

NOTHING REALLY SETTLED

**Meaning of the Cease-Fire
Reaction—Relief, Skepticism
Role of the Antiwar Movement**

Banker Goes Honest

Lamar B. Hill, a director and president of the First National Bank of Cartersville, Georgia, was sentenced January 25 to serve ten years in prison for embezzlement. The sentence was rather light. He could have got 300 years and a \$300,000 fine. A few days before, three young men who had stolen \$13,834 from the Tunnel Hill branch of the First National Bank of Dalton, Georgia, were sentenced to sixteen years each.

In Hill's case there were various extenuating circumstances:

1. He embezzled the dazzling sum of \$4,611,473.35.

2. He was caught because he had decided not to go on with his scheme after practicing it successfully since 1951. "I got tired," he explained. "I could have hid it again. But wouldn't you get tired after 21 years?"

3. He denounced the laxity of bank officials and auditors. "The average bank director is selected because of his position in the community or his business connections with the bank, and he doesn't know anything about the banking business."

4. He may now put his vast knowledge at the service of humanity. "I'm fixing to write a book on how to keep people from doing it."

5. He is a highly respected member of the community. According to the January 26 *Wall Street Journal*, "A weathered farmer named Felton Fisher said about what a lot of others did: 'He has done more for Bartow County than any other man who has been here.'"

Fanny Mae Kelly, wife of a pastor, said, "He's the best president that's ever been in the First National Bank."

Since he was arrested, Hill has felt relaxed. Eats and sleeps better than in years.

He is still not out of trouble. The bank has filed suit against him to recover the \$4,611,473.35. The Internal Revenue Service claims that he owes the government \$3,621,511.04 as its share of the undeclared income. But the money has all been spent. Just slipped through Hill's fingers on bad investments and living in the style a bank president is accustomed to. □

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Meaning of the Cease-Fire Agreement in Vietnam

By Jon Rothschild

The signing of the Vietnam cease-fire accords in Paris on January 27 took place in what *New York Times* correspondent Flora Lewis called an "eerie silence, without a word or gesture to express the world's relief that the years of war were officially ending."

During the eighteen-minute-long ceremony U. S. Secretary of State William Rogers signed his name to sixty-two pieces of paper that were attached both to multiple copies of the "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam" and to the four accompanying protocols on implementation. If the most conservative available statistics are utilized, we arrive at a figure of 24,000 dead South Vietnamese per signature. Afterwards, Rogers handed out souvenir pens to his assembled aides.

The eerie silence in the grand ballroom of the former Majestic Hotel reflected a prevalent feeling about the accords—one of tense anticipation and anxiety, which is exactly the reaction the agreement deserves. None of the basic issues around which the civil war in South Vietnam has been fought was settled. The implementation of the agreement depends entirely on the goodwill of Thieu and Nixon.

The struggle of the Vietnamese people for national independence and socialism has not been won; it has merely reached a turning point. The United States stands ready to resume its military aggression at any moment, and political, economic, and military interference will continue in any case.

Within twenty-four hours of the time the Vietnam cease-fire officially took effect, U. S. bombers, including B-52s, were in the air over Laos, pounding the countryside where the Pathet Lao revolutionary forces hold sway. This despite the accords' provision calling upon all parties to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia. In Vietnam itself, ground fighting was reportedly continuing in dozens of hamlets.

What the Agreement Says . . .

The full English text of the accords was released by Nixon on January 24. In substance, the terms do not fundamentally differ from the sum-



Oliver Williams/New York Times

mary agreement announced October 26 by Radio Hanoi. There are twenty-three articles contained in nine chapters that correspond roughly to the nine points of the summary of the October draft agreement.

In essence, they call for a cease-fire in place, the release of U. S. prisoners of war, the withdrawal of all U. S. forces from Vietnam within sixty days. Implicitly, two administrations and two armies are recognized in the South—Thieu's and the liberation forces'. They are instructed to settle their differences peacefully through an electoral process.

On Laos and Cambodia, the agreement is vague. It calls for the withdrawal of all "foreign" troops, which presumably includes North Vietnamese forces. There is no explicit call for a cease-fire in either country. Henry Kissinger told reporters on January 24 that Nixon expected a formal cease-fire in Laos within fifteen days. He said the United States looked forward to a *de facto* cease-fire in Cambodia and implied that a secret

understanding had been reached with Hanoi on this point.

A brief recapitulation of the major points of the agreement demonstrates their similarity to the October accords.

In the first chapter, the "United States and all other countries" declare that they "respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam." This represents no change from the October agreement. It means that Kissinger failed to force the North Vietnamese to accept the formal division of their country.

Also like the October agreement, the January draft calls for the cease-fire to take effect twenty-four hours after the signing. Cessation of hostilities specifically includes the end of all U. S. bombing of North and South Vietnam. The same chapter calls for U. S. withdrawal and for dismantling all U. S. military bases in South Vietnam. There is no mention of the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South.

Chapter III stipulates the release of U. S. prisoners of war, to be effected concurrently with U. S. troop withdrawal. Where the October accord was ambiguous on the status of South Vietnam's several hundred thousand civilian political prisoners, the January agreement is specific. Saigon's political dissidents will be left to the mercy of the Thieu regime: "(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties. . . ." This clause, as Thieu's actions have already proved, is among the most dangerous in the entire agreement.

Chapter IV of the treaty, like point four of the October draft, deals with the question of power in South Vietnam—the heart of the civil war. The terms call upon the warring class forces in the South to engage in rec-

conciliation, to "maintain peace, . . . settle all matters of contention through negotiations and avoid all armed conflict." The two "South Vietnamese parties," the agreement states, will "achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other."

Both sides are further called upon to "insure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free enterprise."

The treaty repeats the October draft's provision for the formation of a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, to be composed of three equal segments, including representatives of the liberation forces, the Thieu regime, and "neutralists." The October draft had described this body as an "administrative structure," a designation Thieu had opposed as too easily interpreted as the nucleus of a coalition government. The January agreement does not characterize the body at all, but simply says that its task is to ensure implementation of the agreement and to organize "free and democratic general elections under international supervision."

The Council will function "on the principle of unanimity." That is, any proposal unacceptable to the Thieu clique will be vetoed in the Council. Any complaints the liberation forces might have about Thieu's violations of the treaty's manifold guarantees of democratic rights can be referred to the Council, where they will be rejected by Thieu's representatives. In one of the agreement's typically repulsive, sugar-coated formulations, article 12 explains that the Council will come into being through a negotiation process that will take place "in a spirit of . . . mutual nonelimination."

The agreement reaffirms the character of the "demilitarized zone" as merely a temporary, nonpolitical demarcation line, but stipulates that "North and South Vietnam shall respect the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demar-

cation line," a provision that Kissinger and Nixon interpret to mean that North Vietnam does not have the right to send supplies across the zone to the liberation forces in the South.

Chapter VI sets up a series of "joint military commissions" designed to supervise the agreement, and calls for the establishment of an International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) to be composed of equal delegations from Canada, Indonesia, Hungary, and Poland. The final article of the Chapter calls for an international conference to be convened within thirty days of the signing of the agreement. The purpose of this body is "to guarantee" the agreement. Attending will be the four participants in the Paris negotiations (North and South Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the United States), as well as the four countries that make up the ICCS, plus France, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim will also be invited.

Chapter VII calls for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Laos and Cambodia, and bars the use of those countries' territory "to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries." On January 24 Henry Kissinger told U.S. reporters that the Nixon regime interpreted this clause as a prohibition of North Vietnam's transporting military supplies to its forces in South Vietnam, that is, as a supplement to the clause on the demilitarized zone, designed to ensure the gradual attrition of the Southern liberation forces.

Chapter VIII allegedly inaugurates a new era of "reconciliation" between the United States and North Vietnam and cites American willingness to "contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction" of North Vietnam.

Chapter IX states that the agreement will go into effect immediately upon its signing by official representatives of the participating sides.

And What It Means

The contradictory character of the agreement can best be seen by comparing its substance both to the original war aims of U.S. imperialism

and to the goals of the Indochinese social revolution.

For nearly a decade, the Indochina war has been the focal point of the international class struggle. The U.S. ruling class showed that it recognized this reality by the immensity of its military and economic commitment to the war effort. In comparison to the size of the territory and population concerned, U.S. imperialism expended more firepower, spent more money, suffered more casualties, and engendered deeper domestic social crises in the course of its campaign against the Indochinese revolution than it had in any previous conflict since the turn of the century.

Consider, for example, the financial expenditure. According to Pentagon figures, the war in Vietnam alone, that is, excluding money spent on the fighting in Laos and Cambodia, cost the United States \$110,000 million. The vastness of the figure becomes somewhat more comprehensible if it is averaged over the ten-year period of direct U.S. intervention—it comes to well more than \$3,000 a second, every second, for ten years.

It should be added that the Pentagon's figure excludes so-called indirect or long-term costs, such as government obligations to veterans. These expenses could increase the cited figure by as much as \$50,000 million.

A more macabre index of the intensity of the imperialist commitment to the Indochina aggression is the total tonnage of bombs dropped. The January 25 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde* estimated that since the beginning of 1965 the United States has exploded between 14 million and 15 million tons of bombs and shells on North and South Vietnam, the approximate equivalent of 720 Hiroshima-type atomic bombs.

The American use of chemical agents against both the people and land of Indochina has ensured that the long-term effects of the war (ecocide, increased incidence of birth defects and cancer, etc.) will be scarcely less disastrous than the effects of atomic weapons. Between 1962 and 1970, *Le Monde* reported, the United States spread defoliants and other chemicals over about one-seventh of the South Vietnamese countryside; nearly 50,000 tons of chemical agents were used. The National Liberation

Front estimates that about 1.3 million persons in South Vietnam alone have felt the effects of some type of U. S. poison.

The third major U. S. weapon of mass destruction was napalm. A total of more than 200,000 tons of the jellied gasoline was dropped on the Vietnamese people between 1965 and the time the cease-fire went into effect.

As horrifying as this brief synopsis may be, it tells but part of the story. It ignores, for example, the anti-personnel bombs and devices, the mass destruction of crops through burning, and most of all, the number of South Vietnamese killed by the U. S. ground forces, which at the height of the American invasion numbered more than 500,000.

Such was the intensity of the ten-year-long imperialist effort to demolish the Vietnamese revolution. The aim of three successive U. S. administrations was to guarantee capitalist rule in South Vietnam, to eliminate the National Liberation Front as an effective political force, to create a stable regime in Saigon capable of defending itself against the Vietnamese workers and peasants without direct U. S. intervention and without intolerable amounts of imperialist aid.

Despite the most massive effort in imperialist history, the United States did not succeed. Nixon has been forced to withdraw his troops from Vietnam while allowing North Vietnam to leave its forces in the South. The Saigon regime is far from stabilized, and the liberation forces retain control over a significant section of the South Vietnamese countryside. U. S. imperialism has had to recognize, even if only implicitly, that a state of dual power exists in South Vietnam.

In this respect the agreement represents a defeat for U. S. imperialism — one for which the Vietnamese people and the international antiwar movement may take full credit. U. S. capitalism's inability to crush the resistance of the Vietnamese people has provided the world with a convincing demonstration of the power of the colonial revolution. The central post-second-world-war effort of the American ruling class—to inaugurate an indefinite period of unrestricted U. S. empire-building—has received a decisive setback. The resistance of the

Vietnamese workers and peasants likewise touched off a wave of radicalization, particularly among the youth, on a worldwide scale.

The ability of the Vietnamese people to resist U. S. domination and the radicalization and mobilization generated by the antiwar movement will seriously restrict U. S. imperialism's ability to carry out similar interventions in other sectors of the colonial revolution. This in itself—whatever may be the final outcome of the struggle in South Vietnam—represents a major achievement for the world revolution.

Betrayal by Peking and Moscow

But all this is only one side of the impact of the cease-fire agreement on world politics. The accords must be viewed not simply in light of what the U. S. rulers failed to achieve, but also in light of what the Vietnamese revolution could have achieved but did not.

The socialist revolution in South Vietnam has not been victorious. The Thieu regime remains in power; capitalist social relations have not been overturned; the South Vietnamese peasantry has not gained control over its land; the Vietnamese people have not won the right of self-determination.

Chief responsibility for this lies with the bureaucrats who govern in Moscow and Peking. Were it not for the Stalinist betrayal of the Vietnamese workers and peasants, a betrayal that began with the first introduction of imperialist troops into Indochina and which deepened progressively as the war dragged on, the Vietnamese people would today be celebrating the unification of their country and the victory of a workers state over imperialism.

For the first years of the war against the U. S. invasion, the Vietnamese people were forced to fight almost exclusively with weapons captured from the puppet army or preserved from the war of independence against French imperialism. The Soviet Union extended no significant aid whatsoever until the Johnson administration began systematic bombing of North Vietnam in 1965. The Mao bureaucracy, while issuing countless statements professing its eternal solidarity

with the Vietnamese fighters, likewise kept its support purely verbal.

When the antiwar movement began in the United States in 1965, the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies and the worldwide Stalinist parties in solidarity with them took an abstentionist attitude. They not only failed to build the movement on a nonexclusive united-front basis, but frequently opposed antiwar demonstrations as "inopportune." They made every effort to ensure that whatever action did occur would be based on the demand that the U. S. rulers negotiate with the Vietnamese people, and they intractably opposed the demand that the United States withdraw unconditionally from Southeast Asia.

The Moscow and Peking bureaucracies could have ended the U. S. aggression in the middle 1960s. Had they made clear to Johnson that attacks on the North Vietnamese workers' state would not be tolerated, had they provided the Vietnamese sufficient weaponry to defend themselves, had they called for the mobilization of the mass Stalinist parties on a world scale, the U. S. government would have backed down.

This is not mere speculation. The Pentagon Papers demonstrate that at every stage in the escalation of the war, U. S. policy makers paused to examine the Soviet and Chinese responses with the utmost care. And at every critical point, Moscow's and Peking's failure to respond opened the way for fresh escalation.

But it was in 1971-72 that the bureaucratic betrayal had its worst effect. While the bombing of Vietnam was reaching its most intense level, Chairman Mao arranged Nixon's visit to Peking. Throughout the last months of 1971, when the bombing was escalated in conjunction with the "Vietnamization" policy, the Maoists proceeded apace with preparation for the Peking summit.

Days before Nixon's arrival in Peking, U. S. planes conducted their heaviest bombing of Laos and Cambodia since 1970; the bombing of North Vietnam reached record levels. In the midst of this military aggression, the Peking leaders welcomed Nixon in their capital. The People's Liberation Army Band played "Home on the Range" while Chinese Premier Chou En-lai toasted the war crim-

inal whose planes were at that very moment demolishing civilian targets in North Vietnam.

The United States espionage and propaganda apparatuses dropped a new weapon from their planes on the people of Vietnam: photographs of Mao Tsetung shaking hands with Richard Nixon.

The Peking summit-betrayal paved the way for the Moscow festivities. On May 8 Nixon did what Lyndon Johnson had feared to do: He mined North Vietnam's ports and waterways. All overland supply routes connecting China and Vietnam were ordered destroyed. Nixon informed Soviet leaders that he could not take responsibility for casualties suffered by Soviet ships trying to run the blockade.

Nevertheless, the Kremlin declined to respond. Its fight was not with Nixon but with the Chinese bureaucracy. Determined to put on a better show than the Chinese leaders had, the Moscow Stalinists duplicated the champagne banquets and even went the Chinese one better: They allowed Nixon to go on Soviet television to deliver a speech about his profound commitment to world peace.

The Kremlin's message was missed by no one. The détente with Washington would go on. There was nothing Nixon could do to the Vietnamese people that would bar that development. Again, U.S. propaganda agencies dropped their handshake photographs on Vietnam; this time the stars were Nixon and Brezhnev.

The Kremlin's political betrayal of the Vietnamese was paralleled by a military one. When Hanoi and Haiphong faced massive bombing by B-52s, the cities were defended by SAM-2 missiles, outmoded weapons against which B-52s can defend themselves. The Vietnamese were never provided with the low-range SAM-3, which is the best defense against the low-flying U.S. Phantom fighter-bomber. The Vietnamese were never provided with the advanced SAM-4, incomparably more effective against the B-52 than the SAM-2.

What small aid was doled out to the Vietnamese by Moscow was used as a political club with which to bludgeon Hanoi into making political concessions to Washington's war aims.

Even in the last weeks of the cur-



New York Times map shows zones controlled by each side in Indochina, based on U.S.-supplied information.

rent stage of the war, while the December terror raids on Hanoi and Haiphong were in full swing, Moscow and Peking did nothing. The Chinese bureaucracy even compounded their crimes against the Vietnamese people by proceeding with a U.S. tour of a Peking acrobatic troupe. The same issues of mass-circulation U.S. news magazines that contained reports of the devastation of Hanoi and Haiphong carried full-color spreads of the performances of the acrobats, including one of the team captain exchanging pleasantries with Nixon.

History will judge the Moscow and Peking bureaucrats guilty of direct complicity with one of humanity's bloodiest war criminals.

But also on the part of the North Vietnamese, the lack of a consistently revolutionary leadership exacted a toll. By insisting on waging the struggle in the South on the basis of a popular-front program based purely on nationalism, the North Vietnamese leaders weakened the potential power of the Southern movement. The struggle in the urban centers—now more important than ever—was especially weakened through this policy.

By restricting the movement's program to national demands, by play-

ing down the class aspect of the war, the North Vietnamese and NLF leaders also hampered their ability to appeal directly to the U.S. troops. During other civil wars, counterrevolutionary armies have been decimated as much by political propaganda as by artillery. And while it is true that the tactics of the American military (quick rotation of troops, for example) made such activities difficult, it is undeniable that the disintegration of the U.S. ground forces, already profound by 1970, could have been much more rapid.

To arrange the settlement itself, the North Vietnamese leaders allowed themselves to be drawn into secret diplomacy, a practice the Bolshevik revolutionists scrupulously avoided. And they have portrayed the settlement purely as a victory for the Vietnamese people, a one-sided interpretation that can only hinder the vigilance of the antiwar movement and of the Vietnamese masses by sowing illusions about the future.

Regardless of Moscow's and Peking's commitment to peace-and-quiet in Indochina, the intensity of the class struggle there is certain to rise, perhaps even in the immediate future. The dual-power situation legitimized by the agreement is inherently unstable. The prospect for South Vietnam is continued civil war. The question is, on what terms?

Thieu's Counterrevolutionary Terror

Consideration of or speculation about what would happen in South Vietnam if the accords were scrupulously observed would be futile. It is a certainty that the Thieu regime will not grant the South Vietnamese population the democratic rights guaranteed them in Article 11 of the agreement. Thieu has already demonstrated that he regards the essence of the agreement to be a recognition of his own sovereignty and that he views the rhetoric about democracy, national reconciliation, and concord as face-saving window-dressing for the liberation forces. For the Saigon government the accords represent a license for white terror.

A dispatch from Saigon printed in the January 23 *New York Times* described some of the measures Thieu has already taken in preparation for

the impending truce: "One senior officer said that the usual random inspection of identification papers would be intensified and that vehicles entering the cities would be thoroughly searched for contraband.

"In addition, the officer said, the police have been ordered to sweep through residential sections after the 11 p.m. curfew and to make house-to-house inspections to insure that only the authorized residents are present. . . .

"The President is said to have reminded the commanders that under the present state of martial law the police and armed forces are authorized to shoot on the spot people who incite riots and 'applaud the Communists.'

"He also pointed out that they were empowered to arrest summarily anyone who distributed Communist propaganda, flew a Communist flag, interfered with Government officials attempting to maintain order or urged others to move to Communist-controlled areas. Anybody who engages in political activities as a 'neutralist or pro-Communist' or who uses or distributes currency issued by the Communists is also subject to summary arrest, he noted. . . .

"According to the semiofficial newspaper *Tin Song*, which is partly financed by President Thieu's closest aides, these harsh tactics will remain in effect in Government-controlled areas after a cease-fire goes into effect."

In the January 23 issue of the *Washington Post*, correspondent Thomas W. Lippman listed some activities that the newspaper *Tin Song* said would be grounds for death "on the spot." They included "incitement of pro-Communist demonstrations, desertion, or inciting to desertion."

"In some provinces," Lippman reported, ". . . every family has been photographed as a unit, Vietnamese sources say. That photograph is in the custody of the government, and presence of any extra persons in the house—or the absence of any of the persons in the photograph who cannot be accounted for—is taken to be proof of unlawful activity, the sources say.

"In other areas, a color-coding system is used, with each family designated by a color showing the degree of loyalty to the government—a de-

termination that local officials have wide latitude in making."

On January 24 Thieu made a countrywide radio and television speech in which he flatly stated his interpretation of the agreement's content on the question of who is to rule the South: "The Communists demanded that we recognize the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. But they have failed in this respect and no longer pursue this demand because they know we will never accept two governments in South Vietnam."

Thieu's major problem will be preventing the South Vietnamese people themselves from recognizing the PRG. The liberation forces control wide areas of the Southern countryside, perhaps one-third to one-half of it, according to maps based on Washington-supplied information. Until now, however, the bulk of the population of these areas have been driven by U. S. bombing into concentration camps in Saigon-held areas. One of Thieu's top priorities is therefore to prevent the refugee population from returning to their homes in liberated territory. The January 25 *Washington Post* published a report from Peter Osnos describing some of the ways Thieu expects to attain that goal.

"South Vietnamese troops and police have been ordered to restrain the refugees, forcibly if necessary, American sources say, and even refugees from government-held areas will be allowed to go back to their villages only a few thousand at a time.

"As an example of the government's position, an elderly man at a refugee camp just outside Danang said police had warned him that if any member of his large family disappears, the rest will be stricken from food-distribution rolls."

U. S. statistics indicate that there are now 641,000 people in South Vietnam's refugee camps, a figure that is almost certainly far too low. Most of them have no means of making a living and exist under the continuous watch of police and government troops. Of the total, Osnos reported, about 75 percent, that is, some 475,000 people, are from "Quangtri, Binh Dinh, Kontum, and Binhlong, the provinces that are wholly or very largely in Communist hands."

The elderly man that Osnos talked to said he intended to return to his

home no matter what, a feeling that appears to be widespread among the refugees. Since the agreement on "ending the war" guarantees both freedom of movement and freedom of political organization, it can be expected that the refugees will fight to demand the right to go home. Thieu's reaction is predictable:

"Refugees and officials agree," Osnos wrote, "that the government has been unusually efficient in curbing whatever organized activity there has been in the camps for a return to Communist-held areas. U. S. intelligence sources said that systematic sweeps of the enclosures have been made by troops and special police to arrest Communist agents and sympathizers identified by informers.

"The word has been passed that anyone inciting the refugees will be locked up. 'If they resist,' Saigon newspapers quoted official sources as saying, 'they will be shot.'"

It would appear, then, that the estimated number of political prisoners in South Vietnam must be revised upward. In addition to the 200,000 who are held in buildings or other structures known as "jails," there are at least 600,000 held under armed guard against their will in places known by the more attractive designation "relocation centers."

There is, however, a difference in the two categories. While the refugees can expect indefinite confinement, the prisoners may be subjected to far worse treatment. Continuing reports of conditions in South Vietnam's prison camps have moved Amnesty International to take up the case of the prisoners' defense. In a January 26 statement issued in London, the organization declared, "The Vietnam peace settlement has failed to provide adequate safeguards for the estimated 100,000 civilian detainees in South Vietnam. [The low figure and the use of the term "detainees" may be taken as evidence of the group's respectability.] There is real danger that key members of the South Vietnamese non-Communist opposition who are detained will be killed before the supervisory commissions come into operation."

The group noted that there was "evidence that selective elimination of opposition members has begun." In December, the statement said, "267 political prisoners were sent from Chi

Hoa national prison in Saigon to the notorious prison on Con Son Island [also known as Poulo Condor], home of the 'tiger cage' detention cells." Amnesty also reported that "300 prisoners traveling on a boat from Con Son to the mainland are reported to have been killed."

Such is Thieu's scenario. Recalcitrant political prisoners will be liquidated, hundreds of thousands of people will remain behind barbed wire in government-held areas, persons believed to be sympathetic to the liberation forces will be summarily arrested and/or executed, newspapers hostile to the regime will be suppressed, demonstrations and all other forms of political activity not sanctioned by the government will be proscribed, citizens whose photographs are retained in police files will be restricted to their houses, persons who turn up in someone's house other than their own and have the misfortune to be detected will be arrested.

It can further be expected that those seized for all these "crimes" will be classified as common criminals, not political prisoners, and thus will be unaffected by Article 7 of the "Protocol on the Prisoners," which states, "The term 'civilian detainees' is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities."

It should be recalled that even persons who are acknowledged to meet that definition will not be released, according to the terms of the agreement. Rather, the question of "the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties. . . ." Persons who are not civilian detainees according to the above definition cannot even be the subject of negotiation, according to the agreement.

General Thieu has already received multiple guarantees from his mentors in Washington of his "right" to proceed as he sees fit in South Vietnam. In announcing to the U.S. people that an accord on ending the war had been reached, Nixon stressed that the "United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate

government of South Vietnam." From the standpoint of the U.S. government, the Thieu regime retains the right to govern its own territory any way it wants. Resistance by the liberation forces or by the South Vietnamese people to Thieu's conduct can thus be considered to be in violation of the cease-fire agreement, and to be grounds for fresh U.S. intervention.

And the Popular Resistance

Fundamentally, Thieu's draconian decrees represent the continuation of the civil war by the counterrevolutionary forces. This offensive will inevitably be met by resistance from the population. The unknown quantities in the situation are the response of the leadership of the revolutionary forces and the ability of the population to continue its struggle.

The same questions raised by the announcement of the October draft accords are raised by the present agreement: Will the North Vietnamese army come to the aid of the local NLF forces against Thieu's repression? Will the North Vietnamese defend their own base areas or will they gradually withdraw? Is the NLF infrastructure sufficiently intact to take on Thieu's army and police, the latter being deprived of the assistance of U.S. bombing? To what extent has the Southern population been temporarily demoralized by the years of genocidal bombing? Have the liberation forces been able to preserve their cadres in the cities, which will increasingly become the centers of struggle in the post-cease-fire period? Given Thieu's gross violations of the agreement, will Hanoi and the Southern liberation forces find ways of circumventing those sections of the accords that would prevent them from fighting back?

On the positive side, it is clear that the agreement is sufficiently vague—or unenforceable where it is not vague—to permit determined resistance by the liberation forces.

For example, the machinery established to "police" the agreement is completely inadequate from the viewpoint of U.S. imperialism. Nixon had pressed in the Paris negotiations for a massive deployment of troops representing the International Commission of Control and Supervision. In

this he was not successful. The ICCS will have a total of 1,160 members, 290 from each country. The Protocol on the commission details its personnel as follows: Each party will supply one senior representative, a headquarters staff of twenty-six, five persons for each of seven regional teams, two persons for each of fifty-five field teams, and 116 persons to provide "support for the commission's headquarters and its teams."

Actual inspection, then, will be carried out by fifty-five teams of eight persons each. The two teams assigned to the demilitarized zone area will have twelve members each. The 600-mile-long South Vietnamese border will be policed by nine inspection teams. An article in the January 26 *Washington Post* observed: "[U.S.] Army sources noted that at one time (1968-69) 54 U.S. Special Forces border-watching camps had dotted the jungles and mountains facing Cambodia and Laos, and heavy North Vietnamese infiltration still occurred."

If the well-trained Green Berets were unequal to the policing task, it is certain that a much smaller number of inspection teams will fare much worse, *if the North Vietnamese leaders decide not to abandon their comrades in the South.*

The military clashes that took place in the last days before the cease-fire went into effect indicated that the Saigon army is still unable to cope with the liberation forces on an equal basis. The January 22 *Washington Post* carried a report of heavy fighting in the Michelin rubber plantation forty miles northwest of Saigon. There were "strong indications," the report pointed out, that "two South Vietnamese battalions were decimated."

Captain Phung Van Thao, who was in charge of one battalion, said his unit "fell apart" under the liberation forces' assault.

The rapidly increasing rate of desertion from the puppet army is explainable in part by the troops' fear that in the absence of massive American bombing any serious contact with the North Vietnamese army would mean their annihilation.

Will the liberation forces exploit this weakness? Will they be able to organize the urban population into mass action—necessarily including armed self-defense—against the government's

political and economic repression? That Thieu will continue the civil war is certain. For the future of the Vietnamese and Indochinese revolution, the central question will be whether the liberation forces will do so also—and in an organized way.

If they adhere to the provisions of the agreement on the sanctity of the demilitarized zone and on the "peaceful" solution to political conflicts while Thieu systematically violates all the democratic aspects of the accord with full U.S. support, the Vietnamese revolution will sustain a grave, and perhaps long-lasting setback.

The Question of Leadership

In the weeks and months following the signing of the Paris agreement, the quality of the leadership of the liberation forces will be the decisive factor in the Vietnamese revolutionary struggle. The emergence and development of a consistently revolutionary vanguard is an absolute necessity. Without it, the Thieu regime and its Washington backers will isolate and destroy the liberation forces; and the ability of the antiwar movement to mobilize its forces will be significantly diminished.

If a revolutionary Marxist leadership does emerge, if Thieu's counter-revolutionary offensive is answered with revolutionary struggle in the pattern set by the Bolsheviks, there is no reason to suppose that the Saigon puppets will be any more successful than they have been in the past.

* * *

A report in the January 28 *New York Times* quoted an unidentified "well-informed South Vietnamese official" as saying that the Nixon regime had informed both Saigon and Hanoi that "if the cease-fire is violated in a blatant way, the United States will intervene again immediately."

The agreement signed in Paris allows the United States to maintain unlimited military force based in Thailand, on Pacific installations like Guam, and on the Seventh Fleet, which will continue to patrol the waters off the coast of Vietnam. Massive bombing of Vietnam can be resumed immediately should Nixon decide that the Vietnamese people have violated the Paris agreement. The

Saigon clique has already demolished the accords. Nixon's position is that the liberation forces must adhere to them anyway—or face renewed U.S. aggression.

The December saturation bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was ended only because of the heroic resistance of the North Vietnamese people and the mobilization of the international antiwar movement—especially the actions carried out by trade unions against U.S. capitalism. Nixon has now attempted to demobilize the antiwar movement by insisting that there is nothing more for it to do.

To fold up the movement of solidarity with the Vietnamese revolution at the current decisive stage would be to grant U.S. imperialism a free hand to renew its war. To mistake a turning point in the Indochinese war for its conclusion would be to ignore all the lessons of the conflict's twenty-five year history.

The antiwar movement was built on the premise that the United States has no right to negotiate anything related to the future of the Indochinese people. That struggle—to compel U.S. imperialism to get out of Indochina—has not yet been won.

The American ruling class is well aware of what it has been fighting for in Vietnam. Let us take one of the more candid formulations of its goals—one that has the advantage

of coming from a nonofficial source. The January 25 *New York Times* published a number of "man-in-the-street" interviews on what people thought about the truce agreement. A Mr. David Gollan, who is identified as a travel magazine executive, answered as follows:

"The end of the war is going to mean an increase in the travel business. There's no doubt that Vietnam is a tourist destination for the future, along with mainland China. If you have a lot of money to invest, South Vietnam has beaches second to none.

"Watch the Holiday Inns move in. People will want to go to Saigon, which has the reputation of a lively city, and any American who gets there will want to see Hanoi as well. The big circuit will be Hong Kong, Peking, Hanoi, Bangkok, Saigon, Singapore."

Thus the "generation of peace"—Wall Street style. The exposition may lack depth, but the content is accurate enough. On one side the U.S. employers, traders, and businessmen; on the other the Vietnamese workers and peasants, the international workers' movement, and the worldwide antiwar movement. The irreconcilable struggle between the two—waged in a spirit of mutual elimination—will determine, as Kissinger himself might put it, the modalities of the future of Southeast Asia. □

'Genocide Is Still Genocide'

Vienna's Largest Antiwar Demonstration

Vienna

On January 19, the day before Nixon was sworn in, demonstrations were held in all the larger cities of Austria in support of the struggle of the three peoples of Indochina against American imperialism.

In Vienna, the demonstration was the largest of its kind yet seen in Austria. It was organized by the Indochina Solidaritätskomitee, which includes all the anti-imperialist forces from the left Social Democrats to the Communist party youth, the far-left groups, and the Gruppe Revolutionäre Marxisten [Revolutionary Marxist Group, the Austrian supporters of the Fourth International].

Some 8,000 demonstrators marched through the city, chanting slogans calling for an immediate end to all aggressive acts against the peoples of Indochina and for signing the nine-point treaty. Other important slogans were: "Total support until the final victory," "Americans out of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—Victory in the People's War," "The Austrian trade-union federation must boycott the American aggressors," "Nixon, we don't believe a word of it—Genocide is still genocide."

In the welcoming speech, a member of the Gruppe Revolutionäre Marxisten said: "We must not let ourselves be deluded by Nixon. Imperialism

never willingly releases one of its victims. Even if there is a cease-fire, this will not mean the final victory of the revolution. What the United States will do to maintain the puppet clique if it is endangered after the cease-fire will depend primarily on the international solidarity movement. So we must not,

under any circumstances, relax our solidarity."

At the concluding rally, the representative of the Social Democratic party, Joseph Hindels, noting especially Olof Palme's statements, demanded that the Austrian government issue a strong condemnation of Nixon's policy. □

'There Is Really Nothing to Toast'

Accords Greeted With Relief, Skepticism

By David Thorstad

The announcement of a cease-fire agreement in Vietnam was received almost unanimously throughout the world with a mixture of relief and skepticism. Relief that the prospect of further murderous destruction by U. S. bombers appeared unlikely, if not altogether excluded; and skepticism about claims that peace was now, finally, at hand.

There was no celebrating and no joy, but rather a sober awareness that the treaty signed in Paris on January 27 essentially only ratified a potentially explosive, and highly contradictory, state of affairs in South Vietnam and provided no guarantee that the imperialists would not attempt to intervene again in Vietnam or elsewhere in Indochina.

"This is not an occasion for wild rejoicing," editorialized the *New York Times* January 24. "As one Vietnamese neutralist observed when the imminence of peace was first suggested: 'After thirty years of sacrifice and suffering, of rivers of blood and mountains of corpses, there is really nothing to toast.'"

In the United States, there was considerable soul-searching by commentators concerned over the legacy of the Vietnam war—a divided population and a generation of young people who grew up during the war and who, because of it, learned a deep distrust of their government.

Not many commentators went so far as to assert that the agreement had justified the long and bloody imperialist intervention in the affairs of the Vietnamese people. And none criticized Nixon for signing it.

The *New York Times* called the

agreement the "end of a nightmare."

The *Wall Street Journal* said the agreement, as Henry Kissinger described it, was "too good to be true," adding that "no serious person expects that elections will now be held, settling for once and all the political problems of Indochina."

"A time for giving thanks," said the *Washington Post*.

The universal expressions of relief bear witness to the acute moral questions raised by the incessant efforts of the world's most powerful imperialist nation to overcome the determination of a small agricultural country of nonwhite people. "Even the end of the world war did not so universally lift the weight from people's consciences," noted *Le Monde* January 26.

Many bourgeois governments preferred to ignore moral questions and stand silently by, or even lend their support, while the United States carried out its assault on Vietnam. Today their welcoming of the agreement and their earnestly intoned hopes of peace in Vietnam are calculated to cover up their complicity. Thus, for instance, a spokesman of the British Foreign Office said that "Her Majesty's government is very happy that after all these years of war an agreement has been reached in Vietnam." The Italian government said it hoped that the cease-fire would help "guarantee the people of Indochina the opportunity to freely express their will." And Park Chung Hee of South Korea, after announcing the withdrawal of the remainder of his country's troops from South Vietnam, claimed to be hoping "sincerely that the cease-fire leads to a lasting peace."

"Except for the far left," *Le Monde* editor Jacques Fauvet candidly wrote in the January 25 issue of the Paris daily, "world public opinion most often responded with complicity or indifference" to the war. Most European powers, he added, followed "no other policy than one of blindly going along with the United States. No doubt these powers will be showing an interest in Indochina when it becomes a promising market."

Nixon referred to the settlement as one of "peace with honor . . . a peace that lasts." Few would honestly agree with him. "What's honorable about bombing a hospital?" asked former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, who visited North Vietnam in July and August.

In an editorial January 25, the *Washington Post* pointed out the ominous implications of Nixon's referring in such terms to an "unavoidably transitional political settlement, one virtually sure to usher in protracted political and guerrilla struggle." By doing so, it warned, Nixon "tends to commit his own prestige to the gratuitous and dangerous project of ensuring that the 'peace' he has won will last. Precisely down that path lies the possibility of some degree of American reinvolvement, as unthinkable as that prospect may appear today."

The feeling in American capitalist circles tended to be that the cease-fire agreement should be supported despite the fact that it falls short of what the imperialists were shooting for in Vietnam and despite the fact that it provides no long-term guarantees. They reason that this agreement is better than no agreement because it lends a kind of legitimacy to the U. S. invasion of Indochina by formally recognizing the notion that the United States has something to negotiate in Indochina. It thus helps the imperialists to save "face" and mute the barbarity of their war crimes.

"We've signed a piece of paper to get our troops out of South Vietnam and get our prisoners home," said Representative Otis G. Pike, a *New York Democrat*. "But it's no victory and the war may not even come to an end."

Richard D. Holbrooke, managing editor of *Foreign Policy* magazine and for several years a foreign service officer in Vietnam, had this to

say: "Everyone knows deep in his heart that we didn't win this war. Maybe we didn't exactly lose it, but it came out as a stalemate, which is essentially what it has been for years. And for the doves—the people who most wanted to get out of Vietnam—any possible joy was obliterated by the 12 days of bombing at Christmas-time."

The *New York Times*, in a January 25 editorial, welcomed the provisions for an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and the return of American prisoners. The fundamental political issue, however, remains unsolved. "Ambiguity abounds," it noted, "in the pact's provisions for resolution of the political problem in South Vietnam, which, as Mr. Kissinger candidly observed, was 'what the civil war is all about.' The proposed Council of Reconciliation in South Vietnam seems more tenuous than ever; and the rule of unanimity under which it is to act bodes ill for any kind of effective political progress, much less 'reconciliation.'"

Nevertheless, the *Times* concluded, "everyone will agree that it is more honorable to end the fighting than to continue a conflict that has brought so much suffering to the people of Indochina for ill-defined purposes that have little relevance, if any, to American interests in the contemporary world. In that sense it is a 'right kind of peace,' deserving support in the hope that its calculated ambiguities can be transformed in time into the reality of an enduring settlement."

The *Los Angeles Times* welcomed the Paris accord, "even if that settlement is not much more than plaster over the cracks of continuing discord. . . .

"The kind of peace that has been negotiated is not the kind that John Kennedy or Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon would originally have wanted. It leaves Indochina vulnerable to Communist takeover. It creates no bastion in South Vietnam impregnable to Communist insurgency. It assures neither peace nor the peaceful evolution of the societies of Indochina."

The *Wall Street Journal* said January 26 that it views the agreement as a success no matter what now happens in South Vietnam. It voiced the hope that during the current "breather," the Vietnamese adversaries will

"start to sense that the sort of existence it provides is somehow better than the fighting and killing" and that eventually a pattern will evolve similar to the situation in Korea, where nearly twenty years after the armistice "the two Koreas are only now prepared to recognize each other's existence." Such an "optimistic outcome," however, cannot yet be confidently predicted, it continued. "Far more pessimistic outcomes are possible. The agreements could totally collapse, though this extreme seems most unlikely. Saigon could suffer a political collapse allowing a Communist takeover, though this strikes us as far more unlikely than President Thieu's American critics tend to assume.

"But the key point—and the key accomplishment of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger—is that from the American viewpoint the agreement is a success under practically any of the possible outcomes. The American prisoners will be returned, and the end of that anguish is a huge accomplishment even if nothing else could be counted. More broadly, it extricates from Vietnam our troops, our planes and most of all our responsibility for the ultimate outcome."

The conservative *Christian Science Monitor* expressed the view January 25 that while the settlement Kissinger worked out "is not as satisfactory as successive American presidents probably would have liked," it nevertheless deserves support because it "preserves a non-Communist government in South Vietnam. There is a fair chance that some kind of non-Communist government—though not necessarily President Thieu's—will survive in that tortured land."

Vietnam, it added, is "the least successful war" in American history: "Until Vietnam, Americans always won everything they set out to win. They took their independence in 1783. They opened their Western frontiers in 1812. They took what they wanted from Mexico in 1848, and from Spain in 1898. They denied the leadership of Europe to the Germans in 1918, and again in 1945. They kept the Russians out of the same Europe in the 'cold war' and out of South Korea in the process. Everything they set out to do by military power in the world they did—until Vietnam."

Perhaps the most critical note in the American capitalist press came from

the liberal *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*: "In the context of what the greatest military power the world has seen has done to a tiny Asian land there can be no talk of peace with honor. The honorable course would have been to let the Vietnamese alone; saving that, to have withdrawn years ago. There is no honor in destroying a country, its people and its culture—and in the process risking all the values that America pretends to stand for."

None of the capitalist newspapers, of course, carried their concern for honor and "American values" to the point of suggesting that the Nixon administration, congressional leaders, Pentagon brass, and industrial magnates be put on trial for their war crimes in Indochina. To do so would be to imply that imperialism has no right to carry out such crimes either now or in the future; no capitalist newspaper is prepared to make such a reckless suggestion.

Probably those Americans who uttered the most audible sigh of relief upon learning of the settlement were the chicken-hearted "doves" in the United States Congress. As the war became more and more unpopular, they found their rubber stamp for the imperialist aggression in Indochina increasingly awkward to wield. The settlement relieved them of the need to periodically threaten to take action. One of the most prominent of these so-called doves, Senator J.W. Fulbright, a Democrat, "congratulated Mr. Nixon for having obtained a settlement," reported James Naughton in the January 25 *New York Times*.

Kissinger received a standing ovation from senators he was briefing on the cease-fire accord January 26. The 150 representatives present at a House briefing were similarly laudatory.

A number of capitalist editorial statements on the agreement were larded with nauseating adulation for the allegedly peaceful efforts of Nixon and Kissinger, especially the latter. One might think they were being groomed as nominees for the Nobel Peace Prize. Apparently there are some people who would not consider such an idea grotesque, for Senator Henry L. Bellmon has just sent a letter to the Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee proposing that the next prize go to Nixon. "The totality of President Nix-

on's initiatives and accomplishments in 1972 in pursuit of an era of honorable and real peace in the world has been surpassed by no other statesman in this century," he wrote, according to the January 26 *Le Monde*. The French paper suggested that a more appropriate symbol for Nixon than the peace dove might be the rapacious U.S. national bird, the bald eagle.

Typical of this adulation is the *New York Times* editorial on January 25. It hails the "skill and tenacity" and the "calm and detached perseverance" of Nixon's lieutenant and appeals to a divided American population to forge a new unity in expressing the "nation's gratitude" to the right-hand man of the world's No. 1 war criminal. Kissinger, it says, "emerging from his long ordeal of negotiation, clearly deserves the respect and admiration of the country."

One of the themes running through much of the discussion of the settlement in the capitalist media is, indeed, the need to heal the wounds the war has left in the American social fabric and to restore lost confidence in the country's political leaders. It will take far more than conferring sainthood upon Kissinger to accomplish this.

"When President Kennedy led the nation into what became an open-ended military commitment to a struggling small state," wrote the editors of the *New York Times* January 26, "the United States Government was confident in its own power and skill, and it enjoyed the confidence of the American people. As President Nixon succeeds finally in extracting the nation, poorer and wiser, from the commitment, confidence is not a sentiment in surplus across the land."

The *Times's* James Reston wrote from Washington January 23: "The American people seem less confident about many things they took for granted. They are not so sure, for example, that the United States always prevails in foreign conflicts, that big guys always lick little guys, that money and machines are decisive in war, and that small states would rather surrender than risk American military might."

It is the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people that has taught the lesson Reston speaks of. But Amer-

ica's rulers, through their conduct of the war, have themselves taught a few lessons and in the process undermined confidence in their ability to rule. "Because of the secretive way in which it was begun, the deceptive way in which it was repeatedly proclaimed a success, the brutal way in which it was fought and the unequal way in which it was manned and paid for," observed Max Frankel in the January 28 *New York Times*, "the war managed to destroy the confidence of Americans in their purpose, power

and institutions."

But if the Vietnam war has taught the American people to place less confidence in those in power, it has also taught millions to have greater confidence in themselves and their right to engage in mass opposition to policies and politicians that do not represent their interests. This is a lesson they will not be apt to forget the next time the imperialists intervene—whether again in Indochina or in some other part of the world—in an attempt to crush a colonial revolution. □

How a Generation Learned to Demonstrate

The Role of the Antiwar Movement

By Fred Feldman

The major wars engaged in by U.S. capitalism in this century have been increasingly opposed by the American people. World War I, which President Wilson promised would "end all wars," began with a wave of chauvinism. World War II, which was presented as a crusade against Hitlerism and Japanese militarism, aroused nowhere near the amount of chauvinism seen in World War I. Many accepted it as an unpleasant necessity, out of fear of German fascism. As soon as Germany and Japan were defeated, however, the GIs demanded to be returned home. Their mood blocked the plan of U.S. imperialism to deploy them to defend Chiang's regime in China and to take over the colonial holdings of Japan and the European imperialist powers.

The Korean war was thoroughly unpopular, but in the midst of the McCarthyite witch-hunt the antiwar movement did not reach the stage of mass mobilizations.

Historically pacifist movements have thrived between wars. When war was declared, however, the pacifist leaders usually became transformed overnight into the worst kind of patriots. But the movement against the U.S. intervention in Indochina sprang up when the war was initiated on a massive scale and grew as the U.S. military commitment deepened. This fact differentiates this antiwar

movement qualitatively from all past waves of pacifism.

The antiwar movement traces its origins to the call issued in December 1964 by Students for a Democratic Society for a march on Washington on April 17, 1965. At that point, tens of thousands of U.S. military "advisers" were fighting in South Vietnam. The SDS call described the Vietnam war as a civil conflict and called for an end to U.S. involvement. SDS leaders scandalized traditional pacifists and liberals by openly inviting the participation of left-wing groups as the Communist party and the Socialist Workers party.

When Johnson began sustained bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965, campus-based committees set up to build the April 17 march spread rapidly. Despite last-minute denunciations of the demonstration by Norman Thomas, Bayard Rustin, and other reformists, 20,000 persons marched on April 17. A majority of them were college students.

The SDS organizers set an important precedent by appealing for international actions in solidarity with the Washington march. Such protests took place in France, Canada, Belgium, and other countries.

In the weeks following this demonstration, teach-ins were held on hundreds of campuses. These gatherings discussed and debated the real history

of the Vietnam war and the U. S. intervention. Officials of Johnson's administration were invited to defend his policies. Their confrontations with critics convinced thousands of students and professors that the government was lying about the war. The teachers helped open up the credibility gap which widened steadily in the succeeding years. The new element was not that the leaders of U. S. capitalism were liars but that an antiwar movement existed that made it widely known that they were lying.

Increased American troop involvement and the resulting casualties, rising draft calls, and the Buddhist-led demonstrations against the Saigon dictatorship sparked a rapid increase in antiwar sentiment. Although the students were the core of the movement, opposition appeared in every sector of American society.

In the Black community, hatred for the war became well-nigh universal. Referendums in cities such as Dearborn, Michigan, showed strong support among working people for immediate withdrawal of all U. S. forces. The first voices of protest began to be heard among the GIs themselves.

After the first demonstration, SDS withdrew from participation in the antiwar movement. It concentrated on narrowly conceived "community organizing" and "student power" projects. Later the organization turned toward head-on confrontations with the police and, still later, terrorism. Abstention from the antiwar movement contributed heavily to the final disintegration of SDS.

New Groups Move Forward

The main burden of antiwar organizing fell on local and national coalitions made up of students, traditional peace groups, radicals, and other forces. They focused on building mass street actions on a united-front basis. The driving force in these coalitions was the independent committees of college and high-school students.

In December 1966, a national conference created the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. This remained the most important student antiwar organization during the next six years.

On April 15, 1967, more than 350, February 5, 1973

000 persons participated in demonstrations in New York City and San Francisco. This was the biggest political protest action held in the U. S. up to that time.

The rise of the antiwar movement sharpened divisions within the U. S. ruling class. Fearing the deepening of class conflicts at home if escalation continued, major capitalist newspapers and political spokesmen began to advocate a tactical retreat from Vietnam.

Under these circumstances, the February 1968 Tet offensive of the National Liberation Front confronted the Johnson administration with an intolerable situation. Faced with the prospect of a political explosion in the United States, the White House rejected General Westmoreland's proposal to send 200,000 more GIs to Vietnam. Johnson decided to win a Korea-type settlement from the Vietnamese at the negotiating table. As a sop to the antiwar movement, the president announced that he would not run for reelection.

Although the opening of "informal talks" with Hanoi, combined with the diversionary effect of the 1968 election campaign, brought a lull in the U. S. antiwar movement, it did not halt the growth of international protest. In Great Britain, for instance, 100,000 turned out in London on October 27, 1968, to protest American aggression. The tide of opposition began to rise again soon after Nixon took office. On November 15, 1969, more than 500,000 persons marched in Washington, D. C., and 150,000 marched in San Francisco.

By the end of 1969 opposition to the war among GIs had reached a critical level. Many GIs in Vietnam were wearing peace medallions and organizing antiwar fasts and vigils. On several occasions, entire units had refused to fight. In the United States, where the antiwar movement was able to come to their aid, soldiers organized antiwar committees and published numerous antiwar newspapers. Thousands of GIs marched at the head of the massive demonstrations.

Nixon Retreats

These circumstances compelled Nixon to adopt the policy of "Vietnamization." Slowly and reluctantly, he began to withdraw American troops and try

to replace them with mercenary puppet troops backed by massive use of U. S. airpower.

Then in May 1970, when he ordered the invasion of Cambodia with U. S. troops, Nixon suddenly found himself confronted with a major upsurge of protest. The murder of four students by national guard troops during a demonstration at Kent State University in Ohio transformed these protests into the biggest student strike ever seen.

Demonstrations occurred at almost every college in the United States and at many high schools. In a direct challenge to capitalist control of the educational system, students took over university facilities and used them to build the antiwar movement.

On May 21, twelve local unions initiated a demonstration of 25,000 persons in downtown New York City protesting the invasion of Cambodia; this was the first antiwar demonstration organized by the labor movement. It was a significant crack in the myth of monolithic labor support for the war that George Meany, the head of the AFL-CIO, had sought to maintain.

As in previous escalations, Nixon's move into Cambodia touched off an angry international response. On May 10, more than 100,000 marched in Paris. In Mexico City, more than 7,000 students took to the streets. London, Copenhagen, Melbourne, and Bombay were some of the cities where mass protests challenged U. S. aggression in Indochina.

Although Nixon's troop withdrawals caused some to believe that he was really planning to end the war, demonstrations staged in Washington and San Francisco on April 24, 1971, topped even the massive outpouring of November 1969. Major contingents of Vietnam veterans and Chicanos revealed that organized protest had extended its social base beyond the student movement.

In 1972, confident that his offers of détente would gain the acquiescence of Peking and Moscow, Nixon began to reescalate the bombing of North Vietnam. When the Vietnamese answered with their spring offensive, which effectively exposed the failure of "Vietnamization," Nixon ordered the mining of the harbors of North Vietnam.

Nixon was quickly threatened with

a new domestic crisis. Demonstrations and rallies took place on the college campuses, and trade-union leaders called a conference to form "Labor for Peace." However, Brezhnev's willingness to play host to Nixon in Moscow cut across these activities, confused antiwar activists, and convinced most Americans that peace was near. The resultant lull in antiwar activity did not end until Nixon began the carpet-bombing raids on Hanoi and Haiphong.

But as Nixon was sworn in for his second term in Washington, D. C., on January 20, well over 100,000 persons gathered at the base of the Washington monument to express their outrage at the murderous bombings.

The foundation for this demonstration was laid by groups like the National Peace Action Coalition and the Student Mobilization Committee, which have struggled over the years for united action with groups such as the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice.

The Role of the Trotskyists

The mass mobilizations would have been severely curtailed on many occasions had it not been for the existence of a militant left wing in the antiwar movement, based primarily on the campuses. At the core of this left wing were the Trotskyists, who saw defense of the Indochinese revolution as their foremost task. Unlike the sectarians of various kinds, they never made support for their own demands or tactics a condition for participating in united antiwar actions.

The Trotskyists fought for a broad, united antiwar movement open to all who wanted to participate in antiwar demonstrations. They were opposed in this by reformists, who wanted to exclude "leftists," and by ultraleftists, who believed that procapitalist or reformist leaders could be defeated politically by barring them from the speakers' platform at demonstrations.

The Trotskyists' tactics aimed at mobilizing the masses independently of the capitalist parties in demonstrations against the war. They opposed the confrontationist proposals of ultralefts who believed that militant action by small groups could "stop the war

machine" or that clashes with the cops would galvanize the masses.

The most important opponents of mass action were the reformists who wanted the movement to concentrate on electing liberal Democrats. Since most antiwar activists, like most other Americans, believe that change can be accomplished by placing a "good" Republican or Democrat in high office, this illusion had a serious impact on the movement. In 1968, most antiwar activists flocked to the "peace" campaigns of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy. In 1972, McGovern's campaign for the presidency played a similar role.

The Trotskyists patiently sought to educate the antiwar movement about the role and potentialities of independent mass street action and the true nature of the capitalist parties and politicians. The Trotskyists and the forces that supported their proposals for the antiwar movement continued to build demonstrations during these election campaigns. As a result, the continuity of the movement was maintained, and the movement was rapidly rebuilt as the youth became disillusioned once again with the peace promises of the bourgeois politicians.

An equally important debate within the movement revolved around the central demand of the movement. At first most of the demonstrators embraced the demand that Johnson "negotiate now!"

Only a minority, including the Trotskyists, favored the demand for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. They held that the antiwar movement must defend the unconditional right of the Vietnamese to self-determination and call for an immediate end to all U. S. intervention. To concede to the United States the right to negotiate the fate of Vietnam would play into Johnson's hands. This was confirmed when Johnson himself became an advocate of "negotiations" in an effort to confuse and disarm the antiwar movement. The reformists advocated the "negotiations" slogan because they felt this demand would be most acceptable to the liberal politicians whom they viewed as the natural leaders and legitimate beneficiaries of the movement.

Some radicals, however, supported the "negotiations" slogan as an expression of solidarity because the Vietnam-

ese themselves were willing to negotiate with Johnson.

They were answered by Fred Halstead in the January 31, 1966, issue of *The Militant*: "Assuming that [Staughton] Lynd and [Tom] Hayden [two new-left antiwar leaders who held this view] have here correctly sensed the Vietnamese position, does this mean that the antiwar movement of the U. S. should refrain from demanding the complete withdrawal of U. S. troops? Absolutely not. The Vietnamese may feel it necessary to seek an end to the fighting under conditions which are short of full sovereignty for themselves as they did in the original Geneva agreements. That is up to them since it is they who are under the napalm. But it is another matter for American citizens in the antiwar movement in this country to give any credence whatsoever to the claims of the U. S. government that it has any right to negotiate anything about the future of Vietnam."

Events and patient educational work convinced most antiwar activists of the correctness of the "immediate withdrawal" slogan. It became the major slogan of the antiwar movement until the recent period. In addition, the slogan appealed to Americans appalled by rising casualties and to GIs who bitterly resented risking their lives in a war they could not justify.

In recent months the demand for total, unconditional withdrawal has suffered some erosion under the dual pressures of an anticipated settlement and the exertions of reformist forces, particularly the CP and the Maoist grouplets, who have used the slogan "Sign the Treaty Now" to revive the negotiations demand. But the experience of building a mass movement against any U. S. intervention in Indochina has convinced a solid core of the "generation that learned to demonstrate" of the principled necessity of the "Out Now" demand.

The International Protests

The international response to the struggle in Indochina, like that in the United States, was unprecedented. Internationally coordinated days of protest have become a regular occurrence.

Europe-wide demonstrations were symbolic of this spirit of international solidarity. On October 15, 1966, more than 4,000 youths from thirteen coun-

tries gathered in Liège, Belgium, to demand, "U. S. Aggressors Get Out of Vietnam!" in a demonstration sponsored by the Jeunes Gardes Socialistes of Belgium.

The rapid expansion of the antiwar movement in Europe was shown on February 21, 1968, when a second Europe-wide protest was held in West Berlin under the auspices of the German SDS [Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund — German Socialist Students Union]. More than 20,000 attended this rally, which was preceded by an international congress on the theme of "Victory to the Vietnamese revolution."

In France, efforts by the government to suppress antiwar demonstrations were one of the factors that set off the chain of struggles leading to the spectacular nationwide crisis of May-June 1968.

Australia, which sent more than 8,000 troops to fight for U. S. interests in Vietnam, was the scene of a sustained fight for their withdrawal. Trade unions played a leading role in that struggle. In May 1970 more than 115,000 persons demonstrated throughout Australia for immediate withdrawal and an end to conscription. On June 30, 1971, more than 100,000 marched in Melbourne alone.

These demonstrations eventually forced the government to bring all Australian troops home. Antiwar sentiment was a key factor in bringing the Labor party to power.

Activists in countries which had no troops in Vietnam concentrated their fire on their government's complicity with the genocidal war. Tens of thousands were mobilized in Canada around this issue.

In Japan, opposition to the government's ties to the Pentagon sparked demonstrations and strikes involving millions.

In December 1972, the bombing raids against North Vietnam gave rise to the biggest wave of international antiwar action to date. Massive demonstrations occurred in Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Bangladesh, Great Britain, and many other countries.

And something new happened at this point. The working class began to take militant action against Nixon's terror bombings. The seamen's and dock workers' unions in Australia voted not to handle U. S. shipping and goods while the bombing con-



Part of crowd at November 15, 1969, demonstration in Washington, one of the largest demonstrations of antiwar movement.

tinued. In Genoa, Italy, dock workers, acting independently of the union bureaucrats, took similar action. Danish dock workers in Aarhus and Copenhagen followed suit and asked the trade-union movement to launch an international boycott of trade with the United States.

The Stalinist Brake

Throughout the war, the antiwar movement has faced a serious obstacle in the attitude of the Communist parties. They have aped the passivity of the Moscow and Peking bureaucrats. Where these parties play a dominant role in the labor movement, they refused to mobilize their followers to support Vietnam.

In the United States, the Communist party sought to exercise a restraining influence on the movement, although the sheer size of the actions usually compelled it to participate. The CP leaders dragged their feet in building the mass demonstrations; and sometimes, especially when bourgeois liberals were contending in the elections, they opposed demonstrations as a "diversion" from unity with the reformist wing of the Democratic party.

In 1970, the CP provoked a damaging split in the U. S. antiwar movement by insisting that the entire movement accept a reformist program, drop the demand for withdrawal, and support "progressive" capitalist politicians.

The French Stalinists barred the Front Solidarité Indochine from in-

ternational antiwar gatherings and physically attacked FSI militants.

Although the abstentionism of the Stalinists seriously weakened the movement, the growth of antiwar actions showed that mass struggles could be built over their opposition. On April 24, 1971, nearly one million persons marched in protests in Washington and Los Angeles. The CP refused to endorse these actions until just weeks before they took place.

More than any other event, the Indochinese revolution and the antiwar movement gave cohesion and a central focus to a new generation of antiestablishment activists. The struggle against the war undermined respect for the most hallowed institutions of the capitalist government. The powerful and massive protests staged by the antiwar movement inspired resistance to exploitation and privilege by oppressed nationalities, workers, women, and others.

Nixon's Wilsonian promise that the truce in the Vietnam war will mean a "generation of peace" has fallen on skeptical ears. This fact is a tribute to the educational work carried out by the antiwar movement in the last eight years.

The Paris pact will not change the nature of imperialism or its goal of establishing its control in Indochina, in the Middle East, and throughout the world. The activists who built the antiwar movement must remain on the alert, remembering the lessons of the past decade of imperialist deception and anti-imperialist mass action. □

No Truce in Support for the Vietnamese Revolution!

[The following resolution was passed by a majority at a meeting of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International held January 21.]

* * *

Once more it is reported that a cease-fire agreement is imminent in Vietnam. So we must stress again the vital role that the international movement in defense of the Vietnamese revolution is called upon to play, regardless of the results of the current negotiations. Every analysis of the present situation, all information available, points to the conclusion that the Vietnamese revolution will not come to a halt, no matter what the outcome of the cease-fire negotiations. There will be no truce in the struggle of the masses of Vietnamese workers and poor peasants for their national and social liberation.

The savage attacks perpetrated by the American air force in late December 1972 on the Hanoi and Haiphong regions, the unprecedented bombings of the liberated areas of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which are still continuing as of this writing, confirm the determination of the American imperialists to utilize all the means of terror at their disposal to prevent the collapse of the puppet regimes installed in Saigon, Phnompenh, and Vientiane. Considerable amounts of arms and ammunition are still being sent to these puppets. Thousands of Thieu's U.S. "advisers" remain in South Vietnam. And even if the American troops are really withdrawn, powerful imperialist air and naval forces will remain on the alert in Thailand and off the Vietnamese coasts.

Moreover, maintaining the dictatorial Thieu regime in Saigon in the face of the combativity of the Vietnamese masses means that the revolutionary struggle will continue after the cease-fire agreement is signed, even if the general military confrontation between the two class camps halts for a time.

The hard-fought negotiations that took place between October 1972 and

January 1973 were centered precisely on marking out the ground for these future revolutionary struggles in South Vietnam, with each camp seeking to gain the best possible position for waging its fight. This is why the negotiations dealt with questions such as the real nature of the demilitarized zone, the size and role of the international control commission, and similar issues. Any concessions that imperialism may have extracted from the Vietnamese fighters in this regard, as the result of inadequate international support for the Vietnamese revolution in the face of large-scale aggression by U.S. imperialism, in no way undermine the capacity of the revolution to maintain its momentum in South Vietnam.

The puppet Thieu understands this very well. He is hastily setting up a system of semifascist repression, threatening to fire on every crowd of demonstrators, to murder every Communist, and to prevent any return of refugees to liberated villages. At the same time he is holding out the threat of slaughtering the hundreds of thousands of political prisoners in his hands.

The popular masses, for their part, are getting ready to take advantage of any military truce to resume their struggle to free the political prisoners, win democratic liberties, defend their material interests in the cities and countryside, bring about the disintegration of the army and regime of the puppet Thieu, and create and reinforce mass-based organs of power.

In these conditions, the signing of a cease-fire agreement will not mean a halt to the revolution in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, or to the counterrevolutionary intervention by imperialism. These two processes will continue in temporarily modified forms, with the possibility of a new direct military intervention by U.S. imperialism remaining suspended like the sword of Damocles over the heads of the workers and poor peasants of Indochina.

In these conditions also, the masses

of Indochina, confronted with the violence and the maneuvers of imperialism and the native exploiters, will have a still greater need for the active support of the international working class after the signing of the cease-fire agreement, just as they needed this help during the recent weeks of terror bombing by the U.S. Air Force.

The counterrevolutionary role of the bureaucrats of Moscow and Peking, who did not raise a finger to respond to Nixon's bombing of North Vietnam and who continue to refuse to supply the North Vietnamese workers' state with the more modern kinds of defensive weapons made available to bourgeois governments such as those in Egypt, Pakistan, India, or Bangladesh, cannot be condemned strongly enough. By arranging Nixon's visits to Moscow and Peking in 1972, these bureaucrats helped him to weaken the American antiwar movement in the crucial months of the past year. During the cease-fire negotiations they brought the maximum pressure on Hanoi to get the Vietnamese fighters to make concessions to imperialism. They put the crowning touch on this betrayal of the elementary interests of the workers of Vietnam and the entire world by remaining totally passive when Nixon unleashed against Hanoi and Haiphong the largest-scale and most barbarous acts of aggression that humanity has seen since the end of the second world war. The whole counterrevolutionary logic of their "peaceful coexistence" strategy has thus been starkly revealed.

But, for their part, the working masses of the world, after being deceived by the secret diplomatic maneuvers of Washington, Moscow, and Peking, were awakened by the shock and indignation aroused by Nixon's barbaric bombings. They have responded on an ever larger scale since December 1972. Leading up to the actions of January 20, 1973, the international demonstrations against the imperialist war of aggression have constantly broadened. In many countries, these

demonstrations reached new heights. What is more, in Australia, Italy, and Denmark, sectors of the organized workers' movement started, or issued appeals for starting, direct industrial action against the war, thereby pointing out the path for the most effective response to the imperialist barbarism.

It is the duty of the international working class to continue to extend this movement of solidarity, no matter what the outcome of the negotiations and the cease-fire agreement, until the complete and final victory of the Vietnamese revolution. There can be no halt, truce, or "cease-fire" in our solidarity with the Vietnamese revolution—this is the fundamental truth that we must constantly reiterate to the working masses of the five continents as this turn is taking place in Indochina.

The Fourth International issues a solemn appeal to all activists, to all anti-imperialist and anticapitalist organizations throughout the world. For more than two decades the Indochinese masses have fought with a heroism unparalleled and an energy and endurance unique in the history

of this century for the cause of their emancipation and for socialism. They have fought for us all. The least that we can do in return for the great service they have done for the world revolution is to continue unceasingly our actions in solidarity with their revolution, which is also unrelenting.

The Fourth International calls on all working-class organizations to make defending the Vietnamese revolution against the terror of Washington and Thieu, whose blows continue and may escalate further, into the cause of millions and millions of workers in all countries.

It calls on all Communists, on all socialists, not to let themselves be duped by the diplomatic maneuvers of imperialism and by the cover that the bureaucratic betrayers in Moscow and Peking are continuing to provide for these maneuvers.

Our duty is clear. We must maintain, broaden, extend, and unify nationally and internationally the movement of active and militant solidarity with the heroic fighters and the peoples of Indochina until the final and complete victory of the Indochinese revolution. □

antiwar demonstration on December 31.

Labour Minister Clyde Cameron, also a senior minister, went further; he charged that the people in control of U. S. policy were "maniacs." He too condemned the "murderous bombing of Hanoi."

Cameron said, "The world is witnessing an attempt by the greatest military power ever known to impose national torture upon a poor and tiny Asian country to force it to accept America's own repudiation of an agreement to end the war.

"I think it's about time the people of all countries, including in particular the people of America, should acquire proper priorities in this matter.

"After all, war mongering is based upon profiteering and if the people of the world can rise up and take effective action against the profiteering which has so far characterized the American action in Vietnam, the war may come to an end."

According to a report in the January 1 *Sydney Morning Herald* Labor Senator Arthur Gietzelt, speaking at a Sydney antiwar rally on New Year's Eve, said that the government should be persuaded to "appropriate all land owned by US companies in Australia.

"Ban the entry of all US citizens unless they are publicly associated with the antiwar movement.

"Cancel the agreement with the U. S. concerning the Exmouth Gulf and Pine Gap installations."

Senator Gietzelt continued, "... on December 18, Nixon unleashed the most terrible bombing of a civilian population in world history.

"Unionists should refuse to unload US ships, refuel US planes and repair any US equipment, boycott American goods and ban the entry of US films."

Australian trade unionists didn't have to be advised by Senator Gietzelt on the action they should take. Even before the senator made his statement, the Seamen's Union declared all U. S. ships black and refused to man the tugboats to lead them into any Australian port. The Seamen's Union was soon joined by the Waterside Workers Federation, which represents the longshoremen.

Ten unions signed a declaration threatening to take direct action against U. S. economic interests if the

The Bombing Fallout in Australia

Boycott Shook Even State Department

By Sol Salby

Sydney

Both the political and industrial wings of the Australian labor movement responded in a new way to Nixon's latest Vietnam escalation. The old Liberal-Country party government used to slavishly support all escalations. Its sole criticism was reserved for those occasions when it felt the U. S. administration wasn't going far enough.

Under mass pressure the new Labor party government reacted quite differently. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam sent a "strongly worded protest note" to Nixon. The text of the note, however, wasn't made public. Other ministers were more outspoken.

Dr. Cairns, chairman of the Victoria Vietnam Moratorium Committee, who as secondary industry and overseas trade minister is the most senior minister after Whitlam and Deputy

Prime Minister Barnard, issued a statement scoring Nixon's policy that was reported in the December 22 *Sydney Morning Herald*.

"I say to the Nixon administration: 'Stop your attack on the Vietnamese people. Leave them alone. Take your armed forces home.'"

As for the negotiations, the statement continued:

"They were used for electoral purposes. Now [that] they have served those purposes the war goes on and the bombings and killings are intensified."

In a later statement Cairns characterized the bombing as "the most brutal, indiscriminate slaughter of defenseless men, women, and children in living memory." He and fellow Labor Senator W. W. Brown called on the people of Melbourne to attend an

bombing did not cease. They suggested a total embargo on all commercial and industrial activities by U. S. interests in Australia. In a similar move the western Australia branch of the Amalgamated Postal Workers Union demanded that the federal union ban all mail to and from the United States. The Building Trades Group in New South Wales threatened a complete ban on the extensive U. S. building interests.

Two ships were immediately affected by the ban; the *Austral Envoy* and the *Monterey*. For several days they were unable to dock. Both passengers and crew were unable to reach the shore.

Labour Minister Cameron refused to comment on the unions' ban, making it clear that it was a union affair. Jim Cairns thought the ban was a reasonable measure. But all sections of the bourgeois media vehemently attacked the union ban. Even those forces which backed the election of the Labor government and are nominally "antiwar", such as the nationwide *Australian* and the Melbourne *Age* displayed their crudities. A rise in the confidence of the working class wasn't what they bargained for when they helped bring in the Labor government. Both were opposed to the unions' actions.

The Sydney Morning Herald summarised the employers' horror at the new developments in a New Year's Day editorial entitled "Into 1973." These representatives of the conservative wing of the ruling class lamented:

"Australia enters the new year with a complete turnabout in foreign policy. The United States, for so long 'our great and powerful friend', is now the target for the Australian Government's criticism and virulent abuse. The Whitlam Administration has not waited long to abandon the pretence of goodwill towards the US and sabotage the ANZUS treaty. Any stick is good enough to beat Washington, from granting a passport to an avowed enemy of the US [journalist Wilfred Burchett—S. S.] through lifting of travel restrictions to North Vietnam and the cancelling of the military aid program to South Vietnam to Mr. Whitlam's 'strong protest' against America's Vietnam policy.

"The language used by senior members of the Australian Government

about the US is the language hitherto reserved to Moscow and Peking. One minister describes the Nixon Administration as 'maniacs' and threatens the US with commercial and military sanctions. Another denounces America's 'naked aggression' and backs street demonstration against her."

Australian capitalists were not the only ones offended. Nixon and Kissinger didn't appreciate being referred to as maniacs. Diplomatic relations between the two countries became strained. Being used to the servile role played by Australia under the Liberals, Nixon exerted maximum pressure on the Australian government. U. S. Ambassador Walter Rice tried on three separate occasions to protest directly to Whitlam. On two occasions his protest had to be delivered to someone else as Whitlam "wasn't available." Meanwhile Henry Kissinger himself called on the Australian embassy in Washington and lectured the staff on the merits of the bombings. Secretary of State Rogers also expressed "official concern" over the boycott.

The U. S. administration had another card up its sleeve. The American government informed the Australian embassy that a big union would retaliate against the seamen's ban. The Nixon administration's knowledge of the retaliatory ban of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) on Australian shipping before it was publicly announced convinced the Labor ministry that it was arranged by the U. S. administration. Whitlam was of course careful to deny this "offensive supposition" in his press conference. The president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), Bob Hawke, who is also vice-president of the Labor party, wasn't so cautious: "There's no doubt it could have been done in collusion with the U. S. government," he said.

The reactionary stand of Thomas Gleason, president of the ILA, was another example of right-wing bureaucratic leadership in action. Traditionally the ILA leadership has been more hawkish than the Pentagon. Its leaders' supposed concern about the welfare of seamen contrasted strangely with their indifference to the lives of longshoremen and seamen in Vietnam.

While Australia's support for U. S. policies on Vietnam has ended, the ALP bureaucrats very soon were back-

tracking under pressure from the domestic bourgeoisie and the Nixon administration. For some time Whitlam refused to make any public comment on the unions' ban or his ministers statements. The role of forcing the unions to retreat was left to ACTU's President Hawke. He immediately conferred with Whitlam and Seamen's Union Secretary Elliot V. Elliott. Elliott is a member of the Socialist party of Australia—a pro-Moscow group that split from the "independent" Communist party of Australia.

Hawke's role in forcing the seamen to lift their ban was made easier by ACTU Secretary Souter, who publicly dissociated the ACTU from the boycott while Hawke was overseas. It was also aided by the ambivalent attitude of the unions' leadership.

The unprincipled position of the SPA and the CPA, which has strong influence in the Waterside Workers Federation, led them to accept the "right" of the U. S. to negotiate the fate of Vietnam, ignoring the Vietnamese peoples' right to self-determination and tacitly accept a U. S. "right" to maintain a presence in Vietnam. This provided an opening for Hawke.

Hawke simply argued that since talks have resumed, the way to peace is open and there is no need to maintain the ban. An ACTU recommendation to the seamen was carried unanimously by a mass meeting of seamen on January 9. The ban was lifted.

Whitlam has cracked down on his ministers, barring them from making any statements on foreign affairs. However, the labor-movement response to Nixon's murderous escalation had some long-term effects. The antiwar movement, armed with new support, is showing signs of recovering from a period of dormancy. Whitlam committed himself in his January 9 press conference to taking public action if the bombing of Hanoi should resume.

Whitlam also stated: "I'd like to emphasize that our party, our government has a mandate to do all it can to stop the continuation of this war. I hope this is quite clear to everyone here and abroad."

The January 10 *Sydney Morning Herald* reported that ACTU President Hawke had stated the ACTU would consider a further ban against U. S. ships in the event of new bombings.

Police Assault Protesters in Mexico City

Mexico City

Some 600 persons defied an official ban and an overwhelming array of police January 20 to demonstrate here in solidarity with the international protests against the war in Vietnam. After several sharp clashes the marchers dispersed in the face of attacks by the *granaderos* (riot troops).

According to police reports, fifty persons were arrested, all of whom were later released. These included six construction workers from a nearby site, who were badly beaten by the arresting police. The accusation was that they supplied rocks to the demonstrators. Many of the marchers were also beaten up by the cops.

"At times the *granaderos* used excessive force," the Mexico City daily *Excelsior* reported in its January 21 issue. "The same was true of the officers of the Dirección de Investigaciones de la Dirección General de Policía y Tránsito [the Detective Bureau of the Police Department, the plainclothes cops]. They beat up the persons they arrested."

The police did not spare their forces. They brought out special armored cars, jeeps with tear-gas launchers, patrols, and a large number of plainclothes detectives. Thousands of *granaderos* were deployed in small groups. In addition, several army detachments were hidden in the nearby streets.

Two demonstrations had been called, one by the Comité de Movilización pro Vietnam (Vietnam Mobilization Committee), the other by a group called Democrats in Mexico. On January 19, General Gutiérrez Santos, the head of the police department, issued an order banning both. The first group, he said, included people who had "caused trouble" before. The other group was led by "foreigners," that is, American residents in Mexico.

The Comité de Movilización pro Vietnam, which met on January 16 to plan the demonstration, included more than thirty left groups and independent unions such as the two Christian Democratic labor organizations, the Union Nacional de Traba-

jadores (National Union of Workers) and the Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (Authentic Workers' Front).

It is impossible to know how many persons came out for the Comité's demonstration because considerable

Antiwar Demonstrations in Italy

12,000 March in Rome

Rome

After the onset of the new wave of bombings in Vietnam, anti-imperialist demonstrations multiplied in most Italian cities. Powerful demonstrations took place in particular in Milan and Rome, initiated both by the traditional workers' parties—which made a bloc with petty-bourgeois or bourgeois currents—and by revolutionary-left groups and movements.

The January 9 demonstration in Rome was a particularly significant success, coming on the eve of other vitally important events—the January 12 general strike and the struggle against the national congress of the neofascist movement on January 18. It was initiated by seven revolutionary-left organizations, the Fourth International, Avanguardia Operaia, Potere Operaio, Viva il Comunismo, Il Comunista, the Gruppo Gramsci, and the Communist party of Italy (Marxist-Leninist).

The *il Manifesto* group gave its backing on the eve of the demonstrations, as did *Lotta Continua*, whose participation, however, was very limited.

Between 10,000 and 12,000 persons, most of them young militants, marched through the center of the city carrying a great number of red flags and banners. The official slogans were: "Oppose American imperialism and its Italian accomplices!" "The Italian proletariat shoulder to shoulder with the armed struggle of Vietnam until the final victory!" "The revolutionary left supports the Vietnamese Revolution!"

confusion was caused by the police ban and the concentration of repressive forces. Many protesters left before a group of 600 tried to get the march started.

This was the first time since 1968 that the government has banned a demonstration against the Vietnam war. In 1970, some 10,000 persons marched in protest against the invasion of Cambodia. In 1972, a crowd of 20,000 came out. □

On January 7 the Rome group of the Italian section of the Fourth International carried out an action at the international airport in this city. On the main concourse, a banner was raised with the inscription: "With Vietnam until the final victory."

Leaflets in four languages were distributed. Slogans against Nixon were inscribed on the Pan American booth. The two main dailies in the capital, one of which is an unofficial organ of the Communist party, published reports of the action. □

12,000 March in London

London

Nearly 12,000 persons marched in London on January 20 in the largest demonstration against the war in Vietnam since 1968. A contingent of about 3,000, marching behind the banner of the Indochina Solidarity Conference, joined demonstrators assembled at a Trafalgar Square rally organized by the British Council for Peace in Vietnam.

Together they marched to the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square, where one participating group burned an effigy of Nixon.

Many demonstrators carried signs and banners saying "Sign Now." The slogans of "Solidarity Till Final Victory" and "Out Now" were also raised. □

Iceland Fighting Second 'Codfish War'

By David Thorstad

Icelandic gunboats interrupted their surveillance of British and West German trawlers January 23 in order to help evacuate inhabitants of Heimaey Island whose lives were endangered by molten lava spewing up out of the mile-and-a-half-long volcanic eruption on the island. The surveillance is part of an effort to combat a greater long-range threat to Iceland as a whole—the decision of England and West Germany to flout Iceland's fishing limit of fifty nautical miles. Their decision has led to what is referred to as the "codfish war."

The "war" has been going on since Iceland extended its fishing limit from twelve to fifty miles on September 1, 1972. While no bullets are reported to have been fired, the Icelandic government has taken definite steps to enforce its limit, such as barring German and British vessels from seeking haven in its harbors in case of a storm at sea and slashing the trawl-lines of intruders who refuse to go outside the fifty-mile limit. Several such incidents have occurred.

On November 23, for instance, an Icelandic coast guard spokesman announced, according to a Reuters dispatch from Reykjavik, that stones and lumps of metal were thrown at Icelandic fishing boats after the coast guard gunboat *Odinn* cut the wires of the British trawler *Via Nova* off the northwest coast of Iceland. The German trawler *Berlin*, out of Bremerhaven, was given the same wire-cutting treatment on January 6.


On January 19, the British Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries ordered a 1,100-ton, fast, oceangoing tug to head for Iceland to help trawlers ward off wire-cutting "and other aggressive actions."

Great Britain and Germany claim that Iceland is violating international law by ignoring a ruling by the World Court in The Hague on August 17 allowing them to fish inside the fifty-mile limit but limiting their takes. Iceland insists the court has no competence to rule on the dispute, which

it considers political rather than juridical.

Iceland's decision to extend its fishing limit involves a number of political, economic, and ecological questions. But for Iceland and its 200,000 inhabitants, the overriding issue at stake in the codfish war is survival.

Probably no other country is as dependent upon fishing. More than



Politisk Revy

The town of Seydisfjörður on the east coast of Iceland has felt the effects of large foreign fishing fleets vacuuming the sea clean of fish. Its population has fallen sharply in recent years and its fish industry lacks raw materials.

80 percent of its exports consist of fish products. The rich fishing grounds off its coast are thus its very lifeline. The survival of this lifeline is seriously jeopardized by the large, marauding fishing fleets of highly industrialized countries like Great Britain and Germany. These fleets are capable of such enormous takes as to threaten to inflict a kind of "overkill" on Iceland's fishing grounds. The

repercussions of such a situation would be severe not only for Iceland's population but also for the ecological balance in the adjacent waters.

England and Germany are afraid that Iceland's new limit may set a precedent. England, for instance, takes 250,000 tons of fish annually out of Iceland's waters—one-third of its annual take. Another third of its take comes out of the Barents Sea off the northern coast of Norway. The growing pressure in Norway to follow Iceland's lead and extend its own fishing limit is cause for concern in England. (The Norwegian vote rejecting entry into the Common Market has made such a move increasingly possible. The Market requires uniform

sea limits for member countries, and as a nonmember, Norway would not be hamstrung by a requirement that Norwegian fishermen saw as an invitation to the big British and German fleets to raid their fishing grounds.)

Leftist groups like the Sosialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People's party) are making something of a campaign out of supporting Iceland and are

pressing the Norwegian government to follow suit.

There is considerable support for Iceland elsewhere in Scandinavia. Greenland, for instance, is also demanding the right to a fifty-mile limit—in spite of the fact that, as a province of Denmark, such a limit would violate Common Market policy. This was one of the main reasons why Greenland, like Norway, voted against entering the Market.

The Faroe Islands solidarized themselves with Iceland near the end of August by refusing to supply two British trawlers. The Faroes have been granted certain special privileges to fish within Iceland's new limit.

Fishermen in Denmark, on the other hand, are worried that the codfish war may drive their competitors back into the North Sea. Last August they threatened to boycott deliveries of Icelandic fish to Jutland and to block ports with their boats. Packinghouse owners and workers protested immediately that such a move would automatically provoke unemployment and entail the loss of external markets. Iceland supplies more than 60 percent of the fish packed in Jutland.

Iceland's coalition government came to power in June 1971 on a program that included, among other things, reorganizing the fishing industry and extending the fishing limit to fifty nautical miles. In February 1972, the Allting (parliament) voted unanimously to approve a government proposal to this effect. On March 1, Iceland repudiated an agreement it had made with West Germany and Great Britain in 1961 obliging it to take any dispute over future extensions of its fishing limit to the World Court. The agreement, wrote Gudmundur Saemundsson in the November 17 issue of the Danish biweekly *Politisk Revy*, "was made when British warships were still operating inside Icelandic fishing boundaries." The agreement was opposed at the time by the parties currently in the government. They are the Progressive party, the People's Alliance, and the Radical Liberal party.

Iceland claims that as far back as 1949 the United Nations had in effect recognized its right to extend its limit. At that time Iceland set as a condition upon its membership in the world body the acceptance of a 1948 Allting resolution pertaining to the Icelandic continental shelf. "This condi-

tion," wrote Saemundsson, "was approved without objection. The law states that all fishing over the Icelandic continental shelf must be done under Icelandic approval and control. All subsequent extensions of the Icelandic fishing limit are based on this law, which Iceland's current adversaries agreed to in 1949."

On December 18, 1972, the United Nations General Assembly again adopted, by a vote of 102 to zero with 18 abstentions, a resolution submitted by the Icelandic delegate on December 4. The document recognizes the right of states to permanent sovereignty over all natural resources (including fish and oil) found in their

continental shelf and in adjacent waters.

The present codfish war is the second of its kind. The first began when Iceland extended its fishing limit to 12 nautical miles in 1958. At that time, too, Great Britain and West Germany were recalcitrant in their opposition. The "war" lasted until 1961, when Iceland signed the agreement that it repudiated last March.

The second codfish war is only five months old, but it has already become a sore spot in the relations between some Scandinavian countries and members of the Common Market with whom they trade. □

The Shadow of Vietnam Between Old Friends?

Gus Hall Lays One on Harry Bridges

By Frank Lovell

Harry Bridges, the ageing president of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) on the West Coast, has been publicly admonished by his longtime friend and political associate Gus Hall, the ageing general secretary of the Communist party, USA.

Hall stuck his fork into Bridges for pulling out of the antiwar movement. The attack appeared in the January 4 *New York Daily World* under the title "No matter how you spell it—surrender is surrender." It was reprinted on the West Coast in the January 6 *People's World* as a front-page feature: "Bridges 'Off the Beam'—Gus Hall."

The general secretary of the American Communist party was put on the spot by some remarks Bridges made on the nine-point cease-fire agreement in his column *On the Beam* in the December 22 issue of *The Dispatcher*, the official ILWU publication. The CP has been campaigning under the slogan "Sign Now." Bridges attacked this *from the right*.

"Efforts now being made by the various sections of the peace movement here at home to mount a campaign demanding that the United States sign the agreement allegedly reached last October are not going

to get very far and are not, from all appearances, going to receive much support," the Stalinist union chief said. "The demand for the United States to sign now is exactly the demand being raised by Hanoi. This very factor in and of itself rubs a lot of people the wrong way. Too many people hesitate to line up with a program which calls upon them to demand from their own countrymen exactly what is being demanded by Hanoi."

In Bridges's opinion, Nixon has won; the antiwar movement has collapsed; and if the Vietnamese hold out any longer, they will be "overplaying their hand."

Here is how he puts it:

"Although as a rule our union pays little attention to results of national poll takers, it is difficult to ignore what seems apparent in too many ways, namely, that support of the administration's position and of Nixon among the American people has grown to a substantial degree . . .

"If our judgment of the situation here in the United States is correct, then for all effective purposes and for various reasons the peace movement has practically collapsed as an effective organization."

Bridges, in effect, is calling for a

"stand still cease fire in place," as Hall sees it; and this "was the position of the Johnson Administration and it has been and is the position of the puppet Thieu regime."

The stand taken by Bridges would, if adopted, lead to "surrender on the domestic front" and would "disperse the peace movement," according to Hall.

The general secretary of the American Communist party argues that the antiwar movement in the United States should support "the October 20th agreement which Kissinger and Nixon had given their approval to."

How did the Stalinist union chief happen to fall into such a counter-revolutionary position? On this, Hall is discreetly silent. Yet it is not without precedent in Bridges's record, as a brief account will show.

Bridges has been an official representative of the San Francisco longshoremen since the 1934 general strike in that city. However, his militancy evaporated long ago.

Bridges was a friend of the Soviet bureaucracy in Stalin's time, subscribed to the theory of "socialism in one country," advocated peaceful co-existence (between the Soviet Union and world capitalism, and between the working class and the U. S. ruling class), and was the best-known leader in the Stalinist wing of the CIO union bureaucracy until the right wing, led by Murray and the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists—aided, abetted, and pressured by the State Department—split the CIO and expelled the Stalinist-dominated unions.

Murray's priest-ridden faction excommunicated Bridges and the ILWU from the CIO in 1950, but the West Coast longshore union survived. Bridges retained his control of it and continued his class-collaborationist policies.

In 1936, in accordance with the "popular front" line that had just been advanced by Stalin, Bridges actively promoted the "labor contingent" of the Democratic party, working to support the antilabor Mayor Dore in Seattle and collaborating with the reactionary Dave Beck of the Teamsters union in that city.

In October 1937 John L. Lewis appointed Bridges to the post of West Coast director of the CIO.

In April 1938, during a jurisdiction-



BRIDGES: Wants Vietnamese to be reasonable and give up.

al fight with the then independent Sailors' Union of the Pacific, which was defying a National Labor Relations Board ruling, Bridges came out with the hardly novel slogan: "You can't fight against the government."

Later in the same year, at the national CIO convention, Bridges was one of the sponsors of a resolution to draft Roosevelt for a third term. (Lewis, who chaired the convention, ruled it "out of order.")

When the Stalin-Hitler pact was signed in August 1939, the Stalinists at once switched their line. They dropped all talk of a third term for Roosevelt, and started an "antiwar movement" around the slogan "The Yanks Are Not Coming."

Bridges switched, too. But like other Stalinist figures in the union movement he avoided endangering his relations with U. S. employers. In February 1940 he cooked up a "five-year peace plan" for the waterfront, offering the maritime industry a no-strike pledge for five years as part of a compulsory arbitration scheme.

When Hitler scrapped the Stalin-Hitler pact and invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the American CP scrapped its fake "antiwar move-

ment" and demanded immediate U. S. entry into the war.

During World War II, union officials with few exceptions signed the wartime no-strike pledge and tried to enforce it. Bridges was not one of the exceptions.

One of the wartime strikes was against Montgomery Ward in Chicago in the spring of 1944, called by the CIO Wholesale and Department Store Union to raise 40-cent-an-hour wages. The strikers appealed to Bridges for help, asking the ILWU warehouse local in Ward's St. Paul outlet to stop shipping goods to Chicago. Bridges handed them his answer, "We will handle Chicago orders eight hours a day; call it scabbing if you want to."

Roosevelt demanded legislation in 1944 for universal labor conscription, a measure opposed by both the AFL and CIO. When the heads of the two labor federations—William Green and Philip Murray—went meekly to the White House to explain their opposition, Roosevelt told them that in his opinion they did not speak for organized labor. He showed them a telegram from Harry Bridges endorsing the slave-labor law.

Bridges favored extending the no-strike pledge into the postwar years. He told a meeting of the CIO Warehousemen's local No. 6 in San Francisco on May 25, 1944, that "the strike weapon is overboard, not only for the duration of the war, but after the war."

A resolution was adopted at that meeting calling wartime strikes "treason" and urging employers to "refuse to give consideration to the demands of any section of labor" that called a strike during the war and "indefinitely thereafter."

If Gus Hall ever differed with Harry Bridges on any of these items and scores of others in his class-collaborationist course, he never mentioned it publicly. With good reason. It happened to be precisely the course the Communist party insisted on. Harry Bridges today is only being consistent with what he has done in the past, shoulder to shoulder with Gus Hall.

What, then, made Gus Hall suddenly decide to take up the cudgels against his longtime partner in sellouts?

The reason is that the Communist party, USA, faces a very difficult problem. It is but a vestige of what it once was. To make a comeback, it must re-

furtish its reputation. It needs, in particular, a militant image in the antiwar movement.

Success in this endeavor has been gravely compromised by the failure of the Kremlin bureaucrats to provide adequate aid to the Vietnamese, by their failure to react to the mining of the harbors in Vietnam, by their display of abject servility at the Moscow meeting with Nixon, by their complaisance in face of the most massive terror bombings in all history, by the pressure they have placed on the Vietnamese to meet Nixon's terms.

True, the leaders of the American CP could have taken an independent stand and denounced Moscow's betrayal of the Vietnamese revolution. Such an action, however, is absolutely foreign to their political nature. They

were brought up in the same school as Harry Bridges.

Consequently, they clung to the face-saving formula provided by the "Sign Now" slogan. They justified this by the fact that the Vietnamese, under agonizing military pressure from the mightiest power on earth, were compelled to "negotiate" and to make concessions.

What Bridges did was to rip away even this fig leaf. He said in public what everyone suspects the Kremlin bureaucrats really think in private.

And if the truth were known, it's what Gus Hall really thinks, too.

But the general secretary of the American Communist party has to keep up pretenses. That's why he decided to stay "on the beam" and try to look "principled" as against the unprincipled Bridges. □



AMILCAR CABRAL

Portuguese Fear PAIGC Breakthrough

Amílcar Cabral Assassinated in Conakry

"For four years, one of the fundamental aims of the Portuguese has been to kill not only myself, but also other leaders of the party. Because they believe that if they kill me it is finished for our fight."

The words belonged to Amílcar Cabral, founder of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde (PAIGC—African party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands), describing the ever present threat of assassination, during an interview granted while he was in New York for an appearance at the United Nations last October. "Who can tell you if this very moment the Portuguese are not trying to kill me in New York?"

Such attempts had been made on his life before. "The Portuguese tried to kill me even in Conakry," he said, in reference to the abortive Portuguese invasion in November 1970. "They sent troops to Conakry to invade the Republic of Guinea, and the elite of the Portuguese troops were [ordered] to attack my house. They destroyed a part of my house [but] fortunately, they did not kill my wife and my children. I was not in the house."

On January 20, another attempt was

made. This time it succeeded. Cabral was shot dead outside his house.

In announcing the deed, President Sékou Touré of Guinea attributed the murder to "the poisoned hand of imperialism and Portuguese colonialism."

The assassin was reportedly Innocente Camil, a commander of the PAIGC's naval forces. In a radio speech January 22, Touré said that Camil and his accomplices were arrested while attempting to reach Guinea-Bissau by boat after kidnapping a number of PAIGC cadres. These men, according to Touré, were Africans "belonging to the Portuguese colonialist army who had infiltrated the ranks of the PAIGC by pretending to be deserters." He said that they would be tried by members of the PAIGC.

"Imperialism wanted to use this crime to create a deep conflict within the PAIGC and then to make people believe that a great fighter like Amílcar was unpopular inside his own party, thereby liquidating also the great prestige that he had acquired in the struggle and through struggle."

Cabral, wrote Marcel Niedergang in the January 24 *Le Monde*, "had

the stature of a true head of state, and his intellectual and moral qualities placed him head and shoulders above many present-day African leaders." His assassination is a severe blow to the African liberation struggle.

It came at a time when the guerrilla movement he founded in 1956 controlled approximately two-thirds of the territory of Guinea-Bissau and three-quarters of its population. It is also a crucial point in the history of the PAIGC. Since the armed struggle was launched in 1963, the guerrilla movement had succeeded in consolidating its support to the point where it reportedly felt strong enough to declare independence in 1973 and to demand recognition by the United Nations.

In preparation for such a move, the PAIGC held elections for a national assembly last year during the months of April through July in the territory it controls. One of the first acts of the new national assembly, it is assumed, will be the declaration of independence. Cabral had reportedly won the backing of seventy countries for this move.

The Portuguese military governor of Guinea-Bissau, Antonio Spínola, stated a few weeks ago, according to the Danish daily *Politiken* January 22, that "he now expected the decisive guerrilla offensive to be launched as a prelude to a declaration of independence."

An Irish Mass Revolutionary Party?

By Gerry Foley

The dominant theme of the discussion at the Sinn Féin (Official republican) convention December 16-17 in Dublin concerned building a revolutionary party. This objective was set in the keynote speech last year at the June 24 Bodenstown march, the largest annual gathering of republicans, by Seán Garland, the national organizer of Sinn Féin. The December meeting was viewed as preliminary to a special convention next April to discuss a major reorganization of the movement.

To win real national freedom and destroy the direct and indirect influence of foreign business and financial interests, a deepgoing social revolution is required in Ireland. A struggle capable of defeating the political, military, and economic power of British imperialism and its allies requires international ties to be successful.

As they set their sights toward making a socialist revolution, the republican leaders found themselves faced with more and more complex problems and tasks, and it has become evident that a loose organization with vague political positions is not adequate to this work. This realization was spelled out in the *Ard Comhairle* (National Committee) resolution on organization and structure:

"Sinn Fein recognises that its foremost organisational task is the creation of a revolutionary party of the Irish working-class to act as the vanguard in the social and national revolutionary struggle on which we are engaged. The revolutionary vanguard party cannot be an umbrella organisation embracing different ideologies, and we affirm the need to intensify our development towards ideological unity and clarity within our Movement on the basis of our educational programme. This can only be done on the basis of democratic centralism; democratic in that all decisions are taken on the basis of the fullest consultation with and participation of the membership; centralist in that all decisions are implemented from top to

bottom and that minorities accept the view of majorities on all matters of policy. We therefore call upon the incoming Ard Comhairle to set up a working committee to examine the organisational structure of the Republican Movement, to produce its draft report within three months."

While these organizational changes were being considered, the level of political discussion rose in the Official republican movement. The convention was unanimous in endorsing the correctness of the basic policy followed in the past period, that is, concentrating on revolutionary political activity and mass organization as opposed to the old apolitical guerrillaist outlook of the Irish Republican Army. At the same time, the formulation of specific policies and demands came under deepgoing criticism.

The Donegal *Comhairle Ceanntair* (District Committee) presented the broadest critique of previous policy. Its resolution dealt with all the major areas of activity. On the North it said:

"This Ard Fheis [the convention] must recognise that the policy to date in the North has been misdirected in so far as the Civil Rights and democratisation demands have been presented in isolation rather than as part of the revolutionary process. It should be clearly understood that the call for democracy in itself presents no threat to the capitalist interests in the 6 Counties. While fully supporting democratic demands, revolutionary Socialists must also raise demands which point to the specific interests of the working class throughout Ireland. Therefore more attention must be focused on employment, bad housing, weak Trade Union organisation and other such issues which are common to the working class. While British troops are present in the 6 Counties, we must continue to demand their immediate withdrawal and oppose their presence by all means."

This section of the Donegal CC's resolution, however, illustrates some of the basic weaknesses of the discus-

sion. The implications of the various points were by no means made clear. For instance, no revolutionist could dispute the fact that presenting "Civil Rights" and "democratisation demands" in "isolation from the revolutionary process" has been a grave error, probably the gravest the republican movement has made in its recent history.

But the statement that the "call for democracy in itself presents no threat to the capitalist interests in the 6 Counties" seems to isolate the demand for democratization from the revolutionary process in another way. It is hardly true that the call for democracy in the Northern Ireland context does not threaten capitalism. It has produced the most acute crisis presently faced by any European capitalist regime.

In this context, the call for raising revolutionary "working-class" demands, while axiomatically correct, seems to imply that economic struggle as such is something separate and higher than democratic or *political* struggle against imperialism. In fact, making such a counterposition would destroy the whole meaning of the term "revolutionary process" and substitute a static, sectarian schema.

At the same time, the idea that there are some kind of economic demands that appeal equally to all sections of the working class in a sense that democratic demands don't is not only contradicted by the whole experience of the Marxist movement in the period of the general crisis of capitalism but by the specific experience of the revolutionary movement in Ireland, and this is clearly explained in the works of the greatest Irish socialist thinker, James Connolly.

The point on "international capitalism" in the Donegal CC's resolution also touched on a weakness of republican policy in the past:

"The Republican Movement rightly recognises that international capitalist domination of Ireland is the main obstacle to progress. However, the anti-EEC campaign suggested that there was a possible alternative within an Irish capitalist context. The struggle against international capitalism necessarily brings us up against native capitalism. The movement failed to point out that the only real alternative to the Common Market was

the establishment of a Socialist Republic. As capitalism is international, Socialism must also be seen in an international context, i.e., the struggle for a Socialist Republic within a Socialist Europe. It is not the task of Socialists to sort out the capitalist alternative.

"We must therefore oppose the effects of international capitalism, e.g. massive redundancies, with calls for workers' action not with Utopian calls for more protection for Irish industries, etc."

This point is also a good one in a general sense, but the authors of the resolution do not say how they would have organized the anti-EEC campaign to make the "socialist alternative" concrete to the non-proletarian popular strata in Ireland or to the masses of workers who have been inculcated with a capitalist outlook. In every country there are groupings who are quick to say "socialism is the only answer" to every problem that arises but who cannot relate their demands and slogans to the concrete experience and understanding of the people.

In particular the rejection of "Utopian calls for more protection for Irish industries" is vague. In every underdeveloped country, socialist revolutions have resulted in reinforced measures to protect and foster industrialization. Do the authors of this resolution think that a socialist revolution can only be made in the context of all or a major part of Europe? This is not clear. On the other hand, the idea that in the age of late imperialism a real independent Irish capitalist development is possible would certainly be "Utopian."

In this sense, the resolution's point that "our involvement in defence of small farmers and other oppressed groups must be designed to raise the consciousness to the need for Socialism" is absolutely correct.

Likewise the point on internal education and democracy was very positive:

"It is essential that the Movement intensify its internal educational programme at central and local level to develop the political consciousness of its members. The clandestine history of the Movement has tended to stifle internal free expression and discussion between members of divergent points of view. The need therefore for internal

democracy is evident. Externally, each member should speak with the voice of the majority as expressed through the *Ard Fheis*. This could be summed up as full democracy inside and absolute discipline outside.

"These proposals are presented as ideas towards a revolutionary programme. We call on the incoming *Ard Comhairle* to draw up a detailed plan of action on these proposals. The movement must now consciously develop a revolutionary programme as part of the process of becoming a truly revolutionary organisation."

Despite this general appeal for free discussion, however, none of the speakers in the debate commented on the fact that there was no concrete discussion of the movement's two main activities, the campaign against the EEC and the civil-rights movement. There was no report by a member of the leadership responsible for these areas of activity. What was achieved? What were the problems? What does the republican movement project, in particular, for the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association? As a result of these deficiencies the debate was rambling and contradictory and nothing was clarified.

These are important questions. The civil-rights movement has been the main motor of the struggle in the North. That organization is now clearly on the decline.

Moreover, one incident since the *ard fheis* underlines the importance of clarity about republican policy in the civil-rights movement. The January 20 issue of *The Irish People*, the weekly paper of the American supporters of the Provisional republican movement, reported:

"Provisional Sinn Fein in Derry have turned down a request made by Derry CRA to postpone a march that the *Comhairle Ceanntair* had planned. . . .

"A spokesman for Derry CRA yesterday reaffirmed their stand on any form of march and warned that a march could only cause trouble. He added that they intended going ahead with their day of commemoration which includes the following—an all-night vigil on Saturday, 27th, starting at 11 p.m. for British people who will be coming over to take part in the demonstrations; Requiem Mass at 11 a.m. in St. Mary's Church, Creggan, on Sunday, January 28th; a wreath-

laying ceremony at 12 noon; a commemoration ceremony at Free Derry Corner at 4 p.m.; and at 8 p.m., a candlelight vigil in the Free Derry area."

The Derry CRA's explanation for its decision was that a march would stir up sectarian feelings, that is, infuriate the Protestants. There could, of course, be local tactical reasons for such a course, and the Official republican position on this is not clear. But there were two tendencies in the discussion at the *ard fheis*, each of which would imply different attitudes on such a question.

One tendency was to stress the necessity of avoiding Catholic-Protestant clashes in the North at all cost. Another tendency recognized that any movement that challenged the system in the North was going to provoke communal conflict.

If the first tendency is carried to its logical conclusions, it would mean abandoning the main slogan that has been advanced for several months by the republican movement, "Back to the Streets." If the Officials accepted such a position, it would mean the end, in effect, of their strategy of mobilizing the masses in Northern Ireland, since the experience of the past four years has shown abundantly that any action by the nationalists to protest against the system is going to upset the Protestants. Certainly such an important change should have been made very clear at the *ard fheis* and debated fully. On the other hand, if the Official republicans oppose such decisions, then it should be made clear who is responsible for them; otherwise the blame will fall on them, since they are known to be the strongest political force in the CRA.

At the *ard fheis* a major resolution on the civil-rights movement was introduced which clarified the policy of the Official republican movement on some issues: "The Republican Movement could not under any circumstances call for the reestablishment of a 6 County parliament. To do so would mean total recognition of Britain's right to impose a Partitionist assembly on the Irish people, and would be in complete conflict with the Republican and Separatist tradition." This resolution made it clear that although the Official republican movement favored demanding democratic rights from the British government

and Northern Irish authorities, it did not accept the context of a Northern statelet. In effect, this resolution rejected the "stages" concept earlier held on one level or another by some of the republican leadership, a concept that envisaged "democratization" of the Six-County state as a precondition for struggling for national liberation.

In particular, the preamble to this resolution represented a major step forward in republican thinking toward a consistent revolutionary perspective. Unfortunately this document was not distributed; but many of those present seemed to be familiar with its contents. The main objection to making it public seemed to be that it contained a characterization of the Communist party as reformist, which was repeated in the open debate by the resolution's sponsor, Seamus Costello.

These remarks were attacked by other delegates as "red-baiting," although it was quite clear that Costello was objecting to the politics of the Communist party and not its right to exist or to take part in the struggle for national and social liberation. It was the protesters in fact who followed the method of red-baiting, that is, using emotional scare words to obscure the political issues. They would have made a more positive contribution to the debate by frankly defending the Communist party of Ireland against the charge of reformism. In the long run this is the only way they will be able to retain the respect of the membership.

The main criticism the preamble made of previous republican policy toward the civil-rights movement was that the Officials had appeared to confine their objectives to the civil-rights demands and not put forward clearly enough their own revolutionary nationalist program. The civil-rights demands alone, according to the preamble, fitted in with the Communist party's perspective of reform rather than revolution.

This was a correct assessment of a very dangerous tendency. But at the same time it was not a well-balanced one. The civil-rights demands were not reformist in effect. Their impact was revolutionary. They produced the most powerful mass mobilization in modern Irish history. What was reformist was the CP's determination to formulate these demands in a way that specifically and

explicitly accepted the framework of bourgeois parliamentary democracy, British control and the partition, in a way that imposed narrow limits on the dynamic of the struggle. Besides failing to put forward its own revolutionary demands in propaganda and agitation, the republican movement did not fight the Communist party politically in the Civil Rights Association itself and thus allowed the movement to be robbed of its revolutionary momentum. This, among other things, is what left the way open for the development of terrorism in the North, which further accelerated the decline of the mass movement.

Thus, while the preamble reasserted and clarified the revolutionary principles of the Official republican movement, it did not come to grips with the concrete form in which reformist influence has manifested itself and has had its most pernicious effects. It did not chart a militant course for the civil-rights movement.

Of course, the December *ard fheis* did not say the last word about republican policies. It was only another step in a deepgoing discussion that has been in progress for some time and has already gone further than the public statements of the movement and its spokesmen would give any reason to hope. But the failure of the preamble to deal directly with the deficiencies of both the civil-rights movement itself and its effective leadership sets a dangerous precedent.

It is all too easy, and many examples have shown this, for a politically broad movement to develop a reluctance to face political struggle on the left, to fear that posing sharp political questions is "sectarian" or "divisive." Newly developing left movements in particular have been anxious to avoid the "old polemics." But wherever new movements have been confronted with profound social crises and political challenges, this attitude has led to abdication of responsibility, turning inwards, and collapse.

This was the case, for example, of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in the United States; it was SDS that initiated mass actions against American intervention in Vietnam. But when the fundamental question arose of whether the movement was going to take a principled stand of independence from capitalist politicians and

support for the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own fate as opposed to the opportunist stand of calling for "negotiations" and supporting liberal capitalist candidates, the SDS leadership backed away. It did not want to, or could not, make a choice between what were clearly two irreconcilable strategies, the latest continuation of the "old" Stalin-Trotsky split that they wanted to avoid.

And since SDS could not lead the movement without making a choice, as well as for other reasons, it turned away from trying to mobilize masses of people against the war, which was clearly the main issue radicalizing American society.

This retreat was covered up by all sorts of ultraleft and economic rhetoric about "community organizing," or "fighting the war at its root," and by campus revolts that were pictured as miniature Communes. But SDS became more and more disoriented and cut off from reality.

Since there was no clear political focus of activity, there developed a hothouse atmosphere of romantic illusions and posturing that proved an ideal breeding ground for the most destructive kind of sectarianism. The organization was finally torn apart by a free-for-all between competing groups of hysterical ultraleftists trying to outdo each other with super-Stalinist poses.

Ironically, many of the "new left" SDS leaders had shifted 180 degrees from a position holding the CP to be revolutionary (while privately admitting that it was reformist) to denouncing the Kremlin bureaucracy and its acolytes as "new imperialists." At no time during their entire evolution did they seriously face up to the problem of the real origin and role of Stalinism.

The fact is that unity on the left is a dialectical process that involves political clarification, and therefore struggle, as well as united action on common goals. Refusal to face political issues that are necessarily divisive leads to throwing up artificial barriers that cause confusion and disorientation and in the long run lead to far worse divisions. The republican split is at least partially an example of this. The fact that the stated political programs of both the Officials and Provisionals are almost exactly the same

has not prevented the most confusing and destructive kind of factional warfare (and physical warfare in some instances) between the two groups.

At the same time the political uncertainty and uncertainty of the Official republican movement has produced a sectarian, isolationist reaction to the political threat posed by the Provisionals. This attitude, among other things, seems to have led the republicans to fear open political conflict with their Communist party allies in the civil-rights movement. The result has been that the militancy and effectiveness of the movement have declined, weakening the mass alternative to terrorism and increasing support for the Provisionals' guerrilla campaign.

Moreover, the dogmatic and emotional reaction to the challenge of the Provisionals and their incorrect strategies has tended to paralyze thought and initiative in the Official republican movement itself, whose only weapon against the right wing of the Provisionals (which is supported by sections of the Church and the capitalist class) is its political understanding and flexibility. It is ironic in fact that while the most dogmatic anathematizers of the Provisionals have tended to be Stalinist trained, the Communist party of Ireland has been less inhibited than the Officials in seeking contacts with the Provisionals (although the CP attitude may change now that the Provisionals are isolated and under attack).

The Official republican movement cannot, of course, be compared to the American SDS, but it has shown some of the same tendencies and it has absorbed, because of its historical position and political looseness, the Irish expression of the international current that gave rise to SDS and other such formations. Therefore, it is legitimate to fear that it may fall prey to the same failings.

The civil-rights question is the acid test for Irish political organizations. Not only does it remain the central issue in the North, but the fight against repression has become the key to the political situation in the South. Because of the *political* and *social* mechanisms of imperialist control in Ireland, and because of the revolutionary traditions of the Irish people, the struggle against repression and discrimination is the cutting edge of the fight against imperialism. In fact, the

civil-rights movement is an anti-imperialist movement in essence, and this is becoming clearer and clearer as the British army assumes a more and more active role in repressing the nationalist people. Economic issues underlie this struggle, and as it develops, its economic implications will become even clearer. But the *political* issues of democracy and an end to discrimination are the focus.

Nonetheless, there are historical tendencies in the Official republican movement that could deflect it from concentrating on this issue. Furthermore, both ultraleftists and opportunists are anxious to divert revolutionary republicans from this task. From the standpoint of the workerist ultralefts, the civil-rights movement has never been "revolutionary" enough because it does not unite Protestant and Catholic workers and explicitly challenge capitalist productive relations. The reformist role of the Communist party in the CRA leadership gives force to these arguments.

At the same time, the Communist party and its supporters would be happy to see the republicans leave the "civil-rights side of things" to "cooler heads," or "more politically experienced" people, as they picture themselves.

There is another reason why it is important for the Official republican movement to define its strategy for

the civil-rights movement. It would be a dangerous and almost certainly unfruitful policy to try to separate reorganization of the movement from clarification of the basic political issues and solution of the concrete political problems facing the Official republicans. Democratic centralism can only function in the context of agreement on the fundamental political questions. It requires a leadership elected on the basis of clear political positions, a leadership that assumes full responsibility to the ranks for its political actions. Otherwise, centralism becomes a straitjacket instead of a weapon, represses discussion rather than making it more fruitful and purposeful.

It is unlikely, in fact, given the stage of the Official movement's political development that a real democratic centralist organization can be set up by the April conference. But this meeting can establish structures and procedures conducive to a better discussion within the movement. And while revolutionists everywhere support all movements in Ireland fighting against British imperialism, they cannot help but feel a special concern about this most serious attempt in Irish history to set up a mass revolutionary party. This is especially so since the chances for an effective and united struggle against imperialism hinge to a large degree on the success of this effort. □

Indictments Issued in Israeli 'Spy' Trial

Four Israeli Arabs and two Jews were indicted January 25 in the "espionage and sabotage network" case.

Daoud Turki, Ehud Adiv, Subhi Naranani, Dan Vered, Anis Karawi, and Simon Hadad were specifically charged, according to the January 26 *Jerusalem Post*, with "membership in a hostile organization, contacts with enemy agents, giving them information, and aiding the enemy in the war against Israel."

The government is charging that although Daoud Turki, an Arab from Haifa, was the head of the "network," it was Ehud Adiv, a former paratrooper in the Israeli army, who "did the most damage to the State by passing on vital military information to the Syrian intelligence." This would indicate that the regime will, in the trial, deliberately focus on the Jewish defendants in order to intensify the witch-hunt that has been whipped up around discovery of the al-

leged "network."

The brief *Jerusalem Post* report of the indictments provides a further indication of this: "Not on trial but figuring prominently in the charges is the extreme left-wing Matzpen group, which the prosecution calls the 'recruiting ground' for the alleged spy ring. Also mentioned is an even more extreme splinter group, the Red Front."

The prosecution has announced that twenty-four additional persons would soon be indicted in the case. Several of those seized have charged the police with torturing several of the prisoners. (See *Intercontinental Press*, January 29, p. 73 for an account of the origin of the case and the response of the left to the government-inspired witch-hunt.)

Judge Emanuel Slonim of the Haifa District court has set February 11 for hearing the pleas and February 25 for the first hearing.

TEN YEARS—History and Principles of the Left Opposition

By Max Shachtman

[This is the third installment of "Ten Years—History and Principles of the Left Opposition," the pamphlet by Max Shachtman first published in 1933. Serialization began in our January 22 issue.]

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Planned Economy: Industrialization and Collectivization of Agriculture

While conducting its fight against the ravages of Stalinism on the international field, the Opposition was simultaneously engaged in a sharp struggle against the policies of the bureaucracy at home. The Communist worker whose head has been systematically pumped full of lies and who has been taught a history of the past ten years which never took place, frequently answers the criticisms of the Oppositionist with a general reference to the undoubted successes of the Five Year Plan. In nine cases out of ten, however, he is not aware of the fact that it took years of struggle (1923-28) by the Left Opposition merely to have a Five Year Plan adopted by the party leadership.

The introduction of plan into Soviet economy can be traced as far back as July 1920. The whole railroad system was a wreck. The party put Trotsky in charge of restoring transportation and on the date mentioned the famous "Order No. 1042" was issued as the first of a series of systematic measures which finally brought order and regularity where chaos and collapse had prevailed before. Lenin spoke of it as an example of what had to be done in the other branches of industry. The report made by Trotsky to the Eighth Congress of the Soviets based on the experience, and the theses he prepared together with Emsharov, were warmly defended by Lenin against the "skeptics who say: 'What good is it to make forecasts for many years ahead?'"

The question of long-term planned economy was raised more sharply in 1923 by Comrade Trotsky. Unaided this time by Lenin, who had already been compelled to withdraw from the party councils, Trotsky laid before the party his arguments for the elaboration of plan in economy in order to carry out successfully an industrialization of the country and a collectivization of its backward, scattered, individualistic agriculture. The critics of the Opposition, be it said in passing, never stopped to explain the contradiction (created by themselves) between

their two claims: first, that Trotsky was opposed to building socialism in Russia, and secondly, that he was too extreme in his proposals for industrializing the country and particularly its agriculture.

From 1923 on, the Opposition pointed out that the only material foundation for socialism is large machine industry capable of reorganizing agriculture as well. Russia's backwardness made the speedy development of such an industry especially imperative in view of the retardation of the international revolution. In addition, the Left wing showed, the vast mass of the peasantry was undergoing a process of differentiation in which the rich peasant (the Kulak) was growing stronger and making dangerous advances which only the organization of the poor peasants and their systematic introduction to collective farming would be able to impede. The Opposition demanded an industrial progress that would be able to dominate and reorganize agriculture, satisfy the needs of the peasantry on a cheap basis, and provide the economic basis for abolishing the petty bourgeois strata of the village population.

How did the bureaucracy reply? These "practical people," who would not allow themselves to be taken in by "fantastic ideas" about planning for years in advance, launched a furious assault upon Trotsky. Rykov hastened to report to the Fifth Congress of the Comintern that Trotsky's proposals were a petty-bourgeois deviation from Leninism, that the Russian party leadership was doing all it could do and all that could be expected of it in the field of industry and agriculture. Stalin sneeringly replied to the Opposition's arguments with the comment that it wasn't a plan that the peasant needed, but a good rain for his crops! The danger of the rising Kulak was derided.

But the Kulak was growing in strength and becoming the dominant figure in the countryside. Moreover, he was permeating the party—a whole section of it—with his ideology. The first two years of struggle of the Opposition finally bore fruit in the revolt of the revolutionary Leningrad proletariat in 1925, which compelled its leaders—men like Zinoviev who had fathered the campaign against "Trotskyism"—to combine in a bloc with the 1923 Opposition. The alarm felt by the Leningrad proletarians at the inroads being made by the Kulak and his urban associate, the Nepman, was not, however, shared by the crust-hardened bureaucracy. Instead of adopting the proposals for a systematic industrialization of the country, the Stalin-Bucharin leadership steered a course towards that same Kulak whom, later on, when they took fright at his growth, they sought to "liquidate" by decree at one blow.

To the already well-to-do peasants Bucharin cried out the advice: Enrich yourselves! Kalinin made speeches denouncing the poor peasants as lazy good-for-nothings because they did not accumulate, and praising the diligence and industry of the "economically powerful peasant," that is, of the Kulak. Pravda (in April 1925) urged that the "economic possibilities of the well-to-do peasant, the economic possibilities of the Kulaks, must be unfettered." The Commissariat for Agriculture of the Georgian Soviets, in harmony with the prevailing atmosphere in the ruling strata of the party, elaborated a project for the denationalization of the land. In 1926, the Kulak course of Stalinism was pushed so far that for a time the Cen-

tral Executive Committee of the Soviets granted the vote to exploiting peasants. In all this period, the belated present-day upholders of the Five Year Plan "as against Trotsky," not only had industrialization and collectivization furthest from their minds, were not only its staunchest opponents, but actually steered a directly opposite course.

In 1925, that is, even before the 1927 platform of the Opposition bloc, Trotsky once more wrote in detail about the tremendous possibilities which the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a proletarian dictatorship offered for the progress of socialism, even on the basis of an isolated workers' state. In "Whither Russia?" he advanced the idea that even with an independent reproduction based on socialist accumulation, the Soviet republic could show a speed of industrial progress unknown and impossible under capitalism. His prediction of a possible 20 percent annual growth (six years later this was proved to be an entirely moderate figure, entirely attainable), was the subject for great merriment among the functionaries assembled at one of the party congresses, caused by the "ironical" ridicule which Stalin showered upon the prediction. The official position was expressed by Bucharin when he put forward the perspective that Russia would build socialism "with the speed of a tortoise," at a snail's pace!

The 1927 platform of the Opposition was the most elaborate and definite proposal it had presented to the party, and this was undoubtedly one of the reasons why it was so rabidly attacked. It was officially suppressed by the bureaucracy, which refused to print it. Its circulation in mimeographed form was made a crime punishable by imprisonment or exile. There are Bolsheviks in Siberia today for having distributed the ideas which Stalin was himself compelled to adopt in large measure two years later. In the Platform, the Opposition demanded a categorical condemnation of the first Five Year Plan elaborated by Rykov and Krzhizhanovsky, and adopted by the party leaders. This timid, worthless plan proposed an annual growth of 9 percent for the first year and a decreasing percentage every year thereafter until it would reach a 4 percent growth at the end of the plan.

The bolder proposals submitted by the Opposition, which later were proved to be infinitely more realistic and applicable, met with just as strong a condemnation from the Stalinists. On all sides the Opposition spokesmen were taunted by the bureaucrats with the question: Where will you get the means?—although the expenditures for industrial development proposed at first by the Opposition were greatly exceeded when the current Plan finally got under way. And when the Opposition presented its proposals for raising the means by a forced loan from the Kulaks, by a lowering of prices based on cutting over-

head and the bureaucratic apparatus, by a skillful utilization of the foreign trade monopoly, etc., the bureaucrats raised a hue and cry against the "counter-revolutionary Trotskyists."

In the days of the French revolution the reaction sought to overthrow the rule of the city artisans and revolutionary petty bourgeoisie by inciting the peasants against them, by arousing every one of the backward, reactionary prejudices of the French peasants against the "predatory capital." Such a cry is the distinguishing feature of reaction. And true to themselves, the bureaucracy which had come to the top on the basis of the post-1923 reaction, made use of the same methods. Stalin, Rykov and Kuybyshev signed a manifesto to the whole Russian people announcing that the Opposition proposed "to rob the peasantry." The lesser bureaucrats carried on an even more reactionary propaganda in the villages against the Left wing. In the cities, in the meantime, the disturbed proletarians were assured by Stalin and Bucharin that there was no danger whatsoever from the Kulaks, that there were some, it is true, but not enough to worry about. The professional statisticians were put to the job of presenting tables to prove the "insignificant percentage" of the Kulaks. The need for collectivization was minimized to the vanishing point. As late as 1928, the principal agrarian "specialist" of the apparatus, Yakovlev, the commissar for agriculture, declared against the Opposition that collective farming would for years to come "remain little islets in the sea of private peasant farms." At the Fifteenth party Congress, where the Opposition leaders were all expelled, Rykov hectored the Opposition with the question: If the Kulak is so strong why hasn't he played us some trick or other? As will be seen further on, Rykov did not have long to wait.

Finally, only a few months were required in the application of the original Five Year Plan of Rykov-Stalin in order to demonstrate how well-founded had been the Opposition's criticism of its inadequacy. The apparatus was compelled to revise it virtually from stem to stern.

Without the persistent years of struggle of the Left Opposition, it is entirely doubtful that even those measures of progress which have been made thus far would have been accomplished. Left to themselves, unhampered by the demands of the Opposition, there is every reason to believe that the Stalin-Bucharin bloc would have continued to go further into that reactionary, nationalist swamp where the Kulak and the other classes hostile to the October Revolution were steadily pulling it.

The essential, positive features of the Five Year Plan, the phenomenal success which a proletariat in power has been able to show in the realm of industrial progress—these are a debt which is owed exclusively to the unremitting struggle of the Opposition. That is how the records of history will register it.

The Break-up of the Bloc Between the Right Wing and the Center and the Launching of the 'Third Period'

The struggle conducted on an international scale against the Left Opposition was led jointly by the Centrist faction and the Right wing. In their endeavors to beat down the Marxian wing of the International no distinctions could be perceived between Brandler and Thaelmann, Jilek and

Gottwald, Sellier and Thorez, Lovestone and Foster, Kilboom and Silen. This unity was symbolized by the combination of Stalin and Bucharin who established themselves as the "incorruptible Leninist Old Guard."

It was no mere fictitious unity. On all questions of inter-

national and domestic policy, of principle and tactics, these two sections of the ruling bloc held a common view. They went hand in hand against "Trotskyism," and hand in hand with Purcell and Chiang Kai-shek. Together they defended the theory of socialism in one country, of "two-class workers and peasants parties." They jointly introduced to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928, the revisionist program adopted by the delegates.

But at the end of 1927, the ebb-tide of reaction which had brought the regime into power was giving way to a Leftward turn in the ranks of the international proletariat. In Russia itself, the "bloodless Kulak uprising" of 1928 had a sobering effect upon the workers and they began to press upon the leadership for a turn of the helm to the Left. It was in this atmosphere that Stalin was compelled to steer in the opposite direction from the one he had been sailing for five years. Starting cautiously with an attack upon obscure representatives of the Right wing, he succeeded so quickly in stripping the latter of its support that he was able in 1929-1930 to make a frontal attack upon its real leadership: Rykov, Bucharin and Tomsy.

To a Communist public dumbfounded by the unexpectedness of the attack, the three leaders of the Right wing were presented by Stalin as the banner-bearers of the capitalist restoration. The president of the Communist International, the head of the Soviet government, and the leader of the Soviet trade unions were depicted by Stalin as the agents of the Thermidorian counter-revolution! But it is precisely this "trio" with whom Stalin had for five-six years been in the most intimate "indissoluble" alliance against the Left wing of the party.

If Stalin's indictment of the Right wing had any meaning at all—and it did—it was, at the same time, a murderous arraignment of the Centrist faction itself. For what pretense could it make to Bolshevism when it had admittedly been in indistinguishable solidarity for half a decade with restorationists? Where in all history could an instance be found of the genuine revolutionary tendency having been in an inseparable bloc with another tendency which, within virtually twenty-four hours, proved to be the champion of black reaction?

Given the fact that both sections of the leadership had a common-principle basis, given the fact that to cut off the Right wing Stalin had to borrow copiously from the ideological arsenal of the Left Opposition (the Right wing did not hesitate to accuse him of "Trotskyism" just as Trotsky foretold in 1926!), Stalin's campaign against the Right wing served at the same time as a deadly self-revelation of Centrism, and an involuntary tribute to the justice of the whole Opposition struggle.

Let it not be forgotten that the whole Fifteenth Russian party Congress condemned the Oppositionists as panic-mongers for warning against the growing Kulak danger. Just as Rykov had taunted the Opposition with the question: If the Kulak is so dangerous why hasn't he played us some trick?—so Molotov cried impatiently in December 1927 that the Kulak was nothing new, that there was no need of alarm or of special measures beyond those already in force. Everybody "agrees," argued Molotov, who insistently minimized the magnitude of the exploiting farmers, "it exists, and there is no need to speak about it."

Only a few brief weeks later the whole Soviet Union was violently shaken by a demonstration of the tremendous power which the Kulak had amassed all the while that Bucharin-Stalin-Molotov-Rykov had been covering him up from Trotsky's criticisms. In January 1928, right after the congress and emboldened by their success in having the Left wing cut off from the party, the Kulaks rose in what came to be known as their "bloodless uprising." Powerful and confident, they refused to turn over their hoarded stocks of grain and, in effect, declared: Unless the Soviet power yields to our demands for prices above those fixed by the proletarian state we shall keep our stores and starve the cities, the working-class centers, into submission!

So effective and alarming was their resistance that for the first time in many long years, the Soviets were compelled to requisition the villages' grain by armed force. All the official philosophy of "Enrich yourselves!" the vicious self-consolation about the insignificance of the Kulak, the rabid hounding of the Opposition for its timely warnings, were now whipped to tatters by the realities. The revolutionary spirit of a now alarmed working class, which had by no means been entirely eliminated by the campaign against the Opposition, forced its way into the open in spite of the obstacles put in its path by the bureaucratic regime. It is this pressure from below which gave the real impulsion to the break-up of the hitherto solid Right-Center bloc. This still unclear revolt against the previous line of yielding to the capitalist elements inside and outside the country, jerked the helm out of the hands of the Right and forced a change in the course.

On the basis of this Leftward current in the masses, the Stalinist faction opened up a new phase of its development, the "third period" of its blunders on a Soviet and an international scale. This flight of the frightened bureaucrats from yesterday's rank opportunism to adventurism is embraced in what has become known as the "third period."

The arbitrarily defined period does not commence in the Comintern's history with its proclamation at the Sixth Congress, but even more definitely at the Ninth Plenum of the C. I. early in 1928. At that time the first signs of a working-class resurgence in Europe could be detected, but only the first signs. The vote cast for the Communist parties, particularly in Germany, was increasing, but with it, also, the vote cast for the social democracy. In a number of other countries, however, the working class was either writhing in the pain of a still unsurmountable defeat, as in China, or else passive under the soporific effects of a temporary economic boom, as in France and the United States.

The Ninth Plenum, instead of establishing the precise stage of development of the international labor movement, proclaimed the rise of a "new and higher" stage of the Chinese revolution (not counter-revolution, but revolution!), gave its blanket endorsement to guerrilla adventurism, and announced from the mouth of Thaelmann and the other spokesmen of the Comintern that the working masses throughout the world were becoming "more and more radicalized." The warnings against this light-minded conception of an automatic, horizontal progress of the revolutionary movement were of no avail, for they were uttered by the Opposition. Trotsky's clear-sighted

analysis of the real status of the movement was not only passed over in silence at the Sixth Congress to which it was presented, but it was not even given to the assembled delegates.

The Sixth Congress in the middle of 1928 carried the Ninth Plenum a few steps further in absurdity. Formally, it marked the culminating point of the collaboration between Centrism and the Right wing (Stalin and Bucharin). Actually, it incorporated into the foundation of the next period a mixture of opportunist premises and ultra-Left deductions which have been at the root of all the confusion and defeats suffered by Communism since that time.

The Sixth Congress had many points of similarity with the Fifth, which was held in 1924 after the defeat in Germany. In 1924, no defeat was acknowledged; on the contrary, the revolution was proclaimed to be right ahead. In 1928, the same error was made with regard to the Chinese revolution. In the period of the Fifth Congress, Stalin made the novel discovery that the "social democracy was the most moderate wing of Fascism." In 1928, the Sixth Congress laid the basis for the unique philosophy of "social-Fascism." The Fifth Congress celebrated the victory of "Bolshevization" and "monolithism," at a time when the very basis under the various "Bolshevik leaderships" imposed upon the national sections was being undermined. In 1928, the most violent internal struggles were being fought behind the scenes of the "unified Communist International." The Fifth Congress, with all its ultra-Leftist palaver, contained not merely the germs of a brief spurt to the Left but also a protracted swing to the Right, to the period of the Anglo-Russian Committee, of the Chiang Kai-shek alliance, the Anti-Imperialist League and the "Peasants' International." The Sixth Congress, for all its endorsement of adventurist conclusions, consecrated the revisionist theory of socialism in one country and established the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" (that is, the Kerenskiad or the Kuo Min Tang tragedy) as an iron law governing the destinies of the revolution on three-quarters of the earth.

The struggle against the "Right danger" launched at the Sixth Congress, which Bucharin had resisted only as recently as the Fifteenth Congress of the Russian party, was platonic and anonymous. Its value may be estimated from the fact that it was proclaimed from the Congress tribune by the international leader of the Right wing, Bucharin. In this manner, the formal unification of the ruling bloc was preserved and used to cover up the bitter internal dispute.

It is instructive to observe that at the very time that Stalin was busily engaged in sapping the ground under Bucharin and Co., going so far as to organize an unofficial congress of his own, simultaneously with "Bucharin's Congress," he nevertheless took the leadership in condemning any rumors about disagreements in the Russian party leadership as "Trotskyist slanders." In a special report on the subject made by Stalin himself to the Council of Elders at the Congress, he repudiated all rumors regarding differences in the Russian Political Bureau. He emphatically denied that there were any Right wingers or Right wing views in the Political Bureau or even the Central Committee, and, to confirm his assertions, intro-

duced a resolution, signed by himself and every other member of the Political Bureau which declared:

"The undersigned members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union declare before the Council of Elders of the Congress that they most emphatically protest against the circulation of rumors that there are dissensions among the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C. P. S. U."

Needless to say, the assembled marionettes listened solemnly and approvingly to this criminally ludicrous deception of the Communist International, concocted jointly by Stalin and Bucharin.

The dissolution of this state of affairs was not long delayed. In almost less time than it takes to tell it, virtually all the leading spokesmen of the Sixth Congress were either crushed organizationally, expelled outright, or saved from expulsion by humiliating capitulation. Just as the leaders of the Fifth Congress lasted but a brief moment in the seats of power, so did the Sixth Congress "Bolsheviks" meet with a speedy end. Bucharin, the political leader of the Congress, the reporter on the program, the president of the Comintern, was denounced a few months later as the leader of the capitalist-restorationist tendency in the Soviet Union (no less!). Lovestone, Gitlow and Wolfe were unceremoniously expelled as agents of the American bourgeoisie. Roy, who had made a livelihood denouncing Trotsky as an agent of Chamberlain, found himself designated in exactly the same manner. Jilek and Co. in Czechoslovakia, Kilboom in Sweden, Brandler (and almost Ewert) in Germany, Sellier and Co. in France, and a host of others, were expelled or withdrew from the Comintern.

The removal of any Right wing restraint made possible the climb to the heights of absurdity at the Tenth Plenum in 1929, to the very peaks of the "third period." The Tenth Plenum was the *reductio ad absurdum* of the Sixth Congress with a number of novelties added by Stalin and Molotov on their own account. It was the Plenum par excellence of the "third period," the same "third period" which was at first denounced as an opportunistic idea by the Thaelmann-Neumann delegation to the Sixth Congress.

The "third period," its proponents explained, was characterized by a constantly increasing radicalization of the masses, simultaneously in every country. There can be no fourth period, announced Molotov, for the third period ends with revolution. The present "heightened political sensitivity of the broad masses," added Losovsky, "is a characteristic sign of the eve of a revolution." Moireva, a member of the E. C. C. I. [Executive Committee of the Communist International], declared: "It is my opinion from the May events as well as from the recent Polish events that there were a series of elements in them that recall our July days. The fact alone that the Communist parties had to restrain the most advanced sections of the working class in their surge forward, speaks for a rapidly approaching revolutionary situation." This extravaganza is illuminated only if it is remembered that "our July days" were the direct precursor of the October insurrection in Russia. It should be borne in mind that all these fantasies were presented to the official Commu-

nist world as unshakable articles of faith more than three years ago!

From this "third period" with its incessantly rising radicalization of the masses in virtually every country in the world, in which France was solemnly announced to be at the head of the revolutionary list (in 1929!), flowed the theory of social Fascism, a disease of senile decay from which the Comintern is suffering to this day. With Stalin's ingenious formula of 1924 in mind, Manuilsky now announced that "the fusion of the social democracy with the capitalist state is not merely a fusion at the top. This fusion has taken place from top to bottom, all along the line." Improving on Lenin, Manuilsky announced that Noske back in 1918 was already a social Fascist.

The master strategist, Bela Kun, who destroyed the Hungarian revolution by failing to understand the nature of the social democracy in 1918, now tried some ten years later to repair the damage by advancing an even worse interpretation: "Social-Fascism is the type of Fascist development in those countries in which capitalist development is more advanced than in Italy. . . . In this stage of development, social reformism dies out: it is transformed partly into social demagogic elements and partly into the element of mass violence of Fascism."

From this Manuilsky drew the conclusion concerning the united front policy that "we have never considered it as a formula for everybody, for all times and people. . . . Today we are stronger and proceed to more aggressive methods in the struggle for the majority of the working class." What the lesser functionaries had to contribute to the question may easily be imagined from these few quotations.

The official motivation for the establishment of the "third period" and all its commandments was false from beginning to end. But this does not mean that there was not a profound reason for the 180 degrees turn in the course of the Comintern. Centrism, bereft of any anchor in principles, possessing no platform distinctly its own, was driven to the Left by the pressure of events and criticism. Having no real foundation, it must base itself upon an artificially preserved prestige. In order to maintain the continuity of its prestige, that is, in order to explain away the head-over-heels turn to the Left, or more precisely, in order to justify the change without in any way leaving room for criticism of its preceding course, the "third period" was called into existence.

By its proclamation the Centrists were able to justify the "united front from the top" with Chiang Kai-shek and Purcell as well as no united front at all. Both were justified by one brilliant theory: the arbitrary establishment of "periods." In the "second period," according to this convenient dogma, it was the essence of Bolshevism to maintain a united front with proved strikebreakers in return for their "struggle to defend the Soviet Union" from British imperialism. In the "third period," however, all social democrats from Purcell down to the socialist worker in the shop had become Fascist and the Communist must therefore have nothing to do with them. The "third period" formulae were the philosophy by which Centrism linked together the two mutually supplementary periods of its blunders, crimes, and ideological disorder without

prejudice to itself: at least, that was the intention of its artificers.

The "third period" was, and to the extent that the remnants of it still clutter the road it still is, a milestone of Centrism's road of bankruptcy and decay. The more than three years since its proclamation have witnessed a new series of defeats added to those accumulated between 1923 and 1928.

It is in this period that the rise of Fascism in Germany could proceed without encountering any effective resistance by the Communists, who were prohibited by the dogma of "social Fascism" from making a united front with the social democratic workers. Disoriented by the fantastic prediction of Molotov that France stood at the head of the list for revolutionary struggle, the Comintern was taken totally unawares by the upheaval in Spain. When it was finally shaken out of its stupor, the Spanish Communist party was rendered impotent by the extreme sectarianism of its policy, by its rejection of the tactic of the united front.

In the United States the unparalleled opportunities for revolutionary work afforded by the convulsions of the crisis were lost, one after the other, by the application of tactics which repelled hundreds of thousands of workers moving in the direction of Communism. In England, France, Czechoslovakia—in a word, in every important country, the theory and practice of the "third period" brought the Communist movement to its knees, introduced confusion into its mind, paralyzed its limbs and isolated it from the masses. If the international social democracy is still a big power to be reckoned with today, if it still retains its sway over millions of workers, it has the blunders of Stalinism to thank for it.

The passionate desire of the masses for a united front to resist the encroachments of the bourgeoisie was repulsed by the bureaucratic demand of the Communist parties for a "united front from below" or a "Red united front," that is, a united front dependent upon the acceptance in advance by non-Communist workers of Communist leadership. The hatred of Fascism manifested by socialist workers, as well as Communists, was never utilized by the Stalinists. Instead, they repelled the socialist workers by their empty chatter about "social Fascism" and their alliance—in Germany, at any rate—with the Hitler bands in the notorious "Red" Referendum in Prussia. The resistance which the socialist workers were eager to offer to the capitalist attacks, was further weakened by the sectarian policy of splitting the unions and forming tiny Communist trade union sects.

The Comintern's isolation from the masses on the political field as well as in the trade unions, which the Opposition forecast in time, has proceeded hand in hand with an unprecedented ideological and moral degeneration in the ranks of official Communism. This could not be expected to continue over a long period without ending in a terrific crash, be it inside the Soviet Union or outside of it.

The accumulated effects of this degeneration within the Soviet Union have brought in their train the dangers of Thermidor and Bonapartism, just as they threaten the whole Communist International with discreditment and dissolution.

(To be continued.)