

Intercontinental Press

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'British Troops Out of Ireland!'



The Irish Times

BRITISH TROOPS break up Northern Ireland civil rights march between Dungannon and Coalisland January 30. On same day,

troops murdered thirteen unarmed demonstrators in Derry. Massive protest march in Newry February 6 proceeded peacefully.

Nixon Heads for Peking as Bombs Fall on Indochina

A Statement of Position by the Fourth International:

Chile--the Coming Confrontation

'Blood on His Hands!'

Suharto 'Welcomed' to Australia

Indonesian dictator Suharto arrived in Australia February 6 for a three-day goodwill visit, the main purpose of which was to offer up his country to Australian capital investment. He was given the red-carpet treatment by the Australian government, anxious to make their ally's trip a successful one.

But when Suharto arrived in Sydney on February 9, he was greeted by jeering demonstrators, who managed to follow his itinerary through most of the day.

"President Suharto of Indonesia faced demonstrators almost everywhere he went during his one-day visit to Sydney yesterday," wrote the February 10 *Australian*. Seven hundred police were on hand at the Sydney Town Hall to "protect" Suharto from approximately 200 demonstrators. One woman was arrested as she tried to cross a police barricade.

Suharto's speech at the Town Hall was virtually drowned out by protesters chanting, "Go home, Suharto!" "He's got blood on his hands!" "Free your political prisoners!"

"We are against the political and economic bans placed on the Indonesian people by the present dictatorship," Malcolm Salmon, one of the coordinators of the action, told the Sydney *Mirror*. Demonstrators followed Suharto to the Wentworth Hotel, where he was staying, and later returned to the Wentworth to picket a state banquet being held in his honor.

In an address to the Australian-Indonesian Business Co-operation Committee, Suharto urged Australian capitalists to invest in Indonesia. He had previously delivered a similar speech to about 200 businessmen in Melbourne. According to the *Australian News Weekly Round-Up* of February 9, Suharto "emphasized the great changes in Indonesia since his Government took office in 1966."

One of the "great changes" that the president did not deign to mention was the murder of 500,000 opponents of the regime, a fact the protesters managed to point out. □

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Nixon Continues to Escalate Vietnam War

By David Thorstad

The U.S. air war in Indochina has undergone a sizable escalation just prior to President Nixon's China trip. "An intense United States bombing campaign against Communist base areas along the Laotian-South Vietnamese border entered its fifth day today as the United States command reported the heaviest American air raids in South Vietnam in two years," wrote Craig R. Whitney from Saigon in the February 13 *New York Times*.

The Nixon administration has used its oft-repeated predictions of a large-scale offensive by the Vietnamese liberation forces timed to coincide with Tet, the Lunar New Year, which begins February 15, as an excuse for sharply intensifying its air attacks.

In the twenty-four-hour period ending at 6:00 a.m. February 12, Whitney wrote, "Air Force and Navy fighter-bombers flew 172 tactical air strikes, all but two of them against enemy base areas bordering the two northern military regions, from the border zone west of Kontum to the demilitarized zone at the North Vietnamese border. The number was the highest since Sept. 24, 1970. . . ."

This number, however, as one military source admitted, was "just the tip of the iceberg": at least that many strikes were also flown against supply depots and bunkers across the borders of South Vietnam.

The number of missions flown by the giant Air Force B-52s during a twenty-four-hour period ending at 6:00 a.m. February 13—nineteen—was the highest since June 1968, Whitney reported February 14.

At the same time, Washington has moved to reinforce its fleet of B-52s in the Western Pacific and its aircraft-carrier strength in the Gulf of Tonkin. "According to the Administration sources," an Associated Press dispatch reported from Washington February 9, "at least a squadron of fifteen B-52s and supporting tanker planes have been ordered to the Western Pacific, probably to Guam, in position to reinforce other B-52s in Thailand." More

than forty B-52s are already operating out of Thailand.

On February 10, the aircraft carrier *Constellation* made an "unscheduled early return" to the Gulf of Tonkin, said Whitney in the February 13 *Times*. "There are now three aircraft



NIXON: Off to Peking to the tune of bombs falling on Indochina.

carriers with 200 fighter-bombers and support planes in the gulf, the same number stationed there at the height of the American war in 1968 and 1969." According to William Beecher in the February 11 *Times*, there are plans to send a fourth carrier "in the next few weeks."

This escalation of the air war not only dramatically reveals the depth of cynicism and hypocrisy in Nixon's talk about "winding down" the Indochina war. It also gives the lie to the glowing report he gave the U.S. Congress on the situation in South Vietnam in his "state of the world" message February 9. In that speech, he praised his "Vietnamization" policy, referring to an "overall picture of grow-

ing self-sufficiency and security in South Vietnam," and claimed that "over 80 percent of the total population of South Vietnam is under effective government control."

One such place considered to be under "effective government control," Hue, has been the site of a strongly anti-American "cultural week," according to a story by Joseph B. Treaster in the *New York Times* February 9, the very day Nixon made his speech to Congress. The exhibition at the University of Hue included photographs of American soldiers and planes, and signs condemning the U.S. war. Treaster called it "one of the strongest statements so far in a growing climate of open South Vietnamese hostility to the American involvement here." The exhibition was also critical of U.S. puppet Nguyen Van Thieu and his troops.

One white-walled building at the university is covered with anti-American slogans and caricatures of President Nixon. And the depth of the hostility to the war among the population is suggested by the fact that "for the moment officials in Hue do not appear to be prepared to force a confrontation with the students."

At the same time President Nixon is in Peking, *Le Monde's* Vietnam correspondent Jacques Decornoy reported February 10, a meeting of leaders of the Indochinese liberation forces is expected to take place in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or in territory under Pathet-Lao control. The last such meeting occurred nearly two years ago, in Canton, before the thaw in relations between the Chinese and the U.S. imperialists.

The purpose of this meeting, according to Decornoy, will be "to remind the world, particularly the Americans, that the war is far from being over and especially that a settlement of the conflict cannot be achieved through negotiations with the Chinese or the Soviets."

On January 31, the voice of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, *South Vietnam in Struggle*, observed: "Let Nixon go on holding talks and making speeches, let him take diplomatic trips as often as he can, but he cannot in the least change this elementary truth: the nature of American imperialism has not altered a bit; it remains as senselessly cruel as it is excessively greedy." □

Nixon's Peking Shopping List

By Allen Myers

"This trip," Richard Nixon told a news conference February 10, "should not be one which would create very great optimism or very great pessimism. It is one in which we must recognize that twenty years of hostility and virtually no communication will not be swept away by one week of discussion."

While recent remarks by Nixon and representatives of his administration have tended to warn against expecting "too much" from his visit to Peking, such warnings should be seen as insurance against failure rather than a statement of Nixon's expectations. The U.S. imperialist chieftain is not traveling to China for the sake of "communication." He clearly hopes for some quite concrete benefits.

Public declarations to the contrary, the number-one item on Nixon's Peking shopping list is a deal to end the Indochina war on terms acceptable to the U.S. ruling class. Perhaps the most straightforward expression of this aim to come from government circles was provided by Edward Brooke, Republican senator from Massachusetts. Brooke was interviewed by Godfrey Sperling Jr., who reported the senator's views in the February 10 *Christian Science Monitor*.

Liu Shao-chi Studies 'True Doctrine'

Chinese Official Says Lin Is Alive

Lin Piao has been "politically eliminated" but is still alive, according to Chinese government officials. A group of French members of parliament who spent three weeks in China was told this version of the vice-chairman's fate, Jonathan C. Randal reported from Paris in the February 10 *Washington Post*.

According to the legislators, Wu Fan-wu, director of the European section of the Foreign Ministry, denied reports that Lin was aboard the mys-

terious plane that crashed in Mongolia last September 12.

Asked if "eliminated" meant that Lin is dead, Wu replied, "No, it was a political elimination. In China we never confuse political errors with persons," according to a United Press International dispatch.

Randal wrote that Wu had also told the French delegation that Liu Shao-chi "is now in the north on a people's commune, where he can return to the true doctrine based on experience." □

Brooke predicted that Nixon and the Mao leadership would arrive at an agreement on a coalition government to replace Thieu in Saigon. "The Massachusetts Senator," Sperling wrote, "sees President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai finding a new 'middle ground' position whose basic ingredient will be agreement to a 'coalition government' which would supervise elections for a new Vietnam government."

"He said he was certain that the two parties could find a 'mix' for a coalition that would be agreeable to both."

Sperling quoted Brooke as saying: "I put a lot of stock in the Peking trip, even though the President tells us not to expect too much coming out of it. I'm certain that Vietnam will be right at the top of the agenda. "Once a coalition government mix is agreed to, then the return of prisoners and the phased total withdrawal of troops, linked to a stated date for full withdrawal, could begin."

"I think that the setting up of a coalition government is fundamental to the working out of any agreement between the President and Premier Chou. And I think you are going to end up with this coalition govern-

ment followed by elections."

Brooke also indicated that any U.S. withdrawal of troops was going to be dependent on an acceptable outcome of any "elections" that are held:

"Asked whether this [elections conducted by a coalition government] might not permit a Communist take-over of South Vietnam, the Senator answered:

"We're not going to agree to a Communist take-over of the south."

While one need not regard the details of Brooke's predictions with the same certainty that he expressed, the Republican senator's opinions were obviously not obtained from a crystal ball. A far more likely source is a private "briefing" by White House officials.

Nixon has past experience to support the belief that Peking will attempt to pressure the Vietnamese into a settlement. Writing in the February 18 issue of the revolutionary-socialist weekly *The Militant*, published in New York, Dick Roberts revealed some passages of the "Pentagon Papers" that were omitted from the excerpts published by the *New York Times* and other papers. Here is how the authors of the secret study of the Indochina war described the role of the Chinese and Soviet bureaucracies at the 1954 Geneva conference:

"While it is fair to state that the immediate implications of the accords did not reflect (even according to CIA reports) Viet Minh strength and control in Vietnam at the time of the conference, it is equally important to understand why.

"Viet Minh ambitions were thwarted, not so much by Western resistance or treachery, as by Sino-Soviet pressures on them to cooperate. . . . Together and separately, Moscow and Peking pressured concessions on the Viet Minh.

"Invariably, the two principal communist delegates, Chou En-lai and Molotov, played major roles in breaking deadlocks with conciliatory initiatives. . . . 'Peaceful coexistence' was the hallmark of their diplomacy.

"The Chinese, in particular, were interested in border security, buffers, preventing the formation of a U.S. alliance system with bases in the region, and reconstruction at home. The two big communist powers did not hesitate in asserting the paramountcy of their interests over those of the

Viet Minh." (Emphasis added.)

Nixon's February 9 "State of the World" message to Congress also indicated his expectations, although the language was of course a good deal more vague. Among the "considerations [that] shaped this Administration's approach to the People's Republic of China," Nixon listed the following two points in first place:

"Peace in Asia and peace in the world require that we exchange views, not so much despite our differences as because of them. A clearer grasp of each other's purposes is essential in an age of turmoil and nuclear weapons.

"It is in America's interest, and the world's interest, that the People's Republic of China play its appropriate role in shaping international arrangements that affect its concerns. Only then will that great nation have a stake in such arrangements; only then will they endure."

No one will deny that the war on its doorstep is a "concern" of China. The question is what "stake" Nixon can provide for Mao in "international arrangements" dealing with Indochina. Brooke's predictions of a "coalition" government in Saigon suggest that Nixon might offer the "withdrawal" of U. S. troops in exchange for a "neutral" government that would then be supplied with "advisers" in civilian clothing. Mao, it will be recalled, accepted a similar arrangement in Laos in 1962.

There have been signs that Nixon would be ready to sweeten such an offer with hard cash. At his February 10 press conference, Nixon made a point of praising a book on China by André Malraux, who was French minister of culture under de Gaulle. A few days earlier, Malraux had been reported as telling Senator Edward Kennedy that Mao would very likely bring up the question of U. S. "aid" to China.

"Mao will look at Nixon," Malraux was quoted as saying, "and ask the first question: Is the richest nation in the world prepared to help one of the poorest countries in the world—namely China?"

Questioned about this by one reporter, Nixon replied:

". . . I cannot really predict, with much confidence as Mr. Malraux perhaps can, as to what Mr. Mao Tse-tung's questions will be.

"So, consequently, I don't believe it would be proper to comment now on a question that has not yet been asked by him. If it is asked, I will have an answer."

Spain

Franco Faces Rising Wave of Unrest

During the past several months the Franco regime has faced a nationwide upsurge of worker and student protest.

Labor unrest, the latest wave of which was kicked off by the workers' occupation of the state-owned SEAT auto complex last October, has spread to many areas of the country. On February 5 the Michelin tire factory in Vitoria was closed. Two weeks before, some 3,000 workers at the plant had walked off the job, demanding a wage increase. Work stoppages and demonstrations have occurred among the 100,000 employees of the national bank. The regime is afraid the labor upsurge will spread further, since many contracts are currently being renegotiated.

The trade-union actions have been accompanied by a new wave of student struggles. According to the January 29 *Rouge*, weekly paper of the Ligue Communiste, ten of Spain's eighteen universities have been hit by mass protests, which have involved a total of between 150,000 and 200,000 students. Some cities have seen their first mass antigovernment actions since the 1930s.

According to *Le Monde* of February 8, the University of Valencia was closed on February 4, following clashes between students and police; in Barcelona the schools of pharmacy, philosophy, and arts and letters are closed; in Madrid, the strike of medical students has not been broken, although as many as 1,000 students have reportedly been arrested; at Granada, medical students have gone on strike; at Oviedo, two schools have been closed for the past two weeks by student strikes.

In the Basque provinces, fresh repressive measures were taken by the Francoites following a kidnapping conducted by the ETA [Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna — Basque Nation and

Rich American tourists abroad have a reputation for extravagant spending. If he can get the item at the top of his shopping list, Nixon is not likely to quibble about the price. □

Freedom]. The Basque provinces have been divided into military quadrants, and roadblocks have been set up across most important thoroughfares.

The repression has been accompanied by a shake-up in the personnel of the police apparatus. A new director and deputy director of the Civil Guards have been appointed, and the province of Guipúzcoa has a new governor, an old fascist military leader who was formerly head of the Madrid police.

But despite the increase in police measures, the opposition has shown no sign of being intimidated into silence. □

Three French Students Win Release From Franco Prison

On February 4 the Franco government released three members of the Ligue Communiste [Communist League, French section of the Fourth International] from the Figueras prison, where they had been held since January 1. Jacques Giron, Gilles Marquet, and Gilbert Dufourcq were each required to post bond of about \$700. They had been arrested on vague charges of transporting illegal Marxist literature from France to Spain.

The report of their release (in the February 8 *Le Monde*) did not indicate whether the three had been allowed to return to France.

The release represented a victory for the vigorous defense campaign for the prisoners launched in France by the Ligue Communiste. □

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Nixon, Mao Try to Recoup Losses in Bangladesh

By Jon Rothschild

On February 6 Bangladesh Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman arrived in Calcutta for two days of talks with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. At the conclusion of their conversations it was announced that the remaining Indian troops in Bangladesh (approximately 40,000 out of the initial invasion force of between 90,000 and 150,000) will be withdrawn before March 25, the first anniversary of the Pakistani assault on the Bengali population.

Rahman and Gandhi said the Indian army had completed its duties in Bangladesh and was being removed in order to avoid feeding Pakistani propaganda, which had reportedly been delaying recognition of the new state by several countries.

India and Bangladesh are expected to sign a treaty of friendship and economic assistance in the near future.

Speaking to a rally of about 500,000 in Calcutta, Rahman said that the policies of his government would be based on nationalism, democracy, and secularism, and added, in his first pronouncement on the subject, that "communism has no place in our country."

Rahman's publicly announced anti-communism, when viewed in the context of the impending withdrawal of Indian soldiers, indicates that he feels confident that the job of disarming the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Forces) guerrillas has been successfully achieved.

Unperturbed by Rahman's Calcutta speech, the Soviet Union signed a trade agreement with the Bangladesh government on February 9. The exact terms were not disclosed, but according to the Paris daily *Le Monde*, it stipulates that the Soviet Union will send steel, gasoline, and animal foods to Bangladesh in exchange for jute, tea, goatskin, and spices.

The Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced February 6 that Rahman will personally visit Moscow at the beginning of March.

The withdrawal of Indian troops, and the temporary stabilization of

Bangladesh that it indicates, has touched off a multifaceted diplomatic entanglement, as the United States, China, and the Soviet Union jockey for position in the new alignment of the subcontinent.

In Nixon's "State of the World" speech February 9, he referred to U. S. relief efforts in "East Bengal." It was the first time that he had called Bangladesh anything but "East Pakistan." According to the February 10 *New York Times*, "government officials" described the change as "deliberate." They said that recognition of Bangladesh by the United States was under "active consideration." Two weeks before, State Department spokesmen had said that such a move was "not under active consideration."

In the same speech, Nixon offered Gandhi a "serious" dialogue aimed at improving relations with the United States. For the first time, Nixon admitted that the Pakistani war against the Bengali people was not entirely justified. That statement and Nixon's acknowledgment that the United States had continued to aid Pakistan throughout the carnage of March-December were widely seen as a subtle concession to Gandhi.

On its part, the Soviet bureaucracy, while demonstrating its desire to help the anticommunist Rahman out of his economic difficulties, is also engaged in fence-mending with Pakistan. Diplomatic circles in Moscow have reported that preparations are being made to invite Pakistan President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Moscow, sometime after Rahman's visit.

A report in the Communist party newspaper *Pravda* on a recent convention of the ruling Pakistan People's party held in Karachi repeatedly stressed that the Soviet Union "is a sincere friend of Pakistan," and drew a sharp—and completely unwarranted—distinction between Bhutto's policies and those of Yahya Khan. The article was described by the February 10 *New York Times* as "the most favorable report" on Pakistan to appear in the Soviet press in months.

Even the Chinese government, which was the only major power to precipitously withdraw its consular staff from Dacca after Rahman took power, appears to be hedging its bets. Early last August Burmese head of state General Ne Win held talks in Peking with Chinese leaders. China reportedly agreed to cease aiding insurgents in northern Burma in exchange for Burmese support in international diplomacy. Last week, Burma recognized the Rahman government. The February 5 issue of the usually well-informed *Far Eastern Economic Review* commented: "In fact, sources hinted, the Burmese decision was made at the suggestion of Peking which wanted a line of communication to Dacca. Chinese consular officials stayed in the Burmese Embassy in Dacca until they were repatriated—and Burma today officially manages Chinese interests in Bangladesh."

In the midst of the maneuvering for a general realignment of forces in the subcontinent, the major problem that remains is the future of relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan. On this point Rahman is under extraordinary pressure from the Bengali people not to accept any sort of deal with the butchers in Rawalpindi. This accounts for his statement at the Calcutta rally that Bhutto should "be sent to an insane asylum" if he thinks he can establish relations with Bangladesh.

There are signs, however, that Rahman may be speaking differently in private. A front-page editorial in the February 9 *Le Monde* noted that the announcement of the withdrawal of Indian troops could open the door to negotiations between Dacca and Rawalpindi. The February 10 *New York Times* reported that a dispatch in *Pravda* "seemed to indicate that the Soviet Union might be prepared to play an intermediary role to arrange more normal relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh."

Finally, Bhutto himself, not wanting to spend any time in a lunatic

asylum, has changed his tune. The February 9 *Christian Science Monitor* published sections of an "exclusive" interview granted by Bhutto to its correspondent Henry S. Hayward on February 6.

Bhutto said he wanted to talk to Rahman, "the earlier the better." Asked if Pakistan could conceivably recognize Bangladesh, Bhutto replied, "I have to make a full search for a *modus vivendi*. It cannot be a snap decision. The people must know that I have made every effort to heal the breach."

He said he "feels morally bound to accommodate the East Pakistan viewpoint." A concession to a Muslim Bengal, he said, "would not be a defeat for Pakistan."

Great Britain

Heath Declares 'State of Emergency' as Miners Continue Strike

London

Well into the fifth week, there is a growing optimism amongst Britain's 200,000 miners that they are going to win their strike "for a decent wage." Unlike the 1930s and 1940s, when the British working class were still feeling the effect of the defeat of the 1926 General Strike, the mood amongst the miners and the British working class as a whole is today one of confidence and determination to win.

The effectiveness of the miners' strike is unquestionable. Their militant pickets have succeeded in tying up the coal supplies going into practically every major power station in the country. Yesterday [February 8] the Heath Tory government invoked a "state of emergency" empowering the government to take desperate measures to meet the effectiveness of the miners' strike by cutting off electric power supplies and potentially to use the British troops to clear pickets so that scabs may transport coal.

Significantly enough, the "state of emergency" was declared after well over 8,000 miners and their supporters converged on London by the train-load last Sunday from coalfields as far away as Scotland, bringing with them their wives and children, militant slogans, and a cheerful determin-

On the subject of India, Bhutto said he was prepared to "chalk out a new equilibrium. . . . If India is not myopic we can reach agreement."

On February 8, Bangladesh formally applied for membership in the British Commonwealth. During that week France and Italy revealed that they would join the list of Common Market countries recognizing Bangladesh.

The place of the subcontinent in the new concert of Asia that Nixon hopes to arrange with Peking and Moscow will no doubt be high on the agenda when he visits those two capitals in the coming weeks. But the interests and desires of the Bengali people will be of tertiary concern at best. Rahman, to be sure, will in no way emerge as the protector of those interests. □

ation that they will succeed.

The miners' case is unimpeachable. In 1947, when the mines were nationalised, there were 985 mines; since that time, 770 have been closed; with new openings, only 292 remain. More than 400,000 jobs have been lost, creating derelict communities, moving miners and their families to other areas like refugees, many having to move two or three times.

Since nationalisation 6,545 men have been killed at work, and 38,000 miners have been injured in accidents. Last year alone ninety-two miners were killed in the mines. Their work is hard and dangerous; industrial accidents and pneumoconiosis (800 deaths in 1967) reap a heavy toll.

During the past fifteen years, there has been a severe deterioration in the miners' pay, to the order of 25 percent, resulting in them going from the top to the sixteenth position for the British work force.

Productivity almost doubled in the twenty years since 1947, yet the National Coal Board refuses to pay more. The basic rates are £19 underground and £18 surface, with a take-home pay of £13-£14 respectively. This causes 88,000 miners to be in a position to accept welfare benefits in addition to their earnings.

The National Coal Board offer of £2 and £1.90 increases is an insult. The miners' demands come at the end of a twelve-month period when the cost of living has risen 1 percent per month!

Sympathy for the miners' cause is widespread both inside and outside the trade-union movement. Oil workers have refused to cross picket lines, and railwaymen have refused to carry coal. S-U carburetter men in Birmingham have walked out in a twenty-four-hour strike, and the 109 men are threatening to take one-day strikes until the miners get their demands.

Some Labour MPs, themselves members of the NUM (National Union of Mineworkers), have joined the picket lines alongside the miners. Many student groups are calling meetings at their colleges and universities to discuss the strike and to give financial assistance and to help out on the picket lines.

An emergency committee in Colchester—comprising members of the Essex Labour party, Communist, Marxist, and Women's Liberation groups, and students from Essex University—billeted fifty-three Yorkshire miners who travelled down from the north to picket the power station in Ipswich.

After a massive rally of between 30,000-40,000 students responding to Tory attempts to curtail the autonomous functioning of student unions terminated in Trafalgar Square, a contingent of about 5,000 of them marched further to the National Coal Board to express their solidarity with the miners.

Even the bourgeois press has begun to recognise the intransigence of the British miners. Many are editorially expressing sympathy with the miners' demands.

The miners themselves have been travelling up and down the country picketing power stations, coal deposits, and docks. Many miners have been injured and/or arrested as a result of harassment by the police, who have attempted to break picket lines to let scabs go through. Perhaps the most vicious of these police assaults is taking place many miles away from the coalfields, at Saltley, Birmingham, where more than 500 pickets from all over the country have come to prevent the moving of 100,000 tons of coke, which is the last accessible stockpile in Britain.

The likely outcome of these police

assaults occurred last Thursday [February 3], when one miner, Fred Matthews, was killed by a lorry breaking through a picket line at Scunthorpe, Lincolnshire. Mr. Matthews's four brothers, themselves miners, were on the demonstration on Sunday [February 6], and his mother sent a letter which was read to enthusiastic approval, urging the men to continue their fight against "the most vicious Tory Government of this century."

Among those taking part in Sunday's protest march were 700 miners from South Wales, 500 from Nottinghamshire, along with counterparts from Yorkshire, Scotland, and Kent. Traffic was, of course, brought to a halt as the procession, led by killed pipers and seven colliery bands, marched through central London from Speakers Corner to Trafalgar Square.

Many onlookers joined the march, which looked very much like a miniature of the 150,000 trade unionists who demonstrated last February against the Industrial Relations Bill. The march was joined by some Belgian miners over here, with moral and financial support, and a large contingent of students, Labour party Young Socialists, and other political organisations.

At Trafalgar Square a piper played a one-minute lament for Fred Matthews. Afterwards the square, swelling with supporters, was made available to speakers from the miners' union, Transport and General Workers Union, and the Labour party. Significantly enough, despite the forceful arguments of the union brass, they were often not strong enough for rank and file, many of whom kept shouting for a general strike.

In the event of the government using the Industrial Relations Act against the miners, Lawrence Daly, general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, said: "Let them try it. We will break that legislation,

Mao Thought Works Technological Wonder

In an article published by the Chinese Communist party theoretical journal *Hongqi*, a group of Shanghai truck drivers explain that Mao Tsetung Thought "gives us the motive power to drive our trucks well and illuminates our advance."

Capitalist-roaders and other revisionists presumably rely on gasoline and headlights.

as eventually it will be broken by the trade-union movement."

Daly emphasised the unity and determination of the men and suggested that the Trades Union Congress might help the situation by translating its moral support into practical action. One of the main speakers at the rally, Wedgwood Benn, chairman of the Labour party, was reproached by some miners who reminded him of pit closures under Labour governments. He commented that the government had deliberately tried to stir up public sentiment against the miners and had completely underestimated the spirit of the miners and their families.

Jack Jones, leader of the Transport and General Workers Union, the largest in the country, called on the whole trade-union movement to unite behind the miners, but he did not elaborate precisely what actions would bring about this unity. Collections totalled more than £1,900 in cash, apart from cheques, which were also contributed.

The miners' strike is in large part

Soviet Union

Letter Reports Fainberg's Life in Danger

Parallel with the current crackdown on dissenters at large in the Soviet Union, oppositionists already confined are also being subjected to harsher treatment. A "brief typewritten report" from Moscow dissidents, described in the Western press January 29, states that Viktor Fainberg, a well-known oppositionist confined in the Leningrad "special" psychiatric hospital, recently attempted suicide after being injected with a depressive drug.

Fainberg was declared insane for participating in the Red Square demonstration against the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The *samizdat* report said that he and fellow inmate Vladimir Borisov, one of the initial supporters of the Initiative Group for Defense of Human Rights in the USSR, had been conducting a hunger strike for at least thirty-three days. Attempts were being made to force-feed them, the report said. The forced injections that brought Fainberg to the point of suicide were apparently part of the authorities' attempt to break the strike.

a response to the Tory government's large-scale assault on the British labour movement, but it looks as if the government is having at least second thoughts. The miners represent the tradition of British working-class militancy against the Tories, and their solidarity in this fight is quite a remarkable index of the power of the British working class.

In an interview with the *Sunday Times*, one old-timer summed up today's sentiment: "The National Coal Board threatened they'll close down pits if the strike goes on. At one time this would have shocked a mining community. The miners lived for a pit and the pit helped them to live. Generations of pitmen have lived with this philosophy. But now that's all gone. The older generation count no longer. If the Coal Board shut the pits, the younger generation won't give a monkey's, and I don't blame them. We've been treated shabbily, and we want a fair wage for a fair day's work. We won't go back until we get it." □

Fainberg and Borisov conducted a similar hunger strike a year ago, for eighty-one days, from March 13 to June 7. They announced their hunger strike at that time with an open letter appealing "to the progressive public of all countries, to all people of good will."

In that document they warned that "not a single country, not a single people has a guarantee that the practice of mass mental sterilization will not be adopted by its ruling elite. Of course, this can happen only under a totalitarian system. But given the fact that totalitarianism is generally speaking historically doomed, it is precisely now, in the transitional period, that it tries to take its revenge in the most unexpected places. It is sufficient to recall the recent conspiracy of the Italian generals, the growth in influence of the military-industrial complex in the USA, and so on."

Moscow dissidents, in appealing for support to these heroic hunger strikers now, warned that "the lives of Fainberg and Borisov are in danger." □

Latvian Communists Protest Russification

Copenhagen

A letter by seventeen Latvian Communist party functionaries has been smuggled out of the Soviet Union. It protests against a "Great Russian national policy," which the writers say threatens to obliterate Latvia as a nation. The letter, published in the January 30 issue of the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter*, was addressed to a number of Communist parties, including the Rumanian, Yugoslavian, Italian, and French CPs. The head of the Swedish Communist party, C. H. Hermansson, also received a copy of the letter, which took up ten tightly written sheets of paper.

According to *Dagens Nyheter*, all of the signers are prominent figures in the second-layer leadership of the Latvian party, working directly under the Central Committee and the Presidium.

The accusations that Moscow's policy is to obliterate native influence in the Soviet republic of Latvia are supported by a long series of facts that correspond to a high degree to what has been reported in the West from other sources. Thus, the document seems to be genuine and to reflect serious dissension in the Latvian CP, dissension reaching into the top leadership.

All of the signers say that they worked in the underground Communist party in Latvia before the war. They fought in the Red Army, or as partisans, during the war and want to advance socialist development in their country. What they oppose is the Russification process in Latvia, where the Soviet regime is quite consciously settling Russians, White Russians, and Ukrainians so that the Latvians will become a minority in their own country.

The result of this process, the letter said, is "that 20,000 to 25,000 new residents are registered every year in the Latvian capital of Riga and that the proportion of Latvians in the city is now only 40 percent as compared with 45 percent in 1970. In the country as a whole in the same period, the percentage of Latvians fell from 62 to 57 percent." The writers

warn that Latvia can suffer the same fate as the Karelo-Finnish republic, which has been incorporated into the Russian republic. "The same fate awaits both Kazakhstan and Latvia," they say.

Russian immigrants completely control the party apparatus and personnel policy in all areas, so that the Latvians are excluded from influential posts. Moreover, industries are developed which do not serve Latvia's economic needs but those of the Soviet Union. The writers go on to say that Russian military units are stationed in Latvia while Latvian units are sent as far away from home as their time

in the service permits.

The letter gives a detailed description of the way in which Russians—and Latvians whose education and position make them more Russian than Latvian—are being taken into the party apparatus, while Latvians are being dropped. In all meetings and documents, the language used is Russian. If anyone objects, he is charged with "nationalist deviation."

The conclusion states: "We think that you must see the truth about what is happening here and feel compelled to put pressure on the leaders of the Soviet Communist party. We know that that is not easy. They are not used to listening to other people. They act from positions of power and recognize only power. But your parties have great influence in the world Communist movement and your opinions cannot be ignored." □

Attack on 'Samizdat' Journal Reported

The *Chronicle of Current Events*, the most successful of Soviet *samizdat* publications, is under new attack from the bureaucracy, according to reports in the Western press. Accounts in the *New York Times* and *Christian Science Monitor* quote Soviet dissidents as saying that the Communist party Central Committee decreed on December 30 that the journal must be suppressed.

A wave of arrests in Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine, and Lithuania is reportedly connected with this decision. Despite the Central Committee's decree, however, issue number 23 of the *Chronicle* was circulating in Moscow at the beginning of February.

The attack on the underground journal appeared to be part of a stepped-up campaign against all forms of dissidence in the Soviet Union.

On January 12, the weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published a scurrilous attack on novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. The article attacked the author for, among other things, the social position of his grandfather, allegedly a wealthy landowner.

Literaturnaya Gazeta claimed that Solzhenitsyn's novel *August 1914* "was welcomed by anti-Sovietists of all kinds," and attempted to prove

its point by misquoting reviews that have appeared in the West. A review by Anatole Shub published last June in the *Washington Post*, for example, said that the novel "represents the most profound sort of challenge to the very essence of the Stalinist and neo-Stalinist regime." In *Literaturnaya Gazeta's* article, this was translated as: "*August 1914* is a real unmasked challenge to the present Soviet regime, aimed at its essence."

The attack on Solzhenitsyn was unusual in that he is normally not mentioned in the Soviet press.

On January 25, the Communist party newspaper *Pravda* summarized a Central Committee decree attacking Soviet critics for insufficient zeal "in exposing the reactionary essence of bourgeois 'mass culture' and decadent trends, and in the struggle against various kinds of non-Marxist views on literature and art and against revisionist aesthetic conceptions."

No critics were mentioned by name, but reviewers were attacked for showing a "conciliatory attitude toward artistic and ideological trash." The decree indicated that the Central Committee planned to add "politically mature" critics to editorial boards of magazines and publishing houses. □

In Dublin the Flames Rose High as British Embassy Burned to Ground

By Wataru Yakushiji

Dublin

Throughout Ireland industry was half paralyzed in the days following the January 30 massacre by British troops in Derry.

On February 1, for example, 1,000 workers from the Tallaght Industrial Estate; groups from Beamish and Crawford Limited and from the National Electrical Engineering Trade Union employed at Joseph Murphy Structural Engineers in Santry; workers from An Foras Taluntais (Agricultural Institute); workers from the Booth Poole and Company plant at Islandbridge, and from the Aspro-Nicholas factory in Walkinstown—all walked out and staged a protest march on the British embassy. According to the February 2 *Irish Times*, 500 people from a British-controlled Hammond Lane group of companies also walked out and marched from Bluebell.



The Irish Times

BOY WOUNDED in face by bullet on "Bloody Sunday" in Derry. Massacre touched off massive demonstrations.

'British Murderers Out!'

From noon until late at night, Fitzwilliam Street, on which the British embassy stands, and Merrion Square North, which crosses it, were crowded with protesters. Traffic was brought almost to a halt. Late in the evening a crowd of about 8,000 jammed the streets around Merrion Square, and in a ceremonial manner a gelignite bomb was thrown at the embassy to the loud cheers of the crowd.

The slogans most often heard from the marchers were "British Murderers Out!" and "Support the IRA!" The former was more frequent than the latter.

Cooks Travel Agency on College Green, Austin Reeds tailors on Grafton Street, and Maples of London—a British-owned furniture store—on Dawson Street were attacked with petrol bombs.

Two-Day March in Cork

The February 2 *Irish Times* reported that in Cork, brewers, busmen, schoolchildren, teachers, ESB (Electric Supply Board) workers, and other trade unionists marched through the city continuously for two days in protest against the Derry pogrom. There was no bus service, following a decision not to work by 250 drivers of the National Busmen's Union and the ITGWU (Irish Transport and General Workers Union).

The Mogul of Ireland mine at the Silvermines, Nenagh, came to a halt when more than 400 workers decided to quit work for forty-eight hours.

At the IRA Rallies

I observed events in Dublin at first hand. Public rallies held by the two wings of the IRA showed a clear contrast. The Provisionals' rallies have been limited to angry attacks on British imperialism and filled with shouts and cheers. The Officials tend to explain the political nature of the con-

flict, and attempts were made to show the next step to be taken, though my impression is that they have not succeeded in this.

However, political consciousness has been growing rapidly. Twenty-five of the fifteen young men and fifteen young women whom I interviewed on O'Connell Street on the night of February 1 said they felt they must help achieve a united Ireland and that they agree with republicanism. When I asked them which wing they preferred, ten said the Officials and the rest did not answer. Eighteen of those I interviewed were workers and twelve were students. My impression was that the masses are not provided with any direction for the next step other than angry street demonstrations.

On February 2, the National Day of Mourning, from early in the morning O'Connell Street was filled with workers, church groups, and every other conceivable group marching to the embassy in Merrion Square.

50,000 in Dublin March

For four consecutive days the streets around the embassy had been crowded with protesting masses. Despite a strong, chilly wind and bitter rain, tens of thousands now came to the symbol of British imperialism. All the stores, restaurants, theaters, and offices were closed, and bus service was reduced by 95 percent.

At 3:00 o'clock, Parnell Square East, which leads into O'Connell Street, was jammed with trade unionists and citizens. My estimate is that there were well over 50,000 workers gathering for a protest march. Hundreds of placards read "Fascists Out, North and South," "British Troops Go Home," "Release the Internees," "Jack Lynch [premier of the Twenty-six County government] can go to Copenhagen for a foreign king's funeral. He couldn't go to Derry," etc.

Among the biggest groups were the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union, Automobile Workers Union, General Engineering and Mechanical Operators Union, and Amalgamated Union of Woodworkers. Along the route thousands of ordinary citizens joined the demonstration.

Embassy Goes Up in Flames

By 4:30 p.m. the streets around the embassy were so packed that I

found it impossible to move. I could hear loud cheers and see flames rising from the embassy. The February 3 *Irish Times* gave this description of the events:

"... stone-throwing started and was encouraged by the crowd; each stone to hit a window was cheered, but the stones bounced back from the bullet-proof panes and the reinforced shutters. Then the petrol bombing started, at first sporadically, each flash acknowledged by the crowd, who shouted: 'More, more, more...'

"Three young men climbed onto a balcony at the end of the square and swinging between the balconies, made their way to the poles that once bore the British flag. A man in a fawn pullover took a Tricolor from his pocket and hoisted it to the half-mast position. The crowd roared approval.

"A second man took a hatchet from his pocket and started to hack at the windows and the steel behind them. The crowd marked each blow with a cheer and, as the glass fractured and the steel fell back, roared with delight.

"... while the demonstrators were still singing, the final attack began. Petrol bombs and red flares dropped at the entrance, the fire took hold and the flames shone through the broken windows."

Police Guard Passport Office

At 8:00 o'clock in front of the General Post Office, the Provisional wing of the IRA held a rally, with about 500 people listening. After fifteen minutes, the speech ended with an appeal: "We are going to the British embassy. Those who support the Provisional IRA should follow our lorry." About 200 people followed the instructions and marched off along O'Connell Street toward the embassy.

Soon after they left, the Official IRA began its rally. There were only about 200 people at the beginning, but the audience grew to well over 500 in half an hour. The Official IRA speeches, unlike that of the Provisionals, attempted to show political solutions. They emphasized the importance of a negative vote in the coming April referendum on the EEC [Common Market] and urged people to organize and occupy their workshops the next morning.

The crowd then marched to Mer-

tion Square behind the lorry of the Official IRA. En route, hundreds more joined the march. As the marchers, singing "We Shall Overcome," were passing the British passport office (only 100 yards from the already burnt-out embassy), several petrol bombs were thrown at the building.

Immediately the *gardai* (police) charged the crowd with batons. Dozens of people were knocked down on the road, and according to the *Irish Times*, two newspaper photographers were among those beaten on the head. I managed to escape with baton blows on the back.

After four consecutive days of mass

upheaval in Dublin, people seemed to be at a loss as to what to do next. The embassy blaze on February 2 appeared to provide a temporary channel for the deep anger against British imperialism and the frustrated and long-cherished hopes for a truly independent and united Ireland.

However, the growth of political consciousness that has begun to take place among the masses of the South will be an important factor for the future of the nationalist movement in Ireland. Many walls in Dublin now bear such slogans as "British Murderers Out!" "Fianna Fáil Traitors," and "EEC—No!" □

On the Spot Report

Newry—Biggest Demonstration in Ireland Since the Twenties

By Wataru Yakushiji

Newry

I arrived in Newry from Belfast the evening before the February 6 march. There were many roadblocks maintained by the British army and the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR). Driving around Newry late at night, I was often stopped and searched by British soldiers and UDR men.

The border with the Twenty-six Counties was sealed as early as February 4. Despite this, some 10,000 persons came to join the march from all over the South—Cork, Dublin, Galway, Limerick, etc. Their buses were stopped at the border, but the marchers came over the hills on footpaths into Newry.

In preparation for the march, the British reinforced their army in the Six Counties with the 550-strong Second Battalion Light Infantry—an obvious attempt to intimidate the nationalist population.

The Stormont regime filled the mass communications media with threats, saying that the Newry march would be a repetition of Bloody Sunday in Derry. The bus I rode from Belfast was stopped and searched by UDR men, who told us: "It will be another Derry tomorrow. We will be waiting for you. In Derry it was thirteen, but in Newry it will be much more."

On the morning of the march, the streets of Newry—a town of 15,000 population, about 90 percent of it nationalist—were filled with people who had come to participate. Along the Newry canal and the River Clanrye, about 2,000 British troops could be seen. Early in the afternoon they built a strong barricade at the bottom of Monaghan Street, which leads up to Camlough Road, along which the march was expected to pass.

The march organizers took steps to avoid any confrontation with the troops that might lead to a pogrom. Some 800 stewards helped to direct the demonstrators.

As an additional precaution against confrontations, Rooney's Meadow housing estate, about half a mile from the center of Newry, was chosen as the rally site. The march began at 3:00 p. m., and although it took only thirty minutes for the head of the procession to reach the housing estate, marchers were still arriving at 5:30. Placards carried by the demonstrators had slogans like "End the internment," "Free all the political prisoners," "Abolish Stormont," "Withdraw all the British troops now," and "Abolish the Special Powers Act." There were also in-

frequent slogans criticizing the Lynch government.

Speakers at the rally included Social Democratic and Labour party (SDLP) members of parliament and Bernadette Devlin. The cheers of the crowd of 100,000 reached a peak when Devlin began her speech.

"We have had our Bloody Sundays before," she said. "We have lost our people. They have lost their lives in the struggle before. So let us pledge today that in the face of repression—we have been batoned, intimidated, interrogated, interned, and slaughtered on the streets—that we will continue in the struggle until we have finally defeated British imperialism."

Devlin criticized the statements of SDLP speakers that "peaceful means" were the only way to win democracy. She explained that they would not be permitted to achieve their objectives peacefully by British imperialism, which "neither knows nor cares about the meaning of peace or justice or freedom or democracy." She went on to explain why a united socialist Ireland is the only solution, and concluded to thundering applause.

There was then a minute of silence in honor of the thirteen persons murdered in Derry. The stony silence of the huge throng was awe-inspiring.

The February 7 issue of the *Belfast Irish News* made the following evaluation of the march:

"Ireland will remember Newry yesterday as the finest day in the history of the Civil Rights Association's struggle against Stormont and the Special Powers Act.

"To make it possible 60,000 people—some estimates were as high as 100,000—marched two miles in stoney silence and showed their contempt for Stormont by breaking the Government ban on parades."

The Civil Rights Association had originally expected only about 30,000 demonstrators, but the political awakening in the Twenty-six Counties and the deepening determination of the nationalist population of the North combined to produce a march that is being described by movement leaders as the largest since the 1920s.

The demonstration showed that the people of the South have begun to go beyond verbal solidarity with their compatriots in the North—a fact also indicated by marches the same day in Dublin, Dundalk, and Cork. □

Iran

Shah Asks Death Sentences in New Trial

By Javad Sadeeg

On February 6 the shah of Iran brought another group of young revolutionists before his military tribunals.

This group consisted of twenty persons, and the prosecutor asked death sentences for the following four: Ali-Reza Shokouhi, Mohammad Ahmadian, Hussein Hashemi and Abdullah Razavi-Emad.

The air edition of the semiofficial Teheran daily *Ettelaat*, which consistently refers to the accused as "saboteurs," listed the charges as the publication and distribution of unauthorized leaflets, formation of a communist organization, preparation for hijacking a plane, the production and storing of ammunition and explosives, and, finally, theft of bicycles.

The prisoners denied the right of the military court to try them because of the political nature of the charges.

Ali-Reza Shokouhi declared in the court that he was a Marxist-Leninist and that he did not recognize the authority of the military to try him. Other prisoners supported him, reported the Teheran daily *Kayhan* in its air edition of February 6.

The judge, Colonel Jafar Vosougi,

agreed with Captain Yadallah Gobadi, the prosecutor, that their court had all the jurisdiction it needed.

This trial follows the trial of twenty-three militants that ended on February 2 amid charges by the accused that even their families were not allowed to attend. The trial of the twenty-three lasted ten days, and six death sentences were handed out. The prisoners have appealed, as has the prosecutor, who is asking additional death sentences.

In our February 14 issue we reported the names of those sentenced to death. The following nine were given life terms at hard labor: Mehdi Savalani, Gholam-Reza Golavi, Bahman Ajhang, Abdol-Karim Hajian, Bahram Gobadi, Ali-Asghar Izadi, Javad Oskoui, Abdul-Raheem Sabouri, Mohammad-Ali Partovi. Five of these were originally sentenced to death, but the sentences were commuted. The following were given between three and fifteen years: Hameed Arzpeyma, Ali Sarmadi, Tagi Hameedian, Raheem Karimian, Fariborz Sanjari, Hassan Rade-Merrikhi, Hassan Golshahi, and Ahmad Abbaspour. □

'Le Monde' Describes Repression in Iran

"In Iran, the trials of oppositionists are following on each other's heels at a stepped-up pace, and the sentences imposed are getting worse," begins a front-page editorial in the February 8, 1972, issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*. In the editorial, the influential newspaper calls attention to the shah's efforts to respond to deepening opposition to his regime with an increase in repression.

The first week in February, it reports, "military tribunals condemned to death, one right after the other, six, and then five, activists of the far left accused of engaging in attacks." On February 6, courts-martial began to try two groups of young people,

consisting of twenty and twenty-three persons, for "attacking the security of the state, subversion, armed attacks and assassinations." One has already been condemned to death, and the death penalty is being sought for four others. A third trial, involving 143 persons, is currently under way.

"Last year at least fifteen persons were executed on the same grounds," it stated.

"The harshness of the authorities is in keeping with the development of 'urban guerrilla warfare' in the country," the editorial went on. "For the past fifteen months, in fact, young people—mostly intellectuals—have taken to the *maquis* to use arms in

their fight against the shah's regime. Attacks and raids have increased against police stations, police militia headquarters in the provinces, banks and public administration buildings." Some prominent officials of the regime are said to have barely escaped death in these attacks.

In view of the wide scope of the violent opposition to the regime, *Le Monde* observes, "it might seem surprising that the authorities are not giving more publicity to the trials, which with few exceptions are being held behind closed doors and are exceptionally brief." The lack of publicity, of course, makes it easier to deal harshly with political prisoners by making it more difficult to mobilize world opinion against the shah's repression.

"Last year, thirteen prisoners were executed even before the verdict was announced in the press. The discretion observed in this way tends to give substance to the charges made by the opposition." Some of these charges, it points out, are that it is a regular practice in Iranian prisons to use torture, that the accused often die before their trial begins, and that the authorities take advantage of the repressive atmosphere "to imprison opponents of the regime who have committed no acts of violence."

In addition, it refers to indications by the Iranian Students Federation that from time to time persons disappear who are never heard from again. "More than once," it adds, "representatives of foreign organizations—the International Federation for the Rights of Man, in particular—have observed, first hand, 'violations of the basic rights that belong to the human person,' and have accused the Savak—the secret services—of introducing a reign of terror throughout the country."

The editorial concludes by noting that the ban on all opposition political parties, "followed by a merciless repression," and the complete lack of basic freedoms only "serve to aggravate" an already worsening situation marked by "strikes by workers, endemic agitation in the universities, and the development of urban guerrilla warfare. . . ." □

British Radio Bars "Subversive" Music

Paul McCartney's latest song says England should "give Ireland back to the Irish." It has been banned by BBC.

Moroccan Purge Trial Opens

Morocco's second major political trial in less than a year opened January 31 in the city of Kenitra. The defendants, 1,081 of them, are charged with committing a personal assault on the person of King Hassan II and his family, attacking the internal security of the state, and trying to overthrow the Moroccan form of government. (The prosecution seems to regard these charges as synonymous, but has resorted to all three so that various laws can be invoked in sentencing the defendants.)

The indictment relates to an abortive attempt last July 10 to depose Hassan and institute a Libyan-type military regime. On that day several hundred military cadets—led by Hassan's personal military chief, Mohammed Medbouh, and Colonel M'-Hammed Ababou—invaded the palace during a party celebrating the king's forty-second birthday and killed some of the most corrupt officials of the government.

Within forty-eight hours after the defeat of the coup, Hassan executed, without trial, all the participants he could lay his hands on. This would indicate that the present trial, in which the defendants range from military leaders to ordinary soldiers, is an

attempt to deter other potential rebels.

The prosecution has claimed that the military plot involved much of the leadership of the Moroccan army, especially the directors of its academies. The coup was allegedly first planned for May 14, 1971, but for mysterious reasons was postponed by Medbouh and Ababou.

Thus far only three defendants have testified. Their defense revealed the less-than-iron backbone of Moroccan military reformers. Mohammed Ababou, the older brother of one of the coup leaders, claimed that he was a "model officer" who tried to talk his brother out of his "mad adventure." On the day of the coup, he said, his brother looked like a "man possessed" and that the only possible resolution of his brother's state of mind was to kill or be killed.

Two captains of the Ahermoumou military academy claimed that they really had no idea what was going on; that Colonel Ababou had told them that the king's palace had been occupied by "subversive elements." According to their account, they were only following orders when they assaulted the palace. They never knew they were attacking Hassan himself. □

Kaunda Arrests Opposition Party Leaders

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda banned one of the two bourgeois opposition parties February 4 and arrested its leader, former Vice President Simon M. Kapwepwe. Kaunda also reportedly ordered the arrest of 133 other leaders of the United Progressive party (UPP).

Until last August, Kapwepwe was a member of Kaunda's United National Independence party (UNIP) and a close associate of the president.

Kapwepwe evidently hoped to capitalize on dissatisfaction with Zambia's worsening economic problems and Kaunda's attempt to solve them by an "austerity" program that includes a wage freeze and a ban on strikes. Although Kaunda ignored Kapwepwe's demands for a general election to form a new government,

the UPP leader was elected to parliament in a December by-election.

In announcing the ban on the UPP, Kaunda said that the party had carried out "outrageous actions aimed at the destruction of life and property." He charged that attempts had been made to blow up Freedom House, the UNIP headquarters.

The arrests were made under regulations that allow detainees to be held indefinitely without trial. More than 100 UPP members were arrested in October and accused of gun-running, but none have yet been tried.

There was speculation that Kaunda's actions against the UPP were part of a plan to establish a single-party state, but so far no measures against the other opposition party, the African National Congress, have been announced. □

Torture and Murder in the Prisons of Ceylon

[A full-page spread on the repression in Ceylon appeared in the January 9 issue of the authoritative Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter*. We have translated the conclusions of the two journalists who prepared the article — Sven-Ake Aulin and Siv Naeslund — and their documentation on the treatment of the political prisoners.]

* * *

Sixteen thousand political prisoners in Ceylon are threatened with a massacre. Packed into prisons, schools, hospitals, and nursing homes, they have been confined for nine months without trial or access to a lawyer.

Three prisons were turned over to the military in September. Reports of torture and mass murder have been smuggled out by the internees. But the regime has permitted no inquiries. A representative of Amnesty International was refused admittance to the prisons and members of parliament have been denied their legal right to visit them.

The special-powers law in force gives the police and military the right to bury or cremate the bodies in case of deaths without informing the authorities or the relatives of the deceased.

The political prisoners are young people, ranging in age from the early teens to about thirty. They were captured or they surrendered after the disturbances in the spring. The government used every possible weapon against the JVP [Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna — People's Liberation Front].

The JVP was a young radical movement rooted in the peasant districts. It supported the ruling coalition parties in the 1970 elections but later turned against them in disappointment over their inability or unwillingness to carry out their campaign promises.

In the fall and winter of 1970, the JVP continually gained in popularity. There were never less than 5,000 people at its meetings. In mid-March, the government suddenly declared a partial state of emergency. About 450 of the organization's leaders were ar-

rested, including Rohan Wijeweera — who had been the head since 1965.

Three weeks later the JVP responded with simultaneous attacks on a large number of police stations all over the country. The movement's supporters were armed with hunting rifles and homemade grenades. They were met with helicopters and machine guns.

In the course of a few days — a few weeks in some districts — the rebellion was crushed. The activists were killed or imprisoned. Many completely innocent persons were caught up in the mass jailings.

There are many eyewitness accounts of drunken policemen using guns and clubs in berserk attacks on prisoners. Any malicious report was enough to get an innocent person jailed. A released prisoner estimates that about 800 of the 1,200 persons confined with him did not have the slightest connection with the JVP.

The government claims that about 1,200 activists and civilians were killed. No one we talked to put the figure below 10,000. Lord Avebury, who visited Ceylon as a representative of Amnesty International, thinks that 50,000 persons may have been shot or tortured to death since the spring of 1970. The number of policemen and soldiers killed is 135.

One person claims that a unit of 67 soldiers killed about 1,700 persons in two weeks' time. Many sources indicate that the unwritten orders for the first weeks were: "Shoot! Take no prisoners." These orders are confirmed by a trial transcript from the city of Kataragama.

The discontent in Ceylon is increasing. The relatives of the victims of the repression in the spring are shaken and desperate. The price of basic necessities like rice, sugar, and transportation have risen. Out of a total population of 12,000,000, about 1,000,000 are unemployed. Many of those without jobs are well-educated youths.

The government's dilemma is that many of the prisoners are innocent and should be released or brought before a court. But imprisonment has made many of these people politically conscious. The JVP is carry-

ing on an education program among the prisoners.

Under the prevailing conditions, the government feels more comfortable with the special-powers laws. There is no indication that it intends to withdraw them. To the contrary, they are steadily being reinforced with new regulations. The latest of these is that confessions or information given in the prison camps, that is, under torture, will be considered legal evidence. This law is being applied retroactively.

At present there is virtually no possibility for protesting against the dictatorship in Ceylon. The papers are censored, public meetings are banned, posters cannot be put up or leaflets distributed. Anyone can be arrested for anything.

Since it gained its independence from British rule in 1948, Ceylon has been governed through free, democratic elections. The situation here was regarded as more hopeful than in most Asian countries. But for nine months, Ceylon has been a police state.

* * *

Letter From Vidyodaya Prison, Dated November 14, 1971

In the last few days a great many things have happened here. On the 5th the guards surrounded and fired on section 1 over a minor thing. The bullets went through the walls and several of our comrades were hit. We were standing in the lunch line when the shooting started. Since we had done nothing to provoke this, we did not dream that they would start firing. They kept up a barrage for twenty to twenty-five minutes. We think that they were using dum-dum bullets. Not even pigs or dogs are shot while they are eating.

They fired into our section too. Those who were eating or having a drink of water rushed into the buildings to take cover.

Excerpts From Two Letters of an Internee in Welikade prison

On the morning of September 28, 450 prisoners did not get any wash

water. Lunch for the day was damp and moldy. When the prisoners complained about conditions, the guards shot at them.

There is one latrine here for fifty people. The prisoners sleep crowded together on the floor. The food is repulsive, and some days it is served without any water to drink.

On November 7 a clash occurred between the common-law and political prisoners. The fight continued on the 8th while the guards joined in, on the convicts' side. The guards fired on the political prisoners and six wounded men were taken away under a rain of blows from the guards and common prisoners.

Excerpt From Letter of an Internee in Vidyodaya Prison, Written November 12, 1971

In section 1 some prisoners smuggled in marijuana, with the help of the guards. When they took it, a commotion started. Those who wanted peace and quiet informed the officers, who told them: 'Kill them or let them alone.'

After this intermezzo, we asked the officers to remove the four or five undesirable prisoners, although we had put up with them for six or seven months.

The fight between these troublemakers and the other prisoners took place at a building near the barbed-wire fence. Suddenly we heard shots from the watchtower on one side. But the guards on patrol began shooting from all directions and the situation for the people in the prison became very dangerous.

The people working in the kitchen, those who were in the sick bay, and those in the toilet were wounded. It is possible that some were killed. Most took cover in safe places or fell flat and survived.

The barrage began immediately, without any warning. They were deliberately trying to kill some people.

Even the major took part in the firing, wearing a helmet, as if he were fighting another armed force. The privates did, too, some of them shooting from a prone position. If the guards had fired only to suppress the disturbances, they didn't need to turn their guns on the buildings. They are worse than fascists. Sections 2 and 4, where there had been no disturbances,

were also fired on. This action was a reprisal against us.

* * *

[The two journalists gave this account of a discussion with the relatives of some prisoners.]

* * *

We first heard of the de Silva family in an office in the capital city of Colombo. One of Nomis's brothers,

Finland

Paper Workers Answer Production Cuts

[We have translated the following article from the January 9 issue of the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter*.]

* * *

Helsinki

At 6:00 a. m. Saturday [January 8], workers at the Yhtyneet Paperitehtaat factory in Simpele in the southeast of Finland "occupied" a paper-making machine. The management responded by cutting off the supply of raw material to the machine and ordering the workers to go home. The result was that all the workers downed tools and went on strike. The factory was totally shut down.

The dispute was over a shift to a five-day week, which means a 20 percent wage-cut for about twenty workers. Five workers have been fired.

The employers announced December 14 that a new system for operating the paper machine would be put into practice starting at 6:00 a. m. January 8. Instead of maintaining three shifts to run the machine twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, production was to come to a halt over the weekend. Five people were given notice when a whole shift was abolished.

The twenty-four workers who tended the machine refused to accept a reduction in hours involving pay cuts.

Already on Friday [January 7], the workers let it be known that they were going to seize the machine and keep it running as before.

The new production schedule was

whose son was among the relatives jailed, told us what happened. Then we asked him. "What about the elections?"

"There isn't anybody to vote for anymore. We must make a revolution and take power ourselves."

"You're only saying that because your son is in prison."

"No, it is not because of my son. Everybody in the town voted for the government. Everybody has seen how the police behave. Now we want a revolution." □

due to go into force Saturday at 6:00, but the workers refused to follow it and announced that they had taken over machine No. 2.

The workers maintained control of the machine for an hour and fifteen minutes. Production was in full swing, until the management cut off the flow of raw materials. The machine was switched to the slow speed.

"It is best for you to go home," the managers said.

The workers at the machine read the bosses' directive. They left but got the support of close to 600 other workers.

The employers claimed that the reductions in hours were introduced only to meet the stipulations of the union contract. The five people fired were temporary employees. The cutbacks were made because of sales difficulties.

The workers protested that the hours cuts meant less pay and that people were being laid off. Unrest over the layoffs has lasted for a month. The workers say also that the paper machine should have been kept running as usual while the negotiations with the union were going on in Helsinki. They pointed out, furthermore, that the contract stipulated shorter hours without any loss in pay.

The factory is located in the area of Finland near the Soviet border. □

Should Make Nixon Feel at Home

A Harvard China expert says Mao is preparing for Nixon's visit by studying English. His favorite practice phrase is "law and order."

Arrests, Secret Trials Continue in Czechoslovakia

By David Thorstad

The wave of arrests in Czechoslovakia of persons accused of carrying out antistate activity is continuing, with an estimated several hundred involved. Very few have been released, and at least two have already been sentenced to prison terms.

The scope of the arrests, the identity of those known to have been arrested, and the similarity of the "crimes" with which they are charged all lend substance to speculation that the regime of Gustav Husak is laying the groundwork for trials of leading intellectual figures in the 1968 "Prague Spring"—despite his promise when he took office that there would be no such major political trials.

There have actually been several waves of arrests in the past two and a half months. The first came at the time of the national elections on November 26 and 27 last year. At that time about forty persons—among them Jaroslav Sabata, a former high official in the Communist party in Moravia, and a close adviser of Alexander Dubcek before the latter was replaced by Husak—were arrested for "sabotage of the elections by distributing and producing tracts that were hostile to the state."

This was followed by another wave of arrests near the end of December of persons allegedly engaged in opposition political activity. On December 29, a leader of the former Union of Czechoslovak Students, Ladislav Mravec, was sentenced to a year and a half in prison following a secret trial. Bernard Margueritte reported in the Paris daily *Le Monde* January 14. At the same time, two other prisoners were given suspended sentences of ten and eighteen months each.

Mravec was accused of handing three documents from the student union, in particular a list of demands raised during the student strike in November 1968, to two Polish citizens, and was found guilty of locating a mimeograph machine for them to run off their "noncensored bulletin," thereby attempting to "contribute to the

overthrow of the socialist system in a fraternal country."

These arrests continued throughout January. Among those known to have been arrested during this period are Milan Huebl, former rector of the Communist party college; Ludek Pachman, former chess champion; Karel Kyncl, journalist; philosopher Karel Kosik; historian Karel Bartosek; journalist Vladimir Nepras; Ka-



LEDERER: Gets two years in prison for speaking up before Gierek did.

rel Kaplan, a scientist; Jiri Littera, former secretary of the Prague party committee; Rudolf Slansky, son of the former general secretary of the party, who was executed in 1952 after a frame-up trial; Jan Sling, son of Otto Sling, another party figure who was executed at the same time; Jiri Lederer, a well-known journalist and commentator in *Reporter*, the former organ of the journalists' union that has been banned for three years; and Valerio Ochetto, an employe of Italian radio and television, who is accused of serving as liaison between Czech

émigrés and the opposition inside Czechoslovakia.

Lederer, whose trial began on January 14, was condemned on February 2 to the maximum sentence of two years in prison for his "crime." He was found guilty of "defaming an allied state and its representatives." This was in reference to his articles dealing with Poland and Gomulka, published in April and May 1968 in *Literarni Listy*, the then organ of the Writers' Union. According to the February 4 *Le Monde*, Lederer had "criticized Gomulka for having lost his authority and for being incapable of controlling the situation in his country. The same criticisms have since been made officially by Gomulka's successor as head of the Polish party, Edward Gierek, particularly in December 1970 when the former first secretary was forced to resign. Foreign journalists were not allowed to cover Lederer's trial, but only to hear the reading of the verdict."

Lederer was also accused of giving an interview in 1968 to a Polish journalist employed by an English magazine, who then published a report on the interview in an émigré Polish review, *Kultura*, put out in Paris.

The arrest of the Italian journalist Valerio Ochetto added a new ingredient to the brew the Husak regime is cooking up. Ochetto was arrested at the beginning of January, but it was not until a week later that Italian authorities were notified, and not until a month later, February 5, that the first Italian representative, Ambassador Agostino Benazzo, was able to visit him. He is accused of having "aided criminal, subversive activity against the Czechoslovak Republic." He could receive a three- to ten-year prison term.

According to the February 8 *Le Monde*, the Czechoslovak Communist party newspaper, *Rude Pravo*, accused Ochetto of being a go-between for opposition groups in Czechoslovakia and Czech émigrés in Italy, in particular Jiri Pelikan, the former head of Czechoslovak television and

later cultural attaché at the Czech embassy in Rome, where he stayed after the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. According to *Le Monde*, *Rude Pravo* claims that Pelikan and "the persons arrested in connection with him" have admitted to playing this role. The CP newspaper asserts that Pelikan hoped by means of this arrangement to obtain information on secret political and economic data that "are of interest to imperialist news agencies," and that he and his "contacts" were hoping to "overthrow the present regime" of Husak.

Pelikan refuted the charges against Ochetto in an interview with Agence France-Presse that was reported in the February 8 *Le Monde*. The intellectuals arrested in Czechoslovakia are not "reactionaries," he stated, but persons who have "devoted their entire life to the cause of socialism and freedom."

"It is quite clear," he continued, "that Prague wants to prepare the way for a trial against the alleged 'second center' of the party. For that they need activists in the 'Prague Spring,' a foreign agent to serve as a 'liaison,' and Czechoslovak exiles who will be presented as agents of 'imperialist' news agencies. But through those arrested, it is the leaders of the 'Prague Spring' such as Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Kriegel, and others—and their 1968 policy—that are the real targets."

Pelikan said he was not surprised at the charges made against himself. *Rude Pravo*, he explained, had already branded him as "a revisionist, a Trotskyist, a Zionist, an imperialist agent and a Maoist. Interviews that I never had with members of the American Congress have been invented, as well as meetings I never attended; and they have even gone so far as to accuse me of having been a Gestapo agent during the war because I was able to survive the Nazi persecutions."

On January 20, the Italian Communist party newspaper, *L'Unità*, joined protests of Ochetto's arrest that are sweeping Rome, reports the January 22 *Le Monde*. It has also voiced strong protest over the expulsion from Czechoslovakia during the first week in February of a former editor of *L'Unità*, Ferdi Zidar. According to James Feron, writing in the February

10 *New York Times*, Zidar, who is secretary of the International Organization of Journalists and has been an active member of the Italian Communist party since 1938, was expelled on three hours' notice "on charges of having spoken with former party officials" in Prague.

"Western newsmen have been quietly warned to stay away from former

party officials and dissident newsmen," Feron said.

He also noted that on February 7, another Italian journalist, Demitrio Volcic, "was searched for an hour and a half as his train left the country, according to Italian sources. They say that only a copy of *Rude Pravo*, the Czech Communist party newspaper, was taken." □

Mexico

Police Report Death of Genaro Vazquez

On February 2 the Mexican police announced that Genaro Vázquez Rojas, leader of a guerrilla unit operating in the state of Guerrero, had been killed in an automobile accident. The crash supposedly occurred while police were pursuing Vázquez on a road near Morelia in the state of Michoacán about 130 miles west of Mexico City.

Some sources have disputed the police version of the incident, claiming that Vázquez was shot to death.

The latter version, according to the February 4 *Le Monde*, gains some credence from the fact that the authorities had recently launched a huge campaign against all the revolutionary organizations in the country. Just before Vázquez's death several members of his organization had been arrested. There were other arrests, as many as several hundred according to some sources, in Chihuahua, Monterrey, Guadalajara, and Mexico City. The arrests continued at an accelerated pace after Vázquez was killed.

The February 16 issue of the radical U.S. weekly *Guardian* contains a brief account of Vázquez's life. He was born in Guerrero in 1934. From 1957 to 1960 he worked as a schoolteacher in Mexico City. During that year he returned to Guerrero and became a leader of the Guerrero Civic Committee, a leftist political group that led a series of demonstrations resulting in the ouster of a corrupt governor.

Vázquez was forced to flee Guerrero because the regime blamed him for the committee's actions. He was arrested in Mexico City and sent back to prison in Guerrero.

Soon after his imprisonment, he was

freed by guerrillas of the Civic Committee, the remnants of which formed the Guerrero National Revolutionary Civic Association, an armed struggle organization. In December 1970 the association kidnapped a banker and received a \$40,000 ransom for him.

The army then sent twenty-five battalions into Guerrero to smash the association.

Last November Vázquez's group kidnapped Dr. Jaime Castrejón Díaz, rector of the state university, and obtained the release of nine political prisoners and a ransom of 2,500,000 pesos [one peso equals US\$0.072] in exchange for freeing him.

The day after Vázquez's death, thirty-eight prisoners escaped from the Morelia prison through a tunnel. It has been suggested that Vázquez was en route to the prison to direct the escape when he was intercepted by police. □

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The Capitalist Context of the Crisis in Ecology

[We have translated the following article, with its introductory editorial note, from *Mullvaden*, the monthly newspaper of the Revolutionära Marxisterna Förbundet (Revolutionary Marxist League), the Swedish affiliate of the Fourth International.]

* * *

At present the national scene is undoubtedly dominated by economic problems—unemployment, monetary difficulties, etc.—the crisis phenomenon that is inherent in the capitalist mode of production itself and that has periodically manifested itself for as long as industrial capitalism has existed.

The predominance of these questions at this point in the economic cycle must not lead us to close our eyes to the specific context in which this crisis phenomenon appears today—the particular neocapitalist stage bourgeois society entered in earnest in the postwar period, a stage that has brought with it a significantly more complex, combined, and multi-dimensional "crisis situation."

This context can be summed up in the terms "ecological crisis," "urban crisis," "crisis of the capitalist state apparatus," and "crisis of ideology." A common feature of all these phenomena is that they never before constituted anything like the striking social and all-embracing problem they do today. It is, we believe, impossible to understand capitalism and the future course of its crises without taking up these questions on a Marxist basis, analyzing them, and drawing out their political implications.

The confusion and uncertainty that have arisen around the social and political meaning of these ecological and "urban" questions reflect their newness. What do they signify? What alternative is there to the present direction of development? How will it be put into practice? There is no clear answer to these questions today. We can, however, discern some fundamental tendencies.

First of all, the situation is marked by a rapid growth of more or less

spontaneous and disparate, loosely structured local groups such as Aktion Kollektiv-Trafic [Mass Transport Action Group], Byalag [Village Life], Alternativ Stad [Alternative City], and "Vi Flytt Int" [We Aren't Leaving] movements, among others. These groups represent simply an immediate response to the social crisis. From a sociological standpoint, they have mobilized primarily strata that, for various reasons, are particularly sensitive to this problem—the student youth, the "technical intelligentsia," the people of neglected regions.

The workers have not mobilized to any extent on these questions. A characteristic feature of these spontaneous groups has always been political heterogeneity, loose organization, and an unclear strategic perspective. They are an expression of the political vacuum that exists in this area. No multi-issue political parties or organizations have yet succeeded in offering a viable strategy.

In various ways, the established political parties are seeking to canalize spontaneous, radical opinion on these questions into the usual parliamentary channels. On the one hand, they can take advantage of a number of illusions about the bourgeois democratic system's margin for maneuver harbored by many groups, as well as their general lack of perspectives. At the same time they cannot simply co-opt them and make them regular links in the parliamentary bureaucracy. The instinctive opposition of these groups to bureaucracy and centralism is too strong for that.

On the left at present there are two main approaches to this question. One is represented by the KFML (r) [Kommunistförbundet Marxist-Leninisterna (revolutionär) — Marxist-Leninist Communist League (revolutionary)], which, with its eyes anxiously fixed on the classics of Marxism and earlier revolutionary examples, simply turns its back and calls the ecology movement petty-bourgeois and reactionary. On the other hand, there are the VPK [Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna — Left party of Communists, the pro-Moscow CP], and the KFML

which support the spontaneous movement on its own terms, bending to its weaknesses.

We reject both of these paths. We must understand the powerful social dynamic inherent in these questions and incorporate them as an integral part of our strategy for achieving socialism, incorporate them into the struggle of the working class. For it is always the workers who suffer from destruction of the environment, and it is the revolutionary struggle of the working class for socialism that offers the perspective for solving the problem.

We think it is necessary to open a Marxist debate on the concrete political and organizational means for promoting a struggle on these questions, for understanding their role in present-day capitalist society and in the socialist society of the future. The following article is only a small step toward accomplishing this task.

* * *

The earth is round and has a certain limited area. Despite all the probes into space and into the depths of the oceans, it is the level just above and below the surface, the biosphere, that is the most interesting from the human and natural standpoints. In this belt, over millions of years, a rich and many-faceted vegetable and animal life has unfolded. Here also human culture has developed.

The saga of industrialization is the story of how humanity has sought to take control of nature and utilize it for human ends. The development of industry is intimately linked to the rise of capitalism. The force that rules industrial production is the laws of capitalism—the search for the highest possible profit on invested capital, competition between capitalist firms, and the potential of the capitalist market.

All of these facts are elementary.

But the capitalist productive apparatus is not independent of nature. To the contrary, every link is dependent on it. In the infancy of industrial society (and capitalism), this re-

lationship seemed one-sided; the riches of nature seemed inexhaustible. Nature was unchanging, a variable that could be calculated as a constant. Now even the dullest English industrialist can see that it is not so simple. But he has found no new way of reckoning.

The fantastically rapid expansion of the productive forces in the post-war period, which is usually called "the third industrial revolution," has created an entirely new relationship between industrial production and nature. Because of this new productivity, smoke from the great chimneys is spreading all over the earth. The wastes pumped into the Baltic no longer endanger only a few beaches at the river mouths but are turning the entire sea into a sewer. And all the bourgeois scribblers' incantations cannot expand the globe like some big balloon to give it more area.

In order to try to reduce the effects of this process, the Swedish government has created the Naturvårdsverk [Environmental Protection Agency]. This pathetic institution has, of course, shown a great understanding of the problems of industry and the "national economy," but this comprehension has seldom extended to the problems of protecting the environment. Väröbacka and Brofjorden will soon stand as monuments to self-proclaimed great achievements and firm principles of this government department.

"Environmental damage is international—all must cooperate if we are to solve this problem." That is true, but in view of the nature of the situation, such cooperation is impossible. Right now it seems that they can't even solve the problem of bringing together a group of researchers to discuss the matter, which is what the United Nations conference on the environment is supposed to do. And even if the conference takes place, it will probably be nothing but a false front designed to cover up impotence.

A prerequisite for changing the course of development is to abolish the fundamentally anarchic and unplanned economic system represented by capitalism. But this is only one prerequisite, as is shown by the development in the East European countries where there is economic planning. In these countries the ossified bureaucratic power structure and an interconnection with development in the West have

blocked a rational utilization of natural resources in the long term. Only democratic and centralized socialist planning can utilize and develop the numerous specific skills needed to keep the industrial epoch from committing suicide.

In 1963 the Riksdag made a decision that affected all sectors of transportation in the country. It determined that all means of transport must pay for themselves. The reason given was a notion that if every branch of transport showed what it was good for in "free competition," the best result would be achieved. That meant, for example, that the SJ's [Statens Järnvägar—State Railways] streetcar lines in Göteborg and Stockholm should be regarded as a corporation whose aim was to balance the credit and debit sides of its ledgers, and, if possible, offer a profitable field for new investment.

Thus, the Riksdag did not decide whether it was more rational to rely on mass or private transport—on rail or highway traffic. That was left up to competition to determine. But in vying with monopoly capital's foremost product—the automobile—public transport made a pathetic showing. Reduced operations and higher fares have been the result.

Perhaps the most absurd manifestation of this "competitive suicide" was the SJ's competing with its own bus company. Trains and buses depart at the same time for the same destinations. Losses in the public transportation sector are, of course, made up by the treasury. And this leads to unrelenting calls for still greater streamlining and rationalization. This transportation policy seems all the more outrageous, moreover, when we realize that every year many millions of kronor [one krona equals US\$0.19] in subsidies—over and above automobile taxes—go to support road transport (accident costs, highway construction, traffic control, etc.).

The 1963 decision on transportation policy must not be seen as decisive. It should be taken for what it was—definitive confirmation that the national and local governments must conduct their business in a "capitalist" way. Despite the noble aspirations and illusions that center on the public sector, capitalist society compels it to operate on commercial principles. The transportation systems—which for example were transferred from private

to local and national government control, often under pressure from the workers' organizations—are being confronted with ever more insistent demands to show a greater return and to introduce profit criteria. Under capitalism any other objective is as good as impossible.

Thus, the SJ functions like a corporation whose aim is to make a profit. And not only that. The SJ views every line and route as a separate economic unit. A line must make a profit or be closed down. By taking off some trains and manipulating schedules, the SJ has been able to make the "less profitable" competitive. Line closings, moreover, are a hard blow to affected areas, resulting in depopulation or death. In the broader context, thus, the SJ serves as an instrument of state policy for the distribution of industry.

Conditions in the SJ, however, already offer perspectives for struggles. There is a clear possibility of an alliance between the SJ personnel—railroad workers, engineers, stationmasters, etc.—and the passengers and population. Strong opposition to the SJ management has already been shown by both SJ workers and broader social strata. And in this area, with comparatively limited commitment of forces and modest means, national campaigns and actions may in time become practical. If they are initiated or planned by revolutionary organizations, they can have a powerful propagandistic impact.

The rapid and crisis-ridden growth of automobile traffic must be seen in relation to the automotive industry (with its proliferation of useful and useless accessories), to the highway construction business, and the oil companies. These giants of the capitalist economy have pushed this kind of development forward. But the growing number of cars, both scrapped and unscrapped, also points to the irrational character of capitalism.

While new models are presented every year, not a single car with a cleaner exhaust has been produced for sale. New highways, moreover, and expensive expressways through the cities in practice solve no problems. Every widened street or new road tends to fill up again, right away, with cars; and traffic tends to expand so that it always clogs every highway network.

The expansion of automotive traffic

also claims its victims. Every year 1,200 people die in traffic accidents. There is something completely perverse in the statement that it is "normal" for a certain number to die on the roads every holiday. As a soporific, an ideology has developed around the automobile and driving which does not stop with extolling the virtues of cars but is becoming an alienating cult. "Safety belts on!" is the formula for salvation. And as usual it is the working class that has been hardest hit; it cannot afford to pay the SJ's prices and has been forced onto the roads in packed automobiles.

For as long as no mass transport is developed, and this in conjunction with a different way of building cities, the automobile is the only alternative for most people. Such a "turn," moreover, will not occur under capitalist conditions, in which every self-respecting municipality is planning on a heavier concentration of cars—one car for every person in 1990—and is already bankrupting itself in building highways, traffic circles, and police stations.

The opposition to this situation has so far been organized only in actions such as bicycling demonstrations and stopping traffic at pedestrian crossings—that is, actions likely to provoke aggressive reactions from motorists. Such demonstrations challenging the whole traffic situation must, however, be guided by socialist propaganda and the concept of a socialist alternative. These questions can never be solved under capitalism. A different effect is achieved when the struggle is for concrete, specific objectives. Rallies in this case can take place behind clearly anticapitalist demands.

Revolutionists therefore must concentrate more on such questions as workers' transportation to and from their jobs. For example, the demand that the capitalists pay the workers for their traveling time—paid travel time—can already be projected in our regular propaganda.

The influx into the cities, the growth of metropolitan areas, and the depopulation of rural towns are more and more assuming the dimensions of a crisis. The driving forces behind this development are primarily capital concentration and the need of industry for proximity to transport and markets, to a large and varied labor market, for research resources and various types of subcontracting. Other

factors also enter in, such as the trend toward large-scale production, the centralization of state and private administration, the growth of the so-called nonproductive services sector brought about by technological development, and the expansion of higher education and research. And in the other aspect of the city-country relationship, agriculture and certain branches (such as paper, textiles, and many others) are finding it difficult to keep afloat in an increasingly internationalized economy.

In the 1960s, this whole development entered a new phase. Factory closings multiplied and structural rationalization—that is, applying the pruning hook in the less profitable branches—was no longer seen simply as the result of the capitalist economic process. It acquired a political purpose. The state was now beginning to intervene actively. With its AMS [Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen—Labor Market Board] and its investment funds, it developed an instrument for accelerating migration to the growth regions. The municipal government reforms, the consolidations to form enlarged city administrations with definite central areas, can be said to have developed in response to this trend.

Corrective measures by the national government, introduced in a very contradictory way and without any great conviction—e.g., increased support for dispersing industry and the desperate flight of agencies from Stockholm—have had only marginal effects.

Here the national government and the Social Democracy clearly bowed to monopoly capital and its aims, which involved direct support for export industry and high-profit concerns. The Social Democrats gave their own demagogic justifications. Expanding companies can pay the best wages; a plant that cannot meet the prevailing wage level must be "cleared out of the way." And, of course, this is the way things are under capitalism. Thus, with an assist from the Social Democrats, many people have been forced to migrate directly from the rural towns to metropolitan areas into completely new conditions.

The city-country contradiction must be seen on several different levels. While we can say that central and southern Sweden have developed at the expense of the north, we must also realize that a depopulation prob-

lem exists in Skane [the southern section of the country] and the metropolitan regions. Moreover, this development must not be seen as clear-cut or moving in only one direction.

In fact, not all industry is shifting to the big cities (e.g., Stenungsund and Väröbacka), and some branches are even abandoning the metropolitan areas in an attempt to exploit the lower wage rates and more advantageous municipal policies in the neglected regions. This is true primarily of sectors that do not need a direct tie-up with research facilities and highly trained labor power. Compare Stockholm for example, where the number of industrial workers is declining and administrative functionaries are becoming more predominant, with a relatively large city like Västerås, which is completely under the sway of heavy industry.

Besides the waste of invested capital in the form of houses, buildings, communications, etc., the economic problems of municipalities in thinly settled areas are increased by the fact that it is the younger workers who leave first. The population ages, and welfare needs increase, while tax income declines. A loss of 30 percent of tax receipts, which more and more municipalities are approaching, is something of a catastrophe.

Nevertheless, it is in the metropolitan regions that the problem will show up most acutely in the future. What is going on here is not the building of cities on the traditional pattern, of urban areas clearly set off from the surrounding countryside. Whole regions are being developed with a centralized structure while their activities are specialized and fragmented on a large scale. In these areas intensively utilized cores of office buildings, banks, and "cultural" facilities stand as great enclaves in an urban landscape unified as well as divided by highways. This means an entirely new style of life, where work and leisure are completely separated, where you buy in big markets and shopping centers, where you are directed to special park areas and go to the movies in the center city, and where you have to have a car.

The crisis of this social system is already a fact. It shows itself in the breakup of social relations, nerve-racking traffic jams and long periods on the road on the way back and forth to work, social isolation in the sub-

urbs, inadequate social services (nurseries, parks, etc.), high housing costs, etc. And the costs of growth in the metropolitan areas, which must be paid primarily by the municipalities through residential and highway construction and health and welfare, among other things, have a tendency today to expand more rapidly than the tax base. In a number of areas, therefore, there is only a minimal margin for increasing municipal spending. Instead the municipalities are being forced to rationalize and make services pay for themselves. Profit mechanisms are beginning to be introduced into such fields as health and social services. And this, in turn, is creating contradictions of great political importance in these areas themselves (nurses and social workers have already mobilized and the cracks are spreading today far up into the municipal apparatus).

The whole problem of metropolitan expansion and depopulation must be seen as a class question. It is primarily the workers who must pay the price in higher taxes and abrupt forced migrations. At the same time, the capitalist metropolitan regions are creating the conditions for an isolated and disjointed style of life, a life style that makes it more difficult for the workers to organize collectively and which thus makes more difficult demands on the revolutionary organizations. In short, it forces them to undertake a political struggle against the whole system of exploitation, both its economic and political and its social and psychological sides.

Take a Coca Cola advertisement and put it next to a picture of Vietnam war victims on the front page of *Dagens Nyheter* [the leading bourgeois daily]. Take a giant bank on Sergels Torg and put it next to a Palestinian refugee camp. Take a fat parliamentary bureaucrat and put him next to a new youth culture ideal. If you do this, you get a picture of the ideological crisis of capitalism.

Capitalism today is unable to produce a coherent ideology capable of concealing or explaining away the enormous flood of information about imperialist war, pollution of the environment, bureaucratic ossification, and profit-directed irrationality. This is a general crisis of civilization. And in this crisis the basic forms of social life in the nuclear bourgeois family, in the relationship between men and

women, and in child care are no less entangled in a skein of contradictions. The same goes for the social sciences and the humanities, and for artistic and cultural life in general.

Ideology is a mirror, but a distorting one. It reflects the conditions in a society of which it is part, a society which it is its function to support and defend from revolutionary activity. For those who can read its hieroglyphics, ideology can reveal a great deal about the underlying structures that govern social life as a whole. Society has the ideology, the culture, the civilization that it deserves.

What kind of society needs a never ceasing flow of noise, pictures, printed matter trying to control—program!—even instinctual life, the deepest and most intimate human functions? What kind of society needs a body and sex cult, which besides the fact that it seeks in a grotesque way to cover up the increasingly ruthless crippling of the human body in the industrial process is also an affront to the most modest demand for a civilized culture? What kind of society sees its interest in offering women as commercial sex objects, as a commodity, on an industrial scale?

Neocapitalism is a stage of capitalism where ideological production takes on an assembly-line, standardized, mass, systematic character. Ideology becomes social in contrast to the earlier private, patriarchal, and personal forms. It takes the path of

least resistance. The makers of ideology have learned that they are most effective when they attack the least protected areas of human life, the unconscious, instinctual processes.

But no matter how implacable and infernal the ideological apparatus, it has definite limits. It can cover up, mask, or divert attention away from the truth, but it cannot remove the basis of its own existence—capitalist productive relations. And because of its increased scope, its industrial character, and its ever more grotesque forms, ideology itself is showing severe strains. Thus, ideological contradictions have been a primary driving force in the whole so-called youth revolt, especially among the student youth who are occupied to a higher degree with the production and consumption of ideology.

In the educational system, ideological questions become a concrete basis for struggles in a different way than in other areas. Such fights can be waged in a more "direct" manner than in the factories, where the hold of bourgeois ideology over the workers can only be broken in conjunction with a struggle over economic and political issues.

The outcome of this ideological struggle is largely dependent on the capacity of revolutionists to challenge bourgeois ideology with a policy based on a critical, scientific approach rather than romantic revolutionary verbiage or "serve the people" cretinism. □

'Peace Corps' Numbers Rising in Chile

The Unidad Popular government of Salvador Allende is requesting that increasing numbers of U.S. "Peace Corps" representatives be sent to Chile, Lewis H. Diuguid reported from Santiago in the January 20 issue of the *Washington Post*. There are presently twenty-six representatives of the U.S. agency in that country, and the Allende government has requested an additional fifty.

The Peace Corps has been ordered out of a number of countries because of the widespread suspicion that its activities are not always altruistic.

"When Allende was elected 16 months ago," Diuguid wrote, "it was widely thought that the days of the corps

were numbered in Chile. They may be, but the Communists and Socialists who attacked the corps while in opposition are benignly quiet now that they are in power."

During the presidency of Eduardo Frei, the number of Peace Corps members in Chile reached a maximum of 400. Requests for representatives dropped off to zero at the end of the Frei administration and the beginning of the Unidad Popular government.

Since then, the number of requests has started to climb. The U.S. agency has been unable to fulfill all of the Allende government's requests because of budget cuts imposed by the U.S. Congress, Diuguid wrote. □

The Eritrean Struggle for Freedom

[The following interview with Woldeab Wollemariam, an official representative of the Eritrean Liberation Front, was granted to *Intercontinental Press* in New York on December 15. We present it for the information of our readers. Wollemariam has not corrected the text.]

* * *

Question. When was your organization founded? What are its aims? And in what conditions does it find itself now?

Answer. The Eritrean struggle began in 1945. The country was occupied by the British in 1941 and kept under its administration until the future of the country was settled by the United Nations eleven years later.

The British in 1945 gave us the right to express our wishes through meetings, newspapers, etc., regarding the future of our country. Several political parties were formed. The majority asked for independence for Eritrea; only the minority asked for annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia. This minority was supported not only by Ethiopia but also by Britain and, later on, by America. Their intention was to divide the country between Ethiopia and the then Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

For that reason they secretly helped the formation of two main political groups: those who asked for independence and those who asked for annexation by Ethiopia. We realized this danger and we fought against this plan of partition, because if Eritrea was divided, it would be lost as a country. All Eritreans, even the Unionist party, were against the partition of Eritrea. They wanted the whole thing to go to Ethiopia, but they were against partition.

So although we were free to express ourselves, we suffered under the British administration, because of their plan to divide the country. Ethiopia was secretly supported by Britain, and they did everything to try to divide the country. For example, they told the United Nations and the world that the country was made up of two religious groups, Muslim and Christian. There is deep religious intolerance between them, they said, so an independent Eritrea would never be at peace; so it is better to divide it. The Christians of the highlands would join Ethiopia; and the Muslims, who neighbor the Sudan, should join the Sudan.

This was a completely fabricated story, because the Eritreans never considered themselves Muslims or Christians; they always lived together. In order to justify their claim, the British organized to do

everything to create artificial dissension between the two communities. They failed.

Then, the other contention was that Eritrea was a very poor country that could not be self-sufficient, so it was better to divide.

To prove to the United Nations that it was a poor country, they organized bands of what were called "Shifta," political bandits. They were recruited, trained, and equipped in Ethiopian territory, then sent to Eritrea to devastate everything. This also we, the Eritrean people, succeeded in enduring in order to keep our country together.

I think in the first stage the Eritreans won the battle. They only fell victim to international intrigues when the Eritrean question went to the United Nations.

Eritrea was visited twice by the United Nations. First by the four-power commission—Britain, America, Russia, and France. According to the treaty with Italy, they had to agree about the future of the country. If they failed to agree, then the problem would be passed to the United Nations. This was the agreement with Italy.

So they visited the country, but they failed to agree on its future. The problem was referred to the UN. This started in Paris in 1948 and continued, still without success, in 1949.

The American government intervened into these international intrigues and conspiracies. At that time the United States—I'm sorry to say, because I'm very pro-American—played a very bad role in the future of Eritrea. This is historical fact, not an expression of hard feelings. The Americans had a lot of influence in the UN, and they could succeed in disposing of Eritrea in the way they planned.

The last five-power commission that visited Eritrea in 1950 was Guatemala, Pakistan, Norway, South Africa, and Burma. Four of them were against the partition of Eritrea and against its annexation by Ethiopia. Norway supported the Anglo-American partition plan.

Burma, supported by South Africa, suggested a sort of autonomous federation for Eritrea, while Guatemala and Pakistan were for full independence after a period of trusteeship directed by the UN. Although some of the members were for independence, the Burmese proposal was more attractive to most of the members of the United Nations.

It was a good one generally. But the United States delegate at that time first of all opposed strongly the Guatemala-Pakistan proposal. Secondly, he did not accept the Burmese proposal. He drafted his own resolution, submitted it to the

United Nations, and this was carried out.

A UN commissioner was sent to Eritrea to implement this resolution. The commissioner, from Bolivia, was under pressure from Ethiopia, the United Kingdom, America. So even in the implementation of the plan, the federation proposed by the United States, as bad as it was, was not implemented properly. The Eritreans had to submit themselves to this injustice, because they had no other alternative. To refuse the UN resolution or its implementation would have been suicide. They knew that they were abandoned by everybody. They were victims of international colonialism and imperialism.

A federation was put into effect in 1952. As soon as the UN commissioner left Eritrea and the emperor [Haile Selassie] was left alone, he one by one demolished the Eritrean constitution, the Eritrean local government, the UN provisions. In 1962 he abolished the last shred of the federation and annexed Eritrea outright.

This is the basic tragedy of Eritrea. We protested and protested, but no one listened to our complaints. We complained to the Secretary General of the UN in 1963, but everyone turned a deaf ear to our complaints.

Now we have come again, because we are sure that the Eritrean question is an international question. The federal act is an international act, which supposedly cannot be violated.

When the UN commissioner had drawn up the constitution of the federation, he ran into trouble with Ethiopia and the United Kingdom, especially with Ethiopia, which said that once the federation was implemented, the UN had nothing else to do with the question—it would then be an internal question.

The commissioner was a very weak man. He asked the Secretary General to send him some legal consultants. They came to Geneva. Their opinion was that it was settled once the resolution was adopted and implemented. But this does not mean that the United Nations has nothing to do with the question, because the federal act will remain an international instrument, and if it is violated the UN has the right to intervene. This is why we are here. We have come to tell the UN that their resolution has been destroyed.

This is one aspect of our activity. But of course we cannot wait until the UN will listen to us, so we have built our own organization and have begun armed struggle against Ethiopia. The organization was established in September 1961. In the ten years of struggle, we have given Ethiopia a lot of hard work.

We fight because we believe that we have a right to self-determination. We will continue to fight until we have attained our aim of independence.

We have no hard feelings against the Ethiopian people, but we are entitled to self-determination. We had been an independent country for centuries. We do

not belong to Ethiopia, neither historically, culturally, nor ethnically. We are an independent, separate country in every aspect. We were free for centuries and we want to be free again.

Q. Then you are fighting for complete independence and not for the reimplementation of the UN federation resolution?

A. Our first aim is to draw the attention of the United Nations to the fact that their resolution has been violated by Ethiopia. If Ethiopia agrees to return to the resolution, then the Eritrean people will be asked if they want to remain under it or if they want independence. We want the UN to consider the Ethiopian violation.

Then we want the Eritrean people to be given the right to self-determination, to be asked.

Q. What sort of actions does the ELF carry out in the country? Is it purely a military organization or does it engage in mass political action?

A. There are many political activities. We publish propaganda booklets and pamphlets. We have people who go from village to village to talk to the people about the struggle, about Ethiopian atrocities, about the aim of the struggle: independence and social justice. But the people do not need this sort of propaganda, because they know the situation; they experience it themselves.

Our main activity is armed struggle against the Ethiopian troops. The best of the Ethiopian troops are stationed in Eritrea, carrying out devastating war. So our main job is to fight with arms. But also there must be political activities with the farmers, the workers, the countryside.

Q. Have you received any international support?

A. Not much. There are some countries in the Middle East, most of the Arab countries, that have given some money with which we buy arms. This is the only area from which support comes.

Also, China and Korea look with sympathy at our movement, but their support is very limited. A few of our guerrillas, not many, but some, have been trained in China. The main help comes from Arab countries.

Q. From governments or popular movements?

A. Both. But especially from organizations.

Q. How long a struggle do you foresee? Do you expect a foreign intervention if you begin to win significant victories against the Ethiopian troops?

A. That is a difficult question. No one can foresee the end of a war for liberation.

But we expect some things to operate in our favor. For example, in Ethiopia there is a movement of people who want change—intellectuals, students—so after the death of the emperor there will be a new political situation. Probably the Ethiopians will realize the futility of this war and will agree to the legitimate request of the Eritreans.

We hope that the United States will put some pressure on Ethiopia, but we rely on our own strength, the justice of our aims. So we carry on, as long as we live.

Q. Which sections of the Eritrean people are the most active in support of the independence struggle?

A. Nearly all Eritreans are workers and farmers. We don't have a middle class or capitalist class. So our main strength comes from ordinary people.

Q. Do the farmers work on their own land or is it Ethiopian-controlled?

A. In the lowland bordering the Sudan, the land is not private property. In the highlands the land is privately owned. Land is the only basis of living for the Eritreans. Land is the basis of their discussions, their legislations, their lives. But there is one very important thing.

The Eritreans are the world's first communists, by centuries. The land is the only source of livelihood. The people have increased in number, but the land has not increased. So they gather in the village and say, for example, our number has increased from fifty to 100 and the land is not sufficient. It is distributed unjustly. So we collectivize the land and distribute it among us. This is done for five or seven years, depending on the region, and then the land is collectivized and redistributed again.

This system has been practiced in Eritrea for centuries.

Q. Has the Ethiopian government interfered in this process?

A. Up to now, no. But if the revolution should collapse, of course the Ethiopians would impose their system. For example, the few industries in Eritrea are in the hands of the Ethiopian authorities. Not openly. But they threaten the owners, who are mostly Europeans. They keep the greater share of these industries for themselves.

So if our resistance collapsed, this system would be imposed all over Eritrea.

Q. Are there then areas of Eritrea that are already liberated, where the people function without Ethiopian interference?

A. Yes, most of the farmers in fact control their land. The Ethiopian government does not so much need land. It needs the sea, the towns. But of course they

are annoyed to have this free society existing and they will little by little try to crush it.

Q. Are most of the Ethiopian troops concentrated in those towns? Do they attempt to occupy areas in the countryside?

A. All important centers are occupied by the troops. They behave just as the fascists did in the 1930s during the Italian invasion. There is no difference. They dictate everything; no one can argue. Eritrea is just like a colony. Maybe the Italians were even a little better than the Ethiopians.

Q. What are your relations with other liberation struggles around the world?

A. We have good relations with and we support—of course not with supplies—all liberation movements in Africa.

We also have very good relations with the Palestinians. Our problem is very similar to theirs. First of all in 1948, when the British handed over Palestine to the Zionists, they also handed over Eritrea to the Ethiopians.

The other similarity is that the Israelis are fighting the Palestinians, and they are also fighting us. They train Ethiopian commandos, Ethiopian troops; they help the Ethiopian secret service and police; they give Ethiopia every assistance, especially in security measures.

The Palestinians assist us more than any other country. They are poor, but they have made others rich. They need help from outside, but they help us.

With the other liberation movements we have contacts and relations, but not in the sense that we help them or they help us; we are all poor organizations. Our relations are informal.

Q. What role has the Sudanese government played in this situation? Have the changes in that regime, especially the coup and counter-coup, had any effect?

A. We still have offices in the Sudan. We have a very large community of Eritreans in the Sudan (probably more than 100,000). We wish our relations with the Sudan were good, because we need the Sudan.

We are surrounded by Sudanese territory; without the Sudan we could not carry out the armed struggle against the Ethiopians. We have the Red Sea on one side and the Sudan on the other. If the Sudan closed its borders, it would be very difficult for us to continue our struggle. We don't want to come into conflict with the Sudan.

But, unfortunately, lately President Nimeiry's attitude toward Ethiopia has disturbed us very much. An agreement of cooperation and friendship has been reached in which each state will refrain from doing anything that could harm the other. This could mean that the Su-

dan would stop us from operating on its territory.

Similarly Ethiopia pledged not to give any asylum or assistance to the Southern Sudanese guerrillas. If this is put into practice, of course our position will be difficult. So, at present, the attitude of the Sudanese government is rather regrettable.

We still have hope, because the Sudanese people are good people; they understand the problem of Eritrea. The country as such is with us, and this gives us hope. Even if the government has concluded a treaty of friendship, the people will continue to support us. The government for the time being is against us.

Q. Have they done anything so far to implement this treaty with Ethiopia?

A. Not yet. But when we left Beirut,

our representative in the Sudan came to visit us and said that the departments of the government had been given orders to implement this agreement. In what form they will implement it, we are not sure. Maybe they will close our offices, prohibit us from carrying arms through the Sudan, we don't know.

Q. And if this happens, will you appeal to the Sudanese people to establish a united front against the government?

A. Yes. As I said, we trust the Sudanese people. Similar agreements were concluded with the Sudanese government under General Aboud. But they came to nothing. So we hope this agreement will fail to materialize. We think the people will put great pressure on the government. □

Junta Cracks Down on 'Foreign Propaganda'

Police Visiting Greek Bookstores

The works of Chekhov constitute "international advertising of Russian literature"; Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution* is full of "Trotskyist content"; and Lenin's *State and Revolution* is permeated with "Communist content." This penetrating literary analysis is the product of the ruling military junta in Greece.

In 1970, in response to strong international pressure, the junta formally abolished censorship, except in the case of works considered to be specifically "antigovernment." "The lifting of censorship," according to the *New York Times*, "turned windows of the many bookshops in Athens into displays of dissidence."

So the junta embarked upon a new, more informal means of cracking down on dangerous propaganda.

New York Times correspondent Henry Kamm wrote in a January 26 dispatch from Athens that his newspaper had in its possession a photostatic copy of a six-page list containing 124 titles of books that are officially frowned upon. Kamm wrote that since the end of last year, policemen had been visiting bookstores urging owners to remove the offending titles from their shelves.

Representatives of the junta at first denied the existence of the list. Then, perhaps remembering that the *New*

York Times has been known to publish photostatic copies of sensitive documents when pressed, they admitted that there was such a list, but claimed that it was merely part of the "usual briefing correspondence among competent state officials," and did not constitute a "restriction of free thought or intellectual freedom."

But Kamm's version is more convincing on two counts. The list bears the unmistakable imprint of the junta's

Ceylon

MP's Brother Held Despite Court Ruling

A brother of a member of Ceylon's parliament was freed from prison by a Supreme Court decision January 21, and rearrested the same day.

P. C. Gunasekera had been arrested without explanation under the state of emergency regulations on December 5. (See *Intercontinental Press*, January 24, p. 87.) His brother, Prins Gunasekera, is a member of parliament for Habaraduwa. Elected on the ticket of the bourgeois Sri Lanka Freedom party of Prime Minister Sirimavo

political-literary stupidity. It is difficult to imagine what other source would describe Norman Mailer's *Armies of the Night* as "Trotskyist"; or condemn a biography of Dostoevski written by a member of the French Academy as being an attempt to "advertise" Russian literature; or attack a book by Erich Fromm as "pro-Chinese."

Furthermore, the appearance of policemen at bookstores at the beginning of the year coincides with the government's launching, near the end of 1971, of a campaign in the regime-controlled press aimed at preparing public opinion for an intensification of censorship.

On November 22, for example, a "regular reader" wrote to the newspaper *Estia*, complaining that a certain Athens bookstore frequented by young people preparing for their college entrance examinations prominently displayed in its window works by Marx, Engels, Trotsky, Guevara, and other revolutionists. It is "high time," this reader wrote, to do something to protect unprepared Greek youth from "Communist tricks," before it's "too late."

On November 25, the government organ *Eleytheros Kosmos* complained in an editorial about the spate of Communist works appearing in Greece. "We very much doubt," the editors wrote, "whether freedom of thought includes the right of foreign propaganda to be systematically and actively organized and injected into our country." □

REVIEWS

Suppressed Report on Prague Show-Trials

The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1950-1954, edited by Jiri Pelikan. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California. 360 pp. \$10.95. 1971.

In April 1968, the Dubcek government set up a commission to investigate the Czechoslovak purge trials of the early 1950s and their aftermath. Stretching over a period of five years, these trials reached high into the Communist party, resulting in the execution of Rudolf Slansky, the party's secretary-general, and other prominent party leaders, as well as the imprisonment of thousands of persons on a variety of trumped-up charges.

The commission was headed by Jan Piller, a member of the Communist party Central Committee, and included historians, lawyers, political scientists, and economists—all of them Communists. Their conclusions were so devastating that the party leadership, even prior to the Soviet invasion in August, constantly found pretexts to postpone the release of the commission's report.

In his introduction to this translation of the document, Jiri Pelikan writes that Piller "... informed the leadership in the summer of 1968 that the Report contained such alarming facts that publication might touch off an explosion likely to undermine the authority of the Party and of some of its top men. This led some Presidium members to agree to postponement—indeed not a few of them saw these documents as a threat to themselves. The experts who had been working on them were instructed to turn in all their notes, denied further access to the records and bound to complete silence. True, even after the August invasion Dubcek tried to have the Report submitted to the Central Committee, but after the blow he had suffered he no longer had the political strength to get this done. The documents were marked top secret and deposited in the archives, in the hope that they would never see the light of day."

One of the ironies in the situation is the fact that Gustav Husak, whose government still prevents the publication of the Piller report in Czechoslovakia, was himself a victim of the trials. Husak was arrested in 1951 and sentenced in 1954 to life imprisonment as a "bourgeois nationalist."

It is not difficult to understand the bureaucracy's determination to prevent the Czechoslovak public from learning the contents of the Piller commission's report. The researchers discovered that the highest levels of the party had connived in frame-ups, the use of torture to extract "confessions," and the careful staging of show trials. Moreover, the work of commissions later appointed to "rehabilitate" those falsely accused was regularly hamstrung by the party Political Bureau.

While the Piller commission devoted most of its attention to domestic aspects of the trials, the report would have created embarrassment for the bureaucracies of the other European workers states as well. The trials were launched in Czechoslovakia only after repeated claims from East Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, and Moscow that Czechoslovakia was the focus of an attempt by imperialism to infiltrate agents into the highest levels of the Communist parties. The interrogation of Czechoslovak prisoners was carried out under the direction of Soviet experts provided by Stalin.

The commission was also instructed to make recommendations as to how a repetition of the purges could be prevented. One particular suggestion must have thoroughly shaken many leaders of the party and state bureaucracy:

"The Commission recommends that the following principle be established: that none of the Party leaders, Security officers or members of the legal profession who had any part in preparing and conducting the political trials, or in the so-called reassessments of 1955-7, shall ever again hold high Party or Government office or work in Security or in the legal profession."

Jiri Pelikan was, prior to the Soviet invasion, chairman of the parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee and a general director of Czechoslovak television. He now lives in exile in Italy. In his postscript to the Piller commission report, he notes some ominous similarities between the period of the early 1950s and the current atmosphere in Czechoslovakia:

"Political opponents are . . . being 'politically' exposed, isolated, stripped of all public positions and silenced. These 'opponents' include Dubcek and most of the Party leadership of 1968 (many of whom, being victims of the trials, could return to public life only after January of that year), and with them the majority of the nation. That, according to the present leadership, is where the matter is to rest. But, once put in motion, the practices acquire an inexorable logic—either the accusations levelled against the men of the 'post-January' policy are justified, in which case punishment must be meted out, or there will be no punishment, with the result that sooner or later it will be seen that the whole business was simply a smoke-screen with no substance behind it."

In addition, Pelikan writes, the collaborators with the occupation forces live "in fear and trembling of an end to the military occupation, or indeed of any political change. . . ." They see political trials as a means of defending their own positions.

"There is every reason," Pelikan adds, "to believe that the mechanism of persecution has been set in motion, and the lesson of the past is that a point is reached at which even the very best of intentions are powerless to apply the brakes. Admittedly, Husak and his colleagues are probably not subjected to the same exceptional external pressures as those brought to bear on Gottwald [Klement Gottwald, head of the Communist party and of the state at the time of the trials] in his day. But they are definitely under pressure from the 'collaborators' at home, as being the only group on which they can rely in pursuing their highly unpopular policy."

The absurd charges that have been made against Pelikan himself are an unfortunate indication that Husak is in fact preparing a new version of the 1950-54 trials.

—David Burton

DOCUMENTS

On the 'Anti-Imperialist Front' in Bolivia

[The following statement was issued February 6 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

The United Secretariat of the Fourth International has had an initial discussion of the situation in Bolivia and the new conditions of struggle facing the revolutionary vanguard. It reaffirms its agreement with the consistent political differentiation maintained in the period prior to the Banzer coup by the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Bolivian section of the Fourth International, in contradistinction to the stands taken by all the opportunist tendencies towards the capitalist Torres government and the clear threats of an ultraright coup d'etat. The es-

tablishment of the dictatorship has thrown the workers' movement back into clandestinity and subjected it to a ferocious repression. In this situation the insistence of the POR on the need to combine mass actions with the development of armed struggle in order to move toward the organization of armed mass action against the Banzer dictatorship is correct.

In the framework of this orientation toward struggle against the military dictatorship of Banzer, the POR recently decided to join the "Frente Revolucionario Anti-imperialista" [FRA]. Unfortunately, the founding document of this front* presents a false polit-

* For the full text, see *Intercontinental Press*, December 6, 1971, p. 1077.

ical line. The theme of multiclass national unity, which it advances, reflects the positions of the majority sectors in the leadership of the front—not only reformists and Stalinists, but also bourgeois elements, including Torres himself, who bear a crucial part of the responsibility for the success of the Banzer coup d'etat. The United Secretariat cannot agree with the POR's signing such a text, which is directly contradictory to the longstanding program of the POR and the lessons of the struggle against the Torres regime and the Banzer coup, which the POR itself had drawn.

The United Secretariat will discuss this and other questions with the POR leadership in a comprehensive way in the coming period. The United Secretariat of the Fourth International calls on all revolutionaries to express greater solidarity than ever with the difficult and courageous struggle being carried on by the Bolivian comrades. □

Chile—the Coming Confrontation

[The following resolution was passed unanimously by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International at the end of December 1971.]

* * *

Organize Democratic Councils of the Workers, Peasants, Slum Dwellers, and Students!

Struggle for the Arming of the Proletariat and the Formation of a Popular Militia!

Build a Revolutionary Party!

Fourteen months ago, as a result of the September 4, 1970, elections and an agreement between the parties of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity)* and the Partido Demócrata-Cristiano (Christian Democrats), Salvador Allende was inaugurated as president of Chile and formed a popular front government. This was a major event that all formations both within the country and in the Americas as a whole had to take a stand on. From the beginning it served as a touchstone, revealing the concepts and attitudes of the various currents in the workers' movement. The experiment in Chile is being watched throughout the world, particularly as a test of the efficacy of the electoral, parliamentary, and peaceful road that has been advocated by the reformists as a way of achieving socialism.

In a setting of vigorous mobilizations of opposing social and political forces, the crisis in Chile is becoming increasingly acute. Particularly since the defeat suffered by the masses of Bolivia last August, the contradictions and the struggle in Latin America have come to a focal point in Chile. Thus it is imperative for revolutionary Marxists to grasp the nature of the events, to understand the tendencies that are developing and the issues that are coming to the fore, and to define their position without any ambiguity so as to be able to intervene effectively.

1. The victory of the Cuban revolution—which coincided with the irreversible crisis of the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois revolutionary nationalist movements that marked an entire stage of the political struggle in many Latin American countries—led U.S. imperialism and the indigenous ruling classes to reexamine where they stood. On the one hand, the imperialists stepped up their military preparations, with an eye to the possible danger of revolutionary struggles inspired by the Cuban example; on the other hand, they projected a reformist course the aim of which was to reinforce certain economic sectors considered to be the most dynamic, to favor a shift in the relationship of forces within the ruling classes toward the "new" bourgeois layers, and to broaden, even if but a little, the mass base of the system. This attempt—to which Washington, however, allotted only derisory funds under the so-called Alliance for Progress—ended in total defeat. Within this context, the reformist experiments, or those tending in that direction (for example, Goulart in Brazil, Belaúnde in Peru) were either crushed

* The Partido Social-Demócrata, Acción Popular Independiente, Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria, Partido Radical, Partido Comunista, and Partido Socialista.

in the egg or soon ended in bankruptcy. One of the consequences of this was the proliferation of military regimes, most of them reactionary, and the tendency to use the army on an increasing scale as a substitute for the traditional political mechanisms that had proved incapable of carrying out their tasks.

The dictatorship of the Brazilian gorillas was one of the variants adopted to establish a relative political equilibrium and to revive the economy through increased exploitation of the working class and the toiling masses as a whole. Another variant was an expansion of reformism that aimed at modernizing and rationalizing the economic and social structures, at imposing a new balance within the ruling classes themselves at the expense of the traditional oligarchy, and at establishing better and more active relations with the masses or considerable layers of them. The pilot experiment in this was the military regime set up in Peru by Velasco Alvarado in October 1968.

The relative success of the Peruvian regime, combined with the defeats suffered by other governments or the dead ends in which they found themselves, favored analogous reformist tendencies—military or civilian—stepping forward in other countries, even if they remained only incipient. As a whole, these currents raised the question of modernizing the agricultural structures through agrarian reforms directed against the most conservative landholding layers and designed to foster the formation of layers of small and middle peasant owners. They sought a more substantial displacement of capital toward the industrial and urban sectors of the economy in general with the idea of breaking the direct imperialist domination of the traditional raw materials sectors. Against the old setup, as partisans of a more vigorous intervention in the economy by the state, to which they assigned an increasing role as a stabilizer, they favored "collaboration" with the so-called modern industrial sectors. Such an orientation, as they saw it, would make possible an improvement in relations with the masses, which, within strict limits, could play a role in supporting the new regimes against the resistance and counterattacks of the ultras.

2. The events in Chile in recent years come within this more general tendency. It must not be forgotten that the Frei regime itself began as a reformist experiment that sought to modernize socio-economic structures, particularly through an agrarian reform, increased intervention by the state, and the final displacement of the former oligarchical ruling layers. Thus in a general way, the Popular Unity government stands as a continuator of the government that preceded it. It was not accidental that in the period before the September 4 election, sectors of the Popular Unity and the Christian Democrats did not exclude running a common candidate and that the Christian Democrats stood on a program analogous to that of Allende's front. Even more significantly—the new president did not project a new agrarian reform, but limited himself to applying the reform adopted by Frei.

The essentially reformist character of the Allende government conforms, moreover, with the program presented before and after the elections. Basically this program projects carrying out the Christian Democratic agrarian reform, ending the direct imperialist grip on the exploitation of raw materials, the statization of a series of in-

dustrial sectors, and the nationalization of the banks. This program, if it were carried out in its entirety, would greatly alter Chile's economic structure, bringing about considerable modifications in the relationship of class forces, in the division of the national income, and in the political role played by the different forces. But it would not involve a qualitative change—Chile would not cease to be a capitalist country dominated by the law of profit and still integrated in the imperialist world structure. In the countryside, agriculture would be marked more and more by the growth of capitalist enterprises and layers of land-owning small and middle peasants that would act as stabilizing elements, at least for the time being. The industrial bourgeoisie would still be the strongest and most dynamic class economically, it would retain and even strengthen its links with international capitalism, and, in the final analysis, it would be the main beneficiary of the new economic and political equilibrium and of the rationalization of the system, including through the presence of a very important sector controlled by the state.

Maintenance of the basic economic structure of capitalism is guaranteed all the more by the fact that the Popular Unity fought for the presidency not only on a strictly electoral level but committed itself to work within the framework of the pre-existing state apparatus (parliament, administrative apparatus, constitutionally authorized bodies of control such as the police, the army). That is why Alessandri and Tomic, who were supported at the time by virtually all the bourgeois voters, agreed to abide by the electoral outcome and permit Allende to take office (the factions favoring a coup d'etat consisted of only very small groupings even within the army).

3. While the events in Chile fall within a more general context of analogous tendencies that are either potential or already operative in other Latin American countries, they are nevertheless marked by very important specific traits that clearly differentiate the Allende regime from any other regime in Latin America.

First of all, while Peruvian reformism is being carried out by a military leadership that has displaced the traditional bourgeois parties, in Chile guidance is being undertaken by a coalition whose base is to be found essentially among the workers, the peasants, and the slum dwellers, and in which the two workers' parties exercise unquestionable preponderance. Thus Chilean reformism is being conducted under the leadership of a workers' bureaucracy.

The question arises as to whether the Allende government is a popular front government in the traditional sense of the term. It has been argued that the bourgeoisie as such, represented politically by the Christian Democrats and to a lesser degree by the National party, is not directly represented in the government. But, even leaving aside the fact that at least one of the parties in the coalition was traditionally a bourgeois party, the bourgeoisie exercises its influence through the petty-bourgeois parties that were included in both the Popular Unity and in the government. In addition, Allende is continually obliged to negotiate with the majority bloc in a parliament dominated by the Christian Democratic party, which permitted him to be elected and which can paralyze anything he undertakes whenever it chooses. Finally—and this is decisive—the class-collaborationist nature of the

coalition was determined by its acceptance of the fundamental economic framework of the capitalist system and the bourgeois state apparatus.

Such a characterization should not lead one to identify the movement of the masses with the coalition nor even to simplify too much the problem of the relationship between Allende and the masses. Allende's victory was the outcome of a long history of hard battles, of many ups and downs, of the slow ripening of a proletariat that is among the oldest and most homogeneous in Latin America. In the eyes of the workers, the peasants, and the plebeian layers of the slums, the September 4, 1970, election represented a victory over the bourgeoisie, a historic step forward in the struggle for the elimination of capitalist exploitation. It expressed a new relationship of forces, more favorable to the masses than ever before. All this became translated after September 4 into an extraordinary upsurge, a broad mobilization of the working class and the peasantry, a radicalization of layers of the petty bourgeoisie, a rise in political consciousness among the plebeian sectors of the big cities. Broad layers of the vanguard, inspired by the mobilization of the masses and confronted by immediate political necessities, began discussing the main themes of revolutionary strategy and the problem of how to get from capitalism to socialism.

4. One of the fundamental factors in the situation in Chile is the inevitable tendency of the mass mobilization to break through the framework of reformism and class collaborationism prescribed by Allende. This, in the final analysis, is what provokes the sharpest conflicts and alarms the indigenous bourgeoisie and the imperialists. Out of fear of being overwhelmed, they raise the question of an inevitable confrontation.

In other words, the bourgeoisie, understanding its necessity, was inclined to accept and even to foster a reformist operation. After the defeat of Frei, this could only be attempted under the leadership of the workers' parties. But it fears the dynamics of a mass movement that could break through the framework of reformism, precipitating a genuine revolutionary crisis and placing on the agenda the question of power. In the same way, imperialism fears that the dynamics of the situation in Chile could have explosive effects on a continental scale, inspiring new upsurges of the proletariat and the peasantry.

In fact, in the period since the election, the workers and peasants have not at all limited themselves to supporting Allende and waiting for the government to act. They have often taken the initiative, obliging the government to approve the things that have been done. More importantly, the practical actions undertaken by the masses have often gone beyond the limits of the program of the Popular Unity. Peasants have taken over land without waiting for formal decisions and have even seized properties that could not be touched, according to the law. Workers have undertaken actions along the same lines, accelerating the process of statization and hitting enterprises that in principle were to be left in the sector of privately owned property. For the bourgeoisie this involved a crucial question—a substantial extension of expropriations beyond the projected limits raised the danger of gravely weakening its social weight, of more profoundly altering the relationship of forces. This could pre-

vent it from effectively carrying out the projected restructuring of the economy to its own benefit. The bourgeoisie recognized at the same time that as this course gathered headway, the working class and the peasantry, by force of circumstances, would more and more be compelled to deal with the question of power by cutting through the limits of the constitution and forming qualitatively new bodies of proletarian power.

In the currently developing conflicts, the contending forces are mobilizing and reacting more and more sharply in relation to issues that must be decided in a relatively short time. The masses—at least the layers in the forefront—are not ready to give up their offensive and are seeking to bring to bear the greater social and political weight they have gained. The bourgeoisie is combining defensive operations and sallies designed to encourage its troops. For the bourgeoisie, it is essential to gain exact delimitation of the three economic "areas" (state, private, mixed) and to maintain the political structures of the system. The latter is required as a guarantee against any tendency to go beyond the framework of the reformist experiment. Allende and his coalition, unable to accede to measures that might provoke a break with the masses or even considerable sectors of the masses, are compelled to reply to the attacks of the bourgeoisie; but at the same time they continually seek to hold back the masses and to counter the pressures exerted from the left. They need to maintain an appreciable margin for maneuver and to avoid or to postpone any major confrontation. This is the meaning of the widely applied measure called *intervención*, which, by designating a manager to act in the name of the government, offers a certain satisfaction to the workers while at the same time not necessarily implying expropriation, thus maintaining capitalist property relations. This is also the meaning of the projected single chamber parliament, which, if it is accepted, would permit the government to carry out its program more rapidly and would better reflect the existing relationship of forces in Chile while on the other hand guaranteeing to the bourgeoisie the preservation of parliamentary structures completely within the bourgeois tradition.

5. In a situation like the one in Chile today, the different forces are not always in position to strictly pick and choose what they will get into or to act in accordance with a thought-out overall plan. The contradictions and potential conflicts accumulate from day to day, and events that are insignificant in themselves, and difficult to anticipate, can precipitate dramatic confrontations at practically any moment. This must never be forgotten, and it would be a grave error for the workers' movement to lull itself with the illusion of a painless unfolding of events.

However, it is unlikely that a decisive confrontation will occur in the immediate future. The government, for its part, is seeking to keep the initiative while carrying on a balancing act and putting the brake on actions from below that it considers to be dangerous from its point of view. As for the bourgeoisie, it is provoking multiple tensions both to create difficulties for the Popular Unity and to make it modify its course more (it knows from experience that reactions of this kind are typical of reformists and centrists). But it is not able to precipitate an immediate showdown, nor does it want one.

It must be remembered, first of all, that the Chilean bourgeoisie has a rather long democratic-parliamentarian tradition and that its political personalities were shaped in that school. This corresponds with the existence of a series of structures and flexible, efficacious mechanisms that make defense and counterattack genuinely possible. The solution of a "strong state," of a military coup, presupposes in any case preparations that the army itself has hardly begun. The forces that are already voicing "golpista" or fascist inclinations and who are preparing the means to carry forward such an orientation are at present completely in the minority, even if they are gaining ground. Finally—and this is the most important—the bourgeoisie and its most representative party, the Christian Democrats, are very much aware that they can hardly visualize a confrontation without having a considerable mass base. Recent events have shown that time can play into their hands thanks to the weaknesses and contradictions of the Popular Unity and the economic difficulties these have helped foster. In fact the Christian Democrats have gained or consolidated positions that are far from negligible among the peasants, have regained influence among the students, and widened their margin for maneuver, including within the working class (particularly among sectors that, misled for a long time by the blind economism of the reformists, have fallen for the bait of certain demagogic bids); and, as the events in Santiago in November and December have shown, the reactionaries are able to mobilize considerable forces in rather aggressive street demonstrations.

Nevertheless, a postponement of the decisive battles is not necessarily injurious to the cause of the working class, which needs to strengthen its positions, to organize an offensive, to face and resolve the decisive problem of arming itself. But this holds true only to the degree that every tendency to limit and to channelize the mass mobilizations, and to give priority to political operations at the top level of the bureaucratic machines and state institutions is resolutely combated; to the degree and rapidity with which economic sabotage is counteracted; to the degree that the working class feels it has no obligation to carry the burden of the economic difficulties without being able to defend itself, to intervene actively, and exercise control; and to the degree that the illusion is rejected that "moderation" and loyalty to the norms of a bourgeois constitution constitute the best way to avoid a reactionary counteroffensive and a fascist coup.

6. It is a prime necessity at this stage of strategical rearmament that the working class free itself completely from any kind of reformist ideas and parliamentary cretinism of whatever form. It must understand that Chile will not prove to be an exception.

In a country whose economic and social structures are very advanced in comparison to the average level in the neocolonial world, it is clearer than ever that the perspective of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, separated from a socialist revolution, does not have the slightest objective justification. The only possible revolution in Chile is a revolution with a socialist dynamic without any break in continuity and at a relatively rapid rate. And emancipation from imperialism—in view of the close symbiotic relation between imperialism and the national bourgeoisie—can be achieved only by the com-

plete expropriation of the indigenous ruling class. Any ambiguity, any slurring over on this subject could have disastrous consequences, disarming the basic revolutionary forces, who need to gain a clear understanding of what they grasp intuitively and try to carry out empirically.

To believe in the idea that a revolutionary dynamic of this kind can unfold completely to a victorious outcome without breaking the political framework of the old society thanks to a "peaceful" evolution and not by breaking up the old state structure, including both the administration and the military establishment, and starting afresh is to deliberately delude oneself, to forget the lessons of the long history of the workers' movement, to be incapable of grasping the implacable logic of the situation that is developing in the country. Far from being a theoretical innovation, as claim the charlatans of all stripes and those who trample on the Marxist method out of empiricism or opportunism, the concept of a "Chilean road" is only a new version of the reformist ideology that Marxism has fought since the turn of the century and that at crucial stages has ravaged the workers' movement in other parts of the world. The essential point is that in Chile the problem of taking power has not been solved at all nor even begun to be solved. It can only be met and actually solved on the revolutionary road.

From all the preceding, it follows that any form of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie or with sectors of the bourgeoisie must be resolutely rejected. This implies that the masses in Chile must struggle to replace the coalition government of the Popular Unity with a workers and peasants government that excludes any participation by parties or groups that represent, if only indirectly, the interests of the bourgeoisie and other layers of the exploiters. This means that the revolutionary process must be deepened and stimulated by the creation of bodies of dual power, by bodies of genuine proletarian democracy formed directly in the plants, the fields, the *campamientos*, and schools, in which the members are elected, subject to recall at any time, and enjoy no material privileges. These bodies will represent the proletariat and the peasantry as a whole and constitute the means of mobilizing the key sectors of the masses in the revolutionary struggle for the conquest of power. The unions will remain separate and apart, continuing to play their specific role, on the basis of the widest internal democracy for all tendencies in the workers' movement and in complete independence from the government and the state.

The revolutionary Marxists are conscious of the difficulties involved in forming and extending such bodies of a soviet type; but if they are not built, one of the essential elements for the conquest of power will be lacking and the revolution in gestation can be aborted. In the battle for workers and peasants councils, the sharpest line of demarcation must be drawn between the exploiting classes and their political machines while this is coupled with an uncompromising defense of the broadest democracy for the masses and all the organizations and tendencies of the workers' movement. The defense of proletarian democracy is all the more necessary in view of the fact that the concept has become obscured after

the decades of Social Democratic and Stalinist preponderance. It is an imperious practical necessity that unfortunately has not been absorbed and understood by the organizations that are struggling against the opportunistic, bureaucratized parties.

A continual, very broad, thoroughgoing mobilization of the masses is the condition sine qua non for a positive development of the revolutionary crisis in Chile. It is precisely because the reformist leaderships—which the working class and peasant masses in their great majority continue to accept—have sought to limit and channelize these mobilizations and to impose decisions taken exclusively at the governmental and parliamentary level, that the movement became weakened, opening the way for the foe to take the initiative and partially set in motion layers whose interests do not coincide in principle with those of the reaction. If this short-sighted policy is continued—still worse, if the government cracks down on sectors of the vanguard of the proletariat and the peasantry, as it has already done on certain occasions, this could strengthen tendencies toward confusion and demobilization. The conditions thus created would enormously facilitate a reactionary counterattack and a rightist coup d'etat.

7. A strategy of revolutionary struggle for power must single out several key objectives. Without pretending to provide answers to all the problems that have arisen and that will arise at different stages, the revolutionary Marxists stress the following:

(a) The poor peasants and agricultural workers cannot accept the framework of the agrarian reform set by the Frei government, that is, by a bourgeois political leadership. The transformations in the agrarian structures must include the total expulsion of the landlords and the expropriation of the capitalist entrepreneurs. The limits on holdings must be set at a level designed on the one hand to avoid forming a layer of rich peasants, dangerous to the revolution, and on the other hand to guarantee the necessary resources to peasants who want to own an individual plot. Very precise norms must be established (particularly with regard to the buying and selling of land) so as to achieve the equivalent of nationalization of the land and to block any tendency toward a new concentration of property. If the agrarian reform refrains from touching the capitalist enterprises, complete domination over the most dynamic sector of agriculture will be left in private hands and the agricultural workers will turn away from the revolutionary process. It is necessary to inscribe in the program of the workers and peasants government the expropriation of the agricultural capitalists and the formation of collective farms. The latter, thanks to their technological level, play a central role in developing the economy during the period of transition.

(b) In the domain of industry, it is necessary to reject the concept of three "areas" that reserves a sector for private capital. Such a sector, embracing the most modern and dynamic fields in the existing capitalist system, would inevitably become the nerve center of the process of accumulation and the meeting place of national and foreign capital. Through general expropriation it is necessary to break the backbone of Chilean capital-

ism, thereby breaking at the same time the indigenous support on which imperialist penetration depends. It goes without saying that to the degree it controls entirely and directly all the key sectors of industry and agriculture, the workers and peasants government would have no interest in breaking up small business and craft industry nor feel any urgent need to do so.

(c) The nationalization of the banking system and the establishment of a state monopoly on foreign trade must be carried out to the end. These measures are all the more necessary because of Chile's position as a semi-colonial country subject to imperialist exploitation.

(d) Workers control plays a key role in a revolutionary strategy for the conquest of power. It fosters the formation of dual power, the active participation of the masses and a deepening grasp of what is genuinely at stake. Through workers control the proletariat mobilizes in a concrete way at the point of production, thus helping broader and broader layers to understand in practice the need to pose the problem of power. Any form of "participation" by the workers, subordinated in reality to the power of the bosses or of government technicians, or any form of "comanagement" must be rejected. It is necessary to demand workers control of production, exercised by democratic bodies, directly elected by the workers. The problems of workers management and self-management will not become real until after the qualitative revolutionary jump, until after the overturn of bourgeois power and the birth of proletarian power.

At the same time, workers control enables the workers to bring all aspects of job relations under surveillance. They are able to challenge the organization of work imposed by the bosses, to intervene actively in setting work rates, dividing of jobs, work breaks, etc. It also makes it possible in already nationalized industries to avoid having a technocrat simply step into the shoes of the boss or the capitalist manager. Workers control can likewise represent a school in which to learn the technical tasks of administration and management which the working class must be able to carry out after the seizure of power lest bureaucratic tendencies gain headway.

Finally workers control can serve as an instrument of struggle against the economic sabotage of the foreign and Chilean capitalists. In connection with this, general measures involving planning and control must be pushed for government adoption along with abolition of trade secrets, opening of the books, and strict control over all banking operations as well as prices, rents, etc. The flight of capital, the closing down of plants, and the hoarding of goods gives extreme urgency to these measures.

(e) The struggle for a workers and peasants government, for the conquest of power, must be conducted above all through forming and constantly mobilizing organs of proletarian democracy rising out of the masses. The building of these organs is an absolutely central task at this stage, and the very fate of the revolution hinges, in the last analysis, on how it is carried out. As a transitional slogan, it is necessary to raise against Allende's project of a single chamber parliament—which fits in with bourgeois parliamentarism—the slogan of a popular constituent assembly whose task would be to lay out new political and administrative structures. This assembly must be elected in such fashion as to assure the

workers and peasants the preponderant representation to which they are entitled because of their specific social weight, thus putting an end to the fraudulent present electoral system with all its dupery.

8. The strategy and orientations outlined here would be completely abstract and not free from the danger of spontanéist deviations if two essential items were left out—the absence of which up to now has constituted the main weakness of the Chilean proletariat, that is, arming the workers and peasants and building a revolutionary party. To struggle for a correct strategy thus means struggling to arm the proletariat, and struggling to build a revolutionary party as the only means of assuring the masses conscious leadership and effectively carrying out the strategy and tactics required to win.

The experience of other countries, above all in Latin America—from the invasion of Guatemala in 1954 to Banzer's coup d'etat in Bolivia last August—has shown that the working class must consider its own self-defense as an elementary task. The lesson is written in letters of blood—the blood of workers, peasants and students. Any illusions in the "good will" of the foe must be rejected as suicidal. In view of the nature of the government and the relations between the Unidad Popular coalition and the broad majority of the masses, the task facing the workers and peasants is to arm themselves, to form political and military instruments of self-defense, to organize a genuine popular militia, to disseminate revolutionary propaganda among the soldiers. Not to begin along these lines would mean in practice depending on the "democratic loyalty" of the army and the specialized repressive bodies. It would mean incapacity to respond to the need felt by increasingly broad sectors of the masses, alerted by the events in Bolivia. Allende's proclamations, according to which the Popular Unity will meet any reactionary violence should it occur, constitute nothing but demagogic bragging, since they involve nothing practical. In place of relying on spontanéism and improvisations, the necessary instruments must be put together now to prevent the class enemy from achieving a crushing material superiority when the inevitable confrontation comes about. Against any possible misunderstanding, the revolutionary Marxists stress that it is not against Allende, but against the threats from the right, and to answer any attack from the forces of bourgeois repression, that the workers and peasants must place on the agenda the crucial problem of arming themselves.

9. In another way, Chile will not prove to be a historic exception—the capitalist system in Chile will not be overturned without the decisive intervention of a revolutionary party, the conscious vanguard of the masses. The tasks pertaining to such a party cannot be left to the Chilean Communist party to carry out. This party, bearing the stamp of a long Stalinist tradition, is the instrument of an indigenous labor bureaucracy and relatively conservative layers of the proletariat that have not been mobilizing in the current crisis with the same dynamism as the younger generation. It has maintained all its traditional concepts, not cutting in the least way the umbilical cord tying it to the Soviet bureaucracy. The tasks of the revolutionary party cannot be left to

the Socialist party either. While the SP has gained a wider hearing, particularly among the younger workers, and has, in the organizations it controls, adopted positions to the left of those of the Communist party—a genuine cesspool of reformism—it does not have the structure of a combat party, it does not have solid and continuous links with the masses it influences, and is more a conglomeration of tendencies and groups than a homogeneous formation, and, in the final analysis, bears the characteristic traits of a centrist organization. In any case, it is necessary to reject any concept based, explicitly or implicitly, on the hypothesis that thanks to the dynamism of the revolutionary process and the power of the mass movement and thanks to the weakening of the bourgeoisie and its very likely continuing decomposition and a situation in which imperialism would be compelled to renounce military intervention, the proletariat can come to power even without a genuine revolutionary Leninist party. It is likewise necessary to reject the variant derived from the hypothesis that an ersatz revolutionary party might prove sufficient, that is, some kind of front in which the revolutionists assemble together, or a cartel in which different organizations of the far left join up.

The task of building a party is indubitably difficult even in an objective context that is very favorable from a number of angles. But it must absolutely be accomplished. At this stage of the class struggle in Latin America, the speed with which the revolutionary crisis in Chile develops to its outcome depends, in the final analysis, on the speed with which the party is built.

10. The tense and dramatic course of events will inevitably provoke growing differentiations among the masses and bring to maturity considerable layers of the vanguard, who will come to understand the nature of the reformist regime, the contradictions in the workers organizations, and the necessity to work out a revolutionary strategy. In fact this line of development is already becoming clearly visible.

Since his inauguration, Allende has had to face mounting pressures from the left and sometimes sweeping demonstrations. There has been a considerable growth of dissatisfied tendencies that have come into conflict with the reformist restrictions. Concrete evidence of this is to be seen on the class level in the moves made by sectors of the workers and peasants that have gone beyond the programmatic guidelines of the Popular Unity and confronted the government with accomplished facts. On the political level it is to be seen in the increasing influence of the organizations standing to the left of the Communist and Socialist parties. It is in relation to these differentiations and these objective tendencies that the problem of building the revolutionary party must be posed, and not on the absurd hope of being able to solve it through declamations and half-hearted moves.

It is not by accident that an organization like the *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*, the only one of its kind in Latin America at the moment, should arise in Chile. The MIR has considerable influence. Originating in student and petty-bourgeois circles, it has succeeded, as the demonstrations of the past period have clearly indicated, in winning authority among the peasant forces that mobilized in land occupations and among several

sectors of the workers who no longer accept the lead of the reformists. It is probable that this tendency will grow in the period now opening which promises a rise in political consciousness among rather broad layers controlled up to now by the Popular Unity.

The influence of the MIR is explained by its capacity to link up with the most dynamic layers of the student movement during its initial phase, of appearing as the most consistent and effective organization of the far left in putting together a rather solid organizational framework, based on cells of professional militants, despite the ultraleft deformations that marked it for an entire period up to the spectacular turn of September 1970. At the same time the MIR knew how to capitalize on the influence wielded in Chile by the Cuban revolution since the beginning of the sixties.

The contradictions to be found in the MIR lie in its incapacity to reach an overall, rigorous definition of the problems of revolutionary strategy on a world scale, in the empiricism that often characterizes its orientations and that has led to sudden oscillations from ultraleft to opportunist positions, in its concept of the party which is far from Leninist democratic centralism, particularly in practice, and in its bureaucratic concept of relations between the party and the mass organizations. This took form in the period after September 1970 in a very clear tendency to adapt to the concepts and needs of the Popular Unity, in almost total silence with regard to international events, even those of first-rate significance (the MIR, for example, has published no analysis of the policies of Moscow and Peking), in a "verticalista" organizational practice that reserves important decisions for the top level (it is significant that no congress has been held for years), in efforts through administrative means and without consultation to impose decisions taken by the party apparatus on organizations considered to be vehicles for reaching the masses.

The consequence of this has been friction within the organization, the departure of groups of militants, particularly among the students, and the loss of important positions in the *campamientos*. In view of its influence, the MIR, because of the weaknesses of its orientation, bears the responsibility in large measure for the crisis in the student movement. For the past year the student movement has not been able to play a major role; instead, it has provided recruits to reactionary provocations.

The forces organized or influenced by the MIR will unquestionably play an important role in building the revolutionary party that is the condition sine qua non for the victory of the Chilean workers and peasants. But other forces that still belong to the traditional parties will participate in this. The Socialist party, because of its present composition and structure, constitutes a seedbed of militants and combative and politically conscious cadres who will have a lot to offer in the process. It must not be forgotten either that a decisive change in the relationship of forces in favor of the revolutionists also presupposes a deep differentiation among the working-class layers that still represent the main base of the Communist party.

In carrying out their elementary task of constructing

a Leninist party, the revolutionary Marxists must avoid both sectarian dogmatism and opportunist adaptation, integrating themselves in the real movements and advancing their program in an audacious way as an autonomous organized force in confrontation with all the other tendencies of the left.

This involves attacking without any ambiguities or concessions the reformist nature of the regime and the forces backing it. Complete independence must be maintained with regard to the popular front coalition. Revolutionists cannot participate in such a coalition even by offering it electoral support. (Revolutionary Marxists can, in certain situations, vote for a labor candidate but not for a candidate of a front that includes petty-bourgeois and bourgeois parties.) They must, however, support progressive measures undertaken by the Allende regime and maintain a united front against the attacks of the reactionaries.

The necessary criticism of the contradictions and weaknesses of the MIR must not at all stand in the way of recognizing the important role the MIR is playing as a catalyzer at the moment or of appreciating the programmatic rectifications or advances it makes (as, for example, in the speech of Miguel Enriquez last November).

A continuous tenacious struggle must be conducted to concretize the revolutionary strategy outlined above and to advance the transitional slogans flowing from it.

11. The outcome of the crisis in Chile will be determined not only by the dynamics of the domestic situation but by powerful international forces. This must be kept in mind all the more attentively in view of the fact that the thesis of Chilean "exceptionalism" goes hand in hand with a confirmed and striking underestimation of these forces. Underlying this attitude, in reality, are extremely dangerous illusions and inveterate opportunism.

It is obvious that imperialism, if need be through its satellites, will do everything in its power to influence developments in Chile and block Santiago from becoming the capital of the second workers state in Latin America. Through its international weight and its links with the Chilean Communist party, the Soviet bureaucracy will also exercise powerful pressure. The Chinese bureaucracy has played only a completely secondary role in Chile and this will hardly change. As for Cuba, its influence takes contradictory forms. Fidel Castro's visit was symbolic in this respect. On the one hand the masses turned out in huge demonstrations to greet him and pay tribute to the Cuban revolution. On the other hand Castro's almost unconditional support of Allende and his adherence to the verbiage of the Popular Unity created obstacles to the development of understanding among the masses of the necessity to build a Leninist party and to develop a revolutionary strategy for the conquest of power.

Thus it is imperative for the revolutionists to grasp the relationship between the world situation and what is happening in Chile and to bring it out clearly. The need for an international revolutionary perspective has become more acute than ever. That is why the battle now unfolding in Chile concerns not only those who stand for revolutionary Marxism in that country but the Fourth International as a whole. In this stage, so important for Latin America, it must bring to bear its theoretical tradition, its political analyses, its experience, and its world organization. □