

# Intercontinental Press

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**Nixon Bombs North Vietnam:**


## ***Air Raids Show Meaning of Deal in Peking***

**Israeli, Lebanese Armies  
Attack Palestinian Bases**

**Murder Sparks Massive  
Protests in France**

**Chile:**

**MIR Weighs Record  
of Unidad Popular**



CHOU: Received as conquering hero in Peking after arranging details of "peaceful coexistence" between Mao's "revolutionary diplomatic line" and U.S. imperialism.

**Exclusive From Dublin:**

**Interview With Irish Republican Leaders**

## General Strike Protests Inflation

Economic activity in most of Argentina was brought to a halt February 29 as Argentine trade unionists began a forty-eight-hour general strike. The action was called by the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT—General Confederation of Labor), the 1,500,000-member union led by supporters of exiled former president Juan Perón.

The strike was seen as the beginning of a struggle against the galloping inflation that has steadily eroded the living standards of Argentinian workers. A 15 percent wage-hike that went into effect in January was immediately wiped out by a 20 percent increase in prices.

Collective bargaining has been banned by the military regime of General Alejandro Lanusse, which rules under a state of siege. Hundreds of opponents of the government have been arrested without charges.

Atilio López, Córdoba regional chief of the CGT, has said that there can be no solution to the problems of the economy while "people who rob now in the name of the military" remain in power.

Government troops patrolled highway routes to the major plants in Córdoba, but there was no violence in that city. In Buenos Aires, several buses were reportedly burned during the action. The industrial belt around the capital was shut down completely, and the meat-packing factories in Rosario were closed.

Labor leaders have called for a national meeting March 13 to determine further action against the dictatorship.

### Creeping Communism in Arizona

Joseph Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, who left the Soviet Union for the joys of life in the U.S., is reported to have separated from her husband because she did not like their style of living at the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation cooperative in Arizona. A newspaper quoted Alliluyeva as saying, "I believe in private property. They live a communal life at the foundation. They share their incomes, their food, their living. Everyone works, including the children. That's why I left Russia."

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EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Mai-tan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

MANAGING EDITOR: Allen Myers.

COPY EDITOR: Ruth Schein.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Gerry Foley, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders, David Thorstad.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.

TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Lawrence Rand.

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PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemenee, Paris 4, France.

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## Air Raids Show Meaning of Peking Deal

By Allen Myers

Less than forty-eight hours after Richard Nixon's "journey for peace" had concluded, U.S. planes renewed the air war against North Vietnam. Nixon returned to Washington from Peking the evening of February 28. On March 1, a U.S. plane bombed and strafed villages in Quangbinh province, according to a statement by the North Vietnamese foreign ministry.

The U.S. command in Saigon admitted to eleven "protective reaction" raids on North Vietnam in the four days beginning March 1. Additional raids occurred March 5, but the number was not disclosed.

Elsewhere in Indochina, there had not even been the pretense of a lull in the war during Nixon's visit to Peking, as a March 6 Associated Press dispatch from Saigon noted:

"For the first time in several weeks, there were no B-52 raids reported in South Vietnam during the 24-hour period ending at noon yesterday. But the United States command reported B-52 strikes against enemy supply lines in both Laos and Cambodia."

The continued bombing raids were one more confirmation of the fact that the "peace" Nixon sought in Peking was not intended to be achieved by an end to the U.S. aggression in Indochina, but by an agreement with the Maoist bureaucracy that would permit U.S. imperialism to maintain a foothold in Vietnam.

In the aftermath of Nixon's visit, the Chinese government gave every indication of regarding the Nixon-Chou communiqué as a victory for Peking. On his return to the capital from Shanghai, where he had seen Nixon aboard his plane, Chou was received with drums, cymbals, and an honor guard of soldiers, workers, and Red Guards. The crowd of 5,000 persons carried banners reading "Long Live Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Diplomatic Line." A March 1 dispatch to the *Toronto Globe and Mail* reported:

"The state-controlled media gave saturation coverage today to Premier Chou En-lai's return . . . from Shanghai, making it clear that President

Nixon's visit is to be presented to the masses as a diplomatic coup for China and a personal triumph for the Premier."

The only "triumph" involved, however, was Nixon's promise of "ultimate" withdrawal from Taiwan and his verbal acceptance of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence." This could, perhaps, be regarded as a victory by bureaucrats who consider diplomatic agreements, rather than class struggle, as the motive force of history, but it did not indicate anything good for the Chinese revolution or for revolution anywhere in Asia.

The areas both of agreement and ostensible disagreement in the Nixon-Chou communiqué provide an indication of what "peaceful coexistence" between U.S. imperialism and the Maoist government means concretely.

Both sides, for example, reiterated their counterrevolutionary position in support of the Pakistani dictatorship against the people of Bangladesh. Here, even the language used by the two governments was almost identical.

The U.S. delegation stated: "Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the cease-fire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of big-power rivalry."

Chou's section of the document read: "It [the Chinese government] firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of

Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination."

Other than on cultural and sports exchanges, the only other areas of expressed agreement were opposition to Soviet diplomacy in Asia and hypocritical declarations of honorable intentions:

"Both [sides] wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.

"Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to the efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

"Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

"Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of influence."

The hollowness of these declarations was demonstrated even before they were made. It is only necessary to recall that it was Nixon and Mao's collusion against revolution in Bangladesh and Ceylon that made the Peking visit possible in the first place.

The disagreements between Nixon and Chou, as stated in the communiqué, were phrased very mildly. On Korea, each side perfunctorily repeated support for its ally. Nixon mentioned Washington's "friendly relations with Japan," while Chou indicated that the Mao government is awaiting Sato's replacement before moving toward rapprochement with Tokyo: "It [China] firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan."

But the most important subject, and the one that naturally drew most attention, was Indochina. Here is the way "Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line" on Indochina was expressed in the communiqué:

"The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goals and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key

problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples."

Agents and supporters of U.S. imperialism quickly indicated that they knew how to interpret these words correctly. On March 1, Nixon's top adviser, Henry Kissinger, gave a "background" briefing for reporters. (The briefing was given on condition that it be attributed only to an "administration official," but two reporters who were not invited demonstrated their annoyance by revealing the identity of the official.)

Among the details revealed by Kissinger was the fact that the sections of the communiqué labeled as the view of only one side had in reality been submitted to the other side for approval. In other words, Nixon had approved Chou's formulation of the Chinese position on Indochina. Describing Kissinger's briefing in the March 2 *Washington Post*, Frank Cormier indicated the reason for Nixon's approval:

"The Americans pointed with some satisfaction . . . to a section in which the Chinese gave their view of the Vietnam War.

"While they acknowledged the wording might strike American ears as belligerent, they interpreted it as one of Peking's most moderate statements on the subject, omitting as it did time-worn rhetoric about China's steadfast stand with the heroic people of North Vietnam against the imperialist devils from the West.

"The Americans took heart from the fact that Chou even signed the communiqué at a time when the United States was at war with North Vietnam, and, periodically, bombing that country."

The "satisfaction" of the Nixon administration referred only to the *public* communiqué. Some of the more astute commentators in the bourgeois press have noted that Nixon is unlikely to have attained less in his secret talks with Mao and Chou. The *New York Times*, for example, commented in a February 28 editorial:

"On the most acute questions of Indochina and Taiwan, the negotiators chose to be purposefully vague, but Peking's hard line has unmistakably given way to a new flexibility. The war with Saigon is no longer portrayed as a fight to the bitter end.



Globe and Mail, Toronto

Premier Chou considers negotiable the peace proposals now on the table. His exclusive mention of the offers by the National Liberation Front may even contain a hint of strained relations with Hanoi." (Emphasis added.)

The conservative *Christian Science Monitor* was even blunter in a March 3 editorial:

" . . . it is a reasonable assumption that the cymbal-clashing at Peking airport [for Chou's return] proves that Chairman Mao got something he values out of the visit, and knows it. We hope we can assume that what Mr. Nixon got in return will emerge in the form of a fairly rapid abatement of the war in Vietnam.

"We note in this connection that Hanoi has still not launched the offensive for which it has long been building. And time for such an offensive is running out. The rains begin again in April. We may well be enduring the final phase of the war."

It is to be hoped that Nixon and the bourgeois press have overestimated the ability of the Mao government to restrain the Indochinese liberation fighters. In any case, an administration official indicated March 2 the belief of U.S. imperialism that it could have benefited considerably had it established "peaceful coexistence" with Mao's regime earlier.

Charles W. Bray, a State Department spokesman, told reporters that as far as relations between Washington and Peking were concerned, "The

history of the past twenty-odd years was an aberration."

There was considerable truth in Bray's remark, in the sense that the decades-long attempt to whip up hysteria against the Chinese revolution had made it difficult for U.S. imperialism to take advantage of Mao's willingness to preserve the *status quo* under the banner of "peaceful coexistence." The "aberration" was the propaganda that pictured the Maoist bureaucracy as more "revolutionary" than its Kremlin counterpart.

For those left currents that have been inclined to take the ultraleft rhetoric of Maoism for good coin, it is now past time to look at the reality revealed by Peking's practice. The betrayal of Bangladesh, the arming of Bandaranaike against the young rebels in Ceylon, and the willingness to deal in secret with Richard Nixon while bombs rain on Indochina all demonstrate that the Chinese ruling bureaucracy is not basically different from that of the Soviet Union.

U. S. imperialism has shown its ability to grasp the implications of this fact. It would be tragic if anti-imperialists displayed less understanding.

### When You Move...

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## Israeli, Lebanese Armies Invade 'Fatehland'

By Jon Rothschild

The Palestinian fedayeen, says Moshe Dayan, now face the decision "to be or not to be."

"I believe that they [Lebanese government leaders] will try at least to restrict, perhaps to control immediately the area, and not to allow the Fateh to act either from Lebanon or to cross the border. . . . Either they take care of the area, or we shall have to do it, by one way or another."

Thus did the Israeli defense minister estimate the situation prevailing in southern Lebanon on March 4, after a week of intensive Israeli assaults on the Arkoub region of Lebanon. (This region is directly north of Israel and west of Syria.)

Even before Dayan spoke, the central leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had made its decision. Said a March 3 *New York Times* dispatch from Beirut: "The leadership of the Palestinian guerrilla movement has reportedly decided to take steps to avoid confrontations with the Lebanese Army, which has moved into areas on the border with Israel that had been under commando control."

"Instructions are said to have been sent to the fedayeen, or commandos, in southern Lebanon to stay out of populated centers and to give up their fixed bases."

Kemal Nassar, a leader of the PLO, explained the decision: "The leadership of the Palestinian resistance movement is eager to strengthen mutual confidence by continuing the dialogue [with the Lebanese regime]. . . ."

Thus the full-scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon, launched February 25 under the transparently fraudulent guise of retaliating for the commando killing of two Israeli civilians, seemed to have achieved its real aim: impelling the Lebanese army to violate the 1969 Cairo agreement and destroy the last important bases of the Palestinian movement in the Arab East.

In 1969, after heavy fighting between the Lebanese army and the fedayeen (and a massive mobilization

of the Lebanese people in support of the Palestinians), the "Cairo agreement" was signed. It accorded the fedayeen the right to operate freely in the Arkoub—provided they did not cross the Israeli border directly from their bases. That stipulation was a substantially meaningless fig leaf for the Lebanese government.

The agreement was signed during the peak of the fedayeen's power, when the first organs of dual power were being created in Jordan. The Lebanese regime was then in no position to resist Palestinian demands.

The Arkoub soon became known in the Israeli press as "Fatehland." When the main Jordanian bases of the Palestinian movement were destroyed by King Hussein in September 1970, large numbers of fedayeen transferred their bases of operation to the Arkoub. During 1971, when Hussein was mopping up the last fedayeen bastions in northern Jordan, the Lebanese regime still did not feel strong enough to attempt a similar feat in "Fatehland."

On February 25 the Israeli military decided to force a resolution of the situation. A column of tanks and infantry crossed six miles into Lebanon to the village of Ainata, a fedayeen stronghold. At the same time, a thirty-minute air strike was launched against fedayeen positions twenty-two miles inside Lebanon.

On February 26 and 27 the assault continued. Backed up by troops, Israeli bulldozers began constructing a military road through the mountains, aimed at interdicting fedayeen movements through the area. The operations during these two days were also accompanied by air strikes.

Israeli-supplied casualty statistics claimed that sixty fedayeen were killed in the combined assaults. That figure, however, does not include people killed in the air strikes, or civilian deaths. (In contrast to the practice of the U.S. army in Indochina, the Israelis do not add the number of civilian dead to the body count of

soldiers—they simply ignore the killing of noncombatants.)

Besides the killings, at least 200 Arab houses were destroyed. Bulldozing people's homes out of existence is standard operating procedure for the Israeli armed forces.

The Lebanese government contented itself with calling for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. On February 28 that august body passed a resolution calling for an immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops—a motion the Israeli government proceeded to ignore until the aims of the operations had been completed. Also on February 28, Lebanese Premier Saeb Salam claimed that if the UN order were ignored, the Lebanese army "would undertake its duty in protecting the country."

Late February 28, the Israeli soldiers withdrew. Then, and only then, did the Lebanese army move into the Arkoub. "This time we intend to occupy the guerrilla positions and keep them," a Lebanese colonel told Associated Press reporters.

An unnamed guerrilla spokesman, according to the March 1 *New York Times*, said that the Lebanese troop movement was well within the limits of Lebanese sovereignty. "Under no circumstances will we infringe this sovereignty," he added.

Zuheir Mohsen, a leader of el-Saiqa (the pro-Syrian-Baathist fedayeen group), was quoted in the Lebanese press as saying that his group was ready to "reconsider" its position in Lebanon. The statement was widely interpreted as meaning that el-Saiqa would not resist the overturning of the 1969 accords.

On March 1, Israeli warplanes raided three Syrian villages near the Golan Heights, apparently to inform the Baathist regime that Syria will not be immune to aggression if it should become a refuge for the fedayeen. The Syrian air force struck back the same day—an unprecedented move for an Arab regime. But the attitude of el-Saiqa toward the Leba-

non events and the fact that Syria has never allowed the fedayeen to function freely on Syrian territory indicate that the Palestinians will get no solace from Damascus.

The timing of the Israeli decision to force Beirut's hand is both significant and ominous. One day after Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat's recent visit to the Soviet Union—and just several weeks after Egypt was rocked by leftist student demonstrations—the "peace" mission of UN special envoy Gunnar Jarring was re-activated. At the same time, the Soviet Union balked at increasing its military aid to Egypt, and the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union declared itself in favor of renewed efforts to reach an accommodation with Israel.

The Soviet Union, which has always favored a Middle East deal aimed at establishing peace and quiet at the expense of the Palestinian revolution, is now especially anxious to show Washington that it can be relied upon to do in the Arab East what Nixon wants the Chinese bureaucracy to do in Southeast Asia. In the Soviet bureaucracy's effort to prove to Nixon that Moscow is a more reliable ally than Peking, the Arab East is the best possible point of departure.

The continued existence of fedayeen bases in Lebanon is a fly in the ointment, and the crushing of the Palestinian movement in its last stronghold is a prelude to fresh attempts at an Israeli/Arab government deal.

The increasing pressure on the fedayeen has apparently led to some divisions within the movement. In an interview granted the French centrist newspaper *Tribune Socialiste* (before the Lebanon events), Nayef Hawatmeh, leader of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPFLP), vigorously attacked what he called the right wing of the movement "represented by the Fateh leadership" which "for several months has been trying to establish peaceful coexistence with the king's regime [in Jordan]."

The Palestinian left wing, which Hawatmeh said was composed of the DPFLP, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, progressive forces in Fateh, and some elements of el-Saiqa, opposed any such collaboration. Hawatmeh called for the establishment of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian front to oppose the Hussein regime.

The suggestion is an appropriate one for Lebanon as well. The failure of the Palestinian movement to establish firm links with the Lebanese population in the south left it unprepared to resist the Lebanese army repression triggered by the Israeli aggression. The recognition of the "sovereignty" of the Lebanese government in southern

Lebanon, on the specious grounds that the Palestinian movement should not be concerned with the "domestic" policies of the Lebanese regime, has deprived the Palestinian movement of its only realistic defense against the repression unleashed by the government: the mobilization of the Lebanese workers and peasants. □

## With Nixon's Backing, Colonels Get Bolder

## Makarios Yields to Pressure From Athens

Despite a clear demonstration of the desire of the population to resist pressures from the Athens junta, Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios has apparently decided to yield to the colonels. On March 1, a spokesman for the Makarios regime announced that conflict with the junta over the archbishop's importing of a \$2,500,000 shipment of Czechoslovak arms was "at the stage of being settled."

The junta had demanded, on February 11, that Makarios turn the arms over to the United Nations "peace-keeping" force on the island. Makarios, who originally rejected the junta's demand, had imported the arms to counter underground groups being organized by General George Grivas, an anticommunist zealot who favors annexation of Cyprus by Greece.

The junta had also demanded that Makarios reorganize his government, expanding it to include Grivasite representatives. According to the *New York Times*, Makarios is said to have accepted that demand as well.

Prior to March 1, thousands of Greek Cypriots, many of whom have favored union with Greece in the past, took to the streets to urge Makarios to reject the junta's ultimatum. Popular pressure, therefore, was in no way responsible for the archbishop's change of heart.

Perhaps a special meeting of the Holy Synod, the executive body of Cyprus's Orthodox Church, had something to do with the switch. Three projunta bishops, Anthimos of Kiti-um, Kyprianos of Kyrenia, and Gennadios of Paphos, comprise the synod. They had been pressuring Makarios to yield to the colonels. Rumors were current in Nicosia, the

capital, that at the special meeting, scheduled to take place on March 2, the bishops would demand Makarios's resignation as president, on the grounds that it is a violation of holy canon for a churchman to hold a temporal office.

Twenty-four hours before the convening of the synod, Makarios's representative officially announced that the archbishop had changed his mind and would surrender the arms.

But the gesture of submission went for naught. The three bishops asked for Makarios's resignation anyway.

On March 3 some 50,000 Cypriots demonstrated in Nicosia in one of the largest rallies ever seen in Cyprus.

Chanting "Out with the Judas bishops!" and "Down with the junta!" they massed at Makarios's residence. On the same day, the Cyprus House of Representatives unanimously called upon the archbishop not to resign, but also said that "steps should be taken immediately for the full restoration of relations between Athens and Nicosia."

Projunta forces have still been unable to mobilize any significant-sized actions against Makarios. But the archbishop seems to realize that Cypriot politics are not decided by the wishes of the Cypriot people. That the Athens junta is not acting with complete independence on the Cyprus question is indicated by the fact that Nixon has suddenly decided to formally override a congressional ban on military aid to Greece and will sell about \$70,000,000 worth of arms to the junta before June 30. Nixon claimed that U.S. "national security" necessitated the move. □

## Torn Between Saving Money and Bombing Cyprus

### Greek Colonels Go Shopping for Arms

Representatives of U.S. and French companies have come up with some fascinating arguments aimed at capturing the Greek market in supersonic jet aircraft.

The reason such a market exists is that the ruling colonels in Athens have apparently decided that the proposed U.S. naval base at Piraeus and all the military advantages of membership in NATO are not sufficient to defend the country from hordes of potential aggressors—Turks, Communists, Cypriots, Palestinians, etc., all of whom clearly covet the Athenian bastion of free-world democracy. The colonels let it be known that they were interested in purchasing two squadrons (about thirty-six to forty planes) of new fighter-bombers.

The United States offered the junta the F-4 Phantom—the Mach-2, \$4,000,000-apiece pride of the U.S. air force. The French countered with the F-1 Mirage, a Mach-2 interceptor that doubles as a fighter-bomber, in a special, stripped-down version for a mere \$1,000,000 per plane. Greek test pilots have written favorable reports on both planes.

According to the February 21 *New York Times*, each of the prospective sellers has resorted to "high-powered sales techniques" to eliminate the other from competition. The most obvious plus on the French side is the peanut-sized price of the Mirage. But the French also argue that Western European countries, as part of the new moves toward unity, should begin procuring a standardized weaponry. The Mirage, they say, is the European plane of the future.

But the United States will have no truck with such sentimentality. U.S. representatives claim that when payments for the Phantoms are stretched over ten years, the unit price is no longer four times that of the Mirage. But more importantly, if the junta expects to use the planes in case of a Cyprus crisis, the U.S. bidders say, the Phantom can stay in the air over a target area four times longer than the Mirage! The French cut-rate model could unload incendiaries on Nicosia for a mere five minutes at a time.

Linked to the haggling about the jet deal is another battle: the U.S. Automation Industries of California and the French Avions Marcel Dassault companies are competing for the contract to build a \$50,000,000 aerospace factory in Greece (one of the country's crying needs). A slightly complicating factor in that rivalry is that Lockheed Services has gone into

### Penalty Increased on Appeal

### Six Prisoners Killed by Shah's Courts

By Javad Sadeeg

Six young Iranian revolutionists were executed by a firing squad in Teheran on March 1. A press release from the Iranian Students Association in New York identified those executed as Abbas and Assadollah Meftahi, Massoud and Majeed Ahmadzadeh, Hamid Tavakoli, and Gholam-Reza Golavi.

The six are part of a group of twenty-three who were sentenced on February 2 by a military court in Teheran, which was in session for only ten days. They were accused of terrorist activities and conspiracy to overthrow the regime. However, these charges were never proved in the military court, and except for the usual "confessions," no evidence was presented.

The young people who were executed had refused to defend themselves in the military court. They contended that, according to the Iranian constitution, as political prisoners they had to be tried in an open civilian court in the presence of an impartial jury.

When the military court handed down the sentences on February 2, all of the defendants appealed the decision. Very little was reported in the press on the proceedings of the military court of appeals. Apparently that court imposed the death penalty on Golavi, who had been condemned to life imprisonment by the earlier

partnership with Dassault on the deal. The American embassy in Athens has announced that whichever group gets the contract, the U.S. government will grant a loan guarantee to the U.S. firm involved.

Two late entries in the business of supplying the Greek dictatorship with arms are Great Britain and West Germany. The former put in its own bid for the fighter-bomber contract, and the latter has sold the junta four 1,000-ton submarines for a cool \$28,000,000. There was no report as to how long the subs could hover underwater in Cypriot harbors. □

court.

The international publicity generated by the activities of the Confederation of Iranian Students on behalf of the political prisoners put the spotlight on the Iranian regime. In order to justify the murders it was about to commit, the regime organized an "antiforeign" and "antisubversive" demonstration of "the Iranian nation" for February 29. The organizers predicted that more than 200,000 would attend, according to the air edition of the Teheran daily *Ettelaat*, of February 28. All schools, government offices, and private enterprises were ordered closed on the day of the demonstration.

On February 29, *Ettelaat* reported, "tens of thousands of people" participated in the demonstrations in Teheran and demanded the maximum penalty for the "foreign elements" and "terrorists." The six revolutionists were executed on the morning of the following day. □

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# The Fourth International

By Pierre Frank

[With this issue we are beginning the serialization of Pierre Frank's *The Fourth International: A Contribution to the History of the Trotskyist Movement*. The translation from the French is by Ruth Schein.

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\* \* \*

## Introduction

Up to the present, no study has been written on the history of the Trotskyist movement. Some work is presently being done in the universities, but it bears only on certain periods or on very limited aspects of the movement.

The principal aim of this book is to give today's young militants some knowledge of the past of the Trotskyist movement. The first part of this work served as material for a course at a school conducted by the French section of the Fourth International in 1948, and was published at that time. It appears here without any appreciable changes, with additional material to cover the ensuing period.

Within the limits of a work of this size, we wanted to give what seemed to us the most essential aspects of the history of the Fourth International. Until now the Trotskyist movement, for reasons connected with the size of its forces, has exercised its influence on the class struggle principally in the domain of ideas, by its analyses and its elaborations of perspectives and programs. Generally speaking, it has not been able to lead mass mobilizations and mass actions based on its program and its slogans; the objective reasons for this are given in this book.

Thus a history of the Fourth International would have to describe above all the positions taken by the organization in the gigantic social struggles that have characterized the world in the course of the forty-five years of the Trotskyist movement's existence. In addition, such a history would have to show how the Trotskyist movement, in the course of these struggles, defended and enriched the formulations of revolutionary Marxism, as developed from the time of Marx down to the early congresses of the Communist International. We would have to do our utmost to illuminate the most important stages in the life of the Fourth International, the problems it had to resolve, the debates that took place, and the positions that were reached.

We have limited this book to the history of the international movement and have not treated the history of its sections, except to the extent that a particular section

might at a particular time play an especially important role in the history of the International.

The history of the Trotskyist movement scarcely poses any problem in connection with what historians call "periodization." The transition from capitalism to the worldwide victory of socialism, inaugurated by the October revolution, is turning out to be much longer and more complex than anyone had imagined in 1917; no other political movement has followed this transitional period as closely as has the Trotskyist movement, whose successive stages coincide with the very stages of that history itself since 1923.

The Trotskyist movement was born in the USSR at the close of the revolutionary wave that followed the first world war, when a period of relative stabilization of capitalism began. It expanded internationally during the great economic crisis that began in 1929. It moved toward construction of a new revolutionary international after the debacle of the German working-class movement in 1933, and founded the Fourth International on the eve of the second world war. It reoriented itself in accordance with the tremendous upheavals of the postwar period. And today the Trotskyist movement is preparing for a new phase concomitant with the turn inaugurated on a world scale in 1968.

In this book we have done no more than mention the mountains of slander heaped on Trotsky and the Trotskyist movement. We have never yet dealt with this question in depth. Because of the vast proportions the calumny assumed and the aftereffects that still remain, this question will no doubt constitute an important subject for future historians. A century ago Karl Vogt and others furiously slandered Marx and his supporters, calling them the *Schwefelbande* (devil's gang) within the movements for emancipation. How tiny and pale were those vilifications compared to those underwritten by powerful states, heaped high in an effort to make the Fourth International appear the *Schwefelbande* of the twentieth century.

This work leaves aside a good number of questions. Given the aim and the size we had set for this book, we could not go into numerous details. There was no possibility of using extensive quotations without requiring three to four times the number of pages. We had to stick to essentials. We hope that we have succeeded in correctly setting forth how the Trotskyists advanced internationally in the domain of theory and practice, in the defense of positions previously taken, and in the elaboration—difficult in every epoch and rendered still more arduous by the conditions under which the movement has fought—of new positions in the face of new problems posed by the changes taking place all over the world.

The author of this book has participated in this "long march" of the Trotskyists for more than forty years, first becoming part of the international leadership of the Trotskyist movement in 1931. Although this work very



largely expresses the views of numerous leading members of the International, it cannot be considered an "official" history of the Fourth International. We do not think that for Marxists there can be an "official" history, even of their own organization.

The organization is an instrument of political combat, which inevitably necessitates a line of action determined according to the rules of democratic centralism. History, to a great extent, serves to determine politics; its determination cannot be placed at the service of politics. For having abandoned Marxism on this question, as on others, Stalinism has obliged the historians under its thumb to write "official" histories, forcing them in fact periodically to rewrite history as a function of the line of the moment. They have succeeded only in accumulating historical falsifications as well as in proving their growing incapacity to draw objective lessons from history.

November 15, 1968

P.F.

## Chapter 1: Historical Continuity

The Trotskyist movement, born in 1923 at the onset of the Stalinist degeneration, has taken part ever since in all the great events of our age, thus assuring the *continuity* of revolutionary Marxism on a world scale. Between the Communist League and the First International, there was a lapse in time of a dozen years in the field of organization—although political continuity was assured by Marx and Engels personally. Between the First and Second International, there was also a gap of almost fifteen years—the political continuity being assured by Engels, who established a kind of international center by corresponding with leaders of parties in the most important countries. The years of World War I fell between the Second and the Third International. This time it was the Bolshevik party and Zimmerwald that assured the maintenance of the Marxist movement.

Our movement, on the other hand, was born within the Third International. From 1923 to 1933 we fought—with in its ranks or outside—as a faction of the Communist International, trying to wrest its leadership from the hands of the centrists and place it once again on the path of revolutionary Marxism. When objective conditions no longer made it possible to pursue this aim, we proceeded directly to the building of new parties and a new, revolutionary international, taking as our point of departure the first four congresses of the Communist International. There was no break, no gap in the continuity of the revolutionary movement, and that despite the enormous ebb in the labor movement starting in 1923, despite the degeneration of the October Revolution, despite the infamous role exercised by Stalinism within the working class.

Congresses and resolutions of a revolutionary organization are not mere matters of form. They do a good deal more than define policy for the immediate period. They record, for the collectivity constituted by the party, its experience, its rules of action, the framework in which—while renewing its membership with the passage of time—it continues to evolve. Should the organization cease to exist, all this remains as historical data that will certainly be used by those who, at some later date, will want to

rebuild the revolutionary party. But only as historical data! They would inevitably have to grope about, sometimes for a very long time, to reestablish, to re-create, an adequate framework for the organization. The degeneration of the Third International and the resulting dispersion of its forces have enormously hindered the progress of our movement, which has experienced numerous crises. But it is enough to imagine for a moment what would have happened if the thread had been broken—if there had no longer been, at a given moment, an international Marxist center—to realize by how much the difficulties would have been multiplied, to have an idea of the even greater obstacles revolutionists would have had to overcome in order to reestablish a firm political movement and to rebuild an international leadership.

History will not fail to point out that it was Trotsky, through the sum total of his works, who made the greatest contribution to this task of maintaining historical continuity. Although the names *Communist-Internationalist* and *Bolshevik-Leninist* have been borne by our various organizations, the name *Trotskyist* will most probably be, and correctly so, the one that history will give us.

## Chapter 2: From 1923 to 1929. The Bolshevik-Leninist Faction in the USSR

*The revolutionary period opened by the Russian Revolution of 1917 was followed from 1923 to 1929 by an ebbing of the revolutionary tide and a period of relative stabilization of capitalism. The European economy was recovering; American capitalism gained world ascendancy, replacing British capitalism, which experienced its first big crisis in 1926. In China the struggle of the colonized masses against imperialism began its great and tragic course. In the Soviet Union, economic progress was small; a bitter internal political struggle went on, in the course of which the bureaucracy succeeded in shifting the axis of Soviet policy from world revolution to "socialism in one country." In several European countries, Socialist parties were in power, while the Communist International and its sections were in crisis, traversing the first stages of their bureaucratic degeneration.*

\* \* \*

The first period of our movement extended from 1923 to 1929. During that period, there was no real international Bolshevik-Leninist movement: there was a Bolshevik-Leninist faction in the CPSU, supported by individuals or groupings in other countries, but liaison between them and the Bolshevik-Leninist Opposition in the USSR was confined to correspondence. There was no real, collective international elaboration of political thought and action.

From the moment of its birth, the Bolshevik-Leninist faction in the USSR evinced one of the essential characteristics of our movement—*internationalism*. The faction was created in 1923 on the basis of an understanding of the changes in the international situation; its principal

battles in the course of these six years bore as much on specifically Soviet questions as on problems of the world revolution.

The point of departure was the *turn in the world situation after the defeat of the German revolution in October 1923*. The German CP was losing ground, while the Social Democracy was moving ahead. Trotsky, against whom was arrayed the majority of the Political Bureau of the Bolshevik party (the Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin troika), maintained that the international situation had changed from top to bottom, that the revolutionary wave of the postwar period was spent, that a period of relative stabilization of capitalism had started, and that all this imposed new tasks for the Communist International and its sections in capitalist countries—as well as for the problems of building socialism in the USSR.

From 1923 to 1929 the Bolshevik-Leninist faction in the USSR fought on three main questions:

- The policy of the leadership in the USSR.
- The Anglo-Russian Committee (1926).
- The second Chinese revolution (1925-27).

## Policy in the USSR

We shall limit ourselves here to a few lines on this question, since it has been thoroughly treated by Trotsky in his *Draft Program of the Communist International: A Criticism of Fundamentals*,<sup>1</sup> and *The Revolution Betrayed*.

The establishment of the New Economic Policy (NEP) after the end of the civil war and the waning of the labor movement had a very great effect on social relations in the USSR, as well as on the ranks of the Bolshevik party.

Political passivity developed in the ranks of the workers. Part of the best revolutionary elements had lost their lives on the field of battle. Another part, which had reached command positions in the Red Army, found executive positions in the state and in the economy, where they applied the methods of command inherited from the army. With the NEP as a base, capitalist elements developed in the cities and in the countryside. The relationship of forces was evolving in a direction opposite to that of the revolutionary period. These factors gave the state apparatus increased independence and power. The entire last portion of Lenin's political activity was devoted to denouncing this danger. We have, he said, a workers state with bureaucratic deformations. Just read his report to the Eleventh Congress of the Russian party to see to what extent he denounced these evils!<sup>2</sup>

The bureaucratization of the state was accompanied and abetted by a bureaucratization of the Bolshevik party. As a revolutionary instrument, the latter was rusting away. A layer of parvenus, satisfied with what had already been obtained, gained the upper hand. These social layers and the state apparatus found their most responsive political expression in the Secretariat of the party, in the person of that "old Bolshevik" Stalin.

The last conversations between Lenin and Trotsky were concerned with organizing a faction to conduct the struggle against this party Secretariat. Lenin's last two letters

to the Central Committee, known as "Lenin's Testament," point out the danger of a split and propose to dismiss Stalin from the post of party secretary.<sup>3</sup>

In October 1923 Trotsky, pointing out the mounting dangers, proposed a "new course," to be characterized by a struggle against the bureaucratization of the party and in favor of the following: admitting young proletarian elements, who had proved themselves, into the leading bodies of the party; making these bodies elective; a plan for industrialization; a certain number of measures to set the poor peasants against the kulaks.

In the beginning, this "new course" was not openly rejected by the majority of the Political Bureau; but the latter did nothing to implement it. On the contrary, the Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin leadership (at that time these names were mentioned in that order) initiated a violent struggle against "Trotskyism," bringing up twenty-year-old differences between Lenin and Trotsky, long outdated by events, and distorting them to boot. Later Zinoviev and Kamenev admitted they had invented "Trotskyism" for this occasion.

The Moscow Opposition, that is, the first faction gathered together by Trotsky to struggle for a "new course"—this faction which comprised a galaxy of militants of the revolution and the civil war and which constituted the first organization of our movement—was prevented by bureaucratic methods from getting a hearing in the party, after having won some preliminary success in the Moscow cells.

Unbeknown even to some who had participated in starting it, the fight on the question of past differences concealed the struggle of the bureaucratic layers against internationalist revolutionary policy.

Since the policy followed by the leadership of the Bolshevik party slid more and more to the right, in 1925-26 Zinoviev and Kamenev broke with Stalin, who then pursued that policy with Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky as allies. The rightist policy was supposed to "integrate the kulak into socialism," which would be achieved "at a snail's pace" (Bukharin); industrialization was denounced as an absurdity ("the peasant needs a cow, not a phonograph," declared Stalin).

The Opposition formed in 1926 by the Zinoviev-Trotsky bloc, forced to meet clandestinely, struggled to impose an industrialization program and a policy directed against the kulak, the Nepman, and the bureaucrat. A five-year plan was finally accepted in 1927 by the Bukharin-Stalin leadership, but the very limited yearly increases projected in the plan indicated the skepticism and hostility of that leadership. Under pressure of the Opposition, another

1. Available in English in *The Third International After Lenin*, by Leon Trotsky. Pathfinder Press, Inc., New York.—Translator

2. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 263-324.

3. These two letters were banned in the USSR. Nevertheless, on two occasions, Stalin could not avoid mentioning their existence. Since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, publication in the Soviet Union of these letters (see Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, pp. 594-96) and other of Lenin's writings, as well as the "Journal of Lenin's Duty Secretaries" (*ibid.*, Vol. 42), has completely confirmed what Trotsky wrote, namely that in the last period of his life, Lenin had sought and obtained Trotsky's support to fight a weakening in the foreign-trade monopoly, the repressive measures taken by Stalin against the "nationalist" faction of Georgian Bolsheviks led by Mdivani, and, above all, to fight the bureaucracy in the party—particularly its political spokesman, Stalin—at the next party congress. Illness, then death, prevented Lenin from so doing.

plan was prepared, with higher yearly goals.

Towards the end of 1927 and without any confidence, the bureaucracy launched the first five-year plan. Early in 1928—less than three months after having broken party unity and exiled the Opposition to Siberia—a frightened Stalin acknowledged the kulak danger, broke with the rightist Bukharin faction, made a sudden zigzag to the left, and began an ultraleft policy (the five-year plan had to be completed in four years, agriculture had to be 100 percent collectivized, etc.). Put into practice in a bureaucratic way, by force of decree, and in a brutal manner by a party shorn of any real political life, this orientation brought the country to the brink of catastrophe.

The old Bolshevik party—after elimination of the left and right oppositions—subsisted only as the political machine of the bureaucracy. The revolutionary cadres were exiled or exterminated. From that date on, the bureaucracy's domination increased and its policy developed in a series of zigzags, ranging from the most contemptible opportunism to the most unbridled ultraleftism. In the final analysis, however, its general direction was very strongly opportunistic. The ultraleft zigzags have now ceased.

### The Anglo-Russian Committee (1926)

The affair of the Anglo-Russian Committee marks the beginning of the Stalinist faction's policy of dissociating the fate of the USSR from that of the world revolution. It was on this question that they began the policy of putting pressure on foreign governments as a substitute for revolutionary struggle in defense of the USSR. This was done particularly through political combinations and subterfuges in which Communist parties abandoned part of their revolutionary program under pretext of thus attracting larger masses than they could mobilize by themselves.

The center of world reaction right after the first world war was still British imperialism, despite the fact that its decline had already begun and despite the phenomenal rise of American capitalism. British imperialism's policy was all the more anti-Soviet, inasmuch as the Russian Revolution set an extremely attractive example for the colonial peoples oppressed by the Empire. From a political point of view, the English labor movement was developing considerable strength. In 1924 the Labour party had had an electoral victory, but had been rapidly squeezed out by its Liberal party partners. Around 1926 a turn to the left occurred in the English trade unions. The English CP was very weak—it still is today—and the Minority Movement it had activated in the trade unions was also rather weak. In order to counter British imperialism's threat to the USSR, Stalin proposed to the Political Bureau of the Bolshevik party that efforts be made to establish a committee of English and Russian trade unions under the pretext of working toward rebuilding trade-union unity on an international scale. A united front of Russian and English trade unions for the establishment of worldwide trade-union unity was politically admissible, although it presented the danger of being mostly a summit operation, difficult for the rank and file to control. But, for Stalin, the real object of this Anglo-Russian Committee was to turn it into the "center of the struggle against imperialist war," the political center of the struggle for the defense of the USSR. In an-

swer to Trotsky, who was at the time still a member of the Political Bureau and who stressed the necessity of relying only on the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, Stalin retorted, "What can you do with *your* English Communists?"

The dispute concerning the aims of the Anglo-Russian Committee did not remain merely a battle of words. The class struggle in Great Britain gave it a tragic content. The leftward swing of the English workers was expressed by a struggle for nationalization of the mines, and gave rise to a miners' strike that was supported by the English working class as a whole.

In May 1926, a ten-day general strike forced the British Empire to its knees. This was the first manifestation of the crisis of British capitalism (a crisis that reached full bloom after the end of the second world war). British capitalism was able to pull itself out of this grave difficulty thanks to—and this was the most important factor of all—the English trade-union leadership's betrayal: they ended the general strike and let the miners continue the struggle alone for several months.

For any revolutionist with the most elementary knowledge of the Leninist position on the united front, this betrayal would call for an immediate break between the Russian unions and the Anglo-Russian Committee—plus an appeal to the English workers to stand up against their leadership. But considering the essential object of the Anglo-Russian Committee to be the "defense of the USSR," and conceiving the latter as a task separate and distinct from the revolutionary struggle of the masses, Stalin kept the committee—whose activity for months and months was reduced to nothing but talk, anyway—in existence.

When the militant members of the English Communist party and the Minority Movement denounced the reformist leaders of their unions, the latter had an easy reply at hand: "That's not what the Russians think—and you can't very well accuse *them* of being reformists and traitors. There they are, in the same committee with us!" This policy disarmed and demoralized the English CP as well as the Minority Movement, which disappeared from the scene.

Several months after the general strike, the leaders of the English trade unions, having thoroughly exploited the committee (which was no longer of any use to them) for their own purposes, denounced the financial aid provided to the striking miners by the Russian unions as an interference in the internal life of their organizations, and used this excuse to break up the Anglo-Russian Committee.

The Bolshevik-Leninist Opposition had exposed Stalinist policy on the question of the Anglo-Russian Committee and had conducted a very strong campaign for breaking from this committee at the time of the betrayal of the general strike.

### The Second Chinese Revolution (1925-27)

A big upsurge occurred in the revolutionary movement in China in the period 1925-27. The merchant and industrial bourgeoisie, whose political party was the Kuomintang, tried to exploit this revolutionary upsurge for their own purpose—the unification of China. At that time the country was divided into a certain number of prov-

inces governed independently by warlords, who were continually at war with each other to extend their dominions.

In the years following the first world war, a Chinese Communist party had been established around Chen Tu-hsiu, a Peking professor who had been active in revolutionary struggles in China for about ten years. The young Chinese CP lacked experience of any kind, and it was the leadership of the Communist International that bore complete responsibility for the CCP's policies during that period. The Soviet bureaucracy, the political expression of which was Stalinism, was hostile to the development of an autonomous revolutionary struggle—in which the Stalinists had no confidence—by the proletariat and poor peasants. To serve the needs of its nationalist policy, the bureaucracy favored a policy of alliance with the Chinese bourgeoisie. In order to justify such a class-collaborationist policy, the Stalin-Bukharin leadership elaborated the theory of a "bloc of four classes" for China (combination of workers, peasants, intellectuals, and capitalists—the last named being considered "progressive" in a colonial or semicolonial country), developed the concept of bipartite worker and peasant parties (parties of two classes), and the necessity for a "revolution by stages" with the "democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants" as an intermediate step between capitalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Put into practice, this policy of class collaboration resulted in ordering the entry of the Chinese Communist party into the Kuomintang. The Chinese CP thus renounced an independent policy and, in particular, opposed the creation of soviets during the ascending period of the revolution; it was also opposed to the development of the agrarian revolution—so that the landed holdings of Kuomintang army officers could remain intact. For months and months the Communist International and its sections praised the Kuomintang leaders to the skies as allies of the proletariat and champions of the anti-imperialist struggle. The head of the Kuomintang armies, Chiang Kai-shek, was particularly singled out for praise, being depicted as the "hero" of the Chinese revolution. (See *L'Humanité*, late 1926, early 1927.)

As the Kuomintang armies neared Shanghai in their march from the commercial South to the North, the workers rose up and seized the city. Their class instinct led them to refuse Chiang Kai-shek's troops entry into Shanghai. But, on orders from the Communist International, the Chinese Communists prevailed upon the workers to allow Chiang Kai-shek and his soldiers to enter the most industrialized center of China. No sooner installed, Chiang Kai-shek set about the wholesale slaughter of the Communist movement of China.

A little later the Chinese Communists, still under orders from the Stalinist leadership of the Third International, resumed the same policy of collaboration with a wing of the Kuomintang, the "left Kuomintang" led by Wang Ching-wei, with the same result. When Chen Tu-hsiu, secretary of the Chinese CP, joined the Left Opposition, he revealed that Borodin, a representative of the Communist International, had declared that "the worker must be the coolie of the Kuomintang."

The Bolshevik-Leninist faction in the USSR conducted a struggle of increasing intensity against the Stalinist policies in China; the peak of this struggle coincided with

the peak of the entire struggle by the Soviet Bolshevik-Leninists against Stalinism.

## Permanent Revolution vs. Socialism in One Country

The three principal questions on which the struggle of the Left Opposition in the USSR was based can, on the theoretical level, be subsumed into one single question: the struggle for permanent revolution, against the theory of "socialism in one country"; the struggle for maintaining a policy of world proletarian revolution, against the nationalist, reactionary policy of the Soviet bureaucracy.

This fight, begun in 1923, had nothing to do with a power struggle between individuals—as some people, obviously incapable of any political insight whatsoever, still think—nor did it have anything to do with a struggle between two revolutionary schools of thought with divergent views on the strategy to follow for the victory of world socialism—as certain bourgeois political leaders and journalists still write, whether through ignorance or through their desire to depict Stalinism as a revolutionary bugaboo. This fight was, primarily and above all, a *struggle between two political formations representing two different social groups.*

The Left Opposition consciously represented the fundamental historical interests of the world proletariat; the Stalinist faction represented the interests of the party and state bureaucracy, anxious to stabilize, consolidate, and, subsequently, increase its privileges.

Inasmuch as the leaders of that faction had come out of the Bolshevik party, for most of them the slide did not take place on a conscious level—in the beginning, at any rate. But they became prisoners of the social layers whose political spokesmen they were, and in a few years this faction became the most conscious, and the most dangerous, counterrevolutionary force *inside* the working-class movement.

The climax of the struggle in the USSR occurred on the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, in November 1927, when the Oppositionists participated in the official Moscow and Leningrad demonstrations under their own slogans, with their own banners and placards against the kulak, the Nepman, and the bureaucrat. For months the Stalinist faction had been accumulating framed-up charges against the Opposition, which had been reduced to clandestine activity. The former had especially sought to plant provocateurs inside the organization. To avoid being quietly disposed of, it was necessary to take political action out in the open. The tenth anniversary served as a pretext for the Stalinist faction to consummate the split in the party and exile the Bolshevik-Leninist militants to Siberia.<sup>4</sup>

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In the following year, the Left Opposition in the Soviet Union continued its struggle in an organized fashion; its center was set up by Trotsky, in exile in Alma Ata. That was why Stalin decided to expel him from Russia.

After 1929, the Trotskyist Opposition in the USSR,

4. Ten years later, during the Moscow trials, Stalin for the first time made the claim that an attempt at "insurrection" had been involved.

our mother section, found itself more and more cut off from its principal leader, Leon Trotsky; as a result, the axis of our movement shifted. From that time on we had but little information about our faction, which was subsequently crushed by the Stalinist repression.

Some information about the political life of Opposition leaders in the Verchne-Uralsk "isolator," before the Moscow trials, can be found in Anton Ciliga's *Au pays du grand mensonge* (In the Country of the Big Lie). This information, however, must be taken with reservations—considering that it comes from a man who broke with Bolshevism and passed into the camp of petty-bourgeois liberalism.

The most important document of the Bolshevik-Leninist Opposition in the USSR for the period under discussion

is *The Platform of the Left Opposition* (1927),<sup>5</sup> drawn in agreement with the Zinovievists (whose first capitulation took place right after the Fifteenth Congress of the Bolshevik party).

One more word about our faction in the USSR: its leading elements included not only old Bolsheviks whose names are well known for their role in the October Revolution, but also an entire group of young cadres trained during the years of the Revolution and civil war, some of whom were well-developed Marxists who never for one moment capitulated. To be cut off from them was, most assuredly, a great loss to our movement.

[To be continued]

5. New Park Publications, Ltd., London. — *Translator*

## Half a Century of Revolutionary Activity

# On the Seventieth Birthday of Georg Jungclas

By Gisela Mandel

Georg Jungclas was seventy years old last week. One of the oldest members of the Fourth International, he is presently living in Cologne with his wife Leni, also a long-time activist in the German section of the Fourth International. Georg Jungclas is one of the leaders of this section, the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten.

Throughout this century, Georg Jungclas has consistently led the life of a revolutionary internationalist.

He was born February 22, 1902, in Halberstadt, near Magdeburg. Two years later his parents moved to Hamburg, where Jungclas came in touch with the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [SPD—Social Democratic party of Germany] youth at the age of fourteen. Three months after he had entered the SPD's youth organization, the local leadership dissolved the group because all its members belonged to the left wing of the party, taking a strong antimilitary and antibureaucratic position during the first world war.

One month later, a new youth organization was formed around a paper called *Proletarierjugend* [Proletarian Youth]. In August 1916, this organization was also dissolved, this time by the general command of the army at the request of the SPD's leadership.

Until 1919, Georg Jungclas had to work as a revolutionist partly in un-

derground groups, partly in newly established youth groups. But then the Freie Sozialistische Jugend [Free Socialist Youth] was founded; in June 1919 it became the official youth organization of the Communist party, which he entered in 1919.

During the war, the left in Hamburg, especially the youth, was politically close to the "Bremen Left," which was part of the left wing of Zimmerwald. They called themselves Hamburger Linksradikele (Radical Left of Hamburg) and were led by Laufenberg and Wolfheim, who were later expelled from the German CP as "national Bolsheviks."

In 1920, Jungclas started to cooperate in the CP's publishing house, Karl Hoym-Verlag, in Hamburg and helped in the preparation of the first German publication of Lenin's *"Left Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder* and Trotsky's *Terrorism and Communism*. He worked at this time with Felix Wolf, who, together with Karl Radek, had come from Russia to Germany at the end of 1918.


In the autumn of 1920, the left wing of the Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei [USP—Independent Social Democratic party] and the CP fused to form the Vereinigte Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands [VKPD—United Communist party of Germany]. In Branch 70 in Hamburg,

the USP brought eighty people into the new party, while Jungclas was the only member of the former CP to join in that part of the city. He was then sent by the party to work in the Blom und Voss shipyard in the harbor of Hamburg-Altona.

During the March 1921 uprising in central Germany, Jungclas took an active part in the first factory occupation: the occupation of the shipyard. He was a member of the group that planted the red flag on top of the management's office.

After a savage attack by the police, the shipyard was retaken by the management, and Jungclas was fired because of his "communist activities." He then lived in semi-legality until 1922. He worked mainly in the educational field for the Communist Youth in Thuringen. Belonging to the left wing of the party, he worked with Hugo Urbahns, Ruth Fischer, Maslow, and Scholem.

In 1923, when the workers of Hamburg engaged in street battles and built barricades, Jungclas participated in the occupation of the police station in Hamburg-Eimsbüttel. Despite the tremendous courage displayed by the workers, Jungclas today considers the Hamburg uprising—which was led politically by Thaelmann and militarily by Hans Kippenberger—as adventuristic. The objective conditions



GEORG JUNGCLAS

were present, but the subjective factor, the Communist party, failed.

From 1924 to 1926, Jungclas was in Silesia in order to escape the hands of the Hamburg police. With the left inside the CP, he belonged to the so-called Zinoviev wing. He especially agreed with the latter's conception of the party, which today Jungclas considers to have been the preparation for the Stalinist dictatorship over the party.

In the middle of 1926, still with strong reservations toward the group

around Trotsky, he nevertheless came closer to the United Left Opposition. Through contacts and work in the German "Urbahns Group," he became oriented toward the Trotskyist point of view and was expelled from the CP in 1928.

In the same year, the Leninbund was formed, within which Jungclas belonged to the Trotskyist minority. He strongly supported Trotsky's position on the character of the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet conflict over the Manchurian Railway, and the

question of the opposition within the German CP.

In 1930, together with a minority of the Leninbund, he founded the Left Opposition in Germany, which looked upon itself as the German representative of the Leningrad Opposition. In 1931 the group began publishing *Die Permanente Revolution* [Permanent Revolution], as well as Trotsky's pamphlet on the same subject.

At the same time, as a member of the leadership, Jungclas built the Hamburg group of the Left Opposition and came into contact for the first time with the International Secretariat, which included Pierre Frank, who is still a leader of the Fourth International; Max Shachtman, who later left the International to form his own little sect; and Sedov.

While Jungclas was still in the Leninbund minority, he exchanged correspondence with Trotsky, who in one letter described him as the "pillar of Hamburg." But his profoundest experience during this period occurred when he met Trotsky and accompanied him to Copenhagen, where Trotsky gave his famous speech in defense of the October Revolution. As he remembers it:

"If at first I was a little 'disappointed' to meet, not the 'Red General,' but a comrade like you and me and everybody, with slippers and a house jacket, I was nevertheless happy about our meeting. 'Jungclas,' he said, 'Jungclas from Hamburg, I know what that means.' I belonged together with the Belgian comrade Lesoil [founder of the Belgian CP and a personal friend of Trotsky, killed during the second world war] to the direct companions of Trotsky who were to intervene in case of difficulties and only on demand of Trotsky. The meeting in Copenhagen was in itself a big event, but especially impressive were the following days of discussions with the comrades present from different countries. It was the first time I met with comrades of the different international sectors, united in an international initiative."

In the spring of 1933, after participating in the first illegal congress of the Left Opposition under Nazism, and after several months underground, Jungclas emigrated to Denmark. In Copenhagen he built a German immigrants' group, which had close relations with left and centrist elements of the Danish working class.



This group had sharp debates with the London Bureau, which coordinated several centrist organizations, and particularly with Willy Brandt, a member of the London Bureau and today chancellor of West Germany, who at that time supported the Stalinist popular front and the politics of the POUM [Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista—United Marxist Workers party] in the Spanish civil war.

In the summer of 1936, Jungclas visited Trotsky in Hønefoss, Norway, and in 1937 he oriented himself completely toward political work in Denmark with direct links to the International Secretariat.

After the invasion of Denmark by German troops in 1940, he and his group had to work underground. They published two illegal papers, a theoretical one called "International Politics" and a propagandist one called "Workers' Opposition." One of the main activities of the group was aiding Danish Jews.

When the group participated actively in the preparation of the Danish "people's strike" of June 1944, its activity was suddenly and brutally stopped by the Gestapo. In May Jungclas was arrested and in September he was transported back to Germany. He was kept in hard-labor camps in Hamburg, Berlin, and Bayreuth. His transport papers, which still exist today, were headed by the remark: "Communist, worthless fellow (*Knecht*), to be shot if attempts to flee." He continued his political activities in the camps, in discussions and education with his fellow prisoners.

On April 16, 1945, American troops set the occupants of the camp free, but it was still some time before Jungclas was released because Czechoslovakian and other Stalinists among the prisoners had taken over the camp.

In 1946, Jungclas made contact with the Fourth International after earlier contacts with leading members in Hamburg. He and his political friends in July 1947 began publishing the first German Trotskyist journal, *Unser Weg* [Our Road], which appeared until September 1959.

The German section of the Fourth International sent him as a delegate to the Second World Congress in Paris in 1948. Because of the regulations set up by the occupation forces, as a German citizen he could not legally travel to France, and he had to cross

different borders illegally six times.

As a member of the German section, Jungclas then participated in the publication of the German journal of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, *Die Internationale*, a magazine that still appears as the main publication of the German section.

His main activity in the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s was in support of the Algerian revolution, in close contact with the Mohamed-Hardi tendency inside the FLN. He was involved in the publication of the paper *Freies Algerien* [Free Algeria] between 1958 and 1962.

Jungclas also participated in the publication of the paper *Sozialistische Politik*, which was directed at members of the SPD, between 1954 and 1956, and after May 1956 in the publication of *Die Internationale* and *Internationale Information*, which existed until 1960.

## West Germany

# Ernest Mandel Barred by Berlin University

Ernest Mandel, the Belgian Marxist economist already barred from the United States, Switzerland, and France, has been declared *persona non grata* by the West Berlin Senate. As a result of the Senate action, a vice president of a major university has resigned, and the president has expressed fears about the fate of the administration during the coming summer semester.

It all started when the hiring board of the political economy department at West Berlin's Free University voted thirteen to one, with one abstention, to offer the Marxist scholar a teaching post that had been vacant since 1970.

Social Democratic Senator for Science and Culture Werner Stein, however, arbitrarily ruled that Mandel could not accept the position. Stein apparently considers himself the guardian of the tender ears of young German students. In addition to barring Mandel, he forbade the university to appoint Wolfgang Lefèvre to the post of academic assistant, on the grounds that the latter had been a prominent member of the Sozialist-

Georg Jungclas participated in all the World Congresses of the Fourth International, and for years he has been one of the leaders of this world organization. He was secretary of the German section until 1967, when he was released from this job in order to write the history of the German section for the education of younger German-speaking revolutionists.

He is one of the finest and most consistent revolutionists, much respected by the German left in general and by the Fourth International's organizations throughout the world for his courage and principled revolutionary Marxist stand during half a century. No member of the Fourth International passing through Cologne fails to visit Georg and Leni Jungclas.

Almost alone today, Georg Jungclas embodies the unbroken continuity of the best traditions of the German left socialist and communist movement.

February 27, 1972

ischer Deutscher Studentenbund [SDS—German Socialist Student Federation].

On February 22 the West Berlin Senate voted to approve Stein's decision. (There was unanimity among the delegates of the Social Democratic party and Christian Democratic Union.) The Senate unabashedly stated that Mandel's academic qualifications were not in question. The exclusion was strictly political—Mandel allegedly organizes political activities directed against the democratic, constitutional order. Although he may be a qualified economics scholar, Mandel is also, according to Stein, "one of the authoritative leaders of the Fourth International." As such, he "gives instructions on how, in concrete situations, the revolution should be made."

To help bolster the Senate's action, West Berlin Senator Kurt Neubauer sent a confidential letter containing information, compiled by the political police, on Mandel's activities during the May 1968 French revolutionary upsurge.

Mandel characterized the Senate's decision as "not just a disgrace, but



political idiocy," pointing out that he had not intended coming to the university to "throw bombs or set up machine guns."

Marxism aims, Mandel said, at replacing this society "with the active support of the great majority of wage-workers. In the German Federal Republic, that means the absolute majority of the whole population."

The February 25 *Frankfurter Rundschau* reported that controversy over Mandel's exclusion is on the rise. On February 24 Margherita von Brentano, a vice president of the Free University, resigned her position in protest over Mandel's exclusion, saying that the Senate decision had complete-

ly ignored the desire of the majority of the students and faculty to add qualified socialists to the university staff.

The university administration is, according to the February 28 issue of *Der Spiegel*, "worried" about the summer semester. Thus far, student protest over the Senate's action has been largely verbal. But university president Rolf Kreibich, who has expressed his disagreement with the exclusion, expects "unrest." Professor Krause-Junk voiced "the worst apprehension." And Professor Uwe Wesel, another vice president of the university, was even more apprehensive: "We will all be swept away." □

## Mexico

# Thousands Hear Mandel Lecture Series

### Mexico City

The Belgian Marxist economist Ernest Mandel recently spent a week lecturing here. He did so in response to an invitation by the UNAM [Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México—Autonomous National University of Mexico] to take part in winter courses in the Department of Political and Social Sciences.

The general theme of the courses was "The Student Revolt and Contemporary Society." They began with Mandel giving a lecture February 9 on "The Proletarianization of Intellectual Labor." This was followed on February 11 by a talk on "The Crisis of the Bourgeois University," and the series concluded February 14 with a lecture on "The Unity Between Theory and Practice." In addition, Mandel participated in a round-table discussion February 15 with Susan Sonntag and Robin Blackburn, who also took part in the winter courses.

The remarkable success of the Mandel lectures was even reflected in the bourgeois press. *Excelsior*, the country's main newspaper, gave front-page and editorial coverage throughout the lectures to the importance of Mandel's ideas.

Mandel had an enormous impact on the students of Mexico City. Never have these winter courses been so successful, although they have in the past attracted prominent figures like Roger

Garaudy, Kolakowski, Marcuse, André Gorz, Colletti, and Edgar Morin, among others. Since the Science Department auditorium (which holds more than 1,000) was too small, Mandel's final two lectures had to be moved to the Philosophy Department. Even there, the 2,500-seat hall was jam-packed for both lectures and for the round-table discussion.

## Peru

# Velasco Continues Repression of Miners

[The Comité de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (Committee for the Defense of Human Rights) in Peru released in January the following information on the situation of political prisoners.]

\* \* \*

Since the massacre at the Cobriza mining center of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation last November, in which at least twenty-three miners were killed, the military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado has continued its repression of the miners and their families.

The wives and children of the workers have been evicted, many helpless

One of the most important aspects of these lectures was the question-and-answer period, which took up a wide variety of topics, including an assessment of the Mexican student struggles of recent years, the course of Maoism, Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, and others.

Mandel's lectures are to be published in the magazines *Siempre* and *Plural*, and as a pamphlet by *La Internacional*, the organ of the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista [International Communist Group, the Mexican Trotskyist organization].

In addition to the three main lectures, Mandel spoke to more than 1,000 economics students at the UNAM School of Economics on the topic "Primitive Accumulation and Industrialization in the Third World." The lecture was based on a chapter from his book published in Mexico last year, *Ensayos sobre el neocapitalismo* [Essays on Neocapitalism].

Mandel's visit was highlighted by the mass media. In addition to the daily newspaper coverage, he was interviewed on television, as well as by *Solidaridad*, the magazine of the Sindicato de Trabajadores Electricistas [Electrical Workers Union], the review *Punto Crítico*, and—surprisingly—*Oposición*, the voice of the PCM [Partido Comunista Mexicano—Mexican Communist Party]. □

and with no place to go. Despite claims by Minister of the Interior Richter Prada, they are not receiving salaries and allowances of their husbands.

The school for the Cobriza miners' children has been arbitrarily closed down by the company.

Three hundred Cobriza miners have been dismissed.

The government claims that there was no massacre at Cobriza. In an attempt to hide proof of the massacre, five bodies of victims were mutilated. They were found later by their wives in the Mantaro River.

The government also claims that none of the miners are imprisoned. In fact, however, there are still sixty min-

ers, union officials, and legal advisers in various prisons in Peru in the wake of the Cobriza massacre.

Most are in the jungle prison of El Sepa. Those workers from the Cobriza local are: Roberto Quispe Salcedo, Sergio Zea Arce, Lorenzo Mayta Torres, Pedro Aloña Quispe, Cirilo Pardo Chavarría, Carlos Inga Nestares, Juan Bautista Maldonado Mamani, Julio Romero Escobar, Mauro Baldión Huamán, Santos Chavez Castro, Máximo Arivilca Bedoya, Valentín Parí Figuerroa, Leonidas Bedoya Ramos, Paulino Barzola Barrientos, Carlos Silverio Yauri, Pedro Vilca Alejo, Nicomedes Cruz Conderi, Carlos Sanchez Chavez, Saturnino Riera Cente, Aquiles Oré Quincho, Macedonio Cruz García, Juan Antonio Taxza Salas, Enrique Idone Cordero, Raúl Quiñonez Huamán, Manuel Hancagina Chiroque, Máximo Rojas Torres, Manuel Aguilar Mámani, Juan Chanca Peña.

Workers from the Cerro de Pasco local imprisoned in El Sepa are: Pedro Tacuche Alcoantára, Amadeo Rivas Machaquay, Moisés Suansnavar Malqui, Pedro Gutierrez Vigo, Víctor Ledesma Santos.

From the La Oroya local: Primitivo Laureano Zevallos, Miguel Linares Espinoza, Juan Cornejo Gomez, and the union physician César Augusto Rojas Huarato.

Those imprisoned also include Jesús Riveros Aquino, general secretary of the Morococha local; and the union legal advisers Genaro Ledesma Izquieta and Ruben Martinez Nagan.

The following miners are being held in the Lurigancho Prison in Lima: Encarnación Huarilloclo Zapana, Gumerindo Morales Paraguez, Angel Vilchez Sosa, Abraham Perez Serpa, José Cordova Jesús, Guillermo Damián Nuquán, Florencio Mamani Mina, César Augusto Palomino, Augustín Yerba Pucari, Vicente Yerba Pacoria, Jacobo Camargo Palomino, Luis Huaranga Bautista, Jacinto Pozo Cordova, Luis Torres.

Miners imprisoned in El Sexto are: Edilberto Gonzales, Efraín Palomino, and Juan Ancasi Damián (who was wounded by two bullets in the neck and two in the stomach and requires hospitalization).

In addition, there are two political prisoners in El Sexto: Pedro Durand and José Nique de la Fuente, president of the Student Federation of the University of San Marcos. □

## Ireland

### A Move Toward Internment in the South?

"In a democratic society the president of a political organisation should not be on the run," Tomás Mac Giolla, president of Sinn Féin, told a news conference in Dublin February 23. "If the Government wishes to arrest me, I openly challenge them to do their damndest." Mac Giolla's home had been surrounded the previous day during a dragnet intended to sweep up leaders of the republican movement (see *Intercontinental Press*, March 6), but Mac Giolla had not been home.

According to a report in the *Irish Times* on February 24, Mac Giolla "emerged from hiding last night and said that he would continue to operate openly and refuse to be driven underground."

By February 26, the total number arrested since the raids began three days earlier had reached twenty-three, although the *Irish Times* reported that "a number" had been released the previous day.

The arrests are being made under Section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act which, according to the *Irish Times* February 23, permits a policeman "without warrant, to stop, search, interrogate and arrest any person whom he suspects of having committed, of being about to commit, or being or having been concerned in the commission of an offence under the Act or whom he suspects of carrying a document relating to the I. R. A. or whom he suspects of being in possession of information relating to the commission or intended commission of an offence."

The catch-all wording of Section 30 is thus as broadly phrased as the Act itself, which makes it an offense not only to be a member of the IRA but to carry any documents deemed to offer support to it.

"The arrest of leading Republicans in Dublin has been described by the Six-County [Northern Ireland] Republican executive as a prelude to internment in the South," noted the *Irish Times* on February 25.

Tomás Mac Giolla, who was interned for twenty-one months during the in-

ternment campaign in the 1950s, told his news conference that the arrests were an attempt by the government to restrict opposition to Ireland's entry into the Common Market. "The Common Market is the most important issue facing this part of the country now . . ." the February 24 *Irish Times* quotes him as saying. "These arrests are a deliberate act by the Government to limit one of the major forces in the fight against their E. E. C. [European Economic Community] efforts."

In a statement February 23, Sinn Féin denounced the arrests as a "deliberate and blatant attempt to suppress an open political organisation" and said that the attempt "exactly complements Brian Faulkner's suppression of the Republican clubs in the North under the guise of arresting gunmen. . . . This act of naked oppression and denial of the rights of political association and expression will boomerang on the Government because of the strength of our organisation and its strong links with workers' and farmers' organisations."

"This is just the beginning of the Government's compromise and sell-out to Westminster pressure. They are, in fact, preparing the ground for accepting Heath's proposals [on a "solution" for Ireland] and selling out the whole struggle of the people in the Six Counties." □

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## Why Dublin Attacked Irish Republican Movement

[The following interview with Seán Kenny and Tomás Mac Giolla was granted to Gerry Foley in Dublin on February 24. Kenny is one of the joint general secretaries of Sinn Féin, the political arm of the republican movement. Mac Giolla is president of Sinn Féin.]

[The day after this interview was conducted, Kenny was arrested as he was being driven to the airport. He had planned to fly to the United States to help organize international opposition to the repression of the republican movement.]

\* \* \*

*Foley. When did you first learn that the police were attempting to arrest Mr. Mac Giolla?*

*Kenny.* At 12:45 a.m. on February 23, Tomás Mac Giolla received a telephone call to tell him that the Special Branch, the political police, were on their way to arrest him. When they arrived at 1:00 in the morning, Tomás Mac Giolla was no longer in the house. His wife, May, and myself were there.

About sixteen Special Branch men came to the door, banged on the door and demanded to know where Tomás Mac Giolla was. His wife told them that he wasn't there, that she expected him back in an hour. They stayed outside in the garden. Between 1:00 and 2:00, the Branchmen attempted on various occasions to force their way into the house. They brought keys, pushed on the door, and at one time they produced what I would say was a sharp instrument and tried to force the lock.

May Mac Giolla and myself piled the furniture against the front door, turned out all the lights, and barricaded ourselves in. We made sure all the windows were locked and that the back door was secure. The Special Branch stayed outside all night and also remained in the garden. At 8:00 in the morning they tried to break in again, banging on the door. We just ignored them. We refused to answer their demands to open the door.

At 8:40 they tried again and got the same reply.

I think that they were under the impression in the morning that we weren't in the house, although telephone calls were coming through. They remained on duty most of yesterday outside Tomás Mac Giolla's house. They were frightened away constantly both by the presence of television cameras and press men coming out to interview Mrs. Mac Giolla and myself through the window. The fact that they were being filmed as well forced them out of the vicinity. It was decided yesterday evening when I received a message from Tomás Mac Giolla, who was in a neighboring house all the time watching some of what was going on, that we should call a press conference. The purpose of the conference was to explain politically what was happening in the Twenty-Six County area.

We called the conference for the Hotel Montrose, which is about three miles from the Mac Giolla home, and we switched it suddenly to the house where Tomás had arrived. The political police were outside but they didn't try to force entry; there was no sign of them this morning, so I think we have beaten them politically.

Two of the men arrested, Tony Hefernan, one of the two joint general secretaries of Sinn Féin, and Jeremiah Kelleher, vice president of Sinn Féin, were very active in the fight against joining the Common Market. So, these arrests seem to be an attempt on the part of the government to suppress the campaign against the EEC as well as political opposition to the regime.

*Foley. What measures do you intend to take to combat the government's attempt to intimidate political opposition?*

*Kenny.* I expect that there will be a demonstration outside the home of Mr. Des O'Malley, the minister for justice. We organized a press conference last night to explain to the world press what was happening. We will be attempting to organize broad com-

mittees to bring mass demonstrations onto the street, if those arrested will be held and charged.

The Dublin government can hold these men under the Offenses Against the State Act for seventy-two hours. If they are not released after this time, they must be either charged or released. We are satisfied that there is a potential for extensive protests against these arrests. Numerous organizations have sent statements to us opposing the arrests, and asking us when they should organize their members to protest. These organizations include housing action committees and sections of the trade-union movement, which we have been working closely with in the campaign against the EEC. And all left-wing organizations in the Dublin area have been in touch with us.

Many of the members of these organizations were outside the Bridewell prison last night [February 23] and it is hoped that they will be outside Des O'Malley's house tonight.

*Foley. Do you expect the development of a civil rights movement in the South as a result of this repression?*

*Kenny.* There is a great need for a civil rights organization down here in the South. There is an organization called the Citizens for Civil Liberties, but unfortunately they do not seem very active at times. There is a need for a civil rights organization down here to fight against the Offenses Against the State Act and the Forcible Entry and Occupation Act, as well as against repressive antiunion legislation. And the sooner such an organization is started, the better for all.

*Foley. Did the police threaten to arrest you or Mrs. Mac Giolla?*

*Kenny.* BBC television informed me yesterday that I had been arrested as far as they knew, that the story had come out from police headquarters. I think they might have arrested me if they had gotten into the house.

I don't think they actually knew I was there. It was Tomás Mac Giolla they came looking for.

They came to the *United Irishman* office and the printing room and arrested the three mail workers there. So, if they had gotten into the house, they certainly would have arrested me and it's possible they would have arrested Mrs. Mac Giolla, who is very active in Sinn Féin and very active in the National Commemoration Committee, which organizes the Easter commemorations in honor of the different revolutions throughout Irish history.

*Foley. Do you have any indication yet of the response of public opinion to these arrests?*

*Kenny.* The working press have had very good relations with the republican movement over the last number of years. The reporters attached to the government paper, the *Irish Press*, were more than helpful throughout the night at Tomás Mac Giolla's house in informing me who had been arrested and what the police were saying over their radio. Most of the newspapers here in Dublin are tuned in to the police radio and can pick up information. The *Irish Press* reporters stayed on duty for two hours extra that night, just to keep us informed. We are very grateful to the reporters, who are ordinary Irish working-class people.

The public reaction was forestalled by the government's statement that it would hold the men arrested for only seventy-two hours. But if the government attempted to introduce selective internment and open internment camps in the South, it's possible that there could be fiercer political opposition in the South to such repression than there has in fact been in the North.

I know that people overseas, especially in America, have in the past, in the fifties, when there was internment without charge or trial down here, organized vast demonstrations. I feel that friends of the Irish struggle overseas are certainly much more aware of our political position now than they were then, and this could strengthen the opposition to internment very, very much.

There are large groupings of people in the South which object strongly to the government for various rea-

sons. Most of them are involved in the campaign against entry into the Common Market. Certainly, they would throw their full forces into protesting these arrests, because they would see that the leadership of the anti-internment movement is being jailed. They may not necessarily agree with Sinn Féin or the Official IRA, but they would certainly see that these measures are political harassment of political activists in the South and they would object to that.

I think that the government is in a shaky position. The ruling party did create an impression last week at the Royal Dublin Society during the Fianna Fáil ardfeis [convention] that there was support for repression. They organized a cheering circus to applaud threats of action against the IRA. Although they didn't name Sinn Féin, we felt that our organization was what they were actually talking about.

Sinn Féin is a very active political organization in different parts of the country on such issues as the EEC, the fisheries, various housing problems, in support of the small farmers, and so on. We feel that the demonstration at the weekend by Fianna Fáil did not represent the Irish people. The Irish people have not spoken as yet.

The cheering at the ardfeis was a political stunt to try to create the impression that the Irish people wanted closer collaboration with Britain, when in fact it is the opposite that they want.

*Foley. What is the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Féin?*

*Kenny.* Sinn Féin is a completely autonomous political organization. Our branches and our organization as such hold annual general conferences publicly to which the press is invited.

We are an open political organization. And in the Twenty-Six County area we are a registered political party, recognized by the Dublin parliament. We contest elections at local and national level. We will be putting forward candidates for the next general election.

We work closely with other groupings of republicans, such as the Official IRA. But we are an autonomous political organization. We work politically at all stages. We are organized

in local branches throughout the North and South. In the North, Sinn Féin is banned. And what we have there are Irish Republican Clubs that send delegates to the annual general meetings of Sinn Féin.

The political policies of Sinn Féin and of the Official IRA are identical. Both are organizing politically for the reconquest of Ireland, for giving the people ownership and control of the natural resources of the country, for the establishment of a democratic socialist republic in all of Ireland, the abolition of both existing governments, and the destruction of British imperialism in all forms throughout Ireland. Politically both organizations are identical and work together on political lines.

*Foley. Do you think that these arrests have come as the result of British pressure on the Dublin government?*

*Kenny.* In 1957 pressure was kept on De Valera through the British embassy in Dublin, and as a result he interned the executive of Sinn Féin and leading Sinn Féin and IRA personnel throughout the country. At one time there were about 300 or 400 republicans in an internment camp in the South of Ireland, from 1957 to 1959.

Now we believe that the pressure is again being put on the leadership of the Dublin government. This shows the close collaboration between the Dublin and London governments. It shows that economically and financially we are controlled by Westminster. The government here is a puppet of Westminster.

*Foley. How do you think the nationalists in the North would feel about these actions? Would they regard them as a blow against their struggle for civil rights?*

*Kenny.* Our members would understand that the crowd down here in government are the same type as they have up in the North. The ordinary people in the North, who may not be politically conscious, would think that it was a complete stab in the back. Of course, it is.

For about six months now, Jack Lynch has been roaring against internment in the North, saying how bad it was and all that. They have the same repressive laws down here.

It just takes a signature by the minister for justice to bring in internment without charge or trial.

What's happening now is exactly what happened in June and July under the Faulkner government in the North of Ireland, when something like forty-eight homes were visited, mainly homes of members of the Official republican movement, by the political police. At that time people were detained for a short period and some were eventually charged for having political documents, mainly dealing with the case against joining the Common Market.

It is possible that these arrests are meant as a test. Certainly the people in the North would see it as abject collaboration with the British government that is repressing them up there. I think that Jack Lynch will make the people up there much more politically aware by making these moves against republicans down here.

*Foley. Do you think that internment will be weakened in the North if this move toward repression is defeated in the Twenty-Six counties?*

*Kenny.* If we can defeat the repression in the Twenty-Six Counties, internment certainly would be much weakened. A lot of people down here have come out on the streets against internment in the North. I can't see these people standing idly by if internment comes in here in the South.

It is up to Sinn Féin now and other democratic organizations to form some kind of united grouping to fight against the repressive legislation down here in the South, to organize pickets, mass marches, and so on. We have done this already on several occasions, such as in 1971 when the Forcible Entry bill was becoming law. About 5,000 people marched to the home of the president, De Valera, demanding that he not sign this bill into law. But of course he did sign it. But this demonstration showed that 5,000 were willing to come on the streets on very short notice and protest. Since that bill became law, quite a number of homeless families, who were squatting in landlords' property, have been jailed and persecuted.

*Foley. Mr. Mac Giolla, were you surprised when the political police tried to arrest you? Had you been expecting anything of the sort?*

*Mac Giolla.* I wasn't really surprised. It came rather fast, of course. But during the Fianna Fáil annual conference of the previous weekend, it was apparent that the government were prepared to take fairly severe action against republicans, when the suitable occasion arose. And it was also made clear from the statements made both by the prime minister and the minister for justice at that conference that, in dealing with what they call terrorists and gunmen, they were quite prepared to jail many members of Sinn Féin, the political organization, in the course of these arrests.

All they wanted was a suitable climate of opinion in order to put this decision into effect. And obviously they felt that the aftermath of the explosion in Aldershot gave them the opportunity. They moved that night, the night of the 22nd. In their arrests that night, they took in, amongst others, one of our vice presidents and one of our general secretaries.

I was informed late that night that I could expect that the police would call to arrest me. About fifteen minutes later, the police did arrive at my house. I wasn't here. I was quite close as a matter of fact. Four carloads of Special Branch men arrived at my house to arrest me.

These arrests clearly showed that the government wanted to link Sinn Féin in the people's minds with the explosion in Aldershot. On this basis, they wanted to pick off the leadership of Sinn Féin and force the members to go underground, to go on the run, or to act in a clandestine manner as if they were an illegal organization. This has been done in the past and it was obviously their intention to repeat it.

They were following the pattern established by Brian Faulkner on August 9 when he introduced internment in the Six County area. The first people to be taken in were the political activists, members of the republican clubs and some socialist groups in the North. It immediately meant that the general membership of these organizations were afraid to go out on pickets, to hand out leaflets, put up posters, or even to hold meetings. They were looking over their shoulders.

Gradually over the past few months, members of the Republican Clubs have been picked up in different areas as a means of intimidation to prevent

political activity. The government in Dublin obviously hoped to do the same thing here.

This is why we felt that it was vitally important to bring maximum publicity to bear to show what precisely they were doing. I think we succeeded in doing this and have successfully prevented further arrests, for the moment at least.

In my own case, once the glare of publicity came on the Special Branch men on the road outside my house, they vanished like sewer rats before the light of day. They haven't been seen all during today, February 24. There is no sign of the Special Branch in the vicinity. Apparently, they have given up any further attempt to arrest me. This, however, doesn't mean that there will not be more attempts when suitable occasions arise.

Under the Special Powers Act, that is the Offences Against the State Act—Irish people generally get both acts confused because they are so much alike—there's a very wide range of powers available to the government short of internment. They can introduce internment at any time they wish, of course. But this wouldn't be very popular at the moment, because the Irish people have shown total opposition to internment in the North. And therefore internment in the South would not be acceptable to them.

But apart from internment, for which at the moment the climate is unsuitable, they can introduce special criminal courts. They can introduce military courts, in which men of no legal experience, army colonels, are set up to try people. There are practically no examples of anyone being acquitted by military courts.

They can enforce the section under which anyone can be stopped in the streets and asked to account for his movements for any particular period, a day, a week, a month. He must then account for his movements to the full satisfaction of a police officer. If he refuses to account for his movements—and remember that when he is asked to account for his movements he is not necessarily suspected of any crime—he can be sentenced to six months imprisonment. Again, there have been no examples that I know of, of escape from this section of the law. Because no matter how hard you try to give an accounting of your movements, under questioning from

a police officer you have to account for every detail. And if you cannot, you come under the penalty of the law.

Any document with the letters IRA on it is an illegal document, even if it is widely circulated and available for sale. You can be sentenced to prison for three to six months for possessing such a document. So, the Offenses Against the State Act gives the government plenty of scope for detaining republicans, socialists, or any other groupings for any length of time they wish.

My view is that this new wave of repression here is also linked to the economic situation in the South, and that workers can expect antilabor legislation, such as a wage freeze, and that the government here will start cuts in social benefits. Repressive legislation will be used against labor organizations as well as against socialists and republicans. Also this repression is linked with the Northern situation, insofar as the Heath proposals are about to be made public. And when these are made public, Mr. Lynch wants to be in a position to accept them as the basis of talks, in order to get to the conference table with Mr. Heath. And so he wants to cut off the leadership of the republican movement, which has been the spearhead of the struggle in the North and in fact has been in the advance of the main struggles for social and economic rights in the South over the past few years.

Furthermore, this repression is obviously linked to the referendum on EEC membership. The referendum was to take place in April, but it has been postponed until the end of May. (There is no fixed date as yet, but it has been suggested that it will take place at the end of May.) The postponement was due to the fact that Mr. Lynch wants to get the talks with the Westminster government completed before the referendum takes place.

The issue of the EEC is very much linked with the Heath talks, because the proposals on the national question which will be discussed, will, Mr. Lynch hopes, be in the context of Ireland and Britain both being members of the EEC and therefore being very closely integrated economically and to some extent politically. On this basis, Mr. Lynch hopes to get the Irish people to accept the prospect of what he calls unity of the Irish

nation in the context of a federal structure dominated by Westminster.

*Foley. How did you decide to respond to the attempt to arrest you?*

*Mac Giolla.* Well, I suppose you could say that I was in hiding for twelve or fourteen hours. During the course of that time I could see that the president of Sinn Féin remaining in hiding was a victory for the government, insofar as they were putting me in the position of having to operate from underground. I felt that it was vital that the organization remain openly active and not be driven underground.

For that reason we arranged a press conference on the evening of February 23 in order to bring full publicity to bear on the activities of the government and explain what the purpose of our organization was, what our political policies were, what our objectives were. And we wanted to make it clear that we intended to continue operating openly in opposition to establishment policy and that we would not be driven underground.

The Republican Clubs in the North have adopted the same position, although they were banned a couple of years back. In spite of internment, they have continued to operate openly, and we have continually emphasized to them the need for doing this. I felt therefore that it was vital that we do the same thing from the very beginning of the repressive era down here.

And so we called a press conference which was very successful. I held the press conference in my own home. Immediately on the arrival of the television cameras, all the Special Branch men disappeared, and I put clearly before the press and the Irish people what I felt the purpose of the repression was, what the government hoped would be the effect of it.

And I stated clearly that I intended, and our organization intended, to operate openly, that we were in such a vital stage in the development of the situation here in Ireland, both North and South, that there were such vital issues before the Irish people—first of all, the imminence of the talks between Heath and Lynch and secondly the issue of the EEC referendum—that we must remain open and active amongst the people and linked closely

with the people's organizations in this struggle.

So we regard the press conference as a victory for us and a defeat for the government, in that I am now in a position to operate openly and the issues at stake have been explained to the people, who will therefore be prepared to back us in demanding our rights of political association, freedom of expression. Although arrests may continue throughout the country, certainly at the moment it appears that the government has had to waver in its attempt to bring about all-out repression.

*Foley. Do you think that sympathizers of the Irish struggle overseas can help defeat these moves toward repression?*

*Mac Giolla.* Yes, they certainly can. There is gradually more understanding of the type of repression that is taking place in the North.

I think the general impression among the Irish abroad was that in the South you had a democratically elected Irish government which was using democratic methods. I think that these actions now are a clear indication of what we have been trying to explain to people, that the government here in Dublin is one of the prongs of the two-pronged effort of British imperialism here in Ireland. There is a repressive regime in the North and a repressive regime in the South, both of which collaborate with the British government in the solutions it offers to its problems.

I think international protest now against the denial of civil rights in the South would have a tremendous effect, even a greater effect than it would have on the regime in the North of Ireland. I think international protests can force the government here to repeal the Offenses Against the State Act. Repeal of the Special Powers Act is one of the demands of the civil rights movement in the North and the Offenses Against the State Act in the South is in some ways even more repressive. Therefore, protests against the repression here would be part of defending the struggle in the North as well.

We certainly hope for solidarity from abroad with the revolutionary movement here. The campaign against repressive legislation here can follow on to action against the sec-



tarian [religious] system here and the institutions and constitutional provisions that give a special position to the Catholic church in the South. It is vitally necessary to remove this

system if we are to create the conditions for unity, in other words, if we are to create the kind of secular society down here which the civil rights movement is working for in the North. □

Airways Corporation]. This demonstration was organised by the Sean South and Fergal O'Hanlon Society, a group consisting mainly of expatriate sympathisers of the IRA. About 150 persons attended to support slogans such as "British Troops Out of Ireland," "End Internment Without Trial," and "Release All Political Prisoners."

## Australia

### Marchers Back Irish Self-Determination

Sydney

The struggle for self-determination in Ireland continues to receive resolute support from significant sections of the Australian population, despite the almost completely hostile reporting of the issue in the local press. A large proportion of the Australian population consists of descendants of Irish immigrants, and until recently Irish traditions such as the St. Patrick's Day march have had a large following. Recently the flow of Irish immigrants to Australia has increased.

On Sunday, February 6, some 3,000 persons marched in Sydney to protest the slaughter of thirteen civilians in Derry on the previous Sunday. The march was led by pallbearers carrying thirteen coffins and was conducted in funereal silence, with no slogans.

Afterwards a rally at the headquarters of the Irish National Association was addressed by several speakers, some of whom pointed out that the war in Ireland was not a civil war or a religious war, but a war between the "haves and have-nots"—a class war. A collection of several hundred dollars was taken up for the families of persons interned without trial by the British government.

The march included a significant section of recently arrived Irish im-

migrants and a broad cross-section of the Catholic community, as well as numerous other sympathisers of the struggle for independence in Ireland.

On February 11 another protest was held, this time starting outside Gold Fields House (office of the British High Commission) and proceeding to the offices of BOAC [British Overseas

Although the February 6 march was by far the largest Irish solidarity action yet seen in Australia, there have been significant actions in other centres. There has been a solidarity march of about 300 persons in Adelaide, and several actions in Melbourne have attracted up to 200. There have also been actions in Canberra. In most of the state capitals, there are organisations of Irish people sympathetic to the independence struggle. □

### Week of Solidarity With Ireland Receives Wide Support in Belgium

Brussels

The Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs-Revolutionaire Arbeiders Liga [LRT-RAL, Revolutionary Workers League in Belgium's two languages], Belgian section of the Fourth International, organized a series of five meetings (February 7-11) in solidarity with the Irish people's liberation struggle against British imperialism and its agents.

Because the preparatory campaign for these meetings met with a growing response among the vanguard, Social-Democratic Minister of Justice Alphons Vranckx issued a decree February 5 prohibiting members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from attending the LRT's meetings.

The same night the Political Bureau of the LRT protested this action and announced that the meetings would be held as planned, with the Irish speakers.

Many other organizations also protested Vranckx's decision: Jeunesses Socialistes [Young Socialists]; l'Union Nationale des Etudiants Communistes [National Union of Communist Students]; Fédération Bruxelloise des Jeunesses Communistes [Brussels Federation of Young Communists]; l'Or-

ganisation Chrétienne de Gauche "Rencontres Ouvrières" [Christian Left Organization "Workers Encounters"]; the student union organizations; *Combat*, the organ of the Walloon People's Movement; Comité Pluraliste pour la Liberté d'Expression [Pluralist Committee for Freedom of Expression], etc.

The meetings took place as scheduled. A strong defense was organized to protect the Irish speakers from all police intervention. The meetings were a smashing success, both in terms of the number of participants and the enthusiastic atmosphere. Many times the speakers were interrupted by shouts of "The IRA will win!" In Brussels, Gerry Lawless was given a four-minute ovation.

In all, 5,000 persons participated in the five meetings: 1,800 in Brussels; 1,200 in Ghent; 1,000 in Louvain; 600 in Liège; and 400 in Antwerp. It was the largest number of people the Belgian section of the Fourth International had ever rallied to a series of meetings.

Most of the daily and weekly press, radio, and television covered these meetings as well as the two press conferences organized by the Political Bureau of the LRT. □

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# Murder by Factory Guard Sparks Mass Protests

By David Thorstad

The murder of a Maoist activist outside the state-owned Renault factory in the Paris suburb of Boulogne-Billancourt on February 25 has shaken France and given rise to a left-wing opposition united on a scale not seen since the May-June events of 1968.

The victim was 23-year-old René-Pierre Overney, a former Renault employee who was fired in June 1970 for his political activity. He was shot down in cold blood by a factory guard dressed in civilian clothes. The guard, Jean-Antoine Tramoni, has been indicted for murder.

The scene of the murder was a Maoist rally outside the plant gates as the workers were leaving for the day. For three weeks, according to *Le Monde* of February 27-28, a group of Maoist activists had been holding daily demonstrations demanding the reinstatement of Sadok Ben Mabrouk, another former employee who was fired for "selling *La Cause du Peuple* outside the factory." Sadok Ben Mabrouk and Christian Riss, another fired employee, have been on a hunger strike for a month demanding that they be rehired.

The day of the murder, the demonstrators were also inviting the workers to join a demonstration that evening at the Charonne subway stop in commemoration of eight persons killed by police in 1962 and "to protest the discrimination to which immigrant workers are subjected in France."

According to the account in *Le Monde*, the rally began as had many on previous days, with a group of factory guards and demonstrators exchanging harsh words and a few blows, and with poles carrying red flags being broken. Suddenly, a group of *barbouzes* (secret agents) showed up. These, said *Le Monde*, are "actually watchmen in civilian clothes" inside the factory.

A young worker who witnessed the events described what happened next: "I was near Overney and his comrades. There were twenty of them at most. They had just turned away from

the guards and were moving toward the *barbouzes*. One of these men dressed in civilian clothes steps aside from the group of watchmen. He's a stocky man, of medium build, wearing a trenchcoat. He's one of the administrative employees of the surveillance service.

"At this point, he is about three or four meters from Overney and appears very calm. Suddenly, out of his pocket he pulls a rather high-calibre revolver—9 millimeters, I think—and in cold blood fires at Overney, who collapses, hit in the chest. . . ."

When the demonstrators realized what had happened, they and some of the workers who were looking on attacked the guards with iron bars, wounding five of them. Overney, who was taken to the hospital, died soon after.

That evening, there was a heavy police detachment at the Charonne subway demonstration, which had been planned for some time. They prevented the demonstrators from forming into a single group. Of the 1,000 who *Le Monde* says participated, 316 were picked up for identity checks. "The police seized many red flags, as well as a banner on which the following words had been hastily written: 'Today, at 3:00 p.m., one of our comrades was killed by Renault cops.'"

The same evening, the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International, called for a united-front meeting in its headquarters the following morning. The meeting was attended by most of the organizations on the French left. Besides the Ligue, these included the PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party), the Socialist party, Lutte Ouvrière, the Maoist *Cause du Peuple*, the Revolutionary Marxist Alliance, AJS (Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme—Alliance of Youth for Socialism), Révolution, and Secours Rouge (Red Aid—an antirepression group). The Communist party and the union federation it controls, the CGT (Confé-

dération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor), refused to attend.

The meeting issued a call for a demonstration on Monday, February 28, and urged "all workers, all workers' and democratic organizations, and all antifascists" to join it. *Le Monde* reported February 29 that a number of other groups joined in supporting the call. Among these were the MLF (Mouvement de Libération de la Femme—Women's Liberation Movement), and the Center for Communist Initiative (Centre d'Initiative Communiste), which involves a number of former leading figures in the CP like Roger Garaudy, Charles Tillon, and Jean-Pierre Vigier.

The demonstration, from the Charonne subway stop to the Place Stalingrad, drew 30,000, according to *Le Monde's* estimates. "For the first time in a long time, a dozen organizations representing divergent and generally antagonistic tendencies came together in this joint demonstration," reported *Le Monde* March 1. The march was preceded earlier in the day by meetings in high schools throughout Paris and the suburbs.

"While the activists of the Ligue Communiste were the most numerous, many of those who participated had no definite affiliation. They were students, high-school students, and groups of young workers who had come in response to appeals from leaflets distributed at factory gates and educational institutions. Thus, for the first time in a long time—but with the seriousness that the recent death of one of their own lent to this demonstration—those in Paris who are challenging the system found once again, at least on the surface, the unity in action that marked May 1968."

The front row of the march included Michel Rocard, national secretary of the PSU; two PSU deputies; Jean-Pierre Vigier; Alain Krivine, Henri Weber, Michel Rotman, and Charles Michaloux of the Communist League;

the publisher Jean-Edern Hallier; and Jean-Paul Sartre.

At the head of the marchers were members of the Renault Struggle Committee to which Overney belonged, and Alain Geismar, a Maoist leader. They carried a wreath of red flowers and a portrait of Overney. There were also a few red flags, a large white banner proclaiming "Down with the Armed Bands of Capital!" and another one in Arabic behind a Palestinian insignia.

At the end of the march, Michaloux urged the participants to turn out the following weekend for the funeral services for Overney. *Le Monde* reported some clashes between police and demonstrators who ignored requests to disperse. There were several attempts to set up barricades, a number of windows were broken, and a few cars damaged, but the sporadic violence lasted for only a couple of hours. Thirty-three were held for identity checks.

The funeral procession to Père Lachaise Cemetery March 4 "produced the biggest show of strength of the New Left since its near-revolution in 1968," wrote John Hess in the *New York Times* the following day. "Chanting revolutionary hymns and calls for vengeance, the demonstrators recovered at least for the moment the unity and vitality that they appeared to have lost after the May movement collapsed and was turned into a Gaullist victory." The boulevards leading to the cemetery were "a sea of red flags and banners" as Overney's coffin was borne in on the shoulders of his comrades.

Hess estimated the size of the procession at 50,000. The National Broadcasting Company put the figure at 100,000.

On March 1, the Political Bureau of the Communist party denounced plans for the funeral march. "Naturally, Communists will not take part in such a demonstration," it said, charging that its purpose was "to divide the workers and the democratic forces."

The murder of Overney is having considerable reverberations on the French left. All the unions at Renault — except for the CFT [Confédération Française des Travailleurs—French Confederation of Workers], which is really not a trade union but a small organization of fascist toughs—strongly criticized the use of armed guards dressed in civilian clothes in

the factory. But beyond this point, their positions contrasted sharply.

The CFDT [Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor], for instance, called for the resignation of the Renault officials responsible for the use of armed guards and demanded the "immediate disbanding of this private police force." It also called a protest rally at an intersection inside the plant premises for Monday morning, February 28.

The CGT and the Communist party, which dominates it, took a different approach. Both termed the whole thing a "provocation" cooked up by the bourgeoisie and its Maoist and "ultraleftist" agents.

The CGT said that the "Renault management, those in power, and their Maoist accomplices bear the entire responsibility [for the murder]. Thus, for more than two years, leftist groups have been used outside the factory to create an unhealthy climate on the inside. . . ." The union accused the plant management of hiring "fascist thugs who call themselves Maoists" in order to carry out provocations. It blandly pointed out that "shots were fired by a man dressed in civilian clothes," as if the cold-blooded murder were simply part of a prearranged plan.

The Communist party charged that the government was using the incident "by manipulating leftist groups." Its newspaper, *L'Humanité*, denounced Monday's mass protest march as "an anticommunist demonstration."

The day after Overney was murdered, the CP's Political Bureau issued a statement linking the murder to "a vast undertaking of political provocation on behalf of those in power." It asserted that the "ruling powers are in trouble, their audience is growing smaller, their future is uncertain. They are looking for a way out through adventures. Workers and democrats: The ruling powers want disorder! They used it successfully in 1968, and today they want to do it again."

The CP called on "all Frenchmen and Frenchwomen—whatever their beliefs—to resolutely forge a Popular Union" and stated that "the opportunities for beating the aristocracy of money have never been as great as they are today."

Georges Marchais, the CP's assis-

tant general secretary, was speaking in Strasbourg the evening of Overney's murder. In response to a question about the likelihood of revolution in the immediate future, he referred to the murder as a "great boon to those in power" and evoked the specter of another May 1968: "I ask the question: Are we going to start all over again as in 1968? And I reply: No, that must not start all over again."

All this is an indication of how sensitive the CP is to the activity of leftist groups inside the CGT and in the factories. "For years the Communist party was the only political group in the factories," wrote Thierry Pfister in the February 27-28 *Le Monde* in a two-part series on "Political Activism Inside the Factory." In recent years the relationship of forces has been changing, however.

And since 1968, tendencies of the far left have begun to have an impact in the factories. Pfister mentions a bulletin distributed by the Ligue Communiste in Sochaux, which "seems to enjoy somewhat of an audience because each time it is distributed it is the topic of conversation in the canteen."

The real collusion in the factories, of course, is not between the management and so-called ultraleftists, but between the management and the CGT. "In order to oppose this penetration of 'ultraleftist' propaganda or activists," noted Jean-Pierre Dumont in the February 27-28 *Le Monde*, "the CGT has not hesitated itself to use commando methods." During the latest firing of "ultraleftist" workers at Renault, "the CGT militants closed their eyes to the procedures followed by the management." In the Paris bus and subway system, noted Pfister, "it is said without blinking that the CGT is like a small island of discipline."

"Especially since May-June 1968," he wrote in the February 29 *Le Monde*, the CGT has "eliminated a certain number of leftist elements who, once they sank local roots, tended to forget the instructions of the union. The Communist party has had to 'invest' a relatively large number of its cadres in the CGT in order to carry out these delicate surgical operations."

Pierre Vianson-Ponté, writing in *Le Monde* March 1, compared the "tacit agreements" between the CP and the Gaullist government beginning with

May 1968 to one between two boxers shaking hands before they start the fight: "Certainly, each one hopes to win, but each one also hopes that the match will be played according to the rules, without any disorder, and to the general satisfaction of both."

"Perhaps the most significant aspect of the events of the past few days is that students as such have hardly figured in them . . .," editorialized the *London Times* March 1. "The orga-

nization which took the initiative in calling the [February 28] demonstration, and which provided the stewards for it as well as a good part of the rank and file, is not a student group but an adult political organization, the Communist League. These events therefore serve to highlight two aspects of the development of the revolutionary movement in France since 1968: it has become more 'political,' and it has moved out of the universities towards the working class." □

## Czechoslovakia

### Gustav Husak's Historic Phrase

By Pierre Frank

In a French Communist party Political Bureau communiqué dated February 17 and published the following day in *L'Humanité*, we find the following sentence by Czechoslovak Communist party leader Gustav Husak in answer to a question from Roland Leroy, a member of the French Political Bureau sent to Prague: "The time of prefabricated frame-up trials has definitively passed."

Historic words! Husak was speaking only of Czechoslovakia, but despite him, his words have a bearing on the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European workers states. So a "time of prefabricated frame-up trials" did exist!

This is the first time a Stalinist leader has made such a confession. In his report to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party, Khrushchev denounced the repression unleashed by Stalin, especially since that repression hit some old Stalinists. But he didn't question the trials themselves. In the "histories" of the Bolshevik party and the Soviet Union published since then, the Moscow trials are not mentioned.

We repeat: this is the first time a leader of a Stalinist party—a leader who was returned to power through the intervention of the Soviet army in his country—has acknowledged that the trials were prefabricated frame-ups, and that there had been a whole period during which the leaders of the workers states carried out such

measures in the name of socialism.

The confession is overdue, but it is impossible to have any faith in the assertion that such times have



HUSAK: Considers frame-ups less desirable—or less convincing—than in past.

passed. First, because Husak spoke only of Czechoslovakia, but also because even there people have recently been arrested, prosecuted, and con-

victed for their activities during the 1968 "Prague Spring."

If something about these trials has passed, it is not the Stalinist leaders' willingness to employ such methods, but the refusal of those indicted to submit to the terror and confess to crimes they did not commit.

In the Soviet Union it has become dangerous for the regime to stage such prefabricated frame-up trials. So an even more barbarous procedure has been instituted: internment of opponents, with the complicity of doctors of torture, in psychiatric asylums.

No vote of thanks is due the Political Bureau of the French CP for getting this confession out of Husak. The CP leaders addressed themselves to him not because of concern for proletarian morality—for many years they sanctioned such trials without reservation—but in order not to be hindered in their policy of class collaboration in France. They "recorded" Husak's words, but didn't make the slightest effort to find out the real situation in Czechoslovakia so far as arrests and trials are concerned. And they never dared take a similar step with regard to the Soviet leadership.

In the matter of freedom of opinion in the workers states, no confidence whatsoever can be placed in the Stalinist leaders. But Husak's confession is a sign of the ever increasing weakness of these leaders—it shows that today they are obliged to plead their own innocence.

More than ever, campaigns and actions must be multiplied to win the release of all prisoners (whether in prisons or in "psychiatric asylums").

Thus will socialist democracy's day of triumph be prepared—and those who committed so many crimes in the name of socialism will be compelled to account for their deeds before people's courts. □

### New Honor for Nixon

A new entry in the U.S. 1972 *National Society Directory* is Claude "Moosehead" Tramar. The directory lists "socially prominent" persons who "are among the leaders of their communities."

Claude is distinguished from all the other socially prominent individuals by the fact that he is a dog.

The publishers of the directory said they didn't know how Claude's name got into the book. That wasn't what puzzled us. We were wondering if Claude objected to being listed in the same book with Richard Nixon.

# After the Defeat: A Bleak Future

By Tariq Ali

[The following article is scheduled for publication in a French translation in the Paris monthly *Le Monde Diplomatique*.]

\* \* \*

A strike wave has gripped Pakistan. Despite the fact that martial law is still in operation, all the military regulations prohibiting strikes are being ignored daily by hundreds of thousands of workers all over the country. The workers are openly defying the police and, thanks to their militant tactics, are compelling capitalists to agree to their wage demands. This fact in itself gives us an indication of the extent to which social and economic crisis has developed in (West) Pakistan since the defeat of the Pakistan army and the emergence of Bangladesh.

Although the defeat of the Pakistan army in Bangladesh by the Indian army was *political* more than military—in the sense that the Pakistan army, guaranteed safety by the Indira Gandhi regime, chose to surrender without a fight—its effects in West Pakistan were traumatic. Overnight the results of indoctrination in army propaganda disappeared, and mass demonstrations in the cities demanded Yahya Khan's overthrow.

Clearly a new *military* coup d'état would not have been appreciated by the masses in Pakistan, and the ruling class, in collusion with the army, opted for a continuation of military rule, but in civilian clothing.

Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, one of the politicians responsible for the invasion of East Bengal and the leader of the People's party, was appointed president and chief martial-law administrator. He placed his predecessor under arrest, released Sheik Mujibur Rahman, and made demagogic speeches throughout the country promising an end to oppression. In reality, however, he is attempting an extremely difficult task for any bourgeois leader in Pakistan today, namely, the task of stabilizing the existing social order

and preserving the capitalist mode of production in Pakistan.

This is not to imply that there exists a political force in West Pakistan strong enough to overthrow the existing state, but merely to stress that the crisis cannot be solved within the existing framework and that the bourgeoisie will be compelled to search for a new political formula—impossible to confine within the present geo-



BHUTTO: Army's civilian-face finds Mao's blessing useful left cover.

graphical limits of the "moth-eaten and truncated" state of Pakistan.

The People's party, which Bhutto leads, emerged as the largest single party in West Pakistan after the ill-fated elections of December 1970, but its strength was confined to two of West Pakistan's four provinces: Punjab (the largest and most important) and Sind.

The party's social base in the two provinces reflects its hybrid nature somewhat accurately. In the Punjab it represents the petty bourgeoisie and all its layers, though now that Bhutto is president, many monopolists and landlords will flock behind his banner. In Sind (Bhutto's home province, where he is one of the largest landlords!) the base of the party, excepting

marginally for the industrial center of Karachi, rests on feudal landlords who decided to back one of their own in the last election and whose loyalty is no doubt being handsomely rewarded at the moment.

Thus while Bhutto is in power at the moment owing to the fact that the army would rather have a civilian face while it recovers from the blow inflicted on its prestige, what gives him a certain amount of autonomy is the fact that he does command some support, a factor which is convenient for the army as well in the present circumstances.

However, what Bhutto is attempting politically is more ambitious. He is trying to incorporate the extreme left under his umbrella by claiming that he has the blessing of the Chinese government. Thus a leading "Maoist" in the People's party, Mairaj Mohammed Khan, is one of the special presidential advisers and part of the martial law administration. Also, a renowned Urdu poet, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, known for his pro-Moscow sympathies, as his Lenin Peace Prize testifies, is a cultural adviser to the government—a poet at the court of Emperor Bhutto.

Given the past record of the left and its extreme opportunism and chauvinism, there is every possibility that Bhutto will win its support. This will not mean very much to the new regime, but it will remove a potential alternative from the political scene and give the regime a left cover.

The main political issue today is the question of ending martial law and convening the National Assembly. These two demands have been put forward by the National Awami party, which emerged as the strongest political force in the remaining two provinces, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The National Awami party is led by the nationalist politician Wali Khan, and though it has been infiltrated by the pro-Moscow "Communists," their influence is negligible; in any case, they tail-end the party leadership and carry out its dictates.

What Wali Khan would like is a coalition government at the Center and governments in NWFP and Baluchistan dominated by his party. However, Mr. Bhutto is not so anxious to share political power at the present moment, and demonstrations by thousands of armed supporters of

Wali Khan in Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP, have left him unmoved.

In a certain sense, the political maneuverings which are taking place on Pakistan's political stage have an air of unreality about them. It seems that few bourgeois politicians have really understood what the events of the last year signify. They seem to think that it is possible for them to go on in the same old way in completely changed circumstances.

The power of landlordism in the countryside can be seen from the fact that 1.25% of the total number of landholders in Pakistan control 31.2% of the total area under private control, whereas 64.4% of the landholders (i. e., poor peasants) own among them 15.25% of the whole. The increase of landless laborers, coupled with growing unemployment (some of it a direct result of the loss of Eastern Bengal), makes the crisis more intense than it would otherwise have been. Hence the debates between the National Awami party and the People's party have a somewhat hollow ring as far as the masses are concerned.

We are therefore likely to see a continued rise of the mass movement, and the inability of a capitalist government to grant the demands of this movement will make the political situation even more unstable than it has been in the past. Bhutto's inability to deal with this movement is bound to bring the army back into the picture.

The new commander in chief of the army, General Gul Hassan, is not only more sophisticated than his two predecessors, Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, but is known to harbor ambitions regarding the presidency, and it is unlikely that Bhutto will succeed in keeping him at arm's length for too long. Given Gul Hassan's marked distaste for the "left," which was exhibited when he was director of the Joint Services Intelligence some years back, his military dictatorship is likely to be much harsher. Even if one ignores his subjective inclinations, the social and economic situation in Pakistan will not tolerate an "easy" regime if the social structure has to be preserved.

The disintegration of the state of Pakistan has, of course, created two crucial weak links within the subcontinent. Both West Pakistan and Bangladesh, as they exist today, have shattered the stability of South Asia;

given the fact that in Asia as a whole, South Asia is of prime strategic and political significance for U. S. imperialism, from now on the latter's main aim will be to preserve the power of the bourgeoisie in the entire subcontinent.

Already the indications are that Bhutto, Mujibur Rahman, and Indira Gandhi are planning a "summit" meeting to discuss common problems, and the existence of the latter is understood by all.

If the Nixon-Mao talks result in an Asian Yalta and the Chinese agree to divide Asia into "spheres of influence"—and all the signs indicate that they are prepared to do so—then South Asia will come under the American "sphere of influence," and a meeting of the three bourgeois leaders (possibly including Mrs. Bandaranai-

ke for good measure) will discuss one key problem: not the mythical threat of "Communist aggression" but the more real threat posed by the rise of the mass movement in different parts of the subcontinent.

A threat to one will be regarded as a threat to all, and some type of common defense agreement will undoubtedly be reached. In the short term, this is the only way for imperialism to preserve the fragile *status quo* in South Asia.

The lack of a strong and unified revolutionary movement will make the task of these four bourgeois horsemen of the South Asian apocalypse easier, but they should not be too optimistic. The social crisis is too far advanced to allow anything more than temporary victories for the existing order.

February 18, 1972

## Bangladesh

### Kremlin, Nixon Show Approval of Rahman

At a state banquet in Moscow, where he had just arrived (March 1) for a four-day "good will" visit, Bangladesh Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman paid tribute to the "great revolutionary traditions that from the very beginning placed the Soviet government and the Soviet people on the side of our struggle for justice and freedom."

Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin had just finished expressing his hope that Rahman's visit would "lay the foundation on which to build good traditions of firm friendship and cooperation" between the two countries.

The following day, at the headquarters of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, two aid agreements between Bangladesh and the Soviet Union were signed. The first, details of which were not disclosed, was an emergency program to foster "the reconstruction of vital branches of the economy." The second was a \$45,000,000 package originally scheduled for application to Pakistan.

Rahman's declared admiration for the revolutionary traditions supposedly embodied in the present Soviet leadership smacks more of diplomacy than conviction. In the February 19 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*,

correspondent T. J. S. George described Rahman's policies in Bangladesh as something less than revolutionary.

In the construction of a new state apparatus, Rahman has relied on discredited elements of the old state bureaucracy, George wrote. A particularly controversial move was his reinstating of some of the so-called 303, a group of civil servants dismissed on charges of corruption during the Ayub Khan regime.

Charges of favoritism in political appointments have become a topic of conversation in Dacca: ". . . leftist circles here [Dacca] say he [Rahman] may be building up a cadre of officers who would be personally beholden to him. They ask why. Is he preparing for the day when he may have to consolidate his position by cracking down on leftists and other political opponents?"

In the coastal belt, George wrote, some "well-armed and politically conscious activists are currently underground—and reportedly being hunted by the Mukti Bahini." George describes these groups as "Maoist," which is a designation the bourgeois press tends to apply to any peasant-based militant group in Asia. It is far more

likely that government forces are in fact moving against leftists in general, characterizing them as Maoist because of the population's thoroughly justified hatred of the Chinese bureaucracy's betrayal of the Bengali people during their struggle against Pakistan.

The latest diplomatic consequence of Rahman's apparent ability to develop a stable state apparatus seems likely to be recognition of the new regime

by the Nixon administration. The *New York Times* reported March 3 that "senior foreign policy officials" said March 2 that the United States would extend diplomatic recognition to Rahman's government "within four to six weeks." Nixon is waiting, the officials said, to weigh the effects of Rahman's visit to the Soviet Union and to see if Indian troops are withdrawn from Bangladesh by the declared March 25 deadline. □

a celebration of the first anniversary of the coup. The killings continued on a regular basis.

By February 4, only 102 of the 510 prisoners remained alive. They were given no food and told to eat their own excrement if they were hungry. The prisoners overheard a guard tell a cook that they were to be executed on February 5. The most usual form of execution, the escapees said, was throat-slitting. They decided they would rather be shot trying to escape.

A private managed to force open one of the main doors to the compound, and under a hail of machine-gun fire the prisoners ran to the open gate. According to the prisoners' account, bodies piled up near the open gate, forming a sort of barricade that allowed a few of the prisoners to get away.

The Uganda regime has claimed that the Mutukula escapees were not Uganda army internees but Tanzanian guerrillas, and that the Tanzanian government was rounding them up to return them to Uganda. To refute that claim, the Tanzanian government produced the escaped soldiers to be interviewed by the Western press. □

## Uganda

### Thousands of Soldiers Reported Murdered

Since Uganda President Milton Obote was overthrown by a military coup on January 25, 1971, thousands of members of the Langi and Acholi tribes have been slaughtered by the regime headed by General Idi Amin. Charges of massacre, which had been current for the past thirteen months, were confirmed by Martin Meredith, a correspondent of the *London Observer* who interviewed Ugandan refugees in Tanzania.

Twenty miles from the northern Tanzanian town of Tabora, Meredith talked to nineteen men who escaped from the Ugandan prison at Mutukula. They are believed to be among the few survivors of the 5,000 Acholi and Langi tribesmen formerly serving in the Ugandan army.

"The eyes of the men had that dreadful haunted and listless look of those who have been driven beyond the breaking point of terror. Remnants of their uniforms hung in tatters from their backs," Meredith wrote.

The refugees said that during the few days following the coup on January 25, 1971, hundreds of their fellow-tribesmen in the army were rounded up and separated from other troops. Despite their lack of resistance, most senior officers were executed, and the lower-ranking soldiers were interned.

Meredith had a list of eleven missing officers. Nine of them, according to the refugees, had been murdered. Many had been tortured and mutilated. Thirty-two officers had been led into a room that was then blown up by explosives.

Last December 28, the refugees said,

510 Acholi and Langi soldiers at the Luzira prison were transferred to Mutukula prison, a few hundred yards from the Tanzanian border. On January 12, guards began executing prisoners, in bunches of ten.

On January 24 a captain took eleven prisoners and shot them fifteen yards away from the other detainees. The prisoners were told that this was

### Australian Capital Sees Suharto as Ally

Sydney

The recent diplomatic tour of Australia by Indonesian dictator Suharto and his foreign minister, Adam Malik [see *Intercontinental Press*, February 21, p. 162], represents another attempt on the part of the Australian government to gloss over its white supremacist policies (particularly in immigration) and to forge anti-communist diplomatic links with reactionary regimes in Southeast Asia.

With the decline of the British Empire and Commonwealth as a force in the area, the government has come to recognise that it will have to play a more independent role in forming alliances that can ensure safety for capital invested in the region.

For some time, the Australian bourgeoisie entertained hopes that the U. S. government would fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of British military forces from East of Suez. But the reverses suffered by the United States

in Indochina and the consequent reluctance of Washington to engage in other direct military interventions dashed these hopes. Australian capitalism is therefore attempting to build its own alliances in the area.

Within a week of Suharto's visit, the McMahon government announced an offer of sixteen Sabre jet fighters to the Indonesian government. At about the same time, McMahon also announced the gift of nine small gunboats to the Marcos regime in the Philippines.

Unfortunately for Suharto and the Liberal party government, the dictator's tour was not all cocktail parties and sugary speeches. At the reception for Suharto and Malik at Sydney Town Hall, the local dignitaries and their visitors could not be heard above the chant of "Go home, butcher!" About 200 persons demonstrated against Suharto in Sydney, and a protest march of similar size was staged in Melbourne. □

## MIR Weighs Record of Chile's Unidad Popular

[The following editorial appeared in the first part of December in *El Rebelde*, the official voice of the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) in Chile, under the title "The Masses Rise Above the Weaknesses and Errors of the Left." The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The MIR has called for strengthening the unity of the left in an offensive of the working masses against the seditious bourgeoisie and the state apparatus through which it rules, as well as for a discussion within the workers' movement of the weaknesses and errors of the left in the Chilean political process.

In order to contribute to this necessary discussion, we have decided to devote this issue of *El Rebelde* to a political inventory of the first year of the Unidad Popular [UP—Popular Unity], considering not only the UP's conduct in the government but also directing ourselves to the seditious policy of the right, the performance of the workers', peasants', and squatters' movement, the struggle against imperialism, etc.

We do this in the belief that revolutionary criticism within the working class strengthens the struggle for socialism. This editorial will take a critical look at the political activity of the left during this first year. And because of the fact that many important political events have occurred during the year, we will have to take more space than usual.

### Balance of Power Between the Workers and the Bourgeoisie

The Unidad Popular's electoral victory and its assumption of governmental powers brought about a temporary balance of power in the class struggle in Chile.

On the one hand, the growing strength and deepening radicalization the working class had been experiencing since 1967 culminated, with the aid of a strategic electoral setback for the bourgeoisie, in the setting up of a left-wing government that undertook a bold program of popular reforms. For the first time in Chile, a government supported by powerful workers' parties had managed to control a part—a fraction—of the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie: the executive branch.

On the other hand, the ruling classes, although weakened by an electoral defeat they had not expected, remained in control of the rest of the state apparatus: a parliament in which they had an artificial majority, a judicial power in the hands of reactionary officials, and a body of legal regulations laid down by themselves to serve their own interests. They also retained their

wealth—their companies, their farms, their business interests, their means of mass communication, etc.

### Reaction Intends to Regain the Power It Lost

Although the bourgeoisie continues to hold on to most of its power, it knows that the presence of a left-wing force in the government constitutes a very serious threat to its class interests. The bourgeoisie knows that it cannot allow this equilibrium in the class struggle to be prolonged indefinitely. It must again take the offensive, once more impose its political authority over the nation, and recover the government it lost. If it does not, it risks losing power altogether.

The bourgeoisie's first reaction, while it was still taken aback by its defeat, was a desperate attempt by a few small reactionary groups to carry out terrorist acts and putschist adventures. But these all failed because they were discovered and denounced by the revolutionary left, because they met with determined opposition from the working masses, and because they did not have the desired effect on the armed forces.

Since the assassination of General Schneider, the bourgeoisie has understood that these desperate adventures are bad business and that it must carry through a serious strategy of sedition that takes advantage of all the resources placed at its disposal by its control of a large part of the state apparatus and its immense economic power. Since then, this is the path the bourgeoisie has chosen: to patiently get armed civilian groups ready and to make an effort to penetrate the armed forces; by using parliament and the judicial apparatus, to strangle the government's reform program with legal loopholes; to apply pressure and boycott the popular measures taken by the executive branch; to create a climate of alarm and political instability through artificial institutional clashes and propaganda campaigns. In other words, the bourgeoisie has been rapidly preparing the way to recover the government it lost.

### The Problem of Mobilizing the Masses and Dealing Blows to the State Apparatus

The equilibrium in the class struggle has imposed a dilemma on the left in the government, and on the working classes, similar to the one facing the bourgeoisie. The working classes cannot permanently maintain the existing balance of power with the bourgeoisie, nor can they wait until the latter goes on the offensive in order to recover the fraction of power it has lost. The working classes must increase their own strength through an active mobilization of the masses. They must keep hitting away at the bourgeoisie, weakening its bases of economic power, and destroying its state apparatus. In other words, the elevation of Popular Unity to governmental status



historically obliges the working classes and their political parties to plan on a conquest of revolutionary power by workers and peasants within a short space of time.

### **Legalism, Bureaucratism, Demobilization of the Masses**

However, the government's first year shows us that the clarity that exists in the ranks of reaction has not prevailed in the ranks of the traditional left. While the bourgeoisie has embarked on a seditious offensive to win back the fraction of power it has lost, within sectors of the government and the Unidad Popular tendencies have held sway that have blindly and childishly chosen the path of executing popular reforms and measures through bureaucratic and administrative channels, not understanding that a revolutionary movement can gain in strength only when it is rooted in the mobilization and active participation of the masses.

These sectors have placed their political actions against a background of careful respect for bourgeois legality, which not only seriously limits the possibilities for carrying out the planned reforms, but also strengthens and legitimizes the bourgeoisie's institutions of power. Besides not going on the offensive to deal blows to the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie, these sectors have cast aside the means governmental power places at their disposal for carrying out the kind of agitation and propaganda that could prepare the working classes for taking power. Quite the opposite: their defensive attitude has instead helped foster the myth and the confused notion that the working masses are today in power, when in reality power is in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

### **Stagnation of the UP's Program**

By proceeding in a legalistic and bureaucratic fashion, and by not basing themselves on the mobilization and participation of the working masses, these sectors of the left have brought the Unidad Popular to the point of stagnating in the legality the bourgeoisie has used to defend its own interests. Not only have they thereby greatly limited and detracted from the program of the Unidad Popular, but they have also made many sellouts and concessions to the pressures and ultimatums of the bourgeoisie.

Thus, for example, the government agreed to the modification in the plan to nationalize copper, obliging Chile to pay about \$700,000,000 in copper company debts. It also yielded to pressures from the Cámara Chilena de la Construcción [Chilean Chamber of Construction] by going along with the traditional system of construction, which favored the contractors and made access to housing difficult. The UP has seen itself compelled by the boycott of the Contraloría [Federal Control Office] and the right-wing pressures from the DC-PN [Democracia Cristiana-Partido Nacional—Christian Democracy-National party] to send Congress a proposed law to establish three Categories of Property [Social, Mixed, and Private], which will greatly limit its program for nationalizing industry. It has given free reign to a "justice" carried out by reaction that lets Schneider's assassins go free while it represses and imprisons peasants, students, and workers. The propagandistic pressures of the right

held up the educational reform and the nationalization of private education, which would make culture accessible to everybody. The UP has accepted the Agrarian Reform Law of the Christian Democracy, which prevents full access to land for the peasants and the total elimination of large estates. It has dropped its program for creating a Popular Assembly that would ensure the representation and participation of the working classes. Instead it now favors merely changing the present bicameral Congress into a unicameral one.

This respect for bourgeois legality and the bourgeois state apparatus, this willingness to accept reaction's use of institutional cover to promote its seditious aims, this demobilization of the masses, and these concessions to pressures from the right have not appeased the bourgeoisie. They will only encourage the ruling classes to be even more aggressive in their offensive to recover the power they have lost.

### **The Government Is Not Getting Stronger**

In spite of the fact that the Unidad Popular's program of reforms has gotten bogged down, during its first year in government it has carried out many measures that have benefited the working masses more than those of any previous administration.

The redistribution of the national income in favor of the poorest sectors of the population and the freezing of prices have given these sectors a buying power heretofore unknown. The result of this has been a salutary increase in production and a significant decrease in unemployment. The expropriation of around 1,300 of the estates having at least 80 hectares, the nationalization of nearly all the banks, the government's taking control of some industries, and the nationalization of copper and other minerals dealt important blows to the ruling classes and meant a big step forward for the working classes.

But these positive measures have not greatly strengthened the government. Due to the demobilization of the masses and the fact that they have not been involved as the motor force of the reform process, the government and the traditional left have not won the kind of mass power that will be necessary for positive economic and social measures.

### **The Class Struggle Exceeds the Limits of Legalistic and Bureaucratic Policy**

Despite the legalistic and bureaucratic policy certain sectors of the Unidad Popular have given the government, the very dynamic of the class struggle has impelled important layers of workers not to hold back on their mobilizations against the bourgeoisie. In fact, the government's first year shows us that the most dynamic sectors of workers, peasants, squatters, and students have gone beyond the defensive policy that the legalistic and bureaucratic sectors of the Unidad Popular have tried to impose.

The statistics on mass mobilizations indicate that, except for the squatters' movement, which was more passive at the beginning of the year, the workers, peasants, and students carried out more occupations of bourgeois properties by June 1971 than in the three preceding years.

Since June, these direct forms of struggle have increased even more.

These data show that the working people are 'not in-

### **Illegal Occupations, January 1, 1968-June 15, 1971**

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Occupations of land	8	23	220	175
Occupations of industries	5	24	133	339
Occupations of estates	16	121	368	658
Occupations of educational institutions	166	10	102	382

clined to let themselves get bogged down in the labyrinth of bourgeois legality, nor to make concessions to pressures from the right. On the contrary, the decision of the working people to mobilize on their own to win even more industries, more estates, more housing, and more education for the people is spreading throughout the country—to the industries, the rural areas, the shantytowns of Chile.

These working people are the same ones who have raised the banners of struggle against bureaucracy and in favor of the active involvement of the masses in the implementation of reforms. The concessions and weaknesses of certain sections of the government have forced them to take the initiative and to stop hoping that their problems will be solved for them. The working people are taking the offensive, leading themselves, and struggling on their own, without any bureaucratic go-betweens, for their class interests and against the bourgeoisie. The working people have gone beyond the path of legalistic reforms and are beginning to use their own forms of struggle.

### **The Revolutionary Left Is Getting Stronger**

The same class-struggle dynamic that has impelled vast layers of workers, peasants, squatters, and students to go beyond the legalistic forms of activity that characterize the Unidad Popular and to stand up to the bourgeoisie on their own have brought about an accelerated growth of the revolutionary-left tendencies in the working classes during the first year of government by the traditional left.

This is reflected in the great influence acquired during the year by the organizations that bring workers of the revolutionary left together in mass fronts. The Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario [MCR—Revolutionary Peasant Movement] is spreading throughout the entire country and is unquestionably taking the leadership of the peasant struggle for land and in opposition to the boycott and sedition of the *latifundistas* [big landholders].

The Jefatura Nacional Revolucionaria [JNR—National Revolutionary Leadership] is becoming the strongest organization of the homeless; it is coordinating encampments by squatters in every city in the country and is heading the struggle against the Chilean Chamber of Construction and against bureaucracy in housing.

The Frente de Estudiantes Revolucionarios-Movimiento de Unidad de Izquierda [FER-MUI—Front of Revolution-

ary Students-Movement for Unity of the Left] in the student area are growing in all the universities and in secondary, technical, teachers' training schools, etc. Their approach is to resolutely confront reaction and to fight for a reform of education in Chile that will put it within the reach of the people as a whole.

But the most significant thing is the amazing growth of the Frente de Trabajadores Revolucionarios [FTR—Front of Revolutionary Workers]. In the space of a few months, this organization has developed into the national movement of workers within the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores—Workers Central Union] who are struggling for a real and active participation by the workers in implementing reforms in industry. It is the FTR that is the driving force behind the direct mobilization of the masses to take over more factories for the people.

It is not only independent and activist workers, peasants, squatters, and students belonging to the MIR who participate in these mass organizations, but also many activists and sympathizers of the Unidad Popular who use them to pressure the traditional left to stand up more firmly to reaction.

### **Repressive Assaults**

The ruling classes know that the stagnation of the Unidad Popular's program of reforms and the policy of legalism and demobilization promoted by elements within it result in confusion, contradictions, and the estrangement of broad layers of workers, peasants, and squatters from the government. Naturally, this weakens the government. That is why the right, through propagandistic campaigns and the clever use of the reactionary Chilean judicial system, has devoted its best forces this year to stirring up conflicts between the government and the most radical layers of workers, between the traditional left and the revolutionary left.

Unfortunately, some sectors of the Unidad Popular officialdom have let themselves be carried away by this reactionary game. Echoing the propagandistic campaigns and the pressures of the bosses, they have ordered the evacuation of estates and student headquarters, and other repressive assaults on mass fronts. In other cases, they have stooped—whether through explicit statements or by simply keeping quiet—to legitimizing the pressures on the workers by the bosses and the police persecutions that the judicial apparatus has unleashed.

This conduct has seriously damaged the left as a whole and the government itself, since it has driven away many who are drawn toward supporting the left and has led to confusion among large numbers of workers. In short, the left is growing weaker and reaction is gaining fertile soil for making inroads with demagogic slogans.

### **A Dangerous Sectarianism**

Bureaucracy and the demobilization of the masses of working people, the concessions and sellouts to the pressures of the bosses and to their grip on legality, and the repressive assaults on some sectors of the working people have led the MIR, as well as the thousands of organized workers, peasants, squatters, and students who support our positions, to level just criticisms at the elements in

the Unidad Popular that are behind this equivocal policy. These elements do not want to enter into a serious discussion of the critical problems that are weakening the left. They forget that revolutionary criticism among working people strengthens the struggle for socialism. Instead, blinded by their own policy, they look for quick and dogmatic answers and promote sectarian attitudes against the revolutionary left in the mass fronts, without paying any attention to the heavy costs sectarian attitudes inflict on the left as a whole.

Throughout this first year of the Unidad Popular government, the MIR has demonstrated that in spite of its differences with the government, it has never tired of meeting its responsibility to history by holding high the banner of a united front against the common enemy. In the most difficult moments the government has faced, the MIR's actions, investigations, and denunciations of the sedition and putschist intentions of the right were the main factor ensuring the stability of the government.

Nonetheless, without setting itself up as a judge, the MIR has known how to respond to its revolutionary duty to criticize—openly, before the peasants and work-

ers—the errors and weaknesses of the left in the political process that Chile is going through. Only in this way can the workers and the revolutionary forces of the left be strengthened and move forward.

## The Conquest of Revolutionary Power by the Workers and Peasants

What defines a revolutionary process, and what makes it irreversible, is the mobilization and active involvement of the working masses in the struggle to destroy the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie and to take power. What the Unidad Popular has failed to do in its first year in government is precisely to mobilize the masses and deal blows to the institutions and apparatus of the state. A failure that could be fatal, since the dynamic of the class struggle makes only two outcomes of the Chilean political process possible: fascism or socialism.

The Movement of the Revolutionary Left has tried to bring about the unity of the entire people and the entire left in a struggle to take power and to establish a revolutionary workers and peasants' government. □

# Open Letter Calls for End to Terror in Argentina

[A number of U. S. civil libertarians have addressed the following open letter to Dr. Carlos de Rozas, Argentine ambassador to the United Nations, on the question of repression in Argentina. The letter was to be presented to him March 4 at a conference at New York's New School for Social Research on the topic "Paternity or Fraternity: The Relative Attitudes of the United States Towards Latin America." However, de Rozas, who was scheduled to present an opening address to the conference, failed to appear. The open letter was distributed to those who attended.]

\* \* \*

We appeal to you, the Ambassador from Argentina to the United Nations, to join us in protest against the violations of civil liberties that have occurred in your country with increasing frequency.

We speak specifically of the past year's cases of abduction of attorney Nestor Martins and his client, Nildo Zenteno; Marcelo Verd and Sara Palacio; Luis Enrique Pujals, law student; Diana Alac, sister of a well-known labor leader; attorney Juan Pablo Maestre and Mirta Missetich; Dragutin Tanasijevic, trade-union delegate for the Bus Drivers Union; and several others, many of whom have never been found by the authorities or who

have been found murdered after prolonged torture.

We speak of the cases of attempted abduction of attorney Roberto Quieto, attorney Jorge Vargas, and others where no success has been met by the authorities in apprehending those responsible.

We speak of cases of assassination of dissidents like the cases of Carlos Rodriguez Fontan and Luis Seijo, Santiago Pampillon, Juan José Cabral, Emilio Jauregui, Alfonso Bello, Diego Ruy Frondizi, Manuel Belloni, and most recently the murder of architecture student Silvia Ester Filler December 17, 1971, while she was attending a student body assembly; and the shooting of Segundo Gomez, a construction worker who was imprisoned and then shot down in cold blood by prison officials.

We speak of cases of political prisoners who have testified to the regularity with which political prisoners are tortured in Argentine jails, most notably in the 60-page testimony released at a news conference at the Association of Guild Lawyers in Buenos Aires January 12, 1972.

We speak of the denial of basic human rights to adequate physical conditions of imprisonment—denials of medical attention, healthy diet, fresh air and sunlight.

We speak of the right to a fair and

speedy trial which has been denied in cases like that of Victor Lapegna, who has been held since the middle of 1970 without charges being placed against him; we speak of the fifteen delegates of the Fiat union; of Agustin Tosco, a trade-union leader from Córdoba; of Dr. Vicario, leader of a community government in Córdoba; of Dr. Curuchek and Martin Federico, lawyers of the Fiat workers; and the Third World priests in Rosario—all of whom have been held for long periods of time without trial under the Executive Power Laws in your country.

In the face of the mounting reports of such practices in your country, we appeal to you to make public at this gathering your support to our demand for the *immediate release of all political prisoners in Argentina and a halt to the abduction and torture of dissidents.*

*Sandra Levinson, professor; Marvin Gettleman, professor; Barbara Dane, folksinger; Susan Schnall, ex-lieutenant (junior grade), United States Navy; Dale Johnson, professor; Richard Garza, USLA Justice Committee; Joseph Heller, author; Jules Feiffer, cartoonist; Paul Sweezy, editor; Stanley Diamond, professor; Nat Hentoff, journalist; Emile de Antonio, film-maker.* □