

## The Cease-Fire in Laos



***Caamano  
Reportedly Killed  
in Guerrilla Clash***

***Why Israeli State  
Commits  
Mass Murder***



# Lapps in Sweden Sue Government

"We have now begun to fight for our rights," says Tomas Cramer, a representative of the Swedish Lapps. Cramer's organization, the Svenska Samers Riksförbund (SSR—National Association of Swedish Laplanders), is suing the Swedish government on behalf of forty-four Lapp towns in Jaemtland, demanding that "crown lands" there be returned to their proper owners, the Lapps.

Cramer is optimistic. "The burden of proof lies with the state, but it can't prove anything," he said in an interview in the February 16 issue of the Danish daily *Politiken*. "It will be clear after the ruling around November 1 that the Lapps own the land, the country, because they are the original inhabitants of the Northland. And their land was gradually taken away from them just the way it happened with the Indians of North America."

The case is being closely followed not only by Sweden's 10,000 Lapps, but by all the 50,000 Lapps in the northernmost part of Europe. Most, 35,000, live in Norway, and around 3,000 live in Finland. The rest live in the Soviet Union.

"This case has given the Lapps a great deal of self-confidence," Cramer said. "They have taken their fate into their own hands and are turning against the colonial policy used against them by Sweden, Norway, and Finland." Cramer was referring to the water-power, timber, and minerals that are taken out of Lapland and not returned in any way.

Until 1751, no foreign powers claimed national sovereignty over Lapland. In that year, a joint Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish commission drew up an agreement on boundaries that recognized the right of the Lapps, a nomadic people, to rights over their land. The SSR is basing its legal case on this agreement.

Some of the more radical Lapps are demanding autonomy for Lapland and independent representation in the Nordic Council, Cramer said. "Why not?" he asked. □

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EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

COPY EDITOR: Lawrence Rond.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Candida Barberena, Fred Feldman, Gerry Foley, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders, David Thorstad.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.

TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Ruth Schein.

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## The Laos Cease-Fire and the Indochina Revolution

By Jon Rothschild

On the morning of February 22, the U. S. Air Force command-and-control aircraft that directs American bombing strikes in Laos left its station for relocation to Thailand. This was in accordance with the provision of the Laos cease-fire pact that calls for the end of U. S. bombing of the country.

Before leaving, the pilot sent a radio message to ground control: "Good-by and see you next war."

He may have spoken too soon.

On February 23 senior U. S. military officials admitted that nine B-52s had bombed Pathet Lao positions near Paksong on the western fringe of the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos. The raids came less than twenty-four hours after the Laotian cease-fire formally went into effect, and were allegedly a response to what Vientiane Premier Souvanna Phouma described—fraudulently, as it turned out—as a general Pathet Lao offensive conducted in violation of the cease-fire.

The February 24 *New York Times* cited "administration sources" as saying that the illegal bombing was aimed at securing both short-term and long-term objectives. In the short run, "any failure to respond to active combat thrusts by North Vietnamese or Pathet Lao forces after the cease-fire might have tempted further disregard of the truce."

And also, "willingness to resume B-52 strikes in Laos would add force to private warnings that any major violations in South Vietnam by North Vietnamese troops might bring about a resumption of air operations against the Hanoi Government."

The first part of the explanation is nonsense, since there was no "active combat thrust" by the liberation forces. With the appropriate changes in terminology ("resistance to aggression" for "violations" and "people of North Vietnam" for "Hanoi Government"), the second part is one of the more honest descriptions of U. S. intentions for the post-cease-fire period in Indochina.

It is of some significance that U. S.



New York Times map shows zones controlled by opposing sides in Laos.

spokesmen should concede that military actions in Laos will be a means of warning Hanoi about possible attacks on North Vietnam. The "peace" agreement signed in Laos on February 21 differs in certain respects from the Vietnam agreement—and almost exclusively in ways that are favorable to the liberation forces. So the evolution of the Laotian situation will provide information on exactly what U. S. imperialism is willing to tolerate in Indochina; and exactly how much the North Vietnamese leaders are willing to challenge the U. S.-imposed limits.

Nearly all Western press reports on the Vientiane agreement noted the dejection prevalent in government circles and the elation among Pathet Lao representatives. It appears that on most disputed issues the views of the liberation forces prevailed.

The most crucial terms of the settlement are:

- A cease-fire in place, effective as of noon February 22 will be ordered.

- It is forbidden to "carry out mop-up, intimidation, and suppression drives against the lives and property of the people or to discriminate against people who participated with the opposite side during the war."

- All foreign troops are to be withdrawn. The reintroduction of "military personnel of any type, regular forces or irregular forces, and all kinds of weapons and war means of foreign countries" into Laos is forbidden.

- Pending the holding of free elections for a national assembly and a new government, the present zones of control will be maintained.

- Two bodies will be formed before the election takes place: first, a National Provisional Coalition Government (NPCG) to be composed of equal representation from the liberation forces and the Vientiane administration, with the addition of "two intellectuals who advocate peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy, who will be agreed upon by both sides." This body will replace the present Vientiane regime in the government-controlled zones. Also, a National Provisional Coalition Council, of similar qualitative composition as the NPCG, but different quantitatively, will be formed to assist the work of the NPCG and to help prepare for the elections.

- The cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang (the royal capital) will be "neutralized."

- The currently nonfunctioning International Control Commission (composed of delegates from Canada, India, and Poland) set up by the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos will "continue to perform its duty."

The differences between this pact and the Vietnam agreement mainly involve the coalition government. While the Vietnam accord allows for the preservation of the Thieu regime, the Laos pact calls for the rapid dismantling of the Vientiane government and its replacement by the coalition regime the Pathet Lao claims to have been fighting for.

The composition of this regime will be more favorable to the liberation

forces than the 1962 government imposed by the Geneva accord. That deal provided for a tripartite government including the liberation forces, rightists, and "neutralists." The latter, with U. S. support, soon defected to the "rightists," thus triggering the resumption of the war.

Moreover, where the Vietnam agreement only tacitly recognized the Provisional Revolutionary Government's existence, the Laos pact treats the administration of the liberated territories of the country virtually as a formal government. Article 10, Paragraph B, for example, states: "The two sides will promote the establishment of normal relations between the two zones, and create favorable conditions for the people to move about, make their living, and carry out economic and cultural exchanges with a view to consolidating national concord and bringing about national unification at an early date."

Even on the less crucial terminological and tactical differences, the liberation forces generally got their way. For example, reports in the Western press had indicated that the Vientiane regime had been pressing for a thirty-day deadline on the withdrawal of foreign troops (which it takes to include North Vietnamese troops), while the Pathet Lao had insisted on ninety days.

The agreement appears at first to be a compromise: a sixty-day period. But it stipulates that the sixty days will begin only after the NPCG is set up, and this is supposed to take place within thirty days of the signing of the agreement. Sixty plus thirty still equal ninety.

Also, the Vientiane clique had demanded that it be referred to in the agreement as the "Royal Laotian Government." The Pathet Lao call it the Vientiane administration. The accord says "Vientiane Government"—a designation that excludes its recognition as the government of all Laos.

The Pathet Lao won their point on another terminological question. Article 1, Paragraph B, which refers to Laotian independence, reads in part: "The parties concerned in Laos, the United States, Thailand, and other foreign countries must strictly respect and implement this agreement. The internal affairs of Laos must be conducted by the Lao people only, without external interference."

The Vientiane outfit had been de-

manding that North Vietnam be explicitly named as one of the "foreign countries" concerned. Premier Souvanna Phouma now says that the formulation "foreign countries" does include Hanoi. But the Pathet Lao successfully blocked its specific mention.

All these facts account for the sag in morale in the government camp. Vientiane officials fear that the United States has left them hanging in an unfavorable position. The liberation forces now control between two-thirds and four-fifths of the countryside and about one-third of the population. Many areas have been under Pathet Lao administration for as long as a decade. The Laotian liberated areas are probably even more secure and better able to defend themselves than those in South Vietnam.

Moreover, the Vientiane regime and its army are far weaker than the Thieu clique. "Even presuming that the ceasefire is relatively effective," Malcolm Browne wrote in the February 22 *New York Times*, "the Laotian Army has never been known for its discipline or unity, and now, with the war over in theory, many Vientiane units are likely to disband themselves for lack of unifying direction."

"The most effective elements fighting for Vientiane in any case are irregular troops, many of them tribesmen, who are often paid and commanded by American Central Intelligence Agency men. Irregular units tend to disperse rapidly unless held together by firm command, high pay and a feeling that they will continue to be supported by Americans if necessary."

In light of all this, should the Laos pact be viewed as a big victory for the liberation forces? It would be well to defer a definitive answer on this.

U. S. imperialism clearly failed to achieve its goal of establishing an entrenched pro-American regime in Vientiane. Despite the expenditure of more than \$1,000 million and a level of bombing that, relative to the population of Laos, was as intense as the genocidal attacks on North and South Vietnam, the United States was unable to crush the liberation forces, and even unable to save the Vientiane regime.

In that sense—and in the sense that it will, if carried out, bring an end to overt U. S. military aggression in Laos, most importantly an end to the bombing—it is a victory for the Laotian revolution.

But the more favorable terms won

by the liberation forces in Laos also have an opposite aspect: They indicate, much more clearly than in the case of South Vietnam, that the liberation forces in fact stopped short of what could have been achieved. The Vientiane government will be dissolved (at least if the terms of the accord are implemented), but capitalism remains intact in Laos. This is explicitly stipulated in the section of the agreement (Article 1, Paragraph D) that calls for the recognition, in both zones, of a whole series of democratic rights including "establishing business enterprises and ownership."

The Laos agreement, in its substance, corresponds to the seven-point program that had been the basis of the PRG's political position in South Vietnam. It has been won in a situation that is more favorable, both militarily and politically, to the liberation forces than is the situation in South Vietnam. It may therefore be assumed that events in Laos will directly reveal the intentions of the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao leaderships. The concrete social and political content of Hanoi's notion of "coalition government" will now become clear.

It may be taken as given that the United States has no intention of abandoning Laos to socialist revolution. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 21, U. S. Secretary of State William Rogers hailed the Laos pact as "yet another important step in the over-all solution to the Indochina problem." It is not likely that Rogers views social revolution as an acceptable "solution" to the "Indochina problem."

The aim of the United States appears to be to set Laos up as a buffer zone between Thailand and North Vietnam and to make certain concessions on the composition of the regime, while maintaining social relations that would not advance the revolutionary tide in Southeast Asia.

It remains to be seen whether the liberation forces will accommodate to this aim, although it must be said that so far they have not indicated noncompliance.

Related to this dynamic is the question of secret clauses in the agreement. Already it has been revealed that the Vietnam accords contained at least one secret clause on Laos and Cambodia. Does the Laos pact have similar clauses? Have the liberation forces agreed not to go beyond what they

have already achieved in the Vientiane accords?

It could well be that Hanoi and the Pathet Lao have been blackmailed into making an agreement of an unfavorable nature. Did Kissinger, who was recently in Vientiane and Hanoi, warn the liberation forces that if they sought the overturn of the present system in Laos, they would be met by a barrage of B-52 attacks? If this is the

case, Hanoi's failure to disclose it would be nearly as disastrous to the revolutionary movement as North Vietnam's agreeing voluntarily to restrict the Laotian struggle to the fight for a coalition regime.

The Laotian pact represents in essence an application of the PRG's seven-point program. The future of Laos will therefore go a long way towards demonstrating what that program really means. □

## U.S. and China Move Toward New Deals

### International Indochina Conference Opens

"The anxiety of both U. S. and Chinese officials to get on with the business of a detente does not await the complete enforcement of the cease-fire or even the full withdrawal of U. S. military forces from South Vietnam." This comment from Courtney Sheldon, correspondent of the conservative *Christian Science Monitor*, on Kissinger's latest trip to Peking.

Sheldon's observation could be extended. The detente did not even await the end of U. S. bombing of Laos, which was in full swing while Kissinger was in Peking. And still more, the Chinese leaders maintained strict silence on Thieu's violations of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement.

The Peking bureaucrats took care to let the world know, even while Kissinger was still in China, that U. S.-China rapprochement was about to take a great leap forward. On February 19, Kissinger had a two-hour-long chat with Chairman Mao. The official New China News Agency described the meeting as "a frank and wide-ranging conversation in an unconstrained atmosphere." It noted especially that Mao had asked Kissinger "to convey his regards to President Nixon."

In recent years, Mao has held private discussions only with heads of state and, in the case of countries considered especially friendly to China, with officials of cabinet rank.

For several days in a row, Kissinger appeared on the front page of *Renmin Ribao*, leading daily of the Chinese Communist party.

When Kissinger returned to the United States, he held a news con-

ference to explain the deals that had been made. "Our contacts with the People's Republic of China," he told reporters, "have moved from hostility to normalization."

He announced that in the near future, Peking and Washington would establish "liaison offices" in each other's capitals. The representatives in these offices, Kissinger said, "will have diplomatic privileges and will have an opportunity to communicate with their home government . . . by code."

The "liaison office" is thus a polite term for embassy, which designation cannot be used since the United States still maintains one of those in Taipei.

Of the various U. S.-China economic, cultural, and athletic exchanges scheduled to be implemented or discussed in the near future, one was particularly intriguing. It seems that in 1949 and 1950 the Chinese government confiscated some equipment belonging to certain U. S. corporations. This is a procedure known as nationalization of foreign investment, about which Chairman Mao has written extensively.

It is normally part of a broader process called social revolution, on which the Chairman has also commented on occasion. Not infrequently the corporations in question object to having their profits taken away. They then enter formal claims for "compensation."

According to the U. S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, there are 384 such claims by American companies that feel they were robbed by the Chinese revolution. The total

value of the claims is \$196.5 million. The companies involved include Exxon (better known as Standard Oil of New Jersey), ITT (the well-known snout-in-the-trough conglomerate), First National City Bank of New York, and the Boise-Cascade Corporation, which wants \$53.8 million dollars for the Shanghai Power Company, which it once held but which is now publicly owned.

On February 25, oddly enough in Paris on the eve of the international conference on Indochina, U. S. Secretary of State William Rogers opened discussions with Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei. The subject: compensation for the U. S. corporations. In fairness, it should be mentioned that in exchange for the compensation Peking is asking that its \$78 million in assets frozen in the United States since 1950 be released. This would doubtless ease the hardship of paying off Boise-Cascade.

The international conference on Indochina seems the perfect place for such wheeling and dealing. The gathering of the foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China is serving not only as a forum at which to work out "guarantees" of the Indochina cease-fire, but also to begin to deal with some other troublesome areas.

Rogers, for example, seems to have divided his time. Besides talking with Chi, he also had a "friendly" conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. "It was evident," the February 26 *New York Times* reported, "that the Secretary of State had sought the session at least partly to assuage any Soviet concern that may have arisen over Mr. Kissinger's visit [to Peking]. . . ."

"But aides said that Mr. Rogers also wanted to discuss a broad range of issues with Mr. Gromyko, including the Middle East, an area in which Moscow and Washington have focused special attention since the Vietnam settlement."

The conference on Indochina was scheduled to hold its first session on February 26. Its purpose, as Saigon's Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam put it, is to "de-Americanize the peace"; that is, to arrange an agreement by which Moscow, Peking, and Washington will accept joint responsibility for seeing to it that the Vietnamese liberation forces do not upset the evolving Con-

cert of Asia by fighting for their rights.

There has been remarkably little information about what the conference will do specifically. Not even its agenda has been released to the press. It is therefore certain that the real events of the meeting will take place in the corridors and not at the conference table.

This has already been tacitly admitted by Kissinger. At his news conference he was asked whether the Chinese leaders had reached agreement with the United States on a "cut off" of military shipments to Vietnam. Kissinger refused to answer, saying only that "Indochina was one of the subjects that was discussed in Peking." He made that point several times in the course of his answers.

He was also asked: "Were there any secret agreements made—in view of the fact that you're not discussing the Mao conversations?"

His reply: "You're asking me whether any secret agreements were made? [Is he astounded at the audacity?] The —no, the essential nature of what was discussed is revealed in—is contained in the communiqué and in my explanations. There were no secret agreements."

Indochina was discussed, but there is no information on what was said. And there were no secret agreements. The last time Kissinger was asked an almost identical question—and gave an almost identical answer—he was exposed as a liar within one month. □

penned up. "The refugee program, which cost the United States \$30-million last year and which is expected to require at least a similar outlay this year, has been removed from the joint military and civilian supervision under which it operated until the cease-fire and transferred to the control of the Agency for International Development. Thirty-two American civilians are employed in the relief and rehabilitation program."

Thieu's belligerence is inspired by the knowledge that the United States stands ready to come to his aid should the liberation forces answer him in kind. A South Vietnamese source told *New York Times* correspondent Henry Kamm that "Saigon believed that for at least two or three years, the United States would intervene with air power if Communist forces began any major offensive." Such assistance may be needed since, according to a recently released report completed by the U.S. General Accounting Office last November, the Saigon army still cannot stand off an all-out assault by the National Liberation Front and North Vietnamese forces.

Thieu is also preparing a pretext for canceling or ignoring any election that his huge repressive apparatus proves unable to completely rig. Operating on the principle that the backing of the U.S. Air Force allows him to dispense with plausibility, Thieu charged in a February 24 speech that the North Vietnamese "want to send millions of additional votes into the south by the emigration of millions of people from North into South Vietnam."

One provision of the cease-fire pact that Thieu is implementing with enthusiasm is the one guaranteeing "freedom of enterprise." "Even before the war was over," reported Barry Kramer in the February 20 *Wall Street Journal*, "in Law No. 4-72 dated June 2, 1972, South Vietnam had one of the most liberal foreign-investment acts of any nation. Among other things, all profits earned by investors who qualify are exempt from taxes for five years or longer; export and import taxes are also waived, as are land and building levies. . . ."

"All other potential investments pale at the mention of possible petroleum deposits off the coast of Vietnam. At this point, it is just potential, with

## A Disneyland in Saigon's Future?

# Thieu's New Attacks Have U.S. Backing

By Fred Feldman

Despite the appeal for an end to all fighting issued February 17 by the members of the Joint Military Commission (composed of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, North Vietnam, the United States, and Saigon), Thieu's field commanders have not called a halt to the Saigon forces' violations of the cease-fire. Officers in the crucial central provinces, according to a February 21 dispatch from Pleiku to the *New York Times*, said there had been "no new general directives to Government forces since before the formal start of the cease-fire on Jan. 28."

U.S. backing for Thieu's attempt to chip away at territory held by liberation forces was bluntly expressed by an American military officer in the provincial capital of Kontum. The Saigon forces have been trying to regain control over Route 14, the major highway connecting Kontum with Saigon, although "the government freely conceded [it] had been closed at the time of the cease-fire," according to the February 24 *New York Times*.

"It's nasty, dirty fighting," the U.S. officer was quoted as saying. "They've

[the liberation forces] got small teams working with B-40 rockets, recoilless rifles and wire-guided missiles. You've just got to go in and dig them out. It's bloody but we've got to do it."

A similar struggle is being waged in the port town of Sahuynh in Quangngai province. According to the February 23 *Washington Post*, "Sahuynh was taken by the Communists in the twilight period just before and after the cease-fire came into effect and the South Vietnamese have been trying to push them out ever since."

Thieu's attacks on the liberation forces have helped him to circumvent the provision in the pact that provides for the return of refugees to their homes. "Before the cease-fire went into effect," the February 19 *New York Times* reported, "it had been expected that refugees from Binh Dinh [province] might try to 'explode' out of the camps and head for home. This, it was feared, would provoke violent Government countermeasures. But these refugees have not tried to head home, presumably because of the continuing insecurity in the countryside."

The United States stands behind Thieu's attempt to keep the refugees

little real evidence that oil is out there. . . .

"The government plans to let bids for drilling concessions later this year but may have to hold off if the investment climate doesn't get better. 'The same thing that applies to foreign investments applies to oil concessions,' comments an official of a foreign oil company in Saigon. 'Some big companies would be afraid to bid unless they were sure that the present government were going to exist. Once there's

a degree of confidence, there will be considerable interest."

Meanwhile, Thieu's officials are dreaming great dreams: "Government officials are talking confidently about free-trade ports, industrial parks, 300-room first-class hotels with convention centers covering the Vietnam landscape just as American military bases do now. Would you believe a Disneyland-type amusement park in the suburbs of Saigon? It's on the planning boards." □

## Why Israeli State Commits Mass Murder

### Zionism and the Libyan Airliner

By Jon Rothschild

In view of the astounding lies told by the Israeli government and graciously peddled by Western news media, it might be useful to restate the bare facts.

On February 21 a Libyan passenger airliner en route from Tripoli to Cairo via Benghazi lost its way and drifted over the Sinai peninsula, Egyptian territory now occupied by the Israeli army. The Israeli Air Force sent fighter planes into the air and shot the plane down, killing at least 106 persons. The airliner was clearly recognizable as a nonmilitary aircraft, and at the time it was hit it was heading toward the Suez Canal, that is, away from Israeli-held territory.

That, as they say, is the story. The Zionist regime was confronted with a delicate problem. How to justify destroying an obviously unarmed airplane that obviously was over their so-called territory by accident and that obviously meant them no harm? The answer is simple. First, act enraged at the Libyans. Second, blame the airplane. Third, lie.

This combination of tactics has a special virtue. Even if it is unsuccessful in establishing the regime's innocence, even if every lie is exposed, an atmosphere of controversy can nevertheless be created where none should exist. Thus, at the end of a week of lies, the incident can still be tainted with an aura of confusion, and thereby possible justification. At worst, the world will be presented with

a "tragedy." Not an act of murder, which it transparently was, but rather a terrible event that just happened. An act of god. An existential manifestation.

The tactic worked, just as it has for the past twenty-five years. The process bears examination in some detail, because from it some crucial aspects of Zionism can be learned.

It begins February 22 with the issuing of an official Israeli communiqué, which states that Israeli jet fighters had "approached the plane and instructed it to land in accordance with international regulations. . . .

"When the plane took no notice of the instructions and the warning shots that were fired, it was intercepted by Israeli planes. The hit plane landed inside Sinai 20 kilometers and crashed."

Next, Prime Minister Golda Meir bolsters the story: "The Government of Israel expresses its deep sorrow at the loss of life resulting from the crash of the Libyan plane in Sinai and regrets that the Libyan pilot did not respond to the repeated warnings that were given in accordance with international procedure."

The stage has been set: There is no explicit mention of the fact that Israelis shot the plane down. It was "hit," says the communiqué; it "crashed," says Meir. Also, the most important thing is that the pilot "did not respond to repeated orders to

land." That turned out to be lie number one, as we shall see.

But Meir's statement and the official communiqué do not suffice. They are a bit too weasel-worded to stand alone. Israeli leaders have a reputation for brutally frank pragmatism—the old pioneering spirit. Meir decides to call out the brass.

Major General Mordecai Hod is the commander of the Israeli air force. On February 22 he explains that the Libyan plane was flying over sensitive military areas and that the Israeli pilots "tried desperately to force it down, not shoot it down." He provides evidence to support the key point—that the plane had refused orders to land. He does this by claiming that the copilot survived, and he quotes the injured man as follows: "Because of the relations between our two countries, we decided we'd better try to get away from here."

The quotation has a rather Kissingeresque ring, very uncharacteristic of a Libyan pilot. And no wonder. It turns out to be a deliberate lie. Within days, the Israelis were forced



FLY ME!

to concede that the plane had received no warning to land and that the copilot did not even know that the jet fighters were Israeli until the plane was hit.

But this does not come out until several days later. By then, nobody remembers that the commander of the Israeli Air Force made up a story—



DAYAN: Adds a hundred more to his collection of Arab dead.

presumably because he expected the copilot to be silenced by death.

Next, the Israelis leak some statements to the press from unidentified "officers." Here is one from the February 22 *New York Times*:

"What were we to do? Let a Libyan plane roam at will through our air space? How could we guarantee that it wasn't a kamikaze plane loaded with explosives headed for an Israeli city?" He adds that several weeks ago Israel had received information that some fedayeen were planning to do just that.

Everyone knows the fedayeen are animals capable of anything. Then the regime presses ahead again. It produces one of the pilots who shot the plane down. The press obligingly treats the man sympathetically. He seemed "clearly distressed," reports the *New York Times*. But the pilot unwittingly exposes the unidentified officer as a liar: "When the [Suez] canal was already in view and only one minute's flying time away," he says, "I shot at the wing to force him to land before he could reach the coast. Red flames and black smoke came from the wings."

The fedayeen kamikaze plane is now placed, at the moment of the attack, almost at the Egyptian border and heading west toward Egypt. It doesn't really matter. The point about the

fedayeen has already been made. It will stick.

The next man on the scene is the greatest liar of them all—Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. He describes the incident as a "tragedy" and places blame: "I don't like to blame a dead man for what happened, but he is the only one to be blamed."

Then he proceeds to another lie. He says the "black box"—the tape that records all radio contacts during a flight and that therefore could definitively establish whether in fact the pilot refused orders to land—has not been found. Reporters who visited the crash site said they saw an intact portion of the control panel marked "flight recorder." But the black box was missing. Two days later, after the Egyptian government released the control-tower tape of the flight, the Israelis miraculously produced the black box. No one remembered that Dayan had said it had not been found.

Dayan also added a touch of the bizarre to his press conference. He explained that although he had not been consulted in advance, he still supported the decision of the military to shoot down the plane. Why? "Had I been the pilot of one of the Israeli planes, I might have thought it was a hijacked plane I was following." No one seemed to notice the implication.

Other Israeli officials were brought forward. Minister of Transportation Shimon Peres explained that Israel had "acted in accordance" with all "international principles regarding the penetration of airspace of another country."

By February 22, after the communiqué, the Meir statement, and the various press conferences, everything seemed well in hand. But then, later on February 22, the Egyptian government released a tape recording of conversations between the pilot of the Libyan plane, Captain Jacques Bourges, and the Cairo airport control tower.

The voice of the pilot is heard clearly.

Bourges: "I guess we have some trouble with the heading." (The *New York Times* noted that this was said "with the calm of a man in minor difficulty.")

Then the pilot spotted some planes: "We now have four MIG fighter planes

behind us. Can you give us a radar fix?"

And moments later: "We are shot at by the fighters! We are shot at by the fighters!"

The Israeli story thus crumbles completely. The pilot had received no order to land. He thought he was over Egyptian territory; he thought the fighters were Egyptian planes.

The Israeli government responded on February 24. It admitted that it had found the "black box"—allegedly just that morning—and that the information released by Cairo had been accurate. A retreat was called for. It was arranged by Moshe Dayan.

That afternoon he held another press conference. He retracted his earlier statement that the pilot had been the "only" man to blame for the incident. Now, he admitted, Israel was guilty of "an error of judgment." But he only partially abandoned the original position. The pilot, he said, bears "serious responsibility" because he did not recognize the fighters as U.S.-made Phantoms and because he lost his way in bad weather. "I think you have a right to expect more than that from a trained international pilot," Dayan said. And he emphasized the point by insisting that Israel should not pay compensation to the victims' relatives because that would imply "guilt."

The next day, February 25, after mounting international pressure from many countries (but not the United States or Western European countries), the government changed its mind. After a three-and-a-half-hour special cabinet meeting, a statement was released explaining that payments would be made to victims' relatives "in deference to humanitarian considerations." The reparations did not imply acknowledgment of guilt, the statement said. Dayan announced he agreed completely with the decision.

In the meantime, Israeli political parties were being heard from. Menachim Beigin, leader of the right-wing opposition Gahal bloc, former leader of the Irgun, and organizer of the 1948 massacre at the Arab village of Deir Yassin, expressed his indignation at United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, who had asked for an inquiry into the incident.

*Al-Hamishmar*, organ of the Mappam party, a "left" Zionist outfit, protested the fact that people were com-



plaining about Israel's actions: "The campaign of vilification being waged against Israel without any factual justification must be rejected unequivocally."

The progressive application of the Zionist tactic appears now to be complete. Consider what has transpired. The Israeli Air Force shot down a passenger plane; the government told a series of outright lies; and at the end of the incident, the regime pats itself on the back for its own "humanitarian" consideration for the unfortunate victims of a tragedy.

The Western press dutifully reported each lie, and had nothing to say about the exposure of each lie. The action of the Zionist regime was criticized, but only in the context of the unfavorable effect it might have on peace negotiations in the Middle East. There was no questioning of either the veracity or the morality of the Israeli regime.

The question remains, why did the Israeli Air Force do it? The answer is to be sought in the nature of Zionism. As an inherently expansionist state founded on the denial of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs and implanted into a region that is socially and demographically Arab, the Zionist state must continually demonstrate its military superiority to the Arab states.

It stands in permanent conflict with an evolving movement for revolutionary social change and depends for its existence on humiliating the entire Arab nation. The permanent demoralization of the people of the Arab East is a requirement for the Zionist state.

Zionist military strategy derives from these needs. Periodic terror raids against civilians in neighboring Arab countries (one of which took place in Lebanon on the same day the airliner was shot down) are one manifestation of this strategy. The downing of the Libyan plane was another.

Whether the decision to do it was made at the cabinet level or by some low-ranking air force officer is immaterial. The fact remains that it served a strategic purpose. The absolute military hegemony of the Zionist state was demonstrated once again. And its political strength was shown as well. If Israel can get away with a blatant act of unprovoked mass murder and pass it off as an unavoidable tragedy for which it bears no

responsibility, are there any limits to what the Zionist state can do?

That message goes out to the Arab states. The message to the masses of the Arab East is related. On February 23, Israel returned the bodies of 100 of the victims to Egyptian authorities. The *New York Times* reported that they were placed in plastic bags "inside unpainted wooden crates that appeared to have been hastily hammered together. Several of the

crates had two-inch gaps between the planks, and big crooked nails protruded at many of the edges."

It is inconceivable that this should have been done by accident. It was simply a way of letting the Arabs know that whatever face-saving retreats the Israeli government was compelled to make, nobody was sorry after all. The victims were only Arabs, tertiary pawns in a game being played by powers beyond their control. □

## Zionist Achievements Not Only in the Air

### Israeli Political Prisoners Tortured

Israeli Minister of Police Shlomo Hillel has denied that the persons arrested in connection with the case of the "espionage and sabotage network" have been tortured. (See *Intercontinental Press*, January 29, 1973, p. 73 for the facts of the case and the witch-hunt launched by the government around it.)

Hillel has further stated that none of the prisoners have complained to their lawyers about the treatment they have gotten. The February 26 issue of *Intercontinental Press* (p. 201) published the text of a newspaper advertisement refuting Hillel's claims. Since then, we have received the text of a letter written by Felicia Langer, a lawyer, to Superintendent Sasson of the Department of Special Duties, Nazareth police. In it she details the torture of one of her clients arrested on charges relating to the "spy case."

The information revealed in the letter is stark, and should be recognizable, even by a policeman, as constituting a complaint. It may therefore be assumed that Sasson cannot read, or that the minister of police is not informed of communications of national importance received by his underlings, or that Shlomo Hillel is a liar. (A combination of factors is of course possible.)

Langer's letter deals with Shauki Khatib, whose case is of special interest. Rami Livneh, one of the Jews arrested in the spy case, "confessed" to having failed to inform the police about the network, even though he supposedly knew it existed. The February 2 issue of the Tel Aviv daily

*Haaretz* quoted Langer as giving this account of the origin of Livneh's confession: "His [Livneh's] friend Shauki Khatib was brought to his cell. Rami was told that his friend would be tortured until he—Rami—would speak. This was done three times. In the end, Rami spoke, and gave a declaration under this pressure. He wanted to keep silent until the case came to court, and this is the legal right of every citizen; but when he heard how they tortured his friend Shauki Khatib, he broke down and spoke."

Livneh himself has charged that he was badly beaten. But much worse treatment was reserved for his friend Khatib, who after all, is only an Arab. Here is Langer's letter:

\* \* \*

On January 25, 1973, I interviewed Shauki Khatib in the Yagur prison. He had signed a power-of-attorney for me, something he had wanted to do for some time.

I heard serious complaints from my client about the torture he had undergone during his interrogation. He described this as follows:

On the fourth day of his imprisonment, on or about December 8, 1972, the interrogators brought a white electric cable and a racket similar to a tennis racket into the room where my client was being questioned. The interrogators, whose names my client does not know, then stripped him naked and began to poke his testicles with this cable. The cable was not connected to an electrical outlet. They

told him, "We will castrate you and somebody else will sleep with your wife." (I should like to point out that the word "sleep" is my creation; the interrogators' word was unprintable.)

After this, they allowed him to dress and began to hit him with the racket. My client states that he received at least thirty blows. The interrogators also began pulling his hair while he was seated on a chair.

This went on for awhile, and then he was ordered to strip again, at which time one of the interrogators said to another, "Go on and connect the cable. This son of a whore should be castrated; we have found somebody to sleep with his wife in his place."

The cable was not connected this time either, and Shauki Khatib was permitted to dress again. At that time, the interrogators beat him all over his body with their fists. This questioning was carried out simultaneously by several interrogators, all of whom were dressed in mufti. They used aliases, like "Abu Jamil" and "Abu Assam," which were exchanged among them so that my client would not be able to tell if a particular alias belonged to a particular interrogator.

On or about December 26, 1972, after Rami Livneh was arrested, my client states that another period of brutal treatment began. He was again questioned, while the interrogators pulled out his hair and lifted him out of his chair by the hair.

On one occasion—my client does not remember the date—the interrogators beat him on the head with a club until he fainted, and they had to keep holding him up so that he would not fall down.

After the arrest of Rami Livneh, my client was brought from Acre, where he had been imprisoned, to Yagur prison to persuade Rami Livneh to make a confession. When this failed, they returned my client to Acre. During this period, my client was beaten and kicked regularly every day.

Around the first week of January, my client was transferred to the same cell as Rami Livneh. One evening, between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m., he was taken out to be questioned. His interrogators stripped him, put him under a shower, and poured cold water on him.

After this, he was taken to a room, where he was blindfolded, and something like a plaster was attached to

his leg. Suddenly, his whole body was convulsed, his mouth fell open as if he wanted to cry out, but he could not, for his mouth was painfully convulsed. My client believes that he received electric shock.

This torture, including the cold-water shower, was repeated, my client says, three times during that evening. The interrogators told my client that this treatment would be continued until Rami Livneh agreed to talk.

During the interrogation, when my client tried to protest to his interrogators, they told him, "We are the Knesset [the Israeli parliament], the judges, and your God too." One of them took a piece of paper, crushed it, and threw it into a wastepaper basket, saying to my client, "This is what I think of the law."

My client was also subjected to threats that he had better keep his mouth shut and not complain about what was being done to him; otherwise he would suffer more.

I address your honor to ask you, as the person in charge of the interrogation of my client, to check this grave complaint without delay.

It is unnecessary to point out that the cruel method of interrogation my client describes is a severe infraction of basic human rights and puts to scorn every law and custom of interrogating a suspect when he is without help or succor.

I am awaiting your early reply.

\* \* \*

In addition to the information about Livneh and Khatib, we have also received news from the Israeli League for the Defense of Human Rights [Post Office Box 14192, Tel Aviv] about other defendants in the "espionage and sabotage" case.

Meli Lerman is another of Felicia Langer's clients. She had also appealed to Superintendent Sasson to investigate his treatment. A January 18 information sheet released by the League describes that treatment:

"[Lerman] was beaten repeatedly. The main torture took place on December 30, 1972, in the prison of Akko (Acre). There were two torturers, one dressed in civilian clothes, the other in military uniform. He was ordered to lie on the floor. When he refused, he was thrown down and his torturers trampled on him

and beat him repeatedly. He does not remember how long it took.

"When he was ordered to stand up, he could not, and was forcibly raised and held up while his torturers slapped him in the face and insulted him. He was asked repeatedly how many times he had sexual relations with his wife, and how he could continue to have sexual relations if his genitals were burnt like those of Shauki Khatib."

The League also reported the case of Ahmed Mahmoud Hawari, who was badly beaten and partially lost his hearing. His requests for medical aid were denied for a long time.

Others beaten include Muhammed Dasuki, Subhi Naarani, Fawaz Turki, Rasan Agbariya, Simon Haddad, Ali Sammariya, Hannah Subit, and Salah Jabrin. □

## Correction

The article "Position of the Ligue Communiste on Vietnam Accords" published in the February 19 *Intercontinental Press*, page 188, contained a typographical error in the original French that was preserved in the English translation.

In the section discussing the situation created by the U.S.-China and U.S.-Soviet detentes, this sentence appeared (p. 189, second column, end of the second paragraph): "In this new situation, the Indochinese fighters were able much more easily than in the past to play on Soviet-Chinese 'competition' in order to increase an aid that had been doled out with an eye-dropper."

The sentence should have read that the Indochinese fighters were able much *less* easily to play on that competition.

## Coming

"The 'Second Serfdom' in Central and Eastern Europe" by George Novack.

An illuminating essay on the way rising capitalism revived feudal forms in one part of Europe while it destroyed them in another. Touches on the dispute over the existence of feudal forms in Latin America.

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## Caamaño Reported Killed in Guerrilla Clash

By David Thorstad

In a speech to some 60,000 people during the 1965 Dominican revolt, Francisco Alberto Caamaño Deñó promised that he would die "fighting for my ideals, and do so with my boots on." Official reports from the Dominican Republic some seven and a half years later claim that Caamaño's pledge became a reality on February 16 when he and two other men were reportedly killed in a clash with government troops in the mountainous southern part of the country. The three dead men were said to be part of a guerrilla band that reportedly invaded the country at the beginning of the month. (See *Intercontinental Press* February 26, p. 199.)

The other two guerrillas were identified as Heriberto Geordano Lalane José and Wellington Ascanio Peterson Pietersz. The government did not say how it determined the identity of the three men.

On February 19, a Dominican student living in Cuba whose name was Wellington Ascanio Peterson Pietersz showed up at the Prensa Latina offices in Havana, Dominican passport in hand, to prove that he had in fact not been killed in the mountains of the Dominican Republic. The Balaguer regime's response to this apparent contradiction was to insist on the accuracy of its original story.

All three victims were buried in a common grave in the mountains on February 17. No journalists were allowed to witness the burial, though two were granted permission to view and photograph the bodies beforehand. One, José Goudy Pratt, said there could be no doubt about the identity of Caamaño. "The physical features of the man who led the constitutionalist revolution of 1965 were unmistakable," he said in an account in the February 17 issue of the Dominican *Ultima Hora*. "He was much thinner than he was then; his abdomen was pulled way in, but his chest seemed broad and strong.

"This was Caamaño with his smooth forehead. All the features of his face,

including his premature baldness, were easily recognizable.

"His eyes, like those of his compañeros, were slightly open. He had a glaring bullet wound in the left side of his abdomen and another one, deeper and wider, on the right side of his head between the forehead and the temple."

In spite of such accounts and the publication of numerous photographs, however, many Dominicans remained skeptical. Skeptics included Caamaño's family, which sent a letter to President Balaguer asking that his body be returned to them so that it could be given a Christian burial and that their doubts could be laid to rest. The letter, signed by the former colonel's father, retired Lieutenant General Fausto E. Caamaño, said in part: "Because of the fact that for years Francis's very existence and actions have given rise to a series of assumptions, statements that were subsequently denied, and assertions that were later modified, thereby surrounding his life with a kind of legend, it is natural, in spite of the photographic evidence in yesterday's papers, for our family, which is submerged in a sea of doubts, to be overcome with the terrible question as to whether he did in fact die in an encounter with the country's armed forces." Caamaño's father was a key figure in the Trujillo dictatorship. During the first days of the alleged guerrilla invasion, he joined in signing a statement of continued support to the Balaguer regime.

Approximately a week after the letter was sent, however, a spokesman for the family "who did not want to be identified" told United Press International that accounts that the family did not accept the government's version of the incident were untrue.

Following the family's appeal, Balaguer said that the body could not be exhumed until "the impact that this action might have on public order" was studied. Subsequently, Caamaño's father told the press that it was still "not the right moment" for digging up the body.

In addition to the identities of the alleged guerrillas, other questions and inconsistencies remain. In announcing the death of Caamaño on February 16, for instance, the military put the date of the guerrilla landing as February 3. Earlier the date given was February 4. No explanation for the discrepancy has been offered.

The government charged that the guerrillas were sent by Cuba and were in league with the main opposition political leader in the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch. No proof has yet been presented to back up these charges.

The government also initially claimed that it possessed proof that the guerrillas were led by an officer with links to former general Elías Wessin y Wessin. Wessin y Wessin was Caamaño's principal opponent during the 1965 Santo Domingo rebellion.

The official version of the death of the three men states that they were killed together. One of the journalists who viewed the bodies, however, reported that Caamaño was killed alone, according to a combined Reuters and Agence France-Presse dispatch in the February 20 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*.

A high military official told José Goudy Pratt that the guerrilla band was surrounded the night of February 15. "It was revealed that a force of regular troops encountered the guerrillas at that time and ordered them to halt, not daring to open fire for fear that they might actually be some of their own compañeros from the army. Caamaño and his men took advantage of this moment to slip out of the encirclement and cross the highway to the northeast.

"At this point, it was learned, an army truck went by carrying a number of soldiers, including one who was wounded. Caamaño and his men opened up on the truck, hitting it forty-three times. They also threw a grenade at the vehicle.

"All the occupants of the truck were wounded. . . .

"Caamaño and his group then headed into the pine trees on the northeast side, continuing to fight. The following day, Friday, the insurgents were encircled in front of the area of Arabia [a section of the mountains], where they died fighting the troops."

Caamaño is widely admired in the



Colonel Francisco Alberto Caamaño Deno (far left) guarded by armed rebels and surrounded by cheering followers in Santo Domingo, May 10, 1965.

Dominican Republic for his leading role in the 1965 revolt that aimed to restore constitutional democracy to the government. The rebellion began April 25 with the overthrow of the United States-backed military junta that overthrew the constitutional government of Juan Bosch in 1963. Army forces headed by General Wessin y Wessin, supported by some 30,000 Yankee troops ordered by then President Lyndon Johnson to invade the Dominican Republic, sought to maintain the military dictatorship.

Caamaño armed thousands of citizens and the rebel forces held a section of Santo Domingo for some five months until an armistice was signed and a provisional government set up headed by Héctor García Godoy.

Caamaño was sent to London in January 1966 as the military attaché of the provisional government. He remained in this post after the new government of Balaguer came in, in July 1966, and held it until he disappeared without a trace on October 23, 1967, in The Hague. Since then his whereabouts and fate have been surrounded by nothing but rumor.

Some thought he might have been murdered by foreign agents of the Balaguer regime. Soon after his disappearance he was rumored to be in Cuba, allegedly receiving guerrilla training. In April 1969, Venezuelan journalists reported Caamaño to be in Caracas, and he was also said to have been spotted in Argentina. None of these rumors was ever confirmed.

A curious touch to all this is the fact that in January, less than a month

before Caamaño's alleged death in the mountains of his native country, Dominican security officials themselves stated in Caracas that the former colonel had been killed last year in Cuba, where he was said to have been living.

Major General Enrique Pérez y Pérez was asked by journalists if he had any proof that Caamaño had in fact been killed during combat. According to Moisés Adolfo Iturbides, writing in the February 17 issue of the Santo Domingo daily *El Nacional de Ahora!*, the army chief of staff replied: "You and every other Dominican know that this guy had to be killed fighting. He didn't surrender because he was a wild beast."

Whatever the facts surrounding the alleged invasion by the handful of alleged guerrillas, one thing remains quite clear: Balaguer is taking full advantage of the incident to crush his political opposition. Most of the repression seems to have come down on Bosch's Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD—Dominican Revolutionary party). Although the government will not say how many have been arrested, the figure would seem to be quite high. Winston Arnaud, secretary general of the PRD's United States section, told a news conference in Washington, D. C., February 21 that some 1,400 to 1,500 members and sympathizers of his party had been jailed during the preceding three weeks. He added, according to a UPI report in the February 22 issue of the New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario-La*

*Prensa*, that "the official repression is getting worse by the day."

The only reason the police are giving for arresting anyone, reported Bolívar Díaz Gómez in the February 18 issue of *El Nacional*, is, in the words of the police themselves, "to investigate him in connection with matters of interest to the police."

In his news conference, Arnaud cast doubt on the government story about a guerrilla invasion: "We do not know, nor does it really matter much, if the alleged guerrilla movement exists or not. What is certain is that Balaguer is taking advantage of the situation to deal a severe blow to the PRD."

Arnaud said that all the party's offices in the Dominican Republic have been taken over by troops.

Both Bosch and José Francisco Peña Gómez, the party's top leaders, have gone into hiding. From his hideout, Bosch has demanded that Balaguer produce proof of his charges that he and "other political leaders" had anything to do with the guerrillas. He has voiced concern that if found, he and Peña Gómez might be deported.

Balaguer is thought to be cracking down on his opposition in order to insure his reelection when his term expires in May 1974, although he has not yet officially indicated his intention to run. His strategy appears to be to split his opposition by isolating the PRD from the other non-Balaguerist forces. Several parties, including the PRD and rightist forces, have reached agreement to form a Committee for the Defense of Human Rights whose aim would be to oppose illegal acts by the government. In addition to the PRD, the groups involved are the PRSC (Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano—Revolutionary Social-Christian party), the MIDA (Movimiento de Integración Democrática Antireeleccionista—Anti-reelection Movement for Democratic Integration), and the PQD (Partido Quisqueyano Demócrata—Democratic Quisqueyano party, a far-right group led by Wessin y Wessin).

Balaguer appears to want to break up this already shaky coalition by persuading the other groups that they are being "used" by the PRD, which he seeks to portray as a deceptive outfit hiding behind a cloak of legal-

ity in order to organize guerrilla warfare. And while he seems to be in no rush to make his unconvincing portrait of the liberal PRD more per-

suasive, he is losing no time at all in his drive to destroy the ability of the party, his most serious opposition, to function. □

## Jailed Oppositionists Describe Torture

### Student Protest Continues in Greece

There would seem to be no reason why an officer of the tank corps should be present at a medical school faculty meeting called to choose a new professor of psychiatry. But reason or not, in Greece it happens. And the students, who have never showed signs of being happy about it, appear now to be prepared to do something about it.

A week of university protest during early February was capped February 16 by a police assault on demonstrators in downtown Athens. (See *Intercontinental Press*, February 26, p. 204.) But neither that show of government force, nor the regime's new tactic of drafting dissident students, nor the trial of eleven student leaders arrested during the first wave of demonstrations has broken the student movement.

On February 21 about 2,000 Athens University students staged a sit-in at the university's law school. The action, held to demand an end to government intervention at the university and repeal of the February 12 decree providing for drafting antigovernment students, followed a rally of more than 5,000 students.

Crowds of sympathetic students from schools all over Athens gathered outside the law school, shouting "We want academic freedom!" and "We want our boys back," a reference to more than one hundred students who have been drafted under the new regulation.

The government tried to convince the students that the draft decree was for their own good. An official statement explained that military service would help the students "mature," so that "they could approach their studies with a heightened sense of responsibility."

The students did not agree. Demonstrations against the decree reportedly continued through February 24.

Some university officials have

begun to make minimal concessions in an effort to quiet the students. At the Panteios School of Political Science and Economics, the administration agreed to student representation, but without vote, at meetings of the ruling body. Also, the students were granted a voting representative on the disciplinary committee.

The trial of eleven students who had been arrested February 14 when police broke up a student meeting at the Athens Polytechnic Institute did not go as the regime had planned. The students were charged with "insulting the authorities."

Defense witnesses at a February 18 hearing before a three-judge civilian court testified that the police attack on the meeting violated guarantees that had been given by the police commander that the students would be allowed to leave peacefully.

About three dozen former cabinet ministers, retired generals, and professors testified in support of the students. Former Premier Panayotis Kanellopoulos, a conservative politician whose cabinet was toppled by the colonels' coup in 1967, said that the students on trial had his "full support for standing up in defense of academic freedom," the February 22 *New York Times* reported.

On February 19, eight of the defendants were given suspended sentences ranging from eight to eleven months. Three defendants were acquitted outright. The presiding judge justified this "leniency" by expressing the "hope that one day they will render service to society."

Other opponents of the dictatorship have not fared as well. On January 20, a special military court sentenced retired Lieutenant Colonel Anastasios Minis, a hero of the Greek resistance to the Nazi occupation, to nine years and eight months in prison. Dr. Ste-

fanos Pandelakis, a well-known pediatrician, was condemned to seven years and eight months in prison. They were accused of founding AAA (Anti-stasis, Apeleutherosis, Anexartesi—Resistance, Liberation, Independence), an opposition group that has claimed credit for a number of symbolic bombings in Athens.

Minis and Pandelakis charged that they signed confessions under torture, the February 21 *New York Times* reported. Pandelakis's statement, which was distributed by members of his family, said he was arrested last April 22, and that when he refused to provide the information demanded by the security police, he was taken to a back room.

The statement continued: "Swearing, using insulting language and laughing at me, they took off my jacket, made me lie down on the bench on my back, took off my trousers and shorts, tied up my legs, hands and body tightly with a thick rope and covered my face with a towel so I couldn't see.

"They told me I had five minutes left to talk before they would deal with me. I continued to keep silent and I suddenly felt a pointed object scratching the skin of my lower abdomen. After a while, when someone gave the word, the machine was switched on and I started to feel excruciating pain.

"I thought that they were tearing my flesh. I was violently twitching and jerking. This became increasingly more intense as they moved it all around my stomach and genitals. I was howling with pain."

The electric-shock torture continued at regular intervals until Pandelakis finally had enough.

"I got up dizzily. I picked up my trousers and was taken down to the second floor. I signed what they wanted. It must have been 2 o'clock in the morning."

A similar statement from Colonel Minis said that he had been forced to stand for eleven days and nights, during which time he had been beaten by soldiers.

"My feet are so swollen that the flesh overflows my shoes like a cake that overflows its pan," his statement said, adding:

"I've lost the sense of time. It becomes day, noon and night and I stand always at the same place, sleepless, beaten and insulted." □

# After the French Legislative Elections

By Henri Weber

[The following article appeared in the February 10 issue of *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

The least you can say is that the majority does not have nerves of steel. "Whatever the outcome of the battle," a fiery Sanguinetti told an assembly of UDR [Union de Démocrates pour la République—Union of Democrats for the Republic, the Gaullists] cadres, "don't ever be discouraged. Since this country was born, it has had some terrible moments. But it has always pulled out of them. If we are not victorious tomorrow, we will again fall back on what has always been Gaullism's real calling: retreating to fight another day."

As for UDR General Secretary Alain Peyrefitte, he quickly became very polite to the reformers, and even to the Socialists, whom he offered temporary ministerial posts—if only they would break with the CP!

It seems the news is really alarming. The latest SOFRES [Société Française d'Enquêtes par Sondages—French Association of Public Opinion Surveys] poll showed 47 percent intending to vote for the left (an increase of 1 percent) and only 36 percent for the URP (a decrease of 2 percent). The gap widens.

As *Le Figaro* sadly editorialized: "Of the three possible variants—the present coalition retaining its majority, the balance of power swinging to the reformers, and the united left winning a majority—the first has lost a bit of its credibility. And if the second now appears more likely, the third, complete victory for the left, can no longer be excluded as totally unrealistic."

What kind of political situation will result from the coming elections? What new opportunities and responsibilities will it present to revolutionists? We must now ask these questions. Because whatever the importance of our

election campaign, it means nothing unless it prepares us for the postelection period, when the class struggle will leave the sterile ground of bourgeois parliamentarism and return to its preferred terrain: the factories and the street.

Of all the possible variants, one seems to us to be almost completely out of the question: the pure and simple return to the status quo. All indications are that the majority will suffer some kind of defeat. The depth of this defeat will determine the new political situation. In this respect, two possibilities must be considered.

### Reformers Hold the Balance

The first possibility, and the most likely one, is that the URP will lose its absolute majority in parliament, the united left will reach or slightly exceed a plurality, and the reformers will hold the balance of power. This variant corresponds—irony of the polls, no doubt—to the secret prediction made this week by the chief director of the Ministry of the Interior.

What would be the political situation after such a vote?

The Pompidou regime would be seriously weakened. Internal divisions within the majority, temporarily concealed in order to counter the Union of the Left's offensive, would be freshly exacerbated. Independent Republicans and Duhamelian centrists, less badly damaged by universal suffrage than the UDR, would loudly clamor for a redistribution of posts. Inside the UDR itself, clique warfare would again be in full swing. Even though the electoral setback might not have really been so stinging, it still might precipitate the outfit's fracturing into hostile tendencies.

The extension of the majority to include Lecanuet's centrists, done at great cost, would still more exacerbate the coalitions' heterogeneity.

This frayed and divided regime would necessarily have to take unpopular measures that the Messmer government has put off because of

the elections. In a world situation marked by a resurgence of the monetary crisis and an intensification of competition, it would be necessary to try to stifle the galloping inflation and to push forward attempts to rationalize French capitalism.

The situation would be even more precarious in that the government would be faced with a rather hostile working class. The majority's electoral defeat, the relative strengthening of the Union of the Left, would in fact stimulate popular militancy. *This would be registered all the more firmly in struggles, since all hopes of achieving change through the ballot box would have been disappointed and would become in any case a dead letter until 1976.*

For six months the CP and the CGT [Confédération Générale des Travailleurs—General Confederation of Labor, the country's largest trade-union federation] have been popularizing the slogans of the common program, especially those in the chapter called "a better life." They have been knocking themselves out to convince the workers that these demands are well-founded and realistic. It is impossible that the workers would wait another three years to put them into effect. What they couldn't get at the ballot box they will try to get in struggle.

### A Situation of Partial Upsurges

This situation would be highly favorable for revolutionists. Of course, the reformist leaders will not sit around with folded arms. Séguy [head of the CGT] has already declared that if a reactionary government is reestablished, the CGT will take the initiative and launch struggles. But then it would be possible to outflank the apparatus, both on the goals and the forms of struggle.

As to goals, the workers' vanguard will put forward, as it has done in the past, unifying demands (egalitarian wage scales, and so on) that challenge the capitalist organization of labor.

Gaining support around these demands and utilizing, by going beyond them, certain aspects of the common program, revolutionists will press agitation for workers' control.

In the chapter entitled "Democracy in the Factory," the common program projects a certain number of measures

aimed at limiting the employers' absolute power. In the paragraph called "control of labor" it says: "The factory and work-place committees and the personnel delegates — including delegates from the shops and departments wherever these exist in the factory — must be consulted on all decisions involving hiring and firing, distribution of positions, transfers, classification of workers, setting of the work pace, and more generally, all working conditions. . . . Implementation of these decisions shall be held in abeyance until agreement is reached among all concerned parties."

In previous issues, we have stressed all the ambiguities of these formulations. Suppose, as is inevitable, that the "parties concerned" fail to "reach agreement." Then who makes the decision?

The common program implicitly concedes that the employer will decide. If the parties really can't reach agreement, it says on page 109, then "the employees' representatives can appeal to the labor courts."

Starting from the criticism of these equivocal formulations, and strongly conscious of the workers' democratic aspirations, revolutionists will press for *workers' control with veto power* over firings, hirings, transfers, distribution of occupational positions, the way wages are paid, the work pace, health and security conditions, in short, all working conditions.

This control must be exercised by control committees composed of delegates from the shops, the assembly lines, or the departments, democratically elected by their fellow workers, responsible to them, and recallable at any time. Their functioning must involve opening the companies' books and management records, as the common program itself calls for. The control committees must be accorded a sufficient time during each workday to consult with the workers and to discharge their duties.

As far as the forms of struggle are concerned, revolutionists will redouble their efforts to force the bureaucracy to accept the democratic organization of strikes, through the formation of strike committees elected and empowered to act by all the workers, organized and unorganized. As in the past, they will try to establish an alliance in struggle of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie by setting up support committees.



POMPIDOU: Wants to stay around, one way or the other.

The fight for workers' control and for the democratic organization of struggles will permit the strengthening of the workers' capacity and desire for self-management, indispensable preconditions for the seizure of power.

### And If the Union of the Left Wins

Official spokesmen for the majority claim that a victory for the Union of the Left would precipitate an open crisis for the regime. In his article published in the *Revue des deux mondes*, Pierre Messmer put it down in black and white: If the Union of the Left wins, the government team will not step down. Georges Pompidou will not invite François Mitterrand to carry out a program he considers diametrically opposed to his own. The President of the Republic will try to gain time through a whole series of stalling maneuvers. The ruling class and its state apparatus will use this time to provoke chaos and to turn the situation around.

Already, Giscard d'Estaing [the finance minister] has threatened: "I stress these words," he told a group of URP cadres. "The overthrow of the structures of the French economy that have been proposed to us, the setting up of an expropriating bureaucracy . . . would break our economic spirit and create, within the space of eighteen months, the prob-

lems of unemployment and foreign deficit."

The ruling class will not allow the country to be thrown into depression and panic. It will not hesitate to activate the fascist groups that today lie dormant inside the state apparatus and the UDR.

*This refusal to submit to the 'verdict of universal suffrage' is very dangerous for the ruling class.* It will do more to demystify legalism and bourgeois electoralism than 100,000 propaganda campaigns waged by the revolutionary far left. It will at one stroke provoke the indignation and anger of thousands of workers.

These workers will seek to impose by direct action what they could not attain by following the rules of the bourgeois game.

The class struggle in France will then move to a basic test of strength, in the short term, between the workers fighting to establish a Union of the Left government and the big bourgeoisie, determined at all costs to block the Mitterrand-Marchais team.

In this variant, the revolutionists will have to foster the formation and centralization of popular committees uniting the workers and all tendencies aiming at driving Pompidou out of power (by mass demonstrations in the streets and by strikes) and at instituting a workers' government in his place. The sharp tension of the political and social climate will make agitating for and organizing workers' self-defense especially crucial.

### Prepare for a Rise of Struggles

This solution, as we said, is very dangerous for the ruling class, given the current relationship of class forces. Not only because it would demolish the masses' legalistic illusions, but also because the outcome of the test of strength is not at all assured. That is why, whatever the current bombast of Messmer, Peyrefitte, and Company, it is not at all obvious to us that the bourgeoisie will take this road in the event of a Union of the Left victory.

If they can't bring off some kind of compromise, especially, for example, by buying off Radical and Socialist deputies, it is not impossible that they would prefer appealing directly to Mitterrand, rather than risk under the worst conditions a basic test of strength with the working class.

The President of the Republic would

then hope that he could sufficiently discredit the Union of the Left government to get away with dissolving the Chamber of Deputies within three months and assuring the UDR's return to power.

It goes without saying that his relations with the leftist government would be marked by great conflict. The political tasks would then revert to the preceding case: forming popular committees to force the demands to be met and make Pompidou either submit or resign. Again a test of strength would be likely in a short time.

But whatever the results of the March 4 and 11 balloting, one thing

is sure: In any case, we must prepare for a new upsurge of struggle, a development that will bring about a situation where it will be possible for the rank and file to outflank the reformist leaderships, a situation that will be favorable for revolutionists rooting themselves among the workers.

While today the reformist apparatuses have the initiative and the revolutionists are generally constrained to base their policies around the apparatuses, a completely different situation is on the agenda for the spring of 1973. Starting now, the revolutionists must prepare for it. □

## Aims to Strengthen Its Base

### Ligue Communiste on the Campaign Trail

As part of its aggressive election campaign, the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International, is holding meetings all over the country. These meetings provide an opportunity to confront the other candidates, to make the Ligue known, and to consolidate already existing support.

The February 17 issue of the Ligue's newspaper, *Rouge*, contains a number of reports on meetings held during the previous week.

In Rouen, for instance, 400 people attended a meeting called to support the 331 doctors who signed a pro-abortion manifesto February 5. Among the speakers was Dr. Michel Vivet, a signer of the manifesto and a member of the Ligue.

"More than two-thirds of the participants in the meeting were women," reported *Rouge*. "A lively discussion followed, dealing in particular with the question of what form the struggle should take and what kind of slogans to raise. A support committee was formed to back the five Rouen doctors who signed; it includes a whole series of organizations, except for those of the PCF [Parti Communiste Français—French Communist party]."

The fact that this was the third meeting of 400 people in twelve days in Rouen gives some idea of the kind of response the Ligue is receiving in its campaign.

Another meeting was held in the city of Sète, a stronghold of the CP for years. More than 200 people attended a debate there between the candidates of the Ligue, of the Socialist party, and of the CP—the CP candidate also being the mayor of the city. The topic was "Change, Yes, but How?" Four hours of discussions followed between the Ligue's candidate, a dozen members of the CP, and activists of the CP-dominated union, the CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor) on questions like the nature of capitalist exploitation, working conditions, nationalization, and workers' control.

Among other meetings reported were those in Aix-en-Provence, Dreux, Montpellier, Nantes, (700-800 people), Orléans (300), and Rennes (1,000).

The same issue of *Rouge* reported on the Ligue's campaign in the city of Toulouse, where the far left "has a sizable audience." The Ligue's campaign there, *Rouge* explains "thus does not aim at 'getting ourselves known,' but at strengthening our base in the shops and in the neighborhoods. The axis of our campaign is to do more than carry out activities for activity's sake. We are trying to involve as many sympathizers as possible in whatever we do, giving a great deal of emphasis to political training and initiating public discussions on questions that we feel are crucial for the

workers' movement and the far left."

Some 400 people turned out for the campaign kickoff rally. "On Sunday, February 11, 300 sympathizers attended a meeting with André Fichaut on the topic 'Strike Committees and Workers' Democracy,' which gave an account of the strike by the Brest gas workers. On February 14, there was a student meeting on 'Socialism and the New Man.' Several thousand people are expected at the meeting Friday, March 2, in the Sports Palace.

"Every week there is a citywide 'red school' for students that is open to sympathizers. Two high-school 'Red Wednesdays' are projected on the subjects of sexuality and the army."

A considerable amount of special campaign literature is being published. One run of 20,000 leaflets has been put out, with two more scheduled.

"The Ligue is taking part in a mass campaign against the army," *Rouge* continued. "There is a support committee in Toulouse for the insubordinate members of the ONEF [Office National des Eaux et Forêts—National Office of the Forestry Commission], which is made up of far-left organizations and local movements. Its aims are to support conscientious objectors, press for freedom of expression inside the army and for the release of all those in the brig, and to denounce the civil-war and colonial armed forces." The committee has put out 40,000 leaflets and 4,000 posters. □

### Good Old George

Senator George S. McGovern, the South Dakota Democrat who was his party's presidential candidate in 1972, told a virtually empty Senate chamber on February 22 that he "cannot be at all sympathetic now" to proposals that the United States help pay for the reconstruction of North Vietnam's shattered cities.

During the presidential campaign, McGovern tried to garner votes by posing as a "humanitarian" who was "shocked" by the destruction visited on the peoples of Indochina by U.S. bombers. After his drubbing at the polls—due in part to Nixon's success in outdoing him in "peace" demagoguery—McGovern appears to be opting for a different image.

McGovern said that he could not believe that "the administration wants to continue depriving urgent priorities at home so we can send billions of dollars to a government that the same administration has been instructing us to despise until a few days ago."



## Behind the Turmoil in the German Metal Union

[The following article appeared in the January issue of *Was Tun*, organ of the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (International Marxist Group), West German section of the Fourth International. It deals with recent developments in the IGM (Industriearbeitsgemeinschaft Metall—Metal Industry Union), the largest and most powerful union in West Germany.

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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In the latest contract poll taken among iron and steel workers, some 66 percent of those voting (and this adds up to about 52 percent of the total IGM membership in the steel industry) voted *against* the contract negotiated by the bureaucracy. (It provided for an 8.5 percent wage increase, that is, 46 pfennigs.)

Loderer [a top IGM bureaucrat] said the results of the vote would have "internal consequences" for the union. And when Loderer speaks of "internal consequences," he knows what he's aiming at. He means strengthening the organizational and structural mechanisms of bureaucratic control over the membership. He means intensifying attacks on trade-union democracy and, at the same time, "tightening up the hierarchical bonds."

As early as 1970, Otto Brenner expressed concern about "tightening up hierarchical bonds." It was during an executive board investigation of the causes of the September 1969 strikes. At that time, like today, bureaucratic control over the membership had been badly shaken. At that time, 10,000 workers tore off the bureaucracy's straitjacket on wage policy and conducted wildcat strikes to win wage hikes on their own.

Now an absolute majority of the organized steelworkers, with the most progressive and militant workers in the lead, have rejected the bureaucracy's wage policy in the current round of contract negotiations. In so doing, they have also rejected assaults on their wages, the politics of "social partnership," and the renunciation of

the workers' immediate interests for the sake of some "stabilization policy" whose only real content is stabilizing the employer's profit at the expense of the worker's income. And if it came to a vote in the entire metal industry, the membership's judgment of the bureaucracy's policy would come through just as clearly.

But the important thing about the shaking of the bureaucracy's control over the membership during this round of wage talks is not so much the numerical result of the contract vote, but rather the potentially explosive class situation that arises from a clash of various factors: on the one hand a contract that will mean an actual cut in real wages and the employers' and SP-controlled government's efforts to come up with a stabilization pact; and on the other hand, the membership's highly developed willingness to struggle and its rejection of the bureaucracy's policies.

In 1970, the bureaucracy was able to reestablish its control over the membership—control that had been badly shaken by the September 1969 strikes—by advancing relatively high wage demands (on the order of 15 percent increases) and by winning relatively high settlements (on the order of 11 percent), in fact, the highest increases of the postwar period.

But this way out of the crisis, which in 1970 was completely tolerated by the ruling Social Democracy, will hardly be open to the bureaucracy anymore—in 1973 after the challenge to its control that was raised during this round of contract talks. It's very clear what the capitalists now want from the bureaucrats: They expect them to agree to new and more subtle forms of eroding the workers' bargaining rights than presently exist under *Konzertierte Aktion*.\*

To achieve these new forms, the capitalists will not so much aim at open stabilization pacts. They know the bureaucracy could not put them over

\**Konzertierte Aktion*, literally, concerted action, is a system providing for government intervention into wage disputes between unions and employers. — IP

on the membership. So they will instead go in for secret deals arranged among small circles of the union tops and backed up by state guarantees—deals that are meant above all to lead to binding agreements on wage policy.

The ruling Social Democracy, and especially [Finance Minister] Helmut Schmidt, have completely adopted this capitalist notion of controlling wage struggles from the center, and at the same time have thought up flanking measures (like conjunctural surtaxes) in order to "tax away" any occasional wage increases that may fall outside the scope of the secret agreements.

This "stabilization program," which both the Social Democracy and the employers fully support and want to get passed as soon as possible, leaves the bureaucracy not the slightest maneuvering room to carry out a 1970-style wage policy.

Loderer knows all this quite well. That's why he and his fellow bureaucrats are not talking today (as they did after September 1969) about "grabbing a healthy chunk of the pie" to make up for the lag in wages that was created by their own policy. Instead Loderer speaks about the necessity of "internal consequences," because he is clearly aware both of the existing political situation and the miserably narrow perspectives of the bureaucracy. And he therefore knows that the reestablishing and safeguarding of bureaucratic control of the membership is possible only by pressing the demolition of trade-union democracy and the "tightening up of hierarchical bonds."

It is fairly obvious where the hierarchical bonds are most eroded. It is above all where the economic struggles of the working class, uninterrupted and still growing since the September 1969 strikes, have had their most direct internal effects on the unions—namely, the shop-steward committees, the membership meetings on the state of the contract negotiations, and similar rank-and-file bodies that are subject to control by ordinary workers.

The bureaucracy's systematic

twenty-year-long campaign to depoliticize and even liquidate these institutions has today been largely defeated. More and more, these bodies are becoming the centers of political discussion, training, and action inside the unions. In these bodies, the class-conscious workers are waging a struggle against the bureaucracy's careerist hacks and are fighting for the implementation of a struggle-alternative to the bureaucracy's policy.

There is no doubt about it: Loderer's "internal consequences" will be consciously directed against these bodies, will be aimed at bringing them under the bureaucracy's control.

### The Crisis of Bureaucratic Control and the Need to Build a Left Tendency in the Unions

The fact that the bureaucracy's control over the membership is more and more often being thrown into crisis is just as little an accident as the fact that it was able to raise itself above the membership in the first place. The underlying conditions that account for its ascendancy were the economic and political stability of the postwar reconstruction period, sticking to the status quo in wage negotiations, and the almost imperceptible amount of motion that existed in the working class up until 1969. The fading of these factors is the direct cause of the bureaucracy's crisis.

As a force maintaining the integration of the unions and preserving order, the bureaucracy is ideologically and politically bound to the capitalist system. On the other hand, to play this role it must be accepted by the workers as the direct representative of their interests. For the reasons we have laid out, the bureaucracy was able to live with this contradiction pretty much without any great difficulties until the 1966-67 crisis.

But because of the need to increase the rate of exploitation and because of the sharpening of interimperialist competition, the capitalist class had to centralize its regulation of wages, and this was carried out through *Konzertierte Aktion*, with the participation of the Social Democratic government and the agreement of the trade-union bureaucracy.

This brought masses of trade unionists to the understanding that their leadership was in no way concerned



In October 1971 IGM members held mass demonstrations for wage increases. Bureaucracy now fears it will be unable to control labor militancy.

with their immediate interests but, rather, that the bureaucracy's wage policy was aimed at safeguarding the profits of the capitalists, directly against the interests of the membership.

The steelworkers' response to this was the September 1969 strikes, and this in turn set off a continuously developing process of struggle in the factories and conflict in the unions, carried out through the reactivated rank-and-file bodies.

Through this process, the bureaucracy's whole wage policy—its aims, its basic execution, and its practical effects—increasingly became the subject of criticism. The bureaucracy, pressed by the ever more conscious articulation of the membership's interests (to which the bureaucracy, because of its obligation to this system, cannot and will not do justice), found itself compelled to try to throw the workers off the track with new tricks and maneuvers aimed at cutting off the class-conscious movement at its base.

By resorting to this policy of deception the bureaucracy has, from 1969 to today, succeeded in maintaining its control over the rank and file during the *decisive* phases of the wage movement—even if only at the cost of big shocks, as at the present time.

But this should not obscure the fact that the bureaucracy's maneuvering room has gotten narrower as each successive bargaining campaign has developed. It gets narrower because, given a bourgeoisie in the situation we've described and given a Social Democratic government, the bureaucracy is consistently held accountable on questions of centralized state regulation of wage and incomes policies. And of course the membership learns something from each of the bureaucracy's surprise maneuvers.

With this background, the enormous importance of the bureaucracy's impending attack (couched in rhetoric about "internal consequences") on the class-conscious rank-and-file movement becomes doubly clear. The bureaucracy is aware of the fact that this movement can be most easily disoriented and its leadership can best be broken while it is still in an initial phase—isolated on a local and factory level, having attained uneven levels of development in different locales and factories, and having access to no adequate means of communication.

So long as the movement lacks a cohesive alternative to the bureaucracy's policy, the bureaucrats have the chance of putting over what they are aiming at in the way of "internal consequences."

So after this round of wage talks,

it is the prime task of all progressive, socialist, and communist workers to effect their own "internal consequences": to stubbornly work to overcome the rank-and-file movement's local and factory-level isolation, to build strong communications structures linking the various rank-and-file bodies that the movement has thrown up, to strive through these structures toward trade-union unity in the political sense, and thus to develop a strong, united, class-conscious, and militant alternative to the bureaucracy's policy.

*The struggle for this class-struggle left tendency in the unions is now on the agenda in the IGM.*

### Coming Tasks After This Bargaining Campaign

The struggle against Loderer's "internal consequences" and the struggles for a left tendency will unfold and develop around the practical questions raised by the course and outcome of this bargaining campaign. It is clear to nearly every worker that the average increase, 8.5 percent, represents in reality a wage cut. It is also clear that the decrease in real wages now at hand will be exacerbated in the course of this year by constant or even accelerated price increases.

At the same time, it can be assumed that during this year the federal government will impose a nonrepayable conjunctural surtax that will cut wages down even further. The conclusion is inescapable: This must be a year of permanent struggle against wage robbery.

In this struggle, militant employees must not content themselves with winning raises in this or that factory, but must be the spearhead of regional and centralized struggles. Only in this way will it be possible to throw out the whole contract. Only in this way will it be possible to decisively repel the bureaucracy's splitting maneuvers (to which they have already resorted) aimed at pacifying the most militant workers, especially in the steel industry, by offering them supplementary wage agreements.

The coming struggle against wage robbery must be a united one. If it is conducted in unity, and not on a factory-by-factory basis, then it will be possible to turn this unity into massive public actions against the threatened surtaxes—and this will

have an effect on all similar measures the capitalists are planning.

It will take a fight to make this struggle a united one, because the bureaucracy will do everything in its power to block it, to make this 8.5 percent contract last for its specified duration, and to protect the government's anti-working-class "stabilization policy."

### The Perspective of Qualitative Demands

The bureaucracy has been especially successful in the steel industry in its attempts to disorient and divide the workers over the question of linear wage increases. For every class-conscious worker the principle of across-the-board wage increases is too important—because of its role in fostering solidarity and counteracting wage differentials that provoke competition among workers—to be left as a mere routine demand.

It is necessary to explain on the one hand that across-the-board wage increases are *one* element of a proworker wage policy, but on the other hand, that the full effects of these increases can be brought to bear only in the totality of all the other elements of such a wage policy. In this totality, it must be a foregone conclusion that united demands for wage increases are raised so as to assure that everyone get a real increase in income.

On the other hand, all the bureaucracy's attempts to distort these demands or to co-opt them into its own dead-end wage policy through all sorts

of trickery—which they tried to do in this round of negotiations—must be fought.

In the steel industry, the bureaucracy has consciously provoked the anger of the skilled workers by proposing the far too low 60 pfennig increase and then settling for a 46 pfennig contract. In this way the bureaucrats sharpened the division over the question of across-the-board wage increases by initiating new negotiations for additional increases for the higher-wage groups. The steelworkers will be able to defeat this maneuver only by waging a united struggle to overturn the entire agreement.

If a permanent struggle against wage robbery does take place this year, then our essential tasks will be to see that a sliding scale of wages is demanded, and to become a component of this struggle. The struggle against permanent wage robbery through price increases also involves fighting for means of defense against wage robbery through inflation, that is, it is nothing other than the struggle for the sliding scale of wages.

So, in the coming period, we must prepare for struggles looming up. The main tasks of our intervention will be to generalize and unify the struggle, to strongly root qualitative demands among the masses, to propagandize for the necessity of transforming the class-conscious but isolated rank-and-file movement into a united left tendency in the unions, and to engage in concrete work to build this tendency. □

### Whitlam Visits Indonesia

After yielding to the wave of opposition in Australia to Nixon's holiday-season terror-bombing of North Vietnam, Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam has been exerting himself to assure the imperialists of his loyalty.

His latest step was a four-day visit to Jakarta where he had friendly conversations with President Suharto, Foreign Minister Adam Malik, and other officials. The suppression of civil liberties in Indonesia, where tens of thousands of political prisoners are still held in concentration camps, does not appear to have dampened the atmosphere of "goodwill" that surrounded the visit.

The joint communique issued at the conclusion of Whitlam's junket on February 24 said that Australia and Indonesia

would "work to coordinate their foreign policies with special emphasis on sessions of the United Nations [Security] Council of which both nations are now temporary members," the February 25 *New York Times* reported.

In addition, the Australian and Indonesian leaders pledged "common efforts" to aid Papua-New Guinea. Whitlam has promised to grant formal independence to this colony in the near future.

One difference of opinion marred the spirit of unity: The *Times* reported that "Mr. Whitlam broached the question of forming a new grouping of East and Southeast Asian nations which Australia and New Zealand could join but encountered a lack of enthusiasm for the idea by the Indonesians."

## Lanusse Seeks to Ban Peronist Party

[The Argentine military government asked the courts on February 6 to dissolve the Peronist political coalition, the Frente Justicialista de Liberación (FREJULI—Justicialist Liberation Front). The front is running Héctor Cámpora as its presidential candidate because the military regime refused to allow Perón himself to run. In its suit, the government charged that the FREJULI had violated the constitution with its slogan "Cámpora to the government, Perón to power."

[The government also barred Perón from entering the country to campaign for Peronist candidates prior to the election, which is scheduled for March 11. It said that Perón's "conduct and aims," including his description of the military rulers as "beasts" during an interview in Rome, had prompted the government to bar his return until May 25.

[The following is an assessment by the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party) of these restrictive moves. It is translated by *Intercontinental Press* from the February 7 issue of the PST's weekly *Avanzada Socialista*.]

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Surprisingly, the military junta has initiated a court suit against the FREJULI that could lead to its being dissolved. Immediately rumors began circulating. Will the Peronist movement be banned? Will the elections take place? Will there be a coup? And behind all these questions lingers a very great concern among millions of workers: *What will happen after all this?*

### The Electoral Merry-Go-Round

The national political scene is like a merry-go-round, whirling around on the same spot. We have seen several gyrations in the little more than a month of the new year that has gone by. The government threatened to ban Cámpora for going to Madrid without permission, but it finally decided to let him run; the Justicialists came to blows in San Andrés de Giles, and

while Cámpora was promising a general amnesty, Solano [Peronist vice-presidential candidate] was playing the guerrilla; the military junta got mad and drew up the "Institutional Act" in order to control the future government; and now the Peronist candidates have gone back to being pacifists; Perón is said to have called the military rulers beasts, and Lanusse is threatening to go ahead with his ban.

The political changes that occur in the country have always affected the workers more than anyone else, and we must pay attention to what is going on. But let's not let the twists and turns of the bosses' politicians and the military make us dizzy; let's pay attention to what they do *only when we ourselves are directly affected by it*.

### The Military Wants to Go On Controlling the Government

Didn't Lanusse say that "this is a game in which we must all be players"? Didn't the armed forces promise "fair play"? Yet the truth is that they have not let anyone play unhampered. They have done this by placing obstacles in the way of organizing left-wing parties; by coming up with a clause banning Perón; and then by imposing the "Institutional Act," which limits the powers of the future government and leaves the armed forces in place as the armed guardians of the presidency.

This is a reminder that the elections weren't called out of any love for democracy on the part of the high command, but rather because of the fact that following the Cordobazo and the Vivorazo, they could no longer rule us with a club. They instead sought out an agreement with the bourgeois politicians in order to confuse us, to keep us from mobilizing, and to get us to stake all our hopes on the elections and the old capitalist politicians. The military men do not plan to go back to their barracks after March 11. They have already said that they will continue to make sure that the future government guarantees the "law and order" of capitalist exploitation.

And if anything more were needed to prove this, we already have it in the fact that the army and air force generals and the admirals believe they have the right to determine what can and cannot be said during the election campaign!!!

### What Is Peronism Doing About the Military Maneuvers?

We have had, and we still have, very deep differences with Perón and Peronism. But in spite of our disagreements, we are ready to join all the Peronist compañeros in repudiating the maneuver that is being aimed at them because we have always been and will continue to be defenders of the democratic rights of all the workers, whether or not they share our views. We have already done this many times in the past. But with the same honesty with which we defend their right to campaign for the candidate of their choice, we tell the Peronist compañeros exactly what we have all seen: Up to now, the Peronist movement and Perón himself have systematically refused to stand up to the government by mobilizing the workers. Thus they let Lanusse veto the candidacy of Perón, and when the latter came back to the country it was with "a pledge of peace" that he kept by meeting behind closed doors with all the enemies of the people and refusing to hold any mass meeting. More recently they did everything they could to prevent the workers from embarking on a struggle for our wages under the pretext that "the elections will solve everything."

Those who have been most hurt by these vacillations are the Peronist workers. We call on them to reflect on these precedents so that they will understand that it is only by engaging in our own struggles that we will force those in power to respect our demands.

### Mobilize Against Bans and Restrictions

The military and the bosses work out their political deals behind the backs of the people, and it is hard to see where they will end. It is not out of the question that the threat to ban the FREJULI might be nothing more than another attempt to pressure the Peronist movement into "cleaning house" and getting rid of the movement's most combative groups. But

the possibility also exists that this is all part of a solid agreement between the military and Perón according to which the latter would be assured of a role in a future "shared government" in exchange for "swallowing" the ban. The advantage for the Justicialist chief in such a solution is that it would allow him to avoid shouldering the tremendous responsibility of confronting the government in its present state of crisis and would in addition leave him with his hands free to look after the internal tendencies in the Peronist movement.

All these suspicions are only aggravated by the spectacle of the leadership of the FREJULI continuing to refuse to appeal to the people for support. Sánchez Sorondo has made a glowing defense of the armed forces and has called on them (the armed forces!) to save democracy. And Cámpora preferred to place himself in the hands of "the honest men of the courts."

## Chile

### Battle for Production or Battle for Power?

[The following article was published in the February 3 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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For some time now the Allende government has been facing mounting economic difficulties—galloping inflation (114.3 percent in 1972); a food-supply crisis, with the disappearance of numerous products from the market (meat especially) and, as a result, the massive importing of food supplies; a worsening of the balance of payments deficit; and the draining of currency reserves. These difficulties are well known and they explain why the Union of the Left in France has discreetly stopped hailing the "Chilean example" of the peaceful, electoral road to socialism.

The economic problems of the Unidad Popular [UP—Popular Unity] government are obviously exploited

Be that as it may, one thing must be clear: Only the massive mobilization of the workers can insure the people of their democratic rights, especially those guaranteed by the constitution. In order to accomplish this, our party considers it more important to call on all parties that claim to represent the people (starting with the Peronist movement), the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor], and the workers to join forces to fight against any ban being implemented than it is to analyze the whys and wherefores of this or that speech by Lanusse or Perón. But even if the Peronist movement and the other political forces continue to put a brake on the struggles of the people, the Socialist Workers party will go on fighting together with the workers as we did in Panam, SOMISA, and Banco Nación [the National Bank], and with the same determination we will defend the interests of the workers in the electoral arena. □

demagogically by the Chilean right, which is trying to take advantage of popular discontent to denounce the "misdeeds of socialism." This theme has found a distant echo in the disgusting anticommunist propaganda of the UDR [Union des Démocrates pour la République—Union of Democrats for the Republic, the Gaullists] in France, in which Chile is held up as a horrible "socialist" bogeyman.

Our answer to this ballyhoo is simple: Chile's economic difficulties are not the result of socialism, but of precisely the *absence of socialism*. It is the inability of the reformist government in Chile to call into question the foundations of capitalism and the power of the bourgeoisie that explains these current economic problems.

The UP government has not broken the bourgeoisie's hegemony over the economy. Seventy percent of industry remains in the hands of private capital, as well as most of the trading and banking facilities, etc. Moreover, the UP has *compensated* those few

capitalists who have been expropriated, which amounts to making the workers foot the bill for reformism and directly financing the worst enemies of the working class—and of the Allende government itself.

### Sabotage

The bourgeoisie has obviously used its economic power, which has remained almost intact, to *actively sabotage* the UP's economic policy. It has done this through innumerable means it has at its disposal:

- The withdrawal of bank deposits.
- The flight of capital abroad—\$270 million in 1971 was officially declared (secret transfers amount to much more).
- A halt to investment. Not only are the capitalists refusing to expand or modernize their plants, but they have a tendency to no longer keep up the existing equipment. The reserves of certain companies have been distributed among the stockholders while certain factory heads were busy selling part of the equipment, often in order to transfer their capital abroad (cf. Catherine Lamour, *Le Parti Chilien*, p. 169).

● Sabotage of agricultural production. In the face of the threat of agrarian reform, landowners have stopped investing or are secretly moving their livestock to Argentina. In regions where the reform has been implemented (according to the bourgeois law of the Christian Democratic government), the peasants find themselves on the worst parcels of land without any capital, seed, equipment, or machines—all of which remain on the eighty-hectare "reserves" that are still in the hands of the former owners. Is it at all surprising that under such conditions there should be a decline in agricultural production and a shortage of food supplies in the city markets?

● The secret hoarding of merchandise in order to create an artificial scarcity so it can be sold at exorbitant prices on the black market. Products subjected to price controls are especially made to "disappear" in this way. In some cases, manufacturers simply stop making items that are subject to price controls. Shoe manufacturers, for instance, have given up certain cheap styles for which they figured their profit margins were too low.

This systematic policy of economic sabotage is, on the one hand, an "instinctive" response by the bourgeoisie to the "insecurity" of having a government dominated by working-class parties (even reformist ones), and, on the other hand, a deliberate plan aiming at overthrowing Allende by creating a situation of "economic chaos," or at winning the March 1973 elections by taking advantage of the discontent resulting from these difficulties.

## Produce

What is the solution proposed by the Popular Unity government and in particular by the Chilean CP, which is the most coherent and obstinate reformist force in it? "The battle for production"! "Produce first," the Chilean reformists tell the workers (just like the PCF [Parti Communiste Français—French Communist party] in 1945—naturally, any resemblance is purely coincidental), thereby substituting an economic pseudo solution for a genuine *political* solution of the problem.

How can the workers be mobilized to increase production if they continue to be working for bosses, if production continues within the framework of capitalist exploitation, and if the profits continue to flow into the pockets of the bourgeoisie? To transform the battle for production into the priority task is to politically demobilize the workers and divert them from the real battle—the battle for power, which is the only battle capable of solving the economic problems once and for all by going to their very root.

What reformists do not understand is that there exist two contradictory and irreconcilable logics—the profit logic of capitalism and the logic of socialist planning. Any attempt to "mix," reconcile, or make these two logics coexist with each other is impossible, inevitably doomed to failure. The economic policy of the Popular Unity coalition is just "left" enough to irritate and worry the bourgeoisie, while leaving it in possession of real economic power. The inevitable result is economic sabotage by this bourgeoisie, which makes use of the control levers still in its hands as a weapon against the workers and the reformist government. Nothing could be more wrong than to think that the Allende government is a government



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"of the bourgeoisie" or the mere continuation of the Christian Democratic reformism of Frei. Through its links with the organized and bureaucratic workers' movement, it furnishes the bourgeoisie with weapons that can be used to overthrow it or totally neutralize it.

## A Different Path

Another solution is possible—a *political* and *revolutionary* solution that is logical, clear, and coherent. This is the solution proposed by the Chilean MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left]:

"If the bosses refuse to produce, transport, distribute, and market their goods, the people can and must take these activities into their own hands. The working class does not need the big capitalists in order to carry out these tasks. . . .

"The basic task facing the workers if the crisis is to be resolved and its causes eliminated is the expropriation of the big capitalists in industry, trade, transportation, agriculture, and min-

ing, and the mass communications network that serves them. This task must be complemented by workers' control over operations remaining in the private sector. . . .

"The above can only be achieved if a popular power, alternative to that of the bosses and the bourgeoisie, is developed. Such popular power can only arise out of the struggle and mobilization of the people, out of it being unified from the bottom up and organized on a community basis into Community Workers' Councils." (October 19, 1972, statement by the MIR, published in *Punto Final*, No. 169, October 24, Santiago [see *Intercontinental Press*, November 13, 1972, p. 1252].)

In order to counter the cornering of goods and the speculation of the big merchants who are promoting the black market, the masses have set up the JAPs [Juntas de Abastecimiento y Control de Precios—Food Supply and Price Control Associations], made up of union delegates, housewives' associations, neighborhood councils, etc.

In addition, following the example of some peasant regions (such as Cautín), some cities, municipalities, or neighborhoods (such as Cerrillos, a working-class suburb of Santiago, etc.), have formed Community Coordinating Councils that bring together factory delegates, union delegates, representatives of working-class parties (especially the PS [Partido Socialista—Socialist party], the MAPU [Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria—Movement for United Popular Action], and the MIR), of the JAPs, of neighborhood self-defense groups, etc. These coordinating councils developed especially during the October 1972 crisis (the "bourgeois strike" in transport and trade); they constitute the first embryos of *dual power*. It is by strengthening these forms of workers' power, by creating armed self-defense committees everywhere, and by mobilizing the masses from the bottom up to fight for their interests that the real battle can be won—the battle for power, the battle for socialism.

The moral of history holds for France too. □

## Plague of Frogs Next?

The Food and Agriculture Organization has warned that Israel may soon be under attack by swarms of locusts now concentrated near Jiddah, Saudi Arabia.

## 'Workers Democracy' in Poland

[The French Communist party has been proposing during the current election campaign to make the running of the factories more democratic under a Union of the Left government. But it has also been hailing the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European workers states as paradigms of socialism. Yet in none of these countries do the workers really exercise power, which is in the hands of a bureaucratic caste. In all except Yugoslavia, the right to strike is banned by the constitution.]

[The January 27 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International, published an article dealing with the lack of workers' democracy in the workers states. The following is the section on Poland. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The view of two historians of the PCF [Parti Communiste Français—French Communist party]:

"The December '70 events showed the strength of trade-union action when fundamental questions involving working conditions and daily life are at stake." (*La Pologne*, Editions Sociales, p. 171.)

### The 1970 Events and the Workers' Defense Organizations

What do the Polish workers think about this? During the meeting of the Gdansk and Gdynia shipyard workers with Gierek, the workers passed judgment on their union leaders:

"When everything started, they all disappeared. We stayed outside the building of the leadership and we shouted for someone to come out and see us. Everybody hid—the factory committee, the workers' council, and our union leaders." (Article in *Zapiski Wyrzeza*, December 1970.)

The workers then expressed the same opinion through their votes. At the beginning of 1971, fifty percent of the union leaders were not reelected. At Zameck—where the workers hanged the local secretary (it was a mass ac-

tion!)—75 percent of the former team had to hunt for work somewhere else.

### The Facts

The Polish unions (their model is not Polish) are supposed to fulfill three functions "under the guidance of the PUWP [Polish United Workers party]":

1. Defending the workers' interests.
2. Activation of production: "They cooperate in increasing labor productivity and in strengthening social and production discipline."

3. Social action, such as running child-care centers, organizing leisure time, building housing from factory funds, looking after health care, etc.

Is it necessary to call attention to the fact that the general enthusiasm with which they carry out the second function is doubtless an obstacle to effectively carrying out the first? But actions speak louder than words. Here are a few examples.

- For fourteen years the wages of the miners in Grodzisko remained at the same level without any union authorities feeling the need to do anything about it. It was the workers' wild-cat mobilization that finally brought them satisfaction in 1971.

- The unions were completely absent from the 1970 events, as they were from the uprising in 1956. *In 1970 they had approved the price rise and the new system of economic incentives for increasing productivity that provoked the workers' uprising.* (Cf. the approval by the central council secretary published in *Tribuna Ludu*, March 19, 1970.)

- In fact "today the unions make decisions to fire personnel in collaboration with the government, and they carry them out in collaboration with the directors." (Cf. the open letter to the PUWP by Kuron and Modzelewski.)

In other words, for the Polish unions and authorities, as for Maurice Thorez in 1945, defense of the workers' interests begins with the formula: "Produce First."

As for the rest, it was put well by Slominski, delegate of Zeran factory (in the forefront of the struggle in Oc-



GIEREK: Gdansk and Gdynia shipyard workers told him what they thought.

tober) to the congress of unionists in November 1972:

"Seventy percent of our union officials are a virtual army of paper shufflers and titular delegates for trips abroad; they go to Bulgaria to look for fur coats, to Czechoslovakia for shoes, and to the USSR for motors."

### And After 1970?

To be sure, the warning was a hot one. And so the labor code is going to be changed to replace one that dates from prior to World War II! The idea (nothing more) of self-management has been raised. And yet nothing, or almost nothing, has changed.

Already Krukcz, the president of the unions, can be heard observing that not enough is being said "about the function of activating production and about ideological education" as a task of the unions. So heavily does the bureaucratic system weigh down upon the consciousness of the workers that Slominski (still the delegate from the Zeran factory) is raising nothing more daring than the demand: "We want to feel ourselves co-owners [sic] of the union movement."

But the workers were not crushed as they were in Hungary in 1956. To be sure, there is some bureaucratic "co-opting" being done through the

granting of trifles. Yet the increase in prices, which set off the rioting, was reversed. The obvious distrust of the workers for the bureaucrats persists and can still make itself heard, although it has not yet been able to express itself in a struggle to the end, for power.

Again, in November 1972, a strike wave broke out throughout Poland. These strikes began just before the opening of the seventh congress of the unions (November 13, 1972). They broke out first in the shipyards at Gdansk and Szczecin. The demands raised by the workers were political in nature and concerned the functioning of the unions. They were independence of the unions from the party; free election of delegates and union leaders; and a clear delineation of the powers of the unions.

So tense did the situation become that Gierek himself and Jaroszewicz, the president of the Council of State, went to Gdansk and Szczecin to "ex-

amine" the problem. But the congress did nothing to satisfy the demands and questions raised by the workers, which were not even discussed.

During the congress, strikes broke out at Lodz in three textile plants. The women demanded an extension of the price freeze (instituted in 1970 for two years following the workers' revolt in December 1970, and scheduled to end at the end of 1972) and a 15 percent raise in wages. The second day of the strike when the threat of strikes was spreading throughout the textile industry—a television program was interrupted and Jaroszewicz condescended to promise a continuation of the freeze for one more year. There were also one- and two-day strikes in Silesia in four coal mines, at Rybnik, and at Katowice. There the demand was for a 25 percent increase in wages. Thirty miners were arrested. Feelings were calmed down by distributing purchasing coupons. □

statements on behalf of Vladimir Bukovsky, Pyotr Yakir, and others have appeared in the *Chronicle of Current Events* and circulate in samizdat.

The February 12 *New York Times* reported Sakharov's most recent appeal. He and Yeklina G. Bonner, his wife, have offered to post bail and stand as guarantors for Yuri Shikhanovich. Shikhanovich, who has worked with the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR, was arrested September 28, 1972, and has since been held incommunicado. (See *Intercontinental Press*, February 26, 1973, p. 219.)

Bail procedures are provided for in the Russian Criminal Code, but in practice they are not applied in cases involving political prisoners.

Sakharov, Andrei Tverdokhlebov, and Valery Chalidze founded the Moscow Committee for Human Rights in November 1970 for the purpose of advising the bureaucracy of legal violations by the police and courts in the course of police repression. Chalidze, a physicist and jurist, was deprived of his Soviet citizenship in December 1972 while he was on a speaking tour in the United States. Tverdokhlebov, also a physicist, recently resigned from the Committee for "personal reasons," according to the January 18 *New York Times*.

The Committee now consists of Sakharov; Igor Shafarevich, a corresponding member of the Academy of Science; and Grigory Podyapolsky, a mathematician who joined the Committee in October 1972.

The KGB has so far avoided direct police attacks on the committee members. But four key members of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights, which is more politically conscious and action oriented, were arrested during the crackdown that began in January 1972.

Reprisals against Sakharov have so far been indirect, i.e., administrative actions against his family and colleagues.

This public criticism of Sakharov directly in the official press may well be a prelude to further direct attacks on Sakharov personally. □

#### Discussion Brings a Year in Jail

Winnie Mandela, wife of the former leader of the banned African National Congress in South Africa, has been sentenced to one year in jail for violating the law against speaking to anyone who used to belong to the group.

## Soviet Bureaucrats Turn Loose a Hack

### First Public Attack on Sakharov

Andrei Sakharov, a founding member of the Committee for Human Rights in the USSR, has been publicly attacked in the official Soviet press for the first time. The attack appeared in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, the weekly organ of the Soviet Writers' Union. Sakharov—a noted physicist, member of the Soviet Academy of Science, and "father of the Soviet H-bomb"—has been active in the democratic opposition movement since the late 1960s.

Despite his numerous public statements condemning police repression and his activity in defense of Soviet political prisoners, the bureaucrats had not previously taken any formal steps against him.

The *Literaturnaya Gazeta* attack, written by the journal's editor, Aleksandr Chakovsky, was included in what the February 15 *New York Times* described as a "generally favorable" review of Harrison E. Salisbury's book *The Many Americas Are One*.

In the book Salisbury discusses the importance of U. S.-Soviet cooperation

in order to maintain world peace, stop the arms race, and abolish poverty in the "underdeveloped" world. Salisbury refers in positive terms to Sakharov's recommendations along these lines contained in his 1968 memorandum to Brezhnev.

Chakovsky approves of such views on U. S.-Soviet cooperation when their source is an associate editor of the *New York Times*. But he used Salisbury's references to Sakharov as an opening to attack Sakharov's views as those of a *yurodiviy*—"God's fool."

Sakharov's 1968 memorandum centered on recommendations that were basically an extension of the peaceful coexistence position that has served as the basis of Soviet international policy since Stalin. It was not Sakharov's ideas about a hoped-for world government that prompted the bureaucratic attack on him, but his persistent activities in defense of arrested dissidents in the Soviet Union.

Despite the intense repression aimed at crushing the Soviet democratic opposition, Sakharov continued his protest activities throughout 1972. His



### Krivine on Speaking Tour of Martinique

At the invitation of the Groupe Révolution Socialiste (GRS—Socialist Revolution Group), Alain Krivine, representing the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International, traveled to Martinique for a number of meetings in January.

The purpose of his trip to the overseas French department was twofold, according to a report by Joseph Krasny in the January 20 issue of the Ligue Communiste's weekly newspaper *Rouge*: First, to "lift the curtain of silence" regarding France's colonies; and second, "to make a voice heard other than that of the tricolor chauvinism long ago adopted by the PCF [Parti Communiste Français—French Communist party]. This is the voice of internationalist activists fighting against the chauvinism encouraged in the French working class by the Stalinists and reformists."

The trip was a sequel to a joint meeting of the Ligue and Révolution Socialiste held last November in Paris. In both cases, Krasny emphasized, "French revolutionists stated their unfailing support for the right of independence for peoples colonized by France."

The main meeting was held in Fort-de-France on January 10. Decorated with banners hailing among other things the Vietnamese revolution, the hall was packed. "The various speeches explained first of all the internationalist significance of Krivine's presence," Krasny wrote. "Then a comrade from Guadeloupe demonstrated why the GRS immediately gave its struggle an Antillean character" from the time it was founded in December 1971. Philippe Pierre-Charles, a leader of the group, stated the political positions of the GRS. A comrade from the Jeunesse Avant-Garde [Vanguard Youth] indicated the kind of work that was being carried out among the youth, particularly in the high schools. Another described the GRS's work among Antilleans living in France. Finally, Edouard De Lepine explained the position of the group on the coming legislative elections. "The GRS is calling for a vote for

the Martinican Communist party on both rounds.

A number of open-air gatherings were also organized in the island's bluffs. There were often 150 people in attendance at these evening meetings. Most were cane or banana plantation workers.

Another meeting was organized in Ajoupa-Bouillon, a town of some 1,500 inhabitants whose mayor is a member of the GRS. "Ajoupa-Bouillon

is the first municipality in the French colonies in which workers' democracy prevails," Krasny wrote. "The town is run on a rank-and-file level: Neighborhood committees have been formed whose statutes provide for them to be immediately convened on the request of any single member. Every problem—such as the budget—is discussed by these committees." General assemblies of the committees are attended by nearly half of the town's population.

Krivine's trip to Martinique was not a one-shot affair, Krasny concluded, but rather a stage in the developing struggle for the independence of France's overseas colonial territories. □

### U.S. Still After Babak and Siamak Zahraie

#### Bahram Atai Wins Deportation Fight

The U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) announced February 6 that it is dropping its attempt to deport Bahram Atai, an Iranian student currently doing graduate work at the University of Portland. The INS withdrew the charge that Atai, who is the secretary of the Committee to Defend Babak Zahraie, had not been a "bona fide" student at the University of Washington in Seattle last year.

Atai is one of three Iranian students in the United States who have been facing deportation because of their opposition to the shah's police-state regime. (See *Intercontinental Press*, January 22, p. 53.) Babak Zahraie and Siamak Zahraie are still challenging deportation orders charging them with minor infractions of immigration regulations. If they are returned to Iran, they face certain imprisonment or death. (More than 100 opponents of the shah were executed in 1972.)

At a February 8 hearing on the case of Babak Zahraie, immigration officials said they were processing his request for a permanent residency visa. Previously, the INS had refused to consider his application.

Siamak Zahraie, Babak's brother, faces deportation on the charge that he was not a "bona fide" student dur-

ing the winter of 1972 because he took only six credits that semester. Like Babak, Siamak is asking for a permanent residency visa. Both are married to American citizens.

The political motivation behind the attack on the three students was most bluntly stated by William C. Patillo, INS district director in Portland, Oregon: "A foreign student can be deported from the U. S. on a technical violation of the immigration law if he or she is involved in activities which the U. S. government considers aggravating."

The Committee to Defend Babak Zahraie has been publicizing the cases in an effort to prevent the deportations. Recent endorsers of the committee include U. S. congressional Representative Ronald Dellums, a California Democrat, and Mayor Wes Uhlman of Seattle. Letters of support for the students have been sent to the INS by former New York Congressman Allard Lowenstein, Benjamin Spock, the entire faculty of the philosophy department at the University of Portland, and many other persons.

On February 12, Babak Zahraie began a speaking tour of nine U. S. cities, under the auspices of the Committee to Defend Babak Zahraie. The address of the committee is P. O. Box 15422, Wedgewood Station, Seattle, Washington 98115. □

## Incomes Policy—A Weapon Against the Workers

By Ernest Mandel

[The following article appeared in the February 16 issue of *La Gauche*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs (Revolutionary Workers League), Belgian section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The incomes policy has come on the scene. It ran like a thread through the governmental declaration of the Leburton cabinet: "The measures taken by the government must be upheld and completed by a policy of concert between the social partners aimed at bringing wage increases in line with productivity increases, and more generally, at seeking coherence and equilibrium in the relations between prices and costs."

The latest National Bank report also called for an incomes policy, in a muted form, but it also recognized that "adoption of a formal incomes policy would be met with hostility by the unions, which are already disturbed by their partial application."

It was also openly called for by Mr. Evalenko, former friend of the FGTB [Fédération Générale des Travailleurs Belgique—General Federation of Belgian Workers] and now director of the National Bank. This illustrious citizen delivered a speech before the Belgian Royal Society of Political Economy last January 31. It was warmly greeted by the whole capitalist and conservative press in Belgium, from *L'Echo de la Bourse* to *Libre Belgique*.

### Citizen Evalenko's Incomplete Statistics

All the while denying that he wanted to hold "excessive" wage rises responsible for the inflation now racking Belgium and all the other capitalist countries, all the while denying that he wanted to eliminate the linking of wages to the retail-price index,

Evalenko nevertheless put forward statistics and solutions that would have just that effect; that would make people believe that wage increases are the basic cause of inflation; and that would make wages bear the costs of the "financial reorganization" considered indispensable.

Of course his statistics are incomplete and therefore distorted. They present a false picture of the real development of the economy.

As for his solutions, they would not lead to halting inflation. They would simply produce a redistribution of the national income to the advantage of the bourgeoisie and to the detriment of the workers.

Citizen Evalenko compares the rise of the workers' pure and simple *monetary wages* to the rise in the cost of living. He then concludes that the workers' *real wages* have also increased since the end of the second world war. No sane person would disagree.

But the national income, both in monetary and real terms, has itself increased considerably. The productivity of labor has vastly increased. The intensity of labor has grown. The effort demanded of the worker, by hour or by workday, has risen uninterruptedly.

According to citizen Evalenko's statistics, the base daily earnings of industrial workers supposedly rose, in real terms, at a yearly average of 4% during the 1958-63 period, at 4.7% from 1963-68, and at 6.7% from 1968-71. Mr. Evalenko claims this increase is accelerating, and he's worried about it.

Now, what has happened to the growth of the *physical productivity* (that is, abstracted from price fluctuations) of the industrial worker? Even taking into account the total number of industrial employees (and everyone knows that in fact the number of white-collar employees has risen while the number of blue-collar workers has slightly, but continuously, dimin-

ished), we arrive at the following figures:

From 1963 to 1968: The increase in industrial production was 19%; employment dropped 3%; productivity rose 22% that is, at 7% a year.

From 1968 to 1971: The increase in industrial production was 20.8%; employment was up 0.8%; productivity increased 20%, or 6.66% a year.

Considered over a longer period, the facts are still more compelling. Industrial employment remained the same from 1957 to 1971. But during that same period, industrial production rose 81%, according to the AGEFI index, and 78% according to the index of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

Besides that, over the fourteen-year period, the mean annual increase in industrial physical production was on the order of 5.5% or more.

If these percentages are compared with the annual growth rates of real wages for the same period (provided by Mr. Evalenko) it becomes apparent that the workers were only barely able to maintain their share of the product they create. Their wages generally *lagged behind* productivity increases during the 1958-68 period; they made up the lag somewhat during the 1968-71 period.

### Under Capitalism Incomes Policies Always Mean Policing Wages

Citizen Evalenko's idea of limiting nominal wage increases to 10-12% during the 1973-75 period in reality implies, if it were literally carried out, the severing of wages from the retail-price index. This would happen if prices rose by more than 4% a year, which will very probably be the case.

And even if he meant—and Evalenko did not say this—that the increases would be over and above adjustments in the cost of living, that is, if they were increases in real wages, the workers would still get cheated.

Because a real-wage increase on the order of 3-4% a year while industrial productivity is rising at 6-7% a year means that labor's share of the real (physical) product that it creates is being eaten away year by year.

But this is not at all the only reason why trade unionists and all workers must firmly reject any incomes policy. Two fundamental factors argue strongly against any such policy.

In the first place, under the capitalist system, any incomes policy claiming to regulate the incomes of all social classes is always a trap. In practice, governments can closely control only wages and salaries. Other forms of income are impossible to seriously control under a system of private property. No bourgeois government—not even the Nazi regime, with its most tyrannical powers—has ever succeeded in blocking or closely controlling prices, from which the income of the various sectors of the bourgeoisie derive.

The result is that in practice every incomes policy reduces itself to policing wages, as the successive commissions set up on this matter in France at least had the honesty to acknowledge. And in a period of rising prices, policing wages obviously means boosting profits.

In recent history, every period in which an incomes policy has been applied has seen a spectacular rise in capitalist profits. After Nixon imposed wage controls in August 1971, capitalist profits rose by about 20%. After the German trade unions accepted *Konzertierte Aktion* [a method of government intervention in collective bargaining], capitalist profits in West Germany visibly rose during 1972. And in Great Britain, we have seen an analogous development since the Conservative cabinet established wage controls.

In nonhypocritical terms, *the incomes policy is a means by which the bourgeoisie reduces the wage component of the national income and raises the profits component.* That's what all the literature of the "experts" finally amounts to, no matter how "subtly" it may be put.

### A Threat to the Workers' Freedoms

But the incomes policy threatens not only the workers' material interests. It also threatens their political

interests, their democratic rights.

In fact, the incomes policy, like "social programming," implies that the workers should voluntarily refrain from exploiting favorable conditions in the capitalist "labor market" to raise their wages. In the long run, such a voluntary pledge is unrealizable so long as freedom of association, freedom of the press, freedom to demonstrate, and above all the free exercise of the right to strike are maintained. The bourgeoisie understands that it itself would be playing the fool if it convinced the union leadership on a national scale to accept limits on wage increases, only to see these limits constantly overturned by the militancy of regional, local, or factory units of the trade unions.

An *effective* incomes policy, that is, real policing of wages, therefore requires serious restrictions on the democratic freedoms of the workers' movement. The right to strike must be regulated. Picket lines and "wildcat" strikes must be forbidden. Strike calls through leaflets or newspapers must be restricted or banned altogether. Democratic assemblies of workers and of strikers must be suppressed.

The trade unions cannot simultaneously be controlled by the membership and also subject to the requirements of an incomes policy. So, heavy blows must be dealt to trade-union democracy, and the union apparatus must be transformed into an appendage of the state apparatus. The end result of such a development, which the workers would not accept

without tenacious resistance, would be the strong state, accompanied by violent repression and state "trade-unionism" of the Spanish type.

This is why any concession to the notion of an incomes policy must be firmly rejected by all workers. The struggle for workers' control must be counterposed to any call for "policing wages." The key demands are:

Open the employers' books; end secret banking.

Examination of cost-prices and profit margins by delegates elected in the factories by all the workers.

Control over price changes by union organizations and consumer committees.

When the real records of economic life—and not the fraudulent records cooked up by advocates of incomes policies—are thus revealed, it will very soon become clear who is really responsible for inflation and rising prices. A working-class mobilization against what is really responsible—the international and national capitalist system—would then be possible.

But it is exactly this working-class intervention into the "mysteries of economic life" that the class collaborationists, good "democrats" that they are, are bent on preventing by any means necessary. Surely it takes a subversive professional agitator to suggest that the workers should be involved in something that's none of their business: how to manage and distribute the wealth that they themselves create. □

## Exiled From Irish Politics, Culture

"The judge told Mr. Malone that he must not participate in any cultural events or any other activities having to do with Ireland, nor be a member of any Irish club," a February 23 AP dispatch from San Francisco reported. "He was also warned that he could not make any speeches, attend any meetings or have any farewell parties connected with such a group." The court's conditions also "included a ban from Irish pubs."

Charles Malone—a well-known Irish activist in the San Francisco area who has spoken in defense of the fight for a united Ireland at meetings organized by the Socialist Workers party as well as other places—pleaded guilty to exporting firearms to the Provisional Irish Republican Army. As the father of seven children, Malone was particularly vulnerable to

Nixon's witch-hunt against the movement for Irish freedom in the United States. Either a prison sentence or a prolonged court fight would have caused an intolerable situation for his family.

In return for Malone's pleading guilty, the judge, Samuel Conti, limited the penalty to a \$1,000 fine and a two-year suspended sentence. The conditions were that the persecuted activist cut all his ties with Irish life.

In the context of the witch-hunt against the Irish movement, Judge Conti's conditions are more ominous than the sentence he meted out. They have the effect of branding Irishness itself as subversive. The American government would not be the first imperialist regime to decide that the traditions of the Irish people were incompatible with the established order.

## On the History of Austrian Trotskyism

By Raimund Loew

The relative stability that still predominantly characterizes present-day Austrian society makes it easy to forget that fifty years ago Austria's workers' movement was one of Europe's most militant. In 1918, against the will of both the bourgeois parties and of its own Social Democratic leadership, the Austrian working class won the fight to establish a republic. In the same year, workers' and soldiers' councils that pointed the way to socialism sprang up throughout the country.

The proletariat did not proceed straight from the overthrow of the monarchy to the overthrow of the whole bourgeois system and the establishment of the workers' dictatorship, for which the bourgeoisie can give thanks to the workers' illusions in the Social Democratic leadership and the traitorous counterrevolutionary policies this leadership followed.

In the 1920s, the building of the Republican Defense League, a united self-defense workers' militia under Social Democratic leadership, showed that the Austrian workers' combativity was still far from exhausted. In order to establish its rule, the Austrian version of fascism (clerical-conservative Austro-fascism), unlike its German counterpart, had to smash the proletariat's armed resistance. The complete illegalization of all workers' organizations and the elimination of the last vestiges of bourgeois democracy were made possible only by the brief civil war of February 1934, in which the workers, exhausted and demoralized by the previous fifteen years of Social Democratic leadership, were defeated.

The Austrian Trotskyist movement, one of the oldest anywhere in the world, arose against this background, in a situation characterized by a strong, class-struggle-oriented working class with a rotten opportunist leadership. The early history of this movement is closely linked to the activities of Joseph Frey, one of the workers' and soldiers' leaders during the revolutionary years. Frey was originally a Social Democrat, but from the time of his withdrawal from the 1918 Front he stood in opposition to the Otto Bauer-Karl Renner party leadership. In the same year he became chairman of the Vienna soldiers' council, a post he held for as long as that body remained independent of the Social Democracy, that is, until 1920. He soon realized that it was not enough just to be "more left" than the leadership inside the Social Democracy, but rather that the Austrian proletariat had to build a whole new class-leadership in order to carry out its own revolution. The Austrian Communist party, Austrian section of the Third International, had taken up this task, and Frey saw as the fundamental problem bringing the masses to a break with the Social Democracy and drawing them nearer to the CP. During the 1920 National Council elections, he called on the Social Democratic workers to vote for the Communist party,

an action that very soon cost him his membership in the Social Democracy.

Still in the same year, Frey, at the head of his current, the "Revolutionary Social Democrats," joined the small CP, in which he soon began to play a leading role. Ever since its founding, the party had been in a deep crisis: It had not succeeded in gaining a foothold among the working masses. Frey was immediately drawn into the intense factional struggle over what policy should be followed toward the Social Democratic workers. He came out against the confused, zigzag policy (alternating between left-adventurist-sectarian and right-opportunist lines) that the CP had been following, and fought for the united-front tactic that had been decided on at the Third Congress of the Communist International—since the Social Democracy had a working-class base, a direct offer to the SP leadership of common struggle on the basis of a concrete action program should not be excluded.

It appears that from the beginning of the 1920s the Soviet trade mission and the Comintern intervened vigorously in the web of intrigues afoot in the Austrian CP to isolate Frey and to bring Kopenik forward out of the bureaucratic swamp as "Moscow's man."

From 1923 to 1925 Frey was abroad on assignment from the Communist International—we have no certain information about this trip or about what his tasks were. Conceivably, he might have been assigned a military function in the German insurrection. It was only in 1925 that he returned, to the dismay of the party leadership in Vienna, and again participated in party work. The factional struggle immediately broke out again and became even sharper because of the fact that Frey defended the international positions of Trotsky and the Left Opposition.

Comrade Franz Modlik, who began his work in the Trotskyist movement around that time, has told us what things were like then in the party: "When I joined the party in March 1926, the fight was already in full swing. The Stalinists started working on me the first time I attended a local party meeting; they used all kinds of personal slander to try to dodge Frey's political arguments. In his internal party bulletin, *Klarheit*, Frey polemicized with great determination against the zigzag policy of the party leadership. Kopenik and company were then characterizing the Christian-social Ramek regime as fascist and in many areas they opportunistically ceded the initiative to the SP leadership. Against this, Frey demanded a consistent and active united-front policy toward the Social Democratic workers. His theses were well received in a number of local party units in the Vienna area and also in a few provincial regions, such as Graz and Hainburg. In my unit, the youth and the best working-class cadre were generally supporters of Frey's position, while

the party leadership generally mobilized lumpen elements on its behalf. During the course of the year, things came more and more to a head, until it got to the point where separate meetings of the factions were being held."

It was clear that the Stalinist party leadership could not tolerate the "Communist party of Austria—Opposition" for very long. The excuse for expulsion was the Opposition's somewhat ill-fated attempt independently to take the initiative for a referendum on expropriating church property. This action quickly ran aground, and in March 1927 Frey began publishing the monthly *Arbeiterstimme* [Workers Voice]. The group still called itself by the old name, Communist party Opposition, and regarded itself politically as part of the Communist party.

In 1926, the Linz conference of the Socialist party, under Bauer's leadership, approved the so-called Linz Program, which held out the prospect of workers' armed resistance and the establishment of a "dictatorship of the working people," in the event that the bourgeoisie moved to destroy parliamentary democracy as a means of preventing the Social Democracy from assuming control of the government. This left-centrist program gave the masses of workers great confidence that they could succeed, in the coming 1927 National Council elections, in defeating the bourgeois parties and winning a majority. With this situation in mind, the Communist party decided, on instructions from the Comintern, to offer the SDAP an electoral alliance. But the Social Democrats turned it down. The CP then decided to run its own candidates.

"What was the Opposition's attitude toward this?" we asked Franz Modlik. "Frey considered the attempt to form an electoral alliance with the Social Democracy in a basically positive light," Modlik answered. "But he considered the conditions the CP asked for to be too exacting; they even included the demand for arming the workers. In contrast to the Communist party, we held that a call for a vote for the Social Democrats was still correct, even after they had rejected the alliance. This was a bad mistake, and was criticized as such by Trotsky, since we lost nearly all contact with the CP's working-class supporters as a result of it."

This judgment appears even more justified when one recalls the role the Social Democrats played four months later, during and after the burning of the Justice Ministry in Vienna. The Defense League was used *against* angry workers and the only response to a police massacre of demonstrators was a weak forty-eight-hour transportation strike.\*

Frey's group had thus maneuvered itself into an isolation from which it was never again to succeed in extricating itself.

On top of this came the negative repercussions of the

\*At the beginning of 1927, during a march organized by the Defense League in the provincial village of Schattendorf, a wounded war veteran and a child were shot in front of a hotel by members of the Heimwehr [Home Defense Force], the Austrian fascist party. A bourgeois jury let the murderers go scot-free. The next day, against the wishes of the Social Democratic leadership, there was a huge mass demonstration in Vienna, during the course of which the Ministry of Justice was set on fire. The police shot into the unarmed crowd. Eighty persons were killed and 500 wounded. Two Trotskyist comrades were among those who fell victim to the police terror.

sharpening of the struggle in the Soviet Union: Trotsky's expulsion from the party and the related Stalinist slanders induced a few Opposition members to go back to the Communist party; others became inactive.

The main activity of the group, which was soon to become the Austrian section of the International Left Opposition (ILO) was, Comrade Modlik reports, sales of the newspaper and internal education.

"The main thing was to build a stable core of cadres who could stand up to both the Stalinists and the class enemy. Toward this end, we organized cadre schools, beginning in the winter of 1928-29 and continuing throughout the next four years, in order to educate comrades and potential sympathizers in the basic principles of revolutionary Marxism. Comrade Frey's lectures were attended by about 100 persons. Another main area of work was publishing and increasing the distribution of our organ, *Arbeiterstimme*, which, up to the time it was banned, had a circulation of a few thousand copies."

"What international contacts did you have?"

"As early as 1927, I myself was in Berlin, where I made contact with a number of communist activists, both inside and outside the German Communist party. I especially remember a talk I had with Ruth Fischer about the burning of the Justice Ministry in Vienna. She reproached us for having failed to raise the slogan of workers' councils. Contact with the ILO center fell mostly to Comrade Frey, and from time to time there were also foreign comrades who visited. In 1932 I was again in Berlin—this time as a delegate of the leadership.

"By that time we were no longer a section of the ILO. In 1930 there had been a split over the question of unification with other Communist opposition groups. Leon Sedov, the other comrades of the international leadership, and Trotsky himself thought that we should strive to unify as quickly as possible with these other groups on a parity basis, while Frey vehemently rejected this. In 1930, this led to the break between our group and the ILO."

There was not a new section of the ILO until 1933, when a group called the Bolshevik-Leninists, which came out of the Social Democracy, was recognized as such. The group worked mostly in the periphery of the Social Democracy, where it pressed for the establishment of left wings and pushed for their development toward revolutionary Marxism.

In the meantime, the February 1934 struggles erupted. The armed self-defense organizations of the Austrian proletariat were smashed, and the bourgeois-democratic republic came to an end. From that time on, proletarian politics could be carried on only illegally. In the immediate aftermath of the February defeat the Trotskyist groups, like all the other political organizations to the left of the Social Democracy, experienced a certain upswing because of their correct criticism of the Social Democratic party leadership's opportunism. Frey's group, which now called itself the Kampfband zur Befreiung der Arbeiterklasse [League of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class], linked up with the remnants of the defeated Defense League, who were then quite receptive to a revolutionary critique of the preceding opportunism. From 1934 on, specific propaganda was carried on

through pamphlets, and from 1934 to 1938 an illegal monthly, *Arbeitermacht* [Worker's Power], was published.

Comrade Bruno, who today is still an active member of the Austrian Trotskyist organization, was recruited to the movement during this period. He explains:

"At the beginning of the 1930s, I was in one of the Vienna units of the Social Democratic trade union youth organization, in which a number of comrades were carrying on open Trotskyist propaganda. Although at the time we saw and heard all the 'great men' of Austro-Marxism, from Otto Bauer and Max Adler to Karl Renner, it seemed to me that the ideas of the Trotskyist comrades were most correct and nearer the real goal, that is, leading to the proletarian dictatorship, and so I joined them. After all workers' organizations were declared illegal in 1934, we participated actively in antifascist actions. The workers' movement was not at all completely crushed—there were illegal trade-union structures in the plants, and both the left Social Democratic 'Revolutionary Socialists' and the Stalinists carried on intense activity. In the working-class areas of Vienna there were often lightning demonstrations of 500 or 600 people, who quickly dispersed before the police could show up. Like all the other workers' organizations, we distributed our material as widely as possible. In contrast to the Austrian CP, which in line with the Popular Front tactic struggled for the reestablishment of the bourgeois republic, we clearly put forward socialism as the only possible alternative to the existing regime. But this relatively wide room in which to operate came to an abrupt end in 1936, when nearly all of us were arrested on the basis of an informer's denunciation. In 1937 there was a big 'Trotskyist trial' in the course of which five comrades were sentenced to one to two years in prison. I myself got three months in the Wöllersdorf concentration camp, but was able to serve the time in Vienna."

Until February 1938 the activity of the Bolshevik-Leninists was reduced to only internal education and individual propaganda. But Hitler's policy of blackmailing Austrian Chancellor Schussnig allowed the workers' organizations a certain semilegal activity for about a month before the Nazi invasion. Faced with the imperialist threat from outside, the Austrian bourgeoisie again sought some support from the working class, which it had oppressed for five years, and granted a certain degree of "democratic freedom." On March 9, 1938, Schussnig announced a referendum for or against Austrian independence in order to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the German claims. A brief period of political activity and mobilization began.

"What kind of activities did the Bolshevik-Leninists carry out during this interval, Comrade Bruno?"

"We did everything in our power to take full advantage of this short period of semilegality, and we participated in a series of political meetings and demonstrations. When Schussnig announced the vote and it became clear that a confrontation with Hitler's Germany was imminent, we put out thousands of leaflets stressing the need for the proletariat to raise its own class demands, such as for the reestablishment of political rights, the right to strike, the freeing of political prisoners, without which a simple call for a 'yes' vote would be totally insufficient.

"One of the major demands in our agitation and prop-

aganda was the demand for immediate arming of the workers. At the time the workers' desire for struggle was very high, and this demand was in general very well received. It will be to the eternal shame of the Social Democratic leaders that on March 12, 1938, they went along with the Austrian bourgeoisie's capitulation before the invading German troops, instead of overriding the wishes of the bourgeois government, violently if necessary, and arming the Austrian workers."

The surrender without a struggle to the advancing German troops was a terrible defeat for the Austrian working class, one from which it has to this day not fully recovered. The year 1938, much more than the year 1934, represents the dividing line between the militant proletariat of the first republic and the demoralized, passive working class of the post-World War II period. The proletariat's underground infrastructure, which remained relatively strong after the February [1934] battles, was almost totally smashed by German fascism without any great difficulty.

The Revolutionary Socialists (a left Social Democratic organization that arose from the SDAP) for all practical purposes disintegrated as a centralized organization, and the Communist party leadership was driven into exile.

Because of their numerical weakness, the Trotskyist groups had to limit their work to protecting their internal organizational and political ties and, in terms of external work, to individual propaganda. Already in the summer of 1937 there had been differences in the Struggle League about what attitude to take toward the impending imperialist war. Frey advocated the so-called "combined war tactic," according to which, in case of war, the proletariat should join the bourgeois army and go to the front to fight against Hitler's Germany, to help annihilate the main fascist enemy; at home, the fight against the bourgeoisie should be scaled down if this was in the interest of defending the Soviet Union. As against this, the comrades around Comrade Modlik, as well as the Bolshevik-Leninists, held firmly to the Leninist line of revolutionary defeatism in imperialist countries.

Under these most difficult circumstances, political and organizational activity was maintained, partly by typing, and often even through mimeographing, materials that we needed. Even this minimal activity was personally dangerous. On the basis of a denunciation by a police spy, some of the comrades of the *Gegen den Ström* [Against the Stream] group, which had come out of the Struggle League, were arrested. Comrades Franz Kascha and Jakobovic Joseph were executed, one comrade was driven to suicide, and a few others were sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor.

"Looking back, how would you evaluate your position during the war?" we asked Comrade Bruno.

"It seems to me that the most important thing was the complete political clarity we arrived at on the basis of our revolutionary Marxist education. From the time of the invasion it was completely clear to us that war was inevitable, that the war would have a worldwide character, that the Soviet Union would be attacked by Hitler, and not for a moment did we doubt that fascism would be defeated. This political understanding gave all the comrades the ability to pull through such isolation. Our

attitude was clear: We stood for the defeat of the Nazi armies, and this was concretized in our call for individual sabotage in the factories and inside the German army. We had held this position as early as 1939, when the CP was against it and saw French and English imperialism as the main enemy."

"Concretely, how was sabotage in the German army carried out?"

"Here I can only talk about my own experiences. Like most other comrades, I was drafted and sent to the front. Insofar as possible, I tried to obstruct military actions by damaging equipment and by unsatisfactorily or falsely carrying out orders. For this I was once almost hauled before a court-martial. It was impossible for me to carry out any real political agitation or propaganda inside the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, in a few cases I managed to establish some contact with the civilian population, so much so that often I declared myself a Trotskyist and recruited to our ideas."

With the end of the second world war, the stage of reconstruction of Austrian capitalism began. This was undertaken with the close collaboration of the bourgeoisie, the Social Democrats, and the Stalinists, who were all in the government. In 1945, the surviving cadres of the Austrian Trotskyist Opposition formed themselves into the Internationale Kommunisten Osterreichs [International Communists of Austria]. In spite of the reestablishment of democratic rights for the working class, the organization did not dare come out openly or carry out mass work. This was for security reasons—the GPU was operating in the areas occupied by Soviet troops. Reports of left Social Democrats being imprisoned or kidnapped by the Soviet secret service bore out the comrades in this decision.

In order to prevent being isolated from the working-class movement, the organization decided to implement an entry tactic to help build up left wings in the Communist party and especially in the Socialist party. The *Spartakist* was published regularly as an independent organ. Although the group was quite small, it was nevertheless able to make itself felt by establishing, relative to its size, a rather close contact with the working class; this is shown by the fact that the Trotskyists were present in nearly every decisive working-class event. During the strike wave at the end of the 1940s, the section led a six-week strike of shoe factory workers throughout Vienna, against the will of the union leadership and the Social Democratic heads.

There were a relatively large number of members who had succeeded in establishing positions of responsibility within the factories. During the 1948 SP conference, when the left wing headed by Erwin Scharf was expelled, our comrades supported the left opposition, but spoke against the merger with the Stalinist Communist party of Austria and for the building of an independent revolutionary party.

Our comrades were also represented at the conference of factory councils held during the big strikes of 1950; they criticized the CP's hesitant, planless, and at the same time sectarian behavior, which was leading in the direction of self-isolation.

But the unification of 1945 only lasted for a short time;

again the old arguments over the "combined-war tactic" came up, as well as differences over the social character of the East European states occupied by the Red Army and over the entry tactic. Even though a useful intervention tool became available with the publication of a Vienna edition of the German organ of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International (*Die Internationale*), the organization did not succeed in winning significant numbers of new cadre or in broadening its political activity. Apart from subjective mistakes, which certainly played a part, this stagnation can be explained also by the extremely unfavorable objective situation: Austrian capitalism found itself in a relatively protracted phase of continuous prosperity, and the Social Democratic leadership, whose dominance over the working class was just as complete as before the war, bound the workers to the bourgeoisie and blocked the development of all meaningful struggles. Even the Communist party, much stronger than the Trotskyists, lost one position after the other.

The campaign to support the Algerian revolution, into which the group threw all its available forces, is worth mentioning. It stood almost alone in Austria in carrying out this activity. The Trotskyists especially pushed propaganda supporting the Algerian freedom struggle in the periphery of the SP, such as in the Verband Sozialistischer Mittelschüler [League of Socialist High-school Students] and the apprentices' groups.

Trotskyist politics began to regain a foothold only with the student radicalization, which was very limited in Austria. In the autumn of 1972, after a process of differentiation within various leftist student organizations, the Gruppe Revolutionäre Marxisten [Revolutionary Marxist Group] arose in Vienna. Equipped with the arsenal of Trotskyism, the young organization intervenes in a new national and international objective situation to make its contribution to reconstructing the Austrian revolutionary workers' movement.

We asked Comrade Bruno how, in retrospect, he evaluated Austrian Trotskyism's long march through the wilderness.

"The most essential thing, it seems to me, is that in spite of all our mistakes and our organizational weakness, through our activity we in practice preserved the continuity of revolutionary-Marxist politics. The heritage of Bolshevism cannot be preserved simply in books; a continual redevelopment of its principles in practice is also necessary. I would like to especially stress the tremendous importance of our contact with the International and with other sections. If we had not been able to feel ourselves part of an international movement and participate in the life of this movement through congresses, conferences, and cadre schools, then in all probability, we could not have survived. I hope that the experiences we have accumulated will help us in the future to correctly solve our problems. The successes of recent months prove that also in Austria, Trotskyism is anything but dead, that it is more than ever one of the most vital elements of the young communist movement." □

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*Northern Neighbors*, a Canadian Stalinist monthly, claims that food prices haven't risen in the USSR because "they abolished [the] 'law of supply and demand.'"

### Abortion Becomes an Issue in Belgium

[The following article, entitled "Women's Liberation and Abortion," was published in the February 16 issue of *La Gauche*, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs (Revolutionary Workers League), Belgian section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Throughout the world, the problem of abortion is causing a stir, and in several countries new laws have been passed.

In the United States, the Supreme Court has OKed abortion and authorized it to be legally performed until the sixth month of pregnancy, with the stipulation that it be performed in a hospital facility after the third month. Any repressive law on abortion is now illegal in the United States.

In Austria, abortion has just been made legal up to the third month.

In France, 500 doctors have just signed a manifesto stating that they have performed abortions regularly and without financial gain—a courageous decision in light of French law, which is even more repressive than Belgian law in this matter.

On the other hand, there is increasing discussion about abortion techniques, and especially the American Karman method of abortion by suction. This method can be used during the first eight weeks of pregnancy and makes abortion into a mild operation, practically painless, involving no subsequent risks; it takes only a short time to perform (approximately a quarter of an hour). The simplicity of this technique and the extremely low cost of the equipment it requires make it the kind of technique that could be used quickly and easily on a wide scale.

Moreover, in Belgium, the results of a public opinion poll carried out by the Inusop (ULB) in 1972 in a context in which passions played no role show that a sizeable majority in Belgium favor a liberalization of abortion.

Nevertheless, here as elsewhere, the

reactionary old guard, backward members of the clergy, and conservatives of the far right are shamelessly trying to maintain the existing legislation and even to see to it that it is more strictly applied.

In keeping with its opportunism, our new government included in its program the problem of revising the abortion legislation. What will really come out of this? Just one more farce, probably.

Meanwhile, they are trying to take the steam out of the Peers affair [See *Intercontinental Press* February 12, p. 137] by playing a waiting game.

At the moment, it is the provisions of the Callewaert proposal that are receiving the greatest support from the Belgian public.

It can be assumed that this is the proposal, perhaps in somewhat modified form, that will end up being adopted. The Belgian government can allow itself the luxury of polishing up its image as an advanced democracy by adopting legislation that is already outdated and unacceptable.

The Callewaert proposal is unacceptable because it does not give the freedom of decision to the woman but to a committee of doctors. Thus women are being dealt with as if they were reproductive animals who are too stupid to be given the right to decide what to do with whatever is going on inside their own bodies.

What goes on inside a woman's body will still be decided by the law, but through the intermediary of doctors.

If the Callewaert proposal is adopted, the oppression of women as such and as workers will remain; it will simply be humanized. More hypocritical, and less shocking, that oppression will nevertheless still continue to exist.

The aim of softening the laws will be to throw a bone to the women's movement and calm down its struggle for its demands.

The politicians have just discovered that women, like young people, exist. That they should be listened to and coddled during an election is one thing; but they must under no cir-

cumstances be given the power to make decisions on this!

But women are emerging from too long a servitude to still agree, as they once did, to keep quiet and let others make decisions that affect their lives. They are finally aware—though perhaps not yet clearly—of the fact that they have been cheated, that they are in a way only the private property of men, a means of reproduction, a docile instrument of the capitalist system, which bases its exploitation in the patriarchal family.

The women's struggle is a new revolutionary front, for it is the rising up against oppression of a group that is particularly exploited by capitalism, and it in essence undermines the system by destroying little by little the foundations of the "sacred" family institution.

There are, nevertheless, certain nuances that should be made clear. We cannot accept the motivations of some, who call for the right of abortion and contraception, believing that it is more important to give the masses of people the means for not having children than it is to build decent housing for them, or to open child-care centers and schools.

Our demands for the right of free contraception and abortion are part of an overall analysis of society. These demands are aimed against a class-oriented medicine that excludes purely "social" considerations by serving the function only of creating and repairing workers.

We call for better living conditions, child-care centers accessible to all and open longer, and an end to sex discrimination resulting primarily from the prevailing conditions of procreation and maternity. We demand a freedom of sexuality in which pleasure and procreation are dissociated from one another and in which the sex act would thus no longer be steeped in fear and guilt for the woman.

In this sense we demand the complete right to free contraception and abortion as a condition for the liberation of women in their struggle for emancipation! □

#### Another Day, Another Lie

Air France has disproved Israeli claims that Jacques Bourges, pilot of the Libyan airliner downed by Israeli jets, wasn't licensed to fly the Boeing 727. On February 26, the airline published Bourges' license, which qualifies him to pilot a Boeing 727.