

Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 10, No. 40

© 1972 Intercontinental Press

November 6, 1972

50c

**NO
REAL
PEACE**



Mt. Trashmore

Like other industrially advanced countries, the United States has a garbage problem—only more so. "Americans must cope with 38 billion bottles, 80 billion cans, seven million junked autos and 180 million old tires every year," Larry Bonko points out in the October 22 *New York Times*. "Two year ago, the total bill for disposing of America's trash reached \$4.5 billion annually."

He offers a graphic description of how Virginia Beach, Virginia, finally solved the problem: "They have hoarded 640,000 tons of garbage here and disguised it as a mountain. . . .

"The peak of Mount Trashmore is 80 feet above sea level and eight miles west of the sand, surf, salt water taffy, bikinis and boardwalk that once were Virginia Beach's only, and mundane, claims to fame. . . . With cameras, visitors have come from England, Japan, Australia and Taipei to behold it."

Mount Trashmore is a giant compost pile. "Men with bulldozers and earthmovers covered each layer of garbage with a layer of earth, 18 to 20 inches thick. . . . The crews began to make Mount Trashmore beautiful after the last load of garbage arrived in the spring of 1972. They added 18 inches of topsoil and now, after a wet spring, the grass is taking hold."

It took \$1 million in federal, state, and city money to get Mt. Trashmore started in 1967. Two summers ago the city of Norfolk began contributing its garbage, paying \$3.12 a ton for the privilege. When the dump was begun five years ago, the land was worth \$500 an acre. Now it is valued at \$25,000 an acre.

"The plan is to build a 10,000-seat amphitheater, a boat ramp (for 77 acres of lake nearby) and a 1,500-foot track for the Soap Box Derby, and then embellish the thing with roads and parking lots."

Best of all, the idea is beginning to spread. Evanston and Wheaton, Illinois, will follow Virginia Beach's exemplary action.

And Virginia City itself "is already raising the Son of Mount Trashmore a few miles away."

In This Issue

ECOLOGY	1194	Mt. Trashmore
INDOCHINA WAR	1195	Peking-Moscow Pressure Compels Hanoi to Yield—by Jon Rothschild
	1199	Correction
U. S. A.	1200	Campaigners Chalk Up Gains in SWP Election Battles—by Fred Feldman
	1202	Watergate—Something New in U. S. Politics—by Fred Feldman
	1203	Pentagon Aims for Anderson's Eyeballs
	1206	The Case of Billy Dean Smith
CHILE	1204	Allende's Concessions Fail to Halt Crisis—by David Thorstad
ANTIWAR	1205	4,000 in Copenhagen Protest Vietnam War
	1205	Swedes Protest War
TURKEY	1206	Turkish Workers Party Leaders Sentenced
CANADA	1207	Beiner Campaigns for a Socialist Quebec
DENMARK	1208	Greenland "Reexamines" Tie to Denmark
ITALY	1209	Charge Cops Hid Antifascist Evidence
SRI LANKA	1210	Four Months in Sri Lanka's Prison Camps
SOVIET UNION	1214	Soviet Bureaucrats Dub Coffee Beans Fertilizer
	1214	Stalin's Copenhagen Frame-up Claims
CUBA	1216	Caribbean States Open Relations With Cuba
REVIEWS	1215	When Mao Made a Secret Bid to Roosevelt—by Joseph Hansen
DOCUMENTS	1217	An Addition to "Problems of the Chinese Revolution"—by Leon Trotsky
	1221	Indian Trotskyists Discuss Political Tasks
	1221	Women's Liberation in the Subcontinent
	1222	Berrigan's Open Letter to Leonid Brezhnev
PHOTOGRAPHS	1200	Linda Jenness
	1201	Andrew Pulley
	1205	Danish antiwar march the CP didn't like
DRAWINGS	1223	Daniel Berrigan—by Copain

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Mai-tan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

COPY EDITOR: Lawrence Rand.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Candida Barberena, Fred Feldman, Gerry Foley, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders, David Thorstad.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.

TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Ruth Schein.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemenee, Paris 4, France.

TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright © 1972 by Intercontinental Press.

Peking-Moscow Pressure Compels Hanoi to Yield

By Jon Rothschild

For more than a week, the rumor-mills in the world's capitals had been working overtime, eking all they could out of a single theme: Henry Kissinger's secret talks with North Vietnamese leaders in Paris had resulted in an agreement; a cease-fire in the decade-long Indochina war was imminent. Reporters in Washington virtually besieged the White House, waiting for Richard Nixon to announce to the American people: Here is peace.

On October 26 Radio Hanoi cut through the rumors and announced in an English-language broadcast that Hanoi and Washington had in fact come to an accord for ending the fighting:

"With a view to making the negotiations progress, at the private meeting on October 8, 1972, the DRVN side took a new, extremely important initiative: It put forward a draft Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, and proposed that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and the Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, immediately agree upon and sign this agreement to rapidly restore peace in Vietnam."

The agreement, which Hanoi insists the United States agreed to sign on October 31, was summarized by North Vietnam in nine points. But its essence can be described more briefly. There will be an immediate cease-fire in Vietnam, including a halt to all U.S. bombing. U.S. troops will be withdrawn within sixty days of the signing of the agreement; simultaneously, prisoners of war will be exchanged by the two sides.

The Thieu government will remain in office in Saigon and will continue to administer all territory under its control at the time the agreement is signed. The Provisional Revolutionary Government will be recognized as the lawful authority in all areas currently under its control. Neither

of the two governments, according to the agreement, will attempt to expand its area of influence.

In regard to the regime and social structure of South Vietnam—the heart of the civil war itself—the agreement, according to Hanoi's radio broadcast, states the following (point four):

"The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision;

"The United States is not committed to any political tendency or personality in South Vietnam, and it does not seek to impose a pro-American regime in Saigon;

"National reconciliation and concord will be achieved, the democratic liberties of the people insured;

"An administrative structure called the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, of three equal segments, will be set up to promote the implementation of the signed agreements by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and to organize the general elections; the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at a lower level;

"The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation;

"Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce the military numbers on both sides and to demobilize the troops being reduced;

"The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible and will do their utmost to accomplish this within three months after the cease-fire comes into effect."

In this agreement, the United States made two concessions to Hanoi: U.S.

forces will be withdrawn from Vietnam, and North Vietnamese forces will remain in South Vietnam for an indefinite period. The fact that U.S. imperialism was forced to yield on these points represents a significant achievement both for the Vietnamese people and for the worldwide antiwar movement.

But Hanoi made concessions as well. The essence of them is contained in point four of the agreement. The long-standing Vietnamese demand that the cessation of military hostilities be accompanied by a political solution to the civil war in the South was dropped.

Hanoi and the South Vietnam National Liberation Front abandoned their demand that the Thieu regime be eliminated and their insistence on the formation of a coalition government comprising elements of the present Saigon administration, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and "neutralist" forces.

Hanoi has acceded to the continued existence of the Thieu regime, and thus to the continued existence of an imperialist foothold in South Vietnam. The basic character of that concession was universally recognized in the U.S. press, which generally expressed satisfaction with the terms of the accord.

The *Wall Street Journal* (October 27), the voice of a substantial section of the U.S. financial elite, called the settlement terms "quite favorable ones," and "an honest reflection of the battlefield results." Hanoi's offer, the *Journal's* editors noted, reflected a "will to settle"; the United States appeared to be on the verge of achieving its "minimum objectives."

The *New York Times* (October 27), for several years a critic of Nixon's Vietnam policy and recently an endorser of the candidacy of George McGovern, also supported the proposed agreement: "Long-overdue concessions on both sides have produced a document that realistically recognizes a military stalemate and transfers the struggle for power in South

Vietnam to the political arena where it has always belonged."

Even the New York *Daily News* (October 27), which represents little within the U. S. ruling class but whose opinions on this matter are significant because of the editors' notorious jingoist politics, endorsed the agreement as a Nixon victory: "In essence, Hanoi accepted the proposal Nixon made last May 8, when he ordered intensified bombing of North Vietnam and mining of northern harbors."

The real cause of the jubilation in the U. S. capitalist press lies not only in the nature of the agreement that appears to have been reached, but in the fact that the negotiations came to any conclusion at all. Any pact, no matter what its contents, lends an aura of legitimacy to the U. S. invasion of Indochina, gives the impression that the United States had a justified reason for intervening.

Newspapers, and even sections of the ruling class, had reluctantly come to the conclusion that the war had been a total loss and that the United States would be forced to leave Indochina with no cover whatsoever for its war crimes. Suddenly, the proposed agreement is produced saving U. S. "face" and granting a formal recognition of the premise that the United States did in fact have something to negotiate in Indochina.

The North Vietnamese leaders themselves, while attempting to portray the agreement as a basic victory for the liberation struggle, recognized that they had made important concessions. The October 30 *New York Times* published an article by Richard J. Barnet, codirector of the Institute for Policy Studies and a long-time critic of U. S. policy in Indochina. Barnet, along with several other figures around the antiwar movement, was invited October 27 to "hear a clarification of the views" of the North Vietnamese and PRG delegations in Paris on the subject of the agreement.

North Vietnamese Deputy Minister Nguyen Minh Vy and PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, Barnet wrote, "recognize that a standstill cease-fire involves risks, particularly since they have relaxed their previous demand that President Nguyen Van Thieu's administration and 'Thieu's repressive apparatus' be dismantled before the fighting stops."

That the Vietnamese have made ma-

nor concessions to U. S. imperialism, dropping even their demand for a dubious coalition government, is indisputable. The forces compelling the concessions are not difficult to locate. They lie in Washington, in Moscow, and in Peking.

The Vietnamese people have, during the past decade, provided the world with an unparalleled example of courage and heroism in resisting, virtually alone, the most massive campaign of destruction ever seen in human history. The intensity of the assault by the world's mightiest power against a small, underdeveloped country stands not only as a monument to the courage of the Vietnamese people and as a condemnation of the barbarism of U. S. imperialism, but also as a mark of shame for the bureaucrats in Moscow and Peking.

During the period from 1965 to 1971, according to Arthur Westing and E. W. Pfeiffer's article "The Cratering of Indochina" published in the May 1972 issue of *Scientific American*, Indochina was bombarded by "a tonnage of munitions amounting to approximately twice the total used by the U. S. in all theaters of World War II. . . .

"From the air, some areas of Vietnam look like photographs of the moon," the two authors wrote.

"In the seven years between 1965 and 1971 the U. S. military forces exploded 26 billion [milliard] pounds . . . of munitions in Indochina, half from the air and half from weapons on the ground. This staggering weight of ordnance amounts to the energy of 450 Hiroshima nuclear bombs. For the area and population of Indochina as a whole it represents an average of 142 pounds of explosive per acre of land and 584 pounds per person. It means that over the seven-year period the average rate of detonation was 118 pounds per second. These average figures, however, give no indication of the actual concentration; most of the bombing was concentrated in time (within the years from 1967 on) and in area. Of the 26 billion pounds, 21 billion were exploded in South Vietnam and 2.6 billion in southern Laos. The bombardment in South Vietnam represented an overall average of 497 pounds per acre and 1,215 pounds per person; the major part, however, was focussed on two regions: the five

northern provinces and the region around Saigon."

The *Scientific American* report did not deal with the 1972 bombing, the level of which far exceeded previous intensity. By April 1972, on the eve of Nixon's visit to Moscow, giant B52s were dropping an explosive force equivalent to two and a half Hiroshima bombs *each day* on North Vietnam alone.

And all this leaves out the untold damage wrought by antipersonnel bombs, herbicides, poisons, and other forms of U. S.-created devastation. Nor does it include the threats of the U. S. military machine to destroy North Vietnam's hydraulic system, an act that could have caused as many as 15 million deaths.

In addition to the pressure of the bombing, the U. S. imperialists had blockaded North Vietnam, making it difficult to get supplies through. Without his having gone to these lengths, Nixon himself has admitted, the Vietnamese spring offensive could not have been halted.

The depth of the destruction caused by U. S. imperialism has yet to be established with certainty. Statistics on the number of NLF and North Vietnamese troops killed are unavailable, as are reliable estimates of the number of innocent civilians murdered. But just as important, it is not known what effect the bombing has had on the morale of the South Vietnamese population. Have the leaders of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front concluded that political conditions among the population make further intense fighting impossible?

If that is the case, and if their estimate is accurate, the shame is not that of the Vietnamese people, but of the bureaucrats in Moscow and Peking who have allowed the U. S. ruling class to perpetrate such horrors.

Moscow and Peking's betrayal of the Vietnamese revolution has been epitomized in the role those capitals have played in extorting the present agreement from Hanoi. It is but a part of a long history of perfidy.

When the bourgeois regime in Egypt was threatened with further Israeli expansionism, Moscow sent weaponry of an advanced type that was never delivered to the revolutionary forces in South Vietnam or to the workers state in North Vietnam. Egypt was provided with ground-to-sea missiles that effectively neutralized the power

in the withdrawal of U. S. forces from the island of Taiwan. . . .

"Both negative and positive signs after that indicated plainly that the Chinese were eager to see a Vietnam settlement, and they reportedly communicated this view to the Hanoi leaders in private communications as well as in public statements."

The most obvious Chinese statement in support of a deal with Nixon at the expense of the Indochinese revolution came in July, when Premier Chou En-lai praised the Korean armistice as a model of international relations.

Victor Louis, the Soviet "journalist" who is widely believed to be an agent of the Soviet security police, wrote last June 16 that the North Vietnamese had tried to "undermine" the Moscow-Washington summit with an offensive in South Vietnam.

The assessment that Moscow and Peking had pressured Hanoi into signing the present agreement was nearly universal in the U. S. press. Even normally anti-Soviet writers, such as the syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novack, had some kind words for the Kremlin on this score. In their October 28 column Evans and Novack wrote: "Accordingly, Nixon's political judgment seems vindicated that Hanoi, under pressure from Peking, Moscow, and the brutally effective American bombing and blockade, would agree to a genuine compromise now, rather than dealing with a re-elected and unfettered President Nixon."

In the October 30 *Wall Street Journal* Robert Keatley gloated, "Premier Chou En-lai helped push a balky North Vietnamese leadership into seeking largely made-in-America terms which should halt gunfire throughout Indochina.

"But Mr. Chou did not push alone. Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, too, has let his country make clear that Moscow also wants Vietnam peace more than it desires prolonged Vietnam war; for the Russians, also, proletarian solidarity has its limits in practice, if not in theory."

One viewer of Nixon's television speech announcing the mining of North Vietnam's waters, Keatley wrote, was "the visiting Russian Trade Minister, dining that night at the home of Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson. After hearing Mr. Nixon's tough

words, he turned to his host and said: 'Well, let's get back to business.'"

Keatley also reports that during Nixon's Moscow trip, Russian propagandists traveling with U. S. reporters "privately berated Hanoi for trying to sabotage cooperation between the superpowers. As intended, such talk got into print."

The Kremlin's treachery was even extended into the wrangling of the last week in October, when Hanoi was pressuring the United States to sign the proposed agreement immediately. Nixon was stalling, demanding more talks. On October 27, Soviet Premier Kosygin declared that he hoped there would soon be further Vietnam negotiations. The *New York Times* gave that story the following subheadline: "Premier, in Effect, Backs U. S. View on Another Round in Peace Talks."

But despite the intentions of Moscow and Peking, it is apparent that the current agreement cannot produce peace in Vietnam. At most, it can result in a temporary lull in the fighting.

The accord recognizes two administrations, and more importantly, two armies, in South Vietnam: Thieu's puppet outfit and the North Vietnamese army, along with the guerrillas of the National Liberation Front. The "neutralist, democratic" elements who are supposed to constitute the "third force" in the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord are mostly confined in Thieu's jails or, if they are not, they soon will be.

There is little doubt that Thieu, in an effort to consolidate his control, will systematically eliminate all opposition. The fact that the proposed accord does not dismantle his repressive apparatus and stipulates that it may continue to be supplied with U. S. weapons gives him free reign to do so.

In fact, the bloody repression is already under way. "Saigon and most of the tropical countryside around it have suddenly broken out in the red and yellow of thousands of South Vietnamese flags the Government has ordered displayed under threat of arrest," Craig Whitney wrote in the October 29 *New York Times*. "Each family, the Government says, must have two. It recently reminded the people that to display or even have a Vietcong flag was punishable by death."

Whitney reported that very shortly "each person will be required to produce a Government flag along with

an identification card when asked by the police." Those who fail to display the national flag in front of their homes, "the regime announced October 29, "will be punished according to the laws in force."

In her interview with Richard Barnett, Foreign Minister Binh charged that Thieu had unleashed an extermination campaign against South Vietnam's more than 200,000 political prisoners. "Women and children are being tortured and killed in the Saigon jails," she said. "The U. S. is equally responsible, for Thieu is not capable of carrying out such a policy alone."

The release of civilian political prisoners, according to the agreement, is a matter of negotiation between Thieu and the PRG.

As the Thieu-organized bloodbath began, the United States made clear its intention to rush all possible military aid to Saigon before any cease-fire goes into effect. The October 27 *New York Times* reported that the Defense Department is accelerating shipments of "jets, tanks, and artillery previously scheduled for delivery" to ensure that the equipment arrives "before any cease-fire closes off reinforcement."

Assured of massive U. S. support, the Thieu regime has given ample indication of how it expects to implement the "national reconciliation and concord" called for in the agreement. On October 25 *Washington Post* correspondent Thomas Lippmann cabled from Saigon explaining the Saigon post-cease-fire program: "'The Communists are going to be free to move around,' one official familiar with the cease-fire preparations said, 'but not free to act as Communists.'

"A few details of the government's instructions on preparations for the anticipated cease-fire, made available today, indicate that President Thieu's government would view any cease-fire as the occasion for new political restrictions designed to strengthen its own position.

"It would be up to Thieu's province chiefs, officers of the national police and provincial representatives to determine what constituted subversive activities. Almost any form of agitation or political opposition could be construed as Communist-inspired and subversive and result in quick arrests."

The United States will doubtless support Thieu on this point, claiming that

any activity by the liberation forces within Saigon-controlled territory constitutes a violation of the cease-fire. In turn, Thieu will regard any activity by the "neutralist" forces as NLF activity. "A television program directed at South Vietnamese soldiers," Lippmann wrote, "... warned that the Communists would incite workers to strike, demand release of political prisoners and call for the abolition of emergency decree laws promulgated during this year's military crisis. The way things are done in South Vietnam, it is only a small step from there to concluding that anyone participating in such activities must be a Communist."

The much-discussed postwar bloodbath is now under way. But it is Thieu and his U.S. mentors, not the liberation forces, who are wielding the executioner's ax. The notion that the Saigon regime will allow itself to be ousted through a gradual process of peaceful politicking is preposterous. Full-scale resumption of the civil war is only a short step from the Saigon repression. Thieu can no more permit the indefinite posting of a hostile army in South Vietnam than he can a peaceful political process in Saigon itself. The Hanoi-Washington accord recognizes two governments and two armies and instructs them to settle their differences through an election. The lack of reality in such a plan in the long-term sense is obvious.

But even in the immediate sense the agreement is likely to be unworkable. Significant areas of South Vietnam are under Saigon's control during the day and the PRG's control at night. Even in the Mekong Delta, the country's most populous region, the regime's "pacification" program lies in ruins. In such situations, it is not simply a stretch of territory over which control is disputed, but a village-by-village struggle for power. There is little doubt that peaceful political processes would hand such areas over to the liberation forces. Consequently, Thieu will not permit such processes to unfold. The repression unleashed in the areas under Saigon's firm control will tend to spread geographically, first to contested areas, then to areas recognized in the agreement as North Vietnamese sanctuaries.

What will be Hanoi's response to this repression? Will the North Vietnamese army come to the aid of lo-

cal NLF guerrillas when Thieu breaks the cease-fire? Will the North Vietnamese defend their own base areas or will they gradually withdraw? Will Hanoi put pressure on the NLF comparable to the pressure Moscow and Peking put on Hanoi itself? Is the NLF infrastructure sufficiently intact to take on Thieu's army, the latter being deprived of the assistance of U.S. bombing? To what extent has the South Vietnamese population been demoralized, temporarily, by the U.S. bombing?

The answers to all these questions will be revealed in the course of the struggle itself.

Also unclear at present is the question of secret clauses. At a news conference held October 27 in Paris, North Vietnamese spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le waved a mimeographed document and said, "You can judge for yourself. You can see how thick it is. This is the agreement to be signed." Le refused to divulge the number of pages, but reporters said it appeared to be "about half an inch thick."

There are thus three possible levels of agreement: the summary broadcast by Radio Hanoi, the full text of the public agreement (which Le said would be published when it was signed), and secret clauses.

One aspect of the agreement, however, is perfectly clear: The most massive destructive force ever assembled—the U.S. fleet and air-force installations in Thailand—will remain poised for renewed aggression. Henry Kissinger told reporters gathered at his October 27 news conference that "there are no limitations on American forces in Thailand or on the fleet."

The Pentagon admits that there are 39,000 U.S. troops attached to the fleet and 45,000 stationed in Thailand. The four aircraft carriers in the fleet carry 240 fighter-bombers. The Thailand-based armada contains 500 combat planes, 50 B52s among them.

Should Washington decide that the Vietnamese people have broken the cease-fire by resisting Thieu's bloodbath, the planes and troops are ready. The removal of troops from Indochina itself will in no way restrict the U.S. ability to resume bombing at a moment's notice.

The past history of the Indochina war leaves no doubt that, should the civil war break out again and should the U.S. puppet forces be getting the

worst of it, U.S. imperialism will not hesitate to resume where it left off.

Since Moscow and Peking have demonstrated their unwillingness to act in face of such an eventuality, there is but one international force capable of staying the hand of the U.S. rulers—the international antiwar movement.

The North Vietnamese leaders themselves have recognized this. In the midst of the peace speculation of the last week in October, Nguyen Minh Vy sent a telegram to the offices of the U.S. National Peace Action Coalition, which has called for international mass demonstrations against the war on November 18. "Firmly believe," Vy cabled, "your activities will contribute important part to mobilization of American opinion demanding Nixon administration end immediately Vietnam war and support to Nguyen Van Thieu puppet administration. Withdraw U.S. troops from South Vietnam. Let South Vietnamese people settle own affairs without foreign interference. Wish you every success."

The terms of the proposed "peace" accord make it more crucial than ever to keep up the antiwar pressure. Should the international antiwar movement decide it has won, congratulate itself, and fold up, this would give renewed encouragement to the White House. Only the mobilization of solidarity on an international scale, combined with the continued struggle of the Vietnamese people, can end for good the imperialist intervention in Indochina. The Vietnamese may be forced to make concessions, but the antiwar movement can declare in the most positive terms: *U.S. imperialism has no right to negotiate anything for the people of Indochina.* □

Maothought Does It Again

Hupei peasants caught 10,080,000 centipedes in a month, a new record. Attributing this to Mao's thought, *Jenmin Jih Pao* said that centipede-catching was barred for a time due to "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type."

Correction

In the article "Does Nixon Plan to Obliterate Hanoi?" in the October 23 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, a quotation (p. 1131, column 3) was incorrectly attributed to the October 13 *Washington Post*. It was actually from an editorial in the October 13 *Christian Science Monitor*.

Campaigners Chalk Up Gains in SWP Election Battles

By Fred Feldman

As the 1972 electoral race neared its end, the round of cease-fire negotiations and rumors of impending settlement gave fresh emphasis to the Vietnam war as the central issue. While Nixon pressed Hanoi for concessions, and McGovern wished him success in this, Linda Jenness and Andrew Pulley, the Socialist Workers party candidates, sought to expose Nixon's latest moves and to defend the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own fate.

On October 24, Jenness told a Philadelphia news conference:

"President Nixon has been in office four years and could have ended the war at any time. The fact that he is now talking about peace only shows that he is not after peace but after the votes of the American people, just like he was in 1968.

"I say that the United States has no right to be there and no right to negotiate or demand anything from the Vietnamese.

"Any concessions wrung out of the Vietnamese by the Nixon administration will not be compromises from opposing sides but will be extorted from the Vietnamese at the cost of millions of dead and wounded."

Jenness's revolutionary stand drew this comment from the October 20 *Boston Globe*: "Linda Jenness is tough and uncompromising the way people say they like their candidates to be. . . .

"She was in Boston yesterday attacking the McGovern and Nixon 'election eve peace maneuvers,' and ready to add up the accomplishments of a 13-month third party campaign."

Activists in the SWP campaign could truthfully take credit for some important accomplishments. First of all, they had placed Jenness and Pulley on the ballot in twenty-four states. This was a difficult undertaking since many local election officials do everything they can to keep radicals off the ballot and several states in the last four years have placed new restrictive laws on the books to help them in this.



LINDA JENNESS

Trotskyists will be on the ballot for the first time in Washington, D. C., Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Dakota, and Texas.

Secondly, because of the energy of the SWP campaigners, the bourgeois news media and press have been compelled to pay more attention than previously to the revolutionary socialist candidates and their views.

This, too, was an uphill battle. The newspapers, television, and radio are tightly controlled by supporters of the two-party system. On October 25, the Federal Communications Commission ruled that Jenness and Pulley were not entitled to the protection of the "equal-time" laws since they are "too young" to hold office. (Jenness is thirty-one years old and Pulley twenty-one.)

Attempts have also been made to prevent the socialist candidates from campaigning among GIs on U. S. military bases. Andrew Pulley, who was a leader in GI antiwar activities while

he was stationed at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, was barred by military police from entering Fort Dix, a New Jersey base where 10,000 GIs are stationed. Also barred was Dr. Benjamin Spock, an antiwar activist who is running for president on the People's party ticket.

On October 12, a federal court upheld the Army's action. Colonel Jasper R. Johnson, testifying on behalf of the Fort Dix command, told the court that political speakers would be permitted if this would "further the mission of the base." When asked whether antiwar speakers would be permitted, he replied, "That certainly wouldn't forward our mission, would it?"

The decision was appealed and on October 27 a three-judge federal panel ruled that the Fort Dix brass must allow campaign activity on the base. Linda Jenness immediately announced that Pulley would hold a campaign rally on the base on November 4.

"Ours will be the first presidential campaign rally on an army base in U. S. history," she said. "This landmark decision is a victory for the First Amendment right of free speech and a major extension of political rights of GIs."

Attempts to infringe on the democratic rights of the candidates have not prevented the Jenness-Pulley campaigners from reaching millions of people with revolutionary socialist ideas. More than 14,000 people have endorsed the Trotskyist candidates as a positive alternative to the Republicans and Democrats.

Ninety-three SWP candidates for local offices in sixteen states have played a vital role in bringing the message of revolutionary socialism to the broadest possible audience. In addition to assuring more media coverage and rallies, these candidacies have enabled the SWP to bring revolutionary politics into local issues and struggles.

Debby Leonard, SWP candidate for governor of Texas, told the November 3 *Militant*: "One interesting aspect of

this campaign is being on the same platforms with Raza Unida Party candidates. On many questions I find myself and Muñiz [the Raza Unida party candidate for governor] taking similar positions in opposition to the Democratic and Republican candidates.

"For instance, we are both for abolishing the Texas Rangers [a state police force well known for its brutality towards Blacks and Chicanos], while the capitalist candidates all defend them. The SWP supports independent Chicano political action, and we are urging Texans to vote for RUP candidates for offices we are not running for."

In Massachusetts, SWP senatorial candidate Don Gurewitz represented Jenness in a debate on October 3 with leading youth organizers for Nixon and McGovern. The debate, sponsored by the student government of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst was attended by about 200 people. In Boston, Jeanne Lafferty is running against Representative Louise Day Hicks, a racist candidate backed by McGovern.

In New York's 18th Congressional District, SWP candidate Rebecca Finch focused on the struggle of Black parents and students to control the public schools. Their efforts have come under attack from reactionary forces, including the bureaucratic heads of the New York Federation of Teachers.

In Oakland, California, Ken Milner, a Trotskyist who has long been active in Black nationalist struggles, is running against Representative Ron Dellums, who has built a reputation as a "radical Democrat," and conservative Republican Peter Hanaford.

The Middle East crisis has emerged as a major factor in that race. Dellums has imitated McGovern in his strident pro-Zionism. Milner, in contrast, wrote an article for the *Daily Californian*, a widely read campus newspaper, in which he placed the blame for violence in the Middle East squarely on the Zionist state. He and other local SWP candidates backed a twenty-four-hour protest vigil at the West German consulate in San Francisco by Arab and Iranian students protesting the anti-Arab witch-hunt in West Germany.

Seventeen teams of campaign supporters have been on the road, travel-



ANDREW PULLEY

ing to almost every corner of the contiguous United States. These teams have organized campus rallies and meetings, debated supporters of Nixon and McGovern, distributed campaign literature, and initiated Young Socialists for Jenness and Pulley groups.

During the fall, Linda Jenness and Andrew Pulley made their third national tour. On October 20, Jenness spoke to 350 people at Boston's Faneuil Hall.

The Communist party, the most important opponent of revolutionary socialism on the left in the United States, also has a presidential slate — Gus Hall for president and Jarvis Tyner for vice president. Because of the impact of the SWP election campaign on radical-minded youth, and the growing disillusionment in many sections of the population with the Democratic party, the CP decided to partially mask its continuing efforts to "reform" the Democratic party by fielding candidates in its own name.

These candidates have been running scared against Nixon and biased for McGovern. Gus Hall told a group of supporters in Philadelphia, "We won people away from Nixon. We actually won more votes for McGovern than Shriver did." The CP campaign seeks votes for McGovern under the slogan of "Defeat Nixon."

More than 5,000 copies of *The Truth about the 1972 Communist Party Election Campaign*, a pamphlet exposing the pro-Democratic party orientation of Hall and Tyner, have been distributed by supporters of Jenness and Pulley. The CP candidates have not replied to this challenge, confining themselves to sideswipes against the SWP's support for Black nationalism and its opposition to the "progressive" McGovern.

Despite an intensive effort to get on the ballot in a large number of states, the CP ticket will appear on the ballot in only fourteen. A welcome development was the willingness of the Communist party to join with the SWP in challenging antidemocratic ballot laws in Pennsylvania and Tennessee.

During the spring primary elections, Senator McGovern was widely looked upon by antiestablishment youth as a real alternative to Nixon. Since then, McGovern has moved to the right to accommodate the machine politicians and the labor bureaucrats. Enthusiasm for his campaign has plummeted.

Larry Seigle, campaign manager for Jenness and Pulley, said in an interview that this trend has been quite noticeable:

"Today there are relatively few people involved in the McGovern support groups, which once flourished on the campuses, although most antiwar and radical young people still plan to vote for him. In my opinion, McGovern's poor showing in the polls is not the main factor in this decline. These young people are bitterly disappointed in McGovern because of his rightward shift. That shift exposed him in their eyes as just another dishonest politician.

"As a result, they are interested in our ideas and increasingly responsive to proposals for revolutionary change, even though most of them are not yet ready to vote for Trotskyist candidates. Many remember our warnings that McGovern is no less devoted to capitalism than Nixon. They now take us seriously as revolutionary antagonists of capitalism." □

Watergate—Something New in U.S. Politics

By Fred Feldman

The extent to which the Republican high command has resorted to using espionage and sabotage against their counterpart in the two-party system is something new in American presidential elections—those quadrennial political shows that Wall Street and its representatives hold up to the world as models of democracy.

The accumulating evidence points to top-ranking members of the personal staff of The President as the shadowy figures behind this operation, which goes by the Nixonese title of "offensive security." It has been financed by funds drawn from a campaign war chest of possibly \$20 million contributed by unidentified sources to the Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP).

According to the October 10 *Washington Post*, "FBI agents have established that the Watergate bugging incident stemmed from a massive campaign of political sabotage conducted on behalf of President Nixon's re-election and directed by officials of the White House and the Committee to Re-elect the President.

"The activities, according to information in FBI and Department of Justice files, were aimed at all the major Democratic presidential contenders and—since 1971—represented a basic strategy of Nixon's re-election effort. . . .

"'Intelligence work' is normal during a campaign and is said to be carried out by both political parties. But the investigators said what they uncovered goes far beyond what is normal, and is unprecedented in its extent and intensity.

"They said it included:

"Following members of Democratic candidates' families; forging letters and distributing them under the candidates' letterheads; leaking false and manufactured items to the press; throwing campaign schedules into disarray; seizing confidential campaign files and investigating the lives of dozens of Democratic campaign workers. . . .

"The investigators said that a major purpose of the sub rosa activities was

to create so much confusion, suspicion and dissension that the Democrats would be incapable of uniting after choosing a presidential nominee.

"The FBI's investigation of the Watergate definitely established that virtually all the acts against the Democrats were financed by a secret, fluctuating \$350,000-\$700,000 campaign fund that was controlled by former Attorney General John N. Mitchell while he headed the Justice Department. Later, when he served as President Nixon's campaign manager, Mitchell shared control of the fund with others. The money was kept in a safe in the office of the President's chief fundraiser, former Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans."

According to the October 25 *New York Post*, H.R. Haldeman, Nixon's top political adviser, was one of those authorized to approve payments for "offensive security" operations.

The October 23 issue of *Time* magazine named Donald H. Segretti as one of those hired to infiltrate and disrupt Democratic campaigns:

"The [Justice] department's files state that Segretti, a 31-year-old registered Democrat and a former Treasury Department lawyer, was hired in September 1971 by Dwight Chapin, a deputy assistant to the President, and Gordon Strachan, a staff assistant at the White House. Chapin is the President's most trusted aide-de-camp and acts as a liaison between Nixon and his giant staff. For his services, Segretti was paid by Herbert Kalmbach, Nixon's personal attorney. . . ."

Segretti tried to recruit young lawyers to infiltrate Democratic campaigns, promising them that they would be well rewarded in a second Nixon administration. As Segretti told one prospect, "Nixon knows that something is being done. It's a typical deal. 'Don't-tell-me-anything-and-I-won't-know.'" (*Washington Post*, October 10.)

No Democrat likely to oppose Nixon's reelection effort was immune from "offensive security" surveillance. In 1971 Segretti asked a former army

officer to join the campaign of George Wallace, the racist governor of Alabama who threatened for a time to siphon off Nixon votes by running as the candidate of the American party.

How far Nixon's campaign planners were prepared to go in using police-state techniques against the twin party of U. S. capitalism was indicated in the October 23 issue of *Newsweek*:

"At one stage, the GOP 'offensive security' network contemplated—and then rejected—enlisting a computer in its cause. In February 1971, Administration officials invited a former CIA operative and computer mathematician to meet with them to discuss the possibility of developing a sophisticated computerized intelligence bank of personal data on political friends and enemies. The specialist said he explained that 'scientific methodology' could be used to store data so people could be 'leaned on.' With dirty linen available on demand, he told *Newsweek* last week, 'it is conceivable that key people could be persuaded to repudiate a candidate they had been supporting'—a prospect so unsavory that the mathematician's firm backed out."

These revelations are part of the fallout from a single operation. On the night of June 17, Washington, D. C., police arrested five men while they were busily rifling the files and planting sophisticated bugging equipment in the offices of the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate Hotel. Later, two others, who had left before the police arrived, were indicted for participating in the raid. Three of the Watergate raiders were also charged with a similar invasion of McGovern campaign headquarters on May 27.

Some of the operators had received their training for such "security" operations in the government witch-hunting agencies supported by both capitalist parties.

E. Howard Hunt, who is charged with having organized the burglaries, was hired as a White House "consultant" in 1971 on the suggestion of Charles W. Colson, special counsel to Nixon. Colson is "known as the administration's specialist in covert political operations." (*Washington Post*, September 16.)

According to the June 26 issue of the *New York Times*, Hunt, operating under the code name 'Eduardo,' was

in direct charge of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Hunt worked for the CIA from 1949 to 1970.

G. Gordon Liddy, a former Treasury Department official, was financial counsel to CREEP at the time of the Watergate raid.

James W. McCord Jr. was the security coordinator for CREEP. After three years with the FBI, McCord went to work for the CIA in 1951. He played a peripheral role in the Bay of Pigs invasion. McCord retired from the CIA in 1970.

Representative William Moorhead, a Pennsylvania Democrat, charged on October 22 that McCord helped draft a "National Watchlist" for the Office of Emergency Preparedness. The "Watchlist," supposedly for use in a "national emergency," would include "information the censors will look for as they open letters, monitor broadcasts and question travelers." (*Washington Post*, October 23.)

Bernard L. Barker, who has confessed to participating in the burglary, had \$114,000 in checks from CREEP deposited in his bank account.

The Cuban-born Barker once served in Batista's Bureau de Investigaciones. The June 26 *New York Times* reported that he also once worked for the CIA. "He was reported to have been Mr. Hunt's 'paymaster' for the Cuban landing and, under the code name 'Macho,' to have established the secret invasion bases in Guatemala and Nicaragua."

In an interview with the *New York Times* (September 12), this sinister figure said that "he would endure a long prison term rather than implicate others or disclose the reasons behind the affair."

He explained that he had "always dealt with the paramilitary, the intelligence movement, the people who live by their word." Barker told the *Times*: "I think more as a cop and not as a burglar."

When the Watergate burglars were seized and their connections to the Republican party became public knowledge, Nixon issued a formal denial of responsibility. As the scandal deepened, his aides adopted a public pose of injured innocence. John Erlichman referred to the spying operations as typical "political pranks"—an everyday part of U. S. politics.

Recently Republican campaign director Clark McGregor and White House

press secretary Ronald Ziegler denounced the *Washington Post* for publicizing the charges. At the same time, both of them refused to deny the allegations. Nixon himself has lapsed into silence.

Some sections of the ruling class have voiced criticisms of the Watergate affair and similar antidemocratic moves of the Nixon administration. The *New York Times*, reiterating its endorsement of McGovern, said on October 22:

"Still more ominous, the President and his men have injected into national life a new and unwelcome element—fear of government repression, a fear reminiscent of that bred by the McCarthyism of twenty years ago. The freedom of the press including the electronic media, the right to privacy, the right to petition and dissent, the right of law-abiding citizens to be free of surveillance, investigation and harassment—these and other liberties of the individual are visibly less secure in America today than they were four years ago."

Nixon's "offensive security" dovetails with the tendency, observable to one degree or another in all the advanced capitalist countries, toward the establishment of "strong" governments. Such governments, while not fascist,

seek to restrict or do away with the democratic rights won by the masses.

The organization of powerful staffs, commanded by the president and not subject to congressional control, which has been brought to a new peak by Nixon, is another sign of this trend. These personal "aides" carry out important governmental tasks as well as clandestine operations like the "offensive security" effort. Unlike the cabinet, the FBI, and even the CIA, whose top officials are formally subject to congressional investigation and approval, these presidential assistants are answerable to Nixon alone. This tendency to bypass Congress has grown under both the Democrats and the Republicans.

The high-ranking Democratic targets of "offensive security" have not responded very energetically. This is understandable since Democrats have played a major role in building up the witch-hunting apparatuses. In carrying out imperialist operations like John F. Kennedy's Bay of Pigs invasion, the Democrats mobilized the same "intelligence" underworld that provided the personnel for the Watergate raid.

The McCarthyite witch-hunt itself began under the Truman administration with the "loyalty-oath" requirement and the blacklisting of "suspected" radicals.

Pentagon Aims for Anderson's Eyeballs

Several months ago, the Washington columnist Jack Anderson exposed research being carried on by the Pentagon on a laser gun that could cause a "micro-explosion" in the eyes of "enemy" troops. (See "Go for Their Eyeballs" in *Intercontinental Press*, September 11, p. 938.)

The Pentagon did not like that exposure, and sought to counteract it. In his column of October 17, Anderson recounts how the Pentagon went about it:

"More recently, the Pentagon furnished the editors of Air Force Magazine with material for a blistering attack on us. They challenged our report about Air Force research on a laser beam that would explode the eyeballs of enemy soldiers at a distance of more than a mile. Blinded soldiers, the research noted, would be more of a burden to a fighting force than dead soldiers.

"We based our story on a copy of the actual study, which speaks more than five times of the violent effects of laser beams on eyeballs. Twice, the study cites 'massive blast' effects; in another place, it tells of a 'micro-explosion' in the eyes.

The water[y] fluids in the eyes, adds the study, would 'rise to about 100 degrees centigrade'—the boiling point.

"Although we had a copy of the study, we also contacted two Air Force researchers at Wright-Patterson AFB, where the research was reviewed. They would confirm only that they had been involved in classified research on laser weapons.

"Finally, we located the physician-researcher, Dr. Milton Zaret, who directed the study for the Air Force. To make sure our story was absolutely accurate, we read it back to him word-for-word. He suggested a few minor technical changes, which we made.

"After Air Force Magazine called our story false, we reached editors Claude Witze and John Frisbee. The attack on us was written by Witze who admitted he had never seen the study he accused us of misrepresenting. He also had never tried to reach the scientist who prepared it nor, for that matter, had he bothered to seek our side of the story.

"My understanding was that (the Pentagon version) was the whole package," said Witze. "I rely on them fairly heavily."

Allende's Concessions Fail to Halt Crisis

By David Thorstad

Faced with a continuing nationwide crisis that erupted when truckers went out on strike October 10, Chilean President Salvador Allende decided the night of October 17-18 to grant three concessions to the strikers. According to a report in the October 19 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*, these were the following: to return requisitioned trucks to their owners; to withdraw the government's charges of subversion against the main leaders of the Confederation of Truck Owners, thereby bringing about their release from jail; and to recognize the "private nature" of the transportation companies.

The last concession appeared to remove the bone of contention that had helped set off the strike wave—the government's plan to form a state trucking company in the south, whose potential competition the private companies feared.

The government's concessions failed to induce the opposition, spearheaded by the Christian Democrats, to call off its attempt to engulf the country in chaos and paralysis. On the contrary, on October 21 a whole series of new and explicitly political demands were raised, clearly revealing the ultimate aim of the opposition: to force Allende to abandon his policy of nationalization and to turn him into a captive of the opposition and the army.

The escalated list of demands was presented to the government by a "national commando" representing a whole series of organizations: truck owners, merchants, associations of manufacturers and construction magnates, professional groups, landholders, taxi drivers, Catholic University students, students in private educational institutions, etc.

The list included most of the demands the opposition has been raising over the past few months, among them the following: return to their owners of all factories taken over by the state since August 21; elimination of the Juntas de Abastecimiento y Control de Precios (neighborhood watchdog committees on food supplies

and price controls) and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution; adoption of the opposition's constitutional reform measure forbidding any state take-over without prior approval from congress; expulsion of foreign "extremists" from the country; a promise not to create a unified banking institution; a lifting of the price ceiling imposed on Papelera, the newsprint producer controlled by the right wing; and an end to the silencing of radios (the government has closed down more than a dozen for six-day periods for broadcasting "alarmist" information).

"The government is pretty much being asked to retreat and in large part to abandon the legal means it still has at its disposal in its attempt to begin the 'passage to socialism' called for in its program," wrote Pierre Kalfon in the October 24 issue of *Le Monde*.

On October 27, Allende announced that he had broken off talks with leaders of unions involved in the continuing strike because, according to the Associated Press, "they want political concessions that would limit his constitutional powers."

"I cannot accept that," Allende said in a nationwide television address.

The opposition has resorted to other methods than escalating its list of grievances in order to maintain the momentum of its movement. On October 24, for instance, it called on the Chilean people to stay at home and observe a "day of silence."

"With our silence we want the government to hear the loud voice of the malcontents," said a spokesman for the Democratic Confederation. The confederation consists of the five center and conservative parties in the parliamentary opposition: the Christian Democrats, the National party, the party of the Radical Left, the Democratic National party, and Radical Democracy. United Press International reported that the call for the day received a "mixed response" but "failed to paralyze" activity in Santiago.

On October 29, the Democratic Confederation made public its decision to bring a motion of censure against four ministers in Allende's cabinet. It is taken for granted that the motion will be passed, since the opposition controls both houses of congress. In that case, the four would have to resign.

The ministers, who are to be charged with "repeatedly infringing the constitution and the law," are Jaime Suárez (Socialist), minister of the interior; Carlos Matus (Socialist), economics minister; Jacques Chonchol (Christian Left), minister of agriculture; and Aníbal Palma (Radical), minister of education. It has already been announced that Palma and Suárez plan to resign before the November 4 deadline for candidates in the legislative elections scheduled for next March.

Although the strike has continued, with daily incidents of street violence provoked by demonstrating opposition forces, Allende seemed optimistic at a news conference for foreign journalists October 21. A major reason for his optimism was no doubt the response of the workers and broad layers of students to what the government is calling the "strike by the bourgeoisie."

"No factory has closed its doors," reported Kalfon, "The railroads, the ports, the mines, and the public services continue to function normally. Workers and students, activists and the unaffiliated, have stepped forward to insure the distribution of food to the population, beginning with the poor sectors on the outskirts of the cities."

Allende's tone at the news conference contrasted considerably with his warning a few days earlier that the country was on the verge of civil war. "We are no longer on the brink of civil war," he said, "because the vast majority have understood that the seditious actions of a small group could be crushed without the use of violence. If we wanted, we could bring a hundred thousand or a hundred and fifty thousand people here. The slightest signal would be enough to bring in fifteen or twenty thousand workers from the industrial suburbs of Santiago to open up Santiago's stores. We told them not to do so. The strength of this government lies in respect for the constitution and the law."

A key "strength" of Allende's Popular

Unity government at the moment, however, is the military, in whose hands he placed administrative authority over most of the country's provinces when he declared a state of emergency. This prevented any mass effort whatever by progovernment and working-class forces to combat the right-wing offensive. In the past, Allende has always denounced plots against his government by warning that "the people will answer any provocation." "But the nearest approximation of 'The people' on the streets this time were the middle class strikers who risked their civil-service jobs to demonstrate against the government that paid them," observed Lewis Duiguid in the October 26 *Washington Post*.

During the previous week, he noted in a report October 25, "Allende has averaged more than one public statement per day in high praise of the Chilean military." There are persistent reports in Santiago that high-ranking military officers may soon enter the Chilean cabinet.

Although the military continues to pledge loyalty to Allende, pressures on it to act are increasing. "Sources close to Dr. Allende show signs not only of worry about the eroding popularity of his government, but more importantly about the Army and its potential for action," wrote James Nelson Goodsell in the October 27 *Christian Science Monitor*.

In the city of Valparaiso, reported Everett Martin in the October 24 *Wall Street Journal*, "some people have taken to throwing kernels of corn on the steps of the local regimental headquarters—a not-too-subtle gesture to suggest that the army is 'chicken' for not acting against the government." □

Lives Do Too Add Up

Are human lives precious? Not on Wall Street. They don't add up on calculators. But this may be a mistake, if we are to believe Dr. B. F. Kiker of the University of South Carolina. The human lives lost by the U.S. in the Vietnam war up to 1970 cost more than \$11,600 million through 1970, as he figures it.

His theory is that the discounted value of a person's expected earning power during his or her lifetime is "capital." Thus a person's premature death or disability reduces the nation's wealth. The 40,300 fatal casualties resulting from hostile action through 1970 amounted to a human capital loss of \$5,100 million. The 7,400 fatalities resulting from nonhostile action and the 140,300 nonfatal war casualties brought the total loss to \$11,600 million.

But Danish CP Didn't Like What It Saw

4,000 in Copenhagen Protest Vietnam War



Copenhagen

Some 4,000 persons marched on the American embassy in Copenhagen October 14 in a demonstration staged in connection with the hearings of the International Commission of Inquiry into United States War Crimes in Indochina. The Communist party daily *Land og Folk* ran the above picture of this demonstration. The photograph contains a series of signs in which texts are clearly visible. The one in the center, however, has been tampered with to make it illegible.

Before the CP editors crossed out the sign's lettering, it stated: "Bakaemp imperialism med revolutionaer klassekamp — SUF" (fight imperialism with revolutionary class struggle—SUF [Socialistisk Ungdoms Forbund — Socialist Youth League]). The SUF recently changed its name to the RSF (Revolutionaere Socialister Forbund — League of Revolutionary Socialists), Danish section of the Fourth International. The sign also included a hammer and sickle insignia.

Orley Olsen, the editor of *Land og Folk*, told the daily *Information* that

he didn't know anything about the matter. "I just saw the picture in the paper," he lamely explained. He added that he didn't remember which of his paper's two photographers took the photo. □

Swedes Protest War

Antiwar exhibitions, meetings, and film showings were scheduled for nearly 200 locations throughout Sweden during this fall's "Vietnam Week" October 15-21, according to a report in the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter* October 14. The week, it explained, is one of "intensified work in support of the people of Indochina. Such a week is organized every spring and fall and involves tens of thousands of people throughout Sweden in working to mobilize and make visible the opposition to the USA's aggressive war in Southeast Asia."

The last day of the week saw thousands of Swedes take to the streets to protest the war. Some eighty demonstrations took place that day.

In Stockholm, an estimated 6,200 persons marched; in Uppsala 1,500 took part; and in Lund, there were two demonstrations, one of 1,000 and the other of 200.

Fidel Castro Calls for International Support

The Case of Billy Dean Smith

Billy Dean Smith, a twenty-four-year-old Black antiwar GI, went on trial September 6 at Fort Ord, a California army base. He pleaded not guilty to charges that he killed two officers with a fragmentation grenade at Bienhoa, South Vietnam, on March 15, 1971. Smith is the first GI to be tried in the U.S. for "fragging" (as murder by grenade is commonly called).

The only evidence against Smith is a grenade pin that army officers claim to have found in Smith's pocket after his arrest. However, a ballistics test revealed that the pin did not match the model used in the grenade found at the scene of the "fragging." Smith insists he was far away from the "fragging" site when the incident occurred.

The army has tried to back up its charges by citing Smith's antiwar views, his lack of enthusiasm for "closing with the enemy," and his statements that certain officers were racists.

On October 19, defense attorney Luke McKissack called Hubert Brown to testify. According to the October 20 *New York Times*, Brown said that "he saw two men running from the scene just after the explosion and could not tell whether they were white or black.

"He said that he offered the information to investigators at the time, and that instead of accepting his statement, they placed him in a line-up of suspects along with Private Smith."

As is customary under military "justice," Smith is being tried by a panel of officers. McKissack has protested this violation of Smith's constitutional right to trial by a jury of his peers.

On September 23, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, speaking with Angela Davis at a Havana rally, called for a worldwide effort in support of Smith.

The *Militant* wrote in an editorial on November 3:

"The frame-up trial of antiwar GI Billy Dean Smith takes place in the context of the growing revolt of Black servicemen and women against political harassment and racial discrimination throughout the U.S. armed forces. The Army is prosecuting Billy

Dean Smith to make an example of him and attempt to intimidate other militant Black GIs and other antiwar GIs.

"If all opponents of racism and supporters of civil liberties for GIs unite to demand freedom for Billy Dean Smith, we can make a different example out of this frame-up case. A united campaign in defense of Smith's rights can help to inspire the struggle against the war and for racial jus-

21 Receive Stiff Prison Terms

Turkish Workers Party Leaders Sentenced

Twenty-one leaders of the Turkish Workers party were given heavy prison sentences by a military tribunal in Ankara on October 17. The party had been banned at the beginning of last year "for having violated the law on political parties and for having encouraged the plotting of the Kurdish separatists."

The tribunal found the leaders of the party guilty of propagating "the principles of Marxism-Leninism" in order to "bring about the domination of one social class over the others," and of "creating an atmosphere of anarchy" intended to make it possible to "overthrow the existing economic and social order."

The following were sentenced to fifteen years in prison: Behice Boran, former professor of sociology and president of the Turkish Workers party; and seven members of the central committee—Osman Sakalsiz, Yalin Cerit, Nejat Okten, Turgut Kazan, Can Aikgoz, Yavuz Unal, and Husamettin Guven.

Sentences of twelve years in jail were handed down against the two secretaries general of the party, Saban Erik and Sait Ciltas; two academic: Sadun Aren, economics professor in the Ankara school of political sciences, and Adil Oskul, a law faculty assistant in the same city; and Bekir Yenigun, a trade unionist.

tice in the military. Fighting to free Billy Dean Smith means fighting for the rights of all GIs to express their opposition to the war and racial oppression."

The Billy Dean Smith Defense Committee has been organizing protests in support of the imprisoned GI. Among those who have expressed support for Smith are the Rev. Ralph Abernathy, Cesar Chavez, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, Representative Shirley Chisholm, Representative Augustus Hawkins, Representative Ron Dellums, Angela Davis, Mark Lane, and Jane Fonda.

The address of the committee is 6430 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 521, Hollywood, California, 90028. □

The eight other defendants received sentences ranging from six to eight years each.

The trial of the party leaders began over a year ago, in August 1971. "Throughout their trial," wrote Artun Unsal in the October 19 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*, "the defendants did their best to deny that they were guilty of the charges, insisting that they had acted legally. They disputed in particular the contention of the military prosecutors that the 'scientific socialism' advocated by the TWP was actually nothing but a disguised form of communism, by stating that what was involved was in fact simply a concept of socialism as opposed to 'utopian socialism.' They also stressed that the references in the party's statutes to the 'elimination of exploitation of man by man' and the 'payment of the workers according to the amount of work they do' were incompatible with the Constitution in force. The statutes of the Turkish Workers party had been published in 1962, and up to 1971 Turkish legal authorities had raised no objections to its provisions."

The Turkish Workers party was founded in 1961 and received 3 percent of the vote in the legislative elections of 1965 and 1969, *Le Monde* noted. It was estimated to have some 13,000 members in 1968. □

Beiner Campaigns for a Socialist Quebec

[The following article has been condensed from a report in the October 23 issue of the Canadian revolutionary-socialist biweekly *Labor Challenge*.]

* * *

Alan Beiner, nominated by the Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière (LSO—Québec wing of the cross-Canada League for Socialist Action-Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière) to run for Parliament from Montréal-Lafontaine is the only candidate supporting a socialist program for an independent and French Québec.

His campaign has been reported in all of Montréal's French-language newspapers. A cable TV interview with the Trotskyist candidate was viewed by more than 100,000 people.

The Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes (LJS) is supporting Beiner and organizing campus meetings for LSO speakers. The LJS is campaigning against the closure of French schools (the most flagrant educational cut-backs in Québec), student unemployment, and the language oppression of Québécois students. French schools usually have inferior facilities and students are often forced to use English-language textbooks.

The federal elections confronted the Québec left and nationalist movement with crucial decisions. What attitude should they take toward the boycott proposed by the 60,000-member Montréal CSN (Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux—Confederation of National Trade Unions), led by Michel Chartrand? Should they support the candidates of the New Democratic party?

"We disagree with the idea of abstention from the elections," Beiner explained.

"The PQ [Parti Québécois] position is very ambiguous. Of course, they do not preach abstention, but they are telling their members and supporters to vote for the 'best man.' It is their complete dedication to bourgeois parliamentarism that keeps them from calling for abstention. They don't want to undermine any illusions in the parliamentary system.

"But with the Montréal Council of the CSN, it's a different question. They are reacting to a visible and widespread rejection of federalism among militants in the union movement. But their position of abstaining from the election evades the real problem . . . the majority of Québécois do believe in the institutions of Parliament and still have illusions in elections even if they are questioning federalism. They still hope that some sort of solution to at least some of their problems will be found in the election.

"That is why we, the revolutionary socialists, do not reject elections as a means of struggle. Elections still dominate the political life of the masses. If we are to reach broad layers of the population with our ideas we cannot abstain.

"There is a choice for the working people in many ridings. We think that a vote for the NDP, in spite of its contemptible federalist program, is a vote for independent working-class political action. The NDP is backed by the 235,000-member Québec Federation of Labor and there is a strong support in the Québec NDP for independence.

"Our campaign in Montréal-Lafontaine is also a workers alternative to the boss and federalist parties."

The LSO has challenged the Montréal Council of the CSN to support Beiner. The council has not taken up this challenge.

"In Québec," Beiner said, "the NDP is not a mass labor party and it is not a crucial factor in the class struggle as it is in English Canada. The question of supporting the NDP as a working-class tendency within the Québec nation is different from English Canada because the masses of Québec workers are not going through the experience of the NDP.

"We have major disagreements with the NDP's program in Québec, an important one being the NDP's opposition to the Québécois independence struggle and its defense of the federal capitalist state. While the NDP poses the alternative of independent working-class political action on a cross-Canada plane, we feel it is ab-

olutely essential to challenge the NDP with our own program for an independent and socialist Québec.

"We think that the working class is the only social force that can lead our nation forward, liberating us from national oppression. We do not think workers can do this merely through trade-union struggles. The working class has to become political, has to forge ahead and shape its own class party on a mass scale. . . .

"In the present situation in Québec, where the revolutionary movement is very small and the NDP is isolated from the main thrust of the class struggle, we call on the Québec trade-union federations . . . to launch a mass labor party based on union locals, labor councils, and shop committees. Such a party would bring into its fold socialist and independentist groups who support independent working-class political action and would encompass the NDP."

When workers were laid off at the General Motors plant at Ste-Thérèse, Beiner said, LSO campaign supporters distributed a plant leaflet with a program for fighting unemployment—thirty hours work for the same take-home pay, open the corporation's books, and nationalize the industry if that is necessary to prevent layoffs.

"The big challenge to take the Québec workers forward," Beiner concluded, "is the hurdle of independent working-class political action . . . to break from the capitalist Parti Québécois, from the Liberal and Unité-Québec parties. The LSO stands for the launching of a mass labor party. That is the real test of the 'radicalism' of Québec labor leaders." □

Let Me Say This About That

Until 1968 James Boren worked for the federal bureaucracy. But he became so impressed with the government's "creative nonresponsiveness" that he resigned to found the National Association of Professional Bureaucrats. Its emblem features a ruffled duck strangling in red tape, a tapping finger, a sheaf of memos, the words "status quo" and the organization's motto: When in doubt, mumble.

The association studies "decision postponement patterns" and "orbital dialogue" and says that besides mumbling, bureaucrats live by two other rules: When in charge, ponder; and when in trouble, delegate.

Greenland 'Reexamines' Tie to Denmark

"One aspect of the enlargement of the EEC [European Economic Community] that is often overlooked is that the entry of Denmark into the Common Market will bring with it the entry of Greenland—a territory that is more vast than Western Europe and whose potential riches could some day completely upset the balance of forces between the big economic blocs that are now in the process of formation."

So began an article in *Le Monde* last August 8 by Silvere Seurat, president of the French firm Euréquip. Seurat pulled out all stops in his hymn to the glorious economic, political, and military expansion of European capitalism that Greenland is to make possible. The article sent a chill down the spines of many Greenlanders and provided anti-Market forces there and in Denmark with persuasive arguments against joining.

Seurat reminded his shortsighted colleagues that geographically the Europe of the Common Market "will not be only European." In addition to 1,850,000 square kilometers of European soil, it will also comprise 2,200,000 square kilometers of "this American land discovered in 932 by Europeans, the Vikings," and which, to the delight of farsighted European capitalists like himself, was turned into a Danish province in 1953.

Although the American president James Monroe did not show any concern over Greenland when he issued his famous "Monroe Doctrine," noted Seurat, the distance separating the island from the North American continent (Canada's Ellesmere Island, a mere twenty kilometers away) is nevertheless smaller than the width of the English Channel. The strategic value of this northernmost land, moreover, has not gone unnoticed by one of the Common Market's major competitors, the United States, which has built three military bases there.

At the moment, however, the importance of Greenland, with its 40,000 inhabitants (30,000 of whom are Eskimos) to the Common Market is not so much strategic as it is economic.

The potential of its fishing indus-

try—upon which one-third of its population depends for its livelihood—is only one aspect of this. Of even greater interest is its potential wealth in minerals. The riches of the Arctic are only now beginning to be tapped by the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union. There is no reason to think Greenland lacks resources like those that have been found in recent years in other parts of the Arctic.

Geological explorations in Greenland suggest possibly important deposits of oil, coal, copper, and uranium. According to the Danish socialist bi-weekly *Politisk Revy* July 28, some sixty companies are presently engaged in prospecting for minerals and oil in Greenland. "A while back," *Politisk Revy* reported, "the Danish state granted concessions to a series of domestic and foreign firms, which are planning to carry out extensive exploration. The Canadian company Greenex, which received a concession for extracting zinc and lead in the Umanak district, is estimating an annual production within a few years amounting to 600 million-700 million kroner [U. S. \$80 million-\$93 million]."

Seurat concluded his article by comparing Greenland to the American Far West: "The important thing is that the new Europe, having turned in on itself after abandoning its colonial interests, will be able to make itself felt in a big way in this new Far West that might better be called the 'Far North.' For the potential of the Old European countries for creativity and change will necessarily direct them toward this huge virgin territory—a land that is theirs, and that offers a natural field for their economic expansion and their thirst for human adventure."

Seurat, of course, did not recall what capitalist expansion did to the Native American population of the Far West. Nor did he take into consideration the desires of the Greenlanders themselves. "Perhaps the idea is that they will end up in the National Museum or will live on reservations," wrote Karsten Melander half seriously in the August 25 issue of *Politisk Revy*.

The parallel differs in at least one way, however. Unlike the American Indians, the Greenlanders were asked

—in the October 2 Danish referendum on entry into the Common Market—what they thought about the kind of capitalist expansion that Seurat anticipates. They voted overwhelmingly against entry—while Denmark voted in favor (see *Intercontinental Press*, October 16, p. 1109).

Less than two weeks after the referendum, the consequences of the heavy "no" vote in Greenland began to be felt. One of the island's two deputies in the Danish Folketing, Moses Olsen, announced during the opening of the present session that relations between Greenland and Denmark should now be "reexamined." According to a report by Camille Olsen in the October 18 *Le Monde*, the deputy's statement "made a big stir in Denmark and is going to create plenty of difficulties for the government in Copenhagen."

One of these difficulties will no doubt be related to the fact that the ruling Social Democratic party enjoys a majority of only one vote in the Folketing, thanks to the support of the anti-Market Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF—Socialist People's party) and—the Greenland minister, Knud Hertling.

One of the sources of contention between Greenland and Denmark may develop over the question of fishing boundaries. Greenland wants a limit of fifty nautical miles, which conflicts with the Market policy of setting a uniform limit for all member countries.

There are other considerations as well. "Greenlanders are increasingly impatient about putting up with decisions being made in Copenhagen while the only say-so they have at home is in a purely consultative body (everything affecting them is required to be done through that far-off administrative machine, the Greenland ministry)," wrote Camille Olsen. "Secondly, they are showing increasing opposition to the Danish-style education that is being forced upon their children in school and that in no way speaks to their customs, their mentality, and their needs."

At this point, representatives of Greenland are not expected to demand a "rapid and definitive breaking of the ties that bind her to Denmark," *Le Monde's* correspondent noted, but rather increased internal autonomy similar to that of the Faroe Islands. □

Charge Cops Hid Antifascist Evidence

The political corruption that has resulted in Pietro Valpreda, an Italian anarchist, being held in prison for thirty-four months on "suspicion" of having planted a bomb in a Milan bank apparently extends to the top levels of the state's repressive apparatus.

According to a dispatch published in the October 22 *New York Times*, two deputy prosecutors in Milan have asked that judicial proceedings be launched against three leading police officials who, they allege, concealed important evidence about the Valpreda case.

On December 12, 1969 a bomb exploded in the Banco Nazionale d'Agricoltura in Milan, killing seventeen persons. Two other bombs were simultaneously placed in Milan banks, and another at the Victor Emmanuel Monument in Rome. One failed to explode. Valpreda and eleven other anarchists were arrested for the act, although many in the Italian labor movement believed that the bombings had been carried out as a provocation by neofascists.

Under the pressure of a popular campaign on Valpreda's behalf, some police investigators turned their inquiries down what is known in Italy as the "black trail"—the neofascist and ultrarightist movement. That line of investigation, unlike the one pursued against Valpreda, against whom there is no evidence, has borne fruit.

Last August two neofascists, Giovanni Ventura and Franco Freda, were formally charged with the terrorist act. But Valpreda was not released. According to the October 20 *Le Monde*, the examining magistrate has established "with certainty" that the timing mechanisms attached to the detonators of the Milan bombs were purchased by Freda in March 1969.

"The 'black trail' therefore seems more and more serious," wrote *Le Monde's* correspondent Jacques Nobécourt. "But a question is posed: Hasn't the evidence now held against the rightist extremists been concealed by responsible persons? Without the persistence of several examining magistrates would the investigation have taken this turn?"

The questions are to the point. The three officials against whom the Milan deputy prosecutors have made charges, the *New York Times* reported, are Elvio Catenacci, Italy's deputy chief of police, who at the time of the Milan bombings was the head of the Interior Ministry's office of secret affairs, which handles investigations of political crimes; Antonio Allegra, head of the political office of the Milan police; and Bonaventura Provenza, head of the political office of the Rome police.

The *Times* reporter explained the charges against the three. Catenacci "secretly sent a fragment of one of the bags that held the bombs to its German factory for identification. The German report said that the bag, which appeared black, was brown, but Mr. Catenacci apparently failed to forward this information to the examining magistrate on the case."

The only "evidence" against Valpreda was the testimony of a taxicab driver (who has since died) that he drove Valpreda, who was carrying a black briefcase, to a site near the bank on the day of the explosions. (If the bag became black only after being blown up, the evidence disappears.)

The *Times* continued: "Mr. Provenza also concealed this report and is also alleged to have suppressed the testimony of a sales clerk in Padua who reported that he sold four similar bags, three brown and one black, shortly before the bombings. Mr. Freda and Mr. Ventura live in Padua. Furthermore, if this evidence proved to be accurate, it would contradict the taxi driver's evidence since the one black bag contained the bomb that failed to explode.

"Mr. Allegra is alleged to have lost a piece of cord attached to one of the bags that could have provided useful evidence.

"He was also involved in another judicial inquiry regarding the mysterious death of another anarchist, Giuseppe Pinelli, who was reported to have 'fallen or jumped' from a window at Milan police headquarters while being questioned in connection with the bombings. The police officer head-

ing the investigation was Luigi Calabresi, who was assassinated by unknown persons in Milan last May."

Despite the clear evidence that neofascists committed the bombings and that police covered their tracks, Valpreda remains in prison. He is being held indefinitely by a complex web of tradition and statute in Italian jurisprudence. A motion to free Valpreda on grounds of lack of evidence against him was recently denied by a Milan appeals court.

The court did not contest the claim of lack of evidence, but merely stated that there was no organ having the authority to release Valpreda, as the investigation of the crime is still in progress. That the investigation is no longer aimed at Valpreda was immaterial to the court.

Imprisonment is not the only persecution to which Valpreda has been subjected. One of his defense lawyers was recently denied permission to see him, and this month Valpreda was transferred from his prison cell to the clinic at the University of Rome. His health is said to be very poor.

In the October 6 *Le Monde* Nobécourt noted that only the most right-wing Italian observers fail to see a clear political design in the proceedings against Valpreda. In fact, a group calling itself "Democratic Magistrature" has stated that the continued imprisonment of Valpreda is "contrary to every principle of justice" and "demonstrates clearly the orientation of the police who first put the investigation on the anarchist trail."

The statement concluded: "Such a conception of the judiciary's function is the most dangerous enemy of the independence of justice and thus becomes a factor in the breakdown of the Constitution." □

Catchy Tunes From Mao's Songbook

An outstanding feature of the Army Day celebrations in Peking August 1 was the contributions from the band.

"In the course of the reception," said Hsinhua, the Chinese news agency, "the band played the tunes of 'Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman,' 'A Long, Long Life to Chairman Mao,' 'In Praise of the Great, Glorious and Correct Communist Party of China,' 'The People's Army Is Loyal to the Party,' 'March of the Chinese People's Liberation Army,' 'The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention' and other revolutionary songs."

Four Months in Sri Lanka's Prison Camps

[The following interview with Prins Rajasooriya was recently obtained in Colombo. Rajasooriya is the assistant secretary of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Revolutionary), the Ceylonese section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

Question. When were you arrested and how many other comrades were arrested with you?

Answer. I was arrested on March 19 together with twelve other members of a party organization called the Youth League. We were holding a Youth League meeting at my house when at about seven o'clock the police marched in fully armed — with guns, batons, machine guns, Sten guns. They said we were holding an illegal meeting. They wanted to search my house, and they asked if I had arms and ammunition. When I denied all the allegations, they insisted on our getting into the police vehicle, and we were taken to the Wellawatte police station, which is near my house.

Then I was separated from the rest. We were kept in custody the whole night. Next day, at about midday, the others were taken away and I subsequently learned that they were lodged in other police stations.

I was kept at the Wellawatte police station for at least twelve days. During this period, the other comrades were taken to the Criminal Investigation Department and questioned at length about various matters including their political activities. Submissions were made that we were collecting arms to stage some kind of conspiracy to overthrow the government.

At the end of about twelve days, I think it was about March 27, I was taken to the notorious fourth floor of the Criminal Investigation Department. People have been pushed from this floor to their deaths.

At the Criminal Investigation Department, I was taken to a room where a number of police officers were in civilian clothes. I was grilled from 9:30 in the morning to about 6:30 in the evening. I was asked all kinds of questions—from the time of my

birth to the time of my arrest. These included questions about my politics and about who my associates were.

At the end of this long grilling, I was told that everything had been taken down by a stenographer, that it was being typed, and that I would have to sign a statement. At that point I protested that I had been taken in by the police for one purpose and that very little or nothing had been asked of me about that particular purpose. Then the police officer shook his head and didn't answer me and said that if I wanted my protest recorded, it could be recorded. I insisted that my protest be recorded, that I had nothing to do with the allegations made by the police when they processed me, and that they were completely false and that there was no justification for my being held in custody.

Well, after that, the statement was signed and I was returned to the Wellawatte police station.

The next day, at two in the afternoon, an official of the Criminal Investigation Department brought what was called a detention order. A detention order is signed by the permanent secretary to the Ministry of Defense. Under such an order, one can be kept in custody, that is, in imprisonment indefinitely without trial. Under the present law, the right of applying for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court has been severely curtailed. In fact, it virtually does not exist. If an application is made to the Supreme Court to produce the person who has been kept in custody and to legally challenge the detention under the emergency regulations, a detention order by the permanent secretary is sufficient and the courts are not permitted to go beyond the detention order as such. So I was taken from the Wellawatte police station and lodged in a camp in the Vidyalkara University a few miles from Colombo.

During the April troubles the universities had all been closed and the two universities in Colombo had been converted into detention camps. Detenues—not just members of the JVP but anybody taken into custody by the government—were kept in one of these camps. These are not the only

camp. There are others all over the country but these were the two camps closest to Colombo. There was not enough room in the normal jails, so that a large number of camps had been established to house about 15,000 or 16,000 persons.

When I was taken to the camp, I found there were thirty-one others who were in detention with me in a huge hall. The hall itself was surrounded with barbed wire, there were prison guards inside, and there were armed sentries at various points on the perimeter of the barbed wire. The camp itself was under the jurisdiction of the army. The prison authorities merely supervised what happened inside.

The camp itself was divided into two sections. We were in the main hall, which was really the gymnasium of the university. On the other side a series of buildings, used on the campus as hostels for students, housed about 1,000 or 1,500 prisoners.

We were detained under regulation 18. The others were detained under regulation 19. Whatever the regulation, one was a prisoner, one's freedom was curtailed, and one's rights to be visited by relatives or friends were strictly curtailed. Those, like us, detained under regulation 18, could get visits from wives and children, if we were married, or from father, mother, sisters, or brothers if we were not married—three persons at a time, once a week. The detenues on the other side under regulation 19 could be visited only once a month.

Well, we were kept in this jail. Daily newspapers, books, and magazines were permitted but only after examination by the prison office. They did not permit political literature. Any type of political magazine or book had to be smuggled into the camp. In visits, one was permitted only fifteen minutes to talk to friends or relatives in the presence of a prison guard who had an open register and recorded everything that was said.

We were kept in the Vidyalkara camp until June 13.

The other comrades of the Youth League were released a few days after I was arrested, and I was the only one of our batch who was kept in prolonged detention. I think that the raid was aimed at me because I was the assistant secretary of the LSSP (R) [Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Revolutionary)]. Being a lawyer by profession, I was very active in the pro-

fessional association, the Bar Council of Ceylon, where I had been instrumental in mobilizing opinion against the measures. A month before I was arrested, the Bar Council met, and by an overwhelming majority called upon the government to withdraw the repressive emergency regulations, to put an end to the existing state of emergency as being undemocratic, as being unnecessary under the prevailing conditions in Ceylon.

In addition, it was well known that the party group in the Bank Employees Union was very active and that it was mobilizing the union to change the existing leadership which was pro-government. It was well known that the party group had been able to muster majority support, and it was expected that, in the forthcoming elections at that time, the party group would capture power in the union. In fact, the present president of the Bank Employees' union, Comrade Oscar Perera, is a member of our party and also of the Youth League. It was just luck that he did not attend that particular meeting. It is likely that the police expected him to be present, and I think they were aiming to take both Oscar and myself into custody to demoralize and frighten the bank employees from changing their leadership and adopting a more militant line than they had been following up to that time. Anyhow, Oscar did not come to that meeting and therefore escaped arrest.

In addition, through party lawyers and through our contacts in the law laity, we were mobilizing opinion against the now infamous Criminal Justice Commissions Act. That is a special law, creating a special unit to try political prisoners in Ceylon. This law sets aside all the safeguards that exist in the criminal laws as they exist normally. Confessions obtained by police officers, whether obtained voluntarily or involuntarily are admissible as evidence. The normal laws of evidence do not operate. Lawyers can be shut out of the proceedings of the commission. And even if the commission finds a person not guilty, it has no power to set him free because the government can keep such persons in custody indefinitely whether they are guilty of an offense or not. Therefore we were taking the lead among lawyers to mobilize opinion against the Criminal Justice Commissions Act, which was at that time in

its formative stage. It is possible that these are the reasons I was arrested.

After I was taken to the Vidyalkara camp, I made an application—as I was entitled to do under the regulations—to be taken before what is called the advisory committee set up under the emergency regulations. This advisory committee is under obligation to hear any person who asks to be heard and to inform him why he has been taken into custody and what allegations have been made against him. It must allow him to say anything, or even to produce evidence that he may have in his defense.

Although I made an application to be taken before the committee and although I wrote a series of letters pointing out that I was being denied one of the limited rights allowed under the emergency regulations, I received no reply whatever. I could only conclude that there was no reason for my being held that would stand up or carry even the coloration of justification in the eyes of ordinary men.

We were kept in Vidyalkara camp from March 28 or 29 to June 13. On June 13 we were transferred to the prison in Jaffna. Now this prison is a maximum security prison. It is an old Dutch fort, surrounded by high walls, guarded by the army. Every few yards you find an armed sentry looking down into the courtyard where the prisoners are. We were put in cells and locked up for a good part of the time. Jaffna itself was a regular prison, with regulations that any convicted prisoner is subject to, except that in our case we did not have to wear the prison uniform and work inside the prison.

We were put in cells and locked up until other political prisoners and detainees were transferred to Jaffna and there were not enough cells to house the prisoners in. The majority were kept in an open hall and locked up from six o'clock in the evening to six in the morning. In Jaffna, in addition to the thirty-one of us who were transferred from Vidyalkara, we were joined by thirty others, making a total of sixty-one. These thirty came from the regular prison at Welikede.

There were insufficient cells to lock each of us in for the night so we were put in a long lock-up cell surrounded by barbed wire and kept separate from the convicted prisoners.

As political prisoners we were regarded as more dangerous. We might corrupt the other prisoners and make them revolt; so we were kept in the cell block till August 2, when I was released.

Q. What were conditions like in detention?

A. At Vidyalkara, the food was standard and the quantity adequate but it was monotonous. Most of the time we were fed wild rice.

Because there were so few of us and since we weren't in a regular prison, we were allowed to go into the kitchen and supervise the cooking—we had little else to do except exercise, walk about, and read—and try to make it as palatable as possible. After some time, particularly through the intervention of a doctor who came to visit us, we were able to increase the variety of our diet because things like eggs, milk, came to be prescribed in addition to one ounce of butter a day. In spite of that, we by no means had a balanced diet and the monotony of the food was terrible.

At Jaffna, conditions were much worse. When we entered the little yard, after we were transferred, we were shown the cell block where we were going to be lodged. All thirty of us refused to enter the block and demanded to see the man in charge in Jaffna. There was almost a confrontation between us and the prison authorities. They tried to force us to enter but when they found that we did not yield, they finally took us to the superintendent of prisons, the Jaffna man, and the man who had come from Colombo.

We made it clear that we were political prisoners and that we had a right to live like human beings. At that time, the prison authorities were still not used to housing political prisoners. After about two hours of argument the authorities in Jaffna promised us a number of things. But in spite of all their promises, the conditions in Jaffna jail were pretty grim.

We had to eat the food that was cooked in mass quantities for all the five or six hundred prisoners who were lodged in Jaffna. As the authorities themselves confessed, they had no facilities to house political detainees and the food was much worse than in Vidyalkara. The prisoners in the kitchen, hot and sweating, cooked the food in unsanitary conditions, and

then poured it in cauldrons or buckets which had not been washed for goodness knows how long. We asked for a separate kitchen but the prison authorities were not willing to accede to this. We complained bitterly in a common letter to the authorities in Colombo about the hygiene and living conditions in Jaffna. But to this day we still don't know whether the letter reached Colombo or is still in the files at Jaffna.

The building in which we were housed was one long block of cells. It had not been swept and the floor was covered with about a quarter of an inch of dust. During the dry season, it is very dry and hot in Jaffna. The wind blew right through the building, rousing up storms of dust. Anything left on any flat surface for a couple of hours collected quite a thick layer of dust and throughout the day most of us had to cover our mouths and noses with handkerchiefs.

In addition to this, the bathing facilities were very poor. Out in the yard there was a well, but it was not more than thirty feet from a huge rampart separating the fort from Jaffna lagoon, which flows in from the sea. The water we drew from the well was brackish, leaving your hair sticky and your body encrusted with salt. You just cannot use soap. So things were pretty grim in Jaffna, although we protested and tried our level best to improve conditions.

Q. Were you able to converse with prisoners who had been there for an extended period and get a picture of what things were like for them?

A. I got first-hand information from persons who had been taken into custody and held for sixteen, seventeen, even eighteen months. There were people who had been taken into custody as far back as March-April 1971.

A young police recruit had been taken into custody before the April troubles began. Somebody is supposed to have sent an anonymous petition stating that he was up to anti-government political activity. Well, he was taken before two deputy inspectors-generals of police, he was questioned, and straightaway he was lodged in custody. At the time of my release there didn't seem to be any prospect of his being released and nobody knew what was going to happen to him.

I met the first detainee in all of the

island. His number was D-1 (mine was D-108). Ds were people detained under regulation 18. D-1 was a young boy who lived very close to the prime minister's house. In fact, his street is two blocks behind the prime minister's house in Colombo. He has an elder brother. Now his elder brother one afternoon had been standing on the roadside. He had seen the prime minister pass in her car with her police escort. He is supposed to have turned around to somebody and said, "Look at that woman! She is very stout; she goes about in big cars; she is well fed, all at our expense. We are standing and starving while they have the best in life. Something should be done about it."

Well, this was all that he said. But there happened to be a police informer listening who conveyed this information to the nearest police station. Within an hour's time, the police arrived at his house. He himself was not at home and his younger brother, who is D-1, happened to be at home. He was taken into custody by the police, who said that when the elder brother came to the police station, the younger brother would be released. But when I was in Jaffna, both D-1 and his elder brother were brought from the Welikede prison to Jaffna. Even if there was some complaint against the elder brother, there was nothing that could be said against the younger brother. He had just been kept in custody for an allegation against his elder brother. At the time I was released he had been in custody for well over eighteen months.

I think this illustrates the conditions in Ceylon. People are taken into custody on anonymous petitions, on allegations, without any chance of defending themselves, without any chance of knowing who the person is who made the allegation, or even what the allegation is—jailed for an indefinite length of time, without any trial, without any hope of release in the near future or even without knowing what is going to happen to them.

There were a number of cases like that. Some were political opponents of the government, many were people who had been members of the JVP [Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna] and had participated in the events of April. However, just as many were people who had been critical of the government, or who had carried on activity against the government—legal, nor-

mal, political activity, permitted under the normal laws of the land. There were just as many such people as people against whom the government might have some kind of complaint.

Q. Was your detention successful in intimidating the bank workers?

A. If the government hoped to intimidate the bank employees as a result of taking me into custody, they were very sadly mistaken. They completely misjudged the mood of the workers in that industry.

While I was in jail, the annual congress of the union was held. The old progovernment, passive, class-collaborationist leadership was ousted and Oscar Perera, a member of our party, was elected president. A number of other members of our party were elected to office and the union mobilized on an island-wide basis as it had never done in the past, on a most militant line.

It so happened that a few days after my release the union decided to strike and on September 1 began a general strike that is still in progress.

Now, the former leadership was pro-LSSP, the party led by the present finance minister, Dr. N. M. Perera. Although the collective agreements with the employers had come to an end about two years ago, they did very little to agitate for new and more favorable terms and conditions of employment, although the cost of living has soared to a level never before seen in this country.

The new leadership propagandized in the union, mobilized the members, and finally, when they found no other way out after continuous negotiations with the government, they launched the strike.

They are demanding (1) new terms and conditions of employment, (2) a revision in wage and salary scales, (3) rent allowances to keep up with the inflated rents that prevail in Colombo and other cities, (4) adequate hospital facilities, adequate old age insurance, and a number of similar demands.

Q. Are there any political demands in the strike, related to democracy or civil liberties?

A. Well, there are no political demands as such, although in the process of mobilization, the union itself

at every level, from branches and membership meetings right up to the leadership, passed resolutions condemning the present emergency. The union called upon the government to withdraw repressive legislation. The union also called upon the government to free the political prisoners.

These were not put forward as demands in the strike; but in the process of mobilization, at every stage, resolutions were passed, letters addressed to the authorities on these questions.

Q. What is the present status of the strike?

A. Under the emergency laws, the banking industry has been declared an essential industry. Any strike in such an industry is an illegal strike. This has therefore been an illegal strike from its inception.

The government made a great fuss about this and warned the bank employees that they would face prosecution, that their leaders would be sent to jail, and that very serious penalties would be imposed if they went out on strike. No amount of threats by the government had any effect because the union mobilized and acted.

Since September 1, there have been a number of developments. I think the government miscalculated the situation and overestimated its popularity in the country. One week after the strike began, the government gave an ultimatum to the probationers in the bank—new employees who are on probation and who could be dismissed without any reason or notice. There are a fairly large number of them. They are young newcomers to the industry; most of them have never been on strike. Most of them are hand-picked for their loyalty to the government. The government thought that when it issued an ultimatum to the probationers, they would knuckle under and go back to work. Not a single probationer has gone back to work.

On the next day, an ultimatum was issued to the regular employees. They were told that unless they came back to work they would be considered sacked. Only nine persons out of 7,500 strikers have gone back to work. The number is so insignificant that it has made no impression on the strike. The morale of the strikers is quite high and they are determined to continue

with their struggle until they achieve victory.

Q. Could you describe the impact of the bank strike on the country?

A. You see, the bank strike is the first big strike under the emergency. It is also the first strike that the present coalition government has faced under the present conditions. These conditions have a thoroughly repressive character. As a result of what happened in April and subsequently, thousands have been jailed, and an atmosphere of fear has existed in the country with many people afraid to talk, afraid to participate in any kind of political activity.

In that context, the bank strike has had tremendous repercussions on the morale of the working class, because after the bank workers went on strike a number of unions were bold enough to pledge solidarity to them. In addition, a number of unions have pledged active support in case the government takes any type of direct repressive action against the leadership. For instance, the employees of the Central Bank have said that if the government takes the leaders of the bank employees into custody, they themselves would come out on strike.

A few stooge unions close to the government and controlled by the government parties have condemned the strike. But even in these cases, the rank and file—the branches—have passed resolutions and condemned the leadership for their black-legging actions and their condemnation of the strike.

One thing must be said: The fear of going on strike and launching out on struggles under emergency conditions is disappearing as a result of the strike. This is a great step forward particularly in the present context.

It must be remembered that in addition to the Sri Lanka Freedom party, the coalition includes the LSSP and the Communist party (Moscow). Now both these parties in the past have led trade unions and until recently had a considerable following among trade unionists, and many workers have had illusions about the leaderships of these parties.

The bank strike is starting to end those illusions and the bank strike is part of the political fight to destroy

the illusions that have existed in the minds of the workers that the present government is socialist, that the present government is moving in a socialist direction, and that the LSSP and CP are going to push the government in a leftward direction. I think all those illusions are disappearing and disappearing fast as a result of the bank strike.

In fact, LSSP members who are also members of the bank union today face expulsion because, in spite of orders from their party, they have refused to break the picket line and go back to work. So we know that in the union there are a considerable number of members of the government parties who might break politically with them.

Q. What can people in other countries do to help your struggle?

A. We are living in conditions of a police state. There is no freedom of the press, meetings, trade-union activity. Many types of democratic rights have tended to disappear.

In Ceylon there are organizations like the Human and Democratic Rights Organization which have been brought into existence to fight against the emergency conditions, to publicize what is happening, and to demand release of the political prisoners, the end of repressive laws, and an end to the emergency itself. People in other countries can help a great deal by publicizing what is happening in Ceylon. The workers in other countries can help by, for instance, boycotting Ceylon ships and Ceylon goods, and demanding that the Ceylon government end the present state of emergency and the repression that is going on.

Above everything else, people in other countries must be made aware of the real situation in Ceylon.

Now, in Ceylon itself, a certain degree of mobilization against the government's campaign of repression has commenced. More and more organizations are prepared to engage in some form of protest activity. On October 18, there has been organized a hunger strike campaign. Large numbers of people from all over the country, in many trade unions (already five or six have pledged support) and many people, organized,

unorganized, in groups, in factories, in villages, in offices, in the north and the south, will be participating.

Before this, there will be a series of meetings to publicize the hunger strike and to raise the question of

repression as it exists in the country. People will be told about the hunger strike, and it will be explained to them that this is the first step in a campaign against the repression.

This will help to create a higher

level of understanding and help mobilize people for further steps to come and for any type of action that is planned for the future. This hunger strike that is planned for October 18 is really the first step in a campaign against the repression. □

Good to the Last Drop

Soviet Bureaucrats Dub Coffee Beans Fertilizer

Can coffee be distinguished from fertilizer? Not easily when the Soviet bureaucracy is concerned.

Several months ago, a railroad car filled with bags of fertilizer was slated for shipment to Terbuny, some 250 miles south of Moscow. By coincidence, a shipment of 728 bags of top-grade coffee was simultaneously on its way to Yelets, thirty-three miles from Terbuny.

At the New Proletariat Railroad Station on the outskirts of Moscow the shipping papers on the two cargoes were inadvertently switched.

When coffee arrived at Terbuny, the railroad workers became suspicious. Was this really fertilizer? "The granules, although similar to the expected color and form, failed to dissolve in water," noted the government newspaper *Izvestia*. Moreover, the cargo was in jute instead of plastic bags. On these bits of evidence, the workers concluded that somebody had made a mistake.

But the stationmaster was not about to be taken in by malingerers, who clearly were just trying to avoid work. "Send the railroad car to the distribution point of the Agricultural Technical Agency for unloading," the official ordered.

At the Technical Agency doubts again arose. But again an enthusiastic stationmaster intervened. "Unload your car quickly or I will fine you for idling the railroad car," he commanded.

The car was duly unloaded. But the doubts could not be quashed. An agronomist was summoned. He took a sample of the coffee-colored beans to the local agricultural administration, where leading specialists concluded that the cargo was in fact coffee, not fertilizer.

But they did not have the courage

to say so. After all, the shipping papers said the cargo was fertilizer. Unloading and delivery went full steam ahead.

Some state and collective farms in the area kept the dubious fertilizer in sheds; others simply dumped it for use in fields.

A particularly brash agronomist called in a chemist for consultation. The chemist took a couple of pounds of beans in a jar, but forgot to take the sample to his laboratory. The jar, *Izvestia* reports, remains in the agricultural administration.

Finally, an order went out to all farms in the region to "gather all the

material, down to the last bean, and bring it back to the station." But the bureaucracy had been overtaken by events. Three months after the order, nine of the bags still remain unaccounted for. Presumably, they were appropriated by farmers who trusted their noses more than the shipping papers.

What happened to the real fertilizer? Did it turn up at the Kremlin labeled "coffee—top grade"? *Izvestia* was silent on that. Perhaps Brezhnev himself instructed the censors to keep quiet about how the truth was discovered. □

Stalin's Copenhagen Frame-up Claims

[The following note was received from Milton Alvin, a long-time leader of the Socialist Workers party living in Los Angeles, California.]

* * *

In your issue dated October 16, 1972, there is an article by Georg Jungclas that contains a minor factual error which, for the sake of historical accuracy, should be corrected.

Writing about Trotsky's visit to Copenhagen in 1932, Jungclas calls attention to the attempts of the Stalinists four years later in the Moscow frame-up trials to implicate some of the defendants in a conspiratorial meeting with Trotsky during his visit. Jungclas writes, "The defendants (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Olberg, and their comrades) were accused of meeting Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov in

Copenhagen to receive instructions for murder and sabotage."

According to Trotsky at the Dewey Commission hearings in Mexico in 1937, ". . . it was claimed by the defendants Holtzman, Berman-Yurin and Fritz David that they visited Trotsky in Copenhagen . . ." (*The Case of Leon Trotsky*, p. 9.) The chief defendants were, of course, Zinoviev, Kamenev, etc., but it was alleged in the trial that go-betweens met Trotsky.

Also Jungclas puts the date when the Hotel Bristol (where Holtzman claimed he met Trotsky's son Leon Sedov) burned down as 1919. This might be a typographical error. The actual date was 1917. (*The Case of Leon Trotsky*, p. 167.)

Not one piece of evidence was ever uncovered by anyone that Trotsky met with or conspired with any of the above-mentioned persons in Copenhagen or anywhere else. □

REVIEWS

When Mao Made a Secret Bid to Roosevelt

"One of the great 'ifs' and harsh ironies of history hangs on the fact that in January 1945, four and a half years before they achieved national power in China, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, in an effort to establish a working relationship with the United States, offered to come to Washington to talk in person with President Roosevelt."

This is the opening sentence in an article by Barbara W. Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives," published in the October issue of the American quarterly review *Foreign Affairs*. Tuchman is the author of *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45*, *The Proud Tower*, *The Guns of August*, and other books.

"What became of the offer has been a mystery until, with the declassification of new material, we now know for the first time that the United States made no response to the overture," she continues. "Twenty-seven years, two wars and *x* million lives later, after immeasurable harm wrought by the mutual suspicion and phobia of two great powers not on speaking terms, an American president, reversing the unmade journey of 1945, has traveled to Peking to treat with the same two Chinese leaders. Might the interim have been otherwise?"

Mao and Chou's proposal to come to Washington was transmitted on January 9, 1945, by Major Ray Cromley, acting chief of the American Military Observers Mission in Yen-an, to the headquarters of General Wedemeyer in Chungking. The message stated that Mao and Chou wanted their offer to be sent to the "highest United States officials." The text of Cromley's secret message, now made public for the first time, was as follows:

"Yenan Government wants [to] dispatch to America an unofficial rpt unofficial group to interpret and explain to American civilians and officials interested the present situation and problems of China. Next is strictly off record suggestion by same: Mao and Chou will be immediately avail-

able either singly or together for exploratory conference at Washington should President Roosevelt express desire to receive them at White House as leaders of a primary Chinese party."

Tuchman explains that Chou asked to be provided with air travel to the United States if Roosevelt issued an invitation in response to the request for a meeting. In case Roosevelt turned them down, "Mao and Chou wanted their request to remain secret in order to protect their relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, which was then in the throes of negotiation."

What happened to the request? It was not forwarded either to the White House, the State Department, or the War Department. "It was held up in Chungking by Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley with the arm-twisted concurrence of General Wedemeyer."

Ambassador Hurley, according to Tuchman, was a conceited incompetent who owed his appointment to Chiang's personal intervention with Roosevelt. He became a pliant tool of the dictator. In carrying out the American policy of pressing for a coalition government in China, he threw his weight so much on the side of Chiang as to make it impossible for Mao and his team to remain within it.

Tuchman provides some interesting details on the relations between Chiang and Mao and how they were affected by Hurley's interpretation of American policy.

"Hurley accepted no guidance from his staff. Because he was over his head in the ancient and entangled circumstances which he proposed to settle, he fiercely resented and rejected the counsel of anyone more knowledgeable about China than himself. When the coalition blew up in his face and he found Chinese affairs resisting his finesse, depriving him of the diplomatic success he had counted on, he could find an explanation only in a paranoid belief that he was the victim of a plot by disloyal subordinates. He did not consider there might be a Chinese reason.

"On the premise that his mission was

to sustain Chiang Kai-shek, Hurley of course blocked the bid of Mao and Chou to go to Washington, the more so as it was intended to bypass himself. Although their message had been addressed to Wedemeyer for just that reason, it reached Hurley because Wedemeyer was absent in Burma at the time, and he and Hurley had an agreement to share all incoming information. A second message from Yen-an the next day, addressed to Wedemeyer on an 'eyes alone' basis, quoted Chou En-lai as specifically stating that 'General Hurley must not get this information as I don't trust his discretion.' This, too, reached Hurley with effect that can be imagined. At the same time he learned through information passed by Nationalist agents in Yen-an of Bird's and Barrett's military proposals to the Communists.* A terrible bell rang in his mind: here was the reason why the Communists had walked out on coalition. They had received a direct offer and were already secretly proposing to go to Washington over his head!"

Mao and Chou's request did finally reach Roosevelt, but only in a secondary way and in terms condemned by Hurley. Moreover Roosevelt was plunged into preparations for the Yalta conference.

"Bewildered by the intractability of China, disenchanted with the Generalissimo but fearful of the troubles that would rush in if the United States relaxed support, Roosevelt was inclined to look for a solution in the coming conference with Russia. His hope was to secure Stalin's agreement to support the Nationalist government, thus giving the Chinese Communists no

*Colonel Willis H. Bird, the deputy chief in China of the OSS (the predecessor of the CIA), proposed "the 'complete cooperation' of all Communist armed forces 'when strategic use required' by the American command," according to Tuchman. Colonel David D. Barrett, chief of the Dixie Mission, brought two proposals. One involved an airborne landing of 4,000 to 5,000 American technical troops to operate jointly with the Communist forces. The other "projected, after victory in Europe, a beachhead on Shantung and the landing of an entire U. S. paratroop division of some 28,000 men for whom the Communists were asked if they could take care of supplies, other than arms and ammunition, until U. S. Army supply procedures could begin to function."

choice but unity. He succeeded in obtaining the desired agreement at Yalta, and returned to be confronted by a choice in our China policy. Tired, ill and in the last month of life, he made a decision that closed this episode."

A series of small accidents, the main ones being Hurley's personal quirks and Roosevelt's state of health, thus profoundly affected the course of history, to believe Tuchman. She speculates on how differently things might have turned out had the dice rolled differently:

"... let us imagine instead that, following a more normal process, the message had been duly forwarded to the 'highest officials,' and had received an affirmative response which is 99 44/100 percent unlikely but not absolutely impossible. If Mao and Chou had then gone to Washington, if they had succeeded in persuading Roosevelt of the real and growing strength of their sub-government relative to that of the decadent Central Government, and if they had gained what they came for—some supply of arms, a cessation of America's unqualified commitment to Chiang Kai-shek and firm American pressure on Chiang to admit the Communists on acceptable terms to a coalition government (a base from which they expected to expand)—what then would have been the consequences?

"With prestige and power enhanced by an American connection, the Communists' rise and the Kuomintang's demise, both by then inevitable, would have been accelerated. Three years of civil war in a country desperately weary of war and misgovernment might have been, if not entirely averted, certainly curtailed. The United States, guiltless of prolonging the civil war by consistently aiding the certain loser, would not then have aroused the profound antagonism of the ultimate winner. This antagonism would not then have been expressed in the arrest, beating and in some cases imprisonment and deportation of American consular officials, the seizure of our consulate in Mukden, and other harassments, and these acts in turn might not then have decided us in anger against recognition of the Communist government. If, in the absence of ill-feeling, we had established relations on some level with the People's Republic, permitting communication in a crisis, and if the Chi-

nese had not been moved by hate and suspicion of us to make common cause with the Soviet Union, it is conceivable that there might have been no Korean War with all its evil consequences. From that war rose the twin specters of an expansionist Chinese communism and an indivisible Sino-Soviet partnership. Without those two concepts to addle statesmen and nourish demagogues, our history, our present and our future, would have been different. We might not have come to Vietnam."

And, Tuchman might have added, Nixon might not have missed his calling as a used-car salesman.

To show how barren such speculations are it is only necessary to recall the trend of events at the time and the main objectives of Roosevelt's foreign policy. China was one of the great prizes of World War II, and especially of the war in the Pacific. It was to secure that prize that Roosevelt provoked imperialist Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor, thereby giving him the excuse needed for a military confrontation with this Asian rival. To gain China for American imperialism, Roosevelt required an indigenous regime he could rely on. In this respect, Chiang met every requirement.

What cut across the American imperialist calculations was the renewed rise of the Chinese revolution after the disastrous defeat of 1925-27.

Naturally, Roosevelt was interested in suppressing the revolution or in leading it astray as in the twenties. In fact he sought to combine both approaches. The State Department

backed Chiang's policy of endeavoring to bring the dissident peasant armies under his control or to smash them. And Roosevelt went to Stalin for assistance in derailing the revolutionary forces. Why should Roosevelt deal with the local Chinese Stalinist leadership when Stalin himself was available?

Roosevelt's policies proved ineffective for the simple reason that the Chinese revolution had gathered such momentum that it could not be stopped by either the Kuomintang or the Chinese Communist party. If Mao Tsetung, Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, and the other Chinese Stalinist leaders had stood too long in the way of the revolution, it would have passed over their heads. Other leaders of the peasant armies, or revolutionary leaders of the workers in the cities would have come to the fore. And American imperialism would have "lost China" perhaps even more definitively than occurred under the leadership of Mao and the assemblage of "capitalist roaders" who stood at his side.

Tuchman's article is nonetheless valuable in showing how far back Mao's pro-Washington disposition can be traced. It is to be hoped that she, or some other researcher, will be able to find material on some questions that her discovery inevitably raises. Did Mao send his message to Roosevelt with the knowledge of Stalin? Did Stalin perhaps even suggest it to his Chinese disciples? Or was Mao already thinking of the possible advantages of breaking with the Kremlin and moving into the orbit of the State Department?

—Joseph Hansen

Caribbean States Open Relations With Cuba

Four Caribbean countries have recently decided to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Jamaica announced their decision during the second week in October in Port-of-Spain, where, according to the October 17 *Le Monde*, "the main Caribbean states were meeting to decide to form a Common Market of the Antilles, beginning May 1, 1973."

All four countries belong to the British Commonwealth.

Meanwhile, in a speech in Havana October 14, *Le Monde* reported, Fidel Castro "reaffirmed the position that

there could be no improvement in American-Cuban relations as long as the government in Washington continued its 'counterrevolutionary' policy in Latin America."

"In addition," Castro added, "the criminal war against Vietnam is continuing. Therefore, it is all the more difficult to see how there could be any improvement in our relations with the United States in view of our solidarity with Vietnam and our permanent and intransigent denunciation of the crimes that are being committed there." □

DOCUMENTS

An Addition to 'Problems of the Chinese Revolution'

By Leon Trotsky

[The following letter, dated January 8, 1931, was written by Leon Trotsky to the leadership of the Communist League of China, the Chinese section of the Left Opposition, the international formation that preceded the Fourth International. The letter was included in the Chinese edition of *Problems of the Chinese Revolution* (a collection of articles and letters by Trotsky) but not in the English edition. Up to now it has appeared only in the internal bulletin of the Communist League of America, the original American Trotskyist grouping. That translation was defective. *Intercontinental Press* has checked it against the original Russian and made the necessary corrections. The Russian text can be found in the March 1931 issue (No. 19) of the *Bulletin of the Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninist)*.

[The letter is of considerable interest, in our opinion. It is one of the sources that explains some of the difficulties Trotsky faced in making public his strong opposition to Stalin's fatal policy of forcing the Chinese Communist party to enter the Kuomintang and then of reinforcing the Kuomintang by giving it membership in the Communist International. (The United Opposition to which Trotsky refers was a bloc that Trotsky's group, the 1923 Opposition, formed with Zinoviev and Kamenev and their followers in 1926. Its Russian name has also been translated as "Joint Opposition.") Within the United Opposition Trotsky stood in a minority on what seemed to be tactical questions of concern primarily to the Chinese Communists, and he bowed to the wishes of those in the minority who thought it unwise to speak out publicly on the question, since it would have meant violating discipline, thereby splitting the bloc that had just been formed to struggle against the ever more menacing rise of bureaucratism in Russia. Later, as he indicates in the letter, he considered this to have been a mistake.

[The letter is likewise of interest in showing the importance Trotsky placed on properly appreciating democratic demands as a means of advancing the revolutionary movement in the colonial and semicolonial world. Democratic demands are important—and not only in the so-called backward countries, in view of the erosion of democracy in the industrially advanced countries where the decay of capitalism has gone very deep in the forty years since then.

[The letter is well worth studying from another point of view—what it shows about Trotsky's method of examining reality so as to find a firm base in it for his revolutionary politics. Utilizing the variants worked out by some of the Chinese comrades on the possible relationship between a national assembly and soviets, neither of which existed as yet, he patiently demonstrated how one-sided and therefore disorienting such speculation can

be. Analysis must be based on reality. To guess, to speculate, to make doctrinaire projections can separate the movement from its political foundation in the class struggle as it actually develops.

[It was in the light of such considerations that Trotsky favored a positive attitude toward the partisan detachments of the time, that is, defending them against the Kuomintang's efforts to stamp them out. He suggested that it would be a good move for some of the Chinese comrades to participate in at least the main detachments—not to share their illusions or the illusions of their leaders, but to observe their relations with the peasantry, and to make connections with them as part of the work of building a revolutionary leadership. He was, of course, against giving up the methods being followed by the Chinese Trotskyists, who were carrying on revolutionary activities in the Leninist tradition among the workers in the cities.

[Trotsky's advice on some of the internal problems faced by the Chinese organization should be noted. Because of his distance from the scene he could offer only some broad suggestions. Their general nature, however, reveals his basic approach all the more clearly. Since the Chinese Trotskyists were attempting to carry out a unification in which no differences of a principled nature existed, he advised them to carry it through promptly and without dwelling too long on the past, inasmuch as this could lead to the creation of artificial differences and could even provide openings—as he intimates by a telling example—for elements opposed in reality to the unification. There was no real danger involved in acting without delay; in a living organization new differences would inevitably appear as fresh issues arose in the class struggle. In all likelihood these differences would cut across the old alignments, showing that they had been superseded, and now belonged to the past history of the movement.

[The letter as a whole is a fine example of the kind Trotsky wrote to his followers in his sustained effort to do as much as he could to transfer to a new generation of revolutionists lessons drawn from the vast experience of the Bolsheviks.]

* * *

Dear Comrades!

During the last few months I have received from you a great number of documents and letters in English, French, and Russian, as well as a large number of Opposition publications in Chinese. Pressing work, followed by illness, prevented me from answering you sooner. During the last days I have carefully studied all the documents received—except, alas, the Chinese—in order to be able to answer the questions you have raised.

To begin with, I will say that in studying the new documents I finally became convinced that there is no difference in principle at all among the various groups that have entered on the road to unification. There are nuances in tactics, which in the future, depending on the course of events, *could* develop into differences. However, there are no grounds for assuming that these differences of opinion will necessarily coincide with the lines of the former groupings. Further on, I will attempt to analyze the controversial and semicontroversial questions as I see them from here.

1. The entrance of the Communist party into the Kuomintang was a mistake from the very beginning. I believe that this must be stated openly—in one or another document—especially since in this instance the Russian Opposition to a large extent shares the guilt. Our group (the 1923 Opposition) was from the first, with the exception of Radek and a few of his closest friends, *against* the entry of the Communist party into the Kuomintang and against the admission of the Kuomintang into the Comintern. The Zinovievists held the opposite position. With his vote, Radek put them in a majority in the Opposition center. Preobrazhensky and Piatakov thought that we should not break our bloc with the Zinovievists because of this question. As a result, the United Opposition took an equivocal position on this question, which was reflected in a whole series of documents, even in the Opposition platform. It is worthy of note that all the Russian Oppositionists who adopted the Zinovievist or a conciliatory position on this question subsequently capitulated. On the other hand, all the comrades who are today in jails or in exile were from the very beginning opponents of the entry of the Communist party into the Kuomintang. This shows the power of a principled position!

2. The slogan *Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Poor* does not contradict the slogan *Dictatorship of the Proletariat* but only supplements the latter, and makes it more understandable to the people. In China the proletariat is only a small minority. It can only become a force by uniting around it the majority, i.e., the city and village poor. This idea is in fact expressed by the slogan *Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Poor*. Naturally, we must point out in the platform and in programmatic articles clearly and distinctly that the role of leadership is concentrated in the hands of the proletariat, which acts as the guide, teacher, and defender of the poor. However, in agitation it is completely correct to employ the term *Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Poor* as a short slogan. In this form, it has nothing in common with "Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry."

In a long document (Dec. 15, 1929) signed by Chen Tu-hsiu and others, the problem is formulated in the following manner:

"The tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution in China (national independence, state unity and agrarian revolution) can be solved only on condition that the Chinese proletariat, in alliance with the city and village poor and *as their leader* seizes political power. In other words, the conclusion and the victory of the bourgeois democratic revolution in China can only be attained in the Russian way, i.e., by way of a Chinese October."

I believe that this formulation is completely correct and excludes the possibility of any misunderstandings whatever.

3. On the question of the character of the Chinese revolution the Comintern leadership has reached an impasse. The experience of the events and the critiques of the Left Opposition have completely destroyed the conception of a "democratic dictatorship." However, if this formula is given up, then no other recourse is left except to turn to the theory of the permanent revolution. The pathetic "theoreticians" of the Comintern stand between these two theories in the unenviable position of Buridan's donkey. The

anniversary article (*Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1930) of Manuilsky is the very latest revelation on this subject. A baser mixture of ignorance, cretinism, and villainy cannot be imagined. The Buridanish theory of the Stalinist bureaucrats has been analyzed in the last number of the Bulletin of the Russian Opposition (No. 17-18). On this fundamental question at any rate we do not have the least difference with you, as all your documents demonstrate.

4. In some letters, complaints have been made about some groups or individual comrades taking a wrong position with regard to the Chinese "Red Army" by likening its detachments to bandits. If that is true, then a stop must be put to it. Of course, lumpen-proletarian elements and professional bandits are joining the revolutionary peasant detachments. Yet the movement as a whole arises from wellsprings deep in the conditions of the Chinese village, and these are the same sources from which the dictatorship of the proletariat will have to nourish itself later on. The policy of the Stalinists toward these detachments is a policy of criminal bureaucratic adventurism. This policy must be mercilessly exposed. We do not share or encourage the illusions of the leaders and the participants of the partisan detachments. We must explain to them that without a proletarian revolution and the seizure of power by the workers the partisan detachments of the peasantry cannot lead the way to victory. However, we must conduct this work of clarification as real friends, not detached onlookers and—especially—not as enemies. Without abandoning our own methods and tasks, we must persistently and courageously defend these detachments against the Kuomintang repression and bourgeois slander and persecution. We must explain the enormous *symptomatic* significance of these detachments. Naturally, we cannot throw our own forces into the partisan struggle—at present we have another field of endeavor and other tasks. Nevertheless, it is very desirable to have our people, Oppositionists, at least in the larger divisions of the "Red Army," to share the fate of these detachments, to observe attentively the relations between these detachments and the peasantry and to keep the Left Opposition informed.

In case of a postponement of the revolution, of a new economic revival in China, and of a development of parliamentary tendencies (all these are interconnected), the detachments will inevitably degenerate, antagonizing the poor peasantry. Therefore, it is all the more necessary for us to keep an eye on these detachments, in order to be able to adjust our position as necessary.

5. In several letters, the question of a national assembly is brought up anew. The problem of our political tasks is lost beneath guesses as to whether a national assembly will be set up, in what form, the relationship that might develop between the national assembly and the Soviets, etc. Running through such speculation is a strong thread of political scholasticism. Thus, for instance, one of the communications reads:

"We believe that the national assembly will most likely not be realized. Even if it should be realized, it could not be transformed into a 'Provisional Government,' since all the material forces are in the hands of the Kuomintang militarists. Regarding the government that will be organized after the insurrection, that will undoubtedly be the government of the proletarian dictatorship, and in that case it will not convoke a national assembly."

This supposition is extremely incomplete and one-sided, and, therefore, leaves considerable room for misunderstandings and mistakes.

(a) First of all, we must not exclude the possibility that the bourgeois classes themselves may be forced to convoke *something like* a national assembly. If the reports of the European papers are correct, Chiang Kai-shek is nursing the idea of substituting control over some kind of sham parliament for his control over the Kuomintang party which is now restricting him. Certain circles of the big and the middle bourgeoisie which have come into conflict with what they find to be an exasperating party dictatorship may look with favor upon such a project. At the same time, a "parliament" would serve better as a cover for the military dictatorship in face of American public opinion. As the papers report, Chiang Kai-shek has adopted Americanized Christianity in the not unfounded hope that this will facilitate his credit rating with the Jewish bankers in Wall Street; Americanized Christianity, American Jewish moneylenders and a Chinese pseudo parliament—all these harmonize splendidly with one another.

In case of a parliamentary variant, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, the students, a "third party"—all will be set into motion. The questions of a constitution, suffrage, and parliamentarism will come onto the agenda. It would be nonsense to contend that the masses of the Chinese people have already left all this behind them. Up to the present, they have only gone through the Stalin-Chiang Kai-shek school, i.e., the basest of all schools. The problems of democracy will inevitably, for a certain period, absorb the attention not only of the peasantry, but of the workers also. This must take place *under our leadership*.

Will Chiang Kai-shek convoke his own parliament? It is quite possible. But it is possible that the constitutional-democratic movement will go beyond the bounds planned by Chiang Kai-shek, and this will force him to go further than he wants to at present. It is possible even that the movement will sweep away Chiang Kai-shek together with all his plans. No matter what the constitutional-parliamentary variants, we will not remain on the sidelines. We shall participate in the struggle under our slogans; that is above all, under the slogans of revolutionary and consistent ("100 percent") democracy. If the revolutionary wave does not immediately sweep away Chiang Kai-shek and his parliament, we will be forced to participate in this parliament, exposing the lies of comprador parliamentarism, and advancing our own tasks.

(b) Can we assume that the revolutionary-democratic movement may take on such dimensions that Chiang Kai-shek will no longer be able to keep the military apparatus under control, while the Communists are not yet in a position to seize power? Such a transitional period is very likely. It could advance some sort of Chinese variety of *dual power*, a new Provisional government, a bloc of the Kuomintang with a third party, etc., etc. Such a regime would be very unstable. It could only be a step toward the dictatorship of the proletariat. But such a step is possible.

(c) "After the victorious insurrection," says the document which we have quoted, "a proletarian dictatorship might be instituted and in that case a national assembly

would not be convoked." Here, too, the question is oversimplified. At what moment will the insurrection take place and under what slogans? If the proletariat has assembled the poor peasantry under the slogans of democracy (land, national assembly, etc.) and in a united onslaught overthrows the military dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, then, when it comes into power, the proletariat will have to convoke a national assembly in order not to arouse the mistrust of the peasantry and in order not to provide an opening for bourgeois demagogy. Even after the October insurrection the Bolsheviks had to convoke the Constituent Assembly. Why should we conclude that this variant is impossible for China? The peasantry does not develop at the same rate as the proletariat. The proletariat can anticipate many things, but the peasantry will only learn from the facts. It may be that the Chinese peasantry will need to go through the living experience of a national assembly.

Since the bourgeoisie in Russia delayed convoking the Constituent Assembly for a long time, and the Bolsheviks exposed this, they were compelled, after they had come into power, to convoke the Constituent Assembly rapidly, on the basis of the old election results, which put them in a minority. The Constituent Assembly came into conflict with the Soviets before the eyes of all the people and it was dissolved.

In China we can conceive of another variant. After it comes to power, the proletariat may, under certain conditions, postpone convoking a national assembly for several months, develop a broad agitation in the countryside and assure a Communist majority in the national assembly. The advantage would be that the Soviet system would be formally sanctioned by the national assembly, immediately depriving the bourgeoisie of a popular slogan in the civil war.

6. Of course, the variations we have considered above are only *historical hypotheses*. There is no way of predicting what the actual course of developments will be. The general course, toward the dictatorship of the proletariat, is clear in advance. We should not engage in speculation over possible variations, stages, and combinations, but instead intervene as the revolutionary factor in what is happening and develop powerful agitation around democratic slogans. If we take the initiative in this field, the Stalinist bureaucracy will be brushed aside and the Bolshevik-Leninists will become within a short time a powerful political force.

7. The question of determining what possibilities may open up in the near future for Chinese capitalism is not a matter of principle but of fact. To decide in advance that capitalist development in China can no longer take a step forward would be the purest doctrinairism. A significant inflow of foreign capital into China is not at all excluded. Because of the world crisis, idle capital is accumulating that needs a field of investment. It is true that at present even American capital, the most powerful of all, is paralyzed, perplexed, apprehensive, and deprived of initiative, since only recently it fell from the peaks of prosperity into the depths of the depression. But it has already begun to look for an international bridgehead as the springboard from which it could touch off a new economic upsurge. It is beyond doubt that under these conditions China offers serious possibilities. To what degree will these be realized? This is not easy to predict

either. Here we must not guess a priori, but watch the actual economic and political processes. All the same, it is not at all excluded that while the bulk of the capitalist world is still struggling in the grip of the crisis, the inflow of foreign capital will create an economic revival in China. We must be prepared for this variant, too, by focusing our attention in good time on organizing and strengthening the trade unions and assuring them a correct leadership.

Naturally, an economic upsurge in China would postpone immediate revolutionary perspectives for some time, but this revival will in turn open up new possibilities, new forces, and new sources of strength for victory. In any case, the future belongs to us.

8. Some of the letters from Shanghai pose the question: Should we carry out a complete unification in the individual localities, fuse the press of all the groups, and convoke a conference on the basis of the unification that has already been achieved, or should we permit separate groups to continue within the united Opposition until all the tactical problems have been solved? In such organizational matters, it is difficult to offer advice from afar. It is even possible that the advice would arrive too late. Still, I cannot refrain from saying this to you: *Dear friends, fuse your organizations and your press definitively this very day!* We must not drag out the preparations for the unification a long time, because in that way, without wanting to, we can create artificial differences.

By this I do not mean to say that all the questions have already been settled and that you (or more correctly, *we*) are assured that no differences will arise in the future. No, there is no doubt that the day after tomorrow and the day after that, new tasks will arise, and with them new differences. Without this the development of a revolutionary party is impossible. But the new differences will create new groupings in the framework of the united organization. We must not tarry too long over the past. We must not mark time. We must go onward toward the future.

9. That new differences are inevitable is proved by the experiences of all the sections of the Left Opposition. The French Ligue, for example, was formed from various groups. Thanks to its weekly journal, the Ligue has accomplished very serious and very valuable work, not only from the national, but from the international point of view as well. It has demonstrated that the unification of the different groups was a progressive step. But in recent months some very serious differences have arisen in the Ligue, particularly on the trade-union question. A right wing has formed and taken a position that is false to the core. This question is so important and so profound that it can even lead to a new split. Naturally, absolutely everything will have to be done to avoid this. But if that does not succeed, it will not at all prove that the unification of yesterday was a mistake. We do not make a fetish of unity, nor of splits. It all depends upon the conditions of the moment, on the depth of the differences, on the character of the problems.

10. In Spain, conditions are apparently different from those in all the other countries. Spain is at present going through a period of clear and definite revolutionary upsurge. The heated political atmosphere should greatly

facilitate the work of the Bolshevik-Leninists as the boldest and most consistent revolutionary wing. The Comintern [Communist International] has smashed the ranks of Spanish Communism, it has weakened and rendered lifeless the official party. As in all other important cases, the Comintern leadership has let a revolutionary situation slip by. The Spanish workers have been left to their own devices at a most crucial moment. Left almost without leadership, they are developing a struggle through revolutionary strikes of notable scope. Under these conditions, the Spanish Bolshevik-Leninists are issuing the slogan of *Soviets*. According to the theory of the Stalinists and the practice of the Canton insurrection, it appears that Soviets must be created only on the eve of the insurrection. Disastrous theory and disastrous practice! Soviets must be created when the real and living movement of the masses manifests the need for that type of organization. Soviets are formed at first as broad strike committees. This is precisely the case in Spain. There is no doubt that under these conditions the initiative of the Bolshevik-Leninists (Opposition) will receive a sympathetic response from the proletarian vanguard. A broad perspective can open up in the near future for the Spanish Opposition. Let us wish our Spanish friends complete success.

11. In conclusion, I come once more to the question of unity, in order to point out the extremely pitiful experiences of Austria in this domain.

For a year and a half, three Austrian groups occupied themselves with "unification" and each thought up in turn such conditions as to make the unification impossible. This criminal game only reflected the generally sorry state of the Austrian Opposition which has been overcome by the decay of the official Communist party. This year each of the Austrian groups has succeeded in more than amply demonstrating that it is ready to give up the ideas and principles of the International Opposition but in no case its own sectarian pretensions. The more barren the ideological base of these groups, the more venomous the nature of their internal struggles. They delight in dragging the banner of the International Opposition into the mud and demand that the International Opposition use its authority to cover up their unworthy work.

Obviously the International Opposition is not going to do this. To bring unprincipled groups into the International Opposition would mean poisoning one's own organism. In this respect, strict selection is demanded. I hope that at its conference the International Opposition will adopt the "21 conditions" for the admission of organizations into its ranks and that these conditions will be sufficiently severe.

In contrast to the Austrian Opposition, the Chinese Opposition did not develop on the basis of petty back-room intrigues, but from the experiences of a great revolution that was lost by an opportunist leadership. Its great historic mission places exceptional responsibilities on the Chinese Opposition. All of us here hope that the Chinese Opposition will rid itself of the spirit of clannishness, and, rising to its full height, prove equal to the tasks it faces.

Yours,
L. Trotsky

Prinkipo, January 8, 1931

Indian Trotskyists Discuss Political Tasks

[The Central Committee of the Communist League, Indian section of the Fourth International, held a meeting during August. For the information of our readers we publish below two documents of that meeting. The first is the official press statement issued by the Central Committee; the second is the resolution on women's liberation. Other resolutions of the meeting will be published in future issues.]

* * *

The Central Committee of the Communist League, Indian section of the Fourth International, met at Varanasi, with Somendra Kumar, a trade unionist from Bihar, presiding.

The CC discussed a report on organizational problems by Magan Desai, general secretary of the party, and decided to strengthen party journals and publications in regional languages.

The party has state units in West Bengal, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Kerala, and has ad hoc committees in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

The CC discussed the impact of the India-Pakistan agreement reached at Simla and was of the view that though the agreement would reduce tension on the subcontinent, it failed to tackle the basic problems created by the communal partition of India in 1947.

The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation has reopened the problem of nationalities, which has remained unresolved in both India and Pakistan. The CC held that the problem could be resolved only in the larger framework of the Union of Socialist States of the Indian Subcontinent that would include India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other nations on a voluntary basis.

The problems of Kashmir, Pakhtoonistan, Sind, and other nationalities could be solved only in such a framework on the basis of their right of self-determination.

On the question of Muslim minorities and communal rioting in India, the CC felt that the failure of the capitalist government in India to resolve the communal question resulted from their inability to tackle it politically. This was the reason behind the tendency of the bourgeois governments to resort to police terror against the

minorities. The bourgeoisie themselves needed a communal bias to keep the working masses divided, and for this reason practised discrimination against the minorities in education and employment and in cultural and linguistic areas.

The problem of minorities cannot be solved on a communal basis, without a united struggle of the exploited masses. Nor can a successful struggle be launched without the cooperation of the exploited masses of the majority community, who will be the best allies in the fight against social discrimination against the minority. The final solution will come only through the overthrow of the common exploiters who maintain communalism to keep the working masses divided.

The CC took serious note of the growing assault on the civil liberties of the people and the tendency of the state and central governments to resort to a ruthless suppression of the struggle of the working masses by banning strikes and by resorting to lathi-charges and police shootings. [A lathi is a heavy stick, often bamboo bound with iron, used by police against demonstrators.] The CC decided to organize a nationwide campaign to defend the civil rights of the people in collaboration with var-

Women's Liberation in the Subcontinent

The expansion of women's education since 1947; the expansion of opportunities for employment of women in education and health services, private offices, post offices, banks, and administrative services; the rising cost of living, which forces men to send their wives to take employment; and the spread of a liberal attitude toward women among men have led to the destruction of the myth that women are made only for household duties and are inferior to men in intelligence or in capacity for handling outside jobs involving responsibility.

The existence of a political framework in India wherein more and more women get elected to representative bodies and hold offices in political organizations has contributed to an apparent sense of equality which has further infused women with confidence,

ious left parties and mass organizations.

The CC noted the current radicalization of the youth, the students, and the socially oppressed groups like the scheduled castes and tribes, the backward castes, and women, and directed its units to identify themselves with the struggles of these groups. It decided to organize a movement for the democratization and unification of the trade-union movement under workers' control on the basis of one union in each industry and elected workers' councils at the plant level. The party decided to agitate, among other things, for a cent-for-cent neutralization in the rise of the cost of living, for holding the price line, and against imposition of bans on strikes and against government control of unions.

The redrafted ninety-page programme of the party was finalized as per direction of the party conference held in Bombay in January, 1972. Among other things, it calls for the framing of a socialist constitution for India, abolishing the right to private property, and guaranteeing the right to work. The programme calls for nationalization of the basic and key industries, financial institutions, export and import trade, and trade in essential commodities. It calls for the total nationalization and democratization of educational institutions, with effective representation of teachers and students in managing universities, colleges, and schools.

especially educated and employed women. The drive for family planning has given them some relief and shown them the way to reduce their slavery.

Yet they are greatly handicapped in private and public life. Male supremacy in the family results in such social evils as dowry and sale of women, both legally by parents and illegally by seducers. It is conducive to mental and physical tortures, even by educated men who cannot bear being contradicted by women and force them into the conventional norms of female behaviour through physical violence as well as economic coercion.

Employed women have to perform a double duty, as their work on the job is only an addition to their work in their homes. They are discriminated against in employment and promo-

tion and are harassed by their employers in various ways.

In spite of their lives outside the home, even these women cannot participate fully in the social, political, and cultural life of society. The present society continually shuts the door of social life on them and forces them to go back to the domestic prison. It enslaves them through male-oriented personal laws and saddles them with the responsibility of running homes and rearing children. They have no control even over their bodies and the course of their lives. Educated and employed women resent it and sometimes offer resistance in their traditional way—by committing suicide or by running away from home.

The women's liberation movement in the United States and throughout the world has had its impact on the women of India too. They have begun to express their views and voice their protests publicly. The existing women's organizations have not had much influence. However, formation of radical organizations of women with a view to educate public opinion and agitate for reforms despite resistance from orthodox sections of society will very soon follow.

The struggle against the social oppression of women will develop around the demands of free education for women, free hostels for women students, hostel facilities for employed women, child-care centers and cheap hotels for married women, reservation of jobs and the end of discrimination in employment and promotion, a lighter workload, fewer working hours, liberal conditions of work, including transfer only on demand. As the struggle develops, more basic and fundamental questions will be taken up, including the abrogation of Hindu and Muslim personal laws on marriage, inheritance, and divorce; the right to free marriage and divorce, especially in cases of physical and mental torture and restrictions on personal freedom; and the right to free legal abortions and women's control over their own bodies.

The Communist League of India supports women in all their struggles for social equality and for liberation from the conditions oppressing them. It calls upon all employee unions and student associations to raise and sup-

port women's demands relating to education and jobs. But it is only through women's own organizations that their struggle for personal liberation, for a uniform civil code that respects their personal rights, for control of their bodies and personal lives, etc., can be best and most successfully fought. Such organizations have to be independent, mass-based, and democratically controlled in order to be able

to lead women's struggles to their logical anticapitalist conclusion.

The Communist League of India will support all women's organizations in their struggle and will help them to build a really effective, mass-based, radical organization through fraternal cooperation and criticism on the basis of a nonexcluding united front on a common programme of action. □

Berrigan's Open Letter to Leonid Brezhnev

[The following open letter, addressed to Leonid Brezhnev by Daniel Berrigan, appeared in the October 5 issue of the *Village Voice*, a New York weekly.

[Berrigan was released on parole last February after serving two years and nine months of a three-year sentence for destroying draft files as a way of protesting the U. S. aggression in Vietnam.

[His brother, Philip Berrigan, was given a six-year sentence on similar charges. On September 5, Philip Berrigan was sentenced to four additional two-year terms (to be served concurrently) for the "crime" of "smuggling" letters out of prison.

[Sister Elizabeth McAlister, who was convicted of helping him in the "conspiracy" was sentenced to one year in prison and three years probation.

[In the United States such harsh sentences are virtually unheard-of for such a trivial offense. The sentences were widely interpreted as revenge for the refusal of the jury to go along with the efforts of the Justice Department and the FBI to convict Berrigan and his fellow defendants of an alleged conspiracy to kidnap Henry Kissinger and blow up underground heating tunnels in Washington, D. C.

[Daniel Berrigan's letter reflects the tendency of a certain number of Catholics to turn against the Establishment and become involved in movements of social and political protest. This tendency has become especially noticeable in some of the Latin American countries. In general, figures like Daniel Berrigan seek to retain their religious views. This places them in a contradictory position, since the Catholic hierarchy constitutes a strong pillar of the capitalist economic and social order.]

Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, First Secretary, Communist Party of the Ukraine.

Honored Gentlemen:

I may be known to you as a former political prisoner in the United States, one whose brother is still a prisoner. The occasion of my writing you is the disquieting news we have received here regarding the continuing political trials of Russian, Ukrainian, and Czech dissidents.

Political prisoners are of course an international reality. One might be tempted to say such prisoners are even a bond of fraternity among political leaders across the world, of whatever coloration. Right, left, center—all subscribe to the stern Manichean principle of the innate corruption and criminality of dissidents; all are agreed on the related matters of crime and punishment.

This international consensus is undoubtedly a factor in bringing about the most unexpected acts of detente. One remembers with a certain rueful fascination the recent cordial meetings between you, Mr. Brezhnev, and our President. You exchanged handshakes, banqueted together, toasted your common hopes.

But would it be untimely, Mr. Brezhnev, to suggest the importance of knowing who it is with whom one shakes hands? The stain of blood, were it conceivably present upon the hand of one man, might so easily rub off on another's. You are possibly aware in this regard that Mr. Nixon, whom you welcomed with such warmth to Moscow, has destroyed some 6 million people in Southeast Asia during his four years in office.

Destroyed, that is, whether by slaughter, displacement, or imprisonment. Six million. Do you wince at that number, unimaginable from one point of view? A number, moreover, with certain magical overtones, coming toward us in a bloody and dolorous procession out of Germany in the '30s?

Examine your hands closely, Mr. Brezhnev; the stigma of Mylai may be on them, and of Con Son, and of the piecemeal, methodical destruction of the cities of Vietnam. Even the children? The children also.

But perhaps one is untimely in airing such topics. After all, detente is in the air. Moreover, there are to your credit, along the lines of Mr. Nixon's achievement, certain other matters one might recall. The matters of Hungary, of Czechoslovakia, of the Ukraine. You, as well as Mr. Nixon, are showing considerable skill in coming up with what were once called, in a truly classical sense, "definitive solutions."

More nearly to our point is the emotion arising in certain Americans, when we reflect upon the common methods pursued by both sides, Russia and the United States, regarding political dissidents. Common methods govern the fate of "parasites and malcontents" who dare unroll seditious banners in Red Square, dare burn draft files in Cantonville, Maryland.

Indeed, is this not one of the implications of detente itself? That similar solutions are arrived at by the authorities of both nations—nations whose rhetoric, histories, and conceptions of mankind have in the past seemed so diverse, so nearly irreconcilable?

Perhaps upon reflection, Mr. Brezhnev, there is no real danger of your being infected through a handshake with Mr. Nixon. Perhaps this was the truest meaning of that long glance you two exchanged at your first meeting, a glance at once ironic, courteous, baleful, a glance of mutual, cynical comprehension. The correct apparel, the correct smile; we have passed beyond that first generation fervor, when a revolutionary leader would receive, with grace and moral dignity, say, the leader of one of the world's most oppressive powers.

It is to your credit that you do not indulge in such fantasies regarding Mr. Nixon's visit. You certainly understood, as did your guest, that you two met, not as the representative of



DANIEL BERRIGAN

revolution on the one hand and of oppression on the other, but as twin powers, untroubled mutual images, two whose interests coincided even as they clashed, and therefore clashed most gently. Your meeting reminded us of nothing so much as the coming together of two successful, discreet morticians. So admirable a pair behind locked doors may even have shared one with another some precious trade secret. Let us speculate; on the one hand, the marvel of Lenin's embalming; on the other, the marvel of—what? The Tiger Cages? Vietnamization? We shall never know.

That each of you has secrets to share, one cannot have the least doubt. Both of you hold political prisoners, many thousands of them in the Russian instance, hundreds of them in the American. This is perhaps the worst kept secret in all the world. A genuine symbiosis of means joins you, ideology to ideology, hand to hand. You have both agreed to take and keep hostages against lawless contingencies. The principle once decided on, a like scenario unrolls east and west; police, interrogations, arrests, trials for conspiracy, and then the long ride into oblivion, the passage into non-personhood, the erasure from human life and community of human beings.

Such is the fate of political prisoners in both countries. We wish only to add that many of us who are for the time

being out of prison share in the powerlessness of the prisoners; East and West, Russians and Americans, we know that to be citizens is to have no real access to political leaders. Our fate, like the prisoners', is decided elsewhere. Our leaders have turned to stone.

Turned to stone; your ears, Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Shcherbytsky, have turned to stone. You no longer hear the cry of the dispossessed, the broken, the victims.

Your nostrils have turned to stone. You no longer smell the blood which yourselves have let.

Your eyes and mouth have turned to stone. You no longer see the truth of the world, which according to historical claim you were empowered to interpret and announce.

You no longer speak the truth about human life, about the lives of workers, of the poor, of the youth, of those whose passion and sacrifice initiated the revolution you have betrayed.

Can anyone doubt that by prolonging the agony of political prisoners, by enlarging the numbers of the condemned, you have betrayed the revolution? Or that the first sign of the betrayal is that the opposition must be crushed, at whatever cost, by whatever means? The revolution is degraded, at your hands, in the fate of every man and woman you have destroyed. Instead of a sublime spiritual event, you offer the world the same tawdry czarist stereotype—prisons, political indictments, puppets, the trappings of illegitimate power which (so the claim goes) your revolutions rendered null and void, once and for all. Instead of the revolution, evil times. Indeed, you have made the times so evil that one can do very nearly nothing at all on behalf of his brothers and sisters. No recourse, no mercy, no justice. Only death multiplied, and anguish, and despair. Behold your legacy.

And yet, it is in just such times as these that we are resolved not to lose heart, not to give up. Even if our voices go unheard, it is necessary for them to go on record. To go on record before history, before the next generation, before those who, sifting the ashes and bones of the victims you have multiplied, will ask: did not some few stand firm? They will probe without mercy; who were the criminals and who were the innocent? They will inquire relentlessly, who led the peo-

ple in truth, who misled them with deceit, cruelty, and trickery?

History will want to know why it was necessary to destroy one's fellow citizens, whether indeed they were criminals, or whether they were imprisoned by criminals. History will inquire; therefore, we go on record.

We put on record the names of those you have imprisoned, exiled, silenced, starved, tortured, degraded. The names of Mykhaylo Soroka, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Ivan Dzyuba, Andrei Amalrik, Ivan Svitlychny, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Pyotr Yakir, Simas Kudirka, Yuriy Shukhevych, Valentyn Moroz, Vladimir Bukovsky, and many others. And if certain names are lost, and certain others are erased by death, we still must go on record. For the sake of the next generation, we must point out how in East and West, a common brutal method was used against those whose only crime was to resist crime. We must underscore the fact that the Russian cruelties and the American cruelties were almost exactly parallel, except that the Russians turned their electric shocks, their mental hospitals, their slave camps, their Siberian exile, their police torture, against their own people, while the Americans, more sensitive perhaps to the mythology which makes them out to be more temperate and compassionate, did not commonly use such methods against their own. To do so was not politically expedient; especially when there were

countless Vietnamese, Laotians, Cambodians, and other Third World people upon whom they could experiment with impunity.

Nevertheless, East or West, crimes domestic or crimes extraterritorial, it is for us to go on record. The crimes occurred, the guilt is manifest. Wherever men and women are in exile, dying of forced labor, put to the rack, standing in kangaroo courts, stripped of citizenship, of human dignity, of civil rights—wherever this occurs, we declare that a court of humanity is already summoned. We declare, moreover, that those judged guilty in your courts have become your judges.

Let this be the record. And let the record be unequivocal and clear. Brezhnev, Shcherbytsky, Nixon, and your henchmen, from Siberia to the Ukraine to South Vietnam, are guilty of crimes against humanity.

Your authority is therefore illegitimate. No one need obey your voice, pay your taxes, offer his body to your wars, submit to courts which you assemble, die for a cause which you believe.

Let this be the record. It may be that only the next generation, long after your demise, your laying down authority, the dismantling of your military empires, it may be only after all that, that sentence can be passed upon you. It matters little, if only sentence be passed.

Let the record stand then. Let the court of humanity, the court of the defeated and exiled and imprisoned, be heard. And for those who believe, as we do, in a God of history, a God of mankind, the court assembles in His name, under His authority, to exercise His decree. Let the record stand. □

Not the Greatest President, But . . .

One of the famous photographs of former President Lyndon B. Johnson showed him lifting his pet dog, Old Beagle, by the ears. It drew howls of protest from dog lovers everywhere.

Johnson has now finally managed to get out of the dog house. In an article in the *Ladies' Home Journal*, Traphes L. Bryant, the recently retired keeper of the White House Doghouse, describes

Johnson as "possibly the greatest pet lover of all our Presidents."

One of the proofs is that when Old Beagle died, Johnson had the animal cremated and kept the ashes in a box over the refrigerator.

Bryant has been writing a book about the lives of dogs in the White House since Harry S. Truman.

An appropriate follow-up would be a volume on the two-footed variety.

定期購読で

インターコンティネンタル・プレスを!

"Regularly buy and read the periodical INTERCONTINENTAL PRESS!"

That's the handwritten advice from one of our supporters in Tokyo.

Right on!

We can only add that the easiest way to "regularly buy and read" is to subscribe.

So fill out the blank and mail it in.

Intercontinental Press

P. O. Box 116

Village Station

New York, N. Y. 10014

Name _____

Street _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Enclosed is \$7.50 for 26 issues.

Enclosed is \$15 for one year.

Please send a sample copy.