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Demand Nixon Be Tried as War Criminal

Secret Clause in Cease-Fire

What It's Like in Brazil Today



Disposal With Honor

New York's Environmental Protection Administrator Herbert Elish told the press February 5 that he has come up with an idea that may temporarily solve the city's garbage crisis: namely, to export the stuff.

New York is running out of dump space for its 30,000 tons of garbage a day. Incinerators to cost as much as \$750 million are to be built. Unfortunately it could take ten years before they go into operation.

As a stopgap, Elish has been thinking of shipping the garbage upstate or out of the state. Possibly it could be used to reclaim abandoned mines or land that has been ruined by strip-mining.

A few hitches have to be overcome. Elish said that no one wants New York City refuse. Perhaps it has a bad image.

"We could make some small town in Ohio or Pennsylvania rich," Elish said. "We're willing to pay people to take our garbage, but Pennsylvania, for instance, has a law against importing garbage."

Are other states equally isolationist? That remains unclear. Likewise unclear is whether Pennsylvania would extend transit rights if the dream of getting rich on New York's garbage should appeal to a small town in the Middle West.

Rounded Approach Needed

Some suggestions for Elish:

1. The cash bonus may be superfluous. New York City has succeeded in exporting its air pollution without paying anything to those on the receiving end.

2. The city might improve its financial position—which is also of crisis proportions—by importing garbage plus cash from smaller cities now running out of dump space themselves.

3. What about appealing to Congress? The Republicans and Democrats might just snap up the opportunity to take a daily shipment of 30,000 tons of garbage, plus New York gold, to help ease the taxpayer's burden.

4. And the White House. Can't Nixon have Kissinger work out some kind of disposal with honor to relieve the mounting tensions over garbage? □

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Press Told of Secret Clause in Cease-Fire

By Jon Rothschild

"Q. Dr. Kissinger, because of a news report from Paris this morning that actually there were some 15 or 20 protocols of which only four are being made public, were there any secret protocols agreed to?"

"A. The only protocols that exist are the protocols that have been made public.

"Q. Wait a minute—what about understandings?"

"A. There are with respect to certain phrases read into the record certain statements as to what they mean. But these have been explained in these briefings and made clear. There are no secret understandings."—From January 25 *New York Times* transcript of Henry Kissinger's January 24 news conference explaining the Vietnam accord.

"The United States and North Vietnam agreed secretly in their negotiations in Paris last month that a ban on foreign military activity in Laos and Cambodia would not take effect immediately, sources in the Nixon administration reported today."—*New York Times*, February 10.

It is no surprise to learn that Henry Kissinger does not always tell the truth. The fact that imperialist governments fail to inform their citizenry of what is being said and done in their name, that the Nixon administration has carried this "normal" governmental penchant for deceit to record heights, is likewise no great shock.

What is disturbing about the news about Laos—apart from the nature of the secret agreement itself—is that the North Vietnamese leadership has not only engaged in secret diplomacy, but has in fact agreed to secret clauses, thus keeping important information about the cease-fire accords hidden from the Vietnamese people, the international workers' movement, and the worldwide antiwar movement. Why did Hanoi fail to expose Kissinger's lie, thus in effect covering for the Nixon regime?

The U. S. sources that revealed the



KISSINGER and THO: What secret clauses did they agree to?

secret understanding said that Kissinger and Tho "entered into an explicit oral agreement" that neither the United States nor North Vietnam would stop military activities in Laos and Cambodia until the opposing parties of the civil war in both countries had reached a cease-fire accord on their own.

"According to the sources," the *New York Times* reported, "they also agreed that Washington would urge the Vientiane government and Hanoi would urge the Pathet Lao to approve a cease-fire within 15 days of the Vietnam cease-fire. . . ."

"They also reported that Mr. Kissinger . . . and Mr. Tho . . . had agreed in some detail as to the meaning of 'foreign military activity'; their understanding provided for a cessation of all American air raids and for a withdrawal of the 50,000 to 60,000 North Vietnamese troops currently believed to be in Laos."

Article 20 of the Paris agreement states: "Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, ar-

maments, munitions and war material." (Paragraph b.)

Spokesmen of the Nixon administration have come in for some embarrassing questions from the press because of continued U. S. bombing of Laos and Cambodia in apparent violation of Article 20. At a regular morning press briefing on February 6, White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler was asked about the contradiction. He replied that the United States was "prepared to observe the cease-fire in Laos when that time comes." (Emphasis added.)

Administration officials are now saying that a careful reading of Article 20 shows that there is no specific time set for the cessation of U. S. military actions in Laos or Cambodia. This is in marked contrast to the details packed into most of the other provisions of the accord. The absence of a vigorous public North Vietnamese denunciation of continued U. S. aggression in Laos and Cambodia now becomes explainable. At the negotiating table Hanoi agreed, in effect, that it would not object if the U. S. air force continued to drop bombs on Laos and Cambodia until the domestic liberation forces could be convinced to agree to a cease-fire.

In both countries the effect of this secret clause has been far from trivial. U. S. bombing in Laos has been heavy. "Pentagon sources say," the February 9 *Washington Post* reported, "that while the number of U. S. planes [involved in the bombing of Laos] varies daily, the average involves 30 to 50 B-52 heavy bombers, about 200 smaller fighter-bombers, and about a dozen heavily-armed AC-130 gunships."

South Vietnamese gunships, it was reported, are also being used "to spray machine gun fire along the border areas."

The reason for the U. S. bombing is beyond dispute. The military relationship of forces in Laos is much more unfavorable to the pro-U. S. regime than is the case in South Vietnam. The offensive launched in recent weeks by the Pathet Lao has been meeting with considerable success, despite the bombing.

The February 6 *Washington Post* carried a report on the Laotian military situation. Government troops, Lewis M. Simons wrote, were "nowhere on the offensive." The Pathet Lao, who already control between two-thirds and

four-fifths of the country, were advancing on a series of fronts:

"The most effective Communist attack, described as a 'blow to the government side,' took place at Nam Yeu, in the far northeastern corner of Laos near the Burmese border. Pathet Lao troops, attacking in battalion strength, overran the government base there Saturday morning [February 3], military sources said. . . .

"Far to the south, in the Laotian panhandle, North Vietnamese soldiers led by tanks staged what was called a very heavy attack on government forces near Saravan. A 'large number' of government troops fled the field of battle and are still missing, military sources said. . . .

"Forty miles farther south, on the Bolovens Plateau, North Vietnamese troops staged a heavy shelling and ground attack on Pak Song and another on Phouthevada. Yesterday [February 4], military sources said, government troops attempting to reopen the road to Phouthevada were driven back by 'fierce' North Vietnamese gunfire.

"In the middle of the panhandle, near Thakhek, by the Thai border, the situation was described as 'deteriorating.' Although government forces managed to repulse two North Vietnamese attacks, sources said, fighting was still heavy.

"At another central panhandle location, Muong Palan, North Vietnamese forces drove back attacking government forces in a battle which began on Friday [February 2] and continued today [February 5]."

It is difficult to resist concluding that the liberation forces have the ability to militarily depose the Souvanna Phouma government. There is no evidence that any significant section of the Laotian people support the pro-U. S. clique that rules in Vientiane and its environs.

Nevertheless, the opinion of most observers is that the current liberation forces' offensive is intended not as a bid for state power, but as pressure in negotiations. On February 6, while his army was in shambles throughout the country, Souvanna Phouma suddenly expressed great confidence that a cease-fire agreement would be concluded within one week. The prince had been conducting negotiations with Phoumi Vongvichit, a leading Pathet Lao official who had arrived in Vientiane on February 3 for secret talks

with Souvanna Phouma. The Laotian premier declined to discuss the details of the alleged settlement, but reiterated his stand that all North Vietnamese troops would have to be withdrawn from Laos.

Also on February 6, Ronald Ziegler announced that Henry Kissinger would stop in Vientiane on February 9 on his way to Hanoi and Peking. Ziegler said Kissinger would engage in discussions aimed at bringing about an early cease-fire in Laos.

On February 8, a "highly informed diplomatic source" in Vientiane reported that agreement had been reached in principle between the government and the liberation forces on a Laotian cease-fire to take effect on February 14. "It is felt," Malcolm Browne wrote in the February 9 *New York Times*, "that the precarious military situation of the Vientiane Government—in which several key towns and bases are either under siege or threatened—has contributed to bringing the negotiation process to a conclusion."

In the February 11 *New York Times* Browne quoted an unidentified Western diplomat in Vientiane as evaluating the situation rather more starkly: "Prince Souvanna is in a most unenviable position. His forces are being slaughtered, and the longer the cease-fire waits the more Laotians [read puppet troops] will die needlessly."

On February 12 Laotian government sources announced that a formal accord inaugurating a cease-fire would be signed February 13 by representatives of the Vientiane regime and the Pathet Lao. The agreement was said to be scheduled to go into effect the following day. No details were released, but it was assumed that the opposing camps would maintain their present positions throughout the country.

The secret Tho-Kissinger clause must be viewed in light of this entire chain of events. It seems clear that the North Vietnamese leadership put exactly enough military pressure on Vientiane to force a cease-fire—one that will entail, according to Article 20 of the Vietnam pact, a withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops while some sort of coalition government remains in power in Vientiane. It seems equally clear that in Laos, much more than in South Vietnam, the puppet administration has been incapable of

resisting the advance of the revolutionary forces.

The immediate question that arises is: Did Kissinger warn Hanoi that if the liberation forces in Laos did not agree to a quick settlement, U. S. B-52s would be turned loose on Hanoi and Haiphong once again? Is that why the North Vietnamese leaders agreed to the secret clause pledging to urge the Pathet Lao to settle and tacitly agreeing not to vigorously protest U. S. bombing of Laos until a cease-fire was reached?

If this is the case—and no one can doubt Nixon's willingness to obliterate North Vietnam if he believed it necessary to attain his objectives—then it must be said that Hanoi has done the Indochinese peoples and the international working-class movement a grave disservice by keeping this imperialist blackmail a secret.

In whose interest was the secret deal made? Does it help the masses of revolutionary fighters in South Vietnam continue their struggle? Or does it help Nixon obtain what he wants?

It may well be that the North Vietnamese are not in a strong enough military position to defend themselves against genocidal destruction by the U. S. air force. If that is the case, then certainly no one can fault people who have fought so heroically for so many years against such odds. But if it is the case, the North Vietnamese leadership should say so, should explain to their own people and to the worldwide labor movement and antiwar movement that the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies have not provided them with the means to defend themselves, and that U. S. imperialism has threatened them with total destruction.

One of the most revolutionary contributions made by the Bolsheviks to the conduct of foreign policy was their rejection of secret diplomacy—the assertion of the absolute right of the world working class to know what was going on at the top levels of command. When the Bolsheviks were compelled by circumstances they could not control to make major concessions to imperialism—as in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty—they did so openly, explaining to the world movement that the agreement was a temporary retreat.

The question now arises, are there further secret clauses on Indochina? Has a deal been made for Cambodia?

Are there "understandings" covering the question of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam? The North Vietnamese leaders owe it to their own people, to the fighters of South Viet-

nam, and the rest of Indochina, and to the international working class and antiwar movements to reveal any such clauses. To do otherwise is to free Nixon's hand for new aggression. □

U.S. Assigning Civilians to Military Jobs

Thieu Continues to Violate Cease-Fire

Since the Vietnam cease-fire went into effect, an estimated 200,000 South Vietnamese civilians have been driven from their homes, mostly by government attempts to "nibble" at liberated territory. Some people have been able to return to their villages after brief fire fights between Saigon soldiers and the liberation forces. But 40,000 to 50,000, according to statistics released by U. S. and South Vietnamese officials, remain in temporary shelters as of February 8.

In the February 8 *New York Times*, correspondent Joseph Treaster reported that since the cease-fire was proclaimed between 200 and 300 hamlets have changed hands. One official of the Saigon regime, Tran Nguon Phieu, told reporters that about 20,000 homes had been destroyed in the provinces around Saigon during the period January 28 to February 7. He said the total number destroyed in South Vietnam could be as high as 40,000.

In the February 8 *Christian Science Monitor*, Daniel Southerland described the effects of the battle for hamlets on the population of Long Khanh province. The upsurge of post-cease-fire fighting in the area, Southerland wrote, "has left no one a clear winner.

"It is only clear who the losers have been. They are the people whose homes were destroyed as the South Vietnamese forces retook one hamlet after another which had been temporarily lost to the Communists.

"The government can claim a victory in that it has driven the Communist troops out of all twelve of the hamlets which they penetrated in this province to the northeast of Saigon. . . .

"But the manner in which the government's local defense forces melted away in the face of some of the initial Communist attacks hardly inspired

confidence. And the brutal manner in which the government forces blasted their way back into the hamlets has hardly won friends."

The Saigon troops used "the heaviest weapons at their disposal, including bombs, artillery shells, and helicopter rockets."

That Thieu's soldiers have been attacking liberated villages without provocation has been established by reports from several Western newsmen who have visited villages being administered by the Provisional Revolutionary Government. In the February 8 *Washington Post*, Martin Woolacott, a correspondent of the British *Manchester Guardian*, described his experiences in Binhphu, "a Communist-controlled village in Dinhtuong Province [south of Saigon], which is brave or foolhardy enough to flaunt its blue, red, and yellow Vietcong flags within sight of the government-controlled highway."

"Let this be clear," a PRG official told Woolacott and other reporters as they entered the village. "Since the cease-fire, the government has repeatedly bombed, mortared, and shelled us, wounding and killing many people and creating many problems. Because of these acts by the other side, it is at your own risk that you stay here."

The official was not exaggerating. "The shells started dropping just as we raised our fourth glass of rice wine," Woolacott wrote.

The February 11 *New York Times* printed a dispatch by Neil Davis, a cameraman for an international news-film agency who visited a PRG village in an undisclosed area of South Vietnam. Davis was sitting in on a meeting of village elders when a Saigon helicopter passed overhead. "No one gave it a second look," he reported.

"Five minutes later the helicopter came back, flying a little lower. Everyone immediately faded from sight. We had run about 100 yards before the soldiers shouted 'down,' and I was shoved into the undergrowth.

"The guns on the helicopter, spewing bullets at a rate of 6,000 a minute, sent a long burst all around the tumble-down buildings we had left behind."

On February 10 the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry announced that the Saigon army had carried out 328 encroachment operations against liberated areas between January 28 and February 8. "Many hamlets were razed," the ministry said, and there were "thousands of dead and wounded."

While Thieu has been systematically violating the terms of the cease-fire agreement, his American backers have been busy devising ways to get around the accords' provision that there be no foreign intervention in the affairs of South Vietnam. Essentially, the U. S. technique involves sending Pentagon employees to the haberdasher's to get fitted out with non-khaki gear.

The size of the "nonmilitary" U. S. presence in South Vietnam, according to Peter Osnos, writing in the February 9 *Washington Post*, while much reduced from the peak years in the late 1960s, will still be larger than that maintained by the United States in any other country. The old "pacification" project, one of the most notorious mechanisms of U. S. intervention, will be taken over by a "directoriate" in the U. S. embassy.

While the U. S. military mission will be reduced to fewer than 100 persons, between 5,000 and 6,000 civilians will be retained on contracts paid for by the Defense Department.

"These contract employees," Osnos wrote, "most of whom have been here for some time, will be performing what informed sources described as 'logistical, supply, and training functions' for the South Vietnamese, intended primarily to assist in the maintenance of sophisticated U. S.-supplied aircraft and equipment.

"U. S. officials say that the funding of civilian technicians to work with South Vietnam's armed forces does not violate the provisions in the cease-fire agreement prohibiting 'military advisers . . . including technical military personnel.'"

Sectarians Weigh the Vietnam Agreement

By Fred Feldman

The cease-fire in Vietnam has been interpreted in various ways by the smaller leftist groups in the United States. The analyses range from fervid proclamations of unalloyed "victory" to bitter denunciations of the agreement as nothing but a "betrayal" and a "sellout."

In the February 7 *New York Times*, Rennie Davis, a prominent figure in the splintered "New Left," held that "President Nixon's 'peace with honor' is a face-saving disguise for a 'Vietcong' victory."

He was not alone in this view. *Getting Together*, a San Francisco bi-weekly published by radical Asian-Americans, declared in its February 3 issue: "The victory of the heroic Vietnamese people is indivisible from the victory of the people of America and of the world. Righteousness has overcome evil; light has overcome darkness."

A different evaluation of the agreement was presented in the January 29 issue of *New Solidarity*, the newspaper of the National Caucus of Labor Committees (NCLC). This sect has been at odds with the antiwar movement because of the movement's deafness to its appeals to set up "strike-support" committees based on the NCLC program.

As *New Solidarity* sees it, "The ultra-radical bands that have for years roamed around the avenues and boulevards of the imperialist metropolises discovering romance and adventure in grotesque movements of support for struggles of far-off exotic and idealized 'peoples' will scream 'sellout!' when the implications of the settlement in Vietnam sink in."

Sam Marcy, head of the Workers World party, a group addicted to the thought of Mao Tsetung, although it pays obeisance to Trotsky, hailed the pact at a January 27 public meeting in New York City. "People throughout the world are joyous at this occasion for they know that there has been a victory for the Vietnamese."

In the same speech, however, Marcy hedged a bit:

"The U. S. refused to formally recognize the PRG, but this is not too significant. After all, Nixon still has no diplomatic relations with China!

"Of course, the DRV and the PRG would have preferred a full-scale defeat for U. S. imperialism, where the Thieu clique would have been thrown out last April, but this would have required the complete political support of both the Soviet Union and China during the Haiphong mining."

"They failed to do this," Marcy said, "and even increased their relations with the U. S. at the very time the U. S. Air Force was destroying any city the NLF liberated."

The Shachtmanite International Socialists placed some blame on the North Vietnamese "ruling class." The February 2 issue of *Workers' Power*, their biweekly newspaper, said that "by the logic of their dependence on the other bureaucratic-collectivist states, they are pulled toward sacrificing their national ruling-class interests to the larger interests of their class-system. In signing Nixon's truce, they bowed both to force and to this larger logic."

The Class Struggle League, which promulgates the need for a "fifth international," said the pact was "a victory for the American government."

The Workers League, a group committed to "reconstructing" the Fourth International in accordance with the thought of Gerry Healy, stated its view in the February 5 issue of its weekly newspaper, the *Bulletin*:

"The agreement to end the war in Vietnam signed in Paris on January 27 is the product of the criminal and persistent betrayal of the governments of the Soviet Union and China who have forced the North Vietnamese to accept a settlement that abandons everything they have fought for since 1945."

That is not all. According to the *Bulletin*, the Socialist Workers party had a Machiavellian hand in it. "The cease-fire agreement is the fruit of their collaboration with Stalinism."

This absurdity (a slanderous absurdity, in fact) flows logically from the Healyite position that the SWP "betrayed" by engaging in the organization of nonexclusive mass demonstrations against the U. S. intervention in Vietnam. The Healyites opposed demonstrations that did not exclude all those unwilling to march under their leadership and banners.

The Spartacist League, a rival of the Workers League, was more rational in pinpointing responsibilities. In a statement published in the February issue of their monthly paper, *Workers Vanguard*, the Spartacists' political committee said, in part:

"The main difference between this and the 1954 sellout is the ceasefire in place. . . . Because of this, and the difficulties (real, but not insurmountable) for the U. S. in reinvading, we can judge that the ceasefire does not mean an immediate liquidation of the struggle and could well eventually lead to a Viet Cong victory in the South. However, this gamble is based on the fundamental *strategy of betrayal* [their emphasis] which has been the essence of Vietnamese and international Stalinist policy since the inception of the struggle."

The *Vanguard Newsletter*, which describes itself as "S. L.'s [Spartacist League] most dangerous opponent," had advice for the Vietnamese liberation forces on military strategy. This appeared in the January-February issue, published shortly before the negotiations were concluded. It called on the Vietnamese to launch a "coordinated military offensive in all Indochina, not the limited defensive actions which wait upon a counterrevolutionary deal by Soviet and Chinese bureaucrats."

The out-and-out Maoist groups were unanimous in hailing the nine-point agreement that formed the basis for the cease-fire pact. The January issue of *The Call*, published by the October League, attacked revolutionary socialists who dared offer any criticisms:

"NPAC's [National Peace Action Coalition] and SWP's ultra-'left' stand on the agreement is a great aid to Nixon and Thieu and in essence this position is a rightist position which serves the imperialists. . . . The present negotiations around the 9-Point Treaty have been a valuable weapon in exposing the 'secret peace plan'

of Nixon, in driving a wedge in the ranks of the imperialist and puppet forces, and in winning over many who were earlier uncommitted."

Other groups are still to be heard

from. Their slowness in responding does not mean that they have no opinions. In some instances lack of resources is to blame, or a breakdown of the mimeograph. □

Workers Resist Moves to the Right

Army Strengthens Hand in Allende Regime

"The workers' answer was not long in coming," Faride Zeran wrote in the February 2 issue of the Chilean weekly *Hoy*. "On Thursday and Friday January 25 and 26, the workers of the Cerrillos-Maipú industrial belt seized the streets leading into the town. Thousands of men and women came out.

"The barricades went up at 3:00 in the afternoon on Thursday. The decision was firm. They would not move until there was a definite statement from the government.

"The workers mobilized . . . to struggle against returning Perlak, which had been intervened by the government after long battles and bureaucratic delays, to the old management. In general, they mobilized to fight the Millas bill and turning enterprises won by the workers over to their old capitalist owners."

Zeran ended his article by stating: "The workers of Santiago will paralyze the capital if the government does not drop its line of returning the plants to their capitalist owners."

Even one of Economics Minister Millas's prominent Communist party comrades, Eduardo Bustamante, a union leader at the Metalpart plant, participated in the demonstration: "I am a member of the CP, and I don't feel that there is anything wrong about my being here. I look at the thing from a trade-unionist's point of view and I find that my mates are completely right. So, I do not agree with the people in my party who want to return the industries to the bosses, because I join in with the workers, I work with them, and I have a feeling for the thing."

This crisis was touched off when Orlando Millas introduced a new government bill defining the socialized sector of the economy. While the proposals called for nationalizing 49 en-

terprises seized during various disputes, it categorized another 121 taken from the capitalists as "special cases."

The Political Committee of President Salvador Allende's own Socialist party publicly rebuked him for supporting the bill:

"1. Neither the leadership of the party nor its leading functionaries in the economic field ever had any knowledge of the text of this bill.

"2. As soon as the Political Committee found out the 'terms in which the bill was conceived,' it categorically rejected them. . . .

"3. In its statement the Political Committee said that it not only did not support the provisions of the bill in question but, above all, it did not approve of the statement of the compañero minister of the economy, of which we were not informed in advance. In this speech not only was the bill introduced, but it was explained that a Negotiating Committee would be formed, which could set up a provisory system of coadministration combining representatives of the state, the workers, and the former owners of the forty-nine enterprises nationalized. At the same time, a 'Special Cases' Committee would consider requisitioning or intervening the 121 plants in this category, some of which already belong to the state."

Among other things, the statement of the Socialist party leadership revealed how much Allende is turning toward the more reliably reformist Communist party and the bourgeois formations in the Popular Front as his government moves to the right. The president could only reply that the 121 enterprises had not been returned to their owners.

"The members of the Socialist party and all the workers can relax," he added, "because the president of the

republic has always seen to it, and will always see to it, that the program of the government is carried out and that the revolutionary process is continued in a regular way."

But at the same time another concession by the popular-front government threatened to cause an even more explosive reaction, one that could damage the working-class movement as well as the regime.

As a result both of the economic sabotage by the capitalists facing expropriation and the escalating economic demands from the workers, and of increasing popular consumption, the distribution of goods has become an acute problem. The main organizations through which the people have fought against gouging by retail dealers and hoarders, combated rightist shopkeepers' strikes against the government, and maintained the supply of necessities to working-class neighborhoods have been the JAPs [Juntas de Abastecimientos y Control de Precios—Price and Supply Boards], which are grass-roots bodies functioning in the local areas.

With the sharpening class confrontation brought on by the approach of the congressional elections, the pro-capitalist opposition papers opened up an offensive in late January against the JAPs, running headlines that called for the army to take charge of controlling prices and supply.

On January 22, General Prats, the minister of the interior who was appointed under the pressure of the "bosses' strike" in October, issued a statement saying that the JAPs had only the function of "informing and cooperating with the Dirección de Industria y Comercio [Bureau of Industry and Commerce]," and he announced that inspectors would be appointed to oversee their operations. The decree had the effect of putting these boards under military control. The right-wing papers ran headlines such as "JAPs no, military officers, yes!"

In the January 26 issue of *Hoy*, the editorial board of the magazine noted: "Entrusting more government tasks to military officers has aroused intense debate within the left." But it felt: "This is not the time to examine the reasons that motivated the government to take this step."

One of the magazine's contributors,

Ruy Mauro Marini, pointed out that all the mass organizations under government control have become bogged down in bureaucracy and have failed to involve the people in running the economy. The result, he wrote, has been increasing economic inefficiency and frustration.

But no contributor raised an alarm over the fact that this latest concession gave the army an even tighter grip on the government's throat. Since September the capitalists have repeatedly tried to parlay widespread dis-

content over shortages into a reactionary mass movement to "restore order." There is a clear danger that as pre-election tensions increase, large sectors of the masses may be influenced by capitalist manipulation of supply and prices. If the people have no means for defending themselves against such pressures, a tremendous wave of discontent can be created that can be exploited to force the government further to the right or to overthrow it and to demobilize the workers' movement. □

gunfire raked the Roman Catholic funeral of three guerrillas, wounding at least two mourners. Protestant mobs roamed the city, set fire to a Catholic church, a furniture store, and a tavern, terrorized a parish priest, and attacked a police station and an army post."

Irish nationalists have theorized for more than fifty years that since British imperialism manipulates both the pro- and anti-imperialist communities in Ireland and is forced at times even to repress its historic allies, a basis exists for unity among all "Irish people" against the foreigners. Thus, if the Protestants find themselves fighting the British army—which, for reasons of Britain's overall policy must stop them at a particular time from staging a pogrom or force them to accept a lessening of the repression of Catholics—and in another area the nationalists are fighting the military, this coincidence represents a common struggle against imperialism. On the basis of this conclusion, both the Provisional and Official IRA have suggested staging diversionary attacks on the British army as a means of supporting the Protestants when they find themselves in conflict with "forces of the crown."

It was apparently this concept, which is essentially a romantic nationalistic one, that led conservative groups like the Catholic Ex-Servicemen's Association and the Nationalist party to support the one-day strike of the reactionary Protestant (Orange) groups. But this tactic quickly ran aground on the social realities. As long as they are organized on the basis of proimperialist and antinationalist caste prejudices, even groups whose membership is overwhelmingly working-class in social composition are reactionary on the political level.

As a result of this, the Orange strike was inevitably a reactionary show of force, even though it was formally against an oppressive imperialist law aimed primarily at the nationalists. There is a natural tendency for such exercises to turn into pogroms against the oppressed nationalist population. They are the exact opposite of civil-rights demonstrations, in that they strive to uphold the caste system, not tear it down.

The Official republicans, who claim to have broken with romantic nation-

At the Crossroads in Ireland

The Meaning of the One-Day Ulster Strike

By Gerry Foley

"They took to the streets of Ulster together—right-wing Protestant 'loyalists' and some left-wing Roman Catholic republicans—groups more accustomed to bashing than backing one another," *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Peter Stuart wrote in a dispatch from Belfast in the February 8 issue of the Boston daily.

Stuart seemed impressed at the breadth of support for a one-day general strike called by William Craig, the leader of the right wing of the Unionist party and the home minister who sent the police in to attack the first civil-rights demonstrations. The strike was intended to protest the jailing under the Special Powers Act of two Protestants accused of throwing a grenade into a bus filled with Catholic workmen. "The detention law had previously been applied only to suspected Catholic terrorists," Alvin Shuster noted in the February 8 *New York Times*.

The main body organizing the strike was the Ulster Loyalist Council, a coalition of proimperialist activist groups that includes the Loyalist Association of Workers.

"These hardline Protestants were supported in the strike by the Catholic Ex-Servicemen's Association, whose 15,000 members operate self-protection street patrols in the Ardoyne and Andersonstown areas of Belfast," Stuart wrote.

"Equally surprising sympathy for

the protest came from the executives of Ulster republican clubs and the Nationalist Party, both Catholic organizations.

"Another republican group with deep roots in the minority ghettos, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, initially endorsed the strike but later reversed itself."

Stuart noted: "For years, many have quietly speculated that perhaps Ulster's working classes—Protestants and Catholics alike—had common economic and political grievances deeper than their sectarian differences.

"Such speculation has been encouraged by the tentative feelers extended to each other by the militant Protestant Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and the equally militant 'official' wing of the outlawed Catholic Irish Republican Army (IRA)."

Such working-class unity has been projected as a solution continuously not only by various doctrinaire socialist groups but by most liberal bourgeois journalists.

Unfortunately, the realities of the Irish struggle for national liberation are more complex than the schemas of petty-bourgeois progressives and dogmatists of all types. Why did the Civil Rights Association reverse its position, for instance? An earlier paragraph in Stuart's article provided a clue:

"The strike brought Belfast at least to a standstill. But later in the day

alism, retain this myth and are in fact its most determined defenders for complex reasons. Their romantic concept of "national unity" is reinforced by Stalinist notions of abstract unity designed to keep all struggles of oppressed peoples on a purely trade-union level. It is reinforced also by new-left populist clichés about all poor people having the same interests, as well as by the pressure of British ultraleft workerist sects. The fact that the Official republicans are subjectively revolutionary seems to make them apply this principle with dogmatic conviction, whereas the Communist party, for instance, is able to be much more flexible.

It is ironic also that the Official republicans' schematic concept of working-class unity has had the effect of making the prospects for real working-class unity in struggle even more remote.

The main achievement of the Official republican leadership was to build the civil-rights movement into a mass united front. But when the rise of united action of the oppressed led to increasing polarization of the two communities in Northern Ireland, the Official republicans drew back. They became increasingly defensive and, when they proved unable to control the violent outbursts of long-suppressed rage on the part of the nationalist people, more and more pessimistic.

The Officials' claim that unity of Protestant and Catholic workers was a prerequisite for making substantial progress toward a better system discouraged struggle. Such a perspective appeared increasingly unreal and utopian to the Catholic masses under attack from their "Protestant class brothers and fellow Irishmen." From such a position, it was impossible for the Official republicans to maintain their mass leadership. They were progressively forced back into purely propagandistic activity, as were the other groups that tried to make working-class unity their immediate focus.

As their "working-class" formulas became more and more irrelevant to the immediate situation and were pushed more and more into some indefinite future, a process of conservatism seems to have developed within the Official republicans' own ranks, making them unable to implement po-

litical initiatives. Partly because of this development, the civil-rights movement itself has tended to turn into a propaganda and social-work organization. This is shown, among other things, by the fact that this allegedly united-front body, instead of confining itself to organizing agreed-upon actions, engages in political analyses of the Northern Ireland situation and in polemics against other anti-imperialist groups.

The drift of Official republican policy seems to have come to a kind of culmination in the Bloody Sunday commemorations in Derry and Dublin. The Civil Rights Association cancelled a planned march in Derry on the grounds that such mass activity would be a provocation to Protestant extremists. Instead it organized a "vigil" and a public meeting.

The vigil of radical and liberal personalities from England did not, according to press reports, arouse much enthusiasm among the local population. The action of these visiting notables was rather divorced from the struggle of the people. The public meeting reportedly drew about 3,000 persons. But it was completely overshadowed by a massive Provisional march estimated to include up to 20,000 persons, which drew away about half the civil-rights rally.

In Dublin, the Irish Civil Rights Association (ICRA), of which Provisional Sinn Féin is a prominent component, held a march estimated at about 1,000 persons by the January 29 *Irish Times*. If this estimate is correct, the movement against the repression in the South is still on the decline.

The Officials have correctly criticized the main political force in ICRA for failing to broaden the organization. But on the same day, the Officials held a demonstration in their own name on the outskirts of the city. The *Irish Times* estimated that there were 200 marchers.

In the South also, the Officials are waiting for the trade-unions to take the initiative. Whatever the practicality of this, the fact remains that at this point in both the North and the South, the Officials are not putting forward a mass alternative either to the Provisionals' guerrilla campaign or to their narrow attempts to organize against the repression.

The Bloody Sunday demonstration in Dublin was simply another of a myriad of small, isolated, symbolic demonstrations apparently designed more to keep the membership active than for any political purpose. Thus, it seems to reflect a political failure, the failure to offer political leadership for a mass movement against the repression, a failure that results from the fact that neither the ultraleft workerist-populist nor the reformist influences of the past have been overcome in practice.

A major theoretical step toward overcoming these influences was taken at the Official Sinn Féin convention in December in two resolutions on the North, one rejecting the separation of the civil-rights struggle from the anti-imperialist struggle and another recognizing the protofascist character of the Protestant "working-class" groups. Unfortunately, the practice and effective political line of the republican movement do not seem to have changed decisively since the convention. And it is clear that events are moving too rapidly for shifts to be carried out through a slow process of discussion and argument.

The future of the Official republican movement depends on a section of the leadership recognizing the reality, assuming firm authority, and drastically reorienting the organization. The Irish situation seems to have reached the point often seen in other revolutionary processes where the fate of the most conscious political organization depends on the personal leadership qualities of a few individuals.

The opportunity for projecting a political line that can mobilize the masses has been provided by Lynch's announcement of plebiscitary elections on February 28. As a recognized political party, Official Sinn Féin can not only present its own political solution but offer a platform for a united front of militant opposition to imperialism and repression. But this can only be done effectively by linking the election campaign directly to the defense of the nationalist people in the North, by running candidates that represent the embattled ghetto dwellers and by combining electoral activity with mobilizing masses of people against the repression.

It seems clear also that the Provisional republicans are at a crossroads. Criticism has been rising in

their ranks and among their supporters of the terrorist campaign in the North. On the one hand, the Provisionals have seen their mass support reach its highest levels when they led actions that could appeal to and involve masses of people, such as the housing demonstration in Lenadon Avenue before the end of their ceasefire, and the anti-internment demonstration in Derry on the anniversary of Bloody Sunday. On the other hand, they saw how this support was blown away by the Bloody Friday bombings.

The Provisionals have won the support of most of the militant Catholic population by their obvious determination to fight imperialism no matter what the odds. It remains to be seen whether they can win the active sup-

port of the masses of the nationalist population throughout Ireland in a struggle to defeat the repression and achieve the kind of national independence the Irish people deserve.

The Bloody Sunday demonstration in Derry points the way toward a new stage. Continuing the guerrilla tactics leads toward increased repression and unnecessary sacrifices. The British authorities and the international press are trying to blame the rise in sectarian murders on the guerrilla actions of the Provisionals. This is ominous. Unless public opinion in Ireland and internationally can be mobilized in support of the nationalist ghettos, the claims about "mad sectarian war" could be used to cover up an unprecedented pogrom. □

investment out of the country. Even the United States itself has more severe restrictions than that. But this law was characterized as "communist" and since 1964 foreign capital can take out as much as it can get.

The government uses its propaganda to glorify the United States and the "American way of life," and they encourage North American religious missionaries to come and work among the Brazilian masses. This is particularly true of the Mormons. Of course, they don't mention the American workers' right to strike.

Q. What about strikes in Brazil?

A. Strikes are outlawed. In most cases there simply aren't any unions. Where unions are allowed to exist, they can't strike and the leaders must be approved by the government. If the workers elect nonapproved leaders, the police attend the meetings. The employers simply don't have to worry about serious collective bargaining, and the workers are completely at the mercy of the employers.

This has resulted in a 45 percent drop in real wages since 1964, and they were none too high then. A recent survey showed that a worker on the minimum wage per hour—and the great majority are on the minimum—would have to work twenty-eight hours a day simply to feed, clothe, and house a family.

The result is terrible poverty and very long hours of work, as well as much child labor. It is common for ordinary workers to work eleven hours a day, to work Saturday and Sunday, and for wife and children to work as well.

Many workers are forced to live in favelas (shantytowns) where they pay no rent—and have no sanitation or running water, not to mention electricity or refrigeration. Conditions are no better, perhaps worse, in the countryside.

Q. But Brazil is a vast country with huge wilderness areas, and one would think frontier farming would provide a great escape for the city masses.

A. The fact is that the development of the wilderness is entirely in the hands of big capital—most of it foreign—which is given huge grants of land and generous concessions. There

Under the Military Dictatorship

What It's Like in Brazil Today

[The following interview with a young Brazilian was recently obtained by Fred Halstead in Montevideo, Uruguay.]

* * *

Q. What is the political and economic situation in Brazil right now?

A. Politically it is one of repression, an unabashed right-wing military dictatorship. They have opened the country to unrestricted exploitation by foreign capital, particularly from the United States. They use avowed censorship, control of the educational system, control of the media, of the political processes, and widespread arrests to silence any criticism of this policy.

Economically there is a sustained boom, based primarily on the influx of foreign capital and partly on some showy government projects such as roads and buildings for which the government has gone deeply into debt.

Economically it is capitalism operating in a semicolonial country without restraint—even the restraints of bourgeois democracy—and the results are terribly destructive of the quality

of life as well as of the standard of living of the ordinary workers. It is capitalism gone wild, or allowed to run to its logical extreme.

The government's economic policy is based on three principles: cheap labor, political stability, and what they call fiscal initiatives, which means generous tax breaks for investors and in many cases government grants to investors to encourage them to build enterprises in various parts of the country.

Q. What is the government's attitude toward the United States?

A. Totally in accord with American foreign policy and totally subordinate to American corporate interests. Foreign capital, most of it from the United States, is having a field day in Brazil now. One of the first acts of the military dictatorship after it overthrew the liberal populist regime of Goulart in 1964 was to revoke the very modest law governing the removal of profits by foreign capital from the country.

That law, which was promulgated in 1963, limited foreign investors to taking 10 percent per year on their

have been small farmers who cleared some wilderness and worked the land, but they are simply driven off when the big capitalists come in. Sometimes whole small towns are driven out.

There are places where such development is taking place where signs are put up: "For North Americans only." These are compounds where the American businessmen, technicians, etc., live.

The small farmers face the choice of working for the corporations or of moving further into the wilderness only to be robbed again a little later on. If they work for the corporation, they are paid so little they go deeply in debt to the company store. Then if they try to leave, they are hunted down as criminals either by the corporation's hired gunmen or by the police.

Q. What about the indigenous people in the wilderness?

A. They are killed off by and large. It is very hard to get out word of their fate. In Brazil now, the weak are not allowed to protect themselves, and no social movements are allowed to develop to publicize and fight on their behalf. In the voracious march of capital, the Indians are the weakest of the weak. Some, of course, can work for the corporations. But by and large they prefer to retreat, or fight and die. But it is no contest.

Q. With all this poverty, what sustains the boom?

A. In Brazil now there is a very weak internal market. The boom is based mainly on production for export. Foreign capital exploits the natural resources without restraint and the workers at very low wages without restriction, and it is able to produce commodities cheaply to compete on the world market. It is a paradise for foreign capitalists and their agents in Brazil, but it is a life of desperation for the average worker.

Q. What about the middle class, or those who identify with it, like doctors, engineers, teachers, and so on?

A. The middle classes by and large supported the populist regime [of Goulart], which was liberal capitalist and which had some concern for the internal market. Between 1964 and

1968 the popular movements, including workers' organizations like unions, continued to exist, and there were even mass mobilizations.

On December 13, 1968, a decree was issued taking away individual liberties, the right of assembly, free speech, free press, etc. The middle-class vanguard reacted in desperation, with guerrillaism and individual terrorism. They were simply killed off or jailed and tortured. The government used these incidents to deepen the repression, and many fine young people were lost.

Now things are quiet. The workers by and large are too occupied keeping body and soul together to have time to organize. The newer workers have never known anything but brainwashing from the government control of press, radio, movies, education, etc. They don't like the situation. The government is not popular. But many don't know who is to blame.

Q. With all this injustice isn't there opposition?

A. Yes, but it cannot be expressed openly. The government tries to appear benevolent. If you are nonpolitical and don't complain too much, you are not repressed. But if you have concern about the destructive effects on the country, on the future, on the masses, you must be careful.

Periodically the government sends out questionnaires to local governments, factories, rural areas, packing plants, etc. These must be filled out by supervisors, even foremen. They ask questions about the mood of the workers, about who is agitating, etc. You never know when a bad report might be made on you.

From time to time the government carries out raids, arresting several thousand persons. They are kept a few days and released, usually not being told why. A few are kept. These may be charged, but some stay in jail for months or years without formal charges.

All candidates for election are screened through a series of tests which effectively eliminate all who might not go along with the government. But even then, in many areas, the officials are simply appointed by the president [Emílio Garrastazu Médici] a military dictator.

If a city is declared a "national security area," the mayor is appointed. Of course a "national security area" is any place sophisticated enough to offer serious opposition. Thus, cities like São Paulo and Porto Alegre have appointed mayors.

Q. What about the old political parties of the left, of the populists, the Social Democrats, and Communists?

A. They are not active. The continuity with the past has been broken. They have very little influence in the mass. The masses are without leadership. It could lead to precipitate explosions. Already in the North there have been instances of groups of workers or peasants rising up in desperation, raiding a small city simply to steal food and whatever they could carry away. The actions are brutally repressed. It will take a party like Lenin's to operate in this situation.

Q. What about the national bourgeoisie?

A. There really isn't any. They are all agents of foreign capital, or closely related to it. For the last twenty years every Brazilian minister of finance has been a person who worked for an American corporation before and after holding the ministry. The situation is obviously ruining the country, and you could ask why even the government officials would tolerate it, but the reason is simple: As individuals they are getting rich out of it.

There is a section of the rich who have offered criticism. They are those who are most interested in or dependent upon the internal market. They would prefer some democratic reform as a check on the situation.

But even this criticism is not tolerated. The newspaper *Opinião*, which voiced some of these ideas, was closed down this month [January]. Also, Mesquita Neto, the editor of the country's largest daily, *Estado do São Paulo*, was jailed this month. Now the paper no longer criticizes the government's economic policy. But the *New York Times* published a special economic supplement on Latin America that has high praise for Brazil's economy. It all depends on the angle you see it from. □

Sadat Tries to Whip Students Into Line

By Jon Rothschild

"It is no longer time for words, but for deeds," is Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat's watchword for 1973. On first inspection, this little motto seems intended about as seriously as his claim that 1971 would be the "year of decision." But, as *Le Monde's* Cairo correspondent, Roland Delcour, observed in the Paris daily's January 24 issue, Sadat is consistently applying his dictum in at least one area—repression of the student movement, especially of its left wing.

On January 29 the Egyptian parliament endorsed a report on January's student upsurge. (See *Intercontinental Press*, January 22, p. 45 for an account of the student strikes and demonstrations.) The report had been drafted at Sadat's request by a parliamentary commission. It blamed the demonstrations on "leftists" and recommended strengthening the campus security apparatus by setting up a special civilian police force that would operate on the university grounds under the supervision of campus administrations.

The parliamentary report was the opening move in what has become Egypt's most serious witch-hunt in years. The authoritative Cairo daily *el-Ahram* reported January 29 that Cairo and Ain Shems universities—the two major centers of student radicalism—had begun issuing special passes to registered students, a means of keeping "outsiders" off university property. Cairo rumor mills, which play a special role in the absence of an even nominally free press, began churning out stories of further repressive steps to come.

On January 31 Sadat delivered a two-hour-long speech to the parliament. In it he pledged that his democratic reforms would continue—a sure sign that a crackdown was coming—but also promised that "deviation" would be dealt with "severely." Total freedom of expression, he said, should not exist; it must be limited to the needs of the community. Sadat is a master of platitudinous demagogy, so his observations on the relation-

ship between freedom and necessity can hardly be called newsworthy. But he pressed on to give his version of the student upsurge—and here he went beyond platitudes.

The leftist students, Sadat claimed, had hatched a plot to overthrow the regime. They allegedly planned to seize power, first in the universities, then in the entire country, on January 1. They were to convene a student congress on that date, declare the official Union of Students dissolved and replace it with a National Democratic Student Federation, which in turn would form a series of Committees to Defend Democracy, whose task would be to undermine the regime.

"For the first time," Sadat declared, "we were faced with a deviation from the principles of the July 23 revolution [the date in 1952 on which Nasser's "Free Officers" seized state power]. This is especially serious in the present circumstances and the national crisis we are now experiencing. It amounts to real sabotage of the domestic front. These students undermined national unity."

Sadat tried to maintain the standard Nasserist position of opposition to both the left and the right. He claimed that right-wing elements had planned to take advantage of the chaos that would be created by the leftist "plot" to seize control of the government. Right-wing conspirators, he alleged, had gone so far as to create a "shadow cabinet."

Then he added the final ingredient of the usual Nasserist conspiratorial potpourri by claiming that foreign agitators were active in the student demonstrations, and he took personal responsibility (a novelty for him) for closing down Egyptian universities a week before scheduled mid-semester vacations:

"At the end of October [1972] I became aware of the leftist-rightist conjunction. A campaign of disparagement [of the country] was developing. Foreign reporters, the BBC, French journalists, and reporters from Bei-

rut, all of them fed false information by Egyptian students, were sowing uneasiness throughout the world. . . . Then the agitation began at Cairo University. . . . I had to react. I was the one who asked, on the night of January 3, that the universities be shut down."

Sadat went on to repeat the old Nasserist conception of Egyptian political reality: "The right believes that a privileged minority must run the country; the left wants to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. Both reject our doctrine of the alliance of all working forces. . . ."

"From this day on, each person will be held responsible for his words. Everyone will be held accountable for everything he says if he makes light of the Arab Socialist Union [ASU, the country's sole legal political party] or the principles of our society."

Finally, Sadat provided some statistics on the number of persons picked up and processed by the police: 200 students had been interrogated; 120 persons were arrested, among them 21 nonstudents; 48 will be charged with offenses relating to state security, 18 for having put out leaflets, 47 for having barricaded themselves in the administrative offices of Ain Shems University during the strikes.

On February 3 Egypt's universities, which had been closed for a week longer than called for in the schedule, reopened. The regime attempted immediately to impose a series of new restraints on campus political activity. Political meetings, it was announced, can now be held only if they are convened by the official (progovernment) student union or the local ASU committee with the approval of a faculty dean; wall posters, the most common literary means of student agitation, were banned. The February 4 issue of the *New York Times* reported that when its reporter tried to talk to a student arriving on campus, "officials of the Ministry [of Information] and of the university security office materialized out of nowhere.

"Only picture-taking is permitted, no talking," one of them said. The student quickly disappeared."

The clampdown on campus was paralleled by a sweeping purge of the ASU. On February 3, sixty-four journalists, writers, other intellectuals,



The main gate to Cairo University during the January student upsurge. Cairo and Ain Shems universities have been centers of opposition to Sadat regime.

and professionals were expelled from the ASU by decision of a special Disciplinary Committee of the National Assembly headed by Hafez Badawi, president of the Assembly and close associate of Sadat.

The charges against the sixty-four varied. Some were accused of having committed "acts aimed at creating confusion and distorting Egypt's reputation abroad by supplying the foreign press, broadcasting services, and news agencies with false information, or by signing misleading statements for publication abroad with the aim of depicting the country as shaken by instability and chaos."

Others were accused of having "deliberately and persistently tried to exploit their associations to issue statements which do not represent the views of the people's working forces in an attempt to support the campaigns designed to spread chaos, wreck democratic principles, and distort the work of legitimate constitutional institutions."

In general, those expelled were charged with "departing from the national line, inciting against national unity, and spreading false rumors to create tension."

The list of expelees included some of the best-known Egyptian intellectuals and journalists. This was intended to serve as a warning to lesser-known figures. If Sadat would purge

such men as Louis Awad, a longtime writer for *el-Ahram*, or Yusef Idris, a famous novelist and critic, or poets like Ahmed Hegazi, Mahmoud Amin el-Alem, and Ahmed Doukol, no intellectual figure could be considered secure.

Moreover, expulsion from the ASU is not merely a political inconvenience. Professional people cannot work in their field without being members of the appropriate professional organization, and membership in the ASU is a prerequisite for this. Nabil Hillali, for example, a lawyer who has defended students arrested for their political activities, was one of those expelled. He will no longer be permitted to practice law.

In addition, people expelled from the ASU tend to have difficulties obtaining exit visas; they are therefore trapped in Egypt and subject to the whims of the all-pervasive government bureaucracy.

When the semiofficial Middle East News Agency released the list of expulsions, it noted that the Disciplinary Committee was meeting in "continuous session" and that further expulsions were expected. The second wave came on February 5. Ten regional and trade-union leaders of the ASU were thrown out for "political deviationism."

On February 6 a third list of ex-

pelees was released to the press. This list included some of the leading leftists of the ASU. Lotfi el-Kholy, a member of the ASU central committee and editor in chief of *Talia*, a magazine put out by *el-Ahram's* publishing house, was kicked out. So was Michel Kemal, head of the *Talia* editorial board. Mustafa Bahig Nasser, a close collaborator of Khaled Moeidddin, member of the World Peace Council, was expelled.

As of February 7, the total number of persons expelled from the ASU stood at ninety.

It has been reported that a few of the purge victims are right-wingers, which would be in keeping with Sadat's practice of maintaining an aura of impartiality. But it is clear that the left is the real target of the repression. The February 9 *New York Times* reported that progovernment journalists and officials have been turning up at political rallies designed to support the purge. Invariably, their speeches stress the dangers of "Communist conspiracy."

Furthermore, according to the February 8 *Le Monde*, sixteen persons who had been expelled earlier from the ASU on charges of holding "reactionary" opinions have been readmitted.

Despite the intensity of the repression, there are hopeful signs that the student movement has not been driven back into inactivity. The February 6 *Le Monde* reported that when classes resumed February 3 at Cairo University, antigovernment wall posters began appearing again, in defiance of the official prohibition.

The students seem inclined to meet the purge with increased political activity. A public meeting against the repression was reportedly held at Ain Shems University on February 5. On February 6 students at Cairo University held a demonstration under slogans demanding an end to the purge and the release of all arrested students. The British daily *Guardian* has reported that 100 students at Cairo University have gone on a hunger strike to protest the witch-hunt. □

2 Out of 3 You're OK

American Motors, fourth largest U.S. auto corporation, is recalling all cars it produced during the past 13 months because of the possibility of brake failure in 30% of them.

Tuition Hikes Spark Campus Protests

By Howard Brown

[The following article is reprinted from the February 5 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist newspaper published in Toronto.]

* * *

Cutbacks in student aid, increases in tuition fees and the slashing of education spending, particularly the firing of professors: these issues are moving students into action across the country.

The roots of the present crisis of capitalist-controlled education may be discovered quickly enough by reading between the lines of the federal Peitchinis Report or any of the various provincial reports which inform capitalist educational policy in the present period.

The rapid expansion of higher education over the past decade was the product of capital's need for highly skilled workers. Yet from the beginning that expansion proceeded anarchically, with the pace of enrollment constantly running ahead of the provision of facilities.

With the onset of recessionary conditions, capital discovered it had over-projected its needs for most types of university graduates, indeed that the labor market was glutted with highly skilled workers forced to seek unskilled jobs.

If big business is at the best of times loath to sacrifice its profits to the financing of education, in the present period it cuts back, eliminates the "frills," while attempting to thrust the costs of education onto working people, and through increases in tuition fees, onto students.

Students once again fall victim to an educational system which, far from serving their needs, is manipulated in the interests of capital, subject to all the anarchy of the capitalist business cycle.

The anti-student offensive is cross-country in scope. And students are fighting back. When in the first semester initial cutbacks were announced at Regina campus, students began an

occupation which over the course of the struggle involved more than 3000 students. Each of five general meetings attracted from 800 to 1,000 students, who demanded a halt to the cutbacks. When the university attempted to abolish the near-student-faculty-parity situation in the social sciences, all the better to introduce their austerity measures, the struggle broadened to include the demand for parity in the social sciences.

While the right-wing student council attempts to bury the struggle in dead-end negotiations with the provincial governments, it has been left to the Young Socialists and other student militants to lead the struggle forward.

Then on January 22 massive new cutbacks were announced. While tuition fees are to be increased by \$50, twenty-five professors and nearly all teaching assistants are being fired (affecting nearly every department), and a freeze is being implemented on building construction. With two months of struggle behind Regina students, the situation is an explosive one.

Meanwhile the Québec government is in the midst of its offensive against students. February 15 has been established by the Université du Québec à Montréal [UQAM] as a deadline for the payment of back tuition fees in the amount of more than one million dollars.

Students at the Université de Montréal [UdeM] and Sherbrooke face a similar situation. Five hundred students met at an initial meeting at the Université de Montréal to protest university attempts to collect back tuition. One hundred thousand copies of a special supplement to the UdeM paper are being printed to rally support across the province. On January 27 UQAM students went on strike, with the Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes [LJS] playing an important role in the leadership of the struggle.

With many Québec students having *de facto* enjoyed free tuition over the past three years, the Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes is demanding that this be-

come the norm. "In a so-called democratic society," they argue, "education should be a right, not a privilege." Noting the under-representation of the working class within the student population, the LJS calls for the abolition of tuition fees and the payment of a "student wage."

In Ontario, over the past year more than 15,000 students have been involved in demonstrations or rallies protesting educational cutbacks and increased tuition fees. More than 40,000 students have expressed their opposition to them in referendums.

In the brief period since the Christmas break there have been a number of significant developments.

On January 9, students at Glendon College organized an occupation to protest the university's decision to hold back Ontario Student Award Plan (OSAP) cheques until second-term tuition fees were paid. Almost simultaneously similar occupations took place at York and the University of Western Ontario. The administration's actions in these cases were clearly an attempt to cut across the fee strike called by the Ontario Federation of Students [OFS].

Within days of the occupations, the OSAP cheques were released.

On January 17, students occupied Brock University's board room and the offices of President James Gibson to protest the firing of sixteen faculty members. The occupiers, soon 200 strong, used the thirteenth floor of Brock Tower as an organizing center for the mobilization of students. Fifteen hundred students met in a mass meeting to establish the central demands of the struggle—no cutbacks in courses or faculty. A partial victory was won when the administration agreed to rehire five professors. But Brock students remain alert to further cutbacks.

On January 19 President T. E. W. Nind of Trent University announced massive cutbacks to meet Ontario College of Education guidelines. These include cuts of 35-40 staff, the amalgamation of the major science departments, amalgamation of French and Spanish, and the complete elimination of German.

The Young Socialist-led student council responded by calling a mass meeting of 500 students who endorsed the demand "Stop the Cutbacks—Tax Big Business," and committed them-

selves to resisting the government of offensive.

Student commitment to resist the cutbacks has been demonstrated over and over again in action. Trent, York, and Brock have called for a province-wide coordinated mass action of students at Queen's Park to rescind the fee hike and stop the cutbacks.

Yet the 100,000-member Ontario Federation of Students (OFS) remains reluctant to act. In the first place, the demands raised by OFS are completely inadequate. OFS requests that the age of independence for receipt of student loans be lowered from the present 25, that the recently increased loan ceiling under OSAP be re-established at its former level, and that increases in tuition be deferred pending consultation. The only tactic of resistance the right-wing OFS leadership has advocated is a partial fee strike, clearly conceived as subordinate to its attempt to "negotiate" with the government.

Recent events show even more clearly the inadequacy of the OFS program and strategy. The real interests of students have been articulated best by the slogans "Rescind the Fee Hike" and "Stop the Cutbacks." These slogans, clear and uncompromising in their defence of students, have proved already their capacity to mobilize students in struggle. The demand "Tax the Corporations," put forward by the Young Socialists [YS] and adopted by students at Brock, Trent, and York, serves to cut across propaganda of the capitalist press that the cutbacks are in the interest of the average taxpayer. The OFS continues to concede to the government's feigned concern with the "average taxpayer."

While the OFS tactic of a fee strike is legitimate, it is no substitute for the mass action of students. While the November 22 demonstration of 500 students at Queen's Park against the cutbacks and tuition-fee hike was formally called by the OFS, key elements in the OFS leadership, particularly University of Toronto's Students Administrative Council, abstained from building the action.

The seriousness of the government offensive and the resistance offered by students make both necessary and possible a second mass, province-wide action at Queen's Park in defence of

students' rights. Yet the OFS leadership continues to sit on its hands.

To this point in the struggle, the leadership has been left to rank-and-file militants, with the Young Socialists

playing an important cross-province leadership role, particularly through the YS-led student council at Trent, and YS student councillors on other campuses. □

Russell Tribunal Presidents Issue Appeal

Call for War Crimes Trial for Nixon

[The following statement on behalf of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation in London and the Paris Centre International d'Information pour la Dénonciation des Crimes de Guerre (International Information Center for the Denunciation of War Crimes) appeared in the January 21-22 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*. It was signed by the three presidents of the Bertrand Russell International War Crimes Tribunal—Jean-Paul Sartre, Vladimir Dedijer, and Laurent Schwartz. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

In 1967, the Tribunal, set up under the chairmanship of Bertrand Russell to judge war crimes in Vietnam, found the United States and the general staff of the American army guilty of carrying out a war of aggression, war crimes (massive, systematic, and deliberate bombings of civilian objectives, torture, massacres of prisoners, deportations, etc.), and genocide.

At the time, the Tribunal did not feel it necessary to pass judgment on particular individuals.

Today things are different: *One single individual* who is guilty of flagrant crimes must be denounced before the peoples of the world.

In view of the impossibility of immediately convening the Tribunal, it is we, the undersigned, who bring charges against the President of the United States of America.

We Accuse Richard Nixon of having revealed his true face just after the elections by attempting to blackmail the Vietnamese into capitulating by sending B-52s *by the hundreds*, every day for a period of two weeks, over the main cities of the Democratic

Republic of Vietnam, dropping more bombs on Hanoi and Haiphong than any one country has ever dropped on another.

We Accuse Richard Nixon of an act of aggression that is all the more cowardly in that the decision to carry it out was made in the United States, which is safe from any military reprisals from the Vietnamese.

Although Nixon, as president of the United States and commander in chief of the armed forces, today bears the major responsibility, we are not forgetting his accomplices, the main ones being the heads of his administration, the Pentagon, and the chiefs and directors of the war industry.

We remind all those connected to this war (officials, officers and soldiers, etc.) that international law does not recognize the excuse of obeying orders when it comes to war crimes.

We remind all those politicians, scientists, etc., who are facilitating the carrying out of these crimes that they too bear their share of responsibility.

We Accuse Richard Nixon of maintaining in Saigon a government beholden to him that he uses according to the needs of his criminal diplomacy. This government is holding in its camps and jails more than 200,000 political prisoners over whom hangs the short-range threat of a general massacre—a massacre for which the president of the United States would be directly responsible. We demand that an international commission be allowed to undertake an emergency mission to Saigon to investigate the fate of these prisoners.

In conclusion, *We Accuse* Richard Nixon of being a war criminal who should be judged as the Nazi leaders were in Nuremberg for acts of the same kind. □

The Government Plot Against the Left

By Victor Cygielman

[The following article appeared in the January issue of the Paris monthly *Le Monde Diplomatique* under the title "From the plot against the state to the plot against the left." It presents one analysis of the meaning of the government-inspired witch-hunt launched in Israel after the discovery of an alleged "espionage and sabotage network." *Intercontinental Press* has previously printed the analysis of the anti-Zionist left on this question. (See *IP*, January 29, p. 73.) The present article is of interest primarily because its author is a well-known representative of the Zionist "left," and can in no way be accused of friendliness toward the anti-Zionist struggle.

[Cygielman's fear that the right-wing elements of the Zionist establishment are using the "spy" case as a weapon against even confirmed supporters of the Zionist state is a sharp demonstration of the fact that the Meir government has more than "state security" on its mind in prosecuting Jews and Arabs for their political activity.

[The translation of the article is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Before the opening of the trial, it is impossible to determine in Tel Aviv to what extent the "espionage and sabotage network," in which about forty Israelis—both Arabs and far-leftist Jews—have been implicated, really succeeded in impairing Israeli security. Nevertheless, it does seem that the accused have already been tried and found guilty by the Israeli press. To read the articles published day after day in the Hebrew press, the real question is not whether the prisoners really worked for the Syrian secret service, but rather how young Israelis born in the country—Jews and Arabs, but especially Jews—could have done such a thing.

The average Israeli's shock about the police revelations is understandable. (These are Sabras, among them

a Kibbutznik and a paratrooper into the bargain, who are accused of having betrayed their country.) It is also quite natural that the Israeli man-in-the-street should have confidence in the counterespionage agencies and other special services that are conducting the investigation. What is less excusable is the obliging way the newspapers, however seriously, have hurried to serve as publicizers of the charges (the record compiled by the police). They did so not only before the defense had been able to make itself heard, but even before it had set eyes on the police file.

While Israel has been strongly influenced by English jurisprudence and criminal law, it does not seem to have assimilated any respect for the *sub judice* concept, according to which the accused is presumed innocent until he has been convicted by a court of law. The reader of the Israeli press is swamped daily with many accounts, not of the trial, which has not even started yet, but of the results of the ongoing investigation. These accounts have been provided to reporters by police officers, who are generally somewhat more circumspect when it comes to cases of espionage.

Many Contradictions

Annoying detail: News released by one policeman is often denied by another the next day. One day we heard that the "network" was planning to assassinate General Moshe Dayan. The next day this report was "corrected" with the statement that it was "only" a question of kidnapping the general. The day after that it was explained that Dayan's name did not even come up, but since the Christmas eve "operational plan" projected attacks against Israeli personnel whom the accused regard as "chauvinist," it was only natural to assume that the defense minister was among the targets.

One day we get a list of arms discovered at the home of one of the



DAYAN: A convenient "target" for a non-existent conspiracy.

accused. The next day—mistake, there were no arms. The Israeli chief of police, Inspector General Enaul Rosolio, told reporters about the "very serious harm" the "network" had done to Israeli security. But Shlomo Hillel, the minister of police, minimized the importance of this damage to security.

No doubt the trial will shed some light on all these contradictions. But for the present, we may ask why the government prosecutor, Attorney General Shamgar, did not for one second oppose this "orgy of leaks." Organized by a police force that has clearly been given free rein, this "orgy" could only disorient public opinion, already very uneasy and sufficiently traumatized. By now, nobody in Israel imagines that the accusations brought against the prisoners could be devoid of all basis in fact.

Israel is not a totalitarian country, and a frame-up trial is unthinkable in present-day Israeli society. But one cannot help wondering whether certain Israelis in high places have not given way to the temptation to use the business of the "network" to launch a political operation just at the opening of the election campaign. This could explain the inflating of the police dossier, the exaggerated press accounts, the manipulation of news provided to certain newspapers that are more eager to hit below the belt than to play fair.

For the real accused in this case—beyond the forty or so prisoners—

is the whole Israeli left. The witch-hunt that has just been launched is attacking the entire left, even all moderates. No one is spared, not even the "doves" of Golda Meir's government. Thus, the right-wing nationalist Knesset deputy Mr. Shmouel requested an urgent parliamentary discussion to "examine the spiritual sources of treason."

Treason, according to him, is nourished and encouraged by all those who criticize the Israeli occupation and speak of returning the Arab territories; by all those who propagate "defeatist" views, who are to be found among the left in Israel and "even in the leadership of the Labor party." A direct allusion to Sapir, Allon, and Eban, who are known for their moderate views and who recently launched a political offensive in the Labor party secretariat against Dayan's annexationist conceptions.

Thus, the press campaign about the "network" seems to have been designed to raise the prestige of General Dayan, the only "victim" mentioned by name as a prospective target of attack, and also to embarrass Dayan's present opponents as creators of a "defeatist" atmosphere conducive to the blossoming of all kinds of treason.

This is clearly recognized within the Labor party. Thus, *Davar*, the party's official organ, published a strong editorial attacking those who want to hold the Gan Shmouel kibbutz (where Ehud Adiv, one of the main defendants of the "network" was born and grew up), the Mapam kibbutzim in general, and by extension the whole kibbutz movement responsible for acts committed by a few individuals.

And also in *Davar*, under the by-line of the poet Haim Guri, who is close to Vice Prime Minister Ygal Allon, we can read that "the tendency to seek the 'roots of treason' in the political opinions of one or another person can do more harm to Israel, ten times more harm, than this or that network."

Frightened by this swell of accusations, several Israeli leaders have warned the public against "collective trials," called for by certain rightist politicians and journalists. Even a special service [Special Duties Branch of the police] inspector questioned on television stressed the necessity of distinguishing between the prisoners—

who, although from the extreme left, had quit organizations like Matzpen some time ago—and these organizations themselves. In seeking to explain and come to terms with the motives that could have led young Israeli Jews, Sabras who had served in the army, to act against their own country, some Israeli commentators have brought up the "revolutionary neurosis" that afflicts some of the youth of industrialized countries. Others speak of "self-hate" (that famous *Selbst-*



ALLON: Accused of creating a "defeatist" atmosphere.

hass), which regularly appears during various periods among certain Jewish intellectuals. Finally, others look for the answer in the individual frustrations the arrested Jews are said to have experienced, which are said to have made them bitter or full of hate. (Dan Vered is supposed to have been "broken" by the army; Yehzekel Cohen, who comes from Iraq, supposedly hates the whole Israeli establishment, which is dominated by Jews of European origin.)

The Real Roots of Revolt

Very few people have tried to find in the reality of Israel itself the reason for the violent anti-Israeli sentiment that motivates the four accused Jews, whether or not they are found guilty of espionage. Nevertheless, if the charges are confirmed in court,

it would be useful to ask why such a Jewish-Arab espionage and sabotage group, unprecedented in Israeli history, should be formed precisely during the 1970s.

The continued Israeli occupation of wide Arab territories, and above all the denial of Palestinian national rights, concern a growing section of the Israeli public. According to a recent poll, 68 percent of all Israelis believe that there will be no Israeli-Arab peace until the Palestinian problem is resolved; and among those between the ages of 18 and 29, 72 percent hold this view. But is it not in the nature of things that the youth—and especially young intellectuals, like three of the arrested Jews—should be particularly sensitive to the manifestations of injustice and discrimination they see around them? It would not be impossible that, impelled by an implacable revolutionary dialectic, they might be led to fight the Zionist establishment by every means, including arms.

If the accusation turns out to be true, then the question would be: How could these youths have put their determined internationalism at the service of Syrian nationalism, which in their view is no less reactionary—they say so repeatedly in their pamphlet, *Red Front*—than Israeli nationalism?

But whatever the case, the roots of their revolt must be sought in Israeli reality, and not superficially in merely their leftist ideology. □

Heath Fears U.S. 'Isolationism'

British Prime Minister Edward Heath told reporters on the U. S. television program "Meet the Press" that Western European nations may be obliged to develop closer ties with the Soviet bloc and China if the U. S. unilaterally withdraws troops from Europe.

Heath warned that "the general conclusion would be that America was becoming isolationist, withdrawing into herself, and no longer interested in world affairs."

"The Soviet Union would then start using much greater influence," Heath predicted. Western European countries would make deals with the Soviet Union and China that would not "be in the best interests of the United States." Heath added that Great Britain would not adopt this un-American course. He told his interviewers that he had "absolutely no doubt" that the Communist states were a threat to Western Europe.

Joint Actions in Britain Support Irish Struggle

By Rosemary Sullivan

[The following article is reprinted from the February 3 issue of *Red Mole*, the biweekly paper of the International Marxist Group, the British section of the Fourth International. The subheadings and emphasis are in the original.]

* * *

A monster rally which packed the Camden Town Hall, with an overflow of thousands spread out into the surrounding streets—this was the high point of the Anti-Internment League activities in Britain calculated to use the anniversary of Bloody Sunday, on Sunday 28 January, to rejuvenate the solidarity movement in this country.

At two simultaneous meetings, one inside and one outside the Town Hall, speakers ranging from one mother and four wives of internees, James Wray, father of one of the victims of Bloody Sunday, through Provo, Official, PD [People's Democracy], Gery Lawless (IMG) and Paul Foot (International Socialists) and including Fulvio Grimaldi (editor of *Lotta Continua*, the Italian left-wing daily) and Mike Cooley of the AUEW (TASS) [the technical section of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers], urged the need for solidarity with the struggle in Ireland, and explained the connection between this struggle and the political conjuncture in the world anti-imperialist struggle.

Step Forward

A significant fact in the meeting was the enthusiastic applause when speaker after speaker welcomed the success to date of the NLF in Vietnam and declared the identity of interest between the two struggles. This represents a tremendous step forward from the traditional confusion among the Irish people in relation to U.S. imperialism.

In the weeks and months preceding the demonstration, following an ap-



Part of the 4,500-strong Anti-Internment League Bloody Sunday demonstration en route to Camden Town Hall.

peal made by Bernadette Devlin, the Anti-Internment League [AIL] had organised mass distribution of leaflets and posters, and over 30 local meetings had been called to mobilise support. In most cases, the meetings were organised by local AIL branches, but in some areas, where either there was no AIL, or the AIL itself was not sufficiently representative of the potential support, then *ad-hoc* committees were formed on the initiative of the IMG.

The result of this unity in action and careful preparation was reflected not only in London.

In Scotland, with its peculiar difficulties for work in support of the Irish struggle [i.e., a large Orange population and anti-Catholic bigotry on the part of many native Scots], the Derry Bloody Sunday Commemoration Committee was able to organise a meeting which filled the main hall of Shettleston Town Hall, with supporters traveling from Stirling, Edinburgh, Fife, Coatbridge and other centres to hear Harry McShane, Brian Trench, Gery Lawless and Gerry Doherty address the largest anti-imperial-

ist meeting on the Irish question in Scotland for many years.

Confusions

The mobilisation was not without its confusions. Despite the fact that all the main organisations working on the Irish question had agreed to the idea of one demonstration in London and one in Scotland, a series of minor commemorations were organised in a number of areas, including Leeds, Manchester and Birmingham, which detracted from the central effort. This effect was increased by a number of active supporters of the AIL deciding to travel to Derry for the main commemoration in Ireland.

Top marks politically and organisationally for the mobilisation must go to the Coventry area. Here, strong united front action by IMG, IS and Irish exiles is reflected in the existence of two AILs, one in the University and one in the town, capable of strong initiatives on the Irish question. This was reflected in a whole number of actions in the seven days preceding the commemoration.

A welcome change from the last AIL demonstration was the large turnout by IS, who for the first time in a year outnumbered the IMG on the march, and contributed in no small way to the overall success. The same unity had applied in Scotland, confounding the pessimism on the question of mobilisation on Ireland displayed by the official IS speaker at the mobilisation rally in Sheffield.

The Communist Party failed to mobilise a single branch, and had to content itself with photographs of the rally in the *Morning Star* the next day which distorted the total composition, attempting to give it a peace-nik image. They made the false claim that their Irish front organisation had participated, although in fact it failed to take part.

Breadth of Views

The breadth of views represented on the main platform in London reflected the range of organisations which had supported the demonstration, and drove home the first important lesson—that there does exist a large and slowly growing base of support for a solidarity movement on

Ireland, but that no *one* of the Irish emigrant organisations, or the revolutionary groups has the status *on its own* to mobilise these people who have consistently voted for unity with their feet by marching or not marching. They can be mobilised, they will turn out, and they can be organised, but only when they see that the haphazard and exclusive organisational methods of the past are broken from. Only the broadest principled united front can attract them.

The Bloody Sunday Commemoration showed that in England and Wales the AIL, with all its faults, is alone capable of providing this lead.

The rally can now serve as a springboard for an upsurge of activity on Ireland between now and the crucial period of the White Paper. The impressive £500 collection at the rally provides the lubricating oil for such a campaign, and now makes possible the achievement of the next two tasks for the AIL: the publication of a paper to act as a mobiliser and organiser; and the organisation of a conference called by the AIL which will attempt to organise the full breadth of the solidarity and antiwar forces in Britain. □

that the employed people in the shantytowns will continue to work after moving to permanent dwellings. But this does not happen. On the average, out of every five people who have jobs or various ways of making a living in the shantytowns, only two continue working once they move into their permanent homes. This is because they go to live very far away from their places of work, since the new housing projects for *ex-favelados* have been built in remote enough places so that "decent people" won't notice the wretched stench thrown off by the "Brazilian miracle."

So, at the end of the month they cannot make their housing payments. The two persons still employed have to support the three who are unemployed and have to spend much more for transport to and from their jobs.

Another important demand raised was for more schools for shantytown children. According to the data published by the congress, there are a million and a half *favelados* living in Rio today. But the number of schools is derisory. "There are about 86,000 persons living in Jacarezinho alone, and they have only one two-semester high-school program for adults. Furthermore, this course costs 30 cruzeiros per month [approximately 16 cruzeiros equal US \$1], which is more than one-tenth of the basic budget of *favelados*. Furthermore, the majority of housing projects to which people from the southern shantytowns (in Rio the middle class is concentrated in the southern zone) have been transferred do not even have an elementary school.

At the conclusion of its discussion the congress voted to make a series of suggestions to the government for solving the problems of the *favelados*.

It is clear that petitions or suggestions are not going to get the dictatorship to solve these problems. The problem of the homeless people is the result of inequalities created by the Brazilian capitalist system and guaranteed by the military dictatorship. Such solutions can only be achieved through a process of hard struggles. But as they organize and define their demands more clearly, the *favelados'* awareness will grow and this will prepare them for going beyond making "suggestions to the government" to a concrete struggle to solve their problems. □

Report From Exiled Revolutionists

Brazilian Homeless Hold Congress

[The following article is reprinted from the January issue of *Campanha*, a united-front paper published by exiled Brazilian revolutionists living in Chile. Copies of the paper can be obtained by writing to José Campos, Davile 734, Santiago, Chile. No price for single copies or subscriptions is listed. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The Third Congress of *Favelados* (Homeless People, i.e., the inhabitants of the shantytowns, most of which are located on the hills around Rio de Janeiro) concluded on December 17 in the hall of the Truck and Long-Distance Bus Drivers' Union. It was sponsored by the Guanabara State

Federation of Associations of the Homeless.

However great its limitations, the congress represented a step forward in collective consciousness and the development of a unified program of demands by the *favela* dwellers.

Housing was the most urgent problem discussed. It is well known that shantytown dwellers who enter the government's housing plans become unable after a while to keep up their monthly payments to the BNV [Banco Nacional de la Vivienda—National Housing Bank] and thus come under a constant threat of eviction.

Francisco Vicente de Souza, president of the federation, pointed out that, among other reasons, this is because the budgetary base used to calculate the payments of employed *favelados* for their own homes assumes

Polls Register Shift to the Left in France

By Henri Weber

[The following article, entitled "Who Benefits From the Union of the Left?" appeared in the February 3 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The political offensive of the government majority, which was announced with great fanfare at the beginning of January and for which the drums have been beating for three weeks, has been a failure: It has failed to change the way the French people plan to vote. On January 22, as on December 22, 45 percent planned to vote for the Union of the Left, according to IFOP [Institut Français de l'Opinion Publique—French Public Opinion Institute] (46 percent according to SOFRES [Société Française d'Enquêtes par Sondages—French Association of Public Opinion Surveys]).

This failure shows the extent of popular discontent. It is an indication of the French people's desire for change.

The radicalization, whose effects have been visible for years now in various struggles, is definitely being registered in an electoral swing to the left.

On the electoral plane, the primary beneficiary of this swing is the Socialist party. According to IFOP, 23 percent now plan to vote for the SP and the left Radicals,* as opposed to 20 percent for the CP. This "socialist upswing" is confirmed by various region-

*The Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche (Movement of Left Radicals), headed by Robert Fabre. This group formerly called itself the Mouvement de la Gauche Radicale Socialiste (Movement of the Radical Socialist Left). Following a successful court challenge by the Parti Radical Socialiste (Radical Socialist party), headed by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, it was ordered on January 17, 1973, to change its name.—IP



GEORGES POMPIDOU

al polls. François Mitterrand thus appears close to passing the first test of his way to power—"restoring balance" on the left by gaining a new audience for the Social Democratic party.

One can remember how, at the congress of the "Socialist International" in Vienna, he bragged that this new audience would be found among the CP's electorate. At the time, he gave the figure of three million as the number of Communist voters who were apt to be won over.

But it is not in those waters that the SP is doing its spectacular fishing. The CP's electorate is remaining faithful to Georges Marchais. It is to his right that Mitterrand is winning votes—at the expense of the Gaullists and the reformers. Those defecting from the majority are obviously transferring their votes to the most moderate sector of the Union of the Left.

But if the "socialist upswing" is clear on the electoral level, it is far less clear in terms of the SP's organizational strength and the base it has acquired. On this level, the SP was too low to start with for it not to make *some* progress; thus, socialist sections have appeared here and there in a few fac-

tories. But its capacities for giving organizational shape to social forces and for carrying out mass mobilizations remain ridiculously weak. Its weight in social struggles is insignificant. *For the most part, the SP remains a party of prominent figures and of voters, not a party of activists.*

Let's leave it up to bourgeois journalists, blinded by electoralism, to be naive enough to believe that the swing to the left will aid only the SP. Marxists know that such a phenomenon represents a differentiated process that in various ways affects all left-wing organizations.

According to the polls, the CP is enjoying the full backing of its constituency but is not benefiting from any appreciable influx of new voters. It is on the activist level that it is capitalizing on the general push to the left. *L'Humanité* is making a big thing out of a sizable flow of new members into the party. Compared to the number of cards issued at the end of January 1972, the present results are sometimes two or three times higher. The influence of the mass organizations controlled by the CP is likewise increasing, as the latest results of the elections in the professional organizations show.

While the relationship of forces is evolving in favor of the SP on the electoral plane, it is evolving in favor of the CP in terms of organizational and mass mobilization capabilities.

But here, too, the process is contradictory. While the CP is winning new forces, it will have to reckon with the suspicious attitude of thousands of working-class militants who are too experienced to swallow without gagging the fairy tale about parliamentary paths to socialism. They know about the precedents of 1936, 1945, and 1968. They can see the example of Allende's Chile at this very moment. They have been able to reflect on the way the leaders of the Union of the Left have reacted to the January government offensive: Once proudly presented as a transitional program toward socialism, the common program was systematically interpreted in an increasingly restrictive sense, until finally it stands revealed for what it is—and incoherent program for arranging the bourgeois order.

Part of the workers' vanguard, probably a limited part, will express its distrust by abstaining. The rest

will, without enthusiasm and without illusions, vote for the Union of the Left, in some cases starting with the first ballot, because they feel that this is perhaps the way to clean out the

toral level will be impossible until 1976, the workers will tend with all the more determination to get involved in social struggles, since their hope for change through the ballot box will have been frustrated. The post-election period will be a time for upsurge in struggles of all kinds. All the more so inasmuch as the government will have to pay for the electoral generosity of its predecessor.

If the Union of the Left gets a majority, then a full-fledged crisis of the

regime will break out: The political orientation of Georges Pompidou and that of the Union of the Left stand in contradiction to each other. And Pompidou is not a man who gives in easily. His dilatory maneuvers, tied in with the undermining efforts of the big bourgeoisie, could give rise to a massive extraparliamentary reaction by the workers that goes way beyond the bounds set by the reformist high command. From now on, the revolutionary communists are preparing for these two contingencies. □



FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

UDR [Union des Démocrates pour la République—Union of Democrats for the Republic] mafia, and that in any case one must register one's opposition. These vanguard workers are particularly open to our explanations, as the success of our meetings indicates. Tomorrow, as disillusioned supporters of the Union of the Left, they will be the architects of the movement to break loose from it.

Whatever the outcome of the elections, we must prepare ourselves for a new upsurge in struggles.

The most probable hypothesis, we say, is a clear defeat for the Gaullist-Centrist coalition, nevertheless without stripping it of its majority, whether broadened to include the reformers or not. The defeat of the coalition in power and its possible enlargement will exacerbate its internal divisions and the instability of the regime. Simultaneously, the victory of the Union of the Left will give an impulse to popular combativity.

Since any new solution on an elec-

'Pushed by the Bourgeoisie'

Stephane Just Lays His Proofs on the Table

[At a Paris news conference January 9, Stéphane Just, a leading figure in the French Lambertist movement, the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI—Internationalist Communist Organization) and its youth group, the Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme (AJS—Alliance of Youth for Socialism), accused the Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvrière of putting up candidates in the coming elections who were "crypto-Stalinist and pushed by the bourgeoisie." The following observations on this and related accusations were published in the February 3 issue of the Ligue Communiste's weekly newspaper, *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The AJS-OCI is flipping out. Hard-hitting and stinging articles in *Rouge* and *Lutte Ouvrière* answered Just's statements to the effect that the Ligue and LO are running candidates who are "crypto-Stalinist and pushed by the bourgeoisie." So now Just is getting himself hoist by his own petard. He's attempting to provide *proof* for what he said.

First off, "crypto-Stalinists." Proof of this lies in the fact that the Ligue and LO are making "worker militants, who are trying to find their way to Trotskyism, swallow the Popular Front in the name of Trotskyism" and "digest the left Radical party [Mouvement de la Gauche Radicale—Movement of the Radical Left]."

Second proof: Krivine explains that the SP is an anti-Communist party; *thus*, the Stalinist party is a genuinely Communist party. And *therefore*, Krivine is a crypto-Stalinist. Irrefutable Lambertist logic!

Next, "pushed by the bourgeoisie." The comrades who keep the AJS-OCI books estimate the cost of the campaign at 20,000 francs per candidate. The Ligue is running 100 candidates. Thus, its campaign will cost 200 million old francs. *Therefore*, it will have to obtain financial aid in order to meet such an enormous expense. "Where is the money coming from?" There you have the proof dug up by Just for all those who were waiting for it! There you have the pitiful insinuation that his argumentation amounts to!

But that's not all. The Ligue is being "aided by a press campaign, by radio, by television, by many means of this kind that have been placed at its disposal. By whom? By the bourgeoisie, especially." There you have it: the Lambertists coming up with a theory to explain their own inability to make full use of the election campaign as a revolutionary platform. Including by speaking on television. Is Just ready to state, along with *L'Humanité*, that the appearance of Krivine and Stasi on the program "à Armes Egales" helped to consolidate the political positions of the bourgeoisie?

The last "proof" is the best. On January 20-21, the Ligue took part in a panel on self-management organized

by five magazines. Among them were *Objectif Socialiste*, published by the democratic socialist Robert Buron, and *Economie et Humanisme*, the "review of the Dominicans." Conclusion: "The Ligue is tied to the reactionary milieus of the bourgeoisie." The serious accusation of Dominican collusion was no doubt suggested to Just by his freemason friends, who, as everyone knows, have no ties whatever to the "reactionary milieus of the bourgeoisie."

The floundering of the AJS-OCI can be explained by the deterioration of this organization and its "International."

The Lambertists have a mongrelized and incoherent position in the election campaign: Run twenty candidates, and in other districts call for a vote for the SP-CP, but not for the left Radicals or the candidates of the Ligue and LO.

Two approaches were possible. Either to run a revolutionary campaign, taking advantage of every means for developing revolutionary themes on the widest possible scale and with the maximum impact—themes like the rejection of electoralism, propaganda for workers' control, workers' self-defense, etc. Or, based on their own general outlook, a FUIO [Front Unique Ouvrier—Workers' United Front] campaign that would have backed the candidates of the SP-CP in every district beginning with the first round.

Their actual choice has more than one disadvantage. It is without doubt the result of a compromise between the various internal tendencies in the OCI. This incoherence is all the greater in view of the fact that up until December the Lambertist leaders were involved in negotiations with the Ligue and LO (the organizations it has dubbed "crypto-Stalinist and pushed by the bourgeoisie") on how the revolutionary candidacies should be divided up on the first round. At the time, the OCI was considering running 180 candidates (that would come to 360 million old francs, wouldn't it, Stéphane Just?).

Just's pigheaded and provocative line of argument aims finally at mitigating the Lambertist "International"'s dizzying loss of credibility. The brightest feathers in its cap are falling out one after the other and ending up in various places.

The break with Healy and the English section has been an accomplished fact for quite some time. Relations with Lora and the Bolivian section are at their lowest point since the polemic they engaged in following the Banzer coup d'etat in 1971. B. Nagy, who was in charge of work oriented toward the Eastern European countries, has also deserted, together with a hypothetical Hungarian section. Finally, attempts to get a Lambertist nucleus off the ground in Spain have failed pitifully. Their group of

some fifteen sympathizers there has just split into three factions. So much for the Lambertist balance sheet.

We are willing to grant Just that it is difficult to find in this balance sheet any unshakable certainty in the correctness of his own particular theories or any arguments for defending his political strategy and attacking other people's. Hence the dismaying feebleness of the "proofs" intended to confound the Ligue and LO. And hence their complete ridiculousness. □

A Defective Criticism

Lutte Ouvriere's Stand on the French CP

By Felix Lourson

[The following analysis of the position of Lutte Ouvrière on the electoral program of the French Communist party was published in the January 20 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

As the coming legislative elections draw near, forcing all the far-left groups to state their positions, a certain number of political differences have clearly surfaced. The Maoist and ultraleftist groups, by refusing to have anything to do with the elections, are once again showing their inability to address themselves to the working class as it is and not as they would like it to be. The PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party], after having purged its organization of all revolutionary opposition tendencies, insists on playing the role of red tail-light to the Union of the Left. As for the AJS [Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme—Alliance of Youth for Socialism, the Lambertist youth organization], wrapped up in its own special world, it announces that it will be campaigning for a true workers' government, that is, in fact for the Union of the Left as presently constituted, minus its Radical debris!

A good opportunity for studying the position of the Lutte Ouvrière tendency has come with the appearance of its pamphlet on the electoral program of the PCF [Parti Communiste Français—French Communist party] based on a meeting it held in Paris in December 1972.

Lutte Ouvrière chooses to focus its critique of the text of this program on two points:

"It lacks two essential things: first, the determination to give immediate satisfaction to the essential demands of the workers; second, the determination to allow them to assume control over society as a whole, on the economic as well as on the political level."

Let's look more closely at these two criticisms.

Criticize the Common Program by Raising Economic Demands?

In its pamphlet and in its newspaper, Lutte Ouvrière emphasizes, *correctly*, the altogether moderate nature of the social measures promised by the PCF, as well as the deliberately ambiguous way in which they are formulated—a "progressive" return to the forty-hour week (already obtained legally as far back as 1936!), the "progressive" attainment of a minimum [monthly] wage of 1,000 francs (a demand already put forward in 1968,

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which the rise in prices over the past five years has deeply eroded), etc.

It is perfectly right in denouncing before the workers in this way the "realism" of the PCF leaders, who are attempting to reassure a section of the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois social layers by the "prudence" of their proposals.

But we have seen just about everywhere, in PCF meetings and elsewhere, that the LO militants have been making this question into an *essential critique* of the PCF program by raising "more revolutionary" demands, like the thirty-hour week and a minimum wage of 1,500 francs per month. In view of the prodigious development in techniques that has been occurring, there is nothing utopian about these slogans. A massive reduction in the workweek would seem to be an indispensable prerequisite if the workers are to have time not only to live, but also to discuss and to provide leadership.

But focusing everything on this particular aspect of the program is particularly dangerous: It comes down to instilling in the workers a belief that the revolutionists are the best defenders of the workers because they call for a workweek of thirty hours instead of forty hours, etc.

In reality this approach ends up glossing over the fundamental question, which the PCF program holds can be solved through peaceful methods—that of the concrete means necessary to destroy the domination of the bourgeoisie and to frustrate its counterrevolutionary violence.

This danger stands out clearly in the section of the pamphlet entitled "The Program of the Revolutionists," which takes up the question of state power.

A Political Power Decentralized and Controlled by Whom? The Nation?

LO proposes two alterations in the state power:

1. "A closer control by the voters over those they elect" by making recall possible at any moment. To be sure, recall is a useful measure. But one cannot be satisfied with formulas that are this vague; specifying a class content to this power cannot be evaded. Yet, in all these passages (pp.

45-48), LO speaks of "voters" in general, "citizens," the "nation," the "population." The special basis indicated by such terms for a government of the workers is, to say the least, fuzzy and open to various interpretations.

2. "The decentralization of power and decision-making centers" by "extending the power of local councils" that would be democratically elected. This decentralization theme—very much in vogue all the way from JJ-SS [Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber] to the CFDT [Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor]—remains perfectly ambiguous as long as there is no clarity on the form the central power will take, on the class composition of these "voters," or even on the basic tasks that this power must carry out. One of these tasks could be a bitter struggle against a bourgeoisie that, for its part, is centralized and has powerful means at its disposal. It is doubtful that such a struggle could be waged municipally by municipality.

These formulations, then, are the source of some disturbing confusion. But this confusion stands out even more clearly if one studies in detail what is said on the repressive forces, particularly the police.

A Decentralized Police Under the Control of the Municipalities?!

The Marxist classics generally teach that it is illusory for the workers to try to take over the bourgeois state apparatus and make it work on their behalf. Since the experience of the Paris Commune and many others, they have insisted on the need to *smash* it and to replace it with a new form of power that emerges directly out of the struggle of the workers. So it is with the police, who are an instrument of bourgeois class rule; they must be disarmed and replaced by the armed workers, organized in self-defense committees.

Imbued with reformist illusions, the PCF proposes to "democratize the police both in terms of its functions and of its methods of recruitment." Thus Marcellin's police—the same ones who yesterday were still beating Algerian militants and throwing their bodies into the Seine, and who today are

beating up and killing people in their headquarters, and bludgeoning strikers—will tomorrow be asked to protect an advanced democracy!

But what does LO's "Program of the Revolutionists" propose on this subject? To retain the police, decentralize them, and take away from Marcellin any control over them to make sure they don't get mixed up in politics, but only in repressing "delinquency," and finally to place the police under the authority of local councils and the control of the citizenry!

It is worth quoting the passage at some length:

"And among all these decentralization measures, there is one that is even more necessary than the others: that of the police. We are told that the police are necessary, even indispensable, for the protection of the citizens. Fine! But then let's put them at the disposal of the citizens, that is, of local institutions of power. It is the municipalities that need them in order to deal with delinquency. The only reason Marcellin needs them is for political purposes—to suppress demonstrations, to crush strikes, to go after the militants of the far left, and perhaps some day also the militants of the Communist party and trade unionists.

"If it is true that the police are needed to protect the citizens, then they must be at the service and under the control of the citizens. In other words, the police must be recallable at any moment by the municipality or municipalities that employ them, and it must be possible to supervise and control all their activities. *Citizens' committees* elected specifically for this purpose must be able to inspect the police stations at any time, have access to files, hold investigations on anything relating to police activity, including, of course, having access to prisons and the freedom to control them."

Thus, the PCF talks about democratizing the bourgeois police, while LO wants to decentralize and federalize them. But both would keep the police. It is true that LO goes further by proposing to place the cops under the authority of the municipalities and to have them controlled by committees that would make regular inspections of the police stations. But here, too, a serious doubt arises: Who will

do the leading and who will do the controlling?

And, especially, how can one control armed bands when one is unarmed oneself?

The Paths to Socialism

Not once in the 250 pages of promises made in the PCF's program and in the common program is the fundamental question raised: How do you crush the resistance that the exploiters and their lackeys will not fail to unleash? All that Marchais says is that there will be a "great mass movement." Krasucki adds that "it is reasonable to expect" that the great majority of the exploiters, now put in the position of a minority, "will respect democratic rule." One could not dream up a nicer example of the ingenuousness of the reformists. But what is astounding is that nothing on this can be found in LO's "Program of the Revolutionists."

And we do not think this is the result of an oversight, but rather of a deliberate choice. A few months ago, LO and the LC [Ligue Communiste] decided to work out the text of an open letter to the members of the PCF.

The version proposed by the Ligue stressed the moderate nature of the social measures, pointing out the suspicion to be held of "socialists" like Mitterrand, and then concentrated its fire on the army, the police, etc., and emphasized the need to prepare the workers to struggle against the bourgeois state. In substance, LO's version told the PCF the following: Promise us a thirty-hour workweek, 1,500 francs for everybody, a sliding scale of wages, job security, and better working conditions, and then *whatever our differences and whatever we may think about the elections, we promise that we will vote for you!* Today it is *the very same logic* that is inspiring the LO militants. To the advanced workers who are raising questions about "how to get rid of capitalism," LO answers "with good demands" because it is convinced that this is the part of the program "that the workers will remember in the first place, and almost to the exclusion of any other part." It also answers with "workers' control over the economy but also over politics," without, nevertheless, saying anything about

the form of the state or about the basic tasks it will face.

Yet many workers want to know more than this. They want to know what the strategy of the revolutionary activists is, how to see to it that a May '68 leads to something more than an electoral rout, what kind of socialism we want to build and how it will contrast with the "models" in the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

By not wanting to raise these problems, for fear of not being understood by the workers or of frightening the least politically conscious among them, it ends up making a critique that, for all its sharpness, remains fundamentally on the same terrain as the PCF.

And so LO sums up its basic objectives as follows (still without saying a word about means):

"The broad outline of the program of the revolutionists includes the immediate satisfaction of the basic demands of the workers and workers' control over the economic and political life of the country." And, it adds: "To be sure, this is only a transitional program, and it will not be socialism. But it is a program that makes it possible to solve the main problems facing the working class today, and that would put it in a better situation for eliminating exploitation, which is our fundamental goal."

One might sincerely wonder whether this is an original conception of workers' control or whether it is simply a variation on the theme of the revolution by stages.

Violence and Revolution

When all is said and done, it is not a complete surprise for us to see LO so discreet on the question of violence and of the paths to socialism. It is a sign of the opportunism and timorous policy that we have been able to observe in practice on various occasions.

In May '68 LO's theoretical magazine, *Lutte de Classe*, analyzed the German student movement that had thrown rocks at the police and solemnly urged French students not to indulge in acts of violence that the workers would not understand.

Later, several revolutionary groups united to organize a tough demonstration against a neo-Nazi meeting

in the Palais des Sports organized by Ordre Nouveau [New Order]. Lutte Ouvrière asked its members to stay home that evening. More recently, a demonstration was organized against the trial of Courbain, a member of the GRS [Groupe Révolution Socialiste — Socialist Revolution Group] and a victim of French colonial repression. Lutte Ouvrière at first agreed, and then withdrew its backing when the demonstration was banned. A strange kind of internationalism that cools off as soon as the shadow of a policeman's cape appears on the horizon!

In theory, Lutte Ouvrière recognizes that it will be necessary to destroy the bourgeois state in order to replace it with a state of workers' councils, and it recognizes the need to arm the working class if this is to be done. But in practice what does it do? Does it believe that when the great day arrives, the working class will have no trouble doing what has to be done? Or is the task of revolutionists, *beginning today*, to assume the tasks that the French Communist party has abandoned, such as carrying out revolutionary propaganda inside the army, forming self-defense picket lines against the CFT [Confédération Française des Travailleurs — French Confederation of Workers] and other armed bands of capital, and of supporting international struggles, even if we are only a minority? Does LO think, for instance, that calling the January 20 demonstration in front of the U. S. embassy is an example of militarist ultraleftism?

What needs to be done during this election campaign is, in fact, not to call for "a government that meets the needs of the proletariat" by adding a bit of workers' control, but to clearly state that "we are struggling for the destruction of all the old state apparatuses so that the armed proletariat can itself become the government"! □

Second Coming?

Bao Dai, the puppet emperor of Vietnam until 1954, said February 12, "I am determined to return to Vietnam where I belong." This will not occur immediately since it would be considered a "partisan political act which would detract from my role as national arbiter."

The former monarch told reporters, "I know that many Vietnamese, a silent majority in fact, regard me as the symbol of Vietnamese unity."

The Murky Watergate Case

G. Gordon Liddy and James W. McCord Jr., former high-ranking officials of the Committee for the Re-election of the President (CREEP) were convicted by a Washington, D. C., jury on January 30 of burglarizing and wiretapping the headquarters of the Democratic party at the Watergate Hotel last June 17. At the time of the raid, Liddy was financial counsel of CREEP, and McCord was its security coordinator. Five other defendants had previously pleaded guilty to all six counts of the indictment.

The spies and saboteurs were financed out of Nixon's \$50 million campaign slush fund under the control of prominent figures in the White House. (See *Intercontinental Press*, November 6, 1972, p. 1202.)

In their unsuccessful defense against the six-count indictment, the attorneys representing Liddy and McCord held that the raid was necessary to protect Nixon and other top Republicans from "potentially violent" groups such as the National Peace Action Coalition, the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, and the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. These organizations issued angry responses to the slanders.

The January 18 *New York Times* commented editorially that under this defense, "any individuals or groups could feel free to take up arms or utilize any other repressive measures their paranoid suppositions dictated. Such a political law of the jungle might readily lead from political espionage to defensive assassination."

The Justice Department prosecutor, Earl Silbert, did his best to avoid any line of questioning likely to elicit answers that the Nixon administration might find embarrassing.

The prosecution's star witness, Alfred Baldwin III, a former FBI agent, suffered a timely lapse of memory on January 19. He claimed he could not remember the name of the CREEP official to whom he sent the transcript of a tap on one of the Democratic National Committee's phones. Judge John Sirica, irritated by the prosecution's unwillingness to pursue this



Haynie-Louisville Courier-Journal

'I must say, you have an incredibly honest face . . .'

point, questioned Baldwin himself. As justification for this unusual move, Sirica noted that "all the facts have not been developed by either side."

Under Sirica's interrogation, Baldwin admitted that during an interview with FBI agents he had selected the name "Glenn" as a "reference point" for the "German-sounding" name he had "forgotten." The absent-minded Baldwin's "reference point" resembles the name of CREEP's chief legal counsel, Glenn W. Sedam. Baldwin denied, however, that Sedam was the recipient of the wiretap transcript.

Sirica also questioned a second prosecution witness, Hugh W. Sloan Jr., former treasurer of CREEP. Sloan admitted that the chairman of CREEP, former attorney-general John N. Mitchell, and Maurice Stans, Nixon's chief fund raiser, authorized Nixon to give Liddy the \$199,000 in CREEP funds that he used to organize the burglary.

The day after the attempted break-in at the Watergate, Liddy told Sloan, "Some of my boys got caught last night—I did something I promised them I would never do and used people from this office. I'm afraid I may

lose my job." Sloan denied knowing who were the "them" Liddy was reporting to. On February 2, after the jury had returned the guilty verdict, Judge Sirica expressed "great doubt" that Sloan "has told us the entire truth in this case." Sirica urged a further investigation by the Senate.

The other five defendants were E. Howard Hunt, Bernard L. Barker, Frank L. Sturgis, Virgilio Gonzalez, and Eugenio Martinez. All five have been associated in the past with the Central Intelligence Agency. By pleading guilty they forestalled jury trials that might have produced further testimony pointing to the responsibility of Nixon's top aides for the Watergate raid.

Hunt, a former White House "consultant," entered a guilty plea on January 11. Columnist Jack Anderson wrote on January 15 that "the Justice Department had discreetly sounded out some of the defendants about entering guilty pleas. . . . But more direct messages were relayed through E. Howard Hunt."

Anderson asserted that "Hunt agreed to plead guilty apparently with a tacit understanding that he wouldn't have to spend too long in jail. He privately urged other defendants to follow his example."

Press reports in the following days indicated that other inducements were being offered to the Watergate burglars. On January 14, the *New York Times* reported that "at least four of the five men arrested last June in the Watergate raid [Hunt and Liddy were arrested later] are still being paid by persons as yet unnamed, according to sources close to the case."

"One of the defendants, Frank A. Sturgis acknowledged that payments continued after his arrest. . . . Another closely involved source said that payments to the four men now ranged from \$400 a month up."

According to the January 22 issue of *Time* magazine, the defendants were promised as much as \$1,000 each for each month they spent in prison if they pleaded guilty, with additional funds to be paid them on their release. The offer appears to have had the desired effect. On January 15, Sturgis, Barker, Martinez, and Gonzalez joined Hunt in pleading guilty, leaving only McCord and Liddy to face trial. □

Appeal for Support to Victims of Czech Witch-Hunt

[To protest the Husak government jailing her children and her husband, an intellectual leader of the 1968 reform movement in the Czechoslovak Communist party, Anna Sabatova wrote an appeal to the international Communist movement. Only the Australian Communist party published this statement, according to Richard Davy, writing in the January 30 London *Times*. The following major excerpts from Sabatova's letter are taken from Davy's article.]

* * *

Dear Comrades,

After careful consideration I am starting to write this letter a few hours after the court passed sentence on the last member of my family, my 21-year-old daughter, Anna. She has been sentenced by the Brno regional court to three and a half years in prison. The sentences on my other children and on my husband are also unconditional terms of imprisonment.

It may perhaps seem strange that an individual Czechoslovak woman presumes to address such an important forum as the central committees and the membership of communist and workers' parties throughout the world.

I have decided on this step because in my country, Czechoslovakia, there are no official quarters at the present time to grant me a hearing. . . .

I have seen all my children put in prison. . . . I find myself as a mother in a unique and exceptional situation. Therefore in these the most grievous moments of my personal life, I am guided in what I do by my maternal feelings, my honor as a citizen and by the firm conviction which has led me for 25 years to work for socialism in the ranks of the Communist Party.

I am unfortunately aware of the complications which may arise for me, despite all the proclamations about internationalism, as a result of this public statement. I risk the possibility that I, too, may be arrested as a re-



HUSAK: Jails life-long communists in the interest of "normalization."

sult of this act. I have nothing to lose, however.

My husband, Dr Jaroslav Sabata, a communist since the age of 19, was head of the psychology department at the J. E. Purkyne University, Brno, until Spring 1968, then until the autumn of 1968 secretary of the Brno regional party committee. Later, until his arrest on November 20, 1971, he was employed as an ironworker with the firm Inzenyrsko-Prumyslove Stavby. He has been sentenced to six and a half years in prison.

In this letter I should like to describe some of the circumstances that arose during the court hearings which I attended personally. . . . The building where the court sat was guarded as if the men on trial were a gang of hardened criminals. Relatives and friends had to show their identity cards both in the public corridors of the regional court and outside.

The atmosphere around all the trials

held in Prague and Brno in the summer months was marked by an endeavour to keep the proceedings as secret as possible, although they were officially announced as public trials.

That foreign journalists were not admitted will be known to you. But you probably do not know that admission to these public trials was granted to only one close relative of each defendant. . . .

In formal matters the bench followed the rules; the defendants could speak as they considered necessary. All who have been on trial are sincere supporters of the socialist order.

Dr Wolf, the chairman of the bench, said in his speech stating the grounds for the verdict: "Neither the bench as a body nor any individual member has formed the opinion that the men here convicted were enemies of socialism." That is to say that these communists were condemned for holding different political views, which, by words of mouth and in writings, they made known among themselves and to a few dozen others of similar political persuasion. . . .

My husband himself wrote some theoretical papers, for instance the material for discussion known as the "Little Action Programme", in which he tried to find common ground between communists and those socialists who do not hold Marxist views but support the socialist order in Czechoslovakia.

I would also point out that the "Little Action Programme" expressly states that the action of nationalization in February, 1948, was a necessary and just act about which there can be no discussion.

It is not true that my husband or any of the convicted communists favoured bourgeois democracy. All to a man are unequivocal supporters of socialist democracy based on the interests of the broadest masses and also controlled by the masses. My husband has always stressed as a matter of principle the need for control from below, that is by the will of the people.

Many communist and similar parties of the left, trade unions, and people of democratic, anti-imperialist opinion throughout the world, are justifiably concerned about the series of trials in Czechoslovakia. I am convinced that the communist and workers' parties, individual communists and Marxists, and all other advocates of socialism have an inalienable right to speak out on matters concerning convicted communists, socialists and other citizens. The same right belongs to democratic public opinion in the world concerned with upholding basic human rights.

The international communist and workers' movement must find a common platform based on the substance and not on the superficial aspects of events in Czechoslovakia. In this connexion one must ask: why is the armed entry by night of the allied troops onto the territory of Czechoslovakia denoted as "international aid", while disagreement among many communist and left-wing parties is regarded by our authorities as interference in our internal affairs, which, as distinct from "international aid", is something inappropriate and undesirable?

Why can the people of Czechoslovakia learn nothing of these expressions of disagreement from the legal press in this country?

And I put a further question: Why were these trials kept secret if they were justified?

Finally I would add: not only can the protests of communist and left-wing organizations, including anti-imperialist public opinion, alter the hard fate of the Czechoslovak prisoners, I am convinced that now more than ever before it is the task of the day to work out and clarify political questions on a higher theoretical level, within the communist and workers' movement itself. We need especially to clarify how the power won by the working class is to be implemented further in the socialist countries. In my view, it is not logical to argue that these are issues solely concerning the parties governing in countries where power has been won by the working class under the leadership of the communist parties.

It is essential that communist parties and their allies in countries where the bourgeoisie still rule should be given prospects that will make social-

ism attractive to other strata and groups of the population beside the working class. One cannot make use of allies only during the fight for power and the first phase of building socialist society. In the interests of the world communist movement they must

be assured of all democratic rights also in the later period, that is, in the stage of socialist development which Czechoslovakia, for example, has now reached: and in such a manner that these rights will be genuinely, not merely formally, exercised. □

Ihor Kalynets Jailed

Dissident Ukrainian Poet Sentenced

[The following information has been released by the U. S.-based Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners.]

* * *

Ihor Kalynets, a thirty-four-year-old Ukrainian poet, was sentenced in November 1972 to nine years in prison and three years exile, according to reliable sources in the Soviet Union. Kalynets, who was arrested during the massive roundup of political dissidents in the Ukraine last year, was born in Khodoriv in western Ukraine and completed his studies at the department of philology at the University of Lviv.

In 1966 his collection of poetry, *The Fire of Kupalo*, was published in Lviv. His subsequent works have appeared only in samizdat: *The Opening of the Nativity*, *The Coronation of the Scarecrow*, and *Reassessing Silence*.

Kalynets had been involved in protesting illegal arrests and persecutions of the Ukrainian oppositionists by the KGB [Soviet secret police], and had written several letters to the head of the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in connection with this.

His wife, Iryna, was arrested on January 12, 1972, and in July was sentenced to six years imprisonment and three years exile. Kalynets was arrested near the end of July. He was charged with "willful dissemination of fabrications that discredit the Soviet national and social order." Although it was never proved that Kalynets had written or disseminated "anti-Soviet" material, he was nonetheless convicted and sentenced after a trial in Lviv.

Following the trial, Kalynets was immediately transferred to Vladimir Prison in the Russian Republic, east of Moscow—a prison notorious for its harsh regime. □

Grzimek Quits—Skippy Still at Large

Bernard Grzimek, who was appointed by Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1970 to be West Germany's commissioner for the protection of wildlife, resigned his post recently, according to a report by David Binder in the February 19 *New York Times*. Grzimek, who is well-known as the director of the Frankfurt zoo and producer of an award-winning film about African wildlife, "felt the Government was using him to conceal its lack of activity."

Binder writes, "Scientists reckon that of 2,000 animals native to Germany 2,000 years ago, about 200 have become extinct—100 of them dying out in the last 100 years and 76 more in the last 50 years. More than 500 other animals are considered threatened." Owls, egrets, hawks,

weasels, and beech martens are disappearing from the forests.

Grzimek warned when he took office that failure to take action to protect wildlife could mean "the death sentence for 50,000 human beings" because of the ecological consequences. This upset Grzimek's boss, Agriculture Minister Josef Ertl. Ertl "let it be known that no one could better protect wildlife than farmers and foresters."

Now that Grzimek has resigned, Binder sees only one hopeful sign for West German wildlife: "Skippy, a male kangaroo that escaped from a private zoo in Hameln a year ago, was still at large. . . . He is apparently living with some deer." □

Position of Ligue Communiste on Vietnam Accords

[The following is a statement by the Central Committee of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International, on the Vietnam cease-fire agreement. It appeared, under the title "Total Support Until the Final Victory," in the February 3 issue of the Ligue's weekly, *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

1. A Retreat by Imperialism . . .

The signing of the January 27 Vietnam accords gives formal recognition to a definite strategic retreat by American imperialism in its role as world cop for capitalism. In order to understand the extent of this retreat, it is necessary to review the original aims of the American involvement in Indochina. The participation in the French war effort beginning with the years 1950-1952, the assumption of total responsibility for Western policy toward Indochina after 1954, the support for the dictatorial Diem regime, the unfolding of its "special war" (through the sending of U.S. military advisers) and then of the "localized" war (sending an expeditionary force of 500,000 men and the bombing of the North), all had one goal: to break the back of the Asian revolution in Vietnam, where it was centered, and to create the necessary conditions for a reconquest of the North and perhaps for reopening China to the imperialist market. This strategic objective was dealt a severe blow by the failure of the "local war" and by the 1968 Tet offensive carried out in the cities of South Vietnam by the NLF [National Liberation Front], which made it possible to open the Paris negotiations and halt the bombing of North Vietnam. It was following this setback that American imperialism began to work out a new international policy based on a "three-way peaceful coexistence": Losing hope of reconquering China, the U.S. government would henceforward attempt to

neutralize the role the latter could play in the world revolution by integrating it into the diplomatic game of the "big powers." But the goal in Indochina remained to return to the situation prevailing in 1954. Therefore, the "Nixon Doctrine" aimed at playing on the cowardice of China and the USSR in order to weaken their support; at rebuilding the bases for a consistent neocolonialist policy in South Vietnam (with "Vietnamization"); and at strangling the resistance of the NLF by making the seventeenth parallel a tightly closed border, by instigating the coup d'etat in Cambodia in March 1970, and by intervening massively in Laos in order to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

But this new U.S. orientation was also a total failure. The Vietnamese revolutionists demonstrated more clearly than ever their political independence with regard to China and the USSR; the Cambodian people swung into the camp of the Indochinese revolution; the victory of the Indochinese revolutionary front in the struggle of February 1971 stopped any new American-puppet attempt to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail; the March-April 1972 offensive shook the foundations of pacification; and the liberated zones and the North victoriously resisted the escalation of American terror.

It is this succession of failures that the January 27 accords reflect by depriving the puppet forces of their offensive capability, by putting an end to the *direct and massive* military involvement of imperialism. The U.S. government can no longer hope under these conditions to return to the 1954 situation in the three countries of Indochina.

This defeat for imperialism in its struggle against three small peoples, despite the extent of the commitment of various American administrations, is a major lesson for all peoples of the world. It likewise offers considerable encouragement to the international anti-imperialist movement in its

fight for the final victory of the Indochinese revolution.

2. . . . But Not the Final Victory

For the final victory has not yet been achieved. Imperialist retreat does not mean that imperialism has renounced its goals. The U.S. government is too conscious of the dangers a new upsurge of the Asian revolution would pose for the world capitalist system to simply pull out. The imperialist goal today is the creation of a new line of defense for which Thailand would be pivotal, which would be supported by the urban and coastal regions of South Vietnam, and which would run through Laos and—if possible—Cambodia. Moreover, the means at the disposal of the American puppets today are not negligible. Imperialism has a considerable air and naval military infrastructure in Thailand and in the China Sea and has moved to quickly rearm its puppet armies, while regimes of terror have been set up in the cities. In addition, through an influx of "economic" aid, U.S. imperialism is attempting to apply a policy of social corruption on an unprecedented scale in order to endow the puppet regimes with a minimal social basis. Finally, it continues to take advantage of the passivity of China and the USSR, thanks to their policies of peaceful coexistence.

The January 27 accords do not go beyond the dual power situation existing in South Vietnam—this is the major difference between them and the PRG's seven points of July 1971. "Two powers, two administrations, two armies" continue to confront each other. For more than five years, the second Vietnam resistance, in contrast to the period before 1954, has been confronted with the problem of sinking roots in the urban areas. The difficulty of this problem cannot be underestimated, given the scope of the means marshaled by imperialism and the effectiveness of a policy of terror in the cities that has already cost the lives

of a large number of militants and has led to the jailing of 300,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam. The present strengthening of the coercive apparatus, the decrees aimed at preventing any population movement and any mass demonstration, the "disguising" of U. S. military advisers as civilian advisers, the turning of U. S. military bases over to the puppet regime in order to prevent them from being dismantled, and the stepped up rearming of the army and the puppet police during the past two months all show that the American puppets are ready to defend the new line they have fallen back to and that they are ready to violate the spirit of the January 27 accords.

The violation of the 1954 Geneva accords goes to show that for imperialism these accords are nothing but scraps of paper that can be torn up any time the situation appears to allow it.

Imperialism has not retreated and will not retreat unless it is forced and compelled to do so.

3. 'Tragically Alone!'

These January 27 accords express the complex situation in which the Indochinese revolution finds itself today. They underline its positions of strength and weakness.

The strength of the Indochinese fighters lies in the depth of the revolutionary process that they have led. Only a revolutionary war mobilizing the energies of an entire population in the struggle for national and social liberation made it possible, in fact, to offset the effects of a material relationship of forces (economic, military, and technological) that was totally in the favor of imperialism. Soviet and Chinese aid to the Indochinese revolutionary front is, indeed, very inferior—in value as well as in quantity and quality—to the means marshaled by the American government.

In the face of U. S. imperialism, the situation of weakness in which the Indochinese revolution finds itself is essentially a product of the nature of the aid given by the Soviets (and the Chinese). The USSR refused to "declare the territory of North Vietnam to be an inviolable part of the socialist camp." It did not send either

in quantity or in quality the kind of military materiel to Indochina that would have made achievement of the ultimate victory possible. It continues even today to recognize the authority of the Cambodian puppet regime. China increased this relative isolation of the Indochinese revolution by paying a high price for the normalization of its relations with Washington: Nixon's trip to Peking (just after the first bombings of the North) allowed him to considerably strengthen his international and domestic position. And in this way, China stripped itself of the ability to make any denunciation of the subsequent trip of the president of the USA to Moscow just after the mining of the North Vietnamese ports.

In acting as they did, the Soviet and Chinese governments agreed to undermine the diplomatic offensive launched by the PRG on July 1, 1971, with the announcement of its seven points. They gave de facto authorization to American imperialism to carry out the bloodiest military escalation of the entire history of the Indochina war. They largely contributed toward demobilizing the American antiwar movement (which had reached its high point with the demonstrations against the invasion of Cambodia in March-April 1970*) by showing that Nixon could at one and the same time bomb North Vietnam and improve his relations with China and the USSR. They considerably slowed down the revival of the international anti-imperialist movement, which was getting its second breath after going through a lull during the years 1968-1970. They guaranteed the triumphant reelection of President Nixon by allowing him to portray himself as a man responsible for the détente. In this new situation, the Indochinese fighters were able much more easily than in the past to play on Soviet-Chinese "competition" in order to increase an aid that was being doled out with an eyedropper.

The policy of peaceful coexistence stands revealed for what it really is: a policy that, under cover of defending world peace, defends the interests of the ruling bureaucracies to the det-

*Nixon announced the invasion on April 30, 1970, provoking a massive response by the antiwar movement during the month of May (See *Intercontinental Press*, May 11, 1970, p. 419.)—IP

riment of revolutionary struggles.

To understand the policy of the Vietnamese fighters with regard to the negotiations, these two essential factors and their evolution must, above all else, be taken into account. Indeed, for a year and a half, the relationship of forces has evolved favorably—on the basis of the successes in Laos and Cambodia, and then of the March-April 1972 offensive—in spite of the difficulties added to the struggle by the intensification of the U. S. escalation; yet this evolution was still not able to bring about a purely military victory. On the other hand, the international situation facing the Indochinese revolution worsened, without thereby removing the danger that the world anti-imperialist movement *sooner or later* represented for Nixon. The Vietnamese leadership thus found itself obliged to enter negotiations on a new basis in order to put an end to the U. S. escalation, since it had not received the political and military aid that could have stopped it. But the victories achieved in the field allowed it to enlarge its negotiating margin without thereby abandoning the fundamental objectives, which remain total liberation from the imperialist grip and reunification with the socialist North. In contrast to what happened after Geneva, the January 27 accords leave the revolutionary armed forces as a whole in the South intact. The December 1972 bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong did not succeed in winning for the USA the withdrawal of troops, the regroupment of the front into an outlying zone, the recognition of two Vietnamese states, or the legalization of the Thieu regime.

It is a combination of these favorable and unfavorable factors that basically explains the shift from the seven points of the PRG to today's accords—a shift that was noted by the PRG statement on September 11, 1972.

4. A Period of Intense Struggle

The signing of the January 27 accords and the cease-fire that they provide for thus open up a period of intense struggle that will be crucial for the future of the Vietnamese and Indochinese revolution. Two powers are confronting each other, two pow-

ers between whom no "reconciliation" is possible because they represent two opposing class forces. The PRG is the only representative of the Vietnamese people: It expresses the struggle of the Southern masses for their national and social liberation. The Thieu government remains a puppet force entirely dependent on U.S. aid and representing imperialist and bourgeois interests. Because the ultimate liberation of Vietnam involves a complete break with imperialism and the forces linked to it inside Vietnam, there can be no independence and no real freedom short of the socialist revolution. This remains the perspective of the Indochinese revolutionists, who do not conceive of any independence without reunification with the socialist North. It is this perspective that was carried out in the DRV following the Geneva agreements. It is this perspective that in effect makes irreconcilable the antagonisms that pit the puppet government (embodiment of the neo-colonialist scheme of U.S. imperialism) and the PRG against each other. While the signing of the present accords signifies an important U.S. retreat in South Vietnam, it does not, for all that, represent the final, definitive victory for which we are fighting.

The rate of the struggle that is opening up is hard to make out in advance. There could be a violent and very rapid confrontation brought on by Thieu's repression of the urban masses and the political prisoners. There could be a period of preparing for struggle while the U.S. withdraws — a period during which the liberated zones would reorganize economically, politically, administratively, and militarily after the horrible bombings of the last few months. But the axes of this struggle are already clear: *The puppet power will essentially use what has kept it going up to now: terror, imperialist aid, and social corruption. The Front and the PRG, for their part, are preparing an intense political struggle.* It is the reliance on mass mobilization and the social dynamic of the permanent revolution that gave the revolutionary war its strength. It is on the basis of this mobilization that this political struggle will be able to develop. Heavy weapons have been buried and are ready to be brought out at the sign of any new military

escalation. The agrarian reform will have to be speeded up in order to make possible a systematic policy of demoralizing the puppet administration and army. Preparations for the struggle of the refugees to return to their village, and for the struggle for the freeing of the political prisoners, have been made. The masses are being called on to defend their economic demands and their democratic freedoms. *The battles in preparation cannot be reduced to the opposition between two military and political apparatuses; they in fact represent the continuation of a social revolution that is under way.* Therein lies the essential strength of the Front and the PRG. But it would be dangerous to believe that this process must necessarily reach a rapid conclusion. The equation "cease-fire equals peace equals victory" that the PCF [Parti Communiste Français—French Communist party] tends to advance is criminal in this context because it risks the demobilization of the support movement at a time when it must, on the contrary, prepare itself for new tasks.

As for Cambodia, there the FUNK [Front Uni National du Cambodge—National United Front of Cambodia] is proving itself strong enough to refuse any attempt at compromise with the Pnompenh regime, despite the Soviet pressures, and the present military state of affairs shows that the coming months can be decisive. There, too, the future of the Indochinese revolution is being played out.

5. Develop Support

Here the need to continue and develop support can clearly be seen. This must be done to prevent any new maneuver by Nixon, to help the Vietnamese fighters obtain the release of the Saigon political prisoners, to support them at every step in the coming struggle, and to support, too, the Cambodian and Laotian peoples in the continuation of their struggle.

In order to educate the vanguard, as well as to aid in the development of solidarity activities, revolutionary Marxists must explain how the socialist future of the Indochinese revolution forbids any "national reconciliation" between the puppet regimes and the revolutionary forces. Independent-

ly of the diplomatic and tactical formulations of the Vietnamese leadership (formulations with which we do not always agree), it is our duty to explain the process of permanent revolution as it is illustrated by the history of the Indochinese revolution.

"Total Support Until the Final Victory"—this slogan is today more timely than ever. For us revolutionary Marxists, final victory means victory for the Vietnamese and Indochinese revolutions. We call on all those for whom real independence will not exist for the peoples of Indochina short of the destruction of the puppet regimes in Saigon, Vientiane, and Pnompenh to join their efforts with ours in order to prevent any interruption of this support.

The scope and radical character of the January 20 mobilizations in France, and the number of demonstrations on that day throughout the world and in the USA, show that the anti-imperialist movement is able to continue to mobilize its forces. They demonstrate the deep *distrust* of the anti-imperialist activists for Nixon. They constitute a *warning* to the U.S. government. For us, they represent a *rededication* to continue our support.

The Central Committee of the Ligue Communiste salutes the victories and the heroism of the three peoples of Indochina. It urgently calls on all anti-imperialist activists and all anti-imperialist organizations to continue their solidarity actions in a spirit of unity. It calls for a continuation of permanent, ongoing support activity with the Front Solidarité Indochine.

Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indochina will win! □

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Militants Head Workers' Slate in Tucuman

[The following article on the workers' candidates running in Tucumán, Argentina, in the upcoming Argentine elections was published in the January 18 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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In spite of the abstention of the Peronist Coordinadora [Coordinadora de Agrupaciones Peronistas—Coordinating Committee of Peronist Groups], some important working-class leaders have remained on the slates of candidates being presented by the Workers' Front. Several of them were leaders of some of the main struggles in the recent period.

The candidate for governor of the province is the at-large delegate of one of the largest groups of construction workers in Tucumán—Lorenzo Paredes. Paredes is also a candidate for national deputy, along with the teacher-activist Hugo Polti.

The slate of candidates for national senator is headed up by the vice president of the Unión de Taximetres [Taxi Drivers' Union], Marcelo Magallanes. Héctor Lencina, president of the same organization, is running for mayor of Tucumán. This union recently took the lead in organizing an important mobilization in the wake of attacks on its drivers at night that caused the death of one. The demand for authorization to bring a companion along on night shifts and for a thirty percent hike in the nighttime rate was backed up by work stoppages and massive demonstrations.

The slates of candidates for seats in the provincial legislature representing districts in the provincial capital are made up of various frontline fighters. For provincial senators, the candidates are Armando Chaves (railroad worker) and Angel Serrano, delegate and top leader of the pottery workers' union. There has been an important mobilization in this union against the bureaucrat Márquez. The employees at the Santa Rosa Pottery Works (where Serrano is a shop steward) played a key role in this mobilization.

The slate of candidates running for the posts of provincial deputies for the capital districts is headed up by a well-known student leader—Carlos Esteban Moya. Moya was one of the top leaders of the Tucumán uprising in November 1970, following which he was detained for several months. This is not the only time he has been arrested, since his name is on the list of leaders who are hunted down every time the army or the police decide it is necessary to intimidate the workers' and people's movement. On the same ticket, there are two activists from the Movimiento de Recuperación Sindical de Empleados Públicos [Public Employees Trade Union Reform Movement] (former Víctor Villalba grouping), which is opposing the Suleta bureaucracy; they are Guillermo Herrera and Laura Figueroa. It was the strike by public employees that kicked off the second Tucumán uprising in June of last year.

Activists in various unions that have been involved in recent struggles are beginning to form Workers' Front Support Committees. The most important are those in Alparbatas, which have just engaged in a big struggle against the bosses. The citrus workers, who are in the process of organizing a union, have also formed a support committee.

But the Workers' Front does not constitute an alternative simply because its slates of candidates are full of worker and student leaders who have been actively involved in the struggle. It is also because of its program and its activity, and because of the fact that it has not hooked up with any of the representatives of the bosses, that the Workers' Front constitutes the only way out for the workers of Tucumán.

The bosses and bureaucrats on the Peronist ticket are trying to reach an understanding with the Radicals and the government, not with the exploited workers. Although the Coordinating Committee is attempting to push the struggle forward, by doing Peron's bidding it is slipping dangerously close to falling in behind types like Juri.

Finally, the Alianza Popular [Popular Alliance]—not to mention the traditional variants of the right wing—

is including as one of its candidates the top bureaucrat of FOTIA [Federación Obrera Tucumana de la Industria Azucarera—Federation of Tucumán Workers in the Sugar Industry], Basualdo, who has been repudiated by the sugar workers.

Only the Workers' Front—which neither subordinates itself to nor makes any deals with the government or the Radicals, nor with Alende or Perón, and whose candidates are working-class fighters and not bureaucrats—only this Front will unflinchingly defend the interests of the workers.

The Coordinating Committee Gives In to Pressures

The calamitous state in which the Justicialist [Peronist] local in Tucumán was left when rank-and-file militants gave vent to the indignation they felt at the candidates that were being forced on them is an indication of the crisis of Peronism. The picture was completed by the congress that was to formalize the election of the candidates: It carried out its deliberations under the protective presence of two armored cars.

These were to protect persons of no less stature than Amado Juri, powerful cane grower, exploiter of workers, and former police chief, who is the gubernatorial candidate for the FREJULI [Frente Justicialista de Liberación—Justicialist Liberation Front]. But this wouldn't be anything if his running mates for other posts were not Carlos Imbaud, the former governor of the "Argentine Revolution" [the military dictatorship] during the Tucumán uprising in 1970; Eduardo Paz, the conservative, longtime follower of Patrón Costas; and Márquez, the general secretary of the local CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor], who has been repudiated by his own union (the pottery workers).

The Coordinating Committee of Peronist Groups rose up in opposition to the leadership of the bosses and the bureaucrats. This Committee brings together various sectors that have agreed to confront the official leadership by putting forward a more militant position.

Both our party and the Workers'

Front proposed to the Coordinating Committee that we run joint candidacies comprised of militant workers with no links to any sector of the bosses, including Peronism. In the November 8, 1972, issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, Benito Romano, leader of the Coordinating Committee, stated that he could not vote for any Peronist candidate who was bound to the official machine or who accepted the rules imposed by the regime. He admitted that *"every day it gets harder to put up a fight inside the party."*

On November 25, another important leader of the Coordinating Committee, Leandro Fote, attended the preparatory meeting of the Workers' Front. He told the gathering: *"We are working for the Workers' Front within the Peronist movement because we believe that the workers are not represented in the leadership of the movement."*

Unfortunately, the Tucumán Coordinating Committee did not completely break with the Peronist machine. It ended up presenting its own candidates in order to be able to promote the "candidacy" of Perón and not to break with Peronism. But in spite of their good intentions, not breaking with Peronism means not breaking with Cámpora, Rucci, and Calabró, who are the leaders of the Peronist movement and who are recognized and defended by Perón. It means ultimately ending up by not breaking with Juri and Riera, who are the ones who run the Peronist movement in Tucumán with Perón's blessing. It means falling in behind the policy of Perón, who defends the regime through the daily betrayals of the leaders whom he himself names.

In view of this situation, the Workers' Front proposes: Don't trust any boss, and vote for those of our compañeros who have most distinguished themselves in struggle. Trying to straddle the fence and to continue to invoke the name of Perón means in the final analysis endorsing the policy of an accord with all the parties of the bosses, in order to save the regime.

If there had been great workers' struggles going on in Tucumán, it is almost certain that the thousands of activists involved in these struggles would have constituted a pressure group in support of the Workers'

Front. Going into the elections with working-class fighters as candidates would have been a natural continuation of these struggles against the bosses. However, the absence of such great struggles resulted in the pressures of the Peronist machine being much stronger and in the Coordinating Committee giving in to them.

This weakness of the Coordinating Committee is, in the last analysis, a product of the weakness of the workers' struggles in Tucumán. It has the effect, against the wishes of the committee, of helping to carry out the Peronist plan of preserving the regime, and it prevents the prestige of leaders like Romano and Fote from being placed in the service of a class-struggle alternative.

'Espionage' Frame-Up Revealed

U.S. Documents Prove Ellsberg Innocent

Despite testimony that exposed the U. S. government's attempt to frame Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo on "espionage" charges because of their role in making public the Pentagon Papers, Judge William Matthew Byrne Jr. refused February 2 to dismiss the indictment.

Since the proceedings against the two opponents of the war began in April, 1972, defense attorneys have insisted that the government was suppressing evidence showing that publication of the papers had not harmed the "national defense." Proof of such harm is required in trials for "espionage." Justice Department prosecutor David Nissen adamantly denied this charge.

On January 23, however, Frank Bartino, a Defense Department lawyer who appeared as a witness for the prosecution, admitted that such documents exist. Three days later, Judge Byrne read from a Defense Department analysis stating that the publication of a "memorandum" on the 1954 Geneva Accords—one of the documents named in the indictment—"does not have any effect whatsoever on the national defense." Byrne demanded that all such reports be entered as evidence.

Still more embarrassing for the

In spite of this, we believe that the main thing at this time is to unite all forces in the struggle to defend our standard of living. To this end, we call on the compañeros of the Coordinating Committee to join us in the struggle to win such agreements.

But this is not all. Since they are promoting the candidacy of Perón, we believe that they should demand that General Perón issue a statement indicating his support for an immediate fifty percent increase in all salaries and for a minimum wage of 1,200 pesos [U.S.\$1 equals approximately 10 pesos], as well as a public pledge that if the Peronists win the elections, this will be their first governmental act. □

prosecution was the testimony given January 31 by Edward A. Miller Jr., retired air force lieutenant colonel. Miller testified that he was assigned in December 1971 to review nine volumes of the Pentagon Papers to determine whether their "top secret" classification was justified. Miller and his coworkers found that, even by Defense Department standards, the great majority of the documents should never have been classified.

After Miller submitted his reports to his superiors, he was ordered by the department's director of security review, Charles Hinkel, to "remove them from the files."

Although Judge Byrne refused to dismiss the case against Ellsberg and Russo, he ruled that one count of espionage had been effectively disproved by the new evidence. □

Sinn Fein Candidates

Official Sinn Fein has announced three candidates so far in the special general elections called for February 28 by Prime Minister Jack Lynch. They are Seamus Costello, a popular county councillor, in Wicklow; Mairin de Burca, an activist in many protest movements and a prominent women's liberationist, in Dublin North Central; and Andy Smith, a militant dockerman, in Dublin South East. The list is representative of Sinn Fein's activity.