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ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATORS on New York City's Sixth Avenue in wet but huge and spirited April 22 protest. On following day,

students from 100 campuses voted to continue antiwar offensive, endorsing actions scheduled for April 29 and May 4.

## **Students Extend Antiwar Offensive** **Moscow, Peking Shrug Off New Escalation**

## Bundestag Debates Abortion Reform

A special committee of the West German Bundestag held three days of public hearings in mid-April on a proposed reform of Paragraph 218 of the penal code, which prohibits abortion. Two basic proposals were under consideration. One, submitted by the government, would allow an abortion only under certain specified conditions. The other, submitted by fifty-one members of parliament belonging to the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—Social Democratic party of Germany) and the FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei—Free Democratic party), would permit a woman to have an abortion legally until the third month of pregnancy.

Twenty-eight psychologists, psychotherapists, and sociologists testified before the committee. Seven of them were women.

Writing in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* from Bonn on April 11, Jutta Roitsch reported that the witnesses were all agreed that "instead of focusing the question of abortion on coming up with a clever criminal law, the state would do better to show concern for lowering the number of legal and illegal abortions by providing social assistance in the form of child care centers, a new adoption law, an effective counseling system, or a genuine program of housing construction."

The hearings, according to Roitsch (April 13 *Frankfurter Rundschau*), were a "bitter pill" for the SPD-FDP reformers. For while there was agreement that something decisive has to be done in the area of abortion law reform, "people are still not ready to give a woman the right to decide whether or not she wants to become a mother, whether or not she wants to have responsibility for a child whose upbringing will be largely her own burden."

If any abortion reform is adopted during the current legislative session, she concludes, it will most likely be the government's proposal.

In March, East Germany legalized abortion-on-demand during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. □

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Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.  
CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.  
MANAGING EDITOR: Allen Myers.  
COPY EDITOR: Ruth Schein.  
EDITORIAL STAFF: Gerry Foley, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders, David Thorstad.  
BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.  
ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.  
TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Lawrence Rand.

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PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemeene, Paris 4, France.

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# Mass Demonstrations Set Stage for New Protests

By Jon Rothschild

New York

The capitalist press had given the demonstration little advance publicity. The temperature was in the low forties; a cold wind was blowing; heavy rain, which had replaced the early morning hail, fell throughout the day. But despite all this, the U.S. antiwar movement, whose death had been repeatedly proclaimed by capitalist politicians and ultraleftists alike, turned out in force on April 22.

More than 100,000 people walked along the two-mile march route, which took the demonstrators through the center of New York City. At times, the line of march stretched for nearly a mile. It was the largest demonstration to take place in New York in two years. In Los Angeles, the concentration city for the West Coast, some 30,000 people marched in the largest antiwar action ever held in that city.

"The bombs that thundered down on North Vietnam from American B-52's have fractured two years of campus peace," the *New York Times* had editorialized on April 20. "The renewed student antiwar protests make it plain that many youths never relaxed in their distaste for the bloody misadventure in Indochina. But the lid stayed on so long as hope was retained that the Administration would fulfill its pledge to end American involvement."

The *Times* editorial board then proceeded, under the guise of warning against violence, to urge students to "turn eloquence, knowledge and their newly won franchise into a powerful force to hasten the defeat of any political candidate who hedges on the war issue or offers secret, evasive 'plans' for a military solution to a conflict that can only be settled politically."

In some respects the April 22 demonstrations seemed an answer to the hypocritical nonsense in which the *Times* so frequently indulges. The antiwar movement took to the streets in a year unprecedented for an election year. Rather than aiming to de-

feat political candidates who "hedge" on the war question (as the *Times* itself does in its gibberish about "political" settlements), the movement demonstrated its desire to politically defeat the war itself.

The dominant chant at the New York march was "Out Now!" It became almost universal, as speaker after speaker took up the chant, always getting a mass response. There was virtually no one calling for a negotiated settlement, and the set-the-date-for-withdrawal slogan was conspicuously absent.

Equally absent were the high-ranking Democratic party "doves," many of whom have tried to graft themselves onto mass demonstrations in the past. The highest-ranking capitalist politicians to appear on the speakers' platform were a few congressmen and the borough president of the Bronx.

But the real antiwar movement was fully represented: student leaders at universities and colleges that have sparked the latest wave of protests; Jerry Gordon, one of the coordinators of the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), the group that called and organized the march; Daniel Ellsberg; Victor Gotbaum, president of District 37, the second largest trade-union local in the city; David Livingston, president of District 65, another union that has been active in previous marches; Andrew Pulley, vice-presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers party; David Dellinger of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice; John Kerry of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War; Mary Cotter, chairwoman of the Irish Republican Clubs; Fred Lovgren of the Student Mobilization Committee; Dr. Barbara Roberts of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition; and a range of celebrities such as Ruby Dee, Ossie Davis, John Lennon, and Yoko Ono.

Banners and contingents reflected the geographical and political breadth of the action. High-school and college students, labor unions, women's

groups, political parties, oppressed nationalities were all represented. Contingents from the Middle West traveled as far as 1,200 miles to attend.

Despite the weather, the spirits of the marchers were high, but that sentiment was expressed in an extremely organized manner. Even the capitalist press felt obliged to note the efficiency of the NPAC organizers, who were able to move tens of thousands of people through the heart of New York City without a single serious incident or confrontation with the police.


In large part, this was due to the political seriousness of the demonstrators and the consequent absence of ultraleftism. A contingent of about 250 people calling themselves the Attica Brigade split from the official rally to hold a separate, "more militant" action. They chose, of all places, Grand Central Station as the site for their counterdemonstration. They were thoroughly ignored by New Yorkers hurrying to catch their trains.

In addition to the two NPAC marches, about 30,000 people turned out for a San Francisco demonstration organized by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice.

The resurgence of mass antiwar action was sparked by student demonstrations on more than 100 campuses during the week preceding the April 22 actions: rallies, marches, sit-ins, protests against Reserve Officers Training programs and war research projects on campus, etc. In some major centers, students declared strikes. The National Student Association estimated that about 200 campuses ceased "business as usual" on April 21.

These actions amounted to the most significant upsurge in campus antiwar struggle since the reaction to the May 1970 invasion of Cambodia. Thus far, the activities have not reached the pitch of intensity achieved at that time. To some extent, this can be attributed to the lack of an authoritative leadership on a national scale. Action at each college tends to be

### The Light At The End Of The Tunnel . . .



Oliphant, in the Denver Post

spontaneous; coordination among schools is mostly haphazard; in many cases students have been reluctant to commit themselves to all-out action, tending to underestimate the potential response among other sectors of the population.

But the sentiment for full-scale mobilization remains. On April 23, the Student Mobilization Committee, which cosponsored the April 22 demonstrations and has been the most militant section of the antiwar movement, organized an Emergency National Student Antiwar Conference in New York.

Attended by about 700 people from more than 100 schools, the conference endorsed two sets of actions aimed at extending the current antiwar offensive: those on April 29, which has been dubbed "Out Now Day" by NPAC and is the target date for demonstrations in as many cities as possible both in the U. S. and internationally; and national moratoriums throughout the country on May 4, the second anniversary of the killing of four Kent State University students by the Ohio National Guard. The latter action was called by a coalition of antiwar leaders and groups, and has been endorsed by twenty senators and members of congress.

In general, capitalist politicians have not been able to respond to the new wave of antiwar protest in any organized fashion. Unlike the 1968 presidential campaign, the 1972 race has been unable to defuse mass protest. The Democratic party has failed to project a single "peace candidate" with

enough credibility to convince students to spurn mass demonstrations for election campaigning.

On April 20 the Democratic caucus in the House of Representatives succeeded in mustering one concession

to antiwar sentiment. By a 144-to-58 vote, that body decided to denounce the bombing of North Vietnam as a "dangerous escalation" of the U. S. role in the war. The motion instructed the Foreign Affairs Committee to draft "end-the-war" legislation within thirty days.

But the resolution specified that all U. S. prisoners of war must be released before the end of U. S. involvement and condemned "the current military invasion" of South Vietnam by the North.

Since the House has usually voted down "dove" legislation passed in the Senate, Nixon considered the vote a defeat for his policies. "It's a major revolution," said Massachusetts Representative Robert F. Drinan.

But the thousands of people who marched on April 22 have a somewhat different conception of "major revolution." For them, April 22, and not some vote in Congress, was the week's central event. More importantly, it was seen not only as a culmination of activity but also as a prelude—to April 29, May 4, and beyond. □

## Four Soviet Freighters Hit by Bombs

# Moscow, Peking Shrug Off New Escalation of War

By Allen Myers

"On April 16, as a result of bombing and strafing during a raid by American aircraft over Haiphong, the Soviet merchant ships Simferopol, Boris Lavrenev, Samuil Marshak and Selemdzha, anchored in the port, sustained damage in the form of numerous shell holes, including crew quarters.

"The lives and safety of Soviet seamen were imperiled. There are dead and wounded among the port workers who were carrying on freight operations aboard the Soviet vessels."

The damage to Soviet ships during the U. S. bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong underscored the risks Nixon is running in his latest escalation of the Indochina war. In terms of Soviet response, however, the Kremlin bureaucrats let Nixon off the hook. The official Soviet reaction was lim-

ited to a diplomatic protest, delivered April 16, from which the above quotation is taken.

The Nixon administration's reply to the Soviet protest, by its impudent tone, indicated that the Soviet restraint was likely to encourage Nixon to further aggression.

"In recent weeks," the reply said in part, "the North Vietnamese forces have launched massive invasions across the demilitarized zone and from points in Laos and Cambodia against South Vietnam. Countries which supply offensive equipment to the North Vietnamese and enable them to mount an invasion of South Vietnam share responsibility.

"Nevertheless, the Soviet Government may be assured that U. S. authorities will continue [!] to make every effort to avoid any damage to

international shipping."

The U.S. statement did not even express formal apology for the bombing of the Soviet ships, but merely said that any damage was "inadvertent and regrettable."

Despite this calculated addition of insult to injury, the Soviet bureaucrats continued their diplomatic courtship of Nixon.

"The Soviet reaction to the bombings," Terence Smith wrote in the April 23 *New York Times*, "was vigorous in public . . . but muted in private. A formal protest note was delivered to the American Ambassador in Moscow, but there was no follow-up in Washington nor any acrimony between the American and Russian officials engaged in subsidiary negotiations on economic and trade matters. While the controlled Soviet press was condemning the bombings, other Soviet officials were proceeding eagerly with preparations for the Moscow summit."

The Soviet government's willingness to shrug off the bombing of its merchant ships prompted Nixon to threaten another escalation. Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee April 18, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said the administration would "not rule out the possibility" of blockading Haiphong or mining the harbor—an action that would jeopardize not just four Soviet vessels, but all ships sailing to North Vietnam.

The Chinese response to the escalation was equally helpful to U.S. imperialism. Smith wrote:

"The reaction in Peking was equally pragmatic. The Chinese denounced the American air strikes, but as their statements came over the news tickers in Washington, their touring Ping-Pong players were trading pleasantries with the President in the White House Rose Garden. Premier Chou En-lai pledged in an interview that the Chinese would stand behind the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong 'to the end,' but Peking quietly rejected a Soviet proposal for a joint Chinese-Russian statement denouncing 'United States war crimes.'"

The Mao government's refusal of the Soviet suggestion was reported by Tillman Durdin in a dispatch from Hong Kong in the April 20 *New York Times*.

"China has rejected a Soviet proposal," he wrote, "for united action

in support of the Vietnamese Communists, according to a Moscow radio broadcast beamed to China and monitored here.

"Apparently referring to a recent Soviet initiative, the broadcast said the Chinese 'have even refused to issue a joint statement denouncing U.S. crimes.'"

Of the Chinese government's rhetor-



NIXON: "Secret peace plan" includes a ton of bombs a minute on Indochina.

ical support to the Vietnamese, the Soviet broadcast observed:

"The authorities in Washington have long treated such statements casually, especially since Nixon's China visit, because the U.S. ruling clique is well aware that the Chinese ruling clique, to carry out its selfish political conspiracy, is prepared to sacrifice the interests of the people of various countries in Asia."

The Soviet bureaucrats are undoubtedly correct when they say that Nixon has no trouble seeing the reality behind the Maoist propaganda statements. Perhaps this is why the Kremlin does not even go through the motions of issuing such statements itself.

In his column in the April 22 *New York Times*, Anthony Lewis provided a statistic on what the Indochinese

peoples are facing with little more aid than occasional statements of "support": Since Nixon took office, the bombs dropped on Indochina amount to more than a ton for every minute of his administration. On April 23, the U.S. command in Saigon reported that between April 15 and 20 alone, U.S. planes had flown 350 sorties against North Vietnam. During a twenty-four-hour period April 22-23, U.S. planes, including the giant B-52s, flew 285 missions in South Vietnam.

It is a measure of the determination of the Vietnamese liberation forces and of the popular support they enjoy that such massive assaults have not stopped them from inflicting further defeats on the puppet regime in Saigon.

On April 22, Thieu's regime admitted that it was abandoning efforts to rescue its Fifth Division, surrounded in the provincial capital of Anloc. For two weeks, a 10,000-man force, including several "elite" units, had attempted to relieve the city without success.

"The 21st division," Malcolm W. Browne wrote in the April 23 *New York Times*, "was originally sent up the road to relieve Anloc, but that project was given up, and the objective of the division now appears to be its own survival."

Thieu's troops continue to show an understandable reluctance to die for the benefit of U.S. imperialism. In the April 21 *New York Times*, Browne described the capture of Hoaian, a district capital seized by the liberation forces April 19. Saigon's forces had "fled in disorder," he wrote, and had given up the town before it was actually attacked.

Browne quoted the account of an unidentified American who had been present. His story provided a clear illustration of the difference in morale of the opposing forces:

"They were all around us in the hills, two kilometers away, and we knew they were massing. . . . We lost all our militia units—they just piled up their arms and faded away.

"The South Vietnamese troops just wouldn't do anything offensive—no patrolling, no going out to meet the enemy, nothing.

"The North Vietnamese out there, of course, were just the opposite. Once I saw one of them standing on a hill while an F-4 Phantom was coming down on him, and he stayed there, face to face, firing his rifle at it." □

# Mandel Exclusion Debated Before Supreme Court

By George Novack

The U. S. Supreme Court on April 18 heard arguments on the government's appeal against the lower court decision that the Belgian Marxist Ernest Mandel had been unconstitutionally barred from the United States in 1969 and prevented from filling speaking engagements at leading Eastern universities. The case provides a clear test of the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.

Eight distinguished American professors had joined Mandel in bringing the suit under the auspices of the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. Its general counsel, Leonard Boudin, and David Rosenberg of Harvard Law School wrote the brief for the plaintiffs.

The government attorney contended that under the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, Congress had granted the Justice Department unrestricted power to exclude any alien on any ground from this country. The lower court opinion struck down these two sections of the act.

Supreme Court Justice William Douglas asked whether a foreign scholar who wanted to teach Mandel's well-known work *Marxist Economic Theory* could likewise be refused admission. The government attorney answered yes.

Whereas the attorney general had originally offered no reason for excluding Mandel, the government's appeal referred to a trivial technical violation of visa conditions during a previous visit. This was a transparent pretext, since both the American consul at Brussels and the State Department had recommended Mandel's admission after widespread public protest, acknowledging that Mandel had not been informed of any such restrictions.

The government claimed that Mandel's exclusion did not abridge any constitutional right of the academicians since they had access to his views through other media. When Chief Justice Warren Burger asked whether these would include a videotape interview with Mandel, the gov-

ernment said this was permissible but the scholars had no right to demand his personal presence for an exchange of ideas.

Boudin's presentation to the high court came between his participation in the recently concluded Berrigan conspiracy trial at Harrisburg and the pending trial of Daniel Ellsberg in Los Angeles. He opened his reply by pointing out that the case involved the rights of the American plaintiffs, not Mandel's. He strongly denied that the attorney general had "unfettered discretion" to set standards in dealing with aliens. Justice Marshall had earlier indicated doubt that absolute authority in this area had been vested in the administration.

The plaintiffs' plea was based upon three points, Boudin declared. First, in addition to the general public interest, the academic community had a special interest in becoming acquainted with all opinions on crucial questions, if education was to proceed freely in a democracy. Second, the sovereign right of the people to know has precedence over the acts of Congress or the Justice Department. Third, the right to hear is a vital ingredient of the First Amendment right to full

and open debate of political issues.

The discretionary power granted to the attorney general could not be exercised in disregard of the Bill of Rights, as it was in this case, Boudin argued. The barring of Mandel was an arbitrary and capricious act. The government's belated attempt to justify Mandel's exclusion after the fact by dragging in his alleged misbehavior on an earlier visit was sheer "bureaucratic stubbornness."

The arbitrariness of the exclusion was highlighted by the fact that the Justice Department had refused temporary admission in only nine of 5,000 instances, and the circumstances in most of these did not apply to Mandel.

Was Boudin contending that every time a hundred people petitioned to admit an alien, the Justice Department had to open the doors?, Chief Justice Burger asked. Although gradations exist in the application of all rights, Boudin answered, the issues in the Mandel case are too clear and convincing to be overruled.

The court will give its decision on this important civil liberties case some time before the end of its current session in June. □

## West Germany

### Conference Hears Protests of Mandel Ban

Nottingham

The case of Ernest Mandel, who was banned from West Germany after having been invited to take up an appointment at the Free University of West Berlin, was raised at one of the largest trade-union meetings in West Germany April 13.

The fourth conference on "The Challenge of the Future," to which I. G. Metall [Industriegewerkschaft Metall—Metalworkers Union] had invited academics from all over the world, considered reports from political leaders,

trade unionists, writers, and academicians on different matters concerning "The Quality of Life."

Ken Coates of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation had been invited to participate in the gathering in order to read a paper on workers' control. He introduced his remarks by saying:

"I was delighted, and indeed moved, to be invited to participate in this conference. . . .

"Yet I approached your frontier with some apprehension, because, before leaving England, I read the dossier on the case of Professor Ernest Man-

del. Professor Mandel has written a great deal on my topic for today. Much of what he has written is of considerable importance, and I have certainly learned a great deal from his work.

"You will understand that when I read of his deportation I could not come to Germany without some trepidation, since I myself am certainly guilty of the same crimes of which he stands accused. I have no greater love for the values and institutions of capitalism than he has, and I am no less enthusiastic than he for the success of the German workpeople and their trade-union organisations. Why then was I not deported as well? There is only one plausible reason for this: he is a considerably more distinguished scholar than I am. It seems that the qualification for deportation is strictly confined to academic distinction.

"By inviting many of us whose opinions are, I hope, no less subversive than Professor Mandel's, I. G. Metall has displayed a considerable democratic commitment which contrasts with the behaviour of the state authorities, to the great credit of the trade unions. I take leave to hope that you will do still more to uphold the free commerce of opinion, by interceding in this case to uphold freedom of expression."

Considerable applause greeted this statement, and it was clear that there was strong feeling in the audience about the whole Mandel case.

The conference was also presented with a petition, signed by the following participants: Andre Gorz, Ken Coates, Alessandro Pizzorno, Heinz Kuby, Wolfgang Roth, G. Cella, Serge Mallet, Maurice Chaumont, Alberto Tridente, Robert Jungk, Albert Mercier, H. Claasen, Pierre Naville, and Hans Kopp. The petition read:

"We very much appreciate the opportunities which have been given to us by the I. G. Metall to participate in a free and wide-ranging discussion of crucial social issues. In convening such a meeting, and holding it open to persons with very different points of view, the I. G. Metall is upholding high traditions of democracy. In this connection we feel it necessary to protest against the contrasting actions of the German Government, which recently deported Professor Ernest Mandel in order to prevent his view from being heard in this country. Such inter-

ference with freedom of opinion has a European significance, and must concern all of us, many of whom may expect to be similarly affected, whatever our views, if the principle of State licensing of those opinions which are to be heard gains further currency. As Professor Mandel has said him-

## France

### Edith Beauvais—Revolutionary Militant

[The following is translated from the April 8 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, the French section of the Fourth International.]

\* \* \*

The Ligue Communiste and the Fourth International have just lost a very valuable militant. Edith Beauvais was killed in an automobile accident near Valence.

Edith had come to revolutionary Marxism in Canada, her country of origin. She joined the Trotskyist movement during the early 1960s, when she was very young, and the Trotskyist nuclei were still the "pariahs" of the workers' movement.

A member of the Canadian organization (League for Socialist Action-

self, 'Free circulation should not be confined to goods and capital, but should embrace also persons and ideas.' We earnestly hope that our generous hosts will be able to prevail upon the German State authorities to reconsider this retrogressive decision." □

Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière), she participated actively in building the Québec branch, working especially in Montréal.

In 1967, after a one-year stay in Cuba, she came to France and joined the Parti Communiste Internationaliste, then the French section of the Fourth International. Edith participated actively in building the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire, and later the Ligue Communiste. But the major part of her activity was devoted to international work, in the international commissions of the United Secretariat. Both the French and foreign comrades who worked with her knew her effectiveness and devotion. In losing her, we have lost a real revolutionary militant. We will continue her fight! □

### British Soldier Seeks Asylum in Sweden

London

Lance-Corporal Kevin Cadwallader is the first British soldier to seek political asylum in Sweden because of his opposition to Britain's military presence in Ireland.

"I have left the Army rather than fight in something I think is wrong," the twenty-one-year-old soldier told London *Times* reporter Roger Choate in Stockholm March 31.

Cadwallader left for Sweden on March 7 after learning that his Hampshire unit of the Royal Engineers would be sent to Northern Ireland.

"He explained that when he joined the Army two years ago he had no idea he would be asked to go to Northern Ireland 'and shoot civilians,'" Choate wrote in the April 1 *Times*.

"If I could see a reason for it," Cadwallader said, "or if the Irish came in to kill us, then maybe there would be a good reason to fight. . . ."

"Our squadron would be patrolling streets, and setting up barricades, and

you just would not know if the time would come when you would have to kill a civilian. I'd not want that kind of blood on my hands."

When asked if the Army had ever told him or his mates what they could do if they felt they were being asked to do something morally wrong, Cadwallader replied:

"The only thing they ever told us was that if we don't obey, we'll get sent to the guardhouse. I had no choice. There was no one in the Army I could talk to about this. Or, at least, I was never told there was anyone."

On March 17, an American deserters' group in Stockholm, acting on Cadwallader's behalf, submitted his application for political asylum to the National Immigration Board. Few of the deserters who go to Sweden from the United States, France, Portugal, and other countries are given political asylum.

It seems likely that Cadwallader will be given a resident's permit in Sweden, but for "humanitarian" rather than political reasons. □

## Injunctions Used Against Quebec General Strike

[The following article is scheduled for publication in *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist biweekly published in Toronto.]

\* \* \*

APRIL 18—As the general strike of some 200,000 public sector workers entered its second week, thousands of strikers demonstrated outside the National Assembly building in Québec City today.

A few hours earlier, leaders of the Front Commun [Common Front] of the three labor centrals had announced rejection of the Bourassa government's latest "take it or leave it" offer—a paltry wage increase of between 5.3 and 6 percent a year in a three-year contract.

The biggest strike in Canadian history has closed schools, courts, liquor stores, and government operations. Pickets are patrolling outside hundreds of hospitals and public institutions across Québec.

The decision to launch a general strike of indefinite duration was announced jointly by the leaders of the Front Commun following four days of information meetings throughout the province. The 11,000 regional delegates made it clear that the membership considered another twenty-four-hour general strike like that of March 28 to be an insufficient response to the Liberal government's arrogant refusal to make any important concessions. Negotiations with the government were broken off April 5.

The Front Commun unites all public service workers in the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CSN), the Québec Teachers' Corporation (CEQ), and the Québec Federation of Labor (FTQ).

When the unlimited general strike began April 11, the 6,000 Protestant teachers in Montréal, most of them English-speaking, joined in. The Catholic teachers in Montréal had been the only major group to vote against general strike in the March balloting. But the Toronto *Globe and Mail* reported that by the second day, "the number of Montreal Catholic schools shut

down increased by the hour as the bands of pickets roamed from school to school, forcing non-striking teachers to leave their posts."

The Catholic School Commission reported that 56 of the 67 high schools in the French sector had been forced to close down, together with 10 of the 14 schools in the English sector.

With virtually all government operations except the provincial police shut down, the capital city looked to some as it had under the War Measures. "The strike has given the appearance of a government in exile," the *Globe's* Québec correspondent noted, "and created a situation reminiscent of that during the October kidnap crisis of 1970."

Virtually imprisoned in the National Assembly building, Premier Robert Bourassa, the newspaper reported, "has been working, eating, sleeping in his combination office-bedroom quarters since the strike . . . began."

Writing in the Montréal revolutionary-socialist newspaper *Libération*, André Charbonneau commented: "The most serious threat facing the strikers is the possibility that the Bourassa government will adopt a strikebreaking law to force the unionists back to work in order to impose a police 'ruling' on the conflict. It seems that the government's strategy is twofold: first, to mount a massive campaign of lying propaganda in the daily press to mobilize public opinion against the striking workers and to divide the union members themselves by fooling the weaker elements; then, to proceed with partial injunctions in particular sectors before passing on to the use of the big club."

The mass media are full of scare stories about hospital patients lying untended at death's door—"psychological terrorism," in the words of the FTQ's president Louis Laberge—to justify the large number of injunctions being issued against the strikers.

The Front Commun leaders have instructed strikers to ignore injunctions, and the unions themselves have taken measures to maintain "vital services" affecting human life, as in the

hospitals. Many local unions, summoned before the courts for violating injunctions, face penalties ranging up to \$50,000 a day and their leaders could be sentenced to up to one year in jail.

The only breach in the Front Commun—but a major one—was the defection April 13 of three locals of the Canadian Union of Public Employees, representing 8,500 Hydro-Québec workers. The government has, from the beginning of contract talks, tried to isolate the Hydro workers, for example by refusing to integrate them into the general wage scale of the Front Commun.

So far, most of the concessions in the bargaining have been by the unions, which have cut back wage demands from 46 percent to 28 percent increases over three years. A key demand is an across-the-board minimum wage of \$100 a week.

The public workers' struggle is an important one for all Québec workers. Less than 30 percent of the Québec labor force is organized, and one-third of these are now on strike. What they win will set the pace for workers in private industry.

The strike is significant for other reasons, too. Sixty percent of the strikers are women, and 36,000 of the 40,000 public workers making less than the \$100 minimum demand are women. And they are young—45 percent of the strikers are listed as not married.

The strikers represent a cross-section of the new layers of the work force—teachers, functionaries, hospital workers, women, and youth—who have been in the forefront of the upsurge in union organizing and labor militancy in recent years. Many have only recently entered the labor force from the hothouse nationalist and political ferment of the university campuses and junior colleges of the "Quiet Revolution." They are fed up with the low-wage occupations they have been forced to take. They are militant and determined.

To cut across the government and media propaganda campaign, firm

up the strikers' ranks, and mobilize public opinion behind their demands, *Libération* projects the need for a strike newspaper, daily mass meetings open to all, and the formation of strike support committees to draw in the student movement and other layers of the population—combined with a strategy involving the use of mass picket lines and solidarity demonstrations.

The general strike is a massive confrontation between labor and the Bourassa government—yet the major problem facing the public workers is the total absence of support from any of the major political parties, including the Parti Québécois (PQ).

PQ leader René Lévesque has refused invitations from the labor leaders to solidarize with the strikers, proclaiming, "We are a party which will some day be called upon to form the government and we also have a penchant for the state, regardless of the party in power."

Thus the general strike poses in the sharpest way the need for labor political action independent of the capitalist parties. *Libération* concludes: "The civil service strike constitutes a power test of forces which can only open a new perspective of anticapitalist struggle before the Québec working class and before the whole nation." □

## Unions Call Quebec Strikers Back to Work

Québec union leaders ordered striking public employees to return to work April 22, according to a report in the April 23 *New York Times*. The action came one day after the provincial assembly had passed legislation imposing "heavy penalties on the strikers. The newspaper said that

union officials had attempted unsuccessfully to rally support for defiance of the new law.

Under the terms of the bill, negotiations are to continue until June 1, with the Québec government imposing a settlement if agreement has not been reached by that date. □

## Tension Developing Between Budapest and Moscow

### Protests by Hungarian 'Maoists' Reported

Hungarian students may have begun to overstep the bounds of the "liberalization" policies currently being effected by the bureaucracy. According to a Vienna dispatch printed in the April 12 *New York Times*, travelers arriving in that city from Budapest reported that March 15 saw the first major antigovernment demonstration since 1956.

The unnamed sources said that students shouted down a Communist party speaker who was addressing a rally commemorating the 1848 revolution. The students then broke away from the official rally and marched to the statue of Alexander Petofi, a poet who was active in the 1848 struggles. Police armed with truncheons reportedly set up a barricade to prevent the demonstrators from reaching the statue; a clash occurred and "there

were scores of arrests."

The travelers said the students were "led by Maoists, or those who believe in permanent revolution," and described the attitude of the demonstrators as "anti-Establishment."

An April 13 United Press International dispatch from Budapest reported that "Hungarian officials" had acknowledged that a conflict had taken place March 15 when a group of youths split from the rally, which had been organized by Kisz (the CP youth organization). The officials described the group as "a small minority with no political background." They claimed to have no information about clashes between demonstrators and police, or about arrests.

In recent weeks the Hungarian bureaucracy's liberalization policies—de-

centralizing economic control, expanding material incentives for workers, expanding trade with the West, increasing utilization of market mechanisms—have led to public conflict with the Kremlin.

A February 3 dispatch from Budapest published in *Pravda* claimed that "under present conditions" there was "a greater need [in Hungary] for the struggle against various manifestations of nationalist ideology."

"The intrigues of Zionism have increased lately," the article added. "In Hungary, Zionism is particularly on the lookout in places where the philistine way of life still exists."

"Nationalist ideology" is Kremlinese for the Hungarian bureaucracy's attempt to reduce its dependence on Moscow. "Zionism," for the Stalinists is simply a code word for "Jews."

The *Pravda* article was answered several days later by Karoly Nemeth, a member of the Hungarian CP Political Bureau. In a widely publicized speech, Nemeth called for a struggle against "hostile and erroneous views," among which he specifically included anti-Semitism. No other leading Eastern European bureaucrat has ever, even in so indirect a manner, attacked the Kremlin's anti-Semitism.

The latest public acknowledgment of divisions between the Hungarian and Soviet bureaucracies came on March 29, when Hungarian Premier Jeno Fock returned to Budapest from visiting Moscow. He held an impromptu press conference at the airport.

The two sides, said Fock, had been "unable to reach a final agreement" on Soviet support for Hungary's economic plans.

The explanation for the failure to reach agreement seemed hardly designed to improve Hungarian attitudes toward the Kremlin. "We Hungarians would like to improve the structure of our industry and develop an industrial structure that is more suitable to our national economy; this, too, required the understanding and intentions of Soviet comrades to help.

"Here at home we have had to wrack our brains as to the proposals we could make that would greatly interest the Soviet comrades and would be good not only for the Soviet Union but also useful and necessary for Hungary." □

## Widgery Verdict: Irish Should Avoid British Bullets

By Gerry Foley

"I saw a man and his son crossing the street, trying to get to safety, with their hands on their heads. They were shot dead. The man got shot dead. The son I think was dying.

"I saw a young fellow who had been wounded, crouching against the wall. He was shouting 'don't shoot, don't shoot.' A paratrooper approached and shot him from about one yard. I saw a young boy of 15 protecting his girl friend against the wall and then proceeding to try and rescue her by going out with a handkerchief and with the other hand on his hat. A paratrooper approached, shot him from about one yard into the stomach, and shot the girl into the arm."

This is how Italian journalist Fulvio Grimaldi described the massacre of thirteen civil rights marchers in Derry city, Northern Ireland, on January 31, 1972. (*The Irish Times*, February 1, 1972.)

"Then as we were watching out of the back window into the Market, we saw three soldiers grab hold of a middle-aged man. They kicked, punched, and battered him and took him away over the 'Fish' lane. There was a First Aid boy running to the aid of this man but he was also punched and kicked and thrown on the ground and they [the troops] shot a rubber bullet at him. He was still lying on the ground and Father Daly called him. As prior to this I saw a soldier with a black moustache shoot the boy dead that Father Daly was attending and Father Daly held up a cloth with blood dripping from it to try and get them to stop shooting. They shot at him." (Celine Brolly's statement to the investigation committee set up by the Derry Civil Rights Association.)

"I went to my front window and I saw a youth fall at Glenfada Park—his head was on the kerb and his body on the street. He moved slightly and just as I was going out to him more shots rang out, the youth's body

jerked and lay still. A soldier jumped over his body and then stood at the Housing Trust Office—a youth in blue denims ran with his hands above his head toward the wounded youth, he fell shot beside this youth. He also moved and the soldier shot twice at him again. A Knight of Malta (female), ran toward them, more shots rang out and she had to dive on her mouth and nose. The soldier then retreated; the shooting eased and men were able to lift the three youths and bring one to my house and two next door. These three youths died." (Statement of William Reilly to the Derry Civil Rights investigating committee.)

"I was in the doorway of Rossville Flats. There were two young fellows and another woman. The Saracens [armored personnel carriers] pulled up alongside the doorway. The minute they stepped out, they opened fire at the fleeing crowd. The young fellow McDaid and other young fellows were running across the car park. The paratroopers called out to them to halt. They did so and they were arrested and put into the Saracen. They threw gas in on top of them. The three of them jumped out. They put McDaid up against the wall beside Chamberlain Street. He held his hands on his head and they shot him. I went berserk and a fellow carried me up to the second floor of the flats and I was taken in. It was an execution." (Statement of Mrs. Mary Friel to the Derry Committee.)

In view of the international outcry over the shootings in Derry, the British government set up a special investigating tribunal. To head this body, it named its most honored jurist, Lord Widgery, the Lord Chief Justice of England. For two months, according to the traditions of British law, the matter was kept *sub judice*, which meant that the press could not comment on it and thus threaten the objectivity of the court.

On April 19, Lord Chief Justice Widgery gave his verdict on the cause

of the massacre.

"On the crucial question of who fired first, for example," Alvin Shuster wrote in the April 20 *New York Times*, "Lord Widgery said that he was 'entirely satisfied' that the initial firing came from a sniper. He said he came to this conclusion not from the testimony of any one witness, but from listening over many days to evidence and 'watching the demeanor of witnesses under cross-examination.'"

The British ruling class, of course, has a long experience in spotting those telltale signs in the faces and postures of Irish people that reveal the deceitfulness of rebels.

The blame for the shootings rested, to judge from the Lord Chief Justice's verdict, on the leaders of the 30,000 people who had asserted their democratic right to demonstrate on January 31 in Derry. "The findings of the inquiry also blamed the organizers of the illegal march for creating a 'highly dangerous situation,'" Shuster noted.

The Chief Justice did seem to try to be objective:

"Lord Widgery said that the army was not without some blame. He stated that the firing by some troops 'bordered on the reckless.'"

In his report, Lord Widgery offered a "cool and detached assessment" of the most embarrassing incidents. "Patrick Joseph Doherty—he was certainly hit from behind whilst crawling or crouching, because the bullet entered his buttock and proceeded through his body almost parallel to the spine. Soldier F said he fired as a man turned away, which would account for an entry wound in the buttock [Lord Widgery delicately did not inquire any further into the geometry of the affair]. In the light of the evidence, I conclude that he was not carrying a weapon. If Soldier F shot Doherty in the belief that he had a pistol, that belief was mistaken."

Another man was wounded in the same part of his anatomy:

"Kevin McElhinney—he was shot while crawling southwards along the pavement on the west side of No. 1 block of Rossville Flats at a point between the barricade and the entrance to the flats. The bullet entered his buttock, so that it is clear that he was shot from behind by a soldier in the area of Kells Walk. It seems probable that the firer was Sergeant K, a qualified marksman who fired

only one round in the course of the afternoon. He described two men crawling from the barricade in the direction of the door of the flats and said that the rear man was carrying a rifle. He fired one aimed shot but could not say whether it hit. I was much impressed by Sergeant K's evidence."

No doubt the sergeant's story livened up the talk in the Chief Justice's social circle. ("Well, old chap, they hit two of those bastards right on the spot. That K—God bless him—he could notch the tail of a tiger or shoot the eyes out of a Mau Mau.")

The deliberate intent of the massacre, however, was entirely clear, even without the testimony of the paratrooper Peter McMullan who fled to the formally independent part of Ireland because his unit had been given orders well in advance to stage the slaughter. The aim was to drive the civil rights demonstrations off the street, just as the women's neighborhood-defense groups had been driven off the streets by the murder of two sisters in the Clonard section of Belfast in October 1971.

The shameless whitewash of the Derry murders shows that the British government still intends to beat the nationalist population into submission by brute force. It is not prepared to negotiate with any section of the nationalist community except on the basis of "military victory." Tom Conaty, chairman of the Belfast Central Citizens' Defense Committee and one of the leading Catholic conservatives, seemed to recognize this when he said about the Widgery report: "It destroys the credibility of anyone who says, 'Give Britain a chance. She will do the right thing.'"

Coming in the wake of the British military's calculated murder of the popular Official IRA leader Joseph McCann on April 15, the Widgery report leaves no doubt about the British government's plans for "pacifying Ulster." Nor is there any doubt where the American capitalist class stands on this matter. The *New York Times*, the most authoritative voice of the imperialist successors of the British ruling class, wrote in an editorial April 22: ". . . even the most extreme cannot effectively challenge the first of Lord Widgery's conclusions about responsibility for the Derry disaster: 'There would have been no deaths . . . if those who had organized the

illegal march had not thereby created a highly dangerous situation in which a clash between demonstrators and the security forces was almost inevitable.'"

In other words, as an American Sergeant K might put it, "Anybody who doesn't sit down and shut up deserves to get shot." While the American ruling class uses the old British methods on a much vaster scale, it cannot quite manage the same bland hypocrisy.

## More Leftists Arrested in Feltrinelli Case

Two men, Giuseppe Saba and Augusto Viel, have been arrested in connection with the mysterious death of Italian publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli. The arrests took place during an April 15 raid on an apartment on the outskirts of Milan.

Saba was wanted as the owner of the Volkswagen bus that was found near the high-tension pylon where Feltrinelli's body was discovered on March 14.

Viel is accused of having killed a bank messenger in an armed robbery in Genoa last year. He is charged with being a member of an "October 22" group, said to consist of terrorists in Genoa responsible for various bombings, a kidnapping, and operation of an illegal radio station. Fifteen persons charged with membership in the group have already been arrested, and two more are being sought.

During the raid on the Milan apartment, a number of items were found that were said to have belonged to Feltrinelli. Among them were some clothes, coded notes, and a letter addressed to someone known as "Saetta." The letter was said to outline plans for revolutionary activity by far-left groups.

Not long after this discovery, a prominent political figure in the Genoa vicinity, Paolo Castagnino, was detained and charged with "organizing armed bands" and "armed insurrection against the state." Castagnino, a leader of the Communist group in the town council of Chiavari, had used the alias "Saetta" (lightning) as a partisan during World War II. So, however, had scores of other persons in

There is only one answer to this kind of repression—mass action in the streets of as many cities as possible to scandalize British policy and its supporters. An ad hoc committee organized a demonstration in February that held up the *New York Times* for some hours from delivering its advertisement-swollen Sunday edition. A much broader and better-organized group, the New York Anti-Internment Coalition, is planning another mass demonstration on May 13. □

the Genoa region, former partisans pointed out, charging that police had arrested the wrong man.

The Communist party denounced Castagnino's arrest as a provocation aimed at influencing the May 7-8 elections. Castagnino was released on April 17, twenty-four hours after his arrest, and just as a general strike was beginning in the Genoa port to protest it. Officials admitted that he had no connection with the Feltrinelli case.

The incident was an example of the high-handed methods police investigators have been using. These methods have come under sharp criticism, not only by the far-left but even by a large, moderate newspaper like *La Stampa* in Turin, which has accused investigators of violating the penal code in their search for evidence.

In another development related to the Feltrinelli case, journalist Camilla Cederna and her two codefendants were acquitted in Milan after being put on trial on April 11 for "spreading false, exaggerated, or tendentious news." The three had published a statement in which they asserted that Feltrinelli had been murdered—an idea that merely reflected very widespread doubts about the circumstances surrounding the publisher's death. The legal provision under which they were charged was incorporated into the fascist penal code in 1931, and is aimed purely and simply at stifling the expression of opinions. The Senate had already voted to modify the provision by striking out the terms "exaggerated and tendentious" as too subjective, but the House had not yet had a chance to pass the reform. □

## Growing Worker and Student Struggles in Spain

[The following interview with a leader of the Spanish Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR—Revolutionary Communist League) is reprinted from the April 15 issue of *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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*Rouge.* Following the workers' struggle at the Barcelona SEAT complex last October, important workers' mobilizations—as well as student struggles—developed around the renewal of collective bargaining. What is the significance of this new wave of workers' mobilizations in the context of the worsening crisis of the regime?

*LCR.* Since the struggles against the Burgos trials in December 1970, the Francoist regime has found itself confronted by a rising and increasingly politicized mass movement. The character of the current struggles must be understood in this context. The lessons of the SEAT strike—the demands advanced, the organizational forms thrown up, and above all the massive response given to the attacks by the repressive forces—have been assimilated by wide layers of workers.

So since then we have seen many workers' struggles—the formation of factory assemblies, the defense of unitary demands, the formation of defense marshals, and the organization of solidarity on a local scale. The forty-two-day Michelin strike in Victoria, the seventy-eight-day Elesa strike in Zarauz (both of them in Basque country), and the Commetesa strike in Barcelona are exemplary struggles that show real progress in this sense.

The struggle of the Barzan workers in El Ferrol represented a very important step forward in terms of its level of combativity, its practical exposure of the futility of collective bargaining and, above all, in the movement of solidarity it engendered on a regional and even national scale.

At the same time, the attitude of the repressive forces once again revealed the real character of the "liberalization" recommended by certain forces supporting the regime, as well as the emptiness of illusions that the regime can be overthrown by peaceful means.

Thus, all these struggles take on a deep political significance insofar as the workers' movement, despite its organizational weakness, begins to pose in a very concrete way the necessity for preparing generalized, nationwide struggles that can decisively intensify the crisis of Francoism.

*Rouge.* What is the real importance of the student struggles in the process of strengthening the student movement?

*LCR.* Between December 1970 and December 1971 the student movement did not regain its coordination and unity. But in the December 10 district assembly in Barcelona and the first struggles of the medical students in Madrid, we saw a real resurgence of the student movement—one that would lead to the January and February mobilizations in solidarity with the medical students.

These mobilizations set the outlines of a united response against the imposition of the General Education Law (especially against the selection process) and against the presence of police in the university and the consequent repression.

The massive character of this fight, the radicalization achieved during the confrontations with the police, and finally the extension of solidarity to other areas of struggle (other universities, high schools, interns at the hospitals) would finally make the government retreat and lift its sanctions against the medical students.

On February 14 the Communist party called for a general teachers' strike. This action, which was also supported by other organizations including ours, got a good response particularly in the high schools, but even in the religious teachers' colleges. In Madrid the day's action was not a suc-

cess because the university had been closed.

Later, the March 1-8 days of struggle, despite a decrease in student participation compared to the February mobilizations, gave the movement an opportunity to catch its breath and organize for future actions.

In the course of all these struggles, the student movement attained a power and political level far superior to its best days before 1969.

*Rouge.* What was the LCR's participation in these mobilizations?

*LCR.* As far as the workers' struggles are concerned, the LCR participated in certain struggles, at Commetesa in Barcelona for example, where the strike was led by an assembly and elected committee responsible to all the workers.

In all the factories where the LCR intervened, we tried to effect unity in action with other organizations to aid the extension of struggle and the development of solidarity. Also, from the beginning of the struggle we strongly insisted on the necessity of organizing self-defense, given the inevitable confrontations with the repressive forces that such struggles produce.

As to the student struggles, we can say that in Madrid the LCR played a very important role in the mobilizations of the past several months. From the beginning of the movement the LCR called for the formation of Action Committees to organize solidarity with the medical students. These committees, which included about 400 students, pointed out the necessity of expanding the movement and building a General Assembly of the whole university. We also called for demonstrations organized with marshals, etc.

The Communist party on the one hand and the Action Committees on the other were, in practice, the two most important political forces.

In Madrid the University Organization of the CP and the Student Committee of the LCR issued a joint appeal for a day of struggle on March

1. This was an important step in organizing unity in action in the student movement, but in some respects (how to organize the day, the problem of self-defense) the call was insufficient or ambiguous. On that day there were quickie demonstrations and actions in front of the schools.\*

Again in Madrid on March 8 the LCR proposed joint actions to the other organizations (CP, Maoists). Even though most of them refused to participate, there was a public demonstration. Because marshals were organized to defend the demonstrators, the action came off despite police occupation of the quarter. The same day, the LCR held a secret rally that drew about 600 students.

Finally, the LCR called for a demonstration March 15 in solidarity with El Ferrol workers. About 800 persons turned out, among them some CP members and a substantial number of young workers.

*Rouge. In view of the scope of all these actions, how do you expect coming struggles to develop—May 1 for example?*

LCR. The present political situation is quite tense, and we must expect mobilizations of a political character in the coming months. The Construction Workers Commission in Madrid has already called for a strike in this sector (about 100,000 workers) for the week of April 24-29. Actions have been projected in other sectors as well.

The LCR will mobilize all its forces so that these actions will be well organized and will lead to important progress in the radicalization of wide

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\* The CP leadership—because of the weakness of its organizational hold on the workers' vanguard, and because it is confronted by a far-left that despite its divisions seems to be growing in the present period—finds itself obliged to follow a somewhat flexible policy toward its left. Thus, the March 14 *Mundo Obrero* (the CP organ) referred to unity in action with the LCR in Madrid in these terms: "The Madrid University Organizing Committee of the Communist party of Spain and the Student Committee of the Revolutionary Communist League have published a joint call for struggle against the General Education Law and for a strike to begin May 1, 'without implying that we have forgotten the deep strategic and tactical differences' between the two organizations." This must be surprising for people in France who know the attitude of the French CP leadership toward the "gauchistes." — *Rouge*

layers of workers. In the case of the construction strike, many workers have already drawn the balance sheet of the last strikes and are prepared to organize themselves better this time—despite the restricting role played by the CP—above all in terms of protecting strikers from repression and ensuring democratic organization of the movement.

We hope that the May 1 demonstration can take on a political im-

port and a mass character that will encourage the workers' movement to deal decisive blows against the dictatorship.

On its part, the LCR will also call upon other groups to organize a day of solidarity with the Indochinese revolution in connection with the international campaign now being conducted. Given the situation in Spain, we also consider this a preparation for May 1. □

## Indonesia

### 10,000 Without Hope in Jungle Prison

"We proceeded up the river, and soon all signs of human habitation disappeared. Small birds scouted the shallows for insects, and we saw a couple of crocodiles yawning voluptuously in the sun. The forest loomed all around, utterly impenetrable, and the slow brown water washed back thickly from our bows. There seemed a countless number of mosquitoes and flies to pester our eyes and lips. Two hours up the river, at a cleared patch in the forest, the landing craft walled around to the bank and dropped its door. We scrambled out and were instantly surrounded by saluting soldiers. They led us from the bank to a trail cut out of the forest, which led us presently to an area of fields and wooden huts."

Dom Moraes, author of the above lines, was part of the first small group of journalists permitted to visit the island of Buru, Indonesia, where nearly 10,000 political prisoners are held by the Suharto regime. His report of the trip was published in the March 5 issue of *The Asia Magazine*.

In 1965 the white terror that was unleashed in the aftermath of a right-wing military *coup d'état* destroyed the largest Communist party in the capitalist world. Some 500,000 people were killed and countless thousands were imprisoned. Few have ever been brought to trial.

The regime created three classes of prisoners. Class A consisted of "known Communists" who were supposedly "provably" involved in what the government claims was an attempted *coup* by leftists in 1965. Class C included those only suspected of adherence to

the Communist party. (The government claims that several thousand of these have been released.)

Class B was a sort of no-man's-land—including supposedly "known Communists" not provably involved in the alleged *coup*. These prisoners were not accused of committing any specific act, and thus know that they will be neither released nor tried so long as the present regime holds power.

In 1969 the government began moving Class B prisoners out of the prisons in Java, sending them to remote jungle camps where they would be totally isolated from the outside world. The camps at Buru, some 1,500 miles east of Djakarta, were built in 1969 to accommodate Class B prisoners.

According to a General Wadli, who is in charge of Buru, there are 9,957 prisoners on the island. Sixty-five were university graduates, including thirteen economists and twelve teachers; 343 others were from "various academies" but never completed their studies. Everyone practiced some religion, a distinctly odd fact in a camp inhabited by supposedly hard-core Communists, but Wadli insisted such was the case.

Buru is hardly an island paradise. Located in a tropical rain forest that Moraes said reminded him of the Amazon jungle, it is replete with the usual fauna. Mosquitoes—the anophelous kind and as big as dragon flies—infest the area. Consequently, malaria is widespread.

The eighteen camps of the Buru prison colony were built by the prisoners themselves. For eight months after ar-

rival, a prisoner is given rations by the government. The detainees work at clearing the jungle, building huts, and starting agriculture. After the eight months, prisoners eat only what they can produce themselves. Work is done by hand, and the hours are the usual ones in such places—from early morn to late at night.

Until September 1971 prisoners were not allowed to write or receive letters. Then the policy was changed. Each prisoner can now write and receive one letter a month. Correspondents are limited to parents, wives, or children. Prisoners with no immediate families can neither write nor receive letters.

The rule on limitation of correspondence is enforced even more strictly than its language calls for. Moraes reported that he met no prisoner who had received more than two letters since September 1971. All letters are censored, and only family affairs can be discussed in them.

The prisoners range in age from twenty to sixty. The youngest were only thirteen or fourteen when they were arrested.

Two of Indonesia's most famous political prisoners are in Buru: Dr. Suprpto, a well-known lawyer who had defended many leftists, and Pramudya Ananta Toer, the internationally known writer whose books are now banned in his own country.

Moraes wrote that at a briefing before the press party started out to Buru, "the Attorney General of Indonesia had been asked about Pramudya Ananta Toer. Was he allowed to write? The Attorney General beamed and nodded. Allowed to write? Of course he was allowed to write. 'But,' and he laughed heartily, 'he is not allowed to have a pen or paper.'"

Moraes was able to talk briefly with both Pramudya and Suprpto. Pramudya was asked if he was allowed to write. "It is very hard to say," he answered. Did he have writing materials? "It is very hard to say." Did they have enough to eat? "It is very hard to say."

Other prisoners Moraes talked to left similar impressions of hopelessness and resignation. One of the reasons is that the only way a prisoner can get out of Buru is to convince the military overseers that his "Communist" sympathies have disappeared. Anyone wishing to make such a claim

is brought before a committee. It takes the committee two years to decide whether the recantation is sincere. So far, nobody has been released.

Relatives of the Buru prisoners have a difficult time finding work. A nun who works at a convent in Djakarta that is trying to aid the families of the political prisoners told Moraes that the wives of prisoners would have it easier if their husbands were convicted murderers.

The most revealing thing about Moraes's report is that the author is far from hostile to the Indonesian government. "What has condemned the prisoners on Buru to their terrible situation is not cruelty, but stupidity," he writes. "The Government of Indonesia includes many intelligent and well-intentioned men, and if they could

override this military stupidity, the country would be better for it."

In introducing the article, *Asia Magazine's* editor, R. V. Pandit, wrote, "It seems to me a symbol of the openness of the Government of Indonesia that they allowed the press to visit Buru. They have recently shown their liberalism and tolerance [!] by releasing 15,000 other political prisoners, held under suspicion of being Communists."

Given the political outlook of both the author of the report and the magazine in which it is printed, one may well wonder whether the repression in Indonesia is not in fact worse than indicated. Especially when it is remembered that the inmates of the Buru camps are only in the Class B category. □

## Argentina

# Negotiations Were 'On Verge of Success' When Police Raided Guerrilla Hideout

A few hours before Fiat director Oberdan Sallustro was executed by urban guerrillas in a working-class suburb of Buenos Aires on April 10, one of Argentina's five army commanders, the hated General Juan Carlos Sánchez, was shot and killed by guerrillas in the city of Rosario. A pedestrian was also killed in the rifle-fire.

A message left in the Rosario central post office identified those who carried out the act as members of the FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—Revolutionary Armed Forces) and the ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Army of the People).

Their message reportedly denounced as a "farce" plans by Lieutenant General Alejandro Lanusse's military regime to hold elections next March in cooperation with the Peronist movement, and it attacked the military for "maintaining Argentina under the rule of international monopolies."

*New York Times* correspondent Juan de Onis wrote from Buenos Aires April 10 that following a meeting of the National Security Council, over which Lanusse presided, "it was announced that all terrorist crimes will be judged by military courts with the

power to impose the death sentence for kidnapping or for assault on members of the armed forces and the police."

Some politicians, among them former President Arturo Frondizi, called for the elections to be held sooner than next March in an effort to avert civil war.

The Lanusse government was under heavy pressure from the extreme right wing of the officer caste. Evidently Lanusse feared that these circles might utilize any "softness" toward the guerrillas as a pretext for a military *coup* that could topple his regime.

The assassination of General Sánchez—however popular it might have been in the ranks of the left—could only increase the extreme right-wing pressure on Lanusse.

Philippe Labreveux, the correspondent of *Le Monde*, observed in the April 12 issue of the Paris daily that General Sánchez was a "fanatical anti-Communist" in close touch with the

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top officers of the navy and the air force and thus "one of the candidates to succeed General Lanusse."

"Thus it was an adversary of the government that the guerrillas eliminated," Labreveux continued. "Under normal conditions their action would have tended to strengthen the position of the president of the republic. But General Sánchez's friends could also seize upon his death as a pretext to demand the removal of General Lanusse in the name of the ideas of the assassinated military man."

Sánchez had told a journalist that "if it were up to me, I would put them [captured guerrillas] on a plane and then throw them out without any parachute," Labreveux reported. Sánchez's "brutal methods provoked hostility from a large part of the population and especially the inhabitants of shantytowns in which immigrants from the interior and from adjacent countries are crammed together.

"The repression came down without discrimination against all those who indicated their opposition to the regime — 'accomplices,' according to the general, and guerrillas. This modern anti-

communist crusader had a particular dislike for third-world priests [priests with a radical Christian social ideology who work in urban slums and rural areas] who, in his eyes, were guilty of 'betraying' the church. He had forty-seven of them arrested in September 1971 and only agreed to release them after the bishop intervened."

Labreveux also reported that at the time police shot their way into the guerrilla hideout and found Sallustro dead, secret negotiations were under way between Fiat and Sallustro's captors and that, according to "circles close to the company," these negotiations were "on the verge of success."

"The government bears some responsibility for this fatal end," observed Labreveux. "By stating unacceptable conditions, the ERP had boxed itself in, but it had modified its stance on its own. This result was not enough for the authorities, who wanted to take advantage of the opportunity they had to dismantle the networks of an underground organization in the capital. Mr. Sallustro paid for this stubbornness with his life."

40,000 participated in a six-mile march to the cemetery where the seven were buried.

On April 18, Communist party-controlled unions began a two-day general strike. The action had originally been called as a fourteen-hour strike for higher wages, but was extended in protest over the killings.

That the government has violently attacked the Communist party — which is a faithful follower of Moscow-style "peaceful coexistence" and has never engaged in any sort of armed activity — is a sign that the regime is aiming at a sweeping repression of the entire labor and leftist movement.

The country's economic situation has steadily deteriorated. During 1971 the cost of living rose approximately 36 percent, the economy as a whole did not expand, and the budget ran at a 20 percent deficit. Exports, which play a central role in the economy, have drastically declined, and the much-vaunted Uruguayan social-welfare system stands close to bankruptcy.

Most economists expect a major new economic crisis to erupt within the next two months, Georgie Anne Geyer reported in the April 23 *New York Times*.

The "state of internal war" is the regime's means of dealing with the current social crisis. It remains to be seen whether the government's attack on the Communist party will prod the CP into taking consistent action against the repression. □

## Uruguay

### Seven Killed in Raid on CP Headquarters

Uruguay's congress, by a vote of 97 to 21, declared a state of "internal war" April 15, and government troops did not wait long to go into action. An April 17 predawn raid on the Montevideo headquarters of the Communist party led to a shootout in which seven party members were killed and an undisclosed number of persons were wounded.

Because all nongovernment news accounts are forbidden in Uruguay (one of the results of the declaration of war), reports on the incident were fragmentary. At first, the regime contended that some Tupamaro guerrillas had taken refuge in the CP headquarters and had opened fire on police who were seeking to search the building. But a later statement omitted any mention of Tupamaros, saying instead that police had gone to the site to investigate a report that a gun had been thrown from the building.


This second statement alleged that

the Communists inside agreed to come out, but that one of them pulled a pistol and shot an army officer, precipitating the battle. An April 18 Associated Press dispatch from Montevideo reported that neighborhood residents "insisted to newsmen that the army began shooting from the start and fired on the building for more than an hour."

CP First Secretary Rodney Arismendi said that four of the seven dead had been shot in the back and that the other three had their hands up when police killed them.

The CP members had been keeping an all-night watch at the headquarters because of the bombing of three CP district headquarters by rightist terrorists the night before. An Evangelical Methodist church and the Soviet embassy were likewise targets of terrorist attacks.

Some 1,000 persons attended a wake for the dead CP members, and nearly



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# BOMBING OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS CONTINUES

Yankee plane drops 7-ton bomb only 40 miles from Saigon

HIGH-RANKING YANKEE MILITARY CHIEF SAYS U.S.A. WILL CONTINUE ITS AIR AND NAVAL WAR IN INDOCHINA

FLAP attacks enemy positions in central plateaus for fifth consecutive day

● TOKYO, February 27. — Yankee news agencies reported the United States had dropped a bomb weighing close to seven tons only 40 miles from Saigon.

This is the first time a bomb of this type, the largest in the Yankee arsenal of conventional weapons, was dropped at such a short distance from the capital of the puppet regime.

The news dispatch stated the bomb was dropped from a C-130 at the spot where the U.S. unit was made the object of a surprise attack by the PLAF forces on Friday, causing 22 losses.

The bomb, known as a "daisy cutter," is one of the seismic bombs being utilized by the Richard Nixon Administration for the first time in the war against South Vietnam and Laos. The bomb is so powerful that it can destroy all forms of life within several hundred yards. Its destructive power is topped only by nuclear weapons.

Early this morning, B-52s attacked the region of Khe Sanh seven times in one of the heaviest attacks carried out in the last few months.

Six of these attacks, AFP pointed out, took place one and a quarter miles from the now dismantled base where the crack Yankee troops were defeated on two occasions. The seventh attack took place near the border with Laos, 14 miles from Khe Sanh.

In Saigon, the chief of the Yankee naval operations in Indochina, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, reiterated cynically that the U.S. Government will continue to make use of its air and naval power in that part of Southeast Asia.

The high-ranking military chief said he "can't understand why some people are concerned over the utilization of this power, which involves less risk of lives and has resulted in a reduced average in our losses."

When asked why hundreds upon hundreds of Saigonese soldiers were being killed every week all he could say was that "the greatest cutdown is on the American side as a result of the number of troops that are being evacuated."

A military communiqué identified the U.S. officer who died Friday together with Saigonese General Phan Dinh Soan when the helicopter in which they were flying fell into the sea as Colonel Albert L. Smarr. It was also reported that the same day another helicopter fell into the gulf near the Cam Ranh air base and that several U.S. soldiers were killed.

The People's Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam, meanwhile, continued the attack, for the fifth consecutive day, on enemy positions in the central plateaus and the Mekong Delta.

The main targets of the attack were the bases in Pleiku and Kontum. A Yankee communiqué reported that thirty-five 122-millimeter shells were fired against Artillery Base No. 5.

Attacks against Tamki, Queson, Tien Quoc and Tuang Duong were also reported.

In Laos, the People's Army of Liberation, shot down a U.S. helicopter in the province of Xieng Khouang. The number of aircraft shot down by the Lao patriot forces is now 2304.

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## Cuban Press Reports Nixon's Journey to Peking

As did the press in most of the world, Cuban publications gave prominent coverage to Richard Nixon's China visit. Unlike most articles about the Nixon-Mao detente, however, those published in Cuba made their point more subtly than by direct editorializing.

For the information of our readers, we reproduce on these

two pages a typical example of the Cuban press coverage of Nixon's trip and of another, not unrelated story. Both are taken from the front page of the March 5 English-language *Granma* weekly review. The item above appeared at the top of *Granma's* page, the item at right immediately beneath it. This juxtaposition was not accidental, as is indicated by its repetition in other publications, such as *Juventud Rebelde*.

It should also be noted that although the article at right is datelined Shanghai, it depends almost entirely on quotations from Western press agencies—a suggestion, perhaps, that the Cuban correspondent did not consider the public face of the visit very important. Readers will be able to judge for themselves the meaning of the tone of the article.



Chou opens his arms; Nixon, happy.

## NIXON'S VISIT TO CHINA ENDS

● SHANGHAI, PR China, February 28. — "President Richard Nixon will return to the United States today after having spent seven days in China on a business and pleasure trip," the AP news agency reported.

Nixon left this city Monday morning (Peking time). It was here that the Sino-Yankee joint communiqué drawn following the talks between Nixon and the Chinese leaders was made public. The AP news agency pointed out that Nixon had met with Chou and had spent one hour with Mao Tse-tung. However, Henry Kissinger, the President's adviser, said to newsmen, "We have every reason to believe that the Prime Minister consulted leader Mao about all the various subjects."

AFP reported that Nixon had been seen off by Chou En-lai and the other personalities who welcomed him in Shanghai yesterday. The ceremony at the airport lasted five minutes. There was neither music nor guard of honor. AP reported that Nixon and Chou En-lai had met for one hour before they went to the airport. "In contrast with the day when Nixon arrived in Peking," AP said, "several thousand Chinese lined the streets along which the caravan of cars passed on their way to Hung Chiao Airport."

Accompanied by Chou En-lai, Nixon spent Saturday in Hang Chow, where, as AFP reported, "He stayed at Chairman Mao's summer residence."

AP reported as follows: Nixon's visit to Hang Chow: "President Nixon went sailing for two hours

on Hang Chow's West Lake. Accompanied by Prime Minister Chou En-lai, the President stopped at a bridge and threw pieces of bread from a paper bag to the big goldfish. The fish snubbed the Presidential gift, and Nixon said, 'I guess I used the wrong bait.' It had rained in the morning hours and Chou made Nixon feel better by explaining that 'as a rule, the fish don't eat following a shower.'

UPI said that Nixon and Chou "went for a walk in the picturesque park of Hang Chow, which was blooming with camellias, pansies and magnolias." It pointed out that Nixon extended one hand toward a child and "the child, embarrassed, drew back." The interpreter explained to Nixon that "The child was holding a sweet in his hand and didn't want to let go of it."

UPI also reported that during their walk, Nixon and Chou stopped before a young California fir tree, one of Nixon's official gifts to China.

According to AP, Nixon and his entourage made a stop at "The Isle of the Three Towers," a famous place for honeymooners. Chou invited the visitors in. Going to a cage containing a pair of lovebirds, he started talking to them in Chinese. Almost immediately, the two lovebirds began to rub bills. Mrs. Nixon exclaimed, "How cute!" Chou said that he has several birds in his house in Peking and he talks to them all the time.

On Saturday evening, AFP reported, "The Revolutionary Committee of Hang Chow gave Nixon a dinner in the main hall of a local

hotel, which was bedecked with red flags and American flags. Nixon and Chou were all smiles throughout the affair."

AP reported on the banquet as follows:

"After making a toast with the famous 134-proof Mai Tai liqueur, the U.S. Chief Executive stopped at five of the tables in the front of the room, toasted each of the persons sitting at the tables and took a sip from his own glass. After Nixon returned to his seat, Chou got into an animated conversation with him, throwing back his head and laughing bolsterously on several occasions. He took occasional sips of his Mai Tai and ate a tangerine as he gesticulated with his hands.

"Chou did not call for a toast on Saturday night. In keeping with protocol, this was done by the hostess, Nan Ping, who made a remark about the young trees in the park: the giant California pines. 'May they go on growing higher and stronger, as a symbol of the friendship between the peoples of China and the United States,' she said." Nan Ping is the President of the Revolutionary Committee of Hang Chow.

AFP said that Nan Ping was an outstanding figure during the Cultural Revolution.

On Sunday, Nixon and his group went to Shanghai, where they were welcomed by a number of officials. Immediately after the arrival, Nixon went to view an industrial exhibit, accompanied by Chou En-lai.

"Mrs. Nixon was taken to The Children's Palace, where she watched the children play table tennis, dance and put on stage shows," AP reported.

In a summary of Pat Nixon's activities in China, AP published a number of statements made by her to U.S. reporters about her hosts. "They've been very pleasant," she said. "They have been very friendly and considerate, and they've done everything within their power to make our stay a pleasant one."

With respect to the banquet given by Nixon for the Chinese leaders in Peking on Friday, UPI said that the invitations "were printed in the language and style of the Chinese Nationalists (Taiwan) rather than those of the Chinese Communists." It went on to say that the characters ran from top to bottom — a style used exclusively in Taiwan. In Peking, the characters run from left to right, as in the English language. According to U.S. officials, the invitations were prepared in Washington, where translators have closer contact with Taiwan than they have with mainland China. A White House spokesman said that Chinese protocol officials said the style was correct despite the fact it was antiquated. The Chinese officials also said that Chairman Mao Tse-tung had written several poems utilizing that style.

## Chilean Press Prints Documents on ITT-CIA Plot

By David Thorstad

The revelations by columnist Jack Anderson that the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation cooperated in an effort to prevent Salvador Allende from taking office in 1970 are continuing to stir Chile. The secret documents originating in the Washington, D. C., office of ITT have been published in Chile, in Spanish and English, as *The Black Book of the ITT-CIA*. It became an instant best-seller.

"Just as historians go back to the Archives of the Indies in order to piece together the colonial epoch in Chile or read the manuscripts of the men who brought us freedom in 1810, so investigators in the future will have to make use of the Black Book to find documentation regarding the dramatic days of 1970 that reached their peak with the assassination of the commander in chief of the army, René Schneider," observed the weekly magazine *Mayoria* April 5.

In addition to these documents, however, others have been discovered in ITT archives in Chile that complement those that found their way into Anderson's hands. These documents were made public in an exclusive report in the March 29 issue of *Mayoria*.

The documents, which "went unnoticed at the time the company was intervened by the Unidad Popular government" (September 1971), show that the plotting against a possible Allende victory began early in 1970. (Anderson's documents deal only with the period between Allende's winning of the election on September 4 and his inauguration on November 3.) In addition, they shed further light on the activities of two ITT "officials," Hal Hendrix and Robert Berrellez, and on the military *coup* planned by former Brigadier General Roberto Viaux. Viaux is in jail awaiting trial for his role in this right-wing plot, which led to the assassination of General Schneider on October 22, 1970.

Although Hendrix and Berrellez appeared to be ITT officials, they made

frequent trips to countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, in addition to Chile, in order to study the local political situation; when necessary, one of them would fly to Miami to make a report.

Their key contact in Chile appears to have been Juan Cappello, public-relations director for the Chile Tele-



FREI: Slated for second presidential term under "Alessandri formula."

phone Company, in which ITT has a 70 percent controlling interest. Cappello, according to *Mayoria*, was acting as a CIA agent.

On February 20, 1970, Hendrix sent Cappello a cable from Buenos Aires requesting, on behalf of the New York ITT headquarters, a list of the leading U. S. companies in Chile. As subsequently became evident, the information (which Cappello promptly supplied) was to be used in ITT's

campaign to foment economic chaos in the event Allende should win the election.

In mid-July, Cappello sent a report to New York assessing the chances of the three candidates—Allende, Radomiro Tomic, and Jorge Alessandri—in the elections. In one of the paragraphs of this report—written in English, as are the others—he states: "If Allende ranks first and Alessandri or Tomic arrive second the Congress may elect the second majority. If the Allendistas try anything the Armed Forces may move in to 'guaranty respect for the Constitution'. And this might be a good cause for turmoil immediately after Oct. 24th." (This was the date scheduled for congressional run-off elections in the event no candidate received a majority.)

ITT and the CIA quickly jumped on the possibility that Congress might be persuaded not to elect Allende even if he won a higher percentage of the popular vote than the others. The plan they hatched was dubbed the "Alessandri Formula," and it is the subject of documents appearing in the *Black Book*.

The "Alessandri Formula" was designed to prevent Allende from taking office by having Congress elect Alessandri. Alessandri would then resign and the way would be opened up for new elections within sixty days, with the candidate supported by the major bourgeois parties to be former president Eduardo Frei. Both Frei and Alessandri were in on this conspiracy, but it fell through days before the run-off election when Alessandri, bitter toward Frei, withdrew as a candidate.

Although Frei was a key figure in the scheming of the imperialists, they did not hesitate to make unflattering observations about him in their confidential memorandums. A memorandum from Hendrix and Berrellez on September 17, for instance, noted: "President Frei has stated privately, to his closest associates, to Alessandri and to a State Department visitor last weekend in Viña del Mar, that

the country cannot be allowed to go Communist and that Allende must be prevented from taking office. Publicly, however, he is keeping out of the battle up to this point while feeling steadily increasing pressure from the U.S. and his own camp. Never known for displaying guts in a crunch, he is faced with a dilemma of not wanting to be charged with either turning Chile over to Communist rule or contributing to a possible civil war. A parlay of his highly inflated ego and a chance to occupy the presidency six more years may provide the necessary starch for his decision.

"To help strengthen his position, efforts are being made this week to turn this weekend's observance of Chile Independence Day into a pro-Frei demonstration. Main feature of the observance will be a military parade by about 25,000 troops assembled in Santiago."

The imperialists' assessment of the Chilean armed forces was no more generous. In a memorandum to ITT Vice President E. J. Gerrity Jr. in New York on September 14, William Merriam, vice president in charge of ITT's Washington, D. C., office, quoted the then U.S. ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, as considering the Chilean armed forces to be nothing but "a bunch of toy soldiers."

A "personal and confidential" ITT interoffice memorandum in Washington to Merriam from J. D. Neal on September 30 provides dramatic evidence of how the United States uses its "economic aid" to influence the internal affairs of recipient countries: "For the past several years the State Department has been predicting an upsurge of Marxism in Chile, and foresaw the culmination of the threat in the September, 1970, elections. Knowing this, the U.S. stepped up its AID program in an attempt to help Chile remain democratic."

The memorandum is also quite explicit about the decision to apply economic pressures on Chile on the international level. And it indicates that these pressures were not restricted to the two months of September and October 1970: "The unfortunately heavy probability that Allende will take office in November is well known to the State Department and Embassy Santiago. Both believe Allende will start early and systematically attack foreign private enterprise. Thus forewarned, we should hope the Nixon

Administration will be prepared to move quickly to exert pressure on Allende. However, because of our weak policy in the Hemisphere during the past two years, we cannot count on such immediate and effective action.

"I fear the Department of State will convince the White House to again circumvent the Hickenlooper Amendment [cutting off aid to countries that nationalize U.S. concerns]—as it has done in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, etc. Instead, I look for the silent pressure (?) [sic] which will call for a drying-up of aid and instructions to U.S. representatives in the international banks to vote against or abstain from voting on Chilean loans."

One of the documents published by *Mayoria* deals with a "fishing trip" that appears to have had as much to do with plotting a possible *coup* as it did with catching fish. The cablegram sent from Berrellez in Buenos Aires to Cappello on August 13 stated: "Need as soon as possible the trout (*trucha*)\* fishing dates in Chile. New York VIPs [Very Important Persons] plan fishing trips in September-October and need to know seasons this allowable. Please telex info."

The North American "fishermen," according to *Mayoria*, went fishing with, among others, General Viaux, then Minister of Housing Andrés Zaldívar, General Camilio Valenzuela, and the former general director of the Carabineer Corps of special police, Vicente Huerta.

Despite the fact that Viaux's attempted *coup* failed, and although he was imprisoned, similar attempts to provoke an uprising or a military intervention against the Allende regime have continued to occur since October 1970. One was the "March of the Empty Pots" in October of last year during which right-wing thugs attacked and beat innocent onlookers. Prior to the march, a conspiracy was uncovered in which commandos of the ultraright Fatherland and Liberty movement were to attack the demonstrators and, in *Mayoria's* words, "use whatever means required to cause fatalities."

The latest in the line of plots going back to 1970 was the one uncovered at the end of March this year, the aim of which was to assassinate Allende,

\* Trucha not only means "trout," but also "tricky individual" and "cheat."

take the presidential palace, and free Viaux from prison. The plan was to have been triggered by attacks on an anti-Unidad Popular march—originally scheduled for March 24—once again by armed commandos of the Fatherland and Liberty group, according to the April 11 issue of the Chilean magazine *Punto Final*.

On April 18, Allende announced that he would ask Congress to nationalize all of ITT's holdings in Chile. He did this at a pro-Unidad Popular rally in Santiago estimated by *New York Times* correspondent Juan de Onís to be the same size as the April 12 opposition demonstration of 200,000. Unlike it, however, the pro-government rally was composed predominantly of workers and students.

Allende's announcement represents a challenge to the opposition-controlled Congress, which has been trying to curtail nationalizations. It also shows that the imperialists' sinister meddling in the affairs of Chile has become a major political issue that can only contribute toward further sharpening the polarization of forces within the country. □

## Cambodian Tells of CIA Role in 1970 Coup

When the Norodom Sihanouk government in Cambodia was overthrown by a military *coup* in 1970, Richard Nixon said the ouster "surprised no nation more than the U.S." Not so, says Son Ngoc Thanh, recently named prime minister in the Lon Nol regime.

In a series of interviews granted T. D. Allman, an Oxford University scholar on assignment in Asia last year for the *Manchester Guardian*, Thanh revealed that CIA agents promised to do "everything possible" to help if anti-Sihanouk forces conducted a *coup* and then found themselves confronting pro-Sihanouk opposition.

Beginning in 1965, Thanh said, the United States paid "millions of dollars" to train and equip his own private forces, the "Khmer Serei" (Free Cambodia), which were recruited from Cambodians living in South Vietnam. Thanh met secretly with aides of Lon Nol, who was Sihanouk's premier.

According to Thanh, CIA agents assigned to his staff were kept informed of developments leading to the *coup*.

Thanh further asserts that in 1969 a CIA agent identified as "Fred" pledged U.S. support to a projected invasion of Cambodia by Thanh's forces.

The invasion apparently never occurred, but shortly after the Lon Nol *coup*, Thanh's outfit was airlifted to Phnompenh and played a key role in holding the capital. □

### CP Backs Balaguer on 'Land Reform'

In an effort to cope with a growing threat of upheaval in the country, President Joaquín Balaguer of the Dominican Republic submitted proposals on land reform to the Congress on February 27. They were enacted on March 29.

Balaguer himself called his proposals "very timid." In essence, what they do is provide for the expropriation, after compensation, of rice-growing land irrigated by public canals, as well as all uncultivated and idle lands. Estates of under 500 *tareas* [one *tarea* equals one-tenth hectare or .247 acres] are excluded. Rice crops of small producers will be processed in the mills of the Dominican Agrarian Institute. Those whose land is confiscated will be compensated by being paid 25 percent cash and 75 percent in treasury bonds, stocks in state enterprises, land inside the cities, or in various remunerative state holdings.

A closer look at the law, according to the March 6 issue of the weekly magazine *Ahora!*, would suggest that Balaguer was resorting to understatement when he characterized the reforms as "timid." By buying only idle land, they limit slightly, but do not eliminate, the big estates. They may actually serve merely to persuade big landholders to put idle land into cultivation under the threat of losing it.

Sugar cane plantations are not touched by the law, and the legal definition of a big estate as one with more than 50,000 *tareas* leaves a large number of big holdings completely outside the scope of the reform. The National Planning Office (Oficina Nacional de Planificación) considers 1,000 *tareas* as the beginning of big estates. The actual effect of Balaguer's proposal is to legalize all landholdings up to 50,000 *tareas*.

In addition, sharecropping is not prohibited, although certain of its worst features—payment in kind and by labor—are eliminated. Excessively high fees for rented land are retained.

These timid reforms, said Balaguer, constituted the beginning of a "peaceful revolution." Actually, they represent an attempt to prevent an increasingly explosive social situation from erupting and to help the big land-

holders retain the power they enjoy throughout the country.

Balaguer made explicit reference in his speech to the extreme poverty and economic distress afflicting the Dominican people, especially those in the rural areas. "If this situation continues, the country will run the risk that other Latin American nations have run whereby social injustice has already brought about tremendous upheavals and dislocating revolutionary explosions."

One intention of the reforms is to slow the peasant migration—a result of lack of land—to the cities. "The settling down of this growing mass of people in our urban centers tends greatly to make our social situation increasingly explosive," Balaguer noted. According to the March 11 Santo Domingo daily *El Nacional de Ahora!*, the number of unemployed in the country has doubled in the past two years and now stands at 1,241,031.

Balaguer praised his reforms as bringing justice to the landless peasant and ending centuries of slavery on the land. To a population that has suffered so much under its rulers, observed *Ahora!* on April 10, these fine words contained a "bitter savor of demagoguery."

Juan Bosch, head of the Dominican Revolutionary party (PRD—Partido Revolucionario Dominicano), dismissed the reforms as being "lots of noise with no substance." To talk, as Balaguer did, of "fundamentally transforming the economic, political, and social structures" of the Dominican Republic would mean to make the socialist revolution and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, Bosch explained, although he added that he did not believe Balaguer had it in mind to do this.

However timid Balaguer's reforms were, they were enough for the Dominican Communist party to come out in support of them in a statement by its Central Committee on March 11. Although it had minor criticism (50,000 *tareas* was too high a ceiling for legal landholdings, it felt), it viewed the reforms as a victory for the left.

The reasons that the party gave for its support included the need for "revolutionary and democratic" forces to help "deepen the reformist phenomenon" that the law reflected, the "growing isolation of the revolutionary forces from the popular masses," and the belief that the CP must do what it can to "help isolate the unproductive large estates and the big landowners."

As if vaguely aware that its switch from opposing Balaguer to supporting him might call for further explanation, it asserted that reformism has replaced repression as the main weapon the regime uses to stay in power. "It is nonetheless not possible to point to the precise moment when terror ceased to be the regime's main weapon and was replaced by the reformist policy that diminishes explosive contradictions, neutralizes broad sectors, and incorporates others into the policy implemented from above."

"Balaguer is not revolutionary," it concluded, apparently for party members who were not sure, "nor is his regime, nor are the measures he has proposed. But faced with this reformist policy, the policy that we must follow is different from the one that arose out of the counterrevolutionary origins of the present regime—and especially since it is clear that today the desirable conditions that might cause another violent outbreak do not exist."

On March 13, two days after the CP statement asserting that terror had ceased to be an important tool in the hands of the Dominican ruling class, *Ahora!* reported that the wave of forced expulsions of peasants from lands is "continuing to keep thousands of families in the rural areas in a state of anxiety." The expulsions, which are carried out by the police and the armed forces at the behest of big landholders, are not outlawed by Balaguer's timid reforms. In one area, "more than 800 peasants are being threatened by a group of landowners in order to get them to abandon property that they have been working for more than twenty years."

In another example of wanton brutality, on April 4 police, who claimed to be searching for an alleged leftist, occupied and ransacked the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo. One student was killed, at least nine were wounded, and about 1,000 were arrested. □

# REVIEWS

## Inside the 'New York Times'

*A World in Revolution* by Herbert L. Matthews. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, N. Y. 462 pp. \$12.50. 1971.

Herbert Matthews was a reporter and editor of the *New York Times* for forty-five years, from 1922 to 1967. In this often rambling reminiscence, he summarizes his four and a half decades of journalism.

The high points of this book are undoubtedly the sections on the Spanish civil war and the Cuban revolution. While Matthews was not and is not a revolutionist, and sometimes misunderstands what he has observed, his reporting is honest—a trait that did not always make it easier for him to write for the *New York Times*.

Matthews covered the Spanish civil war from the Republican side of the lines. The *New York Times* policy on the conflict, like that of the European capitalist governments not openly backing the fascists, was a "neutrality" that aided Franco.

In the pages of the *Times*, "impartiality" dictated that exactly equal space be given to dispatches from Matthews and from the correspondent with Franco's forces, even though the former was able to observe and write news stories at first hand while the latter was usually kept miles from the front and forced to rely on official handouts.

The paper's "neutrality" sometimes produced ludicrous incidents. In March 1937, Matthews covered the defeat of the Italians at Guadalajara. He saw for himself the Italian equipment and Italian dead, and talked to Italian prisoners.

"The story was a very big one," he writes. "This was the first positive evidence that Mussolini had not merely sent planes, cannons, tanks, technicians, and advisers—he had sent an expeditionary force. I was naturally excited when I got back to Madrid and wrote my story. I told just what I had done and what I had seen—the men, the bodies, the weapons. To emphasize the outstanding point, I said

that 'they were Italian and nothing but Italian.'

"... As I learned later, the assistant managing editor... had ordered the copyreaders to substitute the word 'Insurgent' wherever I had sent 'Italian.' Whoever edited the story on the Cable Desk had his tongue in his cheek. When he came to my phrase saying 'they were Italian and nothing but Italian,' he dutifully changed it to: 'They were Insurgent and nothing but Insurgent.'"

In Cuba, Matthews' habit of reporting what he had seen and heard created considerable embarrassment for the *Times*. In February 1957, when it was generally believed that Fidel Castro and his followers were dead, Matthews went into the Sierra Maestra and came back with an interview with Castro. Matthews wrote, correctly, that Castro was not a Communist

## Marxist Essays on the Meaning of History

*Understanding History* by George Novack. Pathfinder Press, Inc., New York. 160 pp. \$2.25, £0.95 paper; \$5.95, £2.50 cloth. 1972.

In this collection of ten essays, written over the past fifteen years, George Novack outlines, from a Marxist viewpoint, some of the basic laws of human development.

This is not likely to be popular with those bourgeois scholars who deny that any such laws exist. Particularly in "The Long View of History," Novack demonstrates not only the reality of historical laws, but also how Marxism is able to understand their working.

Another topic of particular interest is discussed in the essay "From Lenin to Castro." Beginning with Isaac Deutscher's criticism of Leon Trotsky's analysis of Lenin's role in the October Revolution, Novack expounds the Marxist view of the role of in-

and that in fact his struggle was opposed by the Communist party.

Several years later, when the process of permanent revolution had impelled Cuba on the road to socialism, Matthews and the *Times* became a handy scapegoat for the right-wingers who view history as a series of conspiracies. Things actually got to the point that a Congressional subcommittee solemnly listened to volumes of testimony to the effect that Herbert Matthews was responsible for the "loss" of Cuba.

In the tradition of liberal bourgeois journalism, the *Times* responded to this witch-hunt by muzzling Matthews. Although the paper for years had no correspondent in Cuba, on at least two occasions when he had visited Cuba, Matthews was forced to publish his reports in other journals.

It would be unfair, however, to imply that Matthews is bitter toward the *Times*. On the contrary, he exhibits toward it a fierce loyalty that is difficult to comprehend. For this reason, the glimpses he provides into the workings of the most influential bourgeois paper in the United States are all the more revealing.

—David Burton

dividuals in history. The question, he points out, is not merely academic:

"Personal decision is the crowning expression of social determinism, the last link in its causal chain. The social determinism operative in the world today is divided into two irreconcilable trends, stemming from opposing class sources. . . .

"To dispossess and disarm the atomaniacs headquartered in Washington, a revolutionary movement of tremendous dimensions and determination will have to be built. No single individual will stop them. But victory in the life-and-death struggle for world peace against nuclear annihilation will require the initiative and devotion of individuals. . . ."

Other topics in this collection include a review of the major theories of history and discussions of the law of uneven and combined development, with particular emphasis on the latter's application in Latin America. □

## Policy of the MIR in the Countryside—II

[The following is the second and final part of a statement issued in Santiago, Chile, on February 6 by the National Secretariat of the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left). The first part appeared in the April 17 issue of *Intercontinental Press*.]

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### **Agrarian Policy of the Communist Party**

What has the agrarian policy of the Communist party been in this context? In the context of a countryside shot through and through with agrarian capitalism and in which the bourgeoisie has established the most merciless superexploitation of the rural poor, the Communist party has above all else poorly defined the enemy and it has distorted the class structure in the countryside in order to justify its policies and to make its alliances.

### **The Agrarian Policy of the CP During the Christian Democratic Regime**

The revolutionary potential of the peasant movement is clearly visible in its struggles during the fifteen years prior to the CD Agrarian Reform law. In that context, a revolutionary vanguard could have directed this huge force, together with the urban proletariat, toward destroying the system.

Aware of the threatening dangers of the great potential power of the peasant movement, the Chilean bourgeoisie, supported by imperialism and its Alliance for Progress, looked for a way out that would blunt the revolutionary threat of the peasantry. And so it drew up a bourgeois-reformist program for the countryside. But since the Christian Democracy was unable to carry out this program all by itself, it looked around for support—and this could only be found on the left. In doing this, it developed a complete theoretical model that painted an incorrect picture of the Chilean countryside. In order to win over the Communist party, Christian Democracy had to play the magician and pull a rabbit out of its hat; it had to invent a myth, a fantasy—though, to be sure, a clever and cunning one.

This fantasy, this magic rabbit that Christian Democracy offered the Communist party and the traditional left, was the fictitious notion that the ills of the country and the countryside, which were the cause of the peasants' suffering, did not come from the capitalist exploitation to which the rural proletariat was subjected, nor from the land monopoly these same big capitalists enjoyed, thereby relegating small landowners to pitifully small pieces of land. The "ills" were the result of the generalized existence of landed oligarchs who did not personally supervise their holdings, who produced nothing by

keeping their farms in a state of abandonment, and who had to be punished in an exemplary fashion. They were the living embodiment of the backwardness of the Chilean countryside. They had to be made to walk the straight and narrow path. They were the ones who owned more than 80 hectares of arable land, so they had to be punished. But only land would be expropriated, and they would still retain the right to hold reserve lands. And so they were "punished."

Along with these people, the Christian Democracy recognized another type. These were very serious, respectable, and responsible people. They were merciless exploiters of the rural proletariat, but they were efficient producers. Not only could there be no question of expropriating these big landholders, but they were to be treated with all deference and respect. These were the big capitalist managers, with less than 80 hectares of arable land.

With this ideological cover, the Christian Democracy was able to put its Agrarian Reform law through parliament (with the votes of the CP). This law was the most efficient way to maintain and develop capitalist relations of production in the countryside.

Each of the law's provisions represents a reaffirmation of the positions and interests of the big agricultural bourgeoisie.

In the first place, the cut-off point on the size of the lands that could be expropriated was set—not accidentally—at 80 hectares of arable land. According to statements by none other than Benjamín Matte, president of the SNA [Sociedad Nacional Agricultura—National Society of Agriculture], the estates with between 40 and 80 hectares of arable land are the most productive and together are responsible for more than 40 percent of the country's agricultural production.

These estates, which are the most important nerve centers for the agricultural bourgeoisie, cannot be expropriated because of their size. And so the big bourgeoisie goes about its business and formulates its policies with the confidence and understanding that these lands will not be expropriated. But this is what the strategists of the Communist party's agrarian policy want neither to hear nor see.

What is more, given the fact that these are also the most productive estates, the expropriation provisions of the law can be applied to them only with difficulty.

But what about the estates with more than 80 hectares of arable land? Is the grip of the bourgeoisie on estates larger than this eliminated? No. The law provides that landowners who are expropriated because of the size of their lands have the right to reserve lands, and these can amount to precisely 80 hectares of arable land. As a result, the big bourgeoisie is able to continue to hold sway over almost the entirety of the expropriated estates. Two-thirds of the estates expropriated by the Frei gov-

ernment were put into reserve lands — all of them of 80 hectares of arable land.

But the Christian Democratic Agrarian Reform law left no loose ends. Only land can be expropriated, not animals or implements. These the landholder keeps in order to reinforce the exploitation of the workers who continue to work on the reserve land. In this way the landholder is "isolated," to use Millas' formulation.

If the landholder has any extra animals or implements, and wants to sell them, the CORA [the agrarian reform corporation] will pay cash for them at the going market price. But if in spite of all this, he still has animals or implements left over and does not want to sell them, absolutely nothing and nobody can force him to sell — even if nearby there are people in *asentamientos* [communities set up on expropriated land in accord with the agrarian reform law] who are in desperate need of machinery and implements. So much for the totally "isolated" landholder.

What happens to the peasants who receive what is left over from the expropriated estates, the part that does not go into reserve land? They get the worst land from the estate since the landholders have the right to choose the best as reserve land. On top of that, the peasant gets only the land, without implements and without animals, while right next door to him the bourgeois landowner has all those implements in greater quantities than he needs.

Finally, as the final touch to its fine job of maintaining capitalist exploitation in the countryside, the CD established the system of *asentamientos*. Through these settlements, Christian Democracy wants to establish a middle bourgeoisie in the countryside that will serve the function of helping to maintain capitalist agricultural relations.

This was the agrarian policy that the Communist party defended and hailed as progressive during the Eduardo Frei government. The Communist party refused to conduct an independent policy with regard to the workers and poor peasants, and chose instead to "isolate" the landholders; but by isolating itself from the peasants, it helped the bourgeoisie to modernize the forms of capitalist exploitation in agriculture.

## The Agrarian Policy of the CP in the UP Government

The Communist party was not satisfied to support the Agrarian Reform law during the Frei government; it went on to become its best supporter and most articulate representative within the popular government. Some leaders of the CP repeat in forums, lectures, and documents that the central task in the countryside is to "isolate" the landholders, and in doing so they isolate themselves from the peasants in addition to isolating the government by denying it the support of the poor peasants. But the leaders of the Communist party remain true to schemes and compromises.

The agrarian policy of the Communist party during the present government had been to unconditionally defend the Christian Democratic Agrarian Reform law. To defend the Agrarian Reform law in the way it was conceived by the Christian Democratic experts means to take on the task of defending the big capitalist agricultural managers. Indeed, from the start, the policy of the leaders of the Communist party has been oriented toward protecting the interests of the big agricultural bourgeoisie,

which they disguise under the name of middle landowners and rich farmers. But not only have they wholeheartedly defended the law, they have also been timid and faint-hearted in applying it.

1. They refused to do anything drastic and expropriate en masse the 3,500 estates that the Christian Democratic Agrarian Reform law allows to be expropriated.

2. They refused to carry out expropriations without leaving the landholders any reserve land or loopholes — and they did this publicly right after the Declaration of Linares. They paid no attention to the outcry from the peasants who were demanding this. They lied when they said that the Linares Program was opposed to the program of the Unidad Popular. The program of the Unidad Popular is in reality a bit more advanced than the policy of the Communist party, for it clearly makes it possible to expropriate without leaving reserve lands, and to expropriate machinery, animals, and implements, which is the same as expropriating without leaving any loopholes.

3. Because it did not want to deal a blow to the big agrarian bourgeoisie as a whole, the CP refused to solve the problems of the majority of the rural poor.

4. The CP wanted to carry out the process of agrarian reform by relying exclusively on the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, the Bureau of Agriculture, and remaining within the confines of the law. In this way, it demonstrated its lack of confidence in the masses, in their initiative and immense creative capacity, and in their practical ability to create a new order. By turning over the entire burden of transforming agriculture to the functionaries of the bureaucratic apparatus, it actually handed over the political responsibility for the process to the petty-bourgeois functionaries who have settled down in the state apparatus.

The Communist party did not seek to alter this bureaucratic apparatus, but retained many Alessandrist and Frei-ist officials, officials who were steeped in an antipopular, antidemocratic spirit, and who were tied in a thousand different ways to the agrarian bourgeoisie, who were entwined in bourgeois relationships, and who breathed that kind of atmosphere. This bureaucratic apparatus made decisions for the peasants, without consulting them, and imposed these decisions from above. The agricultural workers and poor peasants had no control over the institutions of the state apparatus.

5. In line with this policy and with a basic distrust of the masses, the CP did not even want to convert the Peasant Community Councils into real organs of local power — bodies that would have made possible the full participation of the rural workers, their control over the bureaucratic apparatus, and the development of an alternate, popular power.

6. But the most serious aspect of the Communist party's antipeasant policy lies in its not wanting to take into account the fact that the basic confrontation in the countryside is between the rural proletariat and the poor peasants on the one hand, and the big agricultural bourgeoisie as a whole on the other. To try to limit the struggle to those confrontations allowed by the Christian Democratic Agrarian Reform law is to oppose the peasants, and to act against their interests.

7. In addition, the Communist party refuses to combine legal and extralegal forms of struggle, to combine

the extraparliamentary mass struggle with the parliamentary struggle that is unfolding. It mistakenly claims that the process of assembling forces must take place mainly within and through the existing institutional apparatus, making use of the laws, parliament, and the portion of the state apparatus that it controls—the government—in order to deal blows to imperialism and certain sectors of the bourgeoisie and to win over new forces. The history of the class struggle in Chile in the last period demonstrates that this is not possible, for the bourgeoisie is continually gaining ground within the institutional apparatus and is actually setting up its own parallel government. In addition, the relationship of forces within the institutional apparatus depends on the relationship of forces that has been established outside of it in the struggle between social forces.

The Communist party must understand that the only way to change the relationship of forces is to rely on the initiative of the masses, to place confidence in them, and to support their struggles, so that bourgeois power is being constantly beaten back and weakened in mass struggles. As long as there is no revolutionary Agrarian Reform law, the only way out for the struggles of the peasants will not be the legal forms of struggle offered nowadays by the Communist party, but direct action itself. As long as the Communist party continues to show an incurable urge to protect the big bourgeoisie disguised as middle landholders; as long as it insists on trying to unite all the classes in the countryside—including those with the most obviously antagonistic interests—as when it attempts to unite the agricultural workers and poor peasants (whose mutual interests are opposed to those of the big agrarian bourgeoisie) with their direct exploiters, with those who keep them in poverty and hunger, with those who sentence their children to die from curable diseases, with those who own between 40 and 80 hectares of arable land—as long as all this is going on, the Communist party will be acting against the interests of the poor in the countryside. Trying to unite all classes and strata in the countryside with the landholders is as absurd as trying to unite oil and water.

## The Ideological Background of the CP's Policy

Why is the CP so insistent on its policy of uniting all classes in the countryside in order to isolate the landholder? Why does it insist on taking on only that sector of the big bourgeoisie that it dubs landed oligarchs, *latifundistas*, or landholders, and refuse to fight the big agrarian bourgeoisie as a whole? The main reason is its old notion of a semifeudal countryside, and, in addition, its strategy of a revolution by stages. As Communist party leaders have revealed in their articles in the party daily *El Siglo*, we are today supposed to be going through a stage of national liberation as part of the unfolding of the Chilean revolution. They distinguish between two stages in the Chilean revolution. The first, the current stage, is one whose tasks are only anti-imperialist, antifeudal, and antimonopolist. At times the CP calls the antifeudal tasks "antioligarchical" or simply "agrarian." According to the strategy of revolution by stages, during the first stage an alliance has to be made with the bourgeoisie, both in the countryside and in the city; and it is only in the second stage that it can be

opposed. This is why the CP ideologues insist so much nowadays that the basic contradiction in Chile is between the nation and imperialism, with its local representatives—the monopolies and the landholders.

The contradiction between the exploited classes and the big exploiters within the nation itself is demoted to secondary importance. The ideologues tell us that in this stage of national liberation we must only combat imperialism and the financial and landholding oligarchy. This is the source of the great slogan about uniting the peasants and isolating the landholders, which, to put it bluntly, means to put off the fight against the big agricultural bourgeoisie until the second stage. We are told, moreover, in the document of the CP's Political Committee published in *El Mercurio*: "We feel that the party must firmly insist upon the *asentamientos* giving up their lands within a fixed period of time. As for the tempo of the agrarian reform, the Political Committee believes that we must strive to expropriate the estates with more than 80 hectares of arable land."

Complete this first stage of the agrarian reform before focusing our attention on modifying the law—that is the agrarian reform that is being proposed for this stage. The creation of a middle agrarian bourgeoisie is to be ensured through giving lands and ownership titles to settlers in the *asentamientos*, while on the other hand, not a finger is to be lifted against the big agrarian bourgeoisie that owns between 40 and 80 hectares of arable land. By following this line, the CP insists on holding back the struggles of the peasants.

In what we are going to say in the following paragraphs, we are in no sense accusing the Communist party of being an agent of imperialism, as it has so irresponsibly been doing in the case of the MIR. But evidently its ideological confusion and its fear of the masses have brought it to the point of agreeing with some of the populist-type policies that imperialism sometimes puts forward for Latin America. For in reality, the policy of the Communist party in the countryside coincides with the policy that imperialism has been promoting in Latin America ever since the triumph of the Cuban revolution, beginning with the Alliance for Progress. Imperialism and its local bourgeois servants have supported various agrarian reform efforts on the Latin American continent to reduce social tension in the countryside and to ward off revolutionary outbreaks. That was the policy of Christian Democracy in Chile and it stamped its mark on the Agrarian Reform law. The Communist party unwittingly follows the general outlines of that policy. Actually, if the CP joined the government simply in order to carry out this agrarian reform, it could have done a better job of it and speeded up the process if it had done so sooner and joined the Christian Democrats.

## Results of the CP's Policy in the Countryside

1. Unaccountably, the CP refused to take the leadership of the peasant struggles. It did not even just step aside, but in many cases worked against them and left the masses on their own. Any Marxist knows that if a growing mass movement is left leaderless, it will become disorganized, fall apart, and disintegrate, and all its potential power will be lost.

2. The CP irresponsibly failed to take advantage of this

potential power that would have made it possible to assemble greater forces in order to advance more rapidly on all fronts.

3. The policy of the CP was to hand over to the Christian Democratic demagogues those sectors of the peasant movement over which the MIR, because of time factors, had not yet managed to establish its political leadership and with which it had no solid links. The CP's policy of refusing to aid the peasant struggles provided a social base of support for fascism; it made possible the formation and strengthening of armed groups in the countryside.

4. The CP's policy forced the peasant movement to struggle outside of the UP, without the benefit of the unified leadership of the process in which the entire left is involved. It pitted the peasant masses against the government many times, and it promptly turned the repressive apparatus against the peasantry. If the CP and the Unidad Popular had decided to launch a revolutionary policy in the countryside, there would have been a unified leadership for the peasant struggles and the land seizures would have passed into a secondary level of importance as methods of struggle.

5. The CP's policy prevented a real increase in productivity in the countryside and contributed to the scarcity of agricultural products. This occurred as a result of the following:

(a) The refusal to expropriate all the estates with more than 80 hectares of arable land and to put them immediately into production.

(b) The refusal to lower the cut-off point from 80 to 40 hectares.

(c) The refusal to expropriate animals, machinery, and implements—which is the only way the expropriated estates could immediately begin production.

(d) All that this managed to accomplish was to encourage and legalize sabotage on the part of the big landowners. It was an encouragement to the landlords in their systematic destruction of the productive forces in agriculture through slaughtering livestock, leaving machinery idle, destroying implements, etc.

6. All this caused the CP and the government to continue to lose forces among important layers of the peasantry, to fail to win and hold the loyalty of the majority of the people, to lose elections, etc.

## **Agrarian Policy of the MIR**

As we have already said repeatedly, the aim of our policy in the countryside is not to maintain a balance between the exploiters and the exploited. Nor is it to protect certain sectors of the big agrarian bourgeoisie, nor at this stage to try to expropriate the small and middle bourgeoisie.

Nor is it for us a matter of trying to increase the wealth of a few by calling on the workers to win the battle for production, while exploitation by the big bourgeoisie continues. The central aim of our policy in the countryside is to gain political strength and change the relationship of forces by mobilizing the agricultural workers and the poor peasants in order to deal frontal blows to the big agrarian bourgeoisie, while seeking to neutralize the small and middle bourgeoisie. For us it is a matter of strengthening peasant struggles and the worker-peasant alliance in order to continue to lay the foundations for a new

power in the countryside—workers' power, the power of the rural poor, workers and peasants' power.

Consequently, our policy is oriented toward using the mobilization of the masses to deal blows to all of the big bourgeoisie with more than 40 hectares of arable land, destroying in the process the big bourgeoisie's social, economic, and political power base. Our policy is to neutralize the small and middle bourgeoisie, by allowing them to retain ownership of their land and by offering them credit and technical assistance, but at the same time seeking to improve the living and working conditions of the workers on these small estates.

## **Program of the Poor in the Countryside**

The rural poor are struggling for the following:

1. A massive and rapid expropriation of all the agrarian bourgeoisie's estates.

2. A reduction of the cut-off point from 80 to 40 hectares of arable land.

3. An end to the right to reserve land. Expropriation of land, animals, and implements. Terms favorable to the nonpayment of compensation for expropriated land.

4. The setting up of more advanced forms of ownership in harmony with the level of consciousness the agricultural workers and poor peasants have achieved. The use of forms of state ownership in the case of the agricultural workers, and forms of cooperative ownership in the case of the poor peasants, or other more advanced forms if they desire.

5. Greater power to the Peasant Community Councils so that these problems can be solved by the workers themselves through these councils.

The Peasant Community Councils must be changed into local organs of workers and peasants' power. They must function democratically through meetings of the rank and file. They must involve all the oppressed and exploited classes and layers in the area. The community councils must have the authority to decide which estates to expropriate in the community, whether or not to pay for the land, what forms of ownership to institute, and how to organize production. They must control the small estates and small holdings, and demand respect and improvements in the living and working conditions of the agricultural employees. The councils must have authority over matters of health and education in the countryside, and must be responsible for carrying out justice. Finally, the councils must control and keep under their supervision all the agricultural institutions operating in the community. The peasants are not only demanding their share of power, they are demanding the right to begin to exercise that power directly.

## **Forms of Struggle**

The peasant movement will continue its struggle against the entire agrarian bourgeoisie, attempting to lay the basis for an alternate power, for a popular power, in the countryside. In their struggle, the workers of the countryside will have recourse to existing legal forms of struggle as well as to their own initiative, their own strength, and their own action, when the institutional apparatus or the existing legal structure proves unable to solve their

problems or provide a framework for their struggles.

It is clear that the peasant movement cannot limit itself to the confrontations and opportunities for mobilization allowed by the Agrarian Reform law. As we have already said, this law has become a straitjacket for the agricultural workers and poor peasants. They have already broken out of this straitjacket many times, and they will continue to do so, each time with greater force, if a revolutionary Agrarian Reform law is not enacted soon. This law must fully reflect the interests of the countryside's poor and allow them to mobilize on the widest scale. The peasant movement will continue to resort to extralegal struggle, to land seizures, as the only path open to it in view of the refusal of the CP and the Unidad Popular to follow a correct agrarian policy.

At this stage, the peasants are using direct action not only to demand the expropriation of the estates of the big bourgeoisie, but also to demand that the Peasant Community Councils be given real decision-making power.

The MIR calls on the masses of the city and the countryside, and on all revolutionary tendencies, to unite and join forces to aid the struggle of the peasantry, which

is demanding that all the estates of more than 40 hectares of arable land be expropriated, leaving no reserve lands and no loopholes. It is doing this with the goal of assembling the forces required to expropriate the land without compensation. The MIR calls for unity in order to move ahead and develop an alternate power in the countryside, built from the bottom up through the Peasant Community Councils.

In this historic hour in the class struggle in Chile, in which various currents on the left are in struggle, some to further the process, others to hold it back; in this hour full of hesitation, capitulation, and indecision in certain sectors, the MIR calls on all the revolutionary currents of the left to remember this thought of Lenin in September 1917:

"Lack of faith in the people, fear of their initiative and independence, trepidation before their revolutionary energy instead of all-round and unqualified support for it—this is where the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders have sinned most of all. This is where we find one of the deepest roots of their indecision, their vacillation, their infinite and infinitely fruitless attempts to pour new wine into the old bottles of the old, bureaucratic state apparatus." □

## Soviet Press Comes to Defense of French Police

[The massive demonstrations in Paris following the murder of the young revolutionist Pierre Overney February 25 got a sharp reaction in the Soviet press. The writers' union weekly, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, devoted an entire page of its April 5 issue to the ferment in France. It concentrated all its fire, however, on the young revolutionary elements instead of the repressive forces responsible for Overney's death. The banner headline across the page read "'Provo,' That's What the French Workers Call the Maoist Provocateurs." Some sub-heads were: "A Bloc of Splitters of Every Stripe—Anarchists, Trotskyists, Maoists—Under the Flag of Anti-Communism"; "Proletarian France Says, 'They Shall Not Pass!'"

[Instead of the demonstration of 200,000 persons at the funeral of Pierre Overney, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* showed a small crowd of rather tame-looking youths. The caption read: "A Demonstration by Parisian Young Communists—Resistance to the Extremists."

[In spots, the Soviet reportage unashamedly adopted the attitude of the police. "The 'Maos' claimed that 400,000 attended the funeral. In fact, as reported by the police, who had a scientific system for counting, there

were about 18,000 people on the march." The police estimates, which were treated as a joke by almost the entire political spectrum in Paris, apparently found a sympathetic ear in some circles.

[As for the circumstances of Overney's death, Viktor Tsoppi wrote: "'Pierrot,' as his friends called him, was shot at point-blank range by a guard when he tried to trespass on the plant grounds to organize a Maoist diversion there." A young worker in the plant described the shooting differently: "I was near Overney and his comrades. There were twenty of them at most. They had just turned away from the guards and were moving toward the *barbouzes* [secret agents]. One of these men dressed in civilian clothes steps aside from the group of watchmen. He's a stocky man, of medium build, wearing a trenchcoat. He's one of the administrative employees of the surveillance service.

["At this point, he is about three or four meters from Overney and appears very calm. Suddenly, out of his pocket he pulls a rather high-caliber revolver—9 millimeters, I think—and in cold blood fires at Overney, who collapses, hit in the chest." (See *Intercontinental Press*,

March 13, p. 271.)

[As the French press has noted, the Stalinist bureaucrats in the factories have shown signs of worry over the growing impact of revolutionary propaganda, and they have not hesitated to use strong-arm methods themselves to prevent the distribution of leaflets and papers. To give the arguments of the Communist party union officials, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* ran an interview with Roget Silvain, the secretary of the Stalinist-dominated union at the plant where Overney was killed. "We no longer have to explain to the workers," Silvain said, "that the ultraleftist groups, no matter what they call themselves, stand on the same side of the barricades as the bourgeoisie."

[Tsoppi, on the other hand, apparently felt it necessary to point to the CP's recruitment statistics to show that the party is still attracting new members. On another part of the page, Vladimir Volzhskii, a professor of history, tried to give an account of the development of the French far-left. Our translation of this article, entitled "Four Years of Adventures," follows.]

### 1968: The Kids' Party

In a small room occupied by a

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section of UNEF [Union Nationale des Etudiants de France—National Union of Students of France] on the second floor of the famous Sorbonne, the light was dim. Smoke filled the air. Sitting on chairs, tables, and even on the floor, there were ten people, boys and girls. None of them was in a hurry to get to class, since attendance is not compulsory. A discussion had been going on for two hours, at times almost breaking up into fistfights. These people were *gauchistes* [ultraleftists], rank-and-file participants in the battles of May-June 1968. Some were members of the celebrated "Sorbonne Commune." In this building, they barricaded themselves in June 1968, when their leaders at the time, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Sauvageot, and others, tried to split the student movement from the French working class and create a "students' party."

I had come to learn the views of the rank-and-file of this "new left" movement, whose theoreticians claim it is capable of arousing the "consumer society" from its lethargic dream of self-satisfaction.

However, I did not find any systematic "new left" program. One youth declared that he was a "pure" Trotskyist. Two persons leaned toward a Trotskyist organization called the Communist League. A few shouted: "We don't need any party! Let's destroy 'consumer society' first."

The French Communist party and the entire world Communist movement have given serious attention to the mass anticapitalist actions of the students and the youth in general. At the international conference of Communist and workers' parties, it was noted that the increasing political activity of the students and intellectuals was a direct consequence of the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. This development, the conference noted, was also the result of important shifts in the social structure of contemporary capitalist society, in which the intellectual professions have assumed an increasingly mass character. The deterioration in the economic position of the intelligentsia and the changes in its social composition are bringing the interests of the intelligentsia and its reserve, the students, closer to those of the working class and the working peasantry.

Along with this, already in 1968-69 the Communists made a clear dis-

inction between the ordinary participants in the student struggle, who lacked political maturity, experience, and ties with the revolutionary proletarian vanguard, from the *gauchiste* elements who sought to exploit the actions of the students and intellectuals in their own interest.

In June 1968, the Catholic paper *Croix* wrote about the political aims of the ultraleft grouplets. In the actions of these groups, it saw a chance for "Proudhon and Bakunin to make a comeback at the expense of Marx and Lenin."

### 1969: Operation Krivine

The Palais des Sports in Paris, near the Porte de Versailles. Around the building was a triple ring. Two lines of policemen stood behind portable steel barriers. In the inner circle were the "Service d'Ordre" [Monitors] of the *gauchistes* themselves—husky young fellows with red armbands on their sleeves. Alain Krivine, the candidate of the ultraleft Communist League, was holding a meeting. In the hall were boys and girls<sup>1</sup> from fifteen to seventeen years of age. Sitting at the speakers' table were some bearded old guys, obviously not youths. They were leaders of the Trotskyist Fourth International. The hall was filled with a terrible racket. Despite the loudspeakers, the people on the podium could hardly be heard at times. Alain Krivine began to speak. Next to me a youth in a white sports shirt screamed furiously: "Moron! Opportunist!"

This is how the second stage in the evolution of French *gauchisme* began. Why had Krivine, who only a year ago accused the United Socialist party leader Rocard of "opportunism" and "parliamentary cretinism," now thrown himself into the contest for the presidential chair? This year showed that the spontaneous student movement was still far from being a competent political organization. Already in the fall of 1968, the "*gauchiste* generals" were in danger of being left without an army. The "May Movement" itself quickly broke up into doz-

1. Volzhskii frequently uses contemptuous suffixes, whose meaning cannot be rendered very felicitously into English, in referring to young people: *parnishki*—"hobbledehoys"; *devchonki*—"overgrown girls," etc.—IP

ens of feuding groups and grouplets. The problem of politically uniting the remnants of the *gauchiste* "army" of 1968 became a matter of life and death for the erstwhile leaders of this movement.

Founded by the Trotskyists in the early 1930s, the Fourth International<sup>2</sup> led a miserable existence for long years. A real windfall for the Trotskyists was the splitting activity of Peking. Already in 1961, a resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Trotskyist International noted: "The political positions taken by the Chinese CP point to enormous possibilities for Trotskyism and open up a wider field of activity for the Trotskyist movement than it has ever known."

The Fourth International seized on the special presidential election which was held in 1969. In the name of the Communist League, which it had just managed to cobble together, and more minor Trotskyist grouplets, it ran Alain Krivine, a former history student at the Sorbonne, and the son of a wealthy gastroenterologist, as the candidate of the "new left." The bill was footed by the Fourth International. Krivine's becoming an officially recognized candidate gave the Trotskyists considerable legal means for disseminating their slogans through the press, radio, and television.

But this time—despite the grandiose publicity of the bourgeois press trying to present the Communist League as practically a "parallel Communist party"—the splitting tactics of the *gauchiste* leaders and their Trotskyist patrons failed. Krivine got one percent of the vote, showing very graphically the extent of the *gauchistes'* political influence.

### 1970: The Geismar Action

I was sitting with a teacher from the Sorbonne at a little table in a café on the Boulevard Saint-Michel. A policeman was standing not far away. He was wearing a blue raincoat. A girl of about sixteen or seventeen came up to him. She was wearing jeans, battered sneakers, and a sleeveless leather coat. Probably she wanted to ask him a question. But no, she approached him and . . . spit in his face. He grabbed her by the

2. The Fourth International was actually founded in 1938.—IP

arm. She began to scream. A large crowd gathered. A few school-age children slipped through to hurl insults at the "cop." Other policemen were already rushing to the spot from purple vans parked in the narrow sidestreets. At that moment, one of the boys took out a piece of pipe that he had hidden up his sleeve and hit the "cop," who fell to the ground. The police charged into the crowd. The boys fled in all directions. A few minutes later, two youths, their hands cuffed behind them, were taken away.

"What was that all about?" I asked my companion in astonishment.

"Nothing special," he replied. "Geismar's boys have tried any number of times to create a 'revolutionary situation.'"

The scene I witnessed was one of hundreds of ultraleftist provocations that occurred throughout France in the spring and summer of 1970. The organizer of these actions was the most extremist grouplet of *gauchistes*-Maoists, the so-called Proletarian Left, headed by the former vice-president of the teachers' union, Alain Geismar. After Cohn-Bendit and Sauvageot failed to form a "pure" student party in 1968, after the Trotskyist Krivine suffered a crushing defeat in the 1969 presidential elections, the Proletarian Left managed momentarily to seize the leading position among the *gauchistes*.

The Maoist-Geismarists tried to move on to organized activity. At their call, a few hundred students abandoned their studies and got helpers' jobs at the Simca, Renault, and other big factories. What were they aiming at? To undermine the position of the

French Communist party and the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor, the CP-dominated federation] from within by forming Maoist grouplets. However, nothing came of this endeavor.

And then the Proletarian Left shifted over to organizing political provocations. In the spring of 1970, Geismar and his supporters strung together a "mass organization" out of youths and all sorts of declassed elements. They called it "The New People's Resistance" [La Nouvelle Résistance Populaire]. The Maoists began to provoke fights with the police during political demonstrations and rallies organized by the French Communist party, to throw bottles of inflammable liquids into police stations and riot-troop barracks, and to place homemade bombs in banks. It goes without saying that this tactic of provocation, reminiscent of the methods of the OAS [Organisation de l'Armée Secrète—Secret Army Organization, the right-wing terrorists opposing Algerian independence] and its "festival of bombs," brought nothing but needless victims and retaliatory repression from the police. The "revolutionary situation" did not materialize.

#### 1971: Were the Ultraleftists Taking a Vacation?

A relative lull appeared in the *gauchiste* movement. In August, *Le Monde's* observer Thierry Pfister wrote a series of articles entitled "The *Gauchistes* on Vacation."

It was a funny kind of vacation. For example, simultaneously with

"studying the political lessons of three years of struggle," the "action groups" of the Krivine Trotskyists were actively training cadres of propagandists. Special schools were opened by the Communist League. The kind of instruction that was given in these "schools" can be judged by the selections Pfister gave from the courses—how to carry on a conspiracy over the telephone, how to conduct yourself under arrest, the conditions for shifting to illegal work! The idea was beaten into the heads of the not-very-numerous students in these schools that the time for spontaneous and emotional actions was over.

The experience of 1968-70 showed that the ultraleftists were unable to build a political tendency based on this spontaneous upsurge of student actions. Furthermore, thanks to its resolute struggle, the French Communist party had succeeded in exposing the provocative character of the actions staged by the *gauchistes* in their attempt to feed on the social discontent of the workers and the youth. The overwhelming majority of the French workers and the more mature students did not fall for the splitters' lures.

At the same time, as the French Communist party has noted, we must not underestimate the possibility of ultraleft provocations. Re-forming their ranks, the Maoists and the Trotskyists are continuing to rely on the most politically unstable elements of the anarchistic and declassed youth. And this precisely is what is revealed by the recent events at Boulogne-Billancourt. □

## The Meaning of the Indian State Assembly Elections

[The following resolution, entitled "The Assembly Election and Our Tasks," was adopted March 26 by the Communist League, Indian section of the Fourth International.]

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The recent sweeping victory of the Congress, the traditional party of the Indian bourgeoisie, in the sixteen state assembly elections has to be explained in terms of certain political and economic factors and a new cor-

relation of class forces.

These factors include the military victory over Pakistan, the "liberation" of Bangladesh by the Indian army, the radical stance adopted by the Congress leadership, and certain reforms like bank nationalisation introduced by the centre. The Bengali "patriotism" aroused in a state like West Bengal by the Indian army's action in Bangladesh has worked in favour of the Congress at the cost of its leftist opponents. Another factor that helped the Congress is the erosion of the

traditional bases of the left parties among the urban working class and agricultural workers thanks to the disruption of the trade union movement and the absence of militant class struggles, which the left parties have failed to build.

It must be conceded that the people have voted decisively for a programme of social change. To that extent the poll results show that politically the situation has changed in favour of the bourgeoisie and the ruling class. It also poses a serious chal-

lenge to the Congress as the ruling party of the bourgeoisie.

The outcome has also exposed the bankruptcy of the traditional parties, both of the right and the left. It has introduced a process of regroupment of political forces in the country, which will lead to a new process of class polarisation in national politics.

Since the mid-term Lok Sabha [lower house of parliament] poll last year, which gave a clear mandate to the Congress to implement its election promises without any challenge from other parties, the impressive electoral victory has reinforced the trend towards reintegration and reconsolidation of the political leadership of the bourgeoisie, which suffered a serious debacle in 1967.

In the eyes of the vast majority of the electorate, the Congress has emerged as the new and radical alternative to all other parties. In reality, in terms of programme as well as the organisational composition of the party, it is only a continuation of the old united Congress despite the exit of certain old-guard leaders and the influx of the younger elements of the ruling class.

Having "captured" states like West Bengal, Bihar, Punjab, and Delhi, and having secured a majority of more than two-thirds in most of the state legislatures, the Congress is placed in a situation where it has no excuse to delay implementation of its electoral promises, which are at best aimed at fulfilling the limited objective of completing the unfinished tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution and introducing certain reforms within the capitalist framework, and certainly not that of ushering in a socialist transformation of Indian society, as the party claims.

The Congress, as a party of the bourgeoisie of an underdeveloped country, cannot and will not be in a position to overcome the present crisis, which is of a structural nature within the matrix of capitalist property relations. Only a socialist revolution, led by the working class and liquidating the capitalist system, can complete the unfulfilled tasks of bourgeois democracy.

If the ruling party fails to solve the basic problems of the masses in the immediate future, as Indira Gandhi herself has said, the popular upsurge that swept it into office can turn against it in an equally spectacular

manner. In the absence of a militant mass movement led by the working class, the frustration generated could be exploited by the conservative elements of the ruling class to install a dictatorial regime that would seek to suppress democratic liberties and all forms of class resistance of the masses. That is the dialectic of the present situation in a country like India, where a popular upsurge in the absence of a revolutionary leadership can swing from extreme left to extreme right.

The Congress victory in West Bengal, hitherto considered a citadel of leftist forces, and the rout of the CPI (M) [Communist party of India (Marxist)] and its allies of the left front is perhaps the most significant outcome. It is difficult to believe that the rigging of the elections in West Bengal and other states, as alleged by the CPI(M), was the decisive factor in the debacle of the left. The main reasons were the failure of the CPI(M)-led coalitions to fulfill their own electoral promises within the capitalist framework and the class-collaborationist politics pursued by the left parties.

But the general trend in almost all states is clear. It had been a nearly total rout for the opposition parties. The Jana Sangh, which is potentially the most organised party of the bourgeoisie's conservative trend, made a serious bid to become the main opposition party on a national scale but secured fewer seats than it did in 1967.

It suffered severe setbacks in its strongholds of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Delhi. The Jana Sangh has lost its communal appeal among the urban upper-caste intelligentsia, especially after the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of an independent Bangladesh. Nevertheless, it is the only opposition party that has sizable organisational bases in different states and therefore may serve as an alternative party of the bourgeoisie.

The Congress (O) [Organisation Congress] has been practically wiped out in its strong bases of Gujarat and Mysore. The same was the fate of the Swatantra party and other regional bourgeois parties like the Akali Dal, Bangla Congress, BKD [Bhata-tiya Kranti Dal—Indian Revolutionary party], etc.

As for the traditional left parties,

the CPI [Communist party of India] has slightly improved its position, that, too, as an electoral ally of the Congress in some states. But the performance of the CPI(M) was disastrous on a national scale. The fundamental reason for the debacle of the traditional left parties like the SP and CPI is that there was hardly anything to distinguish them from the Congress in their election manifestoes. The Congress has made serious inroads into the traditional base of the SP among the intelligentsia, and therefore the SP has entered a phase of rapid disintegration. The CPI on the other hand, because of its tail-ending and class-collaborationist policies in relation to the so-called national bourgeoisie, cannot be expected to play the role of revolutionary opposition.

The CPI(M) had pursued a line of militant opposition to the Congress, although the former's immediate perspective is one of achieving a "people's democratic revolution" in which the working class seeks an alliance with the "antimonopoly national bourgeoisie." A socialist revolution is not placed immediately on the agenda.

There are some petty-bourgeois radicals who have joined the Congress and who believe that the ruling party is accomplishing the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, fighting imperialism and feudalism more effectively than the left parties by introducing partial reforms like bank nationalisation, abolition of privy purses, etc. They contend that these tasks can be completed by imposing ceilings on landholdings and urban properties and by amending the constitution to restrict or abolish private property. The compulsions of reality in the coming period will demonstrate to such elements that no radical reforms can be achieved within the existing capitalist framework.

The revolutionary Marxists in India should not be swept away by the seemingly spectacular sweep of the Congress at the polls. They should not nurture any illusions regarding the ability of the bourgeois state to overcome the present economic crisis, which is going to deepen and be aggravated in the future, leading to a new phase of political instability and crisis. Therefore the revolutionary Marxists must resist all attempts to subordinate independent class struggle of the masses to the exigencies

of the ruling class and must incessantly strive to build up an independent class organisation and the struggles of the proletariat and the rural poor against the bourgeois state. They must mobilise united struggles of working-class parties and organisations against any attempts to impose restrictive antidemocratic measures like moratoriums on strikes, wage freezes, etc.

There is every reason to believe that

repression by the bourgeois state will be unleashed against mass organisations, despite the massive victory of the Congress, wherever the bourgeoisie feels threatened. Therefore it is necessary to build up united actions of working-class and other mass organisations to resist such repression. It is imperative to forge a united front of working-class parties, especially in states like West Bengal, with the above objective in view. Steps must be taken

to create workers' defense corps, to prevent disruption of meetings and demonstrations, to launch a campaign against political murders and clashes between left political parties, to fight for the unconditional release of political prisoners, including the Naxalites, etc. A united front of the working-class parties that stand for mass struggles against the bourgeois state and its repressive policies must be built up in the immediate future. □

## A Contribution to the History of the Trotskyist Movement

# The Fourth International

By Pierre Frank

[The following, eighth installment of our translation of Pierre Frank's *The Fourth International: A Contribution to the History of the Trotskyist Movement* completes the second section of Chapter 6: "The Period of Splits in the International." (Serialization started with our issue of March 13.)

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## Chapter 6: From 1948 to 1968 (Cont'd)

### Crises and Regroupments (The Sixth World Congress)

The 1953 split had brought the North American movements, among others, into conflict with the International. This resulted in a dangerous disequilibrium within the organization, where the Asian representation was relatively limited; where, as would later be realized, the Ceylonese section had started to degenerate; and where the European sections were working under increasingly unfavorable conditions, in an atmosphere of growing political apathy. The European sections were, of course, going to devote a large part of their activity to helping the Algerian revolution; but, as important as this activity was, it involved only a limited, often not very proletarian, group of people who were sympathetic to the colonial revolution but many of whom had defeatist feelings about a socialist revolution in advanced capitalist countries. There was a striking contrast between what was happening in the colonial countries and the almost complete political stagnation in Europe. In the colonial countries, even when the mass movement suffered defeat, it made

a very quick recovery; the revolution was victorious in Black Africa in 1960; it was going to triumph as a socialist revolution in Cuba, in the very jaw of imperialism. In Europe, on the other hand, with the accession to power of de Gaulle in 1958, the proletariat was going to suffer its most severe defeat since the end of the war.

Another phenomenon of major importance also having repercussions in the Trotskyist movement was the Sino-Soviet dispute.

These events affected not only the Fourth International but also that part of the Trotskyist movement regrouped around the International Committee. There, too, various differentiations were taking place. Thus, through a process comprising both differentiating and regrouping, the reunification of the International was being readied. But meanwhile, prior to the Sixth Congress, a serious crisis began to ripen in the International.

Within the International's leadership, divergent points of view became evident, in the first place on tactical problems concerning the European sections that were devoting the major portion of their activity to helping colonial revolutions. Tendencies appeared that considered any effort by the European sections to deal with problems in their respective countries as of little or no value. These tendencies were a reflection in our movement of those currents that had lost all hope in the working class of the European countries; they had been seriously reinforced, especially in France, following de Gaulle's accession to power. The defeat had been a severe one for the working class: the Communist party had suffered its first big electoral defeat in the second half of 1958, losing a million and a half votes to de Gaulle. For some, aid to the colonial revolution was not a task whose importance was determined by the current political conjuncture, but rather the only thing possible, the proletarian revolution in Europe having been struck off the agenda for a very long period — if not forever.

In the leadership of the International, a kind of agreement took place at that time between Pablo and Posadas. They united against the "Europeans" and the members of the international leadership who did not want to abandon political activity within the European mass movement, even though that movement was generally at a very low level of militancy. The early outlines of tendency formations appeared towards the end of 1959, when the International Executive Committee decided to convoke the next world congress. While the documents were in the course of preparation, comrades Pablo and Santen were imprisoned in Amsterdam and prosecuted for their aid to the Algerian revolution. The organization reacted to these arrests and waged a big campaign for the defense of its members, a campaign linked to the defense of the Algerian revolution.

The arrests gave Posadas the opportunity to launch a violent faction fight against the majority of the members of the international leadership. He mobilized all his forces in Latin America to obtain a majority at the congress. He pretended to be Pablo's spokesman, and it was at this time that his positions and his statements began to become more and more extravagant. So extreme was his behavior at the congress that a small group of comrades, forerunners of the Pablo tendency, disassociated themselves from Posadas despite sympathy for his positions. Defeated at the congress, Posadas pursued the struggle inside the International for a few months; then suddenly, shortly before Pablo was set free, he attacked the latter publicly in the Latin American organs available to him and broke with the International.

The Sixth Congress, held early in 1961, had a hundred participants from about thirty countries. Because of the fierce and bitter—and politically impoverished—struggle waged by the Posadas faction, the discussions did not allow the International to make any real progress in its thinking; on several occasions it was necessary to refute rather primitive statements on the constant and uninterrupted rise of the revolution and the total inability of capitalism to take measures capable, not of braking the revolutionary thrust, but of containing it for a time. But the documents ratified by the congress were not without importance.

The document on the world economic situation noted the economic growth in the workers states, particularly China's appearance on the world scene as an industrial power. At the same time, the document refuted Khrushchev's claims, widely believed in that period, to the effect that the USSR would rapidly surpass the U.S. on the economic plane. As to the capitalist states, the document restated the explanations already supplied on the causes of the "boom" and expanded them in various areas, especially those related to the proliferation of technological innovation. The document further pointed out the possibilities and the limits of the European Common Market, which was then becoming operative. As to the colonial countries, the document stressed their economic stagnation, if not headlong regression, and stated that economic aid—whether from capitalist or workers states—would be insufficient to ameliorate this state of affairs and thus would not vitiate the objective causes giving powerful impetus to the colonial revolution.

The document on the colonial revolution made a special study of the situation in a certain number of colonial

zones or colonial countries. A great deal of space was allotted to the Algerian revolution, whose conquest of independence for the country, already discernible, loomed on the horizon. A special resolution was devoted to Cuba, retracing the revolutionary process that had culminated only a short time before in making the island a workers state, the first in the western hemisphere.

A document on Stalinism noted the "reformist" character of the period that had followed the 1953-57 unrest, and the new contradictions that were beginning to take shape in the workers states. The document also made a study of the new contradictions to which the Communist parties were subject. It pointed out the compromise between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships embodied in the text adopted several weeks earlier by the Moscow Conference of eighty-one Communist and Workers parties, and concluded that this compromise could not be a lasting one, that the Sino-Soviet crisis would inevitably erupt again.

This was the first congress since 1948 at which the Lanka Sama Samaja party (Ceylonese section of the Fourth International) was not represented, and its absence was of great concern to the congress. The LSSP had suffered an electoral defeat in March 1960, completely dashing the optimistic prospects it had envisaged and had led the International to share. Instead of moving on to a thorough examination of the causes for this error in analysis and perspective, as the International—in its internal documents addressed to the LSSP—attempted to have it do, the leadership of the LSSP had adopted a clearly opportunistic line that the International could not approve. In a public declaration, the Secretariat of the International had disassociated itself from the LSSP's line. The Sixth Congress adopted a resolution, which it made public, disapproving the policy followed by the LSSP after the latter's electoral defeat. The resolution especially criticized the LSSP's vote in favor of the budget of the Sri Lanka Freedom party bourgeois government, and called on the Ceylonese party to correct its line.

Posadas and his faction (which kept losing ground in Latin America) noisily proclaimed that they supported Pablo, even denying that their faction was separate and distinct from his. Suddenly, after the congress and about two months before Pablo was released from jail, Posadas unleashed a public attack in Latin America against him. Why this unexpected attack—an attack that surprised Pablo himself at the time it occurred? It soon became clear that even if they were in agreement against those they called the "Europeans," meaning Ernest Mandel, Livio Maitan, Pierre Frank, and subsequently the "North Americans," they were absolutely opposed to each other on the question of the Sino-Soviet dispute. This question affected the Trotskyist movement considerably, as well as the working-class and mass movements as a whole.

During 1959-60, when the Sino-Soviet conflict began to be publicly revealed as a conflict between two parties in which political differences were of prime importance, the International almost unanimously reacted by giving critical support to the Chinese, whose positions on a certain number of basic questions (colonial revolution, peaceful and parliamentary roads to socialism, peaceful co-existence) were progressive compared to those of the So-

viet leadership. At the Sixth Congress, right after the conference of the eighty-one Communist and Workers parties at which the Chinese and Soviet leaderships had arrived at a compromise, the International was unanimous in its analysis of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In a letter to the congress, Pablo wrote from his prison cell:

"Independently of the inevitable ups and downs of this crisis—the Sino-Soviet dispute—and independently of the possible smoothing over of differences, the break between the correctly characterized opportunistic right wing [the Soviet leadership] and the centrist-leaning wing [the Chinese] can be considered deep and lasting."

But towards the middle of 1961, differing opinions on the Sino-Soviet dispute appeared in the International. After having broken with the International, Posadas not only identified his positions almost completely with those of the Chinese, but even declared that he had inspired them. It is common knowledge that Moscow, by distorting certain of Mao Tse-tung's statements on atomic weapons, made every effort to accuse him, falsely, of wanting nuclear war. But Posadas had no qualms about pushing matters to extreme absurdity, claiming it was necessary for the USSR to launch a preventive nuclear war to assure the triumph of the world revolution. He also picked up the Chinese attacks against Castro and even added to them.<sup>29</sup> While the great majority within the International upheld its positions, Pablo completely reversed his viewpoint. He identified the Chinese positions with Stalinism, and gave almost uncritical support to Khrushchev and especially the Yugoslavs.

## The International Committee

A history of the Fourth International must, of course, include the history of the organizations comprising the International Committee and that of the International Committee itself. On this, we apologize for not being able to supply more than brief notes. The primary difficulty stems from the fact that the International Committee really functioned not as a centralized organization but as a faction with loose ties among its members. According to information supplied by comrades who took part in the International Committee, there were few international meetings of the committee, political positions often being formulated, in the form of documents from national sections, after exchanges of views between the committee's sections. Consequently, after reviewing the conditions mentioned earlier under which the International Committee was formed, we shall deal here with the circumstances that brought it to reunification.

We had said that originally there were political differences, particularly in connection with evaluating the meaning of "de-Stalinization" when that process began. There were also suspicions about the role of the international center in the crisis that divided the Socialist Workers party in the United States in 1953. For various reasons

29. We shall limit ourselves here to the political positions found under Posadas' signature, gladly leaving aside an aspect of his prose developed after his break with the Fourth International, wherein he extols—with the utmost solemnity—the cult of his own personality. No one else could come anywhere near his skill in this.

there had been no clarification of this subject. For some years these suspicions, aimed at Pablo in particular, were a serious obstacle to any rapprochement. But beginning in 1956, the Twentieth Congress and the Sino-Soviet dispute brought the positions of the two groups closer on the question of the crisis of Stalinism.

Moreover, on the problems of the colonial revolution, members and sympathizers of the International Committee, especially those in North America and Latin America, underwent an experience with the Cuban revolution that was in many respects similar to the Fourth International's experience with the Algerian revolution.

In the International Committee, too, while the majority adopted positions converging with those of the majority of the International, there was a minority that was to hold differing and clearly opposed positions. This led to a split in the International Committee when the reunification took place. That committee's British and French groups, the Socialist Labour League (SLL) and the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI) respectively, while not holding identical positions on all questions, nevertheless agreed to reject the above-mentioned points of view and adopted ultraleft positions.

For them the colonial revolution does not exist. Colonial countries are capitalist countries—which is true—and consequently, according to them, without a really proletarian leadership, revolutionary-Marxist to boot, there can be no socialist revolution in these countries, only betrayal of the mass movements. The SLL and the OCI have a limited understanding of the peasantry in these countries, identifying it with the relatively well-off peasantry in Western Europe. Although claiming to adhere to Trotskyism, they do not understand the permanent character of the revolution in these countries. When the revolution triumphed in Cuba, they refused to recognize it. A declaration of the National Committee of the SLL states that in Cuba there has been "a political revolution that has transferred power from the hands of one bourgeois class to another sector of that same class. . . . Thus we have Kemal Ataturk, Chiang Kai-shek, Nasser, Nehru, Cárdenas, Perón, Ben Bella—and Castro." "Castro's regime has not created a new type of state," qualitatively different from the Batista regime. Even now, at this date, the SLL still considers Cuba a bourgeois state, and Castro a leader of the same stripe as Batista and Chiang Kai-shek!

As to de-Stalinization, these groups almost completely deny the processes that have taken place in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death. They consider that acknowledging the existence of liberalization measures is a "capitulation" to Stalinism. They are incapable of differentiating between the "liberalization" that has taken place to a certain degree and "democratization"—which does not exist at all.

In fact, in their eyes no profound changes have occurred in the world since 1938, when the Fourth International was founded and the *Transitional Program* adopted. They hold on to every letter of it in an extremely rigid fashion, and denounce as capitulators those Trotskyists who have tried to understand the new conditions of our times and to define a revolutionary-Marxist policy appropriate to these new conditions.

[To be continued]