggling day after day to increase their power in the countryside, in production, and in distribution, it is getting to the point where the CP is not only putting a brake on this struggle, but is actually fighting it. It is doing this by putting forward as its main slogan, the exhortation to produce more: "The main thing is and will continue to be to increase production and productivity in copper, in mining as a whole, in industry, and in agriculture in order to increase exports, reduce what we need to import, and to reach the point where there is an abundance, not a shortage, of consumer goods on the domestic market."

The CP is understood to be pleased with the coup that was recently carried out inside MAPU and with the progress made by its friends inside the SP. New attacks on the left are being prepared.

Another sign of the strengthening of the right that is presently occurring within the government coalition is the fact that once he received confirmation as head of the National Office for Food Distribution and Marketing, General Alberto Bachelet proceeded to clean out the left-wingers.

In line with his stated aim of "implementing a new plan to rationalize distribution," he asked for the resignations of the directors and assistant directors of the state distribution agencies. It is rumored that military men will be appointed to fill these posts.

The general director of the Graham Agencies, Sergio Juárez, offered resistance: "Concretely, with regard to your request that I resign my post—which was from the outset an inadmissible and legally ineffectual request—I am complying by notifying you that, in accord with instructions that I have received and in compliance with an elementary disciplinary duty, I am informing the Socialist party about this matter."

Graham Agencies has taken some of the most audacious measures with regard to direct distribution. It enjoys the sympathy of popular sectors, such as marginal shantytowns and cordones industriales. Bachelet had already removed its director once before, but mass pressure forced him to relent and appoint Juárez, who has followed the same approach as his predecessor. It appears that Bachelet now feels that he is in a stronger position and is attempting to strike a heavy blow.

The Socialist party rejected the path that Juárez had chosen, and Allende stated in a speech that "it must be very clearly understood that it is only the government that can determine which officials should retain their posts and which ones, for reasons that, moreover, need not be explained, must be changed."

War has also been declared on "tomas" [take-overs, occupations]: The first act of the new minister of the interior, Gerardo Espinoza, after taking office, was to state that no more tomas would be permitted.

The "toma" is a form of mass mobilization used by various sectors: The workers take over factories, the peasants take over land, students occupy high schools, squatters take over distribution agencies, and everybody takes over roads, blocks avenues, etc.

Up to now the "People's Government" had not moved directly against this form of mobilization, which is not directed against it. With the naming of the new cabinet, it began to do so.

The tomas continued after the minister of the interior's speech. Allende himself felt the need to speak out, and

on April 3 he devoted an entire speech to attacking the tomas and directing threats at the workers' and people's movement.

The tomas are still going on, however, a breach has opened up between the masses and their reformist leaderships, and the UP is beginning to appear to the masses as a defender

of the rights of the bourgeoisie. The police attack using clubs and tear gas and leaders of the tomas are arrested and put on trial.

The battle against the tomas has begun but it has still not been won. The popular movement recognizes that it must become better organized. □

British Industrialist Released

ERP Puts Retired Admiral on Trial

Retired Rear Admiral Francisco Aleman, kidnapped on April 2 by Argentine guerrillas belonging to the ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Army of the People), is in the process of being tried by his captors. This is the opinion of most observers following a spate of conflicting reports in the press in mid-April.

The evening paper *Crónica* reported April 13 receiving a three-and-a-half-page letter from the ERP on the Aleman case. The paper published only a portion of the letter, however, and in such a way as to leave the reader somewhat confused. The message appeared to suggest that Aleman had been executed. Following publication of the report in a late edition of *Crónica*, the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión* received a telephone call from someone identifying himself as a member of the ERP. This person claimed that there was an error in the message and that reference to Aleman was in fact a reference to Colonel Héctor Alberto Iribarren. This may have been a prank call, however, because Iribarren was kidnapped and executed by the Montoneros, not by the ERP.

The news reports to the effect that Aleman had been executed turned out to be false. On April 15, a letter from Aleman was found in the bathroom of a bar. The text was as follows:

"I am in good health, and as I said in my earlier message, I am being treated well.

"My hand is still weak, but it's getting a bit better.

"I want to deny news reports stating I have been executed that I was informed of today.

"I am being submitted to a revolutionary trial.

"I still believe in you and send you a warm embrace."

The signature, according to the April 16 weekly international issue of *La Nación*, was "a bit illegible." Aleman's family, nonetheless, was able to verify that it was indeed written by him.

The ERP statement to *Crónica* also reportedly contained the following response to the appeal by President-elect Héctor J. Cámpora to the guerrilla group to cease their activities: "Our organization will not attack the new government as long as the new government does not attack the people or the guerrilla movement."

La Opinión reported in its April 18 issue that the news media had also received a statement from the Peronist guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación (FAL—Liberation Armed Forces), Peredo Comando, in response to Cámpora's plea. The newspaper published excerpts of the message. "Today we revolutionists are continuing, arms in hand, the long process that has barely begun—the revolutionary war for socialism," it stated. In another section, it noted that "today, as yesterday, we state that with the use of arms we will win. For, as Che showed, there will be no liberation without a struggle."

Meanwhile, the British industrialist Francis Brimicombe, president of the British American Tobacco Company, was freed April 13 after his company paid an undisclosed sum as ransom. He was kidnapped by four unknown persons on April 8. □

Report Nixon Aides May Be Indicted

By Allen Myers

Perhaps because of his distance from the uproar, it was a conservative British journalist who most succinctly summed up the week's events in the Watergate affair. Discussing the revelations of high-level involvement of the Nixon administration in political espionage, obstruction of justice, political payoffs and various other crimes, Peregrine Worsthorne wrote in the April 8 *Sunday Telegraph* that the scandal "suggests a standard of values in the White House formerly associated only with the presidential palaces of Latin American banana republics, by comparison with which the conduct of the Mafia is made to seem positively dignified and salubrious."


For a time, it appeared that Nixon would succeed in sweeping under the rug the involvement of high officials in last June's raid on the Democratic National Committee's offices in the Watergate Hotel. But public pressure began to build after one of the raiders, James W. McCord Jr., announced his willingness to name names. (See *Intercontinental Press*, April 9, p. 393.)

Faced with McCord's testimony before a grand jury and with the prospect of a public investigation by a Senate committee, Nixon decided to conduct a strategic retreat. In doing so, however, he seems to have created panic in his army of subordinates, and the retreat quickly degenerated into a rout.

On April 17, Nixon called in the press and read a statement. Claiming to have conducted his own investigation on the basis of "serious charges" that were brought to his attention only on March 21, he declared:

"I can report today that there have been major developments in the case concerning which it would be improper to be more specific now, except to say that real progress has been made in finding the truth.

"If any person in the executive branch or in the Government is indicted by the grand jury, my policy will be to immediately suspend him.



MITCHELL: Scapegoat?

If he is convicted, he will, of course, be automatically discharged.

"I have expressed to the appropriate authorities my view that no individual holding, in the past or present, a position of major importance in the Administration should be given immunity from prosecution."

"By taking the counteroffensive," R. W. Apple Jr. wrote in the April 19 *New York Times*, "his [Nixon's] associates in the White House believe, he hopes to show that he sinned not but was sinned against, to portray himself as the prosecutor and not the protector of those to be prosecuted."

Among the factors that may be presumed to have occasioned Nixon's "counteroffensive" was a Gallup poll conducted from April 6 to 9. This showed that 41 percent of the public believed that Nixon had advance knowledge of the Watergate break-in and only 32 percent did not. "The issue," Gallup wrote, "has become of such widespread concern that it could seriously affect G. O. P. [Republican] fortunes in next year's Congressional races."

Still another important factor was widespread rumors that the grand jury was about to indict high-level

administration officials. Nixon had to do something to dissociate himself from the scandal.

But his reference to indictments and convictions touched off a scramble among officials high and low, past and present, to protect themselves by implicating others. The "team spirit" that is supposed to be a hallmark of the Nixon administration was conspicuous by its absence.

One of the "team" in fact appears to have been the first to confirm testimony by McCord that implicated higher-ups. Jeb Stuart Magruder, former deputy director of the Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP) was reported to have confessed to his and others' roles even before Nixon's announcement. Seymour M. Hersh reported from Washington in the April 19 *New York Times*:

"A number of knowledgeable sources said Mr. Magruder met secretly with Federal prosecutors here Saturday [April 14] and provided a full account of his role."

Hersh's sources said Magruder had admitted attending a February 1972 meeting at which the Watergate break-in was planned. Also present, he said, were presidential counsel John W. Dean 3d and former Attorney General John Mitchell, who was the director of CREEP.

Dean conducted an earlier "investigation" of the scandal for Nixon. He was now reported to be under investigation not only for planning the break-in but for obstructing the investigation of it by the courts.

On April 17, syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reported that McCord had testified that he and the other six defendants in the Watergate case had been paid thousands of dollars in return for their silence. McCord himself said he had received \$45,000. Hersh reported April 20 that "sources close to the case" said that Dean had supervised the payment of more than \$175,000 to the defendants.

Nixon lost no time in trying to take his distance from Dean. Immediately after Nixon's speech, press secretary Ronald Ziegler pointedly refused to repeat the statement of a month earlier that Nixon had "full confidence" in Dean.

On April 19, Dean issued his own statement to the press. R. W. Apple Jr. wrote in the *New York Times* the next day:

"Mr. Dean, heretofore considered one of the staunchest 'team players' in the Administration, bypassed the White House chain of command in issuing the statement, notifying neither Mr. Nixon nor the press office in advance. Instead, his secretary, her voice trembling, phoned it to newspaper offices."

Dean concluded his statement with a warning: ". . . some may hope or think that I will become a scapegoat in the Watergate case. Anyone who believes this does not know me, know the true facts, nor understand our system of justice."

It was reported that Dean would claim that the report on his investigation had been distorted by others in the White House. Apple wrote that Dean "has told friends in the last two days that he is ready to implicate other White House aides in testimony to the grand jury."

Like Dean, Mitchell apparently decided that the best defense was to point to someone else. Mitchell testified before the grand jury for three hours April 20. He changed his earlier and often repeated story that he had no prior knowledge of the bugging of the Democrats' offices. He now said that he had been present at meetings where illegal activities were suggested and that he had forbidden them. At a press conference after his testimony Mitchell said:

"I have heard discussion of such things [bugging plans]. They've always been cut off at all times and I would like to know who it was that kept bringing them back, and back, and back."

Mitchell was also reported to have told the grand jury that Dean and former White House aide Frederick C. LaRue were involved in paying off the Watergate trial defendants. Mitchell's lawyer told reporters that Mitchell had admitted to the grand jury that he "had some knowledge that Republican re-election funds were being used to pay the legal fees for the defendants." The lawyer said Mitchell regarded this as a "normal practice."

But Dean and Mitchell were only two of a number of prominent officials reported as likely to be indicted or under investigation. Others included:

- Maurice Stans, former secretary of commerce and chief fund-raiser for Nixon's reelection committee;

- Herbert W. Kalmbach, Nixon's personal attorney;

- H. R. Haldeman, Nixon's top adviser on domestic affairs;

- Gordon C. Strachan, former White House aide, now general counsel of the U. S. Information Agency.

In the April 19 *New York Times*, Hersh quoted a "Congressional source" as saying that Stans, Mitchell, and Kalmbach would all be indicted for perjury for having denied prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in. The next day, the same paper added Strachan's name as being among the likely defendants on this charge. Strachan also was reportedly implicated in the payoffs about which McCord had testified.

As for Haldeman, the grand jury was said to be investigating his possible connection with a \$350,000 secret fund used to pay the defendants. Hersh wrote April 21 that "In a telephone interview, a former member of the Committee for the Re-election of the President confirmed that the committee had handed over \$350,000 in \$20, \$50, and \$100 bills to a key Haldeman assistant in April, 1972, one day before the new campaign finance reporting act went into effect. The cash was stored in a White House safe, the source said."

It remains to be seen how much of the truth will actually ever reach the public. There is evidence, for example, that the political espionage goes far beyond the Watergate incident. Republican Senator Lowell P. Weicker, a member of the committee investigating the affair, has stated publicly that the group should not let Watergate blind it to more far-ranging activities. Weicker has been conducting his own investigation, and its results are evidently of interest to other persons: When he arrived in his office on the morning of April 19, the senator found that the locked filing cabinet containing his papers had been opened by a person as yet undiscovered.

In any event, the atmosphere bordering on panic suggests that a lot of people in Washington are very worried. Even Vice-President Spiro Agnew leaked to the press the information that he was looking for a graceful way to "repudiate" the affair. Bill Kovach wrote in the April 22 *New York Times*:

"Advisers of Vice President Agnew

are urging him to disassociate himself from the Watergate affair 'in the most direct kind of way' to avoid what they see as a harmful political impact reaching to the 1976 Presidential election."

Kovach quoted a "source close to the Vice President" as saying:

"The Vice President and every other Republican is in a difficult position because of this. It has got to be repudiated. It can be done. Spiro Agnew can do it because of his reputation for integrity [sic]; but to do that he's got to virtually move out on his own in a most direct kind of way and when asked about the President and Watergate, he'll have to say, 'I repudiate the whole affair.'"

This would seem to suggest that Agnew does not believe Nixon's efforts to "show that he sinned not but was sinned against" will be swallowed by the general public.

In an April 22 editorial, the *New York Times* indicated that it shares Agnew's doubts:

"The record suggests that Mr. Nixon has been the last rather than the first to try to establish the truth about the Watergate affair and the campaign of espionage and sabotage which it brought to a climax. In his press conferences and repeatedly through his White House press spokesman, the President has denied, dismissed and ridiculed these charges and cast aspersions on the press for inquiring into them. Only after participants in this squalid operation began to testify against one another to the grand jury and further criminal indictments became likely did Mr. Nixon last week belatedly intervene."

No one expects that any of the culprits, even to save their own skins, will directly implicate Nixon. But even the normally respectful press can not help asking how Nixon could be the only person in the White House *not* to know what was going on.

"No one in Washington," Apple wrote in the April 22 *New York Times*, "is arguing in a loud voice, even now, that 'Nixon did it.' But the torrent of new information that has burst through the dike of silence has set many people to wondering how Mr. Nixon could not have known—if not before the act was committed, then at least a long time before he received new information, by his own account, late last month." □

Japan's Mounting Challenge to the U.S. in Brazil

"The home office of a North American news agency asked its Rio de Janeiro affiliate recently for a report on a subject that greatly preoccupies the government and business circles in the United States," Osiris Troiani reported in the April 6 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*.

"This report has just been published. It begins this way: 'Armed with smiles and a lot of money, Japanese businessmen are rapidly penetrating into South America.'"

The reference to Japanese "smiles" sounded a sinister note, somewhat reminiscent of the racist propaganda of the second world war. It was evident from Troiani's report that American capitalists had something more to fear than "insidious oriental flattery." He notes: "The present reality is that Japan has \$20,000 million in reserves and it is hard to invest them in its own territory without provoking grave imbalances."

Some Latin American capitalists, whose security Washington has been so anxious to protect since the Cuban revolution, have shown signs of interest in these new suitors' charms, which may include their "smile."

"We obviously do not share the American alarm," Troiani wrote, "which may have been provoked by flights of fancy like that of Ioshino Doko, president of the Toshiba electronics company, who said not long ago, 'In the coming century Japan will achieve an economic power greater than the United States.'"

In particular, the Brazilian bourgeoisie seem to look to expanding Japanese investment as a means of achieving more possibilities for development and maneuver than have been possible under the exclusive dominance of American capital. After crushing the opposition to its rule, the Brazilian dictatorship was able to achieve both "stability" and an expanding economy based on increased exploitation and impoverishment of the masses. At the same time, growing imperialist rivalry threatens Japanese business interests in the advanced

capitalist countries, especially the United States.

As a result, according to Troiani, a conscious alliance is developing be-



TANAKA: Former trade minister, now prime minister, exports yen.

tween the Brazilian "subimperialism" and the ambitious but politically weak capitalist class in the Far East, an alliance that may be a pattern in the next stage of sharpening interimperialist competition. The Argentine journalist views the increasing economic relations between Japan and Brazil as a deliberate policy of the most conscious representatives of the two ruling classes, the governments in Rio de Janeiro and Tokyo.

"Kakuei Tanaka, who before becoming prime minister was in charge of foreign trade; and Delfim Netto, who has just completed six years as overseer of the economy—during which he constantly sang the praises of the 'Japanese miracle'—certainly saw a little further than the businessmen of both countries."

Netto outlined the advantages recently of "diversifying foreign investment" in a speech at the Brazilian war college, a stronghold of bourgeois nationalism, where many have fears

about the economy being bought out by foreign capitalists.

In his speech, Netto tried to soothe nationalistic officers by minimizing the amount of foreign investment in the country. In particular, he stressed that the "state" controls the basic sectors—energy, steel, transport, and petrochemicals—and has reduced the inflow of foreign capital into commercial banks.

Much of this was soft soap intended to mystify a less than acute audience. Troiani noted: "He was no doubt talking about direct investments, which in his opinion were the only ones that could affect the national sovereignty. In 1972, these totaled only \$200 million. He did not take into consideration the loans of banks and international agencies, which in the same year added up to more than \$3,000 million. But besides this, he failed to mention that while foreign investment is weak in agriculture, according to the report of a parliamentary commission it comes to 31 percent in industry and trade."

Netto apparently felt that others were in a better position to put forward more solid arguments for the government policy.

"The agile minister left it to financial circles in Rio to explain that the diversification of investments is tending to limit the role of North Americans in the Brazilian economy. This is the case of the competition between Ford and Volkswagen, between American and German drug companies, as well as in chemicals and electronics."

In particular, a qualitative change seems to be taking place in the nature of Japanese investment in the recent period, which the Argentine journalist thought had far-reaching implications.

In the late 1960s, Japanese businessmen started paying more attention to Brazil, apparently seeking raw materials sources as well as a market for producers' goods. "Little by little, they acquired stock in small and medium enterprises, above all in textiles and food processing. 'The Japanese are practically the only ones who will enter into forms of association on the

basis of holding a minority interest,' said one of the directors of the National Bank of Economic Development. In turn, the president of the Mitsubishi Corporation—the world's largest exporter—hinted that such 'participation' has been conceived to avoid 'the problems created by other nations,' a phrase which the American news agency's local branch could well have picked up in its report."

Now the Japanese capitalists seem to be getting interested primarily in exporting capital, since they are looking for places to invest their \$20,000 million. "Brazil, whose rate of growth reached 10.4 percent in 1972 and which has political stability and is free from exorbitant inflation, offers the best imaginable field for investing these reserves. It's no longer enough to buy the mine and agricultural products that Japan lacks and sell cheap industrial products to the growing Brazilian middle class.

"Today the Tokyo government is interested in the 'channels of export,' that is, the roads, railways, and ports making it possible to take out raw materials for shipment to the world centers of consumption. The Brazilian minister of industry and trade, Pratini de Morais, has asked the Japanese to put their marketing expertise at the service of Brazilian export policy. They need only 10 or 20 percent of the stock in an associated company to direct production toward their trading firms, whose tentacles extend round the world, including into the socialist area.

"This is not all; Japanese capital has joined with local capital in establishing the first steel enterprise and the first shipyards in Brazil. They are financing in part the petrochemical complex in Bahia. In 1972, the Itoh group and the Brazilian company Vale do Rio Doce founded an enterprise for producing cellulose. On the coast of the state of Pará a city is springing up to mine the iron ore of Carajas.

"This qualitative change is still in its infancy but offers 'unlimited perspectives,' according to the board of directors of Keindanren — the Japanese Manufacturers' Association, whose members toured Brazil last November. In February 1973, a delegation from the Mitsubishi group arrived and announced its intention to invest \$1,200 million in five years time. This

is destined, among other things, for the Seta Quedas hydroelectric dam—now located in Itaipú—whose potential of 10 to 12 million kilowatts will exceed the largest Soviet and American plants."

As another sign of the Japanese capitalists' interests in Brazil, Troiani noted that on March 27 in São Paulo they opened the largest industrial fair they have ever held abroad.

The Argentine economic reporter was convinced that this type of penetration in Brazil reflects the strategy of the Japanese ruling class for meeting the challenge of stepped-up imperialist competition, a strategy soon to be imitated by others.

"When you realize the intimate relationship that exists between the Tokyo government and the big economic

combines, it is hard to believe that these projects do not enter into state policy. Japan already occupies second place in the statistics of foreign investment in Brazil and doubtless before the end of the twentieth century will be vying for first place with the United States. The monetary and trade restrictions that the Nixon government is trying to impose on foreign producers will not fail to accelerate this process.

"Two countries that have prospered thanks to American aid, boldly facing the risk of seeing foreigners buying out their economies, have joined forces to free themselves from an oppressive tutelage, now that the American market seems to be closing to them. On this road they will soon find a third partner—Canada." □

Sri Lanka

Moves to Heal CP Rift Still Unsuccessful

The pro-Moscow Communist party of Sri Lanka has so far been unable to heal the rift in its ranks that became visible with the expulsion of two prominent members in December. (See *Intercontinental Press*, January 22, p. 64.) According to the April 12 issue of the weekly *Ceylon News*, the party "has still not been able to resolve its factional differences despite overtures by both sides."

The two factions are the "hard-liners" led by the party's general secretary, S.A. Wickremasinghe, and the "soft-liners" led by Pieter Keuneman, who is housing minister in the United Front government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike. The Wickremasinghe faction, which controls the party Central Committee and Politburo, wants the CP to distance itself slightly from the repressive policies of the Bandaranaike regime. Keuneman is for continuing the uncritical support that is a condition of his cabinet portfolio.

At the December meeting of the central committee, two members of Keuneman's faction, L.W. Panditha and V.A. Samarawickreme, were expelled from the party. Keuneman is said to insist on their reinstatement as one of the conditions for reuniting the party.

"Although the leader of the soft-liners

... is now attending meetings of the Politburo for the first time since the internal troubles began," the *Ceylon News* reported, "it is understood that he has not wavered from the original conditions which his group stipulated.

"According to political circles Mr. Keuneman had asked that the CP give full and complete support to the United Front Government, that the expulsion of L.W. Panditha and V.A. Samarawickreme be withdrawn by the Central Committee and that the daily newspaper 'Attha' refrain from adopting a line critical of the government."

The newspaper reported that the hard-liners appeared unwilling to meet Keuneman's demands, either on the expulsions or on the question of political line. "In this situation political circles believe that the outcome of the present effort to heal the rift will depend on Mr. Keuneman."

Both sides seem to recognize that the dispute cannot continue indefinitely without leading to the formation of separate parties, a move that has been rumored for some time.

The *Ceylon News* quoted one "CP source" as saying, "One way or another, whether we heal the rift or continue our different ways will be decided definitely in another month or so." □

Canadian Women's Coalition Sets Tribunal

[The following article is reprinted from the April 2 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Toronto.]

* * *

Toronto

Two hundred and fifty women, meeting here March 16-18 in the second cross-Canada conference for a woman's right to abortion, projected a program of activities focussing on a fall Tribunal on Abortion, Contraception, and Sterilization, to indict the federal government for the humiliation, pain, mutilation, and even death that women face because of the unavailability of safe, legal abortion.

The conference, sponsored by the Canadian Women's Coalition to Repeal the Abortion Laws, also projected a campaign demanding that all charges against Dr. Henry Morgentaler be dropped. Dr. Morgentaler is a Montréal physician before the courts on three charges of performing and "conspiring" to perform illegal abortions.

The conference clearly showed that the campaign to repeal the abortion laws in Canada has reached a new stage. The abortion issue has acquired a strategic importance both to women fighting for their liberation, and also to all the forces of church and state arrayed against them. This development results from the growing feminist radicalization in general, as well as from the impact of the organized abortion law repeal movement.

For more than three years, women across Canada have united around the concept of action to repeal the abortion laws, and in the course of building this movement, they have shown how women can fight for their own demands. The demonstrations, rallies, and meetings, the petition campaigns, the daily work of organizing women in opposition to the government's reactionary laws, have given women an example of how to struggle for their rights.

The impact of this campaign was reflected at the conference, which was endorsed and attended by a wide

range of organizations and individuals.

The delegates came from areas as far apart as Vancouver Island and St. John's, Newfoundland. They represented 40 different organizations, from the United Church to the New Democratic party [NDP], and from the High School Women's Birth Control Rights Committee to chapters of the Canadian Women's Coalition from across the country. The youngest woman was 11, the oldest 79. Many were new to the campaign for abortion law repeal. They were women eager to fight against their oppression, who see the right to abortion as an important part of that struggle.

While support for repeal of the laws is growing, the opposition is also mobilizing its forces. The attack by Ontario's Health Minister Potter [against allowing free abortions to be obtained under the provincial health insurance plan] is not an isolated incident, but part of a general onslaught. On March 3, federal Justice Minister Otto Lang announced he is launching an investigation of hospital abortion committees to determine if they are "rubber-stamping" applications for abortions. Meanwhile, the Québec government is proceeding with its prosecution of Dr. Morgentaler, and the right-wing anti-abortion groups, often allied with the Catholic Church, are organizing their forces. The day before the conference opened, a new antiabortion group called "Coalition for Life" was founded in Toronto.

The conference responded to the challenge of the antiabortion forces by mapping out a campaign of summer and fall activities. The major project set by the conference is the cross-Canada Tribunal on Abortion, Contraception, and Sterilization, to take place in Ottawa on November 3. The purpose of the tribunal will be to expose the real situation under the so-called "liberalized laws" and document the sufferings of thousands upon thousands of Canadian women who are treated as criminals for wanting the right to control their own bodies.

Testimony will be sought from wom-

en who have been victims of Trudeau's reactionary laws, as well as from doctors, lawyers, and other professional people.

The coalition will ask women who have had illegal abortions to make public declarations of their experiences. A similar campaign was recently carried out in France where prominent women signed a statement declaring that they had had illegal abortions and defying the government to prosecute them. This campaign was proposed at the conference by Isobel Le Bourdais, who declared that she had had two illegal abortions.

The conference also projected a petition campaign calling for the dropping of all charges against Dr. Morgentaler.

From beginning to end, the conference was imbued with the spirit of militant feminists fighting for their liberation.

A proposal put forward on behalf of the Hamilton Association for the Repeal of Canada's Abortion Laws, to open up the Canadian Women's Coalition to men, received scarcely any support. The gathering reaffirmed women's basic right to organize together and make their own decisions about how to struggle for their right to abortion.

The conference adopted as the basic theme of the campaign "Abortion, a woman's right to choose," rejecting any suggestion that priests, politicians, or doctors have any right to decide for a woman whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.

The basic structure and strategy of the Canadian Women's Coalition, involving many different organizations and individual women around the one demand for repeal of the abortion laws, was discussed and reaffirmed.

This concept of the coalition was attacked by a small group of women, led by Bobbi Sparks from Kingston, Ontario. Their statement accused the coalition of representing the "male-dominated interests of church, professional, and middle classes . . . it has been manipulated and used by political factions, egotists, professionals, bureaucrats and governments. It has prolonged debate and divided us."

This statement was overwhelmingly rejected by the women present. Brenda Dineen from the Manitoba Abortion Action Coalition pointed out in a workshop discussion that "far from

dividing us, the coalition is the thing that's been able to unite us. Women from different backgrounds and organizations can unite to fight for specific demands like repeal of the laws — and this campaign shows us how. It enables all kinds of diverse organizations and individual women to come together around the one thing on which they agree. That gives us the united strength we need to take on the government."

Later the conference rejected a proposal to add demands to the coalition's policy statement other than those directly related to abortion, on the grounds that this could only cut into the broad support the coalition was able to mobilize on the one issue of abortion law repeal.

The conference clearly showed the strength and dynamism of the campaign across the country. This was reflected in the workshop discussions dealing with fundraising, publicity, and education, and all the other aspects of building the campaign.

The largest and liveliest workshop was on Abortion and Women's Liberation, dealing with questions such as why the campaign for abortion has emerged as the central organizing focus for women and why feminists should build and lead this campaign.

For the first time at such a gathering, gay women met in a workshop to discuss their relationship to the abortion law repeal movement.

Many women from the New Democratic party attended the conference, and met throughout to discuss how the NDP can be brought more actively into the struggle for women's right to abortion. The federal NDP program calls for repeal of the laws, and many New Democrats, including the federal caucus and the British Columbia provincial caucus, endorsed the conference.

But the NDP leadership has failed to actively involve the party in the campaign to repeal the laws. In the three provinces where the NDP forms the government, women have pressed the party to carry out its programs by establishing abortion clinics, and by making sure that hospital boards which are under provincial government jurisdiction automatically approve all requests for abortion. One of the problems discussed by NDP women at the conference was how to

organize other women within the party to force the leadership to meet these demands.

Following the Saturday evening plenary session, women from Saskatoon put on a production of the feminist play "The Independent Female, or A Man Has His Pride," and Rita MacNeil sang some of the feminist songs she has written.

The final session of the conference on Sunday discussed how to implement the various projects in cities across the country. It also heard greetings from Barbara Mutnick, representing the Women's National Abortion

Action Coalition (WONAAC) in the United States, and sent telegrams of support to Dr. Morgentaler and Dr. Will Peers in Belgium, and a message of congratulations to WONAAC in recognition of the Supreme Court decision granting women's right to abortion.

The conference closed with the election of four cross-Canada coordinators for the Canadian Women's Coalition — Joan Campana, Lorna Grant, Eleanor Wright Peirine, and Valerie Marsh, specially designated as the high school coordinator of the coalition. □

Bolivia

Banzer Predicts Merger of MNR and FSB

Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suárez has been talking of the possibility of a merger between the ultraright Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB — Bolivian Socialist Falange) and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR — Revolutionary Nationalist Movement) of former President Victor Paz Estenssoro. Both groups have shared power since the bloody overthrow of Juan José Torres in August 1971. Their governmental coalition is called the Frente Popular Nacionalista (FPN — Nationalist People's Front).

Banzer's first public allusion to the possibility of a merger appears to have been made in mid-March. According to a United Press International dispatch from La Paz published in the March 18 issue of the New York Spanish-language newspaper *El Diario-La Prensa*, Banzer said that while unity would not be achieved tomorrow or the day after, it would sooner or later "because God wills it to be so and it is necessary for the country."

At the same time, noted UPI, the FSB and the MNR had just gone through a series of "bitter public disputes between leaders of the two political groups, mainly over the monetary devaluation that was carried out at the end of last year."

On April 10, René Villegas wrote in a dispatch from La Paz, published in the April 11 issue of the Buenos

Aires daily *La Opinión*, that Banzer announced that the forthcoming unification of the two groups would soon become "a concrete reality." The announcement came as the MNR was observing the twenty-first anniversary of the 1952 revolution that brought it to power. "Banzer indicated his optimism about achieving unity between the once bitter enemies while on his way to a peasant meeting in the mountain town of Sica Sica," wrote Villegas.

Reports indicate some opposition within the MNR, not only to such a merger but even to continuing the coalition with the FSB. Villegas noted that the MNR "today appears to be going through an internal crisis that is jolting its ranks (who are split into supporters of its present role in the government and left-wing forces gathered in exile) and what seems to be an increasing atomization."

The Associated Press reported in a dispatch published in the April 11 issue of the New York Spanish-language daily *El Tiempo* that it had recently learned of a statement by a top leader of the MNR, Guillermo Bedregal, who was "expelled from the country six months ago for being anti-militarist and 'ultraleftist.'" In the statement, Bedregal, "after severely attacking the government, proposed that the MNR withdraw from it." □

Probably With Whitewash

Nguyen Van Thieu travels in a plane leased from Pan American but painted as an Air Vietnam craft.

Halfway Measures Fail to Slow Price Rises

By Mike Goodger

[The following article is reprinted from the April 13 issue of *Socialist Action*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Wellington.]

* * *

The serious erosion of living standards caused by rapidly rising prices is becoming a matter of concern to working people throughout New Zealand. The Consumers' Price Index for the first quarter of the year is expected to show an increase of around 2.4 percent, equivalent to an annual increase of 10 percent. This would give New Zealand the distinction of having the highest rate of inflation of all industrialised capitalist countries.

In Auckland, the Campaign Against Rising Prices (CARP) listed 370 price increases in February alone.

The price rises are largely restricted to such basic necessities as food, accommodation and clothing. Of these, food has undergone the sharpest price rise. During February the all-food price index rose by 2.9 percent. If this trend continues throughout the rest of the year, it will result in an annual increase of over 34 percent in the cost of food.

It is clear that the hardest hit by such dramatic rises in food costs are those in the "lower income bracket," that is, workers, students, and people on social security benefits.

These people put Labour in power last year and it might be expected that the government would be doing everything possible to ease the burden on them.

But what has been the response?

Government measures include a freeze on mutton, lamb and fish prices. But pork, beef and smallgoods will not be affected. These are the types of meat which are rising so steeply in price that most people simply cannot afford to eat them any more. The price of mutton and lamb has been reduced by two cents a pound, by means of a government subsidy to wholesalers. As if the meat industry needs a helping hand from the govern-

ment! (The chairman of the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board, C. Hilgendorf, has predicted a record export income for the industry this year of \$750 million, a 50 percent increase over former years.)

Maximum retail prices are to be fixed for certain manufactured and processed goods, and these are to be displayed on the packaging. However, the range of commodities brought under this control is to be determined in consultation with none other than the Manufacturers' Federation and the Retailers' Federation.

The government intends to stop auctioneering firms from bidding at their own auctions and setting artificially high fruit and vegetable prices, but it has not revealed how it is going to achieve this. It is also intended that apples and pears will be brought under full price control.

Just how rigorously the government intends to enforce the price freeze was revealed by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Warren Freer. When asked whether a person who had been overcharged by a retailer would be able to claim a refund, Freer vaguely replied: "I would hope that might be possible."

The principal defect of the government measures is that they do not go to the root cause of high prices. While the National party has tried to blame the abolition of the Remuneration Authority for the price increases, it has quite clearly *not* been wage rises which

have pushed prices up. One of the reasons put forward for the increase in the price of meat has been the high prices which meat is fetching on the world market. Isn't it paradoxical that when one of the country's most important export products is enjoying such success internationally, ordinary New Zealanders cannot even afford to buy it? Who is benefitting in this case? Obviously only the meat industry, which is making record profits and is receiving subsidies from the government. It is not market gardeners or fishermen who are getting rich either, but the wholesaling companies which stand between them and the consumer. Food processing firms are doing very nicely too. Last October James Wattie pointed out that his company's profit of \$4,710,717 was only 6.2 percent up on the previous year's rake-off. "But we're not complaining," he added. "We think our results are satisfactory."

In the face of this situation, Labour's price control measures are hopelessly inadequate. Much more radical steps are necessary to halt the rapid decline of living standards.

For a start, the Consumers' Price Index is almost useless for determining the real increase in the cost of living. The index merely records changes in the prices of a narrow range of selected goods and services, and it is ten years out of date.

The government should work with the trade unions to set up committees which would be able to record price increases on a week-by-week or day-by-day basis. The results of these committees' findings could be tabulated and the necessary adjustments made to wages on a frequent and regular basis, so that workers' wages keep pace with the *actual* cost of living.



These regular income adjustments should also apply to students and people on social security benefits, such as old age pensioners.

For companies which insist on raising the prices of their goods the government should empower the trade unions or elected committees of workers to inspect the financial records of those companies. Then the public would be able to see just who is mak-

ing a fortune out of inflated food prices.

A real workers' government would nationalise the freezing companies, food companies, wholesalers and supermarket chains, placing the production, processing and distribution of food under the democratic control of the working people of New Zealand. This would allow the country's plentiful food resources to serve human needs instead of private profits. □

'No' Vote Shows Widespread Dissatisfaction

Danish Workers End Three-Week Strike

Copenhagen

After a three-week strike and lockout, work was back to normal throughout Denmark April 10. The compromise proposal for ending the conflict (see *Intercontinental Press*, April 16, p. 423), was passed by a vote of 221,066 to 141,172. The large No vote was cast despite an intensive propaganda campaign in favor of the proposal waged by most of the unions and radio and television.

Five unions rejected the compromise proposal. They were the Bookbinder and Paperboard Workers Union, the Bakery and Pastry Workers Union, the Lighthouse Workers Union, the Seamen's Union, and the Danish Printers Union.

There were only 143 Yes votes in the Seamen's Union. With 95.8 percent voting, the percentage of No votes was 86.1 percent. The Bookbinder and Paperboard Workers Union turned down the proposal by a vote of 4,458 to 2,757.

Most noteworthy was the rejection of the compromise by the two Copenhagen metalworkers unions, most of whose members work at Denmark's biggest worksite, the B & W (Burmeister og Wain) shipyards. The vote there was 2,084 against and only 674 in favor. The Copenhagen construction workers, bricklayers, and painters also rejected the compromise.

One other noteworthy vote occurred among the metalworkers in Aarhus, where 2,203 voted No and 1,225 voted Yes. And this occurred in spite of the fact that a majority of the leadership in the large metalworkers organization in Aarhus had urged the membership to vote Yes.

The overall Yes vote cannot be viewed as a sign of satisfaction with the compromise proposal or as a show of confidence in LO [Landsorganisationen—the Danish Trade Union Confederation]. Many voted Yes because they could not see the use of continuing the strike under an ineffective leadership that did not want to organize a genuine struggle to deal a real blow to the bosses and instead had capitulated by abandoning the original demands that the workers had raised in the workplaces. Others undoubtedly took as good coin the threats by the Social Democratic union leaders that if they voted No, the money they would be striking for would not amount to much and the modest strike subsidy they were receiving would be discontinued.

The contract negotiations themselves—in terms both of their length and the secrecy of closed-door talks between the two main negotiators—differed in no way from similar negotiations in the past. On the other hand, some contrast was provided by the nearly three weeks of conflict, which, to a degree, was directed against the union leadership. And even if the negotiations are now over, the conflict is not. The dissatisfaction of the many workers who voted No, as well as of those who voted Yes in spite of their dissatisfaction, will not evaporate.

The struggle that the LO leadership shrank from leading against the employers will now be fought in the workplace. The situation there could very well give rise to numerous strikes with an even greater impact than that of the recent conflict.

Although the compromise proposal carried, the wage fight has not been resolved, nor has "labor peace" now been assured for the next two-year period. The workers themselves will know how to make use of their power to win the compensation for price rises, tax fleeing, and rent increases that the LO leadership does not want to fight for. And the jealousy that the bosses demonstrated in guarding their moneybags, while in the meantime their greedy fingers were digging deeper into the pockets of ordinary working people, has helped lift the veil a bit from the eyes of those who still had illusions about justice and equality under capitalism. □

138 Tried for Guerrilla Activity in Colombia

Following a four-day break for Holy Week festivities, the trial of 138 persons accused of guerrilla activity was scheduled to continue April 23 in the Colombian town of Socorro. Forty-nine of the defendants are on hand for the trial, while the remaining eighty-nine are being tried in absentia.

Near the end of March, shortly before the court martial began, forty-five other persons were freed. The charge against them, according to the commander of the Fifth Brigade of the military forces, Brigadier General Ramon Arturo Rincon Quinones, was "attempted rebellion." They were reportedly freed because the time they had already spent in prison awaiting trial amounted to the minimum they could be

sentenced to.

The defendants were all arrested last year in various places throughout the country and then imprisoned in the town of Bucaramanga. They were arrested, according to a United Press International dispatch in the March 27 issue of the Los Angeles Spanish-language paper *La Opinion*, "after the top leader of the guerrilla group that calls itself the 'Ejército de Liberación Nacional' (ELN), Fabio Vasquez Castano, left behind a satchel with documents in it upon having to quickly flee a military patrol." The authorities claim that the names found in the satchel belonged to urban networks that were collaborating with guerrillas operating in the country's mountainous regions. □

Peron Begins Series of International Trips

As the May 25 inauguration of the Peronist government in Argentina draws closer, former President Juan Perón has embarked on a series of talks and trips designed to lay the groundwork for the new government's international policies. At the same time, the flurry of activity is having the side effect of firmly ensconcing Perón in the driver's seat of the new government.

On April 9, Perón arrived in Paris from his home in Madrid for five days of intense diplomatic and political activity. The details of the talks he held with political and business leaders from various countries during his brief stay have been carefully kept quiet.

The major ostensible purpose of Perón's trip to Paris was to enable him to meet with Mexican President Luis Echeverría, who was on an official visit to France. The meeting was reportedly held at the Mexican leader's request.

In addition to meeting with Echeverría, Perón met with Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, French governmental representatives and important French industrialists, and various Latin American political figures; he also attended a reception given by the People's Republic of China. At the reception, he received a formal invitation to visit China.

Argentine Vice-President-elect Vicente Solano Lima offered some explanation of Perón's aims during a statement to Brazilian journalists reported in the April 10 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*. Solano Lima said that Perón planned to visit Brazil, Chile, and Mexico in the near future, and that his aim, in the case of the latter two, would be "to obtain the support of these governments for a continental policy of defending Latin America from the economic aggression of international imperialism." The Peronist strategy, he added, "which tends toward again making possible a political-ideological link between all Latin American countries, cannot do without the support of any nation on the continent."



JUAN D. PERON

One long-range goal appears to be the creation of a kind of Latin American Common Market. Regarding the way in which the United States—which he characterized as imperialist—might fit into this scheme, Solano Lima said the following: "It is not a matter of doing away with foreign investments in the region, but of creating obligations, the other side of the coin being that the safety of invested capital will be guaranteed."

Among the accomplishments of Echeverría's trip to Europe were agreements he reportedly reached with European capitalists that would establish a system of companies to operate on capital supplied jointly by the state and by foreign capitalists. Perón is said to agree with Echeverría's approach to foreign investment.

After a short break, Perón will be heading off on another trip, near the end of April. He will accompany President-elect Héctor J. Cámpora on an official visit of France, West Germany, and perhaps England.

Then, sometime after the new government takes office, he will visit China; other Asian, and Latin American countries; and possibly the Arab

states. While the European trips appear primarily designed to assure the new regime of political support and to win commitments of financial aid and investments, the Asian, African, and Latin American trips will have a somewhat different aim, observed Andrés Zavala in a dispatch from Madrid published in the April 17 issue of *La Opinión*: "The former Argentine president will attempt to give organizational shape to his concept of the Third World, and in dealing with other political chieftains, he needs the kind of backing that he will have once his movement is in power. In his trip to Buenos Aires after the transfer of power, Perón will issue a message clarifying his thinking and the steps that he feels necessary in order to give intercontinental form to his idea of Third Worldism."

One element in Perón's strategy for Latin America appears to be an attempt to compel the Brazilian dictatorship to accept a new, harmonious relationship with the Peronist regime that might help offset the kind of Brazil-Washington axis that has been developing.

Despite the occasional references to imperialism, Perón appears to be taking a quite gentlemanly approach toward all concerned. He is excluding confrontation as a policy in the arsenal of his government, writes Osvaldo Tcherkaski in the April 11 issue of *La Opinión*: "Spain serves him as a bridge so that no door remains closed to possibilities with North American capitals, and he has already opened up negotiations with China, the USSR, and the socialist camp. He is counting on excellent perspectives in the European Common Market, and just before leaving for Paris, he made a similar arrangement with the Arab countries." □

How Else Could You Tell That He's a Leader?

A regional leader of the West German chemical workers union ran afoul of the ushers when he tried to take his chauffeur with him to a reception at the congress of the Social Democratic party, reports the weekly *Der Spiegel*. The ushers refused to let the chauffeur enter.

"Why can't this worker go in?" asked the union boss. "Aren't we a workers party?"

Replied an usher: "We didn't make any arrangements for labor leaders bringing their personal chauffeurs."

German Social Democrats at a Turning Point

By Herwart Achterberg

Hannover

The fifteenth congress of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [SPD—Social Democratic party of Germany] in Hannover April 10-14 took place under the motto: "For the construction of Social Democracy in Germany." A more appropriate motto would have been "We will permit no changes"—not in the 1972 election program, not in the government's policies, and above all not in the Godesberg Program of 1959.

Since Godesberg, the SPD has been characterized by a bourgeois liberal social program and "modern" capitalist policies on the one hand and by the mass loyalty of the working class on the other. The party now stands at both the high point and the turning point of this formula.

In the November 1972 elections the SPD achieved the greatest electoral success of its history, becoming for the first time the strongest party in the Bundestag. Its membership is at its highest ever: nearly a million. The SPD is at the zenith of its influence; it has reached the limits of its middle class voting potential while maintaining its hegemony over the working class.

But it has also reached a turning point: The two ends of its "double strategy" are beginning to split apart on the fulcrum of governing. The first days of the congress were overshadowed by strikes in the printing industry, so that 80 percent of the newspapers—and their reports on the congress—did not appear. Even six months ago it would have been unthinkable for a union and a section of the working class to do that to "their" SPD. On the other side, during the congress 10,000 Catholics demonstrated in Hannover against the SPD's plans to legalize abortion during the first three months of pregnancy.¹ Catholic lead-

ers whom the SPD has humbly wooed for fifteen years declare the party "unacceptable" for Catholics.

That the SPD's hegemony over the working class faces a crisis is also evident from the statistics presented by Willy Brandt in his report to the congress. Ten years ago the party had 650,000 members, 55 percent of them workers. Only half of these members are in the party today; the other half resigned, were expelled, or died. Of the 600,000 new members, only 28 percent are workers. (Brandt naturally counts as workers the labor bureaucracy and those who have "raised themselves" in the public service and the unions.) Brandt: "Statistically it is no longer possible to speak of a class party."

As a politically bourgeois party, the SPD can no longer exercise direct control over the working class. For this it needs the Social Democratic union bureaucracy as a transmission belt. In his speech Brandt expressed this in the excellent formula: "The SPD and the unions cannot follow identical paths, but they depend on each other." If one changes "unions" to "union bureaucracy," the formula correctly describes the reality.

H. O. Vetter, chairman of the DGB [Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund—German Union Federation] complained bitterly in his greetings to the congress, "In the most recent wage negotiations, the unions showed the utmost restraint. But prices are rising despite this." In other words: The bureaucracy is gradually becoming less able to impose Social Democratic policies on the ranks if it wants to maintain its control.

At the same time, the SPD faces a medium-term leadership crisis. The guarantors of the success of the Godesberg course are men who come from

the working-class socialist movement, most of them even from its left wing (Brandt from the SAP [Sozialistische Arbeiter Partei—Socialist Workers party], Herbert Wehner from the KPD [Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands—Communist party of Germany]). They brought with them the intention of transforming the SPD into a programmatically bourgeois party without losing its political hegemony over the working class.

The coming generation of leadership, on the other hand, consists of: a) Pragmatic technocrats of the "skeptical" postwar generation who are stamped by fascism and the capitalist reconstruction. They form the backbone of the party's right wing. b) Bourgeois reformers originating in liberalism or Christianity, who are driven to "progress" by the problems of capitalist society but have no ties to the working class or the proletarian movement. c) The new generation of union bureaucrats, who stem from a working class in which the continuity of the socialist movement has been broken by fascism, world war, and the postwar period. Politically disoriented, they often settle in the right wing of the party. d) The academic "young left" who dominate the Jungsozialisten [Jusos—Young Socialists, the SPD youth organization]. A more or less degenerated product of the youth radicalization, with neither ties nor influence in the working class, they are bogeymen for the middle-class voters. Their efforts sharpen the crisis of the Social Democracy, but they are incapable of posing an alternative policy or even an alternative leadership.

This leadership constellation resulted in a decision that surprised the bourgeois press: the choice of Heinz Kühn as replacement for Wehner when the latter announced his retirement as the party's second deputy chairman. Kühn, who is almost the same age as Wehner, was a leftist before 1933 and fits the same pattern as Brandt and Wehner. The present leadership seeks

1. The fact that a majority of the SPD favors legalization of abortion represents progress. The reasons for this position are: (a) Eighty percent of women in West Germany favor legalizing abortions, and these women are seen as potential voters for the SPD. (b) The SPD urgently needs

some reforms that cost little or nothing financially. (c) The West German women's liberation movement, while still small, has its center among Social Democratic women, who have a tradition reaching back to August Bebel and Clara Zetkin.

to maintain its continuity as long as possible.

Between Insecurity and Self-Satisfaction

Horst Ehmke, minister of research and technology, asked at the beginning of the congress whether it was going to be a performance of Wagner's *Götterdämmerung* or Shakespeare's *Much Ado About Nothing*. On the second day, after Brandt's speech, the answer was clearly the latter.

Both nationally and internationally the congress had aroused expectations. More than 1,300 journalists were present, and the boxes for the diplomatic corps were overflowing. The reactionary press had been so inflamed about the "danger of a swing to the left" and had so played up the differences with the Jungsozialisten, and the CDU [Christlich-Demokratische Union—Christian Democratic Union] had so built up the bogey of a "socialization of Germany" by the SPD, that great public excitement accompanied the congress. All these speculations turned out to be mere soap bubbles.

The tactic of the party Presidium corresponded to a simple schema:

We want to continue ruling. Therefore we can let nothing disturb the alliance with the FDP [Freie Demokratische Partei—Free Democratic party, the liberal-bourgeois partner in the governing coalition]. (Party Deputy Chairman Helmut Schmidt: "The SPD should have formed this alliance with the liberals 100 years ago.") Therefore we cannot touch the election program, in order not to "break our word to the voters." (At the pre-election congress, they said that the program had to be opportunistic in order to win votes; the "correct" SPD program would be introduced later.) Therefore we can't disturb the policy of the Brandt/Scheel [Walter Scheel, FDP head, vice-chancellor, and foreign minister] cabinet, which is carrying out the best possible "realizable" program. We can't touch the policy of "constitutional rule" and will therefore rather proceed against "violence from the left" (that "violence" being house occupations in Frankfurt, actions against Thieu's visit to Bonn or against the state presidents' resolution barring "radicals" from the pub-

lic service,² and so forth).

The "lefts" were superficially scolded and then generously rewarded for their "good behavior" at the congress. Brandt put this line through effort-



SCHMIDT: Thinks SPD was too slow in abandoning Marxism.

lessly in his "basic report," before which all party groups bowed down. Brandt: "As chancellor I cannot carry out only the will of the SPD; I am the chancellor of all citizens of the country. . . . I am responsible to the people of this country and not to any particular social forces. . . . In the party we need unity and trust," and so forth.

Brandt described the basis of the social-liberal ruling coalition as "the new middle." "Who does not hold the middle cannot rule in the Federal Re-

2. Despite the left's boastful promises beforehand, the ban on Ernest Mandel was mentioned by only one delegate—and he did not belong to the left. Wehner commented, in regard to Mandel, and the denial of a visa to representatives of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front, that he was opposed to "wholesale" bans.

public." The objection of one delegate—"The coalition with the FDP is necessary only if it accomplishes something necessary"—was buried under the exuberance of the leadership.

Beginning of the End of the 'New Party Left'

For the bourgeois press, the "party left" must have been a great disappointment: The right attacked, and the left retreated, stumbling over its own feet. As soon as debate opened following Brandt's speech, three "prominent leftists" (Jochen Steffen, Karsten Voigt, Wolfgang Roth) took the floor to protest their loyalty to the "father figure" Brandt: They had not meant things the way they were taken; many differences were merely misunderstandings; the positions criticized by Brandt are not really held by the left.

The SPD left is capable of nothing but pointing to the dissatisfaction of the workers, helplessly describing social misery in the Federal Republic, and jousting with technological data. It accepts pragmatism as the guiding principle of the SPD. Another "leftist," Rudi Arndt: "Godesberg ended the antiquities business; there is no reason to reopen it." And the most "Marxist" of the SPD left, Professor Peter von Oertzen, banished the socialization of means of production to the nineteenth century, acknowledges Godesberg, and no longer will discuss why he voted against that program fourteen years ago.

In exchange, the left received a recognition that cost nothing: The "theoretical discussion" of the lefts was called fruitful because the postwar SPD had suffered a "deficiency of theory"—but the daily practice of the party would not be permitted to be disturbed. Marxist analysis will be permitted in the SPD, but it cannot be made the basis of politics because it doesn't correspond to "the reality of this century."

A full list of "leftists" ran for positions on the thirty-six-member party executive committee. A few were elected—those who came closest to the "party line."³

3. At first glance, the left cut a fair figure in these elections: Six of its representatives were chosen, most of them in the second round of voting. But this "success"

What is happening with the "new party left" is an old story that has already been repeated half a dozen times in the postwar SPD. They are running up against the *objectively* capitalist character of the SPD. If they want to remain in the party, they must stand on the SPD's capitalist basis; if they develop real alternatives they willy-nilly move outside the framework of the party.

The contradictory character of the SPD as a bourgeois party with mass working-class support necessarily leads to the periodic formation of left wings, which are necessarily shattered again and again. For the SPD the process has the value that it provides a left cover in critical periods of social unrest, broadening the party's ability to integrate the workers and enabling it to control and throttle arising mass movements.

For Reforms—Provided They're Cheap

The congress had three programmatic centers of gravity. The most important was the long-term program.

The "left" had helped to prepare the draft, but the result must have been demoralizing: The long-term program is a continuation of the present capitalist system and the present "reform-capitalist" economic and social policies until 1985. By voting for the program, the "left" postponed its "anticapitalist structural reforms" for twelve years.

The function of the kind of reforms pursued by the SPD was correctly stated by Secretary of State Ehren-

should be seen in connection with their political capitulation. At the same time, a few "veterans" and two ossified right-wingers (Bundestag President Annemarie Renger and Interior Minister Egon Franke) were voted out because they didn't fit Brandt's concept of an integrated leadership.

Brandt received 404 of the 428 votes as chairman. His deputies received considerably fewer: Helmut Schmidt 286 and Heinz Kuhn 280. Since the "left" put up no opposing candidates, this was an unpolitical "reprimand" vote. This showed itself also in the election of the party treasurer, Alfred Nau. In the first round he received only 216 votes, less than the necessary majority. In the second round, after Brandt had intervened for him, he received 286 votes from the same delegates.



BRANDT: "Chancellor of all the people."

berg: "Without internal reforms, no long-term economic growth is possible." The "Club of Rome Report" warnings about the consequences of unrestrained economic growth could not be heeded in the Federal Republic because to do so would be too expensive. It is impermissible for the SPD to brake or control economic growth too strictly.

The most important point in the long-term program is its clear affirmation of investment controls. At the moment the capitalists are screaming about this, but it will quickly prove to be only the old phenomenon observed by Marx, namely that the state protects the general interests of the capitalist class against the narrow interests of individual capitalists.

The problem of multinational concerns was also recognized—not least as a result of the recent currency crisis. The proposed solution of the SPD? In Brandt's words, "The multinational concerns must be placed in the service of progress."

The second center of gravity for the congress was the question of land ownership, which was forced on the SPD's attention solely by the crisis of the cities and a nascent movement of neighborhood groups, rent strikes, and house occupations. The congress had to do with a distinction between usufruct and ownership. That is, the land will remain communal property insofar as possible, but its profitable use through construction and so on is reserved to capitalists.

Another decision was that in the future, land values will no longer be

set by the councils but by the evaluation of each owner. Correctly, but in vain, one delegate pointed out that this will make millions of small homeowners into land speculators and increase land prices and speculation.

The third central question was that of "capital formation." As was to be expected, the congress supported the long-known SPD concept of the "silent" sharing of productive capital with wage earners in the form of funds the use of which is available to capitalists or the state. The idea is to make millions of workers into petty capitalists, who of course have no right of control over and never even see their "capital," but who will—so it is hoped—behave during future labor struggles in a manner appropriate to "owners of capital."⁴

Foreign Policy

The foreign policy debate was marked by the party leadership's vehement avowal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and their "partner," the United States—"the alpha and omega of any German policy" in the words of Brandt. This was the only area in which the leaders became really rabid: Any criticism of NATO, suggestions for reducing Bonn's contribution to the maintenance of U.S. troops in Germany, or criticisms of Brandt's silence on Vietnam or of Thieu's state visit were thoroughly beaten down.

Brandt's failure to participate in the Paris conference of the Second International was justified by the "illusionary people's front policies of the French Socialist party." Solidarity with Chile was, after a vote, expressly limited to the Partido Radical with the pious argument that this was the only Chilean party belonging to the Second International.

On the Palestinian question, the congress declared only that the Israeli state's right to exist could not be brought into question by *anything*. There was not a word of condemnation of the Israelis' latest massacre in Beirut. □

4. This was one of the few questions on which the left really fought—although in vain. The reason lies in the fact that the powerful *Industriegewerkschaft Metall* [Metalworkers Union] had spoken out against the concept of capital formation.

The Breakdown of Dutch 'Confessional' Politics

"Some years ago the then leader of the ARP [Anti-Revolutionaire Partij—Anti-revolutionary party, the Calvinist conservatives] parliamentary group, Dr. J. A. H. J. S. Bruins-Slot, got into an argument with the Socialist theoretician and member of parliament Jacques de Kadt over the future of political Christianity.

"De Kadt predicted: 'The thing is crumbling.'

"Bruins-Slot answered: 'De Kadt, the thing goes back to 1517, when Luther began. It has been under way since then and has taken firm root in the Netherlands. This thing will remain.'

"In the meantime, the election results, opinion polls, and the yearly figures of the Dutch churches reveal that de Kadt is very close to being right. The thing, it seems, is in fact crumbling. But before this process is completed, the thing will cause a lot of upsets in Dutch politics."

This book on the history of the confessional, or religious, parties in the Netherlands since 1850 was published almost simultaneously with the Dutch elections of November 29, 1972.

The results fully confirmed the authors' prediction. The ruling center-right coalition was cut to a majority of one seat by a process of polarization taking place at the expense primarily of the old religious parties.

"The breakdown of 'confessional' politics was reflected again in this election by the heavy losses of the main Catholic and two Protestant parties," Sue Masterman wrote in the December 1, 1972, issue of the *Christian Science Monitor*. "Together they were the foundation on which almost all post-World War II coalition governments had been built."

In the prewar period, the confessional parties were even more powerful. They have been the foundation of bourgeois politics in the Netherlands for almost all of its modern history, and their contradictions account in large part for the complexity and instability of the Dutch party system.

The religious parties that were created, among other reasons, to block the development of class politics have to a certain extent also divided the bourgeoisie. Two Protestant parties still exist—the ARP and the CHU [Christelijk Historische Unie—Christian Historical Union, a historically somewhat more liberal party representing the more secure Protestant bourgeoisie and nobility]. There is only one major Catholic party, the KVP [Ka-

tholieke Volkspartij—Catholic People's party], but it appears to be deeply divided between currents looking toward

Tegen de Revolutie: Het Evangelie! Het Kerkvolk in de Nederlandse Politiek of: Het Einde van een Christelijke Natie (Against Revolution, the Gospel. The Faithful in Dutch Politics or: The End of a Christian Nation), by Martin van Amerongen and Igor Cornelissen. Amsterdam: Paris-Manteau, 1972, 189 pp. No price listed.

a kind of center-left coalition with the PvdA [Partij van de Arbeid—Labor party] and other currents looking toward a Christian Democratic Union including the Protestant parties.

In the crisis of the traditional political system, a variety of "modernist" formulas have arisen. The PPR [Politieke Partij Radicaal—Radical Political party], which although not formally a religious party presents itself primarily as an alternative for "left Christians"—mostly Catholics—won 7 seats in the 1972 elections as opposed to 2 in the 1971 vote. In addition, there is a left populist split from the PvdA called Democratie '70, which won 6 seats, down 2 from the past election.

Within a strictly bourgeois framework, the similarly named Democratie '66 is an attempt to project a "young modern" image to appeal to the new middle classes.

The major left party (the PvdA) and the major conservative party, the VVD [Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie—People's party for Freedom and Democracy], have grown steadily, if very slowly, in competition with the decaying religious parties and with the contradictory trendy electoral formations.

The result of the breakdown of the traditional party system has thus been a plethora of small parties probably unparalleled in Europe and now a prolonged crisis of the political system in what is socially one of the most stable countries on the continent. Since the November election, the queen has been unable to find anyone who could form a government.

"Queen Juliana will soon name someone else to continue searching for a solid par-

liamentary majority among the 14 widely divergent parties," a *New York Times* dispatch reported April 7 from Brussels. "No matter who gets the job, the crisis, the longest in modern Dutch political history, promises to continue for weeks or even months."

Cornelissen and Amerongen follow the Dutch Marxist Henriette Roland Holst in attributing the political peculiarities of the country to the prolonged stagnation that set in with the second half of the eighteenth century after the decline of its old trading and colonial empire.

As a result of this decline, the development of the workers movement was slower than in the other West European countries. "Since the second half of the eighteenth century we have been a country of decay, virtual stagnation, of abnormally slow, unstable development. Our proletariat has long languished in physical and spiritual decadence." (Henriette Roland Holst, *Kapitaal en Arbeid in Nederland*, deel I, Amsterdam, 1902, p. 9.)

By the nineteenth century, the political and social system created by the first of the great bourgeois revolutions had become hopelessly antiquated. But the mass democratic struggles that took place in Europe had only an attenuated effect in the Netherlands. Reforms were instituted from above by the old ruling class in an attempt to forestall the kind of explosions that were taking place in the neighboring countries.

At the same time, Dutch society was marked by the existence of a large economically and socially disadvantaged Catholic population, the descendants largely of the losers in the religious wars that marked the rise of the Dutch bourgeoisie in the sixteenth century. This sector did not win civil equality until the mid-nineteenth century and its loyalty to the ruling House of Orange remained suspect up until the big Catholic antisocialist demonstrations after the Russian revolution.

"If the social conditions of the working masses were markedly bad in the last century, then the Catholics on the average fell still lower as regards income, working hours, and housing. . . . Professor Bongers, a socialist who did pioneering work in criminology, showed in his study *Geloof en Misdaad* [Religion and Crime] (1913) that the rate of criminality was significantly higher among Catholics than among other religious groups and non-

churchgoers. He came to the conclusion, however, that the reason for this did not lie in religion but in the social conditions.

"The Catholics were concentrated much more in agriculture than in industry, trade, and other occupations. Their land was generally poor and their holdings smaller than average. The industrial workers in the Catholic south belonged to the most poorly paid categories. 'Poverty, unemployment, and alcoholism are the deeper reasons why crime takes on a different and graver aspect among Catholics than among the rest of the population.'"

Moreover, the Catholic community was inturned and stubbornly resistant to currents affecting the rest of the society.

"Recently emancipated and given equality, the Catholics continued to be nervous about giving offense. They continued to suffer from a false sense of shame and were distinguished by a constant wariness, 'the defensive attitude of Catholics always ready for a fight.' Professor Rogier [a Catholic historian] describes the Catholic Frisians and Hollanders as typically inturned in their religion. Their piety was hardly visible on the outside but burned inwardly 'in silence like the alter flame in the tabernacle.'"

Like the Irish, whom they resembled in some ways, the poor Dutch Catholics produced an exceptionally high number of priests and especially missionaries.

With the rise of the workers movement, the backward masses of Catholics were enlisted as a bulwark of the bourgeois order. Cornelissen and Amerongen show in detail how the Catholic mass movement was created with the specific aim of blocking socialism.

The line for the first Catholic workers organizations was laid down by Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum Novarum* in 1891. The authors point out that this document "did recognize that the people had rights, but its main thrust was directed at the Godless doctrine of socialism. Private ownership even of the means of production was expressly recognized as a 'right bestowed on man by nature,' while class struggle and strikes were condemned."

Even the most conservative Social Democrats could not fail to recognize the direction of the Catholic mass movement:

"Troelstra [a leader of the Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij (SDAP)—Social Democratic Workers party] said that the real nature of the Catholic workers movement, as dictated by the encyclical, was to fight against the Social Democracy and the independent international trade-union movement. The result, wrote Troelstra [in an 1898 critique], could only be servility and declining wages. The clergy had not been moved by the horrors of capitalism to set up

workers organizations, but by the progress of socialism. In Maastricht, Roermond, Den Bosch, and Breda, Catholic organizations were set up because branches of the Social-Democratische Bond [Social-Democratic League] had sprung up there. In Helmond, Venlo, Waalwijk, and other places where the Socialists had not succeeded in setting up branches, there were also no Catholic organizations."

The Catholic historian Rogier, the authors noted, did not dispute this description of the motives of the founders of the Catholic masses' organizations. They helped to bring about a shorter workweek and better pay "not because Christian justice demanded it but because otherwise the workers would have gone over to the socialists. . . . The worst thing that could happen to one's fellow man was for his spiritual life to be impaired. This was much worse than material poverty and physical exploitation."

Henricus Poels, one of the early Dutch "social Christians," saw the Catholic population not only as a base for maneuvering against the socialists in the labor movement but as the best material for the repressive forces.

"In 1903 he had already distinguished himself as a strikebreaker at the time of the great railroad strike, and in 1917 during a miners' strike he was giving instructions on how to behave to the captain in charge of the soldiers guarding the mines. According to Poels, many more and better troops should be brought in, preferably soldiers from Limburg [a Catholic area], because the Amsterdammers were 'socialists in uniform.'"

For Catholics to play the role Poels assigned to them, their isolation had to be maintained.

"For Poels, openness had very definite limits. Joint meetings with socialist miners were 'a plague,' he wrote in 1917 to his bishop, who had asked his advice. 'We cannot outbid the socialists. Our people are becoming too well acquainted with them. The revulsion that they feel and must continue to feel toward socialists is being lost.'"

At the same time, maintaining a mass movement forced even fire-breathing conservatives like Poels to take up some sharp criticisms of the concrete effects of the capitalist order. "In the same year [1917] Poels gave a speech making a sharp indictment of housing conditions in Maastricht, where TB was prevalent and infant mortality high. He advised, in fact commanded, priests given to preaching against immorality and indecency to go and see the workers' homes. . . . Catholic social doctrine was double-edged in that on the one hand it forced the Catholic leaders to set up their

own unions capable of waging a fight for better wages against the bosses and on the other it preached unwavering discretion and reconciliation."

In his attempt to build an effective machine, Poels found the Catholic nobles and rich bourgeois who dominated the church and its organization a serious obstacle. They lacked energy and an understanding of the people.

Nonetheless, the Dutch Social Democracy, which was in the process of degenerating into an opportunist party at the time of the rise of the Catholic trade-union and political organizations, had its own contradictions that prevented it from taking advantage of those of its rivals. In fact, for most of modern history, the two-sidedness of the Catholic mass organizations worked in favor of the clericalists, enabling them to exert pressure on the rightward moving workers organizations and impose on them their ideology of class collaboration.

This process first became evident in the battle over state support for church schools at the turn of the century. The revisionist wing of the Social Democracy decided to make a "tactical concession" to the confessional parties on this issue. The opportunist leader Troelstra argued that religion had a revolutionary at least as often as a counterrevolutionary effect. "Besides this, by supporting equality for church schools, he was aiming to get *immediate* backing from confessional voters."

The Marxists opposed Troelstra's attitude. Jan Ceton, a teacher, argued for a religiously neutral state school system. "My experience is that as soon as a believer begins to move towards socialism, he stops believing. All of Catholicism rests on authority." J. Saks warned that a church school system would strengthen the hold of the Christian capitalist parties over the workers.

"But at the SDAP congress in Groningen in 1902 the Troelstra wing won a victory. And with this the first modest step was taken toward the Social Democrats entering the government."

At the same time, the Catholic and Protestant religious parties managed to unite on the schools issue, giving an example of the kind of "Christian unity" the conservative Catholics now reportedly look to as a means of halting the general decline in the political influence of the churches.

By the 1930s, after the Russian revolution and the start of the world economic crisis, the Catholic church made a new turn toward social reformism. The revised line was laid down by the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* in 1931. "In [this message] the criticism of capitalism was sharper than in 1891. Charity was no longer considered adequate to eliminate the existing

injustice, stronger stress was put on the 'social character' of property. . . .

"The fact that in this new encyclical a distinction was made between socialism and Communism . . . 'which threatens to destroy all of society with violence and murder,' should surprise no one.

"It was noted with satisfaction that moderate socialists, frightened by their own principles, showed a certain tendency to move toward 'the truths that Christian tradition has always upheld. It must never be overlooked that their aspirations sometimes come very close to the just demands of Christian social reformers.'"

H. Werkhoven, a Catholic union leader quoted in the book, hinted at how this rapprochement actually took place. "It came about through the contacts we had with each other at the negotiating table. We came spiritually closer together. We talked about codetermination; they about struggle. I had always hoped to get them to give up some of their belief in class struggle."

This process came to fruition in the immediate postwar period, when the Catholic political figure and theorist C. P. M. Romme masterminded the coalition of the PvdA and the KVP in 1945, which was later broadened out to include Protestants. "Romme was the one who bound the PvdA hand and foot to the confessional parties. The colonial war in Indonesia, the subordination to American policy, the introduction of one of the lowest wage ceilings in Western Europe, the subordination of the trade-union movement to the PBO ideology in which there was no room for class struggle, the stagnation and even decline of the PvdA after the war—all this was the result of Romme's strategy, which placed a strong imprint on postwar domestic and foreign policy."

When the PvdA dropped the point in its program calling for nationalizations, "the fusion of reformism and official Catholic doctrine reached its ideological culmination."

However, in the 1950s and especially the 1960s, the Catholic contradiction became much more evident. The direct representatives of big capital in the Catholic party were opposed even to reformism. "Professor F. J. F. M. Duynstee, who had ties with this group . . . expressed the fear that this 'absurd equalitarian standpoint,' that is, the concepts of the Catholic union movement, would win the upper hand in the KVP, which 'to an alarming extent has alienated itself from the overwhelming majority of Catholic leading circles in all areas, the middle class, the big employers, the middle-rank civil servants and officers, the magistrates, many technicians, professionals, and farmers.'"

In 1954, the rightist opposition got the bishops to issue a declaration forbidding Catholics to belong to the Social Demo-

cratic union federation, read the Socialist press, or listen to Socialist radio programs. Offenders were to be refused the sacraments and "if they die unrepentant, a church burial."

The 1956 election campaign was the "last hurrah" of Catholic reactionary demagoguery. "Can anyone," the Limburg *Dagblad* asked its readers, "rationally expect these humanists, these God-deniers, these opponents of religion . . . in the PvdA to help put a Christian stamp on public life?" In Maastricht the cabinet minister Luns gave his maiden speech in a Dominican church: "Human wickedness, the consequence of original sin, is clearly evidenced in the realm of foreign policy. The ideology of the PvdA that man is by nature good is fatal in foreign policy."

The religious parties' belief in the doctrine of original sin, however, apparently failed to convince most of the voters that they were more "realistic" than their secular and Social-Democratic opponents. The PvdA won four additional seats, ousting the KVP from its place as the largest party in the country. The church had to resort to new tactics to stem the attrition of its flock and electoral following. Moreover, the effects of a process that had been going on quietly now became evident.

Despite the political and organizational successes of the church, its social base had been steadily crumbling for decades. In the period from 1930 to 1947, when it was at the height of its power, it lost an average of 10,000 members a year. The most obvious cause was the decline in the old patriarchal rural bastions of the faith and the inability of the church to maintain its hold over industrial workers and city dwellers. In February 1949, Father Grond complained in *Pinkstervuur*, the Catholic Action monthly in the bishopric of Haarlem: "Instead of Christianizing the heathen milieu, the Catholics are being heathenized."

After long years of semistagnation, Dutch industry has been growing at an accelerated rate and on an unprecedented scale. "Only in the 1960s has the percentage of large enterprises (employing more than 500 workers) come to account for more than 50 percent of industry. In March 1950, some 358,450 workers were employed in enterprises with more than 500 workers. In 1964, it was almost 600,000." And this has been most marked in the Catholic southern provinces.

"From 1950 to 1963, the number of workers employed in industry rose by 224,000; and of this, 65,000, or almost 30 percent were in North Brabant. . . .

"Limburg presents a picture that in many ways resembles North Brabant. . . . In 1889, 47.1 percent of the working population still tilled the land; in 1959 it was only 15.3 percent. . . .

In recent years Limburg has become one of the most highly industrialized provinces in the Netherlands."

While the vote of Catholic parties has been steadily declining, the drop in the recruitment of clerical personnel has been most dramatic and most immediately dangerous to the church as an institution. In particular, recruitment from the better-educated segment of the population has virtually stopped. The decline in "vocations" has even threatened to have a serious effect on the world church, since for years the Netherlands provided 25 percent of all Catholic missionaries. Faced with the need to make Catholic education more attractive and to train its workers to deal with a situation where isolation is no longer possible, the church has had to run the risks of courting liberals and young radicals.

As a result, the effects of uneven and combined development have shown up with a vengeance among Catholic youth. It is the Catholic universities that have become the centers of left ferment. Whereas only 50 percent of Protestant youth who move away from religion go to the left—the other 50 percent finding a home in the VVD—more than 75 percent of the straying Catholics head in a leftward direction.

Amerongen and Cornelissen devote a special chapter to showing how the Dutch Protestant sects, the product of the first of the great modern bourgeois revolutions, have proven much less flexible than their old rival, much more narrow and ossified. At the same time, of course, the authors' statistics indicate that Protestant "moral training" may give a more effective conservative indoctrination than Catholic authoritarianism.

One particular disadvantage of the Protestant churches is their localism, inherited from the primitive bourgeoisie that gave them birth. This narrowness is reflected in, among other things, a fixation on petty social questions, such as the morality of dancing.

"Before, we had a polite kind of dancing, graceful twirling, a delight. Then the Blacks came in. The customs of uncivilized peoples were adopted. People went to the Heathens. The cakewalk came. Then the Tango. And then the Charleston." (*De Spiegel*, June 4, 1927.)

Despite their revolutionary history, the Protestant churches by and large were just as antisocialist as the Catholics, distinguished from their old rivals mostly by a certain backwoods petty-bourgeois style. J. A. W. Burger, an ex-PvdA parliamentary chairman remembered: "When I was a youth in the Reformed Church, I heard the minister say in his sermon: 'Whoever departs from the path of virtue, falls irrevocably into theft, adultery, yea, even into socialism!' At that point the Willemstad farmers started trembling."

With the faithful flock thinning, even the Protestants have tried to make a liberal turn, but with their characteristic stinginess and hypocrisy. "The *Friesch Dagblad* has recommended moderate doses of Sunday sport to its readers. And even on sex, the reformed churches take a more relaxed view than before. An example is a recent synodal study on 'Persons Who are Homophiles,' a comforting piece for 'Christian Homophiles,' in particular the deviants who are interested in 'constructive and not destructive homophilia,' because they can read in this report that the people of Sodom—who, as

we know, tried to rape Lot's guests—were not 'true homophiles.'"

Amerongen and Cornelissen make very clear, moreover, the limits of the liberalization both on the Catholic and Protestant side. As the radical and liberal adherents of the churches run up against the ingrained reactionary structures of these institutions, no deep-seated prejudices now prevent them from breaking away. And they are exiting from the churches in large numbers, leaving a traditionalist residue more and more resistant to reforming the church or anything else.

—Gerry Foley

DOCUMENTS

Why Britain's White Paper Failed

By James Conway

[The following article is taken from Vol. 2, No. 1 of *The Plough*, the organ of the Revolutionary Marxist Group, the Irish supporters of the Fourth International.]

* * *

Disraeli once said that every time Britain finds an answer to the Irish question, the Irish change the question.

This is just a clever way of saying that British diplomacy in Ireland has always covered its nakedness by avoiding the issues and discussing irrelevancies. The Whitelaw White Paper is just the latest example of the grand old tradition. The key feature of Britain's latest plans for Ireland is their failure to grapple with the needs of the Irish people (which was to be expected) but also their failure to satisfy the needs of British imperialism itself.

The Green Paper—First Step Towards Federalism

It is now commonplace knowledge among socialists, republicans and political commentators in general that Britain and its native clients desire a "federal solution" to the Irish problem. There is no need to elaborate on this, merely to mention that the general forms of this solution were outlined last October in the Westminster Green Paper, *The Future of Northern Ireland*.

The Green Paper constituted a basic reappraisal of British imperialism's strategy in Ireland. The central revision concerned what is known as the "constitutional position" of the Six Counties. The Six Counties were considered to be an integral part of the United Kingdom, and

its status was held to be inviolable except by the will of the Protestant majority, i.e., the Unionist bourgeoisie.

This tenet of British policy was deleted by the Green Paper, which stated that the constitutional position of the North "must not preclude the necessary taking into account of . . . the Irish dimension". In other words the future of the Orange statelet was no longer to be considered purely in terms of the Protestant majority but in terms of the whole people of Ireland. Moreover Britain's confidence at this point was highlighted by its desire to give its change of policy as wide a currency as possible, as is evidenced by the statement (contrary to the wishes of Conor Collaborator O'Brien) that a refusal to speak *now* of Irish unity would be "a prescription for confusion".

The Green Paper not only insisted on placing the question of partition in the context of Irish unity but it also spelt out in a general way what this would mean for the basic structures of the Six County statelet.

For the first time it was openly admitted that the conflict rending the North apart over the past fifty years arose not merely from the existence of two "political viewpoints", but from the existence of "two whole communities".

The reformulation of the problem in this manner pointed the finger logically at other features of the Orange statelet. It was admitted, albeit in an indirect way (using such euphemistic terms as "permanent majority" and "permanent minority"), that this situation had resulted in institutionalised sectarianism against the Catholic minority.

By so framing the problems, the need to radically alter the structures of power

in the North was deliberately posed. Thus the need "to seek a much wider consensus than has hitherto existed" was insisted upon. It was openly acknowledged that "minority groups should be assured of an effective voice and a real influence". And it was stressed that this would have to be done by "giving minority interests a share in the exercise of executive power".

The Green Paper undoubtedly marked a major shift in the historic orientation of British imperialism in the sense that it posed the need for some formal unity between North and South and the need for a definite sharing of executive power between the Catholic and Protestant communities in the North.

Arising from the new orientation two important practical proposals were made. Firstly, that a *Council of Ireland* should be set up which would take account of the Irish dimension by giving the Southern bourgeoisie a significant say in the affairs of the Six Counties. Put simply, it was intended to end the sovereignty of the Unionists. Secondly, that a *community government* be set up in which representatives of the Catholic minority (i.e., the Catholic middle class) would wield ministerial power.

Resistance From the South

Although British imperialism wishes to introduce these reforms and alterations, it is caught in the web of its past policies. Now that it has altered its course, the material results of its past interventions have produced autonomous tendencies which are cutting across her path at this point.

In the South these tendencies assert themselves in two important ways.

Firstly, in the economic sphere: one of the fundamental reasons behind the federal proposals has been the significant increase of control gained by British capital over the Southern economy during the sixties. But this is not only the reason for federalism; it is supposed to be a means to achieving it. The influx of capital, the expansion of industry, the creation of jobs, was supposed to show in a practical way the desirability of integration with Britain. In the short run this may in fact have had some effect.

But the way in which British capital created and organised industry was guaranteed to defeat such a purpose. British capital, to use a Marxist expression, tended to increase the organic composition of capital invested in industry, i.e., it increased the ratio between capital invested in plant and machinery, and capital invested in labour power. Since surplus value and profit are created on the capital invested in labour, a decline was produced in the rate of profit. To offset this decline the rate of exploitation of labour had to be increased. (This in-

creased rate of exploitation has already received a practical manifestation in the huge strike wave which marked the sixties.)

In addition to this central feature, there is a whole galaxy of secondary problems—intensified inflation, worsening balance of payments, rundown of external reserves, etc., which eat away any surplus social product that might have been used to provide decent social services or create a welfare state.

In the long term, the intervention of British imperialism was bound to propel the Irish working class into struggle against its designs, rather than integrating the class into its overall system.

Secondly, in the cultural sphere the hopes of British imperialism have proved equally vain.

During the 30's, 40's, 50's, for reasons we will not discuss here, Fianna Fail seized on the Republican traditions of the working class and small farmers and used them in a demagogic way to consolidate its position of power. Now the process of integration with Britain demands that these traditions be liquidated. But the fruits of thirty years hard work cannot be obliterated overnight. The "ideological reformation" had to begin gradually. The first changes naturally began within the intelligentsia and were slowly transmitted to the general public. But the unexpected explosion of the struggle in the North reactivated the traditional instincts. It came as a timely shot in the arm to the Republican ethos which was about to expire helplessly.

The interaction of these economic and cultural factors have prevented the ripening of conditions and the preparation of public opinion quickly enough to permit any attempt at laying the prerequisite foundations for the implementation of the proposals of the Green Paper.

Obstacles in the North

Of course the more important and profound stumbling blocks to any meaningful implementation of the line elaborated in the Green Paper, came primarily from the North. These obstacles to the policy of the British are traceable largely to the heterogeneity of Unionism and the peculiar position occupied by the Protestant working class in the production process.

The heterogeneity of Unionism stems from the deformed nature of the Irish market and the consequently deformed nature of the Northern market. Because the Northern market is a fragmented piece of the entire Irish market, it succeeded in producing only an unstable and unbalanced economy. In particular it created two distinct layers within the Unionist ruling class, whose interests do not immediately coincide.

The smallness of this market, resulting in high risk and low profitability on capital, causes an outflow of capital to Britain and keeps the size of industrial enterprises limited. Hence the widespread existence of the Victorian-type family firm, which of course is bigger than a petty-bourgeois concern but not quite the norm of 20th century capitalism. This type of firm continues to play a vital and vigorous role in the North of Ireland economy.

By contrast to the effusion of capital there is a continuous influx of capital from Britain which arises from the lower rate of profit due to greater technical advancement and a higher organic composition of capital in Britain. This influx of capital has created an alternative and distinct layer within Unionism, which is much more closely identified with the interests of British imperialism.

While both these wings of Unionism are heavily dependent on British imperialism, they are so in different and even contradictory ways.

The second wing of Unionism, the "moderates" in the present struggle, while it may have some degree of independence, has no real or substantial interests apart from those of British imperialism.

The first wing, the "extremists", is much different, however. The family firm in the course of such a long and prosperous existence has become not only an economic unit but a social and political unit as well. As such, it is much more deeply rooted and interested in the Protestant community.

This situation has created, along with a variety of other factors, a strong paternalism which has reinforced and further spawned a web of favouritism, discrimination, graft, power and privilege.

Accordingly the extreme wing is hostile to any attempt to infringe on its sovereignty and more particularly to sharing state power with the Catholic minority. So, while this wing depends on Britain for profitable outlets for its surplus capital, it has a firm base of its own which can create friction with the interests of British capital.

As Britain proceeded with the plans of reform, it did not consider seriously the significance of the growing schism within the Unionist camp. The *material basis* of the split was not understood and a naive belief persisted that it would heal itself once the gravity of the situation became apparent. As it turned out, no assumption could have been more ill-founded. It is in fact the resistance of the extreme wing of Unionism which today constitutes one of the most dangerous elements in the grave situation which exists.

The second obstacle we mentioned, the position of the Protestant working class, is of course an extension of the problem of heterogeneity in the Unionist camp, but

it is best dealt with as a separate category.

The Protestant working class cannot be understood solely in terms of the labour-capital conflict which characterises any segment of capitalist society. It must be analysed in the context of the evolution of the entire Protestant community. Only in this way can the importance of its role be put in proper perspective.

Two aspects of this evolution must be taken into consideration. To begin with, the elementary historical fact that the Protestant community was planted in Ireland as a bridgehead of nascent British capitalism meant that the lower ranks had to be granted special concessions in order to encourage loyalty and bind them to the aristocracy. The principal concession was security of tenure, which allowed an improvement and expansion of holdings and the emergence of linen weaving and spinning as a "cottage industry". By contrast, the native Catholic population was forbidden any security of holdings and consequently was not in a position to develop any skills or techniques.

By the time of the industrialisation of the North during the middle of the last century, it was only the Protestant peasantry which was in a position to fill up the leading skilled ranks in industry.

In addition, their new advantage by comparison to the Catholic population was reinforced by the factors which, as we have seen, also created a fissure in the Unionist bourgeois monolith—the nature of the Six County market.

While a significant layer of industry with skilled opportunities did spring up, the smallness of its market base prevented widespread diversification and created intense competition for these positions. Since the Protestant workers were installed first, they have been able to use their advantage to monopolise the various trades in the major industries. The Catholic workers on the other hand have been forced to occupy the unskilled positions, and as there is too little scope in this field of employment, they have been subjected to an abnormally high rate of unemployment and emigration.

The Protestant working class has therefore, as Connolly pointed out, come to occupy a position quite similar to the old British labour aristocracy. But there is the additional feature that a reactionary peasant ideology, Orangism, lay ready to hand at the time of the formation of the Protestant working class which they used to solidify their ranks and defend their privileged position.

The Protestant working class is naturally hostile to the moves toward a federal solution and the economic tendencies of diversification which underpin it. Consequently they have mobilized as a

separate identifiable force and have thrown their weight in behind the extreme wing of the Unionist bourgeoisie. This has accentuated the rift in the Unionist camp and reinforced the obstacles to Britain's strategy. The Protestant working class has in fact played a decisive role in the extreme Unionist mobilisation against the threat to its privileged position.

A Disembowelled Green Paper

It is unnecessary to recall here how all the factors we have outlined have intervened in the last few months. In the South, the massive trade union upsurge after Bloody Sunday and the repeated mobilisations after Mac Stiofan's arrest and during the passing of the Offences Against the State Amendment Act are clear enough in their meaning.

On the opposite side, since the abolition of Stormont we have seen the consolidation of the extreme wing of Unionism, the Vanguard Movement led by Craig, and the rise of the Protestant working class through the Orange Order, the Loyalist Association of Workers (LAW!) and the Ulster Defence Association.

It was obvious, even when the Green Paper was first published, that the proposals logically flowing from it could not possibly be implemented against such odds. But British imperialism still had a few cards left to play. In the South an all-out effort to crush republicanism both physically and politically was projected. The main weapons in this drive were the Anti-IRA Bill (O.S.A.A.) followed by the general elections. In the North the border poll was to be used as a lever to enhance the position of the moderate wing and put it in a position where it could compete with the extremists for hegemony over the Protestant workers.

Both of these offensives failed. The Anti-IRA Bill met with tremendous opposition from the Southern people. It was only with the help of a few bombs from British intelligence that the legislation was forced through, and the government recognised its defeat by not widely using its new powers. In the general elections which followed, this defeat was confirmed. (The purpose of the elections was clearly to stabilise the situation for the White Paper, but none of the major pro-imperialist parties were able to raise the pertinent issues such as security, repression, collaboration, etc. Instead the manoeuvre was reduced to a squabble over rates and prices, etc.)

In the North the border poll stunt produced equally ineffectual and dubious results. Although the extreme wing had raised the cry of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, a separate nine-county Ulster with independently negotiated rela-

tions with both the South and Britain, etc., this was largely demagogic hot air. When the crunch came, the moderate wing found it had very little room to outflank the extremists; in fact the only interests which suffered were those of Britain, who had her "Irish dimensions" kicked out the door.

Unable to deal effectively with all these obstacles and suffering repeated defeats every time it tried to grapple with them, British imperialism has been forced to retreat. The magnitude of this retreat can be judged by a comparison of the proposals in the White Paper and those projected in the Green Paper.

The most glaring retreat in the light of such a comparison has been on the question of the "Irish Dimension" since this is central to the federal solution. (Whereas the question of power sharing is only a means to an end.)

Until quite recently, it was thought that the recognition of the "Irish Dimension" in the form of a Council of Ireland which would give the Free State a veto over some affairs in the North would be a central feature of the White Paper. Although it was admitted as the deadline for the White Paper approached that nothing too bold would be ventured in this field, it certainly came as a surprise to all seasoned commentators that no direct proposals on the Council of Ireland were contained in it.

A careful examination of the White Paper commentary on this shows that the whole line of approach to the Council of Ireland has been changed. The Free State will first have to recognise the status of "Northern Ireland" and crush the Republican Movement before any kind of united council can be considered. In addition, the areas of work for such a council are limited in advance to "tourism, regional development, electricity and transport". This means pushing the Irish dimension right out of the picture again. The prospects of the Free State authorities being about to mobilise popular support for a constitutional change which would recognise the right of British imperialism in Ireland and O.K. the extirpation of republicanism in return for a mess of pottage such as "co-operation" in tourism, electricity, transport, etc., is to say the least unlikely. The "regrets" expressed by Cosgrave are a hint to British imperialism and the Unionists about the awkward position their Southern collaborators are in.

The move towards Community Government was also halted, though not in such clear and decisive terms. Firstly the restored Stormont [Belfast] Assembly will not have even the limited power which the old regime had. Prior to this, Stormont had no control over foreign policy, treaties or trade pacts, no control over

currency, weights, measures, radio, air or sea navigation, taxation, post office; no power to declare war or raise an army; in addition, any decision taken by the legislature could be annulled by the Queen's government.

Now the security and constitutional matters have been removed from the sphere of its competence. The new Stormont Assembly will in fact be nothing more than a glorified County Council.

Thus the question of power sharing is avoided altogether by depriving the Assembly of any effective power. In other words, the new Assembly will just be a more naked form of *direct rule*.

In this form, the Assembly cannot act as a stabiliser. While it strips the Unionists of power, it does not give the Catholic middle class (led by the SDLP) any additional power. The SDLP, while it may be prepared to accept this temporarily in the hope of better things to come, will not embrace it as a definitive solution. That is why they have shown such little interest in the proposed structures for power sharing.

Of course, apart from any question of the Assembly having real power, the proposed method of power sharing is transparently ineffectual for the simple reason that the Six Counties by its very nature is a sectarian apartheid state and can only be genuinely reformed in an all-Ireland context. No matter whether the seats are increased from 52 to 80 or 800, no matter whether the straight vote or proportional representation is in operation, the Unionist and Protestant population will still have a substantial permanent majority.

Accordingly, it doesn't matter whether the Cabinet is chosen by the Secretary of State (who will undoubtedly always appoint a couple of Castle Catholics), the ministers, whether they be Protestant or Catholic will have to submit to a Unionist majority. Moreover, these ministers, if they operate in accordance with the procedures recommended in the White Paper will have to bring their legislation through departmental committees which will be elected on a PR [Proportional Representation] basis, which will guarantee that they are Unionist-dominated. So even at this preliminary stage any Catholic or non-Unionist minister would have his hands tied by a Unionist majority.

No wonder Mr. Faulkner could boast that the "epoch making" proposals of the White Paper were only a souped-up version of the proposals made by the Unionist Party as early as . . . 1970!

What Next?

The implications of this failure are be-

coming more obvious every day. The only way out of the complex impasse in the North will be a major defeat for one of the sectors opposing the British solution. Having changed the balance of forces through a decisive military intervention, it may then be possible for Britain to implement some of its proposals.

There are two important opposition groups—the Catholic masses and the extreme unionists. The question is: which of these will the British opt to defeat?

It is unlikely that imperialism will make a major offensive against its former allies. Not for any sentimental reasons of course but because of the dangerous consequences this could have.

Any attempt to crush the organisations like Vanguard, LAW, the UDA, as has already been proved, would generate a whole series of pogrom attacks against the Catholic ghettos. The security forces would then find themselves taking on both sectors at the same time since the resistance of the minority tends to grow over into offense against imperialism. Such a fight they are not capable of winning except at enormous expense to the already over-stretched resources of British imperialism.

Even if such a situation did not occur, there are deeper political consequences which must be considered.

The taming of the "Loyalists" would indeed change the balance of forces but not specifically in the direction of British imperialism. The position of the Catholic masses would be strengthened as a result, and without the extremist wing of Unionism to act as a buffer their struggle could not be easily contained. In the long run, the strategy of defeating the Loyalists would not be the most profitable one for Britain.

On the other hand an offensive against the Catholic minority would have many side effects. The most important effect would be to put the moderate wing of Unionism in a position to compete with the extreme wing of Unionism for leadership of the Protestant working class. A heavy defeat for the Catholic masses would undoubtedly placate large sections of the Protestant workers and reconcile them to Britain's new plans. It is likely therefore that the failure of the White Paper will result in an escalation of the brutality against the Catholic community.

The tasks of revolutionaries and their supporters are twofold. The first task is to expose any illusion that the White Paper might work. (Such an illusion leads to collaboration with imperialism and disarms the people against the inevitable attack.)

The second task is to link the struggle

North and South. Only the mobilisation of the Southern workers can prevent the defeat of the Catholic ghettos in the North. In this respect the tendency among socialists and Republicans to think that the main line of offence against imperialism is along the economic front is very erroneous and dangerous.

The practical tasks of the socialist and republican movement necessary are:

1. To explain how and why the White Paper is a failure.
2. To expose the dangers of collaboration.
3. To prepare for mass mobilisations among the Catholic people.
4. To win support in the South for the minority in the North as the first stage in the mobilisation against imperialism in the South. □

Opposes Common Market Orientation

Minority Quits Norwegian Labor Party

Following last fall's vote in Norway against entry into the Common Market, an anti-Market minority inside the Norske Arbeiderparti (Norwegian Labor party) was organized to fight the party's official pro-Market stance. Toward the end of March, this minority, led by a former government minister and a former member of the Storting (parliament), left the Labor party.

The dissidents accused the party of refusing to go along with the overwhelmingly anti-Market referendum vote and of continuing to operate on the assumption that Norway should enter the Market.

They have decided to join AIK (Arbeiderbevegelsens informasjonskomité mot norsk medlemskap av EF—Workers Movement Information Committee Against Norwegian Membership in the European Common Market). This group, led by the well-known sociologist Berit Aas, who also recently resigned from the Labor party, hopes "to form a political organization that can bring together radical forces within the labor movement," according to a report in the March 26 issue of the Copenhagen daily *Information*. AIK currently has its eyes on the elections scheduled for next September. Between now and then it plans to engage in a cooperative electoral effort with the Sosialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People's party), the Communist party, and other left-wing forces.

Berit Aas, who is a member of the city government in Asker near Oslo, had been under suspension from the Labor party for some time before she

left. Among those who have now followed her out of the party are the director of fisheries, Klau Sunnanaa, and customs director Karl Trasti, who was minister of prices and wages and minister of industry under Einar Gerhardsen.

The March 28 issue of the Danish Communist party paper quoted Ole A. Roessehaug, a leader of the Labor party in Haugesund, on the internal crisis in the party: "As a socialist in the Labor party, I find it much more natural to work together with groupings on the party's left than with groups on the right, the way the Labor party is doing. For us socialists in the labor movement, the distance between us and the Labor party leadership is actually greater than it is between us and the parties to the party's left."

The Labor party is not the only political organization to feel the effects of the anti-Market vote. Following the referendum, the Venstreparti (Liberals), for instance, split in two, with the opponents of the Market retaining the party name.

"Only one party has remained intact—the Conservative party," wrote Frank Bjerkholt in the April 6 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*. "With the exception of the far left, the others have been more or less shaken up by the disputes surrounding the question of Europe. The resulting situation is so complicated that it is, for all practical purposes, impossible to predict what the governmental majority will look like after the legislative elections next September." □