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
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November 13, 1972

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U.S. Holds Out for More



**Siqueiros
Admits
Trotsky
Murder
Attempt**



**Some
Comments
on the
Siqueiros
Account**

Jenness, Pulley At Fort Dix

About 230 people, including more than 100 GIs, attended a November 4 election rally in a theater on the Fort Dix military base. The gathering was the first presidential campaign rally held on an army base in U.S. history.

The rally was scheduled after a federal court ruled that Fort Dix brass could not bar Socialist Workers party vice-presidential candidate Andrew Pulley and People's party presidential candidate Benjamin Spock from taking their campaigns to GIs on the base.

In a subsequent ruling on October 31, federal district judge Clarkson Fisher ordered Fort Dix authorities to "cease from interfering . . . with the distribution of campaign literature . . . between now and November 7."

This decision was a further blow to the brass, since it allowed the rally to be publicized. Customarily, socialist or antiwar leafleters on army bases are seized and their literature confiscated as "evidence."

SWP presidential candidate Linda Jenness, Pulley, and Spock spoke at the rally. Describing his harassment by the army as an antiwar soldier, Pulley said, "When I was in the armed forces, the attitude of the GIs was that they were opposed to the war in Vietnam, and we began to organize against that war. Today I am convinced that opposition to the war is even greater and that more and more GIs will defend their right to organize, which the Constitution is supposed to guarantee."

Challenging the Nixon-Kissinger claims that "peace is at hand," Jenness told the soldiers and civilians: "As long as bombs are being dropped on the Vietnamese people, you know that is not peace. . . . As long as American GIs are in Indochina, there's not going to be any peace."

She called for the antiwar movement to defend Vietnamese political prisoners. "We built a defense that got Angela Davis out; we've got to build the same kind of defense to free these Vietnamese liberation fighters." □

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Military Hardware Rushed to Saigon

By Jon Rothschild

From the small town of Lai Thieu, about twenty miles north of Saigon on Route 13, London *Sunday Times* correspondent Nicholas Tomalin listened on the radio October 27 to "Henry Kissinger prophesying peace." Lai Thieu is a "leopard spot"—and a constantly changing one at that. "That is to say, by night it is one, by day the other. Or some weeks it is proudly Communist, some weeks proudly part of the free world. Each time there is a real change there is a lot of fighting."

In the October 29 *Sunday Times* Tomalin wrote that it was "odd to hear Dr Kissinger talk of concord and unity in this town. It used to look neutral and unassertive. One could imagine the two enemies co-existing there."

But since the cease-fire talk began, Tomalin reported, it has become impossible to be neutral. The rumors of cease-fire have intensified the war in Lai Thieu. "Saigon has ordered every house in Lai Thieu to fly a yellow and red striped Saigon flag. Anyone who shows a VC flag is—by a new decree—instantly shot.

"So the town is now a blaze of Saigon patriotism. Or at least it was when I was there, around lunchtime. So it was along the main road, in the central market, on the banks of the heavily patrolled river. Every car, every bus, every scooter carried a flag. It was like Coronation time.

"In the narrower alleys away from the main road there were fewer flags. In the countryside, by the rice paddies, among the coconut groves and thick foliage, the Saigon flags almost disappeared. The pattern was mathematically precise.

"More than a mile from the road there were probably none, but I did not care to try to discover."

Tomalin asked a villager "who spoke rudimentary French" what he would do when peace came. "There will not be peace," the man replied. Tomalin informed him that Kissinger felt otherwise. "In Washington, Peking,

Hanoi," the man answered, "maybe peace. Here it is more difficult."

The proposed Le Duc Tho-Henry Kissinger Vietnam peace plan—at least those elements of it that have been made public—leaves unanswered the question of who shall rule villages like Lai Thieu. When the cease-fire goes into effect, according to the plan, each village will be administered by the force then controlling it, the Saigon gang or the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

Even apart from the bloody repression that has already been launched in the Saigon-held areas, the likelihood that a cessation of hostilities will dampen the civil war in the thousands of Lai-Thieu-type villages is not great. Unable to bring such villages under his control through "pacification," Thieu will doubtless turn to even more brazen methods after the cease-fire is proclaimed.

That the local revolutionary forces are capable of meeting Thieu's threat is demonstrated by reports that have appeared in the U. S. press regarding the state of the National Liberation Front's infrastructure. In the November 5 *New York Times*, Fox Butterfield quoted "well-informed Vietnamese and American officials" as estimating that "the Communists in South Vietnam have managed to preserve the core of their political apparatus with . . . a dedicated cadre of 40,000 to 60,000."

"The organization," Butterfield wrote, "is spread throughout the country and includes local village operatives, secret agents in Government-controlled areas and political officers among the guerrillas, who form the Vietcong's military arm." A recent study for the Rand Corporation examined the condition of the "Vietcong" in Dinh Tuong province. The investigators found that not only had the NLF been able to "keep the nucleus of its movement intact," but it still enjoyed a large measure of "latent support" among the villagers—despite Thieu's physical control of the area.

The fact that the liberation forces

retain their infrastructure and their support among the rural population bodes ill for Saigon's plan to quickly expand its territory after the cease-fire. At the same time, however, the military strength of the local guerrillas seems much weakened. "Militarily," Butterfield wrote, "intelligence sources report, the Vietcong now have to rely on North Vietnamese troops to keep the traditional Vietcong guerrilla units up to strength. In some famous battalions with Vietcong names, only the guides and a few of the officers are native southerners, the intelligence sources say."

This military factor may partially explain Nixon's current attempt to force the Hanoi leaders to withdraw some or all of their troops from South Vietnam. During the past week it has become clear that Nixon's refusal to sign the Tho-Kissinger agreement had little to do with the allegedly outstanding "linguistic" difficulties of which Kissinger spoke. Rather, emboldened by Hanoi's apparent willingness to "settle" and given a supporting boost from Moscow, Nixon is pressing Hanoi for still more concessions.

On November 2, in his first televised campaign speech, Nixon hinted that his regime was aiming at alterations in the accord: "We are going to sign the agreement when the agreement is right, not one day before—and when the agreement is right, we are going to sign, without one day's delay."

Although he did not define what criteria would serve in the decision of when the agreement would become "right," he did make perfectly clear, according to *New York Times* correspondent Bernard Gwertzman, that the projected settlement should not be viewed "as an American disengagement from that part of the world."

That point should have needed no clarification. Shipments of U. S. military equipment to Saigon have been drastically stepped up since the announcement of the impending settlement. On November 2, U. S. officials disclosed that hundreds of jet fighters, transports, and helicopters not previously scheduled for shipment to South Vietnam were being rushed to Saigon. The new equipment includes two squadrons (a squadron is normally twenty-four planes) of giant C-130 transport planes, two squadrons of F-5A jet fighters, three squadrons of A-37 close-support jet fighters, two

or more squadrons of UH-1 helicopters, and one or two squadrons of A-1 propeller-driven close-support aircraft. The new deliveries will make South Vietnam's air force the world's third largest.



The deployment of the F-5As is of particular interest for several reasons. The planes are in short supply in the United States. Consequently, to get them delivered before the cease-fire takes effect, Nixon has requested South Korea, Taiwan, and Iran—all recipients of the fighter in previous years—to transfer their planes to Saigon. To compensate for losses accruing to the donor countries, the United States will supply replacement squadrons of the more advanced F-4 fighter-bomber.

An anonymous Defense Department official told *New York Times* correspondent William Beecher that Nixon does not expect the Chinese government to object to the escalation of U.S. military hardware on Taiwan because "it is anxious to see the Vietnam war come to an end, too." The official did not explain—and neither did Peking—why supplying Thieu with jet fighters will help end the war.

A further sidelight on the F-5A delivery was the rather offhand comment made by the *New York Times* on November 3: "Officials said that some or all of these planes would later be replaced with the advanced F-5E when it becomes available." According to the Tho-Kissinger accord, military equipment can be replaced only on a piece-by-piece basis. In interpreting the nuances of the accord, many columnists asked whether that meant the United States could escalate the quality of its supplies to Saigon. The Defense Department has now answered that question.

As the frenetic shipping of weapons to Thieu continued, so did the U.S. bombing of South Vietnam and of North Vietnam south of the twentieth parallel. In a twenty-four-hour period from November 4 to 5, U.S. B-52s dropped 2.5 million pounds of bombs. The U.S. command announced November 5 that as many as thirty-three B-52s had hit North Vietnam, while 120 fighter-bombers struck at targets in the same general area.

While the war continued unabated, the negotiations in Paris revealed that the United States is pressing Hanoi for further concessions. "The few re-



Map on left indicates population density in persons per square kilometer. In map on right, light areas represent NLF-held territory; dark areas Saigon-controlled. The breakdown is according to the French magazine *L'Express* and is vastly different from *New York Times* version published last week in *Intercontinental Press*.

maintaining problems of substance," said U.S. negotiator William Porter at the November 2 session, "should not be dismissed as pretexts for delay [in further talks]. Misunderstandings on serious points, if they exist, must be faced frankly and dealt with."

That statement represented the first public acknowledgement from a U.S. official that problems of "substance" rather than of "linguistics" were at issue in the American demand for more negotiations. Writing in the November 3 *New York Times*, Flora Lewis suggested that Kissinger may have "produced a document that Washington, on rereading, found too full of loopholes."

But the real loophole is perhaps less subtle. Having extracted significant concessions from Hanoi, and having been assured of continued Kremlin support, Washington is simply pressing for more, most likely an explicit promise from Hanoi to reduce its forces in South Vietnam and abandon the National Liberation Front fighters to a much bolstered Saigon military apparatus.

There are, as yet, no conclusive indications whether the North Vietnamese leaders are prepared to accommodate Washington's request. On No-

vember 3, U.S. military analysts announced that the North Vietnamese army was moving an armored regiment comprising 100 tanks and 100 armored personnel carriers into South Vietnam's Quangtri province. Quangtri, according to the *New York Times*, is the province from which Nixon has demanded Hanoi remove some 35,000 of its troops. North Vietnam's apparent refusal to comply represents a hopeful sign for the revolutionary fighters in the South.

On the other hand, Xuan Thuy, head of Hanoi's Paris negotiating team, declared in a November 4 interview that while the Nixon regime had promised to sign the Tho-Kissinger accord without alteration, the North Vietnamese government was willing to engage in further talks if the United States demonstrated that it was "serious." Thuy did not elaborate.

At the November 2 session of the Paris talks Nguyen Thi Binh, the PRG's foreign minister, repeated the demand for Thieu's resignation, a demand abandoned by Hanoi in the proposed agreement. The *New York Times* reported that the PRG's presentation at the session was "far more shrill than Hanoi's."

Liberation Forces Continue to Gain Ground

By Fred Feldman

The Tho-Kissinger Vietnam "peace" plan provides for withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Laos and Cambodia but makes no mention of a cease-fire or political settlement in those countries. The impact of the plan on the civil wars raging in these nations thus remains in doubt.

Negotiations between the Pathet Lao liberation forces and the pro-U. S. royal Laotian government headed by Premier Souvanna Phouma began on October 17, but the Pathet Lao, which already controls most of the country, continues to gain ground on the battlefield.

"Early today North Vietnamese troops swiftly occupied the virtually undefended town of Ban Kengkok southeast of Savannakhet in southern Laos," *New York Times* correspondent Malcolm Browne cabled from Vientiane October 28.

"Elsewhere Communist troops were reported to have occupied part of the large farm owned by King Savang Vathana 10 miles north of the royal capital of Luang Prabang. A dusk curfew has gone into effect in Luang Prabang and several other towns.

"Government sources conceded today that a determined drive that began last week to recover the Plaine des Jarres, north of Vientiane, had finally failed in the face of a powerful North Vietnamese counterattack.

"The sources said that the last of the Government troops, commanded by Lieut. Gen. Vang Pao, had been forced completely off the plain yesterday into surrounding high ground after suffering significant casualties."

The intense military activity of the revolutionary forces was assessed as "something very close to a general offensive."

Formally, both Premier Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao leaders advocate the formation of a tripartite, "neutralist," coalition government such as was imposed on Laos by the signatories of the 1962 Geneva agreement. But they differ sharply about the actual composition of such a coalition.

Souvanna Phouma is demanding that the Pathet Lao join his right-wing dominated government. The Pathet Lao insists on the formation of an entirely new coalition in which Souvanna Phouma would head the rightist faction.

Thus far, the negotiations are proceeding in what Malcolm Browne called "an atmosphere of marked rancor." Sot Petrasy, a Pathet Lao representative, told reporters after the October 31 session, "They are using all kinds of little pressures to force us into a position of seeming to be a defeated force asking to be allowed back into their Government. Nothing could be further from the truth."

A coalition government, whatever its composition, would be even less stable than that set up in 1962. As H. D. S. Greenway wrote in the October 23 *Washington Post*, "The reality is that since Souvanna Phouma assumed office as the head of the neutralist faction, in 1962, the neutralist position has been whittled away to the point where today there are no true neutralists. There is only the government and the Pathet Lao."

Some of the difficulties that will confront any effort to contain the opposing forces within one government were noted in the October 30 *New York Times*:

"The division of Laos into a Communist and non-Communist zone has been a fact for years, and it is hard to conceive of either zone at this point submitting to a coalition government.

"One problem that would be especially painful to all Laotians is that of money. For years, the Pathet Lao guerrillas have been issuing bank notes accepted as the legal currency throughout the Communist zone. The Government at Vientiane, of course, has issued completely different notes. As refugees moving from one zone to the other have sorrowfully discovered, Vientiane's kips are not convertible with the kips issued by the Pathet Lao at Samneua."

"Foreign diplomats," the *Times* continued, "generally feel at this point

that the chances are almost nil for an agreement that would truly guarantee a permanently peaceful and united Laos."

Souvanna Phouma has expressed optimism about the prospects for a settlement that would preserve his capitalist regime:

"You must remember that we achieved the status of neutrality in 1962 as a result of the agreement at that time. Laos is a kingdom and all Laotians—even those on the other side—recognize the authority of the king." He claimed that "much destruction has been prevented" in Laos because of its neutral status. (*New York Times*, October 27.)

In fact, this tiny country, with its three to four million inhabitants, has had more than its share of the violence visited on Indochina by U. S. imperialism. Over 2,600 million tons of bombs have been dropped on southern Laos alone. Half the population are refugees. The Meo people, who have provided the backbone of the pro-U. S. armed forces, have suffered 30,000 to 60,000 dead.

The Laotian experience casts doubt on the credibility of the U. S. promise to halt its bombing of Indochina. In "How we ran the secret air war in Laos" (*New York Times Magazine*, October 28) Seymour Hersh reported an interview with Jerome J. Brown, who secretly operated as chief targeting officer in Laos for the U. S. air force for eighteen months in 1967-1968.

Hersh wrote that secret U. S. bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos began "in earnest" in 1964. In 1965 "the Prince [Souvanna Phouma] gave permission for United States aircraft operating out of bases in Thailand to begin making armed reconnaissance flights. In the beginning, Souvanna Phouma approved each mission, Brown said. Before long, however, these functions shifted over to Ambassador [Walter H.] Sullivan, although the Prince technically was responsible for the operations, and remained so during the early years of the air war in Laos. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency was conducting clandestine bombing on its own by 1965, and the Air Force also was secretly training four squadrons of Lao and Thai pilots for future operations."

In Cambodia the situation is, if any-

thing, more unfavorable to the pro-imperialist regime.

Summarizing an interview with Prince Sihanouk in Peking, John Hughes, editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*, wrote in the October 30 issue:

"Cambodia's exiled Prince Norodom Sihanouk says that whatever settlement may be reached in Vietnam, the war in Cambodia will go on. . . .

"He declared North Vietnam had promised to transport Chinese weapons and supplies through Vietnamese territory to Cambodia 'even after a cease-fire in Vietnam.' In amplification, the deposed Cambodian leader said Hanoi would never accept a general cease-fire encompassing all of Indo-China, and would never accept international control, so the continued passage of arms to Cambodia 'will not be difficult.'"

Some imperialist strategists now view the return of Sihanouk as a "lesser evil." C. L. Sulzberger wrote in the November 3 *New York Times* that "a thread of neutralism always ran through his policy.

"Sihanouk's chances in Pnompen have recently improved because Lon Nol, head of the putsch that ousted him, is physically ill and his regime is slowly eroding away. There is little doubt that both Peking and Hanoi would accept him once again as Cambodia's boss and, whatever the precise final terms of settlement between North and South Vietnam, Saigon would have to go along."

As in Laos, it is doubtful that any compromise settlement would succeed for very long in keeping a lid on the conflict.

In recent months, the indigenous revolutionary forces (Khmer Rouge) have increased from 5,000 to more than 40,000 troops. North Vietnam has reportedly reduced its troop commitment in Cambodia to 12,000.

The October 24 *Washington Post* wrote of this development:

"One local political observer noted that seven months ago, when the North Vietnamese were the dominant force in Cambodia, roughly 65 per cent of the land area and 40 per cent of its population was either under enemy control or contested.

"Now that the Khmer Rouge outnumber the North Vietnamese, 85 per cent of Cambodia and 55 per cent of the population is outside government control." □

Which Side Made More Concessions?

The Press Evaluates the Vietnam Accord

"It may appear incongruous, at the moment when the peace so long awaited by millions of Indochinese and by world opinion is approaching, to ask who 'won.' After so many years of war, is it not sufficient merely to state that peace has finally won? But it is perhaps not useless to see who made the greater effort to bring peace, that is, which camp yielded more concessions in relation to its previous positions."

In the October 28 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde* Michel Tatu sets himself that investigative task. His answers, while based on one of the more complete analyses to appear in the world capitalist press, seemed to reflect the general tenor of the opinions of the "opinion makers."

"In this regard," Tatu continued, "a study of the documents, especially of the positions taken during the last year by the Provisional Revolutionary Government and Hanoi on the one hand, and by the United States on the other . . . hardly leaves room for doubt: It was on the communist side that, in the course of the last few months, the greatest and even most essential steps on this road were taken."

Tatu gives a brief summary of the "scenario" that would have followed U. S. acceptance of the PRG's seven points: In the first stage, while U. S. troops were being withdrawn, Thieu would resign as president, his government being replaced by "a new administration committed to peace, independence, and neutrality." Not only would Thieu be compelled to step down, but "his oppressive machine would be dismantled, putting an end to the policy of pacification."

The PRG would then negotiate with this new regime to organize a coalition government which in turn would prepare the country for elections. A cease-fire would go into effect only after the new regime had been founded and the date of elections specified. This scenario embodies what the North Vietnamese leaders intended by their insistence that the "political solution and the military solution could not be separated"; and this is what Henry

Kissinger called (last May) "the imposition, with the flimsiest fig leaf, of a Communist government in South Vietnam."

Tatu notes that the present scenario is far from that specified in the PRG's seven points. He divides "Hanoi's concessions" into four categories.

First, the calendar has been reversed. The cease-fire, instead of following a political accord, comes first. In this respect, Nixon got even more than he had asked for in his eight points of January, 1972, in which he suggested that Thieu resign just before the election.

Also, the PRG's seven points spoke only of an "international guarantee of the concluded accords," and not of international supervision of the elections, as does the present agreement. In all this, Tatu writes, the Le Duc Tho-Kissinger agreement comes "nearer the American proposals of January." Nixon's only concession appears to have been dropping his demand for a presidential election and acceding to a general parliamentary one.

Second, Tatu notes, under the Tho-Kissinger accord, "Saigon, at least in principle, will not be represented by the decapitated, emasculated organ with which the PRG counted on 'negotiating' last year. Not only will Thieu remain in power (and on this point the accord went even further than Nixon himself had proposed when he suggested Thieu would resign a month before the elections), but there is no question of depriving him of the instruments of power."

The tripartite "administrative structure" called for in the present agreement, Tatu notes, was a concession Nixon had already made last January 25, when he specified that the proposed presidential election would be "organized and conducted by an independent organ representing all the political forces in South Vietnam."

The third major area of concessions by Hanoi relates to "military questions," which were, Tatu writes, "also resolved in a manner more satisfying to the United States and its Sai-

gon ally." The U.S. commitment to withdraw its troops from Vietnam even though the agreement does not specify a North Vietnamese withdrawal was an "important concession" from Washington.

"Nevertheless, this last question will be taken up by Saigon and the PRG, and measures of reduction of effective fighting forces are already foreseen (according to our correspondent Jean-Claude Pomonti, the figures on the reduction of Saigon's forces are said to have been set already). Can it be deduced that an analogous figure for the reduction of Northern forces has also been secretly agreed to? It is not unreasonable to assume so. In any case, the PRG's seven points were much more evasive, leaving the discussion of this question to the different Vietnamese parties 'in conformity with the postwar situation.' In other words it would be the province of the government of national concord set up after the cease-fire, and not of the Saigon administration, even dismantled."

In addition, Thieu's army has not been abandoned by the United States, which is allowed to resupply it. And the agreement's stipulation that no new troops be introduced into South Vietnam gives Saigon reason to hope that further movement of Hanoi's forces into the South will end. While it is difficult to see how such a provision could be enforced if Hanoi chose to disregard it, Tatu notes that North Vietnamese leaders "took a great step toward Nixon's sixth point" in accepting the provision.

The final area in which major concessions were offered by Hanoi, Tatu argues, was on the question of prisoners. "The PRG's seven points were quite explicit in this regard, demanding the release of all 'persons arrested for political reasons,' the destruction of the concentration camps, etc. The latest agreement is more restrictive, speaking of the 'release of all persons captured and detained by the various parties.' Must it be concluded that there will be only an exchange of the various prisoners belonging to the camps officially party to the accord—Vietcong and North Vietnamese prisoners in the South, Americans and Southerners in the North—and that the 'third force' oppositionists will be abandoned to their fate?"

Tatu attributes the source of Ha-

noi's concessions to three factors: The Saigon army did not totally fall apart under the impact of North Vietnam's spring offensive; Nixon's response (intensified bombing and the blockade of North Vietnam) did not hurt his standing in the U.S. polls; and Hanoi's allies in Moscow and Peking were "normalizing" their relations with Washington and "probably advised [North Vietnam] to end it."

Nevertheless, Tatu notes, the agreement "is far from a capitulation by the North, and Thieu's reservations are understandable." He will be forced to "share power" in South Vietnam, and a process has been set in motion that may be uncontrollable: "in short, a plunge into the unknown. The agreement implies the immediate emergence, both on the political map and on the land itself, of a third Vietnam at President Thieu's expense—the enclaves held by the National Liberation Front. It will be very difficult for him to prevent their extension during the cease-fire, for nothing is so

problematical as the control of a village."

The U.S. magazine *Newsweek*, which in the past has been critical of Nixon's Indochina policies, seemed satisfied with the terms of the Tho-Kissinger accord. Discussing the apparent divergence between the U.S. and South Vietnamese regimes, the journal noted:

"For the U.S., the basic provisions were right already. In addition to their other concessions, the North Vietnamese agreed to allow the U.S. to keep providing economic aid to Saigon and to replace its military equipment; to free American prisoners even before the Saigon government released imprisoned Communist cadres, and to accept the presence of U.S. air bases in Thailand and carriers off the Vietnamese coast. In exchange, the North Vietnamese extracted one fundamental concession from the U.S. Washington agreed that Hanoi could maintain, and resupply, its military forces in the South—a decision that enables the North Vietnamese to keep some 145,-

Saigon Catholic Activist Appeals for Help

Thieu's Prisoners Face Possible Massacre

[There are an estimated 200,000 political prisoners in the jails of South Vietnam. Their ranks include not only fighters of the National Liberation Front, but Catholic and Buddhist oppositionists as well. Now that every indication points to the fact that South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu is preparing to liquidate his opposition, their lives are in grave danger.

[The following is a letter from a Catholic activist in Saigon appealing to world public opinion to prevent a massacre of political prisoners. The author, a member of the Committee to Reform the Prison System in South Vietnam, addressed it to a Vietnamese priest in Paris. It is dated August 20, 1972.

[The French revolutionary-socialist weekly *Rouge* published the text in its October 28 issue. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

Dear N.

What we are experiencing here is a nightmare. In the past six months, the number of persons arrested has increased at a staggering rate. A number have been deported to the island of Con Son (Poulo Condor); others are being held in the prisons and other penal institutions in Saigon or in the provinces. Since we have received no word from many of them, we have no way of knowing if they are living or already dead.

We no longer know which saints to turn to. Our only hope is to wait for international religious, humanitarian, or legal bodies and movements of our friends abroad to come to our rescue. As soon as possible. We are in danger. The documents and information that you find attached have been gathered under conditions of the strictest clandestinity. In spite of the fact that they are incomplete, do everything you can to get them translated and publicized. Thanks in advance. □

000 of their soldiers on Saigon's territory."

But *Newsweek* did not consider that concession from Nixon at all unacceptable. "He [Nixon] hung tough, and although in the end the President had to give a little too, he managed to wring more concessions from Hanoi than even the most ardent supporters of his war policy have thought would be possible." *Newsweek* suggested one factor that made this outcome possible: "'The full story isn't in yet,' says one observer in Washington. 'But it looks like Moscow and Peking both lined up squarely with the President on this one.'"

The West German weekly *Der Spiegel* noted in its October 30 issue that Hanoi had made two fundamental concessions: separating the "political" solution from the "military" solution, and allowing Thieu to retain control of the Saigon regime. Like Tatu, *Der Spiegel* traced the reasons for these concessions to three factors: pressure from Moscow, North Vietnam's "main supplier of arms"; the impending Nixon victory in the U.S. elections; and the apparent stalemate on the battlefield.

But *Der Spiegel* also stressed the U.S. concession that allows the North Vietnamese army to remain in the South, and even suggested that the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord could evolve into a coalition government. And *Der Spiegel's* estimate of the prospects for peace was more realistic than that of many other capitalist magazines and newspapers:

"And yet, behind the fog out of which last week's rumors became indications and finally explanations, it was still clear that this seemingly endless war would not die so easily. The ruins of the cities and villages of Vietnam, like the ruins left behind in human consciousness, would not be wiped away so quickly, even if the peace treaty were ready to be signed."

In its October 30 issue the Paris weekly *Nouvel Observateur* expressed its concern that the Tho-Kissinger accord would be less than lasting by entitling its editorial "The third Vietnam war."

"Today," wrote Jean Daniel, "the question becomes: How to avoid a third war? An important question, at least for those who prefer the peace of compromise to the victory of cemeteries."

"And it seems that this may be the courageous attitude of the North Vietnamese negotiators. In fact, since last Thursday [October 26] the world knows that they modified, and sometimes withdrew, certain demands formulated in Pham Van Dong's famous 1965 declaration and repeated for the last time by the PRG in September 1972. They accepted the retention of General Thieu as the head of the Saigon regime during the transitional period. They allowed the cease-fire to precede the political settlement. They no longer demanded a three-part 'government,' but rather a 'national council of reconciliation.' Finally, the elections demanded by the Americans will precede the basic reorganization of power. These important concessions, which may sadden professional ultimatumists, in fact give a real idea of the relationship of forces, express a desire not to make the defeat of Nixon too humiliating, and above all, perhaps, express a consciousness of the cost of the war. . . ."

In the London *Sunday Times* of October 29 Henry Brandon, Washington correspondent and personal friend of Henry Kissinger, described with ill-concealed glee the tactical considerations of Nixon's foreign-policy expert:

"On September 21 in a private conversation he [Kissinger] said to me that the 'objective situation' had never looked more favourable to the United States: the Kremlin and Peking had lost interest in supporting the war; the North Vietnamese had failed to score a decisive victory in their Spring offensive; and the mining of the North Vietnamese harbours, though it failed to have the strangling effect the American military had predicted, was bound to have a ruinous effect over the long run. All that he was waiting for was for the North Vietnamese to convince themselves that Nixon was certain to win the election. The combination of these circumstances, he argued, would lead Hanoi to make the necessary concessions."

"Two weeks later came the breakthrough. The North Vietnamese accepted the basic conditions outlined in President Nixon's statement of January 25 and in his speech of May 8. They gave up on what Nixon considered their most obnoxious demand: the forced removal of President Thieu. . . ."

Brandon mentions Nixon's major concession—allowing North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South—but explains that one of the issues Kissinger feels must be "cleared up" is the delineation and supervision of the cease-fire. On these questions, as on previous ones, Kissinger is counting on a little help from his friends. Writes Brandon: "At least the Kremlin is taking Dr Kissinger's assurances that 'having come this far, we cannot fail' more seriously than Hanoi. The evidence is Premier Kosygin's admonition to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong Chargés d'Affaires in Moscow to continue the talks. The discreet co-ordination that exists between Washington and Moscow has clearly helped to advance the prospect of peace in Vietnam."

Perhaps the most negative interpretation of the Tho-Kissinger agreement to appear in the capitalist press was the one offered in the November 1 *New York Times* by I. F. Stone, a well-known independent leftist U.S. journalist who has exposed many of the crimes of U.S. imperialism ever since the Korean war. Stone disagrees with Kissinger's assessment of the accord as "an act of healing," and charges that "the agreement promises more recrimination, disillusion and bloodshed."

"For the third time since World War II," Stone writes, "Vietnamese hopes are being sold down the river; this time with open aid of Moscow and Peking. Thieu is left in control of the army and the police, with his pipeline to the U.S. Treasury unimpaired. Military aid is cut off, but economic aid is left without limit. Thieu can buy arms elsewhere and cover the deficits of a large oppressive apparatus by drafts on Washington."

Stone anticipates the intensification of repression of "neutralist" forces in Saigon-held areas, and notes that the proposed agreement is not even "a program for disengagement. Mr. Kissinger was asked what recourse the other side would have if the negotiations for elections broke down. He answered, opaquely, that the cease-fire has no time limit. To break the cease-fire because Thieu had broken the implied promise of new and free elections would thus still be a violation of Hanoi's cease-fire with us. And the Navy will still be offshore and the planes ready on the Thai bases." □

NLF 'Irritated' by Hanoi's Concessions

The National Liberation Front's delegation in Paris is reportedly "irritated and unhappy" with North Vietnam for dropping three key demands in reaching a cease-fire agreement with the United States, according to a November 1 dispatch from *New York Times* Paris correspondent Flora Lewis. The three demands are the release of political prisoners in Thieu's jails, the resignation of Thieu, and the liquidation of Saigon's police apparatus.

Lewis based her report on information from "American sources in close touch with the Vietcong's delegation in Paris."

Although the NLF, unlike Thieu, has made no public statements challenging any aspect of the announced draft agreement, Lewis noted, its representatives have "repeatedly expressed their concern for political prisoners held by the Saigon government. Many of the prisoners are people whom the Communists would rely upon to staff their administration, the sources said, and to represent them in three-part councils of Communists, Saigon loyalists and neutralists envisioned in the pact."

The release of Vietnamese civilian prisoners is left up to negotiations between Saigon and the NLF by the draft agreement. As a result, no time limit is placed on their further detention. Meanwhile, there is the very real danger that Thieu will massacre thousands of these prisoners in the bloodbath for which, according to every indication, he is already making preparations.

The NLF is also reportedly concerned over the absence of guarantees in the agreement announced by Hanoi and presidential adviser Henry Kissinger that a three-part council of reconciliation will ever be set up. The agreement provides that both the NLF's apparatus and the Thieu puppet administration will remain in charge of the areas they control on the day the fighting stops. "That 'temporary' arrangement," Lewis observed, "is to last until elections can be held to form a new unified government. But there is no date fixed for elections and all further political

moves are to depend on agreements worked out by Saigon and the Vietcong.

"The accord provides only that they 'will do their utmost' to set up a three-part National Council of Reconciliation and Concord within three months after a cease-fire begins."

Lewis also indicated that the NLF's concern over the perils facing political prisoners in South Vietnam has prompted it to step up its efforts to alert world opinion about the question. On November 1, for instance, its Paris delegation made public a

Amnesty to Aid Indochina Prisoners

Amnesty International, the worldwide organization for the defense of political prisoners, has announced its intention to aid imprisoned civilians in Indochina.

At a November 2 Paris news conference Sean MacBride, chairman of Amnesty, explained the terms of a draft treaty that the group hopes will be signed by all belligerents in the Indochina war. The treaty would extend to civilian political prisoners all the guarantees the Geneva convention grants military prisoners of war.

MacBride proposed the formation of a supervisory authority consisting of neutral governments. The signatories to the treaty would present to the supervisory authority lists of all prisoners held, and would open all camps and prisons to investigation by the authority. Protecting the prisoners' physical safety and securing their quick release would be the authority's goal.

MacBride said that there were no reliable estimates of the total number of political prisoners in Indochina, but suggested that 200,000 was not an unreasonable figure. Most of these, he said, are held by the Thieu regime.

MacBride emphasized that Amnesty had received no assurances that any of the governments concerned would sign the proposed treaty, but said copies of it were being sent to the U. S.

letter smuggled out of Saigon's Chi Hoa Prison. The letter, signed simply "The Students Imprisoned at Chi Hoa Prison, Saigon," is dated October 11, 1972, and was received by Vietnamese Catholic sources in Paris. It describes the torture of a student leader, Le Cong Giau, said to be at the point of death in the prison.

The letter concludes: "We beg you to do everything possible (alert public opinion, take all necessary steps) to bring help to our friend whose state is so critical. Otherwise Giau may not survive."

The NLF statement did not mention Giau, but it reported that "more than 10 prisoners" had to be rushed to a hospital following severe beatings by guards October 25. They had tried to protest against "the condition of one of their fellow inmates." □

government, to North and South Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the Laotian and Cambodian governments, the Khmer Rouge, the Pathet Lao, and the regimes of South Korea, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand.

War Games

During NATO-organized "infiltration exercises" conducted in Belgium in November, a dozen soldiers were captured by paracommandos led by one Lieutenant Luc Morel. The lieutenant, who fought in Korea, says he knows "methods for making people speak" and set about interrogating the prisoners.

According to witnesses, the prisoners were beaten, given electric shocks, and hung from beams with only their knees touching the floor. One was forced to lie flat on an electric coil. At times the commandos put pails over the prisoners' heads and beat the pails with sticks.

The interrogation was stopped when a doctor found out about it. The full facts came out during a military tribunal which is trying to decide whether Morel did anything untoward. He insists that torture practice is part of normal training. The prosecutor disagrees and is asking the maximum sentence against Morel—six months in the stockade.

"I thought we had to do it," said one puzzled paracommando. "It was the only method to get needed information."

Workers Call Nationwide Strike

By Gerry Foley

"An unusual meeting of about 500 Bolivian officers of all ranks took place early this month," the Montréal daily *Le Devoir* reported in its October 24 issue. "General Zenteño Anaya — the commander in chief of the armed forces and the person most often mentioned as the probable successor of the present president—declared without any beating around the bush: 'I have come to explain the political situation to you because we are in a critical situation.'"

Le Devoir's correspondent Xavier Uscategui explained that the Bolivian dictatorship was facing a mounting crisis for basically three reasons. The unstable coalition that backed the August 1971 military coup was coming apart. The economic position of the country was continuing to deteriorate. The massive repression that followed the military take-over had failed to crush the workers' movement, which remained unintimidated and seemed to be regaining its positions.

When the Banzer government ordered a 65 percent devaluation of the peso on October 27, the apprehensions of General Zenteño Anaya were confirmed:

"The factory workers declared an eight-hour strike yesterday throughout the entire country," a UPI dispatch reported in the November 1 issue of the New York Spanish language daily *El Diario*. "After the disturbances last night in which about a hundred persons were arrested, more than thirty wounded, and one killed, the workers built barricades in the northern and northwestern sections of La Paz." As a result of the clashes, shops were reportedly closed throughout the city.

In its November 1 issue, *Le Monde* reported that the industrial workers' union had held an extraordinary assembly on October 30 to organize the strike. Independent radio stations also broadcast protests from workers in the banks, on the railroads, and in the building trades.

"In the early hours of the afternoon [on October 30]," the Paris daily continued, "demonstrators gathered in the

center of La Paz, blocking traffic. Several union representatives spoke, calling the government 'fascistic and anti-working-class.' The police used tear gas. The strikers then headed toward the outlying neighborhoods, where they clashed with the police. Several shots were fired. Students joined the demonstrators, throwing rocks at the guardians of order."

In the face of this explosion, the military dictatorship appears to have retreated, while at the same time trying to tighten its grip on communications throughout the country. On the one hand, it ordered the private stations to broadcast only the official communiqués. On the other, it announced that the workers would be given a bonus of 135 pesos [about US\$6.] to compensate for the devaluation, and that the prices of necessities would be frozen.

Even in the days following the coup, the regime proved incapable of imposing a fascist solution, or even the type of all-pervasive repression that exists in Brazil. This was so despite the fact that the left suffered heavy losses. Thousands of political and trade-union activists were jailed, many of whom were sent to death camps in the Amazonian region. Others were beaten and killed by goon squads of the fascist-inspired Phalange. "To escape the prisons of the regime, thousands of militants have fled the country," Philippe Labreveux noted in the October 10 issue of *Le Monde*. "The guerrillas tried to continue the resistance but, divided and disorganized, they quickly succumbed." Nonetheless, since the reformist Torres government capitulated without putting up a serious fight and since the left parties were unable to mobilize the masses effectively to meet the coup, the junta was able to accomplish this repression without having to face an all-out confrontation with the working class.

Despite the formal dissolution of the national trade-union organization, the COB [Central Obrera Boliviana — Bolivian Workers Federation] and its

most militant component, the miners' union, the workers' movement seems to have maintained its morale and its unity in its strongholds. As in the latest confrontation, the Banzer government apparently felt compelled to temper its repression with concessions.

"The government," Labreveux wrote, "considered it prudent to guarantee some 'gains' to the workers in the nationalized mines, notably to uphold the Torres government's decree restoring wages to the 1965 level. Ciro Humboldt, the minister of labor and a leader of the MNR [Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario — Revolutionary Nationalist Movement], has been skillfully manipulating his ministry's funds to try to placate the miners. Nonetheless in one of the main tin mines, the Siglo Veinte, sympathizers of the FRA [Frente Revolucionario Anti-Imperialista — Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Front, the coalition of parties opposing the coup] won the union elections in July by 1688 votes to 600 for the three progovernment tickets."

In the October 24 *Le Devoir*, Uscategui wrote:

"Despite its hard-line measures and its monopoly of the news media, the regime has not been able to cut away the support of the opposition. In the rare cases when public opinion has been able to express itself, the response has been clear. At the mine workers' election in the 'consolidated enterprise' of Potosi, the official parties, the Phalange, and the MNR were unable to agree on a common slate, but in any case they came in respectively last and next to last.

"A left coalition ticket headed by a pro-Soviet Communist party member won. The pro-Chinese Communist party candidates came in second, and after them the Trotskyists. In the Oruro area, the main COMIBOL [Corporación Minera Boliviana — Bolivian Mining Corporation, the state administration of the nationalized mines] mines are still left-wing strongholds impenetrable to the progovernment forces.

"Furthermore, victorious economic struggles have been waged by the primary school teachers, railroad workers, and bank employes. At the same time, a fratricidal struggle has developed between the progovernment forces over the control of the bank workers union." In this battle the Victor Paz Estenssoro faction of the MNR,

which supports the government, lost out, and its embittered protests seem to have increased the tensions in the uneasy ruling coalition.

It seems clear that the shaky alliance backing the coup has been steadily crumbling. In the first place, the Paz Estenssoro group is only a by-product of the decay of the old populist formation that came to power in the wake of the 1952 revolution. It is not necessary to believe the exiled former president and MNR leader Siles Zuazo's claim that "60 percent of the 3,000 political and trade-union leaders arrested in the last year are members of the MNR" to surmise that a considerable proportion of the supporters and adherents of the old broad, demagogic formation find themselves uncomfortable under the rightist dictatorship.

Moreover, even the most corrupted section of the MNR led by Paz Estenssoro is apparently regarded as an unwelcome partner by the Phalange, which is dominated by the big land-owning interests of Santa Cruz province. In fact, the two main political props of the dictatorship seem to be locked in an intense rivalry.

"The Phalangists, who never tasted power before 1971, and the MNR members who had to give it up in 1964, have pounced avidly on the spoils of the vanquished," Labreveux noted, "sharing ministries, prefectures, mayoralties, in short all the jobs offered by the public administration and the state enterprises. . . ."

"It is a tradition in Bolivia that the several thousand public jobs change with each new government. But the number of candidates is always higher than that of the available posts, while the budget remains stationary and continually in deficit. Hence the frequent changes at all levels of government. President Banzer has already reorganized his cabinet twice. The ministry of mines, the most important one, has changed hands three times in a year, as has the ministry of education, which alone absorbs one-third of the budget."

In education in particular, the predatory rivalry of the Estenssoro MNR and the Phalange is evident:

"Closed after the defeat of Torres, the universities are only beginning to reopen. In La Paz, the government-appointed rector does not envisage reopening the school before October. The two parties of the government coal-

tion . . . have divided the professorships of the mostly empty schools between themselves."

Partners in looting the country, it is unlikely that questions of principle or even old resentments at the MNR government's repression of the Phalange in the 1950s continue to divide the two parties. But as to historical formation and base they are different.

The Phalange, inspired by Spanish fascism, is based on the big-landowners of the rich and thinly populated Santa Cruz province, Bolivia's "wild west," where the population is mostly European in origin. It tends to have an old-fashioned piratical capitalist mentality, looking forward to an economic boom in its area as imperialist capital begins to open up its resources. The Phalangist supporters are relatively uninterested in the unprofitable tin mines of the high plateau, where most of the population lives and where the strength of the organized workers' movement is concentrated.

Stressing its contempt and hatred of the Indian miners by a white racist ideology, the Phalange has even tended to develop a perspective of separatism, encouraged by the Brazilian dictatorship, whose territory borders Santa Cruz. The Phalange has every reason to begrudge the cost of the bureaucracy that runs the nationalized mines and to oppose concessions to the miners. On the other hand, the right wing of the MNR has tended precisely to center in the bureaucracy of the state corporations established as a result of the revolution of 1952.

In September, conflicts within the government led to the deportation both of Guillermo Bedregal, a former member of the Phalange who joined the MNR to become a chairman of the state mining corporation and Paz Estenssoro's reputed No. 2 man; and Juan Patiño Ayoroa, the Phalangist commander of the all-important military garrison in the Oruro mining region.

Patiño Ayoroa was the second leading Phalangist removed from his position in the recent period. He was preceded by Colonel Selich Chopp, former minister of the interior and one of the main architects of the August coup. In his article in the October 10 *Le Monde*, Labreveux speculated that Banzer purged the two Phalangist officers in order to forestall a "coup within the coup."

"The government is not unaware that it is threatened by the ambition of the military chiefs. Colonel Banzer keeps a wary eye on his generals, who might accuse him of skipping some of the formalities in taking the presidency. He distrusts his peers and even lower ranking officers who seem to have too lean and hungry a look."

Uscategui had another explanation:

"In fact it seems that Patiño Ayoroa was eliminated less in his capacity as a military officer than as a spokesman for the wild-eyed circles of the Phalange. Colonel Banzer's decision means a simultaneous setback for the MNR and the Phalange. As it is evident that the government is more and more under the exclusive control of the military, it reflects a decrease in Banzer's own power. . . ."

"On the other hand, the Phalange, with its verbal excesses and its blood-thirsty explosions—unable to produce any support for the government but that of individuals hungry for authoritarianism and confined for all practical purposes by the limits of narrow Santa Cruz regionalism—was able to serve as an effective support at the time of the coup and the vast repressive witch-hunt. But since then it has been only an embarrassing ally for a regime aspiring to gain admission to 'inter-American legality.'"

Although Uscategui seems to view the army as a third force standing apart from the rivalries of the right-wing MNR bureaucrats and the Santa Cruz land pirates—which is unlikely—he does note that the armed forces themselves are deeply divided.

"If we add to these factors the undeniable nationalist and even prerevolutionary ferment evident in the younger officers, we can realize the instability of a regime that has nothing to write in the credit side of its ledgers."

Moreover, if Banzer's allies in Bolivia have failed to produce serious support for the regime, the colonel does not seem to have been better served by the foreign powers that backed the coup.

"The 'two year plan' has not produced the results officially expected," Uscategui continued. "This reflects the ineffectiveness of the 'aid' given to the Banzer government. The United States has given \$30 million in credits; Brazil and Argentina have also made their contribution. American military

aid is the highest for any Latin American country: \$4,500,000.

"But the fact is that all this threatens to prove more apparent than real, even if we only note that the indemnity that the Bolivian government paid to the Philips Brothers firm as compensation for expropriating the Mathilde Mine was \$14,000,000. Under the Torres government the company was ready to accept \$2,000,000."

In all, the picture of Bolivia given by recent press reports shows a capitalist system in an advanced state of decay, such as, for example, preceded the revolution in Russia in 1917. The ruling class is split into warring factions, each playing a parasitic and predatory role, unable to see beyond its immediate particular interests, and these divisions are reflected in all the institutions of class rule, including the army.

There now seems no doubt that the

Banzer government and its imperialist allies have been unable to take advantage of the opportunity offered them by the ignominious collapse of the Torres government and the defaults of the left parties to solve the chronic crisis of capitalism in Bolivia. Instead this crisis has continued to deepen.

As the corrupt and unstable ruling coalition crumbles, the workers' movement that maintained itself intact in its strongholds seems to have made a giant stride on October 30 toward resuming nationwide action in defense of its interests. It remains to be seen whether the political vanguard of the workers has learned the lessons of August and, after so many defeats, massacres, and needless sacrifices, will prove capable of ending the vicious circle of capitalist crisis in Bolivia, and of leading the workers finally to overthrow the system. □

children." He claimed that the four targets were occupied only by "terrorists of Fateh, Saiqa, and the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine]." He said Syria was to blame for the raids because it harbored guerrillas and did not respect the cease-fire, a point that was presumably demonstrated when the Syrian army had the audacity to fire artillery shells at Israeli military encampments on the Golan Heights several hours after the air raids.

Sections of the Western press speculated that the Israeli assault was intended to be retribution for the October 29 hijacking of a Lufthansa airplane and the consequent freeing of three members of Black September who had been captured by German police during the Munich events in September. But an unidentified Israeli spokesman quoted by *Le Monde* explained that the raids were "not necessarily a direct consequence" of the hijacking, but that they "fit into the framework of Tel Aviv's new policy of hitting the fedayeen camps wherever they are found."

While it is doubtless true that the Zionist regime intends to continue its policy of military aggression regardless of the activities of the Palestinian resistance movement, the release of the Munich commandos was a significant blow both to the Israeli government itself and to the international capitalist policy of refusing to bargain with or yield to persons who hijack aircraft to further political goals.

On October 29, two or three (reports varied) Palestinian commandos seized control of a Lufthansa plane while it was en route from Beirut to Ankara, Turkey. After stopping in Nicosia and Zagreb for refuelling, the plane was flown to Munich, where the West German government had agreed to turn over the three imprisoned Black September members.

But the guerrillas became suspicious of the intense military activity that seemed to be in progress at Munich airport and accordingly took the plane back to Zagreb. The aircraft, with its crew and twenty passengers, circled over Zagreb while the hijackers made arrangements with West German police to fly the Munich commandos to Yugoslavia.

When the Germans complied, the Lufthansa jet touched down at Zagreb, took the Black September commandos

After Hijacking Frees Munich Fedayeen

Israel Stages Murderous Raids on Syria

By Jon Rothschild

At 7:45 in the morning, October 30, Israeli fighter-bombers streaked across the Syrian border to conduct what the Paris daily *Le Monde* called "particularly murderous" raids. Tel Aviv claimed the targets were "fedayeen camps" in the villages of Duma, Hern, Ain El-Saheb, and Ain el-Sokhneh, all of which are within about seven miles of the Syrian capital, Damascus. As usual, the Israeli claim that the victims of their bombs were commandos is nonsense.

No official casualty statistics were released by the Syrian government, but *Le Monde*, the *New York Times*, and Western news agencies reported that about sixty people were killed and some seventy were wounded.

The greatest civilian toll, according to the November 1 *Le Monde*, was inflicted on the Ain el-Sokhneh camp, which was built two years ago largely to accommodate Syrian refugees from the Golan Heights. "Journalists led to the scene late in the evening could see army technicians defusing time bombs dropped by the Israeli planes. Accord-

ing to the villagers in the area, these bombs were responsible for the greatest number of deaths. Access to the three other bombed camps was blocked as a security measure.

"At the Harasta military hospital near Damascus, journalists were shown seventeen bodies. They were apparently civilians, among them women and children. In the village of Duma on Monday night [October 30], ten hours after the raid, rescuers were still trying to dig out victims."

The October 31 *Washington Post* noted: "Reporters who visited the target areas last night saw ambulances still taking casualties away and bulldozers removing debris from half-demolished houses."

The time bombs, probably of the same type that the United States has dropped on North Vietnam's dikes, wiped out one family of seven, according to news agency reports.

Despite such evidence from eyewitnesses, Israeli chief of staff General David Elazar denied "allegations that Israeli aircraft attacked women and

aboard, refueled again, and flew to Tripoli, Libya, where the fedayeen were granted asylum by Muammar el-Qaddafi. The Libyan regime has refused to extradite the commandos.

The West German decision to yield to the hijackers' demands was angrily denounced by the Zionist leaders, who maintained that the plane should have been stopped even at the cost of the lives of the passengers. Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban called Bonn's move a "capitulation." The Israeli ambassador to Bonn was recalled for "consultations." The German ambassador to Israel defended his government's decision by noting that Bonn "is not at war with the Arabs" and that its "first duty is to protect its own citizens."

Apart from Tel Aviv's fury over the refusal of a major Western regime to implement its bloodthirsty line on the question of hijacking, the Zionists may well have an additional reason to be concerned about the release of the Black September commandos. Once in Tripoli, they were able to speak freely. Although their statements were generally ignored or

played down in the capitalist press, the fedayeen were able to counteract the image of wanton brutality that had been projected on them by the Israeli regime and its allies.

Ibrahim Badran, Samir Abdullah, and Mahmoud el-Safadi declared that they regretted the loss of life at Munich and denied that they were responsible. "It was the Germans' fault," they said. "They betrayed us."

Badran explained that he had joined the Palestinian resistance movement in 1967, after his mother, father, and sister had been killed in an Israeli raid. "We are neither savages, terrorists, nor monsters," Badran told reporters. "We hoped that our operation at the Olympic games in Munich would end without bloodshed. All we wanted was to free our friends imprisoned in Israeli jails."

The three said that they had been treated poorly in the West German prison. "We slept on the floor in individual cells and the food was very bad. For this reason we went on a hunger strike for four days. Then the German police burst into our cells, hit us, and spit in our faces." □

twenty-seven, however, which was due to appear in October, has apparently been delayed.

Seeger writes that although the *Chronicle* is only one of many samizdat publications circulating in the Soviet Union, it "is particularly embarrassing for the government because of its remarkably accurate reporting of violations of individual civil liberties."

"Each issue carries reports of trials and arrests from all parts of the country that are reported no place else in the Soviet Union. It contains letters and news items smuggled out of prisons, hospitals and labor camps."

Describing the role of the *Chronicle* among dissidents in the Soviet Union, Seeger writes, "It serves to keep all the disparate dissident groups of the country—political, intellectual, religious and national—informed of the others' activities and problems. In this way, it counteracts the official government policy of keeping dissident groups divided."

The *Los Angeles Times* article concludes that the reason the underground journal has been able to survive in spite of the police dragnet is that "more people are involved in its production than the few political dissidents known to Western observers."

"The *Chronicle* circle is bigger than even the KGB can encompass."

Another factor contributing to the *Chronicle's* survival is its method of distribution: Recipients of an issue reproduce the entire journal and pass copies on to others they think would be interested. Since it is illegal for an individual to own any kind of copying machine in the USSR, supporters of the *Chronicle* must type carbon copies or make copies by photographing the pages with a personal camera. □

Part of Campaign Against the 'Chronicle'

Lubarsky Gets Five-Year Jail Term

After a four-day trial that began October 26, prominent Soviet astrophysicist Kronid A. Lubarsky was sentenced to five years in a labor camp for alleged "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Among the materials he was charged with possessing and distributing was the *Chronicle of Current Events*, a bi-monthly samizdat journal of dissent.

According to a dispatch from Moscow by Murray Seeger in the November 1 *Los Angeles Times*, the Lubarsky trial was only part of an all-out effort by Soviet secret police to eliminate the *Chronicle of Current Events*. The campaign to stamp out the *Chronicle* is called "Criminal Case 24" by the Soviet Committee on Internal Security (KGB). For the past ten months the KGB has questioned and arrested hundreds of Soviet citizens suspected of having connections with the journal.

Many of those questioned have disappeared into jails, others into mental

hospitals used as prisons. Seeger's dispatch reports that in the last week of October twenty-two-year-old Andrei Dubrov was sent to a mental hospital after being interrogated regarding the *Chronicle of Current Events*.

Despite this ten-month police campaign the samizdat journal has continued to appear every two months since it began in 1968. Issue number

Balaguer to Deport Political Prisoners

More than forty "leftist prisoners" detained in the notorious La Victoria prison in Santo Domingo have reportedly agreed to accept an unknown place of exile in exchange for their release. The prison is reserved for convicted "communists."

Five leaders of the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), including the group's leader, Rafael "Fafa" Taveras, are among those to be exiled. They were convicted in 1971 of conspiracy to overthrow the

government, carrying illegal arms and planning the kidnapping of high political figures.

Taveras' guerrilla group was defeated in 1963. He became head of the MPD in 1970 when Maximiliano Gomez was mysteriously poisoned in Brussels where he had been exiled by the Balaguer regime.

The deportation follows a public expose of prison torture and political repression, according to UPI.

Siqueiros Admits He Intended to Kill Trotsky in Raid

[The following article by Norberto Valentini appeared in the October 9 issue of the Dominican weekly magazine *Ahora!* under the title "Siqueiros Narra Atentado Contra Trotsky (Siqueiros Recounts Assault Against Trotsky). It has been translated by *Intercontinental Press*.

* * *

"Here you are in the world's most colorful country, a wild, vivid, mysterious, and evocative place. See the air, how subtle, transparent, and pure it is. And have you come here to talk to me about assaults, murders, intrigues, things of the past that aren't worth talking about anymore?"

David Alfaro Siqueiros was looking at me through half-closed eyes, almost sleepily; he was wearing a broad-brimmed sombrero and heavy shining leather boots. "Believe me," he continued, "the thing to do is to let yourself go in this countryside. It is best to wander through the fields and discover the mysteries of Mexico in the churches, in the markets, in the mountains, where you will find complete and moving solitude, in the splendid blue mountains where you still hear the legends about Quetzalcoatl, the plumed serpent born of a virgin mother through divine intervention. This is what you should be looking for instead of wasting your time coming here to ask me about things I don't want to remember."

But I had come to this place, to the plain of Cuernavaca, precisely to talk to Siqueiros about assaults, intrigues, and murders.

David Siqueiros is sixty-three years old, with a robust look and a tough temperament. He is considered one of the major figures in contemporary Mexican painting (his works bring prices in the hundreds of thousands of pesos and his school is frequented by the most talented young artists in all of Central and South America). In 1940, however, he wrote a bloody and wasted page in world history. It happened when he led about twenty followers guns blazing into the for-

ress-villa in Coyoacán in an attempt to kill Leon Trotsky, who had taken refuge there after being exiled from Russia.

I had approached the guard at the house at No. 7 Calle Venus in the residential area of Los Jardines with the sort of feeling people have when they think they are embarking on an enterprise foredoomed to failure. Siqueiros does not like being interviewed or photographed. His wife, Angélica, a sweet, gentle woman of about fifty, came to open the door. Thanks to her and the kindness which she immediately demonstrated, the distrust and hostility that the artist usually shows to outsiders were quickly overcome.

Siqueiros received me in the drawing room of his villa but almost immediately he wanted to move to the big shed that he calls his workshop, where he paints and teaches his pupils. "This is the only place I feel comfortable," he said. I recalled a scene in the recent film *The Assassination of Leon Trotsky*, which I saw twice. The role of Siqueiros was played by the actor Luigi Vannucchi. The painter himself is more massive, more imposing. Vannucchi did not completely capture his romantic but tough character, his overbearing but still introverted personality.

In order to get Siqueiros to talk about the events of May 24, 1940, I had to lead him to it by degrees and by using a stratagem. But finally he guessed at the trap and exploded: "It looks like I'm going to have to give in and talk about that damned assault. So be it. And since I am a painter, I will paint while I am telling the story." He dipped a brush into some thick black paint and began to outline forms.

"Those days," he recalled, "were days of grimness and suffering. We had just come back from the Spanish civil war in a very depressed state. In the Soviet Union the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky had undermined the unity of the international Communist movement. We felt that our ideals had been compromised. We thought

that ideological unity had to be restored around the Kremlin ruling class. Stalin was worried that in his exile in Mexico Trotsky might be the center of another chauvinist movement aiming to substitute itself for Soviet power. So he ordered a high official of the NKVD, Leonid Eitingon, to organize Trotsky's physical liquidation and granted him unlimited means.

"But the leader of the Mexican Communist party, Laborde, proved reluctant to support this act of violence and in practice refused to help carry it out. Finally, Laborde and his people were expelled and the party was left under our control."

Siqueiros stood in front of a sheet of paper and drew a wide oval with an "s" in the middle, his initial. In fact he was one of the intransigent leaders of the Mexican Communist party who decided to kill Trotsky.

"On May 24, 1940," Siqueiros continued, "we said that it was time to break from our inertia. I got hold of an army major's uniform and disguised myself as an officer. Twenty of my companions disguised themselves as soldiers. We took the police guarding the Coyoacán fortress by surprise and immobilized them. We captured the American Sheldon Harte, who was Trotsky's personal guard, and broke into the patio of the house. I confess that at that moment I was paralyzed by emotion.

"I had taken part in various clandestine operations and was used to danger. I had participated in political struggles in Central and South American countries. But despite this, I had never found myself faced with the necessity to kill anyone in cold blood. But even so we fired about three hundred shots from the patio into the bedroom where we thought Trotsky was sleeping."

Even today in the walls of the Coyoacán refuge, carefully watched over by Trotsky's grandson, we can see many bullet holes left by the guns of Siqueiros's commandos. The assault failed, either because the attackers acted precipitously or because the



Photograph used by Ahora! to illustrate Valentin's interview with Siqueiros. According to Ahora! the photograph shows Trotsky "at a press conference the day following the machine-gunning." This is incorrect. The photograph was taken some time before the assault led by Siqueiros. From left to right, the persons are Octavio Fernandez, a leader of the Mexican

Trotskyist group; Leon Trotsky; Joseph Hansen, one of Trotsky's secretaries, and Natalia Sedova. The painting on the wall is a self-portrait by Frida Kahlo, the distinguished Mexican surrealist painter who was Diego Rivera's companion. She loaned her home for the use of the Trotskys when they first arrived in Mexico in 1937 after losing their asylum in Norway.

Russian exile had gotten into the habit of sleeping in a different place every night in order to thwart a possible attack. The balance sheet of the action was about ten people wounded and one killed, the American Sheldon Harte, whose body was found a little later buried in the garden of a villa rented by Siqueiros.

"The Mexican police," Siqueiros continued, while he kept on drawing figures with his brush, "arrested me on June 17, along with many of my companions who had taken part in the action. Fortunately a strong solidarity movement on our behalf developed in South American political and cultural circles, and as a result of this I was only sentenced to a few months in jail."

Siqueiros told the judge that the assault was not intended to hurt anybody but only as a "gesture designed to put psychological pressure on Trotsky and get him to give up his political activities." The defendants were acquitted on almost all charges except unauthorized use of military uniforms and interfering with officers in the performance of their duty, that is, disarming and immobilizing the po-

lice guarding Coyoacán. The judge did not take into consideration the death of Harte, ruling it "unintentional and accidental."

Nonetheless Siqueiros was held in jail to stand trial for stealing two cars that were parked in the patio of Trotsky's home. He was released in order to go to Chile when the poet Pablo Neruda got him the job of decorating a palace in Santiago.

"Three months later, on August 20," Siqueiros concluded, "Ramón Mercader had no trouble getting into the semifortress of Coyoacán, claiming that he wanted Trotsky to read an article of his. He was introduced by an American Trotskyist, Sylvia Ageloff, whom he had befriended in the United States. He had an ice ax under his raincoat. When Trotsky sat down at his desk to read the article Mercader struck him violently in the head. I did not know Mercader and I had no desire to meet him when he was in prison. I don't want to express any judgment about him or his action. Everybody has his own principles, and history alone will deliver a just and irrevocable verdict."

In his film *The Assassination of Leon Trotsky*, Joseph Losey tried to scrupulously reconstruct the last days of "Stalin's No. 1 enemy," centering his investigation on the personality of the victim, played by Richard Burton, as well as of the assassin, played by Alain Delon. But the critics have unanimously recognized that the best part of the movie is the bloodthirsty and powerful portrait drawn of Siqueiros. "A strange combination of a fanatic and a political bandit thundering in the midst of his enormous arsenal of weapons."

I mentioned this. He responded only with a grimace. "Things of the past, things of the past," he repeated. And he added, "People get the craziest ideas." Then, clearly sorry that he had said anything, that he had evoked those bygone times, he no longer hid his impatience to be rid of me.

While he was showing me to the gate of the villa (which like the villa of any self-respecting rich person is surrounded by broad grounds with an elegant swimming pool full of bright blue water), Siqueiros showed

me the immense panels he and his students are working on. Half cheerful, half sullen, the old revolutionary today is an untiring worker who carries himself like one of the great Ital-

ian masters of the Renaissance. He makes suggestions, retouches the work of his students, raises objections, certain that his works are worth hundreds of thousands of pesos. □

from jail and whisked to Chile with the collaboration of the Chilean poet Pablo Neruda, then as now a prominent member of the Chilean Communist party?

Siqueiros Finally Discloses Part of Truth

By Joseph Hansen

The interview granted by David Alfaro Siqueiros to Norberto Valentini is of considerable interest, since it is the first time that the Mexican painter has indicated the true story of the machine-gun assault that he led on May 24, 1940, in an attempt to kill Leon Trotsky and his companion Natalia Sedova.

When Siqueiros and other members of the Mexican Communist party were arrested for their crime, the well-known artist claimed that the assault was not intended to kill Trotsky. In his interview with Valentini, he now admits that his intent *was* to commit murder. After breaking into the patio, he says, he was "paralyzed by emotion" because he had never before found himself faced with the "necessity" to kill anyone "in cold blood."

Another important admission concerns Robert Sheldon Harte. Some sources have speculated that Harte was not in reality a Trotskyist but a Stalinist who had succeeded in penetrating the household. In his film *The Assassination of Trotsky*, for instance, Losey presents Harte as being in collusion with Siqueiros. To believe Losey, that was why Harte opened the door, permitting the gang of Stalinists dressed in stolen police uniforms to enter. Siqueiros says, in contradiction to this version: "We captured the American Sheldon Harte, who was Trotsky's personal guard . . ."

Siqueiros also confirms Trotsky's charge that Stalin had set up a special section of the GPU to carry out the assignment of assassinating him. Stalin, says Siqueiros, "ordered a high official of the NKVD, Leonid Eitingon, to organize Trotsky's physical liquidation and granted him unlimited means."

Trotsky also charged that Stalin had intervened in the internal affairs of the Mexican Communist party and ousted the Hernan Laborde leadership

in order to place the party apparatus completely at the disposal of the sector of the GPU assigned to organize the assassination.

Siqueiros's confession, however, is far from complete. He fails to describe how he himself became a GPU agent, how he became enmeshed in the special section assigned to kill Trotsky, and why he found himself faced with the "necessity" of killing the cofounder of the Soviet Union and organizer of the Red Army. Who were the go-betweens with whom he worked? Who gave him the orders?

Siqueiros even fails to tell who gave the order to murder Harte in cold blood. And he fails to tell who carried out this assignment.

Siqueiros mentions that he was held by the police for but a short time after the attempt to kill Trotsky and the murder of Harte. He says nothing about the other members of the Mexican Communist party who participated under his command and who were likewise arrested. What happened to them? How did they manage to escape justice? In particular what happened to the Arenal brothers, both close associates of Siqueiros, who vanished after the assault? It was said at the time that they were the ones who actually killed Harte and that they had fled to the United States. Who gave them refuge in the United States? Members of the Communist party?

Other questions are raised by what Siqueiros admits. He says that he was "fortunately" saved by "a strong solidarity movement on our behalf" which "developed in South American political and cultural circles . . ." There was no such public movement at the time. None whatsoever. Is he, then, referring to the efforts organized by the GPU to save his hide as one of their loyal operators? Was it through GPU influence that he was sprung

A rather astonishing item is the denial by Siqueiros that he knew Ramón Mercader, the GPU agent who succeeded in assassinating Trotsky in August 1940. Yet he mentions him by his real name and not by the name that appeared on his false passport, "Frank Jacson." Not once—from the time he was turned over to the police by Trotsky's guards until May 6, 1960, when he was flown out of Mexico by officials of the government of Czechoslovakia—did the assassin ever admit to his real identity. Is Siqueiros, then, lying when he says he did not know Mercader?

In recalling the details of the May 24, 1940, assault, Valentini makes one error worth noting. He says that the casualties in the affair amounted to ten wounded and one killed. Actually only one person was wounded—Trotsky's grandson Seva. No one was killed at the time, Trotsky and Natalia having escaped the assassins' attempt by rolling under a bed as the machine-gun bullets crisscrossed over them. Harte was murdered several days later in a mountain hideout after being taken there by the gang.

The reason for killing Harte was, of course, to do away with a witness able to identify the assailants. This was crucial for the success of the next attempt. It was necessary from the viewpoint of the plotters not only to save Siqueiros as long as possible but in all probability to keep the identity of Mercader hidden. Mercader may well have been the one in real command of the May 24 assault. Does Siqueiros still fear him? □

Amnesty Declared in East Germany

A total of 30,000 persons will soon be released from prisons in East Germany, according to sources in that country. The regime declared an amnesty on October 6 that is believed to be the most sweeping in the country's twenty-three-year history.

The sources reported that 7,302 prisoners had been freed since November 1 and that as many as 5,000 of those had been convicted of political crimes.

West German officials have estimated that the move may cut the total East German prison population in half.

Chilean Military Gets Three Cabinet Posts

By David Thorstad

In an effort to placate a seemingly intransigent opposition, Chilean President Salvador Allende appointed two generals and an admiral to cabinet posts November 2, including the key post of minister of the interior. The decision to name the three military men was made in an attempt to quell nearly a month of strikes and demonstrations against Allende's Popular Unity government.

The key appointment went to Army Commander in Chief General Carlos Prats, who as minister of the interior will be the number two man in the government and head of the country's internal police apparatus.

Air Force General Claudio Sepulveda became mining minister, and Rear Admiral Ismael Huerta public works minister.

Allende's appointment of military officers, who in Chile come mostly from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, appeared to satisfy one of the major aims of the opposition: to further undermine Allende's base of support by forcing him to pull back from implementing his Popular Unity program and to rely increasingly on the military. The opposition now hopes to deal a heavy blow to the Chilean popular front in next March's elections, during which all 150 members of the House of Representatives and twenty-five of the fifty senators will be selected. If it should win a two-thirds majority in parliament, where it currently holds only a simple majority, it would be in a position to impeach Allende.

There are some indications that Allende's appointment of military brass may persuade the opposition to call off its current offensive. "Opposition leaders have said such a move would help insure honest balloting next March," observed the *Wall Street Journal* November 1. And on October 31, Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democratic candidate who was one of the two men Allende defeated in the 1970 presidential elections, had appealed for a "democratic truce" until the legislative elections. "Let the people decide in March," he said.

According to *Le Monde* correspondent Pierre Kalfon in the November 1 issue of the Paris daily, Tomic's proposed "truce" would be contingent on several guarantees. Among those cited were the appointment of an interior minister "who simultaneously enjoyed the confidence of the president and the opposition," and the presentation of "impartial and objective" news on nationwide television. Kalfon quoted Tomic, who represents the moderate wing of his party, as saying: "Most of the political forces involved on either side refuse the suicidal course of fratricidal war. There is still time."

In order to give Allende more leeway in attempting to reach an understanding with the opposition, the entire fifteen-member cabinet resigned on October 31. Allende immediately accepted the resignations of interior minister Jaime Suárez and education minister Aníbal Palma. Both were among the four ministers whom the opposition announced October 29 that it was planning to impeach. Both had planned to resign anyway by November 4, the official deadline for them to declare their candidacies in the coming elections.

The first official action of the new interior minister was to call in strike leaders for talks. Jorge Mario Martínez, a representative of the striking shopkeepers, left the meeting with General Prats saying, "There is optimism for a prompt solution to the conflict." The general also announced that "The nation will return to full normalcy Monday [November 6]. That is the Government's desire."

In a speech November 3 marking his third year in office, Allende said, "We will respond to the strikers' petitions before Monday and our answer will be definitive; therefore they should return to work Monday."

A United Press International report from Santiago suggested that there was some opposition within the Popular Unity coalition to the appointment of military men to the government. The report, which appeared in the

November 2 issue of the New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario-La Prensa*, noted that opposition within Allende's Socialist party, one of the main components of the popular front, "could be the reason for convening the so-called national plenum, which is to discuss the present situation and possible formulas that Allende might use in order to solve the cabinet crisis brought on by the resignation of the fifteen ministers."

A subsequent UPI report indicated that "Dr. Allende's Socialist party urged him not to give in to the strikers' demands or to slow down the socialization of Chile. The party said that inclusion of the traditionally apolitical military in the Cabinet must not be allowed to freeze the progress toward socialism."

On November 2, the same day Allende announced the cabinet shuffle, former Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei Montalva announced that he planned to run for the Senate in the coming elections.

In addition to broadening the representation in his cabinet to include the military, Allende has taken some other steps in his attempt to deal with the opposition's offensive and to reduce the possibility of a military coup d'état. Kalfon reported, for instance, that thirty-four colonels and lieutenant colonels "were officially transferred to the reserves, among them several known for their right-wing opinions. It is normal at this time of year for a certain number of officers to be removed and others promoted (this is called 'drawing the chimney'). But the number of 'enforced reservists' is higher than usual this time."

In addition, on October 28 the government banned the National Confederation of Truck Owners, the group that initiated the current crisis with its strike on October 10. The reason given for the ban was that the confederation had "exceeded the aims for which it was created by carrying out an illegal strike that has affected the socioeconomic life of the population and seriously violated the law."

Meanwhile, in an apparent effort to apply the law "equally," Allende seems to have responded favorably to a letter he received from the Supreme Court telling him, his cabinet, and the police to enforce judicial decisions. According to an Associated Press dispatch from Santiago October 31, "The jus-

tices pointed out that on Sept. 27 they ruled that a newspaper in the south-central city of Talca, taken over by its employees, should be returned to its owner, but that the order 'still hasn't

been carried out.'" A late report from Talca the same day indicated that the police had intervened and forced the workers to turn the newspaper back to its owner. □

Canadian NDP Holds Parliamentary Power Balance

Liberals, Conservatives Short of Majority

[The following is an editorial on the October 30 Canadian federal election results reprinted from the November 6 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a biweekly reflecting the views of the League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière. The elections gave 109 seats in the federal parliament to the Progressive Conservatives, 108 seats to Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau's Liberal party, and 30 seats to Canada's labor party, the New Democratic Party (NDP). Thus neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives came close to winning the necessary 133 seats required for majority control of the House of Commons. To gain a majority, either major party must win the support of the NDP members of Parliament.]

* * *

At *Labor Challenge* press time, the morning after the October 30 election, the voting returns are still not clear as to whether we'll face a Liberal or a Conservative minority government. But no matter. We agree with Donald MacDonald, president of the Canadian Labor Congress, who told the press that, between the big business parties, "It's Tweedledee and Tweedledum as far as we're concerned."

NDP leader David Lewis was equally correct to reject out of hand suggestions that the New Democratic Party might form a coalition government with one of the old-line capitalist parties. He "would not consider it," Lewis stated, adding that the 30 NDP MPs would use their strategic position in parliament to press for action on the key issues the party has stressed during the campaign. "We will not go for token reforms."

The NDP platform includes demands for higher old age pensions, more public housing, measures to shift the

tax load from individuals to large corporations, and to curb rising food costs. The party also calls for massive public works to reduce unemployment, including construction of housing, sewage treatment plants, public transit systems and day care centers.

Holding the balance of power, according to the peculiar workings of the parliamentary machine, the NDP is well situated to use parliament as a tribune, to speak out on all the key issues, to pose a clear alternative to the policies of the big business parties. It can carry forward its opposition to the "corporate ripoff" that gave the party's election campaign such initiative and momentum.

This is the big challenge before the NDP. The election results constitute a crushing rejection of the Trudeau government — its arrogant, cynical anti-working class policies. The popular disillusionment with Trudeau's promised "Just Society" of the 1968 federal election is registered in Liberal losses across the country.

Liberal ministers, defeated and re-elected alike, are offering up self-justifying excuses that the government was brought down by a right-wing backlash. They point to Tory candidates' appeals for "law and order," wage controls and denunciations of "welfare cheaters" and alleged Québec influence in the inner circles of government.

It's a little late in the day for the Liberals to claim the progressive label. It was the Trudeau government which carried out the War Measures occupation of Québec, deliberately created mass unemployment to hold down wages, and dished out millions of dollars from the public treasury to the hard-pressed "corporate welfare bums."

Since there is no substantial difference between the two parties, the shift by some 10 percent of the electorate

from Liberals to the Tories can hardly be said to indicate a turn to the right. At most the Tories only offered to "do better."

Far from indicating confidence in either of the big business parties, the October 30 federal vote carries forward the antigovernment feeling that has toppled a majority of provincial regimes during the last three years.

Underlying the parliamentary stalemate is a profound political instability, characterized by fluctuating allegiances, regroupments and — most significantly — the steady emergence of the NDP as a labor-based political alternative to the traditional capitalist parties. Of the eight minority federal governments since Confederation, this is the fifth since 1957, in seven general elections.

But the election results nonetheless pose some important questions for the NDP. The party made some modest gains in British Columbia, Toronto and Northern Ontario, strengthening somewhat its urban working class base in those areas. It scored a small but significant breakthrough in the Northwest Territories, where the Native majority elected an Indian NDP member — no doubt on the strength of the NDP's opposition to Trudeau's plans to bulldoze through with Northern resources exploitation, ignoring Native aboriginal rights and treaty claims.

But the party failed to advance much in popular support from the 1968 election; its 17.5 percent share of the total vote fell short of its high-water 18 percent achieved in 1965. It lost three of its six seats in Saskatchewan, and suffered small declines in an already-weak electoral base in Québec and the Atlantic provinces, where it was outdistanced for the first time by Social Credit candidates in Acadian areas. In Montréal, the Socreds overcame the NDP in many ridings where the NDP had previously come second.

While the NDP did not get squeezed out in the major shift of votes between the two main capitalist parties, it can't claim to have made much advance, either. This election saw the party move out more aggressively, pose a clearer, more distinct class identity than ever before. Yet in the end, the majority of voters who abandoned previous allegiances to the Liberals, chose to throw their support to the Tories of Robert Stanfield. While

not a turn to the right, the vote does not indicate any sharp turn to the left. The most ominous aspect is that the Tories have succeeded in re-establishing the urban base that Trudeau-
mania and the NDP shattered for them in the 1960s. Today they are the only party with parliamentary representation from every province and region of the country.

Everything in the parliamentary electoral system, of course, is designed to demobilize the electorate, to bring out its conservative side—from the gerrymandered riding boundaries to the compulsory two-day suspension of campaigning before the polling day. The election results reveal only very partially and inadequately the impact of the powerful and growing sectors of the population that are in motion against their oppression and exploitation. Insofar as those elements

were given expression in the campaign, it was almost entirely through the NDP campaign.

Perhaps the best thing about the indecisive election result is that there will almost certainly be another federal general election within a matter of months—that is, another opportunity for NDP supporters to mobilize and popularize class struggle politics in the labor movement. The challenge to the NDP is to use every opportunity in the next period, both in and out of parliament, to project a clear anticapitalist alternative to the capitalist parties. As the vote shows, the party still has a long way to go before the masses of working people in this country understand the necessity of independent labor political action—the need for a workers government, which the NDP projects in this period.

capitalism and imperialism in the rest of the world, that a victory of the fighters for workers' democracy in the Stalinized countries strengthened revolutionists in the capitalist countries and vice versa. It was a lucid, powerful revolutionary speech that drew enthusiastic applause and chanting from thousands of young revolutionists in the audience, many of whom probably took part in the battles of the French May, which was denounced as a "Zionist plot" by one of the organs of the Polish bureaucracy.

Michel Rocard, a leader of the left social-democratic PSU, also took a very militant line. But, even though he tied his remarks to concrete political issues in France, his arguments seemed considerably more vague than those of Krivine. The Prague Spring, he said, was part of a worldwide movement by workers to take control of their own destinies, to run the factories and enterprises democratically. This tendency could also be seen in France. And, despite the mild objections it voiced to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the French Communist party had taken the same counter-revolutionary attitude to the movement for workers' self-management in France as the Kremlin had to the proletarian democratic ferment in Czechoslovakia.

The featured Czech speaker, Jiri Pelikan, seemed to direct his remarks primarily at Communist party activists who had questions about the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He stressed that the Prague Spring was not anti-Russian, describing the fraternization of the Czech and Slovak resisters with the Russian occupation troops. He emphasized also that, particularly in view of the Kremlin's rapprochement with the West, an international defense campaign had a good chance of forcing release or better treatment of the political prisoners.

To conclude the meeting, Jan Sling, the son of Ota Sling, one of the old Communists executed during the Stalinist terror of the 1950s, delivered a strong statement denouncing the bureaucracy and affirming his faith in socialism. Young Sling, who was brought up in state institutions and forbidden even to use his family name, became an outspoken advocate of workers' democracy during the Prague Spring. He was jailed after the invasion. □

Nearly 4,000 Attend Paris Meeting

Against Repression in Czechoslovakia

The Paris town hall, the Mutualité, which holds four thousand persons, was almost filled on October 26 for a meeting in solidarity with the victims of the repression in Czechoslovakia.

The January 5 Committee, which organized the meeting, represented a fairly broad spectrum of the French left, the Ligue Communiste [Communist League, French section of the Fourth International], the PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party], Objectif Socialiste [Socialist Objective], the French CP opposition group led by the philosopher Roger Garaudy, the AMR [Alliance Marxiste Révolutionnaire—Revolutionary Marxist Alliance], and the OCI [Organisation Communiste Internationaliste—Internationalist Communist Organization].

Almost all the speakers stressed the connection between defeating the repression in Czechoslovakia and advancing the cause of the international socialist revolution. Some moderate and Social Democratic groups took the opportunity to express their support for democracy "in general." But the main Czech speaker, Jiri Pelikan, the director of Czechoslovak televi-

sion during the Prague Spring and the Russian invasion, called for a very specific kind of democracy in the East European countries. He appealed for a "political revolution" that would open the way for the development of socialist democracy by removing the inefficient and dictatorial bureaucracy.

Speaking for the Ligue Communiste, Alain Krivine explained that the 1968 invasion was not carried out in the interest of the workers in either Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union but of a privileged bureaucracy opposed both to developing socialism in the countries it rules and to extending the socialist revolution to other areas. He challenged dissident CP members who claim that the invasion was just a "mistake" by pointing to the enormity of one "socialist" country occupying a "brother nation," explaining what a blow this represented to the cause of socialism throughout the world. It could only be called a crime, and the perpetrators, enemies of socialism. The only answer was a political revolution to overthrow the bureaucracy.

Krivine explained that the political revolution against the bureaucracy in the Stalinized workers states was tightly linked to the revolution against

Status of the Revolutionary Movement Inside Greece

[The following interview with Theologos Psaradelles, a member of the KDKE (Kommounistiko Diethnistiko Komma tes Ellados — Internationalist Communist party of Greece), Greek section of the Fourth International, was given to *Intercontinental Press* in Paris October 25. Psaradelles was able to take refuge recently in France after two previous attempts to escape from the prisons of the junta. On his second attempt he managed to get to Bulgaria but was returned to Greece by the Stalinist authorities. For the details of this incident, see "Interview with Greek Trotskyist Leader," *Intercontinental Press*, October 23, p.1144.]

* * *

Question. What signs do you see of independent mass action reviving in Greece?

A. The mass movement has taken its first hesitating steps. There has been an important strike among bakery workers. But the major activity up till now has been among the students.

The student actions started with protests around the latest anniversary of the military coup d'etat. At first the protesters raised purely student demands. They protested the abolition of the independent student councils and their replacement by puppet bodies manipulated by the junta. The students conducted long strikes, the longest occurring in the vocational colleges and in the law schools in Athens and Salonika.

Initially, the students organized a petition campaign. But when this failed to get results, they went into the streets. After this the movement took on a clearly political character.

Although the student actions were not organized by any one group, it is not entirely true to say that they were spontaneous. They were strongly marked by the new political forces on the left. In particular, the Greek Trotskyists played an important role.

Despite its incipient character, however, the revival of the mass movement has already brought a sharp



THEOLOGOS PSARADELLES

decline in the popularity of spontaneism and terrorism among the young left groups.

Q. What are the main types of activities carried on by the Greek Trotskyists?

A. There are two main areas of activity—the students and the workers. As I said before, the Trotskyists have been able to exercise an influence on the students through their theoretical and propagandistic work. They have published Marxist classics as well as contemporary Marxist works. Taking advantage of the contradictions of the junta, they have also been able to bring out a magazine.

I spoke of two sectors. But it must be acknowledged that the students have been the first to be reached by the propaganda work of the Greek Trotskyists. This is for the good and sufficient reason that because of their higher educational level the students who participated in the mass mobilizations preceding the military coup, in particular in July 1965, were better able to understand the irrevocable failure of the traditional organizations of the left. With all their strength the only thing these organizations could do was to publish journals outside of Greece; they were unable to do practically anything inside the country itself.

In the beginning the radicalized students were organized in circles of

friends. Then they formed political groups, which acted independently of each other and without any contacts among themselves. But this situation changed rapidly as the students realized that the only thing they could do was scatter a few tracts, paint slogans on walls, and put up posters. But all this was completely insufficient. The question has been posed more and more urgently of a regroupment of all these revolutionary forces, and this is the task that the Greek Trotskyists are trying to achieve today.

Through such a regroupment the Greek Trotskyists hope that the students will acquire a revolutionary consciousness freed from all petty-bourgeois influences and be inculcated with a real knowledge of the working class and of its problems. Interest in the working class on the part of the students has been a general phenomenon in Greece, which could be noted even before the dictatorship. It has been shown by the fact that on their vacations and even during the academic year many students have been going into the factories and onto building sites to learn in practice about the problems of the working class and to get a close look at the exploitation to which it is subjected.

As a result of the impasse I noted before, in which all these spontanéist organizations rapidly found themselves, and as a result also of a need felt by the young and not-so-young militants to educate themselves politically—an attitude contrasting with their previous tendency to follow whatever organization was the strongest—some comrades began to think about better tactics, better methods of action that went beyond just planting bombs.

This reflection coincided, moreover, with the junta adopting another tactic as a result of outside pressures. It began to try to set up a democratic facade in order to avoid being too much of an embarrassment to the Western capitalist countries. These regimes wanted to bring Greece into the Common Market, but the dictatorship still represented an obstacle in the eyes of

public opinion in their respective countries.

The new freedoms granted by the dictatorship didn't go very far. They have been limited in fact to the Athens region, where diplomatic missions and other foreign representatives are located. Here observers could see that the junta was granting some freedom of the press, the possibility of showing noncensored films, plays, etc. Nonetheless, our comrades decided to take advantage of the junta's contradictions to supply the revolutionary youth with the Marxist arsenal that the traditional organizations had never provided. Today we can make the following balance sheet.

Thirty-six books have been published, including many classics, which have had an extraordinary influence. Among the authors published are Lenin, Trotsky, and Mandel, whose books have often sold as many as two thousand, three thousand, or even four thousand copies. Before this, Trotsky, for example, was virtually unknown. One of his books was published before the dictatorship but had a very small distribution.

Besides these books, a magazine has been coming out every month and a half. It, as well as the publishing work in general, has served as a center of regroupment for a whole series of groups that arose in the previous period. Groups of youth, but also workers, have come in personally to the bookstore and taken a whole series of books and reprints of parts of books as well as magazines to distribute to their friends and fellow workers.

The problem that the comrades who have begun this work are facing today is how to organize all these potential activists. And I should point out that they don't include students only, but that about half are workers.

The comrades took account of the prejudices that might exist against Trotskyist writings in particular. They started out by persuading a publisher to put out a work by Peter Weiss called *Notes on the Culture of Vietnam*. It sold 4,500 copies. This was followed by a book by Robinson called *Freedom and Necessity*, a book by two members of the *Nouvelle Observateur* staff on May 1968 in France. Another book was on the Prague trials. Since the sales of these books were impressive, other publishers decided to put out Marxist classics, such as Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire*

and Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?* and *State and Revolution*. I should note that these books by Lenin appeared together with books by Trotsky, including *Revolution Betrayed*, *History of the Russian Revolution*, and *Literature and Revolution*. Also published were a book by Pierre Frank and Ernest Mandel on May 1968 in France, and Mandel's pamphlet *An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory*. Mandel's most important work, the *Treatise on Marxist Economy*, is now being published. I think one or two volumes have already appeared. A pamphlet on the nature of the workers states has been published. As for the magazine, about a dozen issues have already appeared, reprinting a lot of material from the publications of the Fourth International.

Q. What is the relationship of forces in Greece between the Trotskyists and the other left tendencies?

A. The present situation in Greece favors rapid growth of the revolutionary left. The Communist party has split into three rival tendencies, which are very active outside the country but practically nonexistent in Greece, as a result of their shattering failure and their virtual dissolution after the coup d'etat. And we can see that various spontanist groups formed in the wake of the coup d'etat and the failure of the traditional left have managed to build rather solid organizations that have been able to survive up till the present. This is particularly true of the October 20 Movement.

Facing the consolidation of these spontanist groups in structured organizations opposing the traditional left, the Greek Trotskyists adopted an understanding attitude toward this phenomenon. We analyzed the roots of this flowering of spontanism in the full sense of the word. The Trotskyists tried to engage in discussions and debates with the spontanists in order to help them clarify their position and to bring them toward a Marxist-Leninist Trotskyist line.

We can see today that under the pressure of events and in the current situation when the mass movement is reviving, especially among the students, these organizations are beginning to realize that they are in an impasse and to seek more effective modes of action than those they have resorted to in the past. An index of

this process is the political differentiation that is taking place in the CP youth organization, which although it has been under tight control of the Bureau of the Interior faction of the CP, seems to be moving very rapidly toward revolutionary Marxism. At the same time, a group that had remained in the CP youth organization for opportunistic reasons, to get money from the party, etc., has broken off and begun to collaborate in action with our comrades in Greece. In the framework of this process, I should note the case of the four members of the October 20 Movement who shouted from the dock, "We are for socialist democracy, we are against capitalism and bureaucracy." They showed a very clear evolution.

In regard to these comrades, I should say, too, that in prison they met Trotskyists and had discussions with them. The results were very positive. These comrades realized that they had held many illusions about the virtues of bombs. They accepted the criticisms the Trotskyists made as well as a number of principles defended by the Fourth International. They also joined with our comrades in combating the campaign of slander and repression carried on inside the prisons by the Stalinists of the emigre or pro-Moscow faction of the Communist party. These comrades have made a statement saying that they did plant bombs but that they were not necessarily right and that this type of action could be debated, that it was possible they should have devoted themselves to mass work instead.

Q. What about the reports of rightist participation in terrorist acts?

A. I should make it clear that the spontanist groups today are not working with the monarchists or Papandreou or any conservative faction. The thing I wanted to stress was that in the wake of the coup the Greek section of the Fourth International suffered a major split, with the majority of its members following the spontanist-bomber line, which was expressed in the Democratic Resistance Committees. These groups included all political tendencies, Stalinists, rightist groups, and monarchists. This experience was brief, even though the committees in the beginning included a considerable number of people. But because of the type of organization they adopted, the young leaders who had left the Greek section soon found

themselves in prison and a new beginning had to be made from scratch.

There is a certain logic. When you base your line on planting bombs and nothing else, you are obviously ready to collaborate with anybody. All sorts of groups are carrying out bombings — monarchists, bourgeois liberals, etc. Papandreou for example is calling for planting as many bombs as possible no matter where and no matter how. But he would be very upset if this type of action were condemned and the spontanéist groups undertook systematic work among the masses.

Q. How many comrades are still in prison?

A. Our comrades in prison must not only suffer the bad treatment they get from the guards but also the slander, the continual denunciations, and attempts to isolate them by the various Stalinist factions. At present about fifteen Trotskyists are in prison, most of whom have been sentenced to very long terms. They often gather in the same cells with other prisoners who consider themselves Trotskyists but who do not belong to any organization, including the Fourth International. They carry on discussions with anyone who is ready to talk to them not just about the situation in Greece but about the problems on a world scale.

One anecdote might help to show how fruitful these discussions have been. Two Stalinists, not just rank-and-file militants, but veteran cadres were sent in to see what the Trotskyists were up to. After listening to the discussions they underwent a transformation. They found out that the Trotskyists were discussing theory, the problems of making the revolution in Greece and in the world and that they were not plotting provocations or betrayals of the other prisoners.

As for the general situation, we are no longer witnessing the kind of brutal repression unleashed in the wake of the coup d'état when there were thousands and thousands of arrests. Even though it lacks the most minimal social base, the dictatorship has relaxed its grip and turned to a sort of selective repression. With practically no mass movement in existence, the dictatorship has been able to grant some freedoms in the areas of publishing and culture. But nonetheless, it does not hesitate to come down very hard on any organized form of

activity. Every clandestine group no matter how small has found itself implacably persecuted by the junta, determined to crush it in embryo.

The imprisoned Trotskyists can take pride in the fact that they are the only political group interested in discussing international problems, notably the problems experienced in America at the present time. Through various papers they are following the activities of revolutionary organizations in the United States and the situation in that country.

Before the summer we envisaged a campaign in defense of the comrades imprisoned in Greece and the idea has not been dropped. It is still under study. The problem is to see in what form it would be the most effective. For a start we are thinking about publishing a pamphlet containing letters, testimony, etc., by the comrades now in prison, describing their sufferings, their life in prison. The aim is to inform the international Trotskyist movement first, and then the public that the various Trotskyist groups can reach through their press. The first stage will be one of informing as many people as possible about the situation of the imprisoned Trotskyists. After this — or at the same time

— we must conduct a fund-raising campaign, because many material needs of the prisoners and their families are not being met.

Q. One final question. We wondered when we read your interview in the September 30 issue of Rouge [the Intercontinental Press translation is cited above] what effect the Bulgarian authorities handing you over to the Greek police had on the Stalinists in your country. Weren't they shocked that a neighboring "socialist" country would turn an escaped political prisoner over to the torturers of the Greek counterrevolutionary dictatorship?

A. Well, the party leaders told their people that I was a drug smuggler and that that was why the Bulgarian authorities had to turn me over to the Greek police. Still, not all the party members believed this and there was a lot of discussion. After all, the East European workers states, including Bulgaria, have been discredited to some extent by their eagerness to develop friendly trade and diplomatic relations with the regime of the colonels. □

More Fallout From Watergate

Bernard L. Barker was convicted on October 31 in a Miami, Florida, court of fraudulently notarizing a check made out to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CREEP) from Kenneth H. Dahlberg, chairman of Nixon's Minnesota campaign committee. Barker was a leading participant in the June 17 raid on the offices of the Democratic National Committee in Washington's Watergate Hotel.

According to the November 2 *New York Times*, Judge Paul Baker, who presided over the two-and-a-half-hour trial, barred the prosecution from questioning witnesses about how Barker obtained the check. The \$25,000 was part of more than \$100,000 in CREEP checks which the one-time CIA operative had in his possession at the time of the Watergate raid.

Although Barker was convicted, his sentence could not be described as overly harsh. In a country that freely hands out thirty-year terms to Blacks

for petty forgery, Barker received a sixty-day suspended sentence. He was required, however, to turn in his notary-public seal.

Reports of Barker's extralegal political activities have continued to appear in the U.S. press. The October 23 issue of *Time* reported that Barker "recruited nine Cubans from Miami in early May and assigned them to attack Daniel Ellsberg, the man who released the Pentagon papers to the public. Barker flew the Cubans to Washington first class, showed them a picture of Ellsberg, and told them: 'Our mission is to hit him—to call him a traitor and punch him in the nose. Hit him and run.' The site chosen was outside the Capitol rotunda, where the body of J. Edgar Hoover was lying in state. The idea was to denounce Ellsberg, who was holding a rally on the steps, and start a riot. As it turned out, the 'riot' ended after a brief flurry of punches, most of which landed on Ellsberg's body-guard." □

Basques Fight Pompidou-Franco Repression

"Seen from afar—from Paris, for example—you might think that the French Basque country was turning separatist, a word which, by the way, the nationalists reject. Is it? What has happened in less than three weeks?"

Jean Rambaud asked this question in the October 31 issue of the prestigious Parisian daily *Le Monde*. It was a development that surprised a broad spectrum of French public opinion, running from right to extreme left, that inspired this query. In the space of a few weeks the protests begun by a few individuals against the French government's persecution of Spanish Basque patriots grew to the first mass expression of national sentiment by French Basques in the memory of generations.

Some 2,000 people marched through the quiet provincial town of Bayonne in the French Basque country on October 27. Even capitalist, French chauvinist politicians were quick to try to identify themselves with the movement.

"Two thousand people in the streets of Bayonne, that's nothing to sneeze at. Even a UDR [Union de Défense de la République—the main Gaullist formation] deputy could be seen joining in with a delegation of general councillors and mayors who were going to demand explanations [for anti-Basque repression] . . . from the subprefect. And this Sunday [October 29] fifty mayors and councillors met."

Almost overnight, ideas that had been dismissed as romantic nonsense by almost all political tendencies seemed to acquire a new credibility.

"Ideas are circulating that yesterday were held only by advanced militants. People are saying that one more clumsy repressive move could give quite a new expression to 'Basque sentiment.' In conversations, people list the conditions for saying 'Why not?' when only a little while ago they would have considered this notion a utopia. [Rambaud obviously means the idea of a separate Basque state; perhaps he does not say so because advocating separatism is illegal in the "indivisible" republic.] Other regions and other ethnic groups are begin-

ning to move in France. European unity is advancing and this will ultimately weaken the central power of Paris. And besides, the southerners offer a support that the other regions don't have. To oppose Madrid they have two and a half million people—there are only 200,000 Basques in France—and they have a vigorous industry. They have begun an open struggle, often a terribly costly one, whose heroic aspect can inspire many young people."

The way for the October 27 march and other demonstrations was paved by the sharpening of the French government's persecution of Basque political refugees early in the month. On October 8, *Le Monde* reported that Paris had ordered seven Basque nationalists deported from France and exiled to the northern part of the country until some other state agreed to accept them.

Not only did this measure reveal the complicity of the Pompidou government with the fascist regime in Madrid, but it worked a cruel hardship on patriots who hoped at least to be able to take refuge with their own people across the French border. This sentiment was expressed clearly by a young woman member of the ETA (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna—Basque Nation and Freedom) in an interview published in Patxi Isaba's book *Euzkadi Socialiste* ("Socialist Basque Country," Changer le Monde, Paris, 1971).

"'Did you feel that you had left home when you crossed the French border?' 'No, absolutely not. Even in the French state, we felt at home, because north Euzkadi is also our people and our country . . . I became more aware of this since we have been living in Belgium, far from our people, far from Euzkadi.'"

On October 8, the reactionary Minister of the Interior Raymond Marcellin issued a decree outlawing the ETA on French soil. *Le Monde* commented in an editorial October 11:

"Taken suddenly on the basis of a thirty-year-old decree, the decision of the minister of the interior follows many recent deportations of Spanish

Basques. It seems beyond doubt that the French government is determined to halt any extension of 'Basque sentiment' favored by the violent resumption of nationalist agitation in the Spanish Basque country. Already last April the government banned a legal and duly authorized demonstration organized by the [French] Basque organization Enbata."

The first protest against the French government's repression was a hunger strike by four young Basques in the cathedral of Bayonne. By October 29, the number of hunger strikers had grown to eighty—forty-six in the cathedral of Bayonne, thirteen in Saint André, seven in Saint Martin de Biarritz, five in the church of Socoa, six in Mauléon, two in Saint Palais, two in Hasparren, and others in Ustaritz and Hendaye. Two demonstrations took place in Pau.

The mass demonstrations in Bayonne on October 27 were touched off when the police arrested a deported Basque nationalist, M. de Madariaga, who had come to join the hunger strikers.

"This was the turning point," Rambaud wrote. "Many people who were indifferent to the cause of the refugees—and still more of nationalism—did not appreciate the assault of the riot troops and the use of tear gas in the cathedral. That same evening, two thousand demonstrators marched. . . . 'Even though it was a mistake,' the moderates said, 'it was proof that Paris is ignorant of our feelings; it was the revelation of a chasm between us.'" □

Kim Chi Ha Freed

South Korean poet Kim Chi Ha, who had been imprisoned in a tuberculosis hospital in the city of Masan since April 14 of this year, was freed unconditionally last July, according to the Danish daily *Politiken*. He had been locked up for refusing to write poems praising the government of Park Chung Hee.

Kim's case was brought to world attention by *Politiken's* Far Eastern correspondent Svend Nyboe Andersen, who managed to interview Kim last May. (See *Intercontinental Press*, June 12, p. 661.) At the time, Kim appealed for an international media campaign to save his life. *Politiken's* story was picked up by the Japanese daily *Asahi Shinbun*. Soon after, Japanese intellectuals formed a protest movement to free Kim.

'Terrorist' Smear Is Aimed at Entire Left

By Ernest Mandel

[The Brussels newspaper *La Libre Belgique* (Free Belgium) published an article in its October 16 issue in which it joined *Newsweek* in slandering the Fourth International by portraying it as a "terrorist international." The Belgian Marxist Ernest Mandel, a leader of the Fourth International, sent the following reply to *La Libre Belgique*. The text was published in the October 20 issue of *La Gauche*, the organ of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs (Revolutionary Workers League), the Belgian section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

In your October 16, 1972, issue under the title "The Internationalization of Terrorism?" you repeat the slanderous charges against the Fourth International and myself that appeared in the September 25, 1972, issue of *Newsweek*.¹ The article is nothing but a tissue of untruths and lies.

It states, among other things, that the Fourth International was founded two years ago in Brussels; in fact, it was founded thirty-four years ago in Paris. A statement is attributed to me — which you present between quotation marks — that I neither uttered nor wrote. The Brussels conference of November 21-22, 1970, in which 3,500 of our comrades from all the countries of Europe participated, is presented as a gathering of terrorists that issued a call to arms. ("Shoot" is the subhead in the *Newsweek* article for the section dealing with this conference.)² This conference — which was public, which was attended by one of your own reporters, and about which you published a lengthy report — actually set itself a more modest goal: to bring together trade unionists and young people who are ready to

struggle against the Europe of the trusts and multinational corporations and for a Socialist United States of Europe.

Your entire article culminates in an insinuation that the Fourth International might be part of a mysterious "terrorist international" or that it might itself perhaps be that international. You add to this another insinuation: that we would like to "bring about the rise to power of fascist regimes." You know perfectly well the slanderous nature of these charges.

The Fourth International lays claim to revolutionary Marxism, not terrorism. It tries to prevent the rise of fascist regimes or dictatorships, not to provoke a victory for such regimes. It proclaims that the emancipation of the workers must be carried out by the workers themselves, not by minorities substituting themselves for the masses, and this goes for armed minorities. I am aware that the view prevailing in the highest circles of our society is the "police conception of history," which holds that social explosions cannot be explained as the result of a system's contradictions but that they are always seen as the product of a dark "plot." It was out of such an awareness, moreover, that during the Brussels conference to which you refer I called attention to the fact that we are neither conspirators nor bomb throwers, because we have confidence in a weapon that is effective and formidable in a different way when used against the capitalist system: our programmatic and organizational ability to ultimately mobilize tens of millions of workers in action. Against them, an arsenal of even the most sophisticated weapons will prove ineffective.

It is true that in addition to pursuing this goal, the Fourth International, in a spirit of solidarity with all victims of oppression, firmly supports mass movements of resistance against tyrannical regimes that leave their victims with no other alternative form of struggle but armed struggle. We are not the only ones to demonstrate this kind of solidarity or to invoke

this principle; it is even proclaimed by the Constitution of the United States. Sweden's Social Democratic government has provided a great deal of support for the armed resistance movement in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. The World Council of Churches has done as much. Even the editors of *La Libre Belgique* are suspected of having a little sympathy for an armed resistance movement that broke out against a certain King William a while back, not far from the offices of the newspaper. Should all these fine people therefore be classified in the "terrorist" category?

You yourselves admit that you have no proof to back up your charges. Nevertheless, you publish them with the obvious intent to slander. To get an idea of how infamous your method is, let us imagine the analogy of an international press campaign on the following theme:

La Libre Belgique's "sympathy" for American imperialism is well known. The CIA is an important agency of this imperialism. It is a matter of common knowledge that the CIA at the very least tolerates the production of drugs and the drug traffic originating within the borders of Indochina, if indeed it is not itself financing and organizing it. It could therefore be assumed that *La Libre Belgique* justifies at least the drug traffic; some badmouths are even saying that it is itself a cover organization for the distribution of drugs in Belgium. Obviously, we don't have any proof to support this hypothesis. But where there is smoke there is fire. Besides, the people at *La Libre Belgique* are so crafty and Machiavellian that the absence of proof proves nothing. All persons who buy *La Libre Belgique* should therefore be aware that they may be helping to finance the drug traffic and in this way are contributing to the delinquency of their children. Are not drugs an excellent means for diverting young people from revolutionary subversion? Is not this one of the political goals that *La Libre Belgique* seeks to attain?

La Libre Belgique's insinuations about the Fourth International and myself follow exactly the same logic and the same method. They are a disgrace to free journalism, even within the bourgeois limits of the term.

One could remain indifferent in the face of this new example of the well-known intolerant, stupid, and vicious

1. The actual date was September 18, 1972. — IP

2. In full, the subhead stated: "The Philosophy 'Is to Shoot.'" — IP

nature of the reactionary press. But this slanderous press campaign is not without reason. It has a very precise purpose: to prepare the way for, and to justify, political repression. Following *Newsweek*, *La Libre Belgique* worms its way into the noble crusade of those who want to restrict or suppress freedom of association, freedom of the press, freedom of thought, and freedom of travel for their political opponents.

Following May '68, the international bourgeoisie became fearful. So, in spite of all outward appearances, the working class was not "integrated" into the system after all! A strike wave broke out across Europe. Profits were threatened. With an intolerable insolence, the workers challenged the right of the bosses to impose speedups, to shift orders to other plants, to fire personnel, and to close factories. All right-thinking persons serving the golden calf obviously had to react against that danger. Thus limitations had to be placed on the right to strike, "agitators" who organize wildcat strikes had to be hunted down, and on occasion shot at, and if necessary the trade unions had to be muzzled.

To achieve these ends, the most determined supporters of strikes by workers and students and the most irreconcilable opponents of rule by capital must first be crushed. If the attempt to stifle the far left succeeds, the next to be hit will be the trade-union left, the official Communist parties, and the Socialist left. And if any willingness to resist remains after all these blows, it will be the turn of the most moderate forces of the workers' movement, the respectful left.

This salami tactic can only succeed if the far left is successfully isolated from the rest of the workers' movement. What easier way to accomplish this than to brand it as "terrorist"? The Fourth International is meeting with growing success in its efforts in many countries to bring together the most determined militants in the struggle for a socialist world. Therefore, the term "terrorist" must be applied to it in order to make it easier to suppress.

This is not the first time that such a maneuver has been used against the leading wing of the workers' movement. In 1878, Bismarck, taking as a pretext an attack on William I, decreed a law banning the press and organizations of the Social De-

mocracy. In 1934, Stalin, taking as a pretext the attack on Kirov that he himself undoubtedly had ordered, had all his opponents and former opponents within the Communist movement in the USSR arrested and later massacred. In both cases, the charge of "terrorism" had no basis whatsoever. Neither the German Social Democrats nor the Soviet Trotskyists had committed a single act of violence against the above-mentioned governments, which they were fighting against by means of propaganda and by educating and organizing activists. The charge of "terrorism" simply served to justify a massive repression of political opponents.

Bismarck and Stalin are not the only terrorists in power who attempted to smear their opponents as "terrorists." Hitler branded the entire anti-fascist resistance as a movement of "terrorist bandits." The motion against international terrorism — defined as "action that aims to attain political goals through the use of violence against persons on foreign territory" — was presented to the United Nations General Assembly by the American government which, as everyone knows, is aiming to attain no political goal by bombing the civilian population of North Vietnam, is killing no one there, and is acting only on the territory of the United States itself.

Let's bet that the Belgian and world workers' movement will not take its instructions from *La Libre Belgique*, that it will not permit any suppression and restriction of the democratic freedoms of the far left under the fallacious pretext of "fighting terrorism," and that it will remember the lesson of the past fifty years: that any repression that is tolerated against any section of the movement ends up be-

ing applied to the movement as a whole.

The only charge contained in your article to which I am ready to plead guilty is that the Fourth International is hostile to the "order" of the "states as they are generally [!] constituted in our century." This "order," which in the space of a half century has produced two world wars, innumerable local wars, the economic crisis of 1929, fascism, Auschwitz, Hiroshima, the genocidal bombing of Vietnam, the poverty of the Third World where millions of children die each year from hunger, and the threat that pollution and nuclear weapons hold for the survival of humanity — yes, this "order" must indeed be replaced with all possible speed by a true social order in which priorities in the use of resources will be determined by reason and humanity, not by the "laws of the market," and in which the associated producers will democratically run their own affairs, free from the requirements of profit and competition. Do we need to let you in on a secret? We are not the only ones to hold this view. It is shared by millions of workers, intellectuals, and young people throughout the world.

I have one last consolation. *La Libre Belgique* has a solid tradition of fighting for lost causes. We are familiar with the brilliant and lasting success that crowned its campaigns against universal suffrage, against the eight-hour day, against the extension of free care through the Assurance Maladie-Invalidité [Sickness and Disablement Insurance], and against the strengthening of the unions. Its campaign against the Fourth International will be crowned with the same success. □

Hugo Blanco Leaves Argentina for Chile

The exiled Peruvian Trotskyist peasant leader Hugo Blanco was put on a plane bound for Chile by Argentine authorities October 26. He had been in prison and held without charge since his arrest July 12. When he was served with a deportation decree last July, Blanco indicated that he preferred to remain in Argentina, but that if that was not possible, he would choose to go to Chile.

The day of his departure, a delegation of some 150 supporters from the Argen-

tine Socialist party (PSA), headed by general secretary Juan Carlos Coral, waited to greet him at the airport. Although the authorities reneged on their promise to let them meet him before he boarded the plane, they were able to see him mount the steps with his clenched fist in the air in the noonday drizzle, reported the November 1 issue of the PSA's weekly newspaper *Avanzada Socialista*. "From below, 150 arms shot up in the air to greet him and 150 voices shouted as loud as they could: 'Viva Hugo Blanco!'"

Court Rulings Attack Freedom of the Press

The U. S. Supreme Court in several recent cases has held that reporters can be compelled to reveal confidential sources and other information to grand juries.

As a result of the most recent decision, Peter Bridge, a former reporter for the now-defunct *Newark Evening News*, spent three weeks in prison under an "indefinite" sentence. Bridge had been convicted of contempt for refusing to answer questions put to him by a Newark grand jury. On October 3, the Supreme Court, by a vote of eight to one, refused to hear his appeal.

Bridge was ordered to testify about unpublished parts of an interview with Newark Housing Commissioner Pearl Beatty. Beatty charged that she had been offered a bribe for her vote on selection of a new director for the city's housing authority. Bridge included the accusation in an article published in the May 5 *Newark Evening News*.

The Supreme Court's refusal to hear Bridge's appeal demonstrated the real intent of its earlier decisions in the cases of Earl Caldwell and Paul Branzburg.

Last June 29, by a five-to-four vote, the court held that Caldwell, a *New York Times* reporter, could be compelled to testify before a witch-hunting grand jury in San Francisco about his conversations with leaders of the Black Panther Party.

The court also held that Branzburg, a reporter for the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, had to reveal names and other information he had obtained on a confidential basis for a news story on the production and sale of marijuana. Branzburg, who now writes for the *Detroit Free Press*, was sentenced on September 1 to six months in prison. He has refused to return to Kentucky to serve this sentence.

The court's five-to-four split in the Caldwell-Branzburg cases paralleled its division in other rulings that have undermined civil liberties in the United States. Four Nixon appointees (Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist) and Kennedy appointee Byron White made up the majority,

while Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart dissented.

The dissenters charged that the decision was an attempt to "annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of the government." Reporters, they warned, would be forced to choose between jail terms and avoidance of sensitive issues. In supporting the majority view, Justice Powell denied these charges. He promised that harassment and questioning with "remote or tenuous relevance" to the investigation of actual crimes would be barred.

These tightened restrictions on freedom of the press have brought an alarmed response from some bourgeois newspapers.

An editorial in the November 2 *Wall Street Journal* charged that by refusing to hear Bridge's appeal the court had contradicted Powell's reassurances: "The testimony Peter Bridge refused would have been the purest hearsay, utterly useless in 'directly establishing guilt and innocence. . . .' It's hard enough to conceive what he could add or detract from her [Commissioner Beatty's] testimony, in fact, that would bear more than a 'remote or tenuous' relevance. A contempt sentence after this is what the Supreme Court, by an 8-1 vote, now seems to say the Caldwell decision really means. . . ."

"It means protection of those functions mentioned in the First Amendment depends on a prosecutor's discretion, subject to abuse if he gets his back up."

Prisoners Escape From Bolivian Prison

Fifty-six prisoners escaped November 2 from the Bolivian dictatorship's maximum security penitentiary on Coati island in Lake Titicaca.

"The escape, which took on the characteristics of a fantastic novel, occurred on Thursday afternoon," the New York Spanish language daily *El Diario-La Prensa* reported November 6. "If the prisoners were lucky [that is, did not get lost] they had to go only fifty kilometers

In an October 6 editorial entitled "Free Press Behind Bars" the *New York Times* warned that one very "destructive aspect of the Court's circumscription of the First Amendment is that, by stripping potential informants of faith that they will or can be protected, it dries up the confidential sources on which newsmen often must rely to fulfill their duty to the public.

"Unfortunately, the tide of judicial thinking generally seems to be slipping away from defense of the public's right to know, as set forth in the Constitution."

Such decisions by the Nixon court are part of a pattern that has also included attacks by The President and his aides on the news media. Speaking before an October 16 gathering of families of U. S. prisoners of war, Nixon launched a broadside attack on "opinion leaders" who criticized his decision to mine the harbors of North Vietnam.

"Who are the opinion leaders?" Nixon asked.

"Well, they are supposed to be the leaders of the media, the great editors and publishers and television commentators and the rest.

"They are supposed to be the presidents of our universities and the professors and the rest, those who have the educational background to understand the importance of great decisions and the necessity to stand by the President when he makes a terribly difficult, potentially unpopular decision. They are supposed to be some of our top businessmen who also have this kind of background.

"Let me tell you that when that decision was made, there was precious little support from any of the so-called opinion leaders of this country whom I have just described." □

to reach the Peruvian border town of Yunguyo, where they surrendered to the authorities."

The Bolivian police complained that the prisoners were aided by guards. But nonetheless the prison was closed.

The minister of the interior, Colonel Mario Adett, announced that his government would press the Peruvian junta to return the escaped prisoners "in view of their extremist past."

Trotsky's Views on Role of Students, Intellectuals

[The following interview with Leon Trotsky first appeared in the December 9, 1932, issue of the Danish *Studentenbladet*. It was reprinted, minus an introduction, in the March 1937 issue of *Fjerde Internationale* (Fourth International). It is from the latter that it has been translated for the first time into English by *Intercontinental Press*. The subheadings appear in the original.]

* * *

And so Trotsky arrived. Anyone expecting to be faced with an old, brutal, fearful figure would be disappointed. Quite the opposite. There was something friendly, highly cultivated, pleasant, and likeable about him. After greeting each of his visitors, he sat down in the empty armchair and waited for our questions.

Trotsky on Students

Where does the revolutionary outlook of students come from—when in fact they are revolutionary?

At the addition of this last qualification, a very revealing and mischievous smile came over the familiar features of his face.

"There you put your finger on it!"

Do they owe this to their social and economic position, or do we have to turn to psychology, perhaps even to psychoanalysis, to explain it?

Once again a mischievous smile. "First and foremost, you have to understand that students do not constitute a distinct and unified group in society. They fall into various groups, and their political attitude closely corresponds to the one prevailing in these various groups in society. Some students are radical-oriented; but of these, only a very tiny number can be won over to the revolutionary party."

When One Reaches Thirty

"The fact is that very often radicalism is a sickness of youth among what are actually petty-bourgeois stu-

dents. There is a French saying: 'Avant trente ans révolutionnaire, après canaille'—Under thirty a revolutionist, thereafter a scoundrel. This expression is not heard only in France. It was also known and used in connection with the Russian students in the prewar period. Between 1907 and 1917 I was living in exile, and I traveled around a lot, giving speeches to the various colonies of Russian students abroad. All these students were revolutionary in those days. During the October revolution in 1917, 99 percent of them fought on the other side of the barricades."

Careerism

"You find this radicalism among youth in every country. The young person always feels dissatisfied with the society he lives in—he always thinks he can do things better than his elders did. So the youth always feel they are progressive—but what they understand by progress varies quite a bit. In France, for example, there is both a radical and a *royalist* opposition. Naturally this radicalism includes a certain number of healthy oppositionist forces, but for the most part it amounts to what can only be called careerism.

"Here we have the real psychological motor force. The young feel shut out; the old take up all the space, and the young can't find any outlet for their abilities. They are dissatisfied quite simply because they themselves are not sitting in the driver's seat. But as soon as they are sitting there, it's all over with their radicalism.

"It's like this: Gradually these young people move into the available posts. They become lawyers, office heads, teachers. And so they come to look upon their earlier radicalism as a sin of their youth, as a simultaneously repulsive and charming error. As a result of this memory of his own youth, the academician comes to lead a double life throughout his entire life. What it is, is that he himself believes that he still possesses a kind of revolutionary idealism, and in re-

ality he retains a certain liberal veneer. But this veneer is only a coating for what he really is—a narrow-minded, petty-bourgeois social climber, whose real interests boil down to his career."

Trotsky shifted in his chair a bit and looked around with a kind, apologetic smile.

Role in Revolutionary Movement

Can students be of any importance to a revolutionary movement?

"The revolutionary student can only make a contribution if, in the first place, he goes through a rigorous and consistent process of revolutionary self-education, and, in the second place, if he joins the revolutionary workers' movement while he is still a student. At the same time, let me make clear that when I talk about theoretical self-education, I mean the study of *unfalsified* Marxism."

Step Down From the Podium

What should be the relationship between the academician and the workers' movement?

A stern and determined expression comes into Trotsky's eyes.

"He must realize that he is coming into the workers' movement as a *learner* and not as a *teacher*. He must learn to subordinate himself and do the work that is demanded of him, and not what he wants to do. The workers' movement for its part must regard him with the greatest skepticism. A young academician must first 'toe the line' for three, four, or five years, and do quite simple and ordinary party work. Then, when the workers have confidence in him and are completely certain that he is not a careerist, then he can be allowed to move up—but *slowly*, very slowly. When he has worked with the workers' movement in this way, then the fact that he was an academician is forgotten, the social differences disappear."

Role of the Intellectual

What, then, is the role of the intellectual in the revolutionary movement?

"His role is to draw general conclusions on the basis of concrete facts. If this process of drawing generalizations out of current conflicting material is not constantly going on, the movement becomes banalized."

When Marxism Is Falsified

Earlier you said that by a theoretical self-education you meant the study of unfalsified Marxism. What do you mean by unfalsified Marxism?

"Criticism of Marxism is not so dangerous. Falsification is a different matter. What I mean by it is theories that go by the name of Marxism, but that have actually abandoned the essence of Marx's teachings. The revisionist Bernstein, for example, made the movement itself the main thing in his theory and pushed the ultimate goal into the background. What resulted from this 'Marxism'? In England, a MacDonald—or a Lord Snowden. You can find other examples yourselves. Such falsification only uses the name of Marxism in order to deceive the workers."

Marx and Marxism

Well, but, as Lis Toersleff wrote, the world hasn't stood still since Marx's time, has it?

"Of course not. I'm no fetishist—Marxism did not come to a halt when Marx died. Marx could also be wrong—mainly in his predictions of when events would occur, and then he erred only in his assessment of the timing. Lenin integrated newly emerged historical factors into Marxism and thus adapted it to our time."

Democracy and Dictatorship

Trotsky then took up the question of democracy and dictatorship: "We communists do not deny—as, for example, the anarchists do—the importance of democracy. But we recognize its importance only up to a very definite point. That point is reached as soon as the class contradictions become so great that the tension causes a short circuit to occur. At that point, democracy can no longer function,

and the only alternatives are either a proletarian or a bourgeois dictatorship. Look at the evolution of the Social Democratic republic in Germany from 1918 to the present. In the early days, the Social Democrats had power, but now it is reactionary generals who are sitting at the wheel.

"Democracy can no longer even play its own game because of the class contradictions. Look, for example, at how the democratic right to asylum—the right of an exiled person to residency—is observed these days."

MIR Statement on Anti-Allende Offensive

[The following are excerpts from an official statement issued October 19 by the Chilean MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) on the current offensive against the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende. The excerpts were published in the October 24 issue of the Chilean bi-weekly magazine *Punto Final*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Local and foreign bosses have unleashed a new and stronger offensive. . . .

With their slogan of "civil resistance" they have unleashed an extensive strike by the bosses that aims at paralyzing the country, besieging the people with hunger, and creating chaos in order thereby to bring about the overthrow of the government, or at least a decisive and permanent shift of power from the civilian sphere to the military. . . .

The relative breadth of social unrest that the bosses and imperialism have achieved with this strategy has been made possible by the weaknesses of sectors of the government over the past two years. The bosses and imperialism are continuing their attack on the people from the positions of power and wealth that they hold; the crisis created by the "civil resistance" is also the product of a weak and vacillating policy that urgently must and can be changed.

At the moment, these same governmental sectors are trying to relegate the working class and the people to

Two Pieces of Evidence

With the mention of the right to asylum, you could see that Trotsky was again coming back to Dalgas Boulevard. With a broad smile, he continued:

"I am not a stubborn Marxist. You can still get me to believe in democracy. But first you'll have to comply with two wishes: First bring about socialism in Germany through democratic means, and second get me a residence permit in Denmark." □

the status of a secondary and auxiliary force in providing a solution to the problems confronting them; they want the people to be observers while the military and the government attempt to find a solution to the crisis. In this way they bring about a de facto paralysis and demobilization of the people and as a result are unable to resolve the crisis. . . .

The present confrontation is between the people and the big capitalists. The only solution to it lies in the workers taking things into their own hands. . . .

If the bosses refuse to produce, transport, distribute, and market their goods, the people can and must take these activities into their own hands. The working class does not need the big capitalists in order to carry out these tasks. If the lack of "democracy and freedom" to exploit and get rich stifles the initiative of the capitalists, workers' democracy can put the industries and the rural estates into production and commerce and transportation into motion. . . .

The basic task facing the workers if the crisis is to be resolved and its causes eliminated is the expropriation of the big capitalists in industry, trade, transportation, agriculture, and mining, and the mass communications network that serves them. This task must be complemented by workers' control over operations remaining in the private sector. . . .

Only in this way will it be possible to eliminate the economic bases upon which the "civil resistance" of the bosses rests. . . .

The above can only be achieved if a popular power, alternative to that

of the bosses and the bourgeoisie, is developed. Such popular power can only arise out of the struggle and mobilization of the people, out of it being unified from the bottom up and organized on a community basis into Community Workers' Councils. . . .

At the present moment, the people cannot allow the bosses to succeed in paralyzing the country and creating chaos. In order to prevent them from doing so, it must normalize transportation, trade, production, attention to the medical needs of the people, etc., by utilizing the organized action of the working class and the rest of the people, supported by the governmental apparatus, the armed forces, and the soldiers.

The people and the revolutionary forces are not opposed to officers and soldiers aiding in the fight against fascism and pushing to get paralyzed operations going again. On the contrary, we will strike together in this. But the armed forces cannot hold back the mobilization and struggle of the workers against the bosses, which is the only way to definitively resolve the crisis. . . .

In order to meet the immediate and underlying tasks, the masses must be brought into action and their initiative developed under the leadership of the working class and the revolutionary forces. In order to accomplish this, daily assemblies must be held in the factories, on the land, in educational centers and housing projects, to discuss the political situation and find a solution to the present difficulties through the power and initiative of the workers themselves. . . .

But what is necessary above all is that Coordinating Committees of all working-class and popular organizations be formed in each community, uniting them in action and struggle and making it possible to move toward the creation of community councils.

We call on the working class, the people, and the left as a whole to respond in this way to the capitalist strike. In the face of the "civil resistance" of the bosses and of fascism, we call on them to open up the floodgates of workers' action, mobilization, and struggle in order to deal a unified blow to fascism. We must strike together, in spite of our differences and in spite of the need to step up ideological struggle and the struggle to win the leadership of the masses

among the people and their organizations. . . .

The reactionary forces of the bosses and of imperialism, of the DC [Democracia Cristiana—Christian Democracy] and the PN [Partido Nacional—National party] must realize that the workers and the people will not

Basis of Unification of the PSA-PRT

[At the end of 1971 a unification took place between the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (La Verdad) and the Partido Socialista Argentino (Coral). The PSA was one of the groupings that emerged from the Argentine Social Democracy when it split up under the impact of the Cuban revolution. Under the leadership of Juan Carlos Coral, the PSA moved to the left as the economic and social crisis deepened in Argentina.

[The PRT (Revolutionary Workers party), organized around the weekly journal *La Verdad* (the Truth) was headed by Nahuel Moreno, a well-known Argentine Trotskyist leader.

[The two organizations merged under the name of the Partido Socialista Argentino. The PSA publishes a weekly journal *Avanzada Socialista* (Socialist Vanguard). This replaces *La Verdad*.

[The basis of the unification was set forth in the following declaration of principles, unanimously approved by the executive committees of the two organizations. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

That the Republic of Argentina is a capitalist country of uneven development that has become increasingly dependent upon the exploitation and capital investment of world imperialism, operating in close association with a highly concentrated and centralized big national bourgeoisie.

That the exploitation of the country by imperialist capital is not being carried out against the wishes of and in spite of the national bourgeoisie, but through its most highly concentrated sectors and with its backing and complicity.

That the high degree of concentration and centralization of capital in Argentina remains an economic and

passively permit their gains and their rights to be taken away; they will not permit the government to be overthrown, nor an authoritarian or fascist dictatorship to be set up. All these forces will achieve if they persist in their aims will be the unleashing of civil war. □

political burden upon the sectors of the middle and petty bourgeoisie, which are semi-exploited by big national and international capital, lack any possibility for independent development, yet at the same time exploit the working class through their enterprises.

That this middle and petty bourgeoisie cannot, as a result, play any decisive leading role in the struggles the Argentinian people must undertake if they are to achieve their liberation, since historically these classes always end up acting as instruments of the big imperialist monopolies.

That the economic and social structure of the country requires linking the struggle for national liberation from the imperialist yoke closely to the struggle against the capitalist regime and the big national bourgeoisie.

That the Argentine Socialist party and the PRT (La Verdad) pledge to allocate all their forces to building the party.

That the party will establish the most fraternal relations with all groups that are struggling—legally or illegally—for national liberation and socialism, in order to jointly work out programmatic, strategic and tactical questions.

That in the course of building the party organization, there must be a deepening of theoretical criticism of the opportunist, reformist and populist deviations that divert the Argentine proletariat from its historic goals, but this critique must not be seen as a hindrance to alliances between the party and all working-class layers that are struggling, around concrete and clear issues, for national liberation and socialism.

That it is essential for the party to establish fraternal ties with the working masses who today are caught up in Peronist populism and its bourgeois reformist ideology. The party must encourage and join with these

masses in all of their concrete struggles against exploitation and oppression, helping them to understand how the political structure and the trade-union bureaucracy serve to block their desire to struggle and limit achieving their historic objectives, which are none other than those that lead to the destruction of the capitalist system and the construction of socialism.

That the party must utilize every method of struggle required by the changing political reality.

That although we are convinced that the state is always an expression of the dictatorship of the ruling classes, even though it may be masked by bourgeois democratic forms, nevertheless, every opening provided by bourgeois legality must be utilized to promote the organization of the workers politically and economically and to assemble a force capable of making the revolution that objective conditions in Argentina and throughout the world have made the most urgent task of the day.

That the utilization of the legal methods of struggle within its reach must not be allowed to divert the attention of the party away from the tasks of also preparing its organization to take up the struggle for political power on all levels and by every means that conditions permit or require.

That the party, through a front of the workers and the exploited masses, must tirelessly struggle to bring about a workers and people's government that will assure national liberation and the revolutionary construction of socialism. Both committees stress the fact that although it may proclaim itself to be socialist, no state is truly socialist unless the working class exercises direct control over the entire state apparatus—the armed forces, the executive administration, the courts, and the legislative power.

That the only combination in which the proletariat and its party can participate is one that moves toward the conquest of state power by the working class, that is, socialist and working-class combinations. Treacherous combinations with any sector of the bourgeoisie are rejected as a way of taking power.

That both executive committees acknowledge the existence of layers of small peasants (growers of fruit, tobacco, cotton, sugar cane, grapes, etc.)

who are exploited by the big proimperialist bourgeoisie, and who are agitating and struggling against their exploiters. Although in the final analysis these sectors are struggling to maintain their position as small producers, just as they will struggle tomorrow against any attempt to socialize agricultural production, the party nevertheless supports their struggles as a social movement (but not politically) so as to isolate the main enemy—the big national bourgeoisie and its senior partner, imperialism. But through that support it will strive to make its momentary allies understand that their problems as human beings can only be solved through socialism, and it will try to win the best ones to the cause and the party of the proletariat. The party will adopt the same position toward the movements that the small shopkeepers, manufacturers, and craftsmen might form in their struggle against the monopolies, whether imperialist or not.

That both executive committees obviously reject the so-called Gran Acuerdo Nacional¹ in which the national bourgeoisie and imperialism are attempting to cover up their cruel dictatorship through "La Hora del Pueblo"² as a response to the profound revolutionary mobilizations of the working class that have been developing since the Cordobazo.³

That this masquerade is possible

1. Gran Acuerdo Nacional (Great National Agreement). The GAN is Lanusse's name for the preparations leading up to the elections scheduled for 1973. It is a coalition through which the dictatorship hopes to unite the ruling class behind one candidate and bring the Peronist union bureaucracy into collaboration with, and participation in, the new government.

2. "The Hour of the People." A middle-class united front formed in November 1970 that advocates a greater role in national politics for political parties. Among the groups associated with it are the Partido Conservador Popular (Popular Conservative party), the Partido Demócrata Progresista (Progressive Democratic party), the Union Cívica Radical Bloquista (Bloquista Radical Civic Union), the Peronist movement, the Union Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union), and the Partido Socialista Argentino (Argentine Socialist party, Selser wing).

3. A massive workers' uprising in the city of Cordoba in May 1969.

only because of the complicity of the Peronist leadership, which seeks to divert the workers from their great historical tasks and keep them within the bounds of mildly reformist and conformist activity that is designed in the last analysis to preserve the capitalist system and imperialist domination.

This rejection includes the ENA⁴, a new opportunist attempt to raise the slogan for a bourgeois democratic revolution, and the new Frente Cívico⁵ proposed by Perón as a way of reaching an agreement with Frondifrigerismo,⁶ as another variant for protecting the capitalist system.

That the tragedy of the organized Argentine workers' movement is the sinister union bureaucracy—an agent within the workers' movement that has prostituted itself to imperialism and the national bourgeoisie. That, faithful to the soundest principles of proletarian internationalism, both executive committees point out: that the main enemy of the workers of the world is U.S. imperialism, world cop of counter-revolution and the major exploiter of the nations and masses of Latin America; that there must be stronger ties with and total support for all peoples struggling for their liberation, for all the forces and all the systems that are heroically struggling to build socialism, and especially for the revolutionary movements of Latin America, for socialist Cuba, and for the present vanguard of the world revolution—the heroic Vietnamese guerrillas.

That without failing to defend the so-called socialist states from any imperialist attack, we will support any struggles by the working class of those countries for socialist democracy, since

4. Encuentro Nacional de los Argentinos (National Forum for Argentines), a Communist party-inspired popular front with "progressive" sectors of the capitalist class.

5. Civic Front. In addition to sectors of the Peronist movement, the ENA has also participated in this formation, which represents "prodevelopment" sectors of the capitalist class and which is designed to promote the elections.

6. Movement led by former President Arturo Frondizi and Rogelio Frigerio. Its official name is the Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo (MID—Movement for Integration and Development). It calls for increased governmental support to the development of national industries.

socialism is the highest expression of democracy for the workers and toiling masses—which means complete freedom of expression and criticism for the workers and their organizations, parties and unions.

That, while recognizing the need for an International, neither of the executive committees, nor the party, will yield their inalienable right to determine strategy and tactics to any leadership or tendency that is not rooted in the proletariat and the Argentine people.

That on the basis of these points, both executive committees are devoting their efforts to building a great Socialist Party, a revolutionary workers' party, deeply rooted in the realities of the nation, in solidarity with all the socialist movements of Latin America and the world, and into which they hope to regroup in a solid vanguard the currently dispersed Argentine revolutionary left.

Demands for Immediate Struggle

1. *For democratic rights. Down with the repressive bodies and laws.*

For the immediate release of all political and social prisoners, especially the guerrillas and trade-union activists.

For a national campaign including all individuals and organizations that want to struggle for the release of Flores, Santucho, Tosco, and their comrades.

For the repeal of all repressive legislation.

Down with the Cámara Federal [Supreme Criminal Court].

For the immediate abolition of all repressive bodies—the Office of Security, SIDE [Servicio de Informaciones del Estado—State Information Service], DIPA [División de Investigaciones Policiales Antidemocráticas—Bureau for Investigating Antidemocratic Activities], etc.

For the allocation of free prime time on radio and television to all political parties, whether officially recognized or not.

For freedom of the press—the Graphics Union to guarantee the publication of any newspaper. Printshops to be obligated by law to accept for publication the organs of political parties, whether officially recognized or not.

Down with the state of siege.

Legalize the Communist party.

For the right of Perón to return to the country and become a candidate.

For the right of every citizen to reside in the country, take part in political life, and form a political party.

II. In defense of the living conditions and jobs of the working class.

An immediate 40 percent wage increase and a minimum salary of 70,000 pesos [\$1 equals 10.20 pesos].

For a sliding scale of wages, to be readjusted every sixty days.

Against unemployment. For unemployment insurance that guarantees a full salary during a period of unemployment.

For a ban on the profits of foreign monopolies being taken out of the country and for their reinvestment in new areas of work in accord with a plan drawn up by the working class.

Elimination of all taxes harmful to public consumption and the work force.

For nationalization without compensation of all industries that close down or stop production, so that they will continue operating for the government but under workers' control;

For the application of law 14,250 on collective bargaining and for parity of labor and management.

For a special parity that makes up for weak trade unions having to negotiate from a position of weakness.

III. For trade union democracy. Kick out the union bureaucracy.

For the unconditional defense of the CGT [Confederación General de Trabajo] and the unions.

Against bureaucracy in the union movement.

The same salary for trade-union leaders as they earned when they were working.

Total replacement every two years of the leading cadres so that leaders go back to the factory or their jobs.

No worker can be expelled from the union unless his expulsion is approved by his co-workers in a section or department. Let his working-class morality be judged by those who know him and not by the bureaucrats.

Every worker or activist fired by management to continue to remain a full member of the union for a minimum of two years in order to prevent any joint attempt by the bureau-

crats and the bosses to keep the best activists not only out of a job, but out of the union.

Annual rank-and-file conventions of all trade-union organizations, from the CGT to the smallest regional organization. Delegates must be democratically elected by their co-workers and represent the number of votes they received in the election. All sectors of the workers' movement to be represented.

For the formation of a Class-struggle Union Movement that will include all union activists who are ready to struggle for union democracy, for the removal of the union bureaucracy, and for its replacement by a new, class-struggle leadership.

IV. For women's liberation

Free and legal abortion, performed in state clinics that have prior authorization from official medical bodies and all the necessary guarantees for safeguarding health.

For the free sale of contraceptive devices once they are approved by state medical schools. Full protection for the unmarried mother and elimination of any legal differences between legitimate and illegitimate children. Equal rights for legal and common-law families.

For completely free, twenty-four-hour child-care centers.

Forty percent of the minimum wage to be paid to working mothers for every child under eighteen years of age.

For effective implementation of the principle of equal pay for equal work. Against all discriminatory practices against women that deny them equal opportunity in carrying out their activities. Obligatory inclusion of women in all union bodies, in proportion to the number of women in the corresponding branches of work, as well as in all governmental and popular bodies. Elimination of any regulation or practice that impedes free sexual relationships between men and women.

Elimination of any discriminatory law or regulation between men and women.

V. For education that serves the working class and the people.

For student control of exams.

For curricula that help students serve the working class and the people. Scholarships so that students who

lack the means to study can do so without having to work.

For the elimination of state economic aid to private universities. Free admission to the university.

For a university government comprised of students, teachers, and non-teaching workers freely elected by each sector, and with the majority consisting of students.

For a university that serves the struggle for socialism in our country. Compulsory, secular, and truly free primary and secondary education for all.

Supply all students in state schools with materials, books, and uniforms. Coeducation and a full program of sex education.

Integration of productive labor at all levels of education. An aggressive campaign to end illiteracy. End all repressive regulations and guarantee the full right of secondary and university students to organize. Repeal the Jorge de la Torre act.

Increase the budget for education and pay for it out of the budgets of the military and repressive forces.

VI. *For the democratization of the armed forces.*

For an end to the repressive role of the armed forces and their use in the service of capital.

For a lowering of military service to a period of three months. For the right of students and workers to fit their military service into a schedule convenient to their studies and their occupations. For the right to organize military service through the universities and the unions. For the constitutional right of soldiers and officers to take part in politics. State-paid wages for draftees. Opening up the rank of officer and field officer to noncommissioned officers.

A ban on soldiers performing any domestic tasks or personal services.

VII. *For socialized medicine.*

Free medical care and medicines for every inhabitant.

For the nationalization of all the clinics, hospitals, and factories that produce medical supplies. For workers' control of all welfare institutions. For a national health plan drawn up by the workers' movement with the aid of doctors and all health service workers.

And Struggle on a Permanent Basis

I. *For a socialist economy in Argentina.*

For immediate nationalization without compensation of all national and foreign banks, insurance companies, foreign trade, the big meat-packing plants, and monopolistic national and imperialist-owned industries.

Repudiate the debts and concessions to imperialism contracted by the dictatorial and reactionary governments.

For workers' control in the big plants, in nationalized industries, and in foreign trade.

For an agrarian reform based on the expropriation without compensation of the big estates, and for their being handed over to the wage workers and small rural producers to be developed into collective forms of production.

For the return of occupied lands to the indigenous communities.

For a new colonization in agriculture, implemented on a socialist economic basis in which the priority will go to rural workers settled on tenant lands, those who have been forced to migrate to the cities by the present latifundist set-up, and immigrant workers from neighboring Latin American countries.

Respect for the holdings of small farmers and the organization of co-operatives for them with low credit rates and technical help from the state.

For the immediate expropriation and urban development of the districts where the workers live in shantytowns. For an urban reform that provides every proletarian family with a comfortable home, paid for out of a small percentage of a worker's salary.

For expropriation of all luxury homes not permanently occupied in Mar del Plata and the other summer resort areas, so that they can be turned over to squatters in the shantytowns. For creation of jobs for those who move into these areas.

For the drawing up of an economic plan by a rank-and-file congress of the CGT that can get the national economy rolling and raise the working class's standard of living.

This plan shall take into account the necessity of reaching agreement with the trade-union movements of Chile and Uruguay on a joint plan

to move toward uniting the economies of our countries.

II. *For an international policy aiming toward the unification of Latin America within a Federation of Socialist Republics.*

For breaking the pacts that bind us to imperialism (bilateral Rio de Janeiro agreements, OAS [Organization of American States], IMF [International Monetary Fund], etc.

For the immediate recognition of Socialist Cuba.

For economic and diplomatic support to the steps taken by the governments of Chile and Peru to nationalize imperialist companies and to all other anti-imperialist measures taken by any other Latin American country economically blockaded or attacked by Yankee imperialism.

Unconditional defense of Socialist Cuba against any external attack, especially by Yankee imperialism, aimed at interfering with the construction of socialism.

For proletarian internationalism.

For the unconditional defense of any workers state attacked by the United States or any other imperialist power.

For solidarity with the people of Vietnam and all peoples struggling for national liberation and socialism.

III. *Build a workers and socialist united front to:*

Fight, on all fronts, against "La Hora del Pueblo," the ENA, the Frente Cívico, and any similar coalition that the bourgeoisie and imperialism have cooked up to divert our heroic working class from the revolutionary mobilization that began with the Cordobazo.

Present a class-struggle and socialist program in the coming elections.

Denounce these elections as merely a diversionary maneuver of the exploiters.

Struggle resolutely for the only solution for the country and the workers—a workers and people's government; for the convocation of a free and sovereign constituent assembly on the basis of a genuinely democratic ballot; and to lay the basis for building a *Socialist Argentina*.

Long Live the Future Socialist Argentina! □

Fascinating Work

"Being president of a peaceful country is not interesting. Anyone can build roads and hospitals."—*Nguyen Van Thieu*