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
*the Americas*

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November 20, 1972

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## **Heavy Bombing Raids Over Indochina**

**Why  
Nixon Won  
Four More Years**



## Argentine Wins Right to Enter U.S.

Daniel Zadunaisky, a medical student and activist in the Argentine movement to free political prisoners, was allowed to enter the United States on November 6 after a four-day battle with immigration authorities in Miami. Zadunaisky had come to the United States to conduct a speaking tour for the U. S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA).

Immigration authorities charged that Zadunaisky brought "subversive" literature with him—an unpublished article on the political situation in Argentina. Zadunaisky was not allowed to telephone the USLA in New York. Officials threatened him with jail or deportation if he refused to "voluntarily" withdraw his request to enter the United States.

Many religious figures, civil libertarians, and Puerto Rican leaders in Miami protested this attack on civil liberties. Working closely with USLA, they helped get news of the case into the mass media and organized a delegation of prominent citizens to accompany Zadunaisky to the Federal Building on the day of his hearing.

While restricted to Miami, Zadunaisky spoke to a McGovern campaign rally and to two church congregations.

Telegrams flooded the immigration office in Miami from well-known personalities and sponsors of the tour, protesting Zadunaisky's detention.

At a hearing on November 6, immigration officials showed little interest in "subversive" literature. Instead, Zadunaisky was questioned about his tour and the political beliefs of the individuals who supported his civil rights. At the conclusion of this interrogation, he was told he would be allowed into the United States.

Zadunaisky is speaking to North American groups about the torture and assassination policies of the Lanusse dictatorship. The address of USLA, which organized the tour, is 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City, New York 10011.

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## Why Nixon Won Four More Years

By Fred Feldman

"The average American is just like the child in the family. You give him some responsibility and he is going to amount to something. He is going to do something. If, on the other hand, you make him completely dependent and pamper him and cater to him too much, you are going to make him soft, spoiled and eventually a very weak individual."


Richard Nixon expressed this opinion of his "fellow citizens" in an interview granted Garnett D. Horner, White House correspondent of the *Washington Star-News*. The interview, held November 5, was not published until after Nixon's November 7 landslide victory over Senator George McGovern. Its publication gave a partial preview of the administration's plans for the coming four years.

In Nixon's view, "the enormous movement toward permissiveness which led to the escalation in crime, the escalation in drugs in this country, all of this came as a result of those of us who basically have a responsibility of leadership not recognizing that above everything else you must not weaken a people's character."

Nixon, who apparently views the brutal bombing of Vietnam as a character-building exercise, pledged to end the "era of permissiveness" and to instill in Americans "a new feeling of self-discipline." He discussed his plans to reduce the welfare rolls and cut back or eliminate the social programs granted by previous administrations as a sop to the Black community.

He told Horner that his reelection would be a vindication of "my position of a strong national defense, my position of peace with honor in Vietnam, my position of opposing, for example, busing for racial balance, my position against permissiveness, amnesty [for draft resisters] being part of that, against legalizing marijuana, being part of that."

In reality, there is little evidence to support Nixon's interpretation of his victory. Despite the big margin in the presidential race, the November 7 balloting reflected no decisive changes in the allegiances of American voters.



NIXON: Gets his "four more years" but no mandate for reaction.

The Democratic party retained control of both houses of Congress, gaining two Senate seats in the process. The electoral patchwork showed no distinctive rightward or leftward trends in the popular "choice" of bourgeois parliamentarians—the mixture remains much as before.

Arthur Krock, a veteran reporter with strong conservative leanings, evaluated the contradictory returns in the November 10 *New York Times*:

"To carry 49 of the fifty states by heavy popular majorities while your party was being rejected as a claimant for the legislative majority required to execute your programs—this marks a turbulence among the American people which would lead to at least two more years of bitter national disunity. Even personally popular Presidential candidates, such as Eisenhower, have won the White House and been denied the Capitol before. But the magnitude of Nixon's personal victory in the face of repudiation

of his party makes the outcome both unique and ominous.

"Perhaps Nixon's incredible sweep of virtually all segments of the population may fairly be classified as a 'mandate' for something—the conduct of foreign policy, for example. But in the wide meaning of the term, he has no mandate at all. The huge popular majority was merely registering its judgment that his opponent was not of Presidential caliber."

The lowering of the minimum voting age to eighteen years added millions of new voters to the rolls and resulted in more votes cast than ever before. However, only 55 percent of those eligible cast ballots, the poorest showing since 1948. Although voter apathy is common in U.S. elections, the unusually low turnout is attributable in part to the distrust that both Nixon and McGovern inspired among many potential voters.

How did Nixon roll up his big majority? Doug Jenness, writing in the November 17 issue of the revolutionary-socialist New York weekly *The Militant* points to several important factors:

"McGovern won Democratic primaries and his party's nomination because of his criticism of Nixon's Vietnam policy. But Nixon swept the carpet out from under McGovern's feet. In the eyes of millions of voters Nixon appeared to be as much of a peace candidate as McGovern. In the last days of the campaign McGovern was even hailing Nixon's unjust nine-point proposal for settling the Vietnam war. . . .

"In addition to the question of peace, Nixon's opposition to busing and increased welfare benefits won him support from the more privileged and racist strata of the working class and from the South—a traditional stronghold of the Democratic vote.

"In 1968 George Wallace, running on the American Independent party ticket, won 13 percent of the vote, mostly from these sectors. Nixon clearly picked up votes that would have gone to Wallace if he had been in the race this year. This partly accounts for Nixon's much larger margin of victory this year. (He received 43 percent of the total vote in 1968.)

"Nixon's catering to the racist sentiments held by many white workers also accounts for why most Blacks and Chicanos voted against him. His substantial defeat in Washington,

D. C., where the majority of voters are Black, testifies to his lack of support among Blacks.

"Although unemployment is still high and prices keep rising, a slight upturn in the economy in the last few months offered a little hope to some voters that things might get better. This probably decided some votes in favor of Nixon."

Throughout his campaign, Nixon carefully sought to avoid being identified with the Republican party or with ultraconservative views. The Committee for the Re-Election of the President was largely independent of the Republican party apparatus and Nixon's campaign literature rarely mentioned his party affiliation.

Nixon did little campaigning and avoided debates. As McGovern became more strident in his attacks on corruption in the Nixon administration, he was answered by politicians from every level of the administration, but almost never by Nixon himself.

Nixon sought to present himself as a hardworking "public servant," above partisan strife. He asked for votes as "The President" and not as the Republican candidate. His supporters portrayed him as a "responsible centrist." McGovern, on the other hand, was pictured as a dangerous "radical."


Important sections of the labor bureaucracy, led by AFL-CIO President George Meany, gave open or backhanded support to Nixon. They opposed the reforms McGovern and his backers instituted in the Democratic party, such as setting minimum quotas of Black, Chicano, young, and female delegates. These changes attracted many dissidents to the Democratic party without altering in any way its pro-capitalist character. But the hidebound labor fakers feared that such reforms would legitimize movements for similar demands within the unions. They may also entertain the vain hope that their assistance to Nixon will be rewarded by concessions from a second Nixon administration.

The bosses of the big city political machines, which traditionally bring out a big vote for Democratic candidates, opposed McGovern's nomination and were unenthusiastic about his campaign. This helped to reduce Democratic majorities in New York City, Philadelphia, and other urban areas.

McGovern's frantic efforts to placate

the labor leaders and the party bosses by shifting to the right on many issues fatally undermined his credibility with many voters.

But most importantly the decisive sectors of the U. S. ruling class, whose views usually determine the outcome of U. S. elections, threw their



MCGOVERN: Just couldn't come across as "presidential material."

weight behind Nixon's campaign. Because these forces have firm control of both parties and of the mass media, they are able, in most cases, to set the tone and direction of the electoral process. Their support for Nixon was reflected in his \$50 million campaign fund and in the backing he received from 600 out of 638 bourgeois newspapers.

Top financiers and businessmen are well satisfied with Nixon's performance in office. They were particularly impressed with his success in getting Moscow and Peking's aid in forcing Hanoi to accept the Thon-Kissinger agreement. They expect Nixon's detente with the Soviet and Chinese leaders to result in further blows against the world revolution. In the class struggle on the home front, Nixon has succeeded in imposing wage-freeze and high-unemployment policies without as yet meeting massive resistance from the unions.

These capitalist figures hope that in his second term Nixon will be able to wear down and ultimately break the back of the radicalization sparked by the Black struggle and the Vietnam war. Although the ruling class had no doubt about McGovern's loyalty to their interests, they opted for "four more years."

The Moscow bureaucrats were decidedly friendly to Nixon's campaign, and once his reelection was assured they became positively effusive in their expressions of support.

On election night, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny sent Nixon a warm telegram of congratulations. "We should like to express confidence," he wrote, "that in the coming period, Soviet-American relations will be further favorably developed in the interests of the Soviet and American peoples, in the interests of insuring international security and strengthening world peace."

(In contrast to the Soviet press, which had never a kind word for George McGovern, the U. S. Communist party denounced Nixon and supported McGovern as a "progressive" bourgeois politician. No explanation of this difference of opinion has appeared in the CP press.)

A November 11 Reuters dispatch from Peking reported the Mao regime's favorable reaction to the Nixon landslide. "Asked if the re-election of President Nixon was good news for China, Mr. Chou [En-lai] said: 'Yes, because he did play a role in improving relations between the United States and China.'"

With such forces lined up behind him, Nixon's victory was a foregone conclusion.

But the outcome hardly justified the predictions made by many bourgeois pundits that the election would see the emergence of a new "conservative" majority, united behind Nixon and the Republican party.

U. S. elections are poor indicators of shifts in popular sentiment. Unlike most bourgeois democratic countries, the United States has no mass workers' party. The overwhelming bulk of the votes cast are divided between the two capitalist parties. Electoral contests tend to center on the "personalities" of the candidates (created for the occasion by professional image-makers) rather than on key issues of the class struggle. As a result, the class interests of the American masses

are not reflected, even in a distorted way, in the election returns.

Reformists in the United States frequently describe the Democrats as the party of a "liberal wing" of the bourgeoisie. In fact, although the Democrats have usually drawn the support of labor leaders and the Black community, both parties contain the whole spectrum of procapitalist opinion, from extreme right to liberal.

The most significant break in the two-party voting pattern in this election occurred in Texas, where the Raza Unida party [RUP] elected five candidates in Zavala County. The RUP—basing itself on the oppressed Chicano nationality—rejected support for either capitalist party in the 1972 elections.

The only consistent class alternative to Nixon and McGovern was the Socialist Workers party ticket of Linda Jenness and Andrew Pulley.

The final tally of votes for the Socialist Workers party candidates is not yet known. Votes for anticapitalist candidates, when they are counted at

all, are usually not revealed for several weeks after the election.

Because of discriminatory laws that kept the SWP off the ballot in 26 states and because of the continuing illusions most Americans have about the bourgeois parties, the SWP vote will not be large. However, revolutionary socialists have a different measuring rod for success than the professional capitalist vote-seekers. This Trotskyist campaign reached more people than ever before with a revolutionary socialist program, and won new forces for the revolutionary movement.

The basic contradictions that afflict U. S. capitalism have not been buried under the Nixon landslide. In fact, they will grow more severe in the coming years. The efforts of the ruling class to reduce the living standards of working people, to preserve the dominant position of U. S. imperialism, and to crack down on dissent will set off explosions which it will not be possible to contain within the capitalist two-party system. □

explosives, aiming at supply areas and troop concentrations."

As the days drag on without a peace agreement being signed, conflicting reports mount over what the secret provisions of such an agreement may be. In some particulars the apparent differences in interpreting the agreement worked out by Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho would appear to be substantial.

One difference, for instance, is over whether a regrouping of forces would follow a cease-fire. "Among the questions already resolved in secret seems to be that of regrouping the North Vietnamese troops in the South into three sectors, claims the Washington bureau of the AFP [Agence France-Presse]," reported *Le Monde* November 8. "The first sector is a long stretch of territory along the Laotian border, in the very north of South Vietnam. The second is in the Central Highlands on the border between Laos and Cambodia, and the third in the Mekong Delta."

However, in an interview November 10 with Agence France-Presse in Paris, Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam's chief delegate to the peace talks denied reports that there would be any regrouping in "specified places." "It will be an on-the-spot cease-fire," he said. "The troops of all parties will stay in their positions at the moment of cease-fire. There are no regroupment zones."

Thuy also stated that Kissinger was "perfectly correct" to describe the proposed National Council of Reconciliation and Concord as an "administrative structure" and not a euphemism for a coalition government.

"Hanoi had never contended that the ambiguously defined council would become the basis of a coalition government," noted Paris correspondent Flora Lewis in the November 11 *New York Times*.

Another area that remains to be cleared up is how many North Vietnamese troops will remain in the South following a cease-fire. Although this point has prompted some of the noisiest recalcitrance from the American puppet in Saigon, the United Press International reported from Tokyo November 7 that *Tin Song*, a Saigon newspaper with close ties to the government, "may drop its insistence on public withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South in favor of a 'secret understanding' with Hanoi to pull out its army." The newspaper,

## Conflicting Reports Over Secret Agreements

## U.S. Planes in Heavy Raids Over Vietnam

By David Thorstad

As the U. S. government rushes military supplies to the Thieu regime over the virtual aerial bridge it has established between Saigon and its Pacific bases, American planes have been heavily pounding both parts of Vietnam.

After October 22, the day Washington ruled out targets above the 20th parallel, strikes on the North averaged about 110 daily. Then, on November 9, this jumped to 180, and U. S. air strikes over North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia totaled 700.

In a dispatch from Saigon November 13, *New York Times* correspondent James Sterba indicated that "Twelve B-52 bombing missions were aimed at supplies in the southern part of North Vietnam, the American military command reported. The raids over the North also included more than 240 tactical air strikes by planes

based on aircraft carriers and at bases in Thailand."

On November 7, as Nixon was being reelected, his planes set a new record for concentrated bombing in a single South Vietnamese province in a single day. "Quangtri province, just south of the North Vietnamese border, was the target for the record B-52 saturation raids," Sterba wrote November 9. "There, in the foothills northwest of Quangtri City, 23 missions were flown, the [U. S. military] spokesman said. This number was more than double the previous high for a single province and amounted to about 70 aircraft dropping a total of probably somewhat less than 2,000 tons of bombs."

An Associated Press dispatch from Saigon November 12 reported that on November 10 "B-52s bombed the demilitarized zone area for the 10th successive day. More than 40 of the planes dumped up to 1,200 tons of

which is backed by Thieu's top adviser, said: "Whatever the secret understanding, the Communists must put up guarantees so that South Vietnam and the allies can accept it."

Syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported November 8 that such an understanding has already been reached. "Hanoi has secretly promised the U. S. to pull out up to 110,000 North Vietnamese troops now in South Vietnam after the war-ending agreement is finally signed, provided Saigon's army is reduced by the same amount," they wrote. The Saigon army is a bloated body of more than 1,000,000.

"Although this 'understanding' was not grafted onto the tentative Washington-Hanoi agreement, it is viewed here [Washington] as strong evidence that Hanoi will not continue the war by active military means after the agreement takes effect," according to Evans and Novak.


"In short, the Hanoi Politburo seems willing to negotiate with Saigon a nearly-total withdrawal of its own forces from the South over perhaps six to eight months (or even less, according to one qualified expert here)."

Referring to this as one of the most "widely publicized sticking points over the signing of a Vietnam cease-fire," *Newsweek* senior editor Arnaud de Borchgrave commented in the November 13 issue of the American weekly: ". . . over the past two weeks, on the basis of talks with high officials in Hanoi, Saigon and Washington, it is evident to me that getting Hanoi to withdraw many of its troops will really not be a problem."

He quoted a Soviet official in Hanoi as explaining that North Vietnam had reasons to call its troops home: "The bombing has caused widespread disruptions. The regime's power is based on the army, and most of the army is in the south. After a cease-fire, the return of several divisions will be a matter of some urgency for Hanoi."

One of the key questions still surrounded by discrepancies is that of the fate of the political prisoners in South Vietnam. In his interview with Agence France-Presse, Thuy said there were 300,000 such prisoners being held by the Thieu government.

On November 8, the North Vietnamese Communist party newspaper, *Nhan Dan*, asserted that the draft



The New York Post

agreement that was to have been signed on October 31 provided for the release of all military and civilian political prisoners in South Vietnamese jails. This provision has been specifically denied by American officials.

"The Vietnam issue cannot be solved peacefully without eliminating at the same time the origins of the war, namely the U. S. aggression and the U. S.-Saigon policy of terror and oppression," the editorial stated. "This is the very reason why the agreement which should have been signed between Vietnam and the United States provides for the release of all captured patriots and military men and the 'civilian internees' who, under Article 216 of the Geneva agreements, 'mean all persons who have in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties.'"

The statement insisted that "all those illegally imprisoned in South Vietnam must be set free. This is an earnest desire of all Vietnam." It charged that the Saigon government has a campaign "to secretly dispose of patriots illegally kept in over 1,000 jails in South Vietnam." It said "assassinations" of prisoners were taking place, and added: "In the past two weeks, puppet police conducted nearly 20,000 raids in the areas under their control, arresting nearly 5,000 people and gunning down several hundred others."

The *Nhan Dan* statement, observed the *New York Times* in an editorial November 10, "now insists that the draft agreement calls for the concur-

rent release of all military and civilian political prisoners in South Vietnamese jails. That would not be inconsistent with the summary of the agreement which was broadcast by Hanoi radio on Oct. 26, calling simply for 'the return of all captured and detained personnel of the parties.' But it is directly contrary to interpretations offered on that same day by both Henry A. Kissinger in Washington and Hanoi's chief negotiator in Paris, Xuan Thuy."

Kissinger said that the questions of American prisoners and Vietnamese prisoners had been separated in the agreement "so that the return of our prisoners is not conditioned on the disposition of Vietnamese prisoners in Vietnamese jails." Thuy confirmed that "to show our goodwill" the North Vietnamese had agreed that "all military and foreign civilian personnel" on both sides would be returned within sixty days, with the exchange of Vietnamese civilians to be negotiated by the Vietnamese parties themselves within ninety days. He repeated this during his November 10 interview with Agence France-Presse.

Meanwhile, Thieu is resorting to massive arrests of persons suspected of supporting the liberation forces or for failure to produce on demand a South Vietnamese flag. "He's arresting anyone who has a third cousin on the other side," said one U. S. official.

In contrast to the optimism of Kissinger's now famous "peace is at hand" statement, *Newsweek* offered the following, rather more sober, assessment of the prospects for peace in its November 13 issue: ". . . there is only one section of the agreement that is clearly spelled out and can be easily implemented—the timetable for the U. S. withdrawal and the release of American POW's. As far as the American people are concerned, that is of paramount importance. For the beleaguered people of Vietnam, however, the prospects are less pleasant. The U. S. B-52s and Soviet SAM missiles will probably be gone, the news of the struggle will not be flashed around the world with as much urgency as before and there may even be a respite in the wholesale bloodletting while both sides regroup and concentrate on building political power. But the civil war in Vietnam that started nearly two decades ago seems destined to go on." □



# Anti-Allende Strike Wave Ends in Chile

Chile began returning to normal November 6 after truckers and shopkeepers ended their twenty-six-day strike against the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende. The strike, which cost Chile an estimated \$170,000,000, came to an end following three days of negotiations between the strikers and the new minister of the interior, General Carlos Prats.

The negotiations resulted in the following concessions being made by the government: All charges were dropped against the striking union leaders; requisitioned vehicles and sequestered property were to be returned to their owners; plans to create a state transportation company in the southern part of the country were suspended; the activity of private truckers would be backed up by legal guarantees; trade and distribution will be reorganized and will remain in the private sector of the economy; a cabinet commission will be formed to look into complaints originating in all sectors of the economy.

According to *New York Times* reporter Joseph Novitski, writing from Santiago November 8, Senator Carlos Altamirano, the leader of Allende's Socialist party, "disagreed in a midnight speech with the Government's promise to return requisitioned factories and to avoid penalizing state employes who had walked out." The Paris daily *Le Monde* noted in an editorial November 4 that as a result of Allende's appointment of three military men, including Prats, to his cabinet, the Chilean Socialists are "torn apart" and it is quite possible that Altamirano will resign as party head.

The other major force in the Chilean popular front, the Communist party, issued a statement November 3 "fully approving" the new cabinet, according to the November 4 *Daily World*, newspaper of the U. S. Communist party.

The MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left), however, has issued a declaration criticizing the inclusion of the military in Allende's cabinet. "It's dangerous for the people to accept alliances made in their

name with some high military officials without some guarantees and conditions for such a program," said the MIR, according to an Associated Press dispatch from Santiago November 9.

The composition of the new cabinet is as follows: interior—General Carlos Prats; foreign affairs—Clodomiro Almeyda (Socialist); national defense—José Toha (Socialist); economy—Fernando Flores (MAPU [Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria—Movement for United People's Action]); government secretary general—Hernán del Canto (Socialist); finances—Orlando Millas (Communist); public works—Admiral Ismael Huerta; labor and social welfare—Luis Figueroa (Communist); public education—Jorge Tapia (Radical); justice—Sergio Inzunza (Communist); land and settlement—Humberto Martones (Radical); mines—Air Force General Claudio Sepulveda; public health—Juan Carlos Concha (MAPU); agriculture—Rolando Calderón (Socialist); and housing—Luis Matte (Independent).

The opposition appears to regard the military cabinet members as guardians of its interests. The Christian Democratic senator and former president of the Senate, Patricio Alwyn, for instance, feels, according to an Agence France-Presse report in the November 5-6 *Le Monde*, "that the presence of three high-ranking military men ought to guarantee a governmental program that respects the law and serves the interests of all Chileans, not only those of a few parties." A spokesman for the right-wing National party, Victor Garcia, said he thought the cabinet was that of a "moderate government."

The fact is that Allende has placed the fate of his Popular Unity regime in the hands of the military. It is significant in this regard that the promotion of General Prats to the most powerful post in the cabinet occurred at precisely the time that a law was being implemented giving to the armed forces alone complete power to ban the possession of weapons of any kind by individual citizens.

Prats received his military training in the United States. Although he is expected to fulfill his cabinet duties in a "nonpolitical" fashion, Marcel Niedergang noted in the November 2 *Le Monde* that "it is recognized in Santiago that his political sympathies do not lean in the direction of Popular Unity. It is thanks to his insistent intervention that the American military mission has not left Chile and that the joint American-Chilean naval maneuvers, 'Unitas,' were able to take place at the height of the [recent] crisis, in spite of the violent objections of certain leaders of the Socialist party."

Meanwhile, Niedergang also pointed out that as the Kennecott Copper Corporation stepped up its campaign against Chile in October, Allende moved to seize all Chilean holdings of the American-owned Dow Chemical company. The official reason for the seizure was that the Chilean subsidiaries "have not delivered the agreed-upon plastic products." One of the subsidiaries, whose value is set at \$10,000,000, is insured by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a U. S. government body designed to protect imperialist investments abroad. Thus, in the case of the recent seizures—as with the nationalizations last year of Anaconda and Kennecott—the U. S. government itself is directly concerned. □

## Brazilian Women Meet

Brazil's first National Women's Congress attracted several hundred men and women to Rio de Janeiro during the week of October 31 to discuss women's liberation in Latin societies.

Romy Madeiros da Fonseca, president of the National Council of Brazilian Women, explained some of the issues in a Copacabana interview. "Planned parenthood and more day-care centers—that is what the Brazilian woman wants today and this is what we will fight for."

In 1962 she led the campaign for reform of the Civil Code, gaining the right for married women to exercise a profession, travel abroad, hold a bank account, and handle inheritance matters without their husband's permission.

"Everything was done to destroy the congress; it was said we were lesbians, prostitutes, Communists, subversive, but we showed them we're a serious organization," Dona 'Romy' said. The November 4 *New York Times* article also reported that there was significant press coverage.

# Galanskov Dies in Soviet Labor Camp

By Marilyn Vogt

Yury Galanskov, one of the most prominent activists in the Soviet opposition movement, is dead. According to the November 9 *New York Times*, he died in a Mordovian labor camp on November 4 while undergoing an ulcer operation. He had been serving a seven-year sentence in strict-regime camp number 17, which is reserved for political prisoners convicted of "especially dangerous crimes against the state."

The charges against Galanskov involve his allegedly having edited two samizdat literary magazines, *Syntax* in 1958 and *Phoenix 1966* (the latter included a poem by the writer and critic Andrei Sinyavsky that the prosecution declared to be "of a criminal nature"), and having composed poetry that was clandestinely circulated in samizdat.

In January 1968 Galanskov, along with Aleksandr Ginzburg, Vera Lashkova, and Aleksei Dobrovolsky, was tried and convicted under Article 70 of the Russian criminal code, which deals with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Ginzburg had compiled a *White Book* which exposed and documented the injustices surrounding the 1966 trial of Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel, the first show-trial of the post-Stalin era.

Like the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, the Galanskov-Ginzburg trial was a blatant attempt by the Soviet bureaucracy to intimidate the growing democratic opposition movement. But the trials provoked widespread protest within the Soviet Union and served to mobilize and unite the antibureaucratic sentiment they had been designed to stifle.

Regarding the trial and conviction of Galanskov and Ginzburg, Bertrand Russell stated: "So intolerably unjust were the procedures of the court that even the official journal of the British Communist party, normally a faithful spokesman for the Soviet Union, felt compelled to publish its criticism."

The absurdity of the Kremlin's case, the violations of Soviet law throughout the proceedings, and the severity of the sentences (Ginzburg got five

years) prompted letters of protest from Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Latvia, the Ukraine, and other parts of the Soviet Union. There were nearly 700 signers—scientists, students, workers, intellectuals, and local Communist party activists. One hundred friends, relatives, and supporters of the defendants gathered at the courtroom on the last day to hear the verdict announced.

Despite the bureaucratic reprisals against nearly 100 of those who spoke out for the defendants, the democratic opposition emerged from the trial stronger and better organized. Informal contacts established during these events were to spur the emergence of the *Chronicle of Current Events*, the first issue of which, dated April, 1968, was devoted almost exclusively to the Galanskov-Ginzburg trial.

The *Chronicle* has appeared every two months since then (at least until July 1972) as a clandestinely compiled and distributed collection of information on the activities of the anti-bureaucratic movement, with special attention to the trials of dissidents and the fate of those sentenced. Our information on Galanskov's life comes from the *Chronicle*.

A determined activist, Galanskov in 1965 had conducted a one-man demonstration outside the U.S. embassy in Moscow to protest the invasion of the Dominican Republic. He continued his political activity in the labor camp. Although he suffered from severe stomach ulcers, which caused him to be hospitalized during his first days in the Mordovian camp (May 1968) and periodically thereafter, Galanskov joined other prisoners in hunger strikes against the harsh prison conditions throughout 1969-70.

In October 1970 he was sentenced to two months in a special isolation-regime prison, called BURs, where prisoners are kept in cells on especially low food rations. This sentence was a reprisal for his protests against the poor food rations in the labor camp. The harsh conditions in the prison resulted in his hospitalization for twenty days in December 1970.

The hospital authorities patched him up so that he could finish serving the special two-month sentence.

Along with other prisoners, Galanskov directed letters to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and to leading cultural figures protesting the penal policies "worked out by experts and presented by them in special handbooks with a cynicism worthy of the concentration camp experts of the Third Reich."

In a statement from the Mordovian camp dated Autumn 1969 Galanskov, Ginzburg, and "five friends" indicted the forced labor camps to which members of the democratic opposition are condemned by Soviet bureaucratic "justice," camps where ". . . forced labor and cruel exploitation are the norm, where people are systematically kept hungry and constantly humiliated, where their human dignity is debased. Through these camps passes an uninterrupted human flow, millions strong, which gives back to society physically and morally crippled people."

But the Soviet bureaucracy did not choose to give Galanskov back to society. Four years and five months in the harsh Mordovian labor camp killed him. His hunger strikes, one of the few avenues of protest open to the prisoners, and the written protests did not result in improved living conditions in the camp. Instead, he was sentenced to even harsher conditions, which further compromised his already failing health.

Through his political and literary work, his trial statements, and his protests from prison, Galanskov helped spur the growth of the democratic opposition in the Soviet Union on a scale unanticipated by the Soviet government.

For example, in February 1968 in the aftermath of his trial, a group of prominent activists in the opposition movement came together to issue a statement to the Presidium of the Consultative Conference of the Communist parties being held in Budapest. They pointed to the revival of political trials and harsh sentences dealt to people who had merely expressed their views, to the inhuman conditions in the forced labor camps, and to the violation of the rights of small nationalities. They appealed to the "many communists abroad and in our country" to "fully consider the peril caused by the trampling on the



rights of man in our country." Among the twelve signers were Aleksei Kos-  
terin, Pyotr Yakir, Pavel Litvinov, Py-  
otr Grigorenko, Victor Krasin, and  
Ilya Gabai.

In his own appeal for support in  
reforming Soviet penal colonies, di-  
rected to the Communist parties in  
the West and to the Western world in  
general, Galanskov stated:

"Fortunately such events as the hun-  
ger strike in February 1968 . . .  
sooner or later become known both  
in our country and abroad. . . . [Pub-  
licity abroad about the] arbitrariness  
and acts of crude coercion by Soviet  
official personnel . . . force the state  
bodies and officials to take quick ac-  
tion. In this way the Western press

and radio are fulfilling the tasks of  
what is at present lacking in Russia,  
an organized opposition. . . . [Un-  
fortunately] the West often devalues  
itself by a concern for sensation or  
for temporary ideological compro-  
mise, and does not show the neces-  
sary persistence in its approach to  
matters which for us are of critical  
importance."

This, then, was the courageous and  
internationalist-minded young militant  
whose blood is on the hands of Brezh-  
nev and company. His life stands as  
a model of revolutionary devotion de-  
spite whatever weaknesses there were  
in his political understanding of what  
the "Western radio" represents. □

year term in a Mordovian concentra-  
tion camp for "anti-Soviet agitation  
and propaganda." At his first trial  
Moroz refused to plead guilty and  
instead used the opportunity to  
denounce the untrammelled Great  
Russian chauvinism of the bureau-  
cratic Soviet regime.

While serving his first sentence in the  
concentration camp, Moroz wrote *A  
Report from the Beria Reservation*,<sup>2</sup>  
which is perhaps the most brilliant  
and imaginative of all dissident writ-  
ings on the subject of the KGB  
mentality. The article is a deadly dis-  
section of the secret police psychology  
and the KGB no doubt had it in mind  
when they arranged to have Moroz  
stabbed in prison.

After completing his first sentence,  
in the nine months of freedom before  
being rearrested, Moroz wrote a  
number of essays protesting Russifi-  
cation and cultural vandalism in the  
Ukraine and criticizing manifestations  
of opportunism and defeatism in the  
ranks of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

In the political spectrum of Ukrain-  
ian dissenting opinion, Moroz repre-  
sents what might be called the "demo-  
cratic-nationalist" tendency. This ten-  
dency, strongest in the Western  
Ukraine, is characterized by its attack  
on Great Russian chauvinism from the  
standpoint of Ukrainian nationalism.  
It holds, in the words of Moroz, that  
"absolute rejection of nationalism  
'whatever one may put into it'—is  
a *Stalinist* and not a Leninist thesis.  
Lenin did not hold this position. Lenin,  
as is known, put into the nationalism  
of an oppressed nation positive mean-  
ing."<sup>3</sup>

The "democratic-nationalist" ten-  
dency is also marked by its uncomp-  
romising, revolutionary, and activist  
approach to the nationalities question,  
as well as by its stress on the need  
for individual dedication in a time of  
general political passivity.

Appeals on behalf of Moroz were  
sent to Communist party officials in  
the Ukraine by Ivan Dzyuba, V.  
Chornovil, and V. Antonenko-Davidov-  
vich. Moroz's trial was also reported  
in Number 17 of the *Chronicle of  
Current Events*, the Russian-language  
underground publication. □

## Bureaucracy Tries to Kill Moroz

By Ted Harding

An attempt on the life of a prominent  
Ukrainian oppositionist was recently  
made in the prison of Vladimir, a city  
in the Ukraine. Valentyn Moroz, 36,  
a talented Ukrainian historian and  
publicist, was repeatedly stabbed after  
he was transferred by the KGB (Soviet  
secret police) to a cell contain-  
ing prisoners convicted of criminal of-  
fences. The criminals pounced on  
Moroz with knives, and he was found  
in the cell unconscious and bleeding  
severely.

According to a report in the emigre  
press (*Ukrain'ske Slovo*, October 22),  
Kiev dissident circles interpret the in-  
cident as an attempt by diehard Stalin-  
ist officials of the KGB to liquidate  
Moroz. The dissidents point out that  
Vladimir prison contains mostly politi-  
cal prisoners, and claim that the KGB  
transferred criminal elements to the  
prison to commit the act.

The stabbing seriously endangered  
Moroz's life since he was already suf-  
fering from acute anemia and stomach  
ulcers, for which he had been denied  
basic medical attention. After a short  
spell in the Vladimir prison hospital,  
Moroz, already in critical condition,  
was transferred from Vladimir to  
Kiev, a distance of well over 1,000  
miles.

Moroz is one of the most abused  
political prisoners in the Soviet  
Union—and one of the most militant.  
On November 18, 1971, he received

one of the harshest sentences to date—  
nine years imprisonment and five  
years of exile—on charges of "anti-  
Soviet propaganda and agitation."

Moroz acted courageously through-  
out the closed trial that ended in the  
fourteen-year sentence. Entering the  
courtroom under machine-gun surveil-  
lance, he turned to the people  
assembled with both fists raised  
above his head in a gesture of  
defiance. He remained silent through-  
out the entire proceedings to show his  
contempt for the judicial farce.

Instead of taking the stand in his  
own defense, Moroz passed a written  
statement to the tribunal at the begin-  
ning of the trial. Copies of this state-  
ment, known as "Instead of a Last  
Word," were smuggled out of prison  
and circulated widely in the Ukraine.<sup>1</sup>  
In it Moroz warns the Soviet bureau-  
cracy that the national movement in  
the Ukraine has just begun, and asks,  
"Is it possible you do not comprehend  
that you will soon be dealing  
with social movements of massive  
proportions?"

The 1971 trial was the second time  
the young Ukrainian historian faced  
the Soviet courts. He was first arrested  
early in 1966 and sentenced to a five-

1. The statement is included in a pam-  
phlet published by the Committee in De-  
fense of Soviet Political Prisoners, Post  
Office Box 294, Station "M," Toronto 21,  
Ontario, Canada.

2. Contained in Michael Browne's *Fer-  
ment in the Ukraine*, Praeger, 1971.

3. V. Moroz, *Among the Snows*, Ukrain-  
ian Information Service, London, 1971.

## Concerning the Assassination of Leon Trotsky

S. W. Gerson, Executive Editor  
*Daily World*

P. O. Box 544, Old Chelsea Station  
New York, N. Y. 10011

Dear Mr. Gerson,

In the November 1 issue of the *Daily World* you published a review of Joseph Losey's film *The Assassination of Trotsky*. The reviewer, David Gordon, alleges—without citing any source—that Lenin used the epithet "poseur" to describe Trotsky. Gordon then continues: "Richard Burton, playing Trotsky, makes him resemble a poseur, posturing, making some pompous (and some incomprehensible) statements."

That ought to have won five stars in the *Daily World* for the film, since Burton's Trotsky is patterned on the Stalinist image of the coleader of the Russian revolution, cofounder of the first workers state in history, and organizer of the armed struggle that won victory in the civil war. Gordon even concludes: "The film is poorly acted incohesive and badly told; perhaps that suits Trotsky's political record." With all due consistency, the review is entitled "Inept film fits Trotsky legacy."

Since the film fits so well with the Stalinist view of Trotsky's personality, why such lack of enthusiasm for Losey's production? The reason is that Losey presents the truth concerning Stalin's responsibility for the murder of Trotsky.

How important this is to the *Daily World's* reviewer is shown by his asserting in the very first paragraph: "The film attempts to tell the story of Trotsky's last days, in Mexico, and to fix blame for his assassination upon Stalin and the Soviet Union, a charge that to this day has not been substantiated."

Now, of course Losey did not attempt to fix the blame for Trotsky's assassination upon "the Soviet Union." Losey clearly shows that the plot against Trotsky was spun by Stalin and not by the people of the Soviet Union.

Has the charge against Stalin not been substantiated? I will not attempt in this letter to cite the overwhelming



LEON TROTSKY

evidence as to Stalin's guilt. What I would like to do, however, is to suggest a simple and obvious means by which you and the other members of the editorial board of the *Daily World* can establish the facts through an inquiry of your own.

First let me remind you, since you seem to have forgotten it, that the murderer, who went by the names of "Frank Jacson" and "Jacques Mornard" among others, was released from prison on May 6, 1960, three months before the termination of his sentence. He was taken secretly by Mexican officials to the airport where he was handed over to two officials of the Czechoslovak embassy, Oldrich Novicky and Edward Foulches. The three boarded a waiting airliner and flew to Havana. There Trotsky's murderer was kept in hiding at the country estate of the Czechoslovak mission. The next report was that he had been flown to Prague.

In its lead editorial in the issue of May 8, 1960, the *New York Times* said of this:

"Last Friday the Mexican Govern-

ment finally released the man who calls himself Jacques Mornard. This is the killer who twenty years ago wormed his way into the confidence of Leon Trotsky and then ended the latter's life with axe blows on the head. For two decades the world has been reasonably sure the killer was a Moscow agent sent by Stalin to murder the hero of the Bolshevik Revolution who had lost the Kremlin power struggle. If any doubt of this remained, it was dispelled last Friday when the killer walked out of jail with a diplomatic passport from Communist Czechoslovakia and, accompanied by two Czech diplomats, boarded a plane with Prague as his final destination."

In view of the location of the murderer's residence, it appears to me that with your special connections you are in a singularly good position to interview him and thus get his views as to Stalin's responsibility in the crime.

After all, the *Daily World* has fully supported the extraordinary efforts—including an invasion by Soviet troops—to maintain the same kind of government in Czechoslovakia as the one that provided a haven for Trotsky's murderer.

By way of breaking the ice in an interview, you or your Prague correspondent might ask "Jacson" what his current source of income is. That would lead naturally to his source of income at the time he came to Mexico to kill Trotsky.

It would be interesting to know how he got his false passport, which originally belonged to Tony Babich, a Canadian who volunteered to fight with the Loyalists in the Spanish civil war and lost his life (and passport) there.

An especially instructive line of questioning might be developed concerning the unusually skilled forgers who altered the passport. How did they get the passport in the first place? Didn't the Stalinists exercise command over the brigades in the Spanish Republican Army to which volunteers like Tony Babich, the original possessor of the passport, were assigned?

Was it just coincidental that Trotsky's murderer, whose real name was Jaime Ramón Mercader del Río Hernández, also participated in the Spanish civil war, working with members of the NKVD, Stalin's secret political police? Exactly when and where did Mercader get this passport? Why did he adopt the name of "Frank Jacson"?

Other questions come naturally to mind. Besides murdering Trotsky, was "Jacson" the one who murdered Trotsky's guard Robert Sheldon Harte, kidnapped in the May 24, 1940, assault led by the Mexican painter and Communist leader David Alfaro Siqueiros? Was "Jacson" also the one who murdered Rudolf Klement, the secretary of the group preparing the founding congress of the Fourth International in 1938?

If you think that the answers to these questions would still prove insufficient to pin down the identity of the figure whose orders "Jacson" carried out, I am quite willing to prepare a list of additional questions to help you in a quest to settle what must be a nagging problem for your staff. I could also provide you with some pertinent background material that might prove useful in interviewing the killer.

There is not much point in doing that, however, until you have ascertained for sure whether the present Czechoslovak government and the Soviet occupation forces will take your excellent credentials into account and grant you permission to interview the retired executioner.

Sincerely yours,  
*Joseph Hansen*

A fairly human community-oriented system has been submerged into a privately oriented, ambitious capitalistic system.

Freedom of mobility for the workforce has been introduced in Greenland—for example, by sending Greenlandic female workers to Herning [a city in Jutland].

You talk about sovereignty and the right to self-determination. Well, what has the little Europe Denmark done to Greenlandic society? What happened to the one Greenlander who attempted to integrate himself into the general Danish parliamentary system? Moses Olsen was almost sent back to his "sod hut" out of fear that a Greenlander might weigh too heavily in the scales in forming the government.

The sovereignty of Greenland is now tied to this government, which, holding the Greenlander Knud Hertling [Greenland's minister] hostage, wants to make us even more dependent on a Europe that has oppressed, and oppresses, the weaker, peaceful nations in the third world.

To this Europe we say "no."

We are not talking about independence from Denmark, but about independence from the strong economic and political power that the EEC [European Economic Community] is going to become.

We did not vote on Greenland becoming a part of Denmark in 1953. The only time we have participated in a referendum was over lowering the voting age, and in that referendum Greenland said "yes" to lowering the age to eighteen, while the rest of the Danish kingdom said "no!"

This is absolutely our only chance to say "no" to the disappearance of the Greenlandic people into the big European state.

"No" to the Common Market! □

## 250 Years' Experience With 'Greenland's Brussels'

### Why Greenland Voted 'No' on Market Entry

[The following speech was given at an anti-Common Market rally in Copenhagen on September 16 by Jens Geisler, chairman of the Unge Groenlaenderes Raad (Council of Young Greenlanders). It deals with the question of the relationship between Denmark and its province, Greenland—a relationship that became more rocky with the October 2 referendum, in which Denmark voted to join the Common Market. Greenland voted overwhelmingly against.

[The text of the speech was published in the October 6 issue of the Danish socialist biweekly *Politisk Revy*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

I regard it as a great honor as a representative of the Greenlandic anti-Market forces down here to have been given time to speak to a large Danish audience.

It is not unusual for a Greenlander to address a political gathering; but it is highly doubtful that his opinion will be heard or have any influence on the political life of Greenland!

Our experiences with Europe and community endeavor are somewhat different from yours.

Our 250-year experience with Greenland's Brussels, Copenhagen, has, by way of example, achieved for us the following results:

The United States and NATO have been brought in, turning Greenland into a strategically important area in so-called East-West relations.

The hunting and fishing people of Thule have been deported to make room for an American base and other military installations.

A Greenlandic colliery was closed down for "purely economic" reasons, and then its workers were deported to the industrial belt along the west coast of Greenland.

### Mal Vivant—or—What's in a Name?

On June 30, 1971, Samuel Cochran died after eating a can of vichyssoise manufactured by the "Bon Vivant" company. The cause of death was found to be botulism. Seven days later, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ordered the company shut down.

But in the land of the free, you just can't keep a good entrepreneur down. The November 14 *New York Times* reported that Bon Vivant has changed its name to Moore and Company and is back in business.

Mrs. Andrew Paretti, owner of the "new"

outfit, told reporters that all operations will be under the direct supervision of the FDA. Production is expected to start within a week, and Moore and Company's canned specialties should be on the shelves of supermarkets by the end of the year.

There is just one matter outstanding. The FDA has filed for an order to seize thousands of cans made by Bon Vivant before it went out of business. The company objects, saying there is nothing wrong with the stuff—especially now that it has a new label.

## On the Revolutionary Struggle Against Zionism

[The following interview with Michael Warschawski, one of the leaders of the Israeli Socialist Organization (Marxist), was obtained for *Intercontinental Press* early in October. The ISO-Marxist is commonly known as Matzpen (the Hebrew word for "compass"), which is the name of its newspaper.]

[We are publishing below the first part of the interview. The second part will appear in the next issue of *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

*Question: How would you characterize the general political mood in Israel today?*

*Answer:* After the 1967 war there was a very sharp turn to the right on the part of the whole population of Israel. The national unity created by the war is still a factor even today.

But the last two years have seen the beginning of real struggles in Israel, mostly strikes by workers, very militant strikes, and a certain amount of radicalization—I would not call it a radicalization, but there is more serious criticism of the government's policies. The fact that the Black Panthers [an organization of Oriental Jews] appeared, for example, is very interesting.

You have to understand that these strikes, the Black Panther struggle, and a certain radicalization in some strata of the youth are the exception in a very nationalist and rightist situation in society as a whole.

To this day there is no real movement of political opposition to the Israeli state and government. There are economic struggles, struggles relating to certain specific problems of certain specific strata or classes. But there is no substantial group with a real critique of the Zionist ideology and program.

A consequence of this situation is the lack of any independent mass organizations—of workers, for example, or of Oriental Jews. Everyone in Israel is organized in Zionist parties, in Zionist organizations, in a Zionist

so-called union, and any criticism is always within the framework of these kinds of organizations.

The 1967 war was the beginning of a new period in Israel. The war not only added very great territory to the Israeli economy and administration; it also—and this is very important—marked the beginning of industrialization of Israel. The need for weapons and other war-related requirements is bringing about the industrialization.

This industrialization has some common characteristics with industrialization in fascist countries, like Germany, Italy, and Japan. First of all, it is an industrialization around weapons and war. Second, it is directed by the state. And third, it is being carried out in a period in which there is a strong working class, but in which there is no need to destroy working-class organizations because the working class has no independent organizations.

The whole industrialization is being carried out by the government, by the Histadrut, by the whole Zionist system, at a time when the working class has no real possibility of uniting and fighting back. The workers are paying a very high price for this industrialization and for this new economic boom. Real wages are going down, and this is the reason for the struggles and strikes that are taking place today.

But these struggles have gone no further than attempting to defend the workers' social and economic position.

On the other hand, the fact that today there is what we could call "peace"—there is no war, there are no internal problems—makes it appear more and more to the Israeli masses that the problem is not with Zionism but with "better government." This government has proved itself with regard to the problem of "security" and war against the Arabs.

In addition you must understand that the work of revolutionary political organizations is very difficult. We understand that our struggle has to be against the Israeli Zionist state, and not against this or that government within the framework of that state. We have to make clear to the Israeli masses what the Zionist state

is and what price the Israeli masses have to pay for Zionist policies.

The Zionist policy itself, however, produces questions that can potentially radicalize the society. For example, the question of immigration is a very hot issue today in Israel. On the one hand we have a great mass of people, mostly Oriental Jews, who are paying a very high price for Israeli policies, even today in a "peace" situation.

Fully half of the budget is for military expenditures, directly or indirectly, while more than 30 percent of the population lives below the officially set minimum standard of living for a family.

On top of this, we have a large new immigration from the developed capitalist countries, and from the Soviet Union. These immigrants have many rights and also make many demands. So Israeli-born Jews feel that these immigrants are taking from them what is rightfully theirs.

Thus the Black Panthers have published a petition against Jewish immigration and in support of the tax Soviet Jews must pay in order to emigrate to Israel. Such a petition can have great popularity because this is a real and concrete problem and preoccupation of the Israeli masses.

Of course this issue of immigration is one that the anti-Zionist revolutionary organizations have to include in their agitation. This is an issue that makes clear the contradictions not only between Zionism and the rights of the Arab Palestinians and the Arab people as a whole, but also the contradiction between Zionism and the rights of the Jews in Israel.

Our entire program revolves around such points—to make it clear that Zionist policies can not solve the problems of Jews not only outside Israel but even inside Israel. And if an Israeli Jew is not ready to pay a very, very high price in terms of standard of living and in rights, then it is in *his* interests to break with Zionism.

But we have to understand that the situation today is not one of radicali-

zation. It's a situation of national unity and of strict domination by the Zionist parties over the whole population. And the struggles that are occurring in some sectors of the society do not go beyond concrete, economic demands and do not express any perspective of changing society from a Zionist to a socialist society.

Of course I have only been speaking here about Jews in Israel.

*Q: You said there have been some signs among certain sectors of young people of a change in this monolithic support by Jews in Israel for the status quo. Could you describe what you meant by this?*

*A:* The '67 war caused the beginnings of a radicalization among certain strata of Israeli youth, mostly those in the high schools who have to go into the army. They are beginning to ask what will happen when we have war, and war, and more war. The fact that to a certain extent they see that Zionism and war are linked together makes them begin to break in a certain measure with the Zionist commitment.

However, the great majority of them have not gone beyond criticism and skepticism to break with Zionism. And on the other hand, the great majority of the young Jews in Israel have moved significantly to the right. Organizations like the JDL (Jewish Defense League) are stronger today than they ever were.

However, the past three years have been characterized, within this rightward shift, by a severe repression: first against Arabs but then against left organizations, against Black Panthers, against workers on strike—laws against strikes, etc. And this repression provoked some young people (I would say even thousands—in the universities mostly but also to a certain extent in the high schools) to begin to fight against the repression.

For example there developed what is known here as the May 2 Movement, a movement that began in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem after the arrest of the leftists and Black Panthers in a May Day demonstration.

This movement can mobilize a demonstration of 4,000 people in Jerusalem—a very significant development. There have never been demonstrations of this size in Israel of people

struggling against the government, against police brutality, against the arrests.

This movement exists, there is no doubt of that. In Haifa University, for example, although quite by accident, the left Zionists received a majority and are today leading the Haifa student union.

Thus there are possibilities of radicalizing the youth around such problems as repression and discrimination between Oriental and non-Oriental Jews and between Jews and Arabs. But the great majority of them are not now revolutionary or anti-Zionist.

*Q: You mentioned that the Jewish Defense League now exists here in Israel. Is this a new phenomenon, and could you describe it further?*

*A:* To a certain degree it is a new phenomenon. The right wing of Zionism has never had a very great influence in Israel. The core of the Zionist parties, of the Zionist establishment, was the so-called workers' Zionism. They were always the majority, and they did the work. Many people understand very well that the right Zionists are perhaps the most Zionist in word, but in fact the "left" Zionists did the work very well.

The present immigration from the United States, from Europe, and from the Soviet Union is a new factor; it's an ideological immigration—of people who are not coming to Israel because of oppression but because of a generally rightist or fascist ideology. And they are coming at a time when Israel is strong; when people are not so sure about the slogan that the Arabs want to kill all Jews and that we are in danger. Now people don't believe this so much.

In this situation the ideology and mobilization have to be in another direction—in a very rightist and nationalist, even anti-labor direction. So there is no doubt that the JDL has an influence today because all of the classical Zionist organizations have failed to organize young Jews. They failed to give them an ideology to fight for. They were the government; they were the establishment. The left opponents of Zionism asked the youth to break with Zionism. But then the youth saw the right opposition to Zionism—an opposition that criticizes the government for its "cowardice," for its "communist" tendencies, for its

"weakness" in relation to the Black Panther struggles and workers' struggles.

For the young the JDL is an alternative, and events like the Lod incident or the Munich incident make them more and more popular. They demand that the government be stronger against Arabs, against what they call terrorism. And if you are not strong enough, they say, we will be strong. This attracts many, many young people to the JDL.

*Q: In Europe and America there has been a process occurring on the left of a growing alienation from Israel and opposition to Israel and to Zionism. What has been the effect of this within Israel, and what has been the attitude of the Zionists towards it?*

*A:* The first effect was the change in immigration from Europe and the U.S. Before the '67 war and one or two years after the war, the immigration was of young liberals—people who didn't know exactly what Zionism was—and "left" Zionists. Generally when these people arrived in Israel they were astonished to see what Zionism really is in practice. The anti-Zionist propaganda of the Palestinian organizations, of revolutionary organizations outside Israel, and of Matzpen, to a certain extent, made more and more clear to them what Zionism was.

But then the immigration began to come from the right—young people who know what Zionism is and agree with it.

Another factor has been the loss of credibility of Zionist propaganda. Generally before the 1967 war, a great majority of liberals—and even radicals—outside Israel supported Israel against the Arabs, who supposedly wanted to kill the Jews in Israel. But after the war many, many people understand that the problem was the opposite—that of a colonial state and an oppressed people. And that the oppressed people today is not the Jewish people but the Arab Palestinian people.

There is no doubt that today the "friends" of Israel abroad are more rightist than before '67. Many liberals support Israel—but with some criticism. Only the rightist, bourgeois, and even fascist parties outside Israel—in South Africa, for example—are solid supporters of Israel.

Inside Israel there is a great hatred of the left. And because there is the concept here that the left outside Israel is largely made up of Jews, the general view here is that leftists are self-hating people, Jews who are ashamed of their Jewishness. There is also the concept that the left and the right—fascism and communism—are the same thing.

It can be said today that every Zionist—even the most left—has to break with the real revolutionary left and even with radicals in Europe and in the United States.

*Q: What was the impact of the Munich kidnapping incident in Israel?*

*A:* A great hysteria, for many reasons. First, the Israeli Jews have never felt so deeply that the problem of the Arab resistance still remains, despite the tremendous strength of the Israeli army and state and despite the defeats suffered by the Palestinian resistance organizations. There has been no solution to the problem, and the struggle, the terrorism, will continue.

Second, there was a great feeling of impotence. A feeling that Israel can bomb and bomb and bomb Syria and Lebanon and Jordan, killing many, many people, but that the Palestinian resistance will continue to fight, if necessary with such tactics as at Munich.

What is interesting about the effect of the Munich incident is not only that it strengthened national unity—as happens after every such incident—but that no one in Israel really criticized the Israeli government for consciously deciding to sacrifice the Israeli athletes.

Only a small minority asked, "But why didn't we give them what they wanted?"

So on the one hand, the Munich incident deepened the feeling of insecurity among the Israeli masses, but on the other hand, it strengthened the feeling that we have to fight together against the Arabs, who want to kill us.

I think that activities such as those carried out by Black September in Munich have a bad effect in Israel, from a revolutionary point of view. A bad effect because they deepen the nationalist and chauvinist reactions in Israeli society.

But also it had a great importance in making clear to all Israeli-Jews

that as long as the Zionist state exists there will be struggle and resistance against it—resistance from Arab countries, or resistance in Europe, but that the Palestinian organizations will never cease their struggle against Zionism.

*Q: What has been the political mood and evolution of political thinking among the Arab people within the occupied territories and the Arabs who had lived within the prewar boundaries?*

*A:* The Israeli repression inside the occupied territories was very great. Today there is no real struggle against the occupation. Even in the Gaza Strip, where the repression was greater and the struggle longer than on the West Bank, it can be said that today there is no mass struggle.

That is one point; the second point is that, from an economic point of view, the Arabs in the occupied territories are making some money. Not only the petty-bourgeois sectors, but even the workers, even the refugees.

Today between 50,000 and 100,000 Arabs are working in Israel. The Israeli government has not formally decided whether or not to integrate the Arab economy of the occupied territories into the Israeli economy; this is still under discussion amongst the tendencies inside the Zionist parties. But in fact such an integration exists. It can be deepened, but it exists.

There is a certain amount of development—the standard of living is improving and there are jobs. The economic relations with the Arab world are better than they ever were before the occupation. So Arabs in the occupied territories have the feeling on one level that "O. K., we are in Israel,

we are in Jordan; the difference is not so great."

But national feeling, the sentiment of national honor, is still very strong and will continue to be strong.

The Israeli Arabs—Arabs who were inside the boundary of Israel before the war—are even today hostile and have the feeling of being Palestinians and not Israelis—even if they vote for Zionist parties.

Incidents such as the Munich incident have both a good and a bad effect on Israeli Arabs. The good effect is that such incidents give them their honor; they have the feeling that they are fighting and that at least some among them are not ready to say O. K. to the occupying Zionist regime.

But they have a bad effect because it is only a feeling; it is only a sentiment for saving their honor. They are not fighting; they are not organizing politically or militarily against the occupation. They respect the comandos, and respect the Black September organization for their actions, and they have the feeling that "this is our struggle." But they are making money today.

My estimation is that the integration of the Palestinian Arabs of the occupied territories will be deeper and deeper. The hope of returning to the sovereignty of the Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan), the hope of escaping the domination of the Jewish Zionist state—perhaps to have a certain kind of Palestinian state—is less strong than it was before. But the feeling of being Palestinian, of having rights, and the feeling that some day they will regain their rights, this feeling is still strong and will remain strong.

[To be continued.]

## Labor Protests Mount in Uruguay

A twenty-four-hour general strike was called November 8 throughout Uruguay by the CNT [Convencion Nacional de Trabajadores—National Convention of Workers]. The union announced, according to a UPI dispatch in the November 9 issue of the New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario-La Prensa*, that it had taken this action in support of hard strikes among certain categories of workers and "for the reestablishment of individual rights, as well as democratic and trade-union rights in general."

On October 17, the hospital workers organized in the FUS [Federacion Uruguaya de Salud—Uruguayan Federation of Health Workers] went on strike demanding higher wages.

On October 30 the primary-school teachers walked out, and they were followed a week later by the secondary-school teachers and administrative personnel.

In addition to demanding higher salaries, the teachers were protesting against the government's education bill to restore "discipline."



# Whither the Officials?

By Bob Purdie

[The following article is reprinted from the October 16 issue of *The Red Mole*, the biweekly paper of the IMG (International Marxist Group—British section of the Fourth International).]

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Following the "laundry" revelations about the British army spying in Belfast, the Official IRA have issued an important statement. It threatens to call off their cease-fire and may indicate their return to a more militant policy. In spite of Operation Motorman—the invasion of the Free Areas—the Officials had maintained their cease-fire, insisting that civil war had to be avoided. This stance had in turn been in sharp contrast with their previous policy of armed operations which included the shooting of Senator Barnhill and the Aldershot bombing.

This article takes up some of the political problems which explain the zig-zags of the Officials. It discusses various questions raised by the September 1972 issue of their paper, the *United Irishman*, which carried to extremes some of the trends developing in the paper over the preceding months.

We will not be diverted by the many quite apolitical attacks on the Provisionals and on left-wing critics of the Officials; characterisations of the Provisionals as "this cancerous growth, spawned by the moneygrabbing gombeen mind of Jack Lynch and Fianna Fail"; and statements such as: "The Provo/Trots saw a war of National Liberation where there was none, they supplied socialist jargon to justify the bombing of children, they turned Civil Rights into Civil War and they are revealed today for what they always were—not tribunes of the working class but rather a psychosis of the middle class."

These attacks are merely symptoms of the political crisis within the Officials. They are an attempt to close ranks by whipping up anti-Provoism, and to deal with internal critics by

associating them with "Trotskyism"—which they dub as simultaneously an importation of "failed" ideas from England, and a capitulation to the Provos. That the *United Irishman* gives space to such nonsense is eloquent testimony to the internal crisis being caused by their wrong policies.

The Irish Republican Movement took a great step forward when, in the '60s, its leadership took up a socialist position based on a Marxist view of society. Unfortunately they saw Marxism as a mechanistic system which could produce an automatic answer to any political problem. Their perspective, based on this formal method, was that the struggle in Ireland would move through three successive and separate stages; the struggle for democracy in the North, the struggle for national unity, and the struggle for a socialist Ireland.

This was wrong on two counts. Firstly, the necessary conceptual distinctions between the different elements of the struggle does not imply that they are insulated from each other, or that they develop along a linear path; in fact they interact with each other, and one aspect of the struggle serves to aggravate the crisis which brings the others into prominence. Secondly, the reality of the situation in the North was that these three elements were interlinked in an especially contradictory way, and that the mere posing of a mass struggle for one immediately brought to the fore the struggle for the other elements.

To be concrete, the Six Counties represented a very special form of bourgeois state which could only exist by basing itself on a set of sectarian institutions, which through the Orange ideology, created a mass base for the Unionist Party. Any substantial challenge to any aspect of that delicate system immediately created the possibility of destroying the state. Thus the mobilisation of a mass struggle for democratic rights could only advance to a very limited extent before it challenged the existence of the state, and opened up once more the

national question. In so doing a war was sparked off which if it is to be won poses the problem of effectively drawing the mass of the workers and small farmers in the whole of Ireland into struggle behind the Northern minority. This problem can only be solved if the achievement of national unity and the defeat of British imperialism in the North becomes the central and unifying factor of a generalised mass struggle North and South, in which the particular demands of different sections (urban workers, small farmers, the Gaeltacht, etc.) are welded together into one revolutionary struggle for a Workers Republic.

In this schematic outline, it can be seen how the 'stages' of the struggle are intimately linked. Of course, understanding this does not in itself solve the problems of revolutionary strategy, and while the escalation from the democratic to the national struggle was achieved fairly quickly, and a leadership capable of driving it forward thrown up by the struggle itself, the transformation to a socialist struggle is much more difficult. But unlike the Official leadership, who see everything in formal and abstract terms, such an approach poses the problems of the Irish revolution as a linked series of concrete *tasks*. Thus the national struggle resolves itself into the need to defend the ghettos, which in turn becomes a struggle to smash Stormont, and the British Army. And the socialist phase, far from being a remote and academic problem, is posed *immediately* in the need to extend the struggle to the South.

Because the leadership of the Officials insisted all along that the struggle was only about democracy, and had to be restricted to Civil Rights, they were unprepared when the crisis reached its sharpest point in August '69, and could not play the role they should have played in the defence of the Catholic areas. But following August '69 they compounded their error by setting their faces against the developing national struggle which quickly escalated to a guerrilla war against the British Army.

Today the effects of this series of errors can be seen in the deepening of the negative trends in the politics of the Officials, and the consolidation of their organisation around a reformist programme. The September 1972 issue of their paper, the *United Irish-*

man, demonstrates this. Monotonously it repeats, on page after page, the same three simplistic themes: that the struggle is simply one for Civil Rights, that the Provisionals are mad sectarian wreckers, and that the "Trotskyites" are ultra-left agents of reaction.

Maintaining the argument that the struggle in the North is solely about democracy the Officials say: "We do not want civil war. We repeat again and again that the issue in the North of Ireland is CIVIL RIGHTS NOW. On that there can be no compromise and no talking. We do not want prevarications; we do not want stalling; we do not want bombing; we do not want sectarian killings. We want full guaranteed democracy" . . . . .

"Britain's strategy for Ireland, then, has been very basic: the minimum of concessions on civil rights and the maximum of British control over the Irish people and their economy."

And in another article entitled "Why Britain Won't Give Civil Rights," they say: "Civil rights means for us the full freedom of political activity, the opportunity to work for the creation of working class unity and for the winning of a sizeable section of the Protestant working class to support of the fight for national liberation and socialism. Civil rights is basically, then, a struggle to smash the patronage system of unionism and win the freedom to operate politically and the freedom to advocate the sort of Ireland we believe is necessary."

There are three dangerous elements in this argument. Firstly, it is true that the British have refused to grant the demands of the Civil Rights Association, for such simple concessions as a Bill of Rights. But this is not because they are opposed to civil rights. On the contrary, they have been anxious to "normalise" the North for a long time. This is indeed essential for their long term plans to reorient their relationships with the gommeen bourgeoisie in the South. They resist such demands because they are trying to re-establish stability, and they know that concessions to the Catholic minority on that scale would deepen the mass Orange resistance.

So they balance delicately, while trying to achieve their main priority at this time; *the de-mobilization of the Catholic resistance*. If they achieve this, through militarily smashing the Provos, and/or exhausting the minority, it is quite possible that they will

introduce sweeping reforms in the North, as a means of sealing up the crack in the dam which nearly flooded them. Such reforms would aim at buying off the Catholic resistance, and eliminating some of the structural factors which have made the Catholic revolt so powerful. It is doubtful, even given the above conditions, that Britain could actually solve the Northern Ireland problem, through internal reform, but at least they could create a period of stabilisation.

In this situation the Officials' schema would have two disastrous results. It would mistake as a victory for the minority, what would in fact be a consolidation and strengthening of British imperialism. *And, more important, they would not be prepared for the inevitable smashing of the resistance organisations which would accompany such a strategy.* The Official Republicans would go down along with the Provos, PD, et al., and despite the "democracy" would be unable to advocate any "sort of Ireland."

Secondly, the conception that all that is required to win over the Protestant working class is the opportunity to propagandise to them in a democratic state is utopian. It is not lack of facilities to convince them through argument, but the material basis for sectarianism existing in the institutions of the state which polarises them away from the national and democratic struggle.

This view is coupled with the following statement: "The Provos have blasted away what slim hopes there were of working class unity in this generation, and have given birth to the Protestant reaction of the UDA, UVF and other more vicious forces like Vanguard and the Tartan gangs."

It is difficult to imagine a more mistaken or dangerous view. By singling out this one factor as responsible for the inflammation of sectarianism, the *United Irishman* misestimates the political situation in the North and the real significance of developments within the Protestants. Such a statement shows the dangers of mindless Provo-bashing, when the difficult and complex situation in the North has to be faced seriously.

The main factor in the mobilisation of the UDA, UVF, Vanguard, the Tartans, etc., is the crisis precipitated within Unionism by Direct Rule. This is a new phase of the general crisis within the political and ideological insti-

tutions of the Six County state created by the struggle over the past three to four years. It does not represent a *strengthening* of sectarianism (although it provokes heightened sectarian tensions), but since it is caused by the loss of control over a state security apparatus, and the threat to the Protestant ascendancy, it is a response from a *weakened* position. This weakness is further accentuated by the fragmentation of the former Unionist monolith into a number of warring factions. It is accompanied by a deepening feeling of despair amongst large sections of the Protestant community.

Far from working class unity having been "blasted away," this generation is closer to it than any generation in the last sixty years. But it will only be possible to create unity when a sufficiently large section of the Protestant working class has lost all faith in the traditional ideology and institutions of Orangeism, and realises that only acceptance of their common lot with the working class in the rest of Ireland can give them any future.

The Belfast strike of 1907, and the unemployment riots of the Thirties, represented the breakdown of sectarian barriers between workers, during a time when the Protestant ascendancy was so secure that the maintenance of its ideological hold through the sectarian institutions had somewhat relaxed. The economic interests of Catholic and Protestant workers brought them together fleetingly; but this was enough to remobilise the sectarian institutions, and reassert their ideological hold over the Protestant workers. Today when these institutions are shattered and debilitated, the possibility of real and lasting working class unity is much closer. But it can only come about if the Catholic minority and their organisations remain firm and press forward with their struggle, and they are backed up by the mass of the Irish people. Within this context there can be a discussion about which tactics give best hope of getting across to Protestant workers who have gone furthest towards breaking with Orangeism, and the question of bombing targets, etc. is relevant in this context. But the line taken by the Officials is a dangerous strategical diversion.

Thirdly, the *United Irishman* argument misunderstands the nature of the national struggle. The Catholic minority in the North are not mobilised by

abstractions like "national unity," "self-determination," or "political independence." They fight for an end to internment, to get the British troops off their streets, and to ensure that Stormont never returns. This does not mean that they are consciously restricting themselves to basically democratic demands, but that they are responding to the concrete problems posed for them by the nature of the Six County State.

To return to the argument above: the national and socialist struggles consist of a series of concrete tasks, none of which can be achieved within a partitioned or capitalist Ireland. The mobilisations around the democratic demands of the Civil Rights movement therefore cannot be seen as a purely democratic struggle because, while individual demands could be achieved within the Six County State, as a programme which mobilised large sections of the Catholic minority, these demands could only lead to the *smashing* of the state. It is vital for revolutionaries to understand this, because revolutionary leadership does not consist of convincing the masses to make a revolution, but in convincing them to take the steps which will move them into revolutionary struggle; and then enabling them, on the basis of that experience, to make the leap in consciousness required to understand that they require a revolutionary transformation of society.

The trajectory being followed by the Officials has grave dangers. It is now clear that the split in the Republican Movement was the tragic and politically confused result of an attempt to graft a reformist programme onto the Republican tradition. Since the split the Officials have been adjusting their policies and actions to align with that programme, and have therefore been changing the nature of their organisation. Their continued counterposing of a reformist to a revolutionary programme (which means that they counterpose democratic to national struggle, and immediate working class unity to the struggle to smash the barriers between the workers), has only one logic—the abandonment of Republicanism. The need of the Irish revolutionary movement is to move beyond traditional Republicanism to a Marxist understanding of the inseparably linked nature of the working class and national struggles in Ire-

land; but at the same time to encompass the aims and fighting tradition of Fenianism.

The Officials instead are moving back, away from Republicanism, and towards the creation of a new kind of reformist movement in Ireland. Such a development would be a tragedy, it would make more difficult the task of politicising the mainstream of Irish Republicanism, and would surrender all the advances made within Republicanism since the '56-'62 campaign. We know that this would not happen without a deep internal struggle, but without a correct programmatic basis those who are opposed to this trend within the Officials would be defeated and demoralised.

Like a despairing gambler, dou-

## Thousands Try to March on Bogota

## Wave of Peasant Unrest Sweeps Columbia

A militant peasant movement "of wide scope" is sweeping Colombia, according to a report in the November 4 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*. The armed forces have been called out to prevent peasants from staging marches. Since the beginning of September, these "peasant marches" have spread throughout the country, and widespread arrests have been made both in Bogotá, the capital, and in several provincial towns, particularly Bucaramanga and Baranquilla.

The agrarian struggle is reportedly being organized and led by the ANUC (Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos—National Association of Land Users), a legal body created in 1968 by former head of state Carlos Lleras Restrepo. It was designed to channel the discontent of the rural masses, still under the thumb of the big landholders. "This 'liberal' weapon has proven to be a two-edged sword," *Le Monde* reported. "The present leaders of the ANUC have been radicalized and, since August 1971, are demanding a genuine agrarian reform. 'The land to those who work it': This revolutionary slogan, which has already been heard in other Andean countries, has brought to the path of anger and revolt the poor peasants and small landowners whose lands have been plundered. The rate

of land occupations has increased strikingly during the past few weeks." Last September, ANUC issued a new slogan: "Everybody to Bogotá!" Thousands of peasants responded by attempting to make their way to the capital to insist that their demands be met. So far, they have been prevented from reaching it. "The government's counteroffensive has been especially harsh in the cities," according to *Le Monde*, "where many 'suspects,' whose guilt in many cases consisted of being listed in the address books of persons already detained or questioned, have been arrested. It is estimated that a hundred persons have been arrested in political circles in Bogotá during the past two months." Those arrested are said to include some well-known intellectuals, among them the filmmaker Carlos Álvarez and his wife, Julia Álvarez. In several cities, trade-union headquarters have been sacked. The Communist party headquarters in the southern part of Bogotá has been surrounded by the armed forces. "A bulletin from the CP's regional committee calling for 'non-clandestine mass actions' against the state of siege was branded a 'subversive plan,'" and a projected festival to be organized by the party's newspaper, *Voz Proletaria*, was denounced as a "guerrilla festival" and banned. □

### Sri Lanka Masses Challenge Regime

[The following article has been taken from *La Gauche*, the weekly paper of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs (Revolutionary Workers' League, the Belgian section of the Fourth International). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Ceylon has been ruled since 1970 by a coalition government composed of the bourgeois Sri Lanka Freedom party [SLFP], led by Mrs. Bandaranaike, and two reformist parties, the Lanka Sama Samaja party [LSSP] and the Communist party. This regime has followed a consistent anti-working-class policy reflecting a steady disintegration of the basis underlying the country's traditional economic and political structures.

Ceylon has experienced a growth in public education, in democratic rights for the workers' movement, and in the standard of living of the masses, quite unlike the other countries in South Asia. Its economy, resting on the one hand on a small-landowning peasantry and on the other, on rubber, tea, and coconut plantations oriented entirely to the export market, provided the material base for this development.

The political life of the country, centered around a parliament divided between a traditional "right" (the United National party) and a "left" dominated initially by the LSSP and later by the coalition, reflected these relatively stable social conditions.

Sharpening economic and social contradictions put an end to this idyll. A rate of industrialization lagging behind population growth resulted in an enormous mass of unemployed—mostly educated young people—in the countryside, to whom the successive governments of the "right" and "left" could offer no perspectives.

A chronic deficit in the balance of payments and in the budget led to the disappearance of the basis for financing extensive social services. Ceylon came under the domination of the international credit system. The International Monetary Fund demanded an austerity policy, the price

of which would be paid by the masses, and the present government has persistently carried one out. A process of radicalization has turned the working masses more and more away from electoralist and parliamentary illusions and given them an entirely different perspective for achieving socialism.

In the grip of a deepening crisis of its system, the Ceylonese bourgeoisie has been resorting for ten years to two main weapons—division and repression.

The Ceylonese working masses are divided into four major categories—the urban proletariat, the plantation workers, the poor peasantry working their own land, and occasional wage-workers (the unemployed) in the countryside and in the cities. These masses have different ethnic origins and religious traditions; they speak different languages.

For years, while it was a section of the Fourth International, the LSSP educated the Ceylonese proletariat in the principles of internationalist working-class unity, swimming courageously against the chauvinist current. When it broke with Trotskyism in 1964 and entered into a coalition with the SLFP wing of the bourgeoisie, it abandoned this revolutionary tradition, becoming a promoter of ethnic division.

Along with the CP, it supported the government's policy of making Sinhala the only official language and denying the rights of citizenship to the majority of plantation workers, even threatening to deport hundreds of thousands of them back to India.

This policy of division progressively reduced the striking power and the united thrust of the proletariat and the Ceylonese working masses. As a result, a rapid politicization took place among the rebel youth essentially outside the framework of the organized workers' movement and without any organic connection with the urban masses. By a policy of growing repression, the government was thus able to provoke this youth into insurrectionary actions and to crush it in April 1971 in a bloodbath in which

15,000 young persons were massacred and thousands interned without trial, and in which torture and rape were perpetrated on a grand scale.

The coalition government took advantage of this opportunity also to proclaim a state of emergency, which it has maintained to the present day (for eighteen months!), to ban strikes, impose a severe censorship on the press, postpone elections for seven years, and introduce a court system considerably reducing the rights of the defense.

For a year the Ceylonese proletariat has seemed stunned by the succession of betrayals, divisions, and repressions to which it has been subjected. But there are increasing signs of a revival in progress. And our comrades of the LSSP (R [revolutionary]), the Ceylonese section of the Fourth International, are playing the preponderant role in paving the way for and organizing the reunification of the masses and the resurgence of mass struggles.

After some small skirmishes, the first strike has defied the government's state of emergency and its ban on all work stoppages. The leader is a member of the LSSP(R). This strike, which has partially paralyzed economic activity throughout the island, could not be broken because of the resistance that arose even in the unions still controlled by government parties, the LSSP and the CP. Its outcome remains uncertain.

The government finally dragged before its tribunals thirty-two leaders of the revolutionary youth organization, the JVP [Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna—People's Liberation Front], including the main leader, Comrade Wijeweera. Our comrade Bala Tampoe, the general secretary of the LSSP(R), is one of the principal defense lawyers. There is a constant stream of relatives of other prisoners, coming from some of the most remote villages of the island, through the offices of the Ceylon Mercantile Union, which Comrade Tampoe also heads. Through this cooperation, an alliance is being knit little by little between the Sinhala peasantry and rural unemployed and the urban proletariat.

Since public demonstrations are strictly forbidden, the masses transformed the funerals of Philip and Robert Goonewardena, two founders of

the workers' movement in Ceylon, into a powerful antigovernment rally. Thirty thousand persons followed the funeral cortege, which ended up in a mass meeting. The audience prevented representatives of the government parties from taking the podium. Only Comrade Bala Tampoe was able to address the crowd.

The struggle against the ferocious repression that has swept down on the youth of the country has been made very difficult by the censorship. Any public mention of the word "repression" is forbidden by the army. Under these conditions, our comrades came up with the idea of organizing a special kind of protest on October 18—a general hunger strike.

This initiative, launched by the CMU, was an enormous success. A million persons took part. It was prepared by a campaign of mass meetings throughout the country organized by the CMU. Three of these rallies, held respectively in Colombo, Jaffna, and Kolonnawa, each had an attendance of about a thousand. Everywhere, moreover, the halls rented were full, despite the fact that in most places the police prevented any distribution of leaflets or written announcements of the meetings.

But the essential thing about the October 18 general hunger strike was its united character, re-cementing the unity of the working masses. In fact, for the first time since the racist turn of the LSSP and the CP in 1964, the powerful union of the Tamil plantation workers, the CWC, participated in a joint action with Sinhala sections of the working class, turning the hunger strike into a strike pure and simple. About 300,000 agricultural workers did not go to work that day. The smallest of the three trade-union confederations on the island, which formerly followed the Sinhala chauvinist line, joined in the movement. Speakers of Sinhala origins spoke before Sinhala crowds; Tamils to Tamil crowds. The JVP prisoners now on trial also participated in the hunger strike.

Thus, the different sectors of the Ceylonese working masses, who for ten years have been divided by the criminal policy of the traditional reformist leaders, are beginning again, under the impetus of our Ceylonese comrades, to join ranks in a mighty bloc.

Forming a new revolutionary leadership for the reunifying masses—

is the principal task that remains to be accomplished in Ceylon. The LSSP(R) is still a very weak organization, but this aim must be

achieved, if this tortured island is at last to be able to look forward to a victorious anti-imperialist, socialist revolution. □

## Unrest in Israel

# Wildcat Strikes Worry Zionist Regime

Wildcat strikes are breaking out in Israel, and the Zionist regime is becoming alarmed at the trend, according to a report by Terence Smith in the October 26 *New York Times*.

"The major ports, Haifa and Ashdod, have been crippled for weeks by strikes, and tourists arriving by air have encountered long lines as a result of a protracted slowdown—known locally as 'an Italian strike'—by customs officials," Smith reported.

"Tel Aviv firemen are threatening to go out. The city's flour mills are closed. Six of Jerusalem's 10 movie theaters are dark. . . .

"A peculiarity of Israeli strikes is that a majority—63 per cent last year—are staged by public employes, including civil servants, firemen, hospital workers and teachers. That statistic has won Israel a dubious distinction: While she ranks seventh among industrialized nations in strike days lost per worker, she ranks first in the number of strikes by public employes."

Smith interviewed Abraham Friedman, head of Hebrew University's Department of Business Administration, about the strike wave.

"The workers have lost all their inhibitions about striking," Friedman said. "Some of them went as long as four years without increases, and now they are making up for it."

Friedman added: "The workers in a given factory have discovered their power to strike in spite of the industry-wide agreements between the national union [Histadrut] and the Government."

According to Friedman, 52 percent of the strikes in the last year were "unofficial"—unsanctioned by Histadrut, which negotiates annual agreements with major employers and the government for the great majority of Israel's workers.

"They were unofficial strikes," Fried-

man told Smith; "but the fact is they succeeded, the workers got more money, and there will be more of them."

The role played by Histadrut is one reason for the prevalence of wildcat strikes. While "representing" the workers in negotiations with the bosses, the Histadrut bureaucrats are among the biggest employers in the country. Histadrut owns banks, shipping, airline companies, the largest construction firm in Israel, the largest health insurance system, and a major share in nearly every branch of the economy.

The Israeli government is trying to crack down on the labor unrest. Smith reported: "Earlier this year Parliament passed a law giving legal status to labor contracts, enabling employers to sue strikers for damages. As a result heavy fines were imposed on maintenance crews of El Al, the national airline, after an unauthorized strike this spring." □

## Leonid Likes It

Soviet Communist party chief Leonid Brezhnev claims the reelection of Nixon has strengthened the prospects for world peace.

Speaking at a Kremlin banquet honoring a visiting Bulgarian delegation, the top Soviet bureaucrat explained that "serious changes for the better" have recently taken place in Soviet-American relations and promised that Moscow would do its best to help continue the process.

TASS, the official Soviet news agency, quoted the following analysis of the U. S. election as delivered by Brezhnev:

"Unlike the quarter-century of cold war, this time the electoral campaign in the U. S. A. was dominated, as regards international questions, mainly by appeals for a peace-loving, realistic foreign policy. The electoral results indicate, it seems to us, support for precisely such a policy."

### Decisive Battles Ahead in Italy

By Livio Maitan

Many of the discussions that have been developing in recent months in the revolutionary left and in the workers' movement in general are linked more or less directly to the analysis of the objective situation that took form about a year ago and assumed a definite physiognomy with the formation of the Andreotti government. A clear understanding of this phase is indispensable both to clarify the orientations for the immediate future and to outline a strategy for the longer run. This is what I will try to do as briefly as possible, utilizing, among other things, elements of the analysis formulated by the Fourth International and its Italian section on several occasions in past years.

#### The International Dimensions

Let us recall first of all the international context in which the new phase of political struggle in Italy is taking place. Over and above compromises or partial agreements between some of the major powers in the opposing camps, or certain defeats and halts of the revolutionary movement, the context remains one of multiplying and sharpening conflicts throughout the world, and one of periodic revolutionary explosions.

The example of the Indian subcontinent is particularly significant. As a result last year first of the brutal Pakistani repression of the Bengali popular masses and later of the Indo-Pakistan war, the national bourgeoisie regained not inconsiderable margins for maneuver, dealing a number of blows to the revolutionary movement. Despite this, in the space of a few months explosive tensions have reappeared and are reemerging almost daily, even while this is being written, both in Pakistan and in Bangladesh. New grave crises, thus, may arise even in the near future in a sector where, I repeat, the national bourgeoisie scored several points in the preceding period.

There is scarcely any need, on the other hand, to note again that the

situation in the Arab East remains explosive notwithstanding the severe defeats the Palestinian revolutionary movement has suffered in the past two years. Regardless of the specific assessment of the action undertaken by the Black September group, the events in Munich have a symbolic significance that goes beyond the Near East.

In the phase of the historical crisis of imperialism, of the overall rise of the revolutionary forces, of an ever closer interconnection among the various theaters of a conflict that is tending to assume the features of a worldwide civil war, in a phase when it is relatively easy to come by deadly weapons of war, the technologically developed societies seem extremely vulnerable even to modest-sized revolutionary organizations. In periods of defeat, such groups can strike blows that, even without serving the aims of a coherent revolutionary strategy, can still provoke tensions, dismay, and confusion in countries remote from the immediate field of battle. To take the case of Western Europe in particular, there are two countries—Ireland and Spain—where explosive situations exist capable of precipitating open conflicts and revolutionary crises which could have incalculable repercussions for the entire continent.

These same great capitalist industrial powers are more than ever shaken by constant conflicts. The international economic machinery as a whole is shot through with burgeoning violent crises. Think of the crisis of the monetary system for which there is not a sign of even an attempt at solution. Think of the consequences of continued capital concentration and the constantly increasing competition among the giants of monopoly capital themselves. Think of the tendency toward an international synchronization of the economic cycle, which has already occurred to a certain extent in the last two years and which threatens to make any upturn more difficult after periodic recessions.

We will not go back over the new

phase that opened up in capitalist Western Europe in 1968. Its most advanced manifestations were the French May and the Italian prerevolutionary crisis, but in various ways it embraced a whole series of countries. The 1968 events expressed the profound political and social crisis of so-called neo-capitalism. This stage of capitalist development, which emerged following the post-World War II crisis, had given its advocates the illusion of unending economic progress and permanent stability. The point that needs to be stressed here is that the economic situation that took form in 1970-71 has had profound structural causes (alongside more or less normal conjunctural causes). In essence, we have been seeing the successive exhaustion of the principal stimuli that assured the prolonged boom in the 1950s and the early 1960s. Moreover, no new sectors have yet appeared capable of assuring a new phase of prolonged growth.

The capitalists have always had a tendency to shed tears about their problems, to lament about how small their profits were. This fits in with the argument about the necessity of holding down costs and subordinating everything to the demands of economic equilibrium that has been advanced ever since capitalism began when the workers' movement starts to organize and fight for a less inhuman standard of life. But this doesn't mean that "depressions are invented by the bosses" and that the cries of alarm from ministers and official economists are without foundation from a bourgeois point of view. The fact is that one of the basic factors in the crisis of Western capitalism is an actual falling rate of profit. This decline has assumed particular scope in countries like Italy and Great Britain.

The declining rate of profit, as Marx taught, is inherent in the capitalist system. But the problem is that in the present context the Western European—and, to a lesser extent, the U. S. and Japanese—capitalists cannot compensate so easily for this decline. Recessions and the difficulties of assuring strong subsequent upturns prevent them from increasing the overall volume of surplus value. At the same time, the political and social relationship of forces prevents them from increasing the rate of exploitation, which in the last analysis, ac-



ording to the logic of the system, is the real solution.

All the struggles and disputes that have developed in this period in various West European countries turn precisely on the question of how to get out of this impasse, how to find a way to increase the rate of exploitation, how to co-opt the workers into a project of restabilizing the economy. All this ultimately depends on the relationship of forces. So far the bourgeoisie has not succeeded in reestablishing the pre-1968 relationship and in subjecting the working class to a restored discipline.

In a phase characterized in general by great structural crises such as opened up in 1968, there is inevitably a succession of ups and downs in the workers' struggles, and in anti-capitalist mobilizations. France obviously could not long remain at the level of May 1968, and May was in fact followed by a revival of the government's strength and the retreat of petty-bourgeois strata. The crisis in Italy was exceptionally prolonged, lasting for about four years, but then in its turn the Italian bourgeoisie began to open up its counteroffensive.

However, the ebb in neither France nor in Italy has brought on a real restoration of bourgeois power, a restabilization that would more or less immediately have repercussions on the general situation in Western Europe. Neither France nor Italy has returned to the conditions prevailing before 1968. No new equilibrium has been restored that could assure a new phase of economic ascent and relative social stability. The present period continues to be marked by a high degree of conflict, by the instability of the political solutions being tried, by profound unrest among broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie, by a persistent militancy on the part of the working class, by the existence of substantial vanguards on the watch against the restorationist designs of the ruling classes and the capitulationist strategy of the reformist leaderships.

I should add immediately that we cannot assume that even a phase of this type will last indefinitely. The capitalism of Western Europe cannot accept conditions such as those it has had to put up with in recent years as "normal." The system cannot survive a constant decline in the rate

of profit, a continual wearing down of profits. Decisive confrontations between the fundamental classes are inevitable sooner or later.

Let us leave aside the question of the tempo and rhythm of the development of these clashes, even though in itself it is an important one. *The essential thing to understand is that the bourgeoisie cannot restore stable equilibria and assure a new broad economic revival without first inflicting a major defeat on the working class.* In none of the large countries of capitalist Europe has such a victory been achieved by the ruling class and this does not seem possible in the immediate or near future. In certain countries, in fact, the workers' movement has not yet revealed its full potential, has not yet had its French May or its Italian-style vigorous and prolonged ascent.<sup>1</sup>

### An Interlude and the Possible Outcomes

The observation that the bourgeoisie has not succeeded in resolving the contradictions of Italian society may seem only too obvious. The fact is that it has not succeeded either in finding partial solutions to the most acute immediate problems. It is continuing to live from day to day and to get by with miserable palliatives, evasions, and stalling — by dipping into the reserves accumulated in the past, which are by now becoming dangerously depleted.

The problem of education, a timely one at the start of the new year, is a good example of this reality. There has not even been a start at solving the problems at the root of the crisis in this sphere, problems that helped to bring about the explosion of the

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1. While taking into account the obvious differences, the example of Brazil seems an instructive one. In alliance with the imperialists, the Brazilian national bourgeoisie has been able to restore a certain political equilibrium (the dictatorship has lasted now for more than eight years) and to achieve an impressive economic revival. But the precondition for this was establishing a military dictatorship, which was born out of a portentous defeat of the workers and peasants' movement and succeeded in imposing a drastic reduction in the standard of living of the proletarian masses deprived of any instrument for defending themselves economically or politically.

student movement and progressively produced a situation of paralysis. The bourgeois press itself does not hesitate to recognize this explicitly.

But to come back to the economy for a moment, have any minimally effective measures been launched to overcome or mitigate the most crying distortions, to break out of the most suffocating bottlenecks, to establish the preconditions for a revival of some strength? The answer is implied. I need only mention the so-called chemicals plan. I need only point to the lack of substance of the various planning projects that are constantly coming to nothing and being revised without any practical effect.

The analysis stressing the chronic instability of the Italian situation, despite the insidious counterattack that has thrown the working class as a whole on the defensive, is based on these structural factors. The precarious position of the Andreotti government, the narrowness of his parliamentary majority, the endless internal disputes in the coalition parties — these are the most visible manifestations of this instability — are only the reflection of a more fundamental crisis that has by no means been surmounted. Let me repeat: *Despite the initiatives it has taken on the political level and its efforts to reconsolidate its own ranks, the bourgeoisie has not overcome its own crisis of leadership.* The bourgeois groups themselves remain profoundly divided even on the economic solutions to be adopted for starting up a new cycle. The episode of the clash between the major chemical combines is symptomatic in this regard.

Another factor of instability is represented by the fluidity and divisions of the petty bourgeoisie. A part of this social stratum has undoubtedly evolved toward the right, furnishing recruits for the electoral battalions of the so-called National Right, or supporting in the May 7 elections the Christian Democrats, who presented a conservative scowl this time instead of the old reformist smile. Another section of the petty bourgeoisie is wavering; it hesitates to take a definite line and is prone to abrupt shifts in various directions. Other sectors, finally, have not backed away from the radicalization they experienced in the crucial years of the ascent. A par-

tial but significant example of this tendency is the recent mobilization of thousands of teachers, who in some cases conducted militant demonstrations. This mobilization was rooted, essentially, in the persistent structural crisis of education, but it was helped along and stimulated by contingents of young teachers who proved themselves first in the student movement of 1968-69.

The conclusion that flows from our analysis is that while the prerevolutionary crisis of 1969-70 has been surmounted, while the great upsurge has exhausted its full potential and the working class as a whole has been forced onto the defensive, we are still a long way from a real conservative restoration and even from a solution to the political and social instability. In other words, the present phase must be defined as an interlude—whose duration it would be futile to try to predict with any exactness—an interlude between the great struggles of 1968-71 and a decisive class confrontation that can either take the form of a new impetuous upsurge or culminate in a far-reaching defeat for the proletariat.

Which one of these two variants will win out is by no means predetermined. The game is still open. And in the situation of instability and conflict that persists the workers have objectively an opportunity to win successes and to undertake counterattacks. At the same time, the vanguard has an opportunity to play a role in the interest of the movement as a whole and to make gains in strengthening its own positions and extending its own influence in the advanced sectors of the class.

We reject, therefore, two divergent but equally erroneous interpretations of the present situation. The first incorrect view is put forward by those who deny or try to minimize the changes that have been appearing for more than a year and in particular in the last six months, thereby justifying a blind forward acceleration and adventurist actions. The second error is made by those who think that we are already in a phase of restabilization destined to last for many years and who thus suggest a strategy of withdrawing and cutting back.

## The Dangers of the Present Situation

Since we have made our basic evaluation clear, we can point out all the negative sides and the pitfalls of the present situation without fear of being misunderstood.

In the first place, the decisive groups in the ruling class have made a clear choice, on which they have already achieved wide agreement. The center-left policy has been definitely abandoned, still more clearly as regards the content than the possible governmental formulas. This is the fundamental meaning of the two Andreotti governments, the first before and the second after the special elections. The Socialists have been kicked out the front door and they can get back in through the back door—or the servants' entrance—only on the condition that they accept the humiliation of renouncing the reformist projects of the early 1960s and agree to live in sin with the liberals. It is evident that such a turn involves a new governmental lineup, with all the implications this can have for the various camps.

In the second place, given the relationship of forces in the country and their reflection in the parliament, this new coalition has only limited independence. This means that if the Andreotti government or any similar government that might be formed wants to survive, it will have to reach *de facto* compromises with the National Right. According to normal legislative practice—which is an important factor in a system of parliamentary democracy—such deals are absolutely necessary unless a government resigns itself to being periodically outvoted or paralyzed to a large extent in the committees.

As everyone realizes, these are not so much predictions about the future as descriptions of what has already happened (and on the important occasion, moreover, of electing the president of the republic). The result will be a constant and strong drift to the right by the ruling coalition, a concrete tribute paid to the National Right, consisting in the first instance of toleration for goon squad attacks and other provocative actions. That substantial sectors of the state apparatus will try to take advantage of this opening to carry out more naked repression is in the logic of things.

The economic trends of this phase, especially the continuation and heightening of the inflationary process, moreover, can favor a conservative evolution on the part of broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie. It is the workers who pay the heavy price of a recession and an inflationary spiral, and an upturn after a recession is inevitably achieved at their expense. However, strata of the petty bourgeoisie can also be hit. In fact, because of their lower level of organization and their fragmentation, they often are in danger of suffering the consequences of recession and inflation before the working class (or better organized and more militant strata of the working class).

To take, for example, the waves of price rises and the crisis in distribution, we can predict as a likely variant that before even a precarious new equilibrium is found, there will be a new advance in the process of concentration in this sphere, with a concomitant reduction in the ranks of the small shopkeepers. Even today the small retail merchants feel caught in a vise, having on the one hand to face the greed of the wholesalers and on the other the reaction of the consumers, who respond by taking out their anger on the ones they have daily contact with and by reducing the volume of their purchases. Such sectors of the petty bourgeoisie—as well as others who feel that they are paying the price for the long-drawn-out conflicts between the fundamental classes and who sometimes really are harmed by the prolonged instability—can become ripe for fascist and semi-fascist demagoguery and constitute a mass base for reactionary operations.

The mobilizations of recent months, the high level of participation in strikes in the first phases of the battles over new union contracts, the militancy of broad strata, and the ferment of criticism present in many major factories have so far given positive indications of the mood and combat-readiness of the working class. It would be wrong, however, to fail to appreciate the negative consequences of the fact that all this is taking place in a context that has undergone the changes we have pointed to. Concretely, this means that there is a real danger of the more advanced strata of the working class finding themselves relatively isolated, and that the working class as a whole

will not be able to count on the mobilizations of other forces converging with its struggles and thus will not be able to rely on the potential solidarity and sympathy of broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie.

The turn imposed by the big bourgeoisie and the new climate it is trying to establish have already begun to put pressure on the intermediate social strata, which in turn are putting pressure on strata of the working population and the proletariat itself. One manifestation—or reflection—of this tendency has been first the capitulationist retreat of the ACLI [Associazione Cristiana dei Lavoratori Italiani — Italian Christian Workers Association] and second the crisis that has seized the CISL [Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Liberi — Italian Confederation of Free Trade Unions]. And this tendency can spread out like an oil spot to other sections of the trade-union movement and left parties (for example, parts of the Socialist party).

The situation can become more serious, if unemployment assumes more substantial scope than it has so far. The presence of a massive reserve army of labor would come to weigh negatively on the workers' capacity for mobilization. The workers could be thrown on the defensive and find their striking force gravely reduced. Even a partial demobilization of the mass movement would obviously be an extremely favorable factor for the conservative offensive and the desperation of the unemployed masses could even open a breach for rightist demagoguery in the ranks of the proletariat itself.

## The Fight to Be Waged in the Months Ahead

We repeat what we have said before: Despite the changes for the worse that have occurred, nothing is decided; the working class has still to fight the decisive battles—and it can win them. It is vital that revolutionists play their role in these struggles.

We should say right away that the dangers inherent in the present situation must not lead us into making any concessions to the strategy of the reformists or keeping quiet about the responsibility they bear. We say this because there have already been by no means insignificant signs of op-

portunistic retreat, if not capitulation (although touted as "realistic choices") in the face of reformism. The simple truth is that the traditional trade-union and political organizations, which to a large extent retain a dominant influence among the masses, have failed to exploit the potential of the prerevolutionary crisis and the great upsurge, into which they were dragged against their will and in contradiction with their previous political plans. The truth is that it is precisely the basic inconsistency of the traditional leaderships that enabled the Christian Democrats to regroup their forces, to reconsolidate, and resume the attack, and which allowed the extreme right to find an opening and to develop an aggressiveness that is unprecedented in the postwar period. Precisely because of the strength they continue to hold—and which they boast of at every opportunity—the reformists bear heavier blame than ever.

Even if we granted (which we do not) that they could change their spots, there are no signs of the reformists repenting. Their analysis itself is flawed at the root. They cannot fail to see the negative trends and dangers which ultimately threaten them too. But instead of viewing the Italian situation as the result of fundamental tendencies that operate in society in a given context—because of the iron logic of class and under the stimulus of the irrepressible demands of the system—they deplore, to repeat Berlinguer's words, "the break among the three great Italian popular currents and their rejection of dialogue" (*l'Unità*, October 2).

Instead of waging a systematic campaign to explain to the masses the crucial importance of the union bargaining battles for the overall political trend, the reformists lament that these struggles do not have an "active character" and regard them as the prerogative of the workers' representatives, the leaders of the union federations. On the other hand, the Communist party has continued to lead imposing demonstrations during the electoral campaign and for the celebration of the anniversary of *l'Unità*. It should explain, however, why the enormous energies devoted to these demonstrations have not also—and above all—been exerted on the occasion of general strikes and the most important workers' demonstrations or

in campaigns with a specific political purpose, such as the one for the release of Valpreda.

To us, the reason for this seems clear. The PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano — Italian Communist party] wants to demonstrate its mass influence, which is unquestionably a significant means of pressure—or of discouraging any fascist or neofascist attempts at a Latin American style coup. But it is carefully avoiding mobilizations that would pose a real test of strength between the fundamental classes. Thus, despite its strength, it remains more than ever in a vicious circle, because that is what you get into when you center your struggle on winning reforms in a period in which there is less objective room and less subjective readiness than ever for reformist operations of some minimal scope that would enable the party to take a place in the political circles running the country.

The orientation of revolutionists in this phase must center around participating actively in the contract-renewal struggles that are going on at this writing. They do not represent a "normal" episode in trade-union life, but a new confrontation between the classes whose outcome cannot fail to have profound repercussions on the relationship of forces and all subsequent developments. What the bourgeoisie is after is to force the workers to pay the cost of reviving the economy, to restore "authority" in the plants, and more generally to get the process under way of creating a new political leadership and consolidating the conservative turn.

The interest of the working class is first of all to repel the offensive against the level of employment, to prevent rising prices from bringing about a drop in real wages, to win better wages and conditions, and to put up a determined fight against any attempt at restoring the old relations in the shops. The stakes are thus extremely high, and the confrontation has a clear political portent. Hence the necessity that the working class bring all its strength to bear in converging battles and mobilizations and not expose itself to the risk of fragmentation, inconclusive actions, and scattered struggles.<sup>2</sup>

2. For the platform of the revolutionary Marxists, centered on an all-inclusive sliding scale of wages under the control of the

If this is our evaluation of the meaning of the battle in progress, it follows that in the months ahead we must strive to bring about a convergence between the struggles of other sectors of the working population and the student movement with those of the major categories of industrial workers. This objective must be pursued by two methods: by promoting mobilizations for specific objectives *right now* that would, however, have the effect of tying down the enemy—including the repressive forces—on a vast general front; and by stimulating demonstrations, such as big rallies and marches, of active solidarity on the occasion of large or general strikes. Thousands and tens of thousands of students marching in the streets side by side with workers from the foundries, chemical plants, and building sites would have a clear political importance and constitute a positive factor for reviving the student movement as such.

The importance of the student struggle must be stressed also in view of its importance for the fight against the new outbreak of fascism, the threat of gangs of extreme-rightist goons and provocateurs, whose actions have multiplied in recent months. It is, in fact, possible that, following up on Almirante's arrogant pronouncements about the fascists' determination to impose order in the schools, the National Right will launch its first serious offensive in this area, well aware that if it launched a frontal attack on the factories it would risk getting a rather severe lesson. It is essential to deflate the fascist threat, to see that any attacks are decisively repelled, that *the attempts of the goon squads to impose a climate of intimidation are crushed in embryo.*

Unity in action among the various components of the student movement, including those that identify with the traditional organizations, is a vital necessity that only blind sectarianism or a self-destructive urge could lead us to reject or ignore. At this moment, the policy of the united front of all organizations and groups in the workers' movement remains more valid than ever as a political guide-

workers, see the pamphlet *Contratti; una Battaglia politica della classe operaia.* (Available from *Quarta Internazionale*, c/o Silvio Paolicchi, viale Bligny 50, Milan, Italy. Price 100 lire, about U. S.\$20.)

line. The revolutionary left must help to achieve this, beginning by trying to achieve unity of action within its own ranks, since, among other things, this is a precondition for offering itself as a credible component of a more general united front.

The battle in and around the schools takes on an importance also inasmuch as it is an episode in the struggle for winning sway over the petty bourgeoisie. In fact the student movement—although not as such petty bourgeois—has been one of the driving forces behind the radicalization of broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. If it were to retreat in the face of fascist violence, this would

have extremely negative effects on these same strata, with all the dangers we have already pointed out. Thus, this battle must not be lost.

If they are able to follow these orientations, the revolutionists will be able at once to help in achieving victories of the working class as a whole, to establish much more substantial links with the masses than they have now or have had in past years, and to win over to their strategy and methods the vanguard workers, the natural leaders of the class, who are conscious of the dangers in the present situation and of the fundamental sterility of the policy of the reformist organizations. □

## 'No Cause for Immediate Alarm'

# Japan Doubles Rate of Rearmament

In the next five years, the government of imperialist Japan plans to spend \$15,000 million on rearming. This is double the current rate. Premier Tanaka has assured the world that the purpose of stepping up the armaments buildup at such a pace is purely "defensive."

Commenting on this editorially October 16, the *New York Times* noted that the announcement was "certain to revive anxious memories of Japanese militarism in Asia . . ."

However, to believe the editors there is "no cause for immediate alarm. At most, Japan's arms spending under a five-year plan will amount to no more than one per cent of gross national product, a ratio well below the world average of 6.5 per cent."

The *Times* continues:

"In terms of the potential afforded by a still rapidly expanding economy—one that trails only those of the United States and the Soviet Union in total output—Japan's projected military expenditures remain among the most restrained in the world. If the Japanese appear to be shedding some of the inhibitions generated by their disastrous defeat in World War II, there are no clear signs of any revival of virulent militarism."

The editors even insist on it: "An expansion of Japanese 'self-defense forces' within the limits proposed by Premier Tanaka's Government should

give Japan's neighbors no valid basis for fear."

"However," the editors add almost as an afterthought, "the maintenance of such a limit will depend in large measure on external development, including the future course of Japanese-American relations."

And if the course of Japanese-American relations becomes troubled, say by sharpening economic competition, what then? Will the limit of Japan's "defensive" arms buildup become as indeterminate as that of the United States? Will it include training in the use of modern weapons? Will it include stockpiling nuclear bombs? An arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles? A fleet of submarines equipped with nuclear weapons? At what point is the possession of such arms to be regarded as "offensive" and not "defensive"?

Curiously, the editors of the *Times* note that "The Nixon Administration has openly encouraged Japanese rearmament." That leads, naturally, to a very important question, but one that is left unanswered by the editors of this influential newspaper: *Why is the White House pressing Japan to rearm?*

With their inside sources of information, the editors of the *New York Times* ought to let their readers in on the secret. Or would that stir up too much clamor over the preparations for World War III? □

## German Trotskyists Analyze Bundestag Elections

[The following article appeared in the October issue of the West German monthly *Was Tun*, organ of the Revolutionär-Kommunistische Jugend (Revolutionary Communist Youth), an organization in sympathy with the Fourth International. It presents the analysis of the RKJ and the GIM (Gruppe Internationale Marxisten—International Marxist Group, German section of the Fourth International) on the elections to the West German parliament, the Bundestag.

[The major contending parties are the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—German Social Democratic party), led by incumbent Chancellor Willy Brandt; and the CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union—Christian Democratic Union), led by Rainer Barzel. The CDU uses the name CSU (Christlich Sozial Union—Christian Social Union) in Bavaria, where it is led by Franz-Joseph Strauss.

[The incumbent government is a coalition between the SPD and the FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei—Free Democratic party).

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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### The Parliamentary Polarization

The background music for the seventh Bundestag elections has been truly spectacular. For the first time the West German parliament was dissolved before its term was up. For the first time a chancellor called for a "vote of confidence" in order to lose it. The party leaders are flailing at one another as though their very existence were at stake. The election battle looks like the scenario of a Wagnerian opera. The mass media are screaming about a "moment of truth," and without doubt it has caught the public's ear; unquestionably, a record number of voters from all classes and layers will be mobilized for the parade to the ballot box.

Clearly, Marxists cannot let themselves get caught up in all this, but

rather must consider the election in its relation to the real state of the class struggle. And that is a completely different level. Whoever thinks that this election, because of the parliamentary illusions and social-democratic consciousness of the majority of the workers, represents a political decision in class terms—or at least a preliminary decision—is deluding himself about the current stage of West German parliamentarism and its parties—or else is bending to the sentiment in the factories, instead of utilizing that sentiment to point up the real class meaning of the election.

In fact, the two major rival parties are in complete agreement on the decisive point: to represent the interests of capital "through thick and thin" and put the bourgeoisie in the best possible position for the coming class battles. After the balancing game of the CDU/CSU on the Eastern treaties, the "great coalition for internal security," and the sham battle over "pension reforms," the formal differences left in the two parties' platforms are not worth talking about.

All the high-sounding talk about stability and inflation is nothing but an election tactic reflecting the self-interest of the CDU, which still conceives of itself as the "real" ruling party. Barzel and Strauss can do nothing to alter the fact that the monetary crisis and currency devaluations represent an international capitalist trend, and they know it.

Nevertheless, the decisive sections of the bourgeoisie today clearly favor a shift from an SPD government to a CDU government. This raises the question of the character of the German Social Democracy.

### What Is the Social Democracy?

Any position a revolutionary organization takes on an election has both a principled and tactical side. The principled side is that revolutionists cannot cross the class line. The notion that the more progressive or less reactionary "fraction" of the bourgeoisie must always be supported belongs to

the theoretical arsenal of pre-1917 Menshevism, which held that the development of the productive forces was not yet "ripe" for the proletariat's seizure of power.

We, of course, consider the development of the productive forces not only ripe, but long since overripe for socialism. As we see it, capitalism owes its survival to the crisis in working-class leadership—the Stalinist degeneration and the survival of the Social Democracy (whose survival is in turn dependent on the survival of capitalism). In the current period in West Germany, what is needed first of all is the development of an independent class movement, and this can come about only through a break with the Social Democracy.

The question of the political character of the SPD can be clearly answered since its adoption of the Godesberg Program in 1958. The SPD then changed from a classical reformist to a social-liberal party. In terms of its political program, the SPD is a bourgeois party. On the occasion of the elections, the SPD has dredged up some old slogans about "democratic socialism"—that SPD sacred cow; socialism to get the workers' votes, democracy to reassure the bourgeoisie. But this is strictly an election gimmick—since the petty-bourgeois Philistines they call the "Schiller vote"<sup>1</sup> are threatening to defect, more votes must be gotten from the workers. In all decisive points the SPD favors the capitalist system, the "free-market economy" based on "private enterprise."

Of course the Godesberg Program only formalized the actual character of the Social Democracy rather than suddenly transformed it in some mystical way. We must view the evolution of the SPD from a reformist workers' party into a "people's party" (that is, a bourgeois party for the wageworkers) as both the product of and a

1. For Karl Schiller, the ousted SPD minister of finance identified with holding down wages and "tough" economic policy.—IP.

producer of the decline of the West German proletariat's political class consciousness — a decline that occurred under the influence of the results of fascism, the world war and its destruction; the capitalist "economic miracle"; and, at the same time, the claims of the degenerate Stalinist system to represent communism.

This shift to a "people's party" was not aimed at the real petty bourgeoisie, which is numerically rather insignificant, but at the petty-bourgeois consciousness among broad sectors of the workers.

On the other hand, from a sociological standpoint, considering both its membership and its constituency, the SPD is the party with the widest base among the working class.

Historically, there have been workers' parties with no socialist goals, such as the British Labour party, and also parties with a large working-class and trade-union constituency that are not workers' parties, such as the Democratic party in the United States. The SPD undoubtedly stands between these two poles.

It is inconceivable that a process of political and class differentiation will fail to affect the 500,000 factory workers among the 900,000 SPD members. It is not excluded that with a sharpening of the class struggle sections of the present SPD rank and file will break with the party's bourgeois program. But it would be crass economism to want to define the political character of the SPD by its sociological base. It is much more the case that this base determines the Social Democracy's usefulness for the bourgeoisie.

Whether sections of the SPD membership will break from the party depends to a large extent on whether there is a strong revolutionary pole of attraction outside the party in the form of a communist organization that can be taken seriously as a real alternative by sections of the workers.

At the same time, the transformation of the SPD into a "people's party" means that it can no longer directly fulfill its role as a bourgeois agent in the proletariat, because it can no longer identify itself with the day-to-day concerns and slogans of the workers. (It now stands above "particular interests.") This function has been taken over by the trade-union bureaucracy, which on the one hand is po-

litically controlled by the SPD, but on the other hand must maintain its own special interests against the SPD, since it is directly accountable to the working-class "membership."

That is, while the Social Democracy continues to exercise ideological hegemony over the proletariat, it can exercise organizational control only indirectly. The attitude of the trade-union bureaucracy thus plays a key role in determining the relationship between parliamentary elections and the class struggle.

### The SPD as a Ruling Party

The SPD became a ruling party in 1966, when it entered the "great coalition" with the CDU. At the time, the West German bourgeoisie had been thrown into a deep crisis of leadership by the end of the Adenauer era (or rather, by the end of its special favored position in international competition). This crisis was marked by the fall of Erhard, the "economic miracle man." The CDU proved itself incapable of bringing West German capitalism up to date and of mastering the new economic situation.

The crisis of bourgeois leadership is a worldwide trend resulting from the anarchy of the capitalist mode of production, which no longer corresponds to the development of the productive forces and is ripe for overthrow. The bourgeoisie can no longer solve the problems that it itself creates and must defend itself not only against the proletariat but against its own outdatedness as well.

Bringing the SPD into the government fulfilled the bourgeoisie's highest hopes. Schiller's success was based not primarily on the fact that he had better economic gimmickry than the CDU, but on the fact that the SPD was able to make the workers pay for the effects of the 1966-1967 recession without the trade-union leadership making any protest. Schiller pushed through his wage guidelines, his *Konzertierte Aktion*,<sup>2</sup> and his fabulous investment breaks and tax favors for capital. In the SPD and the trade unions, he acted as the direct representative of big capital, though

2. A system of so-called collaboration among representatives of labor, business, and the government to adjudicate labor disputes. — *IP*.

to his credit it must be said that he made no secret of it.

In 1969, in order to preserve its electoral popularity among the wage-workers, the SPD ran an election campaign on a program of social reform. With the aid of the FDP, the zealous capitalist watchdog, it was able to piece together a governmental majority.

### The Bourgeoisie Is Dissatisfied

The interests of capital are not identical with the desires and interests of the capitalists. Although the SPD's policy conformed to the needs of capital on all essential points (halting wage increases, changing the constitution and the executive branch to suit the class-struggle needs of the bourgeoisie, liquidation of the barriers to trade with the East, renunciation of structural, meaningful reforms), the bourgeoisie was dissatisfied.

In Willy Brandt they had a chancellor who was too ambitious to be content with merely being an agent of capital; he wanted to make use of his narrow political maneuvering room.

● He did not confine himself to "normalizing" trade with the workers states, but gave his eastern policy "programmatic" features (even if only in the form of pious sentiments). For the bourgeoisie, this endangered important anti-Communist structures in the realm of domestic politics.

● He carried promises of reform into actual bills. True, he neither could, nor wanted, to get them passed against the employers' resistance, but to the bourgeoisie they nevertheless appeared threatening enough, even as "Reformruinen" [shipwrecked reforms], standing as portents of costly concessions.

● He thereby objectively fostered the development of reformist tendencies within the SPD, tendencies whose development represented no immediate threat to capital but which, in the eyes of a crisis-ridden bourgeoisie, seemed troublesome enough if they only blew away a tiny bit of capitalism's ideological smokescreen.

But the chancellor's ambitions also annoyed the SPD leaders themselves. (As shown, for example, by the recent interviews of Helmut Schmidt and Leber, in which they referred contemptuously to the chancel-



lor's "weaknesses as a leader" and put forward their own views.) Inside the ruling circles they could stick closely to Brandt's line, and they could make sure that it didn't go beyond talk. Outside, however, they had to "go along," while maintaining a certain distance. Unlike Schiller, they were not "free-wheeling" figures able to cast themselves off outright from the SPD; but then again they never had to, because they controlled the party apparatus. And the power of the party apparatus remains absolutely unshaken. The Young Socialists [the center of left opposition] were really—to quote a prominent SPD right winger—"the tail that wanted to wag the dog."


On the other hand, Brandt's maneuvers definitely strengthened the workers' illusions in the Social Democracy. Today the SPD uses this, going all out to herd the workers to the ballot box and to bind them more tightly to the Social Democracy.

The main reason for the change in the bourgeoisie's attitude toward the SPD as a ruling party lies, however, in the economic area. For the bourgeoisie, the SPD is an ideal ruling party under conditions in which the workers must be made to pay the price for the solution of acute difficulties, in which the trade unions must be more completely co-opted in order to avert the danger of impending workers' struggles, but in which there is also maneuvering room to grant the workers apparent concessions. Otherwise, the trade-union leadership could not afford to play along without losing its base.

Generally, during the past four years, wage increases have stayed within the established guidelines. But in 1969 a wide gulf appeared between the guidelines and the wage hikes. The trade-union bureaucrats had pushed beyond the tolerable limit of "self-sacrifice." So in September 1969 the workers won their own increases—through wildcat strikes. The result was 1970, when the largest wage increases of the postwar period were won as the union leadership tried to recoup its lost ground among the ranks.

The capitalists learned well the lesson of all this: If wage increases are to be held to zero (and this is necessary to protect the German bourgeoisie's position in the world market),

then this must be achieved against the trade unions, not through their cooperation. This new policy was initiated in grand style by the employers' strategy during the 1971 metalworkers' strike. Schmidt, the new "superminister," tried to accommodate this trend by transforming *Konzertierte Aktion* into secret negotiations with compulsory settlements. But even if



BRANDT: Has the German bourgeoisie decided to dump him?

he was able to get the union bureaucracy to go along—and this was completely possible because of the bureaucracy's fear of disrupting its dearly beloved Brandt regime—it was still questionable whether the industrialists were satisfied. Since 1969 they had learned to reckon with the rank and file in the factories.

After three years of continuous rise in workers' struggles in West Germany, the bourgeoisie prefers a regime that has no alliance with and no influence over the trade-union leadership, but which would accordingly have fewer qualms about dealing harshly with the unions, and, if necessary, unleashing open repression against the workers in order to stabilize the rate of profit.

Pressed by their increasing difficulties in maintaining their profit rate, the capitalists are aiming at the "strong state." And the candidate for "strong man" is Franz-Joseph Strauss.

This does not mean that leading capitalist circles have written off the SPD. Its role of controlling the workers is still indispensable, and they

have as much reason to trust Helmut Schmidt as we have to distrust him. But at present they prefer a CDU government, or, failing that, the SPD remaining in the government as part of a new "great coalition" under CDU leadership.

## The Social Democracy Disarms the Workers

The strong state must be established by class-struggle means. It will not come about by governmental or parliamentary decree. In this, a Strauss will naturally be more determined than a Brandt. But anyone who assumes this justifies the attitude that "despite everything" the SPD must be supported should take a moment to look at the way this position rebounds on the real class struggle.

Precisely the close alliance of the SPD leadership and the trade-union bureaucracy means that the latter would greet a Barzel-Strauss regime with the proper fury—and with the assurance that they had a militant rank and file behind them. The IG-Metal bargaining struggle of 1972-1973 would definitely get quite lively.

On the other hand, an SPD regime could have the effect of the unions making it easier for capitalist measures to be passed—out of fear of hurting the government by resisting. As chancellor, Schmidt would not push as hard as Strauss, but he might well get more accomplished—and this leaves aside the question of wage struggles, which in the wake of an SPD victory would surely be the most subdued in years.

We do not want to minimize in any way the dangers of a Strauss-dominated regime—in fact, years ago we warned about the strong-state tendency he represents. We only want to make clear by this example that if socialists follow the logic of their parliamentarist arguments, they will inevitably lose touch with the real state of the class struggle.

## SPD No Defense Against the Strong State

The SPD responds to capitalism's strong-state tendencies by bending to them, and even by making itself the pace-setter. One need not cite the most extreme cases like Hamburg (Ruhnau, the Hamburg decree) and Berlin (Neu-

bauer). In the area of "internal security," repression, and changing the constitution to suit the class-struggle needs of the bourgeoisie, the SPD-FDP federal government has carried out the strong-state program, following consistently in the direction set in 1968 with the passage of the emergency laws. The SPD has objectively prepared the way for the strong man and the strong state by providing the weapons for Strauss and company.

The carrying out of all these programs, from the emergency laws to the "general renovation" of the constitution this spring, to attacking the rights of foreign workers, to limiting the right to strike, to restricting the right of collective bargaining through *Konzertierte Aktion*, to job discrimination against socialists, to the travel ban on Marxists like Ernest Mandel (even within Common Market countries), to strengthening the state's repressive apparatus—all these moves represent objective defeats for the working class that put them in a more difficult position at the start of class struggles.

These have not been subjectively recognized as defeats because so far the workers have not been directly hit by them to any significant extent—and also because the SPD participates in the government and consequently supports such policies. Because of their illusions in the Social Democracy and the role of the union bureaucracy, the workers have not yet recognized that these measures are aimed against them.

This means that from the viewpoint of their own consciousness, the West German workers have not suffered a serious defeat. Their will to struggle is unbroken. Whether the bourgeoisie succeeds in establishing the strong state depends not on the results of the current elections, but on whether the workers are able to mobilize to resist or whether the SPD can successfully block such resistance.

In April of this year, the SPD gave us a graphic example of its attitude on this question. Untold thousands of workers struck and demonstrated against Barzel and Strauss's attempt to depose the Brandt regime with a parliamentary maneuver—a brief, but very militant, assault that showed the bourgeoisie the perils of its plans.

Together with the union bureaucracy, the SPD leadership patted the workers on the back and sent them

home, demobilizing and demoralizing them with a "policy of consensus" with the putschists. In such a situation, an election would have had a completely different class meaning than the current one in which the workers passively march to the ballot box in isolation and will accept the outcome in the exact same manner.

The April events show that the political character, and not the sociological base, of the SPD is decisive. The SPD would rather be weak in parliament than be strong through workers' action. It would rather be dumped by putschist maneuvers than base itself on the combativity of the workers.

There are those who object that the workers must go through all these experiences with the SPD, that the workers can disavow and break with the SPD only if it is a ruling party. And if six years of SPD participation in the government and three years of a Brandt regime has not been enough to bring about such a break, then the SPD must be helped to come to power again and again until the workers get the idea.

This position presumes a quantitative development of class consciousness ripening from SPD government to SPD government. In reality this is not what happens. Consciousness develops unevenly, through leaps.

In Sweden many decades of social-democratic rule did not lead the workers to break with the Social Democracy. But in the middle of the 1960s, in the context of the sharpening worldwide crisis of capitalism and the new upsurge of the revolutionary movement in the imperialist metropolises, a new upswing in workers' struggles took place throughout Europe. In Sweden this brought about what forty years of social-democratic rule had failed to do—spontaneous, militant, mass workers' struggles of months' duration, above all in the Kiruna mining region. This fundamentally altered the state of the class struggle in Sweden.

In reality, this new upswing of the European workers' struggle had little to do with which party was ruling or with the workers' experiences with social-democratic regimes. Rather, it took place, with only insignificant exceptions, in all European capitalist countries, including the hitherto "model" country, the German Federal Republic. In reality, the acute crisis of capitalism will sharpen in coming

years and the militancy of the workers' struggle will increase as well.

These struggles will compel the workers to transcend the bounds of the Social Democracy and will create the conditions for a realignment of the relationship of forces between the Social Democracy and the Communists.

It is of course true that divisions may arise within the SPD itself, especially over its role as a ruling party. But no one should confuse the SPD membership (or even the Young Socialists) with the proletariat.

## **Crisis of Parliamentary Consciousness**

Barzel's attempted coup last April, the crass manipulation of members of parliament, the Schiller debacle, the flood of corruption that came to the surface around the *Quick* affair, the "advisor" contracts of MPs, scandals such as the Paninter case, the fluff about "codes of honor" for MPs, have all shown up the system in its own terms. The deep crisis of parliamentary consciousness among the population that came to the fore during the memorable April days has constantly received fresh fuel and has not to this day been ameliorated, even if the stampede to the ballot box is under way. The recognition that MPs can simply cross party lines and thus overturn election results remains deep.

Every radical-democratic demand about control over parliamentary events is so obviously illusory that such well-intentioned plans can only be stillborn in the real world. For revolutionists, this shaking of parliamentary illusions is a good starting point for demonstrating that the only form of "control" that the rulers really fear is independent class action.

At the same time, in this way the meaning of the elections and of parliamentary events can be put in perspective for the advanced workers, who can thereby be oriented toward relying on their own struggles instead of on the parliamentary SPD.

## **Should the CP Be Supported?**

The German Communist party is undoubtedly a workers' party. In principle, there is no reason why the CP could not be supported in an election campaign.

There are two essential relevant criteria in a revolutionary organization's decision to support another party in an election:

Either it is a workers' party with a mass base and by supporting it one supports a specific class movement; from this viewpoint, revolutionists could support a reformist or centrist party in certain situations;

Or else it is a revolutionary party and is supported because of its program; from this viewpoint even a numerically small party could be supported in an election if there were no realistic class alternative.

The CP meets neither criterion. Certainly it is quantitatively stronger than the other left organizations. But it is just as much marginal to the working class. On other occasions we have dealt with the political and programmatic basis of the CP and of Stalinism in general. Here we would make just one more observation: The open character of the German CP leadership's role as an agent of the Soviet and East German bureaucracy is clearly shown in its attitude toward the political trials and the "normalization" in Czechoslovakia; this sharply separates it from other Western CPs that have a mass base.

But the CP is not even a barometer of class consciousness in this election. As a consequence of its "theory" of an "antimonopoly democracy" it is orienting its own members toward an SPD victory in order to "stop Strauss."

When the Communist Youth organ *Spartacus* called for voting for the CP as the only workers' party, the following question was raised in the CP organ *UZ*:

"Would the CP be making a big mistake by running its own candidates in the Bundestag elections because the CP voters would take away votes from the SPD and thus might help the CDU-CSU return to power?"

Polikeit, a Central Committee member, answered this way: "We understand the seriousness of this question." Although the SPD-FDP government "has not fulfilled the many hopes and aspirations of the working people because it put the profit and power interests of industrial and financial bosses first," the return of the CDU "would be a heavy blow, a dangerous turn to the right."

That the CP nevertheless put up its own candidates was based on the fact

that "a strengthening of the CP will also [help] those forces in the SPD who want their party to adopt a policy exclusively oriented to the interests of the workers."

Clearly, the CP leaders do not want to win these forces to their "workers' party." Rather, they assume that these forces will push for a workers' policy within the SPD. And this is supposed to be the mystical effect of a strong CP showing in the elections—but not too strong a showing; that could help elect the CDU.

Thus, with a wink of the eye, the CP urges its members to vote for the SPD (which, by the way, already happened in many areas during the 1969 elections) and contents itself with picking up the malcontent and protest vote.

Under these conditions the CP candidacy is no alternative—neither politically nor in the consciousness of the proletariat. *UZ*'s fear that the CP will pull too many votes away from the SPD is patently unfounded. It is much more likely that bourgeois propaganda will point to the CP's vote as "proof" of the numerical insignificance of the communist following in this country.

The main reason for the CP's electoral campaign may be to compensate with some public activity for its do-nothing politics against the union bureaucracy in the factories so as to give their members something to do and prevent the party from tumbling into oblivion.

### Prepare for Coming Battles

On the basis of this analysis the Central Committees of the GIM, Ger-

man section of the Fourth International, and the RKJ, its sympathizing organization, decided that their position on the election cannot be reduced to recommending any specific vote—no matter how much this may be regarded as a deficiency.

We must assume that the overwhelming majority of the working class—and especially its organized sectors—will vote for the SPD whether we call for them to do so or urge them not to. The workers will certainly thereby express the illusions whose negative effects on the class struggle we described above.

We must use the election struggle to explain the consequences of a CDU-CSU or SPD-FDP victory. We must make clear that the workers' hopes for reforms will be disappointed by any regime, because capitalism is no longer in an objective position to grant fundamental reforms, and this is not proposed by either side.

We must explain to the workers their own political attitude and tell them that the important thing—no matter what the outcome of the election—is to prepare themselves for coming struggles, to defend their increasingly threatened material and social interests through organized struggle, and, in case of an SPD victory, to break down the union bureaucracy's "stand pat" policies, oppose the increasing dismantling of political rights and possibilities for militant resistance.

We must point to the bracing experiences the workers had last April with parliamentarism and its parties and hold up the struggle in the form of mass strikes and demonstrations as a practical alternative to passive trust in the election of the SPD. □

## Split in Venezuelan Popular Unity Coalition

One of the main parties supporting the Venezuelan Popular Unity coalition, the Union Republicana Democrática (URD—Democratic Republican Union), has withdrawn its backing, according to a United Press International report from Caracas November 8. The party had given the coalition, which goes by the name Nueva Fuerza (New Force), fifteen days to drop its present candidate for the December 1973 presidential elections, Jesus Angel Paz Galarraga. Paz is the head of the Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEP—People's Electoral Movement), which, together with the Communist party, plans

to remain in the coalition.

According to a UPI report in the November 7 issue of the New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario-La Prensa*, the URD presented the Popular Unity leadership with a petition demanding Paz's replacement "because it felt that the politician would not inspire the Venezuelan voters." The URD wanted the head of its own party, Jovito Villalba, named as presidential candidate.

The URD defection is expected to increase the prospects of the leftist Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS—Movement Toward Socialism). □

# Healyites Smear Bala Tampoe

[The following statement was issued October 29 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

\* \* \*

The October 21, 1972, issue of the *Workers Press*, the official organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist Labour League, carried a slanderous attack on Bala Tampoe, the general secretary of the Ceylon Mercantile Union. The author of the article, one Jack Gale, asserts that Tampoe is "known to have associated with the CIA."

Why should the imperialist spy agency want to associate with Bala Tampoe? Washington is certainly not preparing to overthrow the Bandaranaike regime—at least from the left. Gale offers no explanation. Nor does he explain what interest Bala Tampoe, who opposes both imperialism and the Bandaranaike regime, could conceivably have in associating with the CIA.

The author of the article indicates as his source of information only Edmund Samarakkody, a former factional opponent of Tampoe. An investigation undertaken by us in 1969 showed that the slander was cooked up and put into circulation originally by the former Trotskyists in Ceylon who betrayed the movement and accepted posts offered them by Bandaranaike, and who were under heavy fire for this from Bala Tampoe.

How did this bit of ancient garbage happen to finally end up gracing the pages of the *Workers Press*, which makes a great show of its repugnance for the former Trotskyists in Ceylon and all their works?

First of all because the technique of the "big lie" has been utilized with increasing frequency in recent years by the leaders of the SLL under the guidance of their general secretary, Gerry Healy, and this item looked particularly suitable for such use.

The smearing of Bala Tampoe, a leading Ceylonese Trotskyist, in this way is on par with the beating that stewards of the SLL inflicted on Ernest Tate, a leading British Trotskyist, while Healy looked on. Tate was "guilty" of hawking Trotskyist literature in front of an SLL public meeting. Tampoe scorned inducements to line up with the SLL.

These are signs, among others, of the deep degeneration of the SLL. Incapable of meeting criticism with reasoned arguments, the leaders of the SLL borrow from the arsenal of Stalinism—which also calls for labeling political opponents as "spies" and "agents" of foreign powers and subjecting them to physical assault.

The timing of the attack on Bala Tampoe is worth noting. Tampoe is one of the main attorneys for the defense of the young revolutionists of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, who are now being processed in the courts by the repressive Bandaranaike regime. Coinciding with this defense, various unions (among them the Ceylon Mercantile Union) initiated the first big action by the toiling masses of Sri Lanka since the "state of emergency" was decreed by Bandaranaike a year ago. This action was a nationwide, twenty-four-hour hunger strike. And the bank workers, in defense of their wage standards, called a strike in defiance of the coalition government composed of the bourgeois Sri Lanka Freedom party, the reformist Lanka Sama Samaja party,

and the pro-Moscow Communist party.

All the reactionary supporters of the treacherous coalition regime rallied in support of its efforts to railroad the JVP revolutionists to long terms in prison, to smash the bank workers' strike, and to keep the masses cowed.

This was when the Healyites found it necessary to make their contribution. They did not solidarize with the Trotskyist-led bank workers' strike. They did not solidarize with the legal defense of the young revolutionists of the JVP against the frame-up charges of the coalition regime. They did not solidarize with the hunger strike taken as a step toward arousing mass resistance to the abrogation of democratic rights in Sri Lanka.

Instead, the Healyites singled out the "main enemy" for their bucket of mud.

What does Healy hope to gain from this? Something of great importance to him. In view of the latest developments in Sri Lanka, curiosity in the ranks of the SLL over his real reasons for splitting from the world Trotskyist movement might become troublesome. A fast prophylaxis was required. Hence the poisonous article against Bala Tampoe and the Fourth International. □

## Lambertists Attack Antiwar Demonstrators

[Some 30,000 persons turned out for an antiwar demonstration in Paris October 15 called by the youth organizations of the Communist and Socialist parties. Although it was not one of the sponsoring groups, the FSI (Front Solidarité Indochine—Indochina Solidarity Front) called on its supporters to join the demonstration. More than 4,000 marched in the FSI contingent.

[At one point in the demonstration, the "defense guard" of the Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme (AJS—Alliance of Youth for Socialism, a group that claims to be Trotskyist) attacked the FSI contingent, clubbing a number of marchers and sending four members of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International, to the hospital.

[The AJS is affiliated with the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI—Internationalist Communist Organization, a group headed by

Pierre Lambert which considers itself the French section of the "International Committee of the Fourth International"). A split in the rump "International Committee" became public in October 1971, with the OCI on one side and the Socialist Labour League (SLL) of Great Britain and the Workers League (WL) of the United States on the other.

[Flagrant violations of the norms of workers' democracy and the use of physical attacks on other tendencies in the workers' movement are nothing new for either side of the split "International Committee." In a number of instances, their acts of violence have been directed at members of the Fourth International. And while this latest assault is perhaps the most vicious, it has precedents in such incidents as the beating of Fourth International representative Ernest Tate by SLL goons outside a meeting in

London in 1966 at which SLL leader Gerry Healy was speaking.

[The following three items deal with the October 15 attack by the AJS. They appeared in the September 21 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly organ of the Ligue Communiste. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

## Letter to the National Bureau of the AJS

When the October 15 demonstration for the victory of the Indochinese peoples was over, four Trotskyist activists belonging to the Ligue Communiste ended up in the hospital. They were not clubbed by Ordre Nouveau [New Order, a fascist group], nor by the defense guard of the JC [Jeunesse Communiste—Communist Youth], but by members of the AJS, an organization that claims to be Trotskyist and to observe the norms of workers' democracy.

For us, the seriousness of these events is unprecedented, all the more so in that they were planned in advance. On the eve of the demonstration, the AJS spread a rumor everywhere that it was going to be attacked by the JC. Your national leader, Claude Chisseray, even telephoned the headquarters of the Ligue to warn us and to ask us where the FSI contingent would be located.

For our part, we had received no hint of any provocation by the JC's SO [service d'ordre—defense guard], aside from its usual attitude of preventing revolutionary groups from joining the main body of the official demonstration.

On the morning of the march, the AJS distributed a statement signed by a few fellow travelers in the FEN [Fédération de l'Education Nationale—National Education Federation] and Pontillon of the PS [Parti Socialiste—Socialist party] in which, in advance, it voiced its indignation at any physical attacks against the AJS. For more than an hour, beginning at 2:30 p. m., FSI activists were able to witness a state of permanent friction continue, without leading to any serious clash, between the defense guards of the AJS and the JC. It was in order to lift this blockade that was preventing the FSI contingent, which was behind it, from moving ahead, that we decided

to head into the tail end of the UEC [Union des Etudiants Communistes—Union of Communist Students] contingent. As soon as the AJS saw its path cleared by the JC's defense guard rushing to prevent us from going through, the AJS activists, clubs in hand, charged the FSI contingent twice, shouting "Pablistes assassins" [Pabloites, Murderers].

Another, equally hysterical, charge occurred at the Place du Colonel Fabien, followed by beatings of isolated FSI activists in side streets.

Out of respect for the heroic struggle of the Indochinese freedom fighters for whom you care so little, we felt it was more constructive not to strike back and to let you pass. This kind of confrontation strikes us as wretched.

The methods you used against us, after having used them against the Maoists, the PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party] and the PS, are on a par with the worst examples of Stalinist violence; they have nothing in common with the workers' movement and the Fourth International—even if they do seem to provide a temporary solution to the problems facing an organization that is at a standstill (as your skeletal contingent showed is the case with your group).

In the interests of all revolutionists, it must be clear that we will not stand for this type of behavior, even though its effect can only be to further discredit you within the workers' movement.

Since it appears to be your intention to pursue this kind of "political struggle" within the university, we feel we should warn you against the consequences of such acts: They would not fail to be answered by all those who remain committed to workers' democracy.

As far as we are concerned, if this kind of thing should continue, we would be forced to break off all relations with an organization that did not realize that it is against the bourgeoisie that all revolutionary militants must deal their blows. Communist Greetings.

Political Bureau  
Ligue Communiste (French Section of  
the Fourth International)

## Letter From an FSI Activist

Comrades,

An active sympathizer of the Ligue

Communiste and an activist in the FSI, I took part in the October 15 demonstration along with the other comrades of the Versailles committee. I witnessed the charge by the AJS defense guard in its attempt to cut off the FSI contingent.

I can state, without exaggeration and without trying to make any facile comparisons, that the AJS's defense guard showed itself to be every bit as brutal as any charge by the CRS [Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité—Companies to Protect the Security of the Republic, the special riot police] (and I know what I'm talking about).

In previous demonstrations we have had run-ins with the defense guard of the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor]. Revolutionary militants have suffered serious blows in them, but today, comrades, the AJS topped all previous records: They went after militants in adjoining streets who were trying to discuss the situation and beat them with wooden bars. . . .

But tomorrow, comrades, this unleashed defense guard will perhaps attack strike pickets. Today they struck while shouting "Unity for Indochina"; what unity will they invoke when they strike tomorrow?

In any case, there is a very well-known name for such practices—fascism. It's not "just a little fascist," as a salesman for *Solidarité Indochine* said; it is fascist pure and simple.

Long live socialism!

A. P.—FSI activist  
in the Versailles  
committee

## Reply to FSI Activist

Comrade,

We understand perfectly your indignation and anger. This is not the first time that the AJS has physically attacked activists of the far left, whether anarchist, Maoist, or PSU comrades. Nor is this the first time that its "defense guard" has charged the tail end of a contingent: The high-school students demonstrating for the release of Gilles Guiot in February 1971 remember well the Lambertist aggression at the Place de la République. But this is the first time that the AJS has attacked, swinging clubs and beating isolated militants in side streets. This unquestionably represents

a new stage in sectarian hysteria, and all revolutionary militants must recognize this.

Nevertheless, we do not agree with your characterizations of this organization, nor with the conclusions that you draw. The fact that the AJS rather systematically resorts to the use of physical violence within the workers' and revolutionary movement in no way justifies viewing it as "fascist," and even less treating it as such. For revolutionary Marxists, this term is used to refer to organizations manipulated by big capital in order to terrorize the workers' movement and, ultimately, to destroy it. Revolutionists have only one policy toward these organizations: to seek to crush them in the egg by any means necessary.

It is completely false to equate the AJS to this type of organization. It would be completely incorrect for us to go after it the way we go after *Ordre Nouveau*.

The AJS is a narrow and troublesome sect. This does not make it any less a tendency of the workers' movement that takes over (and diverts) the political energies of hundreds of young people and workers. Besides, if one were to generalize from your reasoning, one would have to conclude that the Stalinists, who on a permanent basis resort to violence against revolutionary activists and who have shown themselves in this area to be a hundred times worse than the AJS (by physically liquidating thousands of militants), are also guilty of "fascist practices."

One cannot let oneself be blinded by indignation, however legitimate. Experience has shown that whenever the AJS goes through serious internal difficulties, it looks for physical confrontations with a wide variety of organizations. In such situations, violent confrontations serve to foster cohesion among its members by sharply opposing them to everything that is not the AJS.

The violence of the recent confrontations gives an idea as to the unhealthy internal state of this organization. Not only did the much vaunted perspective for a Revolutionary Youth International collapse when the Lambert-Healy "International Committee" split apart, and not only is UNEF [Union Nationale des Etudiants de France—National Union of French Students]-Unité [Unity, the AJS con-

trolled wing of the student union] moribund, but the OCI recognizes that there is a "sluggishness in all the AJS units." The thin turnout for the AJS contingent on October 15 (800 at the very most) gives an idea of the kind of mass audience this organization enjoys; it also explains its beligerence.

It is not in the interest of revolution-

ists to let the AJS sink into a state of raging madness. On the contrary, we must do everything we can to bring it to the point where it will respect workers' democracy—without, of course, tolerating its extortionist behavior. This has always been our approach. And this is what we must continue to do.

Henri Weber

## **Continues to Demand 'Out Now'**

# **NPAC Builds November 18 Antiwar Marches**

Marches and rallies demanding immediate and unconditional U. S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia were held in more than twenty U. S. cities on October 26. The protests, called by the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), were a prelude to larger antiwar demonstrations to be held November 18.

More than 1,000 persons participated in a war-crimes tribunal in Boulder, Colorado. One hundred persons picketed the White House. Other actions took place in Philadelphia, Houston, Austin, Cleveland, Chicago, Tallahassee, Tucson, Nashville, Cincinnati, Portland, Knoxville, Atlanta, St. Louis, and other cities. A picket line in solidarity with the October 26 demonstrations was held in Glasgow, Scotland. In addition to the October 26 events, antiwar Vietnam veterans staged protests in six cities on October 23.

On November 4, rallies in several cities demanded that Nixon sign the Kissinger-Tho treaty. These were sponsored by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, a group which opposes NPAC's call for immediate withdrawal of U. S. forces.

In an October 30 news release, NPAC responded to the latest round of "peace" negotiations:

"NPAC will not depend upon promises or agreements—signed or unsigned—to end the war. The whole sordid history of the Vietnam war—as the Pentagon Papers prove—is one of lies and deceptions by successive administrations. More than one President has attempted to demobilize antiwar sentiment in order to buy more time to insure a continued U. S. presence in Southeast Asia.

"Our demand of OUT NOW! means the immediate and unconditional end to all U. S. intervention and aggression in Indochina. NPAC affiliates across the country will continue educating, organizing, and mobilizing people into the streets under that demand. We will be in the streets of twenty U. S. cities on Saturday, November 18, 1972, demanding NO U. S. CONDITIONS! U. S. OUT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA NOW!" □

## **Big Gas Deal On**

The Soviet Union and three American firms are negotiating a contract which is expected to bring 2,000 million cubic feet of natural gas a day to the east coast of the United States by 1980. The three U. S. companies (Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Brown & Root, Inc., and Tenneco, Inc.) are competing with U. S. and Japanese corporations to bring Soviet natural gas to the West Coast as well.

The U. S. firms are offering to provide credits for the development of the USSR's vast resources of natural gas. The credits will finance the construction of a pipeline 2,100-2,500 miles long from Yakutsk in eastern Siberia to the port of Nakhodka on the Pacific Ocean, a liquefaction plant, and twenty tankers. The credits would be repaid with deliveries of natural gas.

The negotiations are expected to result in a preliminary agreement by the end of 1972.

The deal, reported the November 8 *Christian Science Monitor*, will require a major decision by the Nixon administration to provide credits to the USSR.

"Behind these decisions will lie not only economic but political considerations, since trade is a key factor in Washington's effort to improve relations with Moscow." □