

# Intercontinental Press

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Vol. 10, No. 9

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March 6, 1972

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## What They Cooked Up in Peking



革命不是請客吃飯

"A revolution is not a dinner party" reads this quotation from Mao Tsetung. Peking dinner party for Nixon, however, proved

ideal place for discussing plans to strangle Indochinese revolution and preserve Asian status quo.

First Time in English:

### **Trotsky on Austrian Workers' Fight Against Hitler**

# Angela Davis Wins Release on Bail

After sixteen months in prison, Angela Davis was released on bail February 23. Speaking at a news conference the next day, Davis said that the granting of bail meant that "the legal apparatus can no longer hold political prisoners in prison for long months prior to trial and attempt by isolating them and in many other ways to break their will to fight."

Davis, a Black militant and Communist, had been held ever since her arrest on October 13, 1970, on charges of murder, kidnapping, and criminal conspiracy stemming from the August 1970 shootout at the Marin County courthouse in San Rafael, California. Davis is accused of providing the weapons with which seventeen-year-old Jonathan Jackson attempted to kidnap a judge in order to free political prisoners. Jackson, two of his accomplices, and the judge were killed in the incident.

Requests for release on bail had been repeatedly denied despite the recommendation of the Marin County Probation Department that Davis be granted bail. The legal pretext for the refusal was a California law that prohibits bail in capital cases when there is "any substantial evidence" of the defendant's guilt.

On February 18 the California supreme court ruled that capital punishment violates the state's constitutional prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment." This ruling had the effect of invalidating the law under which Davis was denied bail.

Despite the fact that there was no longer any legal basis for denying bail, the state prosecutor still opposed the defense motion to release Davis. In granting the motion, the judge imposed a number of restrictions on her activities. Davis must live in Santa Clara County, where the trial is being held, must report to a probation officer weekly, and may not talk about her case outside the courtroom. □

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Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

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Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemenee, Paris 4, France.

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# What They Cooked Up in Peking

By Allen Myers

"This magnificent banquet," Richard Nixon said in his toast on his last night in China, "marks the end of our stay in the People's Republic of China. We have been here a week. This was the week that changed the world."

The exaggeration, it may be assumed, was for the benefit of U.S. voters, who had already been subjected via television to a week of one superlative atop another. Nixon and the Mao regime had agreed, not to change the world, but to preserve the *status quo* in Asia.

The deals cooked up in more than thirty hours of talks between Nixon and Chou En-lai were not, of course, spelled out in the official communiqué released February 27. The bulk of that document simply repeated the often-expressed public positions of the two governments and could have been prepared in separate sections in Washington and Peking without any consultations at all.

Other than this, the communiqué contained two verbal concessions to the Mao government. One was the acceptance of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence":

"There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, nonaggression against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations."

The other concession, while containing no more substance than the first, is likely to be more highly valued by the Chinese bureaucracy. This was

a vaguely worded promise of eventual U. S. withdrawal from Taiwan:

"The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful



NIXON: Proves adept at quoting—and understanding—Mao Tsetung Thought.

settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U. S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes."

## Taiwan and Vietnam

Predictably, even this promise of "ultimate" withdrawal was sufficient to send the puppet Chiang Kai-shek regime into near hysteria. Chiang is

obviously aware that a puppet's strings can be wound about the neck as easily as around hands and feet.

*Lien Ho Pao*, the largest daily paper on Taiwan, headlined its editorial comment, "Nixon's Cowardice and Failure Shown by Joint Communiqué." The Taipei daily *China Times* complained that "Mr. Nixon has gained nothing in return for his statement about withdrawal. Not even a specific commitment that the Chinese Communists will not resort to the use of force in the Taiwan area."

When the paper said that Nixon had obtained nothing, it obviously meant nothing for Chiang Kai-shek, a statement that may well be quite accurate. Nixon, however, has broader interests than those of the ancient dictator, and the most pressing of them at the moment are on the other side of the South China Sea.

The "tension in the area" on which "ultimate" U. S. withdrawal from Taiwan is to depend clearly has its focus in Indochina. Nixon's signing of a communiqué promising "nonaggression against other states" has not changed his goal of a military victory in Indochina. This goal was summarized by T. D. Allman in the February 19 *Far Eastern Economic Review*:

"Three years ago the US Republican Party's presidential candidate, Richard Nixon, assured a war-weary American electorate that he had a secret plan to end the war. It now appears that President Nixon wants to end the war by winning it. The communists are left with the choice of continuing the struggle or capitulating.

"With his Christmas raids against North Vietnam, Nixon further expanded the war. He has already done almost all he can do without seriously risking his chances of re-election. He has invaded Cambodia and Laos, increased military aid to all three countries, structured the American troop 'withdrawals' in such a way as to leave a large US expeditionary corps in South Vietnam indefinitely, and scaled up the bombing of North Vietnam."

The weeks before Nixon's departure for Peking in fact saw a major escalation of the air war in Indochina. The prospect is for more such escalations in the future.

"While speaking of peace and withdrawal," Allman wrote, "Nixon stead-

ily has eroded the military limitations laid down by his predecessor—the bombing halt, the prohibition of cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia—as well as the political limitations of his own promise to the American people to end the war. In the official rhetoric 'ending the war' has turned into 'ending US participation in the war,' and even 'ending US participation in the ground fighting.'

"'There is a constant tendency,' one US official in Laos remarked recently, 'to always try one more gimmick and hope it will work.' As never before in Laos, the penchant for military gimmickry has found quick approval in the Nixon Administration. The problem is that at the moment none of the gimmicks—vastly increased bombing, massive population shifts, B-52 raids, a subsidised national economy, fresh injections of foreign mercenaries and new equipment—is working. Cambodia is another example."

It should be noted that of the 8,000 to 9,000 U.S. troops on Taiwan, only about 300 are involved in "advising" and training Chiang's forces. A portion are involved in supporting CIA activities in the region, but the bulk of the U.S. force is engaged in direct support of the war effort in Indochina.

It thus appears that Nixon has promised Mao the "ultimate" abandonment of Chiang Kai-shek if Mao will help achieve the Indochina settlement that Nixon has been unable to accomplish by military means. The promise costs Nixon nothing, since even if Mao is able to force a compromise upon the Indochinese liberation forces, U.S. imperialism will have no difficulty in discovering other sources of "tension in the area."

### "A Long March Together"

The generalities contained in the communiqué were of less significance than the manner of Nixon's reception. The diplomatically correct but restrained tone of the greeting accorded to the imperialist chieftain at Peking's airport appeared to have disappointed American officials, who must have had in mind the enthusiastic welcome received on previous occasions by such lesser figures as the Pakistani butcher Yahya Khan.

The initial coolness was seen as a sign of Chinese displeasure at Washington's continued support for Chiang

Kai-shek. Once this *pro forma* display was completed, however, the Maoist regime lost no time in demonstrating an enthusiastic hospitality.

Less than four hours after his arrival, Nixon was closeted in conference with Mao himself. It is practically unprecedented for a visiting head of state to be received by Mao on the first day of a visit.\*

That evening, Chou En-lai was host to Nixon at a gala banquet attended by some 800 guests. While a band played "America the Beautiful," Nix-



CHIANG CHING: "Peaceful coexistence corrupts."

on, Chou, and their subordinates roamed from table to table drinking toasts to "friendship."

In his formal toast, Nixon called on the Chinese bureaucrats to join him in "a long march together," and demonstrated his proficiency at quoting Mao Tsetung Thought:

"Chairman Mao has written, 'So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently; the world rolls on, time presses. Ten thousand years are too long, seize the day, seize the hour!'

"This is the hour. This is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and a better world."

\* U.S. reporters in China diplomatically neglected to point out that the last recipient of this honor was named Nikita Khrushchev.

For his part, Chou made the point that despite its rhetoric, the Chinese government has always been eager for "peaceful coexistence" with U.S. imperialism:

"The social systems of China and the United States are fundamentally different, and there exist great differences between the Chinese government and the United States government. However, these differences should not hinder China and the United States from establishing normal state relations on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence; still less should they lead to war. As early as 1955 the Chinese government publicly stated that the Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States and that the Chinese government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States government. This is a policy which we have pursued consistently. We have taken note of the fact that in his speech before setting out for China, President Nixon on his part said that 'what we must do is to find a way to see that we can have differences without being enemies in war.' We hope that, through a frank exchange of views between our two sides to gain a clearer notion of our differences and make efforts to find common ground, a new start can be made in the relations between our two countries."

In a February 22 editorial, the *New York Times* summarized the atmosphere: "One might have thought the Peking banquet a reunion of old friends rather than the first social meeting of the leaders of two nations that have been bitterly hostile for more than two decades."

The Cuban press had a more ironic comment on the festivities, according to a February 26 Reuters dispatch from Havana:

"For three days during the President's visit the morning newspaper Granma and evening paper Juventud Rebelde adopted identical page make-up: a main headline on the Vietnam war and another headline in the same type on the President's visit.

"On one day, Granma, the official Communist party newspaper, divided its front page into two parts. The first banner headline said: 'B-52 Planes

Are Bombing South Vietnam Areas. North Vietnam Attacked Four Times Yesterday by Yankee Planes.' The other headline read: 'Cordial Meeting Nixon-Mao. Friendly Show of Affection Chou-Nixon. The Paper Tiger Makes a Honeyed Speech in Peking.'

On February 22, the Maoist government atoned for the lack of fanfare at the airport by devoting the entire front page of *Renmin Ribao*, the Communist party newspaper, to Nixon's visit. Photographs showed Mao and Chou welcoming Nixon. Similar attention was devoted to the visit in other Chinese papers, television, and radio.

"Foreign diplomats and residents here," Stanley Karnow wrote from Peking in the February 23 *Washington Post*, "said that the attention being paid to Mr. Nixon in the media is incomparably bigger than that accorded Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, who came here last June, even though relations between China and Romania are close."

Karnow added that Nixon's party was "delighted last night when Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, emerged alongside Chou En-lai to lead the Nixon group to a performance of a revolutionary ballet entitled 'The Red Detachment of Women.'

"The move to associate Chiang Ching with the President's visit was interpreted as a strong endorsement by Mao of the current attempt to reach a Sino-American reconciliation."

This interpretation was partly based on Chiang Ching's reputation as being a "leftist" during the "Cultural Revolution." One of her public remarks in that period, Karnow wrote, was the observation that "peaceful coexistence corrupts." That winged phrase is not likely to be inscribed on Peking wall posters in the immediate future.


## The U. S. Elections

In the U. S., the spectacle of Nixon being wined and dined in Peking, carried into millions of homes by television, was accompanied by a virtual frenzy of imitation of anything Chinese. Manufacturers rushed into the market with everything from Mao buttons to imitations of a spittoon that was visible in a photograph of Nixon's meeting with Mao.

The fad was a by-product of the campaign gimmickry that was an in-

tegral part of the trip from the moment it was announced. Nixon has upstaged his Democratic party rivals, pushing the upcoming New Hampshire primary into the back pages of the newspapers.

The Democratic candidates, most of whom are trying to capitalize on anti-war sentiment by posing as "doves," found themselves boxed into the position of having to endorse the trip, which Nixon had baptized a "journey for peace." To have mentioned the reality of the deals being made in Peking would have been to step outside the ground rules of capitalist politics, which excuse almost anything



MAO: Gives Nixon a welcome surpassing the one he gave Khrushchev.

in the pursuit of personal ambition except the truth.

Moreover, Nixon's would-be replacements as world cop must now look forward to a repeat performance of the whole extravaganza when he visits Moscow in May. The Soviet bureaucrats are not likely to allow their Chinese rivals to outdo them in fawning on Nixon.

The Mao government is well aware of the illusions about the Indochina war fostered by Nixon's visit. In the February 21 *New York Times*, an American professor named Richard H. Pfeffer provided an illuminating account of a two-hour interview that Chou En-lai granted to him and fifteen other Americans on January 31. He wrote:

"While in public the Chinese press continued to hammer away at American imperialism and to openly denigrate President Nixon's eight-point proposal, in private we had almost no serious discussion of the connec-

tion between improvements in Sino-American relations and the war.

"And when I indicated my anxiety on that score and pressed the point that the announcement of the Nixon visit had both hurt the antiwar movement in the United States and enhanced Mr. Nixon's chances of re-election, I was firmly if diplomatically put in my place. I was evasively informed that whether the Nixon visit contributes to his re-election is a domestic United States issue, which the American people will decide. I was also informed the Chinese believed that if Mr. Nixon did not change his policy of aggression in Indochina, the great American people would continue to struggle against the war.

". . . 'If the American Government goes with its eight-point proposal,' Chou declared, 'it will not be possible for the war to be ended in Indochina, and especially in Vietnam.' He added, 'So the movement against the war of aggression should continue. Events develop by twists and turns, and this will also prove to be the case after Nixon's visit to China.'"

The American people, however, do not mobilize against the war on the basis of Chou's declarations of what they "should" do, but on the basis of the realization that Nixon is not keeping his promise to end the war. This realization is precisely what Mao and Chou are helping Nixon to delay. The "twists and turns" of the Chinese bureaucracy are a betrayal of the Indochinese revolution.

## The Vietnamese View

In the February 19 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Leo Goodstadt provided an apt comparison between the Nixon-Mao détente and an earlier summit meeting:

"The massive buildup of American naval and air power in the Gulf of Tonkin is President Nixon's bargaining counter for the Peking Summit. . . . Hanoi is in the same position as Peking was when President Eisenhower met Nikita Khrushchev at Camp David in 1959. Encircled by American bases, the Chinese then denounced the Kremlin for betraying the world revolutionary struggle in seeking to defuse the Soviet confrontation with the United States."

Because of their dependence on the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies for

weapons, the North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Government are not likely to engage in public polemics over "peaceful coexistence." They have, however, expressed a determination that the war will not be settled by a deal in Peking. David Boulton, a British television director who recently visited North Vietnam, wrote in the February 20 *New York Times* of an interview he was given by Hoang Tung, editor of the Communist party newspaper *Nhan Dan*.

"While Nixon gets his 21-gun salute in Peking," Tung told Boulton, "we'll be giving him a different kind of salute in South Vietnam. There will be more than 21 guns. And they won't be firing blanks."

"This war is going to be settled here in Hanoi, nowhere else, . . ." Tung added. "Nothing that is said anywhere else, by anyone else, can make the slightest difference. Nixon believes there are fairies in the moon. He hopes to win by talking in Peking what he has failed to win by fighting on the battlefield. He's gone to the wrong place."

On February 24, a National Liberation Front radio broadcast, in an obvious reference to the Peking trip, attacked Nixon for trying to "capitalize on the internal disagreements of the socialist camp in order to further his interests." Nixon, the broadcast said, was attempting to "split countries in the socialist camp and the world Communist movement and perform the trick of peaceful evolution through economic cooperation and other maneuvers."

### Soviet Subservience


Nixon did not create the split in the "socialist camp," but he clearly knows how to take advantage of it. The Soviet bureaucracy has responded to the Mao-Nixon rapprochement primarily by trying to surpass Mao's concessions.

Harry Schwartz described the Brezhnev regime's pursuit of Nixon's favor in the February 21 *New York Times*:

"One day we read about a new agreement for Soviet-American research on health and environmental questions. Then we learn there will soon be a treaty limiting the number of ABM's Moscow and Washington will deploy. Next comes word that

the Russians have agreed to new talks to settle an almost forgotten issue, the Lend-Lease debt owed this country since World War II a generation ago.

"And even before these latest advances, Soviet representatives in Washington . . . were overfulfilling their norms in the area of trying to make friends and influence people in the Nixon Administration. They were pointedly trying to make it plain that their instructions from Moscow were to permit no obstacles to arise to the President's visit to the Kremlin, re-



CHOU: "Twists and turns" a way of life.

ardless of how annoying or even provocative any particular local irritant in Soviet-American relations might seem."

Schwartz, a member of the editorial board of the *Times*, indicated that the influential sector of the U. S. ruling class for which the paper speaks could scarcely conceal its joy at the way Moscow and Peking have allowed their disagreements to be exploited by U. S. imperialism. The frankness with which Schwartz described Nixon's playing off one bureaucracy against the other is itself quite remarkable:

"The Kremlin has been wooing the President frantically, trying to get across the message that he doesn't need to make a deal with Mao Tse-tung because he can do better in Moscow when he flies there in May.

"This transparent Moscow bidding for Mr. Nixon's favor substantially

strengthens his hand in his talks this week with Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai. Those two shrewd and practical leaders are fully aware of what the Kremlin is doing, and they could hardly help feeling the pressure to provide the President with some tangible benefits that would encourage him to resist Moscow's blandishments.

"The President is in the position of the lovely maiden courted by two ardent swains, each of whom is aware of the other but each of whom is uncertain of what happens when the young lady is alone with his rival."

A major theme of Soviet commentary on Nixon's Peking visit has been its "anti-Soviet" aims—as though the leader of U. S. imperialism could conceivably feel friendly intentions toward the most powerful workers state.

The Soviet bureaucrats have also pointed out—with apparent relish—the obvious implications for Indochina. An article from Poland reprinted in the Soviet press, for example, was quoted by Charlotte Saikowski in the February 18 *Christian Science Monitor*. It observed that the announcement of the trip "could not be interpreted in Hanoi as other than an attempt to reach a deal with its sworn enemy."

*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Saikowski wrote, printed a series of photographs of the U. S. bombing of North Vietnam under the headline "While they prepare in Peking." Such comments would be more telling if the Kremlin bureaucrats were not themselves preparing in Moscow more of the same attempts to achieve "peaceful coexistence" with imperialism that have characterized their policy for decades.

Nixon was obviously confident that Brezhnev and company would swal-

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low almost any insult rather than renounce their illusions. This was indicated by one passage in the communiqué clearly directed at Moscow:

"Neither [Peking nor Washington] should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to the efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. . . ."

### Sato Is "Visibly Irritated"

The Soviet bureaucrats could think of no more fitting response to the Nixon-Mao détente than to begin courting U. S. imperialism's chief "ally" in Asia, the Sato government.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Tokyo at the end of January. The communiqué at the conclusion of his visit announced that Japan and the Soviet Union would negotiate a peace treaty to end the state of war that has technically existed between the two countries since the second world war. Gromyko also indicated his government's eagerness for Japanese capitalists to invest up to \$1,000,000,000 in a proposed oil pipeline from Irkutsk to the Sea of Japan.

For Sato, the Soviet overtures provided a welcome opportunity to demonstrate some independence from his unreliable ally in Washington. Sato, as Elizabeth Pond wrote from Tokyo in the February 24 *Christian Science Monitor*, has been increasingly subject to criticism "for not being in Peking instead of President Nixon."

In the February 24 *New York Times*, John M. Lee mentioned some of the factors contributing to this criticism:

". . . One is the fear that the United States might take advantage of the President's visit to muscle in on Japan's position as China's natural trade partner. Another is the vague fear that the mutual security treaty between Japan and the United States might be weakened to appease Peking or that China might be courted as a future counterweight to Japanese ambitions in Asia."

Sato, who was described by Lee as "visibly irritated while watching live coverage of the President's arrival in Peking," had found several other ways to express his displeasure. One was the sending of two foreign-ministry officials to Hanoi February 8-11.

Tad Szulc reported in the February

25 *New York Times* that "high-level efforts" by the U. S. government were necessary to persuade Sato to change the timing of the mission, which was originally scheduled for the same week that Nixon was in Peking! Szulc quoted Japanese sources as saying that the Nixon administration had tried to block the mission completely.

This was followed by a decision to establish diplomatic relations with Mongolia, an ally of the Kremlin. In an amusing parallel to the way Sato learned of the "Nixon shocks," U. S. officials were reported to have learned of the Sato government's decision by reading it in Japanese newspapers.

### U. S. Out Now!

It remains to be seen how much of the spicy dish cooked up by Mao and Nixon can be forced down the

throats of the parties concerned — particularly the Indochinese freedom fighters.

In part, this will depend on what agreements Nixon reaches in May with Brezhnev, another cook anxious to add his favorite ingredients to the pot.

But secret agreements, whether arrived at in Peking, Moscow, or Washington, cannot stop the international class struggle. The antiwar movement in particular has already demonstrated that the Mao-Nixon rapprochement will not deflect its defense of the Indochinese revolution.

Opponents of U. S. imperialism still have the potential to defeat the schemes of Nixon and the practitioners of "peaceful coexistence" by continuing to organize massive protests in the streets to demand "U.S. out of Indochina now!" □

## 'Withdraw' Ground Troops, Escalate Air War

## Nixon's Change of Tactics in Indochina

By Alain Petersen

[The following article is reprinted from the February 19 issue of *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

To understand U. S. imperialism's new Indochina strategy one must integrate a certain number of apparently contradictory facts. Nixon's determination to keep control of Southeast Asia has certainly not diminished. The evolution of the situation in China, however, and the intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict make less acute the necessity of militarily maintaining a costly base. But Nixon, policeman of imperialism, must always protect his reputation as a guarantor, especially since the Indian subcontinent is on the move and rumblings are being heard in Thailand and Burma. Just one push and down go the Asian dominos. All of the tactics employed up to now have not succeeded in ending the Indochinese peoples' revolu-

tionary struggle. More than that, on the military level, U. S. failure is unquestionable.

The large-scale operations in the South, the bombings of the DRV, the fighting in Laos and Cambodia have all been stinging military defeats for the Americans. Moreover, the imperialist war has resulted not only in turning the greater part of world opinion against the United States, but also its own youth, its veterans, and even — this is something new — certain sectors of the working class, who have supported the big NPAC [National Peace Action Coalition] mobilizations.

U. S. ground forces, disgusted with a war that is more than questionable, refuse to fight, take drugs, shoot their officers. In short, they are no longer usable in ground combat. All this didn't happen overnight. The outlines of this crisis have been discernible for the past several years.

On the other hand, the air force, privileged, generally kept away from the dirty work, has remained usable, as have the Marines.

How could imperialism get out of

the impasse? Nixon's response was twofold. First, Vietnamization, that is, the increasingly exclusive use of puppet troops as cannon fodder for the "dirty work," the ground operations. Secondly, chemical warfare, massive bombings, the intervention in Laos and Cambodia to aid and reinforce the puppets.

But this strategy, followed during 1969 and 1970, presupposed the ability to bolster the puppet regime enough to keep it from collapsing. It also assumed that chemical and aerial warfare would be enough to support the Saigon troops effectively. But the strategy has not been successful or, in any case, not successful enough to assure that U. S. ground forces, which are leaving Vietnam on a rather regular basis, will be replaced by puppet troops.

So imperialism again changed its strategy, still maintaining the same general orientation that includes the inescapable necessity of bringing the GIs, who are no longer capable of fighting, back to the United States.

## The Electronic War

How to make U.S. support most effective with the least possible recourse to ground troops? The answer is the air force. It has a number of obvious advantages. It need not be based in Indochina. It needs only a small number of well-paid, elite troops who see the war only as flights that are as calm as those of a regular airline, punctuated for just twenty seconds by the release of twenty tons of anonymously unloaded bombs; soldiers without direct responsibility, who see no unpleasant spectacles like My Lai massacres.

But it's not precise enough. The blanket of B-52 bombs, thick and destructive as it is, falls haphazardly in the jungle. The attempted resolution of this problem is *electronic warfare*. By now, everybody has a rough idea of what this means.

The Pentagon has most obligingly come up with a whole array of gadgets, supposedly infallible. Generally, these electronic detectors are supposed to sniff out the presence of troops on the march, report the passage of trucks, transmit to the U. S. command the slightest order given by a "Vietcong" section commander.

Once detected, the objective is destroyed by an artillery barrage or

by bombings, themselves electronically directed. The nature and position of the target can be ascertained, even at night, by the use of infrared rays, lasers, or ultrasensitive cameras. Anything that can be seen is destroyed.

In theory, all this is very disturbing. But in reality, it seems to be otherwise. U. S. reports indicate numerous failures, gaps, errors in transmission or interpretation. In fact, there is no proof that the B-52s—which unfortunately bomb with impunity, because south of the seventeenth parallel the Indochinese revolutionaries have no means of fighting them—have become any more effective as a result of these gadgets.

This does not mean that the bombings themselves do not, by their intensity and repetition, create a certain problem for the Indochinese revolutionaries. But not to the point of interrupting communications between different regions, or with the North and Laos.

## Reinforcing the Puppets

How to bolster the puppets? In our view, this second aspect of the operation is more important. We must be frank. The complete collapse of the military and political structures of the Saigon regime has not been achieved. Certainly, without the American presence in 1965 and 1968, things would have been different.

But what's the situation in 1972? It seems that an operation unprecedented in history has been unleashed by the imperialists. It consists of substituting for the natural life style and structures of South Vietnam a new life style and new structures which can totally alter social life in a way that delivers the population, bound hand and foot, to the puppet regime.

This operation has two aspects:

1) Systematic destruction of Vietnamese cadres, not only those supposedly belonging to the National Liberation Front, but also those of traditional Vietnamese village life—people who are presumably potential supporters of the resistance. This is Operation Phoenix, initiated several years ago.

2) Forced urbanization of the rural South Vietnamese population, either bringing them into large towns or into concentration camps. For the imperialists, this policy has several advantages:

● It protects a substantial part of the population from "bad influences," which cannot be spread so easily in the closed milieu of urban or concentration-camp life.

● It suppresses or considerably reduces the natural base of support for the Indochinese revolution: the people, among whom the guerrillas move with ease.

● It destroys traditional structures, notably the family life of Vietnamese society, which is, in the local context, a factor in resistance to the "American way of life."

● It allows for the replacement of rural life—already made difficult by the war—by an urban life replete with new needs: dependence on food supplies, the black market, prostitution, subordination to the economy of military occupation, etc.

As Noam Chomsky has commented, this different society, this artificial creation of a special infrastructure, is a prelude to the consolidation of this society through its industrialization under free enterprise, which is projected by the American leaders.

Confidential reports such as the Smithies report for the Institute for Defense Analysis and those of the South East Asia Development Advisory Group (a U. S. agency specializing in Southeast Asia) confirm the deliberateness of this policy.

In fact, the United States wants to integrate South Vietnam into a huge economic complex of free enterprise and heavy investment, in which capitalist Japan will play an important role.

All this permits the construction of a "credible" puppet power on a more solid basis, ultimately resting on a real social foundation, dependent on the American system and tied to that system by all the bonds that create the neocolonial life style for those it enchains.

Multinational corporations, *including French ones*, have an important role to play in this operation—not only by their economic role, but also because they involve their countries of origin. The affair of the UDR [Union pour la Défense de la République—the Gaullist party] deputy Boscher will appear in this light one of these days.

While waiting for this new "sphere of Asian prosperity" (that old dream of imperial Japan) to be constructed, the United States must assure the surviv-



al of the puppet regime. For that, they must help it on the ground, underwriting the great expense of an army of more than 600,000 men.

The fighting value of these men is low. That was seen in Laos. But while they are in Saigon uniforms they are fed, lodged, paid. Their pillage and depredation are tolerated. They are the "clientèle" of the United States, certainly not by conviction but only because they have to eat and support their families.

Imperialism's maintenance of a "national" army, paid to do nothing but repress the people, is an old ploy — of which Africa and Latin America offer numerous examples. But this army still cannot stand on its own feet. It needs help. That is the aim of the electronic war and the operations of the B-52s, which are, at least from the ground (as we have seen), beyond the reach of the Indochinese revolutionaries' weaponry.

### The Third Front

This policy will not be completely effective, according to American officials cited by Chomsky, until 1973-75. Until then imperialism must hold on. To accomplish this, Nixon and Kissinger moved on the diplomatic front. With a two-sided diversion aimed at gaining time — announcing their trips to Moscow and Peking and spectacularly launching a clever, although totally fallacious, "peace" plan in order to deceive public opinion — the two confederates executed an adroit maneuver.

Either they will lead Peking or Moscow, or both — unfortunately on this point the present interests of the two bureaucracies converge — to put pressure on the Indochina Revolutionary Front to accept, in one form or another, a new Geneva. The second phase of the operation can then be set in motion after Nixon is reelected, whether the negotiations have been successful or not.

Or else, they will exacerbate the contradictions between the Soviet Union and China, playing one against the other, to the detriment of political and material support to the Indochina Revolutionary Front, and wind up, through alternately advancing threats and apparent concessions, at gaining the several months they want in order to assure Nixon's reelection and con-

solidate their economic grip on South Vietnam.

All this is perfectly coherent. U.S. imperialism has learned a lot. It knows that it can protect its control over an apparently unfavorable situation by playing its "national" and even "neutralist" card. The Middle East and Africa are good examples. Neocolonialist strategy has matured. It has acquired experience from ten years of mistakes.

It benefits from the aid it receives from the peaceful-coexistence and great-power policies of the two big workers states, whose leaders have never met their responsibilities to the Indochina revolution.

### A Crucial Period

But is this strategy irresistible? Far from it! Above all because the Indochinese revolutionaries have always remained unshaken in their determination to fight on. The nub of the problem is the real solidity, present and future, of the puppet regime. If the famous neutralist, or even discreetly anti-American, regime is installed in Saigon — which in the Pentagon Papers Johnson's adviser Under Secretary of Defense McNaughton considered an acceptable solution — what would happen? Would it very quickly evolve toward the socialist reunification of Vietnam or would it

very quickly succumb to the adulterated charms of neocolonialism? And what about the puppet regimes in Vientiane and Pnompenh? Who will exercise real power over the masses of those cities?

If the whole situation very quickly swings in the direction hoped for by all the world's revolutionary Marxists, won't Nixon then be led to respond with another massive escalation? Is that why the B-52s and the U.S. aircraft carriers are heading to the Tonkin Gulf? Won't they try to accomplish what McNamara did not succeed in doing: throwing up a blockade across the seventeenth parallel — an atomic blockade if necessary — without bombs, but simply with radioactive wastes? Rumors about this have already started.

The coming weeks and months will be crucial. They will, all evidence indicates, decide the future evolution of all Southeast Asia. Our task is quite clear! More than ever before: massive militant, permanent, material, and political support to the Indochina Revolutionary Front.

No to the new strategy of imperialism!

Not one cent, not one weapon, not one investment to the puppets!

End the divisions in the workers' camp in defense of the Indochinese Revolution!

Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the Indochina Revolution will win!

## 'Science' in the Service of Society

### How U.S. Official Protects Environment

U.S. government officials have long been aware that when they want to make unpopular decisions, it helps to have an "expert" commission recommend the decision that has already been made. Since the countless studies carried out every year almost never disagree with official policy, it is perhaps understandable if administrators occasionally anticipate events and announce the results of a study before it is made.

A recent case in point concerns William D. Ruckelshaus, head of the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA has so far refused to support proposed legislation that would outlaw one-way bottles and cans, which environmentalists consider a major source of litter.

Manufacturers of the one-way containers have vociferously opposed requiring that soft drinks and beer be sold only in re-

turnable bottles. Last October, Ruckelshaus began citing a study that he said supported the manufacturers.

According to Ruckelshaus, an experiment in California found that returnable bottles were even more of a litter problem than one-way cans and bottles. Customers didn't return them when the required deposit was small. When the deposit was raised to 11 cents, Ruckelshaus said, unscrupulous persons could manufacture bottles themselves and sell them for a profit.

When reporters asked for more details on the study, however, the EPA eventually admitted that it had never been made. A spokesman for Ruckelshaus said the latter "had apparently seized on some information and taken it way further than was true." An ability to do that consistently has won high office for more than one capitalist politician. □

# How the Workers in Austria Should Fight Hitler

By Leon Trotsky

[The following article, unsigned, was published in *Unser Wort*, the organ of the German section of the International Communist League, in two parts in July and September 1936 (Volume 4, Numbers 13 and 14). It would therefore have been written while Trotsky was in Norway.

[The title as it appeared in *Unser Wort* was "Sollen die österreichischen Arbeiter die 'Unabhängigkeit' Oesterreichs verteidigen? (Ein Gespräch)"—"Should the Austrian Workers Defend the 'Independence' of Austria? (A Dialogue)."

[The German version printed in *Unser Wort* is the only one known to have survived. The article appears here for the first time in English. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.

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A: Don't you think the RS [Revolutionäre Sozialisten—Revolutionary Socialists]<sup>1</sup> and the KP [Kommunistische Partei—Communist party] are right when they say that the Austrian workers are under the same necessity as the French workers? Don't they have to defend their country in order not to be attacked by Hitler?

B: If the French workers defended "their" country (Is it really then their country?) under the leadership of Blum and Cachin, they would do Hitler the greatest service they are capable of. They would make it possible for him to tell the German workers: "They always talk to you about class struggle. The class struggle is a fraud. The French worker defends his country. Ties of blood are stronger than Marxist dogma. The German worker must also defend his fatherland. We are engaged in a holy, national struggle."

That is how Hitler would speak. And he would not find it difficult to win belief, in view of the fact that a significant part of the German working class is contaminated with nationalism, a contamination encouraged by the earlier policies of the SPD [Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—Social Democratic party of Germany] and the KPD [Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands—Communist party of Germany]. No, there is only one way to cure the German working class of its nationalist infection: the class struggle against one's own bourgeoisie in every country!

A: And are we then to take no notice of the political regime of a country? France is a democracy, Germany a fascist dictatorship. Isn't a war between France and Germany a struggle of two irreconcilable political regimes?

1. The RS was the "illegal" Social-Democratic organization, founded after the Socialist party was crushed by troops in February 1934.

B: No. It is a struggle of two imperialisms. In the world war, too, the social patriots of the Entente countries, like Longuet and Henderson, spoke of the struggle of democracy against Hapsburg and Hohenzollern militarism and of the struggle for a "just" peace. We are familiar with the "just" Versailles peace.

On the other side, the German social patriots like Wels and Scheidemann chattered about the fight "against czarism." But this did not hinder these gentlemen from supporting their government after czarism had been overthrown and the German army was led against the Russian revolution.

They did not even vote against the vile peace dictated at Brest-Litovsk. All these formulas—"struggle of the democracies," "friend of peace," "antifascist alliance," etc.—are nothing but ideological cloaks. If fascist Italy decides to fight on the side of France, these people will begin to distinguish between a "constructive" and a "destructive" fascism.

A: But one cannot overlook the fact that France is an ally of Soviet Russia. If French imperialism is weakened, Soviet Russia will also be weakened.

B: Does imperialist France really appear to you to be a certain, reliable partner of the Soviet Union?

Let's consider the question from the standpoint of the best possible case: the day on which National Socialist Germany is conquered. On that day at the latest, imperialist France will ally itself with death and the devil and, if need be, with recently defeated bourgeois Germany, against the Soviet Union. The only certain aid for the Soviet Union is the victory of the revolution in the capitalist countries, no matter what their political regime and foreign policy may be.

The development of revolutionary struggle will weaken imperialism? Of course. That is precisely the point! That is the way the Soviet Union will be strengthened.

A: Perhaps you didn't completely understand me. I see the following danger: If French imperialism is weakened by the sharpening of revolutionary struggle, and the French army is undermined, then Hitler would be strengthened and could win a military victory over a France embroiled in civil war. He might even capture all of France.

B: If revolutionary battles and victories had no effect outside the country in which they occur, events might turn out as you have pictured them. But reality is quite different.

In war, the morale of the soldiers is crucial. To undermine the bourgeois morale of an army, there is no stronger means than the example of revolutionary struggle.

Revolutionary example is effective in any situation, but to an especially high degree in wartime. For the hungry masses, who have death staring them in the face, engaging in a revolution during a war is far less of a risk than not engaging in it.

There is also a whole series of new circumstances that hasten the unleashing of the revolutionary process and that drastically shorten, in particular, the duration of the revolutionary struggle for power. Consider only the changed picture of modern war, the direct horrors of which (air war!) will this time be visited on the rear areas too.

And let's not forget that the masses have learned a great deal from the experiences of the last war and the postwar period. Above all, don't overlook the proletarian revolution throughout the world, which represents a far more important factor than in the previous world war, not only in numbers but also in richness of experience and political maturity. All this makes it probable that the revolutionary process will be incomparably quicker than it was in Russia in 1917.

Nevertheless, we cannot say it is excluded that the ever-so-short period before the victory of the proletarian uprising will permit Hitler to occupy a portion of France. It is conceivable that at first Hitler's powers of endurance will be stronger than the effects of revolutionary battle. But with the victory of the revolution, the opportunity will be quickly regained to reconquer the lost regions and, beyond that, to squeeze German capitalism to death in the vise of a workers' France and the Soviet Union.

A: I have to admit there is much to that. But does the same thing apply for little Austria that applies for big France? Isn't there the danger that Hitler will swallow *all* of Austria?

B: Politics, especially revolutionary politics, is inconceivable without danger. "A real socialist," Lenin writes in his August 20, 1918, letter to the American workers, "would not fail to understand that for the sake of achieving victory over the bourgeoisie, for the sake of power passing to the workers, for the sake of *starting* the world proletarian revolution, we *cannot* and *must not* hesitate to make the heaviest sacrifices, including the sacrifice of part of our territory, the sacrifice of heavy defeats at the hands of imperialism. A real socialist would have proved by *deeds* his willingness for 'his' country to make the greatest sacrifice to give a real push forward to the cause of the socialist revolution.

"For the sake of 'their' cause, that is, for the sake of winning world hegemony, the imperialists of Britain and Germany have not hesitated to utterly ruin and throttle a whole number of countries, from Belgium and Serbia to Palestine and Mesopotamia. But must socialists wait with 'their' cause, the cause of liberating the working people of the whole world from the yoke of capital, of winning universal and lasting peace, until a path without sacrifice is found? Must they fear to open the battle until an easy victory is 'guaranteed'? Must they place the integrity and security of 'their' bourgeois-created 'fatherland' above the interests of the world socialist revolution? The scoundrels . . . who think this way, those

lackeys who grovel to bourgeois morality, stand triply condemned."

If there is a way to defend oneself against Hitlers in Austria, it is by striking at one's own bourgeoisie. The politics of the "lesser evil" leads only to the greatest evil. To get Hitler, there was no more certain way than supporting Brüning. The same holds true for the Austrian Brünings.

A: And your solution is?

B: . . . the revolutionary two-front war. The task is to combine the struggle against Schuschnigg<sup>2</sup> with the struggle against the Nazis. One cannot participate in the independence swindle. But that is a problem we must discuss another time.

A: You just said that the Austrian proletariat must combine the struggle against Schuschnigg with the struggle against Hitler. You shouldn't overlook the fact that the RS and KP also want to overthrow Schuschnigg.

B: Of course they want to. But at the same time they take the position of defending Austrian "independence," that is, the same position as Schuschnigg. By doing so they confuse the workers; they disorganize and hamstring the proletarian struggle. Their speech is less and less distinguishable from that of the government. "Austria" is the battle cry of the government. "Austria" is also the slogan of the KP. One can read in *Rote Fahne*, the issue for the end of June 1936:

"Yes, we declare ourselves for Austria! Not only do we declare ourselves: the workers are the only ones who fight for Austria. We will save Austria from betrayal and catastrophe by fighting against the handful of adventurers and politicians of catastrophe in the authoritarian government, the Heimwehr [Home Guard] bands, the Nazis, and the supporters of the Hapsburgs."

*Arbeiter-Zeitung*, the organ of the RS, uses the same kind of language.

A: But don't the RS and KP want to defend Austrian independence only *after* the bourgeoisie has restored democracy?

B: Certainly. "The workers will defend only a free Austria" is the way their continual declamations go. The bureaucrats would like to be *paid* for handing over to the bourgeoisie workers trained to be enthusiastic cannon fodder.

A: But don't they want to defend the independence of Austria in order to fend off Hitler?

B: First of all: The so-called independence of Austria is a lie. In reality Austria is a vassal of Italian imperialism. When the RS and KP scream at the top of their

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2. Kurt von Schuschnigg became Chancellor after Dollfuss was assassinated in July 1934. Strongly anticommunist, he repressed the left while attempting to win Hitler's agreement to Austrian "independence." Early in 1938, under German pressure, Schuschnigg appointed three Nazis to prominent posts in the cabinet. His attempt to forestall *Anschluss* by means of a plebiscite was cut short by the entry of German troops.

lungs about the "independence" of Austria, that only indicates their effort to protect Austria from *Anschluss* [with Germany] and to make it into a vassal of the no-less imperialist bloc of France and the Little Entente, which is allied with the Soviet Union.

Their entire policy proceeds from the idea: The main enemy of both the Austrian and the Russian workers is Hitler. Therefore the first task is to strike at Hitler. For this reason it is necessary to ally the proletariat with all the "antifascist forces," under which shamefaced name the "democratic" bourgeoisies inside and outside Austria are included. This alliance, naturally, is possible only with the *complete deferment of the class struggle*. On any other basis an alliance between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is inconceivable. But as we have just attempted to show, this policy makes easier the victory of the Nazis.

Our path is quite different. We proceed from the opinion that war puts the question of fighting for power before the workers perhaps even more sharply than the economic crisis.

One must use the war to unchain the proletarian revolution in all countries. But that is possible only through the sharpest opposition and struggle against the power conducting the war. Only in this way can we gather the lower layers of the petty bourgeoisie and decisive parts of the army around the proletariat and carry out the revolution.

On Sundays and holidays the RS and KP also speak about the revolution, but they don't really believe in it.

If they did, they would not direct the hopes of the masses they influence toward parts of their own bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisies of other countries. They would not talk of the "peace front"—that is, the front of the bourgeoisies in those countries opposed to Hitler, but who are just as imperialistic as Hitler—and ignore the only real peace front, that of the international working class.

If the present situation is not to end in another war in which *one* imperialist grouping emerges victorious instead of the proletarian revolution in as many countries as possible, then the hopes of the workers must be directed not toward the class enemy, whatever the guise it takes, but toward their own strength, toward revolutionary action against *their own* bourgeoisie.

The proletariat can be the strongest social force in modern society. What hinders the victorious unfolding of this power is the parties that still have great influence over the proletariat. The proletariat has been weakened and is kept in this weakened condition by its old and degenerated parties, whose entire work consists of inoculating their followers with disbelief in the proletariat's class strength.

One cannot make the revolution with leaders who do not believe in the revolution. From this comes the unavoidable conclusion: If the socialist revolution is to triumph, it is necessary to devote all our strength in every country to the building of a new revolutionary workers' organization. This is an obligation for everyone who does not want to see the working class again neglect a great historic opportunity. □

## Devlin, Marchers Sentenced in Belfast

# Dublin Government Arrests Republican Leaders

The official British inquiry into the "Bloody Sunday" murder of thirteen civil-rights demonstrators in Derry January 30 got under way in Northern Ireland February 21, while a stepped-up campaign of repression against the Irish Republican Army was being launched by the Dublin government in the south.

The Dublin move against the IRA was announced February 20 by Minister of Justice Desmond O'Malley in what the February 21 *New York Times* termed an "unusually tough speech" to the annual conference of the government party, Fianna Fáil. O'Malley said that the attorney general would intervene to place on trial certain persons whose cases the government felt "had not been prosecuted with enough vigor," reported the *Times*.

The announcement was viewed as a reference to the case of seven men, "allegedly members of the illegal Irish

Republican Army, who appeared before a court at Dundalk on arms-smuggling charges," the week before. The charges had been dismissed because of lack of evidence.

In a radio interview later, Irish Prime Minister Jack Lynch said his government did not plan to introduce military courts at the moment. "Nobody can rule out anything in the present circumstances," he added, however. "We are determined to maintain the law and the security of the people."

Three days after O'Malley's announcement, a dragnet operation was begun for leaders of the IRA and the republican movement. Eight leaders of the Official IRA were detained, among them Cathal Goulding Sr., chief of staff; Tony Hefferman, joint secretary of Sinn Féin, the political arm of the Official republicans; and Michael Ryan, manager of the *United Irishman*. They were detained under an act that allows police to hold sus-

pects for forty-eight hours without bringing charges.

Sinn Féin denounced the raids as a "deliberate and blatant attempt to suppress an open political organization."

More raids followed the next day, with the rounding up of ten persons reported by the Associated Press to be members of the Provisional IRA.

Raids continued on February 25 when, according to Reuters, "a number of Republican militants" were picked up, including Sean Kenny, joint secretary of Sinn Féin.

On February 21, the British government opened its Bloody Sunday "inquiry" in the largely Protestant town of Coleraine, in spite of objections from the Catholic community. The inquiry is headed by the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Widgery. According to Bernard Weinraub in the February 22 *New York Times*, the Catholic community has "largely re-

fused to participate on the ground that Lord Widgery, a former British Army officer, could not investigate Army actions impartially."

"We want the inquiry to be an international one," said the relatives of the thirteen slain demonstrators in a statement made before the opening of the inquiry. "We totally reject the Widgery tribunal as a means of establishing the truth since it is neither independent nor impartial and since its terms of reference prohibit production of the full truth."

Weinraub reported that the relatives modified this stand the day the inquiry began and agreed to testify "in spite of our continued grave reservations."

Testimony on February 24 included that of a Roman Catholic priest, the Reverend Edward Daly, who said he had been in a crowd that was running away from advancing British armored cars when he heard a shot ring out, killing an unarmed boy next to him. "That was the first shot of the afternoon," he testified.

James Chapman, a former British army sergeant now working in the civil service of the Defense Department, said that from his apartment window he saw armored cars surge into the Catholic Bogside, the troops get out and immediately assume firing positions. "They were then opening up at almost point-blank range at about 150 to 300 people fleeing through a barrier." He saw three persons, none of them armed, hit as they climbed a barricade.

The British army has been claiming that paratroopers opened fire only after a sniper and nail-bomb attack by the demonstrators and that the soldiers fired only at "identifiable objects" who were tossing bombs or engaging in a sniper attack. "They did not shoot indiscriminately and did not carry out a policy of murder," asserted Brian Gibbens, counsel for the Ministry of Defense, February 24.

Yet John Stocker, counsel to the inquiry, said that laboratory tests of the clothing of the victims showed that in the case of twelve out of the thirteen, there was no evidence at all that they had been carrying bombs. Traces of nitroglycerin and four nail-bombs were found in the pockets of the thirteenth, he said, but he offered no evidence that the victim had actually thrown any.

On February 19, three days before

the inquiry opened, Bernadette Devlin and twelve other persons were sentenced to six months' imprisonment in Belfast for taking part in protest marches in defiance of the ban on such protests. They were released on \$260 bail each, pending appeals.

In a statement she read to the court, Bernadette Devlin said that "as an individual like every other individual here, I have been tried before this court like a job lot in an auction.

"I have been tried before heavily armed police and Army—the forces of British imperialism." She said she considered her participation in the anti-internment march in Belfast on Christmas Day, for which she was sentenced, "legal and justified" because "I contend that the law in this state is itself illegal."

On February 23, the High Court of Northern Ireland ruled invalid a regulation empowering British army officers to force gatherings of people to disperse. The ruling also found that the army's power to search, enter

homes and make arrests without warrant conflicted with Ulster's basic charter, Anthony Lewis reported in the *New York Times* February 24. The charter is a 1920 British law that does not give the provincial government the power to legislate "in respect of the armed forces." As a result of the ruling, noted Lewis, "anyone arrested by the army in recent months could have sued."

The ruling prompted the British government to rush a bill through Parliament that in effect reversed the court's decision. Home Secretary Reginald Maudling said it was "clearly a matter of great urgency," and both houses of Parliament prepared to sit through the night if necessary. The bill, which makes members of the armed forces immune, retroactively, for any action that would have been illegal under the court ruling, became law at 2:00 a.m. with the support of both Tories and the Labour party. □

## Bandaranaike Weds Science to 'Justice'

The Ceylon "United Front" government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike is planning to introduce a new development in jurisprudence, according to a dispatch from Colombo by B. H. S. Jayewardene in the February 12 *Far Eastern Economic Review*.

With more than 15,000 prisoners arrested in the aftermath of last April's uprising, the regime has shown considerable doubt about how to proceed. Bringing the alleged culprits to trial could be embarrassing since many are being held on no more evidence than anonymous denunciations. On the other hand, the young prisoners are undoubtedly a danger to the governing coalition, in a political if not a military sense.

The solution to this problem would not be possible without the benefits of modern technology. Bandaranaike, according to Jayewardene, will leave the determination of guilt or innocence to computers:

"Computers have now completed processing data gathered on each detainee and determined the extent of each one's involvement. About 4,000 face charges only of attending revolutionary lectures. They are due for

early release. The Government will decide later what action should be taken against the others. Those against whom there is substantial evidence of direct involvement will have to face charges of high treason which carries a mandatory death penalty."

There are undoubted advantages to leaving the judicial decisions to computers. Even the sternest of human judges might be moved to injudicious clemency at the thought of requiring large numbers of youths to face a mandatory death penalty—an emotional failing to which computers are not subject. Moreover, computers can be programmed much more easily than can juries to accept as valid evidence whatever the programmer desires.

Bandaranaike's pioneering role in computer jurisprudence may well go down in history alongside Richard Nixon's introduction of computerized bombing in Indochina. It only remains now to develop a computer that can perform the actual executions, and the members of the United Front will be able to say with a clear conscience that there is no blood on their hands.

## Atmosphere of Crisis in Khartoum

### Two Sudanese Leaders Resign

General Khaled Hassan Abbas, vice president and minister of defense of the Sudan, handed his resignation to President Jaafar Nimeiry on February 13. The Nimeiry-Abbas split, the reasons for which remain obscure, produced a crisis atmosphere in Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, according to the semi-official Egyptian newspaper *el-Ahram*.

Abbas was the organizer of the reactionary counter-coup that returned Nimeiry to power last July 22, three days after the latter had been deposed by leftist-inclined army officers.

For some time there have been rumors of differences between Nimeiry and Abbas, who is considered the most strongly pro-Egyptian official in the Sudanese government. On the night of February 14, Sadat sent Egyptian Foreign Minister Mourad Ghaleb to Khartoum to try to arrange a reconciliation between Nimeiry and Abbas.

Ghaleb was apparently unsuccessful. He returned to Cairo the following day, and on February 17 another central Sudanese official tendered his resignation, supposedly for personal reasons.

This time it was Maamoun Awad Abu Zaid, general secretary of the Sudanese Socialist Union (the country's sole legal political formation) and a close follower of Abbas.

Nimeiry announced that he would reserve judgment on Zaid's resignation and threatened to dissolve the political bureau of the SSU if there were any further defections.

Army-imposed censorship prevents the issues that divide Nimeiry and Abbas from being publicly aired. It is known that since the July 22, 1971, counter-coup, Nimeiry has been furiously trying, without a great deal of success, to reconstruct a popular base for his ruling junta. His rhetoric has shifted from Nasser-style anti-imperialism to Islamic diatribes and has increasingly appealed to the most backward rural sections of the country. The Sudanese Communist party, once the largest in the Arab world, has been virtually destroyed. The left wing of the forces that formed the SSU is mostly in jail. (The regime

admits that there are slightly more than 1,500 political prisoners, most of them in Khartoum and the Blue Nile province, where the left has traditionally been influential.)

The open break between Nimeiry and Abbas came at a delicate time for the president. Some 900 delegates are in the process of drafting a new "national charter" for the SSU. And on February 15 negotiations between

representatives of the central government and Anya-Nya, the organization that leads the autonomy movement of the South Sudanese, opened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The central government under both Nimeiry and his predecessor has been trying to crush the South Sudanese for fifteen years. Ending the rebellion, whether by force or negotiation, is considered a priority task in Nimeiry's plan to reestablish "law and order" in the Sudan.

It is possible that Abbas's differences with Nimeiry center around the two questions of the future role of the SSU and the handling of the situation in the South. □

### Egypt

### Sadat Moves Against 'Subversives'

By Jon Rothschild



ANWAR EL-SADAT

Threatening to resign if the wisdom of his policies were challenged, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat received a vote of confidence at the closed-door congress of the Arab Socialist Union, which began February 15. Sadat has

been under heavy pressure from student demonstrations demanding action against Israel. His inability to obtain greater amounts of military aid from the Soviet bureaucracy has been an additional embarrassment.

Nobody took the threatened resignation very seriously, but the fact that Sadat would even suggest quitting was a clear sign that his government has been shaken by the student protest. The members of the ASU, aware that they lack a suitable alternative to Sadat, unanimously passed a resolution declaring their "total confidence" in him. The resolution described Nasser's successor as "the pioneer of our struggle and the leader of our battle of destiny."

The congress then proceeded to approve the usual motion on the Arab-Israeli conflict. It stated that "war of liberation is the only road to recovery of the occupied territories," but added that "the moment of battle must be decided by taking into account the international conjuncture," and requested a continuation of efforts to reach a political settlement with the Zionist state.

In pursuance of that aim, the United Nations Middle East special envoy, Gunnar Jarring, arrived in Cairo February 18 to discuss "peace plans" with Egyptian leaders.

More significant than the reiteration

of Sadat's long-standing policy of windbagism on the Arab-Israeli question was the opening of a small-scale (at least so far) witch-hunt against leftist opponents of the regime.

On February 13 three Europeans — a French student, a Belgian industrialist, and his son — were arrested on charges of having conspired with Israeli intelligence to spread subversion in Egypt. Initially, the regime tried to imply that the three, who have supposedly confessed, were involved in the student demonstrations.

But in reality, Sadat's charges relate to an incident that took place last July, when letters denouncing the regime appeared in numerous mailboxes. At the time, according to the Paris daily *Le Monde*, most people attributed the letters to the Muslim Brotherhood, an extreme right-wing group, because of the anticommunist tone of the letters. *Le Monde* correspondent Roland Delcour noted in that paper's February 20-21 issue that the infantile style of the letters did not seem to point to Israeli intelligence — which is fluent in Arabic — as their source. The linking of the incident, even if only by implication, to the student demonstrations seems, therefore, to have the sole aim of intimidation.

On February 19 Salah Nassar, chief of state security, was forced to admit that the alleged Israeli agents were not connected with the student demonstrations, despite the tone of earlier reports.

Sadat has attempted to quiet the students by a combination of conciliatory gestures and thinly veiled threats. On February 18 he announced that the thirty students held in custody since January 24 would be released. But he also said that the actions of the student rebels were an objective aid to Israel. The same theme was sounded by Minister of Justice Mohammed Salama: "It has been firmly proven that most students remain healthy and responsible and that we can have confidence in them, with the exception of a few groups of extremists who get their instructions from abroad." Salama, and Sadat before him, singled out "some partisans of the Palestinian revolution" as examples of the foreign-controlled extremists.

The Egyptian press has reported two rounds of arrests, besides the three Europeans. The February 21 *el-Ahram* reported that police operations had unearthed a group of twenty-

seven "subversives" who had managed to infiltrate the presidential services. Their aim, according to the police, was to "overthrow all [!] the regimes in power in Arab countries." Police said their suspicions that such an outfit existed were raised by the appearance of subversive leaflets during the

student demonstrations.

Another leading newspaper, *el-Akhbar*, reported that five persons belonging to a subversive cell had been arrested in Helwan, the industrial complex south of Cairo that has been the scene of militant trade-union activity. □

## 'Progressive Front' Formed in Syria

A new "Progressive Front of National Union" has been formed in Syria, apparently at the behest of the ruling faction of the Baath party. According to the February 15 *Le Monde*, four non-Baathist political tendencies will participate in the front: the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), a Nasserite formation led by Jamal Atassi; the Movement of Socialist Unionists, led by Jamal el-Soufi; the Movement of Arab Socialists, led by Akram el-Haurani; the Communist party, led by Khaled Backdesh, the Arab East's leading Stalinist.

Negotiations to establish the front began last November; they were conducted by President Hafez el-Assad, Vice President Mahmoud Ayoubi, and the ASU's Jamal Atassi. The statutes and charter of the front will be published at the end of February.

The supremacy of the Baath party will not be challenged by the new political formation. Students, for example, are forbidden to join any of its components except the Baath. It is unclear whether the front will be a purely consultative body or whether it will have executive powers. □

## Two Guerrilla Groups Unite

## British 'Advisers' Fighting in Oman

Despite the British government's pledge to recall all of its troops stationed east of Suez by the beginning of 1972, British soldiers have continued to participate in the attempt to crush the revolutionary guerrilla movement in the southern part of the Arabian peninsula.

The question of the British role in the secret war in the newly "independent" state of Oman was raised recently when it was announced that two British soldiers of the special air service had been killed during operations against the rebels.

The dead soldiers were officially "advisers" to the army of the Omani sultan, whose government is strongly supported by Great Britain. But, like the U.S. advisers in Indochina during the early 1960s, British personnel in Oman are taking an increasingly direct role in the fighting.

During 1971, as the official date for British withdrawal from the Arabian peninsula drew close, a series

of political maneuvers aimed at maintaining control of the region was set in motion by the Heath government.

The Union of Arab Emirates was created by the fusion of six of the so-called Trucial states, which lie on the southeast border of the Arab-Persian Gulf. Bahrein and Qatar, northwest of the Trucial states, became formally independent and members of the United Nations. Oman, on the southeast corner of the Arabian peninsula, likewise became independent and joined the UN.

But the British government continued to arm and train the armies of their new puppet regimes. The Omani sultan's minister of defense is British; the Royal Air Force maintains a staging post on Masira Island, just off the Omani coast in the Arabian Sea; the sultan's air force is kept in operation by British installations in Salalah, the only town of any size in Dhufar, a province of Oman.

The reason for all the concern about

a sparsely populated, relatively small geographical area is not hard to find: Nearly 70 percent of Western Europe's oil supplies (and the largest proven oil reserves in the world) are located in the territory around the Arabian peninsula.

The whole region has been the scene of revolutionary struggle and civil war between Western-supported royalist forces on the one hand, and republican and/or leftist ones on the other.

On January 29 it was announced

in Aden, Southern Yemen, that two guerrilla groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf and the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, had united after holding a conference in Ahleesh, a liberated zone in Dhufar, last December.

The new group, Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, vowed to continue the struggle against the British-backed sultanate in Oman and Dhufar. □

## France

### Freedom for Pierre Rousset!

[We have translated the following article from the February 19 issue of *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International.]

\* \* \*

For more than ten days, our comrade Pierre Rousset, a member of the Political Bureau of the Ligue Communiste and a national leader of the Front Solidarité Indochine [FSI—Indochina Solidarity Front], has been held in Santé Prison in Paris.

Pierre Rousset was arrested on Tuesday, February 8, at 2:00 a.m. He is said to have been picked up on Pierre Le Roux Street in the seventh *arrondissement* by a hypothetical brigade (which had never been heard of prior to this) called the "brigade for the detection of criminal offenses."

According to information in our possession, it is alleged that Pierre Rousset had agreed, on behalf of Latin American revolutionaries, to act as go-between in transporting various items that the police are referring to as "materials capable of being used in making explosives."

Whatever Mr. Marcellin's police may say or claim, one thing is for sure: Pierre Rousset is being isolated in a cell without newspapers, without books, without the wherewithal for doing any work, all because of an absolutely elementary political act of solidarity on his part.

Above all, he must be granted the status of a political prisoner, so that he may read and write in a normal fashion.

It would be a poor move for the French government to keep behind bars an activist whose political activities—as all his comrades, and surely the gentlemen from the intelligence services, know—at least never involved delivering weapons to bloody dictatorships like those of Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua or Paraguay.

By his opposition to the torturers who are crushing their people through misery and death and who assassinate those who oppose their bloody rule

## Tunisia

### Students Shout, 'Down With Dictatorship!'

On February 9 the Habib Bourguiba regime shut down the law and art schools of the University of Tunis until next September. The action came just after police used tear gas and clubs to break up the first major anti-government demonstration in Tunisia in fifteen years.

University students, joined by several hundred high-school students, had gathered in major downtown intersections and had chanted, "Down with dictatorship!" and other slogans. According to the February 10 *Le Monde*, one of the demonstrators' key slogans was: "National unity is

a bourgeois maneuver. You have sold Tunisia for flour."


The regime had threatened to close the university on February 8, unless students returned peacefully to their classes the following day. On the afternoon of February 8, national guard units were stationed at various points around the capital city. But the students took to the streets in spite of the threat.

On February 10, in a speech to the National Assembly, Premier Hedi Nouria blamed the demonstrations on a "Baathist" country in the Middle East, presumably either Syria or Iraq.

But six days before, Minister of Housing and Public Works Sayah had another explanation. On February 1 a Frenchwoman, Simone Lelouche, was convicted of conspiring against the security of the state in 1968. She was given a two-year (suspended) prison term and expelled from the country.

According to Sayah, the students used the case "of a Jew of French nationality" to spread anarchy: "It is clearly evident that behind this disturbance lie Zionist schemes, just as was the case in France in May 1968 with another Jew, Cohn-Bendit."

Sayah's analysis of the French May events is less original than it sounds at first. During 1968, it was shared by the French fascists, who called the popular student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit "the German Jew." The French student movement responded by adding a slogan to their demonstrations: "We are all German Jews!"



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—such as our comrade Luis Eduardo Merlino, who was tortured to death by the Brazilian gorillas—Pierre Rousset has done a service to a cause that is not his alone, but ours as well.

Mr. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing [Minister of Economy and Finance] struts about in Rio de Janeiro praising the "Brazilian miracle"; Mr. Jean de Lipkowski [Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] celebrates the Greek colonels' "struggle for freedom"; Mr. Raymond Marcellin [Minister of the Interior] collaborates with Franco's police; gener-

ally speaking, the French government is the most faithful supplier of weapons to all the dashing and well-bred dictatorships on the planet.

For trying to lighten the load—even a little—of those who will bring down these regimes of sweat and blood, Pierre Rousset has been held for more than ten days. To hold him any longer would be just one more admission of the political sympathies of those in power and of their complicity with the butchers of Latin America.

Freedom for Pierre Rousset! □

## 'Followed the Law' and Pocketed the Profits

# French Premier Caught Up in Tax Scandal

On February 15 millions of French television viewers were treated to an unusual spectacle: a high government official discussing his personal financial situation. The official—Premier Jacques Chaban-Delmas—took the drastic step of appearing on TV to deny that he had engaged in tax fraud. His speech was an effort to still a public controversy set off January 19 by charges in the satirical weekly *le Canard enchaîné* that he had paid no taxes from 1966 through 1969. During much of the period, he was speaker of the National Assembly.

For a month the premier had wavered between ignoring the charges and defending himself publicly.

"These vacillations are dangerous," wrote Pierre Viansson-Ponté February 3 in the Paris daily *Le Monde*, "for they simultaneously give credit to the idea that one has nothing to say and the impression that one has a lot to cover up." There was mounting public suspicion that the wealthy and powerful were benefiting from tax loopholes that for the common wage-earner were nonexistent.

*Le Canard enchaîné* produced two of the premier's tax returns to back up its charge that he had avoided taxes through tax credits equal to half the dividends he had received from his stocks. It subsequently also published a photostat of a letter from Chaban-Delmas in December 1970 to a tax inspector named Edouard Dega explaining how he had deducted tax rebates from his taxes in 1968 and

1969. Dega is currently in jail on charges of helping wealthy taxpayers evade payments.

The premier's television appearance did little to dispel the rising suspicions of millions of French workers who must pay annual taxes amounting to about one month's salary merely because they are not lucky enough to belong to a privileged stock-owning class that is forever seeking new ways to add to its privileges.

He had only "followed the law as it applies to everyone," he asserted. His income as speaker of the Assembly was not legally taxable, he explained. And as for tax credits, well, they are a kind of withholding system whereby taxes are paid "at the source," so the taxpayer does not always have to pay anything at the end of the year. "But," observed Henry Giniger in the February 16 *New York Times*, "the technical explanations made it plain that the corporation had paid and the shareholders got the reduction in taxes."

"The law is certainly complicated, too complicated," Chaban-Delmas noted. "It may be necessary to find different ways of formulating it. . . ." He made no suggestions.

He did, however, offer ideas on the importance of "protecting one's private life," and suggested his own might have been better protected if his financial affairs had never been dragged into public view by the press. "Every freedom must be limited by respect for the freedom of others. When this

limit is breached, we no longer have freedom but license. And this goes for freedom of the press as well as for any other freedom."

He concluded his television remarks by affirming his desire to "transform our society by making it better, by heading toward what I have called a 'new society'. . . ."

One ingredient in his "new society" (though he did not say so) might be a civil service that does not leak embarrassing documents to the press.

The French civil service is known for its discretion, but, as Giniger pointed out, "the tax officials themselves, civil servants with relatively low incomes, have begun to complain, through their unions, about the thousands of requests received each year for deals that will get relatively well-off people out of tax troubles." The leaking of documents prompted the Gaullist movement, to which the premier belongs, to issue a complaint in mid-February against "civil servants who have gone astray."

Scandals do not usually bring down French governments. But this one is coming at a time when attention is already turning toward the elections scheduled for 1973. And the Gaullist government is particularly vulnerable because it has tried to cultivate an image of high-minded integrity and dedication to the general interest. Chaban-Delmas has shown that there was also dedication to special interests.

But, of course, serving special interests is a daily routine under bourgeois regimes. And when the routine gives birth to a scandal, it says less about the individuals involved than it does about the system as a whole. "It is true that the root of the scandal is not in the Chaban case. . . ." noted the French revolutionary-socialist weekly *Rouge* February 19, "but in the entire fiscal system whereby the bourgeoisie makes the workers pay the enormous costs of its state apparatus and its privileges." □

### Research on Socialist Women

Mari Jo Buhle, 54 Walker St., Somerville, Mass. 02144, is doing research work for a doctoral dissertation on revolutionary-socialist women in the U.S., like Antoinette Konikow, who began their radical careers in the Socialist party in the period before 1919. She would appreciate hearing from anyone who can suggest sources of information such as personal papers, letters, or published items by such figures.

## The Economic Crisis and the Common Market

The Belgian Marxist economist Ernest Mandel visited Denmark in mid-November of last year, at which time he addressed public meetings in Copenhagen and Aarhus. While there he was interviewed by Jorgen Rasmussen on Danish radio. The following is the transcript of the interview, with the introduction Rasmussen gave Danish listeners. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.

\* \* \*

The Belgian Marxist Ernest Mandel is internationally known as an economist and as a leading figure in the Trotskyist Fourth International. He has been concerned with the Common Market in both capacities. His debate with the French economist and politician Servan-Schreiber on the character of the international competition between the United States and Europe, and the Common Market's place in it, attracted a great deal of international attention. Servan-Schreiber saw technical and economic cooperation between the European states and cooperation between capital and labor as a necessary condition for meeting the American challenge.

Mandel, on the other hand, believes that economic and political development in America and Western Europe is characterized by more deep-going antagonisms, and that these antagonisms can be overcome only by abolishing capitalism, by the working class taking power and beginning the construction of socialism. Instead of dealing with the Common Market as such, which according to Mandel is only a symptom, we chose in this interview to deal with the more fundamental problems facing Western capitalism.

*Ernest Mandel.* I believe that capitalism entered a period of structural crisis beginning with the first world war. The system was able to survive chiefly because the workers' movement did not take advantage of the opportunities it had following the first world war to remove capitalism and introduce a socialist economy. What fol-

lowed was a rather long period with a standoff between the classes, and in the course of this period the economy remained relatively stagnant. The working class's defeat in the face of fascism created the conditions for altering this balance.

Throughout the preceding period of stagnation, an accumulation of capital had taken place that could not be invested productively. Inventions and scientific discoveries had also accumulated that were not applied, because the rate of profit, as Marxists call it, was too low. When the working class had suffered a defeat at the hands of fascism and with the second world war, the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation rose very sharply. As a result of this, the rate of profit also rose, and that created the incentive for a massive reinvestment of surplus and for a massive productive application of all the scientific and technical discoveries I mentioned.

And so we had what could be termed a third technological revolution at the end of the second world war—for example, automation, atomic energy, the petrochemical industry, plastics, etc. This gave an enormous impulse toward increasing investments and productive activity, and bringing about big structural changes in industry. This provided the basis for the protracted period of economic growth that we have experienced since World War II.

I can say in passing that the armaments economy played a critical role with respect to prompting many of these industrial innovations, but it is not the main cause. The main cause was an increase in the rate of profit.

But at this point capitalism's logic goes to work—the classic logic of capitalism. A rise in investments and a rise in industrial productivity—economic growth—also mean a rise in employment. The enormous unemployment of the thirties and the beginning of the forties disappears; there is as good as full employment in most of the imperialist countries.

Since this is occurring neither under fascism nor under a dictatorship, it

leads to a change in the balance of power in the labor market to the advantage of the working class, and wages begin to climb. As a result, the rate of profit begins to fall. This phenomenon could already be observed at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties.

Thus, what is fundamental is that there is a hard struggle between workers and capitalists over what Marxists call the rate of surplus value. And as long as institutional changes do not decisively weaken the working class, as long as it has not suffered a defeat, and as long as we do not have a "strong state" that bans strikes and crushes the power of the trade unions in this struggle, it is precisely this full employment that helps the working class hold the rate of surplus value steady.

So we have a number of forces that tend to pull in the direction of a decline in economic growth. Add to this a series of other factors, of which inflation is naturally the most important. But these are all tied up with the underlying process.

In the long period of economic growth, the productive capacity grew faster than the income of the masses, as it always does under capitalism. This leads to what Marxists call a realization problem, that is, a shortage of opportunities for realizing surplus value, a lack of effective demand. The state has to step in to increase the total effective demand, and it does this chiefly through inflation and extending credit. This was a general phenomenon throughout the twenty-five years following World War II.

When this happened in small or middle-sized countries like France or Italy, which are not so important to the world's economy, it did not produce great disturbances. But when it occurs in the United States, which is the key economy in the West, and whose currency, the dollar, is the most important international means of payment, then it produces insoluble contradictions. In order to prevent a crisis of overproduction inside the United States, inflation of the dollar was nec-

essary. But in order for the dollar to be used as an international means of payment, it needed to remain stable. Between these two tasks there was an insoluble conflict, which broke out in the crisis in the international monetary system that we have been seeing now for several years.

But I repeat: the main cause of this crisis is not one or another technical aspect of the fluctuations in the dollar, in the balance of payments deficit in the United States. These are only symptoms of something that goes deeper: the fact that throughout this entire period of economic growth, even with full employment, one of capitalism's basic contradictions has been the difference between the growth of its productive capacity and the growth of the buying power of the masses.

This difference did not smooth out, and it was necessary to create an increased level of credit so that the produced goods could be sold. To give just one example. The total private debt in the United States at the end of the second world war amounted to 75 percent of the national income, whereas today it is 150 percent of the national income. At the end of the second world war, indebtedness—that is, what each household had to pay back in the form of interest on and repayment of debts—amounted to about 8 percent of a family's monthly income. Today this figure has climbed to 23 percent of the monthly income for the average household. Thus this long period of prosperity also doubled the level of debt, and this occurred in conjunction with a decline in the rate of profit, which had to bring this relatively long period of progress to an end.

*Jorgen Rasmussen. There is a widespread theory to the effect that the powerful economic growth in Western Europe after World War II was essentially the product of two things: in part the massive American economic aid, and in part the economic co-operation that the European countries were to have entered into as a condition for the aid. What role do these more institutional factors play in your analysis?*

*Mandel. I would say that they play a rather small role. We observed the same phenomenon after World War I, though on a smaller scale. Germany, which was the key economy*

on the European continent, had a very sick economy after World War I, with enormous inflation and with production at a standstill; when the German mark became stabilized in 1923, Germany received a great deal of American credit. These credits provided the background for the brief upswing in the German economy between 1923 and 1929. When the economic crisis broke out, these credits were withdrawn, and that was one of the factors that accelerated the economic crisis and made it much more serious.

After the second world war, a number of institutional frameworks were established that were designed to prevent a repeat of what happened after World War I. Generally speaking, you can say the same thing about politicians and economists that you say about generals: they are always fighting the previous war, not the new one; they are always trying to solve twenty-year-old problems, not the new ones. Thus, after World War II people were busy dealing with the causes of the crises in the twenties and thirties, and they began to carry out a policy designed to prevent such crises, but they did not act on the basis of an analysis of contemporary problems and difficulties.

Therefore, many of the changes that were carried out, particularly within the international monetary system, led to increased difficulties since they tend to increase inflation, to spread inflation from one country to another, and to make inflation a generalized phenomenon instead of holding it under control in a single country.

Why did American capitalism give Western Europe enormous aid under the Marshall Plan? I believe the reason is very obvious. It was not done out of charity. The economic as well as the political and social interests in America coincided with the interest in stabilizing capitalism in Western Europe.

The alternative, naturally, was the collapse of Western European capitalism. That would have been a catastrophe from every point of view—economic and political, as well as military. So there was no choice. The lesser evil was chosen, that is, to help rebuild Western European capitalism, which meant—and I do not think the American government was blind to this—to contribute to strengthening a future competitor. But there was no choice.

Today we often forget that the most important question of a technical nature at that time was the lack of dollars. In those days the "dollar crisis" did not mean that there were too many dollars in Western Europe, but that there were too few. The institutional frameworks that were established were of such a nature as to be able to insure that a fixed supply of dollars (Marshall Plan aid, for example) could be spread out over the entirety of Western Europe in the best possible way.

Today the situation is completely different. Today the European capitalists say that they are no longer suffering from a shortage of dollars, but from an oversupply of dollars. Under these new conditions, the institutions that were created in an entirely different situation no longer function. They no longer function because they were built on a shortage of dollars, on a strong dollar. Today, as a result of the inflation of the dollar, the problems are quite different, and a solution must be found in a modification of all the frameworks established after World War II.

*Rasmussen. But can it not be said that some of the things that were built into the Common Market—for example, the liberalization of trade—also had some longer-range effects? Can it not be said that one of the more outstanding elements in Western European economic development since World War II has been a liberalizing of trade and the movement of capital? Especially within the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] and the EF [Europaeiske Faelleskab—European Community]?*

*Mandel. We must distinguish between the fundamental trend and its institutional expression or outward appearances. The fundamental trend is not institutional, but technical and economic.*

I said earlier that the long period of growth the capitalist economy experienced after World War II could essentially be explained in terms of a new technological revolution. The result of this technological revolution is an increase in the scale of production in the most important capitalist concerns. The amount of mass-produced goods is far greater than can be sold on the national market. We are thus faced with an international-

zation of capital in the form of concerns that operate on an international scale. The technological revolution has developed a technology that cannot be applied on a narrow national basis.

That is the fundamental line of development. Whether institutional frameworks are established to advance this process or to check it can be debated. Let me give an example to throw light on what I mean.

What is the Common Market, seen from a purely institutional point of view? The Common Market is a free-trade area with a common external tariff. That is a self-contradictory phenomenon. It means that within it trade is completely free, but in relation to the countries outside of it, it can be prescribed that trade will be somewhat more difficult. But what do we see?

We see that many of the international companies operate as if the Common Market did not exist. That means that they have created factories outside of the Common Market with an eye on the market existing outside of it, and that they have created factories inside the Common Market with an eye on the market existing inside of it. Thus the creation of the Common Market has, in reality, not changed this group of concerns' frame of operations at all. Therefore, I will maintain that the creation of these international institutions is a result, rather than a cause, of this internationalization of capital.

But this must be seen together with the general evolution toward a liberalizing of trade, for this is a general tendency and one that is not at all limited to the Common Market. This evolution also applies to trade between the United States and Japan, between the Far East and Europe, etc. It is a worldwide phenomenon.

But I want to emphasize that this is a result of economic growth and not a cause of it. It is like a red thread running through the entire history of capitalism that every time there is an increase in economic growth there is simultaneously a liberalizing of trade. But every time there is a falling off of economic growth and an intensification of international competition, which is what it leads to, there are tendencies to return to economic nationalism. And this is precisely what we are now seeing.

From the moment there is a decline in economic expansion, as at the end

of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies, there is a definite hesitation to liberalize trade any further. As an example of this, we can cite the protectionist interference of the United States and now Denmark also. This has given rise to a certain fearfulness—not because Denmark is a big country, but because it is a sign of a change in attitude in the international economy, and because following the United States and Denmark, other countries too can take this path; and that would mean the end of that long period of economic liberalization.

*Rasmussen. Does this more deep-going economic decline mean that capitalism as such is on its way into a crisis?*

*Mandel. Exactly. In a period of economic boom, institutions like the Common Market are relatively easy to set up, and social questions within each individual country take on more the character of welfare questions and the like. When there is a decline in available markets, international competition and rivalry are heightened, and the underlying conflict between the classes again comes to the fore. □*

## U.S. Students Plan Antiwar Campaign

A conference of the student antiwar movement meeting in New York February 25-27 voted to help organize mass demonstrations against the Indochina war on April 22 in New York City and Los Angeles. Close to 1,300 persons from 30 states attended the conference of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Southeast Asia (SMC), which met in Washington Irving High School. The SMC has 20,000 members in 400 colleges and high schools throughout the United States.

In addition to supporting the call for mass demonstrations on April 22 that came out of last December's convention of the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), the SMC conference decided to organize high-school speak-outs against the war on April 19. The conference expects rallies, teach-ins, and strikes to take place in high schools all across the country on that date.

The mass-action proposal that was adopted by the delegates emphasized the need for the antiwar movement to expose the Nixon administration's claims that it is ending the war. Nixon "continues to tell the American people that he is winding down the war," it stated. "He tells us that if we will just be patient he will end the war—eventually. He even made another special television appearance on January 25 to report to the American people the attempts he claims he has made to end the war. With that speech Nixon proved what we have been saying all along. Nixon is doing *nothing*

to end the war. He has no intention of ending the war; in fact, at the same time that he addressed the American people with his phony 8-point 'peace plan,' American planes were intensifying the air war over Southeast Asia. Three hundred Indochinese people die every day at the hands of the United States military. That may be Nixon's idea of winding down the war—but it isn't ours. Our peace plan has one point and it's no secret: *Immediate, total, unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. troops, planes, bombs and matériel from Indochina. OUT NOW!*"

The broad agreement on mass action against the war was a striking feature of the conference, occurring as it did in an election year. The proposal for mass demonstrations April 22 was supported by the national representatives of the youth support groups for several Democratic party candidates (Mayor John Lindsay, Senators Edmund Muskie and George McGovern, and Eugene McCarthy), as well as Socialist Workers party candidate Linda Jenness. The conference agreed to maintain the SMC's independence and not to endorse any candidate.

Alluding to the fact that election years have not generally provided favorable circumstances for mass antiwar mobilizations, the April 22 mass-action proposal noted: "We can't predict the size of these demonstrations. The next few months may be a difficult period for the antiwar movement. Some people who have worked with the antiwar movement in the past

may turn all of their resources and energies towards electoral activities to the exclusion of anything else. We hope that those who will be working for candidates, whether they be Democrats, Republicans, Socialists or whatever, will also join in building these demonstrations."

The SMC gathering also sent a statement to the organizers of the Versailles Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese Peoples protesting the exclusion of the French Front Solidarité Indochine. "We believe that any division that stands in the way of unified action for an immediate and unconditional end to the U.S. war in Indochina is unjustifiable," the message stated. "It is only by mobilizing the masses of the world, including all social, national, and political groups opposed to the war, that it can be ended. We believe that the exclusion of the FSI from the Versailles conference was contrary to this need. We call upon the organizations involved in the Versailles conference to help overcome such divisions by recognizing the principle of nonexclusion and the need for a united front of all antiwar forces throughout the world." □

### **Antiwar Group Formed in Glasgow**

Glasgow

An "Indochina Committee" was formed in Glasgow February 2 in response to the call of the U.S. National Peace Action Coalition for international mass demonstrations against the war in Indochina.

The slogans agreed upon were:  
U.S. troops out of Indochina now!

End British support of U.S. aggression!

Solidarity with Indochina's fight for self-determination!

Work was started immediately by contacting trade unions, student organizations, and labour groups. The committee will try to mobilize support from all layers of society, as it is important to build mass solidarity actions against the war and to raise people's consciousness as to the real situation in Indochina.

Right on for April 22!

## **Large Demonstrations in Many Cities**

### **French CP Assaults Antiwar Marchers**

After forcing the exclusion of the Front Solidarité Indochine (Indochina Solidarity Front) from the Versailles Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese Peoples, the leadership of the Stalinist French Communist party tried to physically expel FSI marchers from the demonstrations called by the conference and held throughout France on February 12-13.

But the FSI, which has organized the largest antiwar actions in France in the recent period, refused to be intimidated. FSI members decided to participate in the demonstrations, marching in contingents that occasionally even outnumbered the "official" demonstrators.

In Paris, the FSI turned out some 2,500-3,000 demonstrators. In Evreux, Grenoble, Lyon, Marseille, Orly, Toulouse, and Tours, the CP goons were unable to prevent FSIs from participating.

But in three cities, the turn of events was especially embarrassing to the Stalinist bureaucrats. In Clermont, CP goons assaulted FSI marchers, sending one person to the hospital. The FSI has appealed to all workers' organizations to protest the attack.

In Montpellier, the CP assembled an exceptionally large "defense squad." Here they had a special problem: How could they justify excluding the group that last November 6 had organized the most successful antiwar march and demonstration ever held in that city? As a result of the CP's plans to prevent the FSI from marching, several organizations withdrew their names from the call for the February 12 action.

The FSI publicly declared its intentions in advance: it would not try to force its way into the march, but would peacefully assemble behind the demonstration. To the consternation of the Stalinist bureaucrats, about half the people who showed up for the march were FSIs. The CP attacked the FSI marchers, but failed to break up the contingent. In frustration, the goons even assaulted a contingent of schoolteachers who protested the attack.

The FSI held firm and marched to the center of town. Protests against the Stalinist hooliganism have been widespread, and the League for the Rights of Man is setting up an inquiry into the incident.

In Rouen, the CP was confounded by the fact that when the demonstrators gathered at the assembly point, FSI marchers outnumbered those mobilized by the official coalition.

The FSI supporters listened politely to a speech by a member of the CP-backed Mouvement de la Paix. But when an FSI leader tried to explain the point of view of his organization, the CP marchers, extremely subdued until then, began chanting loudly to drown him out. By the time the demonstration started moving, the CPers were outnumbered by two to one. Demoralized, they decided to cancel their march and stood on the sidewalk watching the FSI demonstration pass by.

In the February 19 issue of its weekly newspaper *Rouge*, the Ligue Communiste (Communist League, French section of the Fourth International), which plays a prominent role in the FSI, wrote that the February 12-13 actions were only the prelude to larger mobilizations to come:

"Until victory, not for one minute, not for one instant, will we slacken in our support to the heroic Indochinese revolutionists, frontline fighters of the world proletariat." □

### **Japan Not for the Birds**

Many species of migratory birds that once spent part of the year in Japan no longer are found in that country, according to a January 22 Reuters dispatch from Tokyo. Air and water pollution are believed to be responsible for the disappearance of the birds.

"A recent survey," the dispatch said, "by the Government's Environmental Agency warned that the number of migratory birds had been declining alarmingly. For example, the survey reported that only 5,000 wild geese had been sighted in 1971, a tenth of the number recorded in 1953."

The agency added that industries had reduced from 149 to 27 the number of wintering areas traditionally used by migratory birds.

## Arrests in Czechoslovakia Stir French CP

By David Thorstad

The current wave of arrests in Czechoslovakia is continuing to have repercussions in the Italian and French Communist parties.

On February 17, the Italian journalist Valerio Ochetto, who had been arrested in Prague last January 5, was expelled from Czechoslovakia and returned to Rome. *L'Unità*, the Italian Communist party newspaper, which had protested Ochetto's arrest, credited the "concrete efforts of the party" with having brought about this "positive conclusion" to the affair.

The same day Ochetto was freed, the Political Bureau of the French Communist party issued a statement approving a report on the Czechoslovak situation submitted by a high-level delegation that had just returned from a trip to Czechoslovakia. The delegation, which was headed by Roland Leroy, had held discussions with Gustav Husak and other Czechoslovak leaders.

According to the Political Bureau statement, the French delegation received the following reply from Husak to their "question" concerning the recent arrests: "There is not now and there will not be any trial or arrest in Czechoslovakia for political acts going back to the years 1968 and 1969; there is not now and there will not be any trial or arrest in Czechoslovakia for anyone's ideas or opinions; socialist legality will be scrupulously respected."

Husak also gave the French delegation "formal assurances" that, in his words, "the time of prefabricated frame-up trials is definitively past." Husak further told the Political Bureau's representatives that the current arrests are part of a "recently begun preliminary investigation into the setting up of an illegal network of conspiracy" and that "most of those examined and interrogated have been released."

The Political Bureau document noted that it was "recording" Husak's assurances, thereby suggesting that it may not have found them completely convincing.

According to André Laurens in the

February 19 *Le Monde*, the leaders of the CP "are voluntarily limiting themselves to an approach that consists of obtaining explanations and public commitments from within the Communist world. This is not enough for the CP's partners, who are more demanding. . . ." This was a reference to the Socialist party, whose Executive Bureau issued an appeal on February 9 condemning the political repression in Czechoslovakia and calling on its leaders to revise "their present positions." This appeal was then sent, according to the February 20-21 issue of *Le Monde*, to "all organizations on the left so that they might associate themselves with it or participate in drafting another text along the same lines."

On February 18 a letter was made public from the CP's assistant secretary general, Georges Marchais, to François Mitterrand, first secretary of the Socialist party. The letter, whose harsh tone Laurens said "stunned" the Socialist party leaders, shows that the French Stalinists are quite sensitive to the consequences the Czechoslovak events may have in French politics.

Regarding the SP appeal, Marchais wrote: ". . . one can only wonder at the meaning of an initiative such as the one you have undertaken. By reinforcing a campaign whose motives are quite obviously anticommunist, this initiative can only tend to place new obstacles on the path to unity and to seek out new pretexts for once more putting off any political agreement that would take the form of a joint program for government."

Despite Husak's promises to the French delegation, *Le Monde* reported February 20-21 that its Eastern European correspondent, Bernard Marguerite, "has just learned, from a very reliable source, that two new arrests of intellectuals are said to have taken place around February 15 in Bratislava." The victims were Agnès Kalinova and her husband, Laci Kalina. "Both are well known in international film circles, particularly in France." Kalina was a professor at the Slovak

School of Cinematography. Kalinova, "a renowned critic," says *Le Monde*, "was a member of numerous international juries and regularly collaborated with the literary journal *Kulturny Zivot*, which has now been suppressed."

The same article claimed that "a hidden struggle continues to go on between the 'centrists' and the 'hardliners' among the country's leaders, that is, between Mr. Husak and his rare friends on the one hand, and Messrs. Bilak and Indra on the other."

Bilak is a member of the presidium and secretariat of the Czechoslovak Communist party; his secret report to the party's Central Committee last October criticizing various "fraternal" parties was recently excerpted in *Le Monde*. (See *Intercontinental Press*, February 28.) Indra, according to an Agence France-Presse report mentioned by *Le Monde* February 20-21, was stripped of his presidency of two committees under the Central Committee February 18 and also lost his post as secretary of the Central Committee.

In the midst of all the reverberations surrounding the latest repressive wave in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Communist party newspaper *Pravda* published a long article February 18 dealing with "the policy of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of the world socialist system," reported *Le Monde* the following day. The article, signed by M. O. Borissov, recalls situations in which the Soviet Union, "as the most powerful of the powers belonging to the socialist community," had intervened to "defend world socialism against direct aggression by imperialism and provocations by its counter-revolutionary agents."

Borissov writes that "in cases where this or that crisis situation should arise, the socialist states have been able to, and still can, count on the internationalist aid of the Soviet Union and other fraternal states."

As examples of situations where such "aid" has been given, he cited, among others, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. "The further away we get from the period of August 1968," he asserted, "the more brilliant the achievement of the Soviet people and their allies appears in saving the Czechoslovak people from the deadly danger of the silent would-be counterrevolution prepared by the forces of imperialism and its agents."

## How Miners Defeated Tory Wage 'Norms'

London

"Now other unions want the same." That is how the front-page headline of *The Observer* on Sunday, February 20, saw the repercussions of the Wilberforce court of inquiry into the miners' six-week-old strike "for a living wage." The inquiry came to a decision in a record time of five days, recommending increases worth between 11 and 24 percent over one year, and 15 and 31 percent over a sixteen-month period to Britain's 288,000 overworked and underpaid miners.

While still requiring the sanction of the rank and file,\* should they decide to accept, the inquiry's recommendations (and extra concessions won after the report was made public, including five extra days of holiday a year and the gradual inclusion of 17,000 youth miners into the full adult rate) will stand out as a clear-cut victory for the miners. The Wilberforce Report crashes right through the government's "norm" for pay rises and, in the words of the February 20 *Sunday Times* editorial, represents no less than "the ruin of its wages policy."

What is more, the miners' win has raised the hopes of other sectors of the labour movement who are impressed by the victory and already, with justification, are claiming themselves to be a "special case" like the miners, and deserving pay increases well above the government's arbitrary 7 percent "norm."

"The tribunal's award of an overall increase in the coal industry's annual wage bill of about 18 percent represents more than twice the going rate and is the biggest settlement in either the public or the private sector during the current wage cycle," wrote *The Observer* in its editorial.

The "generous" pay offer recommended by Wilberforce dramatically underlines the effectiveness of the picketing miners in preventing the transport and use of coal throughout the

country. The same editorial noted that "several factors were all-important: the miners' determination to hold out; the backing of other unions and the help of public sympathy; the unique vulnerability of power stations to picketing; the government's complete inability to foresee all this—shared, admittedly, by most of us; and the inherent justice of their claim for special treatment. It is only the last, of course, that Wilberforce deals with."

To be sure, the government had planned to wait out the strike. "But," continued the *Observer* editorial, "it reckoned, as we all did, without the pickets: their use was of a kind and on a scale never before seen in an industrial dispute."

Not only were the miners able to picket and virtually close down the mines, but they succeeded in changing the normal pattern of defense by using the strike funds that might otherwise be used in strike pay to send "flying squads" of pickets all over the country—to mines, to power stations, and to the docks—thereby succeeding in preventing the delivery not only of coal but of oil and other special substances needed to keep the generators going.

Public sentiment has been with the miners from the beginning, and this too proved a big obstacle for the Tory government. The government's invocation of a "state of emergency" on February 8, which led to massive electricity cuts throughout the country affecting household, transport, and industry, was designed to reverse this public sentiment. But it was largely unsuccessful in achieving this.

The power cuts to industry resulted in massive layoffs throughout the country, according to *The Times* of February 19. These amounted to 1,600,000 on the previous day, when the Wilberforce inquiry finished its public hearings. With more than 1,000,000 people officially registered as unemployed, 1 in 10 of the nation's work force was out of work on that day. Particularly hard hit by the cuts were the continuous-process industries such as steel, and production-line industries such as car manufacturing.

These cuts were deliberately calculated to set other sectors of the work force against the miners.

But, by the sheer force of their numbers and their unity and determination to win, the miners' efforts cut right across these provocations and dramatically showed that this government can be beaten. Perhaps this was best shown by the events leading up to February 10, when over 6,000 miners and sympathizing engineering workers converged on and succeeded in forcing the closure of the massive coal deposit stockpiled at Saltley, Birmingham.

The miners' answer to the Tory government's attempt to isolate them was given again on February 15, when over 9,000 miners, their wives, and other trade unionists marched through London to lobby members of Parliament.

"It was a noisy but peaceful procession with some of the pageantry of a Durham miners' gala," said *The Times* the next day. "Brass bands, including a children's band from South Wales led by a girl drum-major twirling a staff, made the cliffs of the City echo with booming, old-fashioned music such as 'Great Little Army' and 'Colonel Bogey.'"

"Huge scarlet and gold banners were held upright in the tearing wind by guy ropes fore and aft. They were emblazoned with the names of famous pits from South Wales to Yorkshire and Durham, with embroideries of mining scenes and inspiring mottos.

"At Tower Hill, Mr. Alex Eadie, Labour MP for Midlothian, told the miners to march with their heads held high 'to demonstrate to the people of London that the miners have an unanswerable case for more cash.'

"The central lobby was crowded all the afternoon, and thundering cheers

### Beginning Next Week

In the next issue of Intercontinental Press, we will begin serialization of Pierre Frank's book, "The Fourth International: A Contribution to the History of the Trotskyist Movement."

This translation, the first in English, is available only in Intercontinental Press. If you don't yet subscribe, do it now so you won't miss a chapter!

\* Since this was written, the miners voted 96 percent in favor of the new wage scale. — IP

and claps made the dome ring when the lights went out."

The militancy and determination of the miners throughout the strike have given a great impetus to other workers and their unions, who responded in mass solidarity actions with the miners. Notable in this respect was the decision of the transport workers and the railwaymen not to cross the picket lines, and the numerous "unofficial" solidarity strikes called locally in support of the miners. Particularly important in the latter respect were the actions of 35,000 engineering workers in Birmingham, who staged a one-day strike in support of the miners' claim and helped the miners to close the gates at the Saltley Coke Depot.

But it was the miners' militant picketing that proved decisive. "Eight power stations were closed down completely," said the *Sunday Times* February 20, "and 67 were below capacity."

"When the strike began five weeks ago," David Wilson commented in *The Observer* February 13, "most commentators assumed that the miners would put up a gallant fight but either would be beaten like the postmen were last year or forced to accept a compromise, like the power workers, which would make a mockery of their militant stance."

"But the isolation of the miners in the pit villages and NCB [National Coal Board] housing estates had unified them far more than other groups," he continued. "It is this cohesion which enabled the miners to respond far more forcefully than even the National Union of Mineworkers had expected."

"Local union support was instrumental in uniting the miners' leadership to an unforeseen extent. It was assumed that the NUM, riven by battles between left and right, with structural flaws which gave overlapping powers to president and general secretary and considerable autonomy to the federated areas (which has allowed the Yorkshire area alone to spend £80,000 to support its pickets), would not be able to hold the strike together. This was the third fundamental miscalculation."

For several days at the beginning of the strike, the picketing had only a slight impact, and the NUM was resigned to fighting alone. On the sec-

ond day of the strike, the TUC (Trades Union Congress) Finance and General Purposes Committee had appeared to wash its hands of the miners by refusing to co-ordinate support at the national level. But this was before it was known that the transport unions—at local level—would not cross picket lines. The very presence of the miners' pickets allowed other unions to show their support. At the beginning of the strike they had repeatedly said, "the miners' strike is our strike," insofar as the government's incomes policy is the common enemy, and now they were given the opportunity to prove it. And they did.

A notable feature of the miners' strike so far has been the stepped-up harassments of the pickets by the police. There were 263 arrests for various offences alleged to have arisen out of the picketing, said Minister of State, Home Office, Richard Sharples on February 21. Perhaps the most outstanding of these police provocations occurred at Longannet Power station, Fife, Scotland, on Monday, February 14, when thirteen pickets were handcuffed, fingerprinted and remanded in custody, after being accused of rioting and incitement with evil intent. Scottish miners' leaders called on the entire trade union and labour movement to take action, including industrial action, to secure the release of the thirteen. All thirteen were released on £20 bail each on Thursday, February 17, after the whole Scottish trade-union movement reacted with telegrams, resolutions, and protest demonstrations. A gathering of more than 1,000 cheering supporters greeted the thirteen pickets outside the court-house.

"However strong may be the arguments that the miners were underpaid, there is no lack of other people who consider themselves in that category," wrote economics editor Malcolm Crawford in the *Sunday Times* February 20. "And they are bound to be impressed by the victory. Never before, in my recollection, has there been a national strike that has proved so successful. The miners have added 10 percentage points to the NCB's original offer, while bringing industry literally to its knees—and all the while maintaining the support of the other unions, whose members have meanwhile been driven on the dole."

Indeed, the ingenious mechanism that the Wilberforce inquiry called "the adjustment factor," which forms the basis of the report's case for special treatment for the miners, is one which other disadvantaged workers can expect to seize with enthusiasm. The railwaymen are about to re-enter negotiations, and the union's general secretary, according to *The Observer*, has already said that the Wilberforce Report has confirmed his members' justifiable case for large increases.

"London's busmen have already turned down a 7-1/2 percent pay offer in expectation of a more favourable climate after the miners' settlement. On Wednesday [February 23], a new claim will be lodged for 300,000 agricultural workers—only six weeks after their last award. A union spokesman said last night: 'Of course we shall quote Wilberforce—we are asking for only £18 which is what the miners had before their claim. We must regard ourselves a special case too,'" noted *The Observer*.

The building workers and the dustmen are further large groups with upcoming pay claims who are already studying the implications of Wilberforce. "And there are others in the pipeline, including those classic special cases, the nurses and the teachers," observed the *London Evening Standard* February 18.

Indications from the various mining areas are that the union leaders will be asking their members to return to work. But the first reaction of the rank and file to the Wilberforce recommendations was anything but submissive. Particularly objectionable about the Wilberforce Report is the suggestion that the miners themselves may have to meet much of the NCB's costs for wage increases by increasing their job productivity.

Whatever the miners decide this week about the Wilberforce award and other concessions won, what is certain is that the miners have left in ruins the government's policy of trying to impose on the public sector something they cannot impose on the private sector—a limit on wage increases to around 7 and 8 percent. And in doing so, the miners have opened up the way for the whole of the working class to follow; what is more, by their militancy and united determination, they have provided a model of how it can be done successfully.

February 23, 1972

*Intercontinental Press*



# REVIEWS

## Iran's One-Man Political Elite

*The Political Elite of Iran* by Marvin Zonis. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 389 pp. \$12.50. 1971.

The attitudes of the "political elite" of Iran—who are defined in a manner the author admits is arbitrary—are labeled by Professor Zonis as "political cynicism, personal mistrust, manifest insecurity, and interpersonal exploitation." The author came to these conclusions after interviewing, with the shah's permission, 170 members of the elite.

These attitudes are not surprising when one considers the actual power relationships. It turns out that the political elite actually does not have much political power. Real power is concentrated in the hands of the shah. Zonis's studies of the shah portray the monarch as a foxy and ruthless despot who keeps all the reins in his own hands. In fact, the shah would not even allow the bourgeois professor to interview his military officers.

Zonis was in Teheran in July 1963 when unarmed masses, who took to the streets in an uprising against the shah, were brutally gunned down. (Zonis puts the number killed closer to the 10,000 reported by the opposition than the eighty-six claimed by the prime minister.)

The powerlessness of the "elite" was demonstrated by the dismissal of four "devoted" high officials who dared to suggest to the shah that the slaughter might provoke greater popular opposition. Zonis describes the shah's feudal reaction to this advice:

"These four had attempted what is never done in Iran—to volunteer suggestions of policy to His Imperial Majesty. That a member of the elite should assume that he could alter the behavior of the shah might establish a precedent dangerous to the continued autonomy of His Majesty's sovereignty. From the shah's perspective, such an assumption must be rejected out of hand, while publicly negated and invalidated. A most effective means of accomplishing these ends and de-

stroying the assumption is to render powerless their perpetrators."

Zonis does not trace the roots of the shah's power. The word imperialism is never mentioned in the book, and only in passing does it mention the "alleged" role of the United States in overthrowing the government of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh and returning the shah to his throne. He provides no class analysis to explain such observations as: "The American and British diplomatic representatives still seem to constitute the most trusted advisers of the shah."

The book is filled with tables that were obtained by processing the computerized data from interviews. Much of the information contained in these

tables is irrelevant and boring, unless the reader is interested in such things as the relationship between the number of trips the elite made outside the country and the number of children they had. The generous sprinkling of Persian proverbs, anecdotes, and poems does not make the text any less boring. Instead they stand as a sad commentary on the state of the social sciences in the United States.

But it is significant that a bourgeois scholar confirms the analysis of the shah's regime made by Iranian revolutionists. The book concludes with the observation:

"Political reform from the bottom up has become virtually impossible. But such reform from the top down, now referred to as the White Revolution, has become increasingly unattainable." And further, the much advertised stability of the regime "remains tenuous, and its power, problematic."

—Javad Sadeeg

## Three New Marxist Journals in German

The West Berlin branch of the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (International Marxist Group, German section of the Fourth International) has launched an ambitious new series of publications under the general title *Permanente Revolution*. The series will be composed of three journals: *Permanente Revolution Aktuell*, which will deal with the current developments in the world revolution, a theoretical magazine called *Permanente Revolution*, and *Permanente Revolution Materialien*, which will publish fundamental works dealing with the roots of current problems in the revolutionary movement.

The first issues of the theoretical and news magazines have appeared. *Permanente Revolution* (a double issue dated November 1971) contains 160 pages of analyses of the three sectors of the world revolution, including articles on the Chinese model of industrial development, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat and its relation to workers' democracy, revolutionary perspectives for Pakistan

and Bangladesh, a critique of the politics of the Italian *Il Manifesto* group, an analysis of the ideology of the student movement, and two general articles on the Marxist conception of the dynamics of the revolutionary process.

Forthcoming issues are scheduled to deal with such questions as the international monetary crisis, the Latin American revolution, and the forms and demands of the working-class movement. Single copies cost DM3.50 (or DM6.00 for double numbers). Subscriptions are available for DM18.00 (about US\$5.75) for six issues.

*Permanente Revolution Aktuell*, the first issue of which is dated February 1972, contains articles on the current struggles in Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia, and Bangladesh.

The price is DM1.00 for a single copy, DM10.00 for a ten-issue subscription. Single copies and subscriptions to both publications can be obtained from Dieter Fölster, 1 Berlin 10, Postfach 214.

—Jon Rothschild

## 'Construct' or 'Reconstruct' the Fourth International?

By Pierre Frank

[The following is a translation of an article scheduled for publication in *Quatrième Internationale*.]

\* \* \*

For many years the stability of the large traditional workers' organizations and the monolithic character of the Communist parties gave rise to comments, often not very intelligent, on the contrast to the numerous splits among the Trotskyists. Many people, especially centrists who engaged in vain exertions to construct mass organizations, claimed that these splits expressed an inherent defect in Trotskyism.

In the last few years, the picture has changed considerably. It is rather hard to keep track of the splits in the various Maoist, spontanéist, etc., groups in the world, while the sections of the Fourth International have been registering substantial progress. Furthermore, since the Sino-Soviet dispute, Stalinist monolithism has been shattered beyond any possible repair. We have seen serious convulsions in some Communist parties in power (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia), even open splits in many other CPs (Spain, Greece, etc.).

Splits, therefore, no longer appear as the exclusive vice of the Trotskyists. In truth, the history of the workers' movement shows it to be, among other things, an incessant struggle of tendencies and groupings, entailing splits and reunifications. In fact, if there was ever anything that had hitherto been unknown in the workers' movement, it was the monolithic character imposed on workers' formations by the power of a bureaucratized workers state.

If the struggles of tendencies, splits, and regroupments have a varying importance on the general level of the struggle of the masses, they are rarely without some political significance that ought to be examined. This holds true likewise for the break that has just taken place between the French OCI-AJS [Organisation Communiste Internationaliste-Alliance des Jeunes pour Socialisme—Internationalist Communist Organization-Alliance of Youth for Socialism] on the one hand and the British SLL [Socialist Labour League] on the other. These two organizations<sup>1</sup> constituted the main components of an "International Committee" whose objective was the "reconstruction" of the Fourth International, which had, according to their account, been destroyed by "Pabloism."

On various occasions we have explained<sup>2</sup> that at the

end of the second world war, immense new problems were posed; that differing responses to them on the part of revolutionary Marxists, combined with the effects of considerable centrifugal forces, had precipitated a period of splits within the Fourth International; that this period ended in 1963, when the principal Trotskyist organizations in the world wound up advancing identical answers to these new problems and reuniting. Some groups refused to take part in this reunification, thus enabling some people to claim that there were four international organizations, all asserting their right to the name of the Fourth International.

That the Stalinists indulge in amalgamating these diverse formations in order to fight Trotskyism is not surprising. But for other, politically experienced people to commit such an error betrays a lack of common sense.

In point of fact, it suffices to see things as they really are:

As far as the "Posadistas" are concerned, it is impossible, even displaying much good will, to consider them to be anything more than a screwball sect of no political interest.

The "Pabloites," who are numerically small but politically well-defined, have nothing at all in common with the Fourth International. They renounced it implicitly upon splitting, when they said they were leaving the "hardened champions of a dead past without a future." (This is the basic reason they did not want to remain in the reunified international.) Today, they implicitly recognize this in preparing to eliminate mention of the Fourth International from their name.

On the international scale, outside the Fourth International, there was only Lambert and Healy's joint "committee," consisting of two national organizations of some size, asserting adherence to Trotskyism, waging a fierce, virulent battle against the existing Fourth International, and claiming to be constructing, or reconstructing, one that would have absolutely nothing in common with "Pabloism." Crash! The "International Committee" is now split wide open, and Lambert and Healy are denouncing each other in terms no less virulent than those they used against the Fourth International; each even finding that the other has become infected with "Pabloism."

The public documents of this struggle issued up to now are as follows: a declaration signed by Lambert, Lora, etc., last October 12; a declaration of the SLL, etc., October 24; a reply by Lambert November 21.<sup>3</sup> These docu-

3. Lambert and Lora's October 12 declaration was printed in *Intercontinental Press*, November 1, 1971, p. 942. The SLL's October 24 declaration can be found in *Intercontinental Press*, November 22, 1971, p. 1015. Lambert's response of November 21 was printed in *Intercontinental Press*, January 17, 1972, p. 46. — IP

1. For the sake of convenience, I will use the names of Healy and Lambert to designate these organizations.

2. See, among others, chapter six of my book *la Quatrième Internationale*.

ments do not provide complete clarity on the origins and basis of the break, but just the same they enable us to see, at least in part, what united Healy and Lambert and what led them to separate.

## What United Them

For a long time their unity was cemented by a common hostility—which neither of them has lost, toward the Fourth International. But what is the source of this hostility? As Trotskyists both of them recognize in principle the necessity of a revolutionary Marxist international, functioning on the basis of international democratic centralism.

But for them, this is an abstract concept; and between this concept and what they actually do, there is a big gap. Each has a national domain in which he operates politically because they think above all in terms of tactics. They accept general analyses on a world scale only so long as these do not upset the policies they decide on on a national scale. This trait, already observable in them when they were still members of the Fourth International, could only become worse after their break with the latter in 1952-53.

This trait received formal status at their 1966 international conference, where they passed a motion according to which their committee was bound only by unanimous decisions.<sup>4</sup>

They could not accept the reunification (in 1963), because they would have been in a minority. Not wanting to admit this openly, they concealed their fundamental hostility to a world party capable of interfering in their "national" affairs by denouncing the Fourth International as a "Pabloite" organization.

This became more and more ridiculous as time went on, for while they continually attacked Mandel, Maitan, Frank, Tariq Ali, Hansen, Krivine, etc., as "Pabloites," they never said a word about Pablo's current positions. The farce has reached the slapstick stage, now that they have discovered "Pabloism" in each other. Among them, this term no longer has any political content whatsoever. A Pabloite is any person who claims to be a Trotskyist but disagrees with them.

Along with this "national" trait, they both follow the same concept as to how to build an organization. Both of them are constantly cooking up gimmicks designed for no other aim but to recruit.<sup>5</sup> Hence the slogans often having no direct relation to development of the class struggle at any given moment, but advanced in ways to pull in new members. One of the consequences of this style of operating, to take the Lambertists as an example, is that since May 1968 (in which they floundered completely) they have let the mass demonstrations go by—in the demonstrations of solidarity with the Vietnamese people, they have not shown up; in the Burgos demonstrations they appeared belatedly after the Communist party was constrained to do something following the demonstrations of the far left; in the demonstrations of high-

4. Were there already differences between them? In any case, once outside the Fourth International, they showed the true nature of their "internationalism."

5. On this point, see H. Weber's pamphlet *Qu'est-ce que l'A. J. S.?*

school students around the Guyot affair, they were not to be seen . . .

## What Divides Them

There were frequent disagreements between the Lambertists and the Healyites, especially in 1966, but they remained united. There was no split when Healy refused to defend the Lambertist dogma according to which the productive forces continued to stagnate following the second world war. What was the origin then of the crisis that led to an open split?

According to Lambert's November 21 document, the disagreements allegedly began in 1969, when they decided to prepare an international conference of their committee. These disagreements are said to have intensified during 1970, about the time Healy went to the Fourth International to ask that a discussion be opened with the perspective of possible reunification.<sup>6</sup>

It was on the occasion of their rally at Essen (at the beginning of July 1971) that the conflict became public. Lambert rejected an amendment advanced at the rally by Healy. About three months later, the position taken by Lora during the Bolivian events precipitated the open break.

On the Bolivian question, Healy—aside from his usual excesses, such as comparing Lora with the Ceylonese Lanka Sama Samaja party ministers who participated in the repression in their country—criticized Lora for having followed a Menshevik policy in hoping, as he had himself written, that General Torres would arm the workers against the other generals. Lambert answered that the Popular Assembly had "become, through the intervention of Lora's POR, an organ of dual power," "an organism in which the hegemony of the proletariat is affirmed from top to bottom." How could a few speeches, which did not even call upon the workers to arm themselves, have created dual power?

On the other hand, after the split, Lambert condemned Healy for giving "critical support" to "the bourgeois Indian government"<sup>7</sup> for its military intervention in Bangladesh. One can see that Healy and Lambert bounce the ball back at each other, trading charges of opportunism. Each sees the faults of the other. But for our "national Trotskyists," neither Bangladesh nor Bolivia is the determining factor in the split.

Although the causes are also not to be found in Lambert's policies in France, it is fitting to mention the criticism Healy advanced in his October 24 document and the defense made by Lambert in his November 21 reply to Healy. Here the opportunist politics of the OCI emerge in full clarity.

In the first place, Healy accuses Lambert of having drawn such pessimistic conclusions from de Gaulle's rise to power that he was incapable of preparing for May

6. See *Quatrieme Internationale*, No. 45 (September 1970). Proposing possible reunification undermined their whole struggle against "Pabloism." In his November 21 document Lambert takes Healy to task for this maneuver, but at the time Lambert did not publicly disavow it.

7. *Workers Press*, December 6, 1971.

1968 and that as a result he tail-ended during the events themselves.

"May-June 1968, with the French workers on General Strike, themselves striving for an alternative government, was the greatest testing time for the OCI. But what did the strike reveal?

"It revealed the theoretical bankruptcy and political impotence of the OCI whose leadership—guided by a superficial impressionist analysis of de Gaulle's coup in 1958—had exaggerated the strength and viability of the Fifth Republic, abandoned its revolutionary perspective and written off the revolutionary capacities of the French working class.

"This defeatist conception, which extended even to the Vietnam war, was summed up in the rationalization of Lambert that the French working class was 'decisively defeated in 1958'. This pessimistic and essentially middle-class outlook expressed itself in all the organizational and agitational work of the OCI and the AJS before and after 1968. It is an undeniable fact that at no time during the General Strike did the OCI leadership advance a socialist programme. Nor did it attempt to undermine the political credibility of the Stalinist leadership by critically supporting the demand of the Renault workers for a 'popular government' by advancing the demand of a CP-CGT government. Instead the OCI leaders tail-ended the working class and restricted the political scope of the strike by demanding a central strike committee. This was a complete evasion of the *political* responsibilities of revolutionary leadership."

This same tail-ending tendency, Healy said, was shown in the 1969 presidential election. In practice the Lambertists split, some voting for Duclos, others for Defferre, and still others, like Lambert himself, abstaining.

"Even from this 1968 experience the lessons were not learned. In fact the abstentionist methods and omissions of the General Strike period were continued into the presidential elections of 1969.

"In the referendum in March of the same year, the OCI had correctly campaigned for a vote against de Gaulle, in contrast to the abstentionism of the Pabloites. However, the gains from this correct turn were lost in the presidential elections, the class character of which was ignored by the OCI. Basing themselves on their fraudulent theory of the 'United Class Front', the OCI leaders used the failure of the CP and Socialist Party to agree on a single candidate as a pretext for not supporting the CP candidate, Duclos, against Pompidou.

"The task of revolutionaries was to raise the consciousness of Stalinist rank and file by critically supporting Duclos and pointing out that the main enemy was Pompidou. The OCI should have campaigned throughout the labour movement to demand that the CP candidate be pledged to a socialist policy against the banks and monopolies. To carry forward this fight, while calling for a massive vote for Duclos, was the best way to exposing the Stalinists and their programme of 'advanced democracy' and fighting for alternative revolutionary leadership. Any other course leaves the Stalinist control undisturbed. It was also necessary to expose the SP candidate whose party refused to vote for Duclos in the second ballot and supported the bourgeois candidate, Poher.

"The OCI leaders did none of these things. Some

members voted for Duclos, others for Defferre (SP) and others, including comrade Lambert, abstained. What was worse, the OCI attacked the Stalinists for having dared to stand a candidate in the elections despite the fact that the Stalinists in the previous presidential elections in 1965 did not do so and instead supported Mitterrand, a bourgeois politician."

In Healy's opinion, these were not accidental errors, because Lambert has oriented not toward the workers influenced by the Stalinists but toward the more backward ones following the Social Democrats: "At no time has the OCI been able consistently to put forward a policy and programme to bring it close to the mass of the French workers who vote for the Stalinists and are organized around the Stalinist-led CGT. Instead they have orientated towards those sections still supporting the social-democrats, primarily in the older industries."

This orientation toward the Social Democracy has recently been intensified. After all, isn't it necessary to "save" the Socialist party from Mitterrand?

After long denying all revolutionary perspectives, Lambert has now discovered "the imminence of revolution." This turn, which to my knowledge was made without any serious explanation, has not changed the Lambertist policy. As before, this policy still consists in calling for a "united class front." Healy denounces this as abandoning the perspective of building a revolutionary party:

"Now the OCI, using the formula, 'imminence of revolution', elaborating a schema of natural stages through which the working class passes on the road to power, distorting the tactic of united front of the working class, has taken the road of liquidationism laid down by these revisionists."

Earlier in the document, Healy says: "Within this framework the OCI's position on the 'united class front' becomes a complete liquidation of the party and its subordination to the Stalinist and social democratic parties and union apparatus. Lenin and Trotsky saw the united front as a *tactic* and not a strategy as the OCI claim. They saw it as a relationship between mass workers' parties of a temporary character for the purpose of winning the masses to the Communist Party. The OCI has transformed this into an overall 'unity' of the class achieved on the basis of its present leadership, without the participation in the united front of our party. This 'united class front' more and more, in their theorizing and practice, takes over the role of the revolutionary party itself."

In his November 21 reply Lambert ducks questions such as his having oriented his activities toward the backward sections of the French working class by asking Healy if the PS [Parti Socialiste] and Force Ouvrière are not "workers' organizations," and leaving the impression that Healy's "preference" is the Stalinist bureaucracy—which would be a manifestation of "Pabloism."

Lambert displays his opportunism with notable clearness when in opposition to Healy he argues for his "united class front." This policy, he writes, "is a strategic line insofar as it is always (that is, without regard to the circumstances, the relationship of forces, or tactical factors in the strict sense of the term) *present* in a revolutionary policy." He specifies further on: "And where the working class is under the leadership and control of sep-

arate organizations, this policy takes the form of a united front of all the organizations of the class." In other words, where the workers are organized and led by reformist organizations, a revolutionary policy would always include a united front of these organizations, "without regard to the circumstances, the relationship of forces, or tactical factors." This is monstrous! It means quite simply jumping on the bandwagon of these organizations when they are engaging in betrayals, for example in time of war or of movements like May 1968, without mentioning lesser occasions when the united front of these organizations is carried out in practice at the expense of the workers.

We will perhaps be told: you exaggerate; Lambert may have expressed himself badly; he has not forgotten the program. Let's see. He deals in his document with the May 1969 presidential campaign in France, forgetting quite like Healy the Trotskyist candidacy of Alain Krivine and overlooking the differences within the OCI on the vote (Defferre, Duclos, or abstention), but he cites and stresses these words by Just:

"But what about program? Didn't a single candidate put up by the workers' organizations need a program? What was it developing into? In these specific circumstances, the development of a program for a government of the united workers' organizations derived from this joint campaign."

In other words, through his campaign the single candidate would have given expression to this program. A program emerging from an electoral campaign!

Healy and Lambert had denounced Krivine's candidacy in the presidential election as being, among other things, a diversion from the "united front." Haven't they ever read Trotsky's pamphlet *What Next?*, written in January 1932 in powerful defense of the united front of Communists and Socialists against the mounting Hitlerite danger? In this pamphlet Trotsky denounced all the various centrists who proposed that the Communists and Socialists present a single presidential candidate. Here is how Trotsky expressed himself (the reader should bear in mind that at the time Trotskyists still considered themselves a *faction* of the Communist International and its sections):

"... in the sphere of propaganda ... a bloc is out of the question. Propaganda must lean upon clear-cut principles and on a definite program. March separately, strike together. A bloc is solely for practical mass actions. Deals arranged from above which lack a basis in principle will bring nothing except confusion.

"The idea of nominating a candidate for president on the part of the united workers' front is at its root a false one. A candidate can be nominated only on the grounds of a definite program. The party has no right to sacrifice during elections the mobilization of its supporters and the census of its strength. The party candidacy, in opposition to all other candidates, can in no instance conflict with any agreement made with other organizations for immediate aims of struggle. Communists, whether official members of the party or not, will support Thaelmann's candidacy to their utmost. What we are concerned with is not Thaelmann but the banner of Communism. We shall defend it against all other parties. Breaking down the prejudices with which the rank and file of the Communists have been inoculated by the Stalinist bu-

reaucracy, the Left Opposition will clear the road into their consciousness for itself."<sup>8</sup>

No comment is required on these lines.

The basis of the divisions that led to the Healy-Lambert split probably lie in the amendment Healy raised at Essen:

"There can be no revolutionary party without revolutionary theory. Behind every opportunist development in the history of the workers' movement, and especially of Stalinism, has been the revision of Marxist theory. The continuity of the struggle for revolutionary Marxist theory in the past, the struggle of the Fourth International and the International Committee, was the only basis for the initiatives which led to this rally and for the struggle to build the international revolutionary youth movement. Revolutionary youth everywhere must devote themselves above all to the task of developing Marxist theory through the struggle against bourgeois ideology in all the forms it takes in the workers' movement. This is the only basis for combatting the dangers of adventurism, activism and 'pure' militancy with which revisionists and Maoists mislead the youth, and which can only lead to historic defeats for the working class."

Lambert's refusal to vote for this amendment provoked two remarks from Healy. In the first place, this refusal showed that Lambert was guilty of underestimating, or renouncing, dialectical materialism. On this point we are faced with one of Healy's customs. Every time he engages in a tendency or faction struggle he believes it necessary to introduce the question of dialectical materialism. Why? Well because Trotsky dealt with this question in the struggle against Burnham and Shachtman in 1939. Trotsky did this because the question was introduced by his opponents, one totally denying dialectical materialism, the other declaring that it had no practical political importance. Trotsky conducted many tendency struggles without introducing this question; but that matters little for Healy. For him, every internal struggle cannot help but pose the question of dialectical materialism. And if no one else is inclined to raise it, he will never hesitate to do so.

Must we add that when Healy indulges in this bizarre idiosyncrasy, he succeeds most often in making himself look ridiculous?

Healy's other comment is politically more serious. For him, the "International Committee" must be considered the embodiment of the "continuity" of the Fourth International. It is therefore around him (with the help of dialectical materialism) that the Fourth International must be "constructed."

For Lambert, the Fourth International has already been destroyed as a centralized organization. It must therefore be "reconstructed." This necessitates beginning by joining with all sorts of groups, forming a "youth international," fronts, etc.

Here, a certain rigidity on Healy's part and Lambert's unbridled opportunism appear to clash. It would not be surprising if the source of this clash lies in the internal situation in the two organizations and in the relation of forces between them.

At one time Healy carried more weight than Lambert

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8. *The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany*, Pathfinder Press, New York, p. 204-5.

in the "International Committee." Now it seems to be the other way around. Also, Healy's organization may be losing some of its steam. In that case, his rigidity could be explained as a means of halting this development. Lambert's document alludes to this fact: "Unless you start off from the political contradictions in which the SLL leadership finds itself and its refusal to see them unraveled by discussion within the ranks of its organization. . . ." Since both organizations are quite empirical, capable of making sudden political flip-flops, their documents do not allow us to probe more deeply into the question at the moment.

### The Healy-Lambert Split and the Fourth International

Healy and Lambert will each continue, as the case may be, to "construct" or "reconstruct" the Fourth Inter-

national. Up to now they have counterposed their joint committee to the Fourth International. Today, thanks to Healy and Lambert, instead of one "committee" we have a "Committee of the Fourth International" and a "Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International." The defunct "committee" was able to deceive some people about what it really represented. The two present committees will more than ever appear as inventions of the OCI or the SLL, designed to give these groups a facade of international affiliation. The split between Healy and Lambert is not a new split in the Fourth International, but a split among its opponents. To divert attention from their split they will not fail—of this we can be sure—to redouble their crass attacks on the Fourth International. But from now on they will be even more incapable than in the past of blocking its progress.

January 23, 1972

## Election Manifesto of Communist League of India

[We reprint below, with minor stylistic changes, the text of the election manifesto of the Communist League (Indian section of the Fourth International). The manifesto is dated February 9, 1972.]

\* \* \*

In ordering the elections to the state legislative assemblies in March this year, the leadership of the Congress party wants to exploit in its favour the chauvinist euphoria created by the Indo-Pakistan war and the aura of the Indian army's liberation action in Bangladesh. The Indira regime has not even cared to lift the emergency before holding the election, in the hope that the general atmosphere in the country might help the Indira Congress to win the election in most states, especially since the working-class parties are in a state of confusion.

The only problem-state appears to be West Bengal, where the Congress has to confront an electoral combination of left groups like the SUC [Socialist Unity Centre], RSP [Revolutionary Socialist party], RCPI [Revolutionary Communist party of India], etc., led by the CPI(M) [Communist party of India (Marxist)]. The strategy adopted by the ruling party in West Bengal, where it has decided to take the risk of seeking a popular mandate, is to resort to a campaign of physical liquidation of militant cadres of worker and peasant organisations with the help of police and antisocial elements.

The role of the CPI [Communist party of India] and its allies is obviously that of tailing the bourgeois Congress. The CPI has entered into an electoral pact with the Congress in West Bengal and in a few other states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh, where the Congress has to lean on a "left" ally to confront organised bourgeois parties like the Jan Sangh, Swatantra, and the Congress (O) [Old Congress]. In other states the Congress has completely ignored the CPI even as an "ally,"

and for obvious reasons. The CPI, as a political party of the working class, stands discredited, having become only a tail of the Indira Congress.

In a state like West Bengal, where organised attacks are being mounted against militant worker and peasant cadres, there are genuine fears whether there can at all be "fair" elections. But the CPI(M)-led coalition suffers from serious parliamentary illusions. It is making a bid to emerge as the "administrator" of the bourgeois state apparatus once again.

In the past, when a CPI(M)-dominated multiclass coalition "ruled" West Bengal, it could not make any difference to the existing social order nor could it solve any of the basic problems of the people under the capitalist constitutional framework. Moreover, the coalition posed a real threat to the capitalist economy in the state. Thus the Congress government at the Centre is determined to assume office in the state by enacting the farce of a democratic election, if possible.

It is more certain, in the explosive situation created in West Bengal by the emergence of an independent Bangladesh—that, too, as a sequel to a popular armed revolt—that a CPI(M)-led left coalition would not be permitted to remain in office even if it secures an electoral majority in the legislature.

The objective of the Centre is to eliminate all semblance of mass resistance in the state. Whatever be the outcome of the elections, the masses in the state will have to face a new period of president's rule, if necessary, and continued repression at the hands of the capitalist state. The revolutionary left in West Bengal, therefore, must concentrate upon mobilising the masses of urban and rural poor to resist the repressive measures of the capitalist state instead of wasting energy fighting the elections under the existing circumstances.

There is need to organise mass resistance to combat the campaign of murder and mass killing let loose, with of-

ficial connivance, against left militants. A nationwide campaign must be mounted to secure the release of thousands of militants packed beyond capacity in various jails of West Bengal and also in other states.

Significantly enough, the CPI(M)-led coalition has raised the demand for "greater autonomy" for states in India. This is perhaps a chauvinist response to the nationality sentiments in West Bengal, created as a sequel to the emergence of Bangladesh.

The traditional left in West Bengal did practically nothing to organise mass intervention in support of the Bangladesh revolution when the military regime of Islamabad let loose its genocide against a helpless population. They patiently waited for the Indian government to send its troops to "liberate" Bangladesh and install a bourgeois regime led by the Awami League in Dacca—forestalling a possibility of a seizure of power by the revolutionary guerrillas of the Mukti Bahini. The revolutionary left in different states should utilise the election period to project the nationality problem in its proper perspective, as a democratic problem left unresolved within the capitalist society and which can be solved only as a part of a socialist revolution.

Bangladesh does pose the problem of nationalities in the Indian subcontinent. But the answer to the problem is to be sought in the united struggles of the exploited masses against the capitalist state as a whole. The bourgeoisie cannot meet the democratic aspirations of different nationalities in India.

There is no doubt that sooner or later the people of the two Bengals would unite, but this is possible only as a sequel to a successful socialist revolution in the entire subcontinent. That is why we have advanced the slogan of a United Socialist Bengal, which will be a precursor to the emergence of a federation of the Socialist States of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Only in such a socialist federation

can the rights and aspirations of different linguistic and other nationalities be really safeguarded.

Already the emergence of independent Bangladesh has led to intensification of struggles of different nationalities in West Pakistan, among the Baluchis, Pakhtoons, and Sindhis. These struggles will find their echo in one form or another in India as well. But under a capitalist framework these urges are bound to be distorted into narrow regionalist channels as in the case of the so-called autonomy movement raised by the DMK [Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam] in Tamil Nadu.

Various reactionary groups like the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra and similar "regionalist" groups in Assam, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka are trying to give a reactionary regionalist twist to the national aspirations of the masses, in the absence of a united working-class mass movement and a strong working-class revolutionary party on a national scale.

The outcome of the assembly elections appears to be more or less predetermined, but it is not going to determine the political future of the country. The Indira Congress might emerge as the ruling party in most of the states. It is pitted against the bourgeois parties like the Jan Sangh, Congress (O), and the Swatantra party in most states.

Except in West Bengal a strong left opposition is practically nonexistent. Thanks to the class-collaborationist politics of the traditional left parties, they have destroyed the image of an independent working-class challenge to the bourgeois Congress. The masses have lost faith in the bourgeois electoral processes, which have been reduced to the level of ritualistic vote-casting every five years to determine which party or combination of corrupt politicians should rule over them on behalf of the capitalist class. Instead of utilising the parliamentary institutions for revolutionary propaganda, the left parties themselves have become their victims as corrupt seekers of power.

Under the circumstances, small revolutionary forces represented by parties like the Communist League—the Indian section of the Fourth International—can serve no positive purpose by wasting their limited material resources to fight a costly electoral campaign setting up their own candidates.

Nevertheless, the masses still have their illusions with regard to parliamentary elections. Our role in the election will be largely restricted to systematic exposure of the policies of the bourgeois Congress and its false pretenses of achieving social transformation within the parliamentary framework, while at the same time we will present a revolutionary alternative to the opportunist policies of the traditional left parties.

We do not advocate a "boycottist" position in relation to the elections except in West Bengal, because of the unique situation prevailing in that state. In other states the Communist League will enter the campaign in critical support of the candidates of the working-class parties, including the CPI(M), RSP, SUC, RSPI,

etc., against the bourgeois parties like the Congress, Jan Sangh, Swatantra party, etc. We dissociate ourselves from the opportunist policy of the CPI of entering into an electoral pact with the bourgeois Congress, and support the CPI candidates only in those areas where it is opposing the bourgeois parties, including the Indira Congress.

We reject the theory that socialism can be achieved through bourgeois parliamentary processes. Socialism can be achieved only through revolutionary mass strug-

gles of workers and peasants who must eventually seize control of all means of production, including land, factories, mines, plantations, and all credit as well as financial institutions, through their elected councils. The immediate task is to combat the antidemocratic and repressive measures of the bourgeois state through united struggles of workers and peasants around their immediate social and economic demands, linked with the objective of an anticapitalist socialist revolution in India. □

## 'To Our Comrades of the PSU'

[In an announcement made public late in January, seventeen members of the Parti Socialiste Unifié (United Socialist party) stated that they were resigning from that party to join the Ligue Communiste (French section of the Fourth International). A five-page open letter addressed "To Our Comrades of the PSU" detailed the reasons for their decision.

[The following are the excerpts from their letter that appeared in the February 5 issue of *Rouge*. Translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

### May '68, the PSU and the Revolutionary Party

. . . Many of us joined the PSU after May 1968 for numerous reasons, some of them "emotional":

- Didn't the PSU seem to have supported the movement wholeheartedly?

- Didn't it break with the sectarianism of other groups?

Other reasons for joining the PSU were tactical:

- Its already somewhat established implantation among the workers and peasants.

- Its national audience (the PSU initials!).

For this new generation of militants, the illusions quickly faded, and the PSU was revealed in all its ambiguities. What do we find in the PSU, and what were the hopes that revolutionaries had for it?

The entire history of the party, from its founding to the Lille Congress [June 1971], is nothing but the history of skillful maneuvering, of compromises not between structured tendencies representing the rank and file, but rather between a few people. This

heterogeneity is tantamount to saying that there is not one but several PSUs: some federations attach themselves to a spontanéist current (Bouches du Rhône); others enter into typically social-democratic electoral alliances with the Socialist party against the Communist party (Grenoble, Orléans, Dijon).

Is a party that tolerates such ambiguities even a party? . . .

The Lille Congress, which struck us (without losing our sense of proportion) as a historic opportunity for the party and for the far left, did not witness the emergence of any left majority. Indeed, the contrary happened. But again, it is important to see what equivocations are contained in the term "left." . . .

The contradictions that the entire far-left all over the world is going through (Maoism or Trotskyism, populism or revolutionary Marxism) reached the PSU left wing *from the very moment* the latter sought to distinguish itself from social democracy.

Fighting against reformism does not make a political line, nor does it make a revolutionary party. There are fundamental differences in the far left, in connection with which positions have to be taken. There is no left in the PSU. The "Simon current"<sup>1</sup> and the GR,<sup>2</sup> set up as a single party, would turn out to be just as incapable of forming a cohesive and ef-

1. Faction of the PSU represented by Simon and the Paris Federation, which seeks to regroup the non-Maoist "left." They refuse, however, to make a serious critique of Stalinism and the effects of Stalinism on the working class. — *IP*

2. Gauche Révolutionnaire, a Maoist current. — *IP*

fective party as was the entire PSU. In this connection, the experience of the Paris Federation is significant. Any genuine political clarification can only lead to blowing the party wide open. *The PSU lives and will continue to live only because of its ambiguities* — ambiguity not only between reformism and revolution, but ambiguity between spontanéism and revolutionary Marxism as well. Ecumenism has nothing in common with Leninism. . . .

## The PSU Balance Sheet

It is now time, six months after the Lille Congress, to draw a balance sheet of the PSU's activities. This accounting, which cannot be neutral, has to be made as a function of the tasks of revolutionists in the present period: construction of an international organization able to offer revolutionary perspectives to mass struggles (implanted, therefore, in the working class and knowing how to construct revolutionary cadres).

1. *Internationalism*. Since it has only sporadic contacts with foreign organizations (reformist for the most part), the PSU is limited to an abstract, sentimental internationalism. The articles in the *Tribune Socialiste* under the heading "International" are for the most part descriptive. . . . The party never was deeply involved in any big international campaign. Work on Vietnam was sporadic. Recently the party's default was evidenced in scandalous fashion at the Lille Congress, which was attended by representatives of the counterrevolutionary governments of Algiers and Budapest.

2. *Working-class implantation*. Despite Behar's<sup>3</sup> bluffs, the PSU has made almost no progress in the plants since 1968. In the last few years, they have never ceased reiterating that the priority of priorities for militants was work in the plants. Thus in certain federations there has been the beginning of work in this area, some local sections. But the latter, left to their own devices and not knowing how to intervene or along what political line (compare the antagonistic positions on unions held by the party's various currents), got up a sale of the *Tribune Socialiste* or a leaflet distribution without any real knowledge

3. Member of the PSU National Bureau, in charge of work in the unions. — IP

of what was happening inside the groups they were addressing. Many party members continued to be obedient CGTers or CFDTers<sup>4</sup> on the job and good PSU members in their local section. The party's left wing did not conduct a principled fight against this practice.

The leadership of the Paris Federation, in which social democracy had been practically eliminated since early in 1970, did next to nothing to forward and to lead work in the plants. There was no coordinated intervention whatsoever by local sections in the big conflicts of 1970 and 1971, interventions that would have gained support, through a campaign of popularization and solidarity, of an action waged inside the plant. . . .

3. *Education of members*. National summer schools, held for brief periods once or twice a summer; several series of sessions on various subjects organized by certain of the federations — the PSU has no educational policy.

Actually, there can be no educational policy in so heterogeneous a party. Political education is neither neutral nor abstract. It is connected with a political line, with well-defined militant objectives. The party's ambiguity and lack of cohesion thus explain its total incapacity in this area.

This gap is sorely felt. Most of the comrades feel that they have made no progress on the political plane since they joined the party (except for the studying they did on their own). Without education, there is, of course, no real democracy. The debates between tendencies, confused because most of the time they deal with tactics and personalities, become incomprehensible to the rank and file. In order to follow them, it is necessary to have participated in the tendency meetings (which are attended by a very small percentage of party members), and to be "in the know" about tactical subtleties. Finally, many comrades make their decisions at congresses more on the basis of leaders (idolization of Rocard<sup>5</sup>) than on the

4. Two large trade-union federations: Confederation Generale du Travail (led by the Communist party) and Confederation Francaise et Democratique du Travail (led by the Socialist party). — IP

5. Michel Rocard, national secretary of the PSU. — IP

basis of a clear political choice. To a great extent this explains Rocard's success at Lille.

4. *Political debate with the entire far left*. Incapable of organizing a clear-cut political discussion within the party, the PSU obviously cannot play a meaningful role in the far left's ongoing debate.

This debate has been led above all by the Ligue Communiste, which has been depicted (with the help of opportunists, ecumenists, and Maoists) as a sectarian group.

As to the PSU, it cannot permit itself, on pain of publicly displaying its contradictions, to participate in an organized public debate with revolutionary groups.

In violation of all of the motions passed at its congresses, the PSU has declined all of the political debates proposed by the Ligue Communiste (whether at the National Bureau level or the Paris Federation level). . . .

*B. Abraham, Guy Rey, Jean Lambert, Henry Coudy, Marc Huret, P. Delain, J.P. Adam, J. C. Boisseau, J.P. Thomas, Evelyne Dorival, Alain Rolla, Ch. Lacourrière, Berges, B. St-Jaimes, François Lambert, Kerforn Bordeaux.*

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- [ ] \$15 enclosed for one year.  
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