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Egyptian Students Challenge Sadat

Shah Prepares Firing Squads

Belfast Regime Attacks Rent Strike

NIXON: New "peace plan" consists of proposals rejected six years ago, plus plans to escalate bombing.

Political Situation in Burma

Nixon's Plan: New Escalation

'Samenakt' Demands Raised in Sweden

"They call it 'Samenakt' or 'Samen power,'" Joe Alex Morris Jr. wrote in the January 11 *Los Angeles Times*. "'Same' is the people's own word for themselves, as they consider the word Lapp to have pejorative associations. . . ."

"Last May 1 a Lapp contingent demonstrated in Stockholm for Lapp rights during the May Day parade, surprising many citizens mainly because few Swedes ever think much about the Lapps. . . ."

As in the case of the American Indians, which they resemble to some extent, the Same are a reminder of the brutal past of capitalism:

"The Swedes, proud of their liberal reputation and their social welfare state, are sensitive about charges of discrimination. The record of past centuries is grisly enough: forceful conversion of the Lapps from their animistic religion, burning off of the lichen ground cover by Swedish farmers so that the reindeer starved. . . ."

The Same, a Swedish Ombudsman [public advocate] told Morris, have many of the same grievances as the American Indians:

"Without any real right to do so and without compensation, the Swedish government has taken the income from timber land, mines and water power in the Lapp territories."

In Sweden, the "natives" suffer from perhaps worse tutelage, apparently, than their counterparts in North America. "In legal disputes, the Lapps are not heard in public court, but behind closed doors, and usually it is a case of the Crown representing the Lapps against another branch of the Crown."

In addition to bureaucratic pressures and public discrimination, the development of big business has dealt hard blows to the traditional Same communities. Modern methods and capital concentration have reduced the need for reindeer herders.

With their free, nomadic traditions, the Same are regarded as "poorly adapted" for wage labor.

"They've got no great interest in working," a mine personnel chief told Morris. "They prefer the outdoors." □

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Nixon 'Peace Plan' Prepares New Escalation

By Allen Myers

"Some of our citizens," Richard Nixon complained during his January 25 televised speech on Indochina, "have become accustomed to thinking that whatever our government says must be false, and whatever our enemies say must be true, as far as this war is concerned."

The remark—which would have been more accurate had he said "most of our citizens"—perhaps indicates that Nixon has acquired an increased respect for the intelligence of the American public. In any event, it was the key to the eight-point "peace plan" Nixon announced during his speech.

The plan and the speech represented a not very subtle attempt to convince the public that Nixon is "truly" seeking peace. The aim of this propaganda is to lay the basis for a further escalation of the war. Unwilling to retreat even an inch from his intention of holding Indochina for U. S. imperialism, Nixon tried to give his proposals an air of novelty by revealing that his adviser Henry Kissinger had secretly conferred with North Vietnamese representatives on a dozen occasions.

The proposals that Nixon tried to portray as concessions actually contained no new substantive elements at all. They added up to the "settlement" that Nixon has sought ever since he took office: the continued existence of a puppet "government" in Saigon, a cease-fire to enable the puppet to control the countryside, the release of U. S. prisoners of war, and the continued presence of U. S. air power within striking distance of the region.

If these conditions were met, Nixon promised a withdrawal of U. S. forces from South Vietnam "within six months of an agreement"—a proposal rejected by the Vietnamese when Lyndon Johnson first made it nearly six years ago.

Nixon gave much emphasis to a proposal for elections under "international supervision" and promised that Thieu would resign one month before such elections. Since such an

arrangement would leave Thieu's entire repressive apparatus intact and in control, the proposal was not treated very seriously even by the American press. Tom Wicker, for example, wrote in the January 27 *New York Times*:

"... he [Thieu] could still run for re-election, his whole administrative apparatus would still be in office, in-



KISSINGER: Traveled to Paris in hope of bridging credibility gap at home.

cluding the powerful province chiefs, and the whole thing would take place within the framework of his Constitution. In his own speech in Saigon, Mr. Thieu made it clear also that the Vietnamese Communists could participate in the elections only if they laid down their arms and renounced violence. What about his own army and internal police?"

In a January 27 editorial, the *Washington Post* provided a succinct account of what Nixon's proposals amounted to:

"This, we are asked to believe, is a new peace plan whose unilateral, public disclosure is likely to break the impasse with Hanoi. This, we are told, is progress, when in fact it is

more of the same old shell game. . . . But the real news here is not of a new peace plan, or even of an earnest secret initiative. What the President told us Tuesday night was nothing more or less than that he and Dr. Kissinger have been privately pressing upon Hanoi a rather shopworn peace plan, only slightly refurbished, and that over a period of 30 months they have been had; he is telling us that he still wants it done the American way and that the North Vietnamese are still not buying it; he is telling us that negotiation isn't working, and that this, by his own admission, leaves the alternative of 'Vietnamization' which he is frank enough to describe as the 'long voyage home.'"

The National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), which is organizing mass antiwar demonstrations in New York and Los Angeles on April 22, pointed out the implications of Nixon's "peace plan":

"Under Nixon's proposal, U. S. bombing will continue and the U. S. will keep providing bombers, helicopters, chemical defoliants, and millions of dollars to the Saigon dictatorship. The Nixon proposal is simply a formula for continued war, for it puts conditions on the Vietnamese and ties U. S. involvement to the maintenance of the Saigon regime.

"The real significance of Nixon's proposal was his threat of renewed escalations if the Vietnamese do not meet his terms. The Nixon proposal is simply an attempt to gain public sympathy and lay the groundwork for further escalations."

The Pentagon has let it be known that it expects a major offensive by the Indochinese liberation forces in the coming months. A number of commentators in the daily press agreed with NPAC that Nixon's speech was designed, among other things, to prepare for a major escalation in an effort to prevent a U. S. defeat. Writing in the January 30 *New York Times*, Terence Smith summarized Nixon's aims:

"The President's goals seemed to be at least fourfold:

● To steal the thunder from his domestic critics, particularly the ever-widening field of Democratic Presidential challengers who had intensified their attacks on his war policy in recent weeks. Simultaneously, to close the divisions among the American public over war policy that have served to encourage and stiffen the North Vietnamese.

● To shift the onus for the Paris stalemate to the other side, which for months has been accusing the United States of failing to reply to proposals put forward by the Communists last July.

● To create a climate at home and abroad that would condone stiff retaliatory attacks to any North Vietnamese offensive in the coming weeks.

● To set the stage for his upcoming visit to China—a visit that many here [Washington] have felt could not succeed without an advance public declaration by the President of his willingness to withdraw all American troops from Vietnam. Regardless of whether it is accepted, such an offer will serve to free the Chinese from accusations that they are betraying their Indochinese allies by dealing with an American President." (Emphasis added.)

No less an authority on Nixon's intentions than Henry Kissinger in effect admitted that the administration was attempting to prepare public opinion for an enlargement of the war. In the January 26 *New York Times*, Terence Smith described Kissinger's remarks:

"We cannot negotiate as a divided people,' a senior White House official [later identified as Kissinger] told a large group of reporters at a briefing shortly before the President delivered his statement on radio and television.

"An impossible situation had developed in which the differences between what we had offered the other side publicly and privately in Paris were so great that our credibility at home was being undermined,' the official said. 'The effect was to demoralize the American people.' . . .

"A third element, the official conceded, was the President's 'awareness' of the possibility of a major enemy offensive in the coming weeks. For several months, the White House has been expecting heavy enemy assaults

in Laos, Cambodia and certain isolated parts of South Vietnam, such as the Central Highlands.

"The other side may still attempt a military victory,' the official said. 'We felt it was important for the American people to understand that if the war goes on, it is not because of our obstinacy at the negotiating table.'"

At a January 27 press conference, Secretary of State William Rogers reiterated Nixon's concern with public opinion on the war:

"My own view is that if there is any inclination at all on the part of the other side to negotiate a settlement—and I think that is in doubt—then the statement by the President the other night, which was so effective, I think will have the effect of unifying the American people. And if they [the Vietnamese] are convinced of that, I think they will be more inclined to work out a negotiated settlement."

New York Times vice president James Reston, in his January 28 column, was willing to assure Nixon that the American public had indeed been fooled by his propaganda offensive:

". . . by impressing public opinion in this country by his persistent effort to negotiate a secret agreement, he [Nixon] has undoubtedly gained

support for stepping up the bombing against the enemy's forthcoming military offensive."

Even Reston, however, predicted that whatever support Nixon had gained would evaporate as it became "clear that Mr. Nixon is demanding, not only the release of the P. O. W.'s, but the neutralization of all of Indochina, the end of all infiltration by foreign troops (are the South Vietnamese Communists 'foreign' in South Vietnam?), a cease-fire and an election process which is virtually certain to restore the Thieu Government to power in Saigon."

War-weariness in the United States is so widespread that Nixon cannot win more than very temporary support from any large section of the American public, no matter how skillful his propaganda. As NPAC pointed out in its statement:

"What the American people want is not Nixon's eight-point program, but a one-point program for the U. S. to withdraw from Southeast Asia, lock, stock, and barrel."

"NPAC will organize national demonstrations," the statement concluded, "on April 22 in New York City and Los Angeles to demand 'U. S. Out of Southeast Asia Now!' We also stand ready to oppose any further escalation that Nixon may be planning, no matter when it may occur." □

'Sharpeville' in Derry

13 Die as British Gun Down Marchers

British troops shot down dozens of Northern Ireland civil rights demonstrators in Derry January 30, killing at least thirteen persons. The massacre began after a march of 15,000 people was halted by a British army barricade in the center of the city. A clash occurred.

"The soldiers replied with volley after volley of gas and rubber bullets and called in water cannon to spray the demonstrators with a purple dye," the January 31 issue of the *New York Times* reported.

"The Paratroop Regiment, especially hated by Roman Catholics for their methods, then drove armored cars through the rioters and it was at this stage that rifle fire was heard over

the duller thud of rubber bullets."

Ivan Cooper, a member of the Northern Ireland parliament and a well-known civil rights activist, said that the shooting began after the march had been diverted into the Catholic neighborhood of the Bogside. A rally had begun. Bernadette Devlin was speaking. Then, Cooper said:

"The speakers threw themselves to the platform and I shouted for people to keep down. I could see the army systematically picking off people who had got up to run away.

"There was complete panic and confusion, and I thought the best thing I could do was to tend to the injured with a friend. I was carrying a white pillowcase. We were both fired on and

my friend was hit on the side of the face. Many of those who died were friends of mine, people I've known all my life.

"I can state absolutely positively that there were no snipers whatsoever. There had been stone-throwing, which had been taken care of. Sniper fire came 10 minutes later from local terrorists.

"The British Army shot down unarmed people, and I hope no one has the audacity to stand up and say they were firing at snipers. They murdered innocent men."

Bernadette Devlin called the massacre "our Sharpeville."

The British command claimed that the troops fired in response to snipers. But it is less than seven months since

residents of Derry heard the British commanders order their troops July 7, 1971, to kill a demonstrator as an example. Cyril Cusack was deliberately gunned down. The next day a nineteen-year-old youth, George Beattie, was shot to death while marching in a funeral procession for Cusack. A black flag still flies over the spot where Beattie was killed. □

Accused of Collaboration With Iraqi Regime

Shah Readies Firing Squads for Iranian Prisoners

By Javad Sadeeg

The shah of Iran is preparing to remove a large number of oppositionists from his torture chambers and hand them over to firing squads.

According to the January 22 air edition of the Teheran daily *Kayhan*, the shah was asked by Swiss and American correspondents whether military trials were now in progress. The dictator replied that two kinds of people were on trial: "communists and terrorists."

The morning after this interview, which apparently took place on January 15, the secret police agency SAVAK held a lengthy press conference at which it announced that the cases of approximately 120 oppositionists, belonging to "three subversive networks," had been handed over to military tribunals.

An unidentified agent went to great lengths to describe the "crimes" of the prisoners, but was vague on the exact number and the date of their trials. He mentioned bank robberies, bombings, and attempts to kidnap the shah's nephew and the American ambassador. The hostages were to be exchanged for political prisoners, he said.

(The January 24 issue of the semi-official Teheran daily *Ettelaat* reported that at least some of the trials began January 23.)

During the press conference, SAVAK produced a prisoner who introduced himself as Naser Samavati, an electrical engineer employed by the government. Samavati said that he and three other persons had been arrested following a gun battle that occurred as they were on their way to blow

up a central electrical network in Teheran during the shah's celebration of 2,500 years of the Persian monarchy.

Samavati was reported to have said that some of his friends had been trained in Iraq and had promised to act as agents of that country.

Samavati was the only prisoner displayed to the communications media — presumably because the others have not yet "confessed" or because the marks of torture used to extract confessions are still apparent.

The SAVAK agent claimed that the "three subversive networks" were associated with the Freedom Movement (a left nationalist and religious tendency), the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh party (a Maoist split-off from the Tudeh party), and a new organization, SAKA (Revolutionary Organization of Iranian Communists).

SAKA was dismantled last summer, the agent said, after some of the members of its Isfahan branch were arrested while robbing a bank there. He added that these members had violated the line of the group's central committee, which advocated patient preparation for the future.

SAVAK accused the three organizations of having received guerrilla training and other aid from the Iraqi regime. The Confederation of Iranian Students was also accused of collaboration with Baghdad.

By tying the revolutionary opposition to Baghdad, the shah is trying to capitalize on the public sentiment aroused by the Iraqi government's

mass deportations of Iranians in early January.

These deportations were the regime's way of responding to the anger of the Arab masses after the shah seized three islands in the Arab-Persian Gulf last November 30. The islands — Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb — command the Strait of Hormuz, a forty-to-sixty-mile-wide channel that connects the Arab-Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is through this strait that Iranian and other gulf oil is shipped.

During the occupation of Greater Tunb, three Arabs and three Iranians were killed. There was no resistance on Lesser Tunb, which is uninhabited.

Abu Musa, which belongs to the emirate of Sharja, was occupied without incident. Sheik Khalid, Sharja's ruler, had worked out a secret agreement with the shah, and even sent his brother, Sheik Saqr, to welcome the Iranian troops. The next day, Saqr was wounded by an unidentified gunman, and two months later Khalid was killed by his cousin in an attempted coup.

Following the shah's invasion, there were anti-Iranian demonstrations in many Arab countries. In some places, shops belonging to Iranians were burned. A soccer match between Iran and Kuwait had to be played in Athens because of the fear of demonstrations if it were played in an Arab country.

The Iraqi government immediately broke diplomatic relations with Iran and with Great Britain, which was

accused of complicity in the invasion.

(The Egyptian government, on the other hand, took a conciliatory line. Mohammed Heykal, editor of the semiofficial Cairo daily *Al Ahram*, wrote that friendship with Iran—by which he meant the shah's verbal support against Israel in United Nations debates—is worth more than three barren islands, a remark that has been widely quoted in the controlled Iranian press.)

The Iraqi government's reaction was conditioned by the fact that the Arab-Persian Gulf is the country's only access to the sea. In addition, the two governments have been quarrelling for years over navigation of the Shatt al Arab estuary, which forms a part of the boundary between the countries.

During the first week of January, the Iranian press was filled with horror stories of refugees pouring into the country from Iraq. The shah's regime claimed that 60,000 persons—about one-tenth of the Iranian population of Iraq—had been expelled.

The *New York Times* reported on January 9 that tens of thousands of refugees were clustered in tent communities just inside the Iranian border. The Iraqi government admitted

the expulsions, saying that the Iranians were security risks.

The shah evidently shared this view of the refugees. On the pretext that Iraqi agents were among the deported, the refugees were not permitted to enter the country until they had been cleared by Iranian authorities. Meanwhile they were stranded in the cold. This brutality is characteristic of both regimes.

U.S. imperialism has displayed a certain lack of confidence in the long-range prospects of the shah's attempts to "Persianize" the gulf. On December 23, the Nixon administration secretly signed an agreement with the newly independent government of Bahrain, providing for a permanent naval station on the island. Washington admitted the existence of the agreement only after it had been reported by the *New York Times*.

During his interview with the Swiss and American journalists, the shah objected to this agreement, and suggested that Nixon could safely leave the policing of the gulf to him. The trial and execution of Iranian oppositionists will presumably help to demonstrate to Nixon that the shah is a reliable cop. □

revolution that has been developing in Northern Ireland. Unlike many both of the ultraleft and "pure" Republican movement, she did not distinguish between the socialistic struggles in Paris and the immediate nationalist struggles of the workers and the minority of the six counties. She saw that they were not just isolated developments; she saw that the different forms of each masked the reality of permanent revolution. She joined Saor Eire because as a group it recognised this reality. Her activism, political sophistication and dedication were recognised by her comrades, who swiftly elected her to Saor Eire's central executive.

But she did not limit her understanding of permanent revolution to the purely national context. She saw that the only way to make Ireland socialist was in the struggle for the worldwide classless, stateless society. To this end in the last year of her life she contacted Irish members of the Fourth International and very notably the late Comrade Peter Graham, and she participated with them in preparing an Irish section of the Fourth International. Once again, such was her ability in this task that on Comrade Graham's treacherous assassination by reactionary elements, she was appointed as an official FI representative in Ireland. Her fatal illness prevented her from taking up this post, however.

One more point should be made too: in just over three months the FI in Ireland has suffered two serious blows. Two of its leading cadres have been eliminated. There are some philistines who feel that such blows will prove mortal. These people will be disappointed. Our losses, grievous though they are, are limited compared to the losses that have been suffered by revolutionaries in the past. The slaughters of the Paris Commune did not prevent the emergence of worldwide scientific socialism. The Republican movement in Ireland was not destroyed because of the murders of 1916 or of 1922. The murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg could not prevent the growth of German Communism, and the Trotskyist movement of the world has survived not only Trotsky's death and that of his son Sedov, but the murders of Trotskyists in and out of Russia. Compared to these facts we have got off lightly, and if our losses were twen-

Irish Revolutionists Mourn Comrade

[The following are excerpts from a speech given by Donald Rayner O'Connor Lysaght, a young Marxist Irish historian and revolutionist, in memory of his comrade Mairin Keegan, who died January 7 in Dublin. We have reprinted Lysaght's remarks from the January 24 issue of *The Red Mole*, a revolutionary-socialist newspaper published in London.]

* * *

Mairin's whole life is the story of political development from the pure idealistic form of nationalism, uncontaminated (as far as possible) by material considerations, to the position of a dedicated dialectical materialist.

She began and she always remained in the Gaelic League. Over many years, though, she became increasingly dissatisfied with the purely cultural and totally unpolitical outlook of this body in the 1950s. In 1962, however, she went to London, and it was here that she saw for herself consciously

the need for political and socialist activity if even her limited cultural aims were to be achieved. But not only this, she became more aware of the value of socialist aims in themselves. She began to examine the various left-wing movements of the time. She rejected in turn Clann na hEireann and the Connolly Association. It was only when she was about to retire from the struggle that she discovered and joined the Irish Workers Group. And it was from then onwards that she began to read, to analyse and to broaden her understanding of the issues involved.

She was not simply an armchair Marxist; she allied theory to action. In May 1968 in Paris she took part in the struggle of the workers and students which has opened the new era of working-class revolution. And in 1969, back in Ireland, as a member of the Dublin Citizens Committee and more importantly Saor Eire [Free Ireland], she gave aid to the national

ty times as great we would still survive.

I might conclude by wishing a long life to the FI but this would be con-

trary to that body's aims. It wants world revolution, and the world includes Ireland, as soon as possible. So I prophesy a short and success-

ful life to the FI and to Saor Eire. Let our enemies, which are those of the working class, beware. We are only just beginning. □

Finland

Elections Pave Way for New Popular Front

By Pekka Haapakoski

Helsinki

Although they produced little change in the relative strengths of the different parliamentary parties, the January 2-3 Finnish elections are likely to result in a new "popular front" government and to have a significant effect on the factional conflict within the Communist party.

The elections, the second in less than two years, were made necessary by the downfall at the end of October of the coalition between the Social Democrats and the parties of the bourgeois center. The seats won in the 200-member parliament by each party were as follows:

	1972	1970
SDP (Social Democrats)	55	52
SKDL (Communists)	37	36
KePu (Center)	35	36
Kokoomus (Conservatives)	34	37
SMP (Country party)	18	18
RKP (Swedish People's party)	10	12
LKP (Liberals)	7	8
SKL (Christian Alliance)	4	1
TPSL (Left Social Democrats)	0	0

The results thus showed a slight trend toward the left, with the working-class parties, the SDP and SKDL, strengthening their positions and the bourgeois parties, except for the SKL, losing votes.

One of the main reasons for this outcome, especially for the SDP's victory, was the conflict between the SDP and KePu over agricultural income. The SDP took a hard stand against the demands of agricultural producers for "parity"—that is, higher prices for agricultural goods.

The SDP built its whole electoral campaign around this issue, presenting itself as "the defender of the con-

sumers' living standard" and acting as though the main contradiction in Finnish society were between "consumers" in the cities and "producers" in the countryside. The SDP succeeded in this role so well that most urban "consumers" supported it solidly, forgetting the price increases the SDP had permitted while in the previous government. This result had been foreshadowed in November by the Social Democrats' unexpected victory in the elections in the Metalworkers' Union.

The SKDL [Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liito—Finnish People's Democratic League, the Communist party's electoral organization] won one additional seat, interrupting the downward trend it had suffered in the last three elections. This upturn occurred despite the worsening of the intraparty conflict during the past year, which led to the expulsion of the Tampere district organization of the SKDL in October. The election results will mean a slight strengthening of the party's "modernist" majority at the cost of the "Stalinist" minority.¹

As for the bourgeois parties, their campaigns were colorless and were overshadowed by the SDP-KePu dispute over agricultural prices.

Negotiations for a new coalition government have begun. The most probable alternative seems to be a new "popular front" consisting of the SDP, SKDL, and the bourgeois center (KePu, RKP, and LKP).

This would bring the SKDL back into the government after less than a year on the outside. It would also most probably mean an end to the intraparty conflict in the form of the suppression of the "Stalinist" minority

at the party conference this spring. Thus the final act in the long disintegration of the Finnish Communist party would not come as a big surprise.

Such a coalition government would also require the SDP and KePu to drop their dispute over agricultural prices.

The costs of a new "popular front" are not very attractive to any of the likely participants, but on the other hand, the stakes are also quite high.

The recession in the world capitalist economy has hit Finland hard. Unemployment is growing rapidly and firms are closing down almost daily.

The UKK agreement² comes to an end in March, and in the negotiations between the state, employers, and the union bureaucracy there has been discussion of "total agreements" lasting two to three years with wage increases that "would be bigger than increases in productivity." More antistrike legislation and new price rises are already being planned, and the Finnish monopolies are eager to work out their special association with the Common Market.

The accomplishment of these tasks requires a government in which "responsible" workers' parties participate in order to restrain their supporters.

From the standpoint of revolutionary socialism, these plans must be opposed in struggle. Some exemplary steps have already been taken by the workers of a paper factory at Simpele a few days after the election. When their employer decided to cut production, the workers first took over the machines and then closed down the whole factory. □

1. For more on the factional conflict in the Finnish Communist party, see "Finnish CP Divided in Face of Radicalization," *Intercontinental Press*, July 12, 1971, p. 664. —IP

2. An agreement on incomes policy initiated by President Urho Kallio in December 1970. —IP

The Life and Death of Amaury German Aristy

"The documents of the Amaury Germán Aristy group revealed by the police have put the attack on the Royal Bank of Canada in Naco in a different light," the Santo Domingo weekly *Ahora* wrote in its January 24 issue. "But they have not dissipated the pall of tragedy cast over the country by the search and destroy mission carried out against this group. . . ."

In the wake of public revulsion at the extermination of a small band of "guerrillas" January 12 by combined police and military forces numbering hundreds of men and equipped with planes, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, the Dominican authorities are trying to justify their massive use of force.

With this aim, apparently, the police command handed a number of documents over to the press. One was a long letter allegedly written to Cuba by Amaury Germán Aristy, the leader of the group destroyed in the military operation. It described plans for setting up an armed movement in the Dominican Republic similar to the original July 26 Movement in Cuba.

The letter described the group's origin in this way:

"Our organization was formed in 1967 as the result of a decision by leading compañeros in the Palmeros group, who were working in the June 14 Movement. We decided willingly and on a personal basis to devote ourselves to building a new revolutionary movement under the leadership of compañero Román.

"This decision was not made hastily or emotionally. It arose from the political line we embraced that there was a historic need for beginning revolutionary war in the Dominican Republic. Some of the compañeros of the Palmeros group did arrive in that country [Cuba?] without a clear and correct appreciation of the need for war and with their heads full of ideas about a party, ideological struggle, international polemics, and so on. But another group, the one that came with Gerardo, brought with them from our country already not only a war line that had been established as the official policy of the June 14 Movement,

but also concrete plans for initiating combat."

The authorities claimed that complaints in the letter about insufficient Cuban financial support were evidence that the group needed to assault banks to get the money needed to carry on guerrilla warfare.

"Román repeated that he had not gotten the rest of the \$50,000 from the Cubans because of the amount of aid they sent to Peru for earthquake relief," the alleged letter said. It also noted that former president Juan Bosch had told the young men involved that they would get no aid from the Cubans because the latter



AMAURY GERMAN ARISTY, slain in Dominican army's "search and destroy" mission.

were no longer able to assist armed struggles in Latin America.

In an interview in the January 24 *Ahora*, police commander General Nivar Seijas argued: "I think it has been proven that we were not fighting innocent lambs or defenseless citizens but perfectly trained and disciplined guerrillas, who were well armed and ready for anything. The final developments proved this."

By this last statement Nivar Seijas was apparently referring to the fact that eight members of the repressive forces were killed and that two of the six youths got away. The gen-

eral was sensitive to charges that American military personnel and equipment were involved in the battle. "I want it to be known that I will never call for any foreign intervention to solve a domestic problem." Finally, the head of the Dominican police promised to end the massive intimidation of the population that accompanied his "search and destroy" mission.

It does not seem likely, however, that the general's assurances and allegations will quiet the outrage over the mid-January incidents. The life of the twenty-three-year-old leader of the slaughtered youths was itself testimony to too much "foreign intervention" in the past.

"When Amaury came to Santo Domingo," Luis Eduardo Lora wrote in the January 24 *Ahora*, "he was barely eleven years old. But he was already grown up and joined the struggle against Trujillo [the dictator set up by the American marines] in 1960." At the age of thirteen, the young revolutionist met the girl who later became his wife. Now his widow, Sagrario Bujosa Mieses recalled: "He already had an adult attitude. At that time, when there was a great lack of revolutionary theory, he stood out as one of the most profound thinkers among the young people of his age."

Amaury was one of the founders of the UER [Unión de Estudiantes Revolucionarios—Union of Revolutionary Students], and participated in the struggles against the military coup that overthrew the elected president Juan Bosch in 1965.

"At the age of only sixteen," Lora continued, "Amaury fought with outstanding bravery against the American forces that invaded the country [in April 1965]. He distinguished himself particularly in the unsuccessful assault on the Palacio Nacional, which was led by comandantes Juan Miguel Román and Tomás Fernández Domínguez, who died in action.

"When all was already lost, Amaury did not take cover but tried to rescue Euclides Morillo, who fell in the fight. In that battle Amaury was wounded for the first time.

"Despite his bullet wounds, Amaury

survived and only a few days later was back on his feet fighting the invading forces of the United States."

Because of the repression, which has been in force since the American invasion, the young revolutionist expected to die a violent death: "Our philosophy," he wrote to his wife, "compels us to take an objective attitude toward life, and therefore we must realize that in the present conditions . . . we must give up any notion of dying of old age in our beds. . . ."

"But I am a superoptimist and a 'chronic adventurer' because I have a premonition that when all is said

and done, it will be my fate to die in my old age—maybe because of an excess of senile passion for an octogenarian wife who is bound to stay as maddening as she is today—even though I do not want to miss a single battle fought by our people on its road to victory."

Amaury's young widow described him as "a model son and brother, a devoted and faithful husband, affectionate toward children, and extremely sensitive to the suffering of the poor." *Ahora* carried many pictures of the dead leader playing with his infant daughter. □

at the university, wore bandages. They chanted "biladi, biladi" (my country, my country) and "Free our comrades!" (a reference to those seized by police at the campus). Students said that 1,500 were arrested during the day's events. The regime conceded that there were 1,000 in jail.

At 2:30 came a new charge by soldiers. Pouring out of trucks, they launched tear gas grenades, until the whole square was covered by a dense cloud. The students were forced to retreat. They broke into small groups on the side streets, and a new slogan was raised: "To the Abdine Palace!" (The palace is Sadat's residence.)

It was hours before the demonstrators were finally quelled by overwhelming force. At the end of the day, Sadat banned all demonstrations in the capital.

In the past, the Cairo student movement has confronted the regime, even violently. What made this battle unusual was the fact that it was not undertaken in haste, after police repression of a single demonstration, but evolved during a week of sustained mass activity and organization.

On January 13 Sadat made a television speech in which he sought to explain the fact that the "year of decision" for war or peace with Israel had passed without any decision being made. On January 16 he announced the formation of a new cabinet, declaring that its purpose was to organize the home front for war. He attacked U. S.-Israeli collusion and made the usual noises about military action to reclaim the territory occupied by Israel since 1967. He called the new government the "confrontation cabinet."

When it comes to saying one thing and doing another, Sadat is a close rival to Nixon. When Nixon says "peace," the world expects war. When Sadat swore in a cabinet that was to prepare for "war," the January 18 *Le Monde* featured a page-one headline reading: "The new Egyptian government seems to be oriented toward the search for peace."

An analysis of the new cabinet shows that, far from embarking on a confrontation policy, Sadat has intensified his policy of "peaceful negotiation." In this context, the rhetoric about war is simply a means of persuading the Egyptian people to accept new economic hardships aimed

Unions Reported Ready to Join Demonstrators

The Student Challenge to Sadat

By Jon Rothschild

On January 24 the Egyptian general staff won its first battle in twenty-five years. But unfortunately for the Egyptian and Arab masses, the combat took place in Cairo, not in the Sinai desert; and the victims were students from Cairo's two leading universities, not Zionist occupying troops.

The confrontation was described by the Paris daily *Le Monde* as the first day of rioting in Cairo since Anwar el-Sadat's accession to power in 1970. But of more significance was the fact that the Egyptian student movement had, for the first time in at least five years, acted in a concerted and well-organized manner to challenge the rightist drift of the Egyptian government.

On the morning of January 24 Sadat sent police and soldiers to the campus of Guizh University (called Cairo University) to dislodge about 1,500 students who on January 19 had occupied the Gamal Abdel Nasser amphitheater in protest against Sadat's failure to effectively oppose Israeli aggression. In so doing, the Egyptian president "threw down the gauntlet to the youth, most of whom had displayed a great amount of moderation up to then," according to *Le Monde's* correspondent Roland Delcour.

Armed security forces occupied most

of the campus and attacked the students in the amphitheater. Cordons of soldiers armed with clubs and shields, supported by similarly equipped Cairo police, encircled the university. The first major clashes took place on a bridge over the Nile. Connecting Roda Island to the left bank of the river, the bridge provides the most direct route from the campus to the center of the city.

The cops assaulted some students who tried to cross the police barricades and cleared many others off the bridge by force.

The students regrouped, took to other bridges, and headed for the downtown area. By noon they reached the central plaza, Liberation Square. Several thousand students crowded around a huge pedestal. (The pedestal was put up to support a mammoth statue of Nasser, not yet completed. Meanwhile the pedestal serves as a ready-made speakers' platform for mass rallies.)

Seizing control of the square, the students erected metal barricades and stopped traffic. Speakers, both young men and women, mounted the pedestal as files of young people converged from adjacent side streets.

In an effort to retake the square, soldiers launched tear gas, but the students held their ground. Many of them, already wounded in the fighting

at enriching the Egyptian bourgeoisie.

The new premier is Aziz Sidky, son of a pasha. In the 1950s he was Nasser's minister of industrialization. Known as a rank opportunist, Sidky represents the technocratic layer of the Egyptian bureaucracy. He was educated in the United States and is notoriously pro-American. Last May 13, he was the first major Egyptian leader to denounce the left-Nasserite Ali Sabry group as traitors. (Sabry and many others were charged with having conspired against the Sadat regime.)

According to the January 18 *Le Monde*, "Many Egyptians, notably the new and old bourgeoisie, . . . see him [Sidky] as a man well qualified to lead Sadat's liberalization policies to their ultimate conclusion with respect to private initiatives and investment of foreign capital."

Another cabinet shift was the replacement of Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad, who has been hostile to the U. S. plan for a partial settlement with Israel. Mourad Ghaleb, the new foreign affairs minister, has been in charge of liaison with the Soviet Union. He had also led the negotiations last October and November with U. S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco.

The combination of "a technician of economic affairs and a technician of foreign affairs" was interpreted by most Egyptians as a sign that Sadat wants to maintain the cease-fire on the Suez Canal front and pursue the objective of a Middle East peace settlement, according to *Le Monde's* correspondent.

Sayed Marei, a rich landowner, was named as general secretary of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the country's single legal political party.

The new government immediately released, amid exhortations to the people about "belt-tightening," a ten-year economic development plan that called for a large increase in both Soviet assistance and foreign investment. In a speech to the National Assembly, Sidky vowed to punish "slackers," an apparent reference to the trade-union movement, and demanded "blood and sweat" from the Egyptian population.

The message was clear: the regime was demanding that the Egyptian workers and peasants sacrifice their economic aspirations to a nonexistent struggle against Israeli occupation. Resistance to belt-tightening, which

has already appeared among sections of the working class, will doubtless be designated as treasonous Zionist subversion. The government will again use the people's desire for a real fight against Zionism to convince them to back a regime that has no intention of combating the state of Israel.

The students were not long in responding to Sadat. Since the beginning of the year, campus meetings had been held to demand a real policy of confrontation with Israel. Resolutions had been passed by the medical students at Guizeh University, for example, but press censorship prevent-



SIDKY: Considers "blood and sweat" of workers attractive to foreign investors.

ed their publication. On January 19 the student movement turned to mass action.

The Nasser amphitheater at Guizeh was occupied by several thousand students. Representatives from other universities and schools in Cairo converged on Guizeh. At a mass meeting, the students put forth several demands: that there be a military confrontation with Israel; that students be given effective military training; that U.S. interests in the Arab world be nationalized. It was also demanded that Marei be dismissed as general secretary of the ASU. The walls of the campus were covered with sarcastic slogans about Sadat's regime.

Marei agreed to meet with an elected

group of fourteen students to discuss the demands.

On January 20 the students, still occupying the amphitheater, asked that Sadat himself come to explain his policies to them. They vowed to remain in the building until this demand was accepted, and threatened to go on a hunger strike.

Marei, incapable of answering the students, cut off the negotiations. The demands then began to escalate.

Finally, the government's inaction enabled leftist students to convince the majority of the meeting that more than a simple dialogue with the regime was necessary. Toward the end of the day, a series of fifteen resolutions were adopted by the assembled students.

The resolutions amounted to a comprehensive attack on the foreign and domestic policies of the Sadat government. They called upon the regime to reject the November 22, 1967, United Nations resolution on the Middle East conflict, which has been the basis of all negotiations aimed at selling out the Palestinians; reject the Rogers plan and terminate all Egyptian initiatives on the opening of the Suez Canal; mobilize the home front; institute a real military training program for students; guarantee free expression on campus; free the Palestinians arrested for assassinating Jordanian Premier Wasfi Tal; lift all press censorship and bring charges against editors who have distorted the truth; eliminate the practice of running single slates of candidates in elections; free the steelworkers who were arrested for striking at Helwan; break diplomatic relations with Jordan; support all Palestinian resistance organizations and recognize the right of students to join them; and take a definitive stand against the Iranian government.

The students then demanded that Sadat personally appear to respond to these resolutions and answer some questions about his policies.

The demand that U. S. corporations be nationalized was reiterated. This was rejected by Mourad Ghaleb as "illogical." (It should be pointed out that Sadat had declared on January 19 that "a state of war" exists between the United States and the Arab people. This would be the first war in which any action against the enemy's economic interests in one's own country is considered illogical. It is an especially instructive lesson in the rigors of war, Sadat-style.)

The following day, January 21, an attempt was made to reverse the demand that Sadat appear in person. The dean of the polytechnic institute convinced the students, over the objections of leftists, to simply "invite" Sadat to appear, and to reaffirm their "esteem for his person."

But, a significant sign of the resiliency of the protest, on January 22 the students, still holding the amphitheater, decided to march downtown. The emphasis in the demands was shifted to the question of press censorship, which had prevented the public from learning about the student protest. A massive show of police force made the students defer the march.

On January 23 Sadat sent Sayed Fuad Abu Hamal, president of the National Assembly, to negotiate with the students. He promised that the Assembly would recognize the students' committee.

But by this time the students had had enough of promises. Even the less militant students had lost all confidence in the regime. "We want answers to our questions. So long as we do not receive them, we will continue our movement in one form or another, even after the vacations. This done, we are certain to become the spokesmen for the majority of our people." Thus, according to the January 25 *Le Monde*, the "most cool-headed" students expressed themselves.

Until January 23 Sadat had played a waiting game with the protesters, evidently hoping that the movement would peter out by January 25, when vacations were scheduled to start. The fact that he sent high-ranking government officials to try to quiet the students demonstrates that he realized the potential explosiveness of their action. But by the morning of January 24, the students had shown unprecedented staying-power. The police and the army were ordered in, and the battle was on.

The night of the clash, the Egyptian press association expressed support for the students. It was the first explicit statement of solidarity from a noncampus sector of the population. But the fact that the majority of the people favor the students' demands is beyond doubt. The January 26 *Christian Science Monitor* reported: "Travelers from Cairo said labor leaders in the Helwan steel works, the Nile Delta textile mills, and

other big industrial centers were ready to join the student revolt."

Sadat closed Cairo's universities on January 24. They will not reopen for three weeks. He thus hopes to defuse student activism. But Eric Rouleau noted in the January 26 *Le Monde*, "The student agitation may cool off during the vacations, but it strongly threatens to reappear. More serious, it threatens to spread to other sectors of opinion, particularly the army, where discontent is said to be on the rise."

Unlike the Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq, the Nasser government was able to create a certain mass base for itself. The Egyptian industrialization program was more successful than any in the Arab world. The Nasser-Sadat policy of fostering capitalist development through the vigorous intervention of the army and government bureaucracy has given rise to the largest and most politically conscious trade-union movement in the Arab world. The Egyptian student

movement bears a closer relationship to that of Western Europe than any in the colonial world.

Consequently, it is considerably more difficult for Sadat to effect a major turn to the right than for the other Arab regimes in the area, which do not have to reckon with organized and politically sophisticated masses.

Sadat's domestic and foreign policies have now been challenged by both the trade-union and student movements. The high degree of organization and combativity shown by the students during the week of confrontation, their determination to forge links with the Egyptian workers, and the character of their demands all represent critical challenges to the Sadat government.

A decisive test of strength appears to have been postponed, but the possibility remains that Sadat may see his dream of a modern capitalist Egypt come true in nightmare fashion: an Egypt as "modern" as France was in May of 1968. □

Protest Repression in Northern Ireland

By Frank Manning

[The following article is reprinted from the February 11 issue of *The Militant*, published in New York.]

* * *

New York

When the Regimental Band, Pipes, Drums, and Dancers of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II's Scots Guards performed at Madison Square Garden here January 22 and 23, they were met by significant protests.

The demonstration January 22 drew 500 people, despite freezing temperatures and a driving rain. Twenty-five hundred people took part in the following day's march and rally, the largest ever held in the U. S. against British repression in Northern Ireland.

The actions were organized by the National Association for Irish Freedom (NAIF); the Irish Republican Clubs, USA and Canada (IRC); and the Northern Aid Committee. NAIF is a U. S. support-group of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), which has organized mass

civil-rights demonstrations in Northern Ireland the past several years and is currently coordinating the mass civil-disobedience campaign against British repression there. The IRC is the North American support-group of the Official Irish Republican Army and Sinn Féin movement. The Northern Aid Committee is the U. S. support-group of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and Sinn Féin movement.

Speakers at the January 23 rally included Ivan Barr, chairman of NICRA; Mary Cotter and John Keane, joint general secretaries of the IRC; and Representative Edward Koch (Democrat—New York). An earlier rally by the Northern Aid Committee featured Representative Mario Biaggi (Democrat—New York).

Both Koch and Biaggi urged demonstrators to write letters to their representatives about the sad conditions in Northern Ireland. Barr, Cotter, and Keane called for continued mass demonstrations in the streets, both in the U. S. and in Northern Ireland, as the most effective way to mobilize mass sentiment against British repression. □

Unionist Regime Moves Against Belfast Rent Strike

By Gerry Foley

After months of sensationalistic stories of "IRA terrorism," the American capitalist press has begun to take account of the mass struggle against the repressive system in the imperialist enclave of Northern Ireland.

"Mrs. McCann is one of thousands of Catholics who are withholding their rent as part of a campaign of civil disobedience that has slowly and quietly gained momentum since last August," *New York Times* correspondent Bernard Weinraub wrote January 20 from Belfast.

"Gas and electricity payments are also being withheld. Catholics have withdrawn from local government and a series of mass marches have been held to protest the government's policy of interning Roman Catholics without trial on suspicion of terrorism. . . .

"The campaign is beginning to bite into Ulster's economy. The rent strike—in public housing in the working-class districts of Belfast, Londonderry, Strabane and Newry—is costing housing authorities about \$150,000 a week, and arrears now add up to more than \$1.5-million. . . .

"In Londonderry the authorities are being harassed with requests for 'lost' medical cards and other records. Gas, electricity and telephone bills have not been paid for five months, but so far there has been no threat to turn off the facilities.

"'They can't very well turn them off because the companies are afraid to send men into Catholic areas,' said Seamus McAlister, an elderly official of the Civil Rights Association."

The ultrarightist Protestant leader, the Reverend Ian Paisley, was somewhat quicker than the *New York Times* in recognizing the threat the rent strike posed to the Northern Ireland system. In debate in the Belfast parliament October 5, 1971, he said:

"This campaign will do more to erode the foundations of our state and in many ways it is more serious than the campaign of the terrorists, because it is an easy way to engage in a campaign against the Government. In fact,

you just have to keep your money. You don't go out and throw stones, you don't blow up installations and you have no blood on your hands. You simply keep your money, and this will bring thousands to the ranks of those who want to bring down this state by subversion."

Although running the civil disobedience campaign apparently seems a diabolically easy strategy to Paisley, it is no simple task. To maintain these rebellious actions in face of the pressures that bear on the nationalist community requires a high degree of conscious political education and organization. A divided nationalist minority must be mobilized and convinced that they can win, despite the fanaticism of the Protestant majority, the power of the British army, and the connivance of the Dublin government in their oppression.

Moreover, under the conditions of military occupation and massive repressive terror in Northern Ireland, all forms of political communication and organization become extremely difficult. Anyone caught painting slogans or even putting up leaflets in the Belfast ghettos is subject to being dragged off to an "interrogation" center and from there to a concentration camp.

In its year-end statement, the Official Irish Republican Army (IRA) stressed that the repression was aimed primarily against popular organization:

"The introduction of internment on August 9th had a twofold purpose:

"1. To further escalate the terror against the people designed to provoke more armed conflict;

"2. To remove the political control which guided the people's resistance and continually thwarted the establishment's plans and leave the compromisers to take over the political leadership of the people.

"Republican Clubs, socialist organizations and the Civil Rights Movement have suffered far more from internment than have the Units of the

Irish Republican Army which have greatly increased in strength since August 9."

The political vanguard in the nationalist areas, on the other hand, has the advantage that centuries of combat have deeply rooted many of the basic techniques of mass struggle in the consciousness of the Irish people. Probably the first militant mass movements of modern times arose in Ireland, and the Irish people have never ceased to put this organizational experience to use.

An illustration of this relative political sophistication of the Irish people was given on January 1, 1972, when the civil rights movement went back on the streets, defying the official ban on marches, threats by ultrarightists, and intimidation by the imperialist troops.

The January issue of the *United Irishman*, organ of the official Sinn Féin, explained how this was accomplished:

"The military thugs who have been given licence to stalk the streets of Belfast and the North made every effort possible on their part to turn this peaceful, disciplined and orderly parade into a riot. Repeatedly they drove armoured cars into the crowd, jeered and shouted obscenities at the marchers. But the people held firm. The stewards did a wonderful job, but the ordinary people themselves fully realised the great importance of not responding to the military's provocation. When the armoured cars were driven into the crowd, the people broke ranks and reformed on the other side. A superb display of what is meant by genuine passive resistance.

"The march was held in contravention of Stormont's ban on marches, but the route was carefully chosen to avoid all flash point areas. The military therefore had no excuse for their peevish behaviour. Once more it has been illustrated that Westminster is not interested in genuine solutions to the Northern problem. The

British government has consistently opposed the introduction of democracy to the North, and has confined itself to mumblings about a military solution. But Britain can have no military solution so long as the people display the massive solidarity shown in this civil rights march."

A little more than two weeks after this march, the Northern Ireland regime braved right-wing Protestant objections to extend the ban on parades for another year, including the period of the traditional Orange marches in July and August.

Furthermore, the Unionist government adopted repressive legislation for victimizing participants in the economic strike.

"Faced with this wholesale refusal [to pay taxes and rents], the Unionists have had to abandon the normal process of enforcing payments," Kevin Boyle wrote in the December 9 *Irish Times*. "Instead they pushed through Stormont, with only the Democratic Unionist Party [the Paisleyites] there to object, the Payment for Debt (Emergency Powers) Act. This measure, which has already been dubbed (by Professor Peter Townsend of the Child Poverty Action Group) the 'worst piece of social legislation passed in the United Kingdom this century,' has all the crude simplicity of a totalitarian decree."

The new law empowers the state to deduct all payments due from government grants to individuals and families, such as unemployment checks, family allowances, sickness benefits, pensions, and even death grants. Both public bodies and private businesses are entitled to collect debts in this way. Furthermore, the act is retroactive, covering debts accruing since last April 1.

The administrative difficulties of collecting debts this way, Boyle notes, make it unlikely that the law can solve the economic problems posed by the strike. But it does provide a means for intimidating and victimizing the poorest section of the Catholic community. "The truth about Northern Ireland is that the place has not suffered sufficiently yet," the *Economist*, that arrogant voice of British imperialism, wrote in its January 15 issue.

In principle, the government can take all benefits a person receives to make up the rent and arrears owed

since August. In practice, orders seem to have been given to deduct the rent money for the week, and an amount of arrears depending on the category of the recipient.

"If the person is unemployed and on the standard rate of benefit, the maximum to be taken for the arrears is £1.50 per week," Boyle wrote. "If the person has an earnings-related supplement, i. e., not the standard rate of benefit, up to £3.50 can be taken as arrears. If he is employed, then the amount taken is the weekly rent and arrears up to £2.

"It is obvious that people either on supplementary benefit or low wages are going to be in severe straits as a result of these deductions. The supplementary benefit allowance is taken as the official poverty line, and the effect of this Act will be to put many thousands of families below that line throughout this winter. . . .

"Indeed, hardship is guaranteed by one provision in the Debt Act which declares that no exceptional needs grants will normally be paid to a rent defaulter. That has already been administratively interpreted as meaning no payments at all, and there is no appeal against a refusal."

Boyle noted that this act was passed following an "unprecedented publicity campaign . . . to cajole people out of the strike," which "produced negligible results."

The act was obviously intended to reopen the divisions in the nationalist community that were closed by the almost universal revulsion at the introduction of the concentration camp system on August 9, 1971.

There are indications that the attempt to divide the nationalist community is having some effect. ". . . it is the poorest and most defenceless section, the unemployed, which is feeling the Government bite, and in Derry there are rumblings of anger from them that the situation was never fully explained," Nell McCafferty wrote in the December 8 issue of the Dublin daily *Irish Times*.

The main point of McCafferty's article was praise for a "new strategy" in the rent strike.

"The arrival in Derry last week of Mr. Des O'Donnell of the Andersonstown Civil Resistance Committee, Belfast, emphasised a shift in the Derry political situation. Mr. O'Donnell came to speak to a private meeting of members and friends of the Social Demo-

cratic and Labour party on the method adopted by his committee in the campaign against internment, especially, against the Stormont regime in general."

This method, McCafferty went on to explain, was to advise the people "to hold onto their withheld rent money in anticipation of such Government measures as are now being effected."

The *Irish Times* reporter suggested very strongly that O'Donnell had come to save the situation from the incompetence of the Official IRA, which has been the main militant political force in the area:

"His [O'Donnell's] arrival was not before time. It had become increasingly obvious in Derry that it was the community which was protecting the I. R. A. and not vice versa. Despite the recent spate of bombings, all of which occurred outside the Bogside area, I. R. A. strength is such that British troops have been able to make several incursions into the Bogside-Brandywell area to conduct searches and make arrests. Resistance to them has been minimal and largely confined to stone-throwing, rattling of binlids and sporadic, ineffective shooting.

"Mr. O'Donnell's arrival coincided with the fact that Government measures under emergency legislation to retrieve moneys due them for rent and rates are beginning to have effect. Family allowance books are being called in, for example, and dole money is being attacked at the source."

The question of whether or not the withheld rent money should be set aside and saved is an important problem in the strategy of the civil disobedience campaign. The moderate and middle-class Catholic nationalists have called for putting the money in escrow. The Official republicans have opposed this on the grounds that if the government knew it could recover the withheld rent, the strike would lose all effectiveness.

Furthermore, the republicans feel that a total refusal to pay rent and state charges challenges the basis of capitalism, thereby offering a means of mobilizing the oppressed people for an assault on the system that holds both parts of Ireland in subjection.

There is every indication that the Official republicans, who represent the largest socialist organization in Ireland, are facing a crucial political test. □

Background to the Political Situation in Burma

[The following answers to three questions about the political situation in Burma were given by Ba Pe, a young revolutionary-socialist intellectual in Rangoon. The answers, dated September 1, 1971, were delayed in transit.]

* * *

Question. What is the nature of the present Burmese regime?

Answer. The "socialist" regime of General Ne Win, imposed by military coup in 1962, reflects the aspirations of the privileged military elite that emerged during and after the anti-imperialist struggle. To understand the politics of the present regime, it is necessary to review the country's political history since the second world war.

In 1942 the Japanese imperialists occupied Rangoon and established an "independent" regime. Numbers of young anti-imperialists, exemplified by the "Thirty Comrades" (including Ne Win), visited Japan for military training.

By 1944, however, it became apparent that Japanese intent in Burma was no less imperialist than the British, and the Japan-trained nationalist fighters took the initiative in organizing an anti-imperialist offensive around the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), a left-oriented coalition dominated by Social Democrats and Communists, and its military arm, the People's Volunteer Organization (PVO) led by Aung San. In 1945 the PVO contributed decisively to the defeat of the Japanese, and Aung San and his associates opened negotiations with the British on the question of Burmese independence.

At this time, however, the Burmese masses exceeded by very far the perspectives of the Aung San leadership, and 1945-47 saw the growth of a mass peasant movement, demanding and often expropriating land.

In 1946 Thakin Soe, the most prominent Burmese Communist, led a minority of the Communist party out of the AFPFL (the so-called Red Flag communists) and called for a socialist revolution. In 1947 Aung San was assassinated by agents of a petty-bourgeois rival, and Thakin Nu was appointed to succeed him as head of government. Late that year Nu concluded an agreement with Clement Attlee for formal Burmese independence; and independence, outside the British Commonwealth, was proclaimed in January 1948.

Meanwhile the mass peasant movement had been augmented by the dissidence of national minority peoples (Karens, Kachins, Shans, Chins, etc., making up some 18 percent of the population) fearful of domination by the ethnic Burmans, and widespread disaffection with the Nu gov-

ernment among PVO veterans. In April 1948 the majority of the Communist party, the so-called White Flags led by Thakin Than Tun, broke with the Nu regime and reiterated Thakin Soe's call for revolution.

Within months the Communists, the disaffected PVO, and such national-minority organizations as the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) had taken up armed struggle, supported by the great majority of the Burmese masses. At first the insurgents enjoyed extensive success, and in 1949 they took Mandalay and proclaimed a provisional government around the National Democratic United Front (NDUF), including representatives of nearly all the minorities. Too, the insurgents were indirectly aided by the pre-occupation of the Nu regime's forces with the invasion of Northern Burma by refugees from the defeated Chinese Kuomintang armies.

But notwithstanding early successes, the NDUF fell short of victory: sectarian bickerings, the unreliability of many PVO supporters of the insurgents (who often had joined the insurgents opportunistically and deserted at the first setbacks), and the demagoguery of the Nu regime tended to sap the NDUF's potential.

On the other hand, neither has the regime been capable of an effective establishment of "order" in large areas of the country; many parts of Burma and most of the minority areas remain under insurgent control.

The Nu regime's demagogic maneuvers, combining a massive wave of religious parochialism with the Pyidawtha or "Welfare State" plan, fostered an enormous, sluggish bureaucracy, which in turn spawned intrigues between various factions among the privileged elite, culminating in a split in the AFPFL in 1958.

As a result of the combat of rival privileged factions, Nu called upon General Ne Win, commander of the armed forces since 1949 and coordinator of anti-insurgency campaigns, to establish a "caretaker" regime until elections in 1960. Although the elections returned Nu's faction (renamed the Pyidaungsu or Union party) to power, intrigue between the civilian and military wings of the political elite brought about, in 1962, the coup, and full military control over the state structure.

The first statements of General Ne Win's "revolutionary council" in 1962 promised a genuinely socialist regime, 100 percent expropriation, an end to excessive bureaucracy, the total suppression of the insurgents, and integration of the national minorities into the state. In practice, the new regime's first major political move was a military attack on a student demonstration at Rangoon University, in which seventeen students were killed and thirty-

eight wounded, and the student union building blown up.

A little later the generals announced the foundation of the Burma Socialist Program party (Lanzin party), and published *The Burmese Way to Socialism*, an incoherent concoction of nationalist "neutralist" rhetoric and schemes toward socialism in one country. A program of expropriation of foreign properties was introduced, and large numbers of petty bourgeois of Indian ethnicity were repatriated. Moves toward a cease-fire with the insurgents were undertaken, and were largely inconclusive except among some Karen nationalists.

In 1964 all political activity outside the Lanzin party was proscribed, and the press was put under strict government control. Since then the regime has moved to establish organs of popular pseudo-democracy, "workers' councils" whose essential function is to strangle the initiative of the masses, and has carried out fanciful "rural development" programs, including the arming of "reliable elements" to combat the influence of the insurgents. The essential role of all such puppetry is, of course, to subordinate the will of the masses to the interests of the privileged elite.

In foreign policy Ne Win has maintained Nu's rather sinuous neutralist line, although "anti-Chinese" riots in 1967, in which a Chinese technician was murdered, provoked a clash with Mao's government that has since been amended.

Ne Win's own career, from the voyage of the "Thirty Comrades," through Nu's anti-insurgency command, to the 1962 coup, reflects the growth of a military caste, acting, notwithstanding its socialist rhetoric, only to preserve its privileged position. The publication of the "new" Lanzin program (entitled *The Correlation of Man and His Environment*) and the transformation of the Lanzin, during the past July's First Party Congress, "from a Cadre Party to a People's Party," like all the programs of the bureaucrats, can only work to maintain the privileged caste and further alienate it from the masses.

Q. What is the status of the opposition?

A. In discussing the development of the postindependence opposition, we must keep in mind the militant character of the anti-imperialist movement as a whole and the widespread influence of socialist ideas. Gandhists were without much influence in the development of our anti-imperialist movement, and from its start the AFPFL was dominated by its Social Democrat and Communist members. Today, the only serious alternatives to the various factions of the elite are explicitly

Marxist forces, which, too, are supported by the masses.

The Communist party was founded in the later 1930s by a group of intellectuals who had been active in the student movement and among other sectors of the independence movement.

Most of the early Communists were Thakins. The Thakins had emerged in the earlier years of the 1930s as the most youthful and energetic anti-imperialists, in contrast to the small minority of "nationalist" politicians forever dickered over shabby and shady deals with the British and the local imperial bureaucrats.

The Thakins took their name from the title *thakin* (lord), which until this time had been reserved for addressing the British. Many of the earliest assertions of our anti-imperialist spirit took cultural forms of this type among the Rangoon students and intellectuals.

It has often been commented that young nationalist students would attend classes at Rangoon University and deliberately affect the rude, bumptious manner ascribed by the British to the rural Burman: talking loudly, dressing in a self-consciously peasant fashion, and refusing to speak English well. But at the same time the young nationalists spoke and read English excellently, and absorbed a great deal of socialist and revolutionary doctrine circulated in the various outposts of the empire.

So the Communist party began among these young nationalists; and particularly during the anti-imperialist war their socialist ideas were welcomed by the peasant masses.

The first split in the Communist party occurred in 1946, when Thakin Soe, the founder of the party, broke away from the AFPFL and issued a call for socialist revolution. In 1948 his call was supported by the majority of the Communists, led by Thakin Than Tun.

Soe's group was called the "Red Flags," and Than Tun's the "White Flags." The "White Flags" were the strongest by far. A small number of Communists remained with the AFPFL and supported the Nu government; it was called the Burma Workers and Peasants party, and most of its cadre have been integrated into the Lanzin.

Thakin Soe's "Red Flags" have been called Trotskyists, but this is a misnomer. From the beginning Thakin Soe criticized the opportunism of the Communists who collaborated with the AFPFL after 1946, and he later criticized Soviet revisionism as well as Mao's failure to extend the revolution throughout the continent.

But Thakin Soe maintained the cult around Stalin, and one would doubt whether, after so long an isolation in the Burmese jungle, he has much acquaintance with the activities of the Trotskyists in other countries, not to say the ideas of Trotsky himself.

In those sectors of the country that the "Red Flags" controlled during the early period of the anti-Nu insurgency, they alienated many of their peasant supporters by the harshness of their attempts to impose immediate communism, particularly by their attacks on *phongyis*

(Buddhist monks) and their summary executions.

To their credit, of course, is the fact that they alone, among all the Burmese "socialists," have consistently fought for the equality of the sexes. Since the early 1950s the "Red Flags" have steadily declined, and today they are no more than a tiny, isolated sect in arms, a cult around Thakin Soe, although occasional forays against government forces keep them in the public mind.

The "White Flags" have maintained a large amount of influence in the country, especially in the minority areas, but have been critically weakened by two con-



NE WIN

tinuous phenomena. The first is the defection of many PVO supporters of the insurgency to the government side, to the extent that the government's current anti-insurgency program is directed by ex-PVO insurgents, at least in the military sector. The other is the shifting fortunes of Burmese-Chinese relations.

Ours was the first non-Communist country to recognize Mao's regime in 1949, and Mao and Nu maintained close, amicable diplomatic and economic relations.

During this period the "White Flags" were naturally discomfited by this set of affairs. In the late 1940s the line of the East Asian Communist movement was for armed insurrections everywhere, and notable revolutionary conflicts occurred in Burma, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya as well as, of course, Vietnam.

Outside Vietnam the Burmese insurgent movement was the only one even moderately successful, largely, of course, because the government (unlike in Malaya and the Philippines) did not have suf-

ficient military force on hand, and was unwilling to obtain the same from the U.S. or the British. But the government was able to use its good relations with the Chinese to brand the "White Flags" mere bandits.

The Ne Win government remained true to Nu's neutralism and kept up good relations with Mao's government until 1967, when riots broke out against the Chinese petty bourgeoisie in Rangoon, and a Chinese was killed. The regime then banned all overt expression of Chinese nationalism, including the wearing of Mao buttons and selling of the "Red Book."

The Mao government has a protectionist policy regarding the Chinese petty bourgeoisie in most of Southeast Asia, and it denounced Ne Win's regime as "fascist" and announced its support for the "White Flags." It appears that the Chinese began sending arms into "White Flag"-held regions of Burma, and that a cadre of Burmans who had lived in China for many years joined the "White Flags."

Later in 1967 a massive and extremely bloody Maoist purge erupted in the "White Flags," with many veteran comrades executed and assassinated for an assortment of chimerical doctrinal "crimes" against Mao's "thought." One cannot too often repeat that many of the victims of the purge had spent their whole lives in the Communist movement, and had spent many years under the most hazardous conditions in the insurgency.

The climax of all this carnage was the assassination of Thakin Than Tun himself, apparently by a young insurgent scheduled to be purged. The bloody terror in the "White Flags" has further contributed to the defection of many supporters to the government's side.

Today, although the "White Flags" maintain control in many parts of the country, particularly the minority regions, they are at their lowest ebb since 1949. Undoubtedly the cruelest blow, and one which will precipitate a major crisis within the "White Flag" movement, is the recent resumption of relations between Ne Win and the Chinese regime, and the announcement by the Chinese government that "revolution is not for export."

The third portion of the Communist movement, those who stayed within the AFPFL after 1948, broke with Nu during the Korean war over the issue of Nu's support for the "U. N. police action" and the maintenance of relations with the South Korean regime, forming the Burma Workers and Peasants party. After various maneuvers during and after Nu's tenure in power, most of the BWPP's cadre were absorbed into the Lanzin party structure.

Little else exists in the country in the way of an opposition. The Social Democrats active in the AFPFL have collaborated eagerly with Ne Win. The various characters who support Nu's "government-in-exile" operating out of Thailand are at best only rivals among the same elite to which Ne Win belongs, and at worst agents of the KMT [Kuomintang] elements in North Burma, the opium growers, and all the other turncoat and

proimperialist scum infesting Southeast Asia.

We cannot, of course, exclude the terrible danger of a U. S.-backed provocation, designed to open yet another front in the Southeast Asian genocidal war. We cannot be so misguidedly proud of our country's revolutionary traditions as to believe there are not those in Rangoon cut out for the role of a Lon Nol. And we should take note of the activity of U.S. agents in our country: the apparent complicity of the U. S. CIA with the growing of opium by the KMT Chinese Nationalist bandits on our northern frontier, and the discreet military aid shuttled from the U. S. to Rangoon by various modest means.

The only other active political element in our country consists of isolated and tiny shoals of intellectual discussion, in the universities and even in the lower echelons of the bureaucracy. Many are questioning the nature of Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Socialism." Many want to break out of the absurd isolation from the rest of the world imposed upon us since 1948 in the name of national traditions and neutralism.

Certainly we would be very happy to see foreign intervention in our country's affairs permanently and vigilantly controlled, for we are in no way interested in seeing Rangoon become another Saigon or Bangkok! But on the other hand we do not want to be divorced from the ferment of revolutionary ideas throughout Asia and the world; *we cannot be*.

We like to keep in mind what was mentioned earlier: that while the Thakins and nationalist students in the 1930s stressed their Burmese identity in their choice of clothing, manners, and speech, they nevertheless assiduously read, and digested, European socialist ideas. It is for this reason, we think, that even given the tremendously oppressive weight of the elite upon our country, even given the setback of the revolutionary movement of the postindependence period, our country has, in its period of independence, accomplished so much more in the way of education and welfare than, for instance, the Nehru government in India.

Unlike Gandhi and his collaborators, our nationalist intellectuals were not afraid to turn to European ideas and apply them audaciously, whatever their own errors. This is, of course, largely because, unlike India, we did not have a national bourgeoisie large enough to need a Gandhi to protect it from the armed masses. Our elite does not have the "glories" of 5,000 years of the caste system behind it. It emerged in a very modern struggle, and contains the seeds of its own defeat.

Q. What is your perspective for the development of the Burmese revolution?

A. Our perspective is multiple, embracing many domestic and international factors, all linked.

First, we must fight to expose the nature of the regime, the fact that it rests on a privileged elite and that the elite's

bureaucratic moves to impose socialism are doomed from the start. Our struggle is therefore for a democratic revolutionary movement responsible to the initiatives of the masses, and not centered around decrees delivered from on high by either the military or the Communist leaders. An aspect of our exposure of the regime is its doctrine of socialism in our country alone. No matter the worth of the doctrine of "socialism in one country" in a European country, in a colonialized country like ours it is virtually suicidal.

And our fight against this doctrine is linked to our fight against the cultural and political isolation of our country from

the dramatic events taking place throughout Asia.

The dictatorship of the Burmese masses, based on a principle of directly democratic control over the political structure, will not only fling a challenge to the bureaucratic elites of China, North Vietnam, and Russia as well as Indonesia, Malaysia, etc., it will provide a link between the struggles of the Indochinese peoples against imperialism and the struggle of the people of Bangladesh for national liberation, an iron ring from Hanoi to Rangoon to Dacca, expanding to Calcutta, Saigon, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur.

Our struggle may be the pivot for the rebirth of a worldwide revolution! □

Pompidou Looks for Scapegoats

Revolt Sweeps French Prisons

"The specter of revolt against the bankrupt 'new society' of Pompidou-Chaban, which since May 1968 has affected the most varied social layers, public bodies, and persons, has just made its appearance in a place where, by definition, it has no right to exist: *the prisons*. After Clairvaux, where in a gesture of despair two inmates killed a hospital attendant and a guard they had taken as hostages; after Toul, where the inmates' rebellion was crushed (through a wretched stratagem of Pleven-the-liar) under the clubs of the CRS; after Nice, where, resorting to the eternal weapon of the exploited, the prisoners rejected the robotlike pseudolabor that is imposed on them—the rebellion is spreading like wildfire: Amiens, Lille . . . the guests in Pleven's houses of detention are in revolt, asserting that offenders, whom bourgeois society produces on a mass scale, are *men* and demand to be treated as such."

Thus wrote *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International, in its January 15 issue. This specter of prison rebellion, which thrust itself onto the international scene after the revolt in Attica, New York, has spread from one French prison to another, and forced itself onto the front pages of the entire French press.

Last December, the inmates of Toul prison rebelled against their miserable living conditions. They were put down by police. But the rebellion focused public opinion on the plight of the

prisoners, and René Pleven, minister of justice, empowered a commission to investigate the Toul insurrection.

The commission was headed by Robert Schmelck, chief prosecutor in the country's highest criminal court. This representative of French jurisprudence began his career as a magistrate in 1943, during the Nazi occupation. He attained a certain stature in his field, and in 1960 became prosecutor general in Algiers, where the rights of prisoners were not exactly strictly observed.

On January 10, the Schmelck commission issued its report. French public opinion was astounded, not because of the report's contents, which were largely an apologetic admission that prison conditions were unenviable, but by the rapidity with which the commission had reported its findings, and by the fact that, considering its source, it was at all critical of the prison administration.

"It seems," the commission wrote, "that the warden [at Toul] adopted for everyone a strict, even rigorous disciplinary regime not always fully justified in its application to the whole prison population by the need for security and order. . . . The brutal show of violence on December 9 [Schmelck means by the prisoners] can in part be explained by the explosive reaction of young people whose hopes were disappointed and whose vitality was smothered instead of being channeled into rational activities."

The commission claimed it could find no evidence of "systematic bru-

tality," but seemed to contradict itself by recommending the removal of Georges Galiana, Toul's warden.

An excerpt from the report printed in the January 15 *Rouge* provides a sample of its general tone:

"Moreover, other more serious charges have been made regarding the utilization of "restraining belts" (*ceintures de contention*). In some cases they are said to have been used as punishment, and not as a safety measure for disturbed prisoners. Furthermore, some inmates are said to have been kept in restraint for several days without ever being untied."

Rouge notes, for the uninitiated, that *ceinture de contention* is an elegant, Plevenesque expression for strait-jacket!

Within one week of the commission report, rebellions, or at least acts of collective defiance, broke out in six prisons: Lille, Amiens, Rouen, Fleury-Merogis (a "model" prison), Ecrouves, and Nancy. Both Amiens and Lille were scenes of workshop occupations by prisoners. It was as if the prisoners were telling the public on the outside that Toul was a typical case, not an aberration that could be dealt with by changing the warden.

President Georges Pompidou reacted to the commission report and the revolts by saying that "it is a narrow path between inhuman indifference and dangerous sentimentalism." He recommended a series of minor reforms in the penal system and a new increase in disciplinary measures to contain any further struggle on the part of the prisoners.

Pleven, at a January 19 news conference, said that reforms would be undertaken at "an opportune moment" but that "this is also the time to re-establish discipline."

Many leftist and labor organizations, including the Communist party-dominated Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor), endorsed the findings of the commission. A notable exception was the Ligue Communiste. The January 15 *Rouge* wrote:

"Vassal to Pleven, Mr. Schmelck does not seek the *real* motives for the revolt of the French prisoners; he does not seek the *truly* guilty ones; he was mandated to find a scapegoat, to present a victim to assuage public opinion, which becomes more and more incensed as it keeps learning more and more about the reality of

prison conditions in France. That this victim is named Galiana, a filthy beast, causes us to rejoice; but it will not be sufficient. The Schmelcks, the Plevens, and the other jailers deserve no better fate."

The most serious of the rebellions occurred at Nancy prison, where an estimated several hundred thousand dollars damage was done to the buildings. The regime was clearly worried by the depth of the struggle and by the fact that a crowd of youths gathered outside the prison gates to express their support for the inmates.

The warden took his cue from Pleven and blamed "outside agitators" for the revolt, without bothering to explain just when the prison adopted a policy of allowing radicals to visit the institution for the purpose of instigating insurrection.

In the January 22 *Rouge*, Félix Lejarret commented on the regime's reaction to Nancy and the wave of rebellions:

"That the old Marcellinesque [Marcellin is minister of interior] fable about outside subversive elements could make its appearance in such a ridiculous fashion at this time well testifies to the panic and stupor gripping all the chief jailers in France—the wave of revolts in the prisons, far from dying down, keeps on rising. After Toul, Nîmes, Amiens, Loos . . . the inmates of Fleury-Merogis (a sort of Club Méditerranée for inmates, according to Jean Ferniot), those of Ecrouves and of Nancy have in their turn, and effectively, gone on the offensive.

"At Fleury-Merogis, after the exercise period, the inmates refused to return to their cells; they demanded two extra hours. At Ecrouves (Meurthe-et-Moselle) they demanded a rise in wages and the opportunity to engage in real physical exercise. At Nancy, pushed to their limit by cold, hunger, and brutality, the inmates enacted the same scenario as at Toul: they climbed to the roof, drew up a leaflet summarizing their demands, which they tried to pass to the assembled population, and for hours resisted the assault of the cops, who finally managed to dislodge them by using a helicopter. Just like Vietnam!

"Definitely, this prison revolt, far from being a simple flash in the pan, is developing into a general conflagration. There is nothing astonishing in that. When the inmates of Ecrouves


rebel, they are transferred to Nancy. When these, in their turn, enter into struggle, the "leaders" are transferred to another prison, where from then onwards, the ferment of subversion can only rise. . . .

"But there's more: through the movement, the rejected inmate caste becomes self-educated, conscious of the possibilities of struggling against the system that oppresses them. They cease to feel isolated and ashamed, are encouraged by the idea that their revolt will not meet solely with hostility outside the high walls of the jails."

The French bourgeoisie is at a loss as to how to respond to the prison ferment. The cabinet is reportedly considering various reforms, and an investigation is under way to determine whether criminal charges should be filed against officials at Toul. At the same time, an investigation into the "outside forces" that supposedly triggered the Nancy revolt is being conducted.

But whatever combination of repression and concession the Pompidou regime may resort to, a new force has entered the French revolutionary movement. As Lejarret wrote in *Rouge*:

"The wall of indifference that surrounded the prisons is breached. Now it is Pleven, France's No. 1 jailer, who is in solitary, an outcast, a repeat offender, the incorrigible executor of the bourgeoisie's dirty work. □



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U.S., Kremlin Jockey for Influence in Bangladesh

According to "authoritative sources in New Delhi and Calcutta" cited by the *New York Times*, the United States government delayed the Pakistani message of surrender by more than twenty hours last December 15.

These sources report that the Pakistani commander, Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi, approached the U. S. consulate in Dacca at about 7:00 p.m. on December 14. Because his own radio had been jammed by the Indian army, he asked U. S. diplomats to convey his willingness to surrender to New Delhi. Consul General Herbert Spivack agreed and sent the message to Washington on a "flash" (top priority) basis. Within twenty minutes the message was received and acknowledged by Washington.

But the message was not relayed to New Delhi until 2:30 p.m. December 15 (Indian time). Since there was no known communication block between Washington and New Delhi, it appears that the Nixon administration simply delayed the message of its own volition.

Charles W. Bray III, a U. S. State Department spokesman, said January 25 that it is "just plain inaccurate" to say that the United States had unnecessarily held up the communication. But he had no convincing explanation to support his claim. There was an eight-hour delay, according to Bray, while U. S. officials confirmed the order with Pakistani leaders in Islamabad. But then, instead of transmitting the confirmed information to New Delhi, Washington unaccountably sought out Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, who was at United Nations headquarters in New York at the time. Supposedly, it took some time to find him.

"Some Indian officials," according to the January 26 *Washington Post*, "see the 20-hour delay as the final hostile action by the Nixon administration" toward India during the war.

It is not clear whether or not the delay was in fact Nixon's last-ditch effort to forestall a Pakistani defeat. But in any case, there were signs late in January that the U. S. government was engaging in some fast fence-

mending with India. On January 27 Secretary of State William Rogers, in a speech to editors and broadcasters, said that he had "read a good deal of criticism about the U. S. position" in the India-Pakistan conflict, but "we're trying to remedy things."

Meanwhile, the Indian ambassador to the United States, Lakshmi K. Jha, who was guest of honor at a meet-



BHUTTO: "God Save the Queen" still a favorite tune.

ing of the National Press Club, told his audience, "Mr. Nixon is President of the United States. India wants good relations with President Nixon—and with any President of the United States."

The U. S.-India diplomatic maneuvering is part of a complicated game now being played by many governments in relation to the subcontinent. On January 24 the Soviet Union officially recognized the Bangladesh government. The move had been expected, since recognition had been extended two weeks earlier by East Germany and Bulgaria. At that time, Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto broke relations with both countries,

and strongly hinted that he would do the same with any nation recognizing Mujibur Rahman's regime.

But on January 25, when Bhutto was asked what he intended to do about Soviet recognition, he replied that his government "has to take a realistic attitude toward the great powers." It was widely suggested that the Soviet move had been delayed two weeks so as to allow for some quiet arm-twisting to convince Bhutto not to retaliate.

Another sign that Bhutto has become resigned to the existence of Bangladesh came on January 30. On that day he was informed that Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia would soon establish diplomatic relations with Bangladesh. (New Zealand and Australia did so the following day.) Bhutto's response was to withdraw Pakistan from the British Commonwealth, a largely symbolic move. Its major effect will be to deprive Pakistan of British educational assistance. Bhutto told his minister of communications to show no hard feelings in announcing the withdrawal: "You can even end up with 'God Save the Queen' if you like."

The only major power that seems to be completely unreconciled to the altered alignment in the subcontinent is China. On January 25, the remaining members of the Chinese consular delegation in Dacca left Bangladesh. Bengali members of the Pakistani mission in Peking have not been permitted to return to Bangladesh.

Diplomatic recognition from major Western powers appears to be contingent on Rahman's success in disarming the Mukti Bahini. Countries such as Britain and France are reluctant to commit themselves to diplomatic relations with a regime that may not be able to control its own insurgent population. As Rahman's January 31 deadline for the total disarming of the Bengali freedom fighters approached, reports on the progress of the campaign were mixed.

The January 31 issue of *Newsweek* reported: "Reports reached Dacca daily of armed bands roaming the countryside making arbitrary arrests, de-

manding ransom and shooting up the houses of non-Bengalis on the pretext of routing out Pakistani collaborators. In one tobacco factory, a band of armed toughs used rifles as a tool of collective bargaining, forcing the factory manager at gunpoint to improve working conditions."

The January 25 *Christian Science*

Monitor reported that most members of the Mukti Bahini are cooperating with Rahman's orders, but quoted a "foreign observer" in Dacca as saying, "It's foolish to believe all the weapons will be handed in. The problem will be how much is left. The more handed in, the more manageable the situation will be for the government. □

ment before the military court, she saw her husband again after his arrest on May 28, 1971. A policeman took her to the room where he was brought, covered with blood, directly from the 'torture chamber.' He was laid on a table. In her statement, Ilkay Demir says: 'They tried to bandage his bleeding feet. The hall was a sea of blood; a woman tried in vain to wash it away. Later I heard that it was not just Necmi's blood, but also Irgan's.'

An appeal from opponents of the regime was published in the December issue of the Swedish magazine *Komentar*.

"The most important thing for us is to stop the executions. We need support from abroad. The government is now trying to present itself as Western oriented but not U.S. dominated. Spiro Agnew's visit was greatly played down. They are now trying to give the impression that they are going to carry out reforms."

The response of progovernment Turks to a hunger strike that was held in Stockholm in mid-January to protest the repression seemed to indicate the regime's concern over its international image. The right-wing group issued a statement claiming:

"The five persons on a hunger strike in Sergels Torg are blackening Turkey's good name and reputation in Sweden. . . . The people who are being sentenced to death in Turkey are not political offenders but common criminals."

The Athens dictatorship has sent secret police agents abroad to organize attacks on anti-Junta protesters. Perhaps the military-dominated government in Ankara intends to follow their example.

It is likely, however, that supporters of the dictatorship will find it difficult to defend the repression in Turkey. The regime does not seem to be working in a very well coordinated way to build up its image abroad. For example, Premier Erim, who was visiting France in mid-January in search of aid and investment, said over French television (according to Van Den Berg) that the liberal 1960 constitution was "a luxury." But while this representative of the military was dismissing the fundamental law of his country so cavalierly, dozens of youths and intellectuals faced death sentences for "trying to alter the constitution by force." □

Mounting Wave of Repression in Turkey

"Some 85,000 troops and civilians were mobilized in 'Operation Tempest,' making it possible to search more than 500,000 homes," *Le Monde* reported in its January 25 issue. For fifteen hours a curfew was maintained in the Turkish capital of Istanbul, while a large proportion of the dwellings in the city were ransacked by the repressive forces.

Even travelers arriving in Istanbul during the operation were forced to remain at airports and bus and train stations while the searches were in progress.

"The operation had two objectives," *Le Monde* continued, summarizing a statement by a spokesman of the military administration. "On the one hand, 230 'anarchists' were being sought. . . . On the other, it was an exercise in 'controlling the home front' in the event of war and preventing sabotage in case enemy paratroopers landed."

If, however, the operation was a training exercise, it seemed best designed to prepare the army for massive military repression of the Turkish population and not to counter small bands of "terrorists."

The same day that "Operation Tempest" took place, the National Security Council met and decided to recommend that the state of siege in effect in eleven provinces since April 26, 1971, be extended for a fourth time.

As for the results of the operation, a communiqué from General Falk Turun, chief of the military administration, said that the "exercise" had made it possible to "capture some of the most wanted men, along with arms and equipment, and to apprehend some suspects."

The communiqué did not say whether the troops had recaptured five alleged members of the Turkish People's Liberation Army, the group that

kidnapped and executed the Israeli consul Ephraim Elrom. The five, three of whom had been sentenced to death, escaped from prison November 30.

Although the January 23 curfew and searches highlighted the extent of the repression in Turkey, few papers have said much about the reactionary terror in the country. Moreover, since "spreading Communist propaganda" is punishable by fifteen years in prison, and severe censorship is in force, it has been difficult for Turkish civil libertarians to inform international public opinion about conditions under the veiled military dictatorship.

However, some prisoners allegedly belonging to the Turkish People's Liberation Army did manage to draw up and smuggle out of the country a memorandum on the torturing of detainees. J. Van Den Berg summarized, in the January 23 issue of the Amsterdam weekly *Vrij Nederland*, some incidents reported in this memorandum:

"Necmi Demir, twenty-seven years old, is an economics student. The death penalty has been asked in his case. Like the others he is charged with 'attempting to alter the present constitution by force.'

". . . According to Demir's statement, he was horribly tortured in the weeks after his arrest. The first 'operation,' as the torture was pompously described, lasted fourteen hours. Demir was kicked and beaten. Sharpened sticks were rammed into his bare feet and legs. A big sore swelled up on his leg, through which the bone could be seen. His face and body were worked over with electrodes.

"Demir's wife, Ilkay, a twenty-five-year-old medical student, also belonged to the group of suspects. She was also given the death sentence, although it was later changed to life imprisonment. According to her state-

Pierre Vallières' Break With the FLQ

By Alain Beiner

[The following article is reprinted from the January 17 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist biweekly published in Toronto.]

* * *

In a letter to the editor of the Montréal daily *Le Devoir* in mid-December, Pierre Vallières, author of the book *White Niggers of America* and leading theoretician of "armed struggle" in Québec, announced that he was breaking once and for all with the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) and withdrawing all support from it.

This action and the documents written by Vallières to justify it, confirm in a dramatic and powerful way the failure of the terrorist strategy, a conclusion advanced by the Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière since the explosion of the first terrorist bomb. After a deep-going reconsideration of the political situation since October 1970, in the light of the lessons of the war measures crisis, Vallières admits the sterility of the FLQ's strategy, its isolation from the real political life of the masses as well as its profoundly unfortunate results.

Under the impact of the new rise of struggles since the calm of the first months of 1971, and the power of the mass movement for independence and the parallel radicalization of the trade union movement, Vallières has come to understand the necessity for revolutionaries to participate actively in this mass struggle, in real political life, in order to influence it.

Analyzing the present political conjuncture, Vallières defines the task of revolutionaries today: educating, organizing, and mobilizing the masses, rather than learning to handle arms and plant bombs. To be sure, Vallières is mistaken when he concludes that it is necessary to join the Parti Québécois, which he considers to be the vehicle of our liberation. The bourgeois PQ is a deformed expression of the mass movement and an obstacle to the development and mobilization of this same mass movement.

In the articles sent to Montréal newspapers, Vallières discusses at great length the nationalist character of the mass movement in Québec, the national consciousness of the masses, and its revolutionary dynamic. Testifying to the power of the national question and its central role in Québec political life, Vallières has been obliged to orient to the mass nationalist movement and to draw some key conclusions from it that a number of "leftists" in Québec ignore. For instance, the dual character of the Québec revolution—nationalist and socialist; the importance of national emancipation to the working class; the impossibility of jumping over or denying the national stage or component of the Québec revolution; and thus the necessity of including national tasks in the revolutionary program and of incorporating the national struggle into the socialist strategy.

Speaking of the failure of the FLQ's terrorist strategy, Vallières stated: "If the 'FLQ threat' has for a year been the theme of the public declarations of the authorities, it is because the October crisis showed them how the regime could profit from spectacular explosions which are isolated from any revolutionary strategy. Such actions can be represented plausibly as being an integral part of a long-term offensive consistent with a strategy of genuine revolutionary armed struggle when in reality they are nothing of the sort.

"Every action of the FLQ, however minimal and limited, every press release bearing the FLQ insignia, however hare-brained, every 'message' from the FLQ, fictitious or real, takes on in these circumstances a *political* importance which benefits *only* those who use the permanent 'FLQ menace' to increase the motivations and the opportunities to club the liberation movement of the Québec masses, while waiting for the 'big' chance that will allow them to do everything in their power to break the back of the movement once and for all.

"If up to October 1970 the armed agitation of the FLQ was the radical expression of the spontanéist and anarchistic character that all national liberation movements have at their inception, it has become today *in fact* the unconscious but objective ally of the repressive strategy of the regime and thereby, far from constituting a tactical support of the Québec people's struggle, it runs the risk of contributing to the crushing of this struggle and to the liquidation of its living forces.

"If ever armed struggle could have been justified in the past as revealing a condition of domination and a resolute will to escape from it, armed agitation, just like the unarmed agitation of those who confuse window-breaking with conscious, positive and mass-oriented political action, is today counter-revolutionary."

To those who wonder whether the rejection of "armed agitation" implies necessarily the disappearance of the FLQ itself or whether it would be necessary instead to maintain it as an organization, waiting for a change of the situation that would allow it to play a role in the struggle, Vallières replies:

"It must be said right away that such a 'waiting' group could never find the tactics adequate to the changing situation in question, since, being cut off from the mass struggle itself, it would voluntarily put itself in a position where it was totally impossible to understand the mechanisms, the transformations, the real level of political consciousness, its composition, etc.; in summary, it would put itself in a situation where it was practically impossible to concretely understand the real evolution of the mass struggle and thus practically impossible to really participate in it, at whatever stage it may be in the long and complex process of national and social liberation that the Québec masses have just begun to launch in a coherent and politically organized manner."

Apart from his evaluation of the Parti Québécois, Vallières' second article, published in the trade union weekly *Québec-Presse*, is full of lessons for those among the left who tend to underestimate the national character of the Québec revolution.

"Some leftists would really like to skip the national stage. They forget that in a colonized society national independence is not one question among others for the workers, but *the most important question*. In fact, the political emancipation of the Québécois collectivity is *the first condition* for the social emancipation of the workers and the building of socialism (the latter being, in the present period, the *only* guarantee of independence and development of a 'just society').

"By counterposing class struggle and national struggle one denies the special characteristics and the relative autonomy of each and at the same time their close interaction. One forgets, moreover, that in a situation like ours, in a colonized society which has always been refused the right to constitute an independent national State, national liberation is a *priority demand* not only for what is called the petty bourgeoisie but also for the masses who compose the majority of that society.

"The struggle for independence, far from diverting the masses from the conquest of political power and the collective construction of socialism, on the contrary brings them considerably closer to these goals; while on the other hand opposition to the political independence of Québec could only compromise irremediably their own emancipation.

"Of course, the political independence of Québec does not in itself constitute a total revolution any more than does the overthrow of a despotic power by armed struggle. Political independence, like the overthrow of a dictatorship, only creates the political and social conditions of a leap forward, a collective liberation which will still have several other stages to go through. . . .

"National liberation movements, despite their frequently 'petty-bourgeois' appearance, all contain an enormous revolutionary potential and all proceed from a complex and contradictory dialectical process."

Vallières takes on those who glorify workers' struggles around purely economic demands, in the hopes that workers will limit themselves to those demands, and who ignore the importance of *politicizing* workers' struggles around demands arising from the national question:

"A certain left unknowingly practices an economism which (like the trade-unionism denounced by Lenin) reduces the political struggle to a series of economic and social demands *without strategic political significance*. While the question of independence has in Québec a fundamental strategic political significance, this left gives the impression that it considers the right to self-determination only as an *abstract* juridical right. And it equates calling for self-determination with support to 'bourgeois' nationalism.

"Another left, for its part, is so caught up in the *universality* of THE stereotyped class struggle and the *pure* proletarian revolution that it begrudges any 'compromise' with the dialectical and *particular* complexity of any concrete process of liberation. It prefers the quiet possession of universal truths to the transformation of a society whose history is not waiting to be written by a Marx or an Althusser before working itself out."

From these altogether correct assertions—the importance of national emancipation and the impossibility of "leaping over" it—Vallières strays from the Québec reality when he concludes "that one must envisage the driving role, the dynamic role, that the Parti Québécois plays and will play increasingly within the movement for national and social emancipation of the Québécois"; when he concludes that the PQ is the vehicle or at least the "first stage" of the liberation struggle.

First, by counterposing "the electoral process" to armed struggle at the present time, Vallières restricts himself to a very mechanical analysis of the mass movement, seeing only that "the mass struggle is taking on an electoral form." In this sense Vallières refuses to see the most significant political expression of this mass movement, namely, the coherent, conscious, organized, mass actions that have taken place outside the electoral process, but which have profoundly influenced this process. Vallières seems to want to deny the revolutionary dynamic of demonstrations, strikes, occupations, etc.—in short, all the mass actions in the streets that Québec has experienced and which the Parti Québécois has opposed, including the demonstration for the national language on October 16 and the demonstration against *La Presse* of October 29, both of them factors in the new radicalization of the workers' movement.

That the mass movement must utilize the electoral process is indisputable, but to say that it ought to limit itself to this process or support a political party that does so and that actively *opposes* mass actions is a completely different question.

That the mass movement must utilize the electoral process *as well*, and that it needs a mass political party, a political instrument capable of taking power, is indisputable, but what ought to be the nature of such a political formation? Vallières is of the opinion that "it is not in the interests of the majority of the Québécois for the union locals to launch at present a second mass party distinct from the PQ. . . ."

Such a party would distinguish itself from the PQ not by its own "phraseology," as Vallières claims but by its class nature—it would be *free of all ties* of dependence on imperialism and its subsidiary, Québec capitalism. This independence from capitalist interests is indispensable for any formation that seeks to lead the liberation struggle to its conclusion. The petty-bourgeois leadership of the PQ does not possess this independence, being bound by many ties to capitalism for its survival in the face of a powerful working class, which would not stop at a simple replacement of anglophone bosses with franco-phone bosses. That is why the PQ abstains from, and even opposes, mass actions and mobilizations that threaten to go beyond the capitalist framework.

As Vallières explains, it is not a question of revolutionaries standing back from the national question, nor of "leaping over" the national tasks, in order to limit workers' action to simple economic questions. It is a question of seeing, as Vallières does not, that the national tasks in Québec can only be achieved under the direction of the working class—at the head of the whole nation—and that consequently the resolution of these essential tasks will be the first measure of a socialist government following the seizure of power by the working class in a revolution. □

Giant Among Revolutionary Democrats

Sam Adams and the American Revolution by Harry Frankel. Pathfinder Press, New York, N.Y. 47 pp. \$0.75, £0.31. 1971.

"I am *in* fashion and *out* of fashion, as the whim goes. I will stand alone! I will oppose this tyranny at the threshold, though the fabric of liberty fall, and I perish in the ruins!"—*Sam Adams*

For both the activist and the student of politics, Harry Frankel's collection of essays on the life and work of Sam Adams is not equaled. It clearly presents the events and characters of the American revolution through their interaction with the best organizer, agitator, and journalist of all the revolutionary democrats.

Adams can give us all a lesson in practical movement-building through his years as a radical. He was not diverted by the personal influence he attained during the time he spent in public office and public life. He was far more interested in organizing the people of New England in struggle against the crown.

While the emerging capitalist class in the colonies was eager for the fruits of the revolution, Adams and other militants found that this class was a timid and unreliable ally.

On several occasions, the radicals of Boston had tried to organize boycotts of British imports. This plan repeatedly met with failure, mainly because of the desertion of the merchants when the going got rough. The boycott was attempted another time in 1774. It was organized in the Solemn League and Covenant. Adams made sure the following lines were included in the founding document: ". . . this effectual plan has been originated and thus far carried through by the two venerable orders of men styled Mechanics and Husbandmen [workingmen and farmers], the strength of every community."

Those who believe that a "democratic revolution" can be carried out in 1972 by way of "broad front" or "national front" alliances with sectors of

the bourgeoisie would do well to recall Sam Adams's experiences with a bourgeoisie far more "progressive" than any now on the scene.

Adams's organization of Committees of Correspondence laid the groundwork for the popular militia in New England, the most effective of any citizen army in the colonies. He built the circulation of his newspaper, the *Massachusetts Spy*, to the point where

it was six times larger than any of the regular papers in Boston. Adams based himself on the masses of workers and farmers, realizing that the best defense was to instill the people with revolutionary ideas and to lead them into revolutionary action. When the fighting began, the people of New England were ready for it.

After less than a year of war, the British had to evacuate Boston, not because it was threatened by a massive regular army but because Sam Adams spent twenty-five years making sure that Boston could *not* be held. "Our business," Adams once said, "is not to make events, but wisely to improve them."

—*Steven Warshell*

New Journal on Palestine and Middle East

In the early 1950s the Israeli government became concerned about the fact that the level of Jewish immigration to Israel showed signs of declining, as did the birthrate of the Jewish sector of the population. Israeli leaders feared that the Arabs, subversive terrorists that they are, would destroy the Jewish basis of the state by traitorously having too many children.

In an effort to stimulate the declining birthrate, the National Insurance Law was passed in 1953. It provided government stipends to families having more than four children.

The trouble was that Arabs were getting the benefits also. Faced with a similar quandary, the South African government would have simply passed a law providing benefits to whites but not Blacks. The Israeli regime, however, is sensitive to world opinion. A more elegant solution had to be found.

In 1970 the enterprising, pioneering Knesset came up with the Discharged Soldiers Law, according to which the minister of labor may, after consulting with the minister of finance, decide to pay stipends to soldiers or soldiers' families, according to the specific family situation. A simple aid-to-veterans bill.

The first article of the law defines "soldier" as anyone who is serving, or has served, in the Israeli Defense Army, the police, or the prison system, plus anyone who was on recognized military service before the es-

establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.

Cynical faultfinders may note that under this definition approximately 99 percent of the Jewish adult population are classified as "soldiers," while only about .01 percent of the Arab population fall into this category. But that, of course, is purely a coincidence.

The Discharged Soldiers Law is typical of Israeli legislation. One of the leading researchers on the Kafkaesque tableau that is Israeli jurisprudence is Sabri Jiryis, an Arab and former citizen of Israel. His analysis of the Discharged Soldiers Law, and several other pieces of recent Knesset legislation, can be found in the "Journal of Palestinian Studies: A Quarterly on Palestinian Affairs and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," published by the Institute for Palestinian Studies and Kuwait University.

The first issue (Autumn 1971) contains, besides Jiryis's piece, an eyewitness account of the fall of Jerusalem in the 1967 war, an analysis of the attitudes of Lebanese students towards the Palestinian resistance movement, and a lengthy interview with Egyptian journalist Mohammed Heykal. Its periodicals section contains one of the most complete lists of publications, in English, Arabic, and French, produced by the various resistance organizations. Copies cost \$2.00 each and are obtainable from the Institute, P. O. Box 7164, Beirut, Lebanon.

—*Jon Rothschild*

Edward Ochab Calls for Polish Workers' Councils

[The Polish workers' rebellion that occurred at the end of 1970 and the beginning of 1971 continues to have repercussions within the Polish United Workers party (Communist party).

[At the Sixth Congress of the party, which opened last December 6, delegates were presented with the Central Committee's report on the preceding three years, which included a "self-criticism" by the leadership.

[Edward Ochab, who was the Communist party's first secretary until 1956 and later minister of agriculture and president of the State Council, wrote the document reprinted below as a reply to the Central Committee's "directives." Ochab's criticism was submitted originally to his party cell. It later found its way into the Polish emigre journal *Kultura*, published in Paris, and was then translated and published by the Paris daily *Le Monde* on December 7. The following translation from the French is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

As a member of the party, I consider it my duty to inform you, before the convening of the party's Sixth Congress, of my criticisms concerning the "directives."

The directives ignore a whole series of key problems that will have to be resolved by the party and the working class. And they present certain other questions in an erroneous fashion.

1. The December [1970] events dramatically demonstrated that the autocratic regime of Gomulka and his men led to the gravest of political crises; placed the party leadership in opposition to the working class and the masses of people; and, in sum, furnished the enemies of Communism with excellent ammunition. The analysis made by the eighth plenum of the Central Committee is, in my opinion, one-sided and superficial.

Gomulka's despotic way of governing, already established several years before the catastrophe of the month of December, had been based, like Stalin's, on:

a) The perverted security bodies, which had actually been placed above the party and which had deeply demoralized the party apparatus;

b) The total suppression of democracy within the party and the continuing elimination of workers from the party, even the most deserving and talented workers, if they "dared" oppose the will of the autocracy;

c) The systematic placing of unprincipled people, careerists, cynics blindly obedient to Gomulka's orders, in leadership posts of the party apparatus and the government;

d) The subservience of the press and the communications media to the *diktat*

of the autocrat and his men, while at the same time retaining the same phraseology about socialist democracy, the collectivity of leadership, serving the people, etc.;

e) The dissemination of legends and myths, provocations, and nationalistic tales, without hesitation in using anti-Semitism (among other tales, the "white coat plot," the "Zionist center" of Slansky, or, in sum, the threat to Polish socialism represented by the "Zionist fifth column");

f) The lack of real independence of the Sejm (parliament) bodies, of the national councils, the workers' councils, the unions, the youth councils, the agricultural cooperatives, and other mass organizations. All that resulted in a lowering of the masses' social activity and a diminution of the vanguard role of the working class in the state.

The directives will have to indicate the sum total of remedies whose application would guard the party against the re-appearance of the processes of autocratic and anti-Leninist deformation.

2. The unhappy experiences during the despotic period of Stalin-Beria and, in our country, during the period preceding the December events, demand particular stress upon the necessity for effective control of the party's organs of power at all levels—especially at the very top and at the level of the *województwa* (departments). Particularly stressed, too, should be the necessity for effective control of the activity of the security bodies, which must never again become an instrument in the hands of a clique of impostor candidates for the post of the people's "guides."

Moreover, it will be necessary to say, in front of the entire party, that the security bodies' recruiting of informers and agents from among party members is a grave violation of party principles. Consequently, it will be necessary to declare null and void all the "engagements" of collaboration with the organs of the ministry of interior obtained by this means. And it will be necessary to prosecute the functionaries who have resorted to this kind of illegal procedure.

A commission of the Central Committee will have to examine the possibility of restricting the duties of the ministry of interior, thus reducing the budget by about 1,000,000,000 zlotys from the level of 1970.

3. In condemning the "antiparty" policy in regard to cadres that was practiced by the group formed around the ex-first secretary of the Central Committee, and in particular the dismissals he carried out in the month of March [1968], it will be necessary to propose to the Sixth Congress that they invite all the communists

eliminated without reason at the time of the Fifth Congress to enter the central bodies of the party.

It will be necessary to utilize to the maximum all the former members of the glorious Polish Communist party and those of the Communist Union of Polish Youth, in all the sectors of these organizations, in the local bodies and in the various social commissions, on the editorial staffs of newspapers, in the publishing houses, everywhere that long experience in party work and the courage acquired in the illegal and difficult struggle against the forces of counterrevolution, nationalism, and revisionism can be put to the best use for the well-being of the working class.

It will also be necessary to examine, rapidly and efficiently, the problem of improving retirement conditions for all the veterans of the Polish revolutionary movement who are no longer working, as well as for their families.

4. The autocratic policies in practice during the period before the month of December have considerably weakened the cadres of the state apparatus, of the Youth Union, and of the party. The changes put into operation after the Seventh and Eighth Plenums of the Communist party will have to be pursued firmly, in order to eliminate from the party apparatus and from the government organs all the inveterate bureaucrats, the careerists, the ONRists,¹ the anti-Semites, the national-

1. ONR—Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny (National Radical Camp), ultraright group that existed in Poland before the second world war.

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ists, the unprincipled individuals, those lacking moral scruples.

This would constitute one of the important ways to reestablish the masses' confidence in the party.

5. It will be especially necessary to make sure that careerists without moral scruples are eliminated from leadership positions in the press, in publishing, and in the communications media. These are the unprincipled people who for years have constituted the support of the autocratic regime, making themselves noticeable by a really ONRist enthusiasm in the struggle against Jews and Communists (under the pretext of struggling against Zionism, of course), who praised the adventurist decisions concerning the change in prices and the new "incentives," even during those tragic days when blood was already flowing in torrents on the Baltic coast. Today they think it is enough to blame Gomulka for this unhappy past to get themselves off the hook, using sentences about party discipline and thus keeping the influential positions from which they had ousted honest and deserving Communists.

Public opinion, especially working-class opinion, has nothing but contempt for these mercenary and corrupt careerists, whose lying tongues cover their real thoughts.

6. Public opinion is very critical of the Sejm's inertia, which was evident during the period when the autocratic tendencies were being strengthened and consolidated, particularly during the tragic December days. The deeply rooted causes for this phenomenon will have to be probed. All the candidates for deputy were, in fact, approved by Gomulka and Kliszko,² and the experience with the most recently elected people has reinforced the general conviction that approval of the list of candidates was decisive for their definitive election. The deputies knew that the autocratic regime held in its hands the real monopoly on jobs, salaries, and the press; they drew from this situation the obvious conclusions, and "they did not deviate."

I think that procedures for electing the Sejm will have to be greatly modified.

At present, after twenty-seven years of the existence of People's Poland, it will be necessary in elections to permit the presentation of distinct slates for each of the parties belonging to the National Unity Front (*Front Jednosci Narodu*) and, eventually, for the members of the Front who don't belong to any party. Such an electoral system will necessitate, on the part of the party leaders at the central and departmental (*wojewodzki*) level and allied groups, a much more careful selection of candidates for the position of deputy. It will oblige them to ascertain the real popularity and real authority of the candidates, whose election will not be automatically assured. On their part, the candidates would have to try, in a more substantial way, to win the confidence of the voters and to reckon with their opinions.

Voting for separate slates would necessarily affect the growth of the Sejm's role and reinforce the conviction of millions of voters that they have gained real influence on the choice of deputies and on public affairs.

That kind of election would certainly be most welcome to our Communist brothers in the West, who are leading a struggle for the creation of a united workers front and a huge popular front; for years now they have been publicly announcing that single-slate elections are not their aim.

7. The events of the month of December demonstrated to what extent the optimism of the party and government leaders differed from the feelings of the working class. The fires set in the buildings of the party's departmental committees on the Baltic coast have illuminated the entire depth of politics in Poland. The long-term consequences of this crisis cannot be eradicated simply by eliminating the most compromised of the political "leaders," by moving on to an immediate change in the work style of certain party bodies, and by revoking the most adventurist decisions and concepts of the previous leadership.

The party will not be able successfully to lead the struggle and the labor of the masses toward the construction of a classless society unless the party enjoys the total confidence and the active support of the working class, especially the workers in the big plants. Now, within the party, workers constitute barely 40 per-

cent, and in the party bodies, that percentage is still lower, often even infinitesimal. The situation is hardly better in the people's councils (*Rady Narodowe*); it's even worse there.

In the course of the events that occurred on the Baltic coast, the local organizations, most especially those of the party, the unions, and the youth, as well as the presidiums of the people's councils, played practically no role whatsoever; they had been thrust aside.

All the conclusions will have to be drawn from these painful events. Lenin's teachings and directives will have to be referred to—on the subject of the role and the importance of the councils of workers' delegates, directly elected by the worker masses, which can constitute the party's best support.

I think that the party's cause and the effort to construct socialism can win only if, besides recognizing the necessity of electing new people's councils and a new Sejm—on the basis of a new electoral system—we launch a call for an election of councils of workers' delegates in all plants having over a hundred workers.

The Polish Congress of Workers' Delegates will have to have the same rights as the Sejm and thus constitute the second Chamber of our system of socialist representation.

I think that such a change in structure will be warmly received by the working class as a whole and by all the progressive forces of the people. At the same time, it will increase the strength and authority of the party. □

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2. Kliszko was Gomulka's main associate in the Secretariat.