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## Balaguer's 'Search and Destroy' Mission



DOMINICAN TROOPS using 105 mm. cannon demonstrate what they have learned from their U.S. "advisers." Photo shows scene from January 12 battle with small group of alleged guerrillas.

Massive government attack was widely condemned. Demonstrations occurred in Santo Domingo, and former President Juan Bosch issued protest against the "search and destroy" mission.

### ***Zimbabwe Gives Its Answer to Heath-Smith Deal***

### ***Nixon Threatens New Escalation in Laos***

## Bengali Says Chinese Troops Aided Yahya

Muhammed Ataul Ghani Osmany, one of the major leaders of the Bengali Mukti Bahini, charged January 16 that uniformed Chinese troops worked with the Pakistani army in Bangladesh during five months of the Pakistani genocide against the Bengali people.

Osmany said in an interview described by Lewis M. Simons in the January 17 *Washington Post* that he had "proof positive" that Chinese troops trained, armed, and advised the Pakistanis, in addition to performing engineering tasks. He described one case of Chinese activity, an incident occurring in the Comilla district in eastern Bangladesh:

"They were replacing a bridge my forces blew up on the Madhapur-Shaistaganj road. They were using a very modern type of steel prefabricated bridging material which extends itself and locks itself in place. The Pakistanis did not have that type of material and they did not know how to operate it."

Osmany said the Chinese troops were quartered in the Dacca cantonment, one mile from the city's center.

Although a member of the now defunct Chinese consulate in Dacca described Osmany's charges as "without foundation," and most Western diplomatic sources expressed surprise at the claim, one unidentified observer was quoted by Simons as saying that he had heard "whispers" for several months about a Chinese military presence. He added that there had been "a lot of traffic" by the Pakistani army between Pakistan and China during the occupation.

In connection with U. S. aid to Yahya's troops, Osmany said it was actually decisive in allowing Pakistan to continue the war—despite Nixon's claim that shipments were limited to spare parts.

"You must remember," he said, "we were on the receiving end and I can tell you the amount of U.S. arms and ammunition was substantial." □

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Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Mattan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

MANAGING EDITOR: Allen Myers.

COPY EDITOR: Ruth Schein.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Gerry Foley, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.

TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Lawrence Rand.

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PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemeene, Paris 4, France.

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## U.S. 'Advisers' Reported With Vang Pao's Forces

### Nixon Threatens New Escalation in Laos

"Concern about the unusually powerful and early Communist offensive in Laos has grown so intense," Craig R. Whitney reported from Vientiane in the January 21 *New York Times*, "that the United States Government has lifted much of the secrecy it maintained over its efforts here and is saying that, far from doing too much, the Americans are doing too little and the Administration may ask for more money."

It is indeed a momentous occasion when Nixon is forced to reveal some previously "secret" aspect of his continued aggression against the peoples of Indochina. The revelation referred to by Whitney was the U.S. government's decision to permit reporters a view of the CIA's base at Long Tieng, on the southern edge of the Plain of Jars. The base has been all but overrun by liberation forces.

The U.S. embassy in Vientiane arranged for reporters to fly to Long Tieng on January 19. Among the other things Whitney observed there was the presence of American "civilians" as "advisers" to Vang Pao, the general who heads the Meo guerrilla army directed by the CIA.

Whitney could tell that the Americans were civilians because they were wearing civilian clothes. Had it not been for this unmistakable sign, the civilians might have been taken for military personnel, since they were involved in the same sort of actions that American military "advisers" have performed throughout the war in Indochina. Those seen by Whitney were directing air strikes.

Nixon was forced to grant this unusual look into his war in Laos by the need for additional funds to prop up his puppet, Souvanna Phouma. Last fall, Congress amended a military procurement bill to limit spending in support of Souvanna Phouma to a mere \$350,000,000 in the year ending next June. This figure does not include the expenses of the massive air war being waged by U.S. planes in Laos, but covers such items as ammunition, support for the remains of Vang Pao's army, and payment of the estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Thai "volunteers" fighting in the country.

Despite this considerable assistance, Souvanna Phouma's forces have been driven from the Plain of Jars, the Boloven Plateau in the south, and, on January 21, from an important road junction between Vientiane and the royal capital of Luang Prabang. The obvious solution to this situation from Nixon's standpoint is to twist arms in Congress for more money—and perhaps to increase such other forms of assistance as U.S. "advisers" or the tonnage of bombs dropped daily.

As Nixon is aware, however, many members of Congress—especially the growing number interested in running for president as "doves"—are reluctant to take public responsibility for such an escalation, although they fully support the aims of U.S. imperialism in Indochina. Nixon apparently feels that a public display of just how bad things are is necessary to bring these waverers around.

Souvanna Phouma performed his part as expected, threatening to throw in the towel unless more money was forthcoming. Whitney wrote:

"The Laotian Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, is aware of the re-

strictions on American aid. A European diplomat who saw him recently said today [January 20] that the Prince was growing discouraged. . . ."

The discouraged prince was quoted by the diplomat as saying, "What can we do? Maybe we'll have to give up."

A "high-ranking" but anonymous official interviewed by Whitney explained that the amendment that was supposed to limit the war had in fact been responsible for its escalation.

"Maybe one of the reasons the enemy is attacking so heavily here now is because of this amendment," the official said. "It just shows the tragedy of trying to put a ceiling on any war."

This philosophical observation probably contained more truth than the anonymous official himself realized. There is in fact no "ceiling" on Nixon's war in Indochina and there will not be one so long as any U.S. troops or planes remain in Southeast Asia.

While the manner in which Nixon floated his trial balloons about escalation in Laos was so transparent as to be almost farcical, it was meant in deadly seriousness. Nixon remains ready to increase the slaughter whenever he believes he can get away with it.

The antiwar movement can respond to this threat by redoubling its efforts to build the most massive demonstrations possible on April 22. □

### 1,750,000th Veteran Returns to U.S.

### The War Goes On—And On—And On

An American GI who returned to the U.S. from Vietnam recently received an "honor" that gives an idea of the magnitude of the war that has been waged against the Vietnamese people.

The January 22 *New York Times* reported that Christopher J. Jimenez was welcomed by officials at the Oakland (California) Army Terminal with a ceremony proclaiming him the 1,750,000th American serviceman to return from Vietnam since 1961.

The paper gave an optimistic slant to its report:

"A Veterans Administration official who welcomed Mr. Jimenez back to civilian life had some cheering news. The decision to honor the 1,750,000th

returning veteran was chosen, rather than the two-millionth, because the possibility of welcoming the two-millionth man home is remote. There are only 170,000 American fighting men left in Vietnam."

Unless Nixon is forced to change his plans, however, the possibility of welcoming the 2,000,000th soldier is not as remote as the Veterans Administration official assumed. If Nixon sets the level of the intended "residual force" at 50,000 troops, the grand celebration would occur around the end of 1974.

And it could occur even earlier if they counted the more than 50,000 soldiers who have returned home in boxes. □

## More on Dominican 'Search and Destroy' Mission

"The operation resumed at 2:20 in the afternoon with the arrival of four M-X-60 tanks equipped with cannon and high-caliber machine guns," the Santo Domingo daily *El Caribe* reported January 13, describing a "search and destroy" mission the day before by the army and the police. The target was a group of six alleged guerrillas hiding in a cave on the outskirts of the city.\*

"While a helicopter flew over the area, trying to direct the fire of the mortars and tanks, a group of soldiers and policemen advanced under cover of the barrage."

Four young revolutionists were killed in the onslaught—Amaury Germán Aristy, Virgilio Eugenio Perdomo Pérez, Ulises Arquimedes Cerón Polanco, and Bienvenido Silveira Leal Prandy. Two other "guerrillas," Plinio Matos Moquete and Harry Jiménez Castillo, reportedly escaped.

The attacking force suffered eight dead and seven wounded.

The day after the operation, a statement attributed to the leader of the revolutionary group, Matos Moquete, appeared in *El Nacional de Ahora*:

"No matter who falls, with our last breath we will reaffirm that there can be no turning back on the road we have taken until the imperialists and the reactionaries are completely smashed and until our people and all the oppressed peoples of the earth are victorious."

In its operation against this small group of youths, the joint army-police command terrorized whole sections of the capital city and paralyzed its normal activities.

"Traffic on the Las Américas highway was stopped past the fourteen kilometer point, when the military declared the area a 'combat zone,' Rafael Rodríguez wrote in *El Caribe* of January 13.

In the same issue of the Santo Domingo paper, another reporter, Manuel José Torres A., wrote:

\*For an early report on this operation and the actions leading to it, see "Massive Witch-Hunt in Santo Domingo," *Intercontinental Press*, January 24, p. 66.

"Traffic was light last evening in the city. Policemen and soldiers arrested several people who had gathered at street corners in various neighborhoods. The names of the persons jailed or detained have not been released. . . .

"The Apolo theater reports that the audience at last night's film showing was only about 60 percent of normal. . . .

"Moreover, it was noticed that El Conde, Padre Billini, and Arzobispo Nouel streets, as well as Mella and Padre Castellanos avenues were practically deserted."

The January 12 operation was preceded by large-scale searches and curfews January 8, which also disrupted the life of many neighborhoods in the city.

Demonstrations against the latest repressive action of the troops and police were held in several areas of the Dominican capital and in San Pedro de Macorís. All sections of the left condemned the brutality of the armed forces. In addition, the leader of the main opposition party, former president Juan Bosch, made a respectful but strong protest:

"The police and military commanders who directed yesterday's operation no doubt thought that they had to do what they did because they were facing armed men who were ready to die fighting. But the people don't see it that way. They think that since these men were surrounded, the police and army should have waited a discreet period, at least until daylight, to start negotiations. They should have told the trapped youths over loudspeakers, repeating it for hours if need be, that they were surrounded and could not escape and that every guarantee would be given to ensure their safety after they gave up."

The former president complained that, under the influence of their American advisers, the Dominican repressive forces had adopted a policy of "overkill," which could have disastrous political repercussions.

"The search operation carried out jointly by the armed forces and the

police on January 8, which aimed at finding the four youths who fell in battle yesterday, was a military technique the Yankee advisers copied from the Germans.

"The Germans used this technique in the last world war, but they used it in wartime to find and eliminate underground fighters in the countries they occupied. And here, as we know, we are not at war with anybody. However, these American police advisers have brainwashed the Dominican police and convinced them that we are at war. Against whom? Who is the enemy?"

"A police official told us a few days ago, speaking at a graduation assembly for police trainees. We are at war against Communism, and it is a policeman's duty to wage war against this enemy. Thus, what these Yankee advisers are doing is not training policemen to maintain public order using a minimum of violence. They are teaching the police to make war on Communism. . . .

"Judging from the statements of well-informed persons and from what can be deduced from the reports in the papers about the meeting of high police and military officials January 6 in the Palacio de la Policía, American officials took part in planning the search operation of January 8. These searches ended in failure. Not a single one of the youths the police were looking for was found.

"But how many people were kept from going to their jobs? How many sick people were kept from going for medical attention? How many doctors were prevented from visiting their patients? How many businesses and plants were closed because their personnel could not leave their homes? And what is worse, more than a hundred persons were jailed, and not one had any connection with the persons sought in this gigantic operation, which is reliably reported to have cost the government about 100,000 pesos [1 peso equals US\$1]."

Bosch deplored the stupidity of such tactics, noting that "before," that is, even under the dictator Trujillo, the police normally used only clubs and

pistols. The former Dominican president seemed dumbfounded at the American ruling class's relying on heavy weapons and grandiose military operations to repress political opposition. What could be the reason for such clumsiness? Was it because they did not understand the "natives"? Or

did they have some unfathomable ulterior motive?

"The Yankee advisers could not have taken into account these results of the operation because they do not know our people. They do not know the terror in which the people of the poor neighborhoods in the capital live,

or the fear they feel when they see themselves surrounded by armed men. Thus, the Yankee advisers could not have considered the consequences of this operation. Or worse, they might have considered them and deliberately provoked them in order to injure someone." □

## Massive Demonstrations Greet Pearce Commission

# Zimbabwe Gives Its Answer to Heath-Smith Deal

In January, an eighteen-member British commission arrived in Zimbabwe [Rhodesia], supposedly to test Black attitudes toward a November 24 agreement between British Prime Minister Edward Heath and "Rhodesian" ruler Ian Smith.

The agreement provides for the formal independence from Great Britain of the white-ruled colony, provided the country's 5,000,000 Blacks accept the terms of a new constitution. While giving lip service to the principle of majority rule (there are only 250,000 whites in Zimbabwe), the new constitution actually allows an almost indefinite extension of the present system of white domination. (See *Intercontinental Press*, December 6, 1971, p. 1062, for a report on the terms of the agreement.)

The commission contains no Africans; most of its members are British aristocrats (its chairman is a seventy-year-old judge, Lord Pearce) or government employees who have served in the British colonial office. Its plan was to spend a few months in Zimbabwe, interview some Black "leaders," and report that Blacks favored implementation of the agreement.

But, to the shock of the Smith government, not to mention the Tories, an unprecedented mass mobilization of the people of Zimbabwe has brought the work of the Pearce Commission to a virtual halt.

On January 17, some 8,000 Blacks took to the streets of Gwelo, a city in the central part of the country, shouting "No! No!" Mobile police units assaulted the demonstrators with tear gas. One Black was killed; fifty-five were arrested.

Despite the police repression, the Gwelo demonstrations continued for

three days, with Blacks defending themselves against the police attacks.

On January 19, the protests spread to the capital, Salisbury, where cars belonging to whites were stoned by Africans chanting "No! No!"—a phrase that quickly became a national slogan.

About the same time, some 200 miles south of Salisbury, in the Black suburbs of Fort Victoria, crowds of Blacks refused to listen to two representatives from the Pearce Commission. Two Africans were shot down by cops.

By January 19 it became clear that Smith's government had completely lost control of the situation. On that day former Rhodesian Prime Minister Garfield Todd, who is considered a liberal, was arrested, along with his daughter, at his home in Shabani, a mining town where police had recently shot into a crowd of strikers, killing one African and wounding nine others.

The arrest of Todd was widely regarded as a sign of panic on Smith's part. The agreement with Britain provides for the maintenance of "normal political activity" in the country. Denis Healy, the British Labour party's foreign affairs spokesman, said he was "appalled" by Todd's arrest.

Apparently the shooting down of Africans and the Rhodesian law prohibiting gatherings of more than ten people are not violations of "normal political activity." But by arresting a white politician, Smith overstepped the bounds of good taste. Even the *Times* of London began to criticize the terms of the agreement.

On January 20, African opposition to the pact spread to Umtali, about 150 miles east of Salisbury. Eight

were reported killed as cops fired into a demonstration. The same day it was reported that three Blacks had been killed and twenty-four wounded in the Salisbury demonstrations.

The British had previously acknowledged that Africans in the urban centers generally opposed the agreement, although the massive manifestation of that sentiment took them by surprise. But what put the final stamp of doom on the commission's whitewash job was the reaction of Africans in the countryside, where most Blacks live.

Chiefs in the so-called Tribal Trust Lands are on the payroll of the Smith government. They can be dismissed at the will of the regime.

The commission's original plan was to send teams into the countryside, amass a series of statements of support from local chiefs, and then report that most Blacks favored the agreement. But the commission hearings in the countryside received what the January 21 *New York Times* called an "overwhelmingly negative response."

"As its members fanned out across Rhodesia this week," wrote correspondent Charles Mohr from Salisbury, "they were repeatedly met by cries of 'No! No! No!' from crowds of blacks."

"Not one commission hearing, as reported in the local white press, could be considered a 'success' from the British and Rhodesian points of view."

Black opposition appeared to be so unanimous that even the Center party, a coalition of Black and white liberals that opposes the Smith regime but had urged acceptance of the agreement, reversed its stand on January 20.

Also on January 20, the Rhodesian government canceled several public hearings of the commission, and ar-

rested Josiah Chinamano, a leader of the African National Council, which has opposed the agreement.

Smith, who seemed shaken by the fact that "his" Africans had gotten so far out of control, went on national television to proclaim that Zimbabwe Blacks are "stupid" for opposing the agreement. "What greater proof could anyone have of their lack of maturity, lack of civilization, their inability to make any constructive contribution?" asked the white leader.

Smith went on to claim that if Africans opposed the new agreement, they must support the 1969 constitution, which is less hypocritical in its oppression of Blacks.

Finally, after some fifty sessions, the Pearce Commission managed to find one chief, near the city of Bulwayo, who said he supported the proposed deal. It remains to be seen whether the commission will report that the existence of one "mature," "civilized" African, a man no doubt capable of making "constructive contributions" to the oppression of his people, shows that the African people really support the Heath-Smith plan.

In a dispatch from Salisbury in the January 24 *New York Times*, Charles Mohr indicated that the commission may hold its future meetings behind closed doors in order to make it easier to misrepresent African opinion:

"In a few days the commissioners . . . will meet in Salisbury to exchange experiences and discuss ways to improve their sampling efforts. It

seems possible that they will try to find some substitute for the public meetings.

"If they continue to rely primarily on the public meetings and the response does not change, it will be almost impossible for the commission to tell the world plausibly that its findings are that Rhodesians accept the terms."

Whether or not Smith and the British government decide to implement the agreement, it has been completely

exposed before the entire world by the wave of demonstrations. A January 22 statement by the African National Council summarized the determined position of the African population of Zimbabwe:

"If our rejection of the proposals means that the 1969 Constitution will remain, then the African would rather live with an imposed oppressive position than go down in history as having accepted an oppressive constitution for himself." □

## Students in Madrid Battle With Police

More than 250 students at Madrid's two universities were arrested in four days of confrontations with the police, January 17-20. On January 17 a rally of about 1,000 students protesting the expulsion of 4,000 medical students was attacked by mounted police, who have been stationed permanently on campus since the beginning of 1969.

The students fought back, and by noon there were skirmishes at various places around the campus. Some students moved into the downtown area, where they blocked traffic and used stones to protect themselves against police attack.

Some official cars were reportedly stoned, including one bearing the insignia of General Fernando Fierres de Villavicencio, a member of Franco's staff.

On the evening of January 17, police dispersed a rally in the engineering school by firing shots over the students' heads.

About 100 students were arrested during the first day of fighting. There was no report of the number injured.

The demonstrations continued on a somewhat smaller scale on January 18. On January 20, club-wielding police attacked a rally of 800 students in the architecture school. Besides the students, four professors and the dean were beaten. About 150 more students were arrested.

Since last November, medical students had been boycotting classes in protest over changes in the curriculum. The university instituted a series of examinations, one every four months. If a student fails any one of them, he loses credit for an entire year. In addition, the length of study

was increased from six years to seven. Students charged that the ministry of education was trying to initiate a covert quota system.

On January 13 the rector expelled almost all of the medical school students, saying they would be reaccepted only if they signed a pledge to "respect academic discipline" and "accept the security measures the authorities deem necessary so that classes can proceed in an orderly fashion." The students refused and called upon other students to support them by going on strike. Some 500 doctors in two city hospitals declared their solidarity with the students.


Although the students' demands centered on curriculum issues, the question of police repression on the campus figured heavily in their decision to strike. After the university rector charged that it was impossible to have a dialogue with the unreasonable students, they replied:

"There can be no dialogue if the personal safety of those doing the talking is not guaranteed. Every time we chose representatives, they were arrested, prosecuted, and indicted. These penalties and the presence of the police in the university do not seem to be the best way to set up a dialogue."

## Spanish CP Members Jailed

Luis Lucio Lobato, a member of the executive committee of the Spanish Communist party's Central Committee, has been sentenced in Madrid to twenty-one years in prison, according to a January 15 Associated Press dispatch.

The agency said that another party member and a member of the workers' commissions were sentenced at the same time to five and three years respectively.



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### Hundreds of Czechoslovaks Jailed

On January 13 the official Czech news agency, CTK, announced that "several persons" had been arrested on charges of having printed and distributed antistate leaflets. The January 14 *New York Times* reported "informed sources" in Prague as saying that among those arrested were Luděk Pachman, international chess grand master and former champion of Czechoslovakia; Milan Huebl, former rector of the Communist party college; and Karel Kyncl, a radio and press commentator during the Dubcek regime.

Pachman and Kyncl were members of a group that presented a ten-point manifesto to government leaders just before the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion. It called upon the Husak leadership to continue to uphold the "Prague spring" program and work for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

Although charges were brought against many of the signers of the manifesto, no trial took place. Kyncl was recently expelled from the Communist party for having denounced the "normalization" policies of the Husak government at a Prague committee plenum.

Huebl was elected to the party Central Committee at the same time as he was put in charge of the CP college. (It was one of Dubcek's first appointments.) If he is brought to trial, he will be the first of the Dubcek Central Committee members to be tried.

The CTK announcement said that the "antistate" activity of those arrested covered a period of two years, which would suggest that the regime is trying to accumulate "evidence" for a major witch-hunt trial.

Besides the arrest of the three notables, the January 14 *New York Times* reported that "an informed Czechoslovak source has received word from reliable sources in Prague" that two sweeping waves of arrests were conducted in late 1971.

The first came at the time of the national elections (November 26 and 27); the second on December 25 and 26. Aimed at persons engaging in opposition political activity, these two

actions reportedly seized several hundred. Only a few have been released.

At least some of the arrests may have been related to the circulation of oppositionist literature by an underground group. On January 16, *Il Manifesto* in Rome published a translation of a leaflet said to have been circulated at industrial plants in Prague and other parts of the country.

The leaflet, according to the January 17 *New York Times*, "called on workers to fight against the country's pro-Soviet leadership from within the Communist party and the trade unions, and to boycott official rallies."

The leaflet was said to have been given to *Il Manifesto* by Czechoslovak Communists now living in exile. It

was signed "legally elected workers-functionaries of the Czechoslovak Communist party." This was apparently a reference to the party congress held secretly in Prague August 21-22, 1968, at the time of the Soviet invasion.

The leaflet denounced the regime of Gustav Husak as a "dogmatic, bureaucratic clique," and condemned it for suppressing democratic rights. Workers in industrial centers were urged to become a "revolutionary nucleus" for a struggle against the regime.

"In particular," the *New York Times* reported, "workers were advised to oppose the election of party bureaucrats to leadership posts when party cells were called to vote, to insist on secret balloting at the annual trade-union meetings, and to press for full enforcement of existing legislation to protect the safety and welfare of industrial workers." □

### Charged With Defaming Police

### Marcellin Indicts Sartre Again



JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

The charge stems from an article that appeared in the September 1971 issue of *Vérité Rhône-Alpes*, a provincial supplement to *La Cause du Peuple*, of which Sartre is the nominal editor. The article criticized conditions in French prisons.

On his way to the magistrate's office, Sartre told reporters, "This is a ridiculous business. Once more, I await a public trial."

Sartre was indicted on the same charges on January 19, 1971, because of two articles that were published in 1970 by *La Cause du Peuple*. He was also charged with defaming both the police and the prison administration for writing an article on drugs published January 1, 1971, in *Tout*.

As yet, Sartre has not been tried for any of these "offenses."

Indicting radical journalists on defamation charges is a tactic of repression instituted by the Pompidou regime after attempts at outright suppression failed. It was first used against *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste. □

## Allende Plays Into Hands of Rightists

By Jon Rothschild

On January 20, in the wake of the defeat of government-supported candidates in two by-elections January 16, Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens "accepted" the resignation of his cabinet. The electoral setback thus triggered one of the most serious parliamentary crises for the Unidad Popular (UP—Popular Unity) regime since Allende's inauguration in November 1970.

Under normal conditions, the two elections would have been of less than earth-shattering importance. The districts involved, one encompassing O'Higgins and Colchagua provinces, the other Linares province, comprise only about 5 percent of Chile's voters. The O'Higgins-Colchagua contest was for a Chamber of Deputies seat that had been vacated when its holder, a member of the right-wing Partido Nacional (PN—National party), fled the country in panic after Allende's election. The Linares Senate seat had been held by a Christian Democrat who died several months ago. Neither of the districts had been centers of UP strength.

In the April 1971 municipal elections, the UP parties polled 23,100 votes in Linares, compared to 26,800 for the parties of the opposition. In the O'Higgins area, the UP received a majority last April, but in Colchagua the Christian Democratic and National parties ran well ahead. The combined vote gave the UP a slight majority in the district.

For the O'Higgins-Colchagua Senate seat, the January 16 race pitted the Christian Democrat Rafael Moreno, who directed the agrarian reform program under the Eduardo Frei regime, against Héctor Olivares, a member of the Socialist party and head of the copper miners' union. Final returns gave Moreno 77,614 votes to 68,338 for Olivares, representing a shift of about 5,000 votes from the UP to the opposition since April.

In Linares, National party candidate Sergio Diez got 29,990 votes, compared to 21,165 for María Eliana Mery, the government-supported candidate. This represented a shift of

about 2,500 votes away from UP-backed parties since the April elections. In both races the Christian Democratic and National parties supported each other's candidates, closing ranks against the left.

Moreno, a "rising star" in the Christian Democratic organization, called



David, in Direct From Cuba

SALVADOR ALLENDE

the results "a victory for democracy which the totalitarian elements in the government will have to heed." Minister of the Interior Alejandro Rios Valdivia compared the results to "a strong tremor, grade 4, but short of an earthquake."

Preliminary analysis of the returns, according to the January 18 *Le Monde*, indicated that the UP had lost heavily among the small and middle peasant proprietors, who feared that the government planned to reduce from 80 to 40 hectares the amount of land that can be owned by families.

Allende's program of advancing to socialism via the electoral road turned what would have otherwise been two relatively unimportant by-elections (the outcome of which did not even alter the parliamentary relation of forces) into a psychological victory for the rightist forces now mobilizing in Chile.

In the 1970 presidential elections, Allende's popular front was able to win a plurality, although not a majority, of the popular vote. But his inauguration as president was confirmed only by the acquiescence of the Christian Democrats in the National Congress. That acquiescence was based on a series of concessions from Allende. Both houses of Congress are controlled by the opposition, as are the courts. The press is largely anti-government, and the army and police are run by officer corps not noted for their revolutionary zeal. (One of Allende's 1970 concessions to the Christian Democrats was a pledge to prohibit the formation of "private militia," that is, any popular armed force independent of the army and police.)

Consequently, Allende holds office largely by virtue of the sufferance of the Christian Democrats. His projected reforms can be overruled by Congress or be declared unconstitutional by the courts. The strategy of the Chilean national bourgeoisie has been to block unacceptable economic and social reforms and wait for the masses to become disappointed with Allende because of his failure to carry out his promises. With the erosion of the Allende regime, the rightists can then stage a comeback.

Allende, on his part, has steadfastly refused to step beyond electoral bounds, taking the attitude that if the Unidad Popular is voted out of office "democratically," Chile's march to socialism is ended, and disaster ensues.

The fate of the country, according to Allende, should be settled in the electoral arena. This attitude tends to convert every election, no matter how minor, into a portentous contest. The right wing, on the other hand, although it seeks to make the most of any electoral gains, has no intention of abiding by any electoral decisions that run against its basic economic and political interests. It has been mobilizing against the Unidad Popular regime, and this has led to a deepening polarization of forces in Chile.



The Unidad Popular has thus come under increasing pressure, both from the right and the left. The "march of the empty pots" and the antigovernment mass meetings of December showed that the bourgeoisie is preparing for extraparliamentary action. But the rightist mobilization has been combined with parliamentary maneuvering.

On January 6 the Chamber of Deputies voted to suspend José Tohá, minister of the interior, supposedly because he was lax in disbanding leftist armed groups. Allende, to circumvent the opposition, switched Tohá to the post of minister of defense. But the Senate persisted. On January 22 impeachment proceedings against Tohá were held. After twenty-three senators representing parties that support the UP walked out, the remaining twenty-six convicted Tohá of five charges relating to various incidents of rural and urban violence.

At the meeting the accused popular-front leader disclaimed personal responsibility for the fact that some peasant land seizures had not been forcibly reversed by the government. The press of the Socialist party, of which Tohá is a member, charged that the Senate action was a "trial run" for the impeachment of Allende himself.

While the congressional maneuvers were in progress, violence flared in Linares province. A group of members of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) were accused of attempting to kidnap the son of a leader of the National party. A group of landowners, apparently encouraged by their electoral victory, attacked fifteen peasants who supposedly invaded a piece of property.

Allende's failure to deliver on his election promises has already given rise to considerable disenchantment on the part of Chile's workers and peasants. One of the few slogans around which the UP has actually tried to mobilize the masses has been the "battle for production," a polite term for speedup. Chilean workers have understandably failed to respond to the slogan. Although about 100 large factories have been nationalized, some 34,000 small enterprises remain in private hands. Even in the big factories, government delegates outnumber workers' delegates on the management boards by six to five.

Although the workers in the Chuquicamata copper mines were persuaded, by both the government and Fidel Castro, to "moderate" their demands for wage increases and not go on strike, other sectors of the working class are reportedly considering actions to counteract the galloping inflation.

The Chilean left is also showing signs of disenchantment with the "Chilean road to socialism." A member of the MIR has said that while Fidel Castro's policies in the early 1960s could be designated "operation watermelon"—green on the outside, red on the inside—the Chilean state of affairs looks more like the radish: red only on the outside.

Combined with the domestic polarization has been mounting imperialist pressure on Chile. The Kennecott Copper Corporation, one of the major U.S. companies having investments in Chile, has demanded immediate payment of a debt of several million dollars. Chile's dollar reserves dropped from \$335,000,000 in November 1970 to \$100,000,000 one year later. By the end of 1971, the balance of payments deficit stood at \$210,000,000.

In February the Chilean government will meet in Paris with representatives of the United States and twelve other Western countries to renegotiate a plan to repay Chile's foreign debt, which is estimated to be on the order of \$3,000,000,000! Such a debt, especially when compounded by shrinking reserves, is a source of massive pressure on a regime that insists on remaining within the bounds of the capitalist world market.

On January 19 Nixon announced a new policy toward countries nationalizing U.S.-owned industry. From now on, he said, the United States would suspend all aid agreements with any country that does not take "reasonable steps" to insure rapid and "just" payment of compensation to the U.S. owners whose holdings are nationalized.

The statement was directed largely at countries like Chile, and Allende lost no time in answering. The same night the Nixon pronouncement was issued, Allende said that the people of Chile would not tolerate others "trampling" on their independence.

But he continued to try to justify his program by appealing to bourgeois legality, even when confronted

with such a direct imperialist threat: "I think that small dependent countries such as ours are countries that have the right to be respected. Our laws are within the framework of our constitutions, written by a congress more than 150 years old. For that reason, it is a country that can dictate its own laws with dignity."

In the context of the domestic polarization of forces and the attempts by imperialism to tighten the screws on the Chilean economy, Allende has responded by continuing to play the electoral game, practicing class collaborationism. That strategy has blocked the mobilization of the Chilean workers and poor peasants and prevented the transformation of the nation's social system.

Paradoxically for Allende, it has also weakened his electoral position. The inability of the UP to carry out its own program, limited as it is, has caused the UP committees, the basis of the popular front formation at the time of the 1970 victory, to wither away. It has also led to an ebb in popular support for the regime, which has found its reflection on the electoral level.

The bourgeoisie, while welcoming Allende's adherence to an electoral process that enables it to block all important reform measures and take full advantage of its own victories, has shown no sign of confining its activities to parliamentarism. The electoral battles will no doubt continue, but the fate of the country will be settled on another level—the extraparliamentary clash of social forces. □

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## The Case of Pablo Alvarado Barrera

By Carlos Sevilla

[On November 26, 1971, a comando group affiliated with the guerrillas of Genaro Vázquez Rojas, kidnapped the rector of the Guerrero state university, Dr. Jaime Castrejón Díaz. In return for his release, a ransom of \$175,000 was paid, and the government freed nine political prisoners, who were flown to Havana.

[Unfortunately, this did not close the affair. On December 4, Pablo Alvarado Barrera, who had been held in Lecumberri as a political prisoner since July 1967, was murdered. Leftist circles in Mexico, as well as prisoners in Lecumberri, are convinced that the killing was carried out on orders in retaliation for the kidnapping of Castrejón. Alvarado had been accused of association with the Vázquez guerrillas.

[The official government version runs as follows: General Arcaute Franco, the warden of Lecumberri, was eating in the kitchen with Lt. Col. Gil Cárdenas about 9:30 in the evening of December 4. Suddenly two prisoners, the brothers Peña Anaya and Juan López Mejía, who were serving long sentences as professional bank robbers, burst into the room. At gunpoint, they blindfolded the two prison officials. They then compelled General Arcaute to telephone an order to bring Pablo Alvarado so that he could join the two bank robbers in escaping from the prison.

[The political prisoner was brought by the comandante of the prison guard, Ricardo Vital Hernández. One of the bank robbers, Peña Anaya, attacked Vital with a knife. Vital drew his pistol and fired.

[The warden thereupon tore off the blindfold, hauled out a pistol he carried hidden in a shoulder holster, and fired at the prisoners as they attacked him. He killed the two brothers and Pablo Alvarado.

[Thus the warden was not culpable in the death of the three, having killed them in carrying out his duties. As for Captain Vital, he was killed by Juan López Mejía during an escape attempt.

[This official account met with wide-

spread disbelief. It was denounced by the political prisoners in Lecumberri. In an effort to ascertain the facts, Carlos Sevilla, himself a political prisoner until July 6 of last year, visited Lecumberri. His account of what he learned follows.]

\* \* \*

Yesterday I went to Lecumberri prison in order to discover what I could about the death of Pablo Alvarado. I went to Ward "M," where I was held for two years and ten months as a prisoner. I know all the prisoners there. Here is what I found out in talking with various political prisoners:

*Question. What do you know about the attempted escape December 4 in which Pablo Alvarado and three others were killed?*


*Answer. There was no attempted es-*

cape, only ordinary murders, carefully covered up. They were the outcome of various things that we had been exposing for some time. For one, there is a conflict between the prison authorities and the guards. For another, for the past three months, that is, since the new officials took office, there has been a series of provocations against the political prisoners.

The conflict between the prison authorities and the guards started when the new warden demanded that those in charge of the guards lay off seventy of them to make way for members of the "hawks" [rightist civilian terrorists supported by the police].

*Q. Hawks?*

*A. Yes. Since the new administration came in, persons dressed in plain clothes have been carrying out "guard" duties. They tried to keep their identity secret from the prison population, but it became known that they were hawks because the heads of the guard detail spread the word among the guards in order to let them know about the proposals to lay them off so as to create openings. Now everybody knows they are hawks and they themselves admit it. Their chief is one of the persons closest to the warden. His name is Salgado.*



Inside the walls of Lecumberri prison.

The guards have protested vigorously against the scheme of replacing them with hawks, even going to the prosecuting attorney and the president of the city court of justice. But it seems they didn't get anywhere.

However, the conflict got worse. This became evident about ten days ago when a prisoner in Ward "O" hanged himself, and the warden fired one of the guards in that ward. The chief of the guard detail, Vital, who was killed last Saturday, protested. He had an argument with the warden of the prison, and the warden told him he would live to repent it . . . Doesn't the coincidence between that threat and Vital's death seem odd to you, bearing in mind that he died from twenty-three stab wounds, six bullets, and being kicked, and that his brother has accused the warden of being guilty of his death?

*Q. But how do you know about the threats made against Vital?*

A. You know that everyone knows everything here. The guards themselves and the deputies told us what had happened. Besides, Vital was our friend. Don't you remember the dark-complexioned guard with a lieutenant's rating who always used to play basketball with us? That was Vital. Maybe his friendliness toward us had something to do with his death.

*Q. What kind of provocations did the authorities use against the political prisoners?*

A. They started a few days after the new authorities came in. In an interview we had with the warden, he was frank about his attitude. He told us that as an army man, he couldn't treat anyone as a civilian; that he considered us to be enemies because, as he understood it, we had tried to overthrow the government and you had to pay with your life for that; that he would shoot us with pleasure if he got orders to that effect from above; and that if it was necessary to "settle accounts" with someone, he would find a way of doing it outside of his cell.

A couple of days after that, he told us that we could no longer talk with our lawyers in our wards like the rest of the prison population but would have to leave our wards and go to a room specially set up for that.

You can imagine the risks involved in going through a prison filled with thugs and soldiers . . .

Also he soon began to talk about us preparing to break out and that no one would survive that adventure.

You know that the trials that were used to hold us were completely illegal from any point of view and consequently, with the most minimum observance of the law, we would soon be freed. That being the case, to organize a prison break would not only be suicidal but completely asinine.

*Q. Was this the case with Pablo Alvarado, too?*

A. Not exactly, but his situation was similar. Pablo had been sentenced to eight years in prison and had been held since July 1967. In accordance with legal provisions, he could ask to be released on probation when he had completed three-fifths of his sentence. So he was close to having finished the almost five years required to ask for release on probation.

*Q. All of you completely reject the possibility that Pablo might have tried to escape and you say categorically that he was murdered. What else do you know specifically to make you so decided, aside from the general items that you indicated?*

A. To begin with, we are certain that Pablo could not have participated

in the escape plans, which, according to the authorities and the survivor of the alleged group of escapees, were initiated two months ago. Pablo had been held in solitary confinement, that is, incommunicado and isolated for three months when the authorities said he became involved in the actions of a group that was then caught.

In the second place, it is known, and the authorities themselves have likewise mentioned it in their declarations, Pablo refused for two hours to leave his cell. What person engaged in a prison break would be calm enough to wait two hours for someone with whom he had no political ties or any other kind of connection?

Finally, how is it possible to eliminate the discrepancy between the account of Pablo being killed while trying to escape and the fact that his body showed that he had been brutally beaten to such a degree that he was almost unrecognizable, as can be seen from the photographs published in the daily papers?

*Q. So what is your explanation?*

A. We believe that Pablo was singled out in reprisal for or during the investigation of the kidnapping of the rector of the University of Guerrero, and that later he was murdered in cold blood. Probably the other killings were carried out to facilitate the measures taken by the new prison authorities and in revenge against Vital.

December 7, 1971

## Asia Facing 'Problem' of Too Much Food

The so-called miracle rice, which was supposed to create a "green revolution" in Asia, has turned out to be a mixed blessing for most capitalist regimes in the area.

While the rice has resulted in a significant increase in food supplies, it has also brought about a situation not at all uncommon in capitalist systems: overproduction. James P. Sterba wrote in the January 16 *New York Times*:

"Officials in Burma and Thailand . . . are predicting long-term economic depressions as rice prices fall. In both countries, rice exports provide most of the foreign exchange earnings."

In 1967, Japan had to import 500,000 tons of rice to meet domestic needs. Last year the country exported 866,000 tons. The budget approved by the cabinet January 14 includes payments of almost \$32,000,000 to farmers as a reward for not growing still more rice.

Typical rice prices on the Bangkok market, Sterba reported, have fallen to approximately 60 percent of their December 1969 level.

The situation may get even worse for the profiteers: Some experts are predicting that Asia as a whole will produce a surplus of rice within three years. □

# Strikes Express Opposition to South African Rule

By Peter Katjavivi

[The following article is reprinted from the January 14 issue of *Peace News*, published in London. Peter Katjavivi is the representative in Britain of the South West African People's Organization.]

\* \* \*

The industrial and commercial life in Namibia is grinding to a halt. For the first time in the history of Southern Africa a nation-wide strike has been thoroughly successful. In the four weeks the strike has lasted, about 20,000 contract workers have joined the strike, which has now paralysed the major mining industries [and others], such as, for instance, the domestic industries such as dairies and bakeries and the farm industries, and which is now threatening the building and fishing industries. The strike has the support and co-operation of all Namibians, and people join with enthusiasm. As one farmer said: "My 'kitchen-ovambo' heard about the strike on the radio, told the others about it, and they all went on strike".

The last half of 1971 was marked by a large number of protest actions against the South African occupation of Namibia; this was sparked off by the Advisory Opinion given by the International Court of Justice on June 21, 1971. According to the Opinion "the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the territory".

The Namibian reaction came immediately. It was as if the national protest against South Africa's presence, which can be said to be endemic in Namibia, was given a chance to come into the open, inspired by the feeling of international support which the Opinion produced. Local leaders, churchmen, school-children, students and groups of local citizens all came out in a form of protest appropriate to their situation. School-children demonstrated; students boycotted important events at their institutions; the churchmen wrote open letters to the South African Prime Minister as well as pastoral letters to their congregations; local leaders issued statements, and groups of citizens presented their authorities with letters expressing their discontent with South Africa's overrule.

The present nation-wide strike—although described in the press as a strike only against the contract labour system—is a part of the general Namibian protest against South Africa's occupation; the difference from the actions mentioned earlier is only one of scale in that the total labour force of Namibia is in the process of coming out on strike. It is mass-action rather than individual and group-action.

The strike began in Windhoek and Walvis Bay. It was reported in the *Windhoek Advertiser*, December 10, 1971, that the workers in the municipal compound at Walvis Bay were planning to strike on December 14. The work-

ers in Walvis Bay also wrote letters to other parts of the country, urging the workers there to strike on that day. On Sunday afternoon, December 12, the residents of the Windhoek municipal compound, which houses about 6,000 contract workers, held a meeting at which it was decided to strike the following day. On Monday, December 13, the vast majority of Windhoek's contract workers did not leave the compound to go to work. Convicts and white schoolboys were brought in to collect rubbish and deliver milk, and the building industry closed down.

In Walvis Bay the strike took a bit longer to get under way as large numbers of workers waited until the end of the week when they were paid. Later the same week the strike spread to the American-owned Tsumeb mine, which is the major source of revenue for the country. The lead smelter was closed down altogether, while the copper smelter was manned by whites as an emergency measure, and with a greatly reduced rate of production. The strike is now effective at the Klein Aub and Oamites copper mines, the Berg Aukas lead and vanadium mines, the Uis tin mine, to mention a few examples. The latest and last mine to be affected is Consolidated Diamond Mines at Oranjemund.

Workers in commercial and industrial undertakings as well as on farms in various parts of Namibia have also left their work; one of the latest undertakings to be affected was the airport in Windhoek. If the strike continues until February, the fishing industry will be disastrously affected. Likewise, the building industry, which resumes on January 10 after the holidays, has no guarantees that labour will be available.

According to the contract labour system, this strike is totally illegal. Contract labourers have no right to strike as this amounts to breach of contract, which is a criminal offence. It must be emphasised that it is *only* through contract labour that a worker can earn money, and that the sole recruiting agency is the South West Africa Native Labour Association (SWANLA), which represents the employers. The workers are graded according to physical fitness and age into class A, B, C and *piccanin*; the latter are children. Minimum wages are laid down for each class, ranging from R3.75 (about two pounds Sterling per month) for a *piccanin* to R8.75 (about five pounds Sterling per month) for a class A labourer.

To obtain work a man has to report to the recruiting office, and if he is accepted he is sent on to Grootfontein where he is graded and dispatched to his employer. Workers are transported by rail, bus or truck, often over long distances and under conditions not better than those for cattle. A contract labourer is not allowed to take his family with him; his dependants have to be left behind in his home area. Thus by signing a contract a man enters a condition of enforced bachelorhood in a compound while the livelihood of his family depends upon the money

he is able to send home. The International Commission of Jurists in Geneva has appropriately described the contract labour system in Namibia as "akin to slavery".

One of the complaints about the contract labour system is that while it is illegal for either party to break the contract, the employers who break the contract are rarely punished. Recently at a congress in Windhoek one farmer, Mr Dannie van Vuuren, said he always withheld the wages of the workers until their contracts had expired, and recommended this to other farmers as a method of ensuring that workers stayed until the end of their contract. Though he publicly admitted breaking the contract, and publicly advocated breach of contract on the part of employers, no action was taken against him. If an employee of such a farmer wishes to make a complaint, he must report this complaint to the police or the nearest magistrate. If, however, he leaves the farm to do so without first asking permission of the farmer, he is liable to be charged with desertion.

The day the strike began in Windhoek a meeting was held in Walvis Bay which was attended by Mr G. White, the Chief Native Affairs Commissioner for South West Africa, and a group of headmen from Ovamboland. Bishop Auala, who was staying nearby at the time, also attended the meeting. The strikers made the point that Mr Jannie de Wet [Commissioner General for tribal areas of South West Africa] had said they freely accepted the contract labour system because they were not forced to sign on, but that they allowed themselves to be recruited freely. To show that they rejected the system, the strikers said they were now freely handing in their contracts and opting out of the system. Mr White stood up to say that they had misunderstood Mr de Wet's remarks and that this was not what he had meant. The strikers shouted to Mr White to sit down, and he did so.

The following day a similar meeting was held in Windhoek. Here the strikers were given the choice of either returning to work or being sent home. The workers decided to return home. After the officials had left, the police sealed the gates of the compound and no one was allowed in or out. A number of local people, including a school principal, who were in the compound visiting friends or who had attended the meeting, were arrested when they tried to leave the compound. They were taken to the police station and visitors from Katutura township, where the compound is situated, were told to pay R10.00 (about six pounds Sterling) admission of guilt. They complained that no charge had been specified, and when asked, Colonel Krige, the district commandant of the police, refused to reveal it.

Employers in Windhoek have ascribed the cause of the strike to "agitators" and maintained that their employees would never strike unless forced to. However, there is no evidence suggesting this at all. On the contrary, workers joined directly without any form of persuasion. Moreover, when the workers were taken to board trains to return to the north, there was no attempt by any of them to change their minds and return to work, in spite of the presence of the police who had said they would protect people from intimidators.

The implications of the strike for the workers must be understood, not only against the background of the contract labour system itself, but also in terms of the general living conditions for the Namibian people. By

striking, a man not only jeopardises his own livelihood, he also may have to see his wife and children go undernourished or starving. Moreover, he minimises his chances of getting a job in the future and risks arrest and police brutality. For instance, on one farm in the Grootfontein district belonging to Mr James Simson, nine workers went on strike. The farmer took them to the police, who arrested them. The farmer said he did not wish to employ two of them whom he regarded as "agitators". The remainder were beaten, and were then asked if they would return to work, but six of the seven refused.

The fact that the Namibian workers have decided to take these risks shows not only a strong willingness to undertake great personal sacrifices; it also shows that the situation in Namibia under South African occupation has become intolerable to such an extent that sacrifices on this scale have become the lesser of two evils. The act of striking, and thereby of sacrificing, has become a weapon in the hands of the ordinary man against the tyrants. Thus the nation-wide strike reveals a strength the Namibian people have which can damage the enemy extensively. For instance, already two weeks after the strike began it was reckoned that it would take at least a year for the mines to get back to normal production *provided the availability of labour also went back to normal.*

The strike is a national strike; it has the support of the entire Namibian people. This is reflected in many concrete instances. An example is the African policemen in Windhoek who were dismissed by the local authorities on the grounds that they were collaborating with the strikers. Another reflection of the general support is the fact that fellow Namibians have refused to step in for the strikers so that workers have had to be imported from South Africa.

The Namibian struggle against South Africa's illegal occupation of our country has many facets, and the present strike is an important one in that the basis for South Africa's stake in Namibia, the flourishing economy, is being totally paralysed. Thus Namibia will become an economic liability to South Africa rather than support. Moreover, the interests of international monopolies will become minimal, and investors' positions and profits seriously jeopardised. We hope our brothers in South Africa and neighbouring territories will show their solidarity by not stepping in for our workers, because the Namibian struggle is a part of the total struggle against South Africa's oppression and tyranny in the whole of Southern Africa. The Namibian armed struggle is now being reinforced by our workers' actions. □

## A Way to Preserve Your Privacy?

A former special agent who worked for the FBI for five years before becoming disillusioned reports that the bureau has a list of persons who cannot be approached by agents unless they first get permission from superiors. According to the agent, most people on the "no contact" list have been critical of the snooping outfit and are in position to publicize any contact they may have with the agency.

Some of the names on the list—most are unknown, as is the total number—include Senator George McGovern, Eugene McCarthy, historian Henry Steele Commager, and the entire staff of the *Washington Post*.

Obviously, if you want to be left alone, you have to criticize J. Edgar Hoover and then go to work for a newspaper.

## End of the 'Cultural Revolution'?

By Allen Myers

A January 10 memorial meeting in Peking has provided the most concrete evidence yet of the nature and extent of the purge in which Lin Piao has been removed from his position as Mao Tsetung's heir apparent.

The memorial was for Foreign Minister Chen Yi, who died of cancer on January 6. Chen, who was criticized during the "Cultural Revolution," was demoted from the Political Bureau of the Communist party's Central Committee at the Ninth Congress of the party in April 1969. Although he remained nominally foreign minister, he appears not to have exercised that office since 1969.

It was at the Ninth Congress that Lin Piao was enshrined in the party constitution as Mao's "close comrade-in-arms and successor." The honors bestowed on Chen Yi in death—including Mao's appearance at the memorial meeting—by implication take on the aspect of criticism of that decision.

Hsinhua, the Chinese government news agency, in its list of those present at the memorial, gave the names of only six of the twenty-one full members of the Political Bureau: Mao, Chou En-lai, Chiang Ching (Mao's wife), Yeh Chien-ying, Chang Chun-chiao, and Li Hsien-nien.

Yeh and Li are close aides of Chou En-lai. Cheng was associated with Chiang Ching's activities during the Cultural Revolution.

Hsinhua was careful to provide the names of four other members of the Political Bureau who were apparently prevented from attending the memorial by age or poor health. Tung Pi-wu, Chu Teh, Liu Po-cheng, and Kang Sheng were mentioned as having sent wreaths to the meeting or having visited Chen Yi during his illness.

The first three are aged party leaders, and are not thought to play an active role in political affairs. Kang Sheng directed the propaganda campaign of the Cultural Revolution and is a member of the Political Bureau's standing committee, which also in-

cludes Mao, Chou, and—nominally—Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta.

The fallen thus include a majority of the Political Bureau: eleven of its twenty-one full members. Nine of the eleven were first elected to the Political Bureau at the Ninth Congress. Eight of the eleven held military or police positions.

There was no surprise in Hsinhua's omission of Chen Po-ta, Mao's former secretary, who was known to be in disfavor early in 1971. The absence of Lin and Yeh Chun, Lin's wife, had also been expected. The eight others were all, like Yeh Chun, first elected to the Political Bureau in 1969. They are:

Huang Yung-sheng, chief of the general staff, listed fifth in the party hierarchy as recently as last June; Chen Hsi-lien, military commander of the Shenyang region; Chiu Hui-tso, director of logistics for the People's Liberation Army and deputy chief of staff, considered to have been Lin's protégé; Hsieh Fu-chih, Minister of Public Security, responsible for maintaining order in the Peking area; Hsu Shih-yu, military commander of the Nanking region and a deputy defense minister; Li Tso-peng, political commissar of the navy; Wu Fa-hsien, commander of the air force; and Yao Wen-yuan, said by some to be Mao's son-in-law, a propagandist whose 1965 attack on the Peking municipal party organization marked the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.

The line of division in the Political Bureau is therefore fairly clear: on one side Mao, Chou, and the top party bureaucrats; on the other Lin and the leaders of the armed forces, who arose as arbiters during the Cultural Revolution. This division would tend to confirm that a major point of dispute was the reassertion of party control over the military.

The secrecy surrounding all deliberations of the Chinese bureaucracy has left abundant room for the spread of all sorts of speculation on the origin of the present shake-up. Colum-

nist Jack Anderson on December 22 gave the following version of events, which he said was the view accepted by U. S. spy agencies:

"Last August, Mao returned from a visit to South China by train. Lin Piao, knowing Mao's itinerary would take him through Shanghai and Wuhsi, arranged an assassination attempt in Shanghai. It failed.

"Lin then planned to blow up a bridge in Wuhsi to wreck Mao's train. This, too, failed. Mao left his train at Wuhsi and hurried to Peking, arriving there on Sept. 12.

"He ordered the immediate arrest of Gen. Huang Yung-sheng, the Army Chief of Staff; Gen. Wu Fa-hsien, the Air Force Commander; Gen. Li Tso-peng, the navy political commissar; and Gen. Chiu Hui-tso, the deputy chief of staff.

"Mao gave them 10 days to confess.

"Meanwhile, Lin had been preparing to flee to Russia on Sept. 13. He apparently got wind of the arrests and took off earlier on Sept. 12 from Hai-pien airfield in a British-built Trident jet airliner.

"Mao gave orders, according to one report, for the Air Force not to pursue Lin's plane. It crashed, nevertheless, in the Wentoukhan area of Mongolia."

The Chinese press has made somewhat veiled attempts to place the origin of the division at the second plenary session of the Central Committee, in September 1970. For example, the December 24, 1971, issue of *Peking Review* translated an article from *Hongqi* [also spelled *Hung Chi*], the party theoretical journal, that contained the following passage:

"During the period of socialist revolution and construction, Chairman Mao has summed up both the positive and negative historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat and repeatedly warned the whole Party that, while we have won victory, we must never forget class struggle and must be vigilant against the careerists and conspirators like Khrushchov who are nestling beside us. Chairman Mao has personally initiated and led the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which shattered Liu Shao-chi's bourgeois headquarters and dug out the handful of class enemies hidden in the Party. Since the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Party, Chair-

man Mao has once again led the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole nation to unfold and deepen the movement for criticizing revisionism and rectifying the style of work and carry out education in ideology and political line."

In an editorial last August 27, the official party newspaper, *Renmin Ribao*, appeared to be indicating that the differences in the ruling group could be smoothed over, provided that the military members were not too demanding:

"During the First Plenary Session of the Ninth Party Central Committee, Chairman Mao warned members of the whole Party, particularly the senior cadres of the Party, that they must be prudent and careful and must not forget themselves in moments of excitement. Speaking of some comrades from grass-roots units who were elected to the Party Central Committee for the first time, Chairman Mao said: 'See to it that they do not divorce themselves from the masses or from productive labour while performing their duties.' . . .

"After the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Party Central Committee, Chairman Mao issued a series of instructions, including 'Read and study seriously and have a good grasp of Marxism' and 'Carry out education in ideology and political line.' Following Chairman Mao's instructions, the whole Party has been criticizing revisionism and rectifying the style of work in a deep-going way, studying Marxism-Leninism, criticizing revisionism, idealism and metaphysics, opposing conceit and complacency, and correcting some wrong practices in the style of work and setting everything on the correct path." (*Peking Review*, September 3.)

Behind the usual vague self-congratulation, there rings the tone of indignation at upstarts, and a warning. Those Central Committee members "elected . . . for the first time"—more than 40 percent of whom were military officers—and unnamed "senior cadres" seem to "forget themselves in moments of excitement" and have been twice cautioned by Mao himself.

It would no doubt be illuminating to learn just what occasioned the "excitement" in the Central Committee. It is not likely to have been caused by the exposure of "conspirators like Khrushchov" since the same editorial still referred to "Vice-Chairman Lin"

as "deputy leader" of the party.

On December 1, *Renmin Ribao*, *Hongqi*, and *Jiefangjun Bao* (People's Liberation Army Daily) carried a joint editorial entitled "Sum Up Experience in Strengthening Party Leadership." This editorial underlined the primacy of the party over the army, reducing the latter to merely one area of activity among others:

"Our Party is the vanguard of the proletariat; it is the highest form of



David, in *Direct From Cuba*

CHOU: Joins Mao in settling accounts with former "comrade-in-arms."

class organization of the proletariat. Of the seven—industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the army, the government and the Party—the Party gives leadership to the first six. . . .

"Chairman Mao regards Party building as one of the three principal magic [!] weapons for the Chinese revolution and helping to strengthen, and not discard or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party as one of the most important political criteria for distinguishing fragrant flowers from poisonous weeds." (Emphasis in original. *Peking Review*, December 10.)

It would presumably be regarded as

a failure to appreciate the dialectical nature of Mao Tsetung Thought to point out that Mao has discarded a majority of the leadership of the Communist party elected less than three years ago.

The December 1 editorial appears to be the most explicit charge that the Mao leadership is prepared to bring against Lin and his followers at this time. There has been no sign that Mao plans to permit any public mention of the concrete political differences, other than party control of the army, that separated the two factions, even in the distorted manner that characterized the attacks on Liu Shao-chi.

Whatever political differences may eventually emerge, they are more likely to be a justification, rather than a cause, of Mao's break with Lin. The dominant position assumed by the army during the course of the Cultural Revolution—symbolized by Lin's formal designation as Mao's successor and the election of large numbers of army officers to the Central Committee—could not but be a threat to the entire party apparatus, including Mao and Chou at the top.

The ousting of Lin and his followers can thus be seen as the final chapter of the Cultural Revolution. Having used the army to secure their position against Liu Shao-chi's faction of the party, Mao and Chou are now settling accounts with their former allies in the classically bureaucratic manner, manipulating the state apparatus to isolate and destroy opponents. This kind of offensive is more effective in the dark, at least in its opening stages.

Part of the Maoist reticence may thus be due to the need to tread cautiously while potential bases of support for Lin still exist. In the January 12 *Christian Science Monitor*, Henry S. Hayward wrote:

". . . reestablishment of party control is almost certainly not yet complete. Much remains to be done, for example, among China's 29 provinces and major municipalities. Virtually all of these subdivisions have PLA [People's Liberation Army] representatives at or near the topmost posts."

In short, the divisions within the ruling bureaucracy, no matter how carefully locked behind closed doors, retain the potential for involving the masses of the Chinese people in the settlement of the issues that affect their

lives. During the Cultural Revolution, the intervention of the army was necessary to halt this tendency. Now that the army leadership has come under

fire, Mao and the group around him can no longer confidently rely on that instrument to head off a mobilization of the masses. □

## Tariq Ali Interviewed in Canada

# Role of Bangladesh in the Asian Revolution

By Phil Courneyeur

[The following article is reprinted from the January 17 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist biweekly published in Toronto.]

\* \* \*

Tariq Ali, well-known Pakistani revolutionary and a leader of the International Marxist Group (British section of the Fourth International), began a cross-Canada speaking tour January 10, speaking on the Bangladesh liberation struggle.

The day Tariq Ali arrived in Toronto to begin the tour, the newspapers were headlining the London-New Delhi trip of Sheik Mujibur Rahman, the leader of Bangladesh, following his release by the Pakistan regime. What did the visit mean as to the political course of the Awami League regime in Bangladesh, I asked Tariq Ali:

"Well, the reasons for Mujibur's visit to London are quite clear. First, he went straight there to get in touch with British and Western imperialists, to request foreign aid and to press for recognition of the new government. The British Tories and Labour party leader Harold Wilson have both pledged support in return for Mujibur's pledge that he will keep Bangladesh inside the British Commonwealth.

"Mujibur also met the ambassadors of other imperialist countries. But his stopover in New Delhi is even clearer. To thank Indira Gandhi and to assure her that he will keep Bangladesh 'stable' and allied to India."

Tariq Ali explained the makeup of the Mukti Bahini liberation forces. "They consist of three elements. Refugees trained by India, deserters from the Pakistan army, and student elements. It's the students who will probably prove to be the most difficult for the new regime and the Indian army.

"One of the first activities of the new state in Bangladesh will be to try to disarm the student elements and to institutionalize other elements of the Mukti Bahini into a new standing army. But the present disarmament plan has been only partly successful. Mujibur Rahman's role will be to carry out the disarmament of the Bengali masses."

What is the political situation today in Bangladesh? "The masses at the moment are in a state of elation and jubilation at the defeat of Pakistan repression. But they have yet to taste the fruits of the Awami League. The Awami League and Mujibur will attempt to impose a bourgeois state, backed up by Indian military power. But it is unlikely they can establish long-term stability—all the left groups are armed and there is economic chaos and devastation. These problems cannot be solved within the capitalist framework in Bangladesh, particularly by a government subservient to India."

Tariq Ali emphasized the vanguard role being played by the struggle of the Bengali people for national self-determination in the increasing ferment throughout the Indo-Pak subcontinent.

"We have to see the Indian revolution as a whole, but it is also important to single out one of its most important elements—the role the national question will play. The Indian revolution will be a combined revolution, basically, with the national struggle playing a key role. There are fourteen different languages in the entire Indian subcontinent and many, many nationalities. Bengal is one nation; Madhya another. Then there is the Punjab. And there are other smaller nations.

"The Indian revolution will develop unevenly; it will break first at its weakest links—those who are most

oppressed by the Indian bourgeoisie. Bengal is one of the weak links. West Pakistan as a whole now becomes another weak link on the subcontinent. The options before the Indian bourgeoisie are becoming more limited.

"The revolutionaries of the Fourth International are trying to concentrate their tiny resources on specific areas with the aim of building one massive revolutionary party—but beginning by concentrating on those weak links.

"Throughout the whole of the subcontinent the period of bourgeois semi-democracy is coming to an end. You've seen the events in Pakistan and Ceylon, but as Mrs. Gandhi becomes more and more hemmed in by the objective conditions—in 1975 the population of Calcutta alone will be 15,000,000—the Indian bourgeoisie will resort to strong forms of government, possibly with the collaboration of the army and right-wing parties. The revolutionary left in India can have no illusions about a long period ahead of bourgeois democracy."

How can one understand the role of China in Ceylon and Bangladesh, I asked. Tariq Ali indicated that the key to the Chinese position is to be found in the internal situation in China.

"I have a great deal of faith in the Chinese working class, the poor peasants, and the students. These people underwent a politicization during a certain phase. It is now clear that the advancing Asian revolution in Indochina, Ceylon, and the Indian subcontinent, is changing the balance of forces between the Chinese masses and the Chinese bureaucracy inside China—which means that the Chinese bureaucracy now emerges as a conservative force in Asia which means that it tries to preserve the *status quo* because its internal position is threatened by the spread of revolution. They retreat to the shell of socialism in one country. That explains the moves which they have made as far as Ceylon and Bengal are concerned."

Tariq Ali summarized the present tasks for the Bangladesh struggle very forcefully with the demand for the immediate withdrawal of Indian troops. There can be no self-determination for the Bengali people short of the withdrawal of Indian troops, he argued. Ali pointed to the powerful interplay between the struggle in Bangladesh



and the struggles in West Bengal where the Gandhi government has carried out massive repression, including the recent killings and arrests of hundreds of militants.

The perspective which links these struggles is expressed in the call for a united, socialist Bengal. "This is not a mass, popular slogan at the moment, but who three years ago would have thought that the demand for East Bengal independence from Pakistan was a popular slogan?" Ta-

riq Ali said.

In Bangladesh, he said, "the revolutionaries are calling for the election of village committees to administer both civil affairs and the land; for the cancellation of rural debts; for cooperative farming; for nationalization of certain industries and transportation and for the legalization of all political tendencies, including the Maoists who are particularly compromised by Peking's treacherous support of the West Pakistani butchers." □

## Bangladesh

### Rahman Orders Disarming of Mukti Bahini



RAHMAN: Regards Mukti Bahini who keep arms as "gangsters."

On January 17 Sheik Mujibur Rahman, prime minister of Bangladesh, ordered all members of the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Forces) to surrender their arms to the Awami League government within ten days. The order was accompanied by some sentiment-

tal words of praise for the approximately 100,000 fighters who led the fight for independence from Pakistan. More significantly, Rahman included an ominous warning to any who might decide to resist the order.

Those who keep arms, Rahman

said, "will naturally be suspected by their fellow countrymen" of being members of cliques of Pakistani collaborators. Such "gangsters" would meet with "unpleasant consequences."

The latter comment was surely the most viciously cynical in Rahman's brief career as a bourgeois prime minister. In point of fact, it is not collaborators who now hold arms in Bangladesh, but the most consistent fighters for Bengali national independence.

Rahman claimed that his order was motivated by concern for law enforcement. The real reason for the move is quite different.

In many districts throughout the country, particularly in areas north of Dacca, Mukti Bahini units exercise governmental control over the countryside. The existence of local peasant organizations, backed up by an armed and experienced militia, is at present the largest single obstacle to the restoration of capitalist order in Bangladesh. The elimination of that obstacle has been of prime importance to both the Indian government and the Awami League ever since the surrender of the Pakistani army in December.

In discussing the speculation as to why the Awami League provisional government waited until nearly a week after the surrender to install itself in Dacca, we wrote in the January 10 issue of *Intercontinental Press*:

"Whatever the truth may be as to these rumors, it became increasingly obvious that the major concern of Bangladesh's first regime was the disarming of the Mukti Bahini rank and file. . . .

"Indira Gandhi's criterion for when conditions will be 'stable enough' [to withdraw the Indian army of occupation] is a simple one: if and when a bourgeois government allied to India has been firmly established in Bangladesh, and the armed power of the guerrillas has been broken."

To mask the decisive role of the Indian army in this process Gandhi would, we said, rely on the Awami League and Mujibur Rahman:

". . . Gandhi has centered on the demand that Sheik Mujibur Rahman . . . be released. Rahman, it is widely believed, is the only Bengali politician with sufficient authority to bring the guerrillas under control."

In the January 17 *Intercontinental Press*, just after Rahman's release

from prison in Pakistan, we wrote:

"Many Mukti Bahini fighters have said that they will not relinquish their arms unless told to do so by Rahman. The Indian government hopes that this emotional attachment to the popular leader will divert the Bengalis' determination to win freedom for their country."

Rahman plans to use all his prestige to convince Mukti Bahini recalcitrants. On January 24, according to the January 23 *New York Times*, Rahman will personally visit one of the most successful Mukti Bahini units to oversee its dissolution. Centered in Tangail, about sixty miles north of Dacca, the 16,000-member force, operating in isolation from other units and with no assistance from the Indian army, kept a fifty-square-mile area virtually completely free of Pakistani troops for the entire nine months of the occupation. Abdul Kader Siddiqi, the twenty-five-year-old commander of the unit, is reportedly traveling throughout the region to convince local commanders to collect their troops' arms. Correspondent Tillman Durdin noted:

"Sheik Mujib's decision to come here [Tangail] personally to receive the arms appears to have been made not only with a view to paying special tribute to an effective fighting unit, but also to creating a situation in which the ex-guerrillas could hardly afford to make a public show of non-cooperation with the most popular and esteemed personality in the land."

It may be that the Western press, which has reported that Rahman is meeting little resistance to his order, is engaging in wishful thinking. But there are some factors that weigh in Rahman's favor.

Because of the brutality of Yahya's attack on the Bengali people and the nearly unanimous desire of that people for independence, virtually the entire Bengali sector of the Pakistani army defected to the Mukti Bahini. On the one hand, this gave the Bengali guerrillas a core of military experience and expertise usually lacking in the first stages of a guerrilla war. On the other hand, it means that a sizable section of the Mukti Bahini is composed of former professional and semiprofessional soldiers in a bourgeois army, including the officer corps.

At the time of the Pakistani onslaught, there were about 3,000 armed

Bengalis in the East Bengal Regiment [EBR], 12,000 in the East Pakistan Rifles [EPR], and 15,000 in the Mujahid [home guard] and Ansars [volunteer corps].

According to the London *Sunday Times* of January 16, eight battalions of the former EPR and EBR will form the nucleus of the regular army of Bangladesh. In his order to disband, Rahman invited those members of the Mukti Bahini who want to keep their arms to join the new national militia, which will be under the command of the former leadership of the Bengali adjunct of the Pakistani army.

The disarming of the guerrillas and the creation of a regular army is but a part, although at this point the most decisive one, of Rahman's efforts to construct a viable capitalist state apparatus. In his first public address to the Bengali people after his return to Dacca, Rahman said, "I want to tell you in unambiguous terms that ours will be a secular, democratic, socialist state."

But the inspiration for his brand of "socialism" comes from the Social Democratic fakers of the British Labour party. In an interview with Gavin Young of the London *Observer* (published in the January 16 issue of that

paper), Rahman said: "After all, my greatest ideological affinity is with Britain—I am a Democratic Socialist. Think of my friends there—Harold Wilson . . . and Roy Jenkins, who is coming here [Dacca], I hope."

When asked, at a Dacca news conference, about how his "socialism" would relate to the British-owned tea plantations in Bangladesh, Rahman replied, "Democratic socialism, parliamentary democracy, change, yes. But easy does it."

Rahman also told Young that he plans to integrate Bangladesh into the British Commonwealth.

In the January 22 *New York Times*, correspondent Sydney Schanberg wrote that "present indications" are that Rahman will meet "no serious opposition in his efforts to disarm the Mukti Bahini. But he adds a significant proviso: "He could face opposition if Bengali students and other activists decided that the new government was not reformist enough for them." Schanberg meant "reformist" in the sense of "change," and not "taking it easy." Rahman may well find that after all they have endured, membership in the British Commonwealth is not a sufficient reform for the people of Bangladesh. □

## Explained by Kennedy Aide

# Why Indira Gandhi Invaded Bangladesh

Confirmation of the revolutionary-socialist analysis of Indira Gandhi's reasons for invading Bangladesh have come from an unusual source: a U. S. Congressional aide.

In August 1971 Dr. John P. Lewis, dean of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and a member for five years of the Agency for International Development in Delhi, traveled to India with U. S. Senator Edward Kennedy. They visited leaders of both the Indian government and the Awami League. A lengthy report by Lewis was read into the November 16, 1971, *Congressional Record* (S18648) by Kennedy. Excerpts from this report appeared in the November-December issue of *Pacific Research and World Empire Telegram*, which is published by the Pa-

cific Studies Center, East Palo Alto, California.

Lewis's comments, which have hitherto escaped public attention, confirm that the Indian regime feared the effects of the Bangladesh insurgency on West Bengal.

Lewis wrote that his initial impression was that the Indian government would accept the idea that the Bengali refugees were in India to stay and would take steps to absorb them, through various development programs, into the economy of West Bengal. But this turned out to be a misconception:

"Invariably Indians at the political level rejected this absorption thesis out of hand. They, and none more than the Prime Minister herself, are adamant about the necessity for full-scale refugee return. They cite the economic

arguments. They emphasize West Bengal's already teeming demography. But what appears to trouble them most is a political projection. There is evidence, apparently documented, that earlier refugees from East Pakistan, who have entered eastern India in several surges beginning in 1947, have tended after their transplanting to join extremist political factions. The leaders of the ruling Congress party, who, American readers should remember, are scarcely reactionaries themselves, fear the same thing would happen again. They are determined not to promote a further radicalizing of West Bengal politics."

Lewis reported that Indian officials lamented the fact that the repression of the Awami League after its electoral victory had apparently smashed the most promising hope for "peace" in the subcontinent: a regime in East Bengal friendly to India.

"Instead of a program of civil reform, however, the middle-class Awami League constitutionalists with whom we talked in Calcutta now find themselves presiding over an insurgency. They project their struggle with courage and conviction, and they report the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of East Bengalis and their elected representatives. Moreover, from what we could learn from other sources, their claim that the insurgency's fighting force, the Mukti Bahini, is still loyal and responsive to their political authority remains, as of now, valid. Evidently Maoists and other extremist groups, which had been comparatively weak in East Bengal, have not yet begun to compete for control of the insurgency. My guess, however, is that the talents of the official Awami League leadership do not run primarily to the conduct of guerrilla warfare. The longer the struggle persists, thereby both prolonging the internal turmoil within East Bengal and inducing the radicalization of the India-based refugee population, the greater will be the likelihood that conduct of the insurgency, and therefore control of whatever autonomous regime may eventually emerge, will slip into tougher partisan hands."

The "scariest thing," wrote Lewis, "was the way the cold-blooded logic of the situation kept pointing toward war. Reports that certain Delhi think-tanks had produced analyses concluding that a short war to establish an

independent Bangla Desh was the cheapest, least objectionable of the bad lot of alternatives open to India had sounded rather fanciful when I had

heard about them in Princeton. Close-up, however, it was much easier to understand how thinking Indians could be tilting in that direction." □

## Thirty-Seven Face Death

# Attempt to View Trial of Iranian Prisoners

Two international observers will try to attend the trial of thirty-seven Iranian political prisoners facing possible death sentences, the Iranian Students Association in the United States (ISAUS) announced in a December 31 press release. The thirty-seven prisoners were rounded up in the wave of arrests that preceded the shah's extravagant celebration of 2,500 years of the Persian monarchy. (See *Intercontinental Press*, October 11, 1971, p. 859, and November 8, 1971, p. 968.)

Five persons associated with the thirty-seven have already been executed, the association reported. In addition, another forty-two persons have been arrested in connection with the case, and are now being tortured in

the shah's prisons.

The international delegation to the trial is being sponsored by the National Lawyers Guild in the United States, the League of Human Rights in Switzerland, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers in Belgium, and the International Federation of Human Rights in France.

The two observers are John Thorne, who was attorney for murdered "Soleadad Brother" George Jackson, and Jacqueline Portell of France, who was an observer at Franco's trial of Basque political prisoners in Burgos.

The ISAUS urged that telegrams demanding that Thorne and Portell be permitted to observe the trial of the thirty-seven be sent to Prime Minister Hoveyda, Teheran, Iran. □

## Raids in Moscow, Ukraine

# Kremlin Tightens Screws on Dissidents

In two separate raids apparently authorized by high officials, the KGB (Soviet secret police) arrested eleven Ukrainians and seized large quantities of literature from the apartments of eight dissenters in Moscow.

The Moscow raids were carried out January 14-15 under the section of the criminal code dealing with "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation," which is punishable by up to seven years imprisonment and five years in exile. Among the homes raided was that of Pyotr Yakir, one of the major leaders of the Soviet democratic movement. Yakir is the son of a Red Army general who was shot by Stalin in 1937 and later rehabilitated during Khrushchev's reign. The January 16 *New York Times* reported that Yakir was told by KGB agents that it was only respect for his father that spared

him arrest and trial for anti-Soviet activities.

The January 18 *Christian Science Monitor* reported that the police spent eighteen hours searching through Yakir's personal effects and confiscated more than 3,000 items, including books, newspaper clippings, and tape recordings.

On January 16, after visiting Yakir, the Moscow correspondent of the *London Times* was detained for thirty minutes by the KGB and told not to go back to Yakir's address. Later the same evening, three Western reporters were refused entry to Yakir's house by plainclothesmen.

There was no information on who the other seven victims of the Moscow raids were.

The January 15 *New York Times* reported that "reliable sources" said

eleven Ukrainians had been arrested early in January under an article in the Ukrainian criminal code prohibiting dissemination of "deliberately false fabrications defaming the Soviet state." The eleven arrested are apparently Ukrainian nationalists.

Seven people were arrested on January 12 in Lvov, a city in the western Ukraine that is considered a center of nationalist sentiment. The other four were seized January 13 in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital.

## Soviet Union

### Amalrik Seriously Ill in Siberian Camp

Soviet dissident author Andrei Amalrik has been made the victim of brutal mistreatment in the Siberian labor camps to which he was sentenced in November 1970, according to an account of his experiences that has reached Paris. As reported in the January 6 *New York Times*, this account says that Amalrik, who was sentenced to three years in a "restrictive regime" camp, is in poor health and has been denied medical attention.

Amalrik first ran afoul of the bureaucracy in 1963, when he was expelled from Moscow University—for writing a paper on Norse influence in founding the Russian state! Later, he was readmitted.

In February 1965 he was arrested on charges of having circulated "anti-Soviet" and "pornographic" plays, and was exiled to Siberia as a "parasite."

Sixteen months later a higher court overturned the sentence, and Amalrik returned to Moscow, where he worked as a journalist with the Novosti Press Agency. He was fired (there are conflicting explanations of why), and got a job as a mailman.

In early 1970 Amalrik wrote *Can the USSR Survive Until 1984?*, which he sent to the West for publication. It contained an uneven account of the Soviet opposition movement and predicted the destruction of the Soviet state in a war with China. (See *Intercontinental Press*, February 23, 1970, p. 160, for a review of this work.)

Also in 1970, Amalrik finished *Involuntary Journey to Siberia*, an account of his experiences on a state

Only two individuals were identified by the *Times*, Ivan Svitlichny, a literary critic seized in the Kiev raid; and Vyacheslav Chornovil, a former television journalist who was sentenced in November 1967 to eighteen months in a labor camp for having compiled an account of KGB methods used in rounding up Ukrainian nationalists in 1965 and 1966.

The criminal-code article under which the Ukrainians were arrested carries a maximum penalty of three years imprisonment. □

farm during his 1965-66 exile. It was circulated in mimeographed copies and eventually found its way to the West, where it was published.

In May 1970 Amalrik was arrested by the KGB. Simultaneously, one Lev Ubozhko was arrested in Sverdlovsk, 900 miles from Moscow. Ubozhko was allegedly in possession of an open letter written by Amalrik. Because of this, Amalrik was sent to Sverdlovsk, and he and Ubozhkov were tried together on charges of having violated the section of the Soviet criminal code referring to "defamation" of the Soviet state and social system.

The evidence against him consisted of his two books, two interviews he gave to a U.S. television correspondent, and a letter he had written criticizing Soviet writer Anatoly Kuznetsov for collaborating with the KGB and then defecting to the West. At the trial Amalrik denounced the judges and the bureaucracy. In November he was sentenced to three years in Siberia, the six months he had been held before trial being deducted from the sentence. It is this latest term that the account in the *Times* refers to.

It took six months to transport Amalrik from Sverdlovsk to the Kolymsk region, in extreme northeast Siberia. On the way, he fell ill at the Novosibirsk prison, where he was confined in a basement cell. Prison authorities refused him medical treatment, despite the fact that he has a history of heart disease. After several days, he was removed from his cell to continue the trip. □

He lost consciousness, and the convoy supervisor feared he was near death. The supervisor did not want to be held responsible, so Amalrik was sent to a prison hospital. On March 15 (1971) he regained consciousness, but suffered complete loss of memory. He had contracted meningitis. The following month, after having learned to walk again, he was returned to an overcrowded prison. Still running a fever, he was sent to Irkutsk and placed in solitary confinement. From there he went to Khabarovsk, where he was not even allowed to have a mattress.

In June he reached Magadan, on the Sea of Okhotsk. Two weeks later, after seeing a doctor for the first time since April, he was transported to the Talaya camp, 175 miles north of Magadan, where he is imprisoned today.

His friends have reported that Amalrik's spirits are still good, but his health is badly shattered. Despite his condition, he is scheduled to spend another sixteen months in Talaya. □

### Franco Holds French Students

Three French militants from Toulouse were arrested by Franco's police January 1 as they crossed the Spanish frontier. They were thrown into Figueras prison, and are said to have been charged with spreading illegal propaganda because they were transporting Marxist literature in their car. Facing three to six years imprisonment are Jacques Giron, a resident medical student at a Toulouse hospital; Gilles Marquet, a researcher in economic sciences; and Gilbert Dufourcq, a science student.

A campaign to win their release has been initiated by the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International.

According to the January 15 issue of *Rouge*, the Ligue's weekly newspaper, this campaign is already under way in most of the south of France. In Toulouse, a support committee sponsored by many trade unions and student and leftist organizations has been formed to coordinate activities.

On January 14 a meeting to denounce the Franco regime and demand the immediate release of the imprisoned Marxists was held in Paris at the Mutualité. □

# REVIEWS

## How Lyndon Johnson Launched His War

*The President's War* by Anthony Austin. J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, Pa. 368 pp. \$7.50. 1971.

On August 4, 1964, two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin reported that they were under attack by North Vietnamese vessels. Within hours, Lyndon Johnson had gone on nationwide television to announce "retaliatory" air strikes against North Vietnam. And less than a week later, Congress had sent to Johnson the "Tonkin Gulf Resolution," which became the latter's legal "justification" for fighting an undeclared war in Indochina.

Johnson claimed that there were two attacks on U.S. vessels in international waters—one involving the destroyer *Maddox* on August 2 and one involving the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy* on August 4. In *The President's War*, Anthony Austin, on the basis of painstaking research that consumed three years, debunks both "attacks."

Basing his conclusions on U.S. military communications, Congressional hearings, and interviews with participants, Austin shows that the *Maddox* deliberately violated North Vietnamese waters and that its voyage through the Gulf of Tonkin was in part intended to divert North Vietnam's defenses against raids that were being carried out on North Vietnamese islands.

The August 4 "attack," Austin concludes, never occurred. Unusual weather conditions produced radar responses that the U.S. commanders thought best to treat as indications of attacking vessels. The U.S. ships and aircraft that were called in then expended a large amount of ammunition on the waves of the Tonkin Gulf. The only "target" that was nearly hit was the *Turner Joy*, which, with its lights extinguished, was almost fired upon by the *Maddox*.

Austin does not believe that the August 4 incident was deliberately staged, but he shows how the Johnson administration, which was looking for a pretext for escalation, happily seized



JOHNSON: Delighted with Tonkin Gulf "incident" even though it didn't happen.

on the "attack," carefully ignoring or concealing all evidence that no attack had occurred.

Shortly after the "battle" had ended,

John J. Herrick, the commander of the U.S. ships involved, cabled the Pentagon:

"Review of action makes many recorded contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects and overeager sonarman may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sighting by *Maddox*. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action."

The Johnson administration immediately took the further action of filing this message out of sight in the Pentagon, where it was not uncovered until several years later by a staff researcher of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, meanwhile, was sent to assure Congress and the public that there was absolutely no doubt about the *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* having been attacked.

Austin provides a valuable, if unnecessarily wordy, illustration of Washington's use of lies as a prime instrument of foreign policy. *The President's War* should provide any who still need it with an inoculation against the current president's propaganda claims about "Vietnamization."

—David Burton

## Workers' Control—Goal of Belgian Unions

*A Trade Union Strategy in the Common Market* edited by Ken Coates. Spokesman Books, Nottingham. 149 pp. £1.25. 1971.

Subtitled "The Programme of the Belgian Trade Unions," the bulk of this book consists of a translation of the program on workers' control adopted by the Fédération Générale des Travailleurs de Belgique [FGTB—General Federation of Belgian Workers] at a special congress in January 1970.

Although the FGTB is somewhat smaller in size than the other major union federation, the Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens [CSC—Confederation of Christian Unions], its membership is more concentrated in large-scale industries, giving it an added importance in the country's economic and political life.

The language of the FGTB program on workers' control clearly owes much to the federation's traditional

alignment with the Socialist party. While there is good reason to doubt the intention of the party leadership to make good on its talk about class struggle, the union's program nevertheless makes the important distinction between workers' control as a method of struggle and "participation" that seeks to integrate the working class into capitalism:

"The trade union is not to assume the responsibilities of management of an enterprise in a capitalist system. The objectives of the capitalist system do not correspond to those pursued by our trade union movement. . . ."

In addition to the FGTB program, this book contains a brief but informative introduction by Ken Coates, outlining the history of the Belgian labor movement, and three documents relating to the issue of workers' control in Belgium and Great Britain.

—David Burton

## Goals of Indian Trotskyists in Bangladesh Revolution

[The following resolution was adopted at a national conference of the Indian section of the Fourth International held in Bombay December 30-January 2.

[Among other decisions, the delegates changed the name of their organization from the "Socialist Workers Party of India" to the "Communist League." The new name is used in the document.

[The text below includes minor stylistic changes made by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

The plea for greater autonomy within the framework of a united Pakistan, put forward by the Awami League leadership after its massive victory in the 1970 election, soon developed into a national struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh from exploitation by West Pakistan.

Ever since the formation of Pakistan in 1947 following an artificial division of the subcontinent on a communal basis, East Bengal, rich in natural resources, was exploited as a colony by the ruling clique of West Pakistan. Understandably enough, the military junta, unwilling to lose its economic grip on East Bengal, decided to replace economic exploitation with military subjugation.

Soon after the failure of the March 1971 parley between Yahya Khan and Sheik Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, which emerged victorious in the first elections ever held in Pakistan on the basis of adult franchise, an unprecedented and barbarous genocide was let loose by the West Pakistan army.

The Awami League leaders, who were not prepared for any organised resistance, fled from East Bengal and took refuge in India under the protection of the Indian government. They formed a government in exile, which confined its activities chiefly to propaganda highlighting the atrocities committed by the Pakistan army. Hundreds of thousands of innocent Bengalis were brutally massacred by the army.

The responsibility of fighting against the barbaric repression fell on sporadic groups formed by the militant youth under the leadership of the Mukti Bahini. The masses soon rallied behind these militant groups. Thanks to the determination shown by the youth, the resistance of the Mukti Bahini gathered momentum.

The Indian government was reluctant to give adequate arms and training facilities to the Mukti Bahini initially and tried to keep this movement under its control.

Meanwhile nearly 10,000,000 refugees had migrated to India to escape the army brutalities. But the resistance put up by the Mukti Bahini grew far beyond the expectation of the Indian bourgeois rulers, and vast rural areas came under the con-

trol of Mukti Bahini militants. When the Indian government realised that it could no longer contain or guide the liberation struggle according to its own interests, it decided on direct military intervention.

The traditional left parties in West Bengal, especially the CPI [Communist party of India] and the CPI(M) [Communist party of India (Marxist)], failed to mobilize the masses of West Bengal for a militant and effective intervention in the struggle of the people of Bangladesh for their national liberation. They were satisfied with pressuring the Indian government to extend more aid and arms to the fighting forces of the Mukti Bahini.

The military intervention of the Indian bourgeoisie in Bangladesh to wrest the leadership of the national liberation movement from the Mukti Bahini and install a government led by the Awami League in Dacca led to the military conflict with the military regime of West Pakistan.

The war between India and Pakistan, as a war between two bourgeois states, had its own reactionary features. The military support extended by the Indian government to the freedom struggle in Bangladesh was motivated by the class interest of the bourgeoisie in extending its market and creating a new sphere of investment.

Such an intervention was possible largely because of the opportunist policies pursued by the ruling bureaucracies of the two major workers states, the Soviet Union and China, and by the opportunist and chauvinistic policies adopted by the traditional left parties in India.

While the Soviet bureaucracy adopted a policy of identifying itself with the bourgeois state in India after signing the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, the Maoist bureaucracy in Peking openly supported the Yahya regime in its genocide in Bangladesh. Both bureaucracies bypassed the basic issue related to the right of the people of Bangladesh to determine their own future as a nation. The Chinese bureaucracy even today talks of preserving the unity and integrity of Pakistan as a nation.

Having "liberated" Bangladesh from the yoke of the military regime in West Pakistan, the Indian government is now concerned with putting the Awami League in office, excluding the other forces that participated in the fighting. The Awami League was elected in December 1970 for a different purpose under different circumstances, with a mandate to run Pakistan and to secure minor concessions to the masses of Bangladesh within the framework of a capitalist-feudal regime in Pakistan.

The Indian government is evidently interested in promoting a so-called mixed economy in Bangladesh on the prevail-

ing Indian pattern and an administration that will be more beneficial to the Indian bourgeoisie.

The period of resistance that lasted from March 25 to December 3, 1971, has created a new revolutionary situation in Bangladesh.

The young militants who carried on the heroic armed struggle against the West Pakistan army have gained considerable influence among the masses of Bangladesh, especially in the rural areas. In the rural areas liberated by the Mukti Bahini, a parallel government was formed by the local population based on elected "action councils" that collectively took charge of the administration of the villages.

The Mukti Bahini militants who spearheaded the liberation struggle are reluctant to surrender their arms unless they are confident that the government that will be established in Bangladesh will fulfil the aspirations of the people.

The events that have taken place subsequently to the liberation of Bangladesh indicate that the main aim of the Indian bourgeoisie and the Awami League is to establish a government that will safeguard the interests of the capitalist establishment.

During the period of struggle and repression, the industrialists and the landlords fled, leaving the industries and the land to the mercy of the masses. The jute and other industries in Bangladesh were essentially controlled by the West Pakistani capitalist class. The rich tea plantations were mostly owned by British joint companies, and the land by West Punjabi feudal lords.

The Bengalis did not own any major industry or plantation, and with the exit of the foreign capitalists and landlords, there is a virtual vacuum created. The masses who fought against the West Pakistan repression are in control of the land.

There is an ideal situation for transforming the national liberation movement into a genuine socialist economy by confiscating all the industries and plantations, by nationalising all means of production, including land, by establishing workers' control of the nationalised industries, and by bringing land under peasants' co-operatives and collective farms.

But instead of establishing a socialist economy, the Awami League government, ably guided by the Indian bourgeoisie, is endeavouring to reintroduce capitalism on the Indian pattern of mixed economy. While industries and plantations previously owned by foreign nationals are being nationalised and placed under the control of professional bureaucrats, private enterprises based on profit will also be allowed to develop. Foreign capital is also

being invited to develop the devastated industry and economy.

The main problem faced by the Awami League and the Indian government is the disarming of the Mukti Bahini and other guerrilla fighters, who have become the real fighting force in liberated Bangladesh. The attempt to disarm these militants is bound to spark a new situation, in which the armed militants may offer stiff resistance to the Indian bourgeoisie and the neo-capitalist rulers of Bangladesh.

The Indian army, which entered as a "liberation" army, may soon be discredited as an occupation army if it is used to suppress revolutionary struggles and to protect the vested interests of the Indian bourgeoisie and the Awami League. Thus the masses of Bangladesh and the exploited masses of India, particularly of West Bengal, will have a common enemy: the Indian bourgeoisie.

This is the most opportune time to ensure that the struggle of the masses in West Bengal and Bangladesh is integrated. In the process of integrating the struggle, the exploited masses of the two wings of Bengal are bound to come closer and closer together.

The people of East and West Bengal have a common language, a common heritage of leftist struggles, a common culture, and now a common task before them.

The artificial division of the people of Bengal on a religious basis did not last long. The national liberation struggle smashed the myth of identity based on religious considerations, and the new Bangladesh government has declared a secular state. In view of the untold suffering the people of Bangladesh have passed through during the past twenty-five years, any attempt to revive religious sectarianism will be fought forcibly and effectively by the masses.

Apart from the unresolved national problem, which by itself should bring together the two wings of Bengal, the revolutionary situation that exists in Bangladesh as a result of the armed struggle that the people there have waged for nine months has had a revolutionary impact in West Bengal.

The victory of the Indian bourgeois rulers in the recent war has for the time being helped them to tide over the acute economic crisis that they have been facing for the last year. But the crisis of the bourgeoisie has already come to the surface since the war ended. The fact that the Indian government has decided to hold state assembly elections without submitting the national budget is an indication of the gravity of the situation.

India being a vast country of subcontinental dimensions, the political and economic development of the masses and the religions is very uneven in different states. It is likely that the crisis of the bourgeoisie may be manifested more acutely in states like West Bengal where there are already mass struggles. A revolutionary situation may develop much more quickly in West Bengal in view of its proximity to Bangladesh, where the people have already gone through the ex-

perience of an armed struggle.

Therefore it is the duty of the West Bengal revolutionaries to accelerate this process by launching effective class struggle and by integrating the struggles of the masses of the two wings of Bengal. The Communist League considers that this is the most opportune moment for advancing the slogan of a United Socialist Bengal, which is not a mere nationalist slogan, but a slogan for the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeoisie in the subcontinent.

With this end in view, the Communist League puts forward the following transitional demands:

1. Immediate withdrawal of the Indian army from Bangladesh to permit the people of Bangladesh to decide their own future without any outside interference.

2. The Mukti Bahini should not be asked to surrender its arms, and it should be transformed into a nucleus of the People's Militia of Bangladesh.

3. Immediate elections to choose a new Constituent Assembly to draft a socialist constitution for Bangladesh, and in the meantime the establishment of a provisional government of all the forces that participated actively in the struggle against the military junta of West Pakistan.

## Vladimir Bukovsky's Speech to the Court

[At his one-day trial January 5, Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky was sentenced to seven years confinement and five years enforced exile. (See *Intercontinental Press*, January 24, p. 72, for an account of the trial.)

[Bukovsky was reported to have spoken at the trial in his own defense. The text below is the translation of this speech distributed by Reuters.]

\* \* \*

Citizen judges:

I am not going to touch upon the juridical side of the indictment because I have already completely proved its groundlessness in the courtroom.

My lawyer also proved the complete groundlessness of the indictment in his speech, and I agree with him on all points of the defense.

I shall talk of something else: the reprisal against me was being prepared long ago and I knew about this.

On June 9 procurator Vankovich called me in and threatened me with punishment, then an article under the heading "The Poverty of Anti-Communism" appeared in the newspaper *Pravda*, which was almost entirely quoted in the procurator's speech.

The article contained the accusation that I sold slanderous information in gateways to foreign correspondents for small tips.

And finally in the journal *Political Self-*

4. No substitution for West Pakistan exploitation by Indian or any foreign capitalist exploitation.

5. Nationalisation of all means of production, including land, since there is no capitalist or landlord class worth the name in Bangladesh.

6. Distribution of land to the tillers, who have actually protected the land during the struggle.

7. Establishment of workers' councils to take over the management of mills and factories.

8. Confiscation of all the plantations and land owned by foreign capitalists, and establishment of peasant co-operatives to manage all confiscated lands.

9. Free movement of people between Bangladesh and West Bengal to facilitate cultural integration of the two wings of Bengal.

10. Linking up the struggle of the masses of West Bengal with the struggle of East Bengal to establish a United Socialist Bengal.

11. Establishment of a state monopoly of foreign trade.

12. Establishment of workers' and peasants' committees to supervise internal trade and distribution of essential commodities. □

*Education*, Number 2 for 1971, there was featured an article by deputy chairman of the KGB [the political police] S. Tsvigun, in which it was also said that I engaged in anti-Soviet activity.

And it is perfectly understandable that the small detective conducting the investigation into my case could not go against his boss and was obliged to try and show my guilt in every possible way.

Before my arrest there was constantly a tail on me. I was pursued, threatened with murder, and one of those following me lost his self-restraint to such an extent that he threatened me with his service weapon.

While under investigation I petitioned for a criminal case to be instituted against these people. I even gave the number of the official car in which these people traveled around behind me, and presented other facts which made it possible for them to be sought out.

However, I never received an answer to this request from those departments to which I sent it.

Then an extremely eloquent reply was received from the detective: "Bukovsky's behavior under investigation gives grounds for an inquiry into his psychological condition."

The investigation was conducted with countless procedural violations. One can say that not a single article of the UPK [criminal code] was not violated.

The investigation even took such a shameful measure as to put in the cell

with me a stool pigeon, a certain Trofimov, who himself admitted to me that he was instructed to carry on provocative anti-Soviet conversations with me, with the aim of provoking me to similar remarks, and for this he was promised early release.

As you see what incriminates me as a crime is permitted to certain people if this is demanded by "the interests of the case."

I sent complaints about this to different departments and asked now, in court, that they be included in the case, but the court "shied away" from doing this.

As far as the detective is concerned he, instead of examining my complaint and giving me an answer, sent me to the Serbsky Institute for Forensic Psychiatry for medical examination.

The investigation department of the UKGB [KGB administration] very much wanted me to be found irresponsible. How convenient.

Then there would be no case about me, no need to construct a charge, and here there would be no need to prove the fact of commission of crime. The man is just sick, mad.

And if it had all happened like that, there would be no judicial reprisal now and there would not be my final plea: they would try me in my absence, but for the influence of intensive intervention by the public.

Indeed after the first time limit for the expertise—in mid-September—the medical commission discovered I had an ominously vague clinical picture, and from the doctors' questions addressed to me after that I understood that they intended to pronounce me irresponsible.

And only on November 5, after pressure was exerted by the public, a new medical commission pronounced me healthy.

There you have trustworthy proof of my assertion—which is called slanderous here in court—that on the instructions of the KGB psychiatric reprisals are set up against dissenters.

I have other proof for this. In 1966 I was held in psychiatric hospitals for eight months, without trial or investigation and contrary to medical evidence of my mental health, and transferred on being discharged by the doctors from one hospital to another.

And so, on November 5 I was declared sane, and put into prison once more, and the procedural infringements continued.

The ending of the investigation in accordance with [Article] 201 [which requires that defendants and their counsel have access to all materials involved in a case] of the UPK RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] was crudely violated.

I demanded to be given the lawyer of my choice, but the investigator refused me this and signed Article 201 alone, and then wrote that I refused to become acquainted with the case.

In accordance with my right to defense set out in Article 48 of the UPK RSFSR, I demanded that the lawyer Dina Isakovna Kaminskaya be invited for my defense in court.

I addressed this request to the chairman of the Moscow lawyers' collegium and received his refusal with the instruction: "Lawyer Kaminskaya cannot be assigned to the defense since she does not have access to secret case procedure."

One asks what kind of secret case can be involved when I am being tried for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda?

And in any case where and in what Soviet laws is this celebrated "access" set out? Nowhere.

Thus no lawyer was given me. Further, the answer I have mentioned from the lawyers' collegium with which I was acquainted and which bore my signature, was withdrawn from the case and returned to the lawyers' collegium.

There is a written reference to this in the case. Another was put in its place, a completely innocent answer by the chairman of the collegium, with which I was not acquainted.

How can one assess this? Only as an official forgery.

It took my twelve-day hunger strike, a complaint to the USSR Prosecutor-General, to the USSR Justice Ministry, and the CC [Central Committee] of the CPSU [Communist party of the Soviet Union], and also new, active intervention by members of the public before my legal right to defense was finally fulfilled and I was given lawyer Shveisky, who was invited by my mother.

The trial proceedings today have been conducted with numerous procedural infringements. The indictment, in which the word "slanderous" is used thirty-three times and the word "anti-Soviet" eighteen times, contains no concrete indications of which facts are slanderous among those I communicated to Western correspondents and which materials of those taken from me during the search and which I allegedly distributed, are anti-Soviet.

Of the nine petitions I made at the beginning of the trial proceedings and supported by my lawyer, eight were refused.

Not one of the witnesses I named, who could refute various points of the indictment, was called by the court.

I am accused, specifically, of handing over anti-Soviet materials in the presence of Volpin and Chalidze [Aleksandr Yessenin-Volpin and Valeri Chalidze].

However, my demand that these two people be called as witnesses was not met.

Further, not one of the eight people I called who could confirm the authenticity of my assertions on the facts of confinement and conditions of detention of people in special psychiatric hospitals was summoned to the court.

The court rejected my petition that these witnesses be called and motivated it by saying they were mentally ill and could not testify.

At the same time, there are two people among them—Z. M. Grigorenko and A. A. Fainberg—who have never been placed in special psychiatric hospitals, but have been to these hospitals only as relatives [of Major General Pyotr Grigorenko and Viktor Fainberg] and could confirm my testimony on confinement conditions in these hospitals.

Only those witnesses named by the prosecution have been invited to the court. And what kind of witnesses were they?

Well, before my arrest, a former school comrade was sent to me, a certain Nikitinsky who now works at Sheremetyevo Airport's customs inspection section and who was entrusted with provoking me to a crime—arranging for underground printing equipment to be brought in from abroad.

In all probability, Nikitinsky, who did military service in the state security forces, was sent by KGB officials.

But the ill-starred provocateur did not succeed in doing this.

Then the investigation, and then the court too, tried to make him into a witness on this point of the indictment. We saw here how Nikitinsky was not up to this task either.

What were all these provocations and crude procedural violations needed for, this stream of slander and unfounded accusations?

What was this trial needed for? Only to punish one person?

No, there is a "principle," a kind of "philosophy" here. Behind the accusation presented, there stands another, unrepresented.

With the reprisal against me they want to frighten those who try to tell the whole world about their crimes.

They do not want to "carry filth out of the izba" [peasant's hut] so as to appear on the world arena as such irreproachable defenders of the oppressed.

Our society is still sick. It is sick with the fear which has come down to us from the Stalin era. But the process of the public's spiritual enlightenment has already begun and cannot be stopped.

The public already understands that the criminal is not the one who carries filth out of the izba but the one who makes it filthy.

And however long I have to spend in detention I will never renounce my convictions and I will express them, availing myself of the right given me by Article 125 of the Soviet constitution, to all who want to listen to me.

I will fight for legality and justice. And I regret only that over the short period—one year, two months, and three days—during which I was at liberty, I managed to do too little for this cause. □

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