

# Intercontinental Press

Africa

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50c

## Invoking 'Collective Guilt'

# Israel Hits Arab Villages



Israeli Premier Golda Meir personally approved plan to fire on fedayeen and hostages in Munich. Then, in retaliation, ordered "Defense" Minister Moshe Dayan to bomb Arab villages.

## After Kissinger's Secret Visit

# Thieu Drops All Pretense of Democracy

# No Rip-off

To make a point, three artists in New York, which boasts some of the most polluted air in the world, set up two tanks on Wall Street containing 79 percent pure nitrogen and 21 percent pure oxygen. Displayed on a four-wheeled, canopied two-seater, the two tanks were hooked up so that the combination of gases could be dispensed through disposable plastic masks.

The artists offered passersby ninety seconds of deep breathing free of charge.

Was it a test sponsored by public officials? "No," actress Ginger J. Walker said; "we just wanted to see how people reacted to a little fresh air in their system."

Ed Baynard, a painter, explained: "You might say it's street theater on a very existential level. We're just doing it for the hell of it, to see if people want clean air or not."

Sculptor Gordon Matta claimed that the project was "sponsored and conceived, and the money was put up by George Smudge; you know, the paramedical philanthropist."

Those who stepped up for the ninety-second test were well acquainted with smudges, but not "George Smudge."

Marie Cataldo, an office worker, gave her reaction to the novel combination of pure 79 percent nitrogen and 21 percent oxygen: "It opens up your nostrils. It's like really clean and nice."

Dennis Carroll, a file supervisor, said: "You can really tell the difference, except that it makes you a little dizzy because you're not used to it."

Elke Pratlers, a secretary, said: "I'd like to do it every day. The air here really stinks and in my office three guys smoke cigars and that's even worse."

Baynard told the *New York Post*, which reported the happening to its readers: "Nobody could believe it was just a nice thing, that it wasn't a rip-off. What they didn't seem to realize is that we've all been ripped off already."

"We've just been offering souvenirs of what used to be." □

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# Israel's Bombing of Arab Villages

By Jon Rothschild

"The cinder-block home of the Hamse family was demolished. The mother, Rasmilla, and seven children from 14 months to 15 years of age were said to have been killed.

"A new concrete schoolhouse was reduced to rubble. Officials said the school served 600 children."

*New York Times* correspondent Juan de Onís filed the above report from the village of Rafid on September 9. The town, in southern Lebanon, was one of the ten targets hit on the afternoon of September 8 in a seventeen-minute-long Israeli bombing attack on Syrian and Lebanese villages. Between fifty and eighty planes — U.S.-built Phantoms and French-supplied Mirages — were involved in the raids. Because of the swiftness of the attack, virtually no defense was offered by the Arabs. No Syrian or Lebanese planes were sent into the air; no ground-to-air missiles were fired, and, except in northern Syria, no Arab anti-aircraft batteries were used.

Israeli military spokesmen described the raids, the most extensive since the June 1967 war, as retribution for the September 5 Palestinian commando action in Munich during which eleven Israelis were killed. "Our aim," the Israeli briefing officer said, "is to hit the terrorists as hard as we can, to cripple them and to make it clear that we mean business. The message is directed not only to the terrorists, but also to the countries that harbor them."

On September 9, Syrian jets struck back at Israeli positions in the occupied Golan Heights. In the first dogfight in the Arab East in more than two years, three Syrian planes were shot down. The Syrian air force claimed three Israeli jets were downed, a claim that was denied by Tel Aviv.

On September 7 the *New York Times* had printed an editorial on the action carried out by the commandos in Munich. Referring to "the Arab murderers," the *Times* asserted that "The

basic guilt is that of the Arab nations. . . ."


Again on September 9, this voice of a not inconsequential sector of the U.S. ruling class editorialized that "The Arab murderers in Munich have, in effect, served notice on the world that no international gathering for any purpose anywhere is automatically immune from potential attack."

After the Israeli retaliation, which a September 11 *Times* editorial called "predictable and understandable," the editors cautioned Israeli leaders that massive retribution could be self-defeating, driving all Arabs to support "terrorism." Another note of caution was introduced: "Moreover, as Arab civilian casualties inevitably mount from the bombing and shelling, Israel will forfeit much of the widespread sympathy and support it commanded after the senseless slaughter in Munich."

But there were no tears shed for the dead Arab civilians, no mention was made of the Israeli government's message to the world that no Arab village is immune from attack.

Most of the Western press and the governments it supports accepted the Israeli claim that the September 8 bombing raids were not directed against civilians but against "terrorist bases." But de Onís provided counterevidence to that assertion. "First, the people in this village are not Palestinians, and second, there have been no commandos around here for more than a year," one of the citizens of Rafid told de Onís.

Rafid, it should be noted, is one of the few Israeli targets that even conceivably could have harbored fedayeen. This is demonstrated by a glance at the map. Of the eight targets aside from Rafid and one other village in southern Lebanon, three are in northern Syria. Of these, the closest to the Israeli border is a full 100 miles away; two are nearly at the Turkish border; all three are separated from the "promised land" by the entire length of Lebanon.



The New York Times  
Map shows eight of ten villages bombed by Israeli planes September 8.

Perhaps realizing that 100 miles is further than even an "Arab murderer" can lob a mortar, the Israeli military officials who explained the raids to Western reporters claimed that the three targets in northern Syria were "Fateh naval bases." Supporters of the Arab revolution, not to mention participants, may be pleasantly surprised to learn that the commando movement has a navy. The surprise should be tempered by suspicion. The same Israeli military officials announced September 9 that the Israeli navy had sunk a "small attack boat manned by Palestinian guerrillas off the southern Lebanese coast early Friday morning [September 8]." The sources doubted that the crew exceeded ten in number. A heroic victory over Fateh's mighty fleet.

Objective observers must conclude that the bombs dropped on northern Syria, if they indeed touched any boats at all, fell on Arab fishing craft, and not on naval installations.

Another target was the village of Nahar el-Bard in northern Lebanon, about eighty-five miles from the northernmost reaches of Israel. Un-

til the Israeli attack, no one had claimed that there were any operational commando bases in northern Lebanon.

Three targeted villages are in southern Syria, two of them near the Golan Heights, Syrian territory occupied by Israel since the 1967 war. There have been few, if any, reported attacks there during the last two years.

The final target, el-Hameh, is also a considerable distance from Israeli territory. But it is only four miles from Damascus, the Syrian capital. The inhabitants of Damascus, it was reported, could see the Israeli jets swoop in and could hear the bombs falling.

The fedayeen news agency reported September 9 that the total casualties of the Israeli raids were twenty-six dead, most of them women and children, and forty wounded. Arab governments suggested the toll was considerably higher.

The Israeli military apparatus is apparently not yet finished. "Conversations with Israeli government officials here today," *New York Times* correspondent Terrence Smith wrote from Jerusalem September 9, "left the strong impression that yesterday's raid and incidents today were the beginning, rather than the end, of the Israeli response to the Munich shootings."

In a September 10 television interview, Lieutenant General David Elazar, Israeli chief of staff, called the September 8 raids "part of a continuous war." When asked about Arab civilian casualties, Elazar, striking a familiar note, replied, "We make every effort to avoid hurting civilians but many terrorist bases are situated [like dikes] in the vicinity of civilian settlement. It is therefore, unfortunately, impossible always to avoid harming civilians."

That the Israeli bombings were in reality aimed at civilians and not at "terrorist bases" is best proven by the simple fact that there are no longer any functional commando bases either in Syria or Lebanon. This in turn explains to a considerable extent the origins of the Munich action itself.

At 4:30 a.m. on September 5, five Palestinian commandos scaled the fence surrounding the Olympic Village, which housed the more than 10,000 athletes participating in this year's edition of the quadrennial national-chauvinist orgy known as the

Olympic Games. The five were joined by three others, who apparently had gotten maintenance jobs inside the village.

At 4:55 a.m. the eight fedayeen forced open the door of the building housing the Israeli team. An Israeli wrestling coach, Moshe Weinberg, was shot to death trying to bar the door. Joseph Romano, an Israeli weightlifter, was also killed in the assault on the building.

Six team members, aroused by Weinberg's shouting, managed to escape. The rest, seven team members and two security agents posing as team members, were taken hostage by the commandos.

By 6:00 a.m., some 300 West German police, a collection of Olympic officials, and a delegation of West German politicians had arrived at the village. The area was sealed off.

At 9:00 a.m. the commandos identified themselves as Palestinians. At 9:35 a.m. they threw from a balcony a poster on which were listed their demands in exchange for which they would release the hostages.

The two central demands were that 200 political prisoners held in Israel—they were individually listed—be released and that the commandos be granted safe conduct out of Germany.

Negotiations with the fedayeen, who several times postponed their deadline for execution of the hostages, went on all day. West German officials offered to substitute themselves for the Israeli hostages; they offered the fedayeen an "unlimited amount" of money in exchange for the Israelis' release. Mohammed Khatib, Bonn representative of the League of Arab States, and Mohammed Megdiche, Tunisian ambassador to West Germany, both attempted to convince the commandos to release the hostages.

When all these offers were rejected by the commandos, the West German police set in motion a plan to execute the fedayeen without regard to the fate of the hostages.

At 10:00 p.m. the fedayeen, along with the hostages, were transported by helicopter to Fürstfeldbruck air field, a military base fifteen miles from the Olympic Village. They arrived at 10:30.

The West German officials had agreed to provide planes to transport both the commandos and the hostages out of Germany, although the pros-

pective destination remains obscure. The fedayeen agreed that when the 200 prisoners in Israel were released, the hostages would be sent back unharmed.

Instead, police sharpshooters opened fire on the commandos at Fürstfeldbruck. The commandos defended themselves and a battle ensued. When it was over, five fedayeen and all nine hostages were dead. Three commandos escaped death and were captured. They were charged with murder and kidnapping.

Despite the cries of murder by the Western press, it is still not known for certain how the hostages died. Munich Police Chief Manfred Schreiber and Bavarian Interior Minister Bruno Merk both asserted that the police, not the commandos, fired first. (An Agence France-Presse dispatch reported September 7 that the three captured fedayeen admitted having participated in the action but denied having fired their weapons at the airport.)

But regardless of who actually killed the hostages, their fate was sealed when the police decided to open fire. In defending themselves against charges that they had bungled the operation, Munich police provided some interesting data on the origin of that decision. "The final plan for attempting to liberate the Israeli hostages," the September 8 *New York Times* reported, "was approved by Premier Golda Meir of Israel, [West German] Chancellor Willy Brandt, and Avery Brundage, outgoing chairman of the International Olympic Committee.

"Referring to the Israeli Government and to the Arab raiders, Dr. Schreiber said, 'We could not determine or influence their actions.'"

Meir was more direct. The September 6 *New York Times* reported that she "expressed personal satisfaction" for the West German decision to "take action for the liberation of the Israeli hostages and to employ force to this end."

It is quite clear then—and the Israeli government has strongly made this point more than once in the past—that the Zionist rulers have no intention of negotiating with or yielding to commandos who seize Israeli hostages as bargaining pawns. The Israeli government has always favored allowing hostages to be killed rather than dealing with "terrorists."

This precept has now become an international policy of the capitalist class. In Argentina, in Turkey, in the Arab East, and in the United States, aircraft hijackers and kidnappers have been shot down without regard to potential loss of life among hostages or innocent bystanders.

In its September 7 editorial about "Arab murderers," the *New York Times* discussed the so-called rescue operation, complimenting the West German government "whose good will and sincerity of purpose shone forth so clearly during Tuesday's tragic ordeal."

The racist, hysterical propaganda barrage unleashed by the Western press and governments after the Munich events becomes even more astoundingly hypocritical in the light of the capitalist policy on hostages. Leaving aside some obvious observations, such as the stony silence of the bourgeois press in face of the murder of Arab civilians, the ouster of nearly 1,000,000 Palestinians to make room for the state of Israel, the genocidal bombing campaign of the U.S. air force against the Vietnamese people; leaving aside the fact that the governments that so piously denounced the "Arab murderers" (such as the United States, West Germany, and Jordan) are clearly among the leading candidates for the prize of most bloodthirsty; leaving aside the virtual press blackout and governmental indifference to the slaughter of more than fifty Mexican students when the "Olympic spirit" of 1968 was violated by the bullets of Mexican police—leaving aside all this, we are left with the stark fact that had the West German police, with the full approval of the Israeli government, not fired on the fedayeen, the nine hostages might well have survived.

But such subtleties are brushed aside by today's Western leaders. Richard Nixon, George McGovern, and the U.S. press were unanimous on one score—all Palestinians, and even all Arabs, share collective guilt for the death of the Israeli hostages.

Actually, the Munich action was carried out by one commando group that is not even part of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the umbrella coalition that includes most of the Palestinian resistance organizations. Black September, the group that claimed responsibility for the ac-

tion, takes its name from the September 1970 civil war in Jordan, during which King Hussein murdered at least 10,000 Palestinians in refugee camps and broke the power of the fedayeen in Jordan.

That defeat was the opening of a series of setbacks that have reduced the Palestinian movement to its present weakness. The commando presence in Jordan was definitively eliminated during 1971, as Hussein followed up the September massacre with new assaults on Palestinian bases in northern Jordan. Early in 1972, Israeli invasions of southern Lebanon, combined with Lebanese army action against the Palestinians, forced the fedayeen to abandon many of their Lebanese bases.

At the end of June 1972, after another round of Israeli attacks, the fedayeen in Lebanon agreed to cease all attacks on Israel. Most of the commando groups moved their information centers out of Beirut. Syria, the only country where there are still concentrations of commandos, has never allowed the fedayeen to conduct operations against Israel.

The ideology and activities of Black September correspond to the frustration felt by activists owing to the weakened state of the Palestinian movement. Composed mainly of former members of Fateh (the Israeli government insists that Black September is an underground arm of Fateh, which appears to be untrue), the organization has no political program and does not even pretend to be aiming at bringing down the Zionist state. Its activities are designed to publicize the oppression of the Palestinian people and to avenge them for the Jordanian civil war.

Black September's first action was the November 1971 assassination of Jordanian Premier Wasfi Tal. It is believed that the group attempted to kill Zaid Rifai, former Jordanian ambassador to Great Britain. It has hijacked several airplanes in attempts to secure the release of political prisoners in Israel.

The activities of Black September, which has a maximum of perhaps several hundred members, are designed primarily to ensure that the elimination of the fedayeen as a significant political force in the Arab East will not consign the Palestinian people to the oblivion that was their lot from 1948 to 1967. Black September's op-

erations are thus aimed at attracting the widest possible publicity and creating the greatest possible repercussions.

Unfortunately, that type of publicity is to the advantage of the Zionist state, and not to the Arab revolution. Indiscriminate attacks on Israeli citizenry, even if not intended to cause death, allow the Zionist government—which is responsible for thousands of civilian casualties and which has been and will be as long as it exists a reliable beachhead for Western imperialism—to appear as an innocent victim. Such attacks allow the Zionist rulers to foster the myth that the Arab revolution is directed against the Israeli-Jewish masses; they put anti-Zionist revolutionists inside Israel in an extraordinarily difficult position. They do absolutely nothing to enable the Palestinian movement to break out of its current isolation.

The defeats the Palestinian movement has suffered—setbacks that have resulted in the movement's present incapacity to carry on any mass struggles—are in large part a consequence of the programmatic inadequacies of the fedayeen leadership—the failure to develop a perspective of class struggle against the Arab regimes and the failure to integrate such a perspective into a regionwide program of social struggle against both Zionism and the Arab ruling classes.

A political assessment of the movement's past practices and the elaboration of a socialist program for the entire Arab East are necessary if the movement is to prepare for a resurgence. In this context, resort to terrorist actions by small groups or individuals represents a regression for the movement, a regression that disrupts the crucial process of political reassessment.

Further, terrorist actions provide the imperialist and Zionist ruling classes with a pretext to repress some of the most developed cadres, who could play a major role in that reassessment.

In the present case, for example, the Western ruling classes are aiming at the elimination of a most important section of the Arab revolutionary movement—Arab workers and students outside the Arab East.

On September 8 Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski, a leading West German Social Democrat, who is said to be an



expert on Arab affairs, called for the expulsion from Germany of all Arabs "supporting and tolerating terror."

"We know that this would hit many innocent people," Wischniewski admitted, "but the safety of our guests and citizens must be considered more important." On September 9 Willy Brandt announced his support of Wischniewski's proposal. Involved are 36,000 Arabs, 20,000 of them migrant workers, the rest students.

On September 8 the U. S. government announced the formation of an "intelligence committee" to deal with "terrorism." Headed by Roger P. Davies, who holds the impressive post of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, the group will be composed of representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA, and the FBI. The new outfit will almost certainly seek out pretexts for deporting political activists among the thousands of Arab students in the United States.

The intent of the Israeli government's call for the expulsion of alleged terrorists operating in West Europe is straightforward enough. Somewhat more perplexing was the September 8 assault on Syria and Lebanon. The briefing officer who described the attack was asked by reporters why Egypt had not been bombed. The unidentified officer answered that Egypt harbored no operational fedayeen bases. This is true enough. But neither do Lebanon and Syria harbor operational bases. The ostentatious sparing of Egypt by the Israeli air force appears all the more inconsistent when one recalls the original statements issued by Tel Aviv after the Munich shootings.

An official declaration released September 6 identified the "accomplices" of Black September as "Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon." "The Egyptians are the prime party in this incident," a "well-placed Foreign Ministry source" told the *New York Times*. "They have the power and influence to stop these groups, and instead they encourage them."

"The Black September group that carried out the Munich attack is part of the Fateh, whatever their differences. Egypt has given its approval to all Fateh operations, so she shares the responsibility for this one."

Israeli Deputy Premier Yigal Allon, —

who delivered a chauvinistic tirade during a September 7 service for the dead hostages, denounced the fedayeen as a "bestial clique whose sole object is genocide." He then repeated his government's warning that Arab states would be held responsible—Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.

Finally, the Black September communiqué claiming responsibility for the Munich operation was issued in Cairo. The Voice of the Palestinian Revolution, a radio station based in Cairo, praised the action and scooped all other Arab radio stations in reporting it. This would seem to indicate that the Cairo-based station knew of the action in advance and that at least the Black September information service is Egyptian-based.

Why, then, did the Egyptian government, which on September 6 and 7 was "the prime party" in the affair, become in Israeli government eyes wholly innocent of involvement in commando activities on September 8, when the reprisals came?

The answer is perhaps provided by the turn made by Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat when he expelled Soviet troops and military advisers from Egypt in July. Since then, Sadat's turn from the Soviet bureaucracy to U. S. imperialism has become increasingly pronounced.

On September 8 Mohammed Hassan el-Zayyat was appointed Egypt's new foreign minister. El-Zayyat, who was Egypt's permanent representative to the United Nations from September 1969 to February 1972, replaces Murad Ghaleb, who is an expert on Soviet affairs and a former ambassador to Moscow. A September 9 profile of el-Zayyat published in the *New York Times* notes that he is regarded as "one of the most moderate of the Arab diplomats on the question of Israel." Two of el-Zayyat's children attend universities in the United States, of which country he is a great admirer.

El-Zayyat is scheduled to begin a ten-day tour of Western European capitals on September 16. His task, in the words of the *New York Times*, "will be to conduct the major diplomatic offensive that President Anwar el-Sadat announced last month after abruptly ending the Soviet Union's large military presence."

The Israeli government, under pressure from the domestic chauvinist political climate that it deliberately fosters, felt compelled to strike massively —

at the Arab states. But not wanting to jeopardize its developing special relationship with Egypt, it spared Cairo. Sadat, on Wednesday a part of a "bestial clique" aiming at genocide, became on Friday a man who doesn't harbor guerrillas.

On September 8, the day of the air raids, Golda Meir announced in a newspaper interview that "Under a peace settlement, we shall be very generous with Hussein— port facilities in Gaza or Haifa, open skies to his planes, and free passage." This was the first time the Israeli regime had officially raised the possibility of granting Jordan territorial concessions in exchange for a peace agreement.

The gesture to King Hussein and the sparing of Egypt, coming as they did on the same day as the massive raids on Arab villages in Syria and Lebanon, indicate to the Arab revolutionists the forces arrayed against them. Hardly less noticeable than the Israeli air force's avoidance of Egypt was Anwar el-Sadat's lack of response to the aggression against Syria, supposedly a member of the same "federation" as Egypt itself.

The coming revolutionary rising in the Arab East will take account of such facts and will direct itself not only against the aggressors in Jerusalem but against their allies in Cairo and Amman as well. □

### **Basques Honor Martyrs**

About 150 persons marched silently through the small Basque-speaking town of Lequeitio on September 3 to honor two members of the revolutionary nationalist organization Euzkadi ta Akatasuna [Basque Homeland and Liberty], who were killed two days earlier in a clash with police, according to a UPI dispatch in the September 5 issue of the *New York Daily El Diario*. The police of the Franco dictatorship did not try to prevent the march.

A few days earlier, one policeman was killed and another wounded in a clash with Basque nationalists in the town of Galdacano.

According to a September 4 Agence France-Presse dispatch, about 100 persons have been arrested in the wake of these armed confrontations. The arrests were said to have taken place in Basque-speaking areas near Guernica, Lequeitio, Amorebieta, and Llodio.

"The daily Hierro in Bilbao indicates that the rise in violence was the first result of the use of arms by the political section of the separatist movement," a September 4 UPI dispatch reported.

## Thieu Abandons All Pretense of Democracy

By David Thorstad

By executive decree, South Vietnamese puppet Nguyen Van Thieu abolished the popular election of officials in the South's 10,775 hamlets on August 22. He gave his own forty-four appointed military province chiefs two months to reorganize local government and appoint all hamlet officials.

There was apparently some effort to keep news of the decree from going too far beyond the province chiefs. For it was not until two weeks later, on September 7, that the *New York Times* broke the story. Its correspondent, Craig Whitney, explained that it had been issued "without publicity" by Premier Tran Thien Khiem. A possible reason for this secrecy might be the fact that presidential adviser Henry Kissinger had just completed two days of "surprise" secret talks with Thieu four days earlier. Perhaps it would have proved a bit too embarrassing to strip the United States's showcase for democracy of all democratic pretense so soon after the visit of Nixon's top aide. Did Kissinger in fact give the imperialists' blessing to the decision? If he did not, it would suggest the unprecedented situation of a puppet who pulls his own strings.

The decision to abolish elections had been in preparation since last February and was noted at that time in official U.S. reports, according to Whitney. It cannot, therefore, be explained as simply a response to the current offensive, which began in March. It comes on the heels of earlier decrees Thieu has issued since he began to rule by edict on June 27. These decrees place restrictions on the press and stiffen penalties for common crimes and dereliction of duty.

"I have never denied independence and democracy," Thieu said in a speech August 11. "As President of South Vietnam I have always observed democracy. However, if I [may speak as] a citizen, I must complain that our Government has allowed us to enjoy too much democracy too soon. This is like—if you will excuse me for my comparison—a small baby that is given an overdose of medicine

or like a weak person who takes up physical exercise so that his health cannot endure."

He explained the need to restrict the press as follows: "The Communists are now spending money buying newsmen, publishing newspapers and taking advantage of the disorderly and broad democracy and freedom in the south. When an election is held, the Communists try to benefit from it."

Thieu, whose idea of an election is to run himself as the sole candidate, apparently considers even that an "overdose" of democracy. And any newspaper that criticizes him can be seized for endangering national security or favoring communism. On September 6, his government announced that a court had fined forty-eight newspaper and magazine publishers for violations of the press law.

On June 19, Thieu vowed that South Vietnamese troops would recapture within three months all of the territory lost to the liberation forces. Not only is this vow still unfulfilled, but puppet troops are pinned down on all fronts, the struggle against them appears to be stepping up in the Central Highlands, and fear is mounting that Saigon itself may soon come under attack.

If the puppet efforts to regain lost territory have been blunted, the NLF offensive, now in its sixth month, "has achieved 'significant' results," according to Daniel Southerland's account in the *Christian Science Monitor* September 5.

"The Communists have killed and wounded more government troops than they did during the great Tet offensive of 1968," he noted. "In the current offensive, eight of the government's 11 regular infantry divisions have suffered severe losses. In addition to these losses, the government's elite paratroop division has taken a staggering number of casualties, amounting to more than 50 percent of the riflemen in many of its units.

"The Marine division is in better shape than the paratroop division but

for weeks now it has been going through the same bruising ordeal which the paratroops faced earlier in Quang Tri.

"Many of the battle losses have been made up thanks to new recruits. But the experienced small-unit leaders who have been lost are not easy to replace. The quality of many of the best fighting units has suffered as a result."

In addition, the political and military situation in Cambodia has deteriorated to the point that U.S. officials are said to be concerned over the ability of Lon Nol to retain power. Khmer Rouge guerrillas have cut off six of the seven principal highways linking Pnompenh with the provinces. One, Highway 5, provided the capital's link to its rice supplies in Battambang province.

"Phnom Penh lives with the nightly rumble of artillery," wrote Thomas Lippman in the *Washington Post* September 4. "The countryside looks more and more like Vietnam, dotted with ruined towns, shattered bridges and abandoned farms. Except for the capital and its environs, already heavily attacked by rockets once this year, and the province of Battambang in the Northwest, Communist troops hold or are threatening most of the country."

A result of all this has been an acute shortage of rice, the population's staple food. The shortage prompted Cambodian government soldiers to lead angry Pnompenh residents in rioting September 8 during which every food market in the city was reported looted. The U.S. Agency for International Development immediately announced that it would airlift sixty to eighty tons of rice daily from U.S. stocks in South Vietnam to Pnompenh in an effort to quell the unrest. The agency is preparing to advance half of the 20,000 tons of rice said to be under its control.

The political crisis in Pnompenh was heightened the day after the rioting by news that the important district capital of Kampong Trabek had fallen to liberation forces.

Cambodia is one of the richest rice-growing countries in the world and normally has a large exportable surplus. The past two years of war, however, have reduced it to the point where it is now purchasing 10,000 tons of rice from Thailand and hoping for a substantial gift of rice from Japan. □

## U.S. Bombing Aimed Deliberately at Civilians

"Foreign journalists in Hanoi told me of a particular bombing technique which appears to be popular with American pilots. They cited the example of Hon Gai city on the Vietnamese coast. US aircraft came to bomb this city at 3 a.m. They first dropped incendiary bombs, then fragmentation and perforating bombs and finally blast bombs. The incendiary bombs forced people to rush out to the streets and make for the shelters. In the open, they were caught by fragmentation bombs. The lucky ones who made it to the shelters became targets for blast bombs. This bombing pattern leaves no escape for civilians. The city has been practically wiped out, journalists and eyewitnesses told us. I myself did not visit Hon Gai, but what I saw was enough to convince me that, while military targets are being bombed by US aircraft, a policy of directly bombing hospitals, schools, churches, dykes, sluices and other irrigation work had been adopted."

The author of the above report, Harald Aarts, a Dutch medical doctor, visited North Vietnam in August. He traveled with the French geographer Yves Lacoste, who has reported that U.S. bombing of Vietnam's hydraulic installations is "systematic and deliberate." (See *Intercontinental Press*, September 11, p. 939.) In the August 26 issue of the Hong Kong weekly *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aarts further described what he saw.

"Apart from conventional bombs of different calibres, rockets, missiles, and magnetic bombs, American aircraft have been employing a type of delayed-action bomb. These do not explode when they hit the ground. Dropped mainly on cities and dykes, they sink in the soft North Vietnamese soil. Under the water of the rice fields or the debris of buildings, they remain undetected. When the bombers have departed and the sirens sound the all-clear, rescue teams come out to help the victims. As crowds of people get to work in searching for casualties and clearing up the debris, the buried delayed-action bombs, triggered by modern time fuses, explode without warning—often killing more people

than in the direct bombing. I watched one such bomb explode in the dykes of Hai Hung Province. . . . I began taking photographs. Then our guides asked us to leave the spot quickly. They explained that a delayed bomb explosion was usually followed by many others in the same area.

"Also widely used are 'blast' bombs which build up atmospheric pressure to often fatal levels. Those killed and injured by these bombs do not have a single mark of wound on their bodies. Injury is internal. In almost all cases, a rupture of liver and spleen occurs and treatment of these victims is extremely complex.

"Increasingly employed nowadays is the so-called 'perforating' bomb, which is modelled on sophisticated anti-tank shells normally not used against human targets. Lately, however, they have been dropped on a big scale over cities and villages. Some 250 to 300 of these bombs are encased in a 'mother' bomb. When dropped in a target area they penetrate up to 20 centimetres of concrete. This characteristic makes them especially effective against air raid shelters. People are killed mainly by the heat a bomb creates in its target, around its steel nose.

"We saw improved anti-personnel bombs—fragmentation bombs—which are also carried in 'mother' bombs. On explosion, they scatter tens of thousands of splinters which kill people over a limited radius. Improved varieties are called spherical fragmentation or 'plastic' bombs. I saw patients hit by both types. Victims die very slowly. These bombs seem to be directed mainly against the coastal provinces where the air-raid warning system is nowhere as efficient as in Hanoi. Most of the victims I saw were children."

Aarts had a special opportunity to listen to U.S. announcements on bombing policy and then compare Pentagon statements with reality. "One night we listened to the Voice of Free Asia and heard announcers explaining how American aircraft never attacked dykes. If they wanted, the broadcast said, they could have done

it long ago: all talk about dykes and civilian targets being bombed was anti-American propaganda. That night bombs fell two kilometres from our hotel. The next morning we saw living quarters destroyed and a factory for sluice materials razed to the ground. The day before we had seen a dyke which had been hit six times on the same spot."

For years it has been known that the U.S. military, in its war against the people of Vietnam, relied heavily on defoliants and other chemicals aimed at destroying large parts of the country's food supply. But Aarts raises the possibility that the Pentagon may have moved to a much more horrible application of chemical technology. Professor Ton That Tung works at Hanoi's Viet Duc Hospital. A surgeon, Dr. Tung is well known in the West as an expert on liver operations. Dr. Tung showed Aarts "a large number of patients with primary liver cancer. He told me that the incidence of this disease had risen substantially in the last few years. He admitted that he could not fully explain why. He had noticed that the cancer was found mostly in persons who had been living in South Vietnam. He suspected that it probably was the result of some sort of poisoning.

"Specimens of herbicides and defoliation chemicals widely used by the US in South Vietnam had been sent to university specialists in Paris, England and Harvard for investigation. Research showed that molecular structure of these chemicals had been changed (though their old names are retained). The basic ingredient of these chemicals is 2-5-7-8 tetra chloride benzo p-dioxine. This substance is known to be much more cancerogenic than benzopyrene, for instance. When people drink water contaminated by this chemical, the poison cannot be eliminated by the normal processes in the body. What he had to prove, Dr Tung said, is whether the same chemical is present in the liver cells of the cancer patients. But this research job was too specialised to be tackled with Hanoi's limited facilities. To get samples of dis-



eased livers to research centres abroad is a problem because preservation of the samples in a satisfactory condition is difficult because of communications difficulties with foreign countries.

"If Dr Tung's hypothesis proves correct, the use of the chemical could be an appalling violation of all the rules

of war. For, dioxine tetrachloride also causes mutations in chromosomes which could explain the rapid increase in the number of grossly deformed babies which doctors claim is now being experienced in Vietnam. These deformities are undoubtedly due to defective chromosomes; only the direct cause remains in doubt." □

## Anderson Thinks It Almost Worked

# Nixon's 'Secret Plan' to End Vietnam War

During the presidential election campaign four years ago, Nixon proclaimed that he had a "secret plan" to end the Vietnam war. The "plan," wrote syndicated columnist Jack Anderson September 1, "was greeted with derision by Democrats and skepticism by others. But those privy to the President's strategy assure us that he not only had a 'secret plan' but that it has come close to succeeding."

What was it? "His 'secret plan' simply was to appeal over Hanoi's head to Moscow and Peking. He hoped to sit down separately with Russian and Chinese leaders for some straight talk. He thought he could persuade them that U.S. friendship could be more valuable to them than Hanoi's favor.

"Without the support of their two Communist allies, Nixon figured the North Vietnamese would be compelled to come to terms."

Anderson appears to believe that, once elected, Nixon went right to work in an effort to implement his "secret plan" ("Reaching Moscow and Peking took longer and the diplomacy was more sophisticated than the President had anticipated"). But with the pressure of another election year as unavoidable incentive, trips to both capitals were finally arranged. "A month ago," observes Anderson, "it looked as if the scenario would turn out largely as he had foreseen." Among the points Nixon is said to have made to Hanoi's allies was that "he would be easier to deal with before his reelection than afterward."

Following Nixon's trips to Moscow and Peking, wrote Anderson, "the White House learned that both Moscow and Peking had advised Hanoi that Nixon would be re-elected and,

therefore, that serious negotiations should be resumed. This led to the secret talks between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho.

"The word from Moscow and Peking

## Vietnam-Bound Tanks Stopped in Yokohama

U. S. military authorities have run into unexpected obstacles in transporting Vietnam-bound war material between U. S. bases in Japan. The Yokohama city administration, backed by antiwar activists, is making use of traffic regulations to keep U. S. tanks bottled up.

"It all began on Aug. 4, when the U. S. Army sent some M-48 tanks on trailer trucks on a routine run from the Sagamihara supply depot to Yokohama port," the August 23 *Christian Science Monitor* reported. "The tanks had come from Vietnam damaged, were repaired at Sagamihara, and were being sent back to Vietnam on a route the U. S. military has used without challenge for seven years.

"The hitch developed at Murasame Bridge, with its weight limit of 46.9 tons. Officials of the Yokohama city government halted the trailers, with their combined weight of 66 tons, and barred them from crossing the bridge. Several hundred antiwar demonstrators backed up the city officials. They had an airtight legal case.

"The confrontation lasted for two days. On the night of August 6, on the recommendation of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the instructions of the American Embassy here, the trucks withdrew back to Sagamihara without crossing the Murasame Bridge.

"The incident caught the Americans

was so optimistic that the President felt sure he would get a ceasefire. President Thieu, for his part, even agreed to step down and permit an internationally-supervised election in South Vietnam. But the negotiations broke down over the question of who would control the interim government."

In spite of pressure from Moscow and Peking, the Vietnamese have continued their struggle. Sources "close to" Nixon reportedly relayed to the columnist the president's "bitter disappointment" over Hanoi's refusal to accept his terms. "Nixon had expected to be able to tell the Republican convention last month how he had kept his end-the-war pledge. Instead, he returned to cold war rhetoric in his acceptance speech, promising not to 'betray our allies' nor to 'stain the honor of the United States.'" □

completely off guard. Nothing like it had ever happened in the past. Over two decades the Japanese Government has always done everything to help U. S. forces stationed here."

The government of Prime Minister Tanaka is hesitant to move decisively in support of the U. S. war machine. According to the September 4 *New York Times*, a spokesman for the Japanese foreign ministry said that "Japan intended to uphold United States rights to move equipment from bases here but that the Government also intended to see that the traffic laws were obeyed."

The successful action in Yokohama has sparked other efforts to block U. S. military operations in Japan.

According to the *Times*, "A small group of professed Communists prevented three Marine tanks from entering a firing range on the lower slopes of Mount Fuji and another group delayed a firing drill by lighting a fire nearby."

The *Times* reported another development: ". . . Japanese labor unions, some of them under leftist influence, have threatened to stop repairing tanks and other material sent from Vietnam and to refuse to work on shipments intended for Vietnam. American bases here are almost totally dependent on Japanese labor for their operations." □

# Hanoi Indicates Support for McGovern

By David Thorstad

The North Vietnamese leadership has indicated in a number of different radio and newspaper commentaries that it is supporting the candidate of the Democratic party, Senator George McGovern, in the U.S. presidential elections. It cannot be said that the decision will help bring about an earlier end to the imperialist aggression against Indochina.

The senator, who voted for military appropriations for the Vietnam war as late as 1969, has been described by Hanoi, according to the *New York Times* September 2, as "one of the earliest and most persistent protesters against the war of aggression in Vietnam." Both the alleged haste and the "persistency" of the senator in opposing the war will come as news to veterans of the antiwar movement, who had years of antiwar struggle behind them before McGovern decided to hitch onto the antiwar wagon. As late as last April McGovern refused to support demonstrations against Nixon's resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam.

McGovern's candidacy, observed the Communist party newspaper *Nhan Dan* shortly after the senator's nomination last July, provides an alternative to "the policy which prolongs the criminal military adventure in Vietnam."

Following the Republican party convention in August, the paper compared the platforms of the two capitalist parties, and found the Democratic platform more attractive. The Republican platform was described as "hawkish, conservative and chauvinist."

"American and world opinion can see a glaring difference between this document and the election platform of the Democratic party, especially with regard to the Vietnam war, the economic and financial problems and the foreign policy," the paper said, in a thinly veiled appeal to Americans to vote for the Democratic candidate.

The Democratic platform, it said, "reflects some effort to analyze the failures and errors the United States has

committed in Vietnam and Indochina; hence to find a way out."

The antiwar demagoguery of the Democratic party platform, of course, in no way reflects an effort to analyze "errors" like the imperialist venture in Indochina, but rather an effort by a section of the capitalist class to cope with, and to defuse, the enormous opposition to the war that exists within the United States itself. This is why McGovern has urged his supporters not to demonstrate against the war but to concentrate instead on getting him elected.

But to back McGovern is no "way out" of the Indochina morass and bloodbath—for which both capitalist parties bear responsibility. The way out is to continue to mount mass pressure on the imperialists to pull out all

## Trelew Victims Expose Lies of Lanusse

Since the massacre at the Trelew air base in Patagonia on August 22, when a marine guard unit opened fire on a group of nineteen captured guerrillas, killing thirteen outright and badly wounding six others, three of whom died a few days later, Argentine journalists have been asking more and more questions about the government's story that the prisoners were killed "trying to escape."

Different versions of the slaughter were put out by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and the marine officer who commanded the guard at the air base, the latter assigning himself a heroic role in the events.

The government did not report the testimony of the three survivors. It was feared that the Lanusse regime would quietly do away with them, saying that they had died from their wounds. The popular clamor was such, however, that the government drew back.

their forces without conditions—and now!

The McGovern candidacy itself is essentially a product of and a response to the existence of this independent antiwar movement and the deepgoing antiwar sentiment for which it speaks. *Nhan Dan* itself suggested this shortly after McGovern's nomination. "The McGovern phenomenon, in fact, reflects the attitude of large numbers of Americans hoping for a change in the United States policies as well as in its ruling apparatus," it stated.

The effect of Hanoi's decision to support McGovern's candidacy, however, can only be to further complicate the necessary task of mobilizing the antiwar opposition by suggesting that it is more important for the antiwar movement to focus its efforts on capitalist electioneering than on continuing to build a mass movement capable of forcing whichever imperialist candidate wins the election to get out of Indochina. Such a stand not only helps to miseducate the American antiwar movement about the true nature of capitalist politics, but it also goes against the best interests of the Vietnamese people themselves. □

The three survivors have now revealed the truth about the massacre to civil-liberties attorneys, who were described somewhat ambiguously in a September 10 *London Times* dispatch as "lawyers, all of whom defend political prisoners."

The account summarized a statement by the lawyers:

"Six Argentine lawyers have charged that naval guards opened fire 'suddenly and without the slightest incident' on imprisoned left-wing guerrillas who had been paraded at 3:30 a.m. on Aug. 22 at a Patagonian naval base.

"When the prisoners attempted to escape the fire by retreating into their cells, naval officers pursued them, firing their pistols, the lawyers said. They dismissed the official version of the incident . . . as 'completely false.'" (For details of the massacre, see "Argentine Army Guns Down Guerrillas in Prison Break" in *Intercontinental Press*, September 4. □

# Deepening Political Polarization in Chile

By Gerry Foley

"Two years ago, on September 4, 1970, the victory of the Socialist Salvador Allende in the presidential elections seemed to have marked a turning point in the history of Latin America," *Le Monde's* correspondent Pierre Kalfon wrote from Santiago in the September 5 issue of the Paris daily. "The ballot seemed to have won out over the bullet.

"Now this euphoria is completely forgotten."

Kalfon gave this gloomy assessment even taking all the Unidad Popular (UP—People's Unity) reforms at face value. He gave Allende credit for nationalizing copper and other natural resources, eliminating the latifundios, and asserting state control over a large proportion of the monopolies and banks. All of these achievements, he claimed, were now endangered by a mounting right-wing offensive.

"A large part of the political power still eludes Allende's grasp. He controls neither the courts, the military apparatus, nor the most influential newspapers. Furthermore, economic difficulties have so tarnished the government's image that more and more people think the time has come when a final rightist offensive could be decisive."

The right-wing campaign coincides with a sudden dramatic increase in the prices of essential consumer goods. In a two-week period in August, according to the September 3 *New York Times*, the cost of cotton goods rose 90% and the price of cigarettes 110%. Chicken and sugar went up 100%, milk 90%, and beef disappeared from the markets. In attempting to impose price controls and fight speculative hoarding, the government came into a head-on clash with shopkeepers, who formed the spearhead of the rightist offensive.

"This situation," Kalfon wrote, "explains the present strategy of the Opposition, which, sensing a favorable relationship of forces, is deliberately seeking a violent confrontation."

In the sharpening polarization, the government is trying to maintain a balance between the left and the right.

At the very moment the minister of the interior Suárez was in Concepción in the south, paying his last respects to a policeman killed during an attack on antirightist demonstrators, the reactionaries were running amuck on the streets of the Chilean capital:

"Taking the pretext of a demonstration by high-school students that took place in the morning, young extreme rightists, reinforced by lumpenproletarian elements, took over the center of the city for several hours, blocking automobile traffic, beating up passers-by, stoning the windows of shops and apartment buildings, demanding that the residents 'bang their pots' as a sign of support."

The exploited masses that brought the popular-front government to power demanded that Allende let them defend themselves against the ultra-right thugs.

"'Let us make a little expedition to teach those rich boys a lesson,' the building workers asked. 'Give us arms to defend ourselves,' the peasants demand." (They are being intimidated by gangsterlike raids by expropriated landlords).

But the government seems to be taking another course. "Some members of the presidential entourage have confided on their personal authority," Kalfon noted, "that Allende was going to form a new cabinet where all political forces 'without any discrimination' would be represented. One of the tasks of this new cabinet would be to organize free elections after calming the tempers of the people."

The French journalist commented: "The chief of state's accepting such a proposition would simply be a form of abdication."

Political "abdication," however, seemed to be exactly where Allende's conciliationist line was leading him.

"Two years after his election by a slim plurality, President Allende took the occasion of a strategy speech last night to renew his commitment to holding regular elections and abiding by the results," *New York Times* correspondent Joseph Novitski cabled

from Santiago September 6. "He declared that a political solution was the only way out of the crisis and rejected the possibility of a civil war."

The "political solution" Allende seemed to mean was a UP victory in the March 1973 presidential elections. A September 6 UPI dispatch from Santiago published in the Lima daily *El Comercio* quoted the popular-front president as saying:

"The parliament must be in the hands of the people. It cannot be an obstacle to actions favoring the workers. . . .

"We must write a constitution for this stage of the revolutionary process, a constitution that would enable us to advance toward socialism."

The dispatch summarized Allende's scheme for a new constitution: "He said that it must provide for job security, must include the right of workers to run their plants, equal rights for women, the right of workers to work for the progress of the country, organize a new financial and tax system, and provide for the formation of neighborhood committees." According to Novitski's September 6 dispatch, the popular-front president also specified:

"We cannot make a bourgeois constitution nor a socialist constitution. We must write a constitution that opens the road to socialism, that consecrates rights and makes it the workers who govern this country."

Since a UP majority in both houses of congress would be necessary for adopting such a constitution, Allende said: "The coming election campaign must not be seen as just another campaign. It must be kept in mind that victory would enable us to draft a new agrarian reform, a new tax and labor code. . . ."

To the supporters of his government, to the working people who are threatened by counterrevolutionary terror at the hands of rightist gangs and the police of the regime itself, who are being denied the basic necessities of life right now by the capitalist and imperialist masters of the economy, Allende offered no solution but again voting for the UP more than half a year in the precarious future. In face of the rightist offensive, even the parties of his own coalition—with a notable exception—are increasingly unwilling to accept such a passive posture.

As a result, Allende has come more

and more to rely on the one reliably reformist force in the coalition, the Communist party. In June, the president reshuffled his cabinet, strengthening the position of the CP at the expense of his own Socialist party. In an editorial June 20, the voice of U. S. imperialism, the *New York Times*, commented:

"President Allende has moved to resolve a severe crisis within his Popular Unity coalition in Chile by rejecting the radical counsel of his own Socialist party and adopting the more moderate and conciliatory approach urged by the Communists. In thus shifting back toward the center of Chile's political spectrum, Dr. Allende has reduced the danger of large-scale civil strife and given his revamped Government its best chance to revive a sagging economy."

The editors of the *Times*, who have always presented themselves as "moderate" opponents of "Communist extremism and totalitarianism," obviously felt some embarrassment in having to praise their traditional bugaboo as the champions of "moderation" in Chile and as the best hope for restoring a "healthy business climate." But, they explained, there were much more dangerous "extremist" forces in the field, against which the Communists were proving a valuable first line of defense.

"In most countries it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of moving toward the center by adopting the Communist strategy. In Chile, however, the major Socialist faction has long been attracted to the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and Fidel Castro, and one splinter group, the Revolutionary Left Movement (M. I. R.) is openly cynical about Dr. Allende's attempt to lead the country to socialism by democratic, constitutional means.

"The Communists hurl such epithets as 'infantile' and 'elitist' at the M. I. R. and condemn its illegal seizures of farms and factories. They urge consolidation, rather than rapid extension, of the Allende Government's economic and social programs, negotiations on constitutional reform with the opposition Christian Democrats and a working relationship with private businesses. Dr. Allende has now taken this road in an effort to curb unemployment and inflation and to boost production."

In fact, the *Times* editors evidently hoped that Allende's turn toward the

CP's "conciliatory approach" had opened the way for crushing the "extremist" troublemakers.

"This decision may force the President to crack down hard on the M. I. R. in areas where it has built formidable strength; but this is infinitely preferable to a continuation of drift and polarization that carried a genuine threat of civil war or a military takeover. It should always be the objective of Chile's now-united democratic opposition not to force Dr. Allende out of office but to make his Government play by well-established rules."

The main conservative party in Chile, the Christian Democrats, appears to understand very well the strategy recommended by the editors of the *Times*. At a party plenum in March, the Christian Democratic senator Benjamin Prado said: "We are not interested in overthrowing Allende; we are interested in winning him over. And in order to do that it is essential that he remain in his post until 1976 but be left without any popular support."

Allende's turn toward a "conciliatory approach" seemed to represent a major victory for the conservatives' strategy. The price rises that opened the way for the recent rightist offensive were part of the payoff:

"This month, after devaluing the escudo, Dr. Allende began authorizing price increases 'to settle the economy at a realistic new level,'" Joseph Novitski wrote in an August 24 dispatch to the *New York Times* from Santiago.

The price increases were very effective in alienating popular support from the regime.

"'Support is one thing, but making a living is another,' said a truck driver who recalled that he and his union had supported Dr. Allende for President," Novitski reported. "He had been complaining that new shock absorbers for his truck were available only on the black market at four times the official price."

But relaxing economic controls does not seem to have had any effect in pacifying the profit-hungry retailers. If anything it seems to have strengthened their determination to defeat the government's price policy. When Allende was forced to take desperate measures against hoarders and profiteers, the shopkeepers called a "general strike of commerce" on August 21 that opened the way for the latest

rightist offensive.

On the other hand, the regime's shift to the right has forced it to attack the revolutionary left, as the *Times* editors anticipated. And it is on this front that the decisive battle seems to be developing that will determine the future of the popular-front government.

At present most of the reformists' fire seems to be centered on the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria), which has increased its influence in the past two years.

Like most of the revolutionary groups that have developed in Latin America under the impact of the Cuban revolution, the MIR was founded on the premise that guerrilla warfare was the only effective way of fighting for national liberation against increasingly repressive forms of rule by imperialism and the native capitalists. As a corollary, the group tended to de-emphasize the importance of specific political and economic demands, stressing broad anti-imperialist slogans.

In keeping with this approach the MIR favored voting for the popular-front ticket of Allende, while at the same time expressing a very pessimistic view about the possibilities of his being either elected or inaugurated. When Allende did win and was allowed to take office, the MIR was confronted with a problem. Should it support the government or continue preparing for guerrilla war?

At first the MIR seemed to want to do both, and it provided Allende's bodyguard, among other things. Recently, however, the MIR has been raising sharp criticisms of the reformism of Allende and the CP and trying to offer an alternative line. Thus, a very acute confrontation has been developing.

This split came into the open dramatically on May 12, two days after the CP legislator Volodia Teitelboim gave a speech in the Senate blaming the "ultraleft" equally with the right for the increasing violence in the country. "There is an extreme right that traffics in arms and is aiming for a civil war. But there are also 'ultra' groups that call themselves 'left' who are following the same course, playing the role of partner in a mad waltz with their political opposites. They feed on each other. . . ." But the Communists "are against any form of violence that might unleash a fratricidal

struggle in this country.

"However, it takes two to make a fight and likewise you need at least two to prevent a quarrel. And in this respect we think that this is the responsibility not only of the Unidad Popular but also of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano [PDC — Christian Democratic party] and of all those who think deeply about the dilemma of Chile and believe that just men can save this country from being plunged into a catastrophe."

The May 23 issue of *Punto Final*, the biweekly of the MIR, described the clash that came two days after Teitelboim declared war on the "ultra-left."

"Forty-eight hours after Senator Teitelboim's speech, the governor of Concepción, Vladimir Chávez, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist party, authorized the Grupo Móvil [tactical force] of the Carabineros [riot police] to use force to break up a demonstration called by the workers and students of the city of Concepción. The action of the Grupo Móvil, whose dissolution was point No. 37 in the first forty points of the Unidad Popular program, cost the life of a seventeen-year-old student, Eladio Caamaño Sobarzo, and left about forty wounded, some of them seriously. Many persons were arrested, all of them activists of the left parties.

"How did it happen?"

"While the registrars in Santiago were receiving signatures of electors for the formation of the Partido Viauista de Chile (Viauist party of Chile, a group of supporters of the former general Roberto Viaux) — another one of the rights that the constitution grants to the rightist conspirators — in Concepción a new 'march of the empty pots' had been organized."

(The first "march of the empty pots" was in Santiago in December 1971. Scarcities were used as the pretext for organizing a rightist demonstration threatening to overthrow the government.)

"As is usual in these cases, the Partido Demócrata Cristiano helped to provide a legalistic facade for the Partido Nacional [National party, the traditional rightist formation] and Patria y Libertad [Fatherland and Liberty, a fascist paramilitary organization].

"The PDC applied to Governor

Vladimir Chávez for a permit to hold an Opposition rally on Friday, May 12, and this was granted. In view of the fact that the streets and squares of Concepción, like those of other cities, were going to be taken 'legally' by the fascists, the parties of the Unidad Popular (except the CP and the API [Acción Popular Independiente — Independent People's Action, the center liberals] applied for a permit to march the same day. The MIR made the same request. In what seemed a logical decision, aimed at preventing incidents, Chávez authorized only one demonstration, the march of the fascists hiding behind the PDC.

"Faced with this situation, the Socialist party, MAPU [Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria — United People's Action Movement], the PR, the Izquierda Cristiana [Christian Left] (all of which are in the UP) and the MIR met and decided unanimously to build a popular mobilization for Friday . . . that would prevent the fascists from adding the city of Concepción to their list of successes in seizing the streets. This bloc won the immediate support of the provincial council of CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores — United Workers' Federation], the university and high-school student federations, the Consejo Provincial Campesino [Provincial Peasant Council], and the Comando Provincial de Pobladores [Provincial Command of the Homeless People], of the textile and coal miners' unions, as well as other groups.

"Shortly before the fascist march began, the government ordered the permit granted to the PDC by Chávez suspended. But in any case, resorting to the 'civil disobedience' advocated by the rightist leadership of the PDC, groups of demonstrators started a march on the streets of Concepción. Advised of what was happening, the workers and students, who were holding a rally on the university grounds, came out to make their own show of force on the streets. It was then that the Grupo Móvil attacked the people with a brutality that has not been seen in Chile since the 'golden age' of the Frei government."

The Communist party minister of the interior Daniel Vergara supported the action of his comrade Chávez. The Political Committee of the Communist party issued a statement blaming the "ultraleft" for the violence. The

Political Committee of the Socialist party also opposed the united-left bloc in Concepción, expressing its disapproval of the attitude of the SP regional committee in the area.

Despite these pressures, the united-left front held together and decided to form a broader body, a People's Assembly (Asamblea del Pueblo), that could mobilize the masses of the region against the rightist offensive. The new body immediately came under heavy fire from the CP. But it was defended by a member of the Socialist party Central Committee, Guaraní Pereda da Rosa, in an article in the August 4 issue of *Ultima Hora*, the Socialist weekly.

"On the day the body was organized, the Communist party publicly characterized the People's Assembly as a 'masquerade' dreamed up by the 'ultraleft,' which allegedly wanted to deny arbitrarily the presence of the people in the government."

Pereda da Rosa argued that the People's Assembly did not challenge the authority of the government but proposed "by organizing the masses to offer a solution to the most acute problems facing the working people every day, problems which the people's government is prevented from dealing with effectively by the existing state institutions." He denied that the body was an "artificial creation," pointing to the popular support it had won.

"Besides the support of the four UP parties already mentioned (the SP, PR, MAPU, and the IC) and of the MIR, the People's Assembly has the support of sixty unions, including the Sindicato Unico de la Compañía de Acero del Pacifico [United Organization of Pacific Steel Company workers], the four textile workers' unions, various coal miners' unions, the brewery workers, various lumbermen's unions, public health workers, the coopers, and others. Five peasant organizations have joined, thirty-one camps of homeless people, sixteen student organizations, and twenty-seven mothers' cooperatives. In all there are five political organizations and 139 mass organizations representing workers, peasants, homeless people, and students.

"Was this an 'arbitrary' act as the Communist student leader said, or a 'fiction' as it is called by the daily *Clarín*, or a 'harebrained notion' in



the words of Senator Montes? These words are aimed at tens of thousands of workers, students, and housewives, represented by the 5,000 persons who packed the Teatro Concepción July 27 to confirm the authority of the assembly."

"Of course, it cannot be denied that the People's Assembly organized in Concepción was not all that it could have been. One people's party, the Communist party, which represents a substantial sector of the working class in this area and in the country, which has unquestionable weight and responsibility in the revolutionary process Chile is experiencing, did not participate in this event. No Chilean revolutionist, no people's organization can accept this, or still less, be gratified by it. This is why the regional leadership of the SP and the other UP parties have repeatedly appealed to the Communists to come into the assembly.

"But neither can we allow the majority of the UP to be called 'splitters' because they did not agree with the CP's negative view of the People's Assembly. As the Regional Secretariat of the SP maintains, 'when one party thinks it is in command of the process it is very difficult to preserve unity.'"

Despite such statements from leading members of his own party, Allende followed up the attacks of the CP, launching a violent denunciation of the People's Assembly in a statement issued July 31. He seemed to have borrowed his style of argument from his allies:

"The people of Chile are facing a powerful enemy who uses modern techniques against them. And every member of the Unidad Popular, as well as every sympathizer of the national cause not active in the parties of the UP, must realize this. The enemy studies our weaknesses and exploits them. He is able, for example, to give indirect financial aid to any adventure, or exercise a psychological influence on any person who, impelled by impatience that comes from a low ideological level, splits away from the collective struggle to carry out individual actions. . . .

"For the second time in three months in the province of Concepción a divisionist phenomenon has developed, disrupting the unity of the Unidad Popular movement. I do not hesitate

to characterize it as a deformed process that is aiding the enemies of the revolutionary cause. . . .

"The enemy has sought and insists on creating an artificial confrontation dividing the country in struggles whose ramifications the participants themselves cannot foresee. Nothing would suit him better for this purpose than an artificial confrontation with the Unidad Popular.

"I have said that there is no clash between the branches of the Chilean government, and that the executive branch is facing a political conflict created by those persons who from the positions they hold in the other branches of government are exceeding their powers and violating the constitution in order to block our historic mission. . . .

"To overcome the roots of this problem I have set the main objective as winning the 1973 general elections for parliament. . . .

"People's power will not come from a divisionist maneuver by people who are using political romanticism to create a lyrical mirage, which, out of touch with all reality, they call the People's Assembly."

Some elements in the UP responded very strongly to Allende's attack. The IC's reply, for example, was published in the August 6 issue of *La Nación*:

"The government and the parties must recognize the dynamic of the masses themselves who are struggling to defend their interests and to press for changes in the bourgeois state institutions."

The most consistent supporters of the People's Assembly seemed to be the MIR. They proposed not only to use the assembly as a means for mobilizing the masses to resist rightist intimidation and pressures; they also presented a concrete program around which the assembly could organize the people to smash the power of the bourgeoisie and the imperialists and begin fighting immediately against the reactionary sabotage of the country's economic life.

The main points of the MIR program were:

"1. Expropriation of the big industrial, commercial, and financial bourgeoisie. Incorporation into the nationalized sector of all companies with a capital of more than 14,000,000 escudos [the official rate is 49 escudos

per US\$1; the black-market rate is 200]. Unconditional defense of the confiscations, interventions, and nationalizations already carried out.

"2. Expropriation without compensation and in the shortest time possible of U. S. capital in industry, finance, and commerce.

"3. Expropriation without compensation, without leaving any 'reserves' or loopholes, of all the estates of the big agrarian bourgeoisie.

"4. The establishment of workers' control in big private industry, in medium and small industry, and on the estates of the middle bourgeoisie.

"5. Workers' control and management in state enterprises, in the public services, and in the rest of the economy.

"6. Support of all kinds, under the conditions of workers' control, to the small and middle bourgeoisie in the countryside, in the cities, and in commerce.

"7. Organizing the people in the local areas to form Local Workers' Councils [Consejo Comunales de Trabajadores] in the countryside and in the cities.

"8. Preparing the conditions for dissolving the parliament and creating a People's Assembly in its place."

To organize the fight against capitalist economic pressures, the MIR raised the following immediate demands: Payment of a special bonus semiannually, or every time the cost of living rises by more than 5 percent, as a means of readjusting wages and salaries. Immediate payment of the retroactive cost-of-living increases. The adoption of measures that would make it possible to eliminate unemployment and underemployment in the countryside and in the cities."

The MIR program was published in late July. Facing the escalation of the rightist offensive and the catastrophic price increases of August, the National Secretariat of the MIR updated these demands. On August 28, it issued the following demands:

"(a) Immediate readjustment of wages and salaries by 100 percent to cover the increase in the cost of living, with preference given to the most poorly paid workers. Readjustment of wages every time the cost of living rises more than 5 percent. It is to be understood that this does not limit the legitimate struggle of the workers to win increasing shares of the profits

from their bosses. Moreover, we call for establishing state outlets at which the basic necessities would be sold at subsidized prices, giving preference to the poorest strata who lack stable employment.

"(b) Workers' control in the companies of the private sector, on the basis of opening the books of businesses and banks. Workers' management in state enterprises.

"(c) Control by the people over supply and prices, including, if necessary, rationing of the basic necessities. This control should be applied by the unions, the JAP [Juntas de Abastecimiento y Control de Precios—Supply and Price Control Boards], neighborhood groups, and other mass organizations represented in the Local Workers' Councils.

"(d) The establishment of a consumer market basket of basic products whose prices would not be allowed to rise. Discriminatory price rises on those products consumed by the well-to-do strata. A price policy that would effectively transfer resources from the private to the nationalized sector.

## Impose Heavy Fines

## East European Countries Battle Pollution

Stepped-up efforts to combat environmental pollution are being planned in a number of Eastern European workers states, according to a Reuters dispatch published in the August 6 *Los Angeles Times*. The account describes the governments in these countries as "thoroughly alarmed" by pollution so intense that "in most East European states, only a few hundred miles of riverway in each country are clean enough for fish to survive and for vegetation to grow."

"Contamination of Poland's Vistula River from an oil refinery has produced fish which are edible but which smell and taste oily when cooked," according to Reuters.

"This has opened a new outlet for Warsaw's black market entrepreneurs.

"Nowadays they pass through the crowds whispering, 'Fish without phenol . . . fish without phenol . . .' as an added come-on to the well-heeled Warsaw shopper who can afford to pay the price of nonoily black market fish."

"(e) Immediate expropriation of the big wholesalers and big retail traders.

"(f) Expropriation of the industrial big bourgeoisie. Only the people can produce for the people.

"(g) Expropriation of ranches of more than forty hectares without leaving any 'reserves' or loopholes, with the land being handed over immediately to the peasants, under the direction of the Local Peasant Councils [Consejos Comunales Campesinos].

"(h) Workers' control over the means of mass communication in order to stop the campaign of terrorizing the people by creating fears about scarcities.

"(i) Immediate suspension of payment on the foreign debt to the U. S. and the opening of bilateral negotiations with those countries ready to cooperate with Chile. We need our dollars to feed the people."

The MIR program ended with an appeal for worldwide support: "We call on all peoples and in particular the socialist countries to show international solidarity with the struggle of the Chilean people." □

East European governments are adopting remedial measures. Poland for instance has allocated almost \$1,000,000,000 for the period 1971-1975.

Punitive fines—sometimes running into hundreds of thousands of dollars—"are beginning to make it cheaper for factories and enterprises to install filters and purifying plants than to go to court and pay the penalty."

This contrasts sharply with U. S. antipollution efforts. On the rare occasions when U. S. industrial polluters are prosecuted at all, light fines are imposed.

The article names Hungary and Czechoslovakia as the East European states having the most severe pollution problems and reports some initial steps taken by the Hungarian regime:

"This fall, beginning Oct. 1, Budapest city authorities will begin to cut down on inefficient central heating systems based on brown coal briquettes

[an inexpensive coal that contains sulfur], substituting gas or oil.

"Another ambitious long-term project involves the planting of forest belts, tree breaks and parkland around cities in the great Hungarian plain."

Reuters paints a grimmer picture of unchecked ecological decay in Czechoslovakia:

"In Czechoslovakia, one analysis based on official statistics and records suggests that a quarter of the country's 14 million population is exposed in varying degrees to concentrations of poisons in the air above permissible thresholds. . . .

"The main pollution problem of Czechoslovakia stems from the universal use in homes and factories of brown coal. . . .

"Due largely to its reliance on brown coal, Prague at times has recorded a pollution level 14 times the permissible limit for humans.

"Health, particularly of children, is being undermined, and absenteeism traceable to smog is rising."

The high level of pollution in Czechoslovakia's rivers has brought complaints from neighboring countries:

". . . Czechoslovakia was fined already in 1963 for polluting the Elbe River, which runs into East Germany.

"Poland as well as East Germany has lodged claims and extracted fines from Czechoslovakia for polluting the Oder River, which runs through Polish Silesia."

It appears that the Soviet Union, while more than ready to "aid" the Czechoslovak government in repressing dissident workers and intellectuals, has not provided much assistance in this battle against pollution.

"By a stroke of irony, Czechoslovakia has been a major provider of the cleanest source of power—uranium for nuclear power plants.

"But these deposits have been almost wholly exhausted and have gone largely to the Soviet Union for the last 20 years, presumably to be used in nuclear arms stockpiling.

"By yet another stroke of irony, Czechoslovakia is laying pipelines across its territory for the passage of Soviet natural gas—another relatively clean source of fuel.

"But hardly any will remain in the country. The bulk is destined for hard-currency states in Western Europe."

## Brodsky Forced to Leave Soviet Union

By Ernest Harsch

"We Negroes, we poets,  
a in whom the planets splash,  
lie like sacks full of legends and  
stars. . .

"Trample upon us  
and you kick the firmament,  
The whole universe howls  
beneath your boot!"

— *Andrei Voznesensky*

On June 4 Yosif Brodsky, thirty-two, a Soviet poet well known in the West, left the Soviet Union under pressure from the secret police (KGB). The same day, he sent a letter to Leonid Brezhnev requesting his right to return and continue writing in the Soviet Union.

The exact course of events leading up to Brodsky's forced exile are not yet known, but should be so shortly, since he will move to the U.S. as a writer in residence at the University of Michigan this year. His friends simply say that he was told to leave the country and that he had no hopes of getting permission to return.

Yosif Brodsky first received international notoriety in 1964 when a transcript of his trial was published in the West thanks to Frida Yigdorova, a member of the Leningrad Writers' Union. A slander campaign began against him in November 1963 in an article in the *Evening Leningrad* entitled "A semilitary parasite," which charged him with corrupting the youth and writing anti-Soviet poetry. Actually, most of his poetry is apolitical, although he does make a few veiled criticisms of the Soviet bureaucracy.

In February 1964 he was brought to trial in Leningrad on the charge of "vagrancy and parasitism." The judge was openly hostile, as indicated in the trial transcript:

*Judge:* Prisoner Brodsky, what is your profession?

*Brodsky:* I am a poet. I suppose . . .

*Judge:* We don't want any 'I suppose' in this court. Stand up straight and stop leaning against the wall. In future you will face the court and answer the questions properly. Do you have any permanent employment?

*Brodsky:* I thought that was permanent employment.

*Judge:* Answer the question properly.

*Brodsky:* I write poems. I thought they were going to be published. I suppose . . .

*Judge:* We're not interested in what you suppose. Tell us why you refused to work.

*Brodsky:* I did work. I wrote poems.

*Judge:* Who recognized you as a poet? Who gave you the authority to call yourself a poet?

*Brodsky:* No one. Who gave me the authority to enter the human race?

*Judge:* Have you studied for it?

*Brodsky:* For what?

*Judge:* To become a poet. Why didn't you take a secondary education at school where they prepare you, where you can learn. . . ?

*Brodsky:* I didn't think poetry was a matter of learning.

A number of experts testified in his behalf that Brodsky worked as a poet and translator and, indeed, was a very good one. The prosecution then marched a number of its witnesses before the stand. They repeated the charges that Brodsky was a "parasite" and a "corrupting influence" on young people. The verdict was no surprise.

The prisoner Brodsky is not filling the duties of a Soviet citizen. . . . He has refused to work and has continued writing his decadent poems and reciting them at private evening parties. According to the report of the committee investigating the work of young writers, it is clear that Brodsky is not a poet. This is why the court will apply the law of 4 February 1961. Brodsky is condemned to exile in a remote locality for a period of five years of forced labor.

Sent to a state farm near Archangel, he worked as a carrier of manure, his physical and mental health rapidly deteriorating owing to the cold and the severe conditions. Fortunately, in October 1965, he was pardoned and released under pressure from his fellow writers and intellectuals. Arriving in Moscow, he was greeted by Yevgeny Yevtushenko and other young literary figures of the capital.

Although he continued to write his "decadent" and "corrupting" poetry, none of his work has yet been pub-

lished in the Soviet Union, except as *samizdat*. The recent blow against him by the Soviet bureaucrats indicates that they still consider him dangerous. It also indicates an ominous turn by those who would like to see art and literature serve nothing but the interests of the bureaucracy.

Brodsky's letter to Brezhnev became available in Moscow on July 24. It reads:

Dear Leonid Ilyich;

Leaving Russia against my will—which you may know something about—I dare appeal to you with a request which I feel I have the right to make, because of my clear understanding that everything I have done during 15 years of literary work serves and will serve the glory of Russian culture and nothing else.

I want to ask you to give me an opportunity to preserve my presence, my existence in the Russian literary world, at least as a translator, which is what I have been until now. I dare think that the work I have done so far has been good work, and that I could be useful in this field in the future. . . .

I belong to Russian culture, I feel part of it, its component, and no change of place can influence the final consequence of this. A language is a much more ancient and inevitable thing than a state. I belong to the Russian language. As to the state, from my point of view, the measure of a writer's patriotism is not oaths from a high platform, but how he writes in the language of the people among whom he lives.

I feel bitter as I leave Russia. I was born, was raised and have lived here, and I owe everything I have in the world to Russia. Everything bad that I have suffered has been more than compensated by the good, and I have never felt I have been hurt by my homeland. And I don't feel it now.

Although I am losing my Soviet citizenship, I do not cease to be a Russian poet. I believe that I will return; poets always return, in flesh or on paper. I want to believe that both are possible. Mankind has left behind the age when the strong were the right, for there are too many in the world who are weak. The only truth is kindness. Nobody has ever benefited from cruelty, wrath and hatred even when these have been called just. We are all sentenced to the same fate—to die. I who write these lines will die; you, who read them, will die, too.

What we have done will remain, but it, too, can be destroyed. That's why nobody should prevent another from doing his work. The conditions of existence are much too hard to make them even more complicated.

I hope you will understand me correctly, and that you will understand what I am asking. I ask you to give me an opportunity to exist further in Russian litera-

ture and on Russian land. I do not think I am guilty before my homeland.

On the contrary, I think I am right in many things. I do not know what your reply to my request will be, I do not know whether there will be an answer. I

am sorry I haven't written to you sooner, and now I have too little time. But I want to tell you that in any case if my people do not need my body, my soul will be still useful.

Respectfully,  
*Yosif Brodsky*

## Police Meet Students With Gunfire

# Street Demonstrations Flare in Puno

Lima

The bloody events that occurred in the city of Puno at the end of June not only provided a lesson in heroic revolutionary struggle, but also served to further unmask the demagogic character of the "revolutionary" military regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado.

It all began with a visit to the southeastern city of 35,000 by Velasco's wife on June 26. Following the refusal of the mass organizations to join in welcoming her, a reception was organized by the Office of Education for the Seventh Region and the SINAMOS [Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social—National System to Aid the Social Mobilization], a body formed by the present government with a view toward controlling and curbing the trade unions.

The speech by Señora de Velasco was greeted by hissing, during which the goons of the SINAMOS and the pro-Moscow Communists (led by Teodoro Núñez Rebaza, Hermes Gamarra, and Pérez Ruival) pointed out to the police persons whom they should arrest. With this act, they initiated a wave of violence that was to last for several days and leave a number of persons dead.

The police were unable to arrest the demonstrators because the crowd defended them and helped them get away. The police waited until evening, and then arrested three students at home.

The same day, some 250 students went to the market to hold a meeting with the vendors and housewives. They charged that the government was making fun of the people of Puno, and was trying to win their backing for its demagoguery in face of the rising cost of living, the scarcity of certain goods, and the repression. Po-

lice used gas and clubs to disperse the students.

The next morning, when Señora de Velasco visited Puno's old market, she was met by delegates of the vendors—all women—who demanded a new market. In reply, they were told that since they were young, they should build it themselves. In the ensuing scuffle, a vendor was beaten by a guard and insulted by a member of Señora de Velasco's entourage. The vendors called a general meeting to report the incident to their rank and file.

That afternoon, some 2,000 students staged a silent march to demand the release of the three students arrested the night before. At the stadium, their path was blocked by police who hurled tear gas and fired over their heads. The students responded with rocks. The small shopkeepers and vendors in the area joined in and the police retreated.

Then, in the Calle Melgar, a group of students were met by a surprise blast of gunfire. Two fell, wounded in the thigh. This outrage attracted a greater number of indignant inhabitants into the area. In the ensuing melee, the police posted on top of the stadium began to methodically pick off their victims. Four students were wounded in the Calle Melgar, a boy about eight years old was struck by two bullets in the chest, and two other students were riddled with bullets.

In the Calle Los Incas, Señora Candelaria Herrera de Cárdenas was shot dead as she attempted to help drag a wounded student to safety. One other student and a number of residents were wounded there.

In addition to the boy (who was not identified, and whose body disappeared in the morgue) and Señora Candelaria Herrera de Cárdenas, the dead were Roger Aguilar Callo, a

student in veterinary science; Augusto Lipa Calizalla, an agronomy student; and Carlos Carrasco, a high school student.

News of the massacre spread quickly, and a march of irate citizens soon headed for the police station in the center of town. It was pelted with rocks. The flagpole was torn down and used to force open the door. Among other things, furniture, uniforms, papers, and photographs were set on fire.

The military commander, who heads up the SINAMOS, Enrique Falconí Mejía, declared a curfew from 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.

On the morning of June 28, as the students were deliberating what steps to take, some 15,000 persons were marching toward the university, which is located at some distance from the city. The demonstrators, with the mayor in the front line, carried placards identifying the institutions and organizations represented. They demanded that those responsible for the massacre be removed from office and punished. The students joined the peasants and workers, and continued the march to the Plaza de Armas, where a minute of silence was observed for those who had been murdered.

Later, the June 27 Committee, a united front of more than forty groups, presented the following list of demands to the prefect: "Departure of General Enrique Falconí Mejía; resignation and departure of the prefect, Benjamín Jiménez; dismissal and departure of police colonel Oswaldo Vildoso; dismissal and departure of Teodoro Múñez Rebaza; dismissal and departure of Mr. Navarro; cancellation of the journalist Cordero's license; and the departure of Hermes Gamarra and Pérez Ruival from Puno."

The prefect requested twenty-four hours to study the demands. He accused Falconí of bearing the major responsibility for the massacre.

The next day, there was a mass meeting at the university to demand the return of the bodies and the punishment of those responsible. The bodies were delivered to the Glorioso Colegio Nacional San Carlos, where they were placed under guard.

Falconí issued a statement denying the prefect's charges and in turn demanding that the prefect resign. At this point, the people declared an in-

definite general strike throughout the region.

The strike began at midnight, June 29. At 7:00 a.m., June 30, strike pickets blocked El Ejército Avenue, preventing a truckload of police from passing. Police shot and wounded one of the pickets, whose companions defended themselves with rocks. They then drove through the barricade at full speed while opening fire with machine guns. Six persons were wounded, of whom three—a peasant and two workers, one named Pablo Mamani Velásquez—subsequently died.

In this situation, the June 27 Committee announced that the people would give Colonel Vildoso three hours to leave his post. If he refused, he would be removed from the commissariat by the people, who would render justice on their own, the committee warned. Falconí immediately arrested and jailed the colonel.

Shortly afterwards, the June 27 Committee signed an agreement without a number of its delegates being present (including those from the university), and without consulting the masses involved in the struggle. The

agreement provided that Colonel Vildoso would be brought before military justice and that the authorities would not move to close the university. In addition, the committee agreed to suspend the strike, restore the damaged police station, refrain from attacking or insulting "servants of public order," and refuse to acknowledge any demands made subsequent to the agreement.

Within an hour, Falconí was sworn in as the new prefect. He declared Puno under a state of emergency.

On June 30, the martyrs in this struggle were buried. More than 15,000 persons took part in the funeral march.

Although the students were the major factor in setting off these massive mobilizations in Puno, the lack of experience of the student leaders (who took no part in the negotiations with the "authorities") and the absence of a revolutionary leadership rooted in the masses made it possible for the government to emerge from the crisis with less difficulty than it otherwise would have had. □

and were immediately taken into custody by the soldiers."

Sendic's condition was reported as critical in the military hospital where he was taken to undergo surgery for his wounds. "Police sources indicated that Sendic will not lose the ability to speak, although he will possibly be disfigured by the wounds he suffered in the face," according to an Associated Press dispatch in the September 4 New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario-La Prensa*. A bullet reportedly entered the left side of his face, tearing out several teeth, wounding his tongue, and emerging on the right side.

This is the second time Sendic has been captured since the formation of the Tupamaros in 1963. The first was on August 7, 1970. On September 6, 1971, he was among 100 Tupamaros who escaped from the maximum security Punta Carretas Prison by digging a tunnel from the prison to a nearby house. He had managed to elude the police since then.

One of the other guerrillas captured in the latest raid, Xenia Itte González, had escaped from the women's prison in July 1971 along with thirty-seven other Tupamaros.

Since mid-April, when a state of emergency was declared and a virtual war launched against the Tupamaros, more than 1,000 guerrillas have been captured and twenty have been reported killed. Hundreds of weapons, caches of supplies, and hideouts have been discovered. "Torture is systematically used on those who are being held in prison," noted *Le Monde*.

Uruguayan authorities claim to have either captured or killed nearly all of the leaders of the Tupamaros since the brutal repression began April 14. According to the Associated Press, only five are still at large. They were listed as Raúl Bidegain Gressing, Luis Efraín Martínez Platero, Heber Mejías Collazo, Fernando Garín Lanieri, and Heraclio Jesús Rodríguez Recalde. □

## Top Tupamaro Leader Badly Wounded

# Raul Sendic Captured in Shoot-out

Almost exactly one year since his spectacular tunnel escape from prison along with ninety-nine other guerrillas, Raúl Sendic, founder and principal leader of the Tupamaro guerrilla movement, was shot and captured September 1.

An official announcement said that Sendic and two other guerrillas were discovered in an old house in Montevideo's port area in a 1:00 a.m. raid by a combined force of policemen and soldiers. The capture represents an important victory for the police and army, which joined forces last April in a concerted effort to wipe out the guerrilla movement.

There were conflicting reports as to what exactly happened. The Associated Press reported an "official announcement" as stating that the two other guerrillas, Xenia Itte González and Jorge Bernardo Ramada Piendibeni, surrendered, but that Sendic refused, and shouted: "I'm Rufo! I'm

Rufo and I won't surrender alive!" (Rufo is Sendic's pseudonym.) It stated that a gunfight ensued during which Sendic was wounded in the head.

United Press International suggested that all the guerrillas had taken part in the shoot-out: "The guerrillas began to fire their weapons, and the authorities immediately returned fire. Shortly thereafter, the Tupamaros surrendered, discovering then that Sendic was wounded."

From the report in *Le Monde* September 3-4 it appeared that Sendic alone had been involved in the shoot-out and that the other two guerrillas surrendered afterwards: "In the shooting that followed [Sendic's alleged refusal to surrender], Mr. Raúl Sendic was wounded in the jaw and in the shoulder. The two Tupamaros who were with him soon came out of the basement where they had been hiding

## Soviet Tankers Unload Oil in China

Soviet tankers have been unloading oil in Chinese ports in recent weeks, according to U.S. intelligence officials. They concluded that the deliveries represent replacement of oil being pumped at a rate of 1,000 tons a month through pipelines to North Vietnam.

The source of the information apparently was photographs taken by satellites.



### More Repression in Czechoslovakia

In addition to the nine witch-hunt trials conducted by the Czechoslovak regime headed by Communist party General Secretary Gustav Husak during July and August in the Czech section of the country, there was apparently at least one secret proceeding in Slovakia. The results of the Czech trials were reported in the government-controlled press, but word of the Slovak trial has come from other sources.

The September 1 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde* reported that Laci Kalina, a former professor at the Bratislava cinema academy, was sentenced July 26 to two years in prison. The prosecutor had asked for only a four-month sentence. Kalina's appeal of the decision, *Le Monde's* source said, would be heard on September 20.

Kalina was arrested along with his wife, Agnes Kalinova, last January 31. Kalinova is a well-known film critic and a former editor of the magazine *Kulturny Zivot*, which was suppressed during the "normalization." Because of her fame in the West, an international campaign for her release was organized. After holding Kalinova for four months, the Czechoslovak regime was forced to release her. Now, it seems that Husak has taken revenge on her husband.

There were three charges, according to *Le Monde*, against Kalina. He was accused of having listened, in his own apartment, to a record of poetry readings denouncing the 1968 invasion. (The record was produced by Karel Kyncl, one of those sentenced in the July-August trials.) Several other persons were said to have been present at the time.

At the trial, the defense pointed out that the record had been widely sold by Czechoslovakia commercial distributors. Furthermore, the gathering referred to was not a political meeting. One of Kalina's friends had come to visit him and the two listened to the record.

The second accusation was that Kalina had told several persons that a series of articles published in the Bratislava newspaper *Pravda* on the

subject of Zionism and the situation of Soviet Jewry indicated that anti-Semitism had become an official policy of the regime. The defense did not deny this "charge," but pointed out that the *Pravda* series was in fact not devoid of anti-Semitism.

The third charge was that Kalina had attempted to publish a collection of his writings, some of them political, abroad. The defense pointed out that Kalina's book, which was published in Czechoslovakia in 1966, had not yet been withdrawn from circulation (that was done in 1970) at the time of the "crime." Apparently, Czechoslovak authorities, at least in

### Berrigan, McAlister Given New Sentences

The Rev. Philip F. Berrigan and Sister Elizabeth McAlister, two of seven antiwar activists whom the government failed to convict in the Harrisburg "conspiracy" trial, were given prison terms September 5 for the "crime" of "smuggling" letters to each other in and out of Lewisburg prison. (The actual "smuggling" of letters past the prison censors was done as a "favor" by Boyd F. Douglas, a government informer.)

Berrigan, now serving the fourth year of a six-year sentence for destroying draft files in Catonsville, Maryland, was sentenced to four two-year terms to be served concurrently with his present sentence. This conviction could be used as a pretext to deny parole to the forty-nine-year-old priest. A hearing on his parole application was postponed until the conclusion of the case.

Sister McAlister was sentenced to one year in prison and three years probation. Such harsh sentences are virtually unheard-of for so trivial an offense.

After the sentence was handed down, Justice Department attorneys moved to dismiss all the other charges, including the outlandish allegation of a conspiracy to kidnap Henry Kissinger and blow up underground heating tunnels in Washington, D. C. A deadlocked jury voted ten to two for acquittal on these trumped-up accusations, which were among the final concoctions of the late J. Edgar Hoover.

Berrigan and McAlister charged that the new sentences were "vengeful." The *New York Times* agreed in a September 8 editorial:

"What makes this cruel sentence of the Catholic antiwar activists amount to po-

litical harassment is that they are being punished for an act committed in 1970 that would no longer be illegal if it were committed today. Even in 1970 the law then making such letters a technical violation was widely disregarded.

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In several respects, the Kalina trial is even more ominous than the publicly announced frame-up proceedings of July-August. This trial was kept a total secret; the result was not even announced officially. Are there other such cases? The trial occurred in Slovakia, where repression takes on a national character. But most importantly, Kalina was tried for his political beliefs alone. Husak has assured the Communist parties of the West that there would be no such trials. Even Kalina's allegedly criminal act—trying to get his articles published abroad—took place before 1970. In defending the other witch-hunt trials, Husak claimed that no one would be tried—even for allegedly subversive criminal acts—for offenses committed during the 1968-1969 "years of crisis." □



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litical harassment is that they are being punished for an act committed in 1970 that would no longer be illegal if it were committed today. Even in 1970 the law then making such letters a technical violation was widely disregarded.

"The sentence serves as a consolation prize for the Justice Department which, after an investment of millions of dollars in manpower and court time, failed to convince a jury last April that the Harrisburg Seven were guilty. . . ." □

# Large-Scale Arrests Throughout Pakistan

By Javed Hussein

Lahore

Thousands of political activists, belonging to a wide spectrum of political parties and striking trade-unionists in different parts of Pakistan, have been arrested under emergency regulations. Both the ruling parties—President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's party (PPP) and Wali Khan's National Awami party (NAP)—have justified the arrests with the old, familiar phrases used during the military dictatorships and originally formulated by British imperialism.

The NAP, which includes a whole variety of pro-Moscow "Communists," is in power in two provinces, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. In the NWFP it shares power with a religious party called Jamaat-Ulema-Islam. The NAP-JUI coalition has proved to be as reactionary in its day-to-day governing of the province as previous administrations. In the province's worsening tenant-landlord situation, the NAP (whose membership includes a fair number of landlords) has consistently opposed the tenants and has recently imprisoned fifty leading militants of the Mazdoor-Kissan party, a semi-Maoist political formation, because of their "disruptive activities."

In Baluchistan the NAP government is also reported to have imprisoned nearly 400 political workers and peasants and expelled a few political opponents from the province. Not to be outdone, the PPP governments in the remaining two provinces, Punjab and Sind, have resorted to large-scale arrests in order to curb the opposition from both the right and the left. In Sind alone nearly 1,000 people have been categorised as political prisoners.

The situation has become so alarming that Pakistan's most intelligent bourgeois newspaper, *Dawn*, recently carried a front-page article, signed by its editor-in-chief, calling for the creation of a civil liberties union which "should be organised on a nonpartisan basis without any political aims or affiliations. . . . It should give legal assistance where necessary to the

victims of repression, and it could launch a campaign to educate opinion—among the people as well as the ruling parties—on the basic principles of civilised governmental conduct. It should try to insure that political prisoners are treated with humanity and that they are not involved in false criminal (non-political) cases, in accordance with the tradition that has been handed down to us by the British raj. . . ."

While nice liberal talk like this is no doubt well meant, many observers cannot fail to recall that the country's most widely respected civil-liberties lawyer is now the central government's minister of law and is engaged in drafting the new constitu-

## Workers Too Much for Pakistani Bosses

[The following "Appeal to the President of Pakistan through Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, Chief Minister for Sind," was signed on behalf of twelve industrial companies in Sind province. In it, the panic-stricken companies call for President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's direct intervention into what they call an intolerable situation, workers having taken virtual control of production.

[We reprint the appeal for the information of our readers.]

\* \* \*

It has become necessary to make a direct personal appeal to the president in the matter of the current critical labour situation and lawlessness prevailing throughout the industrial sector of Landhi. We do this with confidence in our president and believe that an immediate solution will be found so that the integrity of the national economy is saved from collapse.

Despite our desire to promote genuine trade union movement and implementation of the new labour policy, the militant elements within the trade union movement, individually

and severally have created conditions not only beyond the control of individual mills in the entire Landhi industrial area but have made the local administration ineffective, and the workers almost run a parallel authority and are in complete control of some of the plants. It may be mentioned here that local administration have been apprised by the individual units from time to time of the extreme critical situation.

Also, most of the lawyers who could set up a civil liberties union are attached either to the PPP or the NAP. And it is precisely against these two supposed left parties that civil liberties have to be defended.

The arrests, of course, reflect the extent of the social crisis that has gripped Pakistan since the independence of Bangladesh. The only way out of the impasse requires revolutionary solutions of which neither the NAP nor the PPP are capable. As a result, they look for temporary remedies, such as a long-term alliance with the Indian bourgeoisie.

Meanwhile in Pakistan, rising prices and increased cost of living have created growing disillusionment with Bhutto and Wali Khan on the part of the workers and peasants. And in the absence of an organised socialist alternative, a drift to the extreme right is clearly visible. □

In brief, we give below some of the problems that confront us today:

(i) The control of industrial units is not in the hand of management due to lack of protection, it is spreading to an extent of complete take-over by the industrial units, one by one.

(ii) Under such conditions, excessive and extortionist demands are made by workers such as expulsion from plants of managerial, technical and supervisory personnel, excessive wage-raise demands and concessions of financial nature impossible to be met, breach of agreements and counter-demands, acts of violence, assault, restraint, wrongful confinement, expulsion, damage to property and product, go-slow and other unfair

practices, gross indiscipline within plants and conditions of lawlessness outside plants, hindrances to clearance, transport and delivery of goods meant for local sale and export, loss in production, export declines, quality claims from foreign buyers and otherwise conditions of chaos as managements are rendered ineffective.

(iii) The managements live under conditions of fear and terror and in consequence thereof, are not in a position to effectively implement the various labour law or to restore industry to its feet and make its desired contribution to revive and reactivate national economy.

(iv) It is a common practice that agreements are unilaterally torn up by workers and denounced, and fresh demands are made in utter disregard of the provisions of law or principles of equity. The image of the nation and the building up of the country's economy is not a matter of concern to them except fathering and furthering disorder at every conceivable opportunity.

We make a fervent and earnest appeal to the president for immediate intervention. It is necessary, in the last fading moments of industry, to break

through this immediately to avert complete break-down of industrial sector, the backbone of our national economy. The past few months are replete with examples of how grave moments in the life of our nation have been turned into prospects of peace by your direct appeal to the people and how grave problems and perils met with acts of courage and determination and forces of lawlessness weaned away and harnessed to peace.

We have faith in the stature of president and consider him as the man of the moment who can reclaim and salvage and also believe that our appeal made in the national interest will not go in vain as it is made by us as Pakistanis and nationalists, and not as employers only.

Adamjee Industries, Ltd.  
Al Ata Textile Mills, Ltd.  
Dawood Cotton Mills, Ltd.  
Fazal Shafique Textile Mills, Ltd.  
Firdous Spg. and Wvg. Mills, Ltd.  
Firdous Textile Mills, Ltd.  
Globe Textile Mills, Ltd.  
Gul Ahmed Textile Mills, Ltd.  
Gulbarg Textile Mills, Ltd.  
Husein Industries, Ltd.  
Nagaria Textile Mills, Ltd.  
Nagaria Spg. and Wvg. Mills, Ltd.

United States's view," the *New York Times* reported, "the net effect of today's vote was to delay until 1973 any decision on whether Puerto Rico should be classified as a colony."

This was disputed by Juan Mari Brás, secretary-general of the Puerto Rican Socialist party. "What the committee decided," he said, "was how the anticolonialism provisions could be enforced."

State Department officials reacted angrily to the committee's decision. They said that the UN action was "an insult to the people of Puerto Rico who have chosen to live in a democracy under a constitution of their own choosing in free association with the United States." They cited a 1967 referendum in which only 4,205 votes were cast for independence. These representatives of U. S. imperialism failed to mention that Puerto Rican independence organizations called for a boycott of that poll and that only 57 percent of the eligible voters had cast ballots.

During the debate in the UN committee Alarcón said, "That plebiscite was held in the self-same conditions of foreign military occupation, repression, and the absence of a clear-cut commitment by the administering power regarding its willingness to transfer sovereignty to the Puerto Rican people. . ."

Voting in favor of the Cuban-sponsored resolution were the delegates from Ecuador, China, Yugoslavia, India, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, the Soviet Union, and Tanzania. Cuba is not represented on the decolonization committee, and the resolution was presented on her behalf by the Iraqi delegation. The United States and Great Britain withdrew from the committee in January 1971 because of its allegedly "one-sided" decisions.

Leaders of Puerto Rico's independence movement were jubilant over the moral victory. Fermin Arraiza, a leader of the Puerto Rican Socialist party, said:

"The committee recommendation goes beyond what we had hoped for. All we ask for is that the island be included in the lists of areas that are still considered colonies. The committee report goes beyond this and states that Puerto Rico is a colony and demands that steps be taken to implement decolonization." □

## State Department Angered

# UN Committee Names Puerto Rico as 'Colony' of the United States

The United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization voted August 28 to recognize "the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determination and independence." The committee also set up a working body to report early next year on procedures for applying to Puerto Rico a 1960 UN resolution that calls for granting independence to all territories that are not yet self-governing.

Delegates from twelve nations supported the move, none voted against it, and ten abstained.

In effect, the United States has been declared to be an imperialist power holding Puerto Rico as a colony. The decision reversed a 1953 UN ruling that approved Puerto Rico's "commonwealth" status.

The action climaxed a twelve-year

campaign by the Cuban delegation to put the UN on record against the imperialist role of the U. S. in Puerto Rico.

According to the August 29 *New York Times*, "the vote was greeted by applause from the public gallery, where members of the Puerto Rican Independence party and the Puerto Rican Socialist party were seated—reportedly with guest tickets from the Cubans."

Dr. Ricardo Alarcón Quesada, the Cuban chief delegate, said the committee's action meant that Puerto Rico would now be discussed by the UN General Assembly.

U. S. representatives at the UN sought to downgrade the significance of the committee's decision. "In the

# More Dollars for the Nuclear Arms Race

By Fred Feldman

The "arms control" agreement—a result of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]—signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on May 26, was presented by the signers as a step toward a world of "peace." It has led instead to a new intensification of the nuclear arms race.

The ink on the signatures was hardly dry when Nixon and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird pressed Congress for a \$1,300,000,000 addition to the \$83,400,000,000 "defense" budget for 1973. The extra money is for development of the Trident nuclear missile submarine and the B-1 supersonic bomber.

Laird threatened to withdraw support from the SALT treaty if Congress did not approve the new appropriations. The threat was hardly necessary. The House of Representatives voted for the increase on June 26 and the Senate is expected to concur after the recess.

The August 5 *New York Times* reported administration plans for stepped-up arms development:

"The Nixon administration is quietly moving to shift the emphasis of American strategic planning in case of a major war and to develop bigger, more accurate warheads and other weapons. . . .

"The administration's planners have begun to move toward more advanced weapons that could destroy 'hard targets' in the Soviet Union, such as nuclear weapons storage bunkers and missile silos. . . . Mr. Nixon also has sanctioned the development of weapons improvements, some designed to make selective retaliatory strikes more precise, others to complicate Russia's defensive problems."

The August 10 *Times* pointed out that "in previous years, President Nixon has ruled out the development of missiles so accurate and powerful that they could knock out underground 'hardened' missile silos. This was done so the Russians would not think that the United States was planning a first-strike capability."

This policy reversal drew a cry of alarm from Republican Senator Ed-

ward Brooke of Massachusetts. He wrote Nixon, asking him to "restate the previous firm guidelines you had enunciated in directing the Department of Defense not to seek superfluous and provocative hard-target technology."

While Brooke got no direct reply, Pentagon spokesman Jerry Friedheim reaffirmed plans "to go forward with research and development in improved re-entry vehicles [Pentagonese for nuclear missile warheads] in order to maintain our technological superiority in that field."

To emphasize administration determination to increase U.S. nuclear might, Nixon threw administration support behind a rider to the SALT pact, which is now before the Senate.

The rider, proposed by Democratic Senator Henry Jackson of Washington, urges U.S. negotiators to press for "the principle of equality" in future arms talks with the USSR. This democratic sounding goal means demanding that Moscow agree to big U.S. arms increases in those few areas in which the SALT pact froze U.S. strength at levels below that of the USSR.

It would also commit the Senate to support for "the maintenance and development of a vigorous research and development and modernization program leading to a prudent strategic posture."

The rider is couched in ambiguous terms that some legislators fear would authorize Nixon to abrogate the treaty whenever he felt that Soviet military advances "jeopardize the supreme national interests."

Senator Alan Cranston, a California Democrat, warned his colleagues: "I think we have here the makings of a Tonkin Gulf resolution in the nuclear arms field. I repeat—a Tonkin Gulf resolution in the nuclear arms field may well lie within the Jackson reservation."

"I think the pending amendment, the Jackson amendment, gives the administration a chance to promote an aggressive strategic posture which may thwart a future agreement." (*Congres-*

*sional Record*, August 16, S-13696) Nixon has sought to forestall an unfavorable Soviet response to his moves. On August 9 Ronald Ziegler, the presidential press secretary, stated that the administration does "not endorse" Senator Jackson's interpretations of the rider. The hawkish Jackson, often referred to as "the Senator from Boeing," has been describing his proposal in terms that are certain to alarm Moscow. Although Ziegler assured the press that Nixon did not endorse Jackson's views, he refused to say that Nixon opposed them and he reiterated administration backing of the Jackson rider.

There are indications that these developments are beginning to disturb the Soviet leaders. The September 5 *New York Times* quotes an editorial in the Soviet government newspaper *Izvestia* that warns that "without apparently formally violating the letter of the Moscow agreements, one can still fundamentally violate the general spirit of the agreements by unilateral acts, thus jeopardizing the effectiveness of the agreement itself."

As in 1939, when Stalin assured the world that his ten-year pact with Hitler had won a decade of peace, the Moscow bureaucrats have painted up the results of their pact with Nixon. In reality, Nixon has used the agreement to help divert attention from his continued bombing of Vietnam and the Pentagon's preparations for still bloodier conflicts. □

## Dutch Industrialist Released

Dutch industrialist Jan Van de Panne, who was kidnapped in Buenos Aires September 5, was released in a northern suburb of the city the following day around 6:00 p.m. The president of the Argentine affiliate of the Philips Company of the Netherlands was kidnapped as he was driving to the company's headquarters. The police said they found a note in his abandoned car demanding \$500,000 ransom in U.S. money.

A Philips spokesman confirmed that the company paid a ransom but refused to say how much. The spokesman revealed that the kidnapers were members of the Montoneros, a Peronist guerrilla group.

In addition to Van de Panne, a prominent Argentine businessman, Adolfo Kaplan, was reported kidnapped on September 4 by four unidentified men, according to United Press International.

# Bus Strike Ties Up Transport in Teheran

By Javad Sadeeg

On August 27 the shah's regime brought a nineteen-year-old university student to trial before a military tribunal in Teheran which condemned him to death the next day. Mehdi Rezai was convicted by the impatient generals on charges of committing murder, attempting to subvert the state, and membership in an armed revolutionary organization.

"My comrades and I have accepted living dangerously because we could not passively participate in maintaining crying social injustices in Iran," Rezai told the court, according to the August 30 *Le Monde*.

The shah's press reported that Mehdi Rezai was captured on May 6 after a shoot-out with the police during which his comrade, Habib Rahbari, and a policeman were killed. The police claim that Rezai and Rahbari started shooting when the police stopped them in a Teheran street.

Rezai told the court that he did not intentionally kill the policeman. His pistol went off accidentally when he was tripped by the cops.

Mehdi has three brothers: Mohsen, Ahmad, and Reza. Mohsen, the youngest, is a political prisoner. Ahmad was killed last January during a shoot-out with the police in Teheran. Reza, along with thirty-six other revolutionists, was imprisoned August 27 after SAVAK [secret police] agents raided their meeting places in Teheran. He escaped from prison and managed to send a letter abroad reporting the torture of political prisoners. Excerpts from his letter were printed in the February 28 issue of *Intercontinental Press*. Recently a number of political prisoners have been executed after being convicted by the military in secret trials.

In the last few months the Teheran press has reported the bombing of government buildings, street shoot-outs with the police—which the police claim occur when they trap the revolutionists and seek to arrest them—and the cold-blooded murder of revolutionists by the police under guise of self-defense.

On August 13 a high police official was assassinated in Teheran. This was but the latest of many similar assassinations in the last two years, according to the chief of the national police.

On August 27 a different type of action occurred in Teheran. For the first time in many years the bus drivers and their assistants went on a general strike. The action was initiated by some drivers who brought their buses to a halt. It was opposed by the so-called representatives of the workers, and apparently it started without their knowledge. The strike was immediately declared illegal by the government. The bus system is reported to transport a total of 1,200,000 persons a day. This is the city's sole means of public transport.

The semiofficial Teheran daily *Ettelaat* reported August 28 that the workers went on strike because they were dissatisfied with job classifications and inadequate wage increases—between 10 and 15 percent—granted by the United Bus Company after months of negotiations. The bus company is controlled and subsidized by the government. Its books are always in the red because of graft and corruption.

The government does not dare raise bus fares. When they were raised in February 1970 students initiated a massive bus boycott that lasted for three days. The shah backed down and rescinded the fare increase.

The workers are unwilling to bail out the company by putting up with miserable wages in the face of rising prices. In Teheran rents alone increased 56 percent in the five-year period 1965-1970.

The government blamed the bus strike on a handful of miscreants who "mised" the workers. Twenty persons were arrested. The workers were ordered to go back to work or face losing their jobs. Early in the morning of August 28, 400 army men and 400 government employees were

being used to drive the buses, according to *Ettelaat*.

The Teheran daily *Kayhan* said that the regime was planning to mobilize 5,000 military and government employees to drive the buses. The paper reported that already on August 28 a considerable number of military men were in the drivers' seats. Passengers were not being asked to pay fares. Nevertheless, *Kayhan* said that many people walked and quite a number arrived late to work.

The shah's military can engage in shoot-outs with small forces and can certainly decree death sentences to be carried out by firing squads. But obviously they cannot easily provide transportation for Teheran's working people, or imprison all the bus drivers even if they go on an illegal strike.

## 20,000 Denounce Mujib

About 20,000 Bengalis, chanting, "We want food, we want clothing, we want a life that's worth living," staged a demonstration in Dacca September 3. It was the most serious expression thus far of opposition to the Awami League regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The demonstrators demanded measures to control skyrocketing food prices, a crackdown on government corruption, and establishment of a coalition government.

Maulana Bhashani, head of the National Awami party, who led the demonstration, denounced Mujib and his ministers for "fostering opportunists, smugglers and others responsible for the unprecedented misery in Bangladesh today."

"Until recently," Lewis M. Simons of the *Washington Post* reported September 5, "Mujib was considered above reproach. . . . But now . . . the level of corruption has risen beyond that acceptable by local standards, and the sheikh, who is currently in Geneva recuperating from a gall bladder operation, is being tarred with the same brush as his government."

Because of soaring food prices, and a distributing system that is both inefficient and corrupt, hunger is widespread in Bangladesh. The price of seventy pounds of rice has doubled to \$14, the average monthly income of a Bengali peasant. The prices of cooking oil, kerosene, and cotton cloth have doubled or tripled. □



# Which Way for Yugoslavia?

By C. Verla

[The following article appeared in the July 15, 1972, issue of *Quatrième Internationale*, published by the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

What kind of socialism do we want? The discussion that is going on in the French working-class movement between the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor] and the CFDT [Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor] is often carried on with reference to "models." Because of its experiment in self-management, Yugoslavia enters into this discussion in an important way. The Stalinists have an easy time arguing the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat and centralized planning as opposed to the "so-called decentralized democracy" of self-management. At the other extreme, the social-democratic reformists would extend the experiment in "participation" to include running factories within the framework of the capitalist system; they too have an easy time hiding their anticommunism and their fundamental opposition to the dictatorship of the proletariat by defending decentralized "self-management" and its "democracy" against the repellent Stalinist centralization.

For us, the problem (and the debate on the Yugoslav question) is not a matter of "models" but of program: the permanent extension of the proletarian revolution and its deepening in the construction of a socialism that is not a caricature oblige revolutionary Marxists to wage a struggle at one and the same time for the dictatorship of the proletariat and proletarian democracy on the broadest scale; these are two sides of the same problem. Theoretical analysis and experience confirm that this is the quickest, the most effective, and indeed the only road that leads to socialism with-

out unnecessary historic "detours." This "rule" and this revolutionary Marxist program are not the product of utopian dreaming or moral dogmas. They command our attention in view of the tasks that confront us once the first step—the taking of power and the destruction of the bourgeois state—has been taken. These tasks of transforming society and mankind are too great to be carried out by a bureaucratic state. But these are also tasks that have to be carried out in a context that at the outset is so vulnerable as to necessitate the maintenance of a dictatorship of the proletariat for a whole historic period. This two-sided necessity—dictatorship of the proletariat together with a broad proletarian democracy—has such deep roots that it can easily be shown, on the basis of existing historical examples, that if either component is present, but not the other, it is necessarily very fragile and accompanied by defects and wastage that delay accordingly the day when new social relations of socialist production can be achieved.

Our analysis of Yugoslavia at one and the same time confirms and is based upon this revolutionary Marxist program. Thus it places no stock in the Stalinists' criticism of a regime that is slipping away from them, nor of the criticism of all those who do not at the outset clearly reject class collaboration within the framework of the capitalist system and who do not accept the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat after the taking of power.

### Sad Aftermath of Decentralization

The Yugoslav regime began to decentralize on the economic plane following the break with Stalin at the beginning of the fifties. This decentralization went hand in hand with the introduction of self-management. But it remained closely controlled by the federal authorities—especially in

the key area of investments—until the 1965 reform. To be sure, the central means for intervening in the economy were more indirect and less and less effective as a result of the already disastrous effects of partial decentralization; but for a long time they retained enough importance for the regime's "liberal" ideologues to be able to attribute every failure to the retention of these central powers. Thus it was in the name of self-management, of deepening it, and of freeing it from bureaucratic shackles that the 1965 reform was introduced: If self-management is to be effective, it was said, decision-making would have to be the prerogative of "work units." These units would have to enjoy greater "freedom" and no longer be subject to the central restrictions and heavy taxes that always limited the choices they could make. From this point on, the reform was based on all the classical "liberal" formulas: Objective economic laws must be allowed to take effect because they lead to the best equilibrium within the economy and to a profitability that is indispensable for a healthy economy. In other words, it must be left up to self-management (in reality, the market) to set prices and determine investments; the road to competition between Yugoslav concerns must be opened up; and in the face of competition from the capitalist companies the government must therefore stop intervening to favor this or that region or factory through a price or subsidy policy that "distorts the facts," just as it must stop protecting the Yugoslav economy, since doing so keeps "nonprofitable" activities going.

Once this reform began to be carried out, its effects were disastrous: a considerable increase in the cost of living, which compelled the government once again, in 1971, to "freeze" all prices (in spite of its intentions to liberalize) and to devalue the dinar several times (in spite of the plans for convertibility); a heightening of the inequalities in wages between factories and from region to region; an increase in unemployment (more than 300,000 unemployed, not to mention the more than 1,000,000 working abroad). But perhaps the most striking political and social problem that the reform has aggravated is the increase in social cleavages and differentiation brought on by decentralization. In this con-

nection, the reform has had the effect of painfully revealing all the problems that the ruling Yugoslav bureaucracy has not been able to solve.

## Clash of Nationalities

At the very outset, and quite apart from the defects of the bureaucracy, the problem of the various national minorities is a very complex one to solve in a mosaic-like country like Yugoslavia. Unlike the Stalinist parties of Eastern Europe, the League of Communists had an effective approach toward the national question at the time of the struggle for liberation from the fascist invader and Great Serbian oppression. The first years of the regime were, moreover, marked by an effort of considerable scope to develop the poorest regions by applying the program of the League of Communists to the effect that equality exists in form only unless it is accompanied by real economic equality.

Nevertheless, *decentralization*, accompanied by the maintenance of a *bureaucratic political regime*, was to bring about the *failure* of this policy and a resurgence of the problem of the nationalities during the sixties: indeed, decentralization was to weaken the very means for centrally intervening in the economy that made it possible to reduce inequalities between republics, which often include national minorities. At the same time, the bureaucratic nature of the governmental powers and of the decision-making process could only serve to reinforce the kind of egotistical behavior on the part of regions, factories, and individuals that was being encouraged by the "liberal," decentralizing tendencies. Finally, the clash between the nationalities was marked by the fact that the central bureaucratic powers were by and large dominated by the Great-Serbian nationality (it has, moreover, been dominant on the political level in the ranks of the party since the struggle for liberation), both in the army and in the government service. As a result of this, as well as of the pressure of conflicting traditions among the various nations, antibureaucratic aspirations could also seek to express themselves through the form of nationalist demands and movements. But these considerations are not sufficient

to describe the recent hostility between Croats and Serbs: For if confused, antibureaucratic (and to that extent progressive) aspirations were present, this conflict has by and large been *dominated* on the Croatian side by *reactionary* tendencies objectively favorable to a restoration of capitalism (even though they were not necessarily the direct agents of such a restoration).

With roots in the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois layers of Croatia (craftsmen, peasants, hotel bourgeoisie along the Dalmatian coast, students in the schools of business administration, who are supported by the church), the Croatian nationalists attempted to pit the workers against each other along national lines. This is the first and most revealing aspect of the reactionary character of this current. Wage differentiations along the lines of national origin have, in fact, begun to be introduced in the big industrial centers. The main demands that were raised were the following: complete autonomy with regard to the federation (identified with the Great-Serbian oppressor); that is, *pushing economic and political decentralization all the way*; and also the elimination of any centralized intervention, which was regarded as "usurping" the rightful fruit of Croatian labor in order to distribute it elsewhere; in other words, *de facto* opposition to any planned redistribution of income on behalf of the less developed regions; and finally, a glorification of bourgeois criteria for organizing the economy. When one realizes that Croatia, along with Slovakia, is one of the most developed republics and the one that benefits the most from foreign trade and the expansion of tourism, one can understand why the demands crystallized around the problem of currency. With most of the currency going to the federation, the Croatians wanted to increase their slice of the pie. The "Croatsians"? No, indeed—rather the technocrats and the Croatian petty bourgeoisie who are making money out of their dealing in currency while strikes by workers against wage inequalities and unemployment spread throughout Croatia. For on the other side of this conflict between "nationalities"—and even within the conflict itself—a deeper and more complex

social antagonism is developing that calls into question the relations of self-management and, in a more general sense, the relations of production and property installed by the revolution.

## Whither Self-Management?

It is still difficult in Yugoslavia not to be for self-management. Yet no one in Yugoslavia today any longer believes that it has been fully achieved. No one, moreover, could claim that it has been, in view of the considerable increase in strikes (more than 2,000 since 1958<sup>1</sup>), which, in one form or another, have most often pressed for a *more effective application of self-management*—to the point that the last self-management congress (May 1971 in Sarajevo) at length publicly denounced the various forces holding back self-management. This means that today if centralization often continues, in a confused way, to be counterposed to self-management, currents will develop—in particular within the unions—that will see in *decentralization* the most dangerous source for the breaking up of any possible self-management. Indeed, decentralization and "economic liberalization" favor the development of the main social agents of this policy. Competition and "profitability" in terms of the criteria of the market require, if they are to hold unreserved sway, that they be taken charge of by the social layers that reap the benefits of these laws—the bourgeoisie, but also managers and technocrats. The workers are both judge and plaintiff: Can they agree to fire workers, and to hold down wages in order "to be more competitive" the way a factory manager does? To be sure, differentiations are appearing among the workers thanks to the laws of competition. The more one "rises" in the system of delegating power, and the more the workers are directly connected with the running of the factory and are removed from production, the more easily they will accept the rules of this "game." In this connection, conflicts arise between the workers' committee and the administrative council it elects, which is more directly subject to the influence of the

1. Cf. *Quatrieme Internationale*, February 1971.

manager and of the various technocrats.

But most often it is *self-management itself that the bureaucrats in the factory try to call into question* for it hinders the reintroduction of capitalist relations of production into the factory, and these relations are the best adapted to the "spirit of initiative" required by the competitive struggle for profit. This tendency is most explicit in the factories with mixed capital (part foreign investments and part Yugoslav social funds<sup>2</sup>) where the capitalists are attempting to legalize the "mixed" committees (we all know what this bourgeois-worker "mixture" is worth), to which the self-management committee would then delegate most of its powers. Elsewhere, the manager tries to get himself hired "on the basis of a long-term program" and in this very way to limit the control of the workers over his policy (in Yugoslavia, managers are elected and can be recalled by the workers' councils). An even more common method is to attempt to stress a certain "division of labor" that reinforces the hierarchy inside the factory to the advantage of the technocrats who are considered "competent" to make the most important economic and budgetary decisions. Thus the self-management committee is reduced to dealing with problems relating to wages and working conditions.

As an instrument of workers' democracy, self-management cannot have any substance if the workers are subject to centralized, bureaucratic constraints. Nor, however, can it avoid the constraints of the market either. By atomizing the factories and pitting them against each other, the market also atomizes and opposes the workers to each other; strengthens the petty-bourgeois social layers that are making money from trade; solidifies the position of the bureaucrats in the factory; and undermines the weight of the working class and the relations of self-management—however limited they may be in the Yugoslav regime. It also simultaneously heightens antagonisms and social differentiation.

2. Cf. the article by C. Samary in *Critiques de l'Economie Politique*, No. 7-8, and the article by F. Charlier on "A Program for a Transition to Capitalism" in this issue.

## Widening Social Differences

1. *Differentiations within the bureaucracy. The "red bourgeoisie."*

The conflict between nationalities makes it possible to outline certain key axes of this differentiation:

a. On the most superficial level, this differentiation extends to the various nationalities. The greater autonomy granted to the republics and the economic decentralization are in part the product of pressures (that they also help to encourage) from leading elements who seek to increase their own influence by defending the interests of their various republics when it comes to the apportionment of power (a corollary of decentralization being an increase in the influence of the richest republics).

b. In a more profound way, the policy of economic "liberalization" and the introduction of self-management (which has been in effect for a long time) have favored the development of technocratic layers who head up the "labor organizations." But here, too, certain distinctions must be made:

● On the one hand, between these layers in the *developed republics* (and, within these republics, the layers in the *most dynamic factories*, mainly those oriented toward foreign trade) and the same layers in the *less developed regions and factories*. It is not in the interests of the latter to press for an expansion of the laws of the market, which for them would involve a "colonization" even more real than what the Croatian technocrats are complaining about.

As for the technocrats in factories that are undergoing expansion, their interests link up with those of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois layers in that they call for allowing free course to the laws of the market on all levels at the same time as they demonstrate hostility to self-management (which offers too much resistance to the free-play and to the "sacrifices" of competition). What these bourgeois aspirants want is to also be able to make their "idle" wealth bear fruit and to protect it with a right to own property.

The technocrats in the poor factories are more in a situation of being a workers' aristocracy that attempts to take advantage of its role in the division of labor in order to increase

its privileges but without for all that having any interest in calling either the system or planning into question.

● But on the other hand, the recent Serbo-Croatian conflict revealed another possible differentiation within the most reactionary technocratic layers themselves: *that of the technocrats with links to financial and trade organizations in opposition to the technocrats in the factories.*

Given the present serious economic and financial situation, but given too the more direct importance of the working class in the factories, it is quite likely that the most dangerous forces from the point of view of socialism are the ones that are developing with the aid of the *decentralized banking system*. The links between these forces and international capitalism in the context of the recent creation of an "Investment Company for Yugoslavia"; the objective interests of these layers, their convergence with those of the bourgeoisie, their position of strength in the present situation—all these are weighty factors in moving them in a reactionary direction.

● In this context, the *ruling bureaucracy* and its apparatus occupy a specific position: the policy of the bureaucracy objectively favors the development of centrifugal forces *at the same time* that it checks them. While basing itself on these forces in the vain hope that they will straighten out the economic situation, the bureaucracy nevertheless does not intend either to turn power over to them or to lose its privileges and the system from which it derives them. And in the present situation, the only forces that make it possible for it to struggle against the growing weight of the technocratic layers are the following: on the one hand, state power, on which it retains a firm grip (during the recent conflict, Tito alluded to the possibility of civil war and moved the army into the foreground; the concept of the state as a "body of armed men" is apt to take on a striking immediacy during a period of sharpening conflict); and, on the other hand, its appearance as the *defender of the working class*, of the gains of the revolution, and of self-management. Demagogy? Of course! But for demagogy to work, the masses have to be taken in by it. Whatever the socialist con-

sciousness of the leaders amounts to, therefore, they are prisoners of the social system that enthroned them. What is characteristic of them is a centrist policy, one that is both anti-capitalist and opposed to workers' democracy at the same time.

Because we are not dealing with *social classes with a firm base in the relations of production*, the existing differentiations cannot be defined in terms of neat categories. It is more a matter of describing a *process* than a well-defined reality. As a result, *the entrance of other social layers onto the scene* and the transformation of the relationship of forces will play a big role in such a process: In the context of an open conflict between the working class and the bourgeoisie, the fissures will deepen, turning the differentiations into full-scale divisions along class lines.

## 2. *The Rise of Workers' Struggles.*

The year 1968 marked an important stage in the reaction of the working class and the students (especially in Belgrade) against the effects of the reform,<sup>3</sup> and against the government's policy in general. During the mobilizations at that time, the tendencies in the economy toward private ownership, the ineffectiveness of self-management, and the bureaucratic system were criticized on a broad scale—to the point where Tito had to try to look and sound as he did in the old days. Measures were taken to protect self-management somewhat from its bourgeois detractors and to limit the spread of private property. (Essentially, it exists in the agricultural and handicraft sectors of the economy, and, since the reform, in the tourist sector.) But the most insidious forms of capitalist relations of production were denounced in the new types of factories called "G. G. P."<sup>4</sup> "Self-management from the bottom up!" This was the slogan of the Belgrade students, who were expressing the idea that the only genuine workers' democracy, antibureaucratic power, and struggle against the capitalist restora-

tionist tendencies in Yugoslavia lies not in a decentralization of a self-management limited to the factories and consequently subject to all the centrifugal forces, but on the contrary, in the working class playing a central, and therefore stronger role by directly participating in the exercise of power.

The year 1972 will mark new stages. Following the self-management congress, following the recognition of the right to strike, and in view of the worsening of the economic and social situation, the aggressiveness of the working class can only continue to mount. The working class will be encouraged to move in this direction by a new factor that could be of decisive importance on the Yugoslav political and social scene: the unions as an opposition force to the regime. Indeed, with the weakening of the central powers and of the cohesiveness of the League of Communists, and in the context of an important social crisis, the Yugoslav trade unions appear to be shedding their role as a mere cog in the state apparatus. For the first time, at the beginning of 1972, open opposition to the government's policy reached such a point that Tito alluded in a recent speech to those "who say that the unions are enemies of the government who put forward their own program." The main stumbling block will at first be the government's attempt to freeze wages. But to do this in Yugoslavia is to deal a blow to a sacrosanct self-management, which, to the extent that it exists, takes shape around this very question of wages—especially since the reform, when greater freedom was granted for

decision-making at the factory level. It is also, quite simply, to attack the standard of living of the working class. To "solve" problems in this manner in a country that calls itself socialist is once more to demonstrate the contradiction between actions and sugar-coated words. But at a time when social struggles are intensifying and when the Marshal's uniform is no longer worshiped as it used to be, things may not blow over so easily.

\* \* \*

There is no doubt that the bureaucracy is trying to extricate itself from all this for the time being by stepping up repression. It embarked on this path by censoring *Student* (the newspaper of the students at the school of philosophy in Belgrade) and *Praxis* (the discussion organ of the Yugoslav left-wing intelligentsia). It also began to imprison those whom it designates as "Trotskyists," without succeeding in investing this term with the highly insulting content that the Stalinists gave it in the "good old days."<sup>5</sup> But the Yugoslav bureaucracy, which is caught in the contradictions of its "original" system, will not let this stop it from suppressing all those who today attempt to propose an antibureaucratic solution to the present crisis. It is these people who, out of the failure of the regime, will draw the lessons that will lead to a victory for socialism in Yugoslavia. □

5. Some writings by Trotsky have been officially published in Yugoslavia. He is considered part of the workers' movement. The latest issue of *Praxis* was devoted to him.

## Chicanos Reject Republicans, Democrats

About 1,500 Chicanos and Latinos from eighteen states gathered in El Paso, Texas, for the first national convention of Raza Unida parties.

The convention approved a resolution calling for "complete independence" from the Republican and Democratic parties and declaring that the Raza Unida parties support neither of the two major candidates for president of the United States.

In a report in the September 22 *Militant*, Antonio Camejo stresses the importance of the victory for advocates of independent Chicano political action. They succeeded in winning a big majority

against the forces that favored endorsing Senator McGovern.

Jose Angel Gutierrez, founder of the Texas Raza Unida party and organizer of the convention, will chair the Congreso de Aztlan, a coordinating body set up by the gathering.

### Japanese Waters Still Mined

Japanese military officials estimate that at least 2,000 mines from World War II still linger in Japan's coastal waters. According to the same source, the United States laid about 11,000 mines around Japan during the war.

3. Cf. the article from *Critiques de l'Economie Politique*.

4. Grupnogradjansko preduzece (factories of groups of citizens). The 1965 reform law gave private individuals the right to band together to form such factories, which are nevertheless not considered to be privately owned. — IP

## Two Volumes of Trotsky's Works in Serbo-Croat

A two-volume set of selected works by Leon Trotsky was published in Rijeka, Yugoslavia, in late 1971, marking a significant first for the official book industry in the so-called socialist countries.

The collection was limited to Trotsky's early writings and did not include any polemics against Stalin or any critiques of the bureaucratic system that was established in the Soviet Union over the ruins of the Bolshevik party. Nonetheless, these two volumes offer the new generations of Marxists in Yugoslavia in particular a broad picture of the thought, development, and character of the young revolutionist who was to command the seizure of power in October 1917 and, along with Lenin, lay the foundations of the first postcapitalist society.

Despite the limitations of this collection, moreover, readers could not come away with the impression that Trotsky was merely a historical figure, or a hero belonging to the past of the revolution. In his introduction, Predrag Vranicki stresses Trotsky's role as the main fighter against the bureaucratic system that for half a century has obscured the fundamental goals of socialism and held back the spread of socialist revolutions:

"A few decades ago, no one could have foreseen that the struggle for a new humanity, a new world free from at least the basic forms of alienation, would pass through deeply alienated and inhumane situations and conditions recalling the darkest periods of capitalist civilization. The truth about the past period is still being hidden from a part of humanity. But the future of the Marxist and Communist movement, the achievement of the basic humane ideas that brought this movement into being, depends to a great extent on our making a courageous, principled, critical, and more and more profound investigation of our entire past as a guide to all future actions.

"The nature of Stalinism—and this is the past I am mainly talking about—has still not been sufficiently explored nor has this problem been resolved from a critical and revolutionary standpoint. In the international Marxist and Communist movement as well as here in Yugoslavia we have seen the most profound and all-embracing theoretical and practical critiques of Stalinism. But some questions have not been taken up in full frankness, some situations have not been sufficiently clarified, that is, the situations that gave birth to Stalinism in its mother country and later on in the international workers' movement. (Further on, I will mention some of these episodes that require full and deep-going analysis. The problem today is that not all the documents dealing with these incidents are available.)

"The crisis of the international Communist movement resulting from Stalinism continues to this day. Therefore, understanding this crisis is essential for the very existence of Communism as a world-historic movement. Bureaucratic authoritarianism, the bureaucrats' monopoly on theory and criticism, and their self-satisfaction over certain economic and technical advances cannot cover over the

grave contradictions that exist. The Moscow trials, the beheading of the Red Army, the catastrophic defeats at the start of the second world war, the postwar trials and concentration camps, the 1948 Cominform resolution [excommunicating the Yugoslav Communists], the Hungarian events of 1956, the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the recent Polish events—to mention only the most prominent dates and events in the last three decades—reveal the grave crisis of socialism in this early and still infantile period of its historical existence."

In his sketch of Trotsky's life and writings, Vranicki hails the Russian leader's analysis of the Stalinist system, *Revolution Betrayed*, as his "most important and most relevant work." Moreover, by giving a vivid, concise, and generally accurate account of Trotsky's life, the introduction as a whole seems likely to make readers of this selection anxious to take a look at the anti-Stalinist works that are not included. Whether or not the Tito government eventually allows the publication of *Revolution Betrayed* and similar writings that might be expected to encourage dangerous thoughts even about the liberalized Stalinist system in Yugoslavia, the most important effect of this two-volume set may well be to arouse interest in the "most relevant" of Trotsky's work.

In any case, the contents of this selection should prove invaluable to Yugoslav Marxists in establishing the real theoretical preparation for the October revolution. The first volume contains *Results and Prospects*, which Trotsky wrote in the wake of the 1905 revolution, summing up the conclusions he drew from his study of the peculiar development of Russian capitalism and from the revolution itself. This essay explained for the first time the possibility of a socialist revolution in backward Russia. It gave the theoretical basis on which the October revolution was carried out.

The first volume of the set also contains some of Trotsky's major polemics in defense of the new Soviet regime, *Terrorism and Communism* and *Between the Red and the White*. Since these works include some ideas later modified by Trotsky, such as his supporting the concept of only one soviet party, they may give rise to some confusion among anti-Stalinist Marxists in Yugoslavia. For example, Trotsky's arguing at one point for imposing state control on the trade unions, a proposal that Lenin opposed and Trotsky himself later disavowed, has been used in Eastern Europe to discredit the leader of the Left Opposition as a fighter for workers' democracy. Only the availability of the full range of Trotsky's work can put an end to such misunderstandings and distortions.

In any case, Vranicki opens the way for a wider study of Trotsky's role by recommending Isaac Deutscher's biography of the Russian revolutionary leader:

"Besides the original works of Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Martov, and the other leaders of the Russian Social Democratic and Bolshevik parties—which are the most important source for understanding the prerevolutionary and



revolutionary events as well as the individual figures—and some accounts and memoirs from the period (Lunacharsky, Morizet, Sukhanov, etc.), I must single out Isaac Deutscher's work on Stalin and especially his extensive monograph on Trotsky. This is not only the most important monograph on Trotsky but one of the most important monographs ever written. In three volumes, he gives not only exhaustive accounts of the life and work of Trotsky but of many other of the chief figures, as well as a masterly telling of the history of Russian socialism and Bolshevism."

Vranicki notes that he has relied on Deutscher for the historical facts in his introduction.

In some instances, Vranicki's assessments of Trotsky's ideas are questionable:

"On the basis of present-day experience we can say that Trotsky erred completely in his political diagnoses. The historical process has followed different paths and Stalinist rule has taken and is taking different forms." Vranicki thus seems to reject both Trotsky's view of the revolutionary potential of the working class in the developed capitalist countries and his concept of the need for a political revolution in the Stalinist countries in which the workers would take back the political power usurped from them by the bureaucrats. These precisely are some of the key questions for young revolutionists in Yugoslavia. It would be interesting to know what conclusions Vranicki draws from his statements and what implications will be drawn by Marxists in his country. A very important discussion could develop around these problems.

The second volume of this selection of Trotsky's works is devoted to his articles and essays on culture. The main work included, *Literature and Revolution*, should be of interest in Yugoslavia, even though the Stalinist policy of demanding conformity to bureaucratic governmental views has been greatly relaxed there. The book was written largely as a polemic against romantic and populist notions of "working-class" literature that provided the initial arguments for "socialist realism." Although the polemics with figures of the time are somewhat outdated, this work gives the clearest and most profound Marxist analysis of the relationship of art to politics and social change. Perhaps most importantly, *Literature and Revolution* restates some of the fundamental human objectives of the socialist movement that have been obscured by decades of Stalinist authoritarianism and vulgar populism:

"It is difficult to predict the extent of self-government which the man of the future may reach or the heights to which he may carry his technique," said Trotsky. "Social construction and psycho-physical self-education will become two aspects of one and the same process. All the arts—literature, drama, painting, music and architecture will lend this process beautiful form. More correctly, the shell in which the cultural construction and self-education of Communist man will be enclosed, will develop all the vital elements of contemporary art to the highest point. Man will become immeasurably stronger, wiser and subtler; his body will become more harmonized, his movements more rhythmic, his voice more musical. The forms of life will become dynamically dramatic. The average human type will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Goethe, or a Marx. And above this ridge new peaks will rise."

In addition to *Literature and Revolution*, which is avail-

able in a number of editions in most countries outside the Stalinized workers states, the second volume of the Yugoslav selection contains a number of literary and cultural essays and sketches written in the period between the 1905 revolution and the first world war, many of which have not appeared in print since Stalin stopped the publication and sale of the Russian edition of Trotsky's complete works in the 1920s. These include an analysis of the history and social role of the Munich satirical magazine *Simplicissimus*, as well as a series of articles on the art exhibitions in prewar Vienna. Some of the sketches are literary in form (dialogues or short stories) as well as content, e.g., "On Death and Eros" and "A Discussion of Art on New Year's Eve."

The greater part of these articles are devoted to criticizing the mystical and escapist trends that developed among Russian intellectuals in the period of ebb between the two revolutions. For example, there are long essays dealing with the novelist Merezhkovsky, who preached the reconciliation of Christianity and classical paganism. The article "The Eclectic Sancho Panza and his Mystical Squire Don Quixote" is a commentary on the entire generation of "god seekers." If it is not as profound as similar essays by Lenin and Plekhanov, it is memorable for some of its images.

Trotsky's long essay on Frank Wedekind, included in Volume II, is related to his critique of the escapist mood of the Russian intelligentsia. The leader of the 1905 revolution was interested in the German dramatist of sexuality mainly because of Wedekind's influence on the erotic-mystic cults that arose in the wake of 1905.

"He [Wedekind] offered the Russian intelligentsia exactly what it wanted—a combination of social nihilism (that repulsive skepticism about the destiny of collective humanity) with erotic estheticism. The first will help the intelligentsia liquidate its revolutionary past; the second will console it for the insult it was dealt by the history of the year 1905."

But at the same time, Trotsky's treatment of eroticism in literature was far from the kind of "proletarian moralism" made familiar by decades of Stalinist dogmatism. Trotsky brought out the contradictions and deeper implications of the erotic theme: "The cult of the body, the struggle for physical perfection, has led the artist to call for socialist types of education! That fact speaks strongly for Wedekind's artistic enlightenment as well as the power of the socialist vision of life."

Along with this, Trotsky showed how Wedekind's emotional rebellion was muffled and distorted by the bourgeois literary world:

"Not long ago Wedekind's play *Musik* appeared. Objectively, it was a heart-rending cry of protest against the contradiction between love and its biological consequences, a contradiction that cannot be avoided by women, a contradiction that gives rise to the modern marriage with its official monogamy, its legitimized superstition, its religious aura, and its contraceptive measures. All in all, Wedekind's play was a protest against the laws that prevent women from freeing themselves from the consequences of love while at the same time offering them no means for taking care of children. Paragraph 812 brings the leading character, a teacher in a conservatory, to prison, poverty, and madness.

"The promotion of this play, as of most of Wedekind's

works, was done by Albert Langen in Munich, the publisher of *Simplicissimus*. This advertising was subsequently displayed in the windows of bookstores throughout the German-speaking world. A donkey knows his master's call, and a publisher knows his public's taste. So, this is how Langen recommended Wedekind's work in his ad in *Simplicissimus*:

"Wedekind's new play *Musik* is a work with a strong message. It is fundamentally an argument against the pernicious effects of constantly expanding a system of musical education that absorbs the intellectual labors of many more people than can live from their art alone or by teaching."

Trotsky's article on Wedekind raises some questions about the relationship of sexuality, culture, and politics that are probably more acute today than at any time in the last three decades. But the first of the series in Volume II, "A Fatherland in Time," which was written in 1908, has a broader appeal to the modern reader. It sounds almost like an overture to the age of permanent revolution ushered in by the October insurrection:

"I want to have a fatherland in time—in this twentieth

century born out of storms and tempests. It carries great possibilities within itself. Its territory is the whole earth, while its forefathers were cramped into the little oases of the prehistoric desert!

"The great revolution of the eighteenth century was the work of about 25,000,000 French men and women. La Fayette was called a citizen of two hemispheres, Anaharsis Klotz considered himself a representative of all humanity. What naive, almost infantile self-delusion! What did these pitiful barbarians of the eighteenth century, without railroads or telegraph, know about humanity? La Fayette was a Frenchman who fought for the independence of the young United States, the divine Anaharsis was a German baron who sat in the French Convention. Judged by the limited scale of their contemporaries, they seemed to be 'cosmopolitans' who united the whole world in themselves. But what did they know of the limitless expanses of Russia, of the entire Asian continent, of Africa? These were geographic terms covering a historical vacuum. Neither the eighteenth nor the nineteenth centuries knew a real world history. We seem only now to be on the threshold of this."

—Gerry Foley

## The 'Volunteers' Selected by Stalin

*Volunteers for the Gallows* by Béla Szász. W. W. Norton & Co., New York, N. Y. 244 pp. \$6.95. 1971.

Béla Szász, a longtime Communist, was an official in the Hungarian government in 1949 when he was caught up in the wave of purge trials that swept Eastern Europe. Szász was arrested, tortured, and sentenced to ten years in prison. Released in 1954, he left Hungary after Soviet tanks crushed the 1956 revolution.

Szász differed from his fellow defendants chiefly in the fact that he steadfastly refused to confess to the absurd charges leveled against him. This is presumably what saved his life: Most of those who cooperated with their interrogators and threw themselves upon the "mercy" of the Stalinist apparatus ended up as "volunteers for the gallows."

As was often the case, Szász seems to have been picked for the role of defendant because he had been abroad. (During the second world war, he edited an antifascist weekly in Argentina.) Szász and his codefendants found the most innocent conversations with U. S., British—or Yu-

goslav—citizens during the war years transformed in the indictment into "espionage contacts."

Szász's account of his experience provides little political insight into the trials—he attempts, for example, to trace them to Lenin's theory of the party—but it is extremely intriguing in its observations of the psychology of those involved, of both prisoners and their captors.

In the final analysis, he writes, it was often not physical torture that produced confessions, but an appeal to the prisoner's loyalty to the Communist party. The prisoner, weakened by all that had been endured, would be confronted by an understanding official who explained that of course the charges were false but the international situation required the trials. Therefore, the prisoner was being asked to make this personal sacrifice to the cause of "socialism" by confessing as required. This was the way in which László Rajk, former minister of the interior and the chief defendant in the Hungarian trials, was persuaded to "confess."

When possible, the political police

would also make use of prisoners' past errors and "crimes" to extract confessions to the totally unrelated charges in the trials. A defendant who had made a mistake that "objectively" hurt the cause of socialism would gradually be led to a confession of the "objectively" equivalent charge of espionage.

The political police utilized guilt feelings even when such a tenuous connection was lacking. Szász mentions one prisoner who was driven to confess by remorse for his past marital infidelities.

Particularly interesting are Szász's observations of the political police themselves. Younger and inexperienced members at first genuinely believed that their prisoners were a dangerous gang of imperialists and Titoist spies.

Szász describes how these neophytes gradually became more and more cynical about their tasks as they learned the truth and received promotions. Cynicism and advancement, of course, conditioned each other.

—David Burton

## Tito Cracks Down in Croatia

[The following letter on the repression and trials that followed the removal of several leading Croatian officials last December was written by a group of Croatian intellectuals who recently left Yugoslavia. It was published in the August 9 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The deep-seated reasons for this "silent" coup d'état were basically three in kind. First of all, there was an ideological conflict — with important political implications — that had been building up since January 1970. After the removal of Mr. Milos Zanko, the Stalinist vice president of the Federal Assembly and member of the Central Committee of the Croatian party, the party launched an extensive movement of liberalization designed to involve the masses in political life. Under the name "mas-pok" (socialist mass movement), Croatia's political leaders — especially Mr. Miko Tripalo and Mrs. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar — opened up an important chapter in the history of contemporary socialism. Having learned from the example of Czechoslovakia and from their own experience that the recovery of national identity cannot be separated from the class struggle, the Croatian leaders put forward a policy of dialogue and popular alliances within the framework of a radical decentralization.

This attempt to assert Croatian cultural, political, economic, and social originality was opposed by all the conservative layers, with whom Tito sided. True to the training he had received in Moscow from 1930 to 1936, Tito for the first time openly opposed the Croatian leaders by asserting that the party had no need for the support of the broad masses of the population and that there was "no salvation" outside the party.

The second aspect of the conflict lies in the contradiction between the self-management tendency that the Croatian leaders personified and the

tendency supporting the conservative, procentralization status quo, which opposes economic decentralization. This tendency is especially defended in Serbia, in the federal bureaucracy, in the banks and the Serbian factories producing for foreign trade, in the army, and in the political police.

The third factor in the conflict was external Soviet and American pressure, brought on mainly by the panicky attitude of the Belgrade press and Yugoslav diplomatic representatives, most of whom were from the old conservative school. The feeling of "concern" that arose in Moscow corresponded, once again, with the feeling in Washington.

Tito, who had to decide among these opposing groups, leaned toward the "hardliners" and the "ultras," knowing that without them — and this means without the army and the political police (in which the Serbs constitute the great majority) — he could not retain power. And that was the case in spite of the fact that Croatia and its leaders had always been loyal to him. Only two months earlier, in September 1971, after a long trip throughout Croatia, he had stated that Croatian "nationalism" was a complete fiction and that the Croatian people were totally committed to socialism.

This is why Tito's charges of "factionalism" and "nationalism," aimed at the Croatian leaders, and the brutal interference in Croatian affairs by the central government (following the principle of "limited sovereignty") were deeply resented by the Croatian population, which, during the "Croatian spring," massively sided with their leaders for the first time since the war.

The student demonstrations proved this in a ruthless way. The arrest of the student leaders and of hundreds of demonstrating workers destroyed the proletarianized elite of the socialist movement in Zagreb, who were supporting the team that had been removed from office.

The second wave of arrests and searches began at dawn last January 11. Eleven representatives of the Matica

Hrvatska association — the cultural vanguard of the movement — and numerous other intellectuals were arrested; 460 apartments and student rooms were searched; hundreds of passports were taken away. Among those arrested were, in particular, the university professors; the economists Messrs. Djodan (former member of the resistance and army captain), Veselica (Croatian deputy in the federal assembly), Sosic, Busic (journalist and writer, former student in Paris); the historians Messrs. Tudjman (former member of the resistance and army general) and Ivcevic (publisher of the *Croatian Weekly*); the writers Pavletic, Foretic, and Gotovac (respectively the editors of the magazines *Kritika*, *Dubrovnik*, and the *Croatian Weekly*); the journalists Messrs. Komarica (former member of the resistance and army colonel) and Glibota (staff secretary of the *Croatian Economic Messenger*).

Last spring, the first political trials got under way in Croatia. At first the sentences were "moderate" and essentially affected workers, but these soon gave way to prison-farm sentences of five and six years.

The third big wave of arrests was unleashed last June 30 and is still continuing. To be sure, most were released after a few days. But, in an important change of policy, the police are now no longer respecting the twenty-four-hour limit on detention without trial; now there is no limit to it, and "in-depth" interrogations are becoming common practice. It is for this reason, and because of constant pressures on the tribunals, that the president of the Supreme Court of Croatia, Mr. Drazen Sesardic, resigned at the beginning of July.

With this latest roundup, the police wanted above all to make an impression on the students in order to make sure that they would remain quiet during the collective trials of the student leaders and intellectuals, which were then about to open. Among those arrested most recently in Croatia are again numerous intellectuals, artists, lawyers, and a few priests. It is significant that the arrests are generally being made without real evidence — this the police begin to gather only after the arrests have been carried out. This policy of carrying out "preventive" arrests has helped the police add considerably to their files, which had become

a bit depleted since the time of Rankovic: Some of the files were destroyed that had been built up under Rankovic, the grand master of the political police until 1966, who had files kept on 1,300,000 Croats out of a population of 4,200,000 at the time.

The total number of arrests is considerably higher than the figure of 1,300 given out by the authorities. More than 280 political sentences have already been handed down in Zagreb, Tuzla, Osijek, Sarajevo, Mostar, Split, Sibenik, Zadar, Rijeka, and Karlovac. They have varied from two months to six years. More than 500 investigations are now going on and around 200 persons are still in jail . . . The charges are based on the famous "rubber articles," Nos. 100 ("counterrevolutionary attack against the state and social system") and 118 ("enemy propaganda") of the Yugoslav criminal code. They are presently being interpreted in a much harsher fashion than even a short time ago. In this way it is possible to punish the past activities of student and cultural associations, as well as numerous statements and written documents considered permissible and legal at the time of the "spring," but not permitted by the new ruling team.

The accused include Communists as well as persons with no party affiliation, even when they are supporters of the Tripalo-Dabcevic-Kucar line of socialism "with a human face." Demotions, which are almost regularly accompanied by layoffs, are affecting all fields: The few progressive cadres of the Croatian party and state have been dismissed; the youth and student organizations have been completely recast; serious purges are hitting the university, as well as the trade unions, the communes, and the veterans' associations; numerous legislators, judges, attorneys, and lawyers have been dismissed, arrested, and put on trial. In the factories, there are moves to purge and control the opinions of persons who belonged to Matica Hrvatska (this association had more than 60,000 members).

A climate of frustration, bitterness, and fear reigns in Croatia. Fifteen magazines and newspapers (including the famous *Croatian Weekly*, which had a press run of more than 100,000) have completely disappeared or have been banned; their editors have been fired and are being prosecuted. The

repression is openly tending to break up the nation's infrastructure and to deprive Croatia of its national, its state, and especially its intellectual identity. It aims to destroy the influence of the Croatian intelligentsia that was struggling to establish a more humane socialist society. This veritable intellectual and spiritual genocide can only serve to aggravate the economic crisis in Croatia, which, with 22 percent of the population, 29 percent of the Yugoslav national product, and 40 percent of the foreign currency, has to send 600,000 of its workers off looking for jobs in Western Europe. There is reason to fear that acts of despair may be committed.

The similarity between this repression and the one that is hitting Czechoslovakia is all the more striking in

view of the fact that for the first time a Yugoslav prime minister is taking part in the Comecon conference this year. This event is occurring two months after President Tito's visit to Moscow. According to his own statements at the time of that visit, on the insistence of the Soviet leaders, Tito agreed to three concessions: repairs and refueling for the Soviet fleet in Croatian ports, and the right of Soviet war planes to fly over Yugoslav territory "in case of war in the Middle East."

Far from being a purely internal phenomenon for the Federation of Yugoslavia, the end of the "Croatian spring" could very well signify the tragic prelude to a general calling into question of the balance of power in the Mediterranean basin. □

## World-Famous Class-War Prisoner

# Warren K. Billings Dies at Seventy-Nine

Warren K. Billings, veteran working-class militant, socialist, and fighter for civil liberties, died September 4 in a Redwood City, California, hospital. He was seventy-nine years old.

Billings was codefendant with Tom Mooney in one of the most famous frame-up trials of the twentieth century. Although charged with bombing the July 22, 1916, Preparedness Day Parade in San Francisco, Billings and Mooney were actually on trial for their union organizing activities, and their socialist opposition to the first world war. Although it was proved that the two were not at the parade, Mooney was sentenced to death and Billings to life imprisonment.

Worldwide protests blocked the execution of Tom Mooney. Massive demonstrations by Russian workers at the U. S. embassy in Petrograd in 1917 played an important part in forcing the governor of California to commute Mooney's sentence to life imprisonment.

"Free Mooney and Billings!" became an international slogan to be seen on the banners of working-class marches everywhere.

Although John McDonald, the government informer in the case, repudiated his testimony in 1921, Mooney and Billings were not released until 1939, when Mooney received a full

pardon and Billings's sentence was commuted to time served. A previous conviction for strike activities was the pretext for refusing Billings a full pardon.

Tom Mooney, physically broken by twenty-three years in prison, died in 1942. Billings received a full pardon in December 1961, concluding what even the *New York Times* now admits (September 6) was "one of the nation's most flagrant miscarriages of justice."

After his release, Billings opened a watch repair shop in San Francisco which he ran until his retirement in 1968. "I learned the business the hard way," Billings would tell interviewers; "made my own tools and kept them hidden because it was against the rules to have them." Billings became an executive board member of Watchmaker's Local 101.

The quiet-spoken Billings never gave up his socialist convictions. He could be counted on as an endorser of election campaigns of the Socialist Workers party. In the 1940s he aided the Civil Rights Defense Committee, which defended eighteen Trotskyists railroaded to prison for their opposition to World War II. To the very end, he remained a staunch supporter of victims of capitalist injustice. □