



Some of those who marched to British Government Office in Toronto on first anniversary of "Bloody Sunday" demanding an end to internment and the withdrawal of British troops from Ireland.

Protests Mark 'Bloody Sunday'

***The Coming
Elections
in France***

***How American
Left Views
Cease-Fire***

The Heir

At the age of sixty-one, George Huntington Hartford II, one of the heirs to the fabulous A&P food-store fortune, has received the recognition due him. His achievement, as reported in the February 6 *Wall Street Journal*, was to take a legacy of \$100 million and reduce it to \$30 million. How did he do it?

First of all, he never worried about making money. He concentrated on spending it. Secondly, he went by whim in selecting his ventures.

When he was young, he joined the staff of *The New Masses*, a Stalinist journal. Then he moved over to *P.M.*, a radical New York daily. His contributions included an investment of \$100,000. When he quit, *P.M.* folded.

An interest in beautiful women led him to open up a model agency to help some of them further their careers. Finding it difficult to tie them down to contracts, once they went to Hollywood, he plunged into the movie business himself, financing a few films featuring his wife, a former model. They flopped at the box office.

After a career as an angel for unsuccessful Broadway plays, he shifted to collecting paintings. As an art connoisseur, he knew what he liked. He wrote and published pamphlets accusing Pablo Picasso of "wiping out all the gains that have been made in the world of painting for the last 500 years."

Later he wrote a book blaming abstract art on a Communist plot to bring down Western civilization.

To compete with the New York Museum of Modern Art, he set up his own museum. "My museum represents the taste of the country more," he contended. The public did not agree.

Looking back at it now, Hartford thinks he should have been more conscious in his youth of the need to make money. Still, he is philosophical: "For the survival of capitalism, business can't be just business. It must have a social awareness of the area in which it operates. Take somebody like Getty, or Howard Hughes, or H. L. Hunt. What are they doing with their money? They've missed the boat in my opinion."

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Peking and Moscow Hail the Cease-Fire

By Jon Rothschild

An editorial published in the January 28 issue of *Renmin Ribao*, the leading newspaper of the Chinese Communist party, called the Vietnam cease-fire agreement a "brilliant victory" for the liberation forces. The article noted two respects in which the accords allegedly represent an advance for the people of Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese question could now be solved, the Maoist journal claimed, "without outside armed intervention." And the end of the fighting would have a "positive influence on the reduction in tension in Asia and the world."

On February 1, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai made his first public comment on the agreement. At a Peking banquet honoring chief North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho, Chou called the accords a great victory and paid special tribute to the "valiant, tenacious, inspiring, and heart-stirring struggle under difficult conditions" that had been waged by the Vietnamese liberation forces.

Chou's remarks were apparently greeted approvingly by the assembled dignitaries. But he neglected to mention that his own government played a not inconsequential part in making the already difficult conditions of the Vietnamese struggle still more difficult. Peking was congratulated for its role, however, by an authority who, while lacking Chou's extensive knowledge of the specifics of Chinese aid to the Vietnamese, had enjoyed the advantage of participation in U. S. strategy sessions on how to crush the Vietnamese revolution.

Speaking on the U. S. television program "Meet the Press" on January 28, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William H. Sullivan, former U. S. ambassador to Laos and recently Henry Kissinger's right-hand man during the secret Paris negotiations, explained the dynamics of the process leading to the cease-fire:

"It is very clear that the attitude of China has had a great deal to do with the way in which this situation has worked out."

The Chinese leadership, Sullivan

said, was put on the spot when Nixon clamped the blockade on North Vietnam last May 8. This "produced a situation in which North Vietnam became 100 percent dependent upon China for the provision of its equipment."

"Everything from the Soviet Union had to transit Chinese territory. Nothing could go through the waters and come into Haiphong overseas. This means that China's preoccupation with Soviet encirclement came into play. This means that China's feeling that it would rather have four Balkanized states in Indochina rather than an Indochina dominated by Hanoi and possibly susceptible to Moscow, came into play."

Sullivan concluded that as a result of "calculating" the quantity of supplies they could get through China, the North Vietnamese leaders "probably came to the conclusion that they had to drop all these demands that they had sought continuously since 1968: the overthrow of President Thieu, the establishment of a coalition government, the cutoff of all American support [to Saigon] . . ."

Flora Lewis, the *New York Times* correspondent who covered the Paris negotiations, shares Sullivan's analysis. On January 30 she wrote that "the United States helped China gain control over the flow of supplies to North Vietnam [!] by shutting off Soviet sea routes when it mined Haiphong and other ports. That increased Peking's leverage on Hanoi."

"In the American analysis, Peking now opposes the idea of Hanoi's domination of the Indochinese peninsula, for fear that this would permit an entrenched Soviet influence on China's southern flank. Therefore, with the sea lanes shut, Peking measured carefully its nourishment of North Vietnam's offensive capacity, to help convince Hanoi that a compromise settlement was essential."

A similar interpretation of the Chinese bureaucracy's notion of "victory" in Indochina appeared in the February 5 issue of the U. S. weekly *Newsweek*: "The cease-fire in Vietnam has

brought an about-face in China's attitude toward U. S. forces in Southeast Asia. Chinese diplomats are spreading the word that Peking now believes the U. S. should keep its air strength in Thailand and the Seventh Fleet in Asian waters. The rationale apparently is that China sees these forces as a counter to the growing Soviet presence in that part of the world. In addition, Peking no longer regards them as a threat to its own territory."

It might be hoped that such reports are nothing but CIA-inspired slander, brazen attempts to introduce dissension into the "socialist camp," perhaps even provocations planted by Khrushchevite revisionists who have infiltrated the State Department. But unfortunately, there is corroborating evidence—from Chou En-lai himself.

In the middle of January, Takeo Kimura, a member of the ruling Liberal Democratic party in Japan, visited China with several other Japanese luminaries. Naturally, they had discussions with Chou, who, they report, made two important points in the course of their talks about the future of the Asian continent. First, as reported in the January 29 *Washington Post*, Chou said that the Vietnam cease-fire would not bring peace to Asia. Not because the United States and its Saigon puppets intend to press on in their counterrevolution—*Renmin Ribao* has already proclaimed that the Vietnamese need no longer fear "outside armed intervention"—but because "a certain country would not give up its attempt to dominate the area."

"The Chinese leader," the *Washington Post* explained, "explicitly exonerated the United States, saying that Washington and Peking had agreed not to seek hegemony over Asia and the Pacific. . . ." The "certain country" is the Soviet Union unless, of course, the Maoists have North Vietnam in mind.

Chou's second observation had to do with U. S.-Japanese relations. Kimura's account was reported in the January 20 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*: "In the future, the Japanese-American Security Treaty will cease to exist, Japan being an independent country. But for the present, since Japan needs the protection of the American nuclear umbrella, it is inevitable, Mr. Chou En-lai believes, that the treaty be preserved. It is in the context of Japan's relationship with

the Soviet Union that this is necessary, and not because of Japan's relations with China. It would serve no purpose for Japan to pass from the American atomic umbrella to the Chinese, because Chinese nuclear arms are not of an offensive type."

The "brilliant victory" that the Peking bureaucrats are now hailing, it may fairly be concluded, is the victory of "peaceful coexistence," not the victory of the Vietnamese revolution. "The Nixon administration," the *New York Times* observed in a February 3 editorial, "appears to have good reason to believe that an improvement of economic as well as political relations with China could be one of the earliest and most profound benefits to this country from the Vietnam settlement."

Peking's predominant concern is to outbid its rivals in Moscow for the favor of U. S. imperialism, to ensure that the American ruling class is convinced that Chairman Mao is fully committed to the new "Concert of Asia," even if that entails a continued massive U. S. military presence.

It cannot be said that the Soviet leaders have ceded victory to Peking in the struggle for accommodation with Nixon. On January 30, the Kremlin bureaucrats had their own banquet for Le Duc Tho. Communist party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev took the occasion to make a speech. "New possibilities for easing tension, for consolidating security and world peace open now," he said. "The political settlement in Vietnam can be expected to have a positive effect on relations among states involved in one way or another in events in Indochina. Moreover, this shows it is possible to find a peaceful and just solution to other conflicts, to liquidate the danger from existing hotbeds of war, above all in the Middle East. . . ."

In an article published in the February 4 *New York Times*, Hedrick Smith quoted the above section of Brezhnev's address and commented:

"Those expansive words of almost parental pride were spoken by neither Richard Nixon nor Henry Kissinger but Leonid Brezhnev. The Soviet leader—who had gambled so delicately last May by hosting Mr. Nixon over Hanoi's objections while Hai-phong harbor was mined, and then had to endure the embarrassment [!] of the intensive American bombing of Hanoi in December—chose a banquet honoring visiting North Vietnamese

dignitaries last Tuesday to relish what he saw as the moment of peace with victory."

Brezhnev's victory parallels Nixon's honor, but it is understandable that the bureaucrat in charge of the world's most powerful workers' state would take a good deal of pride in the Vietnam cease-fire. "The Russians," Bernard Gwertzman wrote in the January 31 *New York Times*, "were said [by U. S. officials] to have been active in the last few months in assuring Hanoi that Washington was genuinely seeking an agreement, and in relaying similar information about Hanoi to the White House."

Brezhnev himself noted that the Soviet Union had "helped actively on all fronts [to bring the agreement about], military, political, and diplomatic." And he further hinted that the Soviet Union intended to press for strict implementation of the terms of the agreement when the twelve-power "international conference" on Indochina convenes: "The peoples expect that other parties will honor and completely observe the commitments assumed. An important role in this is to be played by the coming international conference, in which the Soviet Union will take an active part."

Spartak Beglov, a political commentator for the Novosti press agency, went somewhat further than Brezhnev in lauding the effect the Vietnam cease-fire would have on Soviet-American relations: "The greater has been a turn in America from the illusions of a policy of strength to a recognition of the political realities, the wider have opened goodwill sluices in search of more fruitful relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence."

And he further observed, "Of course the work of restoring peace in Vietnam is only begun. The implementation of a just peace will depend to a large extent on how unswervingly and consistently this agreement is put into practice by the parties." (Not by the United States or Saigon, but by the *parties*. Is this perhaps a warning to the liberation forces that the Kremlin will tolerate no "violation" of the accord, such as armed defense against Thieu's repressive terror?)

On the international arena, the next stage in "implementation of a just peace" will come at the convening of the international conference provided for in the Paris accords. The partici-

pants will include North Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the Siagon clique, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, Great Britain, and the four countries that make up the International Commission of Control and Supervision—Poland, Hungary, Canada, and Indonesia. It has been reported that United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim will be asked to chair the meeting.

"The unstated purpose of the conference, and its real importance," Flora Lewis wrote on January 30, "will be to de-Americanize the peace, involving the major powers and the United Nations in responsibility for considering what to do if the cease-fire breaks down."

A more exact term would be to "tripartize" the peace; that is, for the United States, China, and the Soviet Union to arrive at an agreement that will provide for Thieu's right to consolidate his rule through terror and the liberation forces' lack of right to resist with arms. Nixon and Kissinger have already made this clear in their appeals (and threats) to the workers' states to exercise "restraint."

There is unfortunately every indication that the Moscow and Peking Stalinists will go along with Washington. In his speech at the Le Duc Tho banquet, Brezhnev seemed to warn the North Vietnamese leaders that the Kremlin does not consider military aid to Hanoi on the agenda: "The Democratic Republic of Vietnam resumes the constructive work. It now has an opportunity to concentrate its efforts on socialist construction, and new prospects implementing the behests of President Ho Chi Minh—for creating a peaceful, united, democratic Vietnam—have opened.

"A road for peaceful democratic development, for upholding true independence and for conducting the policy of national concord and unification opens before South Vietnam."

The fact that a peaceful road of democratic development has opened in South Vietnam may be news to the people of the South—the refugees behind Thieu's barbed wire, the political oppositionists facing torture and death in Saigon's jails, the peasants and workers exploited under the guns of Thieu's army. All this is part of Brezhnev's and Chou's "victory." Their message to Hanoi—and to Washington—will surely not be misunderstood. □

Thieu Violates Accords on All Sides

"This is only a cease-fire, not a peace," an unidentified Saigon official commented. "We are leaving a shooting war to enter a political war—but one in which the use of knives and grenades will be acceptable."

The semiofficial Saigon newspaper *Tin Son* was kind enough to supply Thieu's conception of knives and grenades by publishing a series of post-cease-fire decrees issued by the general. They were translated and published in the January 23 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*:

"The police and armed forces are authorized to shoot on the spot all those who urge the population to demonstrate, who make trouble, or who incite the people to follow the Communists.

"Those who carry on pro-Communist propaganda, distribute pamphlets or leaflets, fly the Communist flag, or prevent the police from keeping order will be arrested.

"Soldiers, functionaries, or police agents who have deserted or have incited others to desert will be executed immediately.

"Those who assault passers-by on the street or people in private houses will be arrested. If they try to flee, they will be summarily shot.

"Those who urge the population to make trouble, to leave zones under government control to seek refuge in Communist zones or vice versa will be arrested. If they resist, they will be shot.

"Capital punishment is the penalty for those who use or put in circulation Communist currency. . . .

"Neutralists, open pro-Communists, and those who publicly indulge in political activities will be arrested and brought before military tribunals.

"Strict and rapid application of the press laws and the laws on political parties will be enforced so as to prevent illegal activities.

"All members of groups and organizations acting secretly or organizations that have until now followed the Communists, such as the Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces of Trinh Dinh Thao, Lam Van Tet, or Professor Nguyen Van Hao



THIEU: Has openly announced his intention to violate the Paris accords.

of Hue, will be arrested. If they return to the cities [many of the members of these groups have taken refuge in the countryside], they will be tried."

Since the arrival in Saigon of the North Vietnamese and PRG representatives to the Joint Military Commission provided for in the cease-fire accords, even foreign reporters have had a taste of Thieu's press laws and decrees. On January 29 an advance party of North Vietnamese and PRG military delegates arrived at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airport in a U. S. C-47 transport plane. They had flown in from Bangkok, Thailand, and upon their arrival Saigon officials demanded that they fill out "immigration" forms. The delegates refused, on the grounds that to sign would be to recognize the authority of the Thieu regime. Saigon troops then refused to permit them to deplane.

The liberation forces' delegates spent twenty hours on the plane, while U. S. officials reportedly urged Thieu to forgo the immigration procedures. Finally, Thieu relented.

When the North Vietnamese and PRG representatives got off the plane,

they found out how strictly the terms of the accords would be implemented by Saigon. The agreement stipulates that delegates to the Joint Military Commission shall have diplomatic status. Instead, the unarmed PRG-Hanoi officials found themselves surrounded by several dozen Saigon infantrymen armed with M-16 automatic rifles. Nearby stood a Saigon armored personnel carrier.

They were then conducted to a rickety barracks on the base where they will be housed. The February 4 *New York Times* reported that they were "under virtual house arrest."

Thieu's aim in so blatantly violating a seemingly trivial aspect of the agreement is not simply to insult and inconvenience the liberation forces' delegates to the Joint Military Commission, but also to prevent these delegates from making statements to the press—foreign or domestic.

In the February 1 *New York Times*, correspondent Joseph Treaster described reporters' efforts to speak to the Hanoi-PRG delegation:

"Since Sunday [January 28], at least a dozen correspondents and photographers, mostly Americans, have been detained for up to three or four hours as they tried to cover developments at Tan Son Nhut air base near Saigon. . . .

"One correspondent tried to sail a business card bearing his name and telephone number toward a delegation of Communists. He was arrested briefly and told that his press credentials were being revoked on the grounds that he had tried to pass a message to the Communists. . . .

"A correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System television network said he had been told he would be shot if he did not stop filming a scene of Government troops lounging in hammocks at an outpost near Saigon."

On February 1 Thieu simply informed the entire press corps that their credentials were no longer valid for entry into the air base.

The February 2 *Wall Street Journal* reported that even the Polish and Hungarian ambassadors to the international control commission have been barred from entering the encampment where the Hanoi-PRG delegates are housed.

It was under these conditions that the first top-level session of the Joint

Military Commission was held on February 4. Continuing the practice that has characterized all the recent negotiations on Vietnam, the participants released no information about the exact subject of the meeting, confining themselves to the assertion that the session had been "constructive." Reports indicated that the fighting in

the South Vietnamese countryside had temporarily declined to a negligible level.

Negotiations in Paris between the PRG and the Thieu regime on setting up the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord were reportedly scheduled to begin on February 5. □

U.S. Ignores Provision on Military Aid

Laos, Cambodia Feel Effect of Vietnam Pact

By David Thorstad

Reverberations from the Vietnam cease-fire agreement were felt almost immediately in the neighboring struggles in Laos and Cambodia. While Vice President Agnew was touring Southeast Asian capitals soon after the agreement was signed in order to assure the U.S. puppet regimes in Laos and Cambodia of continued imperialist support, there were increasing indications that the Pathet Lao and Prince Sihanouk were taking steps to apply the "spirit" of the Vietnam accords.

Laos, which has already absorbed more than 3 million tons of U.S. bombs, continued to be bombed by U.S. aircraft, including B-52s. The Nixon administration appeared bent on maintaining this bombing as long as fighting between Pathet Lao and government forces, backed by an estimated 30,000 Thai mercenaries, continued. Such fighting is reported concentrated near the Plaine des Jarres, over which puppet forces are trying to regain control.

The reason for the U.S. bombing is, quite simply, that without it, Prince Souvanna Phouma's U.S.-backed government would not be able to hold on to the territory it still controls. The Pathet Lao claim to control some four-fifths of the country.

New York Times correspondent Henry Kamm reported January 29 Laotian Colonel Douang Py's conviction that the area around Muong Kasay in the north, for instance, could not be held without the U.S. bombers. "If we lose air support, we lose all," he said.

"The continued use of this power

in the closely related Laotian conflict after the signing of the Vietnam settlement," editorialized the *New York Times* with meek understatement January 31, "suggests a persisting reluctance of the Administration even now to allow its old Indochina allies to fight their own battles in accordance with the prudent precepts of the Nixon Doctrine."

The Pathet Lao, for its part, seemed to be taking the initiative to cool things off and achieve a cease-fire agreement. "We control four-fifths of the territory, but we have not organized our own government," stated Sot Pethrasy, head of the Pathet Lao's office in Vientiane, according to the January 24 *Le Monde*. "We do not want any splitting up of Laos. Our unchanging position is that the Laotian problem must be resolved by peaceful means. We could take over the entire country, but we are not doing so. This is proof of our goodwill."

On January 30, Communist delegates to the public Laotian peace talks, which began last October, proposed that private talks begin. In a January 31 dispatch from Vientiane, *New York Times* correspondent Malcolm Browne reported that the Pathet Lao agree with Souvanna Phouma that "a cease-fire will come soon."

In addition, said Browne, "according to Government sources here, the Pathet Lao have finally dropped their objections to the Government proposal that discussions of a military cease-fire be separated from negotiations on a political solution for this divided country."

On February 1, a top leader of the Pathet Lao, Phoumi Vongvichit, sent Premier Souvanna a telegram urging an immediate cease-fire. Two days later, he arrived in Vientiane from Hanoi and expressed the hope that a cease-fire would be concluded quickly. "He told diplomats that he had brought several letters from the Pathet Lao capital of Sam Neua for Prince Souvanna," wrote Browne February 3. "These presumably include communication from Prince Souphanouvong, the premier's half-brother, who is the nominal head of the Pathet Lao." Phoumi, the secretary general of the Pathet Lao political party, "made it clear that he would remain in Vientiane to conclude an agreement, and that he had full powers."

All parties concerned, Browne noted, "now appear to be considering a settlement along the agreements of 1962, which provided for unification of the country under a coalition Government." That agreement broke down completely within two years of its being signed.

To facilitate the talks between the two sides, the Soviet Union has offered to operate an airlift between Vientiane and the Pathet Lao capital, thus eliminating the day-long detour via Hanoi for Pathet Lao delegates.

Similar movements toward accommodation were occurring simultaneously in Cambodia. On January 29, Lon Nol tried to cast himself in the image of peacemaker by ordering his troops to suspend offensive action. "The Government," reported Tillman Durdin in the January 30 *New York Times*, "has promised no punishment of opposition forces who come over to its side. In pursuit of this objective, sources said today [January 29], bands of civilians and Buddhist monks were filtering into insurgent areas in an effort to make contact with their enemies, and planes were dropping leaflets denouncing Vietnamese Communist actions in Cambodia and urging that soldiers come over."

There are said to be some 23,000 Vietnamese troops operating in Cambodia, and there were reports February 2 suggesting that these troops were moving out of battle areas. The Cambodian command, however, said that incidents suggesting such a withdrawal may merely reflect a normal ebb and flow of hostilities.

Meanwhile, Prince Sihanouk, apparently under pressure from his allies in Peking, announced January 30, just prior to departing from Peking for Hanoi, that his government in exile was going to "reevaluate" its positions on the Cambodian situation. The day before, Sihanouk had had a long talk with Chou En-lai. "We do not want to look like warmongers," he said. "We do not want to be accused of adding fuel to the fire in Indochina. We want to show our desire for peace."

The "reevaluation" was necessary, he explained, because "our friends tell us that our adversaries are having a field day making us look like warmongers at a time when peace is in the process of being achieved, and that there is a danger of us finding ourselves isolated if our motives are badly understood while Lon Nol is launching a peace campaign."

The next day, January 31, Sihanouk announced from Hanoi that forces supporting him would "not launch offensive actions." He also offered to restore good relations with the United States: "If the United States is prepared to act in a friendly manner with an independent and non-aligned Cambodia, we are prepared for a rapid reconciliation with Washington." He continued to insist on the removal of "Lon Nol and his clique of traitors."

Although American air raids against Khmer Rouge forces have been suspended, the delivery of American military supplies from bases in Thailand and by ship into the southern Cambodian port of Kampong Soam is continuing, Durdin reported February 1.

In spite of the overtures offered by the liberation forces in Laos and Cambodia, the Nixon administration has shown no signs of reciprocating. John Finney reported from Washington in the February 3 *New York Times* that the imperialists have decided to ignore the section of the recently signed Vietnam agreement that provides: "Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material." The administration's present intention, Finney said, is "not to withdraw any of the military aid personnel assigned

to the two countries" and "to continue military aid to Laos and Cambodia unless such aid is specifically prohib-

ited in any truce agreements worked out by the contending factions in the two countries." □

Range From 'All Hail' to Critical Assessment

How U.S. Left Views Vietnam Cease-Fire

By Fred Feldman

There were diverse reactions from antiwar and left organizations in the United States to the announcement on January 24 that U. S. and North Vietnamese negotiators had reached agreement on a cease-fire pact.

NPAC's Position

The National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) said in a statement issued February 1, "The National Peace Action Coalition warmly welcomes the halt to the savage U. S. bombing and shelling of Vietnam and the announced return of American GIs. . . . NPAC supports 100% the right of the Vietnamese people to make any decisions or sign any agreements they may deem necessary in their long struggle to rid themselves of U. S. military and political interference in their country. The demand of the American antiwar movement, however, must continue to be that the U. S. government has NO right to be in Southeast Asia in ANY form, and has no right placing conditions on and demanding concessions from Asian people."

NPAC and the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam announced that they will hold a joint steering committee meeting in Washington, D. C., on February 24 to discuss future plans. The meeting will be preceded by a picket line around the White House demanding that the United States withdraw completely and unconditionally from Southeast Asia.

The PCPJ Position

At a January 25 news conference called by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), Dr. Sidney Peck and the Reverend Paul Meyer termed the pact "a tremendous victory for the people of Vietnam and for peace all over the world."

Peck announced the formation of a

"national emergency network" so that "on twenty-four-hours notice we can respond to any new military moves by the Nixon administration in violation of the treaty." Peck told *Washington Post* reporter William Chapman, "We're going to lobby Congress to cut off all aid to his [Thieu's] regime."

PCPJ has declared February 14 "a day of victory and vigilance" in honor of the accord.

Pro-Maoist View

The *Guardian*, a New York weekly whose editors have recently become converts to Maoism, also hailed the pact.

"The heroic Vietnamese struggle, whose victory is embodied in the new accords," wrote Richard Ward in the February 7 issue, "is also a victory for the socialist countries which provided substantial material assistance to the Vietnamese liberation forces . . ."


Ward admits that "the Nguyen Van Thieu regime is given a temporary respite by the 1973 accords," but he adds, "in less than two months it will be basically on its own without its imperialist protector . . ."

Pro-Moscow View

The U. S. Communist party's newspaper, the *New York Daily World*, hailed the pact in a lead editorial in the January 25 issue.

"The signing of the Vietnam peace agreement in Paris on Saturday will mark an historic victory for the people of Vietnam and for the anti-imperialist struggle," the editorial stated.

"The peoples of Indochina have been sustained in their defiance of imperialist aggression by the unwavering support of the socialist nations. Pre-eminent in material, moral, political,



Fernando/Universidad

Stalinists think it's the real thing.

and diplomatic assistance has been the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The attitude of the CP was still more clearly expressed by Tom Foley in the January 27 *Daily World*. According to Foley, "The central fact about the Vietnam peace agreement to be signed in Paris today is that it follows closely the 1954 Geneva Agreement which ended the 'first Indochina war.'

"That fact in itself helps define the situation: all patriotic Vietnamese regard the 1954 Geneva Agreement as a foundation of their rights, and know that U. S. sabotage prevented the agreement from being implemented, thus denying them their individual and national rights."

Hardly "a foundation of their rights," the Geneva Agreement was forced on the Vietnamese by the threat of U. S. intervention and the joint pressure of Moscow and Peking. By requiring that the liberation forces withdraw to the North, the settlement ultimately deprived the Vietnamese of most of the gains they had won in nine years of battle against the French. The Geneva Agreement, which Foley presents as a model, bought time for the United States to create a neocolonial puppet regime in the South.

Foley hailed the provision in the cease-fire agreement calling for "genuinely free and democratic elections," ignoring provisions giving Thieu veto power over the date, character, and administrative structure of the elections.

In a statement issued January 24, the U. S. Communist party said, "We Communists will support and fight for the implementation of the agreement. We will continue to fight for the full rights of the people of Vietnam to determine their own destiny."

These are mutually contradictory statements, since the concessions exacted from the Vietnamese leaders violate Vietnam's right to self-deter-

mination. The demand for "implementation" of the agreement, like the demands for "negotiations now" and "sign the treaty" that preceded it, concedes U. S. imperialism the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Vietnamese people.

The CP statement denounces revolutionary socialists who challenge the attempt to impose "peaceful coexistence" on the Vietnamese people:

"Nixon's claim of victory, of defeat for the liberation forces, is echoed by the Trotskyites. As at all critical moments, the Trotskyites (Socialist Workers Party) have again emerged as a disruptive force. We reject as slander their position that the leaders of Vietnam are 'selling out' because they are signing the agreement."

The Trotskyist Stand

The position attributed to revolutionary socialists by the Communist party is a Stalinist fabrication. The actual position of the Trotskyists in the United States was stated by Barry Sheppard in the February 9 issue of *The Militant*.

"Under the combined pressure of Washington's military attack, Moscow and Peking's refusal to provide adequate aid, and political pressure from Moscow and Peking, Hanoi finally accepted the cease-fire accords under terms they had previously rejected.

"These accords leave the Thieu regime in control of the major cities, keep Vietnam divided, and contain other conditions Washington has forced on the Vietnamese.

"The next stage in Vietnam will be

marked by instability. The accords reflect the fact that the liberation forces have been unable to achieve national liberation and reunification, and also that they have not been crushed. Two powers continue to exist in South Vietnam—the Saigon regime of the landlords and capitalists, and the liberation forces based upon the peasants and workers. Such a situation is inherently unstable. One or the other of these forces must eventually predominate. The outcome can only be decided by struggle."

Sheppard continued, "Moscow and Peking are putting strong pressure on the Vietnamese to contain the mass struggles that are likely to emerge, to accept the continuation of the Thieu regime, and to seek an accommodation with it through the 'National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord,' which Thieu wields a veto over. If this should occur, it will signal a major setback for the revolution in South Vietnam.

"Most ominous in this regard is the final part of the accords, which gives a prior stamp of approval to the upcoming international conference that will 'guarantee peace' in Vietnam. This conference can only bring more pressure to bear on the Vietnamese from imperialism, and from Moscow and Peking.

"Whatever happens next in Vietnam, these accords will not bring peace any more than the 1954 Geneva accords did. In the aftermath of Geneva the Vietnamese masses once again, slowly at first, resisted the attempt to impose on them a proimperialist landlord-capitalist regime. They will do so again."

It Might Be Unhealthy to Talk

The U. S. military has ordered all American prisoners of war returning from North Vietnam to maintain total silence on the conditions of their treatment and their feelings about the war. Of course it's all for the prisoners' own good, the Pentagon insists—even though the order may have the fringe benefit of keeping antiwar statements out of the press.

The problem is that some U. S. citizens held by the liberation forces are civilians not subject to Pentagon decree. On January 30 State Department spokesman Irwin K. Teven announced the solution to that problem: Returning civilians will be entitled to the same medical treatment as military prisoners, unless they speak to

the press, in which case they will be thrown out of the program.

"If they talk to the press, that would be tantamount to opting out of the system," said Teven. He said civilians released by Hanoi would be flown to Clark Air Base in the Philippines and then advised of their choices: Obey Pentagon orders or speak out and lose opportunity for medical care as well as free transportation back to the United States.

The day after Teven made his announcement, another State Department spokesman explained that the whole thing had been a "misunderstanding." But he added that it would not be "in the men's best interest" to talk to reporters.

U.S. Supreme Court Decision on Abortion

By Candida Barberena

The Supreme Court decision on January 22 legalizing abortion up to six months was the most significant step forward in the women's liberation movement in the United States since passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 recognizing female suffrage.

On the basis of a 7 to 2 decision, the high-court ruling overturned all state laws that restrict the right to abortion under medically safe conditions before the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy. No state may legislate any restriction whatsoever during the first three months. It may, however, define the medical conditions under which the abortion must be performed during the second three-month term, and it retains the power to limit or altogether restrict abortion during the final term.

The historic decision was based on the right to privacy, implicit in the personal liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. With the judgment declaring illegal all laws that compromise the right to abortion—for example, limiting the procedure to "medical" or "social" cases where abortion is necessary to save the woman's life or is termed "detrimental to her psychological well-being"—the court severed a long line of harsh and outmoded precedents condemning abortion as a criminal offense, incorporating it into the penal code, and in the process equating it to murder.

Opponents of legalized abortion in the United States, masquerading as "right to lifers," have consistently argued against this right. The court's denial that "the word 'person' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment" includes the unborn represents a sound negation of these crusaders' argument that likens a fetus to a person.

The declaration further asserted: "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the de-

velopment of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. . . . There has always been strong support for the view that life

Persecution of Belgian Abortionist

The Case of Dr. William Peers

Abortion laws in Belgium carry a maximum of twenty years for a doctor who performs an illegal abortion and five years for a woman who undergoes one. The law recognizes legal abortion only in specific therapeutic cases when a woman's life is endangered.

Under this reactionary legislation, Dr. William Peers, head of the Center of Obstetrics and Gynecology in the province of Namur, Belgium, and cofounder of the Belgian Society to Legalize Abortion, was jailed on January 18 following denial of his lawyers' request for release. He was charged with having performed about 320 abortions during 1972.

A second request to free Dr. Peers was rejected by the court of Namur on February 1. Given the lack of a bail system in Belgium, Dr. Peers is at the mercy of the court, although his lawyers will again on February 17 file a request for his release pending trial. On January 27 in Namur, just prior to the denial of the second plea, some 10,000 supporters of the Willy Peers Committee demanded his release.

Le Monde's Pierre de Vos described the Peers case as "currently occupying as much news space as the unfolding governmental crisis in Belgium or the gas strike that is paralyzing the country." On January 24, the French daily reported that 750 telegrams supporting Dr. Peers had already been received, including statements from Professors Jacob, Lwoff,

does not begin until live birth."

While the Supreme Court acted virtually in accordance with the demands put forth by the majority of the women's movement since 1970, it failed to abolish all constraints. This provides an escape hatch for the states when they rewrite their reactionary laws. In view of this danger the women's liberation movement in the United States intends to keep up the struggle until all the laws restricting the "right to choose" are struck from the books. □

and Monod, the 1965 Nobel Prize winners in medicine.

"The case of Willy Peers . . . is rapidly becoming a national demonstration to legalize abortion, and to a large extent the breadth of the campaign is surpassing everything that has occurred in France during the past few years," said de Vos. □

Strasbourg Abortion Trial

Eight women, ranging in age from twenty-two to fifty-two, faced trial in Strasbourg, France, January 19 for undergoing abortions. Six were released, including several who failed to appear—a very unusual occurrence in French court practice—and two were given suspended fines of 300 francs (about US\$60).

The case had its unusual side. Among other things, the principal defendant, Dr. Jovanovic, an open advocate and practitioner of abortion, died in June. The prosecution decided to go ahead with its case against the material witnesses in order to get a conviction "in principle."

The point of principle, however, seemed to be made by the other side. "A strong current of public opinion was running in favor of the accused before their trial," the Paris daily *Le Monde* reported January 21. "On the eve of the trial 250 demonstrators marched demanding their release and free abortion on demand. A more important development was that for the first time unity was achieved among women of all tendencies."

Almost Worth It

Each returning U. S. prisoner of war will receive a gold-plated lifetime pass good for admittance to any professional baseball game.

Turkish Political Prisoners Tortured

"Last April 3, at noon, Sadik Akincilar, a respected Istanbul attorney, was arrested at his home by plainclothes police, who searched his house, confiscated some documents, and took him to the police station. A few hours later, his eyes blindfolded, he was thrown into a truck, which carried him off. Later, the blindfold removed, he found himself in a basement, face to face with a Turkish army general and some men in civilian clothes.

"'You are in the custody of a counter-guerrilla group called Commando B,' the general told him, and added, 'Your life is not worth as much as a dog's, and don't go talking to me about constitutional rights or lawful guarantees. Down here, you don't have any.'"

The January 8-21 issue of the Paris biweekly *Afrique-Asie*, from which the above account is taken, carried a special report on torture of political prisoners in Turkey. The Turkish armed forces, the real power behind a facade of parliamentary government, have apparently applied—and in some cases improved upon—some of the techniques of their cohorts in Greece, another of the countries of NATO's "northern tier."

Akincilar, *Afrique-Asie* reports, was beaten savagely by his captors, who took care not to damage his face so as to prevent the attorney from later appearing in public with visible marks of their treatment. After the "regular" beating subsided, Akincilar was subjected to a technique perfected by the Athens junta, *falaka*. This involves repeatedly beating the victim with sticks on the soles of his or her bare feet, a procedure that has been known to permanently cripple people without leaving visible wounds.

Akincilar had been the defense attorney in several trials involving alleged members of the Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA), an insurgent group that has been conducting an armed struggle against the military regime. Shortly before Akincilar's arrest, one of the leaders of the TPLA, Mahir Cayan, had managed to escape from army clutches. Akincilar's captors were trying to force him to "confess" to having organized the escape and to having harbored fugitives. Akincilar refused. He describes what happened next:

"When the *falaka* sessions didn't work, they hooked me up to an electric generator. They attached electrodes all over my body. . . . I was bound to an iron chair by chains and ropes. When they first shot the current through my head from electrodes attached to my ears, I thought I would go mad, that my brain would explode, so terrible was the pain. To make it worse, they threw water on my head. . . ."

The *falaka* and electrical torture went on for three weeks. Between sessions, Akincilar was chained to his bed in a cell continually lit by a blinding light. Occasionally, he reports, he could hear the screams of other victims. Finally, Akincilar "confessed," signing a paper he had never even read.

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Afrique-Asie also describes the case of Ulker Akgol, a young woman who was a close friend of one of the leaders of the TPLA. About three weeks before the Akincilar incident, she was kidnapped in a similar manner. The police wanted to know where her friend was. She told them she had not seen him in several months. At that point, Akgol received one week of the same treatment Akincilar had gotten, with the addition of several other techniques reserved especially for women prisoners.

Afrique-Asie notes that the Turkish police have for some time had a well-deserved reputation for brutality. But the most serious incidents of torture seem to involve a mysterious organization known by the initials MIT, a sort of secret service. During the past year and a half, MIT has established several counter-guerrilla centers in various parts of Turkey. This group appears to be the one responsible for the kidnapping and torture of both Akincilar and Akgol.

At the present time, there are at least 3,500 Turks imprisoned on political charges. Some sources estimate

that the total number of persons deprived of personal freedom to some degree (house arrest, etc.) may be as high as 12,000. Bookstores selling "socialist" publications have been raided (in some cases, Thomas More's *Utopia* and Einstein's *Theory of Relativity* have been placed in the subversive category); newspapers have been suspended; trade unions have been dissolved.

Some of the more widely known victims of the repression have been publishers. Suleyman Ege, for example, was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison and twelve years in exile for having published Lenin's *State and Revolution* and Marx and Engels's *Communist Manifesto* in Turkish. Thirty-seven of the 157 articles of the 1961 Turkish constitution have been amended—generally in the direction of subordinating personal rights to "national security and the protection of the state"—so as to facilitate the repression.

The military courts that have tried opponents of the regime have refused to consider charges of torture of prisoners. In an official statement, one court explained why:

"Even if the military court pronounced itself in favor of an inquiry related to torture, and even if said inquiry proved that such had been applied, the court does not believe it possible to determine whether the accused prisoners have been tortured to obtain the truth or to force them to confess to crimes they never committed."

Mass trials of Turkish dissidents are continuing. Last December, a series of harsh sentences were handed down by military courts both in Ankara and in eastern Turkey. (See *Intercontinental Press*, January 22, p. 42.) The latest one began on January 10. Facing the bar in Ankara were 267 persons, 185 of whom were accused of membership in the Turkish Revolutionary Workers and Peasants party. They are charged with having conspired with members of the TPLA to plan guerrilla actions against the state. Dogu Perincek, whom the Paris daily *Le Monde* describes as the theoretical leader of the TRWPP, has charged that the prisoners have been tortured.

On February 1, according to the *New York Times*, an Ankara military court sentenced two students, Feb-

zi Bal and Safa Asim Yildiz, to death. Twenty-five other defendants were sentenced to prison terms ranging from nine months to fifteen years. Gulay Ozde was sentenced to life imprisonment. The *Times* report indicated that the accused had been charged with plotting to overthrow the regime and with membership in the TPLA. It was not clear whether these defendants were among the 267 or part of a different mass trial.

After nearly two years of brutal repression (dating from March 1971, when the military forced the government of Suleyman Demirel to resign), news of torture in Turkey has finally begun to create some embarrassment among European regimes. Turkey is an associate member of the Common Market and has applied for full membership. Because of the attempts of the Turkish ruling class to bring the country into the "Europe of the Nine," the generals have come under some pressure to make their repression less obvious.

Pieter Dankert, Netherlands delegate to the Council of Europe, has been invited by Ankara to head up an investigation of Turkish political conditions, specifically of torture. Sicco Mansholt, outgoing chairman of the

Commission of the European Communities, has said that if the investigation's findings are unfavorable, the commission may react negatively to Turkey's application for membership. This development probably accounts for the fact that the Republican People's party (RPP), once the dominant political group in Turkey but now a minority party in the National Assembly, has recently asked that martial law be lifted. On January 29 Bulent Ecevit, leader of the RPP, stated that he found the regime's denial of charges that it was torturing political prisoners "unconvincing."

But it remains to be seen whether the late-blooming Common Market concern for the welfare of Turkish prisoners will have any impact inside Turkey—or how serious the "inquiry" will be.

When Frank Judd, a Labour party member of parliament and a British delegate to the Council of Europe, asked in December about the "erosion of democracy" in Turkey, he was answered by Secretary of State Julian Amery: "I believe that we must rather admire the manner in which our Turkish friends have safeguarded parliamentary institutions." □

have trebled at least during the past year. The people of Bangladesh never dreamed that this would be their future when they were fighting the Pakistani butchers.

Rahman's popularity has been fast diminishing, and he has been forced to call general elections for March 7. He has tried to silence the voice of the people, and has already banned a few newspapers because they were critical of his administration. Ironically, he has used the same old laws passed by the Pakistani dictator Ayub Khan to gag the press. Just after the January 1 incident, for example, the editors of *Dainik Bangla* ("The Daily Bangla") put out a special edition dealing with the protest and the shootings—and were immediately fired.

Murders of radicals, labor leaders, and workers are being constantly reported in the country. The jails are already full of thousands of people who fought in the freedom struggle. Thus, in an interview with Ingvar Oja, correspondent of the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter*, Major Jalil, one of the most prominent guerrilla leaders of the Bangladesh independence struggle, declared: "What has happened since the liberation? Around 10,000 former guerrilla soldiers are sitting in jail accused of various crimes. When we were fighting the Pakistani army, they called us terrorists and evil-doers, and now we have been described the same way by the new regime. I wonder who the real patriots were in Bangladesh." [See *Intercontinental Press*, January 22, p. 44.]

Recently, in Chittagong, more than 100 workers were murdered under the excuse that they were violating a surprise curfew. Students are being terrorized in their dormitories by armed bandits of the Awami League, almost in the same way they were in the days of Ayub Khan.

With the approach of the elections, Mujib has started campaigning very hard. To him, anyone who opposes the present leadership is a conspirator. His party officials have publicly threatened to wipe out opposition forces if they dare criticize the regime. After the January 1 shootings, Mujib declared before a mass gathering that he would not have to use his police and armed forces to suppress the "conspirators"—a simple appeal to the people would be enough to teach them a lesson.

Awami League Resorts to Violence

Political Turmoil in Bangladesh

By Ibne Azad

On New Year's day, 1973, two students in Dacca, Bangladesh, were gunned down by the police forces of Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The shootings took place in front of the headquarters of the United States Information Service (USIS) during a rally condemning the American bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong.

Demonstrations in front of the USIS had not been new. On countless occasions in the past, the people of Dacca had marched against U.S. imperialism, and the building had been attacked many times. As long ago as 1956, Dacca students had set fire to the British Information Centre in

protest against British bombing of Egypt.

But Mujib, bitterly anticommunist, considered it his duty to protect the interests of his Washington mentors rather than join in the worldwide protest against the U.S. imperialist bombing. The incident was clearly reflective of Mujib's policies of repression.

The Mujib regime has been administering Bangladesh for just over one year now. What has Mujib offered the people during that time? Acute inflation, severe food shortages, black-marketeering, and hoarding, mostly by members of the ruling Awami League, have made life unbearable for the working masses. Prices—of everything from beef to bicycles—

The crowd made a bonfire of the furniture and papers of the central office of the National Awami party (Muzaffar group). The USIS building was retaken from leftist students who had occupied it, and the flags of the PRG and North Vietnam, which had been put up earlier by the students, were pulled down and burned.

The population has reacted against Mujib's repressive policies. On January 2 a general strike was called by all the opposition parties to protest the previous day's shootings. In the January 7 issue of *Holiday*, an English-language newspaper published in Dacca, the well-known political analyst Badruddin Umar described the mood of the city:

"On January 2 Dacca wore a look which reminded one of February 22, 1952. All the opposition parties gave calls for hartal [general strike] on that day and the city life stood completely paralysed. This was not the only remarkable thing. What was most remarkable was the mood of the people. It looked as if in one day the Awami League as a political party had been thrown overboard by the people. The anti-U. S. and anti-Awami League slogans virtually rent the Dacca sky in a manner which reminded one also of the glorious days of December-March 1968-69 and January-March 1971. The only difference which one could clearly notice in the political atmosphere was the increasing awareness of the international character of the exploitation and repression and the need for a commensurate resistance."

There are two major camps in the Bangladesh opposition. One is led by Maulana Bhashani, the ninety-year-old militant peasant leader of the National Awami party (Bhashani). The other, the newly formed Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist party—JSD), is headed by a triumvirate composed of Major Jalil, A. S. M. Abdur Rab, and Shahjehan Siraj. The JSD was formed after a split in the Awami League's student organization between those demanding "scientific socialism" for Bangladesh and those espousing "Mujibism." The former faction set up the JSD at the end of 1972. Major Jalil, an outspoken opponent of Indian expansionism, is its president. Already Mujib's agents have tried several times to assassinate Ab-



RAHMAN: More than a year of corruption and mismanagement.

dur Rab, the JSD's popular general secretary.

The JSD is a new force in Bangladesh politics. It plans to participate in the upcoming elections with a view to using the "vote" as a means of winning state power so as to further the cause of "social revolution, scientific socialism, and class struggle." The party opposes all treaties signed between India and Bangladesh and between the Soviet Union and Bangladesh. It advocates a neutral, non-aligned foreign policy, but does not elaborate its views further than that. It is likely that there are various tendencies holding different views within the party.

But the voice of Bhashani is still the most prominent one on the left. Under his leadership an All-Party Action Committee (APAC) was formed to combat the growing repression in the country. On December 31, 1972, before a mass gathering of workers, students, and peasants, Bhashani declared that the people's struggle against the present regime would be waged either with ballots or bullets, depending on the government's actions. But because of Mujib's increasingly violent actions, Bhashani doubt-

ed that a free and fair election was possible in Bangladesh.

The most interesting recent development on the left has been the politics of the pro-Moscow parties, the NAP (Muzaffar) and the Communist party of Bangladesh (CPB). The anti-U. S. demonstration on January 1 was in fact called by the Bangladesh Student Union—student wing of the NAP(M) and CPB.

For a long time these two parties had displayed complete devotion and loyalty to the Awami League, even going so far as to declare that the NAP(M), the CPB, and the Awami League were the only patriotic parties in the country. These parties had openly supported the government's antidemocratic measures, such as gagging the press, arresting radicals, etc.

So it was a bolt from the blue for these pro-Moscow elements when one of the patriotic parties opened fire on a crowd assembled by the other two. They have lost the favor of the ruling apparatus. Momentarily, they were outraged. Pro-Moscow student leaders, who control the student government at Dacca University, tore up the paper granting Mujib lifetime honorary membership in the body. But very quickly the pro-Moscow leaders backed down. They "apologized" for their misconduct toward the "Prime Minister of Bangladesh."

Sheikh Mujib is confident that his party will win the coming elections. With the opposition disunited and with the backing he has from Washington, Moscow, and New Delhi, the Sheikh may very well be right. The loser would be the working masses of Bangladesh, for whom the future would be definitely more bleak. □

Orders Are Orders

Nixon's murderous bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong in December were invoked by a defense lawyer in a Frankfurt war crimes trial of former Nazis as an argument for acquitting his client, reported the January 14 issue of the Danish daily *Politiken*. The lawyer, Horst Loebe, compared "the Nazis' horrible acts of mass annihilation and the mass annihilation bombings of the Americans." He said his client, a Hamburg police officer accused of complicity in the death of 19,000 Jews in 1942, found himself in the same situation as the American B-52 pilots over Vietnam. Like the pilots, he said, his client just "carried out orders from higher up."

French CP Seeking 'Democratic Reforms'

The French Communist party is showing signs of concern over the apparent increase in voter appeal of the Socialist party, the two being the major political forces allied in the Union de la Gauche (Union of the Left). The aim of the electoral alliance is to win a majority of seats in the National Assembly for these reformist allies during the legislative elections next March.

At the CP's Central Committee meeting January 24-25, its general secretary, Georges Marchais, dwelt on the need to step up the CP's campaign for a strong vote in the first round of the two-round elections. At a news conference following the gathering, he explained: ". . . as we have always said, the democratic transformation of the country requires both the continuation and broadening of the union of all workers', democratic, and national forces, and, in an inseparable fashion, the constant strengthening of the influence and activity of the Communist party."

A strong showing for the Communist party in the first round on March 4 would place it in a better position to ask candidates of the SP to withdraw in its favor on the second round a week later, on March 11.

This two-stage election system is used in France for both legislative and presidential elections. For any candidate to be elected on the first ballot, he must receive at least 50 percent of the votes for that office. If no candidate for a particular post receives 50 percent, a second round is held a week later. In this ballot, the candidate with the highest number of votes wins. In order to run in the second round, a candidate must receive votes totaling at least 5 percent of the registered voters.

This system leaves room for considerable wheeling and dealing and maneuvering between parties. Frequently, a candidate on the left may withdraw in favor of another left-wing or reformist candidate, thereby increasing the chances of defeating a candidate of the bourgeoisie. Usually, though not always, the candidate who withdraws has received fewer votes than the candidate who stands to bene-

fit from his withdrawal.

In 1967, for instance, the CP agreed in thirteen cases to withdraw its candidates in favor of a socialist or "some other democrat" that might stand a better chance of winning. In 1968 the CP gave only eight such "presents," Marchais recalled at the news conference, adding that there would be even fewer this year.

The presidential election is similar, the difference being that there can only be two candidates on the second round. These need not be the two with the highest vote in the first round, however, since the one who came in second might conceivably wish to withdraw in favor of some other candidate.

The system of two rounds of votes favors a fairly precise registration of opinion. On the first round, the custom is to vote for candidates whose *program* meets with the approval of the voter. A voter who does not agree with the program of any candidate on the ballot can show this by *abstaining* on the first round. (This does not invalidate the right to vote in the second round.)

On the second round, a voter may choose to vote for a candidate as a lesser evil, or because the candidate belongs to a class favored by the voter.

Thus in the current election, in areas where *no* revolutionary candidates are running, a worker could express critical support of Communist or Socialist party candidates in the following way: *abstain* on the first round and *vote for* them on the second round.

This would register disapproval of the class-collaborationist program of these two parties while showing support for them as working-class parties *against* the bourgeois parties.

Considerable interest is being aroused by this year's legislative elections because public opinion polls in France show that there is a chance that the Union of the Left could emerge from them with a majority of seats. Interest is, of course, not limited to the far-left groups, whose attitudes to the elections and to the Union of the Left are being exten-

sively covered in *Intercontinental Press*. The bourgeoisie, too, is watching developments closely.

The January 27 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*, for instance, published an article by Alain Duhamel analyzing the strategy of the Communist party. He began by noting that its tone and style have changed ("Today the Communist party has resolutely opted for modernism"). It makes use of "pop" color patterns, audio-visual techniques, abstract graphics, a myriad of discussion-format meetings, and the like.

But while the CP's style is different, its basic strategy, Duhamel notes, has roots that go back decades: "Since 1962, and especially since 1964 and its eighteenth congress, it has rediscovered its popular-front line—which it followed from 1934 until the collapse of the Popular Front, and from 1941 to the beginning of the cold war. With, nonetheless, an essential difference: What, in the first two cases, was the product of exceptional and temporary international conditions—the mounting fascist peril and the world war—is now coming about at a time when 'peaceful coexistence' is going strong, when relations among European states are 'normal' and will, it appears, remain stabilized for quite some time to come. Thus it is no longer a question of forming a defensive alliance or a holy union. The strategy of the CP, as it itself loudly proclaims, is aiming—with a winning, aggressive, and optimistic air—at a quite different goal: the French road toward socialism."

The goal may be the road *toward* socialism, but no one should fear that the goal is socialism itself, Duhamel is quick to point out. The first step is a joint program with the Socialist party, supported by the left-wing Radicals, in order to lay the basis for what the CP calls a "democracy with an advanced economic and social content."

What is meant by this, notes Duhamel, is "neither socialism nor, *a fortiori*, communism. All the leaders of the CP, as well as their allies, have repeated this a hundred times, and they cannot understand how anyone can refuse to believe them. The joint program, if it carries the day, will bring about 'deepgoing democratic reforms.' Nothing more, and nothing less." □

On the Coming French Legislative Elections

By Pierre Frank

A new National Assembly will be elected in France on March 4 and 11. The present legislature was elected in the wake of the defeat of the May movement, after the PCF [Parti Communiste Français—French Communist party] and the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor, the PCF-controlled labor organization] refused to carry the general strike to the point of overthrowing the Gaullist regime and torpedoed the mass movement in exchange for the government's agreeing to hold immediate elections. At that time the UDR [Union des Démocrates pour la République—Union of Democrats for the Republic, the main Gaullist formation] won an overwhelming majority. The upcoming elections will produce a very different lineup.

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to think, as the PS [Parti Socialiste—Socialist party] and the PCF do, that these elections will decide the fate of France. It would also be wrong to think, as the Maoists and spontanéists do, that they have no importance whatsoever. Both parliamentary cretinism and antiparliamentary cretinism would lead us astray in trying to determine the role of these elections. Because of the context in which they will take place and their probable results, the elections have an importance that lies outside the parliamentary arena.

Background of the Elections

It is impossible to understand the present situation in France without going back to May 1968. This revolutionary crisis was the grandiose inauguration of a social crisis affecting the most diverse realms. Replacing de Gaulle with Pompidou has not strengthened the state power in the way hoped for by the bourgeois current that carried out this operation through the April 1969 referendum. The majority is more ridden with

divisions and cliques than ever. It was only with great difficulty that it managed to achieve a certain common front for the campaign. Scandals, some of them very sordid, are popping up everywhere in these circles. Not even a relative equilibrium has been restored in the educational system. Furthermore, other institutions, including some of the most reactionary (the churches, the courts, the police . . .), have been shaken by profound crises. Finally, all sorts of social categories are raising demands and they are doing so primarily in the streets.

As for the working class, its combativity has not been damaged by the fact that the May 1968 movement did not achieve what it could have. To the contrary, it has demonstrated very strong militancy, notably by resorting frequently to tough methods (kidnapping managers, . . .), in the numerous struggles that have occurred since then. But all these struggles have had a sectoral, partial character and have not shown a tendency to spread. Of course, the predominant leaderships in the working-class movement have done everything possible to stamp out such a trend. But even where these leaderships have lost control of strikes, as has happened quite often, the tendency to spread has not been very strong.

The main reason for this has been that as a result of its experience in May 1968 the working class realized that a mobilization of such scope needs a political perspective in order to succeed. Revolutionary Marxists scarcely need note that a general strike is not the arithmetical total of economic strikes but that it constitutes a general political struggle which, as it develops, can pose the question of power. May 1968 caught the leaderships of the left organizations as well as the government by surprise. A rupture occurred between the PCF and the FGDS [Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste—Federation of the Democratic, Socialist Left, an

alliance between the Social Democrats, the Radical party, and the Convention of Republican Institutions] as well as a split within the FGDS. Besides showing that the PCF vote was holding steady, the May 1969 presidential elections registered the collapse of the Socialist candidate, thus confirming the absence, even on the electoral level, of any political perspective.

The leaders of the PCF and the "new" PS realized rather early that a situation marked both by their failure to offer any political alternative and by considerable working-class militancy involved a real danger of larger and larger strata of the working class turning toward revolutionary solutions to find a way out of the social crisis. The February 1972 demonstrations against the murder of the worker Pierre Overney at the gate of the Renault factory, called and led by the revolutionary far left, were a clear expression of this danger.

Thus both leaderships felt a need for getting together on a solution that could channel the discontent of the masses and their aspirations for a profound change into a reformist framework and in a way that would benefit them. Although for almost two years they exchanged pleasantries as well as frequently embittered polemics, suddenly, in less than three months, they reached an agreement to put their signatures to a "common program." So, in the first instance, the Union de la Gauche [Union of the Left, the PCF-PS coalition] and its joint program are an indirect consequence of May 1968. They represent the response of the reformist leaderships claiming to represent the working masses and the cause of socialism to the challenge of this development, their attempt to divert the rising mass movement of revolutionary struggle for the conquest of power into parliamentary channels and to keep it within the bounds of the capitalist system.

Two Goals in 'Union of the Left'

Before examining exactly what the

political bloc constituted by the Union de la Gauche consists of, it is worthwhile to specify the aims—which are different—of each of these two partners.

As for the PCF, in a sense, its objective represents the culmination of a policy initiated at the end of the war by the entry of Communist leaders into the bourgeois governments. At the time, the PCF leadership already revealed a Bernsteinian conception of advancing toward socialism by parliamentary paths, of a broadening of bourgeois democracy that was supposed to lead gradually to a socialist society. But after 1947 this was generally just a propaganda theme without any concrete basis, since the PS in this period did not have the slightest inclination to look for allies to its left. That is no longer the case today (further on we will see why), and so the PCF leadership, while continuing to distrust Mitterrand, is convinced that now it is only a question of time before its people get into the government. To see this you just have to listen to and watch Marchais. He has already taken the necessary lessons so that he can talk, behave, and dress in a manner suitable for a minister of the solidly bourgeois republic. His slogan at the recent PCF congress was "an open hand to all Frenchmen," except of course the far left, to whom this graduate of Thorez's old strong-arm squads showed his fist.

In the case of the PS, things are more complex. After taking control of this party shortly after the war, the Guy Mollet leadership for a long time followed a policy oriented toward the center. In the electoral arena, the PS lost ground constantly, and in 1968 Guy Mollet found himself totally discredited. After Defferre's lamentable failure in the May 1969 presidential elections (barely 5 percent of the vote), the PS had to find a path to salvation. A new PS was in formation, uniting the old SFIO and various groupings, including Mitterrand's. After various tedious episodes, Mitterrand was elevated to the leadership by a combination of the right wing of the old SFIO (Defferre and company) and a "left wing" formed around young technocrats.

Mitterrand pledged to rebuild a strong PS capable of dealing with the PCF on equal terms. In order to

achieve this, he broke completely with Guy Mollet's orientation of looking for allies on the right or at most playing a balancing game between rightist alliances and temporary agreements with the PCF. The new PS leader understood that after May 1968, the party could only make a comeback by turning to the left. So he broke with the Radical party, which had been almost literally bought by J.J. Servan-Schreiber, and sought an accord with the PCF on a basis that in practice was virtually identical with the program proposed by the latter.

On the trade-union level, the PS's old official relationships with Force Ouvrière [Labor Force, the anti-Communist trade union] were cut to a minimum to pave the way for quite close contacts with the CFDT [Confédération Française et Démocrate du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor, the old Catholic unions turned left]. It needs to be noted in order to understand Mitterrand's present orientation clearly, that his course fits in with a personal ambition of winning the presidency of the republic in 1976 at the end of Pompidou's term with the votes of the left (Socialists and Communists) and the center. But in order to engage in such an operation, he needs first to strengthen the PS and assure a success in the upcoming elections. Only the future can say whether or not Mitterrand will be able to pull off a tightrope act. But in the meantime as a result of his agreement with the PCF we are seeing a certain reinvigoration of the PS. The party is recruiting primarily new members who favor joint action with the PCF, and this will not fail to have consequences in the future whose effect cannot be foreseen at the moment.

A New Popular Front?

The common program of the Union de la Gauche is a moderate program of bourgeois reforms. It contains some very limited nationalizations, promises to certain disadvantaged categories of workers, a retirement age of sixty, etc. It does not propose abolishing the Gaullist constitution but only making some amendments. In content, there is no important difference between the Union de la Gauche program and that of the Popular Front, even though the recent version is more extensive than the one in 1936.

But between the Popular Front and the Union de la Gauche there are some very important differences on two essential points:

1. The Popular Front had as its sole objective "barring the road to fascism."

2. Along with the PCF and the PS, it included the Radical party, which at that time was *the main party of the French bourgeoisie*. The decline of this party had already set in but it still had the open support of an important wing of French capitalism, which in particular favored its participation in the Popular Front. This was both for reasons of international policy (that is, reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union as a counterweight to German imperialism, then on the ascendant under Hitler) as well as of economic policy (getting the French economy moving again at the end of the depression years by Keynesian-type measures).

The Union de la Gauche differs from the Popular Front on two points.

1. While recognizing that the common program does not contain any specifically socialist measures, the leaders of the PS as well as the PCF claim that this program, which is supposed to be realized within five years, will promote democracy and thus pave the way for socialism in the relatively short run.

This perspective of a gradual, parliamentary, electoralist development of bourgeois democracy culminating in a socialist society is, as we know, false and deceitful and is setting the stage for the worst kind of disillusionments. But is not without interest to note that these parties can only hope to obtain an electoral victory by offering the perspective of socialism in a relatively short period. This testifies to the ferment in the masses and to the possible implications, if not of a victory, at least of a major electoral success by the Union de la Gauche.

2. In contrast to the Popular Front, the Union de la Gauche does not have the support of any appreciable wing of French capitalism whatsoever, not even among those elements today that have no confidence in Gaullism or Pompidou. To those who raise the objection that Radical office-holders have associated themselves with the Union de la Gauche, it is easy to answer that these figures represent neither a political or a social force. They are individuals who were elected

with the help of Communist and Socialist votes, parasites, mendicants, who have no hope of getting reelected if they follow the orientation of the Radical party, that is, seeking to recreate a "third force." The Union de la Gauche therefore is an alliance of reformist parties solely and not an alliance between the reformists and any bourgeois party. From this standpoint, *the Union de la Gauche is not a new Popular Front.*

The attitude of the capitalist forces toward the Union de la Gauche is one of quite understandable hostility. We must, of course, discount what comes simply from electioneering. In view of the law in force, the results of the elections can depend on a shift to the right or left of half a million to a million voters. So the politicians are not going to turn up their noses at any "argument" that might influence a few thousand votes one way or the other. But the most astute bourgeois are telling Mitterrand: "Your party is numerically weak by comparison with the PCF, and times have changed since the Popular Front, when the Communists were a minority that could be controlled. We know that the Communist party is a reformist party, but its reformism is not *our* kind but the Kremlin's. Furthermore, under pressure as it is from the revolutionary movements, we don't know whether the PCF is able now to maintain its control over broad mobilizations as it still was in May 1968. Your Union de la Gauche operation is too risky."

Mitterrand's reply to this is that he is going to prove that he can change the relationship of forces between the PS and the PCF. And he can say, too, that de Gaulle himself was not afraid of appointing Communist ministers and that they did not carry out a "Prague coup" because France, unlike Czechoslovakia, does not lie in the Soviet sphere of influence.

What is understood but not said in this dialogue is that de Gaulle acted the way he did when he was facing several thousand armed partisans, most of them under the control of the PCF, and that he needed a Thorez in his cabinet in order to disarm them by invoking the need for "one police force, one army, and one state." In a similar situation a Pompidou would act like de Gaulle. But times have changed. We have seen, in Italy for example, that the bourgeoisie is not

prepared to bring the Communist party into the government unless forced to by a situation more than perilous for the survival of its system.

The Perspectives

The trend is now running strongly in favor of the left; the signs of this are increasing. But for those who can remember, it is apparent that we are not seeing a revival of anything like the kind of enthusiasm aroused by the Popular Front in 1935-36. The experience of those years, compounded by that of the immediate postwar period (Communist participation in the government) and of the Republican Front in 1956 (in which the PCF voted for "special powers" for the Algerian war), have left a mark on people's memories, have inspired reservations. Many parliamentary illusions have disappeared, and not only in the minds of those who have already opted for revolutionary solutions. But in the absence of an alternative leadership that can inspire confidence, the masses will vote for the Union de la Gauche and will do so in enormous numbers.

If the Union de la Gauche gets a majority, we will quickly find ourselves confronted with a major political crisis resulting from a conflict between the president of the republic and the new Assembly, since the constitution provides that the government appointed by the president must receive a vote of confidence from the Assembly. And Pompidou will not appoint a government that can get this. Such a conflict would almost immediately be taken outside the framework of the institutions of the Fifth Republic.

In my opinion, it is much more likely that the elections will result, on the one hand, in a considerable success for the Union de la Gauche (it would not be surprising if it more than doubled its seats in parliament) and, on the other hand, in serious changes within the majority. The UDR may lose a substantial amount of ground to its allies. In this case, there will not be an immediate constitutional conflict, since Pompidou will be able to shift the axis of his leadership within the majority. But the parliament will be unwieldy; and, above all, hesitations, uncertainties, and a certain paralysis of the government will ensue. People remember that by giving de Gaulle

only a very small majority the 1967 legislative elections brought on just such consequences, and thus speeded up the ripening of the May 1968 crisis.

Over the past year, the approach of the elections has made Pompidou vacillate in the face of the mass upsurge and the rise of the trend in favor of the Union de la Gauche. He had hoped to be able to carry out an effective maneuver in March 1972 by means of a referendum on the European Common Market. The PCF and the PS disagreed on this issue. The referendum was a failure. In an attempt to reverse the trend he replaced Premier Chaban-Delmas, whose reputation was besmirched by scandals, with Messmer, a retired Foreign Legion Lieutenant and former colonial governor. Messmer, one of de Gaulle's cronies, was to carry the general's banner to victory in the elections. With the unfavorable wind continuing to blow, a new turn has been made less than two months before the elections. In his speeches kicking off the campaign, Messmer is making promises that plagiarize the social program of the Union de la Gauche and even go further.

The outlook, then, is for a major success by the left and for a parliament without a working majority. Of course, this Assembly was not set up to play any role in the Fifth Republic. But, lacking a clear majority, it can block the functioning of the Bonapartist state machine. We can also, and above all, look forward to seeing a new thrust of the class struggle. It would be hazardous to predict the tempos and the breadth of this, but we can certainly count on the class struggle widening, becoming more acute, and rising toward higher levels. This is why the coming legislative elections will only give a static glimpse of the political relationships existing in the country—taking into account the distortions inherent in the parliamentary system under capitalism—but at the same time, by the context in which they take place and by their results, they will give a new impetus, a prod to the masses. And as a result they will open up new possibilities for the revolutionary Marxist vanguard.

Let me add a few words about the positions taken by the labor organizations and by the revolutionary movements. The CGT is giving total and unconditional backing to the Union

de la Gauche and the common program. After many oscillations, the CFDT has come out for a victory of the Union de la Gauche but does not align itself fully with the common program. Force Ouvrière has cited its "nonpolitical character" as a justification for taking no position, since it cannot endorse the alliance of the PS with the PCF when it itself has systematically rejected any unity in action with the CGT.

I have already said that the Maoists, spontanéists, and the like are expressing indifference to the elections; they will probably advocate abstention. The PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party], which has just lost members on its left and right and which has "purged" its ultralefts, has made criticisms of the common program paralleling those of the CFDT, criticisms that do not condemn the reformism of the program but seek to amend it. The party is running candidates in many districts. Rocard of the PSU wants the PS not to put up any candidates against them but the PCF is not going along with that. We still do not know the upshot of this horse-trading.

For several months the OCI-AJS [Organisation Communiste Internationaliste—Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme—Internationalist Communist Organization—Alliance of Youth for Socialism, the followers of Pierre Lambert] participated in discussions with the Ligue Communiste [Communist League, the French section of the Fourth International] and Lutte Ouvrière on dividing up the electoral districts so that in each constituency there would be only one candidate denouncing the Union de la Gauche's "parliamentary roads" to socialism and proposing the revolutionary road instead. (Each of the three organizations intended to put up seventy-five candidates.) Then, when an agreement seemed to have been reached, the OCI-AJS broke off the negotiations and announced that it would run only twenty candidates and that on the first round it would call for a vote for the candidates of the "recognized workers' organizations" (i.e., the PCF and the PS) and "in no case for the candidates of the Ligue Communiste or Lutte Ouvrière, who are crypto-Stalinist candidates pushed by the bourgeoisie!"

It is unlikely that participating in such long-drawn-out negotiations was

only a maneuver. For the time being we do not know the reasons for this about-face or why the Lambertists reduced their candidates from a hundred (which would have assured them television and radio time) to twenty, thereby depriving their campaign of all national impact. In any case, this kind of behavior has once again made it look as if they were trying to be just a group pressuring the big organizations and fighting the other revolutionary formations by the lowest means.

The Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvrière will each put up candidates in many constituencies. Thus, the revolutionary road to socialism will be defended in about half the electoral districts. In particular, almost all the working-class districts will be touched directly by the candidates of these two organizations.*

In the first round, the Ligue Communiste is calling for voting only for the revolutionary candidates and for abstaining where they are not on the

*Lutte Ouvrière declares itself in favor

ballot. In the second round, it will continue to denounce the program of the Union de la Gauche and its purported roads to socialism. But in order to enable the workers to learn by their own experience and not to put any obstacle in the way of this, the Ligue Communiste will call on its supporters, in accordance with the old tactic already set forth by Lenin in his *Left-Wing Communism*, to eliminate the candidates of the bourgeoisie by voting for the candidates—but not for the program—of the Union de la Gauche. In this way we will have counterposed our entire program to that of the bourgeoisie and of the Union de la Gauche and done the most that we can to promote a result that will open up a vast perspective for the development of the class struggle.

January 22, 1973

of the revolutionary road to socialism, but unfortunately the immediate program that it has worked out for this campaign has nothing transitional about it, but is made up of immediate demands, a fact which renders it reformist in content.

On the AJS-OCI Position

The Far Left and the Legislative Elections

By Henri Weber

[The following article appeared in the January 13 issue of *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste. It is the first installment of a series of articles that will deal with the views of various far-left organizations on the coming legislative elections. This article discusses the position of the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (Internationalist Communist Organization) and the Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme (Alliance of Youth for Socialism), both of Lambertist persuasion. *Rouge* describes these two groups as "the far right of the far left." The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The Lambertist position was neatly summed up in the "OCI Call" pub-

lished in issue No. 592 of *Informations Ouvrières*.

In the first round, the AJS-OCI urges, "Vote *only* for the workers' party or organization of your choice: the Socialist party, the Communist party, the OCI-AJS."

Since the AJS-OCI is running candidates in only 19 of the 490 districts, everywhere else the group calls for a *first-round vote* for the SP or the CP. So it is clear that in nearly 300 districts the Lambertists will vote for Stalinist or Social Democratic candidates against the revolutionary candidates run by the Ligue or by Lutte Ouvrière. Thus, in Marseille they will vote on the first round for Gaston Defferre rather than for our comrade Yves Salesses! This position reveals more than mere idiotic sectarianism. It shows that a new threshold of opportunism has been crossed. For

months we have spared no effort to get the AJS-OCI to participate in the far left's revolutionary campaign. A battle of denunciation of capitalism, this campaign is also aimed at fighting the reformist illusions spread by the SP and the CP in order eventually to prepare to outflank them.

By calling for a first-round vote for the CP-SP the AJS-OCI rejects this fight against reformism. Even though on the first round nearly 300 candidates claiming adherence to Trotskyism will be making a radical critique of the Union of the Left and its joint program, a critique based on the program and strategy of revolutionary Marxism, the AJS-OCI prefers to underwrite the reformist bureaucrats. In plain language, this is called capitulation.

What Government Can Satisfy the Demands of the Masses?

Slavish opportunism toward the SP and the CP oozes from every pore of the OCI call.

Thus, after having noted that "none of the elementary and basic demands of the proletariat and the youth, of the masses, are realizable under the decadent capitalist system . . .," the Lambertists dare to write:

"To the question, What government can satisfy their demands? there is but one answer: Only a government of the big workers' parties, a government set up by the SP and the CP, a government with no representative of the bourgeois parties."

So, according to the AJS, an SP-CP government could satisfy the "elementary and basic" demands of the proletariat—demands, moreover, that are incompatible with the capitalist system!

This is no longer opportunism; it is servility.

We say, in contrast to this, that an SP-CP government would be a reformist government, that is, a government of class collaboration, even a loyal administrator of capitalism. As such, it would have neither the means nor the intention of satisfying the "elementary and basic" demands of the workers. It could not even carry out a large number of the measures called for in the joint program. It is to convince the workers' vanguard of this



FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

that we are running in the legislative elections.

Obviously, if the Lambertists think that an SP-CP government constitutes a genuine workers' government desiring to, and capable of, satisfying the "elementary and basic" demands of the masses, then it is quite understandable that they should vote for the SP and the CP on the first round. But then it is no longer comprehensible why they are running even nineteen candidates!

Oh, If There Were No Left Radicals!

On the second round, the AJS calls for a vote for the SP or the CP, but not for the left Radicals. The Lambertists' big complaint against the Union of the Left is that the left Radicals came out for the joint program. That's their point of difference and their angle of attack. For weeks *Informations Ouvrières* has been urging the CP and SP leaderships to break with these spoilers who, by their presence alone, ruin every undertaking.

Ah, the Union of the Left would be so nice if it just got rid of the Radicals, the Lambertists say in essence. If the alliance were limited to just the CP and the SP, it would

almost be the workers' united front so dear to Trotsky. Not only could an SP-CP government satisfy the "elementary and basic" demands, it could even "change the conditions of life."

"Is it possible to change the conditions of life by linking up with the left Radicals?" asks *Informations Ouvrières*. "The answer without the slightest doubt is: No. The leaders of the SP and the CP will not 'change the conditions of life' by maintaining their alliance with the so-called left Radicals, defenders of the bourgeois order. 'To change the conditions of life'—that demands a break with all bourgeois parties and politicians, from the UDR to the Radicals, both the left and right wings."

The opportunism of this article is astounding. What the "OCI Call" says is that the SP and the CP should satisfy demands and "change the conditions of life" if only they would break with the left Radicals. This is a super-opportunist idealization of the SP and the CP. With or without the left Radicals these reformist parties will not satisfy "basic" demands and will not "change the conditions of life." *It is not in order to entice a few Radical deputies that the SP and the CP fail to challenge the institutions of the Fifth Republic or the Atlantic Alliance or the parliamentary road to socialism.* It is because they themselves are reformist, legalist, electoralist parties, degenerated to the core. This is the reason they can come to agreement with a handful of Radical party survivors.

What Concessions to the Radicals?

The Lambertist critique suggests that the SP and the CP have betrayed their proletarian programs by surrendering to the bourgeois program of the left Radicals. But, apart from the well-known fact that the SP and CP worked out the joint program together, *independently of the left Radicals, who signed it without changing a single comma*, this critique simply leaves out any hint of what the capitulation consists of. There is no basic difference between the joint program, the CP's program, and the SP's program. All three are reformist programs of class collaboration. The huge concessions to the Radicals that the Lambertists denounce are purely

imaginary. To the letter, they are present in the SP and CP programs.

It is absurd to determine one's attitude toward the Union of the Left on the basis of the presence or absence of anti-Schreiber Radicals. They are a marginal element that affects neither the class nature of the Union of the Left, nor the social dynamic that it expresses. *It is the CP's hegemony in the alliance that determines the class nature of the Union of the Left, with or without the Radicals.* All the factions of the big bourgeoisie see this clearly enough.

From its own standpoint, moreover, the OCI's virulent campaign against the left Radicals cuts two ways.

They are agents of the bourgeoisie, the Lambertists indignantly proclaim. Maurice Faure is a reactionary deputy, active in every bourgeois political combination; Fabre is a worthy successor to Daladier; Filippi is a banker; Lamirault is director general of the Alfa Romeo . . . But then why does the AJS-OCI call for a vote for the SP? Do the Lambertists think there are fewer bankers, corporation presidents, administrators, and high functionaries in the SP than among the left Radicals? Is Deferre any less a "bourgeois politician" than Fabre and Faure? And Mitterrand? Has Stéphane Just forgotten the time when he wrote: "The SP is today led by Mitterrand, whose political origins and functions are those of a political agent of the bourgeoisie and who, eventually, will lead the Socialist party to its destruction as a workers' party"?* Has he forgotten that to bar Mitterrand's way — unsuccessfully — the OCI went so far as to send cadres into the SP, in alliance with Guy Mollet's hardened clique? "Because," Just said, "we have an interest in seeing the workers' organizations preserve their class character against the bourgeoisie . . .!!"

So what is the meaning of the OCI's main slogan: "An SP-CP government without ministers representing the interests of big capital"? Does this mean "an SP-CP government without Mitterrand, Deferre, and company"? Or maybe that Mitterrand, Deferre, and the rest no longer represent the interests of capital?

*Stéphane Just: "Le gouvernement ouvrier et paysan."

The Lambertist position may seem absurd. In fact, it is much less so than it first appears to be. Their obsessive fixation on the left Radicals has in fact a hidden, basic function. It is an excuse for profound opportunism toward the SP and CP. It hides a real capitulation to the bureaucratic apparatuses of the workers' move-

ment, whom they urge to remain deaf to the songs of the Radical sirens and faithful to their proletarian character. In so doing, the Lambertists sow illusions among the working class. They participate in the reformist mystification operation. We bet the bureaucrats will show them no gratitude for it. □

Irish Actions Mark 'Bloody Sunday'

Demonstrations in U.S. and Canada



Despite rain, marchers turned out in Philadelphia to mark first anniversary of British massacre of Irish civil rights demonstrators.

Spirited demonstrations in several cities in the United States and Canada marked the first anniversary of Northern Ireland's "Bloody Sunday," the day (January 30, 1971) when British paratroopers gunned down thirteen civil-rights marchers on the streets of the Catholic ghetto of Derry.

In temperatures in the low forties and a constant downpour, more than 100 persons marched January 27 to the British Overseas Airlines Corporation offices in Philadelphia, and more than 500 to the BOAC office in New York. Both demonstrations marked an upturn in the movement to protest British repression in Ireland.

In New York the demonstration rep-

resented a very wide spectrum of political opinion. Among the organizations participating were the American Committee for Ulster Justice; the Irish Anti-Internment Coalition; the Con Edison Emerald Society, the Irish club for workers in the New York City electrical utility; the Irish Republican Clubs, the American supporters of the Official Irish republican movement; the National Association for Irish Freedom, the American affiliate of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association; the New York Bartenders and Waitresses for Irish Freedom; Northern Aid, the U.S. supporters of the Provisional Irish republican movement; and the Socialist Workers party

and other left groups. The action was also endorsed by the Gaelic Athletic Association and the United Irish Counties Association.

The New York march continued the trend toward unity set during the demonstrations against the visiting Dublin premier, Jack Lynch, earlier in the month. An important factor in



This march in Los Angeles was one of many held in the U. S.

the success of this action, and of the previous one protesting Lynch's anti-democratic laws, was the willingness of both Northern Aid and the Irish Republican Clubs to work together in united-front activity against the repression in Ireland.

In Philadelphia, the Northern Aid organization refused to participate in a united march. The demonstration was sponsored by the Irish Republican Clubs and supported by the Socialist Workers party, as well as by a fairly broad spectrum of independent personalities. Under the circumstances, the turnout indicates that there is a perspective for building significant united-front actions in Philadelphia against the repression in Ireland.

In Boston, 120 persons attended a commemoration of the Derry Massacre organized by the Militant Labor Forum. Liam Deeny, the leader of the local Northern Aid Committee, spoke, along with several other spokespersons for the movement against repres-

sion in Ireland and a representative of the Socialist Workers party.

In Los Angeles, a new coalition against the repression in Ireland, the Friends of Irish Freedom, organized a demonstration of about fifty people at the BOAC terminal. The groups participating included the Irish Republican Clubs, Northern Aid, and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association.

The main slogans raised in the American demonstrations called for

'When We May Be Proud of Our People'

United Irish March in New York

By John Breheny

[The following article is from the February 3 issue of *The Irish People*, the weekly paper of Irish Northern Aid, the American support group of the Provisional republican movement.]

* * *

Despite a cold, driving rain last Saturday afternoon, over 500 marchers from a dozen Irish organizations took part in New York's initial observance of the first anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Derry.

At 1:30 P.M., headed by the Iona College Pipe Band, the marchers, many wearing black armbands, left Columbus Circle, where they had assembled, and proceeded crosstown to Fifth Ave. and down Fifth Ave. to 44th St., where they massed in front of BOAC [British Overseas Airways Corporation]. Thirteen crosses, each bearing the name of a person slain by British paratroops in Derry on Jan. 30, 1972, were ranged in front of the British offices.

After a short prayer, speakers from each of the participating organizations briefly addressed the gathering.

Enthusiastic applause repeatedly interrupted the speakers, culminating in an almost continuous ovation when Ken Tierney arose to speak as a member of Irish Northern Aid. In a brief but moving address that was at the same time his farewell before returning with the rest of the "Fort Worth Five" to prison in Texas on Monday morning, he vowed that the fight would go on here and in Ireland until

an end to repression in all of Ireland, withdrawal of British troops, and an end to persecution of supporters of Irish freedom by the U. S. government.

In Toronto, Canada, about 100 persons marched to the British Government Office to demand an end to the concentration camp system in Northern Ireland, and the withdrawal of British troops. The Irish Republican Clubs and the League for Socialist Action (the Canadian section of the Fourth International) participated. □

a united, free, and Gaelic Ireland was ours.

The beautiful commemorative ballad "The Thirtieth of Derry" was sung for the assemblage by its composer, Pete Kelly.

For this reporter as for all present it was a proud and thrilling moment with the poignant song for Derry's dead echoing from Fifth Ave.'s tall buildings to gaze over the unbelievably large turnout of people standing silently in the drenching downpour. Carrying on in the spirit of the newly forged unity of purpose of N. Y. Irish groups ranging from left to center to right, first displayed so magnificently in the recent picketing of Jack Lynch, the Irish Community turned out; old people, children, nuns, working men, college students—they were all there.

I saw one old man aged perhaps seventy-five standing hatless in the downpour trembling with cold and striving with lips turned blue to join the singing of the chorus. Beside him a string of children holding placards bearing photograph's of Derry's thirteen martyrs. I learned they had stayed up the night before making them, and sodden as they now had become, the solemn youngsters still proudly held them high.

There are times when we Irish may legitimately be proud of our people and this was one of them. It bodes ill for England's occupation of Ireland—and well for Ireland's present struggle for freedom. □

The Debate on Women's Liberation at the Ard Fheis

By Gerry Foley

Two debates at the Official republican convention in Dublin December 16-17 illustrated the political strengths and weaknesses of the movement as it takes up the task of trying to form a mass revolutionary party in Ireland.

The discussion on the women's liberation resolution showed substantial progress from populist, economic clichés toward a critical, dialectical analysis of a key social issue. The discussion on the cultural resolutions, on the other hand, revealed that some conceptions of Marxism in the Official republican movement are still quite superficial and romantic.

In the 1971 convention, or *ard fheis*, most of those who spoke on the women's liberation resolution were still dominated by economic schemas. They were evidently nervous about raising specifically women's demands, preferring to view the female sex simply as a disadvantaged part of the working class with special economic interests. At the same time, the pressure of Catholic moral indoctrination was quite apparent. There was obvious uneasiness about the demand for legalizing contraception, which, like divorce and abortion, is banned in the South, where Roman Catholic teachings on the family and on morality have been written into the constitution.

No one was willing to speak against the right of contraception—that would have been in contradiction to the republican movement's historic principle of neutrality in religious questions. But many demagogic arguments were raised against pressing the demand for an end to clericalist moral legislation. This was no time, some said, to make a big fuss over the unimportant and rather scandalous subject of contraception when people were being shot in the North and the workers in the South were suffering unemployment, bad conditions, etc. One person, who was perhaps a consistent workerist (that is, an advocate of a one-sided and static economic inter-

pretation of political and social issues), claimed that the answer to the problem of contraception was building two-bedroom bungalows. This argument, it seemed, was not propounded too seriously. But it would be a logical conclusion from the kind of strict economic, "class" approach that has been popular in some quarters of the republican movement.

Obviously in the 1971 *ard fheis*, the question of the right of abortion could not even be raised.

This year, however, the discussion on women's liberation was serious and thoughtful, and it ruled out demagoguery of any kind. The republican women's liberation activists were clearly well on the way to challenging not only the dogmas of the Catholic church but of vulgar "Marxism" as well. The preamble to the resolution said:

"Recognising that both men and women are oppressed by the capitalist system, we believe that women are conditioned in a particular way to accept a secondary and submissive role in society and that this conditioning has led them to accept inequality of education, law, wages and opportunity. We believe that the special function of women in child-bearing has been exploited by the capitalist state as a means of oppressing women, in that they are forced to bear the full responsibility of rearing children without adequate and guaranteed support or protection for the vital work that they do.

"Recognising also that in a State in which the moral code of a particular Church is enforced by law, women are denied the right to control their own bodies and ultimate destiny. We believe that if we are to produce generations of free and conscious citizens both parents must share full responsibility in all aspects of their children's life from birth; the community must implement their responsibility for the welfare of all children."

Although this preamble does project the idea of some sort of ideal

family life, the call for the right of women to control their own bodies is in fundamental contradiction to the Catholic conception of sexual morality and the family, which offers celibacy as the only alternative to patiently accepting the consequences of "natural law," meaning as many births as fertility permits. The right of abortion also follows from the right of women to control their own bodies, although none of the speakers explicitly drew this conclusion.

If the Official republicans follow the principles set forth in this preamble, they cannot help running up against the institution of the family itself. They will have to examine its real social role and origins. The concept of the family evolving to meet certain demands of class society is in direct contradiction not only to traditional Catholicism but to the moralistic populism characteristic of Catholics moving to the left. Accepting an evolutionary, materialistic approach to this question means crossing the last frontier from metaphysics to Marxism.

Furthermore, an attack on the traditional conceptions of family life and the relations between the sexes will bring the Official republicans into conflict not only with the vestiges of their Catholic education and the reactionary institutions and attitudes of Irish Catholic society, but also directly with the Southern state, whose historical, social, and ideological roots are in the Catholic middle class and the clerical machine.

The Southern government has proved willing to drop Article 44 of the Free State constitution, which gave recognition to the Catholic church as the "guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens." It had to make a gesture to defend itself against the charge of being clerically dominated. But there is little indication that it is willing to drop the much more important Article 41 on the family. The backhanded support of the decisive sectors of the hier-

archy for repealing Article 44 seemed motivated in fact by the hope that sacrificing a purely formal recognition of the church's position would divert attention from the following provisions of Article 41:

1.

1. The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.

2. The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State.

2.

1. In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.

2. The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home.

3.

1. The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.

2. No law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage.

3. No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of any other state but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time being in force within the jurisdiction of the Government and Parliament established by this Constitution shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction during the lifetime of the other party to the marriage so dissolved.

Because of the religious underpinnings of both Irish states, the women's liberation issue has direct implications for the struggle for a united Ireland. In fact, the present feminist currents in Ireland seem to have been given their initial push by the development of the crisis in the North.

When the explosion of communal warfare in 1969 once again raised the question of national unity and reform of the two religion-based Irish states, the Dublin government became acutely sensitive to charges of clerical domination. Since it is in the area of morals and the family that the church's power is manifested most clearly and is most resented, virtually every women's liberation demand strikes at the concrete influence of Catholicism as an institution and as a philosophy. In the Irish context, more-

over, such demands tend to have a general antireligious thrust. Despite the fact that the proimperialist Unionist leaders in the North have been quick to denounce reactionary Southern morals legislation, the Protestant churches also hold far more backward views on these questions, in general, than other such bodies in the rest of the English-speaking world.

A strong women's liberation movement in the South could serve as the cutting edge for the demands that arise naturally from the Northern crisis for secularizing Irish society. Some attempts to do this were made in 1970. They seem to have failed, among other reasons because the Official women's liberation activists and their allies did not have a perspective of mass organizing. They did not try to organize large united-front actions around one or two clear central slogans that could reach out and involve or touch masses of women. They did not apply the principle of the Northern Ireland civil-rights movement to women's liberation. Instead, they occupied themselves with small, militant, spectacular actions.

Of course, the Republican movement was in a difficult position at the time to give political leadership to mass, united women's liberation organizations because it was still trying to confine these issues into a "working-class," that is, narrowly economic, framework. Some progress seems to have been made in solving that problem. What is far from clear is how much progress the Official republican movement has made in overcoming its fixation on small, symbolic demonstrations—which are really just a translation of guerrillaism into politics—and how far it has moved toward a clear mass orientation. This is a problem, of course, that affects the work of the republican movement in other areas. Unless the republicans are able to solve it, they will not be able to meet the challenge of repression in the North and the South, and the very survival of the organization will be put in question.

On the other hand, the women's liberation discussion offered some important tools for solving the general political problems of the movement. This was the only debate in which the concept of an abstract unity of all the oppressed and exploited was

openly challenged on the floor. This vague, idealized notion of unity, borrowed from Stalinist sources and from the commonplaces of new-left populism, has been more or less sacrosanct up till now.

Mairín de Burca, Official Sinn Féin's main leader on women's liberation, argued that women must organize to fight against their own specific oppression and that, at least initially, this fight must be waged against another stratum of the oppressed population, working-class men. She pointed out quite clearly—apparently as a result of bitter experience—that those who say that women must not alienate men but first seek unity on issues that unite both sexes are simply using a demagogic argument against any militant struggle for the specific demands of women. (The effect of this argument, in fact, is to divert struggle into harmless liberal channels, into a campaign of education and social enlightenment.) De Burca made a comparison with the civil-rights struggle in the North, in which, she said, the Catholics had to begin the fight because they were the most oppressed. It was not true, she said, that Protestant workers had exactly the same interest as Catholic workers. The same was true of male and female workers.

It was unfortunate that in the other debates de Burca did not carry this analogy further and explain how the call for not antagonizing the Protestants no matter what the cost has promoted the demobilization of the mass movement in the North, leading to a deterioration in the general situation and increasing the isolation of the Official republican movement.

If de Burca had applied the same method to analyzing the main political questions before the *ard fheis*, she could have made women's liberation a central issue in the movement and given a tremendous stimulus to dialectical thinking. This would have been a major contribution toward lifting her organization out of the rut that has blocked it from taking leadership in constructing a decisive mass movement in Ireland.

At the same time, it would have been helpful if de Burca had stressed that the call for women to organize and fight against their particular oppression is a call for *unity in struggle*, as opposed to the abstract, all-embrac-

ing, passive kind of unity touted by the Stalinoids, new-left populists, and workerists. The failure to make such an analysis, in fact, was the greatest default in the women's liberation discussion.

Although a whole series of demands were raised, there was no indication of any concrete activity or campaign on which the work of the Official republican movement would be focused.

In the absence of any perspective of mass work, the edge of the women's liberation resolution seemed to be pointed inward, toward changing the attitudes of people in the movement, rather than against the society that engenders these attitudes and the oppression of women in general. This kind of focus could prove really di-

visive and demobilizing rather than provide the basis for a struggle that would begin by uniting the victims of a concrete form of oppression, and then open a breach in capitalist society for bringing larger and larger strata into the fight against a system that degrades all human values and aspirations.

For all its weaknesses, however, the women's liberation discussion was rich and full of promise. De Burca's rigorously critical attitude to a number of pious "left" generalities was particularly encouraging. In contrast, the discussion on culture was so rhetorical that it seemed destined to discredit any analysis of the Irish national tradition and the language question in particular.

[To be continued.]

Local Strikes Oppose Antilabor Move

British Engineers Union Hit by Huge Fines

By Alf Jennings and Bob Williams

[The following article is reprinted from the January 20 issue of *The Red Mole*, paper of the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

On the 7 December, the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) was fined 50,000 pounds by the National Industrial Relations Court for refusing to obey previous NIRC orders. A Mr. James Goad, a quality-inspector at CAV's, Sudbury, had successfully managed to get the NIRC to declare him a member of the AUEW, against the wishes of the local branch and had ordered the branch to admit him to its meetings.* The fine has sparked off massive strikes by AUEW members all over the country. These actions are continuing, the latest being planned for Merseyside on 19 January.

*James Goad, a fifty-three-year-old former Baptist evangelist, was disciplined by the AUEW for going to work during a strike in 1967. Rather than accept the local's decision, Goad let his membership in the union lapse for nonpayment of dues. In 1971, Goad applied for readmission to the AUEW but was rejected. He challenged the union's decision in the National Industrial Relations Court, which ordered his reinstatement. — IP

This struggle is extremely important. It is a struggle to defend the AUEW, but it is also the second great upsurge of workers against the Act, and a test of the Scanlon leadership's policy for fighting the Act.

At the very moment when the strike wave successfully freed the five [for a report on the jailing last summer of five dockers' leaders and their release after serious strike action, see "Dockers Touch Off Biggest Crisis Since 1926," *Intercontinental Press*, September 24, 1972], the House of Lords changed the law in order to prevent such a confrontation being repeated. Their decision that the union, rather than the individual steward, was liable in law was an attempt to get back to the original aim of forcing the trade union leaders to discipline their own members.

The Government placed its hopes on a prediction of how the trade union leaders would behave when faced with the choice between leading a struggle to bring down a piece of legislation passed by Parliament (and therefore most likely the Government, too) and turning their guns on their own members. Jack Jones proved the Government right, reluctantly paying the fines while making every effort to get the dockers to call off the struggle. Following that, the TUC has allowed unions to attend the Court to defend themselves, thus capitulating in practice to the authority of the Act.

Scanlon and the AUEW leadership,

however, have stuck to the old line of the TUC: 'no recognition'. Of course they have been right not to attend the Court, but this only has meaning if they are prepared to mobilise against the Act.

The Goad case boiled up in October. The first fine made on the AUEW was on 8 November: 5,000 pounds for not appearing in court to defend itself. The Court ruled that Goad was a member of the union and that the Sudbury branch could not refuse him admission to its meetings. When he was excluded on December 1st, the NIRC then imposed a 50,000 pound fine for contempt of its ruling.

From December 7 onwards, district organisations of the AUEW all over the country took the initiative in calling local strikes. These strikes were very solid. On Monday 18 December for example, thousands of engineers in London, Oxford and Sheffield struck, and on the Wednesday, engineers in Hull, Merseyside and Manchester came out. In London and Liverpool, dockers and other workers struck in solidarity. At the same time, resolutions were passed in many areas calling strikes for various days in January. On the 1st January, 13,000 men came out in Leeds, on the 5th 13,000 in Swansea, on the 8th 20,000 in North Wales and 10,000 on Tyneside. Merseyside is planning to take a further step by calling an area general strike on the 19th.

This impressive series of strikes was marred, however, by its fragmentation. This flowed from the lack of any commonly understood policy among those taking action. This became painfully clear in the case of one of the most militant centres of working class struggle: Glasgow. Here, the district leadership had called a strike for the 18th, but then reversed its decision because it felt that local stoppages were not going to give results, and called on the Executive to organise a national stoppage instead. Several areas passed similar resolutions. Most surprising of all is the case of the Sudbury men themselves. They struck on the 11th, thus taking the initiative nationally. But just as the other areas were responding and getting their one-day stoppages organised, Sudbury voted to return to work on the 15th.

This reflects not so much the work of the organised right wing in the union, but a lack of a clear line from the leadership and therefore confusion and uncertainty. Of course, the right wing were organising. In Coventry, many workers voted against strikes and for a change of union policy. Nevertheless, it is only since the first wave of strikes that the right wing in the union have felt able to step up their offensive and change the course of events, catching hold of criticisms of the leadership and partial demoralisation and turning them against the struggle.

The cause of the confusion and disorganisation was the paralysis of the AUEW

leadership. What has just taken place is a tragic example of the useless line of non-recognition. The leadership was faced with a choice between leading a struggle against the Act and the Government or being fined. The response up until the imposition of the fine on 7 December was to hope that the Court could be prevented from collecting the money from the Bank. But the Court had overruled the distinction between 'protected' and 'unprotected' funds. When Hill Samuel, the union's bankers, paid up, the AUEW sacked them. But this was really little more than a demagogic move. They hoped Goad would be discouraged from trying to attend the Branch meeting at Sudbury on December 1st. Unfortunately he tried to attend; hence the 50,000-pound fine.

Throughout this period, the leadership refused to attend the Court or to pay the fine. But it did absolutely nothing to prepare the AUEW membership or the rest of the working class for a struggle against the Act. It refused to recall its NC to change its policy, but it made no plans for action. The first fine went by without any hint of preparation for a battle.

After the second fine, Scanlon felt forced to take a public position. He was busy with metaphysics at this time. No, he wasn't disobeying the law of the land. He was defending the constitution of the union. Then on 10 December, Scanlon called on the membership to 'defend the policy of the union'.

But what *was* the policy of the union? This was never made clear and led to the fragmentation. Was the policy to initiate a struggle to bring down the Act? Or was it to make some localised gestures of protest against the fines and nothing more? Or was it to bring pressure to bear on the government via expensive strikes hitting a crucial sector of the economy? Nothing was made clear. The membership was left in the dark.

Throughout this entire experience, Scanlon has acted as a trade union bureaucrat. Rather than give a strategic line for the working class, he tried simply to defend the narrow corporate interests of his own union. His own position was indistinguishable from most other EC members. He therefore took the position that he was neither for nor against strikes. Neither forward or back. But once the money had been taken by the Court, what other issue was there left but the Act itself?

Even before the Goad case blew up, Scanlon was only 'left' in the sense that he had not shuffled to the right like the rest. He had not moved away from a position that was useless anyway: non-recognition. But part of the confusion among the rank and file was caused by their looking to *him especially* for a lead. After all, he had called one-day strikes against the Industrial Relations Bill before it became law. The Communist Party also gives Scanlon much support, refusing to criticise him even when he behaves in the same way as other bureaucrats, as he

did during the Ford strike of 1971 for example.

The revolutionary left has been warning against an uncritical attitude to Scanlon for a long time. His rhetoric about 'shop floor power' and leaving everything up to the democratic initiatives of the rank and file sounds very nice. But this was all very well in the sixties when the tactic of local bargaining made sense because unemployment was low and the national attacks on the unions were only just starting under Labour. But in the engineering dispute of last year, leaving everything to local initiatives was just a get-out for the leadership, and it led to disaster. The Goad dispute is the same. When national leadership is needed, it is left to the localities to take uncoordinated and sporadic action with no clearly defined policy.

The Communist Party refuses to point out these simple truths. For example, once it became clear that the leadership had no plan of action whatever, the CP tried to cover up this inactivity. The editorial of the *Morning Star*, following the EC meeting of the 19 December at which resolutions for national action were not even discussed, said that the workers were 'making it clear that the Industrial Relations Act will cost the employers far more in lost profits than opposition to it will cost the unions in fines.' This is a very dangerous rationalisation. The engineering employers are not going to put pressure on the Government to 'retreat'.

The CP line implicitly reduces the struggle to the issue of the *fines*, against which only protest is possible, rather than the Act. It is not, for the ruling class, a matter of short-term cost, but a question of how to achieve the long-term aim of defeating the opposition of the unions to the Act. The CP were throwing their weight behind localised initiatives which inevitably lead to demoralization if no national focus is created.

Instead of proposing extending the existing struggle through a rank-and-file lead, they urged 'the EC to bring pressure to bear on the TUC General Council to call for a one-day stoppage as a signal to a serious campaign to get rid of the I.R. Act and the Tory Government . . .' (*Morning Star*, January 2, 1973.) In other words the AUEW EC was right not to call any action and should call on the TUC. Vic Feather should then call a one-day stoppage which would be the signal for a 'serious campaign.' In the meantime, continue the protest strikes indefinitely and hope that the TUC can be won back to a 'left' position at some time in the future.

This attitude on the part of the CP urgently raises for militants the question of what its basic strategy is.

The basic strategy of the Communist Party in the fight against the Act has been twofold. It has said that it is necessary to struggle now against the Act, using the industrial strength of the working class. Secondly it has argued that there must be a simultaneous fight inside the Labour movement to get 'left' policies

adopted and to replace the right wing in the TUC General Council and the Labour Party leadership with 'left' leaders like Scanlon.

But the Goad case (and many other incidents in the past) has brought to light a problem: this 'twofold' policy turns out to be *two alternative policies*: one—that of the militants, who put first the urgent needs of the workers to smash the industrial relations Act: those who vacillate on that must be replaced by leaders who will stand firm, even if the ditherers happen to be the official union leader and if they happen to have a reputation as 'lefts' on the General Council.

And the other possible policy—that of the CP leadership—is to give first place to unity with Scanlon and the official leadership, even when it means allowing militants to be caught off their guard by the bureaucracy's total lack of preparation for a struggle.

The CP leadership tries to argue that those who want to publicly criticise Scanlon are splitters, people who want to break the unity of the working class. In fact, the very opposite is the case. If it was proposed to *exclude* bureaucrats from the struggle on the basis of their past mistakes or failings, that would indeed be a splitting policy.

But what has been at stake is not an attempt to *exclude* Scanlon and the official leadership from *participation* in the struggle against the fines and the Act. The real issue for militants has been whether the *development* of that struggle should take second place to the CP leadership's desire to unite with the official leadership. For the consequences of *that* unity with the official leadership has been to allow the leadership to fragment the unity in struggle of the engineering workers. For the fact cannot be hidden that the response of the engineering workers so far has been disunited, without a clear lead of any kind.

Of course, the CP leadership does not clearly and unambiguously endorse every move that Scanlon makes. Instead it operates a tactic toward the trade union bureaucracy similar to the tactic that the trade union bureaucracy takes towards the Act. Scanlon tries to avoid the issue of a fight with the NIRC and the Act. The CP leadership tries to avoid the issue of a fight against the Scanlon leadership for an alternative leadership.

But in both cases, in the end, avoidance means *acceptance*. Because the CP has avoided the task of spelling out the crippling weaknesses of the Scanlon leadership in the past, the militants were forced by the CP to accept the fragmentation which the executive's policy produced. The CP refused to build an alternative centre that could guide the engineering workers' upsurge and broaden the struggle throughout the working class.

At first sight it is difficult to grasp why the CP refuses to present a clear-cut alternative to the politics of the trade union bureaucracy. It would be tempting to say

that Gollan has simply made a tactical mistake, that he has misjudged Scanlon and will put things right next time. But in fact such 'tactical mistakes' have taken place time and again over the last years in such a way that they quite clearly form a consistent pattern—a strategy. And when we look at the basic strategy and programme of the Communist Party we can see that the leadership's refusal to break with the Scanlons of the labour movement is based on a fundamental *political agreement* on aims and methods in the class struggle.

Both the trade union 'lefts' and the CP leaders want to fight for socialism. But they believe that the struggle for socialism can be victorious under the leadership of the Labour Party provided only that control of the Labour Party falls into the hands of the left-wing, which in turn allies itself with the CP.

The meaning of such a strategy is that it is possible to use the Parliamentary system to introduce socialism: in other words, there is no need to aim for the smashing of the institutions of capitalist rule: all that needs to be done is to change the personnel and put *pressure* on these institutions in order for the working class to achieve its aims. The mass movement is necessary, but only in order to exert pressure along a path of gradual change towards socialism. There is no place within such a strategy for the idea that the working class must organise its struggle on the basis of complete independence, on the basis of a complete refusal to trust in forces tied in any way to the preservation of capitalism.

The CP leadership denies a truth shown repeatedly in the class struggle: that the working class can and must *use* forces like the trade union bureaucracy, parliament etc., but for *its own purposes*, and it must never *depend* on them in order to achieve its goals. Instead the militants must continually bear in mind that one day, in order to carry the mass struggle even one inch further forward, such forces which are dependent in one way or another on the maintenance of the capitalist order must be pushed aside and defeated.

In the struggle of the engineering workers against the Industrial Relations Act it is urgently necessary to free the membership from reliance on the old policies and leadership in order to unite the movement and carry it further forward. The policy of the Executive of telling members to 'do their own thing' in each locality must be replaced by *national strike action*. Pressure must be stepped up on the executive to adopt such a policy.

But at the same time every effort must be made to establish national links at a rank-and-file level so that the fate of the struggle against the Act does not depend entirely on change of line by the executive. Pressure must be stepped up for solidarity from other unions in the common fight against the Act, but at the same time every effort must be made to establish such unity at a rank-and-file level.

The protest strikes must be supported but a battle must be started to change the aim of the movement from that of protesting the fine to forcing an end to the Act, though that means taking on the government in a showdown, and to the

other instruments of class rule. Only such a fighting policy will guarantee a victorious struggle against the Act. And such a policy involves breaking from the tactics and strategy of the Communist Party leadership.

For a Socialist Chile

An Open Letter to the Candidates

[The following open letter appeared in the January 11 issue of the Chilean newspaper *La Aurora de Chile*. The left-socialist newspaper, which first appeared during last October's crisis provoked by the "capitalist strike," has been under pressure from the official bureaucracy of the Socialist party to cease publication.

[The letter is addressed to candidates in the elections scheduled for next March. The translation is by *Inter-continental Press*.]

* * *

We can see you coming. You are coming to our settlements, our unions, and our industrial belts to ask us to vote for you. We, the urban and rural poor, we the slum dwellers, we who are illiterate, we who live in shanties buried by snow in the winter, we women whose teeth have fallen out by the age of twenty, we who have for centuries been left without anything, we will have to vote for some of you.

Yes, we'll vote for some of you. Others we won't vote for. We won't vote for the candidate who kept us waiting for hours when we wanted to discuss the problem of water in our shantytown or for the one who refused to meet with us. We will not vote for the candidate who failed to come to our aid that night in the police station when one of our compañeros was jailed for taking part in an occupation. We will not vote for the candidate who abandoned us when we barricaded ourselves in the factory to prevent it from being returned to some parasite. We will not vote for anyone who did not take part in our struggles. We will not vote for any candidate who defends the bosses, the big landowners, speculators, or saboteurs.

Such candidates we will not vote for and *we do not want them coming into our shantytowns* with their prattle about a democracy that we have never known and a freedom that was never ours. We do not want to see in our shantytowns the grandsons and great-grandsons of those who mowed us down in La Coruña and Santa María de Iquique, those who finance their education in Europe from our toil and sweat, those who gave us bullets when we asked for bread, and bullets when we demanded justice.

We know that this election is not like other elections. We know that this country, which is experiencing upheavals and sabotage, and which finds itself under attack, has split into two irreconcilably opposed factions that cannot go on coexisting with each other. We know that either Chile's poor will do away with Chile's rich, or Chile's rich will resort to assassination at gunpoint in an attempt to hold back the inevitable process. And we do not want to go back to submitting to the rich. To prevent this, we must throw them out of the Congress, throw them out of the courts, throw them out of the federal control office, and wipe them off the face of the land so that they cannot make a comeback and cause us harm.

To prevent this, it is important that we fill the Congress with our own people. For if we don't, all kinds of things could happen to us. How the hatred of those parasites, the owners of expropriated, intervened, or requisitioned properties, would be incited against us! How they would attempt to block every order to requisition or intervene their property! How they would bog us down with precautionary measures! How they would stand in the way of land expropriations! How they would defend the big land-

owners, the bosses, and the speculators! How fast they would return ALMAC [a supermarket chain] to its owners! How they would slash budgets!

To prevent this, we must throw them out before they throw us out.

We saw what they did in October. They left us without transportation, and we had to walk long distances to reach the factories and take off the locks that they had put on. They shut down their businesses, and we had to accompany the trucks on their rounds in order to prevent them from sabotaging food deliveries. We saw them in October, making threats, throwing bent nails on Chile's roads, and starting fires in our plants. We saw them and we know that we must get rid of them — right now!

We have to stop them. We have to stop them before they stop us, the way they did in Ranquil, in El Salvador, in Pampa Irigoin.

We must finish them for good, and we need to have people of our own in Congress who are prepared to do this. We do not want people in Congress who will be conciliatory; we do not want people in Congress who will appease them; we do not want people in Congress who will stop interventions, who protect striking public employees, who make back-room deals, and who do not understand that this is a desperate struggle for survival between two classes, with no possibility of their reaching any mutual understanding.

No understanding between these classes is possible. There is no possibility of agreement between them, the rich, and us, the urban and rural poor. We want all the factories. We want all the land. We want complete charge of the distribution of goods. We want to orient production to meet the needs of the poor. We want a plan for development that we ourselves draw up—a plan that determines prices, investments, savings, wages, and profit margins. We want to control public health. We want to control education.

We want power. We want all the power.

If we are to accomplish this, they will have to be removed from Congress. Only in this way can we get rid of this maze of laws, regulations, and decrees under which we are suffocating and that are preventing us

from curbing economic crimes, from bringing a hoarder before a community tribunal for punishment, from using the funds of A to cover the costs of B, from kicking a supervisor responsible for sabotage out of a plant, from financing health resorts through the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores — Workers Central Union], and from paring down the millions taken in by the privileged layers of the old regime.

We know that it's going to be a hard fight. But not any harder than the one we fought before in the golden epoch of private property—that time when they could gun us down, when they could herd us like cattle onto a ship and exile us, when we used to live an underground existence, sleeping in a different place every night, when we had not yet discovered that there are millions of us, that we are strong, and that we are united.

It's going to be a hard fight, but we are not going to compromise. We do not want kind-hearted peacemakers in this struggle for the survival of our class. *We do not want politicians who call for unity* in terms like: "Don't take over all the factories; respect the rules; disband your demonstrations; let the striking engineers back in; let the striking managers back in; return the ALMAC; don't provoke the bureaucrats in Public Administration." *We do not want politicians like this.* We do not want them involved in our mass fronts. And we will not vote for them.

We know where we can go if we follow this path. We saw what these politicians did in October, and we know where the path we want to follow will lead. But, they ask, aren't you afraid of the violence of another Coruña? Of more bullets? Of an underground existence? Of confrontations? For years we have had Coruñas, bullets, clandestinity, and confrontations. Nothing new that Chile's rich can come up with will terrorize us.

We know how far we can go, and we are ready, if necessary. We are not overjoyed at the prospect, because we are gentle people who prefer peace in which to live and produce—but we are ready, if necessary.

We are ready, and we want our candidates to be ready too. We want to see them in our public meetings

and in our shantytowns, taking part in the organizing we are doing to get ready for a general mobilization of the workers on that day when Chile's rich finally decide to take up arms against the people. We do not want them sipping tea in the parlors of the Congress or giving speeches intended to be read by the bosses comfortably ensconced in their chalets in the Barrio Alto [well-to-do neighborhood in Santiago]. We want to see them in the mud roads and shacks of our shantytowns and in our union locals, organizing together with us the people's defense against the armed attack by the rich.

For this reason, *our candidates will have to join us in signing a solemn agreement.* We, the urban and rural poor, will draw up our own electoral program. We plan to draft an electoral program in which we specify what we expect from a legislator, what he must do to help the revolution, what the role of a revolutionary legislator must be in this process. Then, in a great, mass assembly, our candidates will have to indicate their agreement with this electoral program—the program of Chile's poor, the battle cry of those who have nothing.

With this program in hand we, the humble and exploited, after being ignored for centuries, will move forward, without compromise or retreat, from factory to factory and plantation to plantation, surmounting sabotage and aggression, until we emerge once and for all from the dark night we lived in till yesterday into the new society.

The urban and rural poor

Abortion Fight in Italy

A proposed abortion law has been submitted to the Italian parliament by Loris Fortuna, also the sponsor of the controversial divorce law. His law would give a woman the right to an abortion only when three doctors state that continued pregnancy constitutes "a threat to her physical and mental health." At present, abortions are banned under all circumstances in Italy. Opposition to the proposed law is coming from the Vatican, the neofascists, the Christian Democrats, and almost all bourgeois parties, according to a report in the Danish daily *Politiken* January 22. There are an estimated 800,000 illegal abortions in Italy each year, from which 20,000 to 25,000 women die for lack of medical help. □

Intercontinental Press

Interview With Juan Carlos Coral

"As the candidate for president and member of parliament for a Buenos Aires district of 'the only party that is programmatically and organizationally a workers' party,' Juan Carlos Coral of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores [PST—Socialist Workers party] is a well-known figure on the Argentine left and brings a long political and parliamentary experience to the present election campaign." This is the way the Buenos Aires mass-circulation daily *La Opinión* introduced an interview in its January 23 issue with the presidential candidate of the PST.

[The bourgeois daily wrote that in its opinion Coral did not have a very good chance of being elected: "Although he did not acknowledge it in so many words, the socialist candidate intimated that it will be very difficult for an avowedly Marxist party to win control of the government this March, especially when it is surrounded by giant parties that are determined not to give up any ground." But the paper conceded: "Nonetheless, basing its program on a class alternative and taking a hard attitude toward what the PST calls the 'capitulation of the Peronist trade-union leaders'—and even of the leader of the Peronist movement himself [Perón]—the sector led by Coral has won a place on the ballot and put up a slate composed 75 percent of trade-unionists, workers, and old activists." Our translation of the interview with Coral follows.]

* * *

Question. In its analysis of Argentine society, the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores stresses the class struggle between the exploiters and the exploited. How do you explain the fact that a Marxist party with such an analysis is plunging into another type of struggle, the electoral one?

Answer. I think you are mixing up the class struggle with violence. All the Marxist classics maintain that the class struggle can be waged by vari-

ous methods and various means. The important thing is not to give any ground to the enemy. In the present stage, the governing class is making a temporary tactical shift to an electoral arena, and we have to make a concrete political response. Here we could recall the words of Rosa Luxemburg when she faced a similar conjuncture: "The real reason for our taking part in the parliamentary elections is so that we can extend our socialist educational work."

Q. What real chances does your party have in the March elections?

A. In a process as uneven and confused as the present one, it is impossible to make serious predictions. Moreover, the mass media have a decisive influence on forming opinion, and, with the elections only fifty days away, we have not yet had access to radio or television. We have not been able to publicize our campaign by advertisements, since we lack the financial resources. Nor have we gotten any publicity in the press, owing to a kind of self-censorship imposed by specific official directives. We have not even been able to hold street meetings, and we have run into serious obstacles in distributing the party press.

This kind of manipulation of the election campaign alone can distort the immediate result, but we would consider it a victory if we got only a thousand votes in the whole country, because we have consolidated a class-struggle party, we have offered the workers an independent alternative, and we have gotten a good start on the road to a workers' and people's government.

Q. You are a person with parliamentary experience. Do you think you can go back and repeat everything you have said in your campaign from the floor of parliament?

A. I will go back and use all the parliamentary experience you credit

me with, enriched by the workers' struggles I have participated in since 1966 [when the parliament was shut down by the junta] and especially since the Córdoba uprising. In a parliament that the bourgeoisie uses as a shock absorber for social tensions and conflicts, our deputies will be the expression of every rebellion and the transmission belt for all demands of the workers and the people. We will expose in practice the false promises of the bourgeois politicians.

Q. Your party has called on the entire left to form a Frente de Candidaturas Obreras [Front of Workers' Candidates], claiming that this was the only alternative for all those who consider themselves socialists. Is this position backed by political principle or is it simply a means of catching votes?

A. In the first place I want to make it clear that this front is an alternative not only for socialists but for all trade-union activists prevented by the Peronist bureaucracy from expressing their demands on a political level. Our position on the Frente Obrero [Workers' Front] follows from the party's class-struggle program and its characterization of the national bourgeoisie, which we deny is an independent class able to play a consistent anti-imperialist role. Our strategy is clearly in tune with the present situation, as is shown by the fact that more than 50,000 persons have affiliated with the party [as registered voters] in recent months and that thousands of working-class candidates—who have asked for this way of reaching the public—have been included in our line on the ballot.

Q. Can you explain what future this class-struggle alternative has in a country like ours, where most people are Peronists or "Radicales" [Progressives]?

A. We believe that both Peronism and radicalismo are historically outworn experiences. Radicalismo was the response of the petty-bourgeoisie to the Argentine oligarchy at the end of the last century. Peronism was a Bonapartist experiment of the sort that prospered in almost all Latin-American countries as a result of a specific economic conjuncture in the immediate

postwar period. In the specific case of Argentina, this tendency was reinforced by the errors and deviations of the old left.

But when the imperialist push got going in the 1950s and American capital began flooding into our semicolonial economies, demanding ever higher profit rates, these pressures put an end to the income-redistribution policies that served as the basis of populism. And, one after another, all the class-collaborationist and reformist left tendencies went into crisis. The bourgeois sectors allied with the technocratic-military dictatorships that assumed direct control of the state; and the workers sought roads of class struggle and revolution.

In Chile, for example, after the breakup of Ibañez's coalition the Socialist party was able, by formulating a correct mass line, to transform itself into a powerful workers' party. The start of this process was somewhat delayed in Argentina. But the Cámporas and the Ruccis [the official Peronist leaders] are already clearly allied with Lanusse, Solano Lima, and Balbín [the conservative bourgeois figures]. And at the same time, the rank and file of the Peronist movement, who started mobilizing independently with the Córdoba uprising, are looking for a socialist and revolutionary alternative.

Q. All the candidates of the left cite the need for a workers' and people's government that could establish real authority and thereby eliminate the political pressures that oppress the country. This is the line taken by the Communist party, the Justicialists [Peronists], the Frente de Izquierda Popular [FIP—People's Left Front] and the Alianza Popular [People's Alliance]. Does this mean that your party may ally itself with one of these political sectors?

A. It is not true that all of those groups propose such a thing. The CP calls for government by a broad democratic coalition and the Justicialists and the AP for a multiclass front. The FIP talks about a workers' and people's government, but this is only rhetoric and demagoguery, because they have already announced that in the second round they will support FREJULI [Frente Justicialista de Liberación—Justicialist Liberation Front] or

even Balbín. The absence of a workers' organization strong enough to implement the appeal for a workers' and people's government leaves an opening for certain petty-bourgeois figures to make a demagogic play on the slogan. For this reason we have refused to establish alliances with any of these parties or fronts, and we see no perspective for doing this in the future.

Q. Your party has said that the Frente de Candidaturas Obreras is a call for defending the interests of the proletariat. The CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor] says the same thing about the Frente Justicialista de Liberación. Isn't there a political convergence here?

A. Here also the deeds do not match the words. The CGT is controlled by a conciliationist bureaucracy that acts as the accomplice of the capitalists. It never called for a front of workers' candidates. It supports a slate put up by a front of conservatives, capitalists, and bureaucrats. Nor does it still present itself as the defender of the workers because it rejects class struggles and formulates abstract programs for the nation as a whole.

Q. How would you characterize the Frente de Izquierda Popular as a competitor of your party in the elections?

A. It is the sort of adventure you see when a few intellectuals decide to come down out of their ivory tower and try their luck in the political arena. It has all the contradictions typical of this kind of thing. In his dreams Ramos saw a socialist Perón; he woke up to find a conservative Cámpora. He dreamed of generals of the stature of San Martín; he awoke to find glorified cops. In order to find a way out of his confusion he was forced to try to transform politics into a field of temperamental artistic endeavor. For us, on the other hand, politics is a science, and as such logical and coherent. Moreover, it is a science that we practice in a principled way, never lying to the masses in order to garner votes but always telling the truth in order to win revolutionary activists.

Q. Before the date for certifying

slates of candidates, there were reports in the press that in the Federal District your party was making overtures to the Communist party for an electoral alliance.

A. That is absolutely untrue because the CP remains dedicated to its popular-front policy. They have not projected a class alternative but are going around with a magnifying glass looking for progressive generals, priests, bourgeois, industrialists, and ranchers. Then they are surprised when these personalities betray the program. They offer perfunctory explanations. And start all over again.

Q. In Córdoba, your party's candidate for governor is a leader of the SITRAC-SITRAM [Sindicato de Trabajadores Concord-Sindicato de Trabajadores Materfer—the Concord Workers' Union-Materfer Workers' Union]. He played a prominent role in the Córdoba uprising. What do you think the chances of the PST are there?

A. The same as in the rest of the country. The only difference is that in Córdoba the level of workers' struggles is high enough to enable us to run Compañero José Francisco Páez, who is almost a symbol of the present period.

Q. How would you characterize the two main trade-union leaders in Córdoba, Agustín Tosco and Atilio López?

A. In the midst of the all-pervasive corruption of the union leaderships, Tosco is one of the few who have not succumbed to the bureaucratic mentality and who have maintained a positive attitude in the struggle. Unfortunately he has not been able to take this to a political level but has stuck to an abstentionist or eclectic position. The possibility cannot be discounted that he will end up supporting one slate or another but certainly not that of his compañeros in struggle. As for López, he is one of the most respected leaders in Córdoba. But he is used as a transmission belt to the Córdoba workers by Cámpora, Solano Lima, and Obregón Cano.

Q. The PST makes a distinction between parties of the workers and par-

ties of the bosses. Could you explain which are which?

A. Political parties represent definite economic interests. So, there are parties of the bosses and they defend the various shadings of capitalist interests (the landowners, the industrial bourgeoisie, the foreign cartels). Then there are workers' parties that oppose the present property relations and forms of ownership. It is no boast to say that the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores is the only party that is programmatically and organizationally a working-class party. There are also some vacillating petty-bourgeois parties that invariably end up supporting some capitalist formation. A case in point is the FIP, which, as I noted, has announced that it will support FREJULI or Balbin.



JUAN CARLOS CORAL

Q. Do you think that Peronism as a political party has made any contributions that you can take over?

A. In the historical sense, it has made no contributions we can build on. It was a by-product of the Peronist state. We do seek to carry forward the social process that led to the trade unions becoming mass organizations and to colossal advances such as the Comisiones Internas [Plant Committees] and the Cuerpos de Delegados [Councils of Workers' Delegates]. But these were achievements of the working class and not the Peronist party as such.

Q. The leaders of your party have said on several occasions that the Cámpora-Lima ticket was aimed against the working class. Can you explain that?

A. We say this because this ticket was chosen as an emergency brake on the mass mobilizations. When the Ruccis and the Corias proved impotent after 1969, the Peronists raised their "participationism" [collaboration with the government] to the political level. The Cámpora-Lima ticket is tailored to this purpose.

Q. Whatever their standpoint, the leaders of the political parties participating in the March elections tend to agree that Perón's return to the country after seventeen years was one of three things: the twilight of a myth,

an irreversible historical fact, or a popular triumph won by the mobilization of the Peronist masses. How would you describe it?

A. In the first place, let's say that it was not really a return. It was a business trip. Or, in any case, a capitulationist return, like that of Paz Estenssoro under Banzer's auspices or of Haya de la Torre during Prado's presidency. Although the trip itself was precipitated by the mass mobilization, Perón's conciliationist attitude ushered in the twilight of the myth.

Q. Do you think that the Gran Acuerdo Nacional [Great National Agreement—the coalition of national unity proposed by the military] is still in force?

A. The Gran Acuerdo Nacional, the Unión Democrática [Democratic Union] of 1973, continues to operate because it is the instrument chosen by the bourgeois ideologists to assure the perpetuation of the regime through a "legal" stage. Thanks to the GAN, the heads of the armed services will keep on ruling behind the civilian façade provided by the winning candidate. No one disputes that this formula is alive and well. The only argument is among Lanusse, Balbin, and Perón over who is the father. Each one claims paternity. Perón has

just boasted that he made the GAN a reality in only forty-eight hours.

Q. If your party wins control of the government, what would your political attitude be toward the following: (a) the armed forces; (b) the Catholic church; (c) the role of the trade unions; (d) education; (e) the economy; and (f) foreign policy?

A. On the armed forces: Robert McNamara has written quite correctly that the Latin American armies are the cheapest kind of armed forces for the American taxpayer. They defend American interests thousands of kilometers from the Yankee borders without costing them a penny. This sort of thing will end under a workers' and people's government. We will impose popular control over the armed forces and stop them from being an army of occupation defending ideological frontiers. We will make them into the armed instrument of the people. Along the same lines, we call for community control of the police in the neighborhoods and small towns as the only way to safeguard their security and the interests of the working people.

The Catholic church: We have a profound respect for the personal convictions of every individual, but the state must not invest a single peso in supporting any religion.

The trade unions: The unions will play a vital role. We will begin by democratizing them in order to make sure that they faithfully reflect the will of the rank and file. We will put an end to the cancer of bureaucracy by setting the salary for officials at no more than they earn in their trade, by keeping a check on the expense accounts of delegates to conventions, and by establishing a rule that at the end of their terms—which will be limited—union leaders must return to their jobs in the factories.

Education: All education will be a state monopoly. There are a lot of people who claim to be opposed to the principles of "free trade" in the economy but who expose themselves completely by proposing to apply these principles in the field of education. We will establish free, compulsory education at the primary and secondary levels and give scholarships equivalent to their wages to

workers who want to continue their studies.

The economy: In this area we will start off by raising the question of real wages, which have been cut in half in the last twenty years—in fact, in the case of some basic components of the family food budget, purchasing power has been cut by two-thirds. Therefore, we demand a minimum wage of 120,000 old pesos [350 old pesos equal US\$1] and an across-the-board raise of 50 percent. We will prohibit the flight of capital—in European banks alone, Argentine capitalists have stashed US\$8,000 million in superprofits. We will ban repatriation of profits by foreign capitalists. We will investigate crooked business deals.

As regards the structure of the economy, we will nationalize the basic sectors under workers' control and we will start by expropriating all the

big factories and estates of the monopolies without compensation.

Foreign policy: In this field we will denounce all the pacts and commitments contracted behind the people's back. We will resume diplomatic relations with Cuba. We will develop close fraternal ties with all our sister countries struggling against imperialist exploitation, and Chile first of all. We will do this with the perspective of moving toward a socialist confederation of Latin American countries and taking up the historic tasks of San Martín and Bolívar.

Q. From a class perspective such as your party proposes, how do you evaluate the "native" socialism that was so strongly defended by Alfredo Palacios?

A. Socialism has developed in our country in one-sided forms. Some of these tendencies have had a class-struggle line but have been isolated

from the masses and the national reality. Others, such as Palacios's "native socialism" that you mention, put the emphasis on parliamentary victories as a way of defending the country in the struggle against imperialism. We hope to synthesize both tendencies. We are a class-struggle party and at the same time we are rooted in the reality of the Argentine and Latin American working class.

Q. Your political opponents accuse you of wanting to imitate Alfredo Palacios and of being unable to do it because you lack his ideological profundity.

A. The opponents you refer to reveal in this way their inability to fight me on the level of ideas. For my part, I am not trying to imitate any personality. At most I try to pattern myself on the virtues of the best rank-and-file socialist militants. □

TEN YEARS—History and Principles of the Left Opposition

By Max Shachtman

[This is the fourth and final installment of "Ten Years—History and Principles of the Left Opposition," the pam-

phlet by Max Shachtman first published in 1933. Serialization began in our January 22 issue.]

* * *

The Dangers of Thermidor and Bonapartism

The Great French Revolution of the eighteenth century is rich with instructive lessons for the working class today. Only a priest will declare that there is any absolute guarantee against the fall of the Russian revolution. The revolutionist will stand on guard against it; his vigilance will be keener if he understands the nature of the dangers that threaten and what measures must be taken to ward them off.

The French revolution experienced two periods of defeat: Thermidorian reaction and the Bonapartist dictatorship. On the Ninth of Thermidor (July 27, 1794) the revolutionary Jacobins, Robespierre, Saint-Just, Couthon, Lebas—"the Bolsheviks of the French revolution"—were overthrown by a combination of the Right wing Jacobins,

the vacillators and the royalist reaction. The guillotine which sent 21 Jacobin intransigents to death the next day bit no longer into the reaction. In its turn, the Thermidorian epoch was climaxed a few years later with the ascension to power of Napoleon Bonaparte.

The Thermidorian reaction was made possible by a degeneration and corruption of the revolutionary party of that time—the Jacobin clubs. It was facilitated by a yearning for "peace and tranquility" of certain sections of the people and above all by the politicians' wearying of the revolutionary struggle and moving off to the Right. It gained momentum from the pressure of royalists and reactionaries who adapted themselves to the revolutionary customs and speech of the times in order to save their

own hides. The weak-kneed and weak-minded among the revolutionists yielded to the social pressure of the reactionary class.

The Thermidorian overthrow was not the open counter-revolution. On the contrary, it took place under the old banner and with the old watchwords scarcely altered. The Left wing Jacobins were denounced by the Thermidorians as "agents of Pitt" (just as Oppositionists in Russia were denounced as "agents of Chamberlain"). They were charged with being merely a "few isolated individuals," "malevolent aristocrats" who were undermining the united fatherland. The Right wing Jacobins, who were unwittingly blazing the trail for the starkly counter-revolutionary Bonapartist dictatorship, calumniated the men they executed, imprisoned and banished, as "counter-revolutionists."

The Bolshevik party today is not the party which took power in October 1917. It has gone through a period of social and political reaction. Its doctrine has been sapped at the foundation, distorted and corroded. It has swollen into a vast, shapeless mass by having hundreds of thousands of indiscriminately commanded workers and peasants poured into its ranks until it has lost that distinctness and independence essential to a revolutionary party. It has been deprived of its principal functions by a usurpatory, bureaucratic apparatus which raised itself above it and replaced it. Its revolutionary wing has been violently torn from it by the Thermidorian expulsions of the Left Opposition.

The systematic crushing of the leading party of the proletariat, without which the dictatorship cannot be exercised in a revolutionary sense, not only accentuates the danger of Thermidor in the Soviet Union but, at a given point, also the threat of Bonapartism. On the road of degeneration which leads to the counter-revolutionary triumph, Thermidor and Bonapartism do not present stages differing in their class foundation. In the Great French revolution, Bonapartism swiftly succeeded the Ninth of Thermidor and the Directory. But this succession is as little ordained and inevitable as is the certainty of counter-revolution altogether; a fusion of the two stages, a modification of one or the other under the conditions of a new social epoch—these and many other possibilities are quite conceivable. The Right wing in the Russian party had its strength essentially in the classes and not in the ranks, more specifically, not in the apparatus of the party. The Right wing was so easily crushed on a party scale because it was not prepared to make an open appeal for support to the class interests it represented: the Kulak, and the Nepman dependent upon him. The victory by the Stalinist center over the Right wing triumvirate halted, for the time being, the advance of the Thermidorian forces, of those dark and backward agrarian interests which had been whipped up and nurtured in the reactionary years of struggle against the Left Opposition. Only, this victory did not result in eliminating the other, and more acute, phases of the counter-revolutionary danger.

While both the Right and the Left wings of the party in the Soviet Union represent well-defined class forces and interests, the same cannot be said of the Centrist apparatus. Classic petty-bourgeois force, the graph of its policy reveals a broken line of leaps to the Left and to the Right which become shorter and more frequent with

the aggravation of the crisis. It leans now upon the proletarian core of the country, as during the campaign against the Right wing, now upon the reactionary forces, as during the fight against the Left. It cannot find for itself a firm class foundation from which to operate; the closest it came to such a base was during the period of the idealization by the Stalin faction of the "middle peasant," a shifty social stratum which, far from serving as a solid class foundation, required one itself.

The Stalin faction, however, has its strength in the party bureaucracy: it is the party bureaucracy. In the process of watering down the party until it is a bloated, shapeless mass, the apparatus has, at the same time, raised itself above the party to an unapproachable level and constituted itself a bureaucratic caste. The diffused party mass is unable to reach this caste in order to change it, or to have it reflect the interests of the mass itself. The apparatus, on the other hand, after having strangled the party, must stifle all life within itself. We say "must" because it cannot refer any disputes in its ranks to the party mass below for fear of unleashing a force that is inherently inimical to it. The whole bureaucratic system, consequently, moves inexorably toward a condition in which a decreasing number of individuals decide and speak for all; the number of these individuals today, to all practical purposes, is one, and his name is Stalin.

Devoid of a class basis, the apparatus is permeated principally with the desire for self-preservation and self-perpetuation. Its policies, in all their zig-zags, are subordinated essentially to this aim. The sickening Byzantine flattery of Stalin which is compulsory for every official, the conversion of the army and particularly of the G. P. U. into an instrument with which the Secretariat operates ever more exclusively—combined with the suppression of workers' democracy in general, and party democracy in particular, that is, of the principal guarantees against a degeneration of the proletarian dictatorship—these are the signs of the present period in the Soviet Union. They disclose "the preconditions of the Bonapartist regime in the country."

Tacking desperately between the various classes and social strata, the apparatus satisfies none of them. In this fact lies the danger that the mounting discontent of all sections of the population, and above all of the peasantry, will explode the very foundations of the Soviet power, that is, of the proletarian dictatorship. If the crisis breaks out into the open and reveals that the proletariat and its party have been so weakened that they cannot act decisively and victoriously, then the counter-revolution will probably assume the form of Bonapartism, of the iron man or men "standing above the classes" and apparently mediating between the contending forces, resting for the time being upon the strength of the military forces and the experienced cohesion of the bureaucratic apparatus. It is this prospect which reveals the Stalinist faction as the potential reservoir of the Bonapartist danger.

Superficial examination alone permits one to exclude this possibility, as well as the possibility of a Thermidorian overturn, on the ground of the so-called "liquidation of the Kulak." If this were actually the case, the danger would undoubtedly be considered diminished, although even then, not eliminated. But a more careful scrutiny will reveal that the "liquidated Kulak" is still a substantial force, more

threatening in this respect, that his present activities and progress are not only concealed behind the administratively established collective farms but are facilitated by the rupture of the relations between town and country, worker and peasant, rendered inevitable by the whole course of the Stalin bureaucracy.

"The French farmers," wrote Marx in his classic study of Bonapartism, "are unable to assert their class interests in their own name, be it by a parliament or by convention. They cannot represent one another, they must themselves be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power, that protects them from above, bestows rain and sunshine upon them. Accordingly, the political influence of the al-

lotment farmer finds its ultimate expression in an executive power that subjugates the commonweal to its own autocratic will."

Such an executive power is present in the bureaucratic apparatus of the party and the Soviets. For it to be fully fledged as a Bonapartist ruling machine, it must first receive baptism in the blood shed by a civil war, that inevitable concomitant to the overthrow of the proletarian dictatorship which the reaction cannot hope to avert. The overthrow itself, however, can be averted, but only by restoring the party of the proletariat, the crushing of which has made possible the accumulation of all the internal contradictions and the maturing of the counter-revolutionary factors. It is to achieve this restoration, to bring closer the day of its attainment, that the strength and activities of the Left Opposition are dedicated.

The International Left Opposition

The International Left Opposition has been constituted in every important country. It stands today formally outside of the official Communist parties, not as a matter of choice but of compulsion. In every case, its ranks are made up chiefly of Communist militants whose defense of the foundations of Leninism brought about their expulsion from the party.

The crisis in the Communist International has divided it into three camps: the Right wing opposition (Brandler, Lovestone, Roy); the bureaucratic Centrist faction of Stalin; and the Left Opposition group of the Bolshevik-Leninists. The fundamental standpoint upon which the first two are united despite other differences, is the reactionary, nationalist theory of socialism in one country. This marks the main dividing line between us and the combined Right wing and Center. The Left Opposition, in opposition to this theory, defends the Marxian conception of the permanent revolution, that is, of the uninterrupted development of the world revolution which, starting in one country, can be maintained only by its extension on an international scale.

The Left Opposition was and remains the irreconcilable opponent of the international social democracy, the principal defender of bourgeois democracy. The Right wing is a bridge from the Communist movement to the social democracy. In the United States, Germany and Czechoslovakia, sections or the whole of the Right opposition have already passed over into the camp of the social democracy. What remains of this faction has no stable basis and no right to a separate existence. It vacillates constantly between social democracy and capitulation to Stalinism, with which it has no fundamental differences. The Centrist faction supports the social democracy from the "Left." By its opportunism, at one stage, and ultra-Leftism at another, it has enabled the social democratic leaders to retain their control over millions of workers.

At every stage of its struggles as a distinctive grouping, the Left Opposition has defended the fundamental principles which its spokesmen and leaders incorporated into the Russian revolution and the Communist International in the early days of their existence. These principles, worked out theoretically by Marx, Engels, Lenin and

Trotsky, and tested through and through by decades of struggles, wars and revolutions, are the primary weapons of the world proletariat in its historic fight to emancipate itself and the whole of humanity. These principles have been undermined, distorted and violated by the ruling regime in the Soviet Union and the Communist International. In doing this, it has led the Communist movement, and consequently the working class, from one defeat to another, until the fatherland of the working class, the Soviet republic, is endangered and the organized revolutionary movement is in the throes of its severest crisis.

The Left Opposition, in its struggle for the regeneration of the Communist movement, is fighting for the present and the future of the whole working class!

January 1933

(The end.)

Another U.S. Reporter Jailed

Leslie H. Whitten Jr., a reporter who helped syndicated columnist Jack Anderson write a series of articles on the mistreatment of American Indians by the U. S. government, was arrested by federal agents in Washington, D. C., on January 31 and charged with receiving and possessing "stolen" documents. The documents, which formed the basis of Anderson's exposés, were obtained during a six-day sit-in by protesting American Indians at the U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Hank Adams, a leader of Trail of Broken Treaties, an organization that participated in the demonstration, was arrested along with Whitten. They were seized at Adams's apartment, where Whitten had gone "to get an exclusive story." According to government sources, an anonymous "undercover policeman" told the FBI that Whitten would be picking up "stolen" documents.

Anderson told reporters that Whitten was "handcuffed and fingerprinted and thrown in jail in outrageous violation of the first amendment. . . . We're in the newspaper business and when the Indians steal files from the government and claim that these files show that they've been cheated, then that's a story." □