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Is Nixon Preparing to Obliterate Hanoi?



Allende Declares State of Emergency

Losey's Assassination of Leon Trotsky



Nixon's Popularity

"The overwhelming majority of political observers here expect President Richard Nixon to defeat the Democratic candidate, Senator George McGovern," correspondent B. Strelnikov wrote in the October 13 issue of the Soviet Communist party organ *Pravda*. The main factor favoring the Republican administration, he said, is its well-known initiatives in the foreign policy field.

"These included, above all, a visit to Moscow, negotiations with the Soviet leaders, and the signing of the Moscow agreements, which embraced a broad range of problems that the Soviet Union and the U.S. can cooperate in solving. Such cooperation will benefit the American and Soviet peoples and all humanity. It is not by chance that after the Moscow summit meetings many observers here and all the opinion polls noted a rise in the popularity of the White House. Already at that time, the American commentators were expressing the opinion that this would play a role in the elections.

"Today the American press is writing a lot about the U.S.-Soviet trade agreements [including presumably the grain deal—*IP*]. The majority of observers here, representatives of business circles, and even ordinary Americans think that the conclusion of the treaty for increasing trade between the U.S. and the USSR will also favor the candidate of the Republican party. In his recent speech in California, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Peterson stressed that the development of trade with the Soviet Union would increase employment in American plants and help bring down unemployment."

Although the Kremlin organ described the program of the American CP in glowing terms, it failed to mention that the party was campaigning "against Nixon." And it took a negative view of the candidate the American CP is actually backing: "Seeking the support of the 'powers that be,' McGovern is maneuvering, changing his tactics in midstream, appealing to first one group and then another, including the Zionist moneybags, by declaring support for Israel to be one of the primary goals of America."

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City's Center Bombed in New Escalation

Does Nixon Plan to Obliterate Hanoi?

By David Thorstad

Having run out of "military" targets in the Hanoi region, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided at the end of September to allow the bombing of previously off-limits targets. Barely two weeks later, on October 11, American bombs destroyed the building used by the French mission to the North Vietnamese capital, tore the roof off the Algerian embassy, and damaged the Indian mission.

The apparent removal of the center of Hanoi with its diplomatic residences from the off-limits category represented yet a further escalation of the air war against the North. It was the first time since 1966 that U. S. bombers had attacked the center of the capital.

The attack on the French mission left five employees dead and the delegate-general, Pierre Susini, the highest-ranking French diplomat at the mission, seriously wounded. An Albanian diplomat visiting the mission at the time was also injured.

Agence France-Presse reporter Jean Thoraval, who was in the garden of the mission when the bombs fell, called it "a direct hit." "There was a massive explosion," he reported, "and a huge cloud of ocher-colored smoke rose over the mission complex which houses the residence, chancellery, library, a theater and employee residences."

Michael Maclear, a Canadian television correspondent currently in Hanoi, sent a report to the Associated Press, in which he stated: "We were filming one mile away when at least three jets swooped repeatedly over the heart of the capital. I counted at least a dozen sorties by jets and saw one dive low and drop two bombs despite heavy anti-aircraft fire.

"There was no possibility of pilot error. The bombs hit the diplomatic quarter. There are no government ministries or factories anywhere near."

The Algerian ambassador, Aderazak Bouhara, who was in the courtyard of his embassy at the time of the raid, said, "I can affirm that the destruction was perpetrated by American bombs." A large bomb fragment

fell only two meters away from where he was standing.

United States navy spokesmen said that the target of the Hanoi raid had been the Gialam railroad yard and repair shop—three miles northeast of the French mission. The Pentagon, which has recently been bragging about the pinpoint accuracy of its "smart" bombs, found the three-mile gap rather embarrassing. By its own much-vaunted standards of accuracy, and in view of the eyewitness accounts of the raid, the only conclusion that could be reasonably drawn was that the bombings were deliberate.

While admission of success comes easy to Pentagon spokesmen in raids that leave behind only Vietnamese victims, it apparently comes less enthusiastically when the victims are white-skinned Western Europeans. And so, although the destruction of the October 11 raid was considerably less extensive than that of many others, the Pentagon tried to wriggle out of the dilemma it found itself in by stretching an already immense credibility gap even further—it decided to suggest that the damage to the French mission had been the result of a North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile that may have malfunctioned. Most of the American news media dutifully reported this preposterous hypothesis as if it were worth serious consideration despite the eyewitness accounts of U. S. bombers diving low and dropping their cargo.

An exception was *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis in his October 14 column: "The French mission might have been hit by anti-aircraft missiles, the Defense Department suggested. As if that would make any difference in our responsibility! The North Vietnamese are not yet forbidden to defend their own capital, though the American military sometimes talks as if there ought to be a law to that effect. Those who bomb are responsible for all the consequences."

The North Vietnamese reacted strongly to the Pentagon's suggestion. "If people had not been killed and injured in this tragic affair, this would

be laughable," commented one senior North Vietnamese official.

Despite some minor embarrassment, however, the Nixon administration made it clear that it intended to continue its devastating bombing raids over the North, during which as many as 330 air strikes have been carried out on some days, and nearly 400 on October 15. Following the raid on the French mission, for instance, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was asked at a news conference whether "it was wise to target areas so close to Hanoi" while presidential adviser Henry Kissinger was winding up four days of secret talks in Paris with Hanoi's negotiators. "The situation has been that we will continue the use of our air power during this period," Laird replied. "The President has stated that on several occasions, as recently as his last press conference. We will continue to strike military targets in North Vietnam."

Christian Science Monitor correspondent Takashi Oka wrote from Paris October 12 that "sophisticated observers" there reject the idea that the bombing of the French mission was accidental. To them, "the bombing is a sign that there may be forces within the American military establishment who are opposed to a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict."

The only conclusion that can be drawn from Laird's statement is that no place is off limits to Nixon's bombers. His administration considers the city of Hanoi itself to be a military target. And Quangtri has shown what can happen to it if North Vietnam's leaders refuse to capitulate to imperialism's demands.

In an alarmed editorial October 13, the *Washington Post* editors tried to persuade Nixon not to obliterate Hanoi. "Anything as serious as peace is not going to hinge on the dropping of bombs on Hanoi," they wrote. And while "some conceivable case might be made for dropping bombs on that city" if there were any "important military targets" left there, that case cannot be made now because "there is no vital military target left in Hanoi." Among the victims of such bombing would undoubtedly be the American prisoners of war, they warned. Besides, they added, "Hanoi is a city of some aesthetic value. It was laid out by the French. It has broad avenues and some pleasant buildings. Knocking down buildings is one thing

bombs seem to be able to do with considerable efficiency. Hanoi could be flattened tomorrow. But to what purpose?"

In the ground war in the South, at least a dozen hamlets in Binhduong Province just north of Saigon were seized by liberation forces during the first week in October. Although they have subsequently been driven out of a number of these, their main objective appears not to be to hold them but to consolidate their political and military apparatus in the countryside while applying pressure to the cities. "One of the goals of the attacks that are currently being carried out," wrote Jean-Claude Pomonti in the October 10 *Le Monde*, "is un-

doubtedly to compel the South Vietnamese regular army even more to pull back in order to protect the cities. According to this hypothesis, the Communists could not help but consolidate their control in the countryside, which is very useful to them."

Fox Butterfield, in a dispatch from Saigon in the October 15 *New York Times*, quoted one pessimistic United States embassy "expert" on the current stage of the offensive: "If you look carefully, you can see that the Communists are moving back into their old base areas and letting the villagers know they're back again. Underneath the surface, there is a gradual, inevitable process of erosion of government control going on." □

Nails Driven Through Fingertips

Thousands Tortured in South Vietnam Jails

The Western press has focused considerable attention on the fate of the American pilots shot down over North Vietnam and now detained there. Released pilots themselves have been among the first to admit that their treatment was humane.

With the exception of the 1970 report on "tiger cages" in Con Son prison, however, not much has been written about the many thousands of political prisoners who are mistreated and tortured in the jails of South Vietnam. A report by J. B. Holmgaard in the September 24 Danish daily *Politiken* provides a glimpse into the inhuman conditions prevailing in these jails.

The report is based on letters smuggled out of Chi Hoa and Con Son prisons this summer.

Nguyen Thi Yen, who is the treasurer of the Saigon Student Union, was arrested on June 8, 1972. "She has been brutally mistreated, and recently lost consciousness," Holmgaard wrote. "Earlier, she was forced to stand naked in front of her tormentors, who burned her nipples with cigarettes."

Trinh Dinh Ban, chairman of the South Vietnam Student Union, was beaten until his face was so swollen and his eyes so inflamed that he could hardly see. "Nails were driven through his fingertips, and he was beaten on the soles of his feet to the point where

he could no longer stand up. He was unable to eat, too, so the police had to force open his mouth in order to pour milk down his throat."

Vo Thi Bach, a student, was tortured over a period of several weeks and, among other things, was hanged by her feet. "For some weeks she was placed in a dungeon where she alternately suffered under blinding light and from mice, lizards, and ants that were brought to crawl over her body. Following this, she was transferred to another dungeon where the floor was covered with water."

Nguyen Van Nam, a student and vice-president of the Committee for the People's Right to Live, was given the same treatment as Trinh Dinh Ban. In addition, "he was subjected to electrical tortures and his fingers were ruined from being pounded with a kind of rod. They are now paralyzed."

The leader of the Saigon Buddhist students, Nguyen Thi Hue, was given chemical injections for several days and was then forced to sign a police report.

Many other students have also been tortured. Most imprisoned students, according to Holmgaard, are in "very bad health" as a result of their treatment. Meals consist of nothing but "half a bowl of rice and a few small bites of poor quality, dried fish."

One of the letters that were smuggled

out tells about more than 100 arrested students. ". . . all were tortured and had to be taken to their cells on stretchers. Among the methods of torture commonly used are electrical torture, the forced drinking of soap water, and the hammering of nails through the fingertips."

The families of South Vietnamese prisoners are frequently subjected to reprisals. Members of some families have even been arrested outside the gates to Chi Hoa prison as they came to visit their relatives.

Holmgaard quoted from a letter sent by a prison guard at Con Son to a priest last June:

"I passed by a camp of which my colleague [name omitted] is in charge; like me, he is a guard. I almost collapsed from shock when I saw that there were only women, a few old men, and more than fifty children under nine years of age. All these people came from Hue, Phucam, Phuloc, and Cauhai. Some of the women were pregnant. None of them had any idea why they had been transported there. . . .

"I met an old, white-haired woman. She told me that she had four children—all of them in the South Vietnamese army. Two were stationed in Saigon, one in Dalat, and one in Military Region I. She was brought here forcibly and without knowing why. She is hoping to get in touch with her children, but since she was brought here through deception and force, she does not have her children's KCB [military mailing address] and does not know how she can let them know."

There were more than 1,500 persons like her in the jail, the guard said. □

Pompidou Bans Basques

The Pompidou regime has ordered an end to political asylum in France for members of the separatist Euzkadi ta Akatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty), one of the groups in active political opposition to Franco.

The friendly gesture to the fascist dictator followed Pompidou's recent commitment to support early Spanish membership in the Common Market.

There has been some speculation that Pompidou wants Spain in the Common Market to offset British entry.

The reactionary move against the Basques, however, fits in more closely with the current witch-hunting drive of the Western powers, led by the White House, against all organizations committed to winning national liberation or a socialist world.

Down the Drain With Lon Nol

Nixon gave his 1970 invasion of Cambodia the code name "Operation Total Victory." In the United States it precipitated the broadest outbreak of student unrest in the country's history. In Cambodia, it touched off developments that have finally brought the country to a state of crisis similar in many respects to that prevailing in South Vietnam in 1965, just prior to the massive invasion of U. S. ground troops. An article published in the October 2 issue of the West German newsweekly *Der Spiegel* gives some information on the current Cambodian situation.

"Some 40,000 pro-Peking guerrillas organized in the Front uni nationale du Cambodge [National United Front of Cambodia—FUNC] now control about 70 percent of the territory and 40 percent of the population of Cambodia. And they administer it better than Lon Nol and his satraps do the rest of the country.

"In 'FUNC-land' there is no shortage of food; the population is cared for, medically treated, and politically educated by FUNC, which also organizes traffic and defense."

The Lon Nol-controlled section of the country, which consists mostly of Pnompenh (the capital) and its environs, fares none too well. Cambodia used to be an exporter of rice. Under Lon Nol it avoids famine only through massive imports from the United States, Japan, and Thailand. Despite this aid, food prices continue to soar; during the past two months the increase has been 200 percent.

As bad as it is, the situation is expected to get still worse. Foreign observers estimate that by the end of December Pnompenh, whose population has been doubled by the influx of 700,000 refugees, will receive only 20 percent of the rice it needs. Guerrillas of the Khmer Rouge, FUNC's armed forces, control both the roads and rail system leading to the city. Supplies from the port city of Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) reach the capital only sporadically, and the road connecting Pnompenh to Battambang, center of the crucial rice-producing area near the Thai border

in the west, is no longer passable to government troops.

One U. S. "adviser" in Pnompenh told *Der Spiegel*, "If the guerrillas wanted to seize control of the whole country, they could do it." Such strength is relatively new for the liberation forces in Cambodia. In fact, the regime has built the guerrilla movement by attacking it.

Under the Sihanouk government, Cambodia remained "neutral" in the Indochina war. Vietnamese liberation fighters were permitted sanctuary in Cambodia, and were even allowed to establish permanent camps near the Vietnamese border. If the liberation forces began to reach unacceptably high levels of activity, Sihanouk would threaten to call in the U. S. armed forces. If the U. S. military threatened to move in uninvited, the prince would call for Chinese aid.

At the time Lon Nol seized power with the aid of the CIA, the Khmer Rouge was estimated to have no more than 4,000 adherents. But the Nixon-Thieu invasion changed all that. At the height of the aggression, 15,000 U. S. GIs and 43,000 Saigon troops were thrown against the North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge troops. Thieu's soldiers, *Der Spiegel* points out, conducted themselves in their usual fashion, "plundering, raping, and behaving like conquerors."

Popular support for the Khmer Rouge mounted rapidly. Under Lon Nol, the Cambodian army fights in the style of the South Vietnamese forces. *Der Spiegel* describes, for example, events in the city of Angkor, the ancient Cambodian capital which has been held for two years by the Khmer Rouge. At one time, government troops were able to capture a temple in the area. They opened fire, left and right, with both small arms and heavy weapons. The temple, with all its ancient historical treasures, was demolished.

Since that time, the Khmer Rouge has been able to hold the area. Anti-Communists are able occasionally to sneak into Angkor—not to fight, but to loot. One large, ancient stone statue stolen from Angkor, *Der Spiegel*

reported, was sold on the black market for \$2 million.

Nixon's withdrawal of U. S. ground troops from South Vietnam has indirectly deprived the Cambodian army of its base of support. The Saigon troops quartered in the country are being withdrawn. They are needed in South Vietnam. Without the direct support of the U. S. and Saigon military, the Pnompenh army is considered weak and unreliable.

Government statistics claim Lon Nol to have 170,000 men under arms. This is a rather deceptive figure. Army officers in the field are in charge of disbursing wages to their troops. This has led to the widespread practice of officers reporting to have two or three times as many troops as they actually do and pocketing the extra wages they receive. According to Western estimates, Lon Nol has about 60,000 troops. Their fighting ability is demonstrated by a field report issued after the "battle" of Kompong Trabek, a small village. Following a brief encounter with the liberation forces, Cambodian officers reported these casualty statistics: two killed, thirteen wounded, and 400 *missing*.

Along with his massive army, most of which is missing at any given time, Lon Nol has two additional weapons he employs against the liberation forces.

One is an astrologer who hauls down \$20,000 a month. He is the highest paid functionary on the marshall's payroll.

The other weapon is Lon Nol's own subconscious. He believes himself to be possessed by kindly spirits. To bring them out the marshall goes into a trance, records on tape what he says while in that exalted state, then upon regaining consciousness listens to the message that comes through on playback.

From this one should not conclude that Lon Nol has lost touch with reality. On the contrary, he has demonstrated a firm grasp of his actual situation—by purchasing a villa on the French Riviera. □

In Case You Need to Know

"Fuck" has finally made the Oxford English dictionary. A newly issued supplement defines the word as "transitive verb: to copulate." But dictionary publicist Elizabeth Knight still couldn't bring herself to say it, so at a news conference she spelled it out instead.

'Amnesty' to Check on Political Prisoners in China

Amnesty International, the prestigious civil-rights organization founded in Britain eleven years ago, has announced that it will open an investigation concerning political prisoners in China. Dr. Zbynek Zemen, the head of Amnesty's research department, was quoted by the *Toronto Globe and Mail* September 22 as saying:

"We don't know how many political prisoners there are in China. In fact we're not sure there are any at all in the Western definition of a political prisoner. We have just commissioned a fairly large project on the question. It will try to determine what legal provisions exist for controlling political dissent, and whether China has political prisoners."

Information about political prisoners in China is not easy to come by, owing to the rigid censorship enforced by the Mao regime. Nevertheless, the names of various imprisoned Chinese Trotskyists are known.


Most of them were arrested twenty years ago during a repression of left-wing oppositionists in December 1952 and January 1953. Li Fu-chen estimated in an article in the June 29, 1970 issue of *Intercontinental Press* that as many as 200 persons were arrested in these raids.

In the two decades since the incarceration of these revolutionists, there has been no official word about their fate.

What were they charged with? It is impossible to determine this with certainty, for there were no indictments, no public trials, no communiqués to the press. Reports from China that have reached the outside world indicate that closed hearings were held at which some prisoners were sentenced to five to ten years at hard labor for "counterrevolutionary activities." Those regarded as leaders were ordered imprisoned until they "reformed," i.e., until they forswore all criticism of Mao's regime.

Many of the Chinese Trotskyists had been active for decades in their country's revolutionary struggle. They fought against the Kuomintang dictatorship, participating in the struggle to overthrow it. They supported the

land reform and other revolutionary measures instituted by the regime of the Chinese Communist party. The Trotskyists defended the Chinese revolution against the assaults of Japanese imperialism and later the intervention of U. S. imperialism. Charges of "counterrevolutionary activity"



CHEN CHAO-LIN. Founding member of Chinese Communist party. Photo believed to have been taken in 1941.

against such militants are fabrications in the Stalinist style.

Who are the imprisoned Trotskyists?

Chen Chao-lin was a founder of the Chinese Communist party and later of the Chinese Trotskyist movement. After the second Chinese revolution met defeat in 1927, he became a Trotskyist. The Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship jailed him for seven years. He was politically active in Shanghai when Mao's police arrested him in 1952. Now about seventy-two years old, Chen has spent twenty-seven years in prison under Chiang and Mao.

Chiang Tseng-tung was a leading participant in the Shanghai labor movement during the revolutionary upheaval of 1925-27. As a Trotskyist, he continued the struggle against the Kuomintang regime. If he is alive, Chiang is about sixty-two years old.

Chou Jen-sen, a teacher by profession, was arrested in the Fukien port city of Amoy and is believed to be imprisoned in Shanghai.

Ho Chi-sen played a leading role, along with Mao Tsetung in revolutionary work first in Wuhan and then in Hunan province during the 1925-7 events. Ho was in poor health when he was jailed in 1952. Nothing has been heard of him and it is feared that he may have died in a labor camp.

Ling Hwer-hua was an official of the Printers Union of Canton when he was seized and sent to Wuhan. Ling was sentenced to an indefinite term in a labor camp and no word of his subsequent fate has reached the outside world.

Ling Sun-chi, a lecturer at Canton's Sun Yat-sen University, was taken by police shortly after the massive round-up of Trotskyists. His fate is unknown.

Wang Kuo-lung, a teacher, was arrested in Wenchow, Chekiang province, and is believed to be in a Shanghai prison.

Ying Kwan was a leading Communist party activist in Anhwei province during 1925-7 and later served almost five years in prison for his activities against the police regime of Chiang Kai-shek. After the war, he worked in Shanghai until his arrest by Mao's police. He is about seventy-two years old if he is alive.

The names of many young revolutionists who were seized in 1952-3 have never become known. Relatives of suspected Trotskyists were also seized and disappeared from view.

It is conceivable that a few may have been freed over the years. However, the Chinese press has reported no confessions or capitulations by any of the imprisoned men. This is usually the minimum price that Mao exacts for release. It is more likely that those who have survived are still rotting in prison for refusing to give up their revolutionary-socialist convictions.

Their treatment is contrary to the legal precepts formally promulgated by the regime. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted on September 20, 1954, guarantees

all citizens freedom of speech, press, assembly, and demonstration.

In a statement issued on April 16 of this year the United Secretariat of the Fourth International said:

"The Mao regime should be pressed to provide information on the fate of these political prisoners. Are they still living? Have some of them been submitted to secret trials? What crimes or infractions of the law were they charged with?"

"The secretiveness surrounding their incarceration does not speak well for

the way in which the constitution is observed in China. On the contrary, it indicates that they were imprisoned in flagrant violation of a constitution that 'guarantees' the right of free speech. If this were not the case, why hasn't the government granted them a public trial?"

It is to be hoped that an investigation by Amnesty International will help to break through the wall of silence that has enclosed these political prisoners for two decades. □

Common Market Debated at Blackpool

British Labour Party Moves to the Left

London

"At the end of a confusing day the new situation is that the Labour movement, containing as it does every conceivable view that is possible about the EEC [European Economic Community, the Common Market], can now face north or south and claim justification in one or other conference decisions."

This is how political editor David Wood, writing in the *London Times* of October 5, assessed the previous day's events at the annual Labour party conference at Blackpool.

As for the Wilson leadership of the Labour party, the apparent two-way stretch on the Common Market made no difference. For them, the important thing was that it marked a successful end to the backroom wheeling and dealing, without which their "leadership" positions in the party could have been undermined.

By what was, in effect, a narrow majority, delegates to the conference accepted on October 4 the advice of the National Executive Committee (NEC), to renegotiate entry into the EEC. The leadership was aided in this by having secured an abstention from the anti-Market Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), which had one million votes. A TGWU vote against the NEC statement could have reduced the majority to an uncomfortable 600,000.

As it turned out, after a week of anxious bargaining, conference carried the NEC statement by 3,407,000 votes to 1,802,000. Minutes later del-

egates went on to pass — by 3,335,000 votes to 2,867,000 — a second resolution submitted by the Boilermakers union calling on a future Labour government to reverse the Tory decision to go into Europe, unless drastically different terms could be reached. The strongly anti-Market Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) voted against this motion.

An anti-Market resolution from the AUEW that declared "complete opposition to entry into the Common Market" was rejected by 118,000 votes, a mere bagatelle in Labour's block-voting system. In this vote, the TGWU, the largest trade union in the country, lined up behind the Engineers.

In a fourth vote delegates rejected — by 4,662,000 to 1,543,000 — a motion from Clackmannan and East Stirling Constituency party declaring support for the principle of entry into the EEC.

The conference decisions suggest that the party is now committed not only to renegotiate the terms of entry, but also to seek virtually impossible entry terms along the lines of the Boilermakers' motion. But because the NEC statement came out at the top of the heap, both Harold Wilson and the pro-Marketeers can argue that the terms laid out in the NEC statement must take precedence over the Boilermakers' resolution. In any case, the right-wing Labour Marketeers, led by Roy Jenkins, found reason for rejoicing in that the party is committed to acceptance of the principle of entry.

Underlying the Labour party con-

ference, however, was a more basic message: the Parliamentary Labour party must be made to submit to the conference decisions. As Nora Beloff, writing in *The Observer* of October 8 noted:

"Mr Wilson cajoled and warned, retreated and pounced. The conference hardly realised how firmly he was reasserting the rights of the Parliamentary Labour Party [PLP] and its elected leader to formulate policy and to prepare for the next election.

"The challenge to the party's Parliamentary wing had been building up for a long time and came from a combination of left-wing-dominated trade unions, whose block votes command conference, and *Tribune* militants. And it was Mr Wedgwood Benn who publicly declared that the time had come — in 1972, the year of his chairmanship — to tilt the balance from what he saw as the elitist MPs to the toiling rank and file.

"The chosen issue was to be Europe. The PLP, largely bored by the argument, had agreed to a Wilsonian compromise supporting the principle of entry, but opposing Tory terms. But conference was expected to reject the whole idea of British entry and to insist that, from now on, all Labour MPs must fight to get Britain out. At an eve of conference meeting Mr Michael Foot affirmed that this should be the central purpose of the conference.

"The message was loud and clear: the PLP must be made to submit to the party's will. As it was made plain to all that Mr Roy Jenkins and his friends would not submit, it was implicit that they would have to go. *Tribune* people ominously recalled that no one in the party was indispensable."

Despite the voting results, the fight over Europe and the Parliamentary Labour party's ascendancy is not over. Labour's Marketeers had to be rescued by Wilson, who used all his devious skills to do this. As for the Labour party's left wing, on the other hand, the conference revealed a shift in their direction.

This leftward move was reflected partly in the change of personalities, when the party's National Executive took on two more *Tribune* MPs; and it is also to be seen in the left-wing resolutions on nuclear disarmament and wholesale nationalisation — although the NEC and the Shadow Cab-

inet, which together write the party's election manifesto, can safely be trusted to omit these proposals.

More notably, the leftward shift is revealed in a radicalisation of the party as a whole, as part of the radicalisation of the working class. On October 3, an Engineering Union resolution pledging compensation to Labour councillors who suffer penalties through refusing to operate the Tory rent-raising law, the so-called Housing Finance Act, was carried against the NEC by 4,174,000 votes to 1,000,000. Later, delegates voted in favour of a motion calling for a wide extension of public ownership and renationalisation without compensation of sectors "hived-off" under the Tories.

The day before, the Labour party unanimously passed a composite resolution moved by Jack Jones, general secretary of the TGWU, calling for repeal of the Industrial Relations Act by the next Labour government and demanding that "no future legislation will provide for state interfer-

ence with the independent operations of the trade unions or allow for legal sanctions against trade unions or trade movements in the field of collective bargaining." The last Labour government suffered a defeat in 1968 at the hands of the trade-union movement when it attempted to introduce anti-working-class legislation similar to that of the Tories.

With bad memories of the last Labour government fresh in mind and confronted by a Tory government determined to implement its anti-working-class policies—inflation, unemployment, rent-raising, and anti-trade-union laws—no amount of double-talk and double-dealing on the part of the Wilson leadership can undermine this radicalising process.

The class struggle has a vengeful way of dealing with misleaders and labour fakers. At the party conference this year Wilson had to put his position on the line and, only by chance, he retained it. His was a pyrrhic victory. □

pation, seeing it as a means of avoiding the vastly more costly eventuality of nationalization of their holdings. Negotiations then began over the details.

The major questions under discussion were how much the countries would have to pay for the 20 percent share, how fast the share would increase, and most importantly, what arrangements could be made to assure the companies uninterrupted supplies of crude oil. This problem involved working out means by which the companies would be able to buy back the amount of crude oil accruing to the countries through their 20 percent ownership of operations.

The negotiations, described as "sometimes acerbic," were conducted in seven sessions over a seven-month period. Meetings were held in Geneva, Riyadh, London, San Francisco, Beirut, and New York. The countries involved were five of the twelve members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, and Abu Dhabi, which is part of the Union of Arab Emirates, a federation comprising the former Trucial States on the northeast coast of the Arabian peninsula.

These countries account for 28 percent of the capitalist world's crude-oil production. The other members of OPEC are Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago.

The companies included the "seven sisters"—Gulf, Mobil, Texaco, Standard of California, Standard of New Jersey, British Petroleum, and Royal Dutch Shell—plus the Compagnie Française des Pétroles and the Participations and Explorations Corporation.

Any agreement signed by the seven sisters will inevitably become the standard for similar accords throughout the industry. Besides dominating oil production and refining (they account for more than half the oil produced in the world), the seven sisters represent the strongest bloc of corporate power in the history of the world. In 1971, the combined sales of the sisters totaled \$62,700 million. Their *net income* was \$5,237.8 million.

If the sisters were considered a country and their sales were considered the gross national product, they would rank as the tenth most productive nation in the world, surpassing such

A Case of Squeezing the Golden Goose?

The Oil Cartel Agrees to a New Adjustment

By Jon Rothschild

The agreement reached October 5 at New York City's Waldorf Astoria hotel between five oil-producing countries and nine Western oil corporations occasioned some rather colorful phrases from the normally bland personalities who wheel and deal in the oil industry. Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, who led the oil-producing nations in the talks preceding the agreement and who masterminded the whole operation, called the new accord an "indissoluble catholic marriage of the interests of producing nations, consuming nations, and the oil companies." He said he had been aiming at "squeezing the golden goose without killing it," and added that he felt "very satisfied."

One anonymous oil-industry analyst, when informed of Yamani's metaphor, extended it somewhat: "Yes, it's a marriage all right—a shotgun wedding." Another "knowledgeable expert" in the field went still further, calling

the deal "rape by consent." He also was reported to be satisfied.

Whether marriage, shotgun wedding, or rape, the October 5 accord virtually overturned the hitherto existing forms of concessionary rights held by the oil cartel in the Middle East and ushered in what all the participants agreed, on a more hackneyed note, would be a "new era" for the international oil industry, for the oil-producing countries of the Arab-Persian Gulf area, and for political alignments in the Middle East.

The core of the negotiations that led to the October 5 agreement was the demand of the producing countries for "participation" in the operations of the Western companies. Specifically, the countries concerned wanted to buy an immediate 20 percent share in these operations, with the option of expanding that figure to 51 percent during the next decade.

Last March, the companies agreed "in principle" to some form of partici-

countries as Belgium, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, and Argentina. In 1971 Standard Oil of New Jersey, the largest of the group, had sales totaling \$18,700 million, greater than the gross national product of Austria.


Although the details of the October 5 agreement were not disclosed, pending formal ratification by the countries, most reports indicated that the companies had conceded on the main points. The countries will buy a 20 percent share of operations, and that percentage is expected to reach 51 by the early 1980s.

The "heart of the deal," according to the September 30 issue of *Business Week*, "is a complex formula that would allow companies to 'buy back' part of the governments' share of the oil produced." The purchase price of the crude oil will be tied to a worldwide inflation index (when it applies to themselves, capitalists may well insist on cost-of-living escalator clauses).

The companies will be compensated for their 20 percent "loss" by means of a price discount, an arrangement that is believed to fall about midway between the companies' original compensatory demands and the first offer of the countries.

(The standard course of events in all negotiations over compensation for confiscated oil operations is that the countries offer to pay for the "book value" of the properties. Book value is a preposterously low figure worked out by the companies largely for purposes of dodging taxes. The book value in this case, for example, would amount to about one cent per barrel of proven reserves in the Arab-Persian Gulf region. The companies quite naturally reject the notion that they should be paid only for what they tell the tax man they are worth and demand full compensation for loss of future profits on oil that has yet to be pumped. The compromise finally arrived at is in general an accurate reflection of the balance of forces between the companies and the countries at any given time.)

Business Week reported that under the compromise formula Saudi Arabia will pay \$1,000 million over a period of five years for its 20 percent share of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), 90 percent of which is now owned by three of the seven



The New York Times

Shaded areas indicate countries participating in current negotiations.

sisters: Standard of California, Standard of New Jersey, and Texaco. For its eventual 51 percent share, the Saudi Arabian government will pay an estimated \$5,000 million.

For the companies, the right to buy back the oil confiscated by the producing countries is crucial. Historically, the companies have been resource-based concerns controlling their own sources of raw materials and profiting on operations from the wellhead in the Middle East (or other places) to the gasoline pumps in Europe and the United States. The wellheads were controlled through a system of long-term concessions, deals by which a group of companies would form a consortium having exclusive rights to drill for oil in given areas of producing countries. The governments of the countries involved would receive payment in the form of royalties and taxes.

If the oil cartel lost control of the wellheads, the companies could become competitors in the market for crude oil sold by the producing countries.

In addition, a huge portion of the companies' profits come from the superexploitation of labor power at the wellhead, where labor costs are notoriously low. Because of these facts, the companies have always viewed with disfavor any attempt by producing countries to gain greater control over sources of crude oil, to raise the price of crude, or to extract greater tolls from the companies in the form of royalties and taxes.

On February 14, 1971, for example, a delegation of oil companies led by Lord Strathalmond of British Petroleum and George Piercy of Standard-New Jersey signed a price agreement with a bloc of six OPEC members—Abu Dhabi, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. With the exception of Iran, the countries are the same ones involved in the October 5 deal.

The statement the companies released after the 1971 agreement complained that they had "faced constantly escalating demands by the governments of the OPEC countries, as a result of which each settlement in turn gave rise to further claims. As a result, the companies felt compelled to seek longer term financial stability and to remove the threats of oil embargoes raised by some countries. The assurances given by the countries in the current settlement provides these protections."

The statement added that the companies "have gained assurances against any changes in major financial terms for five years, as well as limitations during the period of the Agreement against new escalating demands by the OPEC producing countries."

This deal, which supposedly guaranteed stability for a five-year period, was challenged almost exactly one year later (in March 1972) by OPEC. And just seven months after the challenge, the countries won not only a major financial change but an overturning of the basic structure of company concession rights.

Why did the seven sisters, with all their power, concede to the OPEC demands? What will be the effect of the new arrangement in the oil industry and in world politics?

The immediate answer to the first question is simple. Participation was accepted so as to remove all threats of nationalization. This was explicitly stated both by the companies and by Yamani. But why should the threat of nationalization be more severe today than previously, when the companies were able to roll with the punches and overthrow any regime that hit too hard?

The basic pressure on the companies stems from the shift in the balance of forces between the cartel and the producing countries in favor of the latter, a shift that has become increasingly pronounced in the last

several years. An article titled "The Middle East squeeze on the oil giants" published in the July 29 issue of *Business Week* claimed that the power of the seven sisters is "crumbling. It has been undermined, ironically, by insatiable world demand for the vital fuel that they produce and sell."

Business Week, which speaks from the viewpoint of the oil cartel, exaggerates the companies' difficulties. But the article does point to an important phenomenon. Oil is critical to world imperialism not only because of the huge investments and profits of the companies, but also because industrialized countries need the commodity itself.

When Cuba tore itself out of its old position of colonial dependency, the profits of the sugar companies were eliminated, but the fact that a portion of the world sugar supply had fallen into "Communist hands" was not in itself decisive.

It is otherwise with oil. The mineral itself is essential, and the dependency of the advanced capitalist countries on an uninterrupted flow of it is expected to increase rapidly. In 1970 Arab countries produced about 60 percent of the oil that moved in world trade. By 1980 that figure will reach 70 percent.

"By then," according to James E. Akins, director of the State Department's Office of Fuels and Energy, "Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and very likely Abu Dhabi will each have production greater than the spare capacity of all other oil producing countries combined. Anyone of these countries could cause a supply crisis by cutting off its production, and any two could cause a very serious one."

Total world energy consumption now stands at the equivalent of 87 million barrels of crude oil a day. By 1980 it is expected to reach the equivalent of 160 million barrels a day. Even allowing for the development of alternate supplies of energy, nuclear power for example, the bulk of the increase will inevitably come from expanding production of oil in a contracting number of countries.

Parallel to this development is the steady erosion of the former U.S. immunity to the vicissitudes of Middle Eastern oil supplies. Today, the United States imports only about 23 percent of the oil consumed within its borders. Most of the imports come



YAMANI: Wants United States opened up for Saudi Arabian investments.

from Canada and Venezuela, only about 3 percent from the Middle East.

But by 1980 between 40 and 60 percent of U.S.-consumed oil will be imported. Barring vast new finds of crude, the bulk of the increased imports will come from the Middle East; there is simply no alternative supply.

Along with the dependency of the United States on Middle Eastern sources of crude, company profits are more and more dependent on Middle Eastern sources. Standard of New Jersey, for example, has 40 percent of its current production and 69 percent of its proven reserves in the Middle East and Northern Africa.

The "squeeze" about which *Business Week* speaks derives from all these trends. The days when the companies could threaten producing countries with going elsewhere for supplies of crude are ending. The threat of boycotting the supplies of any nation that gets out of line—a tactic that was instrumental in bringing down the Mossadegh regime in Iran at a time when that country was the world's leading supplier of crude oil—has become less decisive, although it may yet be useful against individual countries. Deprived of the full power of their economic weapons, the companies

have been forced to make economic concessions to the producing countries.

These concessions will have a significant effect on the world monetary system and on the structure of investment on an international scale. The five Arab-Persian Gulf countries currently receive \$5,000 million a year in taxes and royalties from the oil companies. If the countries can continue to amass such profits—and indications are that the latest deal will enable them vastly to expand their incomes—they will develop huge foreign investment reserves.

At the same time, increased U.S. oil imports will put an intense strain on that country's balance of payments. By 1980, according to *Business Week*, the drain on the balance of payments from oil imports could "climb from the current annual sum of \$4-billion [milliard] to a staggering \$17-billion [milliard]."

David McLean, chairman of the National Petroleum Council's Committee on the U.S. Energy Outlook, estimates that the oil revenues of OPEC members between 1972 and 1985 could total \$500,000 million! It is excluded that the Arab-Persian Gulf states could invest such amounts domestically. "One not unlikely possibility," McLean believes, "is that the OPEC countries could become large equity holders in the financial institutions and industrial companies in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan."

There has already been at least one proposal in that direction. Speaking at the annual Washington, D. C., conference of the Middle East Institute on October 2, Sheikh Yamani proposed that Saudi Arabia guarantee the United States uninterrupted oil supplies in exchange for which Arabian oil would enter the United States *duty free*. Also, Saudi Arabia would be granted permission to invest heavily in the U.S. petroleum industry. Yamani noted that his government was especially interested in "downstream" operations—refining and marketing within the United States.

This proposal, Yamani claimed, was clearly advantageous to both countries. The United States would be assured of the oil it needs from the world's largest producer. A large Saudi investment in the United States would tie the two economies together so that neither could afford to break the bonds. Apart from making the Saudi ruling clique still richer than it

is today, the scheme would guarantee that even should the Saudis be ousted, any Arabian government could not afford to attempt oil-blackmail against the United States.

James Akins described Yamani's proposal as "extremely important," even though the prospect of the United States becoming a field of Saudi investment might be "distasteful to some in the industry." The U. S. petroleum industry, Akins said, will require \$5,-000 million in capital during the coming decade. There is no way, he said, that such a sum could be raised internally or borrowed. "There is no reason why the Saudi or Iranian oil company should not participate with American oil companies in building in the United States the new refineries we will need," he concluded.

An additional merit of Yamani's proposal would be its salutary effect on the U. S. balance of payments. And finally, reciprocal investments would create stronger economic ties that would act as a stabilizing influence in the industry on a world scale.

The current restructuring of the international oil industry reflects the basic trends of world capitalism today. The erosion of the United States position of absolute dominance, already discernible in rising competition from Western Europe and Japan, has now made its appearance in the oil industry. The expansion and spread of giant multinational corporations is now tending toward increased interpenetration of national economies.

The countries bordering the Arab-Persian Gulf will become an increasingly important center of power in the international monetary system. The regimes in those countries will be able to increase their economic and political pressure on the United States on political questions that concern them.

But, paradoxically, the new situation is likely to mean more, not less, U. S. influence in the Middle East, and especially in the Arabian peninsula. The new oil agreement will not hurt the cartel or the local ruling classes economically. The companies will simply pass on increased costs to the consumer; there will be a redistribution of income between the companies and the Arab and Iranian ruling classes, and the exploitation of the Middle Eastern working class will intensify.

The already symbiotic relationship between the companies and the com-

prador classes will solidify. At the same time, being somewhat more limited in the subtle economic weapons available to them, the oil companies will pressure the imperialist governments, especially the United States, to intervene more actively in the affairs of the region, including in countries that do not border the Arab-Persian Gulf but which seriously affect political events there.

That section of the U. S. ruling class represented by the oil trusts, which has always been uneasy about the close U. S.-Israeli alliance, can be expected to press for a shift in U. S. policy in the direction of the Arab regimes.

On October 11, Yamani called for a conference of oil ministers from the five Gulf states for whom he negotiated the October 5 agreement. The meeting, which will be held in Kuwait,

will examine the terms of the accord in detail. After that, each individual country must ratify "participation" treaties with the consortiums operating on their territory. The October 8 *New York Times* reported that industry analysts are "somewhat skeptical" about the durability of the October 5 accord, expecting that OPEC members may press for still more concessions in coming years.

But, John McLean, one of the men who owns and operates the "golden goose," is confident that the eggs will continue to be laid in shining abundance. "I've been in this business 25 years now," he told *Business Week*, "and it has always been in a period of transition, turmoil, and change. We're going through it now, and I think we'll be going through it for the next 25 years." □

New Move Against Democracy in Sri Lanka

Bandaranaike Sponsors Bill to Curb Press

Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike is attempting to tighten censorship of Sri Lanka's newspapers through a "press council bill." However, she is running into heavy opposition from civil libertarians, trade unionists, the bourgeois press, and critics of her United Front regime.

As described in the September 28 *Ceylon News*, the bill would require newspapers to divulge their sources of information to a government-dominated five member "press council." The publication of "false" news or reports on government actions that might "adversely affect the economy" would be barred. Newspapers could not print "official secrets" regarding the police or armed forces deemed "likely to be prejudicial" to defense and security. The "press council" would be empowered to enforce these provisions and to oversee the functioning of the press.

A provision barring the publication of all news about government activities without official permission was dropped to placate the growing resistance to the legislation.

The Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka has denounced the proposed legislation. The September 7 *Ceylon News* quoted its charge that the press

council "will be subject to direct government control and Ministerial directives and will probably be completely subservient to the government of the day." The Ceylon Mercantile Union has also declared its opposition to the proposal.

Members of Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom party have defied their party's leaders by opposing the censorship provisions of the act. Dr. H. A. Anthony Perera, an SLFP member of the Munneswaram village council, "said that the freedom of the press was very essential in a country to preserve human rights and the late premier [S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike] was acutely conscious of it." The village council unanimously asked Bandaranaike to drop the offensive sections, the September 14 *Ceylon News* reported.

Newspapers that have in the past expressed sympathy for other attacks on civil liberties are seeking to defeat the "press council bill." Some fear it will be used to silence conservative critics as well as the youth and trade unionists in opposition to the government. Most of Sri Lanka's bourgeois press supported the right-wing United Freedom party against Bandaranaike's coalition in the 1970 election.

Allende Declares 'State of Emergency'

By Gerry Foley

"At about 3:00 a.m. on an ordinary day, the telephone rang in a house in the Pedro de Valdivia section of the well-to-do Barrio Alto residential area of Santiago. A housewife heard a voice at the other end say that a 'No. 3 alarm' had been issued. The sleepy woman left her bedroom and immediately began to fill the bathtub with water, while she shouted to wake up the rest of the family. She reminded her husband that a 'No. 3 alarm' called for getting the car ready to leave immediately.

"An hour later, while the house was kept in semidarkness, according to the instructions, the telephone rang again. The same voice said: 'The danger is over.' The woman went to empty the bathtub, and the household quickly returned to normal."

An article in the October 10 issue of *Punto Final*, the biweekly magazine of the Chilean MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary left], explained the meaning of this incident:

"The voice on the telephone belonged to one of the home vigilance squads of Proteco, the acronym for the fascist organization Protección a la Comunidad [Community Protection], which is the cover for one of the apparatuses that have been created in Chile to organize those actively opposing the Allende government."

The MIR organ described how middle-class areas have been tightly organized and whipped up to a fever pitch of anti-Communist fanaticism by well-organized gangs:

"The terror imposed by the fascists is so great that some people are firing their maids, in the first place because they are afraid that they're 'giving information to the enemy' and secondly because they are turning the servants' quarters into refrigerated places to keep hoarded food. 'We are prepared for civil war,' these people say."

Since August the right-wing opponents of President Salvador Allende, both inside and outside the state ap-



SALVADOR ALLENDE

paratus, have mounted increasing pressure on the popular-front regime. In this campaign they have been able to exploit popular discontent created by rising prices for consumer goods and shortages of essential items. Faced with imperialist economic reprisals and the sabotage of local capitalists, retailers, and big farmers, the government has found itself in worsening economic difficulties.

Trying to remain within the framework of capitalist legality, Allende has been unable either to take decisive measures against rightist subversion or to meet the demands of the masses whose hopes for a better life were aroused by the popular-front victory on September 4, 1970, and who have been hardest hit by rising prices and shortages. This September prices rose again by more than 22 percent.

In the second week of October, the pressures on the Allende government jumped to a new level. A nationwide truck strike beginning October 10 brought serious shortages of gasoline and flour, forcing the regime to de-

clare martial law in an area from Valparaiso province, 85 miles north of the capital, to Bio-Bio province, 315 miles to the south. About 70 percent of the population lives in this belt.

The truckers' strike was touched off when the government refused to meet the demands of the Confederation of Truck Owners for higher cargo rates. According to an October 12 UPI dispatch, the owners were also unhappy about a state trucking company being set up in the south of the country.

In an effort to stop the strike, which threatened to halt the supply of bread, among other things, the government ordered the arrest of Leon Vilarin, the president of the confederation, along with 160 owners and drivers. In this case, the undersecretary of the interior, Daniel Vergara, invoked the internal security law against subversion.

On October 12, the small businessmen's, retailers', builders', and large farmers' associations declared a strike in sympathy with the truckers.

"Jorge Fontaine, president of Chile's Confederation of Production and Commerce, speaking on behalf of all the sympathy strikers, said the walk-out would begin tomorrow and continue for an indefinite period," UPI reported October 12 from Santiago.

It was a small businessmen's strike that provoked the last crisis of the regime in August.

In the night of October 13-14, the government seized all of the radio stations in the country, reportedly to prevent the rightists from spreading alarmist rumors. The regime and its supporters have often complained about right-wing stations and commentators inciting fears of coming shortages and of "Communist atrocities."

Just after midnight on October 13, Allende broadcast a message denouncing fascists and profascists who, he said, were trying to paralyze Chile. But "he also called on the Government's left-wing supporters to abstain from any moves—such as the occupation of factories, communications centers, or public buildings—that could be interpreted as a 'provocation' and cause the army to stand against the Government," an AP dispatch reported October 13.

Allende had good reason to worry about the attitude of the army. The state of emergency decreed by the under secretary of the interior, a member

of the Communist party, put the military in effective control of the country.

"Gen. Hector Bravo, the commander of the Santiago garrison who is in charge of the state of emergency in the capital, warned that any public meetings or disorders would be dissolved 'with utmost energy,'" AP reported October 13.

In its anxiety to defend itself by "constitutional" means, the popular-front government denied freedoms not only to the militant right but to the left and to the workers' and people's organizations. Moreover, since the state apparatus remains fundamentally under bourgeois control and the right is already well organized, these restrictions can be expected to be much more effective against the left than against the reactionary opponents of the regime.

In fact, by ordering harsh administrative measures against the rightists and at the same time repressing the masses and preventing them from taking control of the society, Allende risked infuriating the petty-bourgeois layers supporting the paramilitary right and, in the last analysis, leaving himself defenseless against them.

One of the dangers facing the country was pointed out by Edgardo Enriquez, a member of the Political Com-

mittee of the MIR, in the October 10 *Punto Final*: "Historical experience shows that while fascist movements develop in prerevolutionary situations, or situations with prerevolutionary features, it is no less true that fascism can only grow and spread in a situation where there is a prolonged and persistent working-class upsurge but where, because of a vacillating and conciliationist policy by the reformist political leaderships of the popular movement, the workers fail to take power into their own hands."

Another danger facing the popular-front government was pointed up by a speech of Senator Benjamin Prado at the March plenum of the Christian Democratic party: "We are not interested in overthrowing Allende; we are interested in winning him over. And in order to do that it is essential that he remain in his post until 1976 but be left without any popular support."

The Christian Democratic strategy expressed by Prado corresponds to what seem to be the main objectives of Washington, to wear down and discredit this unstable leftist regime without at the same time destroying the credibility of the "peaceful road to change." □

[United Socialist party] (22%) and the Parti Socialiste [Socialist party] (17%). On the other hand, the Communist party (34%) and the Gaullist party [Union pour la Défense de la République—Union for the Defense of the Republic] (30%) are held in greatest disrepute among students. It is unfortunate that these figures put the country's largest workers' party and the clique of crooked businessmen on the same level. But at the same time it is a healthy sign that a large section of the students reject the counter-revolutionary methods and objectives of the Communist party.

The overwhelming majority (79%) of the 2,500,000 youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one favor "changes in French society." This strong majority expresses a generalized discontent more than a desire for a precise alternative: Among the 79%, 21% consider a "Swedish-style socialism" as a model; 7% favor the communism of the East-bloc countries; 4% look to Cuba, 3% to China, and 3% to the Chilean experience. The rest, more than half, indicated some other choice or else did not know.

This heterogeneity is reflected in the attitudes toward elections. Of the total number surveyed, 57% favored lowering the voting age to eighteen, but only 50% felt that the vote was really important; and 65% thought that the trade unions defend the "French people" better than do the political parties (14%).

The other tendencies disclosed by the two polls can be summed up in the following result: the majority of the youth reject present-day society and the organizations that uphold it, whether conservatives in power or reformists seeking power. The desire for socialism is widespread, but there is no clear idea of exactly what a socialist France would be like.

This is a terrible demonstration of weakness for the bourgeoisie, but it also places a heavy responsibility on the organizations that for decades have claimed to speak in the name of the working class and to point the way out. The millions of workers who died for the Russian revolution between 1917 and 1922 deserve better than this chilling verdict: In an advanced capitalist country, fifty years after the revolution, "the communism of the Eastern countries" is chosen as a model by a ridiculously small fraction of the youth—7%. □

49% Favor 'Leftist' Ideas

Polls Reflect Radicalization in France

[The following article about the results of two polls conducted among French youth appeared in the September 30 issue of *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Two IFOP [Institut Français d'Opinion Publique] polls published last week in *Point* and *Nouvel Observateur* have just confirmed that the youth are still "the spark of the revolution." *Point* polled students returning to classes for the 1972 session; *Nouvel Observateur* took youth between the

ages of eighteen and twenty-one, those who could vote in the legislative elections if the voting age were lowered—a possibility that, with the publication of this poll, becomes strongly doubtful.

Of the students polled 31% said frankly that they were revolutionists; in September 1968 the figure was only 12%.

The "reformists" who want to rearrange the university system declined in number from 54% to 36%. Those who think that the only way to get results is by direct action, even if it involves violence, reached 48%, while 49% are favorable to "leftist" ideas.

Of the political parties the students feel closest to the Parti Socialiste Unifié

The Martyrdom of Romas Kalanta

[Seven youths were sentenced to prison terms of eighteen months to three years by the Supreme Court of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) on October 3 for taking part in demonstrations May 18 against the Russification of their country. The actions developed in response to the suicide of a twenty-year-old student who burned himself to death in Kaunas four days before to protest the national oppression of the Lithuanian people. TASS reported that the jailed youths had been "organizers and active participants in a street incident . . . as a result of which public order was disturbed and traffic disrupted."

[The details of this and other actions in defense of the Lithuanian nationality were given in issue No. 26 of the *Chronicle of Current Events*, the underground publication of the Russian antibureaucratic opposition. A translation by *Intercontinental Press* follows.]

* * *

On May 14, in a square in Kaunas, Romas Kalanta (born 1953) burned himself to death under a placard demanding "Freedom for Lithuania." R. Kalanta was a high-school senior and the son of a university teacher. Three of his friends surrounded his burning body and did not allow anyone to approach him. They were arrested and charged with "premeditated murder under heinous circumstances" (Article 102 of the Russian Criminal Code). The *Chronicle* still does not know their identity.

R. Kalanta passed away in the hospital several hours later. His funeral was set for May 18. Several hours before the service was scheduled to begin, his body was secretly removed from the morgue and buried. Those who arrived for the funeral went to the site of the immolation. A very large crowd assembled. The militia began to disperse it. Those assembled offered resistance. According to rumors, one member of the militia was killed. Then, outside forces were called in and they dispersed the

crowd. The "disorders" continued on May 19. Many people were arrested. Some received ten- to fifteen-day sentences on "petty hooliganism" charges. Criminal charges have been brought against others.

A Kaunas newspaper carried a photocopy of a letter from Kalanta's parents: "A great misfortune has befallen our family—the suicide of our son. Everyone understands the grief of parents in times like this. But some irresponsible elements, trying to disturb the peace of the city, are taking advantage of our misfortune and making proclamations about how our people are persecuted. Others, looking for thrills, are following their example, causing us still greater suffering. No human beings have the right to conduct themselves in such a manner. The greatest support that can be given to our family is to leave us in peace." This letter was reprinted in the Vilnius Lithuanian- and Russian-language newspapers.

The chairman of the Kaunas city executive committee appeared on local television with "explanations."¹ He stated in particular: "The authorities investigated this suicide and ascertained the circumstances surrounding it. A court medical commission was set up. The physicians participating in this work are: Lecturer in the Medical Science of Physical Culture at Vilnius University Yu. Andriuskaivicius; Chief Physician of Kaunas Psychoneurological Hospital V. Berneris; Chief Psychiatrist of the Ministry of Health Services of the Lithuanian SSR Yu. Gutmanas;² Professor I. Surkus of the Kaunas Medical Institute; and other specialists in the area.³ On the basis of a court psychiatric report, investigation of available documents, notes, letters, pictures of the

1. M. B. Deputalskas. Radio Vilnius reported his statement in English, May 27, 1972.

2. For Gutmanas's role in the case of S. Kudirka, see *Chronicle*, No. 20, p. 234.

3. For example, A. Dauksene, Berneris's assistant. (See *Contemporary Lithuania*, May 21, 1972.)

deceased, and also taking note of the testimony of his parents, teachers, and friends, the commission concluded that Romas Kalanta was mentally ill and committed suicide while in a disturbed state. Certain irresponsible persons, a group of juveniles, who misunderstood and misinterpreted this suicide and who lacked any sense of responsibility, tried to disrupt the public order and the peace in the city. . . . We appeal to leaders in the schools, teachers, parents and youth, and urge you to contribute to strengthening the security of the social order in the city."

Letters were published in an issue of the *Kauno Tiesa*⁴ "condemning the hooligan activities."

The May 22 issue of that paper published an article "Who are these disrupters of order?" The article stated: "On May 18 and 19 a small group of hooligans disturbed public order and peace. So that we could inform our readers of the identity of these hooligans, the editor asked the city prosecutor about it. We learned that in the majority of the cases, the people involved have previously been tried for hooliganism and other criminal offenses. Degenerate, long-haired, perverted hooligans with an unsightly appearance, this is what some of them look like." Further on the article told about five of those arrested in the square. Criminal proceedings have been initiated against one of them, a high-school senior, Henrikas Jotsiunas, "for disturbing public order, insubordination, and assaulting police officers."

On May 28, during a fair in the market place in Varen, Stonis (born 1949; a sanitary technician) and three of his friends raised the national flag. Stonis's friends were immediately seized by the militia, but he managed to get away. The next day on that same square he set fire to himself. He died June 10 in a military hospital. The funeral took place under militia and KGB surveillance. During the funeral all roads to Varen were closed off.

On June 3 on a Kaunas street (the square on which Kalanta immolated himself is under guard) Andriuskaivicius (born 1912; a worker) burned himself to death for the same reasons [as Kalanta did]. He died the next day in a military hospital. He was

4. "Kauno Tiesa" means *Kaunas Pravda*.

buried in secret by the militia in an unknown location.

On June 10, Zalickauskas (born 1910, a worker) tried to immolate himself, but he was seized. He is now in a military hospital.⁵

June 11-18 the international handball competition for the Baltic Cup took place in Vilnius Sports Stadium. The reaction of the Lithuanian elementary, high-school, and college students during the meet was tumultuous: Whenever a foreign team approached the Soviet goal, they shouted "hurrah"; when the Soviet team scored a goal, they whistled. Among the spectators

5. UPI reported the news about Stonis, Andriuskiavicus, and Zalickauskas on July 5 and 6, 1972.

Shah Occupies Island in Arab Gulf

Iranian Students Hit German Witch-Hunt

By Javad Sadeeg

Following the decision of the West German government on October 4 to ban the General Union of Palestinian Workers and the General Union of Palestinian Students, and in view of its continued deportation of Arabs, the Confederation of Iranian Students called for mass protest actions.

On October 10, the Iranian Students Association (ISA) in New York announced that protest demonstrations were taking place in West Germany and other European countries, that a hunger strike was in progress in Paris, and that actions were being projected in the United States for San Francisco, Chicago, Washington, D. C., and New York.

On October 12, 150 people joined a militant ISA demonstration in front of the West German consulate in New York to demand an end to the wave of racist persecution sweeping West Germany. Most of the demonstrators were Iranian, Arab, and other third-world students, who wore masks to indicate that they do not consider the United States government to be any more democratic than its West German ally.

The racist persecution of Palestinians

there were numerous disguised members of the militia and the KGB. They seized those people who were shouting and took them away. The same happened to those who did not rise for the Soviet anthem.

Around 150 people were arrested. Many of them were released after serving a fifteen-day sentence. Several dozen are still under investigation. The majority of the college students arrested were not allowed to take their exams; some of them were not awarded their diplomas.

In the last days of the competition, there were many empty seats in the sports stadium because tickets were not on sale. They were being distributed free to selected enterprises, to trusted party committees—basically to those institutions where the Russians are in the majority. □

and other Arabs that is occurring in West Germany has been encouraged by the shah of Iran for some time. He wants to have the Confederation of Iranian Students suppressed in the European countries and in the United States.

Last March, when West German Chancellor Willy Brandt visited Iran, the shah obtained a promise from him that "an appropriate method will be found to prevent anti-Iran demonstrations in Germany." After concluding an oil deal with the shah, Brandt made it clear, according to reports in the shah's press at the time, that "Germany will not allow the foreigners residing on its territory either to disrupt the internal security of the state or to damage its external relations with friendly countries."

The current wave of persecution was planned well in advance. When the Munich incident occurred, an excuse was found to set the "appropriate method"—an internationally coordinated witch-hunt—into motion. The appropriate method for combating it is the organization of broadly based mass actions like those called for by the Confederation of Iranian Students.

While the Iranian students have been mounting a campaign in defense of Arab students and workers, the shah has been pursuing his own offensive against the Arab people. The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) accused the shah of occupying a new island in the Arab Gulf,* according to a report in the *Christian Science Monitor* October 12. PFLOAG disclosed that Abu Ghanem island, over which Oman had sovereignty, had been handed over to the shah in a secret deal.

In November 1971, the shah occupied three Arab islands—Abu Moussa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. During the occupation of Greater Tunb, the island population resisted, and three of the shah's soldiers were killed. Three Arabs were also killed, and inhabitants who were not too old to move—a total of seventy persons—were expelled.

The shah's purpose in occupying the Arab islands is to establish his military and political domination over the oil-rich region and make it safe for imperialism. This is not a new role for the Iranian regime. It began in the 1920s when the shah's father was put in power by the British imperialists with the task of establishing a centralized state in Iran. The task was accomplished, among other ways, by oppressing many nationalities, including the Arabs living in the oil-rich Southwest. The shah's present policy is merely a continuation of his father's program.

The shah also appears to be interfering in the continuing war between North Yemen and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The government of the latter has accused the shah of supplying arms and funds to North Yemen. □

*Traditionally called the Persian Gulf. It is dominated by imperialist interests, aided by the shah's military expansionism. Located in a predominantly Arab region, it is now referred to as the Arab Gulf by Arab revolutionary organizations.

For Medicinal Purposes Only

"During one week when the North Vietnamese offensive was at its hottest . . . Saigon bought \$333,000 worth of brandy. In 10 months alone, this aristocratic liquor cost the hard-pressed Vietnamese people a whopping \$6.3 million in U. S. funds."—Jack Anderson in his column of October 16.

Interview With Greek Trotskyist Leader

[The following interview with Theologos Psaradelles, a member of the KDKE (Kommounistiko Diethnistiko Komma tes Ellados—Internationalist Communist party of Greece), Greek section of the Fourth International, appeared in the September 30 issue of the French revolutionary-socialist weekly *Rouge*. Psaradelles had just arrived in France shortly after escaping for the third time from Greek jails. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. In the years before coming to Paris, you have gone through quite a bit. Could you briefly tell us about it?

Answer. The Greek police arrested me for the first time in 1967. I was tortured, but released for lack of evidence. The second time, in May 1969, they had evidence. After being beaten for days on end, I was stuck in a neighborhood police station. Actually, escape was not really very difficult. After getting ahold of a little money, I took the boat to Mytilene. From there I got to Turkey on a stolen boat by rowing for eighteen hours.

The political asylum granted by the Turkish authorities meant living under surveillance in an isolated spot 300 kilometers east of Ankara. I escaped twice with the idea of going to Bulgaria and, if everything went all right, to Western Europe. The first time I was caught a few kilometers from the border. The second time I succeeded and turned myself in at the first Bulgarian outpost.

After being transferred from prison to prison, I was interrogated at great length. Without telling them that I was a member of the Fourth International, I asked them to let me go to Western Europe if they did not want to keep me. Their answer came on the train that was apparently supposed to be bringing me back to Turkey when I saw Greek policemen get on board. At that point, I jumped from the train and walked and ran for forty kilometers in a freezing rain. But since I have rheumatism, and since the bor-

der area with Greece is tightly controlled (the people who live there belong to paramilitary organizations), I was finally arrested, and shortly afterward, sent to Athens.

Q. What is the situation facing our Greek comrades?

A. The dictatorship hit our organization very hard and, in spite of



THEOLOGOS PSARADELLES

the real growth we experienced during the sixties, we were neither numerically strong enough nor politically mature enough to resist. And so, a sizable split occurred just after the coup d'etat, and a large number of our members left to get involved in violent activities—without attempting to consolidate the organization—and allied themselves with the centrists and the activists of the EDA [Enosis tes Demokratikes Aristeras—Union of the Democratic Left, legal form of the Greek Communist party prior to the coup]. They were convinced that their actions would bring down the regime.

The main tasks for the comrades who, like me, remained in the section was to reorganize our forces and to sink roots in the masses.

Q. Where do things stand with the political forces on the Greek left?

A. All the political forces in Greek society were completely shaken up by the dictatorship. The pre-1967 bourgeois parties no longer amount to anything, and yesterday's "liberals" are today carrying on a dialogue with the regime. The Greek Communist party has split and lost all credibility. The only ones who in the final analysis have been able—even though weakened numerically—to survive politically are the Trotskyists.

In the aftermath of the April 21 coup, because of the crisis of both bourgeois liberalism and Stalinist reformism, the dominant tendency on the Greek left has become the spontanéist organizations that hoped to mobilize the masses through terrorist activity.

Today this tendency is in retreat, not only because of its inability to resolve the unprecedented crisis of leadership in the working class through its methods, but also, paradoxically, because of the beginning signs of mobilizations, which present the vanguard with problems of a much more precise character.

Q. What tasks confront the vanguard in the present situation in Greece?

A. The political crisis unquestionably persists—and with it the inability of the dictatorship to gain a popular base. Indeed, the dictatorship is unable, without undermining its very existence, to satisfy even the slightest economic and political demands of the workers or to grant political freedoms to the masses.

Recently, in April and May, mobilizations took place at the university. They were, in fact, only the first after a long period during which the masses took no part in politics, and they will not be the last.

In view of the decomposition of the Greek Communist party, more and more newly radicalized young militants are being drawn toward revolutionary Marxism. Our comrades, by taking advantage of the growing radicalization among Greek youth and by preparing for coming struggles, are actively working to build the Greek section of the Fourth International. □

The undertakers in Britain are up in arms against plastic and cardboard caskets, since their use means "further lowering of funeral standards."

Key Questions for the Two Wings of the IRA

By Gerry Foley

In the wake of the defeats inflicted on the nationalist people of Northern Ireland at the end of July — the gravest setbacks they have suffered in more than three years of fighting against the reactionary imperialist social system imposed on their country — virtually all political forces involved in the conflict have been feeling their way toward new ground.

The conservative elements have been trying to reach an agreement among themselves to consolidate their victory. At the same time, the militant nationalist and revolutionary groups — reacting to their defeats and their political weaknesses, which have been revealed by the successful maneuvers that the imperialists have carried out since the introduction of direct rule from London over the British enclave — have been undergoing a process of argument and reorientation.

* * *

"Since the military occupation was not necessary from a security point of view, we are forced to examine the political and symbolic reasons why Whitelaw [the British administrator of Northern Ireland] moved against Free Derry and other 'no-go' areas.

"The community of Free Derry had effectively rejected British domination. It was a liberated area, declared free, not by the I. R. A. but by the whole community, which with reasons known to all had united in their determination to keep the R. U. C. [Royal Ulster Constabulary] out. This community had to be conquered. Politically it was necessary to end the sign of rebellion and to replant the Union Jack on the Creggan Heights."

This was Frank McManus's interpretation of the July 31 invasion of the Catholic ghettos by British forces. McManus, the representative of the Northern Irish county of Fermanagh in the British House of Commons, chairman of the Northern Resistance Movement, and a figure not unsympathetic to the Provisional IRA, ex-

pressed this opinion in an August 2 press conference.

Because of the negative reaction in the Catholic community to the wave of terrorist bombings carried out on July 21 by the Provisional IRA, the numbed population of the nationalist ghettos allowed the British army to overrun, almost without resistance, the self-governing areas that had been maintained for many months as a focus of opposition to the imperialist system in Northern Ireland and as a symbol of the hopes of the oppressed population. The effect of this defeat was not confined to the imperialist enclave.

The reaction in the South to the occupation of Free Derry was quite different, for example, than it had been to previous atrocities by the British army, such as the internment raids of August 9, 1971, and the shooting of thirteen civil-rights marchers on January 31, 1972, which touched off the first general strike in the history of the Free State.

In the aftermath of the invasion of the Catholic ghettos, although its complicity with the British moves was evident, the government party in the South won an unprecedented victory in the parliamentary by-election in mid-Cork. A candidate calling for a stronger stand against British imperialism won only 3 percent of the poll.

"The massive vote has demonstrated extraordinary support for Mr. Lynch [the Dublin prime minister] in his handling of the North's crisis and for a tougher policy against the I. R. A.," the *Irish Times* commented August 4.

The split in the British parliamentary establishment opened up by the resistance of the nationalist population of Northern Ireland to the concentration camp system was apparently closed: "On both sides of the House, William Whitelaw is supported because there is no alternative to his policies," *Irish Times* correspondent Conor Brady wrote August 10. "Vociferous demands from the Labour benches for

release of the internees have died away and Operation Motorman [as the invasion of the ghettos was called] has satisfied the militarists."

Since the British offensive at least temporarily destroyed the chances for maintaining a clear focus of resistance, it has been all the easier for the press to represent the continuing violence in Northern Ireland as the result of blind fanaticism.

It is inevitable, of course, that sharp confrontations will arise between Catholic and Protestant in Northern Ireland whenever the oppressed community raises its head, because of the deeply rooted caste system that exists in the area. In order to win its democratic demands, the nationalist population must convince the proimperialist Protestant community that the caste system cannot be maintained. It is likely that force or the threat of force will be part of this. But individual terrorist attacks cannot bring the bigoted Protestant majority to reason; they can only infuriate people. At the same time, such actions confuse and disorient nationalist opinion in the South and democratic opinion throughout the world, depriving the nationalist people of allies it must have in order to win its struggle.

The feeling of international isolation and the pressure of a wave of random terrorist murders, apparently helped along by the British secret services, cannot, on the other hand, help but undermine the fighting spirit of the nationalist people themselves.

Thus, at the start of the fall the rent strike, the backbone of the resistance in the North, continued to decline, and in September the news was dominated by the plans of the various bourgeois parties for "solving" the Northern Ireland situation. The two poles seemed to be represented on the one hand by the SDLP [Social Democratic and Labour party] proposal of a condominium in which Dublin and London would share authority over Northern Ireland, and, on the other hand, by the plan for full integration of the province into Great Britain, which is favored by Ian Paisley and the British right-wing Tory Enoch Powell.

The liberal proimperialists favor a regional parliament in Northern Ireland with police powers exclusively in the hands of London. The diminished official Unionist party is demanding the restoration of the au-

tonomous Orange administration.

The concept of an "independent British Ulster" put forward by the paramilitary Protestant groups is probably intended simply as a rallying cry that can mobilize the strongest pressure of the Protestant masses against any concessions by London to the nationalist population. On the other hand, the full-integration idea backed by Paisley and Powell (and endorsed by a handful of workerist sectarians as a means for overcoming "divisions in the working class") seems to be increasingly dangerous. This plan is coupled with a demand for ending the special status of Irish nationalists on British territory and treating them "like other foreigners."

These most cunning ultrarightist leaders seem to have realized that the introduction of direct rule has strengthened the principle of British authority over the area. They view this, probably correctly, as the best position from which to defend the basic reactionary institutions in the region.

But at the same time, the situation in Northern Ireland still seems to be fluid. The combativity of the nationalist population, if diminished, seems not to have been broken, and, after four years of fighting, will not fade quickly, especially among the young people who have grown up in the climate of violence and hope of the last years.

The moderate nationalists are still showing signs of caution about negotiating directly with the British authorities, hesitations that probably reflect a persistent militancy in the oppressed communities. Since the occupation of the ghettos, the British government also seems to have been following a policy of caution. It has not made an all-out effort to arrest or rearrest militant nationalist leaders, most of whom remain active in their communities. There have been some further releases of Official and Provisional IRA men, and the Official republican clubs have been given permission to begin the process of registering to contest elections, even though the historic political organization of the republican movement, Sinn Féin, remains outlawed.

The persistent unrest in Northern Ireland has also increased sentiment in Britain for withdrawing the troops. An Opinion Research Centre poll carried out on September 22 showed 55

percent favoring a pullout and letting the Irish settle their own problems.

In this situation, a complex political process seems to be going on in the militant nationalist camp, the direction of which is not yet clear. But the general outlines of some key debates seem to be emerging.

"In Belfast a spokesman for the Provisionals told 'The Irish Times' that there was no question whatever about Mr. Twomey's position as O/C [Officer Commanding] of the Belfast Brigade nor was there any question of any split in Belfast in the Provisionals, or between Belfast and Dublin commands over present policy," Henry Kelly wrote in the September 5 issue of the *Irish Times*.

"It is known, however, that the leadership of the Provisionals is seriously reconsidering the car-bomb campaign and the policy of attacking civilian and semi-civilian targets.

"There is what might be described as 'a general rethink' going on in the Provisional movement over present policy based mainly on some recent military disasters, which included the arrest of prominent leaders, the deaths of volunteers and officers who were planting bombs and, of course, the deaths of completely innocent civilians.

"But the Provisionals are adamant that, though they may be rethinking this policy, this does not mean by any stretch of the imagination that they are considering giving up the fight, calling a truce, or scaling down their operations against the British army."

A report in the Belfast *Sunday News* of September 3 had claimed that Twomey, who ordered the end of the truce and the renewal of hostilities on July 9, had been replaced by Gerry Adams, who was allegedly more interested in political tactics and action than the old military leaders of the Provisional IRA. In denying this report, the Republican Press Bureau in Belfast, which speaks for the Provisionals, explained that while Adams had not replaced Twomey, he had been promoted and was engaged in reorganizing the Provisional Sinn Féin. In contrast to the situation in the Official republican movement, the Provisional political arm has been rather neglected.

A year ago, moreover, the main Provisional organ, *An Phoblacht*, was a small, almost apolitical paper with

a sluggish circulation. In the recent period, it has become an attractive and timely publication and is scheduled to change from a monthly to a biweekly. While the main issue in the split in the Republican movement, for all practical purposes, was the question of "physical force," or guerrilla warfare, versus political methods and mass mobilization, with the Provisionals defending the nonpolitical traditions of republicanism, the September issue of *An Phoblacht* carried an article making the following points:

"The I. R. A. know that physical force is not the *sole* means of revolutionary social change. Guns do not have political principles. The Republican movement is agonisingly aware that armed struggle without a just goal, and based on a reasonable chance of achieving either defence of a beleaguered community or liberation of our country, is monstrously without merit. Possession of arms is no certain test of patriotism, but, like Connolly, the I. R. A. believe that the risks of a carefully planned and principled armed struggle are nothing to the shame of slavery.

"Connolly saw in his day that 'socialists believe that the question of force is of very minor importance'. He answered: 'The really important question is of the principles upon which is based the movement that may or not need the use of force to realise its object'. It is an answer which sincere socialists might pause to seriously consider."

There were ambiguities in this article and there is no evidence as yet of the degree to which these opinions are shared by the Provisional leadership. But the appearance alone of such positions in *An Phoblacht* seems to mark a significant turn in the propaganda of the Provisionals. The author of the article clearly invites political discussion; whereas in October 1971, the attitude of the Provisionals seemed to be represented by the headlines of that month's issue of *An Phoblacht*: "TOTAL WAR — Ta Ré na Cáinte Thart [The Time for Talk is Over]."

This apparent shift on the part of the Provisionals should offer the Official republicans an opportunity to open up a political discussion. The Officials should welcome such a chance, as it is they who have stressed the need for political program and principled unity of all national forces.

It is they, moreover, who have led all the major mass campaigns in Northern Ireland up to the present. And they could ask the Provisionals some sharp questions.

For example, the Officials could ask whether the Provisionals still viewed the introduction of direct rule in Northern Ireland as a victory. In the September issue of *An Phoblacht*, Deasún Breatnach explained the call for abolishing the Northern Ireland government this way:

"Stormont is used by the Imperial Parliament to cloud the issue of political and economic independence, to mask the ferocity of the forces backing the Imperial administration, and to keep the Irish people of the north-east divided by sectarianism.

"But Stormont, like Westminster, also is the guardian of capitalist exploitation and the local defender of the imperial class property and interests.

"If we wish to create the conditions necessary for a revolution so as to return Ireland to the Irish people, Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter, and to the men of no religion, we must attack and destroy the imperial administration. The soft belly of this administration is its puppets; and the weaker of these puppets is Stormont, even though it might appear to be the stronger, backed as it is with so much imperial funds and troops.

"It is the weaker because it is the more absurd.

"One of the greatest difficulties in western democracies in bringing about the revolution is that the tyranny and exploitation is clouded by an appearance of democracy.

"The primary objective of the genuine, thinking revolutionary must be to force the administration to disclose the reality of its class exploitation; the ferocity of its determination to defend the class interests to the end, regardless of the people's will; and therefore, the unreality of its alleged democracy."

Breatnach's thesis was the classical ultraleft idea that the more naked and brutal capitalist oppression becomes, the closer the revolution. The same notion was espoused, during their ultraleft phase, by the Communist parties he denounces as "revisionist."

The Officials could ask, now that the Belfast, Dublin, and London governments have so thoroughly "unmasked themselves," why sections of

the nationalist people continue either to welcome or be lulled by promises of concessions from the imperialist government and why the militant sections find themselves in a more isolated and difficult position than at any time since the start of the present crisis. In particular, they could ask why the allegedly revolutionary slogan of doing away with the Belfast parliament has been taken over by the ultrarightists, who are calling for complete assimilation of the area into English society.

The Officials should have no difficulty in answering Breatnach's claim that "a reform programme is no use to a revolutionary." They could point out that it was the mass civil-rights movement mobilized behind the demand for reforms that brought the nationalist people in the North to the point of revolution, whereas past armed struggles aimed at immediate destruction of the state not only failed to threaten the system but in fact reinforced it. Some Provisionals would even recognize that the success of the civil-rights movement, paradoxically, is responsible for the fact that the guerrilla campaign in progress has much wider support than previous attempts.

For example, five Irish-Americans jailed on charges of running guns to the Northern nationalists wrote in the September 23 issue of the *Irish People*, the weekly paper of Northern Aid, the American support group of the Provisionals:

"In 1968 the IRA hardly existed and the civil rights workers rocked the scandal-run, entrenched Orange-Stormont dictatorship by exposing to the world the horrible gerry-mandering, the massive blatant discrimination in jobs and housing. . . . The Stormont satellite hated the civil rights groups more than they did the IRA . . ."

Of course, the Officials could not convince Breatnach or any other revolutionist if they argued, as they have in the past, that a democratic Northern Ireland state is a necessary first stage in overcoming the divisions in the working class. It is true that the mass of Northern Catholics are not ready to fight against the existence of the partition as such. They are not any more ready than any other people to fight for abstractions. What they will fight against is the concrete effects of the partition on their lives,

the caste discrimination on which the imperialist enclave is based and the denial of basic democratic rights.

But it is no less true that the Northern Ireland state is in essence anti-democratic. It was created to frustrate the democratic will of the majority of the Irish people for national independence. It will remain antidemocratic as long as any substantial section of the nationalist population retains the aspiration for a united independent Ireland. Any revolutionist who denied this reality, or who encouraged illusions of some reformed and democratic state in the imperialist enclave, could rightly be accused by Breatnach or anyone else of being a reformist and a betrayer of the republican tradition.

The Officials could ask other important questions, such as how can the Provisionals expect to mobilize the masses of Northern Catholics behind the demand that the British government commit itself now to ending the border, when the nationalist population is isolated and on the defensive? And if this demand is not raised, what slogans can unite the people for a counterattack on the British system?

The Officials could point to many failures and misconceptions in the Provisional strategy, and if the September issue of *An Phoblacht* is any indication of the attitudes of the Provisional organization, they could expect a fair hearing, at least in some quarters.

Unfortunately, the September issue of the *United Irishman* seemed less inclined to ask questions and engage in debate than to make sweeping and dogmatic denunciations of the "Provos" and the "Trots," the supposed two wings of the "Provo-Trots." This issue, moreover, was not an isolated phenomenon. Since June there has been a precipitous decline of the Official organ into dogmatic frenzy, paralleled, to all indications, by a deepening isolation of the Official republican movement. Why has the Official movement been unable to expose the weaknesses of the Provisional strategy and offer a successful alternative?

The distorted debate between the slogan of a "Democratized Stormont" and the claim that more naked imperialist rule would bring the revolution closer, which I have referred to, is one indication. But there are a number of processes at work to which I will return in coming articles.

Objectives of Marcos's Totalitarian Regime

By Antero Nanhaya

Manila

With the declaration of martial law in the Philippines September 22, all the "free world" countries of South-east Asia have now become naked military dictatorships.

Following a script that has become standard in right-wing coups, President Ferdinand E. Marcos announced that martial law was necessary to prevent the violent overthrow of the government by a foreign-backed Communist insurgency, and also to establish a "New Society."

This hackneyed justification represents the opposite of the actual situation. Any possibility of foreign assistance for the Maoist-dominated Philippine radical movement evaporated with the Mao-Nixon agreement to practice "peaceful coexistence."

As for the "Communist insurgency," the New People's Army (NPA) consists of only several hundred regular guerrillas, most of whom are virtually isolated in the forested mountains of Isabela Province. It was because of the weakness rather than the strength of the radical organizations that martial law could be declared.

The Philippine Maoists, following a popular-front "National Democratic" program, oscillated between ultraleftism and liberal reformism. In face of the government's moves toward a military dictatorship, the Maoists focused on the slogan: *Sagot sa Martial Law—Digmaang Bayan*. (The answer to martial law—people's war.) Omitted was information on who would fight the "People's War." The slogan seemed to be addressed to the bourgeoisie as a threat in hope of forestalling martial law rather than to the workers and peasants, who are far from prepared subjectively to take up such a struggle.

The "New Society" is a transparent euphemism for uncontrolled plunder of the nation. Marcos has in effect said that the corrupt gang which he serves as executive, while unable to solve any of the country's problems with nearly unchecked power for the last seven years, will now, with absolute power, suddenly end corruption.

A sample of the "New Society" was immediately provided. Upon declaration of martial law, all communications media were shut down except for the newspaper *Daily Express*, founded last May by a Marcos flunky, and the KBS radio-television network purchased a few years ago by Marcos through a dummy.

Caught up in the first wave of arrests were the muckraking publishers, editors, and columnists of the major newspapers and magazines, including Joaquin Roces and Maximo Soliven of the *Manila Times*, Amando Doronila and Ernesto Granada of the *Manila Chronicle*, Luis Mauricio and Renato Constantino of the *Graphic*, Teodoro Locsin Sr. of the *Free Press*, and Roberto Ordoñez of the *Philippines Herald*.

The major political critics of Marcos were also quickly apprehended, most notably three senators, Ninoy Aquino, José Diokno, and Ramón Mitra.

The first arrests also included various warlord politicians who have private armies and arsenals, some of whom have been instrumental in Marcos's rise to power, such as congressmen Roque Ablan, Rafael Aquino, David Puzon, José Lingad, and Carlos Imperial, governors Lino Bocalan (Cavito), Moises Espinosa (Masbate), Eduardo Josen (Nueva Ecija), and Rolando Puzon (Kalinga-Apayao), former Governor Carmeling Crisologo (Ilocos Sur), and Rufino Antonio Jr., son of the head of the Philippine Statehood U. S. A. Movement.

Among Marcos's objectives is the silencing of all critics in the bourgeois political opposition. He likewise hopes to co-opt all possible opponents to the right.

The previous vocalness of the bourgeois opposition involved only a fraternal dispute between the ins and the outs, the usual squabble over the lion's share of the spoils.

Before acting, Marcos obtained consent from the ruling circles. Prior to decreeing martial law, Marcos met that same day with members of the Philippine Chamber of Industries, the

Philippine Chamber of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce, and the American Chamber of Commerce.

Also in attendance were the finance secretary (Virata), the governor of the Central Bank (Licaros), the chairman of the National Economic Council (Sicat), the head of the Presidential Economic Staff (Orosa), the chairman of the Board of Investments (Paterno), and the secretary of commerce (Quiazon).

Soon after the announcement, endorsements were received from the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines and the Bankers Association.

Sergio Osmeña Jr., who ran against Marcos in the 1969 elections and who has never conceded defeat because of alleged massive cheating, represented the bourgeois opposition to Marcos. This opposition has now joined in backing the dictator and top executive of their class.

Three days before the declaration of martial law, Osmeña stated: "The Marcos fascism is the greatest threat to our country today. I call on all progressive elements to resist the current fascistic campaign characterized by urban bombing, smearing of the opposition, mass arrests, and intrigues." (*Philippines Herald*, September 19.)

After Marcos declared martial law, Osmeña switched his position, expressing "sincere hopes" that Marcos succeeds in his "bold plan to establish a new society for the sake of our country and people." (*Daily Express*, October 1.)

Others who have had changes of heart include the mayor of Manila and the mayors of its two important suburbs Makati and San Juan, who—before the declaration of martial law—were "opposed to the use at this time by President Marcos of any of the emergency powers." (*Manila Times*, September 19.)

Nemesio Yabut, the mayor of Makati, wired the dictator: "Rest assured the people of Makati with the members of the municipal council under my leadership are solidly behind you in this very timely decision of yours to save the republic and form a new society." (*Daily Express*, September 25.)

Thus with only a few whispers of dissent the Filipino bourgeoisie permitted democracy to be smashed over-

night and have rallied behind their candidate for the role General Suharto played in Indonesia in 1965.

The martial law order was signed on September 21, put into effect at 9:00 p.m. on September 22, and formally announced nearly twenty-four hours later. This lag gave the police dragnet the advantage of surprise. They picked up such figures as Constitutional Convention delegate Enrique Voltaire Garcia, labor leaders such as Ignacio Lacsina, college professors like Hernando Abaya, and "rehabilitated" participants in the 1949-51 Huk rebellion, including Luis Taruc and Alfredo Saulo.

Many radicals had already gone into hiding following raids September 17 by military intelligence squads on nine major Maoist headquarters in the Manila area. In the predawn simultaneous raids, fifty-one university students were arrested, and truckloads of literature and printing equipment were seized.

The man Lyndon Johnson once called his right arm in Asia has long been plotting to install himself as dictator. Recently he militarized the civilian administration, appointing army officers to head the Bureau of Posts (Brig. Gen. Felizardo Tanabe), the Civil Aeronautics Administration (Brig. Gen. Jesus Singson), Philippine National Railways (Brig. Gen. Cesar Jimenez), Public Works and Communications (Col. Manuel Syquio), National Science Development Board (Gen. Florencio Medina), Bureau of Supplies (Brig. Gen. Marte Iglesias), Ports and Harbors Administration (Commodore Santiago Naval), Radio Control Office (Brig. Gen. Ceferino Carreon), Waterworks and Sewerage System (Brig. Gen. Sergio Isada), Bureau of Prisons (Brig. Gen. Vicente Raval), National Housing Corporation (Maj. Gen. Gaudencio Tobias), Police Commission (Brig. Gen. Crispin de Castro), National Bureau of Investigation (Col. Jolly Bugarin), etc., etc. Concurrently, the secretary of defense (Enrile) has been made head of the Philippine National Bank.

Despite his tight control of the army and the government apparatus, Marcos would never have declared martial law without the approval (if not the instigation) of American imperialism and the national bourgeoisie. The

silence of the Nixon administration is eloquent in this respect.

The Philippines is undergoing phenomenal urbanization and proletarianization. Today it has the largest and lowest-paid skilled labor force in Southeast Asia. Since 1966 there has been an almost geometric increase in the number of both unions and strikes despite very high unemployment. The dislocation caused by strikes, the demand for wages to match inflation, the growing militancy of the Philippine workers, and their efforts to form organizations have alarmed both the imperialists and the national bourgeoisie, although most of the labor leadership is bureaucratized and reformist. Under martial law strikes, rallies, and group actions are banned, and "undesirable" employees are subject to dismissal. The decree constitutes a signal to fire union leaders, organizers, and active members.

In the government service, all 400,000 civilian employees have been required to submit "courtesy" resignations, so that the "inefficient and superfluous" can be weeded out.

Besides the upsurge in the labor movement, Marcos is attempting to throttle the general radicalization which was given fresh impetus by the catastrophic storms and floods in July and August that will be reflected in a food crisis around November. The big public reaction to the Marcos-dominated, scandal-ridden Constitutional Convention also entered into his calculations. In addition the Maoist radicals have been gaining strength despite their handicaps, as evidenced by their recent landslide victory in the student elections at the University of the Philippines.

Additional factors motivating the imposition of martial law were:

1. A Supreme Court decision "ending extra-territorial property and business rights for U.S. citizens in the Philippines in 1974.

2. Intensification of the Southern Philippine Christian-Muslim conflict, which is traceable to land-grabbing, mineral rights disputes, and political squabbles between rival warlords.

3. The expiration of Marcos's second four-year term as president in 1974. He is not eligible for reelection.

4. The increasing difficulty of obtaining foreign loans because of the deteriorating economy and uncertain political situation.

5. The repercussions of a 10 per-

cent increase in prices announced by the imperialist oil corporations September 18.

6. The impending opening of full trade and diplomatic relations between the Philippines and the Soviet Union.

With the imperialists and the national bourgeoisie solidly behind him, and with the army willing and eager to act, Marcos needed only the proper scenario. This was the reason for the vociferous month-long campaign stirring up an artificial atmosphere of fear over the menace of a "subversive" takeover.

Numerous mysterious urban bombings created near panic in the Philippine capital. These were used by Marcos to blame the radicals although the evidence indicates that they were planted by government agents.

The atmosphere was reminiscent of August 1971 when a political rally of the opposition Liberal party was bombed and Marcos utilized the situation to suspend habeas corpus and to arrest hundreds of radicals, especially the main leaders of the youth, for a crime they did not commit. Some of these victims are still being held behind bars with no prospect of release.

The expectation is that the new totalitarian regime will engage in fresh waves of arrests and repressive measures. Although there is no way of confirming it because of the censorship of the press, it is believed that approximately 1,000 arrests were made in the first week of martial law. The military has yet to act on its second and third priority lists.

The direction in which the Marcos regime is headed was clearly indicated by Brig. Gen. Tagumpay Nañadiego, judge advocate general of the armed forces, who stated: "It has to be done now. The lessons of Indonesia are too recent to be forgotten." □

Philippine Consulate Picketed

About 250 persons, most of them young Filipinos, picketed the Filipino consulate in San Francisco October 6. The action was one of several in the U.S. protesting the imposition of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos.

Among the slogans chanted by marchers were "Ibagsak fi [Down with Marcos]" "Laban ang batas militar [Oppose martial law]" and "Nixon, Thieu, now Marcos, too." The demonstrations were called by the National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines.

Losey's Assassination of Leon Trotsky

Joseph Losey's film *The Assassination of Trotsky* has on the whole met with an unfavorable response from the critics. Jean de Baroncelli, for instance, writing in the March 31 issue of *Le Monde*, expressed "sharp disappointment" after seeing the opening in Paris last spring.

Everyone, he said, had looked forward to this screenplay by "a great director" in which "one of the most fascinating figures of the century"—"Lenin's former comrade, the organizer of the Red Army, and the indomitable adversary of Stalin"—encounters "his murderer." While Losey "held rigorously to the facts," the outcome was not a work of "tragic dimensions, resounding with passionate politics," but a "banal film, unworthy of Losey's talents."

Baroncelli is severely critical of Losey's decision to exclude politics:

"Politically the film gives the impression of having been sterilized. . . . Of Trotsky's activities at the time, not a word. . . . Losey deliberately neglects the context in favor of the preparations for and achievement of the death scene.

"One can say, so what? We weren't expecting an educational documentary from Losey, or even a political analysis. Which is true. We were expecting only a good film, a powerful effect. But for such a film what is demanded of the director is meticulous reconstitution of the events that gave rise to the dramatic conflict. But such a conflict hardly exists except in the author's intentions."

Baroncelli, in a few cutting sentences, dismisses Richard Burton's impersonation of the main figure: "Then Trotsky appears. It's Richard Burton. Thinned down by a good ten kilos and wearing the required goatee. Meticulously 'made up,' the personage is nonetheless betrayed by the Shakespearean voice of the actor."

* * *

The film has now opened in New York. Here is the first paragraph of Stanley Kauffmann's review in the October 7 issue of *The New Republic*:

"Joseph Losey's picture about Trotsky is atrocious. When the project was first announced, I had a small hope for it, despite the preening, torpid estheticism of Losey's recent films, because he has some knowledge of radical politics (and suffered from it in the McCarthy days, which is how he became an 'English' director). But this film is the work of a man who went back to something that had once been vital to him and converted it all into tritely psychologized, pretty-pasteboard nonsense. It is almost an act of revenge."

Commenting on the structure of the film, Kauffmann finds it "full of inserted character-building touches and obvious parallels and spring-driven data," and "about as lively as a Hollywood bio-pic of the '30s. The dialogue, outside of Trotsky's quotations, which are hardly his best, is incredible in two senses. Example:

"'I can't believe you're going.'

"'All good things come to an end.'"

Even at his worst in the past, Kauffmann continues, Losey has usually provided some scraps of cinematic pleasure. "Here there are none—only platitudes like the freeze-frames, or blatant underscoring, like the intercutting of bullfight clips as Jacson's moment of truth approaches. The murder-moment itself deserves to be called decadent. Jacson stands behind the seated Trotsky and takes the pickaxe from under his folded raincoat. Then Losey gives us a shot of the back of Trotsky's head as Jacson looks at it, a really terrifying moment—vulnerability in essence. An artist would then have shown us Jacson swinging and Trotsky bleeding. But Losey has to make Trotsky rise and turn to Jacson and has to give us a shot of both standing, Jacson holding the pickaxe whose point is fixed in Trotsky's skull. What could have been the horror of the act becomes the horror of the film. That shot crystallizes the putrefaction of Losey."

It is hard to tell whether Kauffmann is critical of Burton or commiserates with him, since he mentions him in only one sentence: "Richard Burton,

the Trotsky, has no character to play, which is what he plays."

* * *

Both Baroncelli and Kauffmann, it is worth noting, hoped for a notable production from Losey because of his radical background, which ought to have equipped him with special appreciation of the struggle led by Trotsky against Stalin. How much did Losey ever really know about this historic contest?

In a long interview granted at the time of the Paris opening of the film, Losey told about his life. Now sixty-three, he was born in La Crosse, Wisconsin. Although his family was of the petty bourgeoisie, he apparently had no independent means. When the Great Depression began, he was in New York. Like many of his generation, he soon became radicalized.

In those days the aura of the November 1917 revolution in Russia still clung to the Soviet Union. The degeneration of the revolution was not yet widely appreciated abroad. In fact, among the vanguard of the labor movement and among extensive circles of intellectuals and artists internationally, the head of the usurping bureaucratic caste—despite his frame-up trials, bloody purges, and labor camps—was able to palm off his dictatorial regime as the continuation of Leninism.

Losey went to the Soviet Union to study theater. It was not until he returned to New York, however, that he became fully "politicized."

"I never met Trotsky," Losey explained. "But in the thirties and forties I knew many dedicated Trotskyists. I belonged to the Communist left. I imagine it was a 'Stalinist' left, although in those days it wouldn't have occurred to anyone to call it that. I thought of meeting Trotsky. All I knew about him was what the Marxists or comrades told me.

"At that time, in the United States, Trotskyism appeared to be a refuge for intellectuals who preferred talk rather than action. These intellectuals were given to arguing for methods so extreme that they appeared capable of destroying what they themselves were trying to achieve. I have the impression, in addition, that the North American left at the time must have had its 'black lists,' its index. Not much different from those of Mc-

Carthyism later on. Some cases were ridiculous since many of those I knew who were tagged as Trotskyists were people Trotsky himself repudiated. Hence the difficulty of knowing exactly what Trotsky was or what he was saying in those years. Because he said many things. But also he contradicted himself a lot."¹

Evidently Losey was little inclined in those years—or later—to investigate for himself what Trotsky actually said. He also had an aversion, it seems, to looking up some genuine Trotskyists.

In the same interview, Losey mentioned one of the difficulties faced by artists of radical political views in the United States:

"When you are part of the left, whether communist or socialist, this poses certain problems in the sphere of business. And films belong to the world of business."

Losey is referring here perhaps less to his victimization during the McCarthyite witch-hunt than to the self-censorship that a film director in the United States customarily observes in view of the limitations imposed by the czars in the industry who hold the purse strings.

As for his private life, Losey mentions that it is the opposite of what one might imagine. "Instead of having more and more money and leisure, I am living under more and more pressure and less and less income!"


A few more interesting details about Losey were provided by Judy Stone in the October 7 *Saturday Review*, a weekly magazine published in New York.

She began her quite favorable review of the film with the following paragraphs:

"A French television interviewer took a random sampling on the question 'Who was Trotsky?' before the Paris opening of Joseph Losey's new film *The Assassination of Trotsky* and so elicited one really revolutionary new theory: 'She was a ballet dancer.'

"If somebody had asked Losey that question in the 1940s, he would have

1. The interview, which appeared originally in the Paris weekly *L'Express*, has not yet been published in English so far as I know. I have translated the above quotations from two different Spanish versions, one in the May 18 issue of the Buenos Aires weekly *Panorama*, the other in the May 12 issue of the Montevideo weekly *Marcha*.



JOSEPH LOSEY: "Films belong to the world of business."

answered, 'The enemy.' But today, at sixty-three, his blue eyes weary in a powerful, furrowed face, the director is less certain. 'There are no absolutes,' he says. 'I want to make films that break down certainty.' . . .

"Now taking on a political subject he never dreamed he would touch, he has chosen to present the old 'enemy' during the last four months of his life in Mexico, 1940 . . ."

Judy Stone interviewed Losey in his home in London. Her article includes a number of statements made by the director that are quoted directly. The following, however, she has paraphrased:

"Losey became involved in the film out of some curiosity, but mostly out of loyalty to a black-listed old friend who wrote the original screen treatment (later discarded). Because they had shared a common pro-Soviet assumption that Trotsky was a counter-revolutionary, Losey wondered what had brought his friend to the project.

"The director realized very quickly that he knew almost nothing about Trotsky; nor, he surmised, did the vast majority of people who had once taken an anti-Trotsky position. He was surprised to learn, for instance, that Trotsky's theory of permanent world revolution, so widely disseminated by his disciples, was confined to a few sentences in the large body of his work and that, unlike many

of his adherents, Trotsky regarded the 'unconditional defense of the Soviet Union' as essential.

"Ironically, the final script, which contains footnotes citing sources for nearly all of Trotsky's lines, was written by Nicholas Mosley—son of Sir Oswald Mosley, once considered Britain's leading fascist, and of Lady Cynthia Mosley, one of Jessica Mitford's sisters. Lady Cynthia was a Trotskyist and Labour MP who had met Trotsky during his exile in 1930 in Turkey."²

Losey was "surprised to learn" that the theory of permanent revolution was "confined to a few sentences" and that Trotsky "unlike many of his adherents" was for "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union"! Could anything better reveal the extent of Losey's *ignorance* of Trotsky's political posi-

2. The very wealthy Sir Oswald Mosley began as a Conservative Member of Parliament. In 1924 he shifted to the Labour party, was elected to its Executive in 1927, and in 1929 was appointed a minister in the Labour government. He resigned in May 1930, formed an ambiguous "New Party" in the spring of 1931 and transformed this into the "British Union of Fascists" in 1932. What led Losey to consider Mosley's son to be an expert on Trotsky and his views? Or capable of composing dialogues that Trotsky might plausibly have engaged in? The fact that his mother once visited the Trotskys in Turkey?

tion and his contributions to revolutionary theory?

Trotsky made "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union" a principle—one of the main lines separating him and his adherents from a world of enemies, stretching from the imperialist powers to the Kremlin. It was precisely because Stalin was *not* organizing an adequate defense of the Soviet Union, but on the contrary paving the way for a German imperialist invasion, that Trotsky opposed the dictator's policies with such vigor, staking his life in the struggle. Not an iota of this is included in Losey's film.

As for the theory of the permanent revolution, it appears that Nicholas Mosley failed to check the first volume of Deutscher's biography of Trotsky,³ which describes the origin of the theory and the thought Trotsky gave to it. How the theory was confirmed by the course of the Russian revolution, how Lenin became a "Trotskyist" as a result, how the theory again became a key issue in the twenties with the rise of Stalinism, thereby engendering a new series of polemics, and how Trotsky returned again and again to the themes of the permanent revolution in subsequent years—all this belongs to outer space so far as Losey is concerned, and, of course, none of it is even hinted at in his film.

* * *

Even the most negative reviews of *The Assassination of Trotsky* have praised Losey on the accuracy of the facts. They have been taken in, I am afraid, by the publicity fed to the press by the producers.

It is true that the main locale—the house in Coyoacán—is reproduced quite well. The shots of the patio taken from the roof are especially good. The reconstruction of the walls is excellent; and many details are accurate, like the flower pots on the steps leading up to the library. Some unimportant changes have been made—such as removing the giant eucalyptus tree that still towers over the house, one of the landmarks in that part of the Mexico City suburb.

The May 24 assault is also well

reconstructed, with the very important exception of the role of Robert Sheldon Harte, the guard on duty who was inveigled into opening the patio gate during the night, letting in the assailants headed by the muralist and member of the Mexican Communist party David Alfaro Siqueiros. Harte is depicted in the film as one of the plotters, a hypothesis that has never been proved and that is contradicted by the fact that he was murdered after being kidnapped by the gang of Communist party members and GPU agents.⁴

For one who was there, however, the departures from fact jump out in almost every scene. For instance, Burton-Trotsky is shown on a balcony peering out at the street through a heavy steel netting. No such balcony existed. The windows opening to the street, moreover, were bricked up.

Alain Delon, who plays the role of the assassin Frank Jacson, wears outfits that appear to be late 1971 or early 1972. Like a cowboy's white Stetson, that is proper dress, I suppose, for the real hero of the film, enabling us to sympathize more readily with his fate.

Trotsky's secretaries and guards, on the other hand, are dressed in peg-top riding pants and boots of some remote period like the twenties, a rather ridiculous getup as compared to the styles of 1971-72. In real life they wore no uniforms, but dressed as they pleased; in this respect not being distinguishable from other college students and young workers of the time.

Burton uses a dictaphone that is an electronic marvel—it speaks backloud and clear, reciting in Shakespearean tones without any background noise like a hifi set equipped with Dolby circuitry. The real dictaphone used by Trotsky was an old, second-hand set of preelectronic vintage.

In the corner of Burton's study, I seemed to see a machine for shaving the records. We could not afford that, and had to take them to the center of the city for shaving after the dictation had been transcribed.

The desk at which Trotsky worked has been reproduced in the film, but

the objects on it are arranged to give an effect of extreme orderliness. This might not have been Losey's fault. After the assassination, Natalia kept the desk that way; and Losey may have thought that was how it was when Trotsky used it. But when L. D. was working, his manuscripts, often on several subjects, piled up, giving an appearance of disorder.

Losey turns the orderliness of Burton's desk to good account. Meticulously placed so that both titles can be easily read are a copy of *Newsweek* and a copy of *Life*. In another scene, Burton reads a copy of *Time*, holding the magazine in such a way as to make the cover clearly visible and highly legible. It is a fine bit of acting.

However, Trotsky considered *Time* magazine so superficial, so pretentious, and so generally distasteful that he never read it. Nor did he follow *Life* or *Newsweek*. To keep up with the news he relied on *El Universal* or *Excelsior*, which were delivered daily, and *The New York Times*, which we bought in the city.

The display of *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *Life* in *The Assassination of Trotsky* has, one must think, more to do with Losey's bidding for good publicity in the United States than with attempting to assure accurate reproduction of the significant details of Trotsky's home.

To present things as they were, Losey should have shown on Burton's desk, or in his hands, the magazine *Clave*, published by the Mexican Trotskyists at the time. Or the *Socialist Appeal* and *Fourth International*, published by the American Trotskyists. Trotsky followed these as well as the other publications of the Fourth International with keen interest. Copies of them *were* to be seen on his desk as soon as they arrived.

A comprehensive list of discrepancies would be long, but it becomes boring to point them out. Were it not for the insistence of the producers on the accuracy with which the film presents the facts, it would not be worth going into this question at all, for the truth is that accuracy on this level is not a prime requisite. The assassination of Trotsky could have occurred in Turkey, in France, or in Norway in the preceding years. Then the locale would have been quite different from the one in Coyoacán.

The assassination might have been

3. The researcher, however, did look through the last volume of Deutscher's biography, or at least the last chapter of the volume. It is a source for some of Burton's declamations in the role of Trotsky.

4. Siqueiros, still living, has not yet revealed the inside story of this murder in which he participated, or what means he utilized to escape being brought to trial. Is he waiting to speak posthumously?

carried out by an agent other than Jacson. For instance, had the May 24 machine-gun assault succeeded, then Losey's protagonist would have been David Alfaro Siqueiros.

Such an alteration of locale and assassin-heroes would not have changed the essential drama to be found in Trotsky's staking his life in the struggle against Stalinism. A dramatist of stature hardly needs an exact replica of the lava stones and adobe in the Coyoacán walls to stage that tragedy and Trotsky's ultimate triumph.

* * *

The publicity on the factual accuracy of the film helps cover up flaws of another nature.

Burton's lines, it is claimed, have been drawn from statements that Trotsky actually said or wrote. Most of Burton's lines, however, were thought up by the producers. Here are a few striking examples:

Burton orders his grandson Seva over to see a litter of rabbits: "Hmm! See, Seva . . . little ones. . . . Hmm! Life! What a struggle."

In a scene with Natasha, Burton sits wearily on the edge of his bed, breathing heavily. He says to his companion, "Where's the food?" Natasha answers: "We've had our food." Burton continues: "The food for the rabbits. It's supposed to come today. What day is it?"

Burton, on meeting Jacson, says: "You like rabbits?" As Seva in the same scene puts a baby rabbit back in the nest, Burton says: "She's a great breeder. She's the favorite."⁵

The following lines from the assassination scene probably represent the scriptwriter's concept of Trotsky's irony:

"They say that when the old sun worshippers tore the hearts out of their still living victims, it was to study the cardinal effect of high altitude. That's a joke . . . a Jewish joke . . . a Bronstein Trotsky joke. . . ."

5. The rabbits in Coyoacan have proved irresistible to others besides Losey—more irresistible than they actually were to Trotsky. Keeping rabbits was thought up as a possible hobby to provide Trotsky with an alternative to pacing back and forth for exercise as he probably did during his years in Czarist prisons. Most of the work of feeding the rabbits and keeping the area clean was done by other members of the household.

To a director with a Hollywood background that might sound quite natural. Trotsky was incapable of uttering such an abomination.

As for the selection of quotations recited by Burton, they are few in number, torn out of context in most instances, and placed together in such a way as to give them most often a meaning Trotsky never intended. Here is an example:

In a scene showing Burton dictating to Otto in the patio,⁶ Burton says, "It cannot be decided now . . . seventeen years after the event . . . whether or not the deaths at Kronstadt . . . which were my responsibility, were justified by history, or not. . . . No, I'm being tautological . . . cut out the 'or not.'"

"Civil war is not a school for humane behavior. Idealists and pacifists have always blamed. . . . revolution for excess but excesses spring from the very nature of revolution which is. . . . in itself an excess of history. Those who wish to do so, may reject revolution. I do not reject it. . . ."

Burton's confession of guilt concerning Kronstadt conveys a quite different impression from Trotsky's statements in the original. Although they are lengthy, some excerpts will demonstrate this:

"The truth of the matter is that I personally did not participate in the least in the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion, nor in the repressions following the suppression. In my eyes this very fact is of no political significance. I was a member of the government, I considered the quelling of the rebellion necessary and therefore bear responsibility for the suppression. Only within these limits have I replied to criticism up to now. But when moralists begin to annoy me personally, accusing me of exceeding cruelty not called forth by circumstance, I consider that I have a right to say: 'Messrs. moralists, you are

6. The scenes showing Burton spending a good deal of time in the patio are imaginative. In the rainy season drizzle and downpours were frequent; in the dry season the air could be brisk and dusty (the street was unpaved). As for eating in the patio, aside from the inconvenience of transporting food and dishes back and forth from a distant kitchen, this was the pre-DDT age. I know that all this is difficult for a Hollywooder to understand, but then the Trotskys did not come from Hollywood.

lying a bit.'

"The rebellion broke out during my stay in the Urals. From the Urals I came directly to Moscow for the 10th Congress of the party. The decision to suppress the rebellion by military force, *if the fortress could not be induced to surrender, first by peace negotiations, then through an ultimatum*—this general decision was adopted with my direct participation. But after the decision was taken, I continued to remain in Moscow and took no part, direct or indirect, in the military operations. . . .

"I stepped aside completely and demonstratively from this affair. Concerning the repressions, as far as I remember, Dzerzhinsky had personal charge of them and Dzerzhinsky could not tolerate anyone's interference with his functions (and properly so).

"Whether there were any needless victims I do not know. On this score I trust Dzerzhinsky more than his belated critics. For lack of data I cannot undertake to decide now, *a posteriori*, who should have been punished and how. Victor Serge's conclusions on this score—from third hand—have no value in my eyes. But I am ready to recognize that civil war is no school of humanism. Idealists and pacifists always accused the revolution of 'excesses.' But the main point is that 'excesses' flow from the very nature of revolution which in itself is but an 'excess' of history. Whoever so desires may on this basis reject (in little articles) revolution in general. I do not reject it. In this sense I carry full and complete responsibility for the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion." ("More on the Suppression of Kronstadt," in the *Writings of Leon Trotsky* [1937-38], Pathfinder Press, p. 164. Emphasis in the original.)

Here is another example of Burton reciting lines publicized as having been dug up from Trotsky's works:

"I trust that I will earn my place in history beside Lincoln in the American Civil War. History has different yardsticks. The slave owner, who uses cunning and violence to chain the slave . . . and the slave, who uses cunning and violence to break the chains. Only contemptible eunuchs . . . will say that they're equal before the court of morality . . . Only contemptible eunuchs will say that they're equal before the court of morality. Let me hear the last of it back. . . ."

This is the original:

"We leave to some Emil Ludwig or his ilk the drawing of Abraham Lincoln's portrait with rosy little wings. Lincoln's significance lies in his not hesitating before the most severe means, once they were found to be necessary, in achieving a great historic aim posed by the development of a young nation. The question lies not even in which of the warring camps caused or itself suffered the greatest number of victims. History has different yardsticks for the cruelty of the Northerners and the cruelty of the Southerners in the Civil War. A slave-owner who through cunning and violence shackles a slave in chains, and a slave who through cunning or violence breaks the chains—let not the contemptible eunuchs tell us that they are equals before a court of morality!" (*Their Morals and Ours*, Pathfinder Press edition, p. 29.)

* * *

With departures like these from what Trotsky really said, with additions that Trotsky never did say, with a spicing of things Trotsky could not possibly have said, Losey fashions a strange figure—a ridiculous, vain, strutting poseur addicted to listening to his own voice. This egomaniacal spouter is insufferable. The figure performing on the screen has no resemblance whatsoever to the living Trotsky. Yet the odd caricature somehow seems familiar. Where have we seen it before?

As I watched the film, the truth became more and more compelling. *This is the image of Leon Trotsky created by the Stalinists in their anti-Trotskyist campaigns of the twenties and thirties.*

The Trotsky played by Burton under Losey's direction is like an echo of the old Kremlin slanders. However, instead of following the old script that pictures Trotsky as plotting the death of Stalin, the script now calls for the reverse. The smear that Trotsky was an agent of Hitler is gone; the mud thrown on his personality remains.

Losey's efforts to the contrary, the film thus does have a modicum of political content. We are offered evidence of the way some Stalinists still view Trotsky even after Khrushchev's revelations in 1956 and the destruction of the cult of Stalin.

Many things fall into place once the source of Losey's concept of Trotsky is seen. It becomes explicable,

for instance, why Losey pictures Trotsky's guards and secretaries as ugly Americans, displaying an imperialist attitude toward Mexicans. (Losey has them speak grossly—and in English—to a Mexican worker delivering a plaque cut in memory of Robert Sheldon Harte.)⁷

We can understand, too, why Losey shows the human relations in the household as opposite to what they were in reality. Losey's robot guards and secretaries stand in fear of the arrogant, domineering Burton. He commands them like a business executive in a Madison Avenue office or Hollywood movie set—and they jump in response. Even the sparkling young Seva is shown as a morose child shrinking before his imperious grandfather.

An exception to this unsympathetic presentation of the minor characters in Trotsky's home is Valentina Cortese's portrayal of Natalia. Valentina-Natasha is a sweet, smiling, long-suffering, apolitical *American* housewife—the old stereotype now being taken to pieces by the Women's Liberation Movement. There is no resemblance between the Natasha of the film and Natalia Sedova, L.D. Trotsky's companion. As a foil to the overbearing Burton, however, Valentina-Natasha may help out with the receipts at the box office.

More significantly, knowing the source of Losey's inspiration, we can see why he is so intrigued by the personality of Trotsky's murderer and why he handles him so appreciatively, even building him into the hero of the film, giving him the final triumphant line, "I killed Trotsky."

* * *

The producers, naturally, were not interested in spending \$2.5 million on a film devoted to the artistic presentation of a partially reconstructed Stalinist concept of Trotsky, although they no doubt preferred that to a true view of the revolutionist who led the uprising against capitalism in Czarist Russia, constructed the Red Army to defend the first workers state against the combined assault of the major im-

7. Losey leaves out the fact that the Mexican Trotskyists regularly participated in guard duties. Some of the guards and secretaries from outside Mexico, it should be added, spoke excellent Spanish.

perialist powers, and later founded the Fourth International to continue the work initiated by Lenin of constructing revolutionary parties on an international scale. What the producers had in mind was a profit on their investment.

This brings us to the moment of truth. *The Assassination of Trotsky* stands or falls on its merits as commercial art. On this level—the profoundest one in the film—Losey may well have scored a success. That is, if current public tastes hold up. The production is a bid to the market for films reeking with violence.

In this context, the long sequence showing the torture of a bull in the Mexico City bullring is firmly motivated, constituting a high point in the drama. The shots in living color are superior to a view from a spectator's seat since a telescopic lens is used. Every detail of the gore, including the bull's coughing of torrents of blood from his slashed lungs, is shown in enlarged detail. For the ultimate delectation of sadistic audiences, close-ups are included of the final butchering of the carcass.

Equally integral to the film is the parallel showing Jacson sinking a pickaxe into Trotsky's brain and meeting the rushes of the wounded man. The blood that flows down Trotsky's face is left there even after he reaches the hospital, although in actuality Natalia wiped this away after Trotsky fell to the floor in the dining room.

A weak point is Losey's skimpiness on the raw sex now in demand. The director offers only one somewhat explicit scene as part of the opening sequence. Losey knows the rating problem, of course, and may have calculated that this was the best he could do without running into a "for adults only" restriction.

How many stars should this work of commercial art receive? That, I should think, is best left to determination by the box office.

—Joseph Hansen

Back to Normal

After examining Shoichi Yokoi for seven months, Japanese doctors concluded that he is in fine health. Yokoi, a fifty-seven-year-old former sergeant in the Japanese army, did not realize World War II had ended and hid in the jungles of Guam for twenty-eight years. Since he returned to civilization, the mercury content of his hair has quadrupled.

On the History of Trotskyism in Palestine

[The following interview was conducted in Haifa during August by John Bunze, who spoke to "Misha," one of the leaders of the "Israeli Socialist Organization-Matzpen (Marxist)," a group of anti-Zionist revolutionists, both Jewish and Arab. The text appeared in the September 15 issue of *Inprekkor* (International Press Correspondence of the Fourth International). The translation from the German is by *Intercontinental Press*.

The ISO is commonly identified as Matzpen (the Hebrew word for compass), which is the name of its newspaper. Founded in 1962, Matzpen was the only active anti-Zionist organization in Israel, uniting all those radicals considering themselves hostile to Zionism. In the course of time, several small groups split away from the ISO. Last February, after a process of political clarification, another split occurred. (See *Intercontinental Press*, March 27, p. 347.) The present group has the perspective of building a Leninist party both in Israel and throughout the Arab East.]

* * *

Question. For how long has there been a Trotskyist group in Palestine?

Answer. Our Trotskyist group arose in the late 1930s and came out of three components.

First, during the 1930s there was a large immigration to Palestine from Germany. The exiles closely reflected the entire German political spectrum. Among them were a few comrades from the Brandler opposition in the Communist party, the majority of whom soon developed toward Trotskyist positions (1937-1938). They were, of course, politically relatively isolated from the general population, and these new comrades were active only on an individual basis in economic struggles. Naturally, the group tried to make alliances, but this was made difficult by their limited experience and lack of familiarity with their new circumstances.

The second component was a group of young people forming the so-called Chugim Marxistim (Marxist Circles), which was the youth group of one of the two wings of the "Left Poale Zion." At the time, this left wing was affiliated to the London Bureau.

The youth group developed under its own impetus toward Trotskyist conceptions, at first without overcoming completely its Zionist leanings. That happened very rapidly when the second world war broke out. About that time we (the German group) learned of the existence of this group, which in the meantime had left the "Marxist Circles" and had brought out a few issues of the newspaper *Kol Hamaamad* (Voice of the Class).

In the course of time various other elements, mostly from *Hashomir Hatzair*, the youth group of the left-Zionist kibbutz movement, came together with these two other tendencies.

All these elements united to form the Brit Kommunistim

Mahapchanim (Revolutionary Communist Alliance), which at the beginning devoted itself both to theoretical and political work. (Independent of us, a group of German immigrants developed the notion that Trotskyists should not be active in Palestine; they restricted themselves purely to theoretical work.)

Q. What were your most important political positions?

A. From the very beginning we rejected Zionism in every respect. Zionism, we said, not only would be incapable of solving the problems of world Jewry, but would also create a new Jewish problem in the Arab East.

The Jewish problem under modern capitalism derives from the combination of the crisis-ridden development of capitalism itself and the fact that, because of the failure of the international revolution to spread after 1917 and because of the rise of Stalinism, the revolutionary-socialist perspective on the Jewish question was never put into practice.

The rankest effect of these factors was the fascist seizure of power in Germany, which eventually resulted in the physical annihilation of the greater part of European Jewry. The Jewish question was—and is—a symptom of the impasse in which contemporary capitalism finds itself and can be answered only by the socialist revolution. We rejected the formation of a Jewish state, because such a state could only be part of this decaying system and could only exacerbate the Jewish problem.

From its inception the Zionist colonization was by nature inevitably linked to the interests of imperialism, against which the native population of Palestine was moving. The Zionist colonization could succeed only if it functioned in close harmony with the interests of, and thereby received the aid of, one or another great power. This is demonstrated by the whole history of Zionism.

In Palestine, Zionism built up a second socioeconomic structure, one from which the Arab population was excluded as strictly as possible.

The Zionists kept Arab workers out of the Jewish economic sector and barred Arab goods from Jewish markets, thus creating their own purely Jewish-capitalist sector as a forerunner of a Zionist state. Through this process the Jewish workers were isolated from the Arab population, and the Arab economic sector was deprived of any possibility of development. The Zionist so-called trade union, the Histadrut, was instrumental in both aspects of the process.

Q. How did you, as revolutionary internationalists, respond to all this?

A. At the outset we saw that the only way to overcome the socioeconomic backwardness of the region was through a general anti-imperialist struggle for a *united socialist Arab East*. (This analysis still holds for our current position on the Palestinian resistance movement.)

We saw—and see—as our task propagandizing and organizing toward this end among both the Jewish and Arab masses in order to construct a united revolutionary-socialist party in the region, which the Stalinists, whose policies always dovetailed with Kremlin diplomacy, were unable to do. In addition, the perspective of a united socialist Arab East was the only one in which we saw the possibility of integrating the Jewish workers into the anti-imperialist and socialist struggle in the region.

Q. Retrospectively, how would you evaluate the significance of your group?

A. During the second world war, our political and organizational situation was extremely difficult. We fought (and illegally) against three enemies—Zionists, British imperialists, and Stalinists. At the time, the latter were perfectly willing to turn us over to the British police.

Essentially, we concentrated on working out our programmatic positions and propagandizing for them with *Kol Hamaamad*. We also put out material in Arabic, German, and English. We had contacts with some Trotskyists in the British army, and they helped us establish contact with Trotskyist groups in Cairo and Alexandria. Our international ties were mainly with the Revolutionary Communist party, then the British section of the Fourth International, and in part with the Socialist Workers party of the United States. We made contact with the Fourth International's European International Secretariat only after the war.

We frequently intervened with leaflets into workers' struggles in the British military installations, in the railway system, in the oil refineries, etc., concentrating on those areas in which both Jewish and Arab workers were exploited by imperialist capital.

After the war, we decided to continue working in these areas. But our intention, with which our international contacts agreed, could scarcely be realized. After the founding of the Zionist state, very few Arab workers were "tolerated" in the Zionist enterprises.

Q. What was your position on the founding of the Israeli state?

A. Even before the second world war, during the great political strikes and struggles of the Arab people, the British raised the idea of dividing the country into Jewish and Arab states. With the crush of wartime hostilities, this plan was pushed into the background. But at the end of the war, the future of the British mandate over Palestine was posed in a sharper form than ever before, for the following reasons:

First, British imperialism had been greatly weakened by the war. Second, U.S. imperialism was beginning to take over in the British colonial areas. Third, the Arab national revolutionary movement was beginning to take hold throughout the Arab East. And fourth, Zionism used the desperate situation of the Jewish survivors in Europe to foster its own aims in Palestine.

Naturally, our most intense activity was directed against the November 29, 1947, decision of the United Nations General Assembly—a decision made with both U.S. and Soviet support—that Palestine be divided into two states, one Arab, one Jewish. The consequence of this division

was that about 80 percent of the Arab population was driven off its land and the Jewish state became a de facto outpost of U.S. imperialism, without whose economic and political support Israel could not exist. It is important to mention here that the founding of the Zionist state was also supported, both politically and militarily, by the Soviet Union.

During this period, we essentially limited ourselves to propaganda against the expulsion, oppression, and expropriation of the Palestinians by the Zionist state and the conversion of the latter into an instrument in the service of U.S. imperialism's struggle against the developing Arab national revolutionary movement.

For starters we advanced—and still do—the following program: the right of return and compensation for all Palestinian refugees, political integration of the Israeli working class into the region, and, as I mentioned before, realization of both objectives through the struggle for a united socialist Arab East.

Q. What developments led to the formation of Matzpen?

A. After the war, and especially after the founding of the Zionist state, a good number of comrades left the country and others withdrew from political activity. Only a handful remained and, after 1951, were able to carry on some activity. During the 1950s I was, as a Trotskyist, completely isolated and was able to link up with only a few sympathizing comrades in the Arab CP and a few Jewish comrades.

During this period I worked in the shop committee of one of the country's biggest factories. There, some members of the CP, a few Mapam members, and I worked together in a "left cell."

In 1951 there was a big seamen's strike. I was the liaison between our factory committee and the sailors' strike committee and helped build a mass solidarity meeting. This strike was particularly significant in establishing the character of the Histadrut. The sailors' strike was not purely economic, but raised the possibility of allowing for the creation of trade-union formations independent of the Histadrut, which can in no way be considered a trade union. The state apparatus—the police, army, and so on—was mobilized in a life-and-death campaign to protect the Histadrut leadership from the workers, that is, to prevent the formation of a real trade union.

Apart from activity in the shop committee, we carried out Trotskyist propaganda in the left cell among a few CP members. But for ideological, as well as objective and subjective reasons, this work could not be brought to organizational-political expression.

In the late 1950s a significant section of the young intelligentsia began to develop a critical attitude toward Zionism and its state, mainly under the impact of the development of the Arab revolution in Iraq. I came in contact with groups like Avneri's Peula Hashemit (Semitic Action) and Moked's Hasmol Hashedash (New Left).

Nevertheless, it was only with the formation of the group that published the newspaper *Matzpen* that the revival of revolutionary-socialist organization took place. *Matzpen* was significant not only for its rejection of Zionism, but also as a part of the worldwide breakup of the Stalinist monolith.

The group arose during the period of the Sino-Soviet polemics. A few young Communist party members in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem advanced the demand that the Chinese documents, instead of just the Soviet ones, should be published. They saw this as a demand for democratization of the CP. Four members of the CP, even before they were expelled (1962), worked with sympathizers outside the party to publish *Matzpen*. At the end of 1962, the Arab comrades, this group, and I came together and the ISO was founded.

Q. How would you evaluate the development of Matzpen up to the recent split?

A. As I mentioned, the opposition of the comrades in the Communist party was based originally on the CP's lack of democracy. But their political conceptions were very heterogeneous and unclear. They took no clear stand on the Sino-Soviet conflict. One of the comrades expelled from the CP considered Pietro Nenni's party a model.

The participation of both of us in the new organization occasioned definite conflicts and crisis in the young group. Nevertheless, the discussion that ensued led to a clearer understanding of Zionism and the Arab revolution; that is, they partially accepted our position.

But in their general political conceptions—and above all in international and organizational questions—they rejected Trotskyism, although a few of them only partially.

Their perspective was to unite all the "non-Zionist" and even all the "almost-non-Zionist" elements. This made the organization still more heterogeneous than it was originally. They grabbed onto all sorts of elements, from anarchists to "left" nonsocialists. This led to a quantitative strengthening of the organization, but at the same time to a lowering of its qualitative level.

In spite of all its serious weaknesses, the great positive value of the Matzpen group lay in the fact that it began to organize a general Jewish-Arab anti-imperialist struggle independent of the Stalinists, that it demonstrated to the Palestinian movement the possibility of mobilizing revolutionary-socialist forces in Israel, that within the international leftist movement it popularized the idea of revolutionary anti-Zionist Arab-Israeli cooperation, and that it laid the basis for a new development of Trotskyism in Israel.

Q. What differences led the Lambertists and Maoists to split from the ISO?

A. After the June 1967 war and the consequent Israeli occupation of Arab territories, the chauvinist and expansionist character of the Zionist regime became even cruder, and this was reflected by the division in Matzpen.

The position of the Lambertists in the ISO corresponded to the general positions taken by this sect. They denied the specific character of the Zionist state, viewing it as a "normal" bourgeois state fundamentally not different from the Arab states. Consequently, they refused to consider the peculiar position of the Israeli working class.

The Maoist position is harder to define, since it was less clear and more fluid than the Lambertist stand. On the one hand they viewed the Palestinian resistance movement as the sole embodiment of all revolutionary practice

in the region, and on the other hand, they recommended that our work be confined exclusively to the Israeli working class. But that was not their final position; they constantly alter it as the need arises.

Q. What is Matzpen's situation after the splits?

A. The departure of these two groups had at least one positive result. Revolutionary Marxists on one side and a conglomeration of anarchists and spontanéists on the other now stand clearly counterposed.

Before the split, the lack of a united political and organizational perspective made progress in our general work impossible. Through fraction work, we revolutionary Marxists had begun to train cadres. To facilitate this we based ourselves on the principles of democratic centralism in order to hold back all sorts of organizational and political individualism. In practice, this meant that activity in all areas devolved on our fraction.

In keeping with the revolutionary-socialist perspective, we defended the old Trotskyist position of building a united revolutionary-Marxist party in the region in order to bring about the united socialist Arab East. We also adopted other established Trotskyist positions.

In this, and on many other questions as well, insurmountable contradictions developed.

Even before the split, we tried to set the general work of the organization on the basis of a program. This program consisted merely of the elementary fundamentals of revolutionary Marxism. But the anarchists and spontanéists strenuously resisted every programmatic position, even if they only opposed it on the vaguest general level.

While our organization was trying to overcome the initial problems of cadre-building, they tried to conduct a hidden wrecking operation through slander.

Q. What is the main axis of your activity today?

A. In the first period of the ISO-Matzpen (Marxist) we still had to deal with some spontanéist weaknesses. Now our main activity is centered among the youth, who are only slightly corrupted by Zionism and are beginning to stir against Zionism's most murderous and repressive manifestations. We concentrate mostly on revolutionary-Marxist building-activities aimed at training cadres who will be capable, when conditions are ripe, of carrying out work in the working class in order to *integrate* the anti-imperialist and socialist struggle in the region.

We publish our *Matzpen* regularly. A little while ago we began putting out some theoretical writings, partly in Arabic.

In the near future we intend to start publishing a regular theoretical journal and an Arabic-language newspaper. (Up to now, such newspapers have been banned by government censorship.)

We intervene in all the essential political struggles as the vanguard of the movement as, for example, in the current fight of the refugees from the Arab villages of Biram and Irkit to return to their homes. We are constantly strengthening our ties with the Fourth International, which gives us organizational, theoretical, political, and material aid. This strong bond is necessary if we are to realize our main strategic task on a proletarian internationalist basis—the building of a revolutionary party in the region. □

An Appeal for International Solidarity

By Rohana Wijeweera

[Rohana Wijeweera is one of the central leaders of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP—People's Liberation Front), a rebel youth movement in Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon). As such, he has been a major target of the Bandaranaike regime's sweeping repression. Wijeweera was arrested in March 1971, even before the April youth rebellion. His arrest was in fact the harbinger of the government's assault on the JVP.]

[Imprisoned since his arrest in one of Sri Lanka's concentration camps, Wijeweera was among the first of the rebels to be brought to trial before the newly created criminal justice commissions.]

[From prison, Wijeweera has sent the following appeal for worldwide solidarity with the victims of the Sri Lanka repression. It was written in English.]

* * *

"Rise, awakened masses! there is no victory without struggle."

*"The oppressed people of Sri Lanka stand today on the battlefield,
"With arms in hand engaged in the fight for freedom,
"They kiss the earth that is soaked with warm blood,
"Open your eyes and see how they die as men."*

It is well known to the world that the ruling capitalist class of our country, Ceylon, in association with the dark reactionary forces of foreign imperialism, has temporarily repressed the Ceylon proletariat and its political organization, the Lanka Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front of Ceylon), by cruel violent and counter-revolutionary action, in order to protect its exploitative system, maintain its class privileges, and prevent its class rule from being overthrown.

Since March 1971 the bourgeois counter-revolution in Ceylon has achieved a temporary and unstable military victory only by committing on a widespread scale and in a manner that appears incredible, the most barbarous, despicable and inhuman

atrocities which constitute the worst terror in our history.

At this moment, when the reactionary and corrupt capitalist ruling clique with the generous assistance and support as well as the blessings of reactionary foreign imperialist powers of various kinds—with the murderous Yankee imperialists at their head—has cruelly repressed the Ceylon proletariat and its revolutionary vanguard, the People's Liberation Front, and caused it to retreat, we as true Marxist-Leninists in accordance with the supreme principles of proletarian internationalism seek your moral and material support and solidarity.

Peoples of all Lands!

We appeal to you.

1. To compel the murderous fascist and dictatorial government of Sirima Bandaranaike, sheltering behind a democratic mask, to repeal immediately and completely the so-called Public Security Act which it has brought into force;

2. To compel it to lift immediately the ban imposed under the emergency regulations on the People's Liberation Front, the vanguard of the Ceylon proletariat, and to remove the repressive measures against the revolutionary movement;

3. To help in revealing the manner in which the reactionary ruling clique which has taken on the character of a "constitutional dictatorship" has used the corrupt and pro-imperialist police forces and sections of the armed services, private terrorist gangs, pilots and aircraft, as well as CIA advice and methods, to massacre in the very country they were ruling, the very people who placed them in power, destroying whole villages, demolishing and burning houses, raping women, wiping out whole families, murdering more than 15,000 revolutionary young men and women and more than twice that number of innocent people—actions that it carried out and is still carrying out in order to repress the revolutionary movement;

To reveal the facts about these barbarous actions that have been concealed and that will shock and appall the whole world;

4. To help in exposing and defeating the insane policies, destructive and

treacherous to the people, pursued by this "fascist democratic" ruling clique, which keeps ten thousand patriotic young men and women imprisoned in inhuman conditions under cover of "rehabilitation"; to compel them to release all those against whom there are no charges, to inform all those against whom there are supposed charges of their nature, and to afford them immediate access to lawyers;

5. To compel them to repeal the arbitrary, inhuman and savage Criminal Justice Commissions Act, to hold trials of political prisoners under the ordinary law earlier in force, and to halt immediately the political repression at present maintained under that Act;

6. To help in revealing the objective reality in opposition to the unprincipled and foul lies, distortions, insults and slanders directed against the Ceylon proletariat movement and its political core, the People's Liberation Front, its principles, policies, programme and its activists;

7. We seek finally your moral and material support, your endorsement and solidarity, in every form, every manner and every means, to tear off the "socialist" and "democratic" masks of the reactionary capitalist ruling Sirima Bandaranaike clique, to expose to the whole world its fascist capitalist nakedness, to protect in retreat the People's Liberation Front, the striking-force of the Ceylon proletariat; to protect the purity and universality of Marxist-Leninist thought, and the sacred right of oppressed humanity to revolt against cruel and arbitrary rulers; to protect the revolutionary honour of more than 15,000 revolutionary young men and women, members of the People's Liberation Front, who sacrificed their lives; to protect the human and social rights of millions of Ceylon proletarians, and to carry forward the Ceylon socialist proletarian revolution to victory.

Wherever you may be in the world, if you are a Marxist-Leninist, if you are a revolutionary, if you are a Communist, if you are a socialist, if you are a progressive, if you are a democrat, if you are a humanitarian, if you are an upholder of justice, we seek your co-operation.

On behalf of more than 15,000 Marxist-Leninist young men and women who found no burial place, who were burnt alive, who had to die seeing their sisters, wives and mothers raped before their eyes, who

were buried alive, who sacrificed their lives on the battlefield, who embraced death in going forward against the enemy knowing they were doomed to die, who did not have the fortune of having their funeral dirges sung by the millions of proletarians whom they served; on behalf of the tens of thousands of revolutionaries who lost their homes, wives and children, brothers and sisters, who were imprisoned, who were crippled and maimed; on behalf of the youth of this country who cannot hope to emerge from the darkness and cruel slavery of the monstrous bourgeois dictatorship into the light of liberation without a revolutionary uprising, without a rebuilding of the People's Liberation Front, without the forward movement of the proletariat; on behalf of the proletariat of Ceylon, defenceless before the rising economic, political, social and military oppression of the bourgeoisie, we appeal to you to fulfil your international proletarian and human duties.

From dark prisons we raise the cry, high, powerful and sacred—"Let pro-

letarian internationalism triumph!"—that was raised by our beloved teachers Marx, Engels and Lenin.

In a land without justice, where both men and rights, justice and fairness, have been burnt at the altar of the vicious purposes of the capitalist ruling clique, we extend in comradeship our hands, bound by the chains of the bourgeoisie, emaciated yet strong.

Before the supreme tribunal of the conscience of mankind we appeal against the savage repression of the capitalist ruling clique of Ceylon.

Peoples of all lands!

It is from you we expect justice and right.

"If tens of thousands advance to take up the tasks that fall from us,

"If the hands of the people are lifted to raise the red banners that drop from our hands,

"If there are voices to sing their grief on our way to the grave,

"Then wherever Death may find me—to welcome him I am ready."

Against Popular Frontism in Argentina

[The following article appeared in the September 27 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly organ of the Partido Socialista Argentino (Argentine Socialist party). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Agustín Tosco, a figure in the workers' movement whose name is associated with the Córdoba uprising and who is known as one of the most prominent victims of the repression of the dictatorship, has been released from prison as the result of a chain of circumstances. Chief of these was the pressure of the workers' and people's movement, and, by extension, the government's need to "pacify" the country during the preelectoral period.

Avanzada Socialista was the first political paper to interview Tosco on his release. Our correspondent spoke to him in Trelew a few hours after he left the prison. Our readers will understand that, as revolutionary politicians, our first concern in speaking to Tosco, along with expressing our happiness at his release, was to question him about his political position in the present situation.

From his answers—which were later confirmed in Buenos Aires in his press conference Monday, September 25—it appears that Tosco is calling on the working-class, popular, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist forces to unite to confront the dictatorship and, thereby necessarily, the capitulationist and treacherous leaderships of the workers' movement. However, he asked for some time to think it over before trying to answer the specific question of what political form this broad unity should take and especially whether it should be headed up by workers' candidates with working-class programmatic demands.

While one of our correspondents was talking to Tosco in Trelew, another of our reporters in Buenos Aires was interviewing Julio Guillán, the leader of the "militant sector" of the Peronist trade-unionists. Guillán also proposed a united front similar to the one projected by Tosco. His answer to our question about working-class candidates was "maybe."

Despite the cautious tone adopted by these two leaders, we think that their answers show that there is a climate in the country clearly favoring united action of proletarian and popular

forces under the leadership of working-class leaders and representatives. Tosco and Guillán come from different currents within the trade unions but they are beginning to converge on a political solution.

The favorable attitude we find in these two leaders only reflects—even lags behind—the impression we get every day at the factory gates. There the workers agree—and they tell us so frankly—that they are sick of voting for the candidates of the bosses and the despised trade-union bureaucracy, that they want something new and different, something like the regroupment pole or workers' front that we are calling on them to form. We are also getting a positive response from many of the activists, shop stewards, and leaders of the small unions in the interior of the country with whom we are discussing the same problem.

Socialists, however, must issue a strong warning against the danger that this extraordinarily favorable climate for forming a political movement of the workers will be wasted and that the militancy of the workers will be diverted into supporting sections of the capitalist class and the petty bourgeoisie.

Any compañero can read in the daily papers that there are politicians who are also calling for "the unity of the working-class, popular, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist forces." They call this by various names—a popular front, an anti-imperialist front, or a front of national liberation. Concretely, politicians like Sueldo, Alende, and the spokesmen of the Communist party—to judge from some recent statements of the ENA [Encuentro Nacional de los Argentinos—National Forum for Argentinians] and from its political tradition—are calling for the formation of such a bloc.

The objective of these fronts—which have nothing to do with our Workers' and Socialist Pole of Regroupment—is to get the workers to come around to accepting a program that mixes up their interests with those of the bosses, and to support some "distinguished" personality, or capitalist or petty-bourgeois politician.

For example, on its front page Monday the daily *La Razón* claimed that the Argentine left is looking for its own Liber Seregni. Since our party was mentioned as part of the left, we

want to make it clear that we are absolutely opposed to the workers putting up any Argentine Liber Seregni as their representative.

Liber Seregni was the candidate of the Uruguayan Frente Amplio [Broad Front], behind which the left of our sister country united. He was a retired general inclined to democratic and populist poses. To be clear about it, we think that it was a crime for the left in Uruguay, where the Communist party controls the trade-union federation, to run a bourgeois candidate and call on the workers to put their trust in him.

It should be clearly understood that we socialists are also for uniting all the working-class and popular forces and that we are happy to see the Suedos, Alendes, or any other "distinguished" figure moving closer to the workers. But what we oppose is their leading the front, heading the ticket, or setting the tone of the program.

Let the Argentine Liber Seregni, if they will, support our Agustín Toscos, our anonymous and heroic fighters, the self-sacrificing worker activists fighting exploitation and capitalist repression, and not the other way around!

The vacillations shown by Tosco and Guillán, as well as the Communist party's traditional "popular front" policy, and the lack of time the workers have for choosing tickets and discussing their program constitute a real threat to the developing workers' front.

We oppose this "popular front" snare so strongly because something very grave is at stake. Those who want to set up a "popular front" and get the workers to support bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sectors are wrecking the chance we have today for taking a great step forward toward winning the political independence of the workers. That is, a step toward the workers having their own party and not letting the capitalist politicians dictate what they should do.

At the same time, these people want to sabotage another great opportunity. They want to keep us from using the elections to organize the class-struggle vanguard in the unions so that it will not only move toward independent political action but will be united and reinforced in order to carry on its struggle against the bosses and against the labor bureaucrats more effectively.

For this reason, we say that the only answer to the danger of a "popular front" is to build the workers' united front, which we have called the Workers' and Socialist Pole. This is also a standard behind which the other noncapitalist forces can and must rally.

The workers' movement itself must develop a program and demand 70 or 80 percent of the nominees. In order to accomplish this, we must build assemblies and meetings in all places of work and proceed with the task of developing a program and electing our representatives. Besides the fundamental anti-imperialist planks, the program must also include specific anti-capitalist workers' demands. And our representatives must be the best and most respected figures in the movement.

This is why it is so important for recognized leaders like Tosco, Guillán, and Romano or Fote in Tucumán, as well as those who have led the great strikes and mobilizations in recent years, to call publicly for drawing up a ticket and a program around which the rank and file can rapidly unite.

Basing itself on a working-class program and working-class candidates, the front must call for full participation of all the popular currents and all the anti-imperialist sectors. The next thing is to discuss the tactical and secondary problem of what party label to use to give its ticket official status. Already the Partido Socialista

has offered its place on the ballot in eleven provincial districts and the federal capital unconditionally to candidates of a workers' front. "Unconditionally" means that it has publicly rejected the proposal to participate in a foul, opportunistic bloc, because it thinks that the workers should run independent candidates.

We call on all class-struggle trade-union leaders, and above all those who have been cautious in taking a position, to declare themselves clearly for the political independence of the workers' movement and to join in a workers' front that will present its own candidates in the elections.

We call on the workers to come together in the factories and in our party offices to discuss program and the election of representatives at all levels.

In this way we can utilize the fraudulent elections the dictatorship plans to stage. In this way we can deal with the trap the regime has set. In this way we can come out of the elections with a united and reinforced revolutionary class-struggle vanguard.

Standing on this principled ground, we will take up the concrete task of drawing up a ticket and forming alliances to intervene in the elections. We will go to all the meetings; we will discuss with all sections of the workers and the populace, whether Peronists, socialists, Communists, liberals, or Christians. But our objective is to defend the political independence of the workers' movement, which today requires putting together a working-class ticket for the elections. □

In Memory of the Trelew Martyrs

[The following statement was issued by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International September 23.]

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At the opening of this first meeting of the United Secretariat after the Trelew massacre, the leadership of the Fourth International in behalf of all revolutionists throughout the world honors the memory of the comrades of the ERP-PRT and the comrades of the other organizations who were vilely murdered by the Argentine military dictatorship.

The reaction of the Argentine revolutionary youth and the vanguard of the labor movement against this massacre proves that these comrades did not fight and die in vain.

The United Secretariat expresses its solidarity with the PRT in its struggle against the repression of which it is a victim and appeals to all the sections to intensify their campaign in defense of the persecuted Argentine revolutionists, a campaign that has already achieved results with the asylum granted first in Chile, and then in Cuba, to Comrade Santucho and his comrades. □