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While Brezhnev and Mao Bargain With Nixon...



Granma

NORTH VIETNAMESE HOSPITAL at Thanhhoa damaged by U.S. bombs. As massive raids continued, Soviet President Podgorny

undertook "peace" mission to Hanoi and Chou En-lai publicly advocated Korea-type settlement in Indochina.

Ahumada Given Suspended Sentence

An important victory for human rights in Argentina has been won in the campaign to free Casiana Ahumada, editor of the Buenos Aires monthly *Cristianismo y Revolución*.

Ahumada was arrested last December and charged with two counts of "inciting to violence." Her lawyers maintained that she was accused solely on the basis of articles published in the magazine. The prosecutor asked a four-year sentence to a prison ship on each of the counts.

According to a June 12 Associated Press dispatch, Ahumada was given a fifteen-month suspended sentence after a trial that began June 7 in Buenos Aires.

The victory was due in no small part to an international campaign in behalf of Ahumada. In the United States, this campaign was spearheaded by the U. S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA).

Commenting on the victory, a USLA representative stated, "The victory in the campaign for Casiana Ahumada shows the impact of work in defense of dissidents in Latin America. This victory has inspired USLA to redouble our efforts to win freedom for all political prisoners in Argentina." □

Guerrillas to Go on Trial

Preparations to try three persons for the April 10 killing of General Juan Carlos Sánchez in Rosario, Argentina, are under way. The three are Gabriela Yofre, 19, Graciela Lilliana Lavalle de Reyna, and Jorge Emilio Reyna. Federal Judge César Black in Buenos Aires has ordered them held under "preventive detention" for alleged crimes of "illicit association" aggravated by the death of Sánchez, according to a United Press International dispatch in the June 12 issue of the New York paper *El Diario-La Prensa*. "Black states that the three defendants have freely admitted taking part in the preparatory phase of the operation . . .," UPI reported. □

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Nixon Bombs as Brezhnev, Mao Wheel and Deal

By Allen Myers

After a four-day visit to Hanoi, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny predicted to reporters in Calcutta June 18 that negotiations to end the Indochina war would soon be under way.

Asked if the talks in Paris would be resumed, Podgorny replied, "yes, soon." He added, "The Soviet Union will do everything possible for a de-escalation of the Vietnam war."

"Everything went as I wanted," he added. "I am very happy with the outcome."

Podgorny's remarks capped a week of diplomatic maneuvers in which Brezhnev and Mao competed more shamelessly than ever in trying to be helpful to Richard Nixon.

The maneuvers began with a diversion June 12, when the Chinese government finally issued a verbal condemnation of Nixon's massive air war against North Vietnam. The language was the strongest used by the Maoist bureaucracy since before Nixon's visit to Peking in February.

"For over a month," the statement said, "U. S. imperialism . . . has continued to escalate its war against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. It not only has mined and blockaded the ports of Northern Viet Nam and daily sent out large numbers of airplanes and warships to make frantic raids on many cities, villages and coastal inhabitation centres, but has steadily expanded the sphere of bombing up to areas close to the Sino-Vietnamese borders, threatening the security of China. These frenzied acts of aggression on the part of U.S. imperialism are new war crimes committed against the Vietnamese people, and at the same time grave provocations against the Chinese people.

"The Chinese Government and people indignantly condemn U. S. imperialism for its new war escalation. China and Viet Nam are neighbours closely related like the lips and the teeth; the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples are comrades and brothers sharing weal and woe; and it is the unshirkable internationalist duty of the Chinese

people to support and assist the Vietnamese people in their war against U. S. aggression and for national salvation. We will resolutely support the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples in carrying their war of resistance to the end, till complete victory is won.

"U. S. imperialism should know that the heroic peoples of Viet Nam and



CHOU: Couldn't believe that U.S. imperialists might lie.

the other Indochinese countries are by no means alone in their struggle."

But for all the rhetoric about "internationalist duty," the Chinese government statement appeared primarily as a warning to Nixon not to put Mao in an untenable position by accidentally dropping bombs on the Chinese side of the border. The declaration was also an indispensable cover for a "provocation" announced two days later.

On June 14, Washington and Peking simultaneously announced that

Nixon's top adviser, Henry Kissinger, would fly to Peking for talks with the Chinese leaders.

"Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, who made the announcement, would not confirm that Vietnam was on the agenda," Robert B. Semple Jr. wrote in the June 15 *New York Times*, "but he noted that Mr. Kissinger did not intend to engage in discussion of 'routine matters.'"

"Mr. Ziegler added that he expected that many international matters of consequence would be discussed and that each side was 'free to raise any subject' it wished."

At a dinner for visiting scholars and journalists June 16, Chou Enlai elaborated a bit on the content of the Chinese government's "support" for the Vietnamese people. Chou used the occasion to praise former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower for the manner in which he negotiated the 1953 Korean armistice.

"Mr. Chou praised President Eisenhower for his 1952 election campaign pledge to go to Korea, if elected, and bring the war to an end," Harrison Salisbury wrote from Peking in the June 18 *New York Times*. "The Premier added that the President did indeed go to Korea and brought the war to a halt in 1953 'in a very straightforward way.' There seemed little doubt that in recalling the Korean precedent the Premier was offering an advance view of the ideas he will lay before Mr. Kissinger when the two reach the Vietnam item on their agenda."

On the subject of negotiations with imperialism, Chou also engaged in a bit of "self-criticism," saying that it had been a mistake to sign the 1954 Geneva accords. He didn't realize that the U.S. government was going to violate the agreement, Chou said.

"We were greatly taken in at that time. That was my first experience in international conferences. I have said this to Premier Pham Van Dong. I have told him we were both taken in.

"We committed a mistake in signing the Geneva agreements and I was the representative who put his signature to that agreement and if we could be forgiven it is only because we lacked experience."

The North Vietnamese premier, unfortunately, was not present at the dinner to give his opinion as to whether the Vietnamese had been "taken in" or sold out in 1954. At any rate, Chou is no longer a novice at international conferences and therefore presumably understands the implications of holding up the Korean armistice as a model for settling the Indochina war.

The Chinese bureaucrats should have no trouble in persuading Nixon to accept a Korea-type settlement in Vietnam, since that is what he has been seeking since he took office. In his "straightforward way," Eisenhower settled for an agreement that left 50,000 U. S. troops in South Korea supporting a puppet dictatorship nineteen years after the armistice was signed. Perhaps Chou's remarks were intended to inform Nixon that he was being too generous in offering to withdraw U. S. troops four months after a Vietnamese surrender.

The Soviet bureaucrats, meanwhile, were not allowing themselves to be outdone by the Maoists in offering helpful advice to Nixon. On June 16, Soviet "journalist" Victor Louis published a highly revealing article in the London *Evening News*. Louis is known as a Soviet diplomatic agent whose journalistic activities serve the dual function of providing cover for his travels and allowing the Soviet government to explain its views or test a new line in an "unofficial" manner.

Louis frankly stated that Podgorny's visit to Hanoi was "aimed at stopping hostilities on all fronts so that new negotiations can get under way." A cease-fire—which would leave the puppet Saigon regime in power—was of course one of the demands made by Nixon when he imposed the blockade against North Vietnam.

"Mr. Louis suggested," Hedrick Smith reported in the June 17 *New York Times*, "that if both the North and South Vietnamese would hold in their present positions, 'There could be a cooling-off period which could lead to a referendum or to new elections in South Vietnam.'

"Both his article and the private

comments of other well-placed Soviet sources indicated that the Kremlin was persuaded by Mr. Nixon during his talks here [Moscow] that he was sincere in wanting to end American involvement in Vietnam."

In the world of "peaceful coexistence," it seems, the U. S. aggression against Vietnam is not caused by the interests of U. S. imperialism but by hot tempers. Louis went on to state more openly than the Soviet bureaucrats have done before that they feel a greater affinity for the U. S. war criminal than for his victims:

"There is suspicion in Moscow that after Hanoi's failure to undermine the Russian-American meeting in Moscow by its new campaign in the South, the North Vietnamese will try to neutralize President Podgorny's visit."

Nixon, who not so very long ago was publicly accusing the Kremlin of responsibility for the Indochina war, ordered a halt to the bombing of Hanoi while Podgorny was in the North Vietnamese capital. The action was more than a courtesy to the Soviet president. It was primarily intended to emphasize to the North Vietnamese leaders the special nature of Nixon's relations with the Kremlin, as Craig R. Whitney reported in the June 15 *New York Times*:

"An American official said of the current pause: 'It cannot help underscoring to the North Vietnamese that we are stopping the bombing of Hanoi only to avoid hurting the chief of state of the Soviet Union and we will start bombing the Vietnamese again as soon as he leaves.'"

The temporary halt to the bombing of Hanoi did not require much restraint on Nixon's part, since the bombers were simply diverted to other parts of North Vietnam. On June 18, for example, U. S. planes flew a reported 320 strikes. Hanoi radio charged the same day that U. S. planes were bombing dam systems and irrigation works in the Red River delta.

On June 17, according to the U. S. command in Saigon, 340 raids were flown—the largest number since Nixon resumed systematic bombing of the North. June 17 was also the ninth consecutive day on which the giant B-52 bombers had been used against the North.

"In order to achieve whatever is being achieved," columnist Tom Wicker wrote in the June 13 *New York Times*, ". . . the most incredible and wanton

destruction is having to be delivered wholesale, not just in North Vietnam but in South Vietnam, which we are supposed to be saving. It is not for nothing that the word 'ecocide,' in reference to American operations in Vietnam, drifts insistently about the Stockholm conference on world environmental matters.

". . . in the end, Mr. Nixon's 1968 campaign plan to 'end the war and win the peace' has become an effort to bomb North Vietnam into submitting to Washington's terms; given the tenacity Hanoi and its people have shown in the past, and apparently still show, that may prove to be about the same as General LeMay's celebrated formula: 'Bomb them back into the Stone Age.'"

While escalating the air war, Nixon has also resumed the sending of guerrilla sabotage units into North Vietnam. In a dispatch from Vientiane printed in the June 15 *Washington Post*, D. E. Ronk reported that the saboteurs consist of Thai and Laotian mercenaries trained by the CIA in Laos.

"Nam Yu, the CIA's most secret base in Laos," Ronk wrote, "situated in northwestern Laos near the town of Ban Houei Sai, is reported to be the primary training center.

"Nam Yu was formerly a base for intelligence teams being sent into South China to report on telephone and road traffic, a program discontinued last year when President Nixon accepted an invitation to visit China." (Emphasis added.)

According to Ronk, American officials in Laos do not expect that Nixon's "peaceful coexistence" with Mao will restrain the former from again sending saboteurs into China if he decides it is militarily necessary:

"Qualified sources here say . . . that they believe that such espionage missions will be increased in northern Laos, and may be resumed inside China itself, to sabotage war material that—because of the mining of Haiphong—is expected to flow increasingly through China's Yunnan Province and the Laotian Province of Phong Saly on its way into North Vietnam."

Such raids may not prove necessary, of course, since the amount of military aid being provided to the Vietnamese is not even sufficient to defend North Vietnam against Nixon's genocidal air assault. Both Pe-

king and Moscow have other commitments that in their view take priority over aiding a workers state under military attack by imperialism. While Mao sends \$300,000,000 worth of

military equipment to shore up the Bhutto regime in Pakistan, Brezhnev provides weapons that could defend North Vietnam to the bourgeois Sadat regime in Egypt.

While the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies wheel and deal with Nixon, the Indochinese peoples are left to face the most destructive military assault in history. □

Would Cause More Destruction Than Atomic Bombs

Will Nixon Bomb the Dikes in North Vietnam?

Ever since U.S. imperialism began the systematic bombing of North Vietnam in 1965, there have been fears that it would eventually undertake the destruction of the dikes that protect the country from flooding if other means failed to force the Vietnamese to surrender. The massive escalation of the air war begun by Nixon in April indicates that the danger of such a murderous attempt is now greater than ever before.

The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has, in fact, charged that U.S. bombs have repeatedly struck the dike network since April—charges blandly denied by the U.S. military. Nguyen Thanh Le, spokesman for the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris peace talks, told a news conference June 8 that between April 10 and May 24 a total of 580 bombs have been dropped on both river and maritime dikes.

There is now increasing evidence that Nixon is planning to flood North Vietnam and that he might be able to accomplish this even without ordering direct attacks on the dike system.

The Plain of Tonkin would periodically be submerged were it not for the fact that the Vietnamese peasants since the Middle Ages have built up an intricate network of dikes. One system is built up along the Red River; a second system, more or less perpendicular to the first, is built up across the plain to block flooding if one section of the primary system breaks; finally, there are coastal dikes that prevent coastland flooding during typhoons. Altogether, there are 4,000 kilometers of dikes, which must be constantly kept up if the crops and lives of some 15,000,000 inhabitants of the plain are to be protected.

A series of strategically selected breaches during the rainy season, noted the French geographer Yves Lacoste in the June 7-8 issue of *Le*

Monde, could inundate virtually the entire plain. "It is very probable that this catastrophe would cause a greater number of deaths than the exploding of several atomic bombs on the Plain of Tonkin."

When U.S. bombing began in 1965, a civilian army of some 200,000 men and women was formed to patrol the dikes along the branches of the Red River, looking for ruptures. Many foreign observers, including *New York Times* correspondent Harrison Salisbury in 1966, saw firsthand the effects of U.S. air strikes against the dikes. Unimpeachable evidence (including photographs and film) of such destruction was presented to the Bertrand Russell International War Crimes Tribunal in 1967.

The Pentagon's policy has been to deny bombing the dikes and to assert that any damage to them has been "accidental." Yet many "accidents" of this kind occurred between 1965 and 1968, and they succeeded in diverting large numbers of workers to repair the damage. In the case of the dikes surrounding Namdinh, which Salisbury observed, the population was kept busy for twenty days repairing the destruction.

The danger of such "accidents" turning into catastrophes will increase during the coming months. For it is during that period that approximately 85 percent of the north's annual rainfall will come. And during this rainy season, the Red River will swell, often approaching the top of the dikes, making them an inviting target for the increasingly desperate imperialist war-maker in the White House.

The Vietnamese know what disaster such a course could bring. They have suffered floods before during the rainy season. "But the worst of all," wrote D. Gareth Porter in the June 3 *New Republic*, "was in 1944 when 25 sec-

tions of the Red River dikes were broken and some 225,000 hectares of riceland, or about one-fourth of the total under cultivation, were ruined. That natural calamity became an atrocity when the Japanese occupation authority requisitioned much of the available paddy for its own purposes, leaving an estimated two million Vietnamese to starve to death."

The Johnson administration gave serious consideration to a plan to combine bombing of the dike system with an all-out bombing of the transport system to prevent foodstuffs from reaching North Vietnam from China. The plan was rejected. Defense Secretary McNamara explained why in a memorandum on May 16, 1967: "There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and most of the world would not permit the United States to go."

This does not mean that the dikes were not bombed. They were, but only on a limited scale. The joint chiefs of staff never liked this restriction, as the Pentagon Papers revealed. They argued for a removal of restraints on bombing Hanoi and Haiphong ("with the expected increase in civilian casualties to be accepted as militarily justified and necessary") and for the systematic bombing of the dikes and dams.

Actually, the United States used its bombing of the dikes in the summers of 1965, 1966, and 1967 to perfect a tactic intended to make possible a rupture of the dikes without ever requiring a direct hit. This technique was described by Lacoste in a report to the Russell Tribunal and summarized in *Le Monde*: "Very large bombs are dropped, not directly on the dike but some distance away, on the alluvial base above which the river flows. The enormous holes thus caused have a jolting and undermin-

ing effect that can result in a full discharge of the river's force onto the plain, and not simply a spilling over of a portion of its water. This tactic, which offers the 'advantage' of not appearing to actually hit the dike while actually being infinitely more destructive, is completed by a series of raids in which pellet bombs are dumped on the workers who have rushed to the scene to repair the damage."

Unlike the use of nuclear weapons, this tactic has the advantage of causing an unbearable catastrophe without Nixon ever having to give a direct order; he could deny any responsibility and blame the result on a series of "natural accidents." The responsibility might even be laid at the doorstep of the North Vietnamese themselves: If they had only spent

more energy looking after their dikes and less on fighting, it would never have happened.

Nixon has lifted the restrictions on bombing Hanoi and Haiphong. Will he give the joint chiefs a green light on the dikes? They are known to favor doing so. And with the fear of direct intervention by the Soviet Union and China diminishing, the least that can be said is that such a go-ahead signal seems less remote than ever.

Nixon has not made any effort to hide the fact that he is holding this option open. Porter recalled that on April 30 Nixon was asked about the dikes and dams. "His answer, carefully phrased, could be interpreted both as a warning to Hanoi and a trial balloon at home. First he called the dikes and dams 'strategic targets,' indicating his acceptance of the joint

chiefs' doctrine that they are legitimate targets. He went on to say that bombing the dikes and dams could cause 'an enormous number of civilian casualties' and that this was something which 'we need to avoid' and also 'something we believe is not needed.' But he did not rule out such attacks at some future time."

Less than two weeks later, following serious setbacks to the South Vietnamese puppet army, U. S. bombers knocked out a number of dikes in the southern provinces and a section of one protecting Hanoi itself.

Was this only a warning? Perhaps. But these "warnings" are continuing. And the waters held back by the dikes will be peaking between July and October. And Nixon's options in Vietnam are running out. □

Interview With Ly Van Sau

Vietnamese Official Discusses Nixon's Escalation

[Ly Van Sau, a spokesman for the delegation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, gave the following interview May 22 to Eric Corijn, editor of *Rood*, the Flemish-language organ of the Belgian Trotskyists. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. Can you tell us about the present offensive, its goal, the reason for conducting it now, and its effect on the troops of the puppet Thieu?

Answer. The present offensive is a natural and logical outcome of the whole long struggle we have been waging for a quarter of a century to liberate all of our country. For three years now, since he entered the White House, Nixon has talked of peace but continued to wage war. Moreover, he has extended and intensified the war in the most savage way. The "Vietnamization" proposed by Nixon is nothing but intensifying and extending the war.

Here in Paris, in the meantime, the Nixon administration rejects all serious negotiation and continues to sabotage the Paris Conference on Vietnam in the most cynical way. The

goal of the struggle we are waging is to free Vietnam from the American yoke and to build an independent, peaceful, neutral, and democratic South Vietnam as a preparation for the peaceful reunification of our country. Facing a situation in which Nixon refuses to make peace, refuses to conduct serious negotiations, and refuses to accept our most equitable offers, we believe that our people have a duty to continue their struggle against the U. S. A.

We are fighting on three fronts, the military, the political, and the diplomatic; and on all these fronts we are seeking the same objective. More specifically, we can say that in two months the present offensive has radically altered the situation in South Vietnam.

The troops of the puppet Thieu are in a wild rout. More than ever, these forces find themselves in a state of passivity and are forced to shift their units from place to place, leaving holes in their defenses. They are now spread over various fronts, which makes them more vulnerable; and half of the regular divisions of the puppet army have been destroyed, put out of action or badly mauled. The top command of the puppet forces has taken severe corrective measures,

and the Americans have had to transfer, discharge, or try a number of generals and high officers. These steps have further increased the demoralization in the puppet army. With respect to us, you must realize that a radical change has taken place, making the relationship of forces at this time very favorable to the patriotic struggle, and real, practical preparations have been made to put an end to the "Vietnamization" of the war by aborting it completely.

Q. What about the prognostications about "the light at the end of the tunnel"?

A. The response of the puppet army to the offensive, as everyone knows, has made its American masters desperate. The wild rout of these troops is not the result of any lack of manpower, weapons, or artillery. On the contrary, the puppet army is very numerous and very well armed and gets extensive support from the Americans. But this army does not have the capacity to stand up against revolutionary combat forces, and its soldiers simply refuse to fight. It seems that Nixon's formula of sending in the Japanese army with American air support to replace his ground forces

has proven to be an illusion. At this time the liberation forces are continuing their offensive. All the prognostications, all the claims that the enemy has made have been shown to be false. We attack where *we* want to and in the way *we* have chosen. Our friends in Belgium can look forward to an even more powerful advance of our struggle with daily victories.

Q. What is the specific role of the American troops still in Vietnam?

A. Whenever we talk about the American forces, we must talk about land, air, and naval forces. As regards land forces, there are still 50,000 to 60,000 men in South Vietnam, not counting the marines. These troops are currently guarding the American bases and leading the puppet troops in their operations. Thousands of American "advisers" are engaged in the second type of activity.

But what must certainly be stressed is the unprecedented concentration of American seaborne forces. This is the greatest concentration since the second world war. Already more than half of the American battalions are in the area. There are more than 1,000 planes and the U. S. is using bases not only in South Vietnam but also in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. . . . The U. S. has 400 B-52 bombers; more than 200 are operating in Vietnam. It is clear that without this support, the puppet forces would long since have been defeated.

The liberated areas have always served as a firm support for the front. In these areas there is a revolutionary people's government. The Revolutionary People's Committees direct the activities of the population. The first task that must be undertaken in the liberated areas is organizing the defense of the people, since these regions are not invulnerable to enemy air raids, coastal bombardment, and paratroop operations. We have always given top priority to safeguarding the women, old people, and children. Therefore, guerrilla units have been set up for defensive purposes. The second and equally important task is to maintain production and insofar as possible increase it.

Q. How have you been able to do this?

A. You are aware of the fact that the land reform carried out by the

Provisional Revolutionary Government and the National Liberation Front has given the land to those who dwell on it. This is a very flexible land reform, adjusted to the circumstances of South Vietnam and constantly readjusted to meet specific situations, taking account of every category of landowner and their attitude toward the revolution. It is thanks to the land reform and the new methods of cultivation, thanks to the elimination of the oppression crushing the peasants, that we have been able to maintain production and even, in some cases, to raise it.

Q. What about social provisions?

A. After defense and production, our third great concern is for education and health. This is very important also because only an educated and healthy people can carry on the struggle. I need only tell you that in recent years no epidemics have broken out in the liberated areas, whereas they have developed in the zones under enemy control. We must also remember that in the liberated areas, the percentage of youth in school is much higher than in the unliberated areas. And we must certainly not forget that all this is taking place under incredibly difficult conditions, and that great sacrifices are being made, because our slogan is "Everything for the Children, Everything for Production."

Q. We can really say, then, that the liberated areas are a model of the future Vietnamese society?

A. Taking into consideration the circumstances I have just mentioned, the liberated areas do, in fact, represent a very important advance. But in view of the war situation, we have not yet been able to do all that we want to do. Let us say that the liberated areas today are a progressive sector of the society in general, particularly as regards education and democracy. All of these changes represent a great encouragement for the people of the occupied areas. In the future, however, we will do much better.

Q. How then do you see the future Vietnam?

A. The government will be a democratic one, very progressive, very advanced but not a socialist one.

Q. What precisely do you mean by that?

A. A democratic and free government—South Vietnam would be independent and neutral, belong to no camp, and conduct a policy of peace.

Q. How then do you conceive of reunifying the two parts of Vietnam?

A. The reunification of the country is a fundamental aim of all our people; it will take place through consultations, discussions, and a mutual agreement between the two societies.

Q. What kind of solidarity can we organize here in Europe? What kind of actions can we carry out?

A. International solidarity is a very important factor and we are very grateful for everything that is done in this area. Recently, following the intensification of the war and the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors, thousands of rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies have been held here in Europe. This has also happened in Belgium. We are very appreciative of all that our friends have done, for their help and support, no matter what political current they belong to. We believe that the most important kind of support is moral and political backing. Everyone in the world must understand the situation in Vietnam well and give the proper answer to the American slander.

At this moment, while they are waging war, the Americans are busy dreaming up all sorts of fairy tales about "massacres" and "bloodbaths" which the North is supposed to have started against the South. They want to make it appear that they, the Americans, are the victims of an aggression and that we, the Vietnamese, ourselves are the aggressors. I must admit this slander has unfortunately had some effect, owing largely to the monopoly the Americans hold over the press and the radio.

Our friends throughout the world could help us a great deal politically by telling the truth about Vietnam to their people and unmasking these falsehoods. Regarding our struggle and our victory, you know that the Americans say that *they* want only peace and that *we* want only war. They "want a cease-fire," "are favorable to any kind of a meeting," "Nixon has already moderated his demands," "the Vietnamese are uncompromising

and rigid," etc. All of this is grossly false and it is clear that Nixon is a liar and a war criminal. We believe that it would be a very important help, moral and political support, to us if our peace plan were made known.

Secondly any form of material support, medicines, money, are very welcome and will be appreciated by the patriots and the fighters in our country. We can only hope that our friends everywhere in Europe will make an effort, because the Vietnamese people are not fighting only for themselves but for the independence and progress of all peoples.

You can be sure that we will do our job well, that we will fight our enemy until we win, and we hope that our friends will do their duty to help bring about the victory of the Vietnamese people.

Q. How important on the international scale is the antiwar movement in the United States?

A. As you know, more than anything else Nixon wants to soothe public opinion in the United States. He wants to present himself as a peace president. He claims he wants peace, not only in Vietnam but everywhere. In reality, however, he has been involved in the preparations for war, and not peace, that have been going on for generations. Therefore, we have always viewed the reactions of public opinion in the U.S.A. as a vitally important factor, and we see that despite all Nixon's maneuvers, despite all the weaknesses the antiwar movement in America has suffered, this movement has maintained itself and is deepening as well as broadening. Finally, it should be stressed that demonstrations against the war are taking place not only in the U.S.A. and Europe but also in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This is a great encouragement to us.

Q. What do you think about international coordination of the solidarity movement, such as the recent April 22 actions, and what is the most important aspect of this solidarity?

A. Without stating whether or not there has been a step forward in the area of coordination, I must say that the reaction came very quickly and at an opportune time. In the U.S.A., Nixon announced the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors on the

evening of the 8th and on the 11th there was already a demonstration. At the end of April and the beginning of May very important demonstrations took place in Europe. We were very happy about that and we hope that in the future our friends will continue their efforts because the whole situation in Vietnam is marked now by the escalation of the war. As you know Nixon is trying to destroy everything that he can. He wants to leave an utterly ruined Vietnam that will be completely dependent on American "aid." After ruining our country and killing us off, he wants to sell Vietnam to the highest bidder; that will never happen, but we must realize that Nixon no longer wants to accept any limit on his genocide and his destruction of all forms of plant and animal life.

The bombing of the North at the present time is not aimed at military targets but at heavily populated districts. In the South also, the Americans have destroyed the cities they have been forced to abandon. They want to carry out a campaign of terror, of the most barbaric repression in order to force the people to lessen their struggle. They will not succeed, but we must stress this aspect of what they are doing. The propaganda here goes so far as to claim that the population of Hue and Quang Tri is fleeing from the liberation troops. That is false. The population is fleeing the enemy bombings being carried out by B-52 bombers and the planes of the Seventh Fleet. Our children are staying with us. Why should we kill our own countrymen? In your solidarity work, you should take account of this aspect, discuss it with people, explain it to them, make them see that these are lies spread by enemy propaganda.

Q. What is the connection between the struggle in Vietnam and Nixon's diplomatic visits to Peking and now to Moscow?

A. The war in Vietnam, it must be said, has weakened American imperialism. Today America is no longer a superpower capable of imposing its will on the peoples of the earth. Prior to World War II, they used gunboat diplomacy. Today Nixon is using the diplomacy of B-52 bombers. In Vietnam, the Americans have never been able to impose their will on our people. We are following a line of national struggle in a very indepen-

dent way. We are getting support in all countries and we are fighting in a way that we ourselves have chosen.

In view of the weakening of American imperialism and its continued string of military defeats, the U.S. is resorting to all sorts of military, political, and diplomatic maneuvers in order to halt these setbacks. The Americans are deluding themselves, however, that they can find a solution to the Vietnamese problem where there is none. We do not usually comment on Nixon's travels. He can go anywhere he likes, including the moon. But we have always said, and our friends agree with us, that a war is going on between the Vietnamese people on the one side, who are fighting for their independence and freedom, and the American aggressors on the other. This war must be settled between the Americans and Vietnamese. The best place for this would be here in Paris, at the peace conference.

Q. This struggle, which began long ago, has had an impact on Laos, Cambodia, and even Thailand. We think that the struggle in these countries is the same one. How fully is the fighting in these three countries coordinated?

A. The U.S. itself has helped to tighten the bonds between the Indochinese peoples, between the peoples of Southeast Asia. The American aggression is always aimed against the peoples. While Nixon talks about ending the war, he is mounting an attack on North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. It is quite natural for peoples who are fighting against the same foe and who have the same ideals of peace and justice to unite with each other. At this moment military solidarity is being expressed and the struggle coordinated in the framework of a united front of the Indochinese people against the common enemy. But this places no limitations on independence and sovereignty. Each people is conducting the struggle in their own country in the way they themselves have chosen. All of this was in the sense of the Joint Communique of the Indochinese Peoples issued in April 1970.

Q. The last question is what sort of solidarity actions do the Vietnamese people want in the future. As you know, we are trying to form united

fronts to build major demonstrations in the fall. Are there any specific aspects that should be stressed?

A. The fall demonstrations are extremely important, but we cannot wait until the fall. Solidarity must not slacken during the vacation period. Experience has taught us that the Americans tend to stage their new aggressions and their new escalations in this time. You must not forget that

the Vietnamese people have not had any vacation for twenty-five years. Let your slogan be "The Vietnamese take no vacations; their supporters cannot take any either."

The people must prepare itself constantly for new attacks. It is on Sundays and holidays when the U. S. troops attack. Continuous solidarity is needed, direct, unflinching, and growing solidarity until our common victory. □

'Protective Aggression' Against North Vietnam

'Lavelle Affair': Bombing Never Stopped

"To men protective reaction was just a euphemism for the F-4's to stage raids over Laos and North Vietnam and bomb the hell out of them," said Edward L. Hancock, a former air force captain stationed during 1970 at Udon Air Force Base in Thailand.

Hancock was only one of "more than a dozen former photo-intelligence specialists and analysts for the Air Force" interviewed for the *New York Times* by Seymour Hersh, the reporter whose stories first brought the My Lai massacre to the attention of the U. S. public.

Hersh's interviews were prompted by an air force scandal that at first looked like the typical military foot-in-mouth syndrome. It all started when U. S. Senator Harold Hughes received a letter, dated February 25, from an air force intelligence sergeant stationed at Udon. The sergeant charged in the letter that intelligence personnel "have been reporting that our planes have received hostile reactions [from North Vietnam] whether they have or not. We have also been falsifying targets struck and bomb damage assessments."

Hughes forwarded the letter to Senator Stuart Symington, who in turn passed it on to Air Force Chief of Staff General John D. Ryan. Ryan realized he had to do something. Ever since regular U. S. bombing of North Vietnam was "suspended" in November 1968, the government had claimed that raids on the North were only carried out in cases where the North Vietnamese had the effrontery to fire on—or appeared to be about to fire on—U. S. planes violating their airspace. As patently preposterous as the

"protective reaction" policy was, the anonymous sergeant's letter threatened to expose that the real state of things was much worse.

Ryan initiated a cursory investigation of the charges. It was discovered that General John D. Lavelle, commander of the Seventh Air Force, had personally ordered at least twenty-eight unauthorized raids on North Vietnam during the period from November 1971 to March 1972. Officially described as protective reaction strikes, the raids were in fact preplanned and not related to hostile North Vietnamese activity. At least three classified after-action reports were falsified by the general to cover up his actions. "You might call it 'protective aggression,'" the *New York Times* wrote.

The air force recalled Lavelle to Washington and, it was later revealed, offered him a choice: demotion to two-star general and transfer of assignment, or demotion to three-star general and retirement from the air force. Lavelle chose the latter course, and the air force, lying as usual, announced that Lavelle had left the service for "personal and health reasons."

But no four-star general in the history of the United States had ever been demoted upon retirement. Suspicion was aroused. Congressman Otis Pike, generally a firm supporter of U. S. aggression in Indochina, pressured the House Armed Services Investigative Subcommittee to hold hearings on Lavelle's retirement. Those hearings took place on June 12.

Lavelle, who testified at the hearings, was candid and unrepentant: "In

certain instances I made interpretations that were probably beyond the literal intentions of the rules." Also: "If I had to do it over again, I would do it again, but look into the reporting system first."

But the general was perhaps a little too candid—he claimed his superiors knew what was going on all along: "I think General Abrams knew what I was doing. But I'm positive that General Abrams had no idea what the reporting requirements were." Translation: Abrams knew what was going on, but had no idea Lavelle was filing reports that were obvious nonsense and thus might allow the truth to slip out.

The House Armed Services Committee held just one day of hearings on the affair, and then declared the case closed. Hersh pursued the matter.

"Without exception," he wrote in the June 18 *New York Times*, the interviewed airmen "agreed that, as one put it, protective reaction 'was a constant joke.'"

"The former intelligence specialists, who were violating Federal codes by talking openly about their work, alleged that many so-called 'protective reaction' raids had in fact been planned in advance by Air Force headquarters in Hawaii or Saigon. In addition, they said that at least three times as many such raids were actually carried out as reported by the Pentagon throughout 1970 and 1971."

Michael Lewis, who spent four years in the air force—one year at the Saigon headquarters of the Seventh Air Force—told Hersh: "I know for a fact that before I left in 1970 we were preplanning targets inside North Vietnam. That means we got an order from the generals at the Seventh Air Force to plan targets in North Vietnam. Later we would read about it in the press as 'protective reaction' strikes. It was the same thing they say General Lavelle did."

James A. Walkley, a former member of a photo-intelligence team assigned to Pacific Air Force headquarters in Hawaii and now an activist in the antiwar movement, told Hersh how the "protective reaction" strikes were planned:

"We'd get reconnaissance reports covering an area of North Vietnam, and if there was a large build-up of supplies, they were referred both to the target-development division and

to the contingency-targeting division.

"Both divisions made up target folders for strikes in the area for sometime in the future. Then in the next few days, it was briefed to the Pacific Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and then to CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific] Air Force and then to Admiral McCain [commander of the U.S. Pacific command and the officer in the chain of command between Saigon and Washington].

"Within two or three days the target folders, which were already made up, would be pulled and the message relayed to the Seventh Air Force and they would carry out the strike, and then the strike would be announced as protective reaction."

Walkley and two other airmen estimated that twenty to twenty-five pre-planned bombing raids later described as protective reaction strikes were flown against North Vietnam *each month* throughout 1970 and 1971.

Responsibility for such activities can in no way be exclusively laid to Lavelle. "To disguise regular bombing as 'protective reaction,'" wrote Craig Whitney in the June 14 *New York Times*, "the reports would have to be falsified not only by an officer as high as General Lavelle, but by their originators—in the case of the Air Force the wing commanders, who are colonels commanding three or more squadrons of twenty planes each."

Leading bourgeois "opinion makers" in the United States have expressed concern about the "Lavelle affair" from a rather parochial angle. "The case of Gen. John D. Lavelle . . . raises the most serious questions about the effectiveness of civilian control over the American military," the *New York Times* editorialized June 15. *Times* correspondent James Reston and the influential *Washington Post* echoed similar fears.

Logic would indicate, however, that we have here more than a "failure to communicate." The "violation" of the "protective reaction" policy was so sustained and so widespread that it must have been common knowledge throughout the air force. Everyone, from individual pilots up through at least the top command of the Pacific air force must have known what was happening. North Vietnamese leaders throughout 1970 and 1971 called attention to the fact that systematic

bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had not been halted. Under these circumstances, is it conceivable that Nixon, the commander in chief of the U.S. armed forces, was the only one kept in the dark?

In his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee General Ryan said that although the air force was convinced that others besides Lavelle had violated orders, no disciplinary action against anyone was contemplated. The Defense Department, a civilian agency, said on June 15 that "there are no active investigations under way" within the military regarding "unauthorized" bombing of North Vietnam.

Lavelle himself, while demoted to

three-star general, will cry all the way to the bank. The demotion was a mere formality—he will receive four-star retirement pay, \$27,000 per year.

Military officers acting in violation of civilian control is considered a serious business in the United States. The country's number one war hero, General Douglas MacArthur, was fired during the Korean war for just sounding like he might do such a thing. The slap on the wrist Lavelle got suggests that there was no military violation of civilian-ordered policy. Rather, as the Vietnamese and the antiwar movement have known all along, the unprovoked, aggressive U.S. bombing of North Vietnam was never really suspended at all. □

Secret Report Describes Second 'Mylai'

In November 1969 an army investigating team headed by Lieutenant General William R. Peers was appointed to probe the circumstances of the My Lai massacre and its aftermath. On March 17, 1970 the Peers report was issued, and at a news conference held the same day, Peers said that he had "no knowledge" of any incidents similar to the massacre at My Lai.

The Peers report is still classified. But the *New York Times* received a copy of it, and printed excerpts on June 4. The opening sentence of the report reads:

"During the period 16-19 March, 1968, U.S. Army troops of T. F. [task force] Barker, 11th Brigade, Americal Division, massacred a large number of noncombatants in *two* hamlets of Sonmy Village, Quangngai Province, Republic of Vietnam." (Emphasis added.)

Seymour Hersh reported in the June 5 *New York Times* that, according to the Peers report, about ninety civilians were murdered by U.S. troops in the hamlet of My Khe 4, less than two miles from My Lai 4, on the same morning as the My Lai massacre.

Hersh quoted a section of the report dealing with the My Khe killings: "In any case, an intense volume of fire from M-16 rifles and the M-60 machine gun attached to the First Squad was directed into and around the hamlet for four or five

minutes.

"Inhabitants of the hamlet, mostly women and children, were cut down as they ran for shelter or attempted to flee over the ridge of higher ground toward the beach."

After the shootings, according to the report, the full platoon began a search and destroy operation in the hamlet, "burning the houses and destroying the bunkers or shelters which each family had constructed in or near their homes."

The Peers report cites twenty-seven acts of misconduct or omission in the initial field investigation of the incident on the part of Major General Samuel W. Koster and sixteen similar acts by Brigadier General George H. Young Jr. Criminal charges against Koster and Young were later dropped—in Young's case because of "insufficient evidence," in Koster's because no "intentional abrogation of responsibility" could be proven. Young was censured, and Koster was demoted—to brigadier general.

Only one member of Bravo Company, the group that committed the My Khe killings, was ever charged—Captain Thomas K. Willingham, the platoon leader. But in June 1970 charges against him were dropped because "based on available evidence, no further action should be taken in the prosecution of these charges."

Nobody from Bravo Company has ever been brought to trial in connection with the My Khe slaughter. □

Okinawa Remains a U.S. Military Bastion

Okinawa, as part of the Ryukyu Islands, formally reverted to Japanese rule May 15 after being controlled by the United States since it was captured in the final days of World War II. In the intervening twenty-seven years, the United States built it up into the strongest bastion of U.S. military power in the western Pacific. Japan's premier, Eisaku Sato, stated with great emotion at a ceremony in Tokyo marking the occasion that it was rare in history for a country to return conquered territory by friendly agreement. He expressed "deep appreciation" to the United States government for its demonstration of friendship for Japan.

But just how "Japanese" will the island be now that the terms of the "friendly agreement"—the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty—have gone into effect? Not very, according to a report by Robert Guillain in the May 31 *Le Monde*.

Having come to depend upon an island whose strategic location has proven so useful to imperialist operations in the Far East (in Korea, for example, and more recently in Indochina), the United States had no intention of interpreting its decision to "return" the island to mean that Japan would now actually enjoy sovereignty over it. The U.S. High Commissioner on Okinawa, Lieutenant General James Lampert, was careful to point out that the island "retains a very great strategic importance" for the United States.

The United States "is keeping formidable offensive capabilities on Okinawa," wrote Guillain. "Japan is not replacing it, but only assuming a subordinate and very modest role alongside it."

Of the 120 bases and military installations on the small island, the U.S. is keeping eighty-seven, including the largest and most important, among them Kadena air base and the Seventh Fleet naval bases at Whitebeach and Naha. The Japanese are to receive the remaining thirty-three installations of secondary importance, such as missile and radar installations.

The Japanese government tried un-

successfully to persuade the United States to withdraw a certain number of special units, SR-71 spy planes, and Voice of America facilities. As concessions, however, the U.S. agreed to remove poison gases and chemical weapons, a spy school and guerrilla training center for American allies in Asia, the giant B-52 bombers, and nuclear weapons.

Just how seriously the United States takes its concessions, however, was revealed when three B-52s landed on Okinawa on May 20 on their way back to Guam after a bombing mission in Vietnam. Moreover, *Le Monde* carried reports on May 4, 17, and 19 of atomic weapons being loaded onto helicopters on Yokota and Okinawa. U.S. authorities have not denied the reports. "Washington has repeatedly stated during the past few weeks that it had no intention of using atomic weapons in Indochina," *Le Monde* reported May 19. "Yet prior to the present offensive, the devices were no longer being taken out of storage. . . . Such news is disturbing. Does it mean that in the case of a major defeat in Indochina, the Americans will let themselves be drawn into the ultimate in escalation, or is it a matter of impressing the leaders in the Kremlin on the eve of the Moscow summit?"

There are now 43,000 U.S. troops remaining on Okinawa, along with some 30,000 "dependents" (members of their families and civilian employees). This figure has remained essentially unchanged since 1971.

Workers, Students Strike in Mar del Plata

Mar del Plata, an Argentine coastal city 400 kilometers south of Buenos Aires, "was totally paralyzed and occupied by military and police forces because of a general strike by workers and students that took place without incident," according to an Associated Press dispatch in the June 16 issue of the New York daily *El Diario-La Prensa*.

"The strike was prepared by the stu-

"As a supply base," wrote Guillain, "Okinawa is an important place for quartering the three military branches [air force, navy, and marines], sheltered from indiscreet prying and possibilities of attack by land. It is a place for carrying out maneuvers, an ammunition depot, a center for a wide range of services. Okinawa can insure logistical support for a powerful army of up to a half million men. It plays a rather important role in the repairing of matériel, in particular that coming from Vietnam. It has the largest medical facilities in the world, and hospitals employing 600 people. An essential link in the chain of radar installations in the Pacific, Okinawa insures the proper functioning of the Early Warning system for Japan, and for the United States itself on its Asian flank. It is also an important communications center."

By the end of 1976, Japan is expected to have a total of only 6,800 troops on Okinawa. It will thus remain a very small military force on an island that will continue to be heavily mortgaged to the United States.

On top of this, Japan made two major concessions when it agreed to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. First, it gave the United States the right to use its Japanese bases not only to "defend" Japan, but to insure the defense of imperialism's interests throughout the Far East as a whole. Second, it agreed that in the system of prior consultation that was set up, it would take a positive approach toward U.S. reinforcement or use of its bases for military operations in Asia. "Japan promised the Americans to say yes as often as possible," Guillain observed, "especially with regard to defending Taiwan or South Korea in any eventual conflict." □

dents, who were demanding freedom for five of their comrades. The trade unions of the workers joined the protest. Four of the jailed students have already been freed, but the strike went ahead anyway."

Student unrest in the city has been on the increase since the murder last December of the student Susana Filler when rightists attacked a peaceful assembly of students. □

A Simmering Crisis in Chilean Coalition

By David Thorstad

Two events of considerable significance occurred in Chile at the end of May: an emergency closed-door session of the National Committee of the Unidad Popular coalition, and elections to the CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores—Workers Central Union).

The UP "conclave," as it is being dubbed, has been going on for more than two weeks in an effort to find a way out of the crisis confronting the coalition. The crisis came to a head over the police assault on thousands of workers and students demonstrating in Concepción May 12. (See *Intercontinental Press*, June 12, p. 671.)

The Associated Press reported from Santiago June 12 that the thirteen ministers in Salvador Allende's cabinet had handed in letters of resignation. The purpose of the move, it said, was "to facilitate any changes planned by President Allende in his Popular Unity coalition." Allende can accept or reject the resignations.

Luis Corvalán, general secretary of the Communist party, one of the major parties in the coalition, told a news conference May 24 that the situation was "very serious." He called it a "crisis in political orientation, a crisis of political leadership."

The crisis involves serious differences within the coalition over how to meet the growing threat from the right and over what course the government should follow in implementing the program of the Unidad Popular.

The dispute has been brewing for months and has taken the form of several sharp polemical exchanges between the CP on the one hand, and the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) on the other.

The MIR, which is not in the UP coalition, insists that the government should mobilize the working masses in a struggle that will ultimately destroy the bourgeois state apparatus and replace it with socialism. It calls on the coalition to fight for planks in its own program that have been

abandoned, such as dissolving the special police of the Carabineers Corps and replacing the bourgeois parliament with a popular assembly. It has taken the initiative in mobilizing peasants to take over farm land and workers to take over factories.



CORVALAN: Bourgeois legality is a brake, but he's in no hurry.

The CP, on the other hand, accuses the MIR of "ultraleftism" and provocation. It insists on strict adherence to bourgeois legality. Corvalán summed up his party's position as follows: "We feel that it [present institutional legality] is a brake, that it is an obstacle to the developing revolutionary process, but not an insurmountable obstacle because up to now it has been shown that things can be accomplished within the bounds of legality and that what it is possible to accomplish depends not so much on the law as on the struggle, on the organization and mobilization

of the masses, on the relationship of forces at a given moment. On the other hand, we think that no possibility exists today, at this moment, to modify this legality, this institutionality—not by any means, neither by legal means nor by extralegal means."

The MIR charges that the CP is trying to reach an accommodation with the opposition Christian Democrats as a way out of the apparent dead end facing the government coalition in the opposition-controlled legislature, and that in order to do this it needs to hold back the developing revolutionary process. The CP denies this.

Although the MIR is not in the UP coalition, its criticisms are shared, at least in part, by certain UP elements, particularly the left wing of Allende's Socialist party. These elements do not agree with the CP's proposals to pull back from applying the program that brought the coalition to power. The progovernment magazine *Mayoría* May 31 described the differences as focusing on "a choice between moving ahead at a faster pace in applying the program or taking a breathing spell in order to consolidate what has already been won."

It was the decision of the regional leaderships of five of the seven UP parties in Concepción to join with the MIR in organizing the May 12 demonstration that brought the differences to a head. The differences became a crisis when the Carabineers, on direct orders from the Communist mayor, opened fire on the demonstration. The UP parties have maintained their united front with the MIR despite official reprimands from their national leaderships.

In his state-of-the-nation speech to Congress May 21, Allende asserted that "the big question posed by the revolutionary process, and one which will decide the fate of Chile, is whether or not existing institutions will be able to open up the way for a transition to socialism." One of the aspects of the current crisis appears to be that the CP and the reformists are answering this question with an unequivocal yes, while the far left, with the support of some elements within the UP coalition itself, says no.

"We believe that the position of the MIR is hardly realistic in that it does not take into account the peculiarities of the Chilean revolutionary process,"

said Minister of Housing Orlando Cantuarias, a representative of the Radical party, in an interview in the April 10 issue of *Universidad*, a student newspaper at the University of Costa Rica. "We believe that we can move toward socialism legally, staying within the system of bourgeois democracy."

The week-long elections to the CUT that ended June 6 were considered especially important because it was the first time in the almost twenty-year history of the labor confederation that its officers were elected on a one-member, one-vote basis. More than 700,000 workers, nearly one-quarter of the entire electorate, took part.

The purpose of the elections was to choose seventy-three members of the National Executive Council of the CUT and thirty-five provincial representatives.

The seven parties in the UP coalition ran separate tickets in the elec-

tions. In addition, candidates were presented by the Christian Democrats and various leftist organizations not in the government, including the Front of Revolutionary Workers (FTR—Frente de Trabajadores Revolucionarios), which is affiliated to the MIR.

Although not all the results have yet been tabulated, the total vote for the UP parties was reported to be more than 70 percent, with the CP and SP together receiving approximately 65 percent. The June 6 issue of the Socialist party's newspaper, *Posición*, called the elections a "vigorous defeat for the right wing within the working class."

The results were far from completely rosy, however, for the opposition Christian Democrats received a surprisingly high vote, especially among public employees. But they also received a majority of the votes in the key nationalized Chuquicamata copper mine, as well as the Chilean State Bank and the state steel works at Huachipato. □

various political tendencies, bravely took on the defense of Martins. It was in his role as president of that committee that he was interviewed by *Nuevo Hombre*.

Q. "Dr. Librandi, to what and to whom do you attribute the kidnapping of Dr. Martins?"

A. "To an operation intended to silence him, carried out by parapolice or paramilitary groups."

Q. "What led you to this conclusion?"

A. "Various things: the speed with which the car in which he was abducted disappeared—at a time (5:30 p.m.) when traffic on Rivadavia is very heavy; the policeman at the corner of Rivadavia and Paraná kept his back to the kidnappers' car, according to statements by witnesses; a policeman who was on guard duty at the office building at 26 Paraná happened "by chance" not to be at the entrance but on the sixth floor; the police intervened five days after the kidnapping was reported and, with the complicity of Judge Víctor Irurzun, for forty-five days held onto the file on the case."

Q. "Doctor, is there any detail or common factor that might allow you to see a relationship between the kidnapping of Martins and those of Maestre, Pujals, Verd, etc.?"

A. "Where it is perfectly clear from the method of operations that we are dealing with the same group is in the case of Dr. Quieto, in the case of Vargas Alvarez, and in the disappearance of the Verd couple. The similarities between these cases could hardly go unnoticed."

Q. "Is there anything else you would like to add, Doctor?"

A. "Yes, there is. These groups appear to be on the increase in Latin America. On the heels of the sadly notorious Brazilian death squad, we now have parapolice groups operating in Argentina, in Bolivia, and in Uruguay."

Meanwhile, the cases of Maestre, Pujals, and Verd—all of whom have disappeared—have still not been cleared up.

But the brutality of this method of repression was dramatically shown by the fact that at the very moment that our comrade was drafting this account, the morning edition of *Crónica* of April 24, 1970 [1972?] reported that there were fears for the life of the journalist and trade-union leader Eduardo Jozami, who was arrested

Argentina

The Violence of Those at the Top

[The following is the third installment of a lengthy feature on repression in Argentina that appeared in the April 25 issue of the Buenos Aires newspaper *Nuevo Hombre*. Its publisher, Dr. Silvio Frondizi, has been arrested

and the newspaper has been banned as a result of the publication of this issue. Translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The Varied Forms of the Repression

By Tomas Corona

Given the fact that the objects of the system's repression are decent and upright sons and daughters of the people, the forms of the repression, far from becoming more simple, are daily becoming more complicated and more varied.

In order to best organize the material on the subject, *Nuevo Hombre* has singled out the four forms whose frequency has conferred upon them the sad label of "typical forms."

In order, we will take up kidnappings, dragnets, repression in the

streets, and finally torture.

Kidnappings

The disappearance of Néstor Martins and his client and friend Centeno shook the country. A defense lawyer for political prisoners, he was snatched from his car in broad daylight and kidnapped under the impassive gaze of the police.

His colleague and comrade, the lawyer Atilio Librandi, together with a broad range of lawyers representing

on the 21st and taken to the 23rd precinct station, where everything was denied. The same source indicates that Marcelo Carmelo Conti—a witness—was also kidnapped after telephoning Eduardo Jozami's home with the news.

Dragnets

These complicated military mobilizations began a relatively short time ago. A particular area is selected and closed off by the military, and then the house searches begin. Patrols with weaponry of war and with the state of mind and methods of combat enter homes and investigate or search in accordance with whatever clues they think they find.

Nuevo Hombre was in Rosario last week. At that time the operation mounted following the death of General Sánchez was in full force.

Of the numerous intimidating and hostile situations, we are selecting one, the harshness of which is more than illustrative.

Tuesday [April] 11: Raid on the student building at 500 Vera Mujica Street.

As a result of the fact that the Peugeot used in the attack on General Sánchez was left in front of the above building, the repressive forces carried out a spectacular nighttime operation there. The building was lit up as bright as day, flares were put out, and police scaled the roof and surrounded the building. Over loudspeakers, the order was given to turn on the lights and open all windows; if this was not done within two minutes, shooting would open up on windows that remained dark and closed. Most people were asleep. On the eighth floor, two young students had gotten the idea of getting under the bed. Over the loudspeakers, the police gave one more minute for the lights to be turned on and the windows opened on the eighth floor before opening fire. By chance, two comrades managed to get inside the building and rectify the situation, which could have resulted in tragedy. The next day, all those who were arrested were released.

Repression in the Streets

Times change, obviously, and from the on-duty policeman with his paunch, his little moustache, and his

good-natured face, who assists children and the blind, we move on to various kinds of characters who subscribe to no ideology and who become mere tools for implementing one of the regime's four classical methods of repression: the street method.

Here the aim is to control the street. Intimidate and persuade. Take action in cases where intimidation has not been enough. The new techniques:

a) Formation of Infantry Guards. Armed squads known to the entire people, especially workers and students in Córdoba, Capital, Catamarca, Mendoza, and Rosario, to mention a few examples.

b) Motor patrolling by militarily equipped units made up of contingents from the police stations; like those mentioned above, they use elements of chemical war—toxic, emetic, and mustard gases—to put down popular demonstrations.

c) Radio-equipped commandos: electronic complexes for communication and centralization of a kind of public "information" network, which they promote.

d) Dividing the cities into "military zones," a criterion current among the police forces, patrolmen, etc.

e) Use of animals with repressive capabilities (horses, dogs).

f) Special mobile antiriot units with hydrotanks—Neptunes—and with all kinds of mobile and infantry patrolmen linked by communications for rapid displacement, not to mention the surprising constancy of the patrolling done by mobile crews of three or four persons each.

g) New unconventional motorized units: antiguerrilla motorcyclists.

h) Spectacular development of civilian groups of the political police (in a quantity analogous to that of the uniformed police), together with the appearance of new weapons: pistols and the classical machete or club have come to be replaced by modern automatic weapons (Brownings), machineguns, and antiriot sawed-off shotguns.

All this implies—although this is not a restricted or specially selected listing—part of an institutional reorganization in which the police pass under the control of the army, whose officers assume responsibility for the strategy of counterrevolutionary war, and perhaps also for the refining of methods of torture (which will be gone into elsewhere).

It is clear that this entire apparatus does not operate on an independent basis. Depending on the situation, it complements its activities with: 1) the police, armed for conventional war and mobilized with swift-moving carriers (as in Córdoba, Catamarca, Mendoza, Tucumán, etc.); 2) constant participation of intelligence services, which make use of such well-known techniques as ordinary "kidnappings" and the physical elimination of persons they characterize as "leaders," "ringleaders," or "extremist elements"; 3) open intervention of infantry troops and the motorized cavalry under the command of officers with weapons for antiguerrilla operations at their disposal (including weapons of a non-military caliber—22 long in Mendoza, for instance) and a methodology of civil war. Not to overlook the presence in these cases of gases, noise projectors, helicopters, medical services in collusion with torturers, and the advice of North American technicians from the Agency for International Development (AID) and the intelligence services of the Yankees and of native Argentinians dependent on the CIA.

Torture: The Everyday Horror

No more than five years ago, when the country was not seething as much as it is today, there was one kind of news that the newspapers and magazines called attention to in astonishment, setting off spasms of collective concern: torture.

Each time a report was published on torture—covered over by this euphemism that the bourgeoisie has become fond of using: "illegal pressures" (as if the entire capitalist system were not one gigantic pressure against humanity)—statements of repudiation were issued, editorials condemning it appeared, indignant commentaries increased. No one got used to or wanted to get used to the horror of this use of barbarism as a judicial expedient or as a tool of the police.

Certainly, no one failed to recall that torture was not something new, but rather a blemish inherited from every single Argentine government during the last forty years. But for five years it remained a modest comfort to know that torture was something sporadic, not used all the time, the bestiality of which only flared up occasionally like a flash of lightning.

The years that followed were to show Argentinians that there were no limits to daily horror and that this agrarian and peaceful land where wheat thrives and dairy cattle graze had to see emerge from its bowels a race of criminals willing to do anything, protected by a legislative branch that abetted them more than any ever recorded in Argentine history, and constituting in their entirety a direct product of the deepening of the national crisis and of the relentless sharpening of the contradictions that are shaking the country.

Then something happened that many—most, even—had not foreseen in any sense. This country grew accustomed to the tortures, became saturated with violence, learned that nothing had to be shocking any more, and that the masters of this world were capable of literally anything in order to defend their worldly interests. Indeed, the capacity for endurance and the threshold of tolerance that this people could reach is frightening.

Cruelty increased, became more sophisticated, more specialized, and abandoned its primitive forms. In 1956, the armed forces shot a handful of Peronist patriots without any risk and without any trial. In 1972, sixteen years later, the bishop of Goya, Monsignor Antonio Devoto, confirms that the arrogant officers of the Second Army Corps approved the torture of a defenseless Catholic schoolteacher, compañera Norma Morello, as yet another way of indicating what they have done to the legacy of San Martín, as yet another way of revealing what they learned in the War College.

Sophistication of inhumanity, invention of increasingly terrifying devices for torturing arrested militants and activists, and a generalized use of "illegal pressure" not—merely—to extract confessions, but purely and simply to punish the unfortunate persons who fall into the hands of police officials or some of the espionage services.

And so we have the fact that on the one hand the social process experienced by Argentina throughout the past fifteen years gave rise first and foremost to a sustained growth in popular willingness to struggle. This combativity took the form of itself modifying methods and conceptions of struggle, of characterizing the enemy with ever increasing accuracy, and of little

by little developing a strategy and more appropriate tactics for combating the enemy. As the inevitable dialectical counterpart to all this, the enemy could do nothing less than step up repression in exact proportion to the extent to which he was sinking into a frightening void.

Greater combativity, more repression. Crueler tortures, greater daring from revolutionists. Intensification of the crisis within the bourgeois front itself, increase in the use of merciless methods to wipe out patriots. It is around these axes that Argentine reality—with violence from the top, and the response to it, violence from below—has been turning during these years.

This process created, in addition, a standard that was designed to meet its needs: impunity. In the Argentina of 1972, torture not only no longer surprises anyone because it is a daily occurrence in official locales, but this is true because the entire system—through the mass means of communication, the official propaganda, and the fatheadedness of the old liberals who were previously scandalized—functions like an air mattress, like a muffler intended to deaden the piercing cries emerging from the torture chambers. In a word, the regime has made itself an accomplice of all this and responds to every allegation of torture with a morsel of frightening cynicism: "nothing but fabrications of the terrorists."

News conferences by lawyers defending political prisoners who have been tortured by the police are held nearly every week. The evidence they furnish is overwhelming. Physical, direct, flesh-and-blood evidence, open sores caused by electric prods, men and women destroyed by the criminal bestiality of this race of subhumans who live in the so-called "security forces."

There is also the flood of appeals for habeus corpus, always with the same routine response: "denied, no cause shown." The daily newspapers, blushing and ashamed, squeeze the reports of torture into smaller and smaller space. In the face of the increasing seriousness of the tragedy represented by the systematic use of torture in Argentina, the system prefers to hush up and deny what is going on.

The cruelty is particularly and deliberately unleashed against fighters belonging to armed organizations. A

virtual hell of "lesson learning" is reserved for them should they fall into the hands of the repression. Bourgeois propriety is left far behind: the system feels it can violate every norm and break through any barrier. "Right-thinking" persons in the elegant parts of town murmur in a low voice: "Well, they brought it on themselves."

It is the end of all legality. The police inflict torture, the judges go along with it, the government attributes accusations of torture to a campaign of defamation, and the armed forces say that they are being insulted.

However, this violence of the system is not something marginal to it. It must not be seen as an isolated phenomenon or something that originated in the ravings of persons who belong in mental institutions. In Argentina, torture is something the dictatorship is compelled to resort to on a permanent basis in its open war on the armed vanguards and on the masses who are resisting continuing exploitation, and who are refusing to go on being excluded from the government and from the real power in the country.

But if the infinite cruelty of the tortures should not surprise us, and if the frightening, moving testimony published in this issue of *Nuevo Hombre* does no more than confirm what we already knew or suspected, still, for all that, the struggle against this manifestation of barbarism must not stop.

The campaign denouncing the tortures must be stepped up in an effort to give it international scope and weight and to portray the true nature of the Argentine military dictatorship in all its dimensions. It is a matter of protecting, to the extent this is possible, the lives and physical integrity of hundreds of our compatriots who now enjoy no guarantees; it is a matter where possible of anticipating and preventing the use of torture against them, and when it is used, of preventing it from being prolonged.

Aside from this, to move forward with the proper perspective, it is appropriate to underline the fact that it is the popular masses alone, the working class and its vanguards, that will have to wipe out this ignominy, which is nothing but a manifestation of a system without hope, of the desperation of the privileged faced with the end they see coming.

[To be continued.]

Mansholt's 'Bomb' and the Subsequent Fallout

By Ernest Mandel

The letter sent February 9 to the president of the Common Market Commission by Sicco Mansholt, a Social-Democratic member of the commission, continues to make news.* It is the first time that a political leader with some international authority has publicly given voice to the fears that a series of scholars have expressed continuously for years. This gives Mansholt unquestioned value as a publicizer. The fact that he has since become president of the commission lends his act still more importance.

The Great Fear of the 21st Century

Mansholt's letter is based on the "Club of Rome Report," which in turn is an extension of the "Meadows Report" published in June 1971 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The various reports summarize the fears current today in scholarly and "enlightened" capitalist circles about the threat that present production of material goods represents for the future of humanity. (The fact that these fears may be so widely trumpeted at the moment when capitalist growth is again slowing down is not at all a fortuitous coincidence.)

The population explosion and a potentially increasing shortage of food, pollution and the rapid degeneration of the human environment, the exhaustion of certain sources of raw materials—these are the bases of this "great fear of the twenty-first century" that is being propagated in technocratic circles. The future, even the physical survival, of the human race seems to be threatened if things keep going the way they have been.

Certainly, it is easy to underline some errors in reasoning and some doubtful, even inadmissible, extrapolations

in the Meadows Report, which Mansholt has reproduced with an obvious lack of critical spirit. The Malthusian idea of a population growth that outstrips progress in food production—propounded ceaselessly for two centuries—has been proven false historically. There is no reason to suppose that it will be verified during the next fifty years.

The notion that the current rate of population growth can be simply extended without taking account of the radical effects that social, economic, ideological, and moral changes can have on the development of the world's population is absurd. Not only the example of Western Europe, but even that of the Soviet Union, demonstrates clearly that population growth tends to decline, and then stabilize relatively once the threshold of civilization and urbanization has been crossed.

There is not the slightest scientific basis for the notion that 500 years from now the earth will be able to sustain a population of only 500,000,000 to 1,000,000,000 human beings—and that only at a very low standard of living. Such a notion extends present-day technology and the present lack of balance between the use and renewal of natural resources.

But to suppose that no other technology is possible is to demonstrate an appalling poverty of imagination.

In fact, the superpessimism of the Meadows Report, reproduced by Mansholt, has exactly this social root. Capitalism is obviously in the process of undermining all the bases of civilization. It threatens humanity not only with nuclear death, but also with strangulation by pollution and with the murderous waste of the fundamental sources of wealth: nature and people.

The "great fear of the twenty-first century" is based on the thesis that no social system other than capitalism is possible. If this manifestly apologetic hypothesis is abandoned, the problem changes and must be formulated as an alternative: either capitalism survives, in which case the

decline of material civilization seems inevitable; or else capitalism is replaced by socialism, and then there is no reason to suppose that we are threatened by cosmic catastrophe. For a long time revolutionary socialists have formulated the problem in these terms—socialism or barbarism. The value of the Meadows-Mansholt Report is that it fundamentally confirms the validity of this alternative.

Irresponsible Critiques

The Marxist critique of the Meadows Report and the Mansholt letter must start from the contradictory nature of their analysis, from their cowardly refusal to draw the revolutionary social conclusions dictated by capitalism's obvious bankruptcy on a world scale. Mansholt and Meadows must be reproached for not having gone very far in their critique of capitalism, of its technology, its motivations, its fatal socio-economic logic.

On the other hand, it is irresponsible—not to say worse—to reproach Mansholt with having "exaggerated," with having gone too far, with wanting to create an atmosphere of panic so as to "discourage" workers' struggles—or even to see the whole business as nothing but a pretext for rejecting wage increases! Still, this is the position adopted by the representatives of various official Communist parties, particularly in France and West Germany.

This suggests an analogy with the same sort of position adopted by certain ultraleftist circles (above all, but unfortunately not only, Maoist circles) on the question of nuclear weapons. Saying that the revelation of the real threat of extinction of all advanced forms of life on earth in the event of a nuclear war is an "invention" of bourgeois ideologists aimed at forcing the masses to "capitulate to nuclear blackmail" is an irresponsibility in the same vein as asserting that the problems of the pollution of the atmosphere and the ocean "divert" from workers' struggles.

*Mansholt, who was formerly the Dutch minister of agriculture, advocates a "closed circuit" economy of recycled products, to be created by tax measures. He acknowledges that his plans would entail "a sharp cutback in material well-being per head of population and limitation in the free use of goods."—*IP*

Such remarks reveal a sad reversal of responsibilities. The capitalist system and the bourgeoisie are not attacked for manufacturing genocidal arms; the capitalist ideologues—they are bourgeois!—are attacked for alerting public opinion to the danger of these arms. The capitalist mode of production is not attacked for threatening the survival of the human race; the scholars—they are bourgeois!—are placed in the dock for calling attention to the threat. A very fine way to "combat bourgeois ideology"—hide the crimes of the capitalist system and the bourgeoisie!

Refusal to Go All the Way

The basic weakness of the Mansholt report, which in effect makes it a document without a future, lies in its refusal to go all the way in its analysis and in the solutions it proposes. In fact, after diagnosing the disease as terminal, it prescribes a few aspirins as a cure: tariffs and fiscal measures to ensure that we choke to death a few decades later!

Mansholt begins by postulating that we must plan the use of resources and the major products of consumption, both agricultural and industrial. But he refuses to ask whether such planning is possible in the framework of a system of private property, competition, and the market economy. It is not through ignorance or stupidity that all over the world automobiles and petrochemical detergents that pollute the atmosphere are manufactured, that all humanity's primary energy sources are burned up at full speed. These are iron laws of competition, of the quest of each trust, each capitalist firm for *individual profit*. They are *forced* to take this road.

To want to rationalize the use of resources and means of production without touching these bases of the disease is to want to commit suicide rationally as opposed to blindly.

In the same way, Mansholt recommends that agricultural production be increased, even when it is not profitable (which, by the way, is exactly the opposite of what the Common Market has done for nearly fifteen years); that industrial products of consumption that do not wear down so rapidly be manufactured; that collective consumption be given priority over private consumption; that scarce resources be "rationed" so as to give equal opportunity to all; that scientific research be reoriented.

But all these nice things are com-

pletely unrealizable in a system founded on the private appropriation of social surplus product, on the market economy, and on the rule of profit. This system must stimulate lack of satisfaction and permanent want in the area of material commodities; it must favor private enrichment, the struggle of all against all, and the other beautiful "values" of civilized bourgeois society. It is that society that has produced all the poisonous fruits that Meadows and Mansholt denounce. To want to proceed with the same system but under different laws is to hope that apples will produce pineapples.

Yes, economic growth is not an end in itself. Ten years ago, well before Meadows and Mansholt, we asserted this elementary truth of Marxism in *Marxist Economic Theory*. The aim of humanity is humanity—and not a continually rising accumulation of less and less useful material things. The automatic and assured satisfaction of basic material needs is a precondition for the full flowering of human capacities and potentials. But the latter can in no way be confused with the former. And this has nothing in common with the Stalinist thesis, taken over from bourgeois economists, of the endlessly growing needs of humanity for material commodities, a thesis that can be based on just one thing: the impossibility of communism.

Yes, worldwide planning of resources and of the principal instruments of human production is an urgent necessity. But this presupposes the totalization of both the costs and the results on the level of the whole society, and not on the level of each factory or each company. It presupposes the suppression of the crying inequality of consumption within nations and among nations. It presupposes the ending of that monstrous waste: the underutilization of human and material resources or their use for aims that are inimicable to humanity (like armaments). It presupposes that production be no longer oriented toward effective demand, but toward previously established, rational priorities.

It therefore also presupposes that construction of reasonably comfortable housing for all not be discontinued under the pretext that there are too many unoccupied luxury apartments, or that too much is spent on constructing banks, administrative quarters, and office buildings. In other

words, it presupposes capitalism's replacement by socialism, rather than partial "rationalization" of the former.

Mansholt proclaims his rejection of "state socialism," by which he means society in transition from capitalism to socialism under a bureaucratic management, such as exists in the Soviet Union. By all evidence, that society exerts no attractive power on the laboring masses of Western Europe. Mansholt, in fact, renders it more attractive when he asserts the necessity of lowering the standard of living in the West (no doubt to the level of the Russian Workers?).

But he shows his bad faith by ignoring the fact that there are other "models" of transitional society besides that in which the bureaucracy wields a monopoly of political and economic power (and in which, we might point out in passing, the principle of individual profitability of factories has resulted in pollution problems similar to those of the capitalist societies).

A strict planning of resources and economic choices such as is suggested by the "Mansholt bomb" can be completely democratic. It can issue from the masses of producers and consumers managing their own factories and their own affairs, mutually consulting to coordinate their plans and wants, establishing their priorities after wide public discussions in national congresses and international workers' councils. Furthermore, this is the only effective form of planning in today's world, the only form that can deal with competition and the market economy. And all the ills denounced by Mansholt flow in the last analysis from the market economy, from competition, and from profit—that is, from Capital. □

Dream Along With Chiang

By the time they graduate, high-school students in Taiwan are supposed to have spent six years studying Chinese geography, but the "knowledge" they receive tends to be limited, according to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*: "... because the [Chiang Kai-shek] Government is reluctant to credit the communists with any positive achievements, the students read about the mainland basically as it was in 1949. ... Even railway lines and highways built subsequently do not appear on maps in the textbooks."

Why Anti-Zionist Risks Five Years in Jail

[Giora Neuman, a member of the Israeli Socialist Organization (commonly known as *Matzpen*, the name of its journal), has been in prison in Israel since November 1971 for refusing induction into the army. After serving five consecutive thirty-five-day jail terms, he was brought to trial June 11 before a military tribunal.

[Refusal to serve in the army on political grounds is a rare act in Israel, and occasions, in addition to prison sentences, near hysteria from the ruling class. *Ma'ariv*, the largest Israeli daily, for example, wrote in an August 8 editorial on draft refusers, "The Israeli army is one of the most human armies in the world, and if anyone sees it the way these people do, something is wrong with his mental make-up."

[According to Israeli law, the minister of defense has the power to exempt any person from military service if that person opposes service on moral grounds. As pointed out in the June 1972 issue of *Cna'an*, an Amsterdam English-language bulletin of information on Israel and the occupied territories, the defense minister exercises this right thousands of times: All Orthodox Jewish women are exempted from military service because their religion requires that they be permanently under the surveillance of their fathers or husbands!

[Neuman's morality, however, is not recognized by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.

[The following interview with Neuman was granted to an unidentified non-Israeli journalist, apparently during February 1972, and was originally published in *ISRAC*, magazine of the Israeli Revolutionary Action Committee Abroad. It was reprinted in the March 20-April 16 issue of *AfricAsia*, a radical biweekly published in Paris, from which we have translated it.]

* * *

Question. Why did you refuse to serve in the army?

Neuman. These are my reasons:

For the past four years, we have lived in a peculiar situation, more exactly, we are occupiers. The state of Israel has grabbed hold of a large territory and a population of significant size, which it subjugates by military rule.

In the occupied territory Israel acts no differently from any other occupier. The population is oppressed. I do not believe there is any such thing as a liberal occupation. All occupation and all oppression are contrary to my world outlook and my conscience, and I do not want to participate in such actions.

Q. Are you a pacifist?

Neuman. I am not a pacifist. Pacifism is an outlook that opposes violence in principle, even in cases of self-defense. That does not mean I think violence is a good thing, but there are times when force must be used in a just struggle.

Q. Don't you think the Israeli army has that right in defending the citizens of the state?

Neuman. I do not think an army can defend its own citizens while at the same time it occupies another territory, oppresses another people, and threatens the urban centers of neighboring countries. For this is not a matter of defense, and such a situation is even a threat to our own future.

Q. Even so, don't you think the very existence of the army prevents the invasion of the country by foreign armies?

Neuman. Refusing to serve in the army is not an isolated act. It is part of a total concept, a recognition of the realities of the Middle East and of the present conflict.

In short, I consider Zionism—and especially its national land-acquisition fund, the Jewish Agency, the state, and its army—to be the major source of the conflict. On a historical level, the task that is posed for us is clearly that of freeing ourselves from the

structure, the establishment, and the Zionist regime. Whoever presents the "problem" by saying "They want to massacre us" is badly deceiving both himself and others.

Q. Would you refuse military service even if the Israeli state were not occupying territories and populations?

Neuman. It is difficult for me to answer that question, because I determine my attitudes on the basis of concrete circumstances. Today there is an occupation and today I refuse. On the level of principle, I would not accept Zionism even if it gave back to the Arab countries some part or another of the conquered territories, for example those conquered in 1967.

Zionism is by nature expansionist because it is a colonial phenomenon, and that is what I oppose on a historical and moral level. In short, I do not know how I would act if the situation were different.

Q. Realistically, what do you want to achieve by refusing to serve in the army? Is it simply a matter of not serving, or do you have other objectives in mind at the same time?

Neuman. Definitely I do not want to serve in the army. But my action is part of a broader struggle, a social struggle to establish a socialist regime. In practice, the significance of my act is demonstrative. I want to prompt people to think about the subject. I would like them to put under analysis things they previously accepted.

The political situation in Israel has a distressing aspect. People live in comfort and tranquility; they eat, sleep, drink, love, sit around and talk, and go to concerts without giving the slightest thought to what is going on a few kilometers from their homes: occupation, oppression, expulsions—through which the refugees become refugees twice over—and "thinning down" ["*allégement*"] of the population. The very fact that Israelis see one individual who does not blindly accept this state of affairs will lead people to think about the things I just mentioned.

Q. Is your aim to lead other youth to follow your path? What do you think would be the possible results?

Neuman. I would like to see a grow-

ing number of youth think as I do politically, without that necessarily implying refusal of military service. I would also like to see other youth refuse military service. But I have no illusions on this point. As to the possible results, as you put it, I have already said that my act is part of a total activity.

Q. Even so, your theory of social struggle seems to me a little utopian, while a mass refusal of military service would have a more practical import. How would you reconcile these two things?

Neuman. Look, resolving the Israeli state's problems is not my job. I have no doubt that if things really came to what you're suggesting on a grand scale, it would be a hard blow to the armed forces of the state. But the army must not be separated from the social structure of the country, and in our case the army is an integral part of the Zionist structure.

Besides, I struggle against Zionism. It is obvious that people who will refuse military service for political reasons, like me, will not see this act as an end to their political activities, and they will constitute a force which, I hope, will open up a radical social transformation, a socialist revolution.

Q. Don't you think, even as a socialist, that the Israeli nationality has the right of self-determination and must have the means to defend that right?

Neuman. To present the problem today as being that of defending the right of self-determination of the Jewish population of Israel is a dishonest trick whose aim is to defend Zionism by utilizing socialist terminology. Our present problem is Zionism, by nature chauvinist, discriminatory, and colonialist. It is Zionism that in practice denies the right of self-determination to another people. I recognize the right of self-determination only in the framework of socialist struggle.

That is, if socialism is victorious in the region and if a community living there thinks it has things in common that differentiate it from others, and defines itself as a people or nation, then I recognize its right to effect its self-determination in a territory where it is the majority.

If a socialist regime is constituted

in the Middle East, I would recognize the right of the Israeli community, whether it calls itself Jewish, Israeli, or any other name, to effect its self-determination. And that on the condition that it does not call into question the rights of the Palestinian refugees and other victims of Zionism. Personally, I do not at all struggle for any national goals. My only objectives concern the social order.

Q. Do you think the Israeli government ought to exempt you from military service on the basis of your political objection?

Neuman. I demand that the Israeli government exempt me from military service. How? Whether juridically or technically, that's their business. In any case, I will persist in my refusal and will struggle for my right, and for the right of others, to refuse military service for reasons of principle and of conscience.

Q. Are you supported by organi-

zations or individuals?

Neuman. I am a member of the Israeli Socialist Organization (*Matzpen*) and my organization supports my right, and the right of youth in general, to refuse military service. *Matzpen* has taken the initiative in our support; demonstrations have taken place in Tel Aviv at the ministry of defense; leaflets have been handed out; petitions have been signed in Israel and abroad. A demonstration took place in London, and petitions with thousands of signatures were sent from England, France, the United States, and Australia. But, curiously, the Israeli press has not said a word.

Q. Giora, if you were head of the Israeli government, what would you do about a phenomenon like Giora Neuman?

Neuman. I would very much like to answer your question, but frankly, I would rather be Giora Neuman than head of the Israeli government. □

Pham Van Dong Discusses Sexual Equality

North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, in a recent interview, was asked his views on the struggle for women's liberation. The interview, conducted by Vagn Sondergaard, appeared in the May 19 issue of the Danish newspaper *Information*.

"Throughout our entire history," the premier said, "women have played a decisive role. Our women are admirable. They cultivate the land; they take part in the struggle; and they take care of the children. Our constitution provides for equality between men and women, and if we are not able to bring about such equality, we will not be able to build a socialist society either.

"But there are still many difficulties. Full equality on the economic and political level is one thing, but the way things are done in the home is quite another. In many of the societies where women have achieved political and economic rights there are women who are extremely capable and knowledgeable who nonetheless feel they are in an inferior position with regard to men. This means that a struggle must also be carried out through which

women can gain self-confidence and self-respect. There are still Vietnamese homes in which the man makes decisions affecting his wife or their children, but this is a problem that our women are paying very close attention to. They are because they are taking part in work on all three fronts. . . .

"Our women work far harder than the men all day long," he continued. "They carry out the most difficult work. If you compare the work and productivity of men and women, you will find that it is women who contribute the most. They are thus also the ones who are producing the conditions for full equality.

"Your women are correct to maintain that the struggle for women's liberation must be carried out along with the economic, political, and cultural struggle. Women's liberation does not automatically come about with taking control of the means of production. The struggle for women's liberation cannot be separated from the remaining part of the struggle, and everyone must take part in it. One can certainly not be a revolutionist without always keeping this in mind." □

Can el-Bakr Defeat Iraq Petroleum Company?

By Jon Rothschild

A Radio Baghdad commentator, voice choked with emotion, called it "the end of the colonial era. . . . The people of Iraq are finally avenged for half a century of exploitation, shame, oppression, and humiliation." Workers and peasants throughout the country who had gathered around transistor radios to listen to an "important announcement" from the government greeted the news with wild enthusiasm, dancing in the streets, cheering, firing shots into the air.

The Baathist government of Ahmed Hassan el-Bakr had, on June 1, nationalized all holdings of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in the north of the country. IPC installations in the Kirkuk region were occupied by troops, and the company's non-Iraqi personnel were ordered expelled from the country.

The following day, the Syrian government announced that it was also taking over IPC holdings, including a 500-mile-long pipeline carrying oil from Iraq across Syria and Lebanon to Mediterranean ports.

IPC has not officially put a value on its lost properties, but industry estimates range from \$520,000,000 to \$780,000,000. The corporation's holdings constitute some 10 percent of all Middle East oil.

The nationalization did not affect IPC's considerable holdings in the south of Iraq, and company executives, while threatening legal action against any buyers of the nationalized oil, tried to play down the significance of the move to the world petroleum industry. The nationalization triggered a series of negotiations, better called wheeling and dealing, that involves more than a dozen countries, including all the major imperialist giants.

The Iraq Petroleum Company is a consortium controlled by six Western corporations. British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell, and the Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP) each own 23.75% of IPC; Mobil and Standard Oil of New Jersey each control 11.875%; the remaining 5% is owned

by the Gulbenkian Foundation of Paris.

The importance of Middle East oil to world imperialism can hardly be overstated. Oil fulfills 44% of all Western European energy requirements. About two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves are in the Middle East and North Africa. As of 1968, North Africa and the Middle East supplied 90% of the oil consumed in Japan, 70% in Great Britain, 80% in France, 90% in West Germany, and nearly 95% in Italy. Although the United States is presently dependent on Middle East supplies for only about 5% of its oil, that figure is steadily growing and is expected to increase still more.

At a May 26 Paris meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, U. S. Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II said that by 1980 the United States would be importing more than 7,000,000 barrels per day of Middle East oil. "What is regarded today," he added, "as uncomfortable dependence on the Middle East will by 1980 be far, far greater."

The Iraqi nationalization of IPC was the latest stage in an eleven-year-long dispute between various Iraqi governments and the giant corporation. In 1961, the Abdel Karim el-Qassim government nationalized IPC's holdings in the newly discovered North Rumaila fields in northern Iraq. The regime offered to pay compensation, and there ensued an interminable conflict over the terms of that compensation.

Geoffrey Stockwell, managing director of IPC, was quoted in the June 6 *Wall Street Journal* as complaining that the Iraqi regime had offered "peanuts" for the North Rumaila fields, although he declined to reveal the exact terms of the offer. (It should be kept in mind that oil companies normally demand compensation not only for the market value of nationalized holdings, but also for estimated lost profits until the expiration of their concessions, which in many cases

means until the end of this century. The oil-producing countries usually offer to pay only the book value of the holdings—that value on which the companies pay taxes, or in other words, "peanuts.")

Stockwell also said that IPC had offered, on May 31, to pay the Iraqi government \$260,000,000 for all outstanding disputes over back payment of royalties, interest, and marketing discounts in a package settlement of the entire mess. This offer was rejected by el-Bakr and the company was nationalized the next day.

But the real reason for the nationalization must be sought outside the endless, and completely ordinary, disputes between the oil magnates and the governments of the producing countries. In contrast to other eastern Arab states, like Saudi Arabia, Iraq's oil production has been declining during the past period. Early this year IPC cut its production from 1,200,000 barrels per day to 694,000. The drop in production was accompanied by a decrease in investment.

Company officials claimed that the reason for the cutbacks lay in the allegedly uncompetitive price of Iraqi oil, which they said had become about 35 cents per barrel more expensive than competing crude oil from the Arab-Persian Gulf. IPC said this resulted from higher taxes and royalties imposed by the Iraqi regime.

El-Bakr estimated that the cutbacks would cost Iraq \$300,000,000 by the end of the year, and thus there was no alternative but to nationalize the company and boost production. El-Bakr's estimate was probably accurate. Fully one-half of Iraq's income comes from oil royalties—the amounts paid by the consortiums for the privilege of exploiting the country's mineral and human resources; 80% of the funds earmarked for the current five-year economic development plan come from oil revenues; 85% of Iraq's foreign exchange earnings come from oil exports.

It is impossible to tell to what ex-

tent IPC's production cuts were prompted by uncompetitive pricing and to what extent the company was just seeking a club with which to bludgeon the regime into a favorable settlement on the question of compensation for the North Rumaila fields. The oil cartel does not open its books to public scrutiny. But the dynamic of the clash is clear. Iraq is as dependent on oil production as the companies are on the right to exploit Iraq's resources. Thus, a constant tug-of-war goes on, each side trying to extract concessions from the other, and each meeting with greater or lesser success depending on factors that transcend both the local political context and the specific question of oil production.

In an article entitled "Power in Oil World Vastly Different Since 1967 War," printed in the June 6 *New York Times*, William D. Smith notes that the period since 1967 "has seen a radical swing in the balance of negotiating power from the industrialized nations of the Western world (and Japan) to the oil-producing states." Smith points to indications of the change—Algeria's nationalization of French oil interests, Libya's seizure of British Petroleum holdings.

Smith advances several explanations for the turn of affairs: the power-pinch on the United States; increased hostility to the West on the part of Arab governments because of the former's support to Israel; the closure of the Suez Canal, which has made Europe more dependent on North African Arab oil.

These factors are no doubt at work. But Smith misses more fundamental relationships. The world capitalist crisis has reduced the power of the oil cartels in their dealings with the oil-producing countries. Heightened inter-imperialist competition has reduced the ability of the companies to function as a monolithic unit—a development the Iraqi regime has sought to turn to its advantage in the current dispute. The expanding role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East has given the oil-producing states increased maneuvering room against the West. And finally, the upsurge of the colonial revolution, primarily the Indochinese revolution, has tied down the imperialist powers and, by sparking the development of a mass antiwar movement, vastly reduced the possibilities of direct imperialist military interven-

tion against any state that moves against the oil companies.

El-Bakr's strategy in the current conflict reflects all these interrelated factors. The major weapon in the arsenal of the oil cartel in any clash over nationalizations has been boycott. As an old company adage has it, "The Arabs can't drink oil." If the imperialists close ranks and refuse to market, refine, or handle nationalized oil, the oil-producing country is put in a difficult position. In fact, unless the oil nationalization is accompanied by a thoroughgoing program of social revolution that tears the country out of slavish dependency on the world market, it is an impossible position.

To combat the threat that boycott represents, el-Bakr has turned to two sources, France and the Soviet Union.

France is qualitatively more dependent on Iraqi oil than the other countries holding shares of IPC. According to the June 9 *Wall Street Journal*, the Compagnie Française des Pétroles estimates that while Standard Oil of New Jersey receives one twenty-third of its crude oil from Iraq, Shell gets one thirteenth of its total, and British Petroleum one twelfth, CFP gets nearly one third of its crude oil from its Iraqi holdings. Iraqi exports account for 14 percent of France's crude-oil imports.

El-Bakr took advantage of this situation to offer the French a deal that would allow CFP to maintain its Iraqi holdings in exchange for refusing to go along with any anti-Iraqi measures called for by the other countries.

At first, this tactic had some success. On June 7 France announced its refusal to take part in a meeting called by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to discuss strategy in the dispute. But el-Bakr is making a serious mistake if he thinks the French government will break with its fundamental class interests. Walking a tightrope, France is simultaneously maneuvering for its own position and trying to serve as a wedge for the rest of the consortium in rolling back the nationalization.

The predominance of the latter aspect of French policy is indicated by the reaction of the other imperialist countries. The June 14 *New York Times* quoted Angus Beckett, an official in the British Ministry of Trade and Industry, on the subject of separate French-Iraqi negotiations: "If the

French can play a role that brings about a satisfactory agreement, jolly good."

The second prong of el-Bakr's strategy is not likely to be any more useful. On June 7, just six days after the nationalizations, the Soviet Union and Iraq signed a trade and economic assistance pact that, although the details were not disclosed, is expected to provide for Soviet purchase of some nationalized oil. The economic pact followed by less than two months the signing of a Soviet-Iraq friendship treaty modeled after the India-Soviet pact of 1971.

Iraq will no doubt get some benefit from deals with the Soviet Union. The nationalized North Rumaila fields, for example, were brought into production only last year, as a result of Soviet aid. But as a purchaser of crude oil, the Soviet Union will be woefully inadequate; as a political ally in the fight against imperialism, the bureaucracy may prove deadly.

The USSR is self-sufficient in oil. It is also not known as a dispenser of hard currency. While it is true that the Soviet Union may buy a significant amount of Iraqi oil (it has recently expanded its practice of serving as a middleman between oil producing countries and the East European workers states), it will be unable to absorb Iraq's huge output. Furthermore, it will likely want to pay for the oil with commodities or development grants, and not with hard currency.

More importantly, the Soviet bureaucracy has no political interest in advancing anti-imperialist struggle in the Arab East. Its search for a détente with the United States is its paramount concern. In its competition with the Maoist bureaucracy for U.S. favor, concessions to the West in the Arab East are at least as important in the long run as concessions in Southeast Asia. What better *quid pro quo* could Brezhnev offer Nixon (or his successor) than a sellout of the struggle against the oil cartel? Given a choice between Nixon and el-Bakr, the Kremlin bureaucrats will not stand with el-Bakr.

Thus far, other oil-exporting countries have supported Iraq against IPC. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar have agreed to subsidize Iraq to the tune of \$400,000,000 to meet losses resulting from the current suspension

of Iraq's exports. These six Arab states, which along with Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, Indonesia, and Nigeria constitute the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), have also agreed not to step up production to meet the Western losses resulting from the Iraq boycott. How long that solidarity will endure is questionable. OPEC, which accounts for 90 percent of world oil exports, is now negotiating with the oil companies, discussing terms for buying a 20 percent share of Western interests in their various countries. Will a state like Saudi Arabia jeopardize its huge oil-development program for the sake of solidarity with the Iraqi Baathist regime—one of its archenemies in the Arab East?

El-Bakr has taken on a formidable enemy. The owners of IPC include four of the "seven sisters," the giant corporations that together control 70 percent of world oil production. The forces behind those four companies are not to be trifled with. Mobil and Standard Oil of New Jersey are controlled by the Rockefeller family; British Petroleum is one-third owned by the British government; British interests also control 40 percent of Royal Dutch Shell. Compagnie Française des Pétroles, while not one of the "sisters," is owned one-third by the French government, which holds 40 percent voting power in it.

Behind IPC stand the power pinnacles of world imperialism. Numerous times in the past, imperialism has sent its soldiers to bang some sense into the heads of uppity Arabs who developed uncivilized ideas about controlling their own countries. A memo of a private meeting held between former U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and a number of oil executives to discuss Iraqi nationalizations in 1958 declared that "nationalization of this kind of an asset impressed with international interest goes far beyond the compensation of shareholders alone and should call for international intervention."

El-Bakr is seeking to counter this well-established imperialist policy through exploiting interimperialist competition, relying on the Soviet Union, and hoping for solidarity from the regimes of other oil-producing countries. As long as he does not fundamentally challenge imperialist domination of his country, he may be

able to reach an accommodation with the corporations. If the objective conditions change and erode the ground from under that strategy, he will face a CIA-type coup or a direct military intervention from the West. In either case, his policy will not extract the country from the vise of imperialist exploitation.


That can be achieved only by carrying the fight through to the end—nationalizing without compensation

all imperialist holdings and placing them under the control of the workers and peasants, a path the Baathists are not likely to follow.

The popular explosion of support for the nationalization by Iraqi workers and peasants shows the people's desire to take that road. But they will only do so when one simple lesson about oil is learned: the Arab masses can't drink the stuff, but imperialism can't live without it. □

South Africa

Students Charged Under 'Antiriot' Law



VORSTER: "Ugly and strong" is better than "pretty and weak."

"The violent police reaction to recent antiapartheid demonstrations by white, English-speaking students was apparently a cold-blooded political decision by the government calculated to provoke a confrontation," wrote London *Observer* correspondent Stanley Uys in a dispatch printed in the June 12 *Washington Post*.

"South Africa has lurched to the right," he added. "After dabbling in various image-building exercises, the government has realized that it is bet-

ter to be ugly and strong than pretty (if that is the word) and weak. Vorster's remark [in support of police violence against students peacefully demonstrating against apartheid] showed that he no longer cares what the world thinks about him."

Vorster has made it clear that his unleashing of the police was not the end of his war against student dissent. On June 11 sixty-two students from the University of Witwatersrand were charged under an "antiriot" law. They could receive prison terms of up to two years and fines of up to \$520. Previously, white students arrested during demonstrations were usually held for a few hours and released on low bail.

Vorster also announced that laws would be passed next year ensuring that all foreign students entering the country would be individually screened by the parliament.

But the government's hard line has not destroyed the student protest movement. On June 9, for example, the entire staff of the University of Capetown joined a mass meeting of students called to protest police attacks on demonstrators. The staff also decided to draft a petition calling for support to the students and circulate it on a countrywide basis.

In parliament Japie Basson, a leader of the opposition United party, called the June 2 police attack on demonstrating Capetown students "disorder committed by the people who are supposed to keep order in South Africa."

The June 9 *Christian Science Monitor* reported that Dr. Alex Boraine,

moderator of South Africa's Methodist church, had called upon the students to continue their protests, saying that the very existence of the universities was at stake.

The South African white population appears to be split as never before, the English-speaking section favoring some reform of the apartheid system, the Afrikaaners remaining intransigent. But that clash comes in the con-

text of a fresh upsurge of the Black movement in all southern Africa—a new level of struggle reflected in the months-long strike in Namibia, the increasing student and worker agitation in South Africa, the Malagasy general strike, and the mass mobilizations in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) that forced the British Pearce Commission to veto a plan that would have ended the disagreement between Great Britain and the racist Ian Smith regime. □

Indonesian Students Give Nasution Advice

Continued political activity by Indonesian students has the military regime concerned about a possible "generation gap." The dictatorship's fears were expressed May 18 in a speech by General A. H. Nasution, chairman of the "Provisional Peoples Consultative Assembly."

"It is deplorable that the armed forces-student partnership flourishing in 1966 no longer exists," Nasution said, referring to the bloodbath that followed the 1965 military coup.

Last December, students staged demonstrations against the government's

plans to build an expensive tourist trap called "Indonesia Indah." There has been continuing ferment over issues like corruption in government. (See *Intercontinental Press*, January 24, p. 65.)

Nasution reported that a tour in which he spoke with student councils in an effort to persuade students to abandon political interests had been unsuccessful. When he raised the government's slogan of "Back to the Campus," Nasution said, the students raised the demand "Back to the Barracks." □

Largest Antiwar Protest in Several Years

5,000 in London March on U.S. Embassy

London

Some 5,000 persons marched in the rain from Trafalgar Square to the U.S. embassy in London June 4 to protest the American government's continued aggression against the Vietnamese people. The demonstration, which was called several weeks before by a number of antiwar groups, labour organisations, and left-wing political groups, was probably the largest antiwar protest in Britain for several years.

At Trafalgar Square, a rally was addressed by Nguyen Van Tien, deputy head of the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government's delegation to the Paris talks. Other speakers included Digby Jacks, president of the National Union of Students; Arthur Latham, Labour MP for Paddington North; Pat Jordan for

the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign; and Dick Nettleton, general secretary of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

Among the banners in the procession were those of the Kingston district committee of the sheet metal workers, BOAC [British Overseas Airways Corporation] shop stewards, transport workers from Ford Dagenham, and trades councils of Cambridge, Ealing, and Harlow. Numerous student union banners as well as the banner of the National Union of Students were also evident, as were women's liberation banners.

The Peoples Front of Bangladesh, the African National Congress, the United Patriotic Front of Turkey, and others were on the march. Members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disar-

mament, the British Peace Committee, the Medical Aid Committee for Vietnam, the Angela Davis Defense Committee, and some American antiwar protest groups were also present.

At the well-guarded U.S. embassy, a deputation from the British Campaign for Peace in Vietnam, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the British Communist party, and the National Union of Students delivered a protest letter addressed to Nixon.

The rally and march were supported by the British Campaign for Peace in Vietnam, the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, the London Cooperative Society, the Greater London Labour party, the British Peace Campaign, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the International Marxist Group (British section of the Fourth International), the International Socialists, and other trade-union and left-wing political groups. □

Poll Causes Concern

Declining Popularity for U.S. Capitalists

U.S. corporations are threatened by an unfavorable public "attitude climate" according to an article in the June 17 issue of *Business Week* magazine. The article was based on a poll by the Opinion Research Corporation (ORC), which found an increasing public dissatisfaction with and opposition to big companies.

The ORC found that corporate profits are considered a cause of inflation second only to the Indochina war; that more than 60 percent of the public favors government regulation of prices; that one person in three believes there should be a ceiling on prices; and that even six out of ten stockholders "believe competition cannot be counted on to keep prices at fair levels and government controls are necessary."

Among the most alarming of the findings for *Business Week* was that one-third of the public "believes the most practical way for workers to improve their standard of living is for them to get more of the money companies are making rather than for the workers to increase their productivity."

The ORC also found widespread concern about ecology. Some 53 percent of those interviewed felt that corporations are doing little or nothing to prevent damage to the environment, a figure that moved *Business Week* to comment that "companies apparently are not doing a good job in telling their side of the pollution story." □

New Zealand Labour Party Bars Socialists

By Keith Locke

Wellington

The Socialist Action League (SAL) is organising a big defence campaign following a decision by the National Executive of the New Zealand Labour party that "membership of the League is incompatible with membership of the Party."

The right-wing Labour party leadership began its witch-hunt immediately following the party's national conference in Wellington May 8-11. At the conference the SAL launched a "Socialists for Labour Campaign" for this year's general election.

The campaign is in support of the Labour party as the political arm of the New Zealand labour movement, but on the basis of a socialist programme and opposition to the right-wing leaders who have betrayed the interests of the party's working-class supporters.

The socialist election effort will be tied closely with union struggles and independent mass movements against the Indochina war, the 1973 South African rugby tour, and the abortion laws, campaigning on their demands.

Most major newspapers reported the socialist campaign and the SAL intervention in the party conference.

The May 11 Christchurch *Press* reported that "the young and militant members of the Socialist Action League—and in a more moderate form, university delegates—have made it clear that they are not happy with the 'conservatives' leading the party. . . ."

"The Socialist Action League is dismissed, in private, by a senior member of the leadership as 'lunatic fringe,' but the league has been busily distributing its literature to any delegate who will accept it—and there are quite a few. . . ."

"Unimportant as the league might be, its thoughts echoed in the conference today." The report went on to explain the debate on women's liberation issues, the war, apartheid, and social welfare.

Delegates were very angry about Nixon's blockade of Haiphong, which

was announced during the conference, and greeted a special motion condemning the escalation with sustained, standing applause. There was obvi-



KIRK: Hypersensitive to persons who criticize bankrupt leadership

ously great enthusiasm for action on the question, and many delegates signed a petition supporting the July 14 antiwar mobilisation. The party leadership, however, bureaucratically prevented a special motion in support of the mobilisation from reaching the floor, and ruled out of order an addendum to a remit that would have committed the party to July 14.

The mood of the conference was more radical than it has been for many years and there were heated debates over New Zealand's relations with apartheid South Africa and the abortion laws. A conference of about 100 of the party's youth held just prior to the main conference passed motions in support of the July 14 antiwar mobilisation, mass protests against the coming South African rug-

by tour, the abortion law repeal movement, and nationalisation under workers' control of all basic industries. It also condemned the party leadership's complicity in the smashing of the New Zealand Seamen's Union.

The futile attempt of the party leadership to stop these motions from coming to the attention of the party conference was countered by one delegate, on behalf of the Socialists for Labour Campaign, issuing a leaflet listing the motions passed by the youth. These leaflets were on delegates' tables when the party president, Bill Rowling, announced that the motions had been eliminated from the official youth report.

The party leaders have now clamped down on the developing socialist opposition to their procapitalist policies. The June 11 *Sunday Herald* explained it like this:

"It appears that the activities of the Socialist Action League at the recent Labour Party conference—when they distributed leaflets pledging a "Socialists for Labour Campaign" but added some nasty swipes at the 'bankruptcy of the Kirk leadership'—angered the party leadership and brought to a head a desire to curb the activities of some on the radical fringe of the party." The leaders also feared that the SAL "might associate the party with extremist ideas and frighten middle-of-the-road voters away."

Though the defence against the proscription has just begun, some party branches have already sent letters of protest. Prominent persons who have already signed a petition defending the right of SALers "to be members of the Labour Party and put forward their particular views" include five Labour candidates for this year's general election. □

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New Information on Frame-Up of Bukovsky

New information on the case of Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky is provided by issue number 24 of the *Chronicle of Current Events*, which has recently become available in the West. The issue, dated March 5, reports the contents of a petition in behalf of Bukovsky, who in January was sentenced to seven years imprisonment and five years exile.

The petition was submitted to the prosecutor general of the Soviet Union by Bukovsky's mother, N. I. Bukovskaya. Besides pointing out the numerous legal violations in the course of the trial, Bukovskaya brought to light information surrounding the testimony of Hugo Sebreghts.

Sebreghts is the Belgian citizen to whom Bukovsky allegedly passed "anti-Soviet documents of a slanderous nature." His testimony was one of the principal pieces of "evidence" used to convict Bukovsky. (See the trial transcript in the June 5 issue of *Intercontinental Press*.)

Bukovskaya revealed that Sebreghts, after returning to Belgium, had written a letter dated April 19, 1971, to the prosecutor general of the Soviet Union. In the letter, Sebreghts repudiated the testimony he had given while being held by the KGB in Moscow. He stated that his testimony was obtained under "physical and psychological pressure." This letter was not introduced at Bukovsky's trial.

The *Chronicle* also describes the hearing held in response to Bukovsky's appeal to a higher court. The proceedings took place February 23 in the Superior Court of the USSR. Despite protests and petitions from abroad and from Soviet citizens pointing out the legal violations and the outright fraudulence of the evidence used to convict Bukovsky, the hearing was brief and general.

The court refused Bukovsky's request to speak in his own behalf. Defense attorney V. Ya. Shveisky asked that Bukovsky be acquitted. The prosecutor, Vorobev, briefly reviewed the charges, and the court upheld the conviction. On February 25, Bukovsky was transferred to Vladimir prison.

Meanwhile, persons associated with

the Bukovsky case are being victimized. Aleksei Tumerman, who released the transcript of the trial to the West, is now confined in a psychiatric hospital. Recent information tells of the harassment of Soviet novelist Vladimir Maksimov, who had employed Bukovsky as a literary secretary.

Yuri Glazov and Yuri Titov, two Soviet intellectuals who recently emigrated, held a news conference in Rome May 30 to report that Maksimov "was in great danger in Moscow." They said that Maksimov was about to be expelled from the Writers Union because he refused to repudiate his novel *The Seven Days of Creation*, which the Writers Union condemns as a "dangerous transmitter of bourgeois ideology." Glazov and Titov expressed fears that Maksimov would be arrested and confined in a mental institution.

Information in issue number 24 of the *Chronicle* would seem to support these fears. It reports that at the end of January Maksimov was summoned to the office of V. Ilin, secretary of the Moscow division of the Writers Union. Ilin tried to persuade Maksimov to write a "renunciation-confession" for *Literaturnaya Gazeta* in connection with his novel, which was published abroad.

Maksimov refused. Several days later, according to the *Chronicle*, he was called before a medical commission of "psychiatric experts," who ruled that Maksimov's psychiatric state had taken a turn for the worse. □

Ask Letters in Behalf of Pyotr Grigorenko

Amnesty International has asked supporters of civil liberties to write the Soviet government, requesting that Major General Pyotr Grigorenko be released from forced confinement in a psychiatric hospital.

Grigorenko has been held since May 1969 as the result of his efforts to defend the rights of Crimean Tatars. "As far as we know," the organization stated in its June newsletter, "this

is one of the longest continuous periods of confinement in a psychiatric hospital that a dissident in the USSR has ever undergone."

A commission was scheduled to rule some time in June on Grigorenko's further confinement.

The newsletter reported that a member of the Amnesty International staff had been able to speak by telephone with Grigorenko's wife. She said that she had last seen him on April 27, and that he had then appeared to be in reasonably good health. Earlier, Grigorenko had been reported ill as the result of brutal methods used to force him to abandon a hunger strike. □

After May Battles

200 in Kaunas Facing Trial

Approximately 200 Lithuanian youths are being held in jail awaiting trial on charges stemming from the May 18-19 street fighting in the city of Kaunas, according to a report in the June 14 *New York Times*. Citing unnamed Lithuanian sources, the report also said that about 300 others had been arrested in the demonstrations, but had since been released.

Some twenty of the arrested youths were said to be students at the Technical and Medical Institutes in Kaunas. The rest are mostly high-school students and young workers. The sources said they did not expect all the arrested youths to be brought to trial.

There was also a report that a second Lithuanian nationalist youth had committed suicide by self-immolation. (The May 18-19 demonstrations broke out after the funeral of Roman Talanta, a twenty-year-old worker who burned himself to death in Kaunas.)

The second suicide, which was not reported in the Lithuanian press, apparently took place around June 3 in the small city of Varena, some fifty miles south of the capital, Vilna. Informants cited by the *Times* said the youth climbed to the top of a four-story building, set himself afire, and jumped to the street. He died four days later. There were no reports of demonstrations in response to the suicide. □

Transcript of the Bukovsky Trial—VI

[This is the sixth and final installment of the transcript of the trial of Vladimir Bukovsky. Serialization began in our May 22 issue.

[The transcript of the trial, which was held in Moscow January 5, 1972, was compiled by Soviet dissident Aleksei Tumerman, who was himself arrested at the time of Nixon's trip to Moscow.

[The translation was done for *Intercontinental Press* by Marilyn Vogt. Explanatory material in brackets is by the translator.]

* * *

Statement of Defense Attorney V. Ya. Shveisky

In the beginning of his statement V. Ya. Shveisky called attention to Article 2 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, which states in part that no innocent person shall be condemned and subjected to punishment. The attorney noted that Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, under which Bukovsky is being tried, can be applied only on the condition that his main aim was the undermining and weakening of Soviet power.

"I contend," declared Attorney Shveisky, "that Vladimir Bukovsky did not pursue this precise aim. But before stating my arguments, I think it is necessary to call the court's attention to one very important contradiction in the charges themselves. As is apparent from the evidence in the case, in 1963 Bukovsky was still in the Leningrad special psychiatric hospital. He was diagnosed as a 'psychopathic paranoid type.' It is true, as is seen in the conclusions of the experts, that no psychiatric treatment was applied in Bukovsky's case. But if we proceed from the assumption that he was actually ill, then everything that he now recounts about his impressions during the time of his confinement in the special psychiatric hospital—all this is the impressions he had when he was in an unhealthy state of mind, impressions which have been retained since that

time in his consciousness. Therefore, if the indictment takes the view that when Bukovsky was confined to the hospital he was mentally ill, then everything he is recounting about the conditions in the psychiatric hospital should be explained not as an intent to undermine or weaken Soviet power, but as a consequence of his erroneous perception of the things he observed at that time. Therefore, the position set forth in the indictment on this question is clearly inconsistent. I am concentrating on this," Shveisky explained, "only for the purpose of pointing out a contradiction in the position set forth in the charges themselves."

In the opinion of the defense, the indictment did not cite convincing evidence that Bukovsky aimed at undermining and weakening Soviet power. "In the television interview that Bukovsky granted to Cole, and in his conversation with American correspondent Jensen, Bukovsky recounted facts that, by his own assertion, he observed in the Leningrad special psychiatric hospital. For the purpose of verifying these facts, Bukovsky made a motion that a number of witnesses be called, but you rejected his request. In the interview and the conversation there were no statements either about the Soviet system or about the political and economic basis of the Soviet regime that could be construed as attempts to undermine and weaken Soviet power.

"Bukovsky made no such statements in his conversations with Nikitinsky and Shushpanov. Similarly, the witness Shushpanov did not confirm that Bukovsky carried on anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda or promised to help him get his anti-Soviet novel circulated abroad. He showed also that the conversation about a duplicator for which Bukovsky is being charged took place at the initiative of Shushpanov himself and that the whole matter was dropped with this one conversation.

"The accusation that Bukovsky intended to organize an underground

press is irrelevant here because there is no evidence that he intended to disseminate in such a way anti-Soviet and slanderous materials.

"The testimony of Bychkov and Tarasov, in particular, in which Bukovsky is accused of saying 'The regime which exists in the Soviet Union is not the one the Soviet people need,' should be viewed, I believe, as the personal interpretations of the two witnesses themselves, rather than actual statements that Bukovsky made to the witnesses.

"The contradictions in their testimony, which the court has noted, of course, serve as confirmation that their testimony was based on individual interpretations of the events."

The defense attorney further stated that he considered unproven the charge that Bukovsky had passed materials to Sebreghts. "Bukovsky himself has categorically denied this charge. V. Chalidze and A. Volpin, in whose presence the alleged transfer of materials is said to have taken place, were not called to testify," Shveisky stated. "Bukovsky's motion that they be summoned to testify in court was denied. Therefore this episode, in essence, has not been verified. All of this leads me to conclude," Shveisky went on, "that the court has not established proof that Bukovsky actually wanted to weaken the Soviet regime. Under such conditions, Bukovsky is not liable for prosecution under Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Therefore, I request that the court find the defendant not guilty."

The Verdict

The court has carefully examined the evidence in the case of Vladimir Konstantinovich Bukovsky, born 1942, of Russian nationality, residing at 3/5 Furmanov Street, apartment 59, in Moscow. In the court examination, witnesses and the defendant himself were questioned and the court concluded that V. K. Bukovsky is guilty of the following:

1. During 1970-71, V. K. Bukovsky engaged in systematic distribution of anti-Soviet materials of a slanderous nature, defaming the Soviet state and social system; gave slanderous information to foreign correspondents; alleged that in the Soviet Union sane persons are interned in prison-like psychiatric hospitals where they are tortured in various ways; he also had

in his possession in his apartment various anti-Soviet materials of a slanderous nature.

Proof of this is the following:

A) Clippings from the foreign newspapers *Washington Post*, *San Francisco Examiner*, and *Daily News* with articles of a slanderous nature, defaming the Soviet state and social system, and headlined "A Russian Who Fights Against the System," "A Soviet Dissident [*Inakomyshliashchii*] Speaks," and "A Russian Heretic [*Raskol'nik*] Tells of the Horrors of Madhouses — Prisons for Dissenters."

B) The film that was shown by the American television company CBS on July 28, 1970, entitled "Voices of the Russian Underground," and the commentary on that film featured in various foreign newspapers and in broadcasts by Radio Liberty, the Voice of America, and the BBC.

C) Anti-Soviet materials of a slanderous nature confiscated during a search of Bukovsky's apartment, as follows: *Chronicle of Current Events* number 17; an "Open Letter to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress" by Pyotr Yakir; an "Appeal by Political Prisoners Ruled Psychiatrically Not Responsible for Their Actions" by Fainberg and Borisov; and a handwritten manuscript entitled "Open Letter to the Twenty-fourth Congress" by an unknown author.

D) V. K. Bukovsky's notebook confiscated during the search of his apartment, in which phone numbers of foreign correspondents are listed.

2. V. K. Bukovsky is guilty of having carried on anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda during several meetings with V. A. Shushpanov, a former employee of the department for foreign relations of the Moscow Patriarchy; also of having asserted that in the USSR sane persons are confined in psychiatric hospitals where inhuman treatment is administered to them, and that personal freedom, freedom of speech, the press, and assembly do not exist in the Soviet Union; also of having discussions with Shushpanov with the aim of persuading the latter to utilize his official missions abroad for the illegal importation of a duplicating machine in order to set up an underground press and print anti-Soviet *samizdat* materials. Evidence of these charges is the testimony given by V. A. Shushpanov during the preliminary investigation and at this trial.

3. V. K. Bukovsky is guilty of having conducted anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda in meetings with Arnold Eduardovich Nikitinsky, who is a customs inspector at Sheremetyevo Airport, having declared that there is no personal freedom in the USSR, that sane persons are interned in psychiatric hospitals in our country for being dissidents, and also having tried to persuade Nikitinsky to take advantage of his official position to help arrange the illegal importation into the USSR of portable printing equipment by getting it through the customs inspection at Sheremetyevo Airport. V. K. Bukovsky's intention in this regard was to organize an underground press for distributing anti-Soviet materials of a slanderous nature.

V. K. Bukovsky is also guilty of illegal possession of two copies of the anti-Soviet magazine *Possev*, which he showed to Nikitinsky.

Evidence to this effect includes the handwritten testimony submitted by Nikitinsky during the preliminary investigation, the taped record of Bukovsky's confrontation with Nikitinsky, and the testimony given by Nikitinsky in court.

4. Bukovsky is guilty of having conducted anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda in the presence of servicemen Bychkov and Tarasov, whom he had just met in the cafe at the Kursk Station. He declared that in the Soviet Union the existing regime does not serve the needs of the Soviet people. He also gave them his phone number and address and the phone number of AP correspondent Astrakhan, proposing to Bychkov and Tarasov that they pass along slanderous information by calling these numbers.

Proof of this is the telephone number of V. K. Bukovsky and Astrakhan in Bychkov's notebook and the testimony of Bychkov and Tarasov given in the preliminary investigation and in court.

5. V. K. Bukovsky is guilty of having met, on March 28, 1971, in the apartment of V. N. Chalidze, with Hugo Sebreghts, a Belgian citizen who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist on instructions of an anti-Soviet Flemish committee. Hugo Sebreghts had been assigned to meet with V. K. Bukovsky. The Flemish committee had given Sebreghts Bukovsky's phone number, which Sebreghts had dutifully noted in his writ-

ing pad. At their meeting in V. N. Chalidze's apartment, Bukovsky passed to Sebreghts two anti-Soviet documents of a slanderous nature — *Chronicle of Current Events*, number 17 and "Open Letter to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress" by P. Yakir, which was later confiscated from Sebreghts at the time of a search.

Proof of these charges is: the conclusion of criminal experts, confirming that the documents taken from Sebreghts and documents with analogous content taken from Bukovsky's apartment during a search were typed on one and the same typewriter; the testimony of Sebreghts given during the preliminary investigation.

V. K. Bukovsky is guilty of having carried out criminal activity under Statute 70, Part I, of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

The court, upon passing sentence has taken into account that V. K. Bukovsky, after having served a term (three years in a labor camp) for an earlier conviction under Statute 190-3 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, continued his criminal activities despite repeated warnings from the prosecutor's office. The court also notes that during the course of the investigation, V. K. Bukovsky acted defiantly, refusing to cooperate with the investigation, and neither in the preliminary investigation nor in court did he acknowledge his guilt.

In the name of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Vladimir Konstantinovich Bukovsky, born 1942 . . . is sentenced to: seven years imprisonment, with the first two years to be spent in prison and the last five in a corrective labor colony; with this sentence followed by five years in exile. The court also orders Bukovsky to pay the court expenses in the sum of 100 rubles. □

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Milestones in the History of Dutch Trotskyism

[In its May issue, the Dutch socialist monthly, *De Internationale*, included an article outlining the history of the far left in the Netherlands from the strong antirevisionist movement before World War I to the revival of revolutionary Marxist ideas among the youth in recent years. Our translation of the article follows.

[*De Internationale* is published by a group formerly linked to the tendency led by Michel Pablo, who broke with the Trotskyist movement in 1965. The group recently applied for membership in the Fourth International (see "Dutch 'International Tendency' Joins Fourth International," in *Intercontinental Press*, May 29, 1972, p. 615).]

* * *

On April 13, 1942, virtually the entire leadership of the Dutch underground revolutionary movement, the Marx-Lenin-Luxemburg Front, were shot in Amersfoort by the fascist occupiers. The most prominent were Henk Sneevliet, Willem Dolleman, Ab Menist, Jan Koeslag, Jan Schriefer, Cornelis Gerritsen, Jan Edel, and Rein Witteveen.

The untimely death of these leaders was an extraordinarily heavy blow for the revolutionary socialist movement in the Netherlands, and it had a long-lasting effect. Even taking into consideration the postwar upsurge of 1945-48, we have to say that after being decapitated in 1942, the revolutionary movement remained a shadow of what it was before the occupation. Only now, and on a still modest scale, have the conditions developed for a revival of revolutionary socialism in the context of the new radicalization that has been developing since 1968.

To a certain extent, 1942 can be regarded as the culmination of a whole historic period in the Netherlands. In this article, we will not go into the first phases of the revolutionary socialist movement, when it was embodied in the tiny Dutch section of the First International and in the very heterogeneous SDB [Sociaal-Democratische Bond—Social Democratic League]. In the SDAP [Sociaal-Democratische Arbeider Partij—Social Democratic Workers party], which developed out of the by then anarchistic SDB, the revolutionary elements were a small minority grouped around the papers *De Nieuwe Tijd* and *De Tribune* (founded in 1907).

In the overwhelming majority of the international Social Democratic workers movement, revolutionary oppositions moving in the direction of forming Communist parties first crystallized under the influence of World War I and the Russian and German revolutions and in the context of a sharpening international class struggle. In contrast to this, the split in the Dutch movement came in 1909 and was based on purely theoretical differences.

This peculiar history contributed in no small way to the revolutionary movement, the SDP [Sociaal-Democratische Partij—Social Democratic party], developing certain sectarian characteristics. Only in the final period of the world war and in the radical period following the Russian revolution did it win any influence in the working class. But this was an influence not so much

on the masses and the mass movement in the broad sense as on a specific part of the working class that was organized in the more or less syndicalist NAS [Nationale Arbeiders Sekretariaat—National Labor Secretariat], which existed from 1893 to 1940. As the Communist party, which had developed in 1918 out of the SDP, became bureaucratized and gradually Stalinized, an opposition arose in close connection with the NAS. The central figure in both the political and trade-union fields was Henk Sneevliet.

Before the first world war, Sneevliet had come to the fore as a left socialist-oriented trade-union leader. He was the president of the Vereniging voor Spoor en Tramwegpersoneel [Railroad and Streetcar Workers Union] and belonged to the Marxist circles in the SDAP that were around the theoretical journal *De Nieuwe Tijd*. In contrast to the leaders of the SDP, he had strong ties with the mass movement, most of all with the rank and file of the NVV [Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigen—Netherlands Federation of Labor Unions] and with the working-class supporters of the SDAP. But he had learned by experience—in the seamen and dockers' strike of 1911—that a revolutionist could not function as a trade-union leader within the framework of the bureaucratic NVV.

With his background, even after his battle with the NVV and SDAP leadership, which ended in the loss of his union position, it was hard for Sneevliet to find his way into the SDP. Temporarily he took refuge in Indonesia, where in a few years (1914-1918), by working in the broad nationalist movement along with a few collaborators, he laid the groundwork for the development of a Communist party with mass influence.

Sneevliet's mass orientation was less successful in China, where as a representative of the Comintern (1921-1923) he helped too much to subordinate the development of the Communist party to an alliance of Soviet Russia and the Comintern with a section of the national bourgeoisie.

After returning to the Netherlands in 1924, he became president of the NAS, which was now closely tied to the CPH [Communistische Partij Hollands—Communist party of Holland] and which numbered a scant 14,000 members.

Thus, he was able to satisfy his need for giving leadership to the daily struggle of the workers in a concrete way and outside the framework of the NVV, as a Communist. Furthermore, in the Communist-oriented wing of the NAS he found a power base for leading the struggle against the sectarian and bureaucratic chiefs of the CPH. The party leadership, however, was overturned in 1925 to make way for a new leading group that was more tightly bound to the Russian bureaucracy and that was out to get rid of the NAS opposition and sacrifice the union itself for the sake of orienting to the NVV. As the CPH became subordinated to the Russian bureaucracy, the possibilities for left Communists waging an opposition struggle could not last very long.

In contact with the International Left Opposition, a small group of Marxists around the theoretical journal *Klassenstrijd* [Class Struggle] carried through a reorientation in the years 1926-27, leading in 1929, after the

break with the Comintern and the CPH, to the founding of the Revolutionair Socialistische Partij [Revolutionary Socialist party].

The new group drew its political inspiration primarily from Trotsky. It did not, however, agree with the concept that the revolutionary opposition should continue to work within the framework of the Communist International, a concept that Trotsky maintained until the total failure of the Communist movement to stop the fascist take-over in Germany in 1933. That Sneevliet and the inner circle around him came into head-on collision with the Comintern and the CPH majority in 1927 was partly connected to the fact that the leadership wanted to adopt an orientation to the NVV at the expense of the NAS and most of all to put an end to the overly close tie between the NAS and the CPH, which enabled Sneevliet to wage an opposition struggle in the party from an uncontrollable power base.

It was, of course, inevitable that sooner or later revolutionary Marxists would have to break with the international Communist movement, which was steadily degenerating into an instrument of the Russian bureaucracy. However, the close tie that Sneevliet and the group of Marxists around him had with a syndicalist-tinged trade-union movement in which they held leading positions and which was much smaller than the mass trade-union movement was to continually mislead them. And the effects of this were all the worse since, after the radicalization of 1918-22, the NAS was to lose ground quickly and fall into deepening isolation. As a result, many workers in the NAS developed a sectarian hostility to the mass trade-union movement. On the other hand, the fact remains that because of its tie with the NAS, particularly in the Stalin period, the revolutionary movement in the Netherlands was never reduced to an intellectual club as it was in other countries, and it continued to play a role in the class struggle.

The problem was a fundamental one that many other revolutionary vanguards have had to face. On the one hand, there was a need for a genuinely revolutionary organization breaking completely with all forms of opportunism and centrism, no matter what their origin (Social Democrat, Stalinist, anarchist, or syndicalist). On the other hand, it was necessary to seek contact with the working class, or at least sections of the proletarian masses, if need be through cooperating with other currents (in this concrete case, the non-Marxist NAS) that did have this kind of contact. Such maneuvers could not be effected without making political concessions. This was true especially in a nonrevolutionary situation and moreover in a period of ebb in the world revolution.

This dilemma is, of course, not posed in abstract and unchanging terms. Whether or not it can be overcome and what priorities should be set depend on the historical circumstances, on the development of the class struggle and the politicalization of sections of the working class.

The historical phase in question was marked by a decline of the revolution and of the entire workers' movement, which, moreover, remained in the grip of the reformist and Stalinist apparatuses. It was marked by the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union and the repercussions of this on the international Communist movement. Capitalism was heading into crisis and this was giving rise to a series of fascist dictatorships in some

countries and extreme reactionary tendencies in the bourgeoisies of others. Political disorientation and demoralization arose also in the oppositionist circles that had broken from the Social Democratic and Communist Internationals.

In this context, the Trotskyist movement gave absolute priority to maintaining and developing the revolutionary Marxist program in opposition to all reformist and cen-



HENK SNEEVLIET

trist forms of opportunism and adaptation (in Social Democratic, Stalinist, or other variants). It stressed above all maintaining a completely independent revolutionary organization of international character.

In the framework of the development outlined, it was inevitable that this determination would lead to collisions with the currents that had broken organizationally from the Second and Third Internationals and were seeking new forms of international socialist collaboration but had not been able to arrive at a truly revolutionary position.

In this international context, the current that for the sake of convenience we call the Sneevliet tendency stood on the left wing, very close to the Trotskyist movement

in the narrower sense. From 1929 to 1935 it led the RSP. In the latter year the RSP fused with the former left opposition in the SDAP, the OSP [Onafhankelijke Socialistische Partij—Independent Socialist party], which had declared itself a party in 1932. The united party was called the RSAP [Revolutionair Socialistische Arbeiders Partij—Revolutionary Socialist Workers party] and existed until 1940, when it was forced underground.

At the international conference of left organizations in Paris in 1933, a minority of four organizations united on a basic revolutionary program which was to be the starting point for the formation of new revolutionary workers' parties and a new International. The signers represented the International Left Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists), the Trotskyists; the SAP [Socialistische Arbeiderpartei—Socialist Workers party] of Germany, which had developed out of the left opposition in the Socialist party; the OSP, and the RSP. Together they formed a committee called "The Center for Forming the Fourth International." It was not a success. After a time, the SAP fell away. The RSP did become a section of the ICL [International Communist League, the Trotskyist organization], but after its fusion with the OSP the united organization, the RSAP, gradually moved away from the Trotskyists in the Center for Forming the Fourth International. In June 1937 a split occurred. A year later, the Trotskyists by themselves founded the Fourth International. Sneevliet and his followers stayed in the RSAP and strove to lay the foundations for a Fourth International in a different way. He thought that the new organization should be based on a number of parties with a real base in the working class, parties which need not necessarily be strictly Leninist and which, in contradiction to Trotsky's concept of a democratic centralist International, should have a large degree of autonomy.

These broader efforts to achieve international ties did lead to some forms of international collaboration—in particular with the Spanish POUM [Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista—Workers party of Marxist Unity]—but did not help in any concrete way to lay the foundations for a new International.

The problem of building the new International was bound up with the Spanish question. Sneevliet and his followers rejected Trotsky's sharp criticism of the POUM's tendencies toward popular frontism and opposed the founding of a Spanish section of the Fourth International. They based this on a position of uncritical support for the POUM. The trade-union question was also a point of constant dissension. Of course, the RSAP supported working in the NVV, since it included the NVV-oriented OSP. But in practice the new party remained in several respects a kind of NAS party, and the Trotskyist movement considered this an unhealthy situation.

Gradually another point of dissension emerged. As a result of the Stalinization of the Soviet Union, doubt arose in broad circles about its character. Was it really a non-capitalist state, a workers state, a degenerated workers state as the Trotskyists argued? This was to become a more and more fundamental point dividing the currents in the left wing of the socialist workers' movement.

After the split and the formation of a Dutch section of the Fourth International, the majority of the Trotskyist-oriented socialists stayed in the RSAP. The section was very isolated and weak, while up until the war the RSAP

continued to number in the thousands and to have real influence among sections of the working class. And, despite its weaknesses, the RSAP had a revolutionary character.

In 1940, the outlawed RSAP formed the Marx-Lenin-Luxemburg Front. Within the framework of this organization—which included the revolutionary organizations that took a principled stand against both fascist and Allied (and Dutch) imperialism and which had also taken part in the February strike—Trotskyists and other elements again worked together. After the shootings of April 13, 1942, the murder of the old leadership, a definitive split occurred.

The non-Trotskyists, or at least part of them, formed the Spartakus group, which was to develop in an anarchosoviet direction and wind up in a blind alley. The Trotskyists formed the Comité van Revolutionaire Marxisten [Committee of Revolutionary Marxists], which in turn formed the Dutch section of the Fourth International. From 1945 to 1951, the latter organization was to be called the Revolutionair-Communistische Partij [Revolutionary Communist party].

After the war little or nothing was to remain of the international groupings in which the RSAP participated following its break with the Center for the Fourth International, or of the non-Trotskyist currents in the RSAP. After the disappearance of the Sneevliet movement, revolutionary continuity was maintained exclusively by the Trotskyists. In particular during the Cold War period, this current suffered severe isolation. But with the development of the massive international youth revolt in the second half of the 1960s, in particular the May-June 1968 movement in France, and with the gradual increase in the prestige of revolutionary Marxist concepts and the growth in strength of the international Trotskyist movement, new perspectives opened up for the revolutionary movement in the Netherlands.

The new possibilities in this period found concrete expression first in the formation of the revolutionary communist youth organization *Revolte* and recently in the development of the left opposition in the PSP [Pacifistische Socialistische Partij—Pacifist Socialist party] into an independent action group, Proletarisch Links [Proletarian Left].

Together with the Dutch section of the Fourth International, these organizations can regard themselves as the sole political heirs of Sneevliet and the RSAP. They are the only ones able to carry on the best elements of this revolutionary heritage and build on them. This means first of all working to lay the foundations of a strong revolutionary vanguard organization, which in turn will give the impetus for a revolutionary workers' party. There can be no question of a new version of the RSAP, certainly not of its ties with the syndicalist-oriented NAS.

With an understanding of all the older and more recent revolutionary experiences and all the mistakes made not only by Sneevliet, the RSP, and the RSAP but also by the international Trotskyist movement, the new organization will undoubtedly be a different one. But it will be able to draw on the best achievements of the prewar movement. Not least in importance of these was a strong and not unsuccessful attempt to get across revolutionary Marxist ways of thinking to the workers. Next we might mention

its proletarian internationalism, in particular the strong tradition of solidarity with the colonial revolution.

Inspired by a critical but positive interpretation of the past, the heirs of Sneevliet and his comrades can begin a new phase, a phase of discussions with all revolutionary currents and elements on preparing a new revolutionary program for the revolutionary organization we want to

build. This organization will combine the best traditions of the RSAP, its ties with the working class, with revolutionary ideas. It will have an analysis of the postwar experience. It will be free of the corruption in the workers' movement caused by the reformists and Stalinists.

The new rise of workers' struggles has opened up a place and a task for such an organization. □

IMG/SL Fusion Conference

[The following account of a conference in London at which the International Marxist Group and the Spartacus League fused forces appeared in the June 5 issue of *The Red Mole*.]

* * *

The fusion conference of the IMG and the Spartacus League was attended by over 500 people on 27-29 May. The discussions at the conference were centred around five central debates; the present political situation, work in the trade unions, Ireland, work amongst women and on the issue of women's oppression, and work amongst students. In addition there were discussions on the international work of the IMG in building the Fourth International, the newspaper, and on work amongst black people. The conference received fraternal greetings from speakers representing sections or sympathising groups of the Fourth International in France, Ireland, Germany, Peru, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Holland. A message of solidarity was also received from the Socialist Workers Party of the United States, which was prevented from attending the conference by the urgent necessity of work against the American blockade of North Vietnam. A speaker was also heard from the Provisional Republican Movement asking for solidarity actions in support of the 20 day hunger strike of Billy McKee, former O/C of the Belfast Brigade of the Provisional IRA now in Crumlin Road Jail, who is demanding status as a political prisoner. One minute's silence was observed for those republicans killed in action in Ireland and for our comrades Peter Graham and Mairin Keegan who had died in the last year. A message of solidarity was sent from the conference to the National Liberation Front of Vietnam and on the Saturday evening a rally was held in solidarity with the Vietnamese struggle at which Robin Blackburn, Tariq Ali, Alain Krivine and Stephanie Coontz of the National Peace Action Coalition of the United States spoke. The conference was started by a one hour report from comrade Ernest Mandel on behalf of the United Secretariat which analysed the development of the Fourth International in the last year and the present stage of the European class struggle.

During the conference four clear po-

litical positions developed. One minority stated that the main task of the IMG should be to build a movement on the issue of Ireland around the three slogans of "Self Determination for Ireland", "Withdraw the troops Now", "Release all political prisoners". The central slogan should be for self determination. In addition movements should be built on the issue of Vietnam and abortion. As a central focus for our work we should urge workers to enter the constituency Labour Parties to campaign on the demand of "Labour to Power on a Socialist Programme". This position received 4 delegate votes for, 113 against and 9 abstentions.

The second minority position held that there should be four main axes of the IMG's work. These were round the issues of Ireland, Abortion, Vietnam and the building of a class struggle wing in the trade unions. In the building of these campaigns they held that the main aim should be mass mobilisations independently of the trade union and other reformist apparatuses. In our work on Ireland our main emphasis should be on the slogan of the withdrawal of troops. The main reporter of this minority stated that the incorrect position of the majority was demonstrated most clearly by their inability to respond rapidly to the upsurge of fighting in Vietnam. This minority received 7 delegate votes for, 115 votes against and 4 abstentions (a summary of this minority's position was printed in *The Red Mole no. 40*).

A third minority position which emerged in the course of the conference, was that to accept the majority document would be disastrous for the organisation. This minority therefore urged that the majority position be not voted on. Some delegates declared they would vote for this resolution on the grounds of the need for a continuing discussion. This position received 27 votes for, 100 votes against and one abstention. Another position was put forward in the form of a resolution that while it rejected the view of this third minority and supported the general line of the majority, nevertheless some of the criticisms were valid and should be incorporated. This was defeated by a substantial majority.

The delegates then passed the general line of the majority perspectives document by 86 delegate votes for, 19 delegate votes

against, 23 delegate abstentions. A summary of this perspectives document appeared in *The Red Mole no. 39* and a resolution embodying its main points is printed below.

Following the voting on the main perspectives document, positions were then voted on concerning Ireland, students, Women, the question of United Front work and on work in the trade unions. The most important of these decisions involved:

1. The Conference was in favour in principle, now that the Anti-Internment League had changed its political positions, of the IMG urging the Irish Solidarity Campaign to enter a process of merger with the AIL and would propose this to the ISC.

2. The new organisation would continue to support the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Student Unions.

3. Amongst women we should continue to work through the Socialist Woman groups and our main work should be on the issue of equal pay/equal work.

4. We supported the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions conference on June 10th.

5. Our main theoretical task was an analysis of the Labour Party and the struggle against economism.

6. Our main organisational task was a strengthening and improvement of our publications.

It was noted in the main report that in

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the last year the forces of the Fourth International in Britain had approximately doubled, that the working class membership of the organisation had increased materially and that we had succeeded in establishing the beginnings of fractions in some industries and trade unions and had the potentiality to do so in some others. The conference finished by electing a National Committee of 21 full members and 14 alternate members. □

Resolution

[The following resolution, referred to in the report above on the IMG/SL fusion conference, appeared in the June 5 issue of *The Red Mole*.]

* * *

1. The main political effort of the organisation in the next year shall be popularisation of the ideas contained in part 6 of the perspectives document and in the document on the united front and trade union work. This resolves itself into three main organisational and political tasks which are conditioned by the political situation.

(a) To organise, using primarily the method of the united front, the struggles not only of the working-class but of all sections of the oppressed. In the present period this involves two fundamental axes. Firstly work in solidarity with the struggle of the Irish people against the forces of British imperialism. Secondly to organise united fronts and rank and file organisations in the trade unions. The political tasks corresponding to these are the struggle within the vanguard for a clear cut line on the subject of self-determination which involves a clear-cut defeatist position with regard to the armed struggle in Ireland, and the question of programmatic clarity on the subject of workers' control and the Labour Party.

(b) The task of the building of the organisation through individual recruitment and in particular of incorporating into the group those advanced workers with whom we have the closest contact. The most important instrument in this is our work on the subject of Ireland and its organisational prerequisite is a strengthening of the central apparatus and the paper of the organisation.

(c) The task of bringing about a realignment of forces within the revolutionary vanguard itself. This concretely boils down to the question of Leninism v Economism. The newspaper, publications, allocation of leadership etc. in the organisation shall reflect these tasks.

These three tasks must be situated within the framework of breaking the most decisive sections of the working-class from social democracy. This will of necessity involve changes in style and content of

the newspaper. Secondly the popularisation of our positions must be situated within a struggle to develop a transitional programme. In beginning to formulate such a programme the new leadership shall be guided by the theoretical principles that:

(a) There exists not transitional programmes for sectors but only one transitional programme for the whole of society.

(b) The content of any transitional programme is the smashing of the capitalist state, lynch-pin of capitalist social relations, which in virtually all conditions is carried out through the propagation and victory of institutions of dual power. Such institutions must be the revolutionary political expression of the working-class, uniting the anti-capitalist struggles of all sections of the exploited and the oppressed and thus be capable of establishing and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. The creation of institutions of dual power which smash the capitalist state-machine and production relations is thus the strategic pivot and substance of the transitional programme.

2. All our political work must be combined with a ruthless ideological struggle for the Leninist conception of the party. This struggle in Britain revolves around combatting the administrative conceptions of the party, traditional within the British "Trotskyist" movement and expressed by the IS, SLL etc. In this fight we must take up the following points:

(a) The building of the party takes as its starting point that it is only on the basis of intervention not merely in all layers of national society but also in the totality of international society that sufficient knowledge for the development of a revolutionary programme can be gained.

(b) The raising of the level of activity of the masses by the revolutionary party is carried out through the organisation of propaganda and agitation (i.e. through the medium of the presentation of ideas — "calls to action" on specific issues either simply flow logically from the content of this propaganda and agitation or fulfil an executive function).

(c) The consciousness of the already active masses among whom the revolutionary party works is not reducible to the ideas which they acknowledge. The consciousness of the masses is a question of all their relationships to their circumstances, the most important circumstance to which they relate being of course the social dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. It is only on this basis that it is possible to understand the uneven development of consciousness within the working-class, including such complex phenomena as Social Democracy and syndicalism.

(d) The task of breaking the working-class from social democratic politics is not a question of exposing the nature of the leadership of the Labour Party but of revealing the bankruptcy of the entire social democratic method of struggle.

(e) In the practical intervention of revolutionaries in the class struggle the "fundamental idea" on which our activity must be based is a concept of the epoch as one in which in a historical sense the bourgeoisie has no progressive role to play and in which capitalism, again in a historical sense, cannot even solve the immediate problems of the working-class. Without such an understanding we are helpless to deal with the Keynesian theories of labourism, the popular frontism of the CP, the gradualism of Labourism etc.

3. The above points define the main political priorities of the organisation but are of course by no means exhaustive. Clearly there will be many conjunctural events during the coming year to which we must be able to turn the forces and attention of the vanguard. In the past the organisation has frequently found it difficult to make sharp turns, particularly in relation to rapid changes in the international conjuncture, such as Vietnam and Bangla Desh. This must be corrected.

4. Our work in the sector of women shall be mediated via the SWGs based on the development of our Marxist analysis of and challenge to the special oppression of women in bourgeois society through the combination of oppression in work, family and in personality expression. This challenge includes combatting bourgeois ideology within the working class and revolutionary movement. The SWGs shall continue to give leadership to the best elements of radicalised women drawing them towards workers in struggle, especially women workers, and linking them to the revolutionary movement as a whole, through their activities and their journal which shall continue to be *Socialist Woman*. The central political campaign, for the current period shall be the equal pay/equal work campaign, and the progress of that campaign shall be assessed after a period of six months.

5. Our work among the masses of students in the coming period will essentially revolve around the question of building united fronts and in particular in relation to the LCDSU and an attempt to build this at the local level on the issue of student union autonomy.

6. The leadership shall arrange a written discussion on the question of governmental slogans.

7. The NC shall organise an internal discussion, including the preparation of documents, on the international questions facing the F.I. and call a conference in time for the election of delegates to the 10th World Congress. □

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