

Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 11, No. 11


© 1973 Intercontinental Press

March 26, 1973

50c

Nixon Threatens Hanoi on 'Violations'

**Lanusse Promises
to Let
Campora Take Office**



**Nimeiry Launches
Witch-Hunt
Against Palestinians**



French Far Left Gains in Elections

Switch to Dogfood

The skyrocketing price of meat in the United States is beginning to touch off a reaction among lower-income brackets of the public. Among other things, there is increasing talk of a consumers' "boycott."

Noting the protests, Nixon has advised consumers to buy the "cheaper cuts." Most families, however, have already been doing this for years; and now the "cheaper cuts" carry stratospheric price tags.

However, Terry Arnall and Jerry Dizmang, two seniors at Oklahoma State University, seem to have taken Nixon's advice at face value. They announced March 3 that they would eat dogfood for a week as a protest against high prices.

"It's getting to the point where a person cannot afford to eat," Arnall said, according to the March 4 *Miami Herald*. "I'm tired of paying 95 cents a pound for hamburger that just fries away. I'd rather pay \$1.52 for a 10-pound sack of dogfood."

"One night we made some real good beef stew out of Skippy and baked potatoes and carrots," Arnall reported. "For lunch the other day we took cheddar cheese soup and put some Purina in it. Chuckwagon is my favorite dry food."

As for other brands, Arnall offered the following comments: "We've been eating Alpo on toast, but it wasn't too good. We like Recipe real well, and it's cheaper . . . we put a lot of garlic and a lot of salt on it and it really brings out the flavor."

Arnall and Dizmang did not turn to dogfood without first checking it out with health director Donald Cooper.

"Dr. Cooper said there would be no nutritive problems with the diet and the hospital dietitian told me there was nothing in the processing of dogfood that could hurt me," Arnall said. "It's all psychological. The dog was eating better than we were."

Arnall and Dizmang said that after a week they would switch back to human food but would probably continue to supplement their diets with canine delicacies. Already they carry dog biscuits in their pockets to nibble on between classes.

In This Issue

ARGENTINA	323	Lanusse Promises to Let Peronists Take Office—by Fred Halstead
	325	ERP Carries Out Guerrilla Action in Cordoba
FRANCE	326	General Tendencies in the First-Round Elections—by Pierre Frank
	327	Revolutionary Candidates in the Elections
	329	Gaullists Squeak Through on Second Round
PAKISTAN	330	Bhutto Intensifies Witch-Hunt
INDOCHINA WAR	331	Nixon Threatens to Resume Bombing
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	332	Confusion Surrounds "Invasion" —by David Thorstad
SUDAN	334	Nimeiry Launches Witch-Hunt Against Palestinians—by Jon Rothschild
GREECE	336	Students Continue to Challenge Junta
IRELAND	337	Local Issues Decisive in Elections —by Gerry Foley
TURKEY	339	Parliament Balks at the Generals' Candidate
ANGOLA	340	The Struggle Against Portuguese Colonialism
U. S. A.	342	U.S. Faces an "Energy Crisis" —by Terry Quilico
GREAT BRITAIN	343	Trade Unions Call General Strike
	344	Students Demand Rise in Government Aid
SRI LANKA	345	A Big Business the Regime Tolerates
IRAN	345	Shah Gives Lawyer Royal Runaround
	346	Students Reported Killed by Police
VENEZUELA	346	Caracas Rally Backs Socialist Candidate
DOCUMENTS	347	Ligue Communiste's Position on Second-Round Elections in France
	347	Sinn Fein's Program in Irish Elections
	348	"ERP 22" Supports Peronists
	349	Rucci Stung by Coral's Attack on Peronists
	350	Developing Situation of Dual Power in Chile
	351	Lessons of the October Crisis in Chile
DRAWINGS	321	Gaafar el-Nimeiry; 336, George Papadopoulos; 350, Jose Rucci—by Copain
	324	Hector Jose Campora—by Sabat
	343	Edward Heath—by David

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Mai-tan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

COPY EDITOR: Lawrence Rand.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Candida Barberena, Fred Feldman, Gerry Foley, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders, David Thorstad.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.

TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Ruth Schein.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Gueme-nee, Paris 4, France.

TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright © 1973 by Intercontinental Press.

Lanusse Promises to Let Peronists Take Office

By Fred Halstead

Buenos Aires

MARCH 13 — The Frente Justicialista de Liberación (FREJULI—the Peronist electoral front) won a smashing victory in the elections held two days ago. With the votes of only 808 precincts out of 54,654 still to be reported, the election board gave the results as follows:

Frente Justicialista de Liberación, 5,995,943 (49%).

Unión Cívica Radical, 2,596,082 (21%).

Alianza Popular Federalista, 1,797,158 (14.7%).

Alianza Popular Revolucionaria, 870,333 (7.11%).

Alianza Republicana Federal, 332,641 (2.72%).

Nueva Fuerza, 256,106 (2.09%).

Socialista Democrático, 112,273 (0.91%).

Socialista de los Trabajadores 76,555 (0.62%).

Frente de Izquierda Popular, 61,731 (0.50%).

Besides this, 125,162 blank ballots were cast; 43,601 were voided as improperly made out; and 35,385 were challenged. The total vote was 12,288,819.

These figures were less than previously announced, the board of elections announcing that a large error had been discovered in the earlier computations.

The Unión Cívica Radical decided not to challenge the Frente Justicialista de Liberación in a second round. Thus the presidential candidates of the Peronist front, Héctor José Cámpora and Vicente Solano Lima, were declared elected. In a speech broadcast nationally late in the evening of March 12, the military dictator General Alejandro Agustín Lanusse said that his regime would abide by the decision of the voters. If the military holds to this promise, Cámpora will take office May 25.

As to the meaning of the election results, I can offer the following opinions as voiced in an interview granted to me by Arturo Gómez, organizational secretary of the Trotskyist Par-

tido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party).

* * *

Question. What is the significance of the Peronist vote?

Answer. It signifies a repudiation of the government by the working class and a significant part of the middle class. The working class hasn't considered any government since 1955 [when Perón was toppled from power] to have been in its interests. But the Peronists received a much higher percentage of votes in the current election than in the 1963 national and 1965 regional elections. This vote indicates, or registers, a radicalization of the middle class, a disaffection by these strata from the government. A big section of the middle class voted for the Peronist front.

Q. What about the Alende-Sueldo vote? [Oscar Alende and Horacio Sueldo were the candidates of the Alianza Popular Revolucionario (People's Revolutionary Alliance), a center-left coalition that included the Partido Insurgente, the Partido Revolucionario Cristiano (Christian Democrats) and the Unión del Pueblo Adelante (UDELPA—Union of the People Forward). It was supported by the Communist party as a popular-front formation.]

A. The Alende-Sueldo vote dropped considerably from that which Alende received in 1965 in running for governor of the province of Buenos Aires. It was also lower than the vote received by Sueldo's Christian Democrats. Also the Communist party did better the last time it ran in 1961. It appears that these so-called center-left forces lost a considerable part of their traditional supporters to parties further to the right. On the other hand, they picked up some votes from the more radicalized sectors of the middle class.

Q. What is the significance of the PST vote?

A. We have had no previous electoral experience that we could use as a basis for comparison. But considering where we were a year ago, there is no doubt that we gained among sectors of the workers vanguard and among the youth, that is, among those who have broken with all the bourgeois options, especially Peronism.


In absolute numbers we made some modest gains that cut into the Peronist movement. These were class votes, working-class votes. It is clear also that a significant number of Peronist workers split their ticket, voting FREJULI for the presidential slate, and for the PST for lesser offices, such as deputy. The great majority of the workers, of course, did not cast a class vote, but voted for FREJULI. But in my opinion this was less a vote for Peronism than a vote against the present government. The PST was the only party on the left that increased its ranks in this period.

Q. What will happen if the Peronists actually take power?

A. First, regarding the "if." It seems reasonably clear from what Lanusse said last night that the armed forces will accept the experiment of a Peronist government. I think we are entering a period similar to that in Chile with a populist, nationalist, bourgeois government.

But there are certain important differences from the situation in Chile that make things more complex here. First, the great weight of the Argentine working class and its very high level of union organization. Second, the absence in Argentina of a mass working-class party. Unlike Chile, there is no mass Communist or Socialist party here. The Argentine workers are still caught up in a bourgeois party, Peronism.

But there is no doubt that the work-



CAMPORA

Sabat/La Opinion

ers now expect things to change in their favor.

Q. Do you think that this will lead to an immediate period of upsurge in the workers' struggles, or the opposite—an immediate period of lull as the workers wait, expecting the new government to solve the problems they face?

A. In the short term this is guesswork. It is very difficult to say what the pace of developments will be in the immediate future. But in the long

run, the upsurge will continue, since the elections do not eliminate the crisis that forced the military to opt for an electoral maneuver. Remember, they didn't do it because the achievement of stability permitted them to relax. They did it precisely because the situation became increasingly unstable under the old regime.

Probably in the coming year, even though the Peronists got more votes than ever, the crisis of Peronism will deepen because its influence among the workers will become more and more undermined. In the past seventeen

years, while it was proscribed, the incapacity of Peronism to satisfy the elementary needs of the masses could not be demonstrated. The masses will continue to struggle as before, but now they will confront a Peronist government.

For example, the week before the election, the workers at the Citroen auto plant here in Buenos Aires went on strike because twelve union activists were fired. A sector of the activists in the plant are Peronists; and some of those who were fired are Peronists. Now, they have talked with one of our comrades about sending a delegation to see C ampora [the president-elect]. This proposal will be taken up at the next assembly of the strikers. It is an example of how important sectors of the workers who voted for FREJULI are already making demands on the incoming government.

Yesterday, that is, the day after the elections, the Citroen workers held a meeting in which the union bureaucrats proposed suspending the strike while waiting for the Ministry of Labor to rule in favor of the workers. At the same time, one of the top bureaucrats of the national union attacked our comrade, saying that the voters had repudiated the PST and its troublemakers in the plants by voting overwhelmingly for the Peronists, as the union bureaucrats had told them to do.

Our comrade answered by pointing out that the situation that had caused the strike had not changed and that the union shouldn't have any confidence in the government with respect to solving the problems of the workers.

One of the fired workers, a Peronist, took the floor to say that he believed the workers had won a victory in the election, but that now things could not be left as they were; they must be changed completely. He accused the bureaucrat of being as bad as the Ministry of Labor. Instead of telling the workers to hold tough in their strike as the only way to win, the bureaucrat had told them to have confidence in the government. The assembly took a vote. It was against the bureaucrats. And they decided overwhelmingly to stay out on strike.

Our party will accompany the masses as they go through this experience, and we are in a much better position to do this because of the gains we

made during the election campaign.

Q. What did the PST actually gain in its campaign?

A. First, we came out of it with a national party that is now well known, that has cadres and branches throughout the country in the major centers as well as many minor ones.

Second, we tightened our ties with the workers through our campaign activities. We now have more members in all the major centers of anti-bureaucratic struggles in the unions to continue the work already begun, such as the Chocón construction workers' struggle in Neuquén, the SOMISA

occupation, the SITRAC-SITRAM in Córdoba, among the bank workers, at Chrysler, etc. Leaders of all these struggles, and many more, were candidates of the Workers Front and Socialist Pole.

Third, we were able to increase the circulation of our paper, *Avanzada Socialista*, from 8,000 at the start of the campaign to 25,000 on the eve of the elections.

Fourth, we began the campaign last year with ten local headquarters. Now we have seventy.

Fifth, of those who applied for membership in the PST during the campaign, we have accepted 1,500 as probationary members.

Q. What will happen now with the Workers Front?

A. The perspective of the Workers Front is to continue to participate in the struggles of the workers and to help give an impulse to the mobilizations of the working class. The Workers Front began as an electoral opportunity for workers who wanted to use the PST ballot status to run for office. But it was more than that, since these workers are leaders of the anti-boss and antibureaucratic struggles. Some workers who voted Peronist are now joining the Workers Front as an instrument in the class struggle. We will encourage this. □

Denies That It Supports Peronists

ERP Carries Out Guerrilla Action in Cordoba

As the electoral campaign in Argentina neared its climax, the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP—Revolutionary Army of the People) engaged in a guerrilla action February 18 that gained some publicity in the Argentine press. The United Press International carried the following account on its wires:

"Forty leftist guerrillas invaded a military headquarters in the interior city of Córdoba Sunday, wounding three soldiers and stealing a truckload of weapons and ammunition.

"The army command identified the guerrillas as members of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), a Trotskyite organization, and said they were successful in stealing the weapons and a truck, which was later destroyed. There was no word on the condition of the soldiers.

"Unofficial army sources said the guerrillas held the post for three hours, disarming 50 soldiers and painting ERP slogans on the walls with spray paint. A draftee who fled with the invaders opened the gates to the 141st Communications Battalion Camp for the guerrillas, who were dressed in army uniforms, the source said.

"They overcame guards one by one until they were in control of the facility, which they held for three hours before leaving at dawn with two cars

and an army truck. The truck was found in another section of the city, completely burned.

"The army sources said 30 rifles and 25 automatic pistols were missing, along with ammunition, uniforms, radio equipment and other supplies.

"There was another attack at the same time, apparently a diversion, on an electrical installation in the town, 440 miles northwest of Buenos Aires.

"No injuries were reported in the diversionary action.

"The guerrillas identified themselves as members of the Trotskyite 'People's Revolutionary Army' (ERP) and said the operation was at least partly in revenge for the slayings Aug. 22 of 16 imprisoned suspected terrorists. Guards said they were shot while trying to escape.

"The ERP, which claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and murder of Italian industrialist Oberdan Sallustro last year, as well as the robbery of the National Development Bank, is one of the most active of the half-dozen armed guerrilla groups in Argentina."

On March 8, three days before the national elections, Héctor R. García, publisher of the Buenos Aires daily *Crónica*, was kidnapped by a group

and held until he agreed to publish a communiqué that they gave him.

García acceded to the request. The *Crónica* published the communiqué in its fifth edition, and García was released late that same night.

The group of kidnapers signed the communiqué "Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo 22 de Agosto" (August 22 Revolutionary Army of the People). This is the first time the name has appeared in public. The communiqué also carried the name "Comando Eduardo Capello" (Eduardo Capello unit). Capello was one of the sixteen political prisoners massacred at the Trelew prison last August 22.

The communiqué called on the public to vote for the Frente Justicialista de Liberación (FREJULI—Liberation Front for Social Justice), the Peronist electoral front headed by the bourgeois politician Héctor J. Cámpora. [For text see "'ERP 22' Supports Peronists" on page 348.]

In Buenos Aires there was speculation in the far left that the ERP had suffered a split and that the communiqué had been issued by the splitters. Nothing has appeared in the press up to now, however, that would either confirm or disprove this. Moreover there were other interpretations.

Cámpora called a press conference March 9. He told the reporters that

the kidnapping of García and the publication of the communiqué were part of a government campaign intended to smear the Peronist movement. He said he was "not going to respond to this provocation" and that it was sufficient to indicate "the contradiction between the publication of the ERP 22 de Agosto communiqué and the existence of Article 212 of the Penal Code, which forbids the circulation of communiqués from the guerrilla organizations."

For its part, the Lanusse regime initiated criminal proceedings against García and *Crónica* for publishing a communiqué issued by a subversive organization.

On top of this, it was reported that *Crónica* received an anonymous telephone call, presumably in behalf of the ERP, insisting that the position of the guerrilla organization was "not to support any of the political slates in tomorrow's elections."

In Rosario the ERP undertook a still more dramatic gesture. The Buenos Aires daily *Clarín* (March 10)

published the following account by its correspondent:

"A presumed commando unit of the 'Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo,'—which seized a local factory to harangue the personnel—denied that it was involved in the kidnapping of the journalist Héctor Ricardo García.

"In the early dawn yesterday, four men and two young women, who identified themselves as belonging to the so-called ERP, forced their way into the installations of the metalworking plant Longo Hnos. y Migliazzo, at 3266 February 3rd St., in the western part of the city. There they harangued the personnel, explaining the position of the extremist cell of not supporting any political party.

"Referring to Héctor Ricardo García they denied that they had anything to do with the case. Afterward, they painted red slogans with aerosol cans referring to the cell and left a banner with a five-pointed star. They cut the telephone wires and fled. The authorities gave out no official information about the incident." □

neuvering (about whether to withdraw in the second round) to make sure that the number of seats they finally win will also make them indispensable to forming a majority in the new parliament.

What about the Union of the Left and its component parts? The Communist party won a few more votes than it did in 1967, and more than it did in 1968, but in percentage terms (it got 21.34%) it did no better than in 1967. In fact, the CP has been marking time for many years, and has hardly profited from the country's undeniable shift to the left. There is even a certain tendency for it to lose ground in the Paris area and in some regions where it has been entrenched for a long time.

The big winner in the first round was the Socialist party, which came close to the CP's percentage. It got 20.65%, in which must be counted 1.48% for the "Left Radicals," who ran with them.

From the electoral point of view Mitterrand, who took over the leadership of the SP after its heavy defeat in the 1969 presidential election and who set as his first task "rebalancing" the left, that is, giving the SP the same electoral strength as the CP, succeeded in the first phase of his plan. When Mitterrand signed the common program [of the Union of the Left], he suggested that this "rebalancing" would be accomplished by winning back the Socialist votes that had little by little shifted to the CP since the end of the second world war and especially since de Gaulle took power.

In fact, he at best nibbled at a few such votes here and there. In some places, especially in the Paris area, he picked up some votes from the PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party]. But most of the SP's gains in areas like the east and west of France were made above all at the expense of the reformers and the Gaullists.

Thus, in the electoral arena the shift to the left worked to the SP's advantage—it picked up support from layers that were formerly apolitical or that followed the bourgeois candidates; the CP made hardly any numerical gains.

In general, the PSU lost ground—on the right to the benefit of the SP and also, in several cases, on the left to the benefit of the candidates

The First Phase of the French Elections

General Tendencies in the First Round

By Pierre Frank

Only fifty-eight deputies were elected in the March 4 first-round voting; 442 seats are still up for grabs in the second-round election on March 11. So only a few general tendencies can be gleaned from the first-round results; a full analysis of the whole election must be deferred.

There were about 1.7 million more voters this time than in 1968; the percentage of those abstaining declined somewhat (it was 18.75%, as opposed to 20.04% in 1968 and 19.07% in 1967). There is not yet any information on the composition of the abstainers.

As had been predicted, the outgoing majority suffered a rather serious setback, not only in comparison to 1968 (those were the elections held just after May 1968, in which the Gaullists capitalized on the Communist and Socialist leaders' betrayal of the movement), but also in comparison to the

March 1967 elections (in which the Gaullists won a parliamentary majority by only a few seats).

Despite the contribution made by a section of the 1967 and 1968 "centrists"—the Centre Démocratie et Progrès group was merged into the majority coalition after Pompidou became president of the republic—the majority only got about 35% of the vote. Nevertheless, the Gaullists heaved a sigh of relief on the night of the elections; they expected to do worse.

The "reformers" (centrists of various shades), who had hoped for a great success, could not do any better than about 12% of the vote, their usual score. Their only interest in their vote is that it will make them indispensable on the second round for stopping the Union of the Left from getting a majority in the new parliament; but they also will engage in some slick ma-

of Lutte Ouvrière and the Ligue Communiste. It did not preserve its local positions very well, except in Saint-Brieuc, and that because of the PSU's connections with the mayor of the city. Rocard did better than the CP candidate because the SP did not run in the district; on the second round, the CP will step down for him.

As far as the far left is concerned, its percentages, except in a few cases, exceeded those gotten in the 1969 Krivine campaign. They generally ranged between 1.5% and 2.5%; in a few cases the far-left vote was 3%, and in one case it was even 5%.*

In a general sense, the results exceeded our expectations, for we were

*After nearly six months of negotiations with the Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvrière over dividing up candidacies, and after starting off by asking for 200 of the districts, the Lambertists of the OCI-AJS [Organisation Communiste Internationaliste-Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme—Internationalist Communist

confronted with the voters' desire to "make their votes count" not only to make sure the Union of the Left would win a majority, but also to make sure that either the SP or CP candidate would come out on top in the

Organization-Alliance of Youth for Socialism] broke off all negotiations and presented just twenty candidates of their own. They ran above all to fight against the Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvrière, putting up their candidates in districts they had not requested, denouncing our candidates as "crypto-Stalinists pushed by the bourgeoisie," and calling for first-round votes for the CP and SP candidates, in addition to their own.

The OCI-AJS thus split from the far left, but could not cut into the SP or CP vote. Result: Everyplace the Lambertists ran, even in cities where they claimed to have hegemony, like Nantes, Clermont-Ferrand, and Grenoble, their candidates were outdistanced, sometimes very much so, by the Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvrière candidates. He who spits in the wind gets his nose all wet.

first round. The fact that the far-left vote was spread throughout the whole country proves that its now undeniable presence is not restricted to a few large centers.

One other very important aspect of this election must be mentioned. Every time there was discussion at public meetings, the questions that were posed—especially by the youth, whether voters or not—dealt with socialist society, how to achieve it, how to organize it, and how to run it. The high political level of the problems raised, the concerns of the youth, and often the originality of their suggestions were remarkable.

If ever the considerable cleavage between the parliamentary framework of bourgeois democracy and the politicization of wide layers of the laboring masses was demonstrated, it was in these elections. We will see this again on the second round.

March 6, 1973

Got Their Best Scores in Working-Class Areas

Revolutionary Candidates in French Elections

Stagnation for the Communist party, big gains for the Socialist party, setbacks for the centrist PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party), and an impressive showing representing extensive and intensive growth for the far left—these are the trends revealed by the results of the first-round legislative elections in France.

Despite the noticeable shift to the left in the country as a whole, the Communist party was unable to make any serious electoral gains. Its total percentage of the vote did increase slightly over its 1968 vote, but was a bit less than its 1967 score.

But more important than the overall stagnation of the CP's vote was the fact that in districts where it has been strong in the past, it actually lost ground. In the March 9 issue of *Rouge*, weekly organ of the Ligue Communiste (French section of the Fourth International), Henri Weber gave some details on the CP's vote. In comparison to the 1968 elections,

the CP candidate *lost* 4% in Courbevoie, 2.3% in Garches, 2.5% in Meudon, 2% in Pantin, 3.2% in Alfortville, 1% in Bonneuil, 1.3% in Taverny, 0.8% in Argenteuil, 0.7% in Marly-le-Roi, 3.7% in Vélizy, and 1.8% in Mantes.

What is especially significant about these unexpected declines is that they represent losses in comparison to an election that was itself disastrous for the CP—the one held in 1968 just after the Stalinist bureaucrats had derailed the revolutionary movement.

There were areas in which the CP increased its percentage of the vote, but the downward tendency predominated.

"This stagnation," wrote Weber, "is even more remarkable in that it contrasts with the stupendous efforts the CP made during this campaign. The reason seems clear: The reservations the CP expressed about the Stalinist system, its international policies, and the regimes in the Eastern countries were hardly convincing. On television,

Georges Marchais claimed that Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union were ruled by a superior form of democracy. He opposed the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, but saluted the 'normalization.' He claimed to be the champion of real democracy, but upheld a completely rigged Twentieth Congress [of the Communist party]. He declared himself in favor of democracy in the plants, but opposed the democratic organization of struggles, preferring the uncontrolled authority of the union officials to democratically elected strike committees. In short, his actions belied his words and gave credence to the bourgeois campaign about 'Communist totalitarianism.' Also, many workers who vote for CP candidates or members in municipal or professional elections refuse to vote for the CP in legislative elections, especially when there is a chance the CP might come to power.

"The CP leadership will not win the confidence of these workers by putting out all kinds of verbal 'gwaran-

tees' or by averring its good faith. *Only the daily practice of workers' democracy and a radical critique of Stalinism will be able to banish these prejudices.* But the CP leadership is completely incapable of this. That's why it does not manage to 'make a breakthrough.' Its vote increases when it's a question of checking a bourgeois offensive (as in 1967); it stagnates or slips when the CP demands 'to run the government.'"

While the CP's vote stagnated, both in general and specifically among the working class, the SP made big gains. A thorough breakdown of the composition of the SP's vote is not yet available, but there are indications that the SP's advance among the working class was considerable.

Weber reports that a poll conducted in December 1972 by IFOP (Institut Français de l'Opinion Publique) showed that while 18% of the workers voted in 1967 for the SP or its allies, 27% were planning to do so this time. (The anticipated working-class vote for the CP was rated at 34%.)

"The workers made up 35% of the SP's vote (and 52% of the CP's)," Weber wrote, "white-collar workers and middle management made up 20%, unemployed 19%, upper management and professionals 9% (2% of the CP's vote), industrial and commercial owners 6%, and farmers 11%. Fifty percent of those who were voting for the SP for the first time said they were practicing Catholics. . . ."

But while the Socialist party was the big winner in the Union of the Left shell game, the far left managed to demonstrate its growing weight in the French political scene. Weber explains that "the political conditions in which the vote was held were very unfavorable to a breakthrough by the far left. As we explained several times during February, the possibility of a victory for the Union of the Left impelled the workers to 'make their votes count' on the first round, especially because in many districts the outcome would depend on only a few hundred votes and because many far-left workers would want to help the CP candidate finish ahead of the SP candidate.

"In spite of these unfavorable conditions, more than 300,000 workers responded to the call of the Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvrière: 'On

the first round, demonstrate your opposition to the regime, your defiance of the Union of the Left, and your determination to settle the question of power by class-struggle methods!' The average score of the revolutionary candidates ranged around 2%, an advance over the Krivine campaign during the 1969 presidential elections (1%). But the average score is not really representative. The Ligue candidates got 5.51% of the votes cast in Sedan, 3.3% in Chelles, 3.39% in Caen, 3.52% in the first district of Strasbourg, 3.36% in the first district of Poitiers, 3.28% in the second in Tours, 2.8% in the second in Lyon, 2.6% in the second in Toulouse and [also] in the first in Montpellier.

"The Lutte Ouvrière candidates got 4% of the vote in Chartres, 4.17% in Issoudun, 3.6% in Rochefort, 2.92% in Thionville, 3% in Douai and in Hénin-Liétard, 4% in Thiers, 3.3% in Meaux and in Montereau, 2.18% in Orly."

In an article published in the March 9 issue of *La Gauche*, weekly organ of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs (Revolutionary Workers League—Belgian section of the Fourth International), a leading member of the Ligue Communiste, Alain Krivine, offered some observations on the relative size of the Ligue-Lutte Ouvrière vote and its significance:

"The Ligue ran 92 candidates and got about 100,000 votes; Lutte Ouvrière ran 167 candidates and got about 200,000. [The two organizations supported each other's candidates and did not run against one another.] On the average, Lutte Ouvrière's vote was slightly higher than the Ligue's (on a national scale, 1.85% for the Ligue, 2.2% for Lutte Ouvrière). Why is this?"

"The two groups did not run exactly identical campaigns; this has to be taken into account. An electoral activity and a revolutionary activity deal with two completely different areas. It is clear that the overwhelming majority of the people who cast revolutionary votes voted either for the Ligue or Lutte Ouvrière.

"The small difference, in our opinion, is a result of two factors. First, the Ligue refused—perhaps incorrectly—to put the photographs and names of the individual candidates on leaflets, while the comrades of Lutte Ouvrière took a different view (without elec-

toralism in the full sense of the term) of this point: They decided to play the game all the way. Second, Lutte Ouvrière was able to get television time; the Ligue was denied it [see *Intercontinental Press*, March 12, p. 266]."

Krivine notes at least two respects in which the far left's 1973 returns differed from its 1969 vote. First, the percentages this time ranged from 0.5% to 5.5%, depending on the particular district; in 1969, the vote tended to be more uniform.

"The second feature is that the revolutionary candidates achieved their best results in the working-class districts. And if you analyze each district precinct by precinct, there are areas where you find the average of about 2%, but you find percentages like 4, 5, or 6 in the precincts in the working-class neighborhoods. In Sedan, for example, our comrade got nearly 10% of the vote in the three precincts in the working-class neighborhoods.

"Why this score in Sedan? Mainly because our candidate is a worker there and got fairly good coverage in the press. Also, the section of the Ligue, while not very strong numerically, includes mostly workers who had been active in the three most recent strikes, in support committees, and so on. In this area the Ligue has played an important role in these strikes, in which its members were involved."

The far-left vote, Krivine points out, indicates a much larger revolutionary current than the mere numerical score. "If one includes the youth under twenty-one, the immigrants, and those revolutionists who do not vote, our influence on the electoral level is significant. One last remark: Whether in the case of Lutte Ouvrière or the Ligue, the vote gotten did not at all correspond to our respective positions of strength in the districts, but much more to the social composition of the electorate. (In the North and in Pas-de-Calais, the Lutte Ouvrière comrades got more than 2%, and in four districts did better than the PSU; in Chartres, for example, where Lutte Ouvrière does not have a section, these comrades got 4% of the vote.)"

Krivine describes the efforts made by the Ligue during the campaign: "In all, about 500 meetings were or-

ganized: both big meetings and small neighborhood gatherings of only four or five people. Because of this, hundreds of people who are not members of the Ligue joined support committees; many of these people are workers.

"At most of the meetings, the working-class participation was quite large, often accounting for half the audience, although the students were hardly pushed aside except in the big meetings. In general, these workers were members of the CP or were trade-union militants who came to see what was going on; that is, they were types who were going to vote for the Union of the Left, because in this election it was very hard to cast a revolutionary vote, given the stakes involved.

"A whole series of people that supported us in struggles told us the same thing: It's a good thing the Ligue is running—it's a guarantee—because we are suspicious of the Union of the Left; but the vote is so polarized that we will vote Union of the Left. There were thousands and thousands of peo-

ple who told us that. Because of that, we had expected to get a ridiculously low score.

"In eleven cities, we had meetings attended by more than 1,000 people."

Weber's article in *Rouge* summed up the significance of the first round vote for the far left:

"Despite the continued grip electoralism has on the French working class, several hundred thousand youths and workers decided to vote for revolutionary candidates who did not have the slightest chance of getting elected in order to demonstrate to the leaderships of the workers' organizations their rejection of reformism and their will to struggle. There were hundreds of thousands of others who, to make their votes 'effective,' voted for the SP or the CP in the first round, but do not identify with the reformist leaderships and would support going beyond them.

"This workers' vanguard will not let itself be tricked after March 11. It will be in the forefront of popular struggles. With it, in unity, let's prepare for the spring of 1973." □

Furthermore, although the "middle-of-the-road" Reform party, which got 12.5 percent of the vote in the first round, backed the Gaullists by and large in the second (withdrawing their candidates in 87 districts in return for the same favor from the Gaullists in 14), they still won 31 seats, a gain of 16, thus increasing the smaller government parties' margin for maneuver in the new Chamber of Deputies.

"With a broadened majority, a bloc of Giscardien, Centrist, and Reform party deputies about a hundred strong will be able to counterbalance a routed UDR ravaged by internal struggles," Henri Weber predicted in the March 9 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly paper of the Ligue Communiste (Communist League, the French section of the Fourth International).

The Communist party gained 39 seats, climbing back to the total of 73 that it had before the De Gaulle landslide in 1968. The biggest gainer in the Union of the Left coalition was the Socialist party, which gained 48 seats for a total of 101. But at that level the "non-Communist left" was still below the 116 seats it had in 1967. The left Social Democratic PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party) gained two seats for a total of 3. The combined left bloc in parliament thus included 177 deputies as of the March 14 report in *Le Monde*.

Between the first and second rounds, the government worked hard to whip up a red scare, with President Pompidou going on state-run television the day before the election to tell voters that they faced a "simple choice between Marxist Communism" and freedom. In the context of the "Gaullist institutions," there was no right of reply.

Unfortunately, the ambiguities of the Communist party leaders made it easier for the government to fan the fears of "totalitarianism" that seemed to account to some extent for the CP's mediocre performance in the first round.

But if the Gaullist red scare had its effect, even authoritative voices in the American capitalist press expressed concern over the basic instability and immobilism of a government based on fear. In its editorial March 15, the *Washington Post* wrote:

"Throughout the campaign, Gaullists said the choice was between progress and national disaster. True, pol-

Red Scare and Rigged Institutions Do the Trick

Gaullists Squeak Through on Second Round

"The opposition had the issues: Gaullist corruption and insensitivity to the common man, a pervading sense of alienation. But the Gaullists had the bourgeois heart and conventional habits of the French people. They also had the particular institutional legacies of Charles de Gaulle, including: a two-round election which positively begs for inter-round deals that blur the people's choice; a constitution that made it uncertain (and therefore fearful) what would happen if a Gaullist executive were paired with a non-Gaullist legislature; and a system of state-run television which President Pompidou flagrantly exploited to his own partisan advantage on election eve." (From an editorial entitled "A 'European Chile'? Non!" in the March 15 issue of the *Washington Post*.)

The "bourgeois heart" of the French people was rather less in evidence in the March 11 runoff elections than the "particular institutional legacies of

Charles de Gaulle." Although the government achieved a fair margin, thanks, among other things, to a deal with the conservative centrists, it still emerged from the final voting in a seriously weakened condition.

The government coalition won 275 seats, according to the March 14 *Le Monde*, 29 more than the majority needed to govern. The main Gaullist party, the UDR (Union des Démocrates pour la République—Union of Democrats for the Republic) lost its absolute majority, falling from 273 seats to 189. Thus, the party of "le grand général" became dependent on its smaller partners, the Independent Republicans of Valéry Giscard D'Estaing, who dropped from 61 to 54 seats; and the Centre Démocratie et Progrès (Middle-of-the-Roaders for Democracy and Progress), which dropped from 26 to 23 seats.

Giscard D'Estaing, in particular, is said to be regarded as dangerously independent by orthodox Gaullists.

iticians everywhere are prone to define their own candidacy in those apocalyptic terms. At a point, however, the rhetoric becomes believed. At that point, it becomes dangerous, artificially inhibiting a 'free' choice on the merits and tending to disincorporate the winner from tending to the legitimate cares of those who supported the loser. The phenomenon is not confined to France. This is not to say the Gaullists are incapable of improving the quality of their rule. It is to say they have a heavy obligation to try."

François Mitterrand, the Socialist party head, described some of the dan-

gers of a Gaullist victory more clearly: "I cannot help noting that the situation created by the alliance between the Reform party and the UDR has upset us. In an opposition with a strong popular vote and a disproportionately weaker representation in parliament, I am fearful for our country. Because in the face of the grave social and economic situations we are going to encounter, a minority leading the nation will not have any real margin for political action. I find this disturbing for our country. I hope that it will manage. We will do everything we can. But personally I worry." □



ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO

National Awami Party Now a Target

Bhutto Intensifies Witch-Hunt in Pakistan

Heavily armed Pakistani police, accompanied by television cameras, reporters, and an apparently unnerved Iraqi ambassador, staged a raid February 9 on the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad. In the offices of the political attaché and the embassy accountant, and in two bathrooms, they found crates labeled "special books—to be opened by Political Attaché Naser Alsaood only."

Prying open the crates, Bhutto's raiders found 300 submachine guns, forty incendiary hand grenades, hundreds of carbine magazines, a VHF radio transmitter, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and other equipment.

Ambassador Hikmat Suleman insisted he was ignorant of the contents of the crates. Political attaché Alsaood, to whom the material had been addressed, was not available for comment, since he had left the country a week earlier.

Although neither ultimate destination of this arsenal nor its source has been made public, Bhutto was quick to take advantage of the incident to escalate the witch-hunt against political opponents that he began last fall (see *Intercontinental Press*, September 18, 1972, p. 988). To the usual targets of Bhutto's repressions—minority nationalities and militant workers—were added his most respectable bourgeois critics, including top leaders of the National Awami party (NAP), the big-

gest opponent of Bhutto's People's Progressive party (PPP).

Bhutto imposed direct rule on the North West Frontier and Baluchistan, the two provinces ruled by the NAP, and sent troops to occupy the provincial capitals. He removed the provincial governors and replaced them with his supporters.

Repression in Baluchistan has been particularly severe. The general secretary of the Baluchistan NAP, Amirul Mulk Mengal, was jailed, along with Manzoor Gichki, a journalist, and others.

On March 2, a detachment of the Civil Armed Forces entered the Marri tribal area in Baluchistan and seized Sher Mohammed Marri, a reputed tribal leader who the government claims is the head of a "guerrilla army" of 20,000 persons. However, the press reported no armed resistance to his capture. Nonetheless, Bhutto's propagandists have attempted to link him to an alleged uprising backed by the NAP and East German advisers.

In Karachi, police seized Altaf Gouhar, editor of *Dawn*, an English-language newspaper that has criticized Bhutto's attack on civil liberties.

Bhutto's allies in the provinces of Punjab and Sind have also tried to get in on the action, even if that necessitates contradicting their master's preferred version of the "conspiracy." Mustafa Khar, governor of Punjab

and a close associate of Bhutto, charged that the mysterious Iraqi arms cache was destined not for Baluchistan or North West Frontier, but for Punjab, where they were to be used in a NAP-organized plot to set off sectarian rioting between the Sunni and Shia Muslims.

A member of Sind's provincial cabinet accused the governor of plotting violence in the province. As proof, he alleged that the governor's nephew was training for guerrilla warfare in the hills of Baluchistan, which, to believe the witch-hunters, are teeming with armed malcontents of every imaginable variety. The governor resigned in protest, accusing Bhutto's regime of instigating language riots and brutally murdering strikers in Karachi last October 18.

So far the bourgeois NAP, which has supported many of Bhutto's repressive moves in the past, has not been able to mount an effective counterthrust to the new stage of the crackdown. Wali Khan, the head of the NAP, attempted to score some points with Pakistani chauvinists by charging Mohammed Akbar Khan Bugti, recently appointed by Bhutto as governor of Baluchistan, with being "soft" on Bangladesh: "Isn't Bugti the only politician in West Pakistan who has supported Sheikh Mujib's six points? Didn't he meet Mujib in London?" □

Nixon Threatens to Resume Bombing

At an unscheduled news conference held March 15 Nixon threatened to resume bombing North Vietnam if Hanoi "violates" the Paris cease-fire accords by sending equipment to be used by their forces in South Vietnam.

The threat came in the form of an answer to a reporter's question on alleged infiltration, about which U.S. officials had been whining for several days. "I can only suggest this," said Nixon. "That we have informed the North Vietnamese of our concern about this infiltration and what we believe it to be, a violation of the cease-fire and the peace agreement. Our concern has also been expressed to other interested parties and I would only suggest that, based on my actions over the past four years, that the North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard such expressions of concern, when they are made, with regard to a violation. That is all I will say about it."

The "other interested parties," of course, are the bureaucrats in Peking and Moscow, who are presumably aware that Nixon's "actions over the past four years" are synonymous with chemical warfare, B-52 carpet bombing, and laying mines in civilian waterways. There was no response from either capital to Nixon's threat as of four days after it was issued. Xuan Thuy, chief North Vietnamese negotiator during the formal Paris talks, seemed unimpressed. "History has shown that threats do not lead very far," he told reporters March 16.

The details on the supposed North Vietnamese infiltration have been somewhat contradictory. On March 16 unnamed "administration analysts" claimed that Hanoi had sent 300 tanks into South Vietnam "in recent months." "Intelligence analysts" said that the tank shipments began last October, when the North Vietnamese "started a major movement of supply trucks, armor, field and antiaircraft artillery, and manpower toward South Vietnam."

U.S. officials claimed that the flow is at least as large as it was a year ago, just before the Hanoi-NLF spring offensive. "At the height of last

year's offensive against Anloc [northwest of Saigon]," one analyst claimed, "the Communists had only about 25 tanks in that area. And they had only captured artillery; now they have long-range 130-mm. artillery that will outrange anything the South Vietnamese have in that area." The 130-mm. artillery have a range of seventeen miles and have not been used by the liberation forces in the past.

Saigon officers added their own claims to those made by U.S. agents. They said the liberation forces had moved SA-7 heat-seeking missiles and AT-3 guided missiles into Tayninh province northwest of Saigon. Le Van Tu, one of Thieu's generals, was quoted by the March 17 *New York Times* as saying that as many as 100 Soviet-built T-54 tanks had been moved into Tayninh by the liberation forces.

Intelligence officials in Saigon (an apparent contradiction in terms) said that the liberation forces now have a full battalion of twelve 130-mm. guns in Tayninh, and that "a number" of radar-guided, twin 57-mm. antiaircraft guns had been mounted on T-54 tanks.

The U.S. officials rounded out their story with the claim that captured Hanoi troop directives suggested that an offensive was being planned for the summer or fall of 1973, after the American troops are gone.

While Nixon was using the alleged North Vietnamese infiltration of equipment as an opportunity to rattle his B-52s, other information from U.S. sources suggested that the North Vietnamese were merely defending themselves and were not planning any offensive. The liberation forces' front-line battalions, intelligence officials revealed, now range from 20 to 50 percent of authorized strength." They usually don't consider going into major combat with less than 65 per cent of authorized strength," the March 18 *New York Times* quoted an "official" as saying.

The estimate of the liberation forces' combat strength is based on the so-

called infiltration rate. During the current dry season, U.S. agents say, Hanoi has sent about 68,000 men into the South; this compares with 91,000 during the last year's dry season.

One U.S. official even admitted that Hanoi's equipment movements to the South were justifiable: "The [Saigon] Government has been doing this right along. There's no reason to expect that the Communists won't do the same thing when they have a chance."

Another American noted that from October to December 1972 dozens of C-5 jet transports landed in Saigon loaded with thousands of tons of equipment for the Thieu regime. "It's very similar," he said. "It's just that we have C-5's and they don't."

There are, however, points of dissimilarity, such as the fact that the United States is supplying weapons to Thieu in violation of the Paris accords and the liberation forces are simply trying to prepare to defend themselves.

On March 16, Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra, the PRG's chief delegate to the Joint Military Commission, charged that the Opposition Socialist party in Japan had revealed that U.S. military shipments were made from Japan to Danang on March 9 and 10 and that 9,000 tons of equipment was slated to go the same route on March 17 and 18.

The next day, at the first news conference he has been allowed to hold since arriving in Saigon, Tra charged that since the cease-fire, Saigon had committed 46,188 violations of the accords. He said the Americans were shipping "great amounts" of munitions to Thieu in violation of the cease-fire. He also said that there were "no grounds whatsoever" for the U.S. charge that Hanoi had shipped 300 tanks to the South.

It is to be hoped that the Hanoi leaders are in fact resupplying their forces, because it seems clear that the U.S. charges are merely a device to set the stage for new aggression. The March 18 *New York Times* quoted one American official who expressed what may well become the official U.S. version if Thieu launches a massive attack on the liberation forces: "The South Vietnamese are damn nervous about all this stuff [the North Vietnamese equipment] sitting right in front of them. They could get the idea that the VC were moving in on them and call in the bombs and artillery." □

Confusion Surrounds Dominican 'Invasion'

By David Thorstad

"What has characterized the last few days has been the enormous proliferation of rumors and interpretations going around," observed the Dominican weekly *Ahora!* March 5. "And among this multitude of versions, the one that has gained the most ground agrees in one respect with the one we have just presented: namely that Caamaño did not die the way the official version of the armed forces indicates, that he did not die in combat but was killed after being captured."

In the month and a half since the alleged invasion of the Dominican Republic at the beginning of February by a handful of guerrillas allegedly led by former Colonel Francisco Alberto Caamaño Deñó, allegedly backed by Cuba, and allegedly in cahoots with former President Juan Bosch (see *Intercontinental Press*, March 5, p. 235), the number of discrepancies, contradictions, and unsubstantiated allegations surrounding the affair has mushroomed on such a scale as to transform the Caribbean island into a rumormonger's paradise.

Presumably President Joaquín Balaguer is quite content to let the confusion persist, because he has done nothing to clear it up. Many people had expected him to back up his charges of Cuban and PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano—Dominican Revolutionary party, the main opposition party, headed by Bosch) involvement during his speech to the National Assembly on February 27. He didn't.

After a month and a half, it is not even certain that Caamaño was one of the three dead men identified as guerrillas on February 16, nor that an invasion took place.

The only thing that is certain in all the confusion is that Balaguer has taken full advantage of the opportunity to deal a blow to the main political opposition he would face should he decide to run in the elections scheduled for May 1974. With the top leadership of the PRD underground, its

headquarters periodically raided, and many of its members under arrest, Balaguer appears to have succeeded thus far in turning the "invasion" to his own advantage.

The three alleged guerrillas whose bodies were photographed by two journalists February 16 were identified as Caamaño, Eberto Lalane José and Wellington Ascanio Peterson Pietersz. Peterson Pietersz subsequently turned up in Havana quite alive and well, whereupon "his" body was identified anew as that of Alfredo Pérez Vargas.

"The number of journalists authorized to see them [the bodies] was drastically limited," wrote *Ahora!*, "and everything seems to indicate that the photos had to be taken from a distance, with a telephoto lens." Such a restriction would, of course, have considerably lessened the ability to inspect the bodies—including tactile investigation—giving rise to speculation that they may have been frozen or embalmed.

"The wounds that could be seen in Caamaño's body were not bleeding," *Ahora!* noted, "in spite of the fact that the first photos (published in *El Nacional*) were taken the same afternoon they died—less than two hours later. It is illogical to think that in the midst of all the tensions that accompany a battle and that do not go away when it is over—even less so when the remaining guerrillas are continuing to be pursued nearby (as the official version added)—that time would be taken to wash the bodies of those who had fallen."

The bodies were buried in a secret grave in the mountains on February 17. No journalists were allowed to observe the burial.

From the beginning, there was some question as to whether the three had been killed together, as the government claimed. With the passage of time, this question, like many others, has become murkier. The Santo Domingo daily *Ultima Hora* reported March 1 that a military source had

"privately" informed it that "about noon" on February 13 "two cadavers were taken out of the morgue cooler in the hospital on the San Isidro base and discreetly taken to the site where helicopters are parked.

"The cadavers, the source said, had been in the morgue since February 7, when they were brought in—from the guerrilla zone, it is thought—in an air ambulance." There are those who wonder if these two bodies belonged to the "guerrillas" whom the government claims died with Caamaño on February 16.

Another element that has inspired incredulity among many is the government's assertion that Heberto Lalane José was operating as a guerrilla in the mountains. The physical prowess this would have required in his case would appear nearly superhuman—he had no left hand and was blind in his left eye. "It could be assumed that a person in this condition would be prevented from doing everything a guerrilla can be expected to have to do," *Ahora!* observed. "For example, climbing mountains by struggling along craggy rocks, or dangerously descending into deep ravines by holding onto stones—and doing all this not at one's leisure but rapidly, in order to escape a life-and-death pursuit. In terms of the mobility that a guerrilla movement by its very nature has to be able to count on, a fighter in his condition would represent too heavy and inconvenient a burden, and as such he would increase the risks of succumbing to governmental persecution.

"For this reason, some credence is being given to the version according to which Lalane José was taken prisoner some time ago in Las Américas airport during an attempt to enter the country with false papers. It has been confirmed that such an incident happened at the end of last December."

Following the announcement of the alleged guerrilla landing, Balaguer said that at least one guerrilla had been sent to the city. Bosch warned on February 28 that any such emissary should be considered a government agent. On March 1, a man identifying himself as a member of the guerrilla band turned up in the offices of *Ultima Hora* and granted an extensive interview before disappearing.

The guerrilla, who identified him-

self as Toribio Peña Jáquez, provided an account of the affair that confirmed the government's version on several points: He insisted there was an invasion (although he said it occurred on February 1, not on February 3 or 4, the two dates the authorities have used); he said that the insurgents arrived in the yacht *Black Jak* that was found abandoned on the southern coast, and that the guerrillas disembarked on Caracoles beach, in spite of the fact that it is closely watched by the navy; and he confirmed that Caamaño headed the expeditionary force and that Pérez Vargas and Lalane José were part of it.

On one key question, however, Peña Jáquez's account differed sharply with the government's: He insisted that neither Caamaño nor Lalane José was dead. The bodies identified as theirs had been doctored up to resemble them, he said.

The guerrilla described various physical inconsistencies between Caamaño and the cadaver to prove his charges: Caamaño had a tuft of hair on top of his balding head, whereas the cadaver was quite bald; Caamaño had a scar on his stomach from a previous operation that does not jibe with the one on the cadaver; Caamaño's clothes were not the same; alongside the body was a helmet, but the guerrillas wore olive-green caps. The body's feet, moreover, were not the feet of a guerrilla, who would have been wearing boots. "I tell you, this cadaver is a trick," he said. "I want the people to know that a guerrilla cannot have the feet of an office worker."

A similar list of discrepancies was offered in the case of the body attributed to Lalane José.

Peña Jáquez provided a number of details on the internal organization of the guerrillas, who he said are operating in two focos. He disputed the government's contention that the guerrillas number only eight to ten, but would not say how many there were.

He was unable to explain one particularly puzzling detail: why the boat on which the guerrillas allegedly arrived was not blown up after they disembarked. Balaguer claims evidence was found on board linking the group to Bosch. The guerrilla said that as a simple "combatant, a military cadre of the organization," he



JUAN BOSCH

could not explain the reason for such a decision, which was made at a "top level."

To some it has seemed strange that the guerrillas led by a popular figure like Caamaño should apparently attempt to initiate a struggle without previously establishing a political network inside the country. While Peña Jáquez stated that the guerrillas do have an organization called the *Comandos de la Resistencia* (Commandos of the Resistance), he indicated that they had anticipated that the very presence of Caamaño would serve to mobilize the masses against the regime and to establish a foco that would continue to increase in size. "We have come with the conviction that we are heading directly toward victory. We have confidence in our people. They have been kept in a state of confusion up to now, but they have also shown that they have great courage."

The PRD appears to have been completely caught off guard by the whole incident. While it did put out a leaflet denying any link to the guerrillas, its response to the repression has by and large been rather weak and ineffectual, both nationally and internationally.

On March 12, according to a United Press International dispatch in the

March 14 issue of the New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario-La Prensa*, Bosch came out of hiding for the first time since the beginning of March and held a news conference in the PRD's national office. He made a "fervent appeal to the opposition parties to unite behind an active plan of struggle against the government of President Joaquín Balaguer." Although the news conference took place without incident, Balaguer's press secretary later said it "clearly shows his [Bosch's] obstinate determination to create a national state of unrest." Radio and television stations were prohibited from reporting Bosch's statements.

One side effect of the alleged guerrilla invasion is the differences it appears to have prompted within the top leadership of the PRD. On February 16, for instance, just hours before the government announced that the three guerrillas had been killed, the PRD's secretary general, José Francisco Peña Gómez, wrote a public letter to Balaguer in which he indicated his belief that there was an invasion and that Caamaño was heading it. He reportedly accused Balaguer of forcing Caamaño to launch a guerrilla effort and charged that Caamaño had been betrayed by the Dominican far left.

Other leaders of the PRD apparently felt that this compromised the party, which has claimed no knowledge of any invasion. Bosch rebuked Peña Gómez in a public letter February 26, which noted that "the beloved compañero secretary general of our party did not share the doubts about the Caracoles invasion that the other members of the PRD's permanent commission held and continue to hold."

Meanwhile, Balaguer seems determined to press on with his goal of eliminating in one blow the two figures who at the moment could conceivably pose the greatest potential threat to his political future—Caamaño and Bosch. □

Bad For Image

In response to angry protests from civil rights organizations, Cleveland's Mayor Ralph Perk has instructed the cops to remove the racist graffiti they have been painting on police station walls. In addition, he told the lawmen to stop wearing swastikas on their uniforms while on duty.

Nimeiry Launches Witch-Hunt Against Palestinians

By Jon Rothschild

"We will support the Palestinian liberation movement to the last man and to the last cartridge," Sudanese President Gaafar el-Nimeiry said last year.

"Not only September will be black. This government can make every single day of the year a black one," he said in a March 6 radio-television speech during which he declared all Palestinian organizations in the Sudan illegal.

One could jump to the conclusion that Nimeiry had changed his mind about the Palestinian struggle between 1972 and 1973. He himself implied as much by claiming that the recent Black September Khartoum operation was the reason for his anti-Palestinian diatribe. But this conclusion would be at best imprecise. In reality, Nimeiry was simply engaging in the usual "progressive Arab leader" demagoguery in 1972. In 1973 he was speaking honestly.

Nevertheless, something has changed. The Nimeiry of 1972 felt compelled to verbally support the Palestinian movement; the Nimeiry of 1973 feels strong enough not only to jettison all pretense of being an ally of the Palestinians, but to actively take the offensive against the Palestinian organizations. Nimeiry's witch-hunt and the reactions to it from other Arab governments and from the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) indicate something about the political conjuncture in the Arab East. For the Arab workers and peasants, and most of all for the Palestinians, the indications are not good.

Nimeiry's first step in initiating suppression of the Palestinian organizations was to try to link Fateh, the group that dominates the PLO, to Black September's Khartoum operation. The opening gambit came from the influential Sudanese newspaper *el-Sahafa*, which claimed that Black September's seizure of the Saudi Arabian embassy was masterminded by the local Fateh office. Abu Selim, a Palestinian who broadcasts on Radio Omdurman (Omdurman is adjacent

to Khartoum, just north of the confluence of the White and Blue Niles), was specifically named. *El-Sahafa* further alleged that a Fateh member identified only as Karim was also involved. The newspaper added that six other fedayeen active in the operation had flown into the Sudan aboard a Libyan aircraft on March 1.

With the rumors thus flying, Nimeiry delivered his March 6 speech. He repeated *el-Sahafa's* story about Abu Selim, but went further. He accused Fawaz Yassin, head of the Fateh office, of being the real brains behind the Khartoum operation and charged that Libya was providing sanctuary to Yassin, who had flown to Tripoli from Khartoum on the day the Saudi embassy was seized. Nimeiry asked Libya to extradite Yassin to the Sudan.

He even demanded that Yassir Arafat, the head of both Fateh and the PLO, condemn the Black September attack on the embassy and also that Arafat ask Libyan strong man Muammar el-Qaddafi to return Yassin to Khartoum.

Nimeiry continued by accusing Fateh's Sudan office of engaging in subversive activities in the Sudan—an absolutely preposterous charge—and even of trying to subvert the Ethiopian regime, a reference to Fateh's alleged support to the Eritrean Liberation Front.

He further attacked the "progressive" Arab regimes (meaning Egypt, Libya, and Syria) whose diplomats, he claimed, had been in contact with fedayeen in Khartoum.

He concluded with the declaration of a ban on all Palestinian groups and with the "year-round blackness" threat to Black September.

There were soon signs that Nimeiry was quite serious. The Palestinian news agency Wafa reported that Abdel Latif Abu Hajli, director of the PLO branch in the Sudan, had been arrested March 9, along with his entire family, as he was trying to leave the Sudan.

On March 13 Nimeiry organized

an anti-Palestinian demonstration in Khartoum, one of the first such actions in the Arab world in years. A crowd that the government radio claimed included several thousand persons marched through the center of Khartoum, chanting "Vengeance!" "Execute the fedayeen!" and "Arafat is a traitor!" The government radio gave on-the-spot coverage to the rally, at which Minister of the Interior General Mohammed el-Baghir claimed that one of the local Fateh members had confessed his role in the Black September operation and had implicated others.

The demonstration may have been far smaller than Nimeiry claimed. United Press International rated it as several hundred, not several thousand. Nevertheless, Nimeiry made his point. There was no counterdemonstration, and no Sudanese group has come to the active defense of the fedayeen.

With the propaganda ground broken, Nimeiry moved on to his next step. On March 12, an indictment was brought against the fedayeen who surrendered to Sudanese troops on March 4. There were four counts: premeditated murder, which carries the death penalty in the Sudan; aggression against a foreign diplomatic mission; "intimidation"; and "illegal detention for the purpose of blackmail, and incitement to illegal acts."

Nimeiry's rush to do the bidding of U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, who had asked that the commandos be executed, is not difficult to explain. Since he physically destroyed the Sudanese Communist party in 1971 he has increasingly opened the country to Western capital, and especially to the United States. According to the West German weekly *Der Spiegel*, the United States is pumping about \$1 million a month into the Sudan; Great Britain and West Germany are also investing extensively. Last year Nimeiry reestablished diplomatic relations with Washington; they had been broken in the aftermath of the June 1967 war.

In 1972 Nimeiry reached a settlement with the Black population of the southern Sudan, who had been waging a decade-long war against the oppressive central regime. Part of the deal was that Haile Selassie would stop aiding the Black rebels in exchange for Nimeiry's denying support to the Eritrean movement in Ethiopia. Hence Nimeiry's charge that the Eritrean fighters and their Palestinian supporters were "interfering" in the affairs of the Sudan.

But Nimeiry's government was not the only one to threaten measures against the Palestinians. There were rumors that King Faisal had decided to "review the status" of the thousands of Palestinians living in Saudi Arabia. The rumors were later denied, but were most likely deliberately floated by Faisal as a trial balloon.


And in Jordan, King Hussein seized upon the Khartoum operation as an opportunity to demonstrate his goodwill to both Washington and Tel Aviv. On March 4 he confirmed the death penalty against Abu Daoud and sixteen others, all fedayeen who had been accused of entering Jordan in February to carry out commando attacks against Hussein officials.

It is unlikely that most of the anti-Palestinian measures instituted by various Arab governments will be fully carried out. The anti-Zionist mood of the Arab masses is such that most Arab governments must take care not to appear as conscious agents of the Zionist state. Much more likely is a division of labor between the "reactionary" and "progressive" Arab states, the latter "intervening" to protect the Palestinian movement from the former, and in the process bringing the commando movement—or rather the commando apparatus—under state control.

This process has already begun—ironically with the participation of the PLO leadership.

On March 4 Arafat addressed a message to the heads of Arab states asking them to intercede with Hussein to spare Abu Daoud's life. He noted that the king's decision to execute the fedayeen closely followed Hussein's visit to the United States. He failed to mention that Anwar el-Sadat's chief adviser, Hafez Ismail, had made a visit to Washington within weeks of Hussein's.

After Nimeiry's banning of Palestinian organizations, Arafat sent out



ARAFAT: Wants Sadat to take the field against reactionary "conspiracy."

another message warning that there were "conspiracies" afoot to "liquidate" the Palestinian movement. He appealed for someone to take the lead in opposing them. The message was sent to Anwar el-Sadat, who is now conducting a major purge in Egypt, is holding an undisclosed number of students in prison without bringing them to trial, and is engaging in a vicious repression of a student movement that was propelled into action partly because of Sadat's arrest of four Palestinian students on charges that they had committed "subversive" acts in Egypt.

Sadat, of course, was eager enough to present himself as the defender of the embattled Palestinian patriots. The semiofficial Cairo daily *el-Ahram* reported March 9 that Egypt, Libya, and Syria were in contact with one another in order to "adopt all measures necessary to guarantee the continuity of the Palestinian resistance and to protect it against any threat of liquidation."

Syrian Minister of State Ali Hashim declared that the Khartoum operation, which was "inopportune," demonstrated that the Palestinian movement and the Arab states need to coordinate their actions.

By the middle of March it appeared that the "progressive" Arab regimes had attained their objective. Hussein

"commuted" Abu Daoud's sentence, which many observers had expected him to do anyway. He will still keep the fedayeen in prison. And Nimeiry had dropped his claim that the top levels of the PLO leadership had been responsible for the Khartoum operation. But he still held the local Fateh leadership at fault; the Fateh office remained closed. His concession was that the PLO would be allowed to keep a Sudanese office open. There was no indication that he had changed his mind about trying the fedayeen as common criminals.

Arafat's appeal to the "progressive" Arab states to defend the Palestinian movement and Black September's terrorist operations against reactionary Arab regimes are complementary responses to the political crisis racking the whole Palestinian movement. From the disastrous defeat suffered in the Jordan civil war, both the PLO central leadership and Black September have learned that the entire Arab nation is not willing to enter struggle against the Zionist state.

Black September has responded by devoting itself to small-scale armed actions against the individual leaders of the "reactionary" states. The assassination of Jordanian Premier Wasfi Tal, Black September's first action, is a case in point.

The Arafat leadership, aware of the adverse publicity surrounding terrorist activity, has sought to oppose the "reactionary" elements of the Arab world by appealing to the "progressive" elements.

The apparent overlap of the Fateh and Black September membership is explainable by the fact that the switch from one perspective to the other can occur rather easily, depending on the conjunctural situation. In the long run, however, the Arafat perspective will outdistance the Black September view.

The Palestinian movement today consists mostly of an apparatus without an organized base. The apparatus is controlled by petty-bourgeois bureaucrats who can be firmly integrated into the framework of the Arab states. As this process occurs, the PLO leaders will be compelled to bring the Black September-type commandos under control; the Arab governments will not tolerate any armed action except by their own regular armies.

The only force that can prevent this development is the revolutionary

movement in the whole Arab East, of which the Palestinian movement must be an integral part. As long as the Palestinian leadership holds to the view that the "internal" affairs of the Arab states are none of its concern, as long as it restricts its program to the alteration of political forms in Palestine alone, instead of

extending it to the social transformation of the entire region through socialist revolution, it will necessarily be isolated from the masses of the Arab East. And as long as it is isolated from the masses of the region, it will remain trapped in the narrow perspective of wheeling and dealing with the Arab regimes. □

Papadopoulos Vows to 'Crush' Protests

Greek Students Continue to Challenge Junta

"When a populace more concerned with soccer than with politics shouts 'Shame on the Police!'; when the moderates are becoming radicalized; when street demonstrations — practically unheard-of since the coup d'etat — are becoming normal; when the indignation that the use of torture had aroused in individual hearts is finally denounced on public squares, how can one not believe that the Athens regime has just been dealt a heavy blow?" wrote Paul-Jean Franceschini in the March 7 issue of *Le Monde*.

Other signs of support for the students, who began their wave of protests in January, in Athens and Salonika, are the fact that during police assaults on demonstrators, taxi drivers have taken on students free in order to help them escape, and quite a few merchants have given them shelter in their shops. "This is important," one student told Franceschini. "Our main objective from now on will be to maintain this solidarity, which is a harbinger of a mass opposition to the regime."

Reports indicate that a majority of Greece's 80,000 students have been involved in the recent wave of strikes and demonstrations. The protests reflect both a growing impatience and frustration after nearly six years of the military junta and an increasing feeling that it can be stood up to. "We have the feeling that this Government can't last too long now, that it can't keep it up," one student told *New York Times* correspondent Alvin Shuster February 27. "We are not saying its days are numbered, but maybe its months are."

The students' demands include release of the more than 100 students

who have been drafted as punishment for participating in the protests, repeal of the special decree that withdrew their draft deferments, undergraduate participation in drafting a new law on higher education, new and democratic elections for student boards, removal of government commissioners (all ex-generals) from the schools, and removal of police informers and suspected members of the fascist youth organization "EKOS" from the campus.

One of the most sharply felt grievances is the handling of last November's student elections. They were organized by students appointed by the government and were rigged. Pro-junta candidates won almost every contest.

A bitter Athens student described the results in his school to Shuster: "At the Polytechnic, we managed to have three elections in two of the schools — topography and chemical engineering. We insisted on elected people watching over the voting. The result was that all the pro-Government people lost.

"Now what's happened to our leaders? Of 15 of the elected representatives in civil engineering, more than half had their deferments lifted last week and are now in the army."

On February 23, the 2,000 students who had occupied the Athens law school for thirty hours agreed to a ten-day truce, but vowed to continue their protests if the regime did not repeal the draft decree. On March 2, Premier George Papadopoulos warned that he would crush the student protests. "The revolution is determined to secure tranquillity and public order at the cost of any sacrifice," he said. "I and my collaborators leave no mar-

gins for experiments. We shall crush any force that emerges to disturb public order and upset social tranquillity."

As the truce ended March 6, students began arriving at the law school for a protest meeting. They were met by sealed doors and a notice that the university would be closed for a week "because of carnival." Greek universities have never before closed for the carnival season, reported the *New York Times* March 7.

The ban on meetings provoked further demonstrations. Several hundred students gathered on Constitution Square, shouting slogans and blocking traffic. Thirty-seven were reportedly arrested.

As part of its campaign to "crush" the student protests, the junta has also



PAPADOPOULOS: Vows to "crush" student protest against the dictatorship.

cracked down on the press. On February 22, it "advised" the press not to cover the protests. Newspapers that had been full of pictures and stories suddenly began hardly using the word "student" at all.

The chief government spokesman, Byron Stamatopoulos, was asked why the newspapers were now ignoring the students. "The Greek newspapers are free to write, in accordance with their opinion, what they like," came the re-

ply. "What is forbidden is to write false reports."

About 100 reporters are circulating a petition calling on the Athens Union of Journalists to save their professional reputations by explaining to readers why all news of the students has suddenly vanished.

One effect of this crackdown, Shuster reported from Athens February 28, is that George Athanassiadis, publisher of the right-wing newspaper *Vradyni*, is now "reluctantly the symbol of press freedom." His offices and

home were raided when he published more details on the students than the government desired.

Among solidarity demonstrations that have been held abroad were one of several hundred in Paris February 24, organized by the Ligue Communiste and Cause du Peuple, and another in New York March 3, sponsored by the United Hellenic Front, Demokratia, and the American Committee for Democracy and Freedom in Greece. □

"peace" and "law and order" issues. His main theme became the alleged inability of the disparate parties composing the National Coalition to rule. Apparently the scare technique had proved unproductive, although it was clear that in reaction to years of seemingly pointless death and destruction in the North, the national combativity of the masses had ebbed. Perhaps for that very reason, local issues, including inflation, unemployment, irritations with Fianna Fail's high-handed machine politics, and the corruption of entrenched officialdom, loomed larger in the minds of the voters than the political crisis that has been shaking the nation for four years.

Cosgrave Replaces Lynch

Local Issues Decisive in Irish Elections

By Gerry Foley

Jack Lynch, the Dublin premier noted for his repressive legislation against the militant nationalist movement, saw a political rival assume his office March 14. His replacement is Liam Cosgrave, the leader of the second major bourgeois party, Fine Gael, which has been traditionally identified with a policy of capitulation to imperialism.

The *Wall Street Journal*, relied on by the big capitalists for the "hard facts," gave a rather realistic picture of Lynch's campaign. In the February 27 issue of the New York financial daily, Richard F. Janssen wrote the following account from Carrick on Shannon in County Leitrim:

"By itself, the pastoral politicking by Prime Minister Jack Lynch gives little hint of what might well be at stake—the very stability of this island democracy and perhaps the fate of its deeply troubled neighbors, the British province of Northern Ireland.

"But the hints came anyway—hecklers hoot and eggs start pelting the dignitaries. The prime minister . . . finishes to hearty applause. But then the crowd turns just as attentively to another speaker, supporting a peppery local lass named Frances Grehan of the [Official] Sinn Fein Party, who insists that the election is 'a fight of the rich versus the poor,' of the unemployed 'against the exploiter and the speculator.'"

The *Wall Street Journal* article also gave a very clear explanation of Lynch's objectives:

"The government must have, and must be seen to have, a clear and unmistakable mandate to speak and act for the Irish people," Mr. Lynch declares. He adds ob-

liquely that major decisions in coming months otherwise could lead to 'a protracted period of political uncertainty and instability.'

"In other words, the release next month of a British 'white-paper' with proposals for the future of Northern Ireland could—if it isn't well-received—touch off even greater violence—violence that could engulf the so-far largely immune independent Irish Republic as well. . . .

"Strangely, neutral analysts and even the partisans themselves say the important thing in this election isn't who wins—Mr. Lynch or his main opponent, Liam Cosgrave. . . . Both Mr. Lynch and Mr. Cosgrave denounce violent solutions, one analyst explains, but without a strong majority in the Dail [parliament], either could be powerless to prevent, say, a rush across the border of armed aid to fellow Catholics fighting the British in Ulster."

Lynch's campaign began with a strong push to stampede the electorate into giving him a mandate to maintain "peace at any price." One of its less subtle features was a television film showing bombings and maimed bodies in the North, followed by a sequence showing cows contentedly munching grass in a quiet Southern meadow. His Fianna Fail party's posters bore the slogan "Progress With Stability."

By contrast, his opponents' slogan "Fine Gael Puts the Nation First" seemed almost meaningless. As for Fine Gael's partner in the "National Coalition," the Labour party, it did not seem to have put up many posters.

Then, suddenly, about a week before the elections, Lynch de-emphasized the

"With hindsight it is clear that Mr. Lynch miscalculated on his election call, then lost his political touch as his Fine Gael and Labour party opponents forged a National Coalition and campaigned on bread-and-butter issues: more jobs, houses, social benefits, price controls, tax relief," the *New York Times* commented March 3 in an editorial.

In view of the traditionally rather immobile Irish electorate and the complicated proportional representation system, some observers considered the shift in seats significant. Fine Gael gained four and Labour two. In contrast to 1969, when it had a radical image and was under strong red-baiting attack from Fianna Fail, the Labour party lost votes in Dublin and gained in the more conservative rural areas. In general, the position of the party appeared to shift well to the right.

Fianna Fail's representation dropped from the seventy-five seats it had won in 1969 to sixty-nine. But five of these had been lost earlier by defections and other causes. Four of the six independents were defeated, as well as the one member for Aontacht Eireann [United Ireland], a party that originated from a split in Fianna Fail produced by the May 1970 "gun plot" incident.

The principal figure in the "gun plot" case, Neil Blaney, won reelection in his Donegal district, where he has a strong local machine. In the Northeast district of Dublin, Charles Haughey, another figure in the "gun plot" case, won an overwhelming victory running under the Fianna Fail label. The attempts of his major opponent, Conor Cruse O'Brien (who was also elected, owing to proportional representation), to brand him as a sympathizer and supporter of the Provisional IRA apparently did not achieve the desired effect.

Both Blaney and Haughey benefited from strong local organization and good connections with important business interests. But their election seems to militate against the idea that there is a strong tide running against appeasing the British imperialists.

On the other hand, the attempt of socially conservative nationalists to create a new party in Fianna Fail's old image fared very poorly in the elections. Sean Sherwin, the only one of Aontacht Eireann's thirteen candidates who won a high enough vote to avoid forfeiting his deposit, nevertheless lost his seat. The likelihood that Fianna Fail will take a more militant-sounding position on national issues made the splinter party's chances seem even dimmer, as its founder, Kevin Boland, admitted, according to the March 5 *Irish Times*:

"No doubt, Fianna Fail, which he [Boland] was sure had decided to accept the White Paper, would now watch the Coalition accept it and revert to their old republican stance by objecting to it from the Opposition side of the House."

Boland's party, in which ex-government officials and party leaders figure prominently, did not even do as well as the reputedly "Marxist" Official Sinn Fein, which got about 15,000 first-preference votes. It was not clear, however, whether the relatively good showing of the Officials as a minority party fulfilled Janssen's prediction in the February 27 *Wall Street Journal*:

"The Sinn Fein Party she [Grehan] represents is accorded little chance of electing candidates, but any significant support for Sinn Fein would indicate sympathy for the outlawed Irish Republican Army, with which it has close links.

In fact, it was by no means clear whether the Sinn Fein vote indicated support for militant struggle against imperialism. National demands were not emphasized in the Official republican campaign, which followed basically left-reformist economist lines, under the slogan "People Before Profit."

The Sinn Fein platform contained a number of proposals, such as nationalization of natural resources, nationalization of the banks and financial institutions, price control, etc., that would be included in any revolutionary-socialist program, but are not by themselves socialist demands. Such measures have been carried out by a number of neocolonialist regimes without changing the nature of the system.

Other planks, such as "redistribution of wealth" and "elimination of poverty" were vague. One demand, "A cheap-money policy for Agriculture, Industry, Housing, and other productive purposes," seemed implicitly to recognize the capitalist system.

No political demands were raised to challenge the basic organization of the economy and society and point the way toward more democratic forms. No internationalist perspectives were offered that could give the Irish people any feeling of having allies in their fight against British imperialism.

Since the Irish economy is marginal

to the big capitalist centers, the only solid asset the Irish workers have is the potential of their country and its strategic position. The Irish people are only too well aware of the Dublin government's real economic weakness in facing the imperialist giants. So, simply calling on the "State" to nationalize the resources of the country without pointing to what a really independent and united Ireland could achieve and what world forces it could base itself on does not offer inspiring prospects.

In an era of accelerated growth of technology and capital concentration, moreover, the notion that using "the capital at present exported" could develop the Irish economy can be easily dismissed by government economic experts as an expression of the old, naive populism of the republican movement.

It is clear that as a militant nationalist organization the republicans felt that they had to wage a largely defensive campaign, in view of the fears aroused by the long and seemingly fruitless conflict in the North and, in particular, by the Provisional bombing campaign. They thought they had to show that they were not "kamikaze nationalists" bent on salvaging the national dream at the cost of the lives and welfare of the people. They had to show that they had a concrete program answering to the needs of the majority of the Irish people, and not just romantic ideals or abstract formulas.

From the defensive standpoint, the Official campaign was successful. They made it much more difficult for the government to repress them. They made progress in getting across the image of fighters for social justice and a better life for the Irish people. In contrast, the Provisionals' call for a boycott (there was a record vote) further isolated them and further exposed them to repression.

Moreover, the young and politically inexperienced members of Official Sinn Fein got precious experience in trying to take a radical political program to the masses of the Irish people. The organization will have an opportunity to put this to good use in the May 30 local elections in the North. Although there also the campaign will probably have to be mainly defensive, the radicalization is much deeper and more political than in the South. In particular the Officials will have to put forward a clear revolutionary perspective to differentiate themselves from NICRA (Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, in which they are the major component), which adopted an antirevolutionary and antinational program in its February 17-18 Annual General Meeting.

Militant nationalists or republicans constitute a vital minority of the Catholic population for any organization that claims to be revolutionary. If the Officials became identified with the NICRA resolution calling on the British govern-

ment to establish "an impartial civilian police force" and for "handing in of all illegally held guns . . . and the calling in of licensed weapons," even as an immediate program, they would find themselves cut off in a relatively short time from republicanism.

In general, the Official campaign resembled the 1969 People's Democracy campaign in the North that led to the election of Bernadette Devlin. It did not make the same impact because of the lack of a popular upsurge in the South, but it had the same look of vague, idealistic radicalism, reflecting growing feelings of deep discontent, especially among youth.

No more than PD have the republicans found the way to give a concrete revolutionary perspective to the masses of the Irish people. Furthermore, they have tendencies within their organization that could divert and destroy it—dogmatic workerism derived from the British sects and dogmatic populism derived from Stalinism through dilettantish university radicals and the traditions of the old republican left.

Whether the organization will advance depends on the emergence of a leadership breaking decisively with both reformism and ultraleftism, a development that no one can predict with assurance. It can, however, be safely predicted that an organization based on a debilitating mixture of these two forms of objectively opportunistic politics cannot survive.

In particular, the republican leadership must face the fact that they cannot continue to drift, relying on education and evolution to carry them forward. As long as they continue without a clear revolutionary orientation, they will also be miseducating their ranks, and miseducation is a hard thing to undo.

In particular, it is dangerous to lose sight of the connection between the various phases of the struggle. It was undoubtedly the easier course to avoid posing the national question sharply in the February elections. But this question is bound to reassert itself even more acutely in the period ahead, and the campaign did nothing to prepare for this.

Although the Coalition may, because of its heterogeneous character, prove less able than Fianna Fail to carry out a repressive policy, it is better equipped to set about dismantling the national traditions of the country. This point was made very clearly in the debate over the new anti-IRA law at the end of November, in which Labour stressed its "internationalist" and "peaceful" history, while Fine Gael attacked Lynch's party as the seed of former "gunmen." With the international recession coming to an end, the Coalition can be expected to set about liquidating the national heritage in the midst of heady talk about social welfare reform and new prosperity.

The Officials' campaign did not clearly distinguish them from some proimperialist Labourites who argue that a whole series of economic and social reforms must be carried out in the South before there can be any talk of uniting the country. Moreover, the Officials did not prepare their

supporters for a situation where Fianna Fail in opposition may try to regain some of its national credentials. In this event it would be even easier for conservatives to brand them as having "some foreign objective" and not being really interested in Irish freedom. □

Crisis for Turkey's Martial Law Regime

Parliament Balks at Generals' Candidate

An open conflict between Turkey's military chieftains and the leading political parties was sparked when the Grand National Assembly refused on March 13 to endorse the military-backed candidate for president, General Faruk Gurler. The seven-year term of President Cevdet Sunay ends on March 28 and the parliament must elect a successor.

On the first ballot Gurler, who had resigned one week previously as chief of staff of the armed forces in order to seek the presidency, got only 175 votes. President of the Senate Tekin Ariburun, a former air force commander backed by the leaders of the conservative Justice party, won 282 votes. Another 45 votes were cast for Feruk Bozbeyli, the candidate of the right-wing Democratic party. The 115 representatives belonging to the Republican People's party (RPP) abstained, preventing anyone from obtaining a majority.

After two more ballots failed to significantly improve Gurler's standing, 100 senior military observers stalked angrily out of the meeting. The next day the politicians decided on a postponement of further votes to allow for negotiations between the parties and the brass.

The armed forces have ruled Turkey behind a parliamentary facade since March 12, 1971, when they forced Premier Suleyman Demirel to resign and imposed martial law on Turkey's most populous provinces. At that time, all of the major parties supported the military's repressive moves.

Since then, more than 4,000 persons have been arrested for opposing the regime or its policies. The regime's use of torture against political prisoners has become an international issue (see *Intercontinental Press*, January 22, p. 42).

The standard of living of the masses has declined steadily since the military crackdown. Prices rose 20% in 1971 and 18 % in 1972, while real industrial wages declined by 6% and 5.9%, respectively, in those years.

As has become customary for military dictatorships in recent years, the Turkish generals promised that their regime would bring sweeping reforms. It has proposed modest tax and land-reform measures, but has allowed them to become deadlocked in a conservative parliament.

The regime's attempt to demoralize the masses by brutal repression, in contrast to the similar program applied for several years in neighboring Greece, has not been entirely successful. Although struggles are at a less intense level than in 1971, unrest has continued among workers, peasants, and students.

Under these conditions, the mildly reformist RPP reversed itself and came out in opposition to the continuation

of martial law. RPP leader Bulent Ecevit began to challenge the regime's use of torture. Many of the RPP's parliamentarians voted against constitutional amendments passed in February that established special military-civilian courts to judge "crimes against national unity" and allowed military courts to continue the current mass trials of civilians even after martial law ends.

Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the Justice party, is also interested in reducing the power of the generals, since he fears they will bar him from again becoming prime minister if his party wins the parliamentary elections scheduled for September. In addition, the Justice party, despite its right-wing policies, was by no means willing to let the RPP monopolize the electoral benefits of an antimilitary stance.

Jubilant in the wake of the inconclusive voting, Ecevit offered to negotiate with Justice party leaders for a common presidential candidate and publicly declared: "Parliament has asserted itself in favor of democracy, and the solution of the presidential problem is in the hands of political parties."

It is far from certain, however, that the generals will let the impasse be broken by a parliamentary headcount. The censors barred the press from printing Ecevit's statement. Outgoing President Sunay, who is also a former chief of staff of the armed forces, appealed to the Grand National Assembly on March 14 to accept Gurler or find another candidate acceptable to the military rulers. □

Harding to Tour for USLA

Mary Harding, the former Maryknoll nun imprisoned in Bolivia for alleged membership in a subversive organization and released January 13 owing to a successful campaign of international protest, will begin a speaking tour of the United States April 11 on behalf of the 1,000 or more political prisoners held by the Banzer regime. During the tour, sponsored by the U. S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA), she will speak to meetings in New York City, Denver, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Cleveland, and other cities.

Harding had lived and worked in Bo-

livia for fourteen years when she was arrested in La Paz last December 5. She was charged with membership in the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army). While living in La Paz, she attempted to reactivate the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, but police harassment prevented this.

During her six-week incarceration, Harding was subjected to physical and psychological torture. International protests and widespread coverage of her case in the news media forced the Banzer regime to release her. She was immediately deported to the United States. □

The Struggle Against Portuguese Colonialism

[The Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Liberation Movement of Angola) was founded in 1956. In 1961 it opened an armed-struggle front in the Luanda region in the northwest of the country. In 1964 it opened up a front in Cabinda Province in the far north. Since 1966, it has also conducted guerrilla operations in the southeast. The MPLA now controls wide sections of the Portuguese colony.]

[The following interview with Antonio Neto, representative of the MPLA in Sweden, appeared in the January 31 issue of *La Brèche*, semimonthly organ of the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Marxist League), the Swiss Trotskyist organization. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. Could you explain the various problems confronting the Angolan movement?

Answer. In the course of our armed liberation struggle we have created a liberated state with an area of about half a million square kilometers, more than a third of the total national territory.

In these liberated areas, we must first of all create cooperative structures and people's stores, ensure the production of basic agricultural goods, and provide for their distribution. For us, the problem of production is not a simple one. The peasants expressed some resistance when they were urged to organize themselves into cooperatives. Furthermore, on May 1, 1970, the Portuguese government launched chemical warfare against us (the second use of this tactic after Vietnam) and naturally this made for some serious problems in reorganizing the system of production and in supplying the population with food.

How did we deal with these problems? By unifying them, by breaking down the old system of individual production and intensifying efforts to-



MPLA FIGHTER

ward cooperation. We did it by preventing exploitation of man by man in the liberated zones; we made this a basic principle of our struggle, a goal to reach by any means necessary. There's no doubt that from the viewpoint of armed struggle our experience is of a special type—it's not just a military and political struggle, but an economic and educational one as well.

Q. Could you explain exactly what this means?

A. Certainly. In the liberated areas we have tried to set up small factories that would not only allow for the partial transformation of the system of production, but would also represent a new experience for the people: the transformation of small farmers into workers. These people must become conscious of the problems of the industrial proletariat, even when the slogan of the day is still "land to those who till it" and other slogans against exploitation of man by man. Liberation evolves in such a way that we must pose questions in a long-term sense.

In this sense a tendency must preach the necessity of a long transitional period after political liberation. It is

the petty bourgeoisie in particular that envisages the creation of new state structures lasting for the longest time possible—structures that would allow the growth of the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie and which would thus prevent the proletariat from claiming power.

On the other hand, the left, the MPLA, insists on speeding up the armed liberation struggle and on building within it structures that prevent the petty bourgeoisie from emerging out of such a process. Finally, there is the problem of breaking with the imperialist economic system; and this is not possible without building the necessary instrument—the party.

Q. What will be the dynamic of this twofold military and political struggle?

A. The political struggle is not posed in terms of months or years. Political settling of accounts necessarily lasts for a rather long period. Our twelve years of military and political struggle have taught us this. As I said, building a party is a basic task. This project is now being discussed, and the MPLA Congress will have to make a clear decision on it.

Besides the party, we need a well-defined structure, the people's army, a military vanguard that must be tightly linked to the party and must be under the party's control. In the military struggle, it is not so much a matter of developing a war with "fronts," but rather a war of liberation generalized over the whole country.

I should also say that even on the military level, the reformist perspective rejects the concept of class struggle (the creation of political structures and a party) and seeks instead to set up a liberation army able to play the same role as the Algerian Liberation Army, for example. Naturally, we must fight against this perspective at the Congress.

Q. But don't you think it would be a contradiction for the movement it-

self to decide on forming a party? Doesn't this run the risk of amounting to a simple change of names and of creating a party that calls itself revolutionary but that in fact still includes all the present components of the movement?

A. I think that the dynamic of the struggle itself will exclude all those who are for a solution that is in the final analysis a neocolonial one. It must be realized that if the reformist plan is adopted by the Congress, that would represent a serious defeat for the MPLA left, for the revolutionaries.

This is directly tied to the conception one has of the army. We say No to the frontier army and we insist on the generalization of the armed struggle throughout the country, and thus on the formation of large combat units; we insist on the acceleration of the process of socialized production in the liberated zones. The reformist plan does not foresee mobility of the armed groups within the social bodies; on the one hand it foresees the occupation of the Portuguese barracks, and on the other hand it views the army as uninvolved in building up the country.

The army would thus be cut off from the masses, and power would be concentrated in the hands of the reformists. We must avoid that. It is exactly on this point that the debate between the two tendencies will revolve, and the debate will be decisive for creating the party. But also, the danger of a mere change of names that wouldn't basically change anything, as you brought up, does exist.

Q. Earlier you stressed the necessity of the future free Angola being released from imperialist control. Could you explain this more exactly?

A. We start from the fact that the MPLA in Angola, the FRELIMO [Frente de Libertação de Mocambique — National Liberation Front of Mozambique], and the PAIGC [Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde—African party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands] have been linked since the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies in 1962.

In fact, we very quickly understood the necessity of creating solid unity

in action for the struggle against Portuguese colonialism. We were faced with a colonialism that refused to set up a decolonization program (launched by other metropolises like France, Great Britain, and Italy), and we therefore had to initiate a protracted and international armed struggle.

Furthermore, we believe that the struggle against Portuguese imperialism is not only the task of our three countries, but more generally is the task of the international anticolonial movement. Other sectors of international colonialism act in collusion with Portuguese imperialism in the framework of their projects aimed at all southern Africa.

Q. Returning to the general problem of anti-imperialism, how does the anti-imperialist struggle in the Portuguese colonies fit into the framework of the African continent, which as a whole is still subjected to imperialist exploitation?

A. As a whole, Africa has not yet taken part in the world revolutionary upsurge. There are countries that are independent in name, but not in fact, neither politically nor economically; imperialism has found other ways of maintaining its domination.

The problem of overthrowing capitalism is posed: In a whole series of countries, the imperialists remain allied to the puppet cliques in power, and struggle against imperialism means struggle against these cliques. In an initial phase, that will be the task of the revolutionary groups, and later of real organizations that will have the historic task of waging the struggle in terms much more clear than the organizations that led the struggle for independence at one time.

Especially in southern Africa we envisage unifying the revolutionary forces of the region, but this can only happen through an intense political debate, through characterizing in the course of this debate the various internal components of the struggle organizations, and through defeating the reformist forces that put the brakes on the revolutionary process.

Q. But do you think that it would be purely a matter of a division between revolutionaries on one side and reformists on the other?

A. Naturally, no. There is also the problem of Stalinism. This is a discussion that is going on in the international workers' movement. Today this movement is in a crisis that reflects itself not only in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the crisis in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, but also in the question of peaceful coexistence and its various forms. Then there is the drama of Bangladesh, the problem of Palestine; that is, the question of a certain *modus vivendi* that has been reached between certain workers' leaderships and American imperialism (look at Nixon's Peking and Moscow trips).

Faced with this, we think that the MPLA must remain independent of these leaderships. When the revolutionary party is formed, it must also stay independent. This does not mean having a nationalist outlook. On the contrary, we have an internationalist outlook, and we think that by opening a front in Angola, by working with the PAIGC and FRELIMO, by linking up with comrades who are waging a struggle in Portugal itself, we are also linking up with the revolutionary struggle of the Indochinese peoples.

And we are also counting on international support, not only from the revolutionary organizations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, but also from the working class of the capitalist countries, which today understands the necessity of raising its own struggle to a higher level by becoming conscious of the fact that reformism absolutely cannot offer the workers a better future.

For our part, we lend our complete support to the organizations that are waging the battle for socialism on the field of class struggle. □

True Believer

The official Libyan press agency reported February 17 that Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi has issued orders that bar Libyans from displaying portraits of leaders. So strictly enforced is this injunction that Qaddafi barred the construction of a statue of his hero, the late Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Qaddafi told the Arab Socialist Union, Libya's only legal party, that the purpose of the regulation is to prevent persons from putting up portraits of "atheists like Marx and Lenin."

U.S. Faces an 'Energy Crisis'

By Terry Quilico

The United States experienced a severe shortage of fuel this winter. According to the January 26 *Christian Science Monitor*, "Fuel shortages are threatening the nation's air, rail and water carriers. Railroads are facing delivery reductions up to 25 percent; some airlines are being forced to take fuel conservation measures short of canceling flights; barge and towing companies are curtailing some services because of the shortage."

Most of the difficulties stem from the scarcity of Number 2 fuel oil (used in diesel engines and heating units) and a lack of natural and propane gas.

Although the "energy crisis" is nationwide, the most dramatic effects have been seen in the Midwest.

- Bus service at night and on Sundays to 33 suburban areas of Chicago has been curtailed owing to a 25 percent reduction in the fuel allotment of a major bus company.

- Some railroad trains are traveling 10 to 15 miles per hour slower to conserve fuel.

- As of February 6, more than 13,000 workers in Illinois have been affected by layoffs and work cutbacks attributed to the "energy crisis."

- Since the diesel tractor is the workhorse of trucking, the shortage of diesel fuel has caused serious problems for the trucking industry. If trucks are not adequately fueled, deliveries of goods to markets and raw materials to industries is delayed. Because of this threat, a lucrative black market in fuel has opened up in the Midwest, charging truckers two or three times the usual price.

- Thousands of tons of grain are rotting in grain elevators due to scarcity of the gas used in drying it.

- The Midwest's corn, soybean, and sorghum crops are threatened by the shortages. Wet winter weather delayed the harvest, and the scarcity of gas and oil makes it impossible to dry out the harvested crops.

This winter's shortages were deliberately created by the major oil and

gas companies. They are using the "crisis" to whip up public support for big price increases, government incentives for expanding production, and watered-down antipollution regulations.

These corporations have been pouring out propaganda about an impending "energy crisis" since 1968, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Federal Power Commission's refusal to approve a big price increase demanded by the petroleum industry.

In the June 26, 1972, issue of the liberal New York weekly *The Nation*, Robert Sherrill wrote, "Beginning in 1968, and for the first time in history, the industry claimed that it found less gas than it sold. It has been claiming the same thing for every year since. The basis for these claims is in industry's file cabinets, secret, not available to Congress or to the public. You just have to take the industry's word for it."

Despite assertions that the United States is quickly "running out" of fuel, 55 percent of the nation's discoverable oil, and 66 percent of its discoverable natural gas are still in the ground.

In a 1971 advertisement in *Life* magazine, the American Gas Association (AGA) admitted the goal of the industry's high-powered publicity campaign: "There's no worry that your home will run short of gas," the AGA assured readers. "It will take higher prices to keep the gas coming."

Last summer, U.S. oil companies delayed the seasonal shift to production of distillate fuels (such as Number 2 oil) until it was too late to meet demands for home heating oil. The demand for heating oil cut into reserves of diesel fuel and the long-heralded "energy crisis" resulted.

Derrell Trent of the U.S. Office of Emergency Preparedness complained about the industry's actions in testimony before the Senate Interior Committee:

"As late as September, government

assessments showed that U.S. refineries could provide adequate distillates for the coming heating season. Actually, heating oil inventories have been lagging since last March, but the refineries were turning out gasoline instead, since the administration's Phase 2 price ceilings on gasoline were more profitable than heating oil prices."

The oil industry has responded to the shortages by heating up its scare campaign. The January 22 *Chicago Sun-Times* quoted Milton Lambert, president of the nation's fourth largest distributor of Texaco products, as saying, "We're facing an economic catastrophe. This thing is going to affect everybody. When stores start running out of milk, meat and food, then people will know its for real."

The capitalist press has given an added boost to the industry's claims. The January 22, 1973, issue of *Newsweek* stated that "the solutions to that problem [the energy shortage] may well strike at the very heart of the American life-style. Consumers inescapably will see their bills for electricity, heating and gasoline raised ever higher—and they could conceivably find these necessities being rationed. There will almost inevitably be more blackouts and brownouts. The environmental issue is certain to be exacerbated as the oil companies fight for more drilling rights and electric utilities for more generating sites."

The Nixon administration is taking steps to meet the demands of the fuel monopolies. A relaxation of price controls has already resulted in sharp increases in heating oil prices.

On January 17, Nixon lifted all import barriers on Number 2 fuel oil for the remainder of the winter. At the same time, he authorized a 65 percent increase in this year's quota of crude petroleum piped into the Midwest from Canada or shipped to the east coast from other countries.

The environment appears certain to be another victim of the artificial fuel shortage. New York City has softened restrictions on the use of low-quality fuels containing sulfur—a big contributor to air pollution. Illinois is under pressure from the Coal Operators Association to take a similar step.

The oil industry is pressing for greater freedom to drill for oil on the continental shelf—despite the dan-

ger of oil spills that pollute the oceans. The January 27 *Christian Science Monitor* quoted one oil executive: "The fuel crunch is on—and environmental considerations are going to have to rate lower priority."

Although the current fuel scarcity is a product of the manipulation of oil supplies by the petroleum corporations, the industry's drive to raise prices reflects a real long-term "energy crisis" faced by U. S. imperialism. The United States is becoming increasingly dependent on oil from the Middle East as a raw material for industry as well as a source of superprofits.

This has encouraged Middle Eastern rulers—including even U. S. clients like the shah of Iran—to drive a hard-

er bargain with the oil monopolies. The deals that have resulted are exerting negative pressure on oil profits and on the U. S. balance of payments. It is expected, for example, that Saudi Arabia will have accumulated \$30 thousand million in gold and currency reserves at the end of the '70s. (See *Intercontinental Press*, October 23, 1972, p. 1136.)

The oil billionaires—backed by the U. S. government—hope to assure a steady flow of oil for U. S. industry and reduce the flow of dollars abroad by increasing imports from other sources and developing previously untapped reserves in the United States. Consumers are expected to foot the bill for these adjustments in the form of sharp price increases. □

Bureaucrats Forced to Act by Militant Ranks

British Trade Unions Call General Strike

London

Mar. 6—The Trades Union Congress, Britain's 10-million-strong trade-union federation, called March 5 for a one-day national strike to protest the wage-freeze policies of Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath. The decision, taken at a special recall congress of the TUC, came in the midst of an unprecedented wave of strikes by railway workers, teachers, gas workers, hospital workers, and government employees.

The scale of the union revolt is causing extreme anxiety to the government's supporters. The London *Sunday Times* of February 18 wrote with horror: "No one can be quite sure where the next shutdown will be; which weak point in the system will suddenly explode; or, indeed, whether the entire system may not accidentally blow up."

The present wave of strikes is caused by the government's refusal to allow workers' wages to keep pace with the runaway inflation, worse in Britain than in any other Western European country. Edward Heath's wage control policies are patterned after those Nixon imposed on American workers in 1971. Under Heath's Phase 2, which is about to begin, only minimal wage increases will be allowed,

but prices will remain largely unchecked. Food prices and rents, exempted from government control, and prices of other major items in the consumer's budget, will continue to soar.

The government's policies have prompted strike action by thousands of workers who have never gone on strike before. On February 27 more than 250,000 government workers held the first strike in the history of their union, the Civil and Public Servants Association. The following day, 30,000 train drivers paralysed the railways. And the day after that, 220,000 hospital workers walked out. A national gas strike, now in its second week, has cut off gas supplies to 2,600 industrial and commercial companies and to more than 4 million homes. On February 27 some 5,000 striking London teachers marched through central London against the freezing of their wages.

The bureaucratic leaders of the TUC have been compelled, much against their will, to unite the entire trade-union movement to take action against the wage-control policy. The one-day general strike will be the first held since the famous general strike of 1926.

It has been intense pressure from

the rank and file that has forced the union bureaucrats to act. The TUC leaders were originally determined to prevent a general strike. The London *Times* reported on February 27, a few days before the TUC recall congress, on the thinking of the TUC Finances and General Purposes Committee, the TUC's inner cabinet: "TUC leaders yesterday decided against an all-out confrontation with the Government over Phase Two wage restraint. . . . The idea of a general strike was raised at yesterday's finance and general purposes committee meeting, but it was not seriously considered as a course of action." And the writer noted: "It [the TUC document on anti-inflation measures] is plainly a far cry from the call for a general strike being mounted by militants in industry."

At the congress the TUC leaders attempted to rule any call for a general strike out of order; but they had clearly misjudged the mood of the unions. Joe Gormley, the president of the National Union of Mineworkers, successfully proposed that this procedure be voted down, and a motion calling for a one-day general strike was proposed by the transport and engineering workers' unions. The motion was carried overwhelmingly. Even Victor Feather, the general sec-



EDWARD HEATH

retary of the TUC, who had earlier argued against even allowing the motion to be put to the congress, was forced to eat his words and vote in favor of the one-day strike.

The date of the one-day general strike is expected to be announced

in the next few days. In the meantime the strikes by gas workers, teachers, and others continue to remind the Heath government that his wage-control policies are producing an unprecedented militancy in the union ranks. □

Thousands Join Protests in Britain

Students Demand Rise in Government Aid

London

Thousands of students joined marches and rallies in ten British cities on February 21 in support of a day of action called by the 500,000-member National Union of Students (NUS). The day of protest marked the high point thus far of mounting action against the present system of grants to students.

The grants campaign was launched by the semiannual NUS conference in November, when delegates overwhelmingly decided to withhold rents for residence halls and to selectively boycott school-run canteen facilities. Some forty-four colleges are now on rent strike and many are carrying out effective cafeteria boycotts. Students at some colleges have carried out occupations as well as local student rallies and demonstrations.

The student action is a response to the deterioration of the real value of grants through inflation and to government cutbacks in higher education in recent years.

The NUS grants campaign has four main demands: an immediate increase in the level of all student grants and an annual, instead of triennial, review; an end to discretionary awards; abolition of the means test; and an end to discrimination against married women students.

The British student grant is more than 25% lower today, in real terms, than in 1962. In order to compensate for inflationary losses since 1962, an immediate increment of more than £100 would be required. NUS has put in a claim to the Department of Education and Science for an increase from £445 a year to £510. But inflation this year already means that for the academic year beginning in September 1973 grants in the region

of £550 are needed to restore the 1962 standard.

Discretionary awards allow local education authorities arbitrarily to deny, or limit, grants to some students (or potential students). In accordance with this system, an estimated 20,000 students, mainly in Further Education, have begun school terms during which they are expected to eat substantially less, need fewer clothes and books, and pay less rent than other students.

The means test cuts students' grants according to their parents' income. The government assumes that students are dependent on their parents and that parents will make up the differ-

ence, although the parents often cannot, or will not, pay.

In addition to this, students must be male or unmarried to be eligible for a full grant. Married women students have had no increase since 1965 and their maximum grant is £275 a year.

The critical nature of the grants crisis for students was evidenced by the militant support the campaign has gained in local colleges throughout the country and by the numbers participating in the day of action. Spirited demonstrations converged on the main student building in central London and moved off to the Department of Education and Science, where a rally was held nearby on the south bank of the Thames. The rally was addressed by Inner London Teachers' Association President Ian Gunn and by several student militants and members of the NUS executive, including Digby Jacks, NUS president and a member of the Communist party.

The NUS figures for the demonstrations throughout the country were the following: London 15,000; Cardiff 5,000; Edinburgh 500; Exeter 1,500; Bristol 5,000; Birmingham 10,000; Manchester 10,000; Newcastle upon Tyne 5,000; Sheffield 6,000.

Taiwan

Chiang Arrests Ten at Universities

Officials of Chiang Kai-Shek's regime in Taiwan claim that two professors, Chen Ku-ying and Wang Shao-po, and eight students were arrested in February and charged with forming a secret organization "sympathetic to the Chinese Communists," a March 15 dispatch from Taipei to the *New York Times* reported.

Those arrested were from Cheng Kung Provincial University in Tainan and National Taiwan University in Taipei. The two faculty members are known to be critics of the regime's social welfare policies.

The *Times* reported, "A friend from another university protested their detention by slashing his neck in public and writing messages with his blood until he lost con-

sciousness and was taken to a hospital."

According to the dispatch, an official of the ruling Kuomintang said that "the secret organizations were 'reading clubs' with sizable collections of Communist books, mostly works by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, in English and Chinese. He said that there was evidence that the members planned to expand their groups and their influence."

They reportedly were treated with courtesy. "In view of their youth, their admission that they had done wrong and their willingness to make amends, it was decided not to prosecute them," the official revealed. Chen Ku-ying and Wang Shao-po were released after twenty-four hours' detention. The eight students were freed several days later. □

A Big Business the Regime Tolerates

"A little boy goes out into the street to play in the evening. He is about to join his mates in a roadside park or vacant lot when a man with a smiling face accosts him. The man is friendliness itself and his hands are full of sweets. The boy readily takes a sweet or two.

"A moment later the world goes dark for the boy. And the man takes him into his 'protective' hands. One more Sri Lankan boy has been kidnapped."

So begins a grim report in the March 5 issue of the Hong Kong weekly *Far Eastern Economic Review* describing the wave of kidnappings that sweeps Sri Lanka every year during the fishing season.

The identity of the kidnappers is no mystery. The abductions are organized by agents hired by the big *mudalalis* (*mudalali* is the Sinhalese term for capitalist), who run the fishing villages on about sixty small islands of the northern, northwestern, and northeastern coasts of Ceylon.

"The *mudalalis*," the *Far Eastern Economic Review* notes, "need labourers who must toil under trying conditions: scorching heat, rigorous battle with the sea, work round the clock. The *wadiyas* [fishing villages] are regular slave camps, with no creature comforts and no entertainment. Only the tough survive. The children kidnapped every year are meant for these slave markets. . . ."

"The labourers are fed on subsistence diet of fish and rice and brackish water. There are no medical facilities and those who fall by the wayside just die. But the fish fetches a good price. Little wonder that 'talent scouts' tour the country."

Not all the youths working in the *wadiyas* were kidnapped, although most were. Some are sold to the *mudalalis*' agents (at prices ranging from US\$1 to \$7) by impoverished parents.

For almost two years, the Bandaranaike regime showed little interest in the kidnappings. Cops restricted themselves to issuing routine warnings to parents to keep a close watch on their children.

This peaceful coexistence was temporarily disrupted a few months ago

when some overzealous "talent scouts" overstepped the bounds of etiquette by kidnapping the son of a police sergeant.

Outraged, the regime ordered its navy, air force, and police into operation. A 300-strong force commanded by Deputy Defence Minister Lakshman Jayakoddy raided thirteen of the islands and "liberated" hundreds of en-

Demand to Know Fate of Abbas Sheibani

Shah Gives Lawyer Royal Runaround

Françoise Rozelaar-Vigier, a prominent French attorney, was commissioned in 1972 by the International Secretariat of Catholic Jurists and the International Association of Democratic Jurists to go to Iran to observe the trial of Mohammad Mofidi, a student, and Dr. Abbas Sheibani, a leader of the National Liberation Front of Iran.

Mofidi was accused of assassinating Police General Saeed Taheri on August 13, 1972. Sheibani was charged with complicity in the assassination.

Rozelaar-Vigier has described her experiences in a statement being distributed by the Iranian Students Association.

After arriving in Teheran on December 7, she met with Dr. Ameli, a former minister of justice, whom the shah has appointed secretary of the "Iranian League of Human Rights." Ameli informed her that she could not visit any of the prisoners as their trials were still being prepared.

"I then met, twice, the Prime Minister, Mr. Hoveida," Rozelaar-Vigier reported, "who told me that the Iranian Government did not recognize the organizations I represented (even though they are recognized by the United Nations) but that I would be allowed, as a private person, to attend any trial of my choice, and would then [enjoy the] benefit of the assistance of an interpreter. Mr. Hoveida

slaved children, many of them under twelve years of age.

But for many Ceylonese, life on the mainland is hardly preferable to slave labor in the fishing villages. Most of the children, according to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*'s report, elected to return to the *wadiyas*, "where, they said, they could do better than in their own homes."

Bandaranaike's "United Front" regime, which claims to be building socialism at an ever so gradual pace, has not yet gotten around to jailing the big *mudalalis*, who perhaps qualify as a progressive sector of the national bourgeoisie. □

also told me that all important trials were announced fifteen days in advance by the press, and that I would be personally informed of those to come. To his knowledge, however, no trial was imminent, and Dr. Ameli confirmed this information."

Having received these assurances, Rozelaar-Vigier returned to Paris on December 16. Shortly thereafter, she was shocked to hear that the trial was, in fact, imminent, if not actually under way. Later she learned that death sentences had already been imposed. She tried for two days without success to speak to the Iranian ambassador.

"I was also told," Rozelaar-Vigier wrote, "that Mofidi underwent torture and had both his legs broken. Is that the reason why he was judged secretly . . . ?"

Mofidi was executed on January 11 (see *Intercontinental Press*, January 29, 1973, p. 89). Sheibani's fate has not been made known and Iranian students in the United States have demanded that the shah break his silence about this.

Rozelaar-Vigier expressed fear about the fate in store for 3,000 other political prisoners awaiting trial in Iran: "Most will be condemned to many years in jail, if not death. Since March 1971, sixty-eight accused have been officially condemned to death and executed, that is, one every ten days." □

Caracas Rally Backs Socialist Candidate

Caracas

An overflow crowd of more than 1,000 people packed the Bolivar Theater here March 2 during an election campaign rally for José Vicente Rangel, the independent Marxist candidate of the MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo—Movement Toward Socialism) in next December's presidential elections. The meeting was organized by the Frente Socialista de Unidad Proletaria (Socialist Front of Proletarian Unity). This is an alliance, consolidated last February, between the Comités de Independientes Por El Socialismo (CIPES—Committees of Independents for Socialism), which includes many young people who participated in the guerrilla struggles during the sixties, and the Grupo Trotskista Venezolano (GTV—Venezuelan Trotskyist Group).

The Socialist Front is giving critical support to the candidacy of José Vicente Rangel along the lines of the document outlining the position of the Trotskyists on the national elections that was published in the August-September 1972 issue of the GTV's monthly, *Voz Marxista* (see *Intercontinental Press*, September 25, 1972, p. 1011).

The front of the hall was draped with a large red flag of the Fourth International and with banners calling for "Proletarian Unity Around the Candidacy of José Vicente," "For a Socialist America," and "Workers of the World, Unite!" Other banners in the theater demanded freedom for all political prisoners, opposed repression, and expressed solidarity with particular struggles of the Venezuelan working class.

A leaflet put out to help build the meeting explained that the poverty and exploitation of the Venezuelan workers cannot be blamed on any one government but rather are endemic to an underdeveloped country with a capitalist mode of production. "There is no other way to end this situation," it continued, "than to organize the struggle for socialism. To achieve socialism, it is necessary to overthrow the capitalist state and build a new state of the workers. This

goal will not be attained easily. We must not lose sight of the fact that the time will come when there will have to be a decisive showdown with the repressive forces of the rich."

After explaining the need to take advantage of the election campaign to present a working-class alternative, the leaflet concluded: "We call on all conscious workers to struggle in their

factories to build a revolutionary workers' party. Such a party will arise only as a product of dealing with the concrete conflicts of each factory with the bosses. In this way the groundwork will be laid for the socialist revolution."

The main speakers at the rally were Astrid Fischer for the CIPES, Alfonso Ramirez for *Voz Marxista*, and José Vicente Rangel. All three were interrupted at various times by the applause of the enthusiastic audience. Representatives of other organizations were given an opportunity to bring greetings. □

Student Strikes Severely Repressed

Iranian Students Reported Killed by Police

At least four students were killed at the University of Tabriz in Iran following a "pitched battle" with police, reported Djavad Alamir in the March 8 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*. Some sources put at six the number of students killed in the fierce police repression of student protests, which have been going on for several weeks throughout the country.

"The present unrest appears to have its roots in student discontent over the regime's domestic and foreign policy (a break with the ulemas [Islamic functionaries], repression, oil policy, and finally, the recent purchase of \$2 thousand million worth of air war goods from the United States)," Alamir wrote.

"It goes back to around February 20, when the technical school of the University of Teheran went on strike. 'Specialized' police commandos reportedly repressed the strikers and arrested the leaders. Several schools were for all practical purposes closed as a result of the refusal of the students to attend class."

At the end of February, the Djondi-Chahpour school in Khuzistan also went on strike. It is rumored in Teheran that police killed one student.

Then, on March 1, the student strike spread to Melli University in Teheran, where the students were demanding abolition of the competitive entry examinations to the university. "Signs appeared with antigovernment slo-

gans and commandos are said to have invaded the academic precincts and expelled the students," reported Alamir. "It is at this point that students in Tabriz, the capital of the northern province of Azerbaidzhan, refused to attend class, just a few days after the announcement of Iran's massive arms purchase.

"In view of their refusal to leave the premises, the police are said to have charged the students. The latter, however, put up a ferocious resistance to the police assaults. They also took the university rector hostage." It was in the ensuing clashes that the students were killed.

According to Alamir, the police repression in Tabriz sparked strikes at the polytechnic and medical schools at Arya-Mehr University, where a large number of students were arrested.

Iranian authorities deny that any students have been killed. According to a report in the March 10 *Le Monde*, they claim that only "identity checks" were carried out in certain schools. □

Literacy Test

"We selected these two men because Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Holdridge not only are experts in Chinese, they are bilingual, incidentally, in both Chinese and American; speak it well."—Richard Nixon explaining his appointment of two officials to serve in the new U.S. liaison office in Peking.

Ligue Communiste's Position on Second-Round Elections in France

[The following statement was released on March 5 by the Central Committee of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International. It was printed in the March 9 issue of the Ligue's newspaper, *Rouge*.

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

From this point on, the URP [Union des Républicains de Progrès—Union of Republicans for Progress] "majority," bankrupt, splattered with scandal, judged and condemned by the workers, is a minority in the country—able to draw only 35 percent of the votes cast.

The slickness of electoral gerrymandering, rigged to aid the URP, and support from the reformers may allow the Gaullists to maintain a slim majority in parliament.

If that is the case, then after the second-round vote is in, the Pompidou government, already battered and confronted both with a working class enriched by the May 1968 experience (one that more and more feels its own strength) and with growing social problems, will be nothing but a caretaker regime, constantly threatened with parliamentary or governmental crisis.

Considering the efforts expended, the Union of the Left did not do much better than its parties did in 1967. Moreover, many workers supported the Union of the Left more in order to fight the UDR [Union des Démocrates pour la République—Union of Democrats for the Republic] than because they agreed with the content of the common program. They hoped to open the way for the deep changes they desire by throwing out the rotten UDR.

Now, by retreating before Pompidou's blackmail about disorder, by saddling itself with respect for the 1958 Gaullist constitution, which was nothing but the legalization of a mil-

itary coup d'état, the Union of the Left is demonstrating its own trepidation.

And this even though the only way to win over people who are wavering and to bolster unity is to show an iron desire to beat the UDR by any means necessary, to throw Pompidou out, and to sweep aside his constitution.

The Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvrière have shown that a revolutionary current exists even on the electoral level. The large number of meetings and the size of the workers' mobilizations even more than the electoral results show that there is a force for which the only real solution to the crisis of the system is the revolutionary transformation of society and the building of a socialist society.

From now on, whatever the outcome of the elections, the problem of post-March is starkly posed. The parties of the United Left, complete prisoners of parliamentary cretinism, can come forward with no solution.

Nevertheless, as far as social demands are concerned, a big backlog remains to be made up. Many questions were in effect left hanging in the hope of winning a general resolution of problems through an electoral victory over the UDR.

Sinn Fein's Program in Irish Elections

[The following "Action Programme" was put forward by the Official republicans in the campaign preceding the February 28 elections in the Irish Free State.]

* * *

● Nationalisation of all mineral and oil resources and their development by the State on behalf of the people.

● Plan for full employment within 5 years. Expanding State sector of industry, using State Mining Co. and State Smelter industry as a base. (Con-

Nevertheless, the size of the mobilizations of youth against capital's army and the struggles over the question of abortion testify to the depth of the regime's crisis.

Nevertheless, waiting for the 1976 presidential elections to settle accounts on the social and political levels is out of the question.

On the second round, we will not do anything that could indirectly favor the victory of the bourgeois candidates of the URP and that could thus serve the left parties as a pretext to explain their own capitulation.

We think that the electoral gains of the Union of the Left will still be seen by the workers as a shifting of the relationship of forces in their favor and as an encouragement to struggle.

This is why, without in the slightest suggesting support to the content of the common program or to the reformists, traitors, and capitulationists who express it, we call for a vote for the candidates of the Union of the Left on the second round as a means of fighting the URP.

Nevertheless, we will not call for a vote for candidates of the Union of the Left who agreed between the two rounds to make changes in the alliance in order to gain the support of the reformers.

Once again it has been shown that elections can settle nothing. The workers can have confidence only in themselves and in their own mobilization to defeat the employers, destroy the bourgeois state, and lay the foundation of a different society, a socialist society. □

● Control Mergers, Closures and Rationalisation of Industry. Use the Capital at present exported—£1,000 million in 1971/72—for modernisation and expansion of industries, such as food processing, thus aiding both small farmers, fishermen and urban workers.)

● Elimination of all speculative investment in farmland and establishment of an upper limit on the amount of land owned by any farmer.

● Expansions of Forestry programme and 'speed up' of land acquisition.

● Nationalisation of Banks and

other Financial Institutions; Restrictions on Export of Capital; a cheap money policy for Agriculture, Industry, Housing and other productive purposes.

● Re-distribution of the wealth — 71 per cent of which is at present controlled by 5 per cent of the population; Introduction of Tax on Capital Gains and on Investment Property.

● Sinn Fein further recognises that the revival of Irish must depend on the revival of the Irish-speaking communities of the Gaeltacht, and accordingly supports the demand for local autonomy for the Gaeltacht communities and demands that the Gaeltacht radio service be placed under the control of a local authority.

● Strict control of Prices; Removal of V. A. T. [value added tax, a sales tax] from foodstuffs, attack on inflation and its source, which is the financial and property speculators.

● Declaration of a Housing Emergency and Promotion of a Crash Programme designed to provide a housing unit for every family. Control of all building land by State or Municipal Authority.

● Elimination of Poverty and Social degradation, both in urban and rural areas as a national Priority; Implementation of a comprehensive free medical and social welfare scheme.

● Restriction of farms to maximum of 200 acres of good land, take over of large estates and redistribution of surplus land to co-operatives of small farmers.

● Ending of Discrimination and repressive laws and establishment by legislation of equal right for all — irrespective of age, sex, or social status.

● Education to be provided for all in a non-denominational state structure which would be democratically controlled by parents, teachers and pupils. Sinn Fein believes that the revival of Irish is part of the revival of the Irish people and promotes the revival of the Irish language and the rest of the culture associated with or derived from it.

THERE is an ample supply of money in the State to finance this programme. There is great wealth in the hands of a few people — it belongs to the workers who produced it! □

of these elections, it is the duty of revolutionists to take advantage of them to inflict a defeat on the dictatorship on this level also.

Owing to the sympathy and support it has evoked from the workers and people, FREJULI has the best chance of all the slates put up of defeating the government's maneuver at the ballot box.

Like all the workers, the ERP 22 knows that Solano Lima, Rucci, Calabro, Odena, and the other pathetic personalities that figure on the FREJULI tickets do not and never will represent them. In fact, these individuals are enemies of the people within the people's movement. But the backbone of the Peronist movement is the working class and the people, the Montoneros and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [Revolutionary Armed Forces], whom the ERP 22 regard as brothers because we have fought shoulder to shoulder with them and our comrades have fallen side by side, giving the blood of the best sons of our people.

The masses will use FREJULI as an instrument of struggle to affirm their demands, to proclaim their right to a better life, the release of the imprisoned guerrillas, independence of their fatherland, the end of exploitation of man by man, and to build socialism.

It is for this reason that the ERP 22 de Agosto calls on the people to deal the dictatorship a defeat at the polls by voting massively for the FREJULI slates and by mobilizing to guarantee that these demands will be met.

This road marked out by Abal Medina, Ramus, Olmedo, Maestre, Baldú, Pujals, Capello, and so many other martyrs of the revolution is the definitive path for the working class and the people to take power.

No foreign flag will wave over this land. The guerrillas and the people guarantee this, not the military officers who have no fatherland and who trample this country under their feet every day, selling it piece by piece to the imperialists. But our banner will wave in all its splendor over this land when no child is denied bread or education; no sick person hospital care; no worker the right to live with dignity; and no Argentine the inalienable right to be master of his destiny,

'ERP 22' Supports Peronists

[The following is a translation by *Intercontinental Press* of a communiqué issued by the "Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Agosto 22" (August 22 Revolutionary Army of the People) that appeared in the March 8 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *Crónica*. For an account of the circumstances under which the communiqué was made public, see the report elsewhere in this issue "ERP Carries Out Guerrilla Action in Córdoba — Denies That It Supports Peronists."

[In addition to the English translation, we are publishing the original Spanish text. This appears below.]

* * *

To the People:

The elections are a democratic victory won by the masses and their vanguard in a long struggle against the military dictatorship. Driven into a corner by attacks from all sides, the dictatorship has come to regard these elections as a lesser evil, as a

concession that could be made to the people in an attempt to prevent them from linking up more closely with the guerrilla organizations. Hence the regime has put the maximum restrictions on the elections in order to forestall defeat.

Despite everything, broad sectors of our people have organized to deal the dictatorship a defeat at the polls.

The Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo 22 de Agosto [August 22 People's Revolutionary Army] firmly believes that the definitive road to national and social liberation does not lead through these elections. Power does not come from elections. In 1962 the military arm of the regime already annulled a vote, and nothing happened. Power grows from the barrel of a gun. As long as the guns are in the hands of the repressive forces and not the people, the generals will remain in power and the exploiters of the country along with them.

But while we realize that workers and people's power will not come out

to freedom, and to national sovereignty.

It is for this that our people are struggling and it is for this that the armed organizations will fight on until the final victory.

Let us take one more step toward this victory by defeating the dictatorship at the polls also.

Workers. There is only one road to taking power — people's war. There is only one choice in the March 11 elections — FREJULI.

Long live [civil?] war and socialism.

Long live the unity in action of the Montoneros, FAR, ERP, and ERP 22, the vanguard of the people in its struggle for freedom.

Glory to the martyrs of Trelew, who like Eduardo Capello died to assure that others would have a chance to live with dignity.

EJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO 22 DE AGOSTO

Comando Eduardo Capello

Spanish Text

Al Pueblo:

Las elecciones son una conquista democrática arrancada por las masas y sus vanguardias en una larga lucha contra la dictadura militar. Esta dictadura, acorralada por los cuatro costados, concibe a estas elecciones como el mal menor a conceder al pueblo para tratar de evitar la cada vez mayor ligazón de éste con las organizaciones guerrilleras. De allí que el régimen haya condicionado todo lo posible esta coyuntura electoral para impedir su derrota.

Pese a todo amplios sectores de nuestro pueblo se han organizado para derrotar en las urnas a la dictadura.

El Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo 22 de Agosto cree firmemente que el camino definitivo de la liberación nacional y social no pasa por esta coyuntura electoral. El poder no nace de los votos. El brazo armado del régimen ya los anuló en 1962 y no pasó nada. El poder nace de la punta de los fusiles. Mientras éstos estén en manos de las fuerzas represivas y no en las del pueblo, los generales seguirán en el poder y con ellos los explotadores de este país.

Pero aún así, sabiendo que de las elecciones no surgirán el poder para la clase obrera y el pueblo, es deber de los revolucionarios el utilizarlas

para derrotar también en este plano a la dictadura.

De las listas presentadas a elecciones, el FREJULI, por la simpatía y el apoyo obrero y popular que despierta es la que reúne mayores posibilidades de derrotar en las urnas la maniobra del gobierno.

El ERP 22 sabe, como lo saben todos los trabajadores, que Solano Lima, Rucci, Calabró, Odena y otros tristes personajes que figuran en las listas del FREJULI, no son ni serán jamás sus representantes. Antes bien, son los enemigos del pueblo, metidos en el seno del movimiento popular. Pero la columna vertebral del peronismo es la clase obrera y el pueblo, son los Montoneros y las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de quienes el ERP 22 se siente hermanos porque juntos hemos combatido, y juntos hemos derramado la sangre de los mejores hijos de este pueblo.

Las masas utilizarán el FREJULI como herramienta de lucha para afirmar sus reivindicaciones, para proclamar su derecho a una vida mejor, a la libertad de los guerrilleros presos, a la independencia de su Patria, al cese de la explotación del hombre por el hombre y a la construcción del socialismo.

Y es por esto que el ERP 22 de Agosto llama al pueblo a derrotar en las urnas a la dictadura, a través del voto masivo a las listas del FREJULI y a movilizarse para garantizar el cumplimiento de estas reivindicaciones.

El camino señalado por Abal Me-

dina, Ramus, Olmedo, Maestre, Baldu, Pujals, Capello y tantos otros mártires de la Revolución, es el camino definitivo para que la clase obrera y el pueblo tomen el poder.

Ninguna bandera extraña ondeará sobre esta tierra. Y eso lo garantizamos los guerrilleros y el pueblo, no los militares sin Patria que la pisotean y la venden a pedazos todos los días al imperialismo extranjero. Pero nuestra bandera ondeará en todo esplendor en este suelo cuando ningún niño carezca de pan y escuela, ningún enfermo de un hospital, ningún obrero de su derecho a vivir con dignidad, ningún argentino de su derecho irrevocable a ser dueño de su destino, de su libertad y de la soberanía de su Patria.

Por esto lucha nuestro pueblo y por esto las organizaciones armadas combatirán hasta la victoria final.

Acerquémonos un paso más a esa victoria y también en las urnas derrotaremos a la dictadura.

Trabajadores: Un solo camino para la toma del poder: La guerra del pueblo. Una sola opción para votar el 11: El FREJULI.

Viva la guerra y el socialismo.

Viva la unidad de acción de Montoneros, FAR, ERP y ERP 22, vanguardia del pueblo en su lucha por la libertad.

Gloria a los mártires de Trelew que como Eduardo Capello murieron para asegurar la posibilidad de que otros vivan con dignidad.

EJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO 22 DE AGOSTO

Comando Eduardo Capello

Rucci Stung by Coral's Attack on Peronists

[The following telegram was received March 8 by Juan Carlos Coral, the presidential candidate of the Trotskyist Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party). It was sent by José Rucci, the leading Peronist trade-union bureaucrat in Argentina, following a television speech by Coral. Among other things, Coral attacked the political positions of the Peronist movement. The fact that a figure of Rucci's prominence considered it necessary to make a rather lengthy reply, which was given considerable publicity in the press, indicates the impact of the PST elec-

toral campaign among the rank and file of the Argentine labor movement.]

* * *

Out of consideration for the millions of workers I represent and in order not to give any appearance of a guilty silence, I have decided to answer you. At the conference of the Confederación General Económica [General Economic Confederation] you once again made it your business to talk about the national leadership of the union movement, calling its heads bureaucrats. Likewise, you had insulting



RUCCI: Took offense at Coral's criticisms.

things to say about the Peronist movement that were in the same vein as some recent remarks by Ernesto Sanmartino [a reactionary politician who supported the 1955 military coup against Perón and who opposes the current elections from an ultrarightist position].

This kind of coincidence started back in 1955 when power was usurped from the people. Enemies of the people can come in various hues but they can never change their stripes. I would remind you of your record and that anyone who for political gain sets himself up falsely as representing the feelings of the workers is either a cheap liar or a servant of the very interests he claims to be fighting, whose watchword is "divide and conquer."

Never forget that the old game of winning elections by campaign dice games, barbecues, and concerts is a thing of the past and that the workers have long memories. They know who their enemies and the allies of their enemies are, and that even though a party of such elements may illegitimately style itself a workers' party, it is far from being an organization of the workers and their allies. In the current process of institutional normalization [moving from a military dictatorship to an elected government], it is no use to pretend to be something; you must actually be something. And your contribution in play-

ing politics puts you among those who are nothing.

Although you—and like you, I repeat, Ernesto Sanmartino—persist in disregarding it, the workers' movement, organized in unions from the ranks up, has been struggling for some time for the liberation of the people. This struggle is conceived within the framework of a perfectly clear political strategy that has the full support of everybody in the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo

—General Confederation of Labor]. This strategy is summed up in the platform of the Frente Justicialista de Liberación [FREJULI — Liberation Front for Social Justice, the Peronist electoral front], whose candidate for the highest office is Dr. Héctor J. Cámpora.

Signed: José Ignacio Rucci. My credentials are that I am a worker chosen by the Argentine workers' movement to be the general secretary of the CGT. I don't know what yours are. □

Developing Situation of Dual Power in Chile

[The following article was published in the February 1973 issue of *Revolución Permanente*, the organ of the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR — Revolutionary Socialist party), Chilean section of the Fourth International, under the title "JAPs (Juntas de Abastecimiento y Control de Precios — Food Supply and Price Control Associations) and Comandos Populares (Popular Commands): Embryos of Workers' Power."]

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Through its finance minister, Fernando Flores, the government announced [on January 11] a series of drastic measures to deal with the acute problem of food supplies and the black market.

Aside from whatever conjunctural considerations related to the coming legislative elections in March may have motivated this action by the UP [Unidad Popular — Popular Unity] government, the cause must be sought in the serious economic crisis that is causing desperation among broad layers of the petty bourgeoisie and even of the proletariat and the working people as a whole, with the resulting erosion of the government's—and ultimately the UP's—social support.

But basically, the roots of this governmental decision lie in the fact that the executive finds itself in an indefensible situation, caught in the cross fire between antagonistic classes in society.

On the one hand, there is an insolent and very powerful bourgeoisie engaged in a full-scale, virulent po-

litical offensive in its desire to regain control of all the power. This bourgeoisie, rather than being satisfied by the conciliatory attitude of the UP leadership, demands more and more, and prepares its leading cadres and its methods for dealing the final blow to the UP. This is what the lessons of the October crisis show.

Dual Power

Facing it is a workers' movement that has not suffered any defeat as a class, that is strong and determined, and that in spite of its general support for the UP resolutely presses ahead on the road toward nationalizing industry and creating basic organs of workers' power, resulting in conflicts with the government itself.

A situation of dual power prevails in Chilean society. This cannot help but be a transitory and unstable stage. The opposing classes cannot settle the problem of power in the idyllic and peaceful electoral arena, despite the government's effort to transform itself into an arbiter of the class struggle by attempting to place itself above it in a Bonapartist role that demobilizes and ties the hands of the proletariat, leaving it at the mercy of the bourgeoisie. The question of power will be settled through class confrontation. In this regard, the death rattle of the policy of a "Chilean road" can already be heard.

What Flores Did Not Say

These are the deepgoing social causes that prompted the Flores statement. After characterizing the short-

ages as a problem that is political in nature and brought on by the actions of imperialism and the national bourgeoisie, the government announced a series of important measures.

What is obvious is that Flores did not unravel the underlying causes of the phenomenon, namely: the existence of a capitalist economy that prevents socialist planning but which, in view of the state take-overs and the struggle of the workers to nationalize industry and establish workers' control, does not feel motivated to increase production, and resorts to boycott; the appearance of a kind of bureaucratic layer that is beginning to have different interests and goals from those of the proletariat and that has transformed itself into a platform for a reformist policy and into an obstacle that will be difficult to salvage for the advancing revolutionary struggle; and the demobilization and resulting frustration of the working masses that have been brought on by the UP leadership. All this is what is behind the deceitful policy of the government in the face of the attack by the bourgeoisie.

The measures that have been announced will, moreover, have no effect unless they go together with a continuing expropriation of industry and with the establishment of workers' control—both of which, furthermore, will make possible an increase in production.

Basically, what is being proposed is state control over domestic trade and the planning of distribution. In achieving these goals the needs of each family will be taken into consideration. The programming of such needs will be the responsibility of the Comandos Comunales [Municipal Commands] and the JAPs, which will be under the jurisdiction of the Secretaría Nacional de Distribución [National Office for Distribution]. The JAPs will not only report cases of speculation, but will have the power to take direct action to prevent it.

The organization of these basic bodies will be extended throughout the entire municipal unit and will involve the participation of all inhabitants and merchants. And although they will not be forced to, it already looks as though the merchant who does not take part will find himself

deprived of certain traditional advantages, such as credit.

The Bourgeoisie Acknowledges the Blow It Has Been Dealt

No sooner had the government's statement been made than the bourgeoisie touched off a campaign of alarm. Its parties, its personalities, and its press denounced the measures proposed by the UP as the first steps on the road to the dictatorship of the proletariat. They charged the JAPs and the Comandos Comunales with being organs of revolutionary power existing outside the law and called for "civil resistance" to prevent the proposed plan from being implemented and to prepare for a confrontation.

They were quite right. The JAPs and the Comandos Comunales are, indeed, embryos of workers' power that, by consistently carrying out the policy announced by the finance minister, will take on great importance since they will involve broad layers of the working class and will press forward with the struggle against the bourgeoisie by going beyond the narrow framework of the parties belonging to the UP.

Revolutionary Conclusions

The class struggle will be intensified and the workers' movement strengthened through the application of the government's plan. We are on the

right course. The decisive confrontation is drawing near.

But if they are to accomplish their tasks, the JAPs and the Comandos Comunales must eliminate any trace of bureaucracy, become democratic, and seek out the criticisms and opinions of the masses, who are the ones who must decide how the supplies are to be allocated—namely, by delivering a quota of the scarce goods to the consumers by means of rationing, without requiring them to pay for those that are in plentiful supply.

The government announcement cannot remain a simple statement of intention; the masses must see to it that it is applied.

In taking on this task, the workers' movement suffers from one weakness: It lacks a revolutionary leadership. The UP has demonstrated its reformist character, its revolutionary verbalism, its scorn for action by the exploited, its weak and conciliatory attitude toward the bourgeoisie, and its inconsistencies. Revolutionists must not be content to point up the positive sides of the government's proposals, nor to warn against the limitations of the UP leadership. We must resolutely take part in the rank-and-file organizations of the workers, in the JAPs, and in the Comandos Comunales in order to urge the workers' struggles forward, to form organs of proletarian power, to help form a true revolutionary leadership in the heat of the struggle, to defeat and destroy the bourgeois regime, and to unflinchingly advance toward socialism. □

Lessons of the October Crisis in Chile

[The following analysis of the class polarization in Chile was published in the February 1973 issue of *Revolución Permanente*, the organ of the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR—Revolutionary Socialist party), the Chilean section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The political *paro* [strike, shutdown of operations] declared by the bourgeois sectors during the month of October, as well as the solution that was found to this conflict, provides the workers' movement and its van-

guard elements with important experiences. A correct evaluation of what happened is indispensable for the success of the advance toward political power.

The *paro* showed that the bourgeoisie is suffering from a profound structural weakness. It was unable to mobilize proletarian and peasant layers, and thus was unable to bring the country to an economic standstill. In spite of its apparent unity, the existence of deep contradictions between the different bourgeois parties and sectors was revealed; while taken as a whole their goal is the same—to defeat the proletariat—they differ over

the tactics that can best accomplish this.

The hard-line sector — represented by Patria y Libertad [Fatherland and Liberty], the National party, and a minority of the Christian Democrats — looked to the use of force as a way out, but they did not succeed in rallying behind them the bourgeoisie as a whole.

Other bourgeois sectors, for the most part the DC [Democracia Cristiana — Christian Democracy], are seeking a solution that will involve no greater social costs to themselves, but will allow them to regain control over the instruments of power that they have lost. They are trying to bog the government down in the limitations imposed by the constitution and legality, to wear it down by taking advantage of its inability to resolve the country's economic problems, and to "democratically" take control again of the state apparatus.

This latter approach is the one that has prevailed. In spite of everything, it is clear that the bourgeois class has not definitively resolved its problem of leadership and is pressing its parties to seek new forms of organization and expression.

What stands out against this background as the basic and decisive lesson that we must learn is the fact that this divided bourgeoisie will be confronting a united and combative proletariat that, above the heads of its present political leaders, clearly posed the question of power and adapted and created mechanisms in an effort to achieve this goal; in action, it crystallized an attempt at dual power, which clearly showed that the workers have decided to enter into the struggle with determination. It was only the compromise and retreat of the government and the UP parties that, for the time being, held back this thrust. Demonstrating its lack of confidence in and fear of the masses, the government had to accept the arbitration of the armed forces.

The most obvious effect of the entry of the military into the cabinet is the loss of the hegemony of the workers' parties in the government, with all the political ramifications that this involves. By accepting military arbitration, which in the final analysis means directly accepting bourgeois tutelage, it is the government itself that is turn-

ing into an arbiter, dangerously placing itself above classes and acquiring Bonapartist features; not even the presence of two "workers' ministers," representatives of the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores — Workers Central Union], can counteract the nature of this new physiognomy.

Only the bourgeoisie has gained from this. It has done so by succeeding in bringing about the formation of a cabinet of "social peace," which means peace in order to preserve the bourgeois system, while it is expected that the proletariat will remain on the sidelines, behave itself in the factories, and increase production, while attempting to prevent any increase in its consciousness and any consolidation of its basic organs of power.

The government and the UP insist on sticking to their peaceful road to socialism. But the proletariat is becoming aware of the fact that this is not its road. This is demonstrated by nothing less than the fact that it is creating organs of power like the Comandos Comunales [Municipal Commands], Cordones Proletarios [Proletarian Cordons], Coordinating Committees, etc.

The most important lesson of the *paro* has been the fact that it raised the problem of power. The choice is clear: Either workers' power will be developed, leading the proletariat to the taking of power, or the initiative will be left in the hands of the bourgeoisie, giving it the best conditions in which to defeat the proletariat. And this has clearly been understood by the workers, squatters, and peasants, who are going beyond their present reformist leaderships and setting out on the road to creating organs that express *their* power.

In this context, a revolutionary leadership is indispensable. Although we cannot yet speak of the existence of a vanguard party, the conditions for its emergence fully exist. And the overriding task of revolutionists is to help form it.

The political situation that is clearly expressed in the causes, evolution, and effect of the bosses' October *paro* presents revolutionists with important tasks to foster the development of all rank-and-file organs that tend toward the formation and crystallization of workers' power, building on the concrete experiences of the workers and

generating organs of dual power that can stand up to the counteroffensive of the bourgeoisie, and in the process go beyond reformism in order to achieve workers and peasants' power.

Within this context, the immediate goals for which we must struggle are the following:

1. The extension of workers' control, starting from the organs that have already been created and recognized by the working class, such as the Vigilance Committees.

2. Direct administration by the workers in industries belonging to the social sector of the economy.

3. Distribution and marketing directly through the JAPs. Demand the expropriation of all concerns involved in distribution.

4. Press for the formation and extension of the Cordones Proletarios, Defense Committees, Municipal Coordinating Committees, etc. Give these bodies a centralized organizational structure, thereby moving toward the formation of a People's Assembly — a genuine workers' parliament that will take the leadership of society into its own hands.

5. The formation of People's Militias focusing on key mass fronts. One way of advancing this task is to relate it to the Municipal Coordinating Committees and Defense Committees.

6. Deepen the anti-imperialist struggle by demanding the expropriation without compensation of companies whose capital comes from abroad. In addition, demand repudiation of the foreign debt.

7. Expropriation without compensation of the big factories belonging to the bourgeoisie.

8. Deepen the agrarian reform through expropriation, without compensation or loopholes, of the agrarian bourgeoisie's land, regardless of whether the landholder has eighty hectares under basic irrigation or not. Along with this, demand the nationalization of all land and that it be turned over to the peasants for use through the Consejos Comunales Campesinos [Peasant Community Councils].

9. Press for the formation of a Revolutionary United Front as a step toward the unification of the revolutionary left, reaching agreement in every workers' front on specific points of agreement between the various organizations. □