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United Press International

BOMBS being loaded aboard U.S. planes on aircraft carrier Constellation in South China Sea. Carrier-based fighter-bombers

and land-based B-52s raided Hanoi and Haiphong April 15-16, escalating air war beyond level of Johnson administration.

AIR WAR GROWS STILL LARGER

Feltrinelli Clue in Telegram

Nearly one month after the mysterious death of Italian publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli on March 16, the chief prosecutor in charge of the judicial inquiry stated: "We are seeking to reconstruct what Feltrinelli had been doing, what kind of life he was leading." He made no mention, however, of a telegram Feltrinelli sent just hours before his death, although it throws light on the investigation.

The telegram was sent from Milan to the painter Vlady, son of the revolutionary Soviet writer Victor Serge. Vlady, who lives in Mexico City, turned the text over to the daily *Excelsior*, which published it on March 21.

The telegram would indicate that on the day Feltrinelli was allegedly plotting to blow up a high-tension pylon, he was actually preoccupied with his publishing activities. In it he requests immediate authorization to publish in Milan the Italian translation of Serge's novel *Les années sans pardon* (Years Without Reprieve), published last year in France by Maspero and now a best seller.

The text of the telegram is as follows: "Anxious to publish Italian translation of 'Years Without Reprieve' (comma) trying in vain to obtain rights that belong to Maspero Editor Paris (stop) Schoijet (Italian intellectual) offered Serge works (stop) Have telegraphed confirmation (stop) Request cable to Milan (comma) authorizing publish novel by Feltrinelli (stop)."

Vlady told *Excelsior* he was stunned to receive the telegram, which would seem to weaken the terrorist hypothesis according to which the inquiry is being conducted.

"... the telegram helps to reconstruct Feltrinelli's state of mind the very day of his probable murder," noted Vlady. He said that "it is obvious that a man who intends to carry out a terrorist act—which requires a heightened nervous tension—is not going to be thinking that morning about bringing out in Italy the translation of a novel for which authorization is needed from Mexico City." □

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Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

MANAGING EDITOR: Allen Myers.

COPY EDITOR: Ruth Schein.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Gerry Foley, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders, David Thorstad.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.

TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Lawrence Rand.

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PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemeene, Paris 4, France.

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Air War Now Larger Than Under Lyndon Johnson

By Allen Myers

Waves of U.S. planes bombed Hanoi and Haiphong April 15-16, escalating the air war even beyond the point reached when Lyndon Johnson was president. For the first time in the history of the war, the giant B-52 bombers—each of which can carry thirty tons of bombs—were sent against the two largest cities of North Vietnam.

Hanoi radio reported that fifteen of the attacking planes, including one B-52, had been shot down. The U.S. command in Saigon at first acknowledged only two losses, but later changed the figure to five.

Hanoi radio also reported that a Soviet freighter in Haiphong harbor had been damaged and one of its officers wounded by bomb fragments and shells fired by an American plane.

It was the fear of provoking a confrontation with the Soviet Union by sinking Soviet ships that reportedly restrained Johnson from bombing Haiphong during his administration.

There was no official statement on the total number of planes involved in the raids, in keeping with Nixon's attempt to censor news of the U.S. aggression. (The U.S. command formally announced April 11 that it would no longer make daily reports on raids against North Vietnam.) However, the *New York Times* reported that eighteen B-52s were involved, and the number of accompanying fighter-bombers may have been in the hundreds.

Nixon now has a total of 130 of the B-52 bombers in the war zone. The largest previous total was 103, in July 1969. In addition, there are more than 700 fighter-bombers based in Thailand, South Vietnam, and on aircraft carriers. Four more carriers are reported en route to Vietnam.

Commenting on this massive escalation in an April 17 editorial, the *New York Times* reinterpreted Nixon's 1968 campaign pledge:

"... that 1968 promise 'to end the war and win the peace' translates into ordinary English as a promise 'to continue the war until the enemy con-

cedes defeat and accepts American peace terms.'"

Fruits of "Peaceful Coexistence"

The massive air raids portrayed to the entire world the real meaning of the Nixon-Mao détente. For all the "revolutionary" language of the Nixon-Chou communiqué and Peking's propaganda, Nixon clearly left China with the understanding that "peaceful coexistence" means a free hand for U.S. imperialism to attempt bombing the Indochinese peoples into submission.

In fact, even the language of the Maoist leadership has undergone a significant modification since the Nixon visit. Writing in the April 9 *Los Angeles Times*, Richard Reston observed:

"Chinese pronouncements on U.S. policy now are more restrained than at any time in recent years. The judgment in Washington is that the Chinese leaders are deliberately trying to cool their rhetoric in an effort to keep the lines of communication between Washington and Peking open.

"Peking's softer public posture appears to be holding even in the face of mounting hostilities in Vietnam."

Reston noted several instances of this change, among them the following:

"The Chinese leadership, for example, no longer refers to China as the 'strong rear area of support' for North Vietnam. Instead, Peking tends to fall back on the old theme of close, friendly and enduring relations between the two countries."

In the April 16 *New York Times*, Benjamin Welles, in an unusually blunt dispatch from Washington, described the Nixon administration's evaluation of the way Peking and Moscow would respond to the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong:

"Senior Administration sources said that the Washington Special Action Group, a subcommittee of the National Security Council headed by Henry A. Kissinger, Presidential Assistant for

National Security Affairs, had carefully calculated likely Soviet and Chinese reaction before recommending the B-52 raid to Mr. Nixon.

"'You can be pretty sure that they weighed that angle with the utmost care,' said one source who asked not to be identified. 'If they'd thought that there was a likelihood of a serious Chinese or Russian reaction—such as sending troops in—they wouldn't have gone ahead.'" (Emphasis added.)

It would be difficult to imagine a more straightforward description of the responsibility of the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies for this latest escalation—a responsibility that applies equally to every U.S. buildup in Indochina in the course of the war. Nixon—or Johnson before him—would not have done it had either of the two largest workers states given a credible warning of determination to defend the Vietnamese revolution. The fruits of "peaceful coexistence," whether of the Soviet or Chinese variety, are not peace but increased imperialist aggression.

It appeared, moreover, that at least the Soviet bureaucrats had been given advance notice of the raids. Welles reported:

"Regarding the question of whether word had been advanced to Moscow, a highly qualified source said:

"'I can't say whether President Nixon passed the Russians a warning in advance to get their ships out of the way and to assure them that we weren't scrapping the coming Presidential trip to Moscow.'

"'But it would be perfectly conceivable that a warning to the Russians was synchronized to coincide with the arrival of the B-52's in the area,' he added. 'Lots of our military-contingency plans include such warnings over the hot line or through diplomatic channels.'"

Elsewhere in the article Welles noted that "officials here said that such an advisory contact had always been part of the contingency plans for the bombing. . . ."

It is unlikely that Nixon would risk offending his Chinese hosts by denying them information that he gave to Moscow, although it is possible that the timing of the decision may have prevented a message reaching Peking before the bombers reached Haiphong. In any case, the Nixon-Chou agreement to establish a hot line between Washington and Peking will eliminate the possibility of such accidental discourtesies in the future.

"Calculated Warning" to Moscow

The Nixon administration was not only confident that the Soviet Union and China would not come to the aid of the Vietnamese. Nixon made it plain that the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was intended to persuade the Soviet bureaucrats to *curtail* the limited assistance North Vietnam now receives.

During the first two weeks of April, as Nguyen Van Thieu's forces suffered defeat after defeat, U. S. officials increasingly stressed the theme that their puppet's setbacks were due to Soviet tanks and artillery supplied to North Vietnam.

At an April 7 news conference, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird accused the Soviet Union of being a "major contributor" to the continuation of the war because it did not insist that weapons supplied to Hanoi be used only in North Vietnam.

Three days later, Nixon himself spoke publicly on the subject:

"We must recognize," he said, ". . . that a great responsibility particularly rests upon the great powers, that every great power must follow the principle that it should not encourage, directly or indirectly, any other nation to use force or armed aggression against its neighbors."

Perhaps fearful of misunderstandings, administration officials later said that Nixon was referring to the "North Vietnamese invasion"—not to Thieu's "incursions" into Cambodia and Laos.

In reality, however, Soviet assistance to North Vietnam has declined considerably. An April 12 Associated Press dispatch from Washington reported that U. S. spy agencies estimate that Soviet military aid had amounted to \$505,000,000 in 1967, only \$70,000,000 in 1970, and \$100,000,000 in 1971.

Similarly, Chinese military assistance was \$145,000,000 in 1967,



FOURTH YEAR OF THE "PLAN TO END THE WAR"

Herblock in the Washington Post

\$85,000,000 in 1970, and \$75,000,000 in 1971.

U. S. spending on the war, according to the very conservative estimate provided in the same dispatch, will amount to \$9,000,000,000 this year.

(Economic aid from the two large workers states increased during the five-year period, but in much smaller proportion. The figures reported were: from the Soviet Union, \$200,000,000 in 1967, \$345,000,000 in 1970, and \$315,000,000 in 1971; from China, \$80,000,000 in 1967, \$60,000,000 in 1970, and \$100,000,000 in 1971.)

"Official indications here tonight [April 15]," Welles wrote from Washington, "were that President Nixon has

chosen to stage a deliberate confrontation with the Soviet Union to force it to limit resupply of the North Vietnamese Army or restrain that army in battle altogether.

"There was no formal comment from the White House on the decision to bomb the Haiphong area. But senior officials acknowledged that the raid was intended as a calculated warning to the Soviet Union."

The chief concern of administration officials in fact appeared to be not that the Kremlin bureaucrats would provide aid for the defense of the Vietnamese revolution, but that the raids might dampen the atmosphere for Nixon's visit to Moscow or, at worst,

that Brezhnev might decide to score a cheap point at Mao's expense by cancelling the invitation.

Memories of 1954

The timing of Nixon's dramatic escalation of the war indicated just how desperate the situation had become for his Saigon puppets. The raids came just one week before the April 22 antiwar demonstrations scheduled by the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) and in an election year in which Nixon's 1968 promise to "end the war" is being recalled by voters.

Even as U.S. planes bombed Hai-phong and Hanoi, the liberation forces continued tightening their encirclement of Anloc, only sixty miles north of Saigon. Thieu's Fifth Division was completely surrounded in the city, and efforts to send a relief column northward along Route 13 had, in the polite words of American journalists, "bogged down."

In the April 15 *New York Times*, Malcolm W. Browne indicated U.S. troops were involved in the attempt to break through to Anloc:

"Americans became more directly involved in the Route 13 battle yesterday when United States Army trucks began using the road to convoy supplies and ammunition to the front.

"The American trucks did not go

all the way to the point where the opposing forces are clashing. But the whole length of the road, from a point well south of Laikhe all the way north, has become extremely dangerous. Laikhe is 25 miles north of here [Saigon]."

In an article published April 14, Browne noted that Thieu had sent into the Route 13 battle the Twenty-first Division, pulling it out of its usual station in the Mekong Delta—"a troop movement from one military region to another, never before forced on any commander."

The situation, he added, had "some ugly similarities" to that just before the defeat of the French in 1954:

". . . the Vietminh, again and again, would overrun a key town or base, forcing the French to try to send relief by road; the road columns were frequently cut to pieces.

". . . Large French forces were pinned down in areas remote from where they were desperately needed. The Vietminh thus thwarted movement of forces that might have held off the fall of Dienbienphu.

"Route 13 has sucked up thousands of men sorely needed elsewhere, and whose home base in the Mekong Delta may soon be under heavy assault."

On April 12, the Nixon administration began launching trial balloons about the possibility of ending the

withdrawals of U.S. ground troops. Although Nixon on January 13 promised a statement "with regard to a further withdrawal" before May 1, his press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, told reporters that no "conclusions one way or the other" should be drawn as to what Nixon would say. There was now, Ziegler added, a "somewhat different set of circumstances."

After a briefing by Nixon, Gerald Ford, the Republican leader in the House of Representatives, claimed that "there has never been a commitment" to further withdrawals. "I don't think you can assume anything at this point," he said.

This possibility has its own dangers for Nixon, however—not only from the opposition it would arouse in the United States, but also from the likely response of the troops themselves.

An indication of the attitude of the GIs was provided April 12 when members of a company in the 196th Infantry Brigade who had been flown to Phubai refused orders to patrol outside the base. The number who refused was variously reported at between 50 and 100 men out of 142 in the company.

"Man, the war stinks," United Press International quoted one of the soldiers as saying. "It's a damn waste of time. Why the hell are we fighting for something we don't believe in?" □

Papua New Guinea

Australian Government Loots Colonial Files

As Papua New Guinea moves toward formal independence, the Australian government, which administers the territory, has been busily picking through the files of the colonial administration in order to remove "sensitive" records.

The action was announced on February 1 and was to be completed before April 20, the date of the opening of the newly elected Papua New Guinea House of Assembly. This body is expected to declare the country independent and would, of course, have control of the files that have been looted by the Australian administration.

The removal of "sensitive" files may have another purpose in addition to preventing embarrassing disclosures about the nature of the Australian government's administration. Shortly after the action was announced, the weekly *Inside New Guinea* commented:

"There's no question that a self-govern-

ing Papua New Guinea could usefully use some of the Australian colonial administration files for political ammunition against Australia in the years ahead. By the same yardstick, Australia could wield a large political stick against some emerging native politicians here with ammunition from Special Branch and other departmental and security files."

In an attempt to stop the looting of the files, the Pangu [Papua and New Guinea Union] party petitioned the United Nations mission that had been sent to observe the election.

(New Guinea is administered under a United Nations trusteeship. Papua does not have the same status formally, but the Australian government administers the two areas as a single unit.)

The UN mission, however, refused to intervene. An appeal by the Pangu party to the UN Trusteeship Council also produced no results. □

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Renzo Gambino—Dedicated Revolutionist

[The following is a translation of the speech delivered by Livio Maitan at the April 1 memorial meeting in Rome for Renzo Gambino.]

* * *

Revolutionists reject hypocritical rituals and fancy phrases. We will not offend our comrade's memory by making any conventional eulogies. This is a suitable occasion for remem-

in Turin.

Renzo was the son of a Fiat worker. After a long and painful stay in the hospital during the war, he began his political activity in the Partito Socialista [Socialist party]. Although even the most critical and dynamic groups at the time had only a rough idea of Marxist concepts and principles, he was one of those who came quickly to understand the degeneration and historical dead end

Stalinism from a revolutionary point of view in the 1950s. You had to fight against yielding to stifling isolation, not let yourself be affected by denigration and slander. You had to be able to swim against the current every day. Renzo Gambino had the capacity to do this, and he could do it with clear conviction and tenacity.

In the period when the revolutionists considered it necessary to work in the PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano—Italian Communist party], Renzo was one of the organizers of the first attempts at opposition by critical elements within the party. When the great crisis of Stalinism came in 1956-57—which assumed considerable proportions in Turin—he was one of those most active in developing the confrontation, the polemics, and a coordinated battle against the Stalinists. His political zeal and dedication won him such profound respect in Communist party circles in Turin that he was able to continue to participate actively in the debate inside the PCI even after he publicly became a representative of the Fourth International.

The last phase of Renzo's work was probably the one that gave the best test of his high political and human qualities. The year 1968 was quite a difficult one for our organization. Renzo was able to maintain the necessary political clarity, to oppose the liquidationist tendencies, to dedicate himself to getting the organization moving again. He was able to understand the major turn that had taken place in the political struggle in Italy and readjusted quickly to the new conditions of work. He was able, therefore, to take part in the work outside the factories, to participate in the critical efforts of the student movement, to play a firm role in the turbulent assemblies of the new vanguard in the difficult first period. If revolutionary Marxism has a real influence in sectors of the working class and the student movement in Turin, we owe it in large measure to his work.

For long years Renzo was a contributor to the revolutionary press.

Italian Trotskyists Mourn Renzo Gambino

Rome

Renzo Gambino, who had been suffering from cancer for a year, died on March 30 in Turin. He was fifty years old. His wife and son are also Fourth International militants.

Gambino joined the Italian section of the Fourth International in 1949. Ever since that time, except for the years 1968 and 1969, he was a member of the Central Committee and for long years was in the Secretariat and the national leadership. He participated in almost all the world congresses of the International and in many plenums of

the International Executive Committee. He was elected to the International Control Commission a long time ago and this was confirmed at the Ninth World Congress in 1969. He drafted the constitution of the Italian section and contributed frequently to the Trotskyist press both under his own name and under the pseudonyms "Rienzi" and "Brando."

For twenty years, Renzo led the Turin Trotskyist organization.

His funeral April 1 was attended by activists and leaders from several tendencies in the workers' movement, including the Communist party.

of Social Democracy and Stalinism. It was this clear fundamental decision that led him—in the period of bourgeois restoration in Italy following the crisis of the war and at a time when, in the climate of the cold war, the Stalinists throughout the world had launched a new wave of witch-hunts—to become one of the founders of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari [Revolutionary Communist Groups], the Italian section of the Fourth International. From those early days, he was the backbone of our organization in Turin and one of the national leaders of the GCR.

It is hard for the comrades who have come into the struggle since 1968 and who now constitute the core of the vanguard to realize exactly what it meant to conduct a polemic against

bering him—remembering him, because although he died medically only a few days ago, his life had already ended a year ago. This is a suitable occasion to reflect on the kind of man he was and on the meaning of his life.

Like most people, our comrade Renzo Gambino had his personal ups and downs and experienced periods of personal difficulty. The small financial resources of our organization forced him to devote too much of his time to working at an occupation in order to maintain himself. But his real life was bound up with the life and fortunes of the movement to which he belonged. And it was because of his constant and vital contributions that the movement developed and became what it is in Italy and especially

He wrote articles that were always rich in content and clear in their argument and conclusions. He was a party man in the fullest sense of the term, always devoting himself with the greatest punctiliousness to the most grinding tasks.

In revolutionary struggle, you need enthusiasm, courage, and a spirit of self-sacrifice. But no less necessary, although perhaps more rare, are methodicalness in work and persistence in activity. Precisely because he had these gifts to the highest degree, Renzo was esteemed not only in Italy but also in the International, in whose congresses he always participated and on whose leading bodies he always sat.

I vividly remember the last time I saw him, that is, the last time before our sad meetings when his condition was deteriorating. After a day of intense activity, about a year ago, he sat down exhausted outside a hall, no longer able to follow the discussion, which was continuing. It was an important day for the revolutionary movement in Turin, where comrades had come from several European sections of the Fourth International. Seeing how much the situation had changed, how far the revolutionary movement had progressed, was probably his last moment of satisfaction. But his satisfaction was very great.

Men like Renzo Gambino express the continuity of the movement; they are the connecting tissue of the organization, a solid guarantee of its future. Renzo died before his time, of a disease that could already be curable if capitalist society did not criminally divert to other paths the scientific resources available today. But he lived a life worth living. With his eyes open, with a clear understanding and with dynamism, he took part in a great historical movement, in the great drama of our times. If the word has any meaning, this is what happiness is for materialists.

So, even in the sadness of this day, we will not let ourselves be overcome by sorrow or grief. Let us listen to the cadence of the struggle that goes on and bid our departed comrade farewell by raising the red flag and singing the "Internationale."

Comrade Renzo Gambino, we express our gratitude to you for all that you have given, for living your life as a revolutionary fighter. □

Despite Kremlin's Repression

'Initiative Group' Continues Struggle

By George Saunders

An appeal on behalf of Vladimir Bukovsky, signed by fifty-two Soviet citizens, provides a glimpse into the activities of one of the major civil-rights organizations in the Soviet Union. (The text of this appeal appears on page 472 of this issue.)

The appeal was issued shortly after Bukovsky's trial January 5. In that trial, the courageous twenty-nine-year-old rights fighter was given an extremely harsh sentence, a total of twelve years of prison and exile.

Addressed to the newly installed United Nations secretary general, Kurt Waldheim, the appeal was drafted by the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR, a loosely knit group of Soviet oppositionists. The Initiative Group first attracted notice in May 1969 when it sent an appeal to the United Nations, requesting that the Human Rights Commission review a series of violations of human rights in the Soviet Union. That appeal was signed by fifty-four Soviet citizens.

The new appeal opens with a reference to Waldheim's predecessor, U Thant, and to the lack of response by the United Nations to previous Initiative Group appeals. This apparently reflects some disillusionment on the part of the Soviet rights advocates. They seem to have hoped that some international publicity and pressure might be generated by means of the UN "human rights" machinery.

However, with the acquiescence of the imperialist powers, the UN has ignored not only the first appeal but also supplementary ones sent in June, September, and November 1969 and in January 1970. In part, these messages described the reprisals suffered by the group's members and supporters for having sent the original appeal.

To what extent do these Soviet dissidents believe that the United Nations is really an organization designed to act in behalf of human rights? Presumably they are familiar with the UN's record in Korea, the Congo, the Middle East, etc.

Or are the Soviet protesters more

interested in the publicity and the legal and moral arguments based on the Soviet government's membership in the UN and its consequent commitment, in theory, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? It is difficult to judge. At any rate, it would not hurt their cause in the future to appeal to international labor and left organizations and progressive movements as well as to "official" bodies and civil liberties groups.

In the May 1969 appeal, fifteen signers listed themselves as members of the Initiative Group. In the current appeal, eight of those have signed again. A ninth, Yuri Shtein, a former director of documentary films who had merely endorsed the first appeal, now lists himself as a member.

The other seven founding members have fallen victim to police repression of one kind or another.

Genrikh Altunyan, for example, a dissident Communist who worked as an engineer in the Ukrainian city of Kharkov, was arrested in July 1969, not long after the first appeal was sent. In November 1969 he was sentenced to three years of "ordinary regime" labor camp under a law against "anti-Soviet slander."

Another founding member of the Initiative Group was the Leningrad worker Vladimir Borisov.* He was taken in for compulsory psychiatric examination in June 1969. At a trial in November 1969 he was ruled insane and confined in the Leningrad "special" psychiatric hospital. There he continued his protest activities, along with Viktor Fainberg, one of the Red Square demonstrators who in August 1968 protested the Kremlin's invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Fainberg and Borisov have become heroes of the Soviet democratic move-

* Not to be confused with the late Vladimir Borisov of the town of Vladimir. The latter established a "Union of Independent Youth" in 1968, was arrested in 1969, subjected to "psychiatric treatment" that included injections of depressant drugs, and in 1970 committed suicide while under that treatment.

ment because of their eighty-one-day hunger strike in early 1971 and their appeal to international public opinion against the use of psychiatry for political repression. Recently they undertook a new hunger strike, beginning in December 1971.

It was reported in March that the authorities have made some concessions in response to the renewed strike, transferring Borisov and Fainberg to the Serbsky psychiatric institute in Moscow for a three-month "review." Whether this is a prelude to their release or a tactic to disarm protest remains to be seen.

Another Initiative Group member who has been forcibly confined in a mental hospital is the courageous poet Natalia Gorbanevskaja. She was the only participant in the August 1968 Red Square demonstration who was not immediately imprisoned. Thus she was able to compile a documentary record of protests against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. That compilation circulated in *samizdat* and has since been published in English under the title *Red Square at Noon*.

After becoming a member of the Initiative Group, Gorbanevskaja was arrested in December 1969 and held until July 1970, when she was ruled insane. In February of this year, it was reported that she had been released from forced psychiatric confinement, but whether she has now been ruled "normal" is not known. During her "psychiatric treatment" there were protests against her being forcibly injected with various drugs that affect the mental processes.

Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Crimean Tatar born in 1944, also signed the first Initiative Group appeal, describing himself as a Tashkent worker. In June 1969 he was arrested after a Crimean Tatar demonstration in Moscow and sent by the police to the Tashkent region. There, in September 1969, he was arrested and, in January 1970, sentenced to three years "strict regime" labor camp on charges of "anti-Soviet slander."

Anatoly Krasnov-Levitin, a writer on religious subjects, has been one of the most prominent and active civil-rights fighters and as such was a key member of the Initiative Group. Arrested in September 1969, he was set free in August 1970 as the result of an unusual ruling by a Krasnodar provincial court. Investigation of his case continued, however. He was re-

arrested in Moscow in January 1971 and, at his trial in May of that year, received three years in "ordinary regime" labor camps, with "anti-Soviet slander" again serving as the pretext.

Besides those whose fate we have recounted here, other members of the Initiative Group and supporters of its appeal have been victimized in similar ways.

Against this background, it is a sign of great determination and courage that the nine remaining members should have issued their statement in the wake of the Bukovsky trial—which, with its harsh sentence, was clearly meant to intimidate and silence the opposition in accordance with the major drive against dissent recently opened by the Kremlin.

Since this statement was issued, the chief figure in the Initiative Group who is still at large, Pyotr Yakir, has been subjected to an extremely thoroughgoing police search. There are reports that he has been placed under close surveillance, that his communication with friends is under tight restriction, and that threats of more serious steps

against him are being made. Other members or supporters of the group have been searched, interrogated, or arrested.

Five of those who signed the present statement—one of them, Yuri Shtein, a member—have since issued a rather pessimistic evaluation of the situation and have declared their readiness to emigrate to Israel. [See *Intercontinental Press*, April 10, p. 406.]

On the other hand, the present appeal indicates a certain replenishment of forces, a peculiar feature of the Soviet oppositional movement in recent years, despite all its difficulties. Of the fifty-four who signed the May 1969 letter, fewer than twenty were still available to sign in January 1972.

To make up for this, there were thirty-five persons endorsing the new appeal who had not been part of the first effort. These added their names in spite of the prospects of repression—and they included at least half a dozen persons who have recently returned to the struggle from prisons or camps, "special" psychiatric hospitals, or domestic exile. □

Turkey

Political Parties Reject Rule by Decree

The Turkish government, which has sought to use the recent kidnapping of three NATO technicians by alleged members of the Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA) as an excuse to intensify repression against the left, received two setbacks during the first week of April.

On April 6, the constitutional court annulled the law under which three TPLA members had been sentenced to death. Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan, and Huseyin Inan were convicted last October 9 of having kidnapped four U. S. airmen and of having committed other acts of violence. They were sentenced to death. Parliament approved the sentence, and President Cevdet Sunay, ignoring a large-scale international appeal for clemency, signed the execution order on March 23.

The March 26 kidnapping of NATO technicians was, according to the government, an attempt to win the release of the three prisoners.

Ismet Inonu, head of the liberal Re-

publican People's party (RPP), appealed the sentence to the constitutional court just before the kidnapping.

The April 6 ruling came as a surprise. The court decided that the law providing for the executions had been improperly drafted and had not been voted on by the parliament in conformity with constitutional rules.

In a mounting swell of antiregime action by the normally sedate Turkish parties, the Democratic party proposed a parliamentary motion of censure against Premier Nihat Erim, who was accused of "creating anticonstitutional situations." The Democratic party has only forty-one seats in the 450-member National Assembly, so the motion has little chance of success.

But it came as if in answer to an April 3 demand by Sunay that all political parties agree to a constitutional amendment providing for rule by decree without prior consultation of parliament. Sunay's request is supported by the military, which placed

the present government in power in March 1971.

On April 8, the three other major political parties joined the Democrats in their opposition to the amendment. The Justice party, which holds 223 seats in the National Assembly, said that "the criticisms and accusations directed against parliament [by Sunay] are totally unjustified." The RPP called Sunay's proposal "unacceptable" and noted that the constitution already provides for rule by decree with prior consultation of parliament.

Even the party of National Confidence, which has been the most unreserved supporter of the Erim-Sunay regime, took its distance from the proposed amendment. Party president Turhan Feyzioglu suggested that the current crisis could be resolved by improving relations between the government and the parliament.

It remains to be seen whether the army, in face of the passive resistance of the political parties, will take direct control. It has threatened to do so in the past, but the unanimity of the

political parties' opposition to a Greek-style solution to the latest social crisis may convince the army to bide its time.

In the midst of the repression, the resistance of students to new attacks on civil liberties, and the parliamentary crisis, the Sunay government received a boost from the Soviet bureaucracy. On April 11 Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny arrived in Ankara for a week-long visit with Turkish leaders.

The Soviet government is seeking a friendship and assistance pact with Turkey similar to the one just negotiated with the Iraqi regime. Podgorny was greeted at the airport by a full entourage of Turkish officials, including both Sunay and Erim.

The friendship pact is not expected to be concluded at this time, but economic cooperation between the Soviet bureaucracy and the Turkish regime has dramatically increased in recent years. Trade between the two countries stood at \$15,000,000 in 1964 and \$80,000,000 in 1971. □

The Council lifted the curfew for three hours on April 8—to allow Zanzibaris to buy food—but it was then reimposed.

On April 9 Zanzibar radio reported that the three escaped assassins had been killed—two were shot by police in the village of Bumbwini, some sixteen miles from Zanzibar Town; the third was said to have committed suicide as police converged on his hideout in Stone Town, the Arab quarter of Zanzibar Town.

The report did not identify the dead men except to say that three were Blacks and one an Arab.

Sheik Karume had held almost dictatorial power in Zanzibar since his party took power in January 1964. The island had been a British protectorate from 1890 to December 1963, when independence was granted. One month later Karume led his Afro-Shirazi party in a revolution that destroyed the political predominance of the Arab oligarchy, but also killed several thousand Arabs.

In April 1964, Zanzibar united with the mainland African republic of Tanganyika, forming the new republic of Tanzania.

Zanzibar was given wide powers of autonomy, and Karume's rule on the island went virtually unchallenged—despite some opposition to the Tanzanian union. On more than one occasion the sheik had declared that Zanzibar had seen its last election in 1963. While some significant improvements in health, education, and social welfare have been effected under the Afro-Shirazi rule, the agriculture-based economy has not progressed much.

This contradiction led to, among other things, the development of the "youth brigades," composed largely of unemployed high-school graduates. The brigades became a well-organized detachment of Karume supporters, and were provided with various privileges such as free, special apartments.

While there had not been much organized political opposition to Karume, resentment of his arbitrary actions (such as jailing citizens for not stopping when his car entered a street) was widespread.

Tanzanian President Nyerere declared an official week of mourning for Karume, to begin April 11. □

Thirty percent of U.S. college students would prefer to live in some other country, according to a recent survey.

Zanzibar Ruler Killed by Assassins

Zanzibar Minister of State Abdu Jumbe announced over the government radio April 7 that "starting from 8:00 p.m. tonight, no one is permitted to walk anywhere in the streets . . . All people should stay in their homes. No aircraft is permitted to cross the airspace. No one may enter the sea areas of the island of Zanzibar." Immediately thereafter, all telephone links with the outside world, including Dar es Salaam, capital of Tanzania (of which Zanzibar is formally a province), were severed. No reason for these moves was given.

The following day, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere explained. Sheik Abeid Amani Karume, Tanzania's first vice president and ruler of Zanzibar, had been shot to death by four gunmen in the Zanzibar Town headquarters of the governing Afro-Shirazi party. Two other members of the ruling "Revolutionary Council," Thabit Kombo and Ibrahim Sadala, were reported seriously wounded in the same attack.

One of the assassins had been killed during the assault; police were searching for the other three.



ABEID AMANI KARUME

There had apparently been no attempt to overthrow the regime, and no motive for the assassination was suggested by government sources.

The Coming Explosions in South Asia

By Tariq Ali

Nixon's visit to China has clarified Chinese policy in relation to South Asia and has brought the regime of Mao Tsetung into line with the policies of Brezhnev and Nixon. We can soon expect a rapprochement between Peking and the Indian bourgeoisie.

The three major powers are agreed that the situation in the Indian subcontinent is far too unstable for them to play around with it and that henceforth the "stability and peace of Asia" depend on the preservation of the *status quo* in South Asia.

It is of course understandable why U. S. imperialism is worried. The success of the struggle in Indochina and the ultimate withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia would leave the subcontinent as the largest Asian land mass still to be liberated from the tyranny of the capitalist world market.

The continuous rise of mass movements and the establishment of liberated areas in this region would therefore mark the beginning of the end for imperialism in Asia. A successful seizure of power in India would change the map of Asia overnight and the revolutionary wave would engulf other areas of struggle such as the Middle East. As we have argued before, a socialist revolution in India would also greatly alter the balance of forces between the Chinese bureaucracy and the Chinese masses in favour of the latter. Hence the unanimity of views between Nixon, Chou En-lai, and Brezhnev as far as South Asia is concerned. A formidable alliance, which we saw in operation in Ceylon and which aided in the repression of the militants of the Ceylonese JVP [Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna—People's Liberation Front].

The enormous strategic significance of the Indian subcontinent—the fact that after Indochina it is imperialism's weakest link in Asia today—necessitates on the part of the revolutionary movement in the Indian subcontinent and abroad an understanding of the problems that South Asian revolutionaries will confront and the areas where success is most likely. We will not try to concentrate on all problems in this particular article. Rather we will concentrate on the four principal zones situated within the subcontinent that we would characterise as the weakest links within the weak link itself.

Pakistan

The defeat of the Pakistan army in Bangladesh created a situation in which it was impossible for General Yahya Khan to carry on governing the country in the same old way. The army itself was completely discredited, and the more sophisticated officers, led by General Gul Hassan, engineered the removal of Yahya

and his replacement by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. A civilian "martial law administrator" thus came into being and ordered the dismissal of several leading generals associated with Yahya Khan. The latter was placed under house arrest.

To understand this turn, we have to appreciate that within the army itself, a whole wave of junior officers were revolted by the behaviour of the High Command, which they characterised as bankrupt and consisting of drunkards.

The crack armoured division was on the verge of open mutiny soon after the war. A large number of junior officers met and decided to lead their division into Islamabad and overthrow Yahya forcibly, despite the risk of civil war.

This situation was avoided only by the intervention of General Karim, the senior officer of the division. He persuaded the officers to postpone their projected action, went to Islamabad, and made it clear that unless Yahya and the generals closest to him were ousted, the country would be engulfed in a civil war. At a stormy meeting of senior officers, General Hamid (an old Yahya stooge) was abused and almost physically assaulted. It was agreed to send for Bhutto. A new military leader would not have been welcome at that particular moment.

Bhutto's take-over of the country was thus carried out with the full support of the army, but he rightly felt uneasy at being appointed president by General Gul Hassan, an officer well known for his political ambitions and a Pathan inhabitant of the North West Frontier Province to boot.

The continuing unrest in the country, particularly the strike by the police force, created a tense situation in which it was becoming clear that the intervention of the army might be necessary. Gul Hassan, we now learn, refused to allow the army to be used to crush the police strike and was, as a result, removed from his post and appointed ambassador to Switzerland. The police demand for a trade union was accepted.

The new army chief is none other than General Tikka Khan, the butcher of Dacca. His appointment can only be seen as a warning to the two provinces of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier. There Bhutto's Pakistan People's party (PPP) is a small force and the National Awami party (NAP) of Wali Khan is dominant, and, more importantly, the government has never been able to enforce laws restricting the use of firearms.

Unrest is also spreading in the armed services. Last January hundreds of members of the air force marched in the streets of Karachi against their officers. They declared that the officers were totally redundant and that the rank-and-file pilots

were totally capable of managing the air force bases on their own!

In February the NAP and PPP signed a pact. Bhutto agreed to remove martial law on August 14, 1972, and to convoke the national assembly whose members were elected in December 1970.

On the economic front, the situation has been characterised by a growing wave of strikes, factory occupations, and *gheraos* [strikes in which the manager is surrounded and not permitted to leave until he has agreed to the workers' demands]. In the March 1972 *Pakistan Forum*, Feroz Ahmed writes:

"The major economic consequences of the separation of East Bengal for West Pakistan are:

"1. Reduction of at least 45% in GNP [Gross National Product], not counting the downward economic trend in West Pakistan itself.

"2. At least a 50% reduction in export earnings, again not counting the reduced capacity for earning foreign exchange in West Pakistan. This would mean a drastic (at least 40%) reduction in the foreign exchange available for the importation of capital goods and industrial raw materials. West Pakistan earned, at the most, 50% of united Pakistan's foreign exchange and spent, at least, 70% of it.

"3. Loss of markets for Rs. 1.7 billion [one Pakistani rupee equals US\$0.21] worth of West Pakistani goods annually, including approximately 40% of West Pakistan's manufactured goods. Even if alternate markets are found in the middle east, there will be no incentive to expand industries such as cotton textiles.

"4. It will be necessary to spend Rs. 550 million annually in foreign exchange to purchase tea, jute and paper, assuming that no foreign exchange is spent on Rs. 200 million worth of other commodities which were purchased every year from East Bengal.

"5. Repayment of nearly \$5 billion, owed foreign creditors, from West Pakistan's resources alone.

"6. Bearing a tremendous burden of military expenditure; the defense budget of undivided Pakistan being roughly 5% higher than the total revenues of West Pakistan.

"7. It will be necessary to absorb the surplus (about 50%) West Pakistani civil service personnel in the central government who were employed in a ratio of more than 4 to 1 as compared to East Pakistanis."

Both Wali Khan and Bhutto have issued appeals for an end to violence, coupled with exhortations to "work harder." While Bhutto states that he wants to encourage indigenous businessmen and foreign investment in the name of a "mixed economy," he cannot expect the workers to have anything but contempt for his government and the class rule it seeks to preserve. In that sense a PPP-NAP government, even after the removal of martial law and even accepting the fact that pro-Moscow Communists are working inside the NAP, will be a bourgeois government faced with exactly the same

problems that confronted Yahya and Ayub before him.

The land reforms recently introduced by Bhutto are a sham that preserves the semifeudal character of the countryside. Given the fact that various PPP leaders in their election rhetoric had been promising that landlordism would be abolished, we can expect to see an acceleration of struggles in the countryside.

Capitalist industry has been severely crippled by the loss of Bangladesh, and here too only a new mode of production would have satisfied the workers. Neither the NAP nor the PPP are capable of smashing the existing social structure. They are, in fact, part of it.

The fact of the matter is that it will be impossible for Bhutto to contain the mass movement indefinitely with or without the help of Wali Khan. This means that the army will be back in some form or shape. To postpone this possibility Bhutto is now preparing to take part in a subcontinental summit, first with Indira Gandhi and then with Sheik Mujibur Rahman. But while political manoeuvres such as this can give him more breathing space, they cannot solve the problems that confront the Pakistani bourgeoisie.

The complete lack of an organised revolutionary force means that the death throes of this class will be prolonged. The *main* task confronting revolutionists in West Pakistan today is to build independent organisations that can arm the masses politically to resist the onslaught that will be unleashed against them. The situation in Pakistan today cannot be compared with the 1950s: A great deal has changed since then, and to imagine that the left can simply pick up where it left off in 1958 (Ayub's *coup d'etat*) is to sow the worst possible illusions. The "stages" theory of first bourgeois democracy and then socialism is extremely dangerous and has to be discarded completely.

West Bengal

The tragedy of West Bengal is not so much that the Congress has won, but the fact that the organisations of the left are in a state of disintegration. The ultraleftism of the Naxalites and the opportunism of the CPI (M) [Communist party of India (Marxist)] have created a situation where hundreds of political militants can be killed both inside and outside the state prisons without evoking any serious response from the workers' organisations.

There is a tendency to blame the defeat of the CPI (M) on the gangster tactics employed by the Congress, but this is an over-simplification. The real reasons for the defeat are *political* and are due to the centrist vacillations of the CPI(M) leaders, who have, after all, participated in bourgeois governments and unleashed repression against those on their extreme left in the past. As always, it is the bourgeoisie that gains from the weaknesses of the left, and therefore Indira Gandhi's election victory is no surprise. According to the Calcutta left-wing weekly *Frontier*:

"To conduct free and fair elections the

State Government fielded in West Bengal a strength which, Governor Dias boasted, surpassed that of the army in any sector during the 1965 Indo-Pak war. This was in addition to the police and armed police, national volunteer forces and home guards. To conduct this free and fair poll, 6,000 leftist election workers were arrested without trial last week, which took the total of people arrested in the State to 32,600. Four thousand leftist election workers and their families were exterminated from the localities by the local roughs. The CPM could not appoint polling agents in 96 centres out of 171 because it feared that the agents would be killed by either the police or the roughs or both.

"Mrs Gandhi came to the State on a whistle-stop campaign and addressed a score of gatherings. At the Tallah gathering PWD [Public and Works Department] workers worked for 10 days to prepare for the election meeting and that cost the State exchequer 1.5 hundred thousand rupees [one Indian rupee equals US \$0.137]. Rs. 44,000 was spent for the Chinsurah meeting, Rs. 50,000 for a North Bengal meeting. The cost of these was borne by the State Government, because of the principle that any visit and meeting of the Prime Minister is the charge of the Government."

All this is no doubt correct, but on its own does not and cannot explain the defeat of the CPI(M). The latter, like the Indonesian PKI [Partai Komunis Indonesia—Indonesian Communist party], thought that its size would be sufficient to protect its cadres. It has now discovered that unless you *prepare* your own party to fight physically against repression by the state and unless you prepare an army based on the masses to challenge the power of the state, you can be crushed and defeated.

The CPI(M) never understood the class character of the state or the necessity for a mass armed struggle, nor the tactic of the united front (as opposed to the popular front). It was its opportunism that created the Naxalites and launched them on an ultraleft course. And if the CPI(M) leaders still don't understand the real reasons for their defeat, what is left of their party will also collapse and leave them with little option but to heal the breach with the CPI [Communist party of India] and ask to be readmitted to its ranks. A mountain will have given birth to a mouse.

It has to be understood that the objective conditions in West Bengal today are such that the Congress government will *not* be able to bring any real change in the situation. But what the defeat in West Bengal has done is to give the Congress party a few more years to rule India on behalf of the bourgeoisie before the latter look for tougher solutions.

The Congress government in West Bengal will make sure that contact between revolutionary groupings in both parts of Bengal is restricted and that there is a strict policing of the border. The complete failure of the Naxalites in both political and military terms and the split between Mazumdar and Chatterji on the question of the real character of the Pakis-

tani bourgeoisie (Ashim Chatterji characterised Yahya as the Prince Sihanouk of the subcontinent; it is not necessary to elaborate on the bizarre consequences of this bizarre methodology) mean that the creation of a new revolutionary organisation with a worked-out strategy and corresponding tactics should be the first item on the agenda of every revolutionary group in West Bengal today.

Bangladesh

Japanese capital and Indian monopolists are today making a bid for the new market that has opened up in Bangladesh. It is becoming clear that they will dominate it, even if Bhutto recognises Bangladesh and trade is resumed.

It is also clear that the Awami League will sponsor several Bengali monopolists and try to establish a strong and indigent bourgeois class. It is the absence of this and a corresponding military and political superstructure that is making it difficult for the Awami League as a party to control Eastern Bengal.

Mujibur Rahman's personality will not be able to solve the problems of famine, pestilence, and unemployment. Here too, as in West Pakistan, only a radical break with the past—in other words the smashing of the existing relations of production and their replacement by a new, socialised mode of production based on planning—can begin to solve some of the problems that have been haunting the Bengali countryside and cities even before the invasion by Pakistan. This Mujibur Rahman is not capable of doing: he is, after all, a classic petty-bourgeois politician and his inspiration comes from the House of Commons rather than the Sierra Maestra.

The Awami League will therefore go along with the plans of the three big powers for the stabilisation of the subcontinent. Of course, it cannot be excluded that many armed sectors of the people will at some stage in the immediate future be forced to resume the struggle, albeit in a confused and chaotic fashion.

The Maoist groups, which dominated the extreme left, are split amongst themselves. The Toha group, which still remains pro-Peking, recently issued its first public statement—a hotch-potch of theoretical confusion, lies about its past (e.g., it claims to have led the fight against the Ayub dictatorship!), and a complete failure to understand the national question and its significance.

A number of militants have broken with Toha and have formed a Communist Unity Consolidation Centre. They include one of Bengal's foremost Marxist intellectuals, Badrudin Umar. The aim of this group is to try to form a united revolutionary party; they have made serious self-criticisms of their past, particularly on the national question. In their view:

". . . now the most important question is to carry the struggle, which brought about our freedom, to its logical end, that is, bringing about a total, absolute and complete revolution in our political, social and socio-psychological patterns of living, culminating in the establishment

of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

However, no mention is made of the Chinese position on the subcontinent, a serious weakness as those revolutionists who fail to understand this question or admit its relevance once again open the doors of opportunism. Nor is there any reference to West Bengal.

Other Maoist groups are beginning to discuss all these questions as they understand what the Chinese attitude has cost them in terms of support within Bangladesh. But essentially the extreme left remains localised, though in some areas such as Noakhali it is armed and capable of resisting repression for a certain period.

The pro-Moscow CP is now legal and functioning. Its policy is little different from its counterpart in India, and it shamelessly tail-ends the Awami League. Given Mujibur Rahman's recent visit to Moscow and the reception that the bureaucrats staged, it is clear that this party will not be capable of any serious opposition. Its aim is to get a few places in the government. If the Awami League leadership were a bit more sophisticated, they would include men like Mozaffer Ahmed in their government: he has talents that would be useful to any bourgeois government, particularly in giving advice on how to deal with the extreme left.

Of course, what has also to be remembered is that Bangladesh is only half a nation. West Bengal is still under the control of the Indian bourgeoisie, and any talk of national self-determination for Bengal that excludes its western part is hypocritical rubbish. That is why the fight for a united socialist Bengal (i.e., real self-determination) has to be started *within* the ranks of the vanguard itself.

Both Mujib and Indira Gandhi are opposed to the idea of a united Bengal. So, incidentally, are the United States and the Soviet Union. They understand that a united Bengal would continue the disintegration of the subcontinent and considerably weaken the Indian bourgeoisie. That is precisely why revolutionists should focus on detaching West Bengal from the Indian Union and removing any government in East Bengal that refuses to aid this process.

Ceylon

The alliance that Nixon sought in Peking has already been demonstrated in practice in Ceylon. All the major, and some minor, powers supported the Bandaranaike regime against the JVP.

The reason for this was not because vast uranium or oil deposits had been discovered in Ceylon (the bourgeoisie is rarely guilty of economism), but because they understood that if the JVP managed to link itself to the Ceylonese working class, the Bandaranaike government was doomed. A new Cuba in South Asia in the present situation would have shattered the stability that all the big powers are so anxious to preserve. It was the exemplary effect of Ceylon that worried them, and that is why they intervened with money, arms, and men.

Thanks to the foreign help, which they

thankfully accepted, the Ceylonese rulers succeeded in repressing the JVP, killing many of their cadres and imprisoning thousands of others. Today there are 16,000 political prisoners in Ceylon. They have been incarcerated on the orders of the bankrupt coalition of Stalinists, renegade ex-Trotskyists, and the bourgeoisie.

What is interesting is how the press of the international bourgeoisie ignores these prisoners. Not a single editorial comment has appeared in any leading bourgeois paper either in Europe or North America. Compare this to the articles written on Nkrumah's Ghana, or Ben Bella's Algeria, or even Nasser's Egypt when they imprisoned political opponents, and you get a good measure of the "objectivity" of the "free press" in the capitalist world.

Ceylon provides the best example of the importance of building revolutionary organisations not tied either to Moscow or Peking. That is why we argue that the Fourth International offers the only coherent analysis and why it has to be

Ceylon

Stagnant Economy Spurs Opposition

"People are grumbling. Prices are soaring. Rumors are flying. Debts are growing. Foreigners are leaving. The economy is stagnant. And there is scarcely a building in the country that couldn't use a coat of paint.

"This is Ceylon," wrote James P. Sterba in the April 9 *New York Times*. Sterba spent four days traveling around the countryside "talking with villagers, farmers, fishermen, students, and shopkeepers," and heard "not one kind word for Mrs. Bandaranaike's Government. . . ."

The "least unkind statement" Sterba heard came from a shopkeeper in Kandy: "They are all incompetents and crooks, but I supposed they are better than these teen-age rebels."

The "teen-age rebels" are the estimated 16,000 youths being held in concentration camps by the Bandaranaike regime—most of them on no specific charge. But the mass jailing of youth and the state of emergency under which the country is ruled have not solved the social problems that gave rise to the radicalization in the first place.

Official statistics put the unemployment rate at 14 percent, but this figure takes no account of the huge number of underemployed. Last year the

built in Asia.

This is not sectarian utopianism, but a very necessary and realistic task that confronts the revolutionary movement today. We have seen that in all the cases discussed above, the lack of a revolutionary organisation of the workers and poor peasants has enabled the bourgeoisie to carry on ruling in the same old way.

The masses are not prepared to let this continue indefinitely, but they lack political organisations. So while we will continue to see spontaneous strikes, peasant uprisings, occupations of factories and government offices, acts of individual terrorism, etc., we will not see any successful conclusions to these struggles because they will not be organised and there will be no organisation prepared to confront the state and its repressive apparatuses. In short, there will be no seizure of power and no dictatorship of the proletariat. That is why, in the political context of South Asia today, the question of organisation becomes absolutely paramount.

March 23, 1972

regime pledged to create 100,000 new jobs; it delivered only 8,000.

Prices, according to Sterba, rose 10 percent during 1971, while the gross national product increased only 1 percent.

Ceylon's foreign debt stands at about \$1,500,000,000. Of every dollar earned from exports, 40 cents goes to servicing the debt.

The Bandaranaike government, which claims to be socialist, has tried to deal with this disastrous situation by suppressing the rights of the trade unions, increasing the rate of exploitation of workers, and brutally eliminating any opposition.

Given the domestic climate that Sterba describes, this is obviously a delicate course to follow. Some international help would seem to be called for.

On April 10 Sterba followed up his article on the Ceylon economy with a report on the "thaw" in relations between the United States and Ceylon. "When ultraleftist insurgent youths rose up in a violent attempt to overthrow the Government last April," he wrote, "it was the American Embassy, under Mr. Strausz-Hupé, that came through with a \$3-million grant for helicopters and spare parts, trucks and communications equipment ahead

of aid commitments from the Soviet Union. That was the turning point, observers say."

Since the initial handout agreement, the Nixon administration has "quietly" stepped up the U. S. military presence on the island. On October 11, 1971, the destroyer escort *Knox* visited Ceylon for five days. On January 25, the *Mobile*, a supply tender, delivered some components of the original aid agreement. Three days later, the guided-missile destroyer *Waddel* stopped off in Ceylon, returning on February 14 for a four-day stay.

Admiral John S. McCain Jr., com-

mander in chief of U. S. forces in the Pacific, consummated all these nautical overtures with a personal goodwill visit.

On April 9 U. S. transport planes arrived in Colombo to deliver four Bell helicopters to the Bandaranaike government. Some sixty pieces of communications equipment are en route, for use by Ceylon's armed forces.

The latest shipments are also part of the \$3,000,000 aid package, which was supposed to be emergency aid to put down an alleged insurrection that took place over a year ago and was shortly crushed.

But 16,000 political prisoners cannot be held in prison forever. While many of the young prisoners were no more than curious about revolutionary ideas when they were arrested, they have been given a clear lesson in the nature of the "United Front" regime.

Sterba reported a joke that is now circulating in Ceylon: "You are accused of having attended two [revolutionary] lectures," says a prosecutor to a young defendant. "No, no," replies the youth. "Five lectures, two in my village and three more in camp." □

New Laws Permit Secret Trials, Forced 'Confessions'

Ceylon Government Prepares Kangaroo Courts

Colombo

The government pushed through parliament April 5 the first of two laws that will wipe out individual civil liberties in Ceylon. The immediate targets of the two acts are the thousands of youths imprisoned without trial since the uprising last year.

The two laws will make it possible to conduct "trials" of these prisoners, against most of whom there is no evidence.

The Criminal Justice Commissions Act was passed after an all-night session of parliament and only four days after it was tabled by the government. The haste was intended to cut off any possibility of public protest against the bill.

The new law permits the government to establish inquisitorial "commissions" to investigate alleged crimes rather than bringing defendants before a court. The government may take this measure whenever it believes that the courts are "inadequate" to deal with:

"(i) offences in connection with, in the course of, or during any rebellion or insurrection or any widespread breakdown of law and order, or

"(ii) offences in relation to currency or foreign exchange of such a scale and nature as to endanger the national economy or interest, or

"(iii) widespread offences of destruction, damage or destroying factories, industrial plants and other installations, whether public or private."

The act is retroactive, applying to "offences" committed "before or after the date of commencement of the Act."

The commissions are permitted to limit the speech of advocates for defendants, to require them to submit their arguments in writing, and to proceed even when a defendant has no counsel.

Section 6 of the act empowers the commissions to exclude public and press and conduct secret trials:

"(1) The Commission shall have the following powers . . .

"(e) to regulate the admission of the public to the inquiry before the Commission;

"(f) to regulate the admission of the Press to such inquiry;

"(g) to exclude the public from the inquiry or any part thereof;

"(h) to exclude the Press from the inquiry or any part thereof. . . ."

Section 11 of the act permits the admission of "confessions" extracted by torture or other illegal means. Moreover, such confessions can be used not only against the person who makes them, but against anyone else:

"(2) (a) The Commission may at the inquiry, notwithstanding any of the provisions of the Evidence Ordinance, admit any evidence, whether written or oral, which might be inadmissible if those provisions were applicable.

"(b) A confession or other incriminatory statement to whomsoever and in whatsoever circumstances made by

any person who is alleged to have, or is suspected of having committed an offence at any inquiry before the Commission may be proved against such person, so however, that if it is sought by or on behalf of such person to reduce or minimise the weight that shall be attached to such confession or incriminatory statement, the burden of proving the facts necessary to support such contention shall lie on such person. . . .

"A confession or incriminatory statement made by an accomplice incriminating any other person suspected of having committed an offence shall be relevant and admissible against the latter person."

Another paragraph of Section 11 provides that reports from government analysts may be taken as "conclusive proof" of everything they contain, without anyone connected with the report being required to testify. Defendants are thus denied the right to cross-examine persons who furnish "evidence" against them.

Finally, there is no right of appeal of a tribunal's decision. The commission can impose any sentence except death.

Before the parliament voted on this bill, one government minister, Felix Dias Bandaranaike, threatened that if the bill failed he would recommend that the "insurgents" be released, beginning with those from districts whose members had opposed the bill.

Enactment of the new law has pre-

cipitated certain interesting political developments.

The Communist party, although a member of the ruling coalition [along with the bourgeois Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP) and the ex-Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja party (LSSP)], officially decided to oppose the bill. But when it came to the vote, two of the CP's six delegates abstained, two were absent, and one voted in favour. Pieter Keuneman, the party's only minister in the government, was conveniently out of the country.

This has produced a rift not only in the Communist party, but in the governing "United Front" coalition as well.

Unions, including unions led by the LSSP and even by the SLFP, vehemently opposed the bill, calling it "fascist" legislation. This included the Ceylon Federation of Labour, the Government Clerical Service Union, the Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions, and the Ceylon Workers Congress. In the forefront of the campaign against the bill was the UCCTU [United Committee of Ceylon Trade Unions], which includes the Ceylon Mercantile Union, the Estate Staff Workers Union, and the Bank Employees Union. The unions recognise that this bill could also be used against strikes and other forms of industrial action.

Many bodies, including the Ceylon Bar Council, the Civil Rights Movement, the Human and Democratic Rights Organisation, church organisations, etc., called upon the government to withdraw the bill.

The second government bill, which will come before parliament on April 20, is as vicious as the first. It is in the form of an amendment to the Interpretation Ordinance and will take away the right to appeal to the courts for a writ of habeas corpus or any other writ that challenges the arbitrary, illegal, and unconstitutional acts of the government.

This bill takes on particular significance in the light of the case of P. C. Gunasekera, which has received wide publicity. P. C. Gunasekera, the brother of Prins Gunasekera (the only member of parliament to leave the government benches in protest against the repression), was arrested last December 5, and a detention order was served on him. For two to three weeks, the government, and in particular Prime Minister

Bandaranaike, had threatened to retaliate against Prins Gunasekera for crossing over to the opposition.

Subsequently the Human and Democratic Rights Organisation, represented by attorney Bala Tampoe,* applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the detention of Gunasekera under Regulation 19 of the emergency laws was illegal. The court agreed and ordered his release.

* Tampoe is also general secretary of the Ceylon Mercantile Union and secretary of the Lanka Sama Samaja party (Revolutionary) [LSSP(R)], Ceylonese section of the Fourth International. In a move perhaps related to the Gunasekera case, police on March 19 arrested and placed under detention fifteen members of the LSSP(R) youth league, including Prins Rajasooriya, another counsel in the case. See *Intercontinental Press*, April 10, p.393. — IP

Within hours, while P. C. Gunasekera was still in the lawyers' consultation rooms, the police rushed in and seized him. He was detained again — this time under Regulation 18, which is much wider in scope.

Tampoe again appealed to the high court. In his arguments he has gone beyond the particular case and contended that the emergency regulations are themselves unconstitutional. It is expected that the court will uphold his arguments. The case has been adjourned until April 24, and the government is now trying to stop the appeal by passing the amendment to the Interpretation Ordinance.

With the passage of the Criminal Justice Commissions Act, the trials are expected to begin shortly. It is hoped that international jurists will attend the sessions of these kangaroo courts. □

India

Kerala Stalinists Back Capitalists

By M. Rashid

Marencheri, Kerala

In a recent statewide labour dispute here, the Communist party of India (Marxist) [CPI (M)], popularly known as "Left Communists," demonstrated that it is neither left, communist, nor Marxist.

When the CPI (M) split from the pro-Moscow CPI [Communist party of India] in 1964, there was a widespread feeling that the new group might develop into a genuine revolutionary Leninist party. In its day-to-day practice, however, the CPI (M) soon proved that it is a thoroughly reformist Stalinist party. In addition to trying to resurrect the cult of Stalin, the party follows Stalinist methods against dissidents in its internal life.

In 1967, a popular front government led by the CPI (M) was formed in Kerala. E. M. S. Namboodiripad, a member of the CPI (M) political bureau, became chief minister. He was also placed in charge of the Home and Police Ministries.

When workers in a thread mill went on strike, Namboodiripad's police shot them down. In another strike, police bullets were used even though

the strike had been organised by the CPI (M)-led Agricultural Workers Union. In the 1970 elections, the CPI (M) was turned out of office and another popular front led by the CPI came to power.

Recently a lockout was called by the Federation of Bus and Lorry Owners. In an uncharacteristic move, the CPI-led government decided to take action against these capitalists. Several leaders of the employers' federation were arrested.

This move won wide support from the union members in the transport industry — but not from the CPI (M).

The CPI (M) openly backed the capitalists. E. M. S. Namboodiripad himself called a press conference at which he denounced the arrest of the transport capitalists.

Despite the support of the CPI (M), which still has a mass base in Kerala, the lockout attempt soon collapsed. □

Sounds Familiar

Taiwan television stations have begun referring to Chiang Kai-shek as the country's "helmsman."

Bonn 'Is Only Doing What It Has Been Told to Do'

[The Amsterdam mass-circulation weekly *Vrij Nederland* ran a full-page interview with Ernest Mandel in its April 1 issue, in which the Belgian Marxist commented on his expulsion from West Germany and the Berlin Senate's refusal to allow him to accept a professorship offered him by the students and faculty at the Free University of Berlin. The interviewer was Igor Cornelissen. The March 6 issue of *Der Spiegel*, West Germany's most influential weekly magazine, also carried an interview with Mandel on this case. (For a translation, see "Mandel Explains Ideas Berlin Senate Tried to Ban," in *Intercontinental Press*, March 27, p. 327.) Our translation of the interview in *Vrij Nederland* follows.]

* * *

"Do you know," Mandel asked me at the end of our conversation in his Brussels home, "what was lying on his desk—just as it was thirty-two years ago when he was murdered? *Der Akkumulations- und Zusammenbruchprozess* [The Process of Capital Accumulation and Collapse] by Henryk Grossman, a work that has been rather underrated by Trotskyists. I was very pleased to see that Trotsky occupied himself up to the last with such problems. There were also books, periodicals, and notes on the American economy. He was obviously very interested in this subject." Mandel gave an enthusiastic account of his trip to Mexico, where he spoke to a massive student audience (about 5,000 people) and where he naturally visited the house—a fortress when Trotsky lived there—where the Russian revolutionist was murdered.

Trotsky's grandson, S. Volkov, a chemist, now lives in the house. Mandel noted with satisfaction that Volkov is not as uninterested in politics as some have thought.

It was 1:30 in the morning and, besides the subject of the interview, Mandel had spoken about the strikes in Belgium, the workers in Charleroi, the students in Nijmegen (he went there to give a lecture), mutual ac-

quaintances in the Netherlands, books on philosophy and history from the German Democratic Republic (which he said were on a much higher level than the Soviet ones), the views of the ex-Maoist Progressive Labor group in the United States, the mass demonstration of the "leftists" in France after the murder of Pierre Overney, and—how could that happen—about Weinreb, whose three weighty tomes stood on Mandel's already crowded bookshelves.

"I got them from my brother for my birthday, not exactly the sort of thing for a birthday gift." Mandel wanted to know what I thought about the matter. "I was fascinated by reading Professor Presser's books on the eclipse of the Dutch Jews, you know, I read them with more than usual interest. This is something that the Dutch comrades keep bringing up, the almost total liquidation of the Jews. They cannot comprehend it, nor can I. In Antwerp more than 60 percent of the Jews managed to survive by going underground. In Holland, this did not happen. This remains one of the great mysteries of the second world war and we are not going to solve it now," Mandel said somberly as he showed me out in the middle of the night.

"What," I asked in my first question, "was the political meaning of the fact that you were not rehired by the Free University of Berlin and of your expulsion from the Federal Republic?"

Mandel. "I would separate these two occurrences. The fact that I was not rehired was connected to a general campaign that the bourgeoisie, the government, and the Christian Democratic opposition have been conducting for months. Their aim is to put a decisive halt to the growing influence of Marxist teachers and professors. This influence, of course, while it is growing in comparison to what it was a few years ago, is still quite small.

"The bourgeoisie is afraid that as a result of the student revolt, there will be a steady increase in the number of leftist graduates going into education. The bourgeoisie is very worried about this and is prepared to pay a high

price to stop it—that is, to risk provoking new conflicts. In Germany, also—although to a lesser degree and more belatedly, for example, than in France and England—the student movement is beginning to awake marginal echoes in the working class. The bourgeoisie is very upset about this, and so there is talk of growing repression.

"My expulsion had more to do with the present political situation, which has rapidly become extremely tense. This situation arose in the whole atmosphere around the ratification of the East European agreements.

"Strong pressure has been put on the Social Democracy by the bourgeoisie and the opposition for guarantees that the international détente will *not* lead to any lessening of the anti-Communist atmosphere inside the country.

"The parallel with the German Democratic Republic is interesting. There also, attempts are being made to sharpen the antagonism to West Germany within the country. Both sides fear the domestic consequences of a détente.

"Unfortunately, a section of the Social Democracy, especially the right wing in West Berlin, have given way to this pressure. I say unfortunately, not just because I myself have become a victim of this process but because the results for the whole West German working class can be bad. They don't understand the real aims of the reactionaries. If you give them a finger, they want the whole hand."

Mandel did not put any stock in the theory suggested by the Soviet German specialist Berezhevskov that the West German elections may center around domestic questions (e.g., wages and prices) and that Brandt might be defeated on these issues. According to Mandel, political life in West Germany is completely dominated by the question of the accords and will continue to be so. All other issues have been shoved into the background.

Cornelissen. "What do you think is the meaning and significance of the accords?"

Mandel. "There is both a German

and an international side to it. In the last analysis, the East European treaties were the result of the change in U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union. This shift was immediately reflected in the German and Asian areas.

"For the United States, as the richest country in the world, it is very important to set a firm economic and technical limit to any further escalation of the arms race.

"The bipolar power relationship between the U.S. and the USSR has now changed into a five-cornered relationship involving the U.S., the USSR, Japan, China, and West Europe. This makes the situation much more fluid. Likewise, American imperialism is at last feeling the need to reduce its balance-of-payments deficit and to cut back the financial burdens of its foreign and military spending.

"As regards West Germany, I am convinced that the initiative for the détente came from the United States. The Federal Republic is only doing what it has been told to do.

"The Christian Democratic opposition to ratifying the accords has also put the economically dominant class in a tight corner. For the first time since its defeat in 1945, German imperialism could become isolated, from the two powers that control the European continent.

"Since 1945, the position of the German bourgeoisie has always been that it must never again oppose both great powers (i.e., the U.S. and the Soviet Union) *at once*."

Cornelissen. "But doesn't the rise of the EEC [European Economic Community], in which West Germany is an important partner, give some perspective for independence from American imperialism?"

Mandel. "No, there is a distinct difference between West Germany's independence in the economic and social sphere and the overwhelming pressure of the American alliance in the political and military area.

"If the accords are not ratified, a very dangerous situation will arise. In the long run, there seems to be only one 'realistic' alternative for the West German bourgeoisie, that is West European atomic armament, based on the already existing British and French nuclear infrastructure.

"The Soviet Union fears such a development, and *rightfully so*. That is why the Soviet Union and the United States have placed so much stress on

the need for a détente and a European security conference, whose aim fundamentally would be to block such a course."

But how then would Mandel explain the tough line of the Christian Democrats? Marxists have always seen this party as the representative par excellence of the economic decision-makers in the society.

Mandel. "I think that we are faced here with a typical example of a phenomenon that many Marxists fail to understand. *Special relationships can give relative autonomy to the political apparatus.*

"In recent years there has been a strong trend in West Germany toward a two-party system, in which the two parties are almost evenly matched.

"If the Christian Democrats want to hold a consistent edge, then they have to be able to attract the ultraright wing of the German political world, which accounts for roughly 5 to 6 percent of the vote.

"If this 5 to 6 percent is scattered among various formations, then, *on the basis of the present trend*, it is evident that the SPD [Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—Social Democratic party of Germany] will remain for years as the strongest party in Germany.

"The only way the Christian Democrats can prevent this is to draw all the votes from this ultraright reservoir. *To that end, they have sacrificed broader, immediate social interests.* They could do this, moreover, up until a few days ago because they believed it was all shadowboxing and that the accords would be ratified. In that case, the opposition would have won the following:

"a) With its help, the SPD would have been able to win important economic advantages.

"b) The political results of opposing the SPD could be garnered in the next elections.

*"As a result of the little coalition crumbling, however, the Christian Democrats now seem to have become the victims of their own maneuver.**

"The conclusion we must draw from

* The Social Democrats first took over from the Christian Democrats in alliance with the liberals of the FDP [Freie Demokratische Partei—Free Democratic party]. This was called the "little coalition" in contrast to the big coalition of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats that had previously ruled the country. — *IP*

this is also interesting. That is, the SPD has become a more reliable ally for Washington than the CDU/CSU [Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union—Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union]."

Cornelissen. "What, in your opinion, is the Soviet Union's strategy for Europe?"

Mandel. "In recent years, the Soviet Union has made an important turn. Paradoxically, it is not impossible that the Chinese may play the same role in a few years.

"Until the early 1960s, it was apparent that the Russians were putting their hopes on a strategy of weakening the American presence in Europe. And in order to achieve this aim, they were prepared to ally themselves with the right-wing forces in Europe.

"Their general line was to support that section of the West European bourgeoisie that opposed the U.S. Thus, even the 'anti-American' tendency of the Gaullist regime pleased the Russians. In recent years, there has been a change. You can see this, moreover, in the network of communications, including a 'hot line,' that has developed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But in this constellation, a European nuclear capacity would create a new and dangerous situation. The risk involved in tactical maneuvers has become much greater.

"The Soviet Union wants to prevent the development on European territory of a new superpower with its own army and foreign policy."

What was Mandel's assessment of this situation—as a Trotskyist? Did he take a sharply critical stance toward both the capitalist Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, a 'degenerated workers state'?

Mandel. "We must make a clear distinction between two things. We have no objection to the Soviet Union, which emerged in 1917 as the first workers state, trying to maneuver between the other states. It is entirely normal for it to try to maintain the security of its frontiers and to try to hold the revanchist sections of the West German bourgeoisie—who since the end of the Dulles policy have been the only significant political force in Europe to question the boundary settlement—in check.

"The general results of the détente policy internationally, that is, the weakening of the myth of the 'threat

of Communist aggression' must also be regarded as unquestionably positive. This has increased the room for political differentiation in the workers' movement, which was less evident in the past when the movement was polarized between pro- and anti-Communist positions.

"But the matter takes on a different face when a shift in the relations between states is backed up by the 'official' Communist parties adopting—under clear pressure from Moscow—a general orientation aimed at consolidating the status quo."

Cornelissen. "That has happened and is happening again."

Mandel. "Yes, with the partial exception of the Spanish CP (and this is still in question), the Communist parties have *not* taken advantage of the détente to mount an energetic attack on the already weakened social and economic structures of Western capitalism. They have not made this the goal of mass mobilizations. To the contrary, they have tried to project themselves as a 'democratic alternative' (which in no way threatens the power of Western class society). This shows a very negative side of the détente policy.

"In this sense, any success scored by the détente policy will *strengthen* the neoreformist degeneration of most of the Western CPs and *accelerate* the process of Social Democratization.

"On the subjective side, we can say that this will facilitate the formation of new revolutionary organizations (to the left of the Communist parties), as is already clearly the case in France, Italy, Spain, and England.

"But the objective consequences of this demoralizing process on the militant worker masses may still be very negative, as they clearly were in Italy in 1969-71. The purely electoralist position of the Communist party gave the right, and even far-right, forces the chance to move on to a *counter-offensive*.

"To sum up, we can say—and the Trotskyists have also said—that a workers state must have a certain freedom to maneuver but that the Communist parties cannot be subordinated to these maneuvers."

Cornelissen. "Isn't it true that even in Lenin's time—for example, in the case of relations with Turkey and Persia—that Russian national interests prevailed over the interests of the world revolution?"

Mandel. "As for the relations with Persia in the early years, I don't know enough to say. But in the case of Turkey I would definitely reject such a claim. One case that is being abundantly discussed and written about at present is Soviet relations with Germany in 1923, when the German revolution miscarried. Some serious authors claim that the Russian national interest took precedence over the revolution.

"In any case, in my opinion, up to 1923 the Soviet attitude was all right. Between 1923 and 1933, as Trotsky said, serious errors were made by the Comintern. After that it acted in a deliberately counterrevolutionary way. The clearest example is Spain. But you cannot draw any mechanical dividing lines in this development."

Cornelissen. "To come to the last question, a lot of confusion has arisen among half or full Maoists over Nixon's trip to China."

Mandel. "It goes without saying that people were bewildered when the 'paper tiger' was received so warmly by the 'red sun.' Not so long ago many Maoists were demonstrating under the slogan 'Yankees—Nazis.'"

Cornelissen. "Do you think a parallel should be drawn with 1939 when the Soviet Union and Hitler Germany signed a nonaggression pact (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact)?"

Mandel. "No, this is not as bad. The Chinese very carefully formulated the text of the final communiqué to avoid any interpretation that they had made a 180-degree turn. The shift was gradual."

Cornelissen. "But it might be objected that what was really decided was not necessarily put into the communiqué. Besides, there might be a secret codicil, as there was in 1939."

Mandel. "Of course, we can be sure in this case that there was secret diplomacy. But in 1939 there was an open treaty with Hitler. In Peking no treaty was concluded against the Soviet Union.

"Some Maoists are arguing now that there are two kinds of peaceful coexistence. Naturally, the Chinese one, in contrast to the Soviet one, is not supposed to be reprehensible. I predict that few militants will be convinced by this. How can the Chinese policy toward the revolutionary movements in Bangladesh, Ceylon, the Sudan, Persia, and Ethiopia be regarded as any-

thing but identical with the opportunistic version of the peaceful coexistence policy applied by Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev? The left Maoists are trying to deny that a turn has occurred, they claim that it is only a maneuver. But if it is a maneuver, then it was not understood by the Vietnamese Communists, because they have issued a sharp warning about any compromise at the expense of the Vietnamese revolution.

"Young left groups influenced by the Maoists have criticized Peking's turn and now stand halfway between the Maoists and the Trotskyists. Others stand somewhere between the Maoists and the pro-Moscow CPs. There have also been reactions in an anarchist direction. The largest Maoist group in the United States, Progressive Labor, now holds the view that both Moscow and Peking are 'social imperialist.' In short, there is definitely a picture of confusion.

"We already predicted some years ago that the blind identification with Peking and Mao would come to an end. We must not forget that, with the exception of a little group of ultra-Stalinist bureaucrats, the Mao craze in the West came from the confrontationalist youth. They have had a fanatical and almost religious reverence for Mao, but they still were not ready to swallow everything. What we are seeing now is a process of differentiation, confusion and decline in the Maoist movement in many countries."

Cornelissen. "And in China itself?"

Mandel. "There, for lack of reliable information, I would have to be more cautious. It is clear that the most radical factions in the Cultural Revolution have now been *eliminated*—not only the genuine representatives of the revolutionary youth, who are portrayed as 'anarchists' and 'Trotskyists' in the Chinese press but also the more bureaucratic group around Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta. There has also been—as has been seen in other quarters—a shift toward the moderate group around Chou En-lai. There has been a turn toward a more moderate policy also in trade, agriculture, and the management of enterprises. Greater emphasis is being placed now on private consumption. The strongly moralistic, almost monastic aspects, as on the question of sexual relations, are relaxing. There is even talk of a 'profit' criterion in industry. It is clear that the turn to the right has been

facilitated by the improvement in the economic situation, in food production and industrial development.

"I think that the youth who were given a strongly romantic and idealistic education in the period of the Cultural Revolution are very disillusioned. There have been negative reactions to this right turn.

"There has also been an interesting report from Hong Kong that the age of the refugees arriving there has changed from what it was a few years ago. Many young people are now

leaving China. This is a minor symptom and it must not be exaggerated, but it is a symptom nonetheless. I have also read reports from Japanese delegations (people who can speak the language) confirming the fact that there has been a heavy demoralization, expressed in a declining interest in politics. In 1968-1969, when Japanese and other delegations visited China, what impressed them precisely was the great interest shown in politics, including what was happening in the West." □

Those 'Friendly' Ships Raiding Cuba

Nixon Orders Navy to Protect Pirates

The Nixon administration has ordered the U. S. navy to protect pirate ships — by force if necessary — from seizure by the Cuban navy. The new policy, initiated in late February, was revealed by the *Wall Street Journal* in an April 12 dispatch from Puerto Rico. The following day, according to the *New York Times*, "senior officials" in Washington confirmed that Nixon had in fact instructed the navy to protect "merchant ships" of countries "friendly" to the United States.

The policy apparently arose in the wake of the *Johnny Express* incident. Last December 15, that ship, registered to Panama but based in Miami and commanded by a Cuban counterrevolutionary with U. S. citizenship, was seized by Cuba. The crew was soon released but the captain, José Villa Díaz, is still in prison.

At first, Nixon tried to make an issue of the Cubans' seizing a "neutral" ship on international waters. But on December 22 Fidel Castro presented evidence that the *Johnny Express* had participated in armed attacks against Cuba and that the CIA had been involved in coordinating such actions. Nixon quickly dropped public reference to the incident, apparently preferring to move secretly.

The terms of the new policy are rather peculiar, even taking their author into account. If a "friendly" merchant ship is threatened by a Cuban vessel, any U. S. captain may intervene, up to and including firing on the Cubans, provided he has "no

knowledge" that the threatened ship is engaged in CIA-type activities, or if he has such knowledge but believes the ship has U. S. citizens aboard.

"Knowledge" that the "friendly" ship is engaged in spying is to be obtained by — asking its captain!

An additional curious note is that the friendly ships will be protected regardless of the friendly power's feelings about the question. The *New*

York Times reported that after the *Johnny Express* incident, Nixon offered to escort Panamanian ships in the Caribbean. Panama refused, but Nixon ordered the U. S. navy to do so anyway.

"We seem to be going back to the United States as the 'policeman of the world,'" complained Dante B. Fascell, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Latin America. "I know of no pending request for such protection by any third countries," he added.

Some may wonder how the United States could be "going back" to a policy it never left. In any case, Congress is now asking for more information on the matter. It may be that some members are concerned about the fact that the United States now has a population of 600,000 counterrevolutionary Cubans, many of whom have boats, and many more of whom nourish delusions of returning, gun in hand, to "free" the Cuban people. None of the *gusanos* work for the CIA — just ask them.

It would be rather embarrassing if the U. S. navy had to transfer ships — from the Tonkin Gulf, perhaps — to cruise the Caribbean protecting a rag-tag collection of modern-day Blackbeards. □

Asks Congress to Suspend Civil Liberties

Bordaberry Declares 'War' on Tupamaros

Uruguay's month-long flirtation with constitutional liberties may be at an end. On April 14 President Juan M. Bordaberry asked Congress to convene in emergency session and declare a state of internal war. If passed, the measure would suspend all individual rights.

Bordaberry's action came in the wake of a series of clashes with the Tupamaro guerrillas, during which eight were reported killed. Minister of the Interior Alejandro Rivera claimed that Alberto Canadan Grajales and Tabaré Rivero Cedres, two Tupamaro leaders, were among those killed. Defense Minister Enrique O. Magnani announced that Raúl Sendic, founder of the Tupamaros, had been shot by government troops. That claim was

not confirmed by other sources.

The April 14 citywide gun battles in Montevideo erupted when security forces moved into neighborhoods where four officials involved in anti-guerrilla activity had been killed in ambush.

Last March 10, the Uruguayan Congress voted 67 to 1 to lift restrictions on civil liberties that had been imposed in July 1969 by then-President Jorge Pacheco Areco. Supposedly enacted to combat the Tupamaros, the measures had curtailed trade-union activities, restricted press reports of guerrilla actions, and granted police wide powers of search and arrest. Newspapers and television stations thought to be endangering "security" were closed down. □

Shah Puts Pressure on Pompidou

"Upon returning from their missions, international observers have reported that none of the fundamental guarantees of human rights are respected in Iran today. Arrests are arbitrary; prisoners are tortured; courts are empowered under SAVAK (secret police) jurisdiction; the accused are not allowed free choice of lawyers; at trials no proof of guilt is presented other than confessions extracted by torture; trials are not reported and are sometimes completely secret; the right of appeal is denied. Observers also report that many arrested persons are never even brought to trial."

The above is an excerpt from a report issued by the French branch of Amnesty International, the humanitarian group that investigates treatment of political prisoners in many countries. Some sections of the report were published in the April 5 *Le Monde*.

The report was intended as an answer to the shah's complaints that France has been spearheading an international press campaign aimed at denigrating the Iranian government.

Javad Alamir, *Le Monde's* correspondent in Teheran, wrote in the March 24 issue of the Paris daily that since the Persian new year (March 21), ruling circles had become openly perturbed by the unfavorable publicity the shah's brutal repression of oppositionists has been getting in the world press.

There are a significant number of Iranian students in Paris, and they have been active in mobilizing opposition to the repression. The French government, because of its failure to decisively suppress the Iranian students and because the French branch of Amnesty has written some honest accounts of the shah's brutalities, has come in for the brunt of the complaints.

Alamir reported that a "responsible Iranian" had contrasted the French attitude with that of the Social Democratic regime in West Germany. Chancellor Willy Brandt recently visited Iran, and the trip was reportedly a glowing success, especially on the economic level.

Soon after, two projects proposed by French firms—the building of a technical university in Iran and the installation of color television in the country—were said to have been given to German companies. Furthermore, Iranian official circles implied that there could be a change in Iran's foreign policy in other respects, forsaking France in favor of West Germany.

The Amnesty report strenuously objected to the shah's threats. Far from backing off, the group pointed out that Iranian political conditions were notoriously inhuman and that a coalition of several international jurists'

'Radical Left' Party Leaves Chile Coalition

Chilean President Salvador Allende's veto April 6 of key provisions of a constitutional change has prompted the most conservative party in his Unidad Popular coalition, the PIR (Partido de Izquierda Radical—Party of the Radical Left), to pull out. The constitutional measure would prevent the government from nationalizing private companies without prior approval from the opposition-controlled Congress. The measure was passed last February.

In a speech announcing his veto, Allende said he would dissolve Congress before he would agree to the opposition's demand that he call a plebiscite on his plans for further state take-overs of industry.

The PIR arose last year out of a split in the Radical party over fears that the party was becoming too "Marxist." In March the PIR published a document sharply criticizing the policies of economics minister Pedro Vuskovic. The opposition turned the criticism to its advantage, causing some embarrassment within the Unidad Popular coalition.

The PIR's two cabinet members, Minister of Justice Manuel Sanhueza and Minister of Mines Mauricio Jung, turned in their resignations on April

organizations was planning joint action to inform public opinion about the shah's violations of human rights. Amnesty reiterated its attack on the shah's repression:

"Finally, we must firmly denounce the constant, careful, and unfortunately successful efforts of the Iranian authorities to convince people that the repression hits only terrorists.

"Only the application of legal norms could allow the Iranian authorities to determine which among the leftists are terrorists. And even the latter have the right, because of the political nature of their desperate actions, to be considered political prisoners, against whom Amnesty condemns the use of the death penalty."

As yet, the shah has not responded to the indictment by the French branch of Amnesty International. But we would urge caution. The royal palate might not take to German champagne.

6. Allende replaced them with an army general, Pedro Palacios Cameron, as Minister of Mines, and Jorge Tapia of the Radical party as Minister of Justice.

On April 12 virtually every opposition group from the Christian Democratic party to the ultraright Fatherland and Liberty movement, whose president the government has accused of helping to plot a *coup* and an assassination attempt on Allende last month, staged a "march for democracy" and against "statist socialism" in Santiago. The march, timed to occur on the eve of the opening of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Santiago, was said by the *New York Times* to be the largest since Allende took office. It put the size at 200,000.

"The crowd appeared to be heavily middle class," it reported on April 13, "which in Chile means a large sector of the urban population, and there were as many women as men."

According to *Washington Post* correspondent David Diuguid, Allende announced that an answering march by supporters of the government will take place on April 18, covering the same route as the antigovernment protest. □

Bolivian, Brazilian 'Gorillas' Expel Soviet Staffs

On March 29 the Bolivian government gave the Soviet embassy in La Paz seven days to remove 119 members of its staff from Bolivian soil. The ostensible reason for the order was that so large a staff was not warranted by the nature of Bolivian-Soviet relations. The Bolivian government noted that its embassy in Moscow consisted of only four persons. About a half-dozen Soviet diplomats will remain in the country.

Foreign Minister Mario Gutiérrez explained that "several sectors of the nation, including the armed forces, had been concerned over the large number of officials in the Soviet embassy," according to an Associated Press dispatch.

The real, though not explicitly stated, reason for the expulsion was that the Soviet Union was allegedly aiding rebel movements inside Bolivia. No evidence of any such aid has been offered by the Bolivian government.


Commenting on the expulsion the next day, Soviet Ambassador Aleksei Shcherbachevich denied any interference in Bolivia's internal affairs and charged that "enemies" of Soviet-Bolivian relations were behind the action.

In addition, he pointed out that the list of Soviet citizens to be expelled was inflated. "Where did they get 119 when the embassy has only 40?" he asked. "I didn't want to make any comment, but it is difficult not to comment when the names and numbers given of members of this embassy are false." Counting the families of staff members, he said, there were only ninety-two embassy personnel in Bolivia.

One of the persons on the list of those asked to leave was poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko, who had briefly visited Bolivia, but was no longer in the country. Another was the four-year-old daughter of an embassy employee.

On March 30, less than two days after the Bolivian move, Brazil too asked the Soviet Union to reduce its personnel in that country. The request was quite unexpected since, unlike Bo-

livia, Brazil has not undergone a recent change of regimes. Ever since last August's *coup* that overthrew Bolivian President Juan José Torres, however, relations between the military butchers in Bolivia and Brazil have been improving. "It goes with-



MEDICI: Extends credit to Bolivian client Banzer.

out saying," observed Alain Jacob in the April 2-3 *Le Monde*, "that the role of the United States in the Brazilian and Bolivian decisions provides plenty of material for speculation."

Then on April 4, President Hugo Banzer Suárez of Bolivia and President Emílio Garrastazu Médici of Brazil met to sign agreements formalizing the seven-month-old Brazilian aid program to Bolivia. The agreements commit Brazil to help with road construction and to advance \$5,000,000 for road-building equipment. Brazil also agreed to extend repayment of a railroad construction debt for another twenty years, to contribute \$1,000,000 to a regional-development plan around Santa Cruz, and to buy crude oil from fields near Santa Cruz

for two years beginning next July.

The Brazilian aid program to Bolivia began in earnest following the *coup* last August. Since mid-1971, Brazil has extended \$13,500,000 to Bolivia in official credit. "Leftists in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile have accused Brazil of playing a role in the Bolivian *coup d'état* last August that toppled the left-leaning government of Gen. Juan José Torres Gonzales and installed Col. Banzer's more conservative Government, and then of rushing to assist the new Government," *New York Times* correspondent Joseph Novitski wrote from Rio de Janeiro on April 4.

On March 29, the same day the Soviet embassy personnel were told to get out of Bolivia, Minister of the Interior Colonel Mario Adett Zamora made an announcement asserting that the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—National Liberation Army) had been "eliminated once and for all." Whether his claim is accurate or not has not yet been independently determined.

New York Times correspondent Juan de Onís provided further information on the matter in an April 5 story from La Paz. "In recent weeks, military investigators have discovered 20 'safe houses,' or secret urban refuges and arsenals, of the National Liberation Army, a left-wing extremist organization, and have arrested 150 suspected members of the group or accomplices here and in Cochabamba," he said.

About fifteen persons have been killed during these searches, he reported. "After a two-hour gun battle with extremists at a house in the Miraflores section last night, in which two persons were killed, the police announced the arrest of Loyola Guzmán, who was a courier between Guevara's rural guerrillas led by Cubans, and urban supporters here in 1967." □

More Finns Out of Work

The number of unemployed in Finland climbed 41 percent during the past year, reported the Danish Social-Democratic newspaper *Aktuelt* on March 29. In February, 75,000 were unemployed, a rise of 22,000 over the previous year.

Toward a United Front in Defense of Ireland

By Gerry Foley

The fields in the rich farm country south of Dublin had already been harrowed and prepared for planting. On Easter Sunday, I could see the first shoots of spring wheat coming up, as I looked out from the train on my way to Kilkenny, a small town about eighty miles southwest of the Irish capital. Famous historically as the stronghold of the Anglo-Norman feudal aristocracy in Ireland, Kilkenny is still the center of one of the most prosperous and conservative agricultural regions in Ireland—"an cathair aluinn," it is called, the "beautiful city" of the Earls of Ormonde.

Malachy McGurran, the leader of the republican movement in Northern Ireland, was scheduled to give the main speech at the ceremonies in Kilkenny commemorating the fifty-sixth anniversary of the Easter uprising of 1916. McGurran had returned only a few days earlier from a speaking tour of France and Scandinavia.

McGurran's tour of the continent was a historic new departure for the traditionally isolated Irish revolutionary movement. Everywhere he went, McGurran stressed the socialist objectives of the Official IRA and appealed to revolutionists to support the fight of the Irish people against British imperialism as part of the world struggle for socialism. "If imperialism is weakened in any part of the world, that strengthens us," he said in every speech.

In most places McGurran spoke from platforms decorated with red flags. At the Mutualite in Paris on March 9, he spoke in front of a large Breton flag placed next to the flag of the Irish republic. Throughout the meeting there was rhythmic chanting: "Troupes Britanniques hors de l'Irlande!" [British Troops Out of Ireland]; "Irlande Unie et Socialiste!" [United, Socialist Ireland]. As McGurran finished, most of the audience of over a thousand persons began singing the "Internationale." I heard the revolutionary anthem again and again during the tour, in French, in Danish, in Swedish, and in Norwegian. It impressed me most perhaps at an open-air meeting in Goteborg, Sweden, where seven hundred persons sang the "Internationale" in semidarkness in front of red flags lighted up by searchlights.

McGurran's tour marked not only a new internationalism on the part of Irish revolutionists but a growing interest in the Irish struggle on the part of the young generation of revolutionists in Europe. In most places, the initiative in arranging the tour was taken by politically unaffiliated individuals who had been inspired by the fight of the Irish people. Naturally, they tried to get the broadest possible sponsorship for McGurran's tour. But the greatest concern was always shown by the revolutionary left.

The growing interest in Ireland among

the young was shown, *inter alia*, by the development of folk-song groups that specialize in singing Irish revolutionary ballads. At almost all of McGurran's meetings in Scandinavia, at least one of these groups performed. Some sang in the local language, others in English. The "Doyles" in Copenhagen sang in an authentic-sounding Dublin dialect.

On the literature tables at McGurran's meetings in Scandinavia, a number of books and pamphlets recently published in Swedish about Ireland appeared, along with imported (and fantastically expensive!) works in English. In Lund, a university town in southern Sweden, a student leader assured me that the local radical bookstore, the biggest in Scandinavia, had begun to carry some books in Irish.

In Sweden, the leaders of the radical miners in the north of the country invited McGurran to speak in their area. Unfortunately, he wasn't able to speak in the mining towns. The crisis created by the introduction of direct rule in Northern Ireland forced him to return home early. But the centuries-old fight for Irish freedom seems to have become a subject of interest for the potentially important new workers' vanguard that has emerged in one of the remotest areas of Western Europe.

In Norway, the only other country in Western Europe with a recent tradition of national revolution, McGurran found many similarities with the situation in Ireland. But he got the best press coverage when he gave an example of international workers' solidarity. A factory was being dismantled in Trondheim, for shipment to Derry, where "labor costs" are lower. McGurran promised to give the Norwegian capitalist a "warm welcome."

McGurran's tour introduced the IRA to some problems in the international revolutionary left which have not appeared yet in such an acute form in Ireland. In France, he found the French far-left divided in its attitude to the struggle going on in Ireland. The ultraleft Maoists of the Gauche Proletarienne [Proletarian Left] saw the bombing campaign of the Provisional IRA as the revolutionary aspect of the fight. Another Maoist group, the PCB [Parti Communiste Breton—Breton Communist party] invited a Provisional representative to speak along with McGurran. A PCB representative was forced to explain in a public meeting that the Provisionals refused to share a platform "with a socialist."

In Sweden, both major Maoist groups, the KFML [Kommunistforbund Marxistisk-Leninistisk—Marxist Leninist Communist League], and the KFML(r) [Revolutionary], gave unqualified support to

the Official IRA. But since both regard each other as representing the class enemy, they had difficulty in cooperating to support McGurran's meetings.

Although the "r" group agreed to back a meeting in Malmo, Sweden, on March 12, which had been organized by their rivals, they nearly broke it up as they marched their followers—whom they had apparently gathered from all of south Sweden—into the hall singing the "Internationale" in the middle of the meeting. Violent fistfights broke out, which were barely quelled by McGurran's appeals for unity.

Throughout the rest of his tour in Sweden, McGurran was obviously concentrating heavily on getting the left to work together in support of the fighters in Ireland. It wasn't easy. The only group that favored such unity was the Revolutionar Marxistisk Forbund [Revolutionary Marxist League], the Swedish Trotskyists, which is still much smaller than the Maoist organizations. In every city, the Trotskyists appealed for the widest possible support for McGurran's meeting and opposed the exclusion of any group.

The "r" Maoists, on the other hand, saw the other left groups as the "main enemy" in the style of the ultraleft Stalinism of 1927-33. The "s" (Social Democrat) Maoists, as they are called by the "r," proposed a bureaucratic, sectarian concept of the united front, in which a special "Irish" organization dominated by them—the Nordirland group—was supposed to take exclusive charge of all Irish work. The argument was that Nordirland was an organization formed specifically to unite all opponents of British imperialism around minimal demands.

How this concept works in practice can be gathered from the operations of the FNL groups, the Vietnam committees controlled by the Maoists, which were held up as the model of what the Nordirland group was trying to do. In the fall of 1970, the FNL group in Uppsala expelled a number of its members. To defend this action, the Uppsala group published a pamphlet called *Trotskyismen, Fronterna Och Vietnamrorelsen* [Trotskyism, Fronts, and the Vietnam Movement]. The introduction explained the expulsions in this way:

"After Vietnam Week in the spring of 1970, a number of Trotskyists, organized in the 'Revolutionara Marxister' [Revolutionary Marxists] declared their interest in becoming members of the Uppsala FNL Committee. . . . At first glance there might seem to be nothing unusual about this. But many comrades both inside and outside the leadership reacted with lightning speed. They argued that we must be wary of the Trotskyists, since history had

shown the Trotskyists' role of opposing united fronts.

"A membership meeting in May decided that the question of the Trotskyists' membership should be postponed until the fall, and in the meantime the leadership undertook to collect more extensive material to serve as a basis for discussion and making a decision. In the last week of September, this discussion material was ready and discussed exhaustively both in neighborhood meetings and in a general meeting. At the neighborhood meetings, the Trotskyists distributed an open letter in the hope that they could split the members. . . . A few days later they got ambitious and brought a leading Trotskyist from France, Alain Krivine, to scold the Uppsala FNL group. . . .

"So the Uppsala FNL group's membership meeting on October 7 decided to exclude members of Trotskyist organizations and some other persons for a Trotskyist line on front organizations. . . . The meeting agreed that the leadership had handled the question properly and decided to endorse this pamphlet with some changes and additions."

The first section of this pamphlet, endorsed by the Uppsala FNL group, expressed this judgment of the Trotskyist movement: "After Trotsky's death in 1940, the 'Fourth International' led a miserable existence until the 1960s, when, in step with the development of social imperialism and in the wake of the broad wave of radicalism, it revived." This denunciation was also extended to a rival Maoist group of the KFML, the Forbundet Kommunist [Communist League], which was dismissed as one of "a number of half-Trotskyist sects . . . which require no further description."

It was argued, among other things, that Trotskyists did not support the struggle of the Vietnamese people because Ernest Mandel criticized Ho Chi Minh. All the ancient and discredited Stalinist stories about Trotskyists in Spain and France

in the 1930s were dragged out. The recitation was given a new touch of exotic color with a little-known tale out of the "history" of the Albanian Workers party: "Among the organizations in the 'Balli Kombetar' [National Front] we find no less than the Trotskyist 'Zjarri group.' In this, the treachery of the Trotskyists was complete. They stood directly in the service of the fascists."

The Albanian story was followed by a capsule political biography of "Nils Flyg, Swedish Trotskyist and Fascist."

Concluding its account of the "Trotskyist line," the pamphlet attacked the Trotskyists for refusing to ally themselves with the national bourgeoisies of colonial countries. It quoted a section from the resolution on Latin America passed at the Ninth World Congress of the Fourth International:

"(12) The first conclusion that follows from this analysis is that any perspective of collaborating with the 'national' bourgeoisie or certain of its so-called progressive sectors must be rejected. Parallel to this, all equivocal conceptions or formulas on the nature of the revolution such as 'national democracy,' 'people's democracy,' 'anti-imperialist revolution,' or 'bloc of four classes,' which have been irretrievably refuted both positively and negatively by vital revolutionary experiences, must be rejected."

The FNL pamphlet quotes another passage: "While the revolutionary left starts off from a common acceptance of the general conception of armed struggle, a basic division repeatedly recurs over the characterization of the Latin-American revolution, with certain tendencies still questioning its outright anticapitalist character, advancing the old formulas of anti-imperialist, antifeudal, people's revolution, etc., and thus leaving open the perspective of collaboration with layers of the 'national' bourgeoisie (see in this regard particularly the theses of the orthodox pro-Chinese organizations)."

The "united front" pamphlet comments: "Yes, the old 'formulas' will be advanced and implemented as long as imperialism and fascism exist. The Trotskyists have forgotten nothing and learned nothing."

While condemning the Trotskyists for refusing to collaborate with the national bourgeoisie, the Swedish "united front" considered them too ready to cooperate with certain other forces. "The Trotskyists have also criticized China for failing to join with the Soviets in a 'united front' against American imperialism in Vietnam. A 'united front' with the social imperialists who today are selling out the people of Cambodia to the U.S. imperialists, who are collaborating more and more with Japanese militarism! This is the 'united front' like the 'fronts' they entered with the fascists in Vietnam and Albania."

The FNL "united front" explained its method for building unity in this way: "We must quote Mao. 'Understand that building and consolidating a national unity front is inseparable from exposing and purging enemy agents.'"

Thus, it seems that at the same time the FNL groups insist that all discussion must be limited to minimum demands they also insist that to be a loyal member

you must be prepared to accept the same sort of absurd superstitions and dogmas as, for example, an Orangeman, with his folklore about "Papist plots" and "the beast with seven horns."

Ironically, if the Maoist "united frontists" are serious about their denunciations of the Trotskyist attitude to the national bourgeoisie in the colonial countries, they would have to exclude McGurran from their meetings. His condemnation of Irish bourgeois nationalists, in fact, was a more blanket one than Trotskyists would make, who have a long experience in analyzing the contradictions of such classes. After all, the Latin American resolution of the Fourth International, which the "united frontists" quoted, says:

"(11) The fundamental dynamics of the Latin-American revolution is the dynamics of permanent revolution, in the sense that the revolution is developing into a socialist revolution without intermediary stages or dividing lines. This does not mean that the revolution could not begin as a democratic anti-imperialist revolution in regard to its objectives and the consciousness of the masses participating in it."


It is possible, of course, that the "united frontists" can persuade McGurran to accept their analysis of colonial struggles. It would be rather exaggerated to claim that what he said about the "green bourgeoisie" means that he is "following the Trotskyist line opposing united fronts." Still it would be a little awkward to try to exclude him from "united front" activity on the basis of such supposedly faulty historical conceptions.

Such an abstract approach can also lead to embarrassment in other contexts. In Norway, the main Maoist leader appealed to McGurran to denounce Trotskyism in general because People's Democracy, whose leader Michael Farrell calls himself a Trotskyist, is supporting the Provisional IRA. This was a case, the Maoist claimed, that proved how the Trotskyists, by nature 'ultraleftists,' lined up with the ultraright. McGurran's answer was that Farrell was a poor kind of Trotskyist because "he is trying to build a cult around himself."

Despite many sectarian attitudes on the part of the young left groups in Scandinavia, however, the prospects for effective united-front work seemed, in general, promising. A very large young radical movement has been built there on the basis primarily of solidarity with revolutionary struggles in the colonial countries. Many aspects of the Maoists' work seem to have been correct.

In Sweden and Norway, the Maoists have apparently trained a whole generation of revolutionists to understand the importance of building broad movements that draw widening layers into struggle on the basis of demands and slogans that they can understand. They have explained the concept that the masses can only overcome the contradictions of their conservative indoctrination, or opportunist leadership, through their experience in action.

Unfortunately these vital lessons have been obscured and compromised by the Maoists' sectarianism and the concept of



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the united front that flows from it. The Maoists see the need to reach out to non-socialist and still nonradical layers as meaning that anything that might upset moderates must be eliminated.

They think that to ensure unity, ideological conformity must be imposed on the united front. Such conformity, of course, can only be maintained by strict discipline, which means expelling elements whose ideas are thought to be out of harmony with the coalition.

The whole basis of the organization thus shifts from one of action to one of ideology, and because of the necessarily broad composition of a coalition, this means reformist ideology. People who consider themselves revolutionists must now not only agree to focus their action and propaganda on the aims of the coalition but must speak as reformists, accept a reformist framework of thinking and its inherent limitations.

Furthermore, who is to impose the necessary discipline? Obviously the coalition as such cannot, because of its inevitably heterogeneous nature. The leading force within it, which must normally be a radical party, has to do this job. Even though accepting the limited function of the coalition, it can only impose such discipline on the basis of its more general conceptions. The FNL group's exclusion of groups and individuals for "following the Trotskyist line opposing fronts" is a particularly grotesque example of this process.

The right wing obviously will accept the leadership of such a left group, which can do a better job than it can to guarantee that the movement will not embarrass it by going beyond the limits of reformism in action.

Furthermore, the role of any left group in such a position makes it possible for the right to turn against it at any time and denounce it for manipulating the coalition. And the principle of exclusion for political beliefs would have been established by the left itself. In such a situation, the right has the power of blackmail that can drag the left vanguard itself further and further to the right and drain all the life and militancy out of the coalition. This seems, in fact, to be what has been happening to the FNL groups.

Furthermore, such methods cannot even guarantee unity and stability, as the Swedish Maoists have seen. When the KFML split, this split tended to be reproduced in their "united fronts." Since enforced ideological conformity was the basis of these groups, what reason was there now for the rival factions to work together?

In contrast, the American antiwar movement has had a very turbulent history. But it only really began to grow and gain effectiveness when it dropped the concept of trying to impose conformity on its components and accepted the concept of seeking the widest possible unity in action.

The leading forces within it, including the Socialist Workers party, the American Trotskyists, were able to keep the whole movement focused on the main issue, line it up behind demands that were inherently revolutionary but still suited the level of consciousness of the masses. But at the

same time, the various components of the movement have not been deprived of the right to express themselves—within the minimum conditions necessary to building common actions—and have thus been able to test their ideas in practice. As a result, the antiwar movement has continually drawn the masses to the left, rather than drawing the vanguard to the right.

Although it makes limited demands, the united front exemplified by the American antiwar movement has no inherent limitations in practice or in its underlying conceptions. It is not a reformist movement but an action movement generated by the insoluble contradictions of capitalist society. It has shown a tendency at times to assume a very forceful character, as in May 1970. The most conscious organization within it, the SWP, moreover, has recognized this potential and done everything possible to achieve it.

Despite the conceptions of some of its leaders, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights movement has tended to operate in practice more like the American antiwar movement than the Swedish FNL groups. It was not surprising then that McGurran insisted that support for the Irish struggle in Europe had to be organized on a genuine united-front basis. He rejected the claim of any organization, whether it called itself a united front or not, to exclusive rights over the movement. He insisted on cooperation among all organizations on a basis of equality. He demanded that any solidarity movement try to involve the broadest possible spectrum, without rejecting help from any quarter on an a priori basis. By this, besides assuring the most effective support for the fighters in Ireland, McGurran taught a lesson that can be vitally important for the development of the young left in Europe itself, and especially in Scandinavia. It is possible, moreover, that wider experience with united fronts will help the Official IRA iron out some of the problems that seem to be appearing in the Civil Rights Association itself.

There seemed to be no doubt that McGurran's tour was a very rich experience for everyone that was involved with it.

I wondered what McGurran would say when he returned to Ireland. The quiet town of Kilkenny was a world away from the forest of red banners and rhythmic chants of tens of thousands of young revolutionists in the avenues of Paris, to say nothing of the Nordic admirers of the "red sun in the East."

As I was waiting for the Easter commemoration to begin, I watched a group of young people dressed for a fox hunt riding down the main street on their horses, led by a big red-haired Irish farm boy. It was like something out of a nineteenth-century novel.

I found McGurran by the courthouse, where the Official IRA supporters were lining up behind St. Patrick's Brass Band. The musicians started playing "A Nation Once Again," and marched off down the streets. We seemed to walk for hours all through the town. It was chilly, with intermittent rain and sunshine, but the crowd stretched for several blocks. Most seemed to be just following the flag, but a small group, seemingly representing every gen-

eration and type in the local population, listened very attentively to a forty-five minute speech by McGurran. He spoke from a wagon, facing a Franciscan monastery, with the ruins of a medieval castle towering behind his back.

It was a very intense speech. He made no gestures but continually repeated a few simple ideas, not new ones but ideas that had probably never been made so clear in such ceremonies. "You cannot free a nation unless you free its people. You cannot free a people unless you give them control over the basic decisions that rule their lives. We came close to freeing ourselves in 1916-22, but we made a mistake. We gave power to the Catholic capitalists and they betrayed us. Through these capitalists, who are owned by England, England still rules us. We did not free ourselves by changing our flag. The flag that flies here flies over Mountjoy prison in Dublin, it flew over the Curragh concentration camp where I was jailed for fighting for Irish freedom. We must reconquer our country, its wealth, its mines, its streams. Power to the people!"

I wondered what McGurran's speech meant to the small, silent crowd. The local people who surrounded him in the pub afterward seemed enthusiastic. An old man came up to him and told him excitedly, "Keep the flag flying." It seemed that McGurran's speech, with all its denunciation of the "traitors who sold Ireland," and "the fighters who were betrayed and had to leave for the slums of Manchester," sounded to that man like a republican speech, not basically different from others he had heard, but more fiery, more uncompromising.

McGurran is a Marxist, the European papers said. He obviously didn't sound like a Marxist, or what a Marxist is supposed to sound like, to a lot of the old republicans in Kilkenny. McGurran is a consistent nationalist. He explained that you cannot free a nation unless you destroy the economic and social system that holds it in bondage. That was a long step toward Marxism. In Europe, he explained how the fight of the Irish people was part of the struggle for the emancipation of humankind. That was another step. It will take more than this to make the Irish revolution, but it was obvious that a long experience had come to some kind of conclusion in Kilkenny that day.

A monk watching McGurran from the monastery walk had a sour look on his face. Maybe it was the chilly wind, or maybe he felt that a different kind of wind was beginning to blow in Ireland, a dangerous one. I thought back to a dozen speeches like this one that McGurran had given over half of Europe. I had a feeling that there was a much bigger change beginning than this monk could possibly realize. □

Ask the Vietnamese

April 16, the day Nixon bombed Hanoi and Haiphong, three Soviet students were to begin a debating tour of the U. S. The topic? "How can the United States and the Soviet Union work together to promote world peace?"

On Fifth Anniversary of Military Rule

By Manos Markakis

Shortly before the fifth anniversary of the colonels' coup (April 21), George Papadopoulos, leader of the junta, took over the post of regent. Thus he is now viceroy, premier, foreign minister, defense minister, propaganda minister, and ex-minister of national education and religion. Out of "unselfishness," he simultaneously draws the salaries of all these posts.¹ This heaping of offices on one person indicates a personnel crisis in the junta.


At the end of 1971, Papadopoulos proclaimed in his annual report: "We mean prosperity for the Greek people!" He was partly right. The Greek and foreign capitalists and the junta compradors are prosperous—but only they.

In the last months of 1971, the colonels' regime remodeled itself again. It divided Greece into seven administrative districts with seven state secretary/governor generals comparable to the despots of feudalism. These seven pashas are the hard core of the colonels, former secretary-generals of ministries, unsuccessful junta propagandists like the former Stalinist Georgalas, and other lumpen from the junta underworld.

Last year the junta denied the existence of political prisoners. ("We have only criminal prisoners.") Agnew's visit in the fall, after the decision of the U.S. Congress canceling military aid to Greece, provided strong support for the Athenian junta. Papadopoulos was quite satisfied with his cordial conversation with Agnew, in which the latter attested to the former's "democratic good conduct." The military-industrial apparatus based on the Pentagon-Wall Street-White House triangle not only ignored the Congress's prohibition of military aid, but actually increased such aid significantly.

Some 175 parliamentary deputies, lackeys of Greek reaction and U.S.

imperialism, directed an appeal to Agnew. It demanded power for *them*, as the saviors of capitalism in the past (the civil war of 1947-49) and in the general interest of the "free" world and of anticommunism. They further stress that a system of par-



PAPADOPOULOS: Providing prosperity for capitalists—and government ministers.

liamentary treachery contains fewer dangers of a social explosion than does an open dictatorship.

In this reactionary and anticommunist letter, the 175 treasonous "national fathers" paint predictatorship Greece as a paradise of freedom and democracy. This was greeted as a positive step by Andreas Papandreou, by Kostas Koligiannis's radio "Voice of Truth," and by "Free Greece" (Communist party "Bureau of the Interior").²

From the time of the famous bourgeois democrat Eleutherios Venizelos [premier 1910-15, 1917-20, 1928-33], the predictatorship "paradise" consisted of: laws prohibiting "Communist propaganda"; the white terror in the civil war, with its tens of thousands

of victims and the concentration camps of Jura and Makronisos, centers for the annihilation of proletarian fighters; the security police (Asphalia), which always functioned, whether under democracy or dictatorship; concentration camps in 1961; arrests; the bloody strangulation of strikes; police control of the unions; political murders (Lambrakis, Velde-meris, Petroulas); and similar pretty deeds of the Greek reaction wearing a parliamentary mask.

Around the same time that the appeal was addressed to Agnew, the junta, because of mass pressure, withdrew from its "miniparliament" two proposed laws, one on workers' insurance (intended to rob the insurance funds), and the other on the press (absolute control over the press and journalists). Today there are incipient strike movements among bank employees and dock workers in Piraeus.

Despite the junta's demagogy about "annulment" of the peasants' debts, nothing has changed. On the contrary, masses of peasants are forced to leave the land and emigrate. This emigration is good business for the underdeveloped capitalism of the southern European periphery (Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece), exporting workers in order to import currency.

In the cities the starvation wages of the workers are frozen. The unions are either destroyed or in the hands of the security police.

The night that has descended on education is without precedent. The entire Greek people is subjected daily to the brainwashing of the junta's propaganda. Police and clergy struggle cheek by jowl for the "new" seed of Greek Christian culture, that is, for the brutality of the barracks, the ignorance of the pastors, and the universal psychological and physical terror.

In this situation, the remains of the traditional left move farther and farther to the right. "From the royal court to the last hut," writes the CP Bureau of the Interior in one characteristic appeal, while the Moscow faction wants to include in its popular front not only C. Karamanlis, the former leader of the National Radical Union and ex-premier, but also the ex-mayor of Athens, G. Plytas, and his king.

The bourgeois demagogue A. Papandreou is right in practice and left

1. The regent's salary alone is 17,000,000 drachma [about US\$566,000] a year. King Constantine in his exile regularly receives the same sum.

2. There are three major factions in the Greek CP: the Koligiannis faction, headquartered in Moscow; the Partsalidis faction, which has the support of the Italian CP; and the Bureau of the Interior [Gra-phion tou Esoterikou]. — IP

in words and is trying to overtake the "serious" left from the left, while Mikis Theodorakis, in his recent statement of resignation from the CP, spoke of the "great American democracy."

Despite the unfortunate situation among the workers and in the resistance movement, the junta remains completely isolated from the masses. Its mass base reaches to no more than 5 percent of the population, that is, the secret-police officers and spies. This phenomenon shows the Bonapartist character of the military dictatorship.

The working class is entirely against the junta, as are the intelligentsia and middle class, and also the larger part of the peasants, while the remainder of the peasants are passive or waiting.

The harsh terror of the first year of the dictatorship has crumbled under domestic and foreign pressure and continues primarily as psychological terror. Sentences in trials have likewise become shorter as the result of domestic and international campaigns. The state of emergency is maintained only in the worker centers (Athens, Salonika, Piraeus, etc.), which indicates that the junta sees danger there.

The weak side of the junta also shows itself in the milder press control. There is today an explosion of Marxist literature in Greece. The colonels would like to forbid it, but because they must reckon with the possible reaction, they are doing nothing for the moment.

The above observations show that possibilities exist for a revival of the workers' movement—theoretically and organizationally on the basis of the worker youth and high-school and college students, who are the best customers for Marxist literature and the literature of the new left.

The old generation of Communists bears on its back four severe defeats (Metaxas in 1936, defeat of the National Liberation Front in 1944, defeat of the partisan movement in 1947-49, and the defeat without a battle of April 1967). The renewal of the workers' movement can proceed only from the youth, who are not similarly influenced by defeats.

The KDKE [Kommounistiko Diethnistiko Komma tes Ellados—Internationalist Communist party of Greece], Greek section of the Fourth Interna-

tional, presented the following transitional demands in the fourteenth thesis of the twenty theses dated August 2, 1971 ("The Dictatorship, the Masses, and the Role of the Revolutionary Vanguard"):

"In the present situation, a basic program of economic and democratic demands, developed in action by the antidictatorial, anticapitalist committees in the factories and unions, must include:

"1. Immediate and general raising of wages and salaries by 50 percent; the same increase in the present pitifully low pension rates; 50 percent increase for the lowest wage groups.

"2. Equality of women and men.

"3. A seven-hour day; a six-hour day for heavy work and for working youth.

"4. Union freedoms: the right to organize, to strike, to demonstrate; freedom of assembly in the factories; factory commissions democratically elected from among the workers to carry out the workers' demands.

"5. Abolition of the antilabor laws.

"6. Free contract negotiations without state intervention.

"7. Improvement of working conditions to reduce the number of accidents, which have increased lately because of the faster pace imposed on the workers by the capitalists.

"8. Housing that meets the needs of worker families.

"9. Improvement of medical insurance at the expense of the state and the capitalists.

"10. Political freedom: freedom of the press, speech, election, association,

assembly, and demonstration; the calling of a constitutional national assembly, which means abolition of all the anticommunist laws directed against the people, whether passed by the dictatorship (beginning with the 1968 constitution) or by the previous 'democratic' regimes of capital.

"11. Investigation of the insurance question by those affected; the solution to come from a democratic all-Greek congress of the insured; no state intervention into the insurance funds; control of insurance by the insured and administration responsible to them.

"12. A general amnesty for political prisoners.

"These are some of the main demands, a step toward united action committees of the workers, to which the workers themselves will add other demands."

The Greek proletariat has a great revolutionary tradition, which is the main reason for the permanent unease of the junta and the state of emergency in the worker centers.

The Trotskyist movement in Greece also has a great tradition, one written in blood. Despite the annihilation of the old leadership of our section by the German, Italian, and Greek fascists—in which the Greek Stalinists also participated—we are confident that today also our section will be able to fulfill its revolutionary role, to fight for the victory of the socialist revolution in Greece and, in cooperation with our fraternal organizations in Europe and the world, for the victory of the world revolution. □

Anglican Cleric Freed in South Africa

A three-man South African appeals court overturned the conviction and sentence of the Very Reverend Gonville French-Beytagh, Anglican Dean of Johannesburg, on April 14. French-Beytagh had been sentenced to five years in prison last November 1 for violating four counts of the Terrorism Act.

Chief Justice Neville Ogilvie-Thompson rejected much of the "evidence" used against the dean as unsatisfactory. The state, he said, had not proved that French-Beytagh had actually desired and advocated violence.

A few hours after the ruling, the dean, whose term of office expired several weeks ago, left South Africa.

When he arrived in London, French-Beytagh explained why he left. "There

was the danger that if I stayed some extreme right-winger might take the chance to bump me off, to reverse the judgment as it were, or that the police might pick me up again." He added that "discretion is the better part of valor." □

Inflation Fighter

Although the U.S. Pay Board is trying to impose a ceiling of 5.5 percent on wage increases, the ceiling doesn't apply to compensation for 1971, when Henry Ford II, chairman of the Ford Motor Company, got a 37.8 percent hike in salary and bonuses. If the ceiling had been imposed earlier, Ford would have had to get along on his 1970 salary of only \$500,000.

The Fourth International

By Pierre Frank

[The following, seventh installment of our translation of Pierre Frank's *The Fourth International: A Contribution to the History of the Trotskyist Movement* begins with the second section of Chapter 6. (Serialization started with our issue of March 13.)

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Chapter 6: From 1948 to 1968 (Cont'd)

II. The Period of Splits in the International

At the Third Congress, no principled differences had appeared within the International, such as the disagreement on the class nature of the Soviet Union that had in earlier years torn the movement. Apparently the International was united; the opponents of the congress's theses in the French section (who were subsequently to form the Internationalist Communist Organization [Organisation Communiste Internationaliste — OCI]) were placing the emphasis in their attacks on the tactical conclusions, in which they saw a capitulation to Stalinism, rather than on the analysis itself, only certain parts of which, generally speaking, they criticized.

The 1953-54 Split

The error in perspective discussed above would not in itself have caused a split; besides, nobody had proposed any other perspective. Nevertheless, two years after the congress, a split occurred on an international scale, preceded about a year before by a split in the French section.

How can the split be explained? As already indicated, we were on the threshold of an unexpected development, the outcome of which was not clear. It is, therefore, not too surprising to realize, after the fact, that the congress's quasi-unanimity really masked divergent positions and tendencies which had not been expressed, not because of lack of democracy in the organization, but because the situation was so unclear. The divisions that subsequently surfaced, not only in the form of splits but also inside each of the groupings resulting from the splits, attest to that. With this as a basis, two other factors played an important, if not decisive, role. To begin with, the theses adopted by the congress had not been assimilated by the sections, their leaderships included. It was only with the advent of the split that the situation became completely clear to the leadership of the International. The latter had not at all been aware of this state of affairs; it did not have a clear view of the condition of the organization

as a whole; and it realized all this, belatedly and to its very great surprise, only in 1953, when preparations were being made for the next congress.

In the months following the Third World Congress, relationships between the International and the majority of the French section,²⁸ which kept refusing to implement the congress's decisions, deteriorated to such an extent that in the middle of 1952 a split took place in the PCI. This split was not to end there: the two organizations claiming to be the French section of the Fourth International soon had their own splits. Disciplinary measures were taken by the International, with the approval of those who, the very next year, would join with those who had been expelled to form the International Committee.

Somewhat later, extremely violent differences erupted in the British section, which, by dint of its systematic work, had made palpable progress inside the Labour party. So intense was the disagreement that a split took place even before the respective positions were clearly established.

The decisive factor in the split was an internal crisis within the Socialist Workers party (SWP), the American Trotskyist organization. At that time the situation in the United States was growing more and more difficult for the vanguard. McCarthyism was on the rise. While a majority of the American organization maintained fundamental Trotskyist positions, a strong minority was searching for a new path. Without stating its essential positions—at least in those of its published documents known to the International—this minority seized upon the Third World Congress's theses and subsequent documents of the International (particularly a discussion document on Stalinism, drawn up in preparation for the next world congress) as weapons in its fight against the majority of the American organization.

When this internal struggle ended in a split, the majority of the SWP blamed the leadership of the International, with which it disagreed at the time on the question of "de-Stalinization." Moreover, the political differences were overlaid with organizational and even personal suspicions. Finally, there was practically no personal contact, no person-to-person exchange of views, during this period. Thus, without being preceded by an extensive political discussion in the international movement, a split occurred on an international scale. A minority established the "International Committee of the Fourth International." As for the SWP minority, no sooner did it break away from the party than it publicly expressed liquidationist positions and openly fought the Fourth International.

The McCarthyism just referred to subjected the SWP

28. The division in the PCI was in the proportion of 55% to 45%—which, of course, contributed to exacerbating the internal struggle.

to a great deal of pressure and led the party's leadership, embroiled in a fight against the liquidationist current, to resist what it considered dangerous innovations. This happened in 1953 when, immediately after Stalin's death, the first "de-Stalinization" measures were taken in the Soviet Union. In preparation for the next world congress (the decision to call this congress had been taken in May of 1953), the leadership of the International had readied a document, "The Rise and Decline of Stalinism," which, in a way the leadership had not expected, sparked the powder keg. Since this document was adopted at the Fourth World Congress and completed at the Fifth, we shall analyze it later. However, we must say here and now that it excited more than fear in the comrades who were going to form the International Committee: they saw in it a capitulation to Stalinism, the liquidation of the Fourth International, and "Pabloism."

This split was by far the most serious of all for the Fourth International. Although all the groups and all the people who have through the years left the organization cannot be considered lost to us for all time, the other splits proved, by their nature and in actual fact, to be rather splits *away from* the Trotskyist movement. On the other hand, this split was in fact primarily a division of the movement itself into two parts, one continuing the International and the other organized in a committee that acted as a faction. This split profoundly affected the life and development of both sides. Actually, it had the effect, among others, of injecting into the International, into the part continuing the organization as well as the other, both a disequilibrium and a reinforcement of the centrifugal forces—during a period which, as we have repeatedly stressed, was replete with powerful forces placing unequal degrees of pressure on various sectors of the movement. All this certainly resulted in reinforcing the heterogeneous character of certain tendencies, as well as reducing the authority of the organization as such and of its center. During the years of this split, members and groups of the international Trotskyist movement experienced developments that were by no means inevitable. Had this split (which, in our opinion, was not unavoidable) not taken place, the International would have been able to reach the overall appraisal of the postwar world that it acquired at the reunification, perhaps faster but certainly in a less costly way.

The Fourth and Fifth World Congresses (1954 and 1957)

Preparations for the Fourth World Congress as well as the congress itself were dominated by the split that had occurred in the meantime. Representatives from twenty-one countries participated in the congress, which was held in July 1954. The congress devoted part of its time to a small group that had waged a violent struggle against supporters of the International Committee but which, right after the split, turned its fire just as violently against the International. This group considered the struggle to create new revolutionary parties unnecessary, did not even stay until the congress adjourned, and then rapidly fell apart.

The most important task facing the congress consisted in subjecting the positions adopted at the previous congress to a thoroughgoing reappraisal. Two principal doc-

uments were adopted. One dealt with integrating the Trotskyists into bona fide mass movements, and reviewed the revolutionary conditions of the era and the essential task of building mass revolutionary Marxist parties. For this purpose, the document insisted on the necessity of merging with the masses *in action, not in program*. It brought out what was happening within the mass organizations, and pointed out the necessity for the Trotskyist organizations to choose a field of work in these organizations—it being understood that reforming them was not the question. To the main considerations, the document added considerations appropriate for applying the tactic in various countries.

The other document was entitled, "The Rise and Decline of Stalinism." Since it was taken up again and completed at the following congress, we shall come back to it later.

The Fourth Congress served mainly to put a brake on the consequences of the split, to effect a regroupment against the centrifugal tendencies let loose by the split, to consolidate the organization in the wake of the blow it had just suffered.

The congress also adopted a resolution declaring the reestablishment of unity in the Trotskyist movement both possible and desirable, and authorizing the International Executive Committee elected at this congress to contact the nonrepresented organizations—those of the International Committee—in order to apprise them of the congress's position on the question of unity.

Shortly after the Fourth Congress, the situation in the International began to improve somewhat, helped in large measure by developments in the international situation.

Beginning in 1955, an unexpected turn in the economic conjuncture became apparent in the advanced capitalist countries. Prosperity began to settle in. This turn called for analysis, and in October 1955, the International Executive Committee provided an initial appraisal. The IEC noted the radical change in the economic conjuncture, the economic prosperity that had been appearing for over a year. The IEC gave a description rather than a theoretical analysis of this phenomenon, and was somewhat cautious as to perspectives.

The most important factor in improving the movement's condition was developments in the Soviet Union and in the workers states of Eastern Europe. In the former, a struggle was going on inside the leadership that had taken over at Stalin's death. Beria was the first to be eliminated. Then Malenkov had to give way to the Bulganin-Khrushchev team. The struggle was to continue for almost another two years. The crisis at the summit, the concessions made by the leadership, opened possibilities for expressing nonconformist views in what had for so long been the citadel of monolithism.

And then came 1956—the year of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the year of the Polish and Hungarian events. At a closed session of the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev had delivered a report on the "Personality Cult of Stalin," in which he denounced many of Stalin's crimes. Khrushchev was not inquiring into the origin of the Stalinist phenomenon; on the contrary, this report sacrificed Stalin as an individual in order to save the power of the bureaucracy. In Poland, strikes followed by a mass movement brought Gomulka, one of Stalin's victims, to the leadership of the party and the state. In

Hungary, faced with the breadth of the mass mobilization and the indecisive attitude of Imre Nagy, the Kremlin repressed the mass movement by a bloody intervention of the Soviet army.

Elsewhere, in the arena of the colonial revolution, hardly had the war between French imperialism and the Viet-minh been ended by the Geneva Agreements in July 1954, when the Algerian war began (November 1954).

Likewise in 1956 came the Suez crisis, in which the governments of France and Great Britain intervened militarily in collusion with Israel against Egypt, following the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Under the joint pressure of Washington and the Kremlin, France and Great Britain had to end their military intervention.

All the sections of the International were engaged in two kinds of activity. First of all, they intervened in the international crisis of Stalinism and the Communist parties, which was expressed mainly among students and intellectuals inside those parties but which also reached working-class layers. In addition, many sections cooperated more and more in helping the Algerian revolution and, more generally, the colonial revolution.

On the whole this period witnessed a new start for the sections, a certain amount of recruiting, a growing confidence due to the fact that, for the first time, all the things we had been saying about Stalinism for so long in an essentially theoretical way were being verified in actuality on an already considerable scale. Besides a still limited recruitment, the organization had a wider audience, and its political authority was reinforced.

Under these conditions, preparations for the Fifth World Congress got under way in November 1956. This congress was to have an entirely different character from that of its predecessor.

In the course of preparing for the congress, an attempt at rapprochement with the International Committee was made, with a view toward reunification, in line with the decision of the Fourth Congress. In the wake of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, it appeared from a reading of the publications, especially those of the SWP, that differences on the USSR and "de-Stalinization" had diminished. This attempt at rapprochement failed, mainly because distrust on the organizational level persisted.

The Fifth Congress, in October 1957, assembled about a hundred delegates and observers from twenty-five countries. Among the fraternal delegates were representatives of the Algerian fighters.

The march of events had permitted far more light to be shed on the problems posed by the postwar upheavals. Three essential questions were dealt with by the congress, the conclusions reached appearing in the following documents: "Economic Perspectives and International Policies"; "Colonial Revolution Since the End of the Second World War"; "Rise, Decline, and Fall of Stalinism."

The document entitled "Economic Perspectives and International Policies" started off with a thorough discussion of the causes for the unexpected prosperity in the United States and Western Europe. It explained the "anticrisis" methods employed by the capitalist states, the role of consumer credit, the public debt, etc. The document went on to explain that the devices used by capitalism to obtain its much vaunted results would eventually bring about increasingly frequent recessions, technological unemployment, and a long-range depreciation of money.

On the economy of the workers states, the document noted its prodigious growth and pointed out that these countries, which had until then stressed the production of capital goods, usually without taking production costs into consideration, would (for social reasons) have to expand their production of consumer goods and would also have to "rationalize" their economy. Far from advocating solutions such as those presently prescribed by reformers such as Liberman, Trapeznikov, Sik, etc., the document emphasized the basic role of workers' democracy, not only as a political factor but as indispensable for development in the economic area.

This document also stressed the fact that although the colonial countries were making economic progress in terms of absolute figures, they were actually regressing in a relative sense compared to other countries; that the result of this would be a growing impoverishment of the colonial masses and consequently the continuation of the objective conditions that were fanning the flames of colonial revolution.

As to the class struggle in the capitalist countries, the document stated that while the economic conjuncture did not allow for revolutionary struggles in the immediate future, in certain countries it could not fail to give rise to trade-union struggles linked to the various phases of the economic cycle.

The congress's document on the colonial revolution stressed the fact that it was the dominant feature of the postwar period; it had upset all the perspectives that had been made since the origin of the working-class movement, even those made after the October Revolution, because all the perspectives had been based on the victory of the revolution in the West before it could triumph in the East. The document pointed out that the colonial revolution could triumph only as a permanent revolution; that it was thus an integral part of the world revolution; that it constituted at a given stage the link between October and the victory of the world revolution. The document went on to a detailed study of the colonial movements, of the nature of their leaderships (particularly those of a pronounced Bonapartist character), of the policy of the imperialists and of the different workers states (USSR, China) with respect to colonial countries and colonial movements. The document examined the respective roles of the proletariat and the peasantry in the colonial countries. Already emphasized was the importance of guerrilla warfare in colonial countries, not only as a military factor but also as a factor in the organization and political education of the masses. The congress insisted on the necessity for the Trotskyist movement, especially for the sections in the imperialist countries, to devote a large part of its activity to aiding the colonial revolution.

The Fifth Congress went back to the document "The Rise and Decline of Stalinism" adopted by the preceding congress and added another section to it entitled, "The Decline and Fall of Stalinism." The completed document constitutes one of the most exhaustive texts extant on Stalinism, the workers states, and the Communist parties. Its point of departure is the great historical stages since the October Revolution: the rise in the revolutionary tide from 1917 to 1923, the decline from 1923 to 1943, the new rise beginning in 1943. It reviews the objective conditions surrounding Stalin's rise in the Soviet Union and

the Stalinization of the Communist parties (isolation and backwardness of the Soviet state, decline of the world revolution) and counterposes the objective conditions of the new situation: the existence of several workers states, the USSR become the second world power, the revolutionary rise throughout the world. Thus it clearly sets forth the conditions underlying the crisis of Stalinism. It demonstrates that henceforth there can be no danger, except in the highly improbable case of defeat in a world war, of a restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. The crisis of Stalinism should consequently result in a confrontation between the bureaucracy and the proletariat. The document characterizes the "de-Stalinization" measures as measures for the self-defense—not self-liquidation—of the bureaucracy, showing that those in power are hoping, through these measures, to find a wider base in the bureaucracy itself and to satisfy some of the crying needs of the masses. That part of the document written after the events of 1956 contained an erroneous perspective: it envisaged a sharpening of the crisis of Stalinism in the immediate future. It did not foresee the period that may be called "reformist," which followed the elimination of the "anti-Party group"

by Khrushchev in 1957 and which lasted about ten years. Finally, the document outlined a program of transitional demands for the political revolution, starting from the demands Trotsky had already formulated in the 1938 *Transitional Program*, taking into account the data furnished by the new conditions in the Soviet Union and by the Polish and Hungarian events of 1956. The document devotes considerable space to the crisis in the Communist parties, both in the workers states and in the capitalist countries. The subsequent development of the Sino-Soviet dispute would renew this subject and intensify its importance.

The discussions at the Fifth Congress were broad in scope; certain points were strongly debated by various delegates, but there was no factional fight. The International had largely recovered; it came out, once again unanimously, in favor of reunification of the international movement. But underneath the unity evidenced at the congress, new crises were brewing. Friction could already be felt in the International's leadership.

[To be continued]

Valpreda Still Jailed in Milan Frame-Up

Fascists Indicted in Bombing Blamed on Anarchist

Three fascists were indicted at the end of March for a series of bombings in Italy that had previously been blamed on anarchists. "There is little doubt that the three arrested fascists were up to their necks in a plot to generate the kind of fear and disorder which might open the way for a right-wing dictatorship," reported *Washington Post* correspondent Claire Sterling from Rome on April 4.

There is increasing evidence that the Greek military junta is involved and that it has been helping to finance and train an underground network of fascist terrorists in Italy over the past four years. At least one of the three indicted had been in close touch with the junta since he organized a trip to Athens for fifty-one Italian fascists at the junta's expense in April 1968. "Since his arrest," Sterling wrote, "a good deal of incriminating evidence has come to light about regular visits to Italy by junta emissaries, consignments of money and the organization of a training camp somewhere in Greece for Italian 'Black Revolutionaries.'"

One of the indicted, Pino Rauti, is not only a member of the national executive of the neofascist party, the Italian Social Movement (MSI—Movi-

mento Sociale Italiano), but he is also a candidate in the May elections.

The indictments represent a dramatic turn in the case of the anarchist Pietro Valpreda. Valpreda has been in prison ever since his arrest three days after the bombing of the Bank of Agriculture in Milan on December 12, 1969. Sixteen persons were killed in the blast. Valpreda is accused of planting the explosives and of having organized other bombings. Despite the indictment of the three fascists in the bombing, he is still being held in prison.

The fascists are accused only of "promoting, financing, and organizing" the bombing, which leads to speculation that Valpreda will be charged with actually carrying out their orders.

The state's case against Valpreda and his eleven codefendants is based on purely circumstantial evidence. It rests mainly on the testimony of one person—now dead—a taxi driver who claimed he drove Valpreda to the bank on the day of the bombing. Valpreda is widely regarded as the innocent victim of a conspiracy by the police and the ruling class to protect neofascists who are really responsible for the bombings.

Valpreda's trial was once more postponed on March 6. On that date the Court of Assizes in Rome ruled that the case had to be tried in Milan, thereby in effect suspending the trial, which could be reopened next fall or even later.

On March 11, the recently formed Manifesto party (named after *Il Manifesto*, the publication of a pro-Chinese Communist group) announced that Valpreda had agreed to become one of its candidates for parliament in the May elections. "If elected," reported *New York Times* correspondent Paul Hofmann March 8, "Mr. Valpreda would have to be freed, at least temporarily, because the Constitution provides that members of Parliament cannot be prosecuted or kept in prison without express authorization from the legislature."

The other defendants in the Valpreda case are his mother, a sister, his grandmother, and a great-aunt, all of whom are free on their own recognizance and are charged with false testimony in corroborating his alibi that he was home in bed with influenza on the day of the bombing; three persons, also in prison since December 1969, charged with criminal association in being members of an

illegal anarchist group and with participating in the bombings; and four others, three of whom have disappeared, who are accused of minor offenses.

The defense of Valpreda has become an important campaign of the Italian revolutionary left. The defense organization, the National Committee of Struggle Against the State's Mass-Murder Frame-Up, was initiated by the Italian antirepression group Soccorso Rosso (Red Aid).

In a statement issued in February, well before the indictment of the MSI members, the committee pointed to the real culprits in the case:

"For more than two years they [Valpreda and his anarchist comrades] have been kept in jail without any reliable evidence against them, while on the other hand, the evidence that the fascists and their direct political and financial backers are materially responsible has become unequivocal and overwhelming. Not only are the fascists the guilty party, but they acted in concert with certain sectors of the employing class in Italy and with state offices, as well as (on the international scale) in collaboration with the espionage and provocation networks of the Greek colonels . . . and American imperialism. . . .

The bombings of December 12, 1969, were instigated by the employers. Not all the employing class were involved. However, all the employers took advantage of the bombings and manipulated their political and social effects. A whole wing of the ruling class (the bourgeoisie of small and middle industry and those with landed incomes, the upper layers of the civil service, broad sectors of our political world, entire 'nerve centers' of the state apparatus) saw this 'slaughter' as the pivot of a well-worked-out strategic design. By isolating the left and whipping up resentment against it, this plan aimed at shifting the whole political balance to the right. The goal was to prepare the way for more or less long-range projects ranging from a 'presidential republic' of the Social Democrats, to a traditional rightist regime of the Christian Democrats, to an outright fascist coup. . . ."

The monopolistic sectors of the capitalists, the statement said, had "exploited the bombings as a means for antilabor blackmail and as an opportunity to unleash the most violent, repressive assault against the van-

guard of the struggle."

The committee noted that companies such as FIAT and Pirelli have aimed "at integrating a section of the official labor movement into the bourgeois state," an aim that requires "social peace" in the factories—to be achieved by "restoring authority" at all costs.

"The December 12, 1969, bombings in Milan and Rome, therefore, were no isolated, chance episodes. They were clearly and premeditatedly exploited by an entire section of the Italian ruling class—a section with definite ties to fascism and world imperialism, Greece and the U.S.A., in the first instance—as a weapon in its counter-attack against the mass movements which were developing in a threatening way, and in particular against the growing organizational and political independence shown by the working class as a whole in the struggle of 'the hot autumn' [1969].

"Nonetheless, the bourgeoisie tried to reestablish its own class unity on the very bodies of the dead in the Piazza Fontana. It forced the settlement of contract negotiations and reconstituted the center-left government. Above all, by using the anarchists both as legal and political scapegoats, it unleashed a harsh and violent repression against the worker and student vanguard in the factories, schools, and neighborhoods, and directly against the political organizations of the revolutionary left.

"For their part, the institutionalized left parties not only left the road open for this repressive and reactionary offensive. They explicitly condemned the continual labor unrest in the factories. They once again advanced slogans calling for raising productivity (that is, intensifying exploitation) and for reforms (that is, abandoning working-class aims for the sake of assuring a rationalization of capitalist development)."

The committee called for a campaign that would expose the basis of the frame-up:

"The task of a campaign of propaganda and action must be to get the idea across to ever wider sectors of the working class and other exploited social strata that the 'political mass murders' (and likewise the murder of Pinelli,* the elimination of the other

witnesses, etc.) are only the most obvious surface manifestation of the daily violence to which the bourgeois system of profit and exploitation subject millions of workers. But these sectors must also be made to understand that the bombs in Milan and Rome were a foretaste of the methods the capitalist criminals will resort to more and more consistently as the class struggle deepens.

"The aim of the mass campaign, then, must not be merely to use the 'focus' of the Milan slaughter for exposing and clarifying the nature and role of bourgeois state institutions. The campaign must also seek to become a factor in the political mass struggle, as a conscious and organized expression of the revolutionary violence of the proletariat in opposition to the systematic violence, manipulation, and abuses of the capitalist system. . . .

"The entire revolutionary left must wage a coordinated political campaign of popular meetings, agitation, propaganda on a mass scale, systematic exposure of capitalist lies, demonstrations, militant actions, 'people's countertrials,' direct action in the schools, factories, and neighborhoods. First and foremost, this campaign must involve the proletariat and the student masses. But it must also embrace radicalizable petty-bourgeois sectors (teachers, newsmen, lawyers, magistrates, etc.), whose protests in such cases have usually been kept in a democratic-progressive key by the reformist parties."

The statement was signed by the Soccorso Rosso groups in Rome, Turin, Naples, Genoa, Florence, Bologna, Trento, and Bolzano. The following organizations are affiliated to these groups: Avanguardia Operaia [Workers' Vanguard]; Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari [Revolutionary Communist Groups, the Italian section of the Fourth International]; Gruppo Gramsci [Gramsci Group]; Lotta Continua [The Struggle Continues]; Potere Operaio [Workers Power]; Centro di controinformazione della sinistra rivoluzionaria [Revolutionary Left Alternative News Agency]. □

And More to Come?

At the last minute, General William Westmoreland canceled a speech to Yale students, fearing antiwar protests. His courage, he said, should not be doubted: "I've fought three wars."

* An anarchist arrested in connection with the Valpreda case who died mysteriously while in police custody.

A Challenge Left Unanswered

The Challenge of Bangla Desh: A Special Debate edited by Pran Chopra. Humanities Press, New York, 160 pp. \$5.00. 1971.

Of all the revolutionary upheavals in recent history, the Bengali liberation struggle has generated perhaps the fewest number of books and analyses. In part this can be attributed to the treacherous support given by the Maoist bureaucracy to Yahya's bloody repression. While unable to block the defeat of the Pakistani army, that support did introduce a certain confusion into the international radical movement. The central debate became whether or not the Bengali struggle was an anti-imperialist one; discussions on revolutionary strategy in Bengal and its implications for the whole subcontinent tended to be shunted to the background. Superficial analysis became the rule.

The Challenge of Bangla Desh is, in general, not an exception to this rule. It is a collection of essays—and like most such works, the contents are of uneven value—written by Indian scholars and commentators during the first months of the Pakistani military onslaught.

Several of the articles stand out in importance. Dr. Arjun Sengupta of the Delhi School for Economics presents a well-documented description of the exploitation of East Bengal by the Pakistani ruling class and examines the economic implications of East Bengal's independence.

Mohammed Ayooob, assistant professor of Pakistani studies at the Indian School for International Studies in New Delhi, is the only contributor who treats the Awami League realistically as a middle-class-based political organization drawn—largely against its will and totally unprepared—into a mass mobilization for national independence.

Other contributors attributed Mujibur Rahman's reluctance to call for complete independence for Bangladesh prior to March 25 (the date of Yahya's military attack) to his belief in the "constitutional process." Ayooob, however, notes that "the Awami League's interests seemed to converge with those of the army-bureaucracy establishment. Both were interested in postponing a decision on the question of autonomy for their own reasons. The Awami League wanted to ride to electoral victory on its autonomy plank and the [Pakistani] regime wanted to defuse the situation by putting the onus of a decision regarding autonomy on a future political set-up where East Bengal would be forced to compromise and whittle down its demands under the pressure of coalition politics."

The Awami League, Ayooob writes, was consistently unable to foresee developing events, and was consistently surprised by its own strength and the depth of Bengali nationalist sentiment. "An open, amorphous organisation with a middle-class, city-based leadership, while eminently suited for fighting and winning elections and even leading a civil disobedience movement, was not the sort of organisation that could either prepare contingency plans for an armed resistance or hope to lead a resistance which was bound to turn into a guerrilla war."

The spontaneous explosion of the Bengali people in March 1971, while Rahman was busy trying to negotiate a settlement with Yahya, took the Awami League by surprise. Ayooob discusses the factors that moved Yahya to abandon the negotiations and launch the war against the Bengalis. The Pakistani rulers, Ayooob notes, "failed to anticipate . . . the magnitude of the East Bengal response to such strong-arm tactics. This miscalculation cost them dearly."

So it did. But Ayooob fails to point out that the Awami League's unpreparedness, and the lack of an alternative leadership, cost the Bengali people even more dearly. In discussing the probable evolution of the Bengali struggle (the essay seems to have

been written in the middle of 1971), Ayooob anticipates the growth of a leftist, Marxist-oriented leadership and expects it to become dominant.

But he did not foresee the Indian intervention, which was specifically designed to prevent such an eventuality.

The Indian ruling class's hostility to the real content of the Bengali liberation struggle is evidenced by a number of the contributions in *The Challenge of Bangla Desh*. The problem for the Indian political commentators is to support the independence of East Bengal while at the same time rejecting the notion that similar fights by other oppressed nationalities in the subcontinent (especially in India) would have equal validity.

This theoretical obstacle is solved by defining the other nationalities out of existence. Sisir Gupta (professor of diplomacy at the Indian School of International Studies, Nehru University), for example, writes: "The world in general and the new nations of Asia and Africa in particular have rightly asserted the principle that the right of self-determination cannot be extended to sub-national groups lest it should bring about a colossal change in the states system evolved in the post-war years. But East Bengal was never a sub-nation."

The first sentence was precisely Yahya's (and Mao's) argument. Gupta accepts it and then sets out to prove that the East Bengalis are an exception, being not a "sub-nation" but a "nation." That the Bengalis do indeed constitute a nation is undeniable. But why the East Bengalis should be a nation while the same people in West Bengal should be a sub-nation is left unexplained. There seems to be only one important difference: East Bengalis were part of Pakistan, West Bengalis are part of India. Indian oppressed groups are sub-nations without the right of self-determination.

This myopia is widespread. Journalist Dewan Berindranath examines the "Tremors in West Pakistan" engendered by the Bengali struggle. There is no similar article on its effects in India.

The Challenge of Bangla Desh provides some good information on the exploitation that sparked the Bengali freedom movement. But it fails to meet the real challenge of analyzing the revolutionary implications of that movement.

Jon Rothschild

Soviet Citizens' Appeal for Bukovsky

[Following is the text of an appeal on behalf of Vladimir Bukovsky, signed by fifty-two Soviet citizens and sent in early January to United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. The Russian original, which only recently became available, has been translated for *Intercontinental Press*. A discussion of the background and meaning of this appeal appears on page 447 of this issue.]

* * *

The groundless and inhuman conviction of Vladimir Bukovsky compels us to appeal to you, just as we appealed—though, unfortunately, without any response—to your predecessor in the high post of Secretary General of the United Nations in connection with a series of gross violations of human rights in our country. In appealing to the United Nations, we proceed from the belief that a violation of human rights, wherever it exists—but particularly when it concerns a great power—affects the interests of all humanity and is not merely the internal affair of the particular country.

In appealing to you, we also proceed from the belief that the case of Bukovsky is one of exceptional importance. Inseparably linked with Bukovsky's name is the exposure of one of the most repulsive phenomena of barbarism in our century: the use of the resources of modern medicine for repressive purposes.

And the sentence handed down on Bukovsky is blatant revenge for these exposures. Bukovsky's final statement to the court, which has been published in the world press [see *Intercontinental Press*, January 31, p. 111], reveals his stature as a courageous champion of human rights better than we could. And, better than we could, it portrays that caricature of a public, objective legal proceeding, which resulted in Bukovsky being sentenced to seven years imprisonment (two years in prison, five years of hard labor) and five

years exile in the name of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

But Bukovsky's cause—the defense of human rights—is the cause of all honorable people on earth, the United Nations' cause, your cause, and ours.

Of course, an unprejudiced opinion presupposes a serious analysis of the facts in the case. We should point out, in this connection, that Bukovsky's interview with American television correspondents concerning special psychiatric hospitals—which was used by the court as the basis for charging him with slander against Soviet reality—is well known and undoubtedly is accessible to your consultants. Equally well known are the documents recording official psychiatric diagnoses, which Bukovsky sent abroad and which substantiate the criticisms made by him in his interview. These documents, as we all know, have already been studied by distinguished specialists, who have

publicly expressed their views. (*London Times*, September 16, 1971.)

We hope that you will find a way to exercise your high authority in order to help Bukovsky, whose actions and example have furthered the growth of public awareness regarding the humane principles of the organization which you head.

Be assured of our deep respect.

The Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR:

T. Velikanova, S. Kovalyov, V. Krasin, A. Lavut, G. Podyapolsky, T. Khodorovich, Yu. Shtein, P. Yakir, A. Yakobson.

Endorsers:

V. Bakhmin, I. Begun, I. Belogorodskaya, S. Vaisblat, A. Volpin, Yu. Vronsky, V. Gershovich, Yu. Glazov, A. Grigorenko, Z. Grigorenko, V. Delone, O. Iofe, Yu. Iofe, V. Ilyakov, I. Kaplan, S. Karasik, L. Kordasevich, E. Kasterina, I. Korsunskaya, I. Kristi, E. Kushev, L. Kusheva, M. Landa, V. Lapin, A. Naidenovich, V. Osipov, T. Petrova, A. Polishchuk, I. Rudakov, V. Savenkova, E. Stroyeva, A. Tapeschkina, L. Ternovsky, V. Timachev, Yu. Titov, Yu. Tumerman, V. Turiyansky, R. Urban, S. Khodorovich, N. Shatunovskaya, Yu. Shikhanovich, A. Shtelmakh, G. Shtelmakh, I. Yakir.

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