

Intercontinental Press

Africa

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Europe

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the Americas

Vol. 10, No. 2

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January 17, 1972

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Political and Social Crisis in Yugoslavia



SHEIK MUJIBUR RAHMAN: Welcomed as head of state by Indira Gandhi, who expects him to maintain "order" and disarm Mukti Bahini fighters of Bangladesh.

Why Nixon Bombed North Vietnam

Soviet Union:

Voices of Protest at Tvardovsky's Funeral

Lambertist 'Reply to a Splitting Act'

Sheik Mujibur Welcomed by Indira Gandhi

Strike by Africans Closes Mines

About 11,000 members of the Ovambo tribe in Namibia, which is ruled by the apartheid South African government, have downed their tools, paralyzing copper production and most mineral processing in the territory. The U.S.-owned Tsumeb Corporation is among the industries shut down.

The strike was initiated in December against the medieval contract-labor system imposed on the Blacks by Pretoria. Ovambos are brought from their homeland near the Angolan border to work for an average of less than \$12.50 a month plus food and lodging. They cannot leave Ovamboland without first signing a contract binding them to their employer. That contract is then unbreakable for twelve to eighteen months, during which time they can neither change from one employer to another nor go home.

The strike is the first mass mobilization of the Ovambos, who previously were regarded as the most conservative of Namibia's peoples. In the past South Africa has used this conservatism as an excuse to reject demands by both the United Nations and the World Court at The Hague that it grant Namibia independence.

But despite the difficult conditions of repression, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) has apparently succeeded in developing a political movement in Ovamboland. Since Ovambos make up about half of Namibia's population, which South Africa estimates to be 749,000, Pretoria now faces not merely the crippling of a significant portion of its mining industry but a potentially powerful national liberation movement in Namibia. □

Next Week

The next issue of *Intercontinental Press* will feature an article on the January 5 trial of Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky. Don't miss "The One-Day Frame-Up Trial of Vladimir Bukovsky," by George Saunders.

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Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

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Why Nixon Bombed North Vietnam

By Allen Myers

"Why was so much of the country surprised last week," Neil Sheehan asked in the January 2 *New York Times*, "when President Nixon ordered the bombing of North Vietnam? The President had said a year ago that he would do it."

Sheehan's question was quite pertinent, although the answer is hardly flattering to the paper for which he writes. For the last three years, the capitalist press, including the *New York Times*, has consistently treated Nixon's "Vietnamization" propaganda as evidence of an intention to end the war and, sooner or later, to withdraw American forces from Indochina. Even such major escalations as the invasions of Cambodia and Laos have generally been treated as deviations from this alleged policy, rather than expressions of Nixon's real intention: to force on the Indochinese peoples a Korea-type settlement that protects the interests of American imperialism.

Nixon, of course, did his best to create misunderstanding with his 1968 campaign claim that he had a "plan" for ending the war. American voters took this to mean that he would get U.S. forces out of Indochina. As the last three years have amply demonstrated, what he really meant was that he planned to win "peace" by defeating the Vietnamese revolution.

Unfortunately, Nixon's aims have not always been understood, even by opponents of the war. Ever since Nixon proclaimed "Vietnamization," elements of the left have periodically declared that the war is virtually "over," that the Vietnamese people have won, etc. This was one of the arguments used in the spring of 1970 to justify attempts by the Communist party and some pacifists to convert the antiwar movement into a "multi-issue" political group for which the war would be only one concern among many.

But the evidence as to Nixon's intentions has always been there for those willing and able to evaluate it. With the December 26-30 bombing raids on North Vietnam, the evidence has accumulated to the point where

sections of the capitalist press have had to acknowledge it.

The record shows that the Trotskyists have correctly analyzed Nixon's strategy from the beginning. Less than two months after Nixon had taken office, the March 10, 1969, issue of *Intercontinental Press* warned:

"Nixon's strategy has been to stall the Paris talks while intensifying the attacks in Vietnam."

The following issue of *Intercontinental Press* reported:

"It is nearly two months since Richard Nixon was inaugurated president of the United States. In his campaign speeches he claimed that he had a plan to end the war in Vietnam. What that may have been remains a closely guarded secret. The reality is that the American command has steadily escalated the war in South Vietnam since Johnson's bombing 'halt' over North Vietnam went into effect last November 1. . . .

"Nixon made his first public statement concerning the NLF thrust [National Liberation Front's February-March 1969 offensive] on March 4. The United States, he said, 'will not tolerate' attacks on South Vietnamese cities. He threatened that 'an appropriate response will be made to these attacks if they continue.'

"Inasmuch as U.S. forces have already been under orders to exert 'maximum' military 'pressure' in South Vietnam since last November, Nixon clearly implied a resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam."

In our November 17, 1969, issue, we drew the following lesson from one of Nixon's speeches:

"President Nixon, in his November 3 speech, told the world and the American people in almost so many words that his administration intends to continue its aggression against the Vietnamese people indefinitely. . . .

"Since he came into office last January, Nixon has stalled for time to allow him to continue the war while quieting public opposition at home. It was this gamble for time that led him to make the token withdrawals

of U.S. troops from Vietnam. . . ."

When Henry Cabot Lodge resigned as chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris talks and was not replaced, we wrote on December 1, 1969:

"This downgrading of the Paris negotiations by Washington is a further proof that Nixon does not intend to end the war in the foreseeable future. He is still seeking a military victory over the Vietnamese freedom fighters."

The May 18, 1970, *Intercontinental Press* asked the question, ". . . why has Washington been unable up to now to secure a settlement of the kind that brought the Korean war to a close, leaving a puppet regime in power supported by a permanent U.S. army of occupation?"

The article discussed the reasons for the continued resistance of the Vietnamese people, and warned that Nixon still intended to force a "settlement" on the Korean model by military means:

"A sector of the American bourgeoisie . . . began to wonder if the objective was not beyond the capacities of even the United States. Their worries were heightened by the deepening radicalization of the American youth. They welcomed Nixon's ostensible turn to withdrawal from the morass.

"But Nixon still believes that by military means it is possible to snatch a 'just peace' from the jaws of defeat. His decision to invade Cambodia was a desperate gamble in accordance with this view."

Nixon lost that desperate gamble, as he did the following year with the invasion of Laos. The December air raids on North Vietnam differed from the earlier escalations chiefly in the fact that the gamble was more desperate.

With each reduction in American troop levels that Nixon has been forced to concede to the antiwar sentiment of the American people, he has had fewer resources to throw into the battle. This disadvantage for American imperialism was partially offset by the fact that the air war was much less visible to the U.S. public than was ground combat involving American troops.

The gamble in the December raids was that their magnitude would alert public opinion to the fact that Nixon has no intention of ending the war except on his own terms. The thousand or more sorties flown against



Conrad, in the Los Angeles Times

North Vietnam could hardly be hidden under the old cover of "protective reactions."

In a two-part series that appeared in the January 1 and 3 *New York Times*, Anthony Lewis gave the back of his hand to the Nixon administration's arguments that the raids were necessary to "protect" American planes:

"The official view is apparently that the United States has a divine right to fly and bomb at will over the entire Indochinese peninsula without challenge by enemy aircraft or missiles. If the North Vietnamese dare to put up an air defense, we are entitled to punish them. It is a notion fitter for psychological than political analysis."

"The illusion," Lewis wrote January

3, "laboriously constructed by the President, is that American forces remain in South Vietnam because the enemy holds American prisoners. The truth is the opposite: The prisoners are useful under the Nixon policy to help justify a residual American force.

"The illusion has it that bombing is necessary to protect the remaining American forces in South Vietnam. The truth is now seen to be the opposite: A residual force will remain largely to provide a reason for continued bombing.

"The illusion is that American responsibility for life and death in Indochina is slowly coming to an end. The truth is that the Nixon policy makes it impossible to see the end of American involvement."

Lewis went on to acknowledge what

Intercontinental Press has been pointing out for the last three years:

"... more and more people are beginning to understand... Mr. Nixon's purpose in Vietnam: to end the combat role of American ground forces but *win the war by other means.*" (Emphasis added.)

The bombing of North Vietnam during Johnson's administration was notably unsuccessful in winning the war for U.S. imperialism. If Nixon expects to win by bombing, therefore, the obvious conclusion is that he intends to escalate the air war beyond the 1968 level.

Fred Branfman, the director of a research organization called Project Air War, drew precisely this conclusion in an article published in the January 2 *New York Times*:

"The thesis that the Administration will go as far as public opinion allows it is fueled by the fact, documented in the Pentagon Papers, that all official analyses deemed the 1965-68 bombing of the North a failure....

"If it is planning on observing previous limitations on the bombing, why did the Administration renew strikes against the North that were shown to be ineffective? And, in particular, why did it do so now at a time when it is making every effort elsewhere to show that the war is 'winding down'? Could it be that it is prepared to bomb Hanoi, Haiphong, the dikes, if it feels public opinion will permit it?"

Branfman pointed out that prior to the December 26-30 raids, Nixon had attempted to provoke some North Vietnamese action that could be used to "justify" them. Thus, the number of "protective reaction" raids jumped sharply in November and again in December.

Branfman considered his main conclusion important enough to bear repetition:

"Unless checked by public opinion, the Administration may well be prepared to level Hanoi and Haiphong, mine Haiphong Harbor, and possibly even bomb North Vietnam's system of dikes."

Nixon's apparent intention makes all the more criminal the offhand manner in which the raids were treated by the Chinese government. Not until the evening of December 29 did the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

issue a perfunctory condemnation of the bombing. [See text in box.]

Official Chinese comments on the war traditionally try to counter bombs with bombast, but the rhetoric of the December 29 statement was even emptier than usual—a fact that caught the attention of the U. S. press. It is interesting to compare the latest statement with the commentary of *Renmin Ribao* at the time of the Laos invasion. Then the Chinese government was quite specific about the threat it saw in the escalation:

"The U. S. bourgeois press has pointed out that he [Nixon] is taking the road the Truman administration took in Korea many years ago. . . .

"Laos is not in Northwest Europe or South America, but in north Indochina. She and China are linked by the same mountains and rivers and have a common boundary of several hundred kilometres. Nixon should not lose his head and forget such common knowledge of geography. By spreading the flames of aggressive war to the door of China, U. S. imperialism certainly poses a grave threat to China. . . ." [For full text, see *Intercontinental Press*, March 22, 1971, p. 264.]

The warning conveyed by *Renmin Ribao* was taken quite seriously by at least a section of the U. S. capitalist class. It highlighted the possibility of Nixon's war getting out of control and undoubtedly contributed to the *New York Times'* decision to publish the Pentagon papers.

Like Laos, North Vietnam has a "common boundary" with China. A similar warning—to say nothing of material aid to the Vietnamese—would seem to be appropriate in the present case.

In the interval, however, Mao's overtures to Nixon have resulted in a new flowering of "peaceful coexistence" in the form of mutual backscratching. Nixon backs Mao's friend Yahya in the India-Pakistan war. Mao looks the other way when bombs fall on North Vietnam and allows Nixon to use the suggestion of a Peking-Washington deal in an attempt to defuse antiwar sentiment in the United States.

On January 7, *Renmin Ribao* carried a photograph of Chou En-lai and the U. S. Air Force crew that flew Nixon's advance party to Peking. In a dispatch from Peking the same day, John Burns of the *Toronto Globe*

Chinese Government Statement on Bombing of North Vietnam

[The following is the complete text of the statement on the bombing of North Vietnam issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the evening of December 29. The translation is taken from the December 30 issue of Hsinhua.]

* * *

In the past few days, U. S. imperialism has sent large numbers of aircraft to carry out successive and ever more violent bombings and raids against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, thus committing new barbarous crimes against the Vietnamese people. On December 18 and 26, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam issued two statements strongly condemning the U. S. imperialist war acts of aggression against North Viet Nam. The Chinese Government and people express their utmost indignation at the U. S. imperialist crimes of aggression and their firm support to the solemn and just stand of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam as set forth in its statements.

The U. S. Government's barbarous bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam has once again exposed the falsehood of its words of peace. Three years ago it undertook to stop completely its bombing of North Viet Nam; yet in fact the bombing has been off and on as it desires, and it has never really acted on its promise. Furthermore, it has repeatedly expressed itself for a negotiated settlement of the Viet Nam question, but up to now it has been unwilling to make a due and serious reply to the seven-point peace proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and has unreasonably obstructed the normal conduct of the Paris talks. The U. S. Government has talked glibly about ending the war in Indochina, but actually it is stubbornly pursuing its so-called "Vietnamization", "Laotianization" and "Khmerization" plans, striving to bolster its puppet regimes and obstinately dragging out its war of aggression by "using

Indochinese to fight Indochinese" and "using Asians to fight Asians". Recently the Nixon Government has openly declared that it will continue to step up its air strikes and take "the actions that are needed and necessary" to deal with the three Indochinese peoples. All this fully shows that U. S. imperialism is intensifying and expanding the war in Indochina under the smokescreen of talk about ending it.

To dispatch aircraft to invade and attack the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam is evidence that U. S. imperialism has suffered disastrous defeats on the Indochinese battlefields and is making a desperate struggle. Recently, the heroic Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian peoples, closely coordinating with each other and concerting their operations, have launched fierce attacks against the enemy and won inspiring victories on the South Viet Nam battlefield and particularly along Highway 6 in Cambodia and on the Plain of Jars in Laos, landing the U. S. aggressors and their lackeys in an even more serious predicament. In raiding North Viet Nam, the U. S. aggressors look fierce, but are in fact very weak; they cannot in the least intimidate the heroic Vietnamese people, nor save themselves from defeat on the Indochinese battlefield as a whole. This act of aggression on the part of U. S. imperialism has already suffered severe punishment at the hands of the armed forces and people of North Viet Nam. Should it obdurately cling to its course and persist in and expand its war of aggression, it will only meet with even more disastrous defeats.

The Chinese Government and people are closely watching the aggressive moves of U. S. imperialism in Indochina. The Chinese people's stand in supporting the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples in their war against U. S. aggression and for national salvation is firm and unshakable. So long as U. S. imperialism does not stop its aggression, the Chinese people will exert their utmost to support and assist the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples in their war against U. S. aggression and for national salvation till complete victory.

and *Mail* commented:

"Observers here considered it a mark of the progress that has already been made that the Chinese should be prepared to show their leaders entertaining members of an air force that continues to shower bombs on China's allies in Indochina."

There is, nevertheless, a limit to

what the Chinese can accomplish in distracting U. S. public attention from Nixon's escalations. It is the fear of arousing the American public that causes sectors of the U. S. ruling class to take exception to the December raids and to those planned for the future. Anthony Lewis expressed this clearly in the articles quoted earlier:

"American opinion has been muted on the war over recent months. The President has had much greater success than critics expected in persuading the public to accept his policy. But that may be because the drop in troop levels and in American casualties seemed to point toward the inevitability of a total U.S. withdrawal.

"What if the public begins to see that no end is in sight? What if those bombers go North again, every few months, to attack another reported enemy build-up? What if more planes are lost, and more pilots made prisoner?"

Even worse, from the standpoint of U.S. imperialism, is the likelihood that Nixon's bombing raids will prove unable to accomplish his goals, and that he will then be moved to try even more desperate gambles—perhaps even going far enough to provoke a reaction from the Chinese bureaucracy. The *New York Times* expressed this fear in a January 5 editorial:

"Years of sustained bombing throughout most of North Vietnam did not solve President Johnson's problems when he had up to a half-million troops fighting in the South. Intensive bombing did not stave off disaster for the Cambodians along Route 6 or for the Laotians and Thais in the Plaine des Jarres. It is extremely doubtful that last week's five-day revival of the air war against the North will seriously upset Hanoi's schedule, especially since those raids were apparently less successful than President Nixon extravagantly claimed.

"The agonizing question then is, what new risks may the President hazard in his desperate attempt to salvage a bankrupt policy?"

Branfman's prediction of one possible "desperate attempt" has been mentioned: the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. In any event, the worldwide antiwar movement, and especially the movement in the United States, is clearly faced with the task of restraining Nixon from new attempts to win from the air what he has not been able to win on the ground.

If the antiwar movement is able to continue exposing Nixon's real intentions, the mass demonstrations scheduled for April 22 may provide occasion for the *New York Times* to complain to Nixon: "We told you so." □

Nixon's 'Tilt in Favor of Pakistan'

By Jon Rothschild

"I am getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan."

"There have been some comments that the Administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate."

Both statements were made by Henry Kissinger, assistant to the president for national security affairs, and advance-man for Nixon's upcoming China trip. The first statement was



KISSINGER: "Getting hell" from Nixon for "not being tough enough on India."

made at a private meeting of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), an arm of the National Security Council. The second, made to newsmen, was for public consumption.

Jack Anderson, whose column is syndicated to more than 700 newspapers, published the first statement on January 3. He said its source was a government memo (stamped "secret sensitive") on a December 3 session of the WSAG.

Kissinger responded by complaining that he had been quoted out of context. On January 5 Anderson let

Kissinger have it by releasing to the press the full text of the memo, plus a Joint Chiefs of Staff account of a December 4 meeting of WSAG and another memo on a December 6 meeting.

Supplying the context did not get Kissinger off the hook. On the contrary, the "Anderson papers" were the clearest documentation since the Pentagon papers of the way decisions are made by the rulers of the "free world."

Motivation and explanation of nearly every decision is marked by cynical trickery. In the memo on the December 4 meeting we read: "Concerning the matter of economic aid, Dr. Kissinger stated that the President had directed that cutoff was to be directed at India only. He indicated, however, that he wanted to read the announcement to the President so that the latter would know exactly what he might be getting into. At this point Mr. [Maurice] Williams [of the Agency for International Development] asked whether some mention should be made in the statement explaining why aid for Pakistan is not being cut off. Dr. Kissinger said that information would be kept for background only."

Williams, who is apparently an economic shyster more than a political strategist, suggested that since the Department of Agriculture had indicated that the price of vegetable oil in the United States was falling, it might be a good idea to continue shipping that to India, instead of wheat. This could avoid "repercussions" in the U.S. market.

The previous day, when asked if Nixon understood that the aid cutoff to India could not be kept secret, Kissinger replied: "If asked, we can say we are reviewing our whole economic program and that the granting of fresh aid is being suspended in view of conditions on the subcontinent."

At the December 6 meeting Kissinger said that the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations should give substantially the same speech in the

General Assembly as he did in the Security Council, except that "he would like something put in about refugees. . . ."

In case anybody thinks this was due to concern about refugees, Joseph Sisco, assistant secretary of state, noted that "this humanitarian issue could be a very attractive one for the General Assembly. . . ."

At the December 6 meeting Kissinger asked whether it would be possible to circumvent the formal ban on sending arms to Pakistan by shipping them through a third party. Jordan and Saudi Arabia were suggested. He was informed that this was forbidden. Kissinger said that Nixon expected to be getting "emergency requests" from Yahya as the military situation deteriorated.

"Dr. Kissinger said that the President may want to honor those requests. The matter has not been brought to Presidential attention but it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated. Mr. Packard [deputy secretary of defense] then said that we should look at what could be done. Mr. Sisco agreed but said it should be done very quietly."

In his December 31 column, Anderson quoted from another secret document, the full text of which he did not release, that said the dispatching of a portion of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal during the war was intended as a "show of force," aimed at compelling India to divert its naval forces, weakening the Indian blockade of Bangladesh ports, and forcing India to keep its planes on the alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistani troops. The official government explanation of the move was that the ships had been dispatched to help evacuate U.S. civilian personnel from Dacca.

Anderson's sources so far remain a mystery. But he has stressed one point: "These sources are no Ellsbergs who left the Government two years ago." He claims that the flow of documents from secret government circles to him is continuing. "My sources—and they are plural—are some of their own boys. And if they want to finger them, they're going to wind up with bubble gum all over their faces."

There is some evidence, despite the fact that the administration claims that a series of low-level personnel

had access to the memos, that Anderson is right. The January 6 *New York Times* quoted a Justice Department official as saying that "measured, low-key analysis" would be a better term than "investigation" to describe the Department's reaction to the security leak.

This contrasts sharply with Attorney General John Mitchell's frenzy when the Pentagon papers were leaked to the press. Anderson said that his sources opposed Nixon's policy of backing Yahya, who seemed to be a sure loser. When the warships were sent into the Bay of Bengal, they feared "another Gulf of Tonkin situation."

At first, Anderson said, his sources gave him "a dozen representative documents." Anderson then demanded more material, and eventually "they let me see a whole massive file of documents."

Only three of these have been published; four others were partially quoted in Anderson's columns. The rest still remain guarded secrets. Perhaps they contain the answers to some questions that are raised by the scant material that has been released. For example, the memo on the December 3 meeting contains the following mysterious sentence: "Kissinger asked for clarification of secret special interpretation of March, 1959, bilateral U.S.

agreement with Pakistan." The same memo quotes Kissinger as saying: "When I visited Pakistan in January, 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March, 1959, bilateral agreement."

Other people might also like some clarification of that agreement, such as 75,000,000 Bengalis or the people of the United States, in whose name such agreements are made. Nixon was vice president in 1959. Perhaps he can provide the answer.

Also missing from the published documents is information on the actions of the U.S. government during the past nine months, while hundreds of thousands of Bengalis were being slaughtered by the U.S. SEATO ally.

The Anderson papers provide little new data on the actual deeds of the Nixon regime. But they do give us a glimpse of the standard operating procedure of imperialist governments. That this material apparently was released by top administration figures and not underling bureaucrats is a measure of the degree to which Nixon's policies have divided even the upper levels of U.S. policy-making bodies. □

Bangladesh

Behind the Indian Invasion

Bombay

At the time of its formation as a state based solely on religion, Pakistan was predominantly an agricultural country. The majority of the population lived on the land. In East Pakistan there were few industries compared to the West, and most of these were in the hands of the Indian bourgeoisie.

Bangladesh has nothing in common with West Pakistan except religion, which lost its ability to cement the two wings the moment the economic exploitation of Bangladesh by West Pakistan began.

The 75,000,000 people of Bangladesh—who formed a majority of Pakistan's population—have a completely

different social and cultural tradition and a different language. Their manners, customs, and problems have more in common with those of South-east Asia—particularly West Bengal—than with West Pakistan.

The high population density of Bangladesh and the lack of industry put a constant pressure on the land. In 1947 most of the landlords, who were Hindus, were dispossessed and

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their lands were redistributed amongst the peasants. Feudalism is therefore practically nonexistent.

Colonial Economy of East Pakistan

Within a short time after Partition, an ever widening gap in per capita income and standard of living between West and East Pakistan became incontestable. The policies of the central government, based in West Pakistan, greatly exacerbated the socio-economic inequalities arising from the uneven development of the two regions and from the uneven distribution of natural resources.

West Pakistan employed three main instruments for the exploitation of East Pakistan. First, scarce resources and foreign aid were inequitably directed towards promoting the development of West Pakistan. Second, East Pakistan's foreign-trade earnings were used to finance imports for West Pakistan. Third, import controls and industrial-licensing policies forced East Pakistan to purchase from the West commodities that could have been obtained more cheaply on the world market. About 40 percent of all West Pakistani exports were sold to East Pakistan. There was a continuous transfer of resources from East to West.

In sum, the economy of East Pakistan bore all the traits of a colonial economy. Herein is to be found the basis for the importance of the national question in the Bangladesh revolution.

An indigenous bourgeoisie was never allowed to exist as an independent economic force in East Pakistan. Almost all the big industrialists were non-Bengalis. Bengali politics were therefore dominated by the upper petty-bourgeoisie, which felt deprived of its rights.

From the above, it is obvious that the national problem in East Pakistan had revolutionary potentialities. The struggle for provincial autonomy and later for complete liberation from West Pakistan was historically progressive and as such to be supported by revolutionary socialists, even though initially this struggle was dominated by the East Pakistani bourgeoisie through the Awami League and its leader, Sheik Mujibur Rahman.

In this respect, the Soviet bureaucracy's policy of supporting India's

attempts to maintain bourgeois rule in Bangladesh is reactionary and anti-Marxist. Just as reprehensible is the Chinese policy of all-out support to the Pakistani dictatorship against the Bengali people.

In the last analysis, both bureaucracies are attempting—just like U. S. imperialism and Indian capitalism—to maintain the status quo in the region. Both are trying to prevent the unstable equilibrium from tilting in the direction of revolution.

A Marxist strategy would have been to support the national liberation struggle, even though led by the Awami League, and in the process to try to wrest control from the bourgeoisie and place it in the hands of the proletariat. As will be seen, such a prospect was not at all utopian, especially after the struggle assumed militant forms in order to resist Yahya's massacres.

The national liberation struggle in Bangladesh was progressive because of its socioeconomic content. If a bourgeois state is now established in Bangladesh, as is likely because of the intervention of the Indian army, it is obvious that the bourgeoisie will be in no position to make Bangladesh a viable economic unit and a strong state.

Economy, territorial contiguity, etc., point with imperative necessity to fusion with West Bengal and the formation of a socialist Bengal.

The logic of permanent revolution poses the perspective of a "Red Belt" of Assam, Bihar, and both Bengals, and alarms all the parties interested in maintaining the status quo in the region.

Class Character of the Awami League

The six-point program of the Awami League, developed in response to the growing demand for regional autonomy, sought to transfer control over foreign trade, foreign-aid allocation, and taxation to the provinces. The Awami League conceived of a federation in which the federal government held control only over defense and foreign affairs.

The six-point program did not call into question the existence of Pakistan as a state based on religion. It did not press for complete independence. Nor did it say anything on the vital language question. As late as March

7, at a rally, Rahman spoke of a united Pakistan with autonomy for each province.

Nothing was said about the agrarian structure favored by the Awami League. Its economic demands would have benefited only the emerging indigenous bourgeoisie of East Pakistan.

Following the December 1970 elections—in which the Awami League won 167 of the 169 seats allotted to East Pakistan—and Yahya's indefinite postponement of the Constitutional Assembly, the league's leadership revealed its bourgeois character in the course of the struggle.

Even while calling for mass civil disobedience, Rahman was anxious to negotiate with the West Pakistanis. At the height of the disobedience movement, Rahman was closeted with Yahya, while the latter used the valuable time given him to organize his repressive forces.

The Awami League did nothing to prepare the masses for what would follow the failure of the talks. It did not arm the people. When Yahya attacked, the league did not call on the people to wrest arms from the enemy.

The entire course of the Awami League before and after March 25 reflected the interests and fears of the compromising, timid, East Bengali bourgeoisie.

After March 25, most of the Awami League leaders were captured, killed, or compelled to flee to India. The national liberation movement, suddenly deprived of its leaders, at first suffered confusion and demoralization. But the process of permanent revolution soon gave the movement a new momentum.

Socialist Dynamic of the Struggle

The Bengali people were forced to take up arms to defend themselves against the reign of terror unleashed by the military regime. After initial setbacks, a regrouping and reallocation of combat forces began to take place. The terrain of the country, the rural population, and the hatred aroused by West Pakistani atrocities combined to give the struggle the form of guerrilla warfare.

Having taken up arms, a national liberation struggle in a backward country has its own momentum, as

China, Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam have demonstrated. The armed struggle in Bangladesh soon began to bypass the bourgeois Awami League leadership.

The relations with West Pakistan had been completely broken. The state apparatus in East Pakistan had ceased to exist. The economy had disintegrated. Bourgeois leadership, which might have contained the struggle, was virtually nonexistent. It was obvious that a prolonged armed struggle would tend to install a proletarian, socialist leadership in control of the liberation struggle.

This dynamic led Indira Gandhi, the most far-sighted leader of the Indian bourgeoisie, to extend wholehearted support to the Awami League.

The desire for access to the internal market of Bangladesh led the Indian bourgeoisie to proclaim its support for the Awami League six-point program and to demand that power be handed over to the representatives elected in the December 1970 poll. But the Indian bourgeoisie resisted recognition of an independent Bangladesh, because the logic of such recognition would apply equally well to various regions of the Indian Union.

At last, however, the dangers of inaction were judged to outweigh the dangers of intervention, even counting the cost of war with Pakistan. The recognition of a bourgeois government in Bangladesh and military invasion has dimmed for the moment the prospect of a Red Bangladesh emerging from the armed struggle.

Revolutionary socialists cannot support the Indian bourgeoisie's military intervention. The tasks of the national liberation struggle in Bangladesh are inextricably linked with the tasks of socialist emancipation. These tasks can only be fulfilled by the armed people themselves.

The intervention of the Indian army will only aid the Awami League in establishing a bourgeois-democratic regime in Bangladesh. The revolutionary socialists will have to place before the people the perspective of socialist revolution, which will solve the unfinished tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. An armed people will have to fight for this perspective against all bourgeois leaders, including the Awami League.

December 11, 1971

Mukti Bahini Still Hold Arms

Sheik Mujibur Freed by Bhutto, Welcomed by Indira Gandhi

On the night of January 7, Pakistan President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto released Sheik Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League and president of Bangladesh, from prison and put him on a plane to London.

Upon arrival, Rahman declared that "the existence of the People's Republic of Bangladesh is an unchallengeable reality."

On January 3 Bhutto had declared that he would "unconditionally" free Rahman. No explanation was given for his delay in fulfilling the pledge, but Rahman reported that Bhutto had appealed to him for "some possible link" between Bangladesh and Pakistan. With the collapse of this last-ditch attempt to salvage some face-saving gesture from the military catastrophe, Bhutto placed Yahya Khan and Abdul Hamid Khan, former chief of staff, under house arrest. There was no announcement as to whether either would be put on trial.

Rahman spent only one day in England. On January 10 he arrived in New Delhi, where he was greeted by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who has called his release "a triumph for the people of Bangladesh, India, and world opinion."

Rahman is expected to spend some time in New Delhi, at least longer than it takes to change airplanes. In the January 9 *New York Times*, Sydney Schanberg wrote that an "Indian source" said that if Rahman did stay in New Delhi, he would probably discuss mutual "pragmatic" problems with Gandhi "—such as the gradual withdrawal of the Indian army, which is helping to maintain law and order, and the disarming of the Mukti Bahini [Bengali Liberation Forces]."

Relations between the Indian forces of "law and order" and the Mukti Bahini continue to be tense. The January 7 *New York Times* reported: "There have been daily incidents where armed men calling themselves Mukti Bahini have entered private houses and even the United States Consulate and Information Service to arrest people they said had been collaborators. . . ."

"Many of the guerrillas are students who now want to go back to school. But in some villages the guerrillas are reportedly trying to operate their own governments. This is a problem that Sheik Mujibur will have to deal with, observers here feel."

Many Mukti Bahini fighters have said that they will not relinquish their arms unless told to do so by Rahman. The Indian government hopes that this emotional attachment to the popular leader will divert the Bengalis' determination to win freedom for their country.

The vastness of the task of reconstructing the nation's economy was partially revealed on January 3, when Bangladesh Home Affairs Minister A. H. M. Kamaruzzaman said that \$2,000,000,000 was needed just to begin. Kafiludden Mahmood, chief secretary of the planning department, estimated the country's needs at \$3,000,000,000.

On January 8 Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam announced that banking, insurance, foreign trade, and basic industry would be nationalized. Some 400 operations, most of them formerly owned by West Pakistanis, have been taken over since the Pakistani surrender.

Exactly what sort of nationalizations these will be, however, remains unclear. On December 29 a communiqué issued in Dacca said that the Indian army would, effective immediately, take over operation of all the jute mills in Bangladesh. And on January 2 Gandhi told a rally of the ruling Congress party in New Delhi: "We are capable of meeting all the needs of Bangladesh without asking anybody for help." One may well wonder which government has nationalized Bangladesh's industries.

The notorious failure of India's own economic programs, including its "nationalizations," indicates that Gandhi's statement is pure bluster. Assistance beyond India's capacities will be necessary to prop up any capitalist government in the new state.

The Soviet and Eastern European bureaucracies are already indicating

their willingness to subsidize an Awami League government. The Paris daily *Le Monde* of December 31 reported that the German Democratic Republic will send aid and that the head of the commercial section of the Soviet consulate in Dacca has met with the Bengali minister of industry and commerce, who has been invited to Moscow. The Soviet envoy proposed that a commercial agreement be signed and promised aid of various kinds, notably to the jute industry. In turn, the Bangladesh minister of the interior declared that Soviet citizens will be able to come to Dacca without a visa, "because we are great friends."

That the provisional government appreciates such aid in its present hour of need is also shown by the fact that on December 31 the formerly illegal pro-Moscow Communist party in Bangladesh held its first public meeting in seventeen years. In time the provisional government may be as grateful to the pro-Moscow CP for giving it a left cover as it is to the Soviet Union for providing economic aid.

On the Indian side, anyone still entertaining illusions about that army's intentions in Bangladesh should pick up the January 1 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. In an article by Olle Tolgraven entitled "Classical Warfare," we find the following:

"I have been covering wars in Asia for several years, but I have never seen such a 'decent' war as last month's Indo-Pakistan conflict. Both sides fought like gentlemen. Every rule in the book was observed, every standard of classical warfare maintained. There was an atmosphere about this war which lifted it above the ordinary. The Americans in Vietnam could learn a lesson or two from the British civilised regard for human life shown by both the Indians and the Pakistanis.

"One of the many cartoons spawned by this war seemed to sum up the spirit admirably. It showed two stiff-upper-lipped generals with clipped moustaches meeting each other on the battlefield and saying: 'We haven't had much fun since Sandhurst, old chap.'"

Those having more experience with the "British civilised regard for human life" (like the inhabitants of Belfast, Dresden, Cairo, Calcutta, Dacca, and quite a few more of the world's major population centers) might seek

a somewhat different explanation for the gentlemanly conduct of the opposing armies toward each other. In fact, Tolgraven himself points to the answer: "The Indians also let the Pakistani troops keep their arms for a few days for protection against sneak revenge attacks by Bengalis. . . ."

East Pakistan Governor A. M. Malik, who had nervously sought refuge in the neutral zone of the Intercontinental Hotel, attracted vengeful guerillas screaming for his head. The Indian Army put two tanks in front of the hotel to prevent the guerillas from breaking in." □

A Very 'Holy' Sort of 'Socialism'

De Silva Presents Constitution for 'Socialist' Ceylon

Colvin R. de Silva, one of the Lanka Sama Samaja party's representatives in the Ceylon "United Front" government, presented the coalition regime's "Draft Constitution of Sri Lanka" to an enthusiastic House of Representatives December 29. (Sri Lanka, which will be the country's name under the new constitution, is Sinhala for "Holy Ceylon.")

Passage of the draft is assured by the government's large majority in the House, which earlier converted itself into a Constituent Assembly in order to adopt a new constitution.

There were, to be sure, a few members who objected to the incongruity of proclaiming a "Republic pledged to realise the objectives of a socialist democracy including the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens" while the country was still under a State of Emergency that prevents all citizens except government ministers from expressing their opinions publicly.

De Silva refused to yield anything to such quibbles. For a leader of the LSSP, which abandoned Trotskyism in 1964 in order to demonstrate that socialism can be achieved by means of coalitions with bourgeois parties, de Silva's presentation of Holy Ceylon's "socialist" constitution was undoubtedly his moment of glory.

The "socialist democracy" to be established in Sri Lanka contains some elements not foreseen by the founders of scientific socialism, who lacked the theoretical insight that comes with a ministerial portfolio in bourgeois governments. One of these elements is the obligation of the state to foster religion, as proclaimed in Chapter II of the draft:

"In the Republic of Sri Lanka, Bud-

dhism, the religion of the majority of the People, shall be given its rightful place, and accordingly, it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster Buddhism. . . ."

Lest the Tamil minority, which is primarily Hindu, take offense at this provision or at the recognition of Sinhala as the sole official language, the draft grants the minority the concession of having the laws they must obey translated into Tamil.

It would of course be a violation of Sri Lanka's "socialist democracy" to give such a minority a voice in making the laws. The constitution therefore expressly preserves the 1948 law that deprives of citizenship more than 10 percent of the population—the so-called "Indian Tamils," whose ancestors came to Ceylon in the nineteenth century.

Last but not least, the citizens of Sri Lanka are guaranteed an impressive list of "fundamental rights and freedoms," including equality before the law, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, etc. The guarantee, however, contains some fine print that allows the "fundamental" freedoms to be set aside by "existing laws" such as the present State of Emergency or "in the interests of national unity and security, national economy, public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or giving effect to the Principles of State Policy. . . ."

Some of these provisions might lead observers to conclude that the "socialism" of the LSSP is indistinguishable from the capitalism of the dominant coalition party, the bourgeois Sri Lanka Freedom party of Prime Min-

ister Bandaranaike. De Silva, however, found a tactful and diplomatic way of expressing his adherence to revolutionary tradition. When he

presented the draft to the Constituent Assembly, the January 6 *Ceylon News* reported, de Silva was "sporting his customary red tie." □

Denounce Treatment of Others' Still Held

20 Mexican Political Prisoners Released

By Ricardo Ochoa

Mexico City

On December 20 the last twenty prisoners of the hundreds jailed in the repression of the 1968 student and popular movement were released. Most of them were members of the PCM [Partido Comunista Mexicano—Mexican Communist party].

The day after their release, they held a press conference where they denounced the pressures that the political prisoners still in Lecumberri are being subjected to in the aftermath of the murder of one of their comrades.

Pablo Alvarado Barrera was shot down by guards on December 4, apparently in reprisal for the kidnapping of Dr. Jaime Castrejón Díaz November 26 by a commando group affiliated with the guerrillas of Genaro Vázquez Rojas in the state of Guerrero. The guerrillas had hoped to force the government to release fifteen political prisoners.

The participants in the news conference noted that there are still about a hundred political prisoners in Lecumberri who were jailed in repressions before and after 1968. These include the journalists Victor Rico Galán and Adolfo Gilly; doctors Gilberto Balám, Isaías Rojas, and Rolf Meiners; as well as the student leader Adán Niete Castillo and others. Among those jailed after 1968 are all the so-called guerrillas arrested by the present administration of Luis Echeverría, most prominently members of the Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria [Revolutionary Action Movement].

The former political prisoners answered reporters' questions about their position on kidnappings carried out by the commando groups. The questions were pressed quite sharply in view of the fact that two kidnappings took place in Acapulco on the day

of their release. Guerrillas under the command of Genaro Vázquez Rojas were alleged to be responsible. All of the former prisoners voiced opposition to kidnapping as a tactic.

One of the participants in the news conference, Francisco Colmenares, a student member of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario [Revolutionary Workers party], read a statement that he had signed the day before, along with Adolfo Gilly, Victor Rico Galán, Roberto Iriarte, and six other prisoners. Among other things, the authors of the statement said:

"As Marxists and socialists, we completely oppose individual terrorism as a method of struggle, just as Marx and Engels opposed it and Lenin combated it. We realize that there are some desperate elements who see no way forward, who have no confidence in the masses and their methods, and who lean to terrorism. They are completely wrong. But we also realize that the CIA and the political police promote, encourage, and directly organize terrorist acts in order to try to break up and repress the mass movement. Terrorism has never been an effective way to organize the masses, that is, to organize a revolution. We already have historic experience of this in Mexico which goes back to the Mexican revolution, a revolution accomplished by the organized violence of the masses and not by isolated, individual actions. And thus terrorist methods have gotten no response or support in this country.

"The government claims that it was Genaro Vázquez's movement that kidnapped Castrejón Díaz. If that is so, we consider that these comrades made a wrong move and that they must reflect on its results. But we declare as of now that we consider any further kidnappings to force the release of political prisoners as harming the

struggle of the workers' movement and the masses to win democratic rights and organize themselves independently. Such actions endanger the lives of political prisoners, who are hostages in the hands of the bourgeoisie. We wish, moreover, to expose the interest of the CIA, the trade-union bureaucrats, and the big bourgeoisie in promoting and organizing new kidnappings for their own benefit, attributing them to revolutionary groups as a pretext for repression."

Besides Francisco César Colmenares, the following prisoners were released: Ramón Danzós Palomino, Rodolfo Echeverría Martínez, Pedro Estrada Vega, Rafael Jacobo García, Fernando Granados Cortés, Mario Hernández Hernández, José Manuel Irené Téllez, Arturo Martínez Nateras, Carlos Medina Sevilla, Roberto Miñón Corro, Eduardo Montes, Agustín Montiel, Ernesto Olvera, Alejandro Ortiz Camacho, Arturo Ortiz Marbán, Ignacio Plata Díaz, Meltis Rincón Gallardo, Américo Saldívar, and Gerardo Unzueta. □

Protest Repression in Peru

"Several French intellectuals—including Jean-Paul Sartre, Daniel Mayer, Maurice Nadeau, Louis Daquin, Marcel Manville, and Daniel Guérin—have signed a statement protesting against 'increased repression in Peru,'" the Paris daily *Le Monde* reported in its December 30 issue.

The statement of the intellectuals noted that thirty workers were killed—not eight as the wire services claimed—when the so-called revolutionary government of Velasco Alvarado sent police in to break a strike at the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mines.

In listing the crimes of the Velasco regime, these prominent left-wing personalities also pointed to the case of the Trotskyist peasant leader Hugo Blanco, who was deported from his own country during the repression of the teachers' strike in September 1971. At the same time, a number of officials of the striking union and a student leader were sent into exile.

The statement also noted the arrest November 10 of Jacqueline Lobatón, the widow of the slain guerrilla leader Guillermo Lobatón. □

Which Way for Peru, Uruguay, and Chile?

[The exiled Peruvian revolutionist Hugo Blanco gave the following interview to a Canadian student in December in Mexico City. We have translated Blanco's answers from Spanish.]

* * *

Question. What do you think Fidel's recent visit to Peru means for the Cuban revolution and for Peru itself?

Answer. First of all, I think that his visits both to Peru and Chile were progressive in one sense. They represented a tacit recognition by both the Chilean and Peruvian governments of Cuba and its revolution, a break in the U.S.-erected blockade against Cuba. These are very positive symptoms. If Peru decides to trade with Cuba, if it recognizes Cuba, that is a very good thing. It is a triumph for the revolution throughout the continent.

But there were many negative aspects to this visit. Unfortunately, it also marked a capitulation by the Cuban government to the Peruvian dictatorship. I repeat, we are not against establishing trade or diplomatic relations with Peru. But we are against paying the price of political capitulation to achieve this. We are against Fidel Castro and the Cuban government in general having to say in return that the Peruvian government is revolutionary, that it is advancing toward socialism, and even, according to what we have been told, to say that anyone who opposes this regime is a counterrevolutionary. I think that all this was very negative.

You have to remember that Castro's invitation to visit Chile, as well as the reception he got in Peru, was a reflection of mass pressure, a reflection of the revolutionary rise that is occurring in Latin America in general, and particularly in those countries. It was specifically to ingratiate themselves with the masses that these governments welcomed Castro. And precisely this should make us understand, and should make the Cuban government understand, that the upsurge of the Chilean and Peruvian masses should be impelled forward and not pulled back. Capitulating, saying that these governments are revolutionary, injures not only Peru—that is, the Peruvian and Chilean working masses—but it injures Cuba itself.

The best kind of support Cuba could get would be the victory of a socialist revolution, of a workers' revolution in Peru, in Chile, or in any other country of Latin America. But the statements of Castro and of the Cuban government in general, by supporting the bourgeois regimes currently in power in both Chile and Peru, tend to hold back such a revolution. Therefore, even from the standpoint of Cuba's interests, the best thing would have been to tell the truth to the Peruvian and Chilean masses, not to surrender to the blandishments of these governments.

Telling the truth to the masses, I repeat, does not contradict opening up trade connections or diplomatic relations, or even agreeing on common actions with these bourgeois governments so as to strengthen your position

against imperialism. But there must be full political clarity about such diplomatic maneuvers. If we realize that it is the masses who make revolutions, we must educate them. And we cannot do this by diplomatic lies. The applause Fidel received, both in Chile and Peru, was the applause of the Peruvian and Chilean masses for the Cuban revolution; it was not for Fidel's capitulations to the bourgeois governments of these countries.

Q. Fidel came to Peru after visiting Chile. How similar are the governments in these two countries?

A. The Peruvian government is a regime sponsoring industrial development. While it represents the Peruvian bourgeoisie as a whole, it is more inclined to favor those sectors with an interest in industrial development. This category includes not only Peruvian bourgeois sectors but also the imperialist sectors of the United States, the European countries, Japan, and also petty-bourgeois strata whose interests are tied up with Peruvian industrial development. The measures introduced by this government were taken fundamentally in accordance with these economic interests.

Undoubtedly, in order to carry out its plan, the Peruvian government will have to take into consideration the pressures from the proletariat and the other exploited classes. In order to achieve its objectives, it will unquestionably have to resort to a certain demagoguery to win the support of the masses, or at least neutralize their action. But there is a great difference between the government in Peru and the one in Chile. In Chile, the main factor in the rise of Allende and the measures he is taking is the pressure of the masses. In Peru it is only another factor, the main one being the government's development schemes. In Chile it is fundamental. This is the principal difference between the Velasco and Allende governments, as it was between the Velasco and Torres governments.

Q. The government of Allende is now just over one year old. Many said when he was elected that his regime represented the road to socialism in the particular conditions of Chile. What do you think about this claim and what do you believe his government represents?

A. Allende rose to power as the result of an election. But, as we all know, this election could have been thrown out by the legislature. In order to win in the congress he needed support outside his own grouping. Concretely, this meant from the Christian Democrats. But in order to get this backing, Allende had to promise that he would preserve inviolate the main bulwarks of the bourgeois system—the judiciary and the army—pledging that they would not be replaced by organs arising out of the people, such as people's courts in the case of the judiciary, and popular militias in the case of the armed forces.

Besides this, Allende also made a lot of promises about maintaining respect for the church. We defend freedom of

religion. But all Allende's long-winded avowals showed a complete capitulation to the bourgeois system.

We must understand that if the army is left untouched, then the main defensive force of the whole bourgeois apparatus remains intact. We see this now. Allende cannot nationalize the basic industries. He has nationalized some mines, he has expropriated some ranches, all of course with compensation. But he has not touched the manufacturing sector. And naturally he cannot do it, because if he did, the army would topple him immediately. Of course, this might turn into a civil war; it might open up risks for the bourgeoisie of a real revolution that would really destroy the bulwarks of the bourgeois system and really open the way for a socialist government. But what I wanted to show was that in promising at the start of his administration to respect the basic pillars of the bourgeois system, Allende committed himself to respect the bourgeois system as a whole.

I am not saying that whatever nationalizations he carries out are not progressive steps. I do not mean that they represent what the nationalizations in Peru generally represent, since the latter are completely bourgeois measures to improve the functioning of the Peruvian capitalist system. Unquestionably, in Chile many of these measures are the result of great pressure from the popular masses. But one swallow doesn't make a summer, that is, these measures do not mean that there is socialism in Chile.

For all these reasons, I do not believe that the Allende government represents the road toward socialism, at least not in the sense that Allende, by his actions, is leading Chile toward socialism. His government may be a step toward socialism in another sense, in the sense that it will give the masses their final experience with a bourgeois reformist government and that, as a result of this lesson, they will come to understand that they themselves must take power, destroying all the foundations of the bourgeois system. That is, for what it is teaching the masses, the Allende government can be, and unquestionably is, a step toward the socialist revolution. But not in the sense that it is on the way to becoming a socialist government.

Q. In recent weeks there have been signs on several occasions of a powerful right-wing mobilization against the Allende government. What measures do you think the Allende government should take in order to respond effectively to this threat?

A. The government should explain to the people what is happening and call on them to act. The only way to halt the resurgence of the right in Chile is to mobilize the popular masses to block this mobilization. The task of stemming the rightist tide cannot be left to the bourgeois army, because it is only lying low, waiting for its chance to strike at the government, a chance that may be created precisely by such right-wing demonstrations. It is quite likely, moreover, that these demonstrations are being fomented by elements in the army itself.

I said that the army is lying in wait for the right moment to move, to overthrow Allende. It is calculating the relationship of forces, estimating whether or not the popular masses have been sufficiently weakened to permit a coup. Thus, the only way to block these intentions effectively is to mobilize the masses. Clearly Allende is not

doing this. He is afraid to do it. For if the masses did mobilize actively against these right-wing maneuvers, the mobilization would burst beyond the limits Allende, or the leaders of his Unidad Popular, want to impose. Therefore, I think it is the duty of the revolutionary left in Chile to organize the popular masses themselves to resist these rightist schemes, even though Allende opposes such a mobilization.

Allende's attitude is like Perón's at the time of the 1955 coup in Argentina. Demonstrations began against the regime, and afterward the army took charge of the offensive. But Perón held back mass action and blocked all attempts to mobilize the masses. Allende is taking this same suicidal attitude, suicidal for him, perhaps, and for his regime. But I firmly believe that Allende is one of the capitalist system's last cards in Chile, that is, the fundamental reason Allende is failing to mobilize the masses is that he prefers the capitalist system to be saved, even if his regime falls.

Q. After the defeat of the Frente Amplio, Fidel was reported as saying that this defeat showed that in Uruguay an armed struggle would be needed to bring about the victory of socialism. What is your opinion of this statement?

A. It seems that the Cuban government still lacks a coherent strategy for the Latin American revolution. The option for revolutionists is not limited to capitulating in a popular front, or in an alliance with bourgeois sectors, which Fidel defends in Peru; it is not limited to what Fidel is defending in Chile, or what he would defend in Uruguay if need be. That is, we do not have to choose between this and guerrilla warfare, or immediate armed struggle. What we must do is raise the consciousness of the masses, starting off from their present level, using various tactics depending on the real situation in each country. We have to raise them up until they understand that they must overthrow the capitalist system and establish a socialist one by means of a workers' government, or a workers and peasants' government.

It seems to me that what has to be done in Uruguay is encourage the masses to organize to struggle for the demands they are fighting for now, to lift them toward better forms of organization and struggle until they gain the awareness that only by overthrowing the capitalist system can they see their aspirations satisfied.

There is no question that when the working masses come to understand this, the bourgeois system is going to defend itself tooth and nail. It is going to attack the masses fighting for their rights, just as it has always done. And then the masses will learn that they must also destroy the fundamental bulwarks of the capitalist system in order to establish their own state. To put it in a nutshell, our difference with Fidel is not that we are opposed to armed struggle but that we do not think that the answer to the Frente Amplio's defeat in Uruguay is to create guerrilla units.

Q. What is the significance of the Peruvian government's recent repression of union struggles?

A. The essential meaning of the repression is that the Peruvian government represents precisely the class enemy,

that is, it is the representative of the exploiting classes in Peru. This is the underlying significance of the heavy blows this government has inflicted on the working class.

But, of course, there are immediate causes. This government has followed a zigzag policy. Sometimes it has made concessions to the working masses in order to win their favor; other times it has found itself obliged to repress them. An example of repression is the teachers' strike, which the government found it necessary to crush, although later it relented somewhat. Specifically, it was in this repression that I was deported, along with a student leader and several officials of the teachers' union. Another acute case of repression was the recent massacre of the miners, in which the government clearly demonstrated its class character, as well as showing clearly what, in the last analysis, its attitude will be in confrontations between the Peruvian working masses and an imperialist company.

The case I am referring to was the bloody repression of the workers in the copper mine owned by the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. More than twenty-five members of the mine union were murdered. More than a hundred of them were wounded, many seriously. Over a hundred miners have disappeared. And the surviving union activists are being hunted like wild animals in the vicinity of the mine and throughout the central region of the country, where the mine is located. There are dozens of prisoners; they are being savagely tortured. The repression, moreover, has spread to other urban sectors; and political leaders have been jailed, like Ricardo Onapuri. The scope of the attacks has extended to include some student leaders like Julio Castro and left activists like Jacqueline Lobatón, the widow of a guerrilla leader in the 1965 campaign who was murdered by the repressive forces.

Q. You began your political activity in Peru as a leader of the struggle of the Peruvian peasants to obtain land. What is the government doing today to meet the needs and demands of the people and the peasantry for land?

A. Actually, my work in Peru, that is, my work as a Trotskyist activist, began in the Lima labor movement. But later I went to live among the peasants in my native region, the Cuzco area, to be precise, in the valley of La Convención. In that period, the masses themselves took many of the things they were demanding, that is, won the gains they were seeking by the strength of their organization and the power of their struggle.

For example, their main achievement was winning possession of plots of land that formerly belonged to the landlords so that the peasants could work this land. Besides winning the ownership of these plots, the peasants made gains with more far-reaching implications, such as getting the lands being cultivated by the landlords turned over to the union, which worked them collectively for the collective good. Also, the fallow lands were distributed among peasants who had no plots of their own. These last two gains were lost; the repressive forces compelled the peasants to retreat and wrested these victories from them.

But the first and fundamental gain, the possession of the plots of seized land, remains essentially intact throughout the province of La Convención and in the valley of Lares. The successive governments that have ruled

since that time, that is, since the early 1960s, have been unable to crush the peasants, have been unable to take this victory back from them. Of course, the various governments did not recognize the peasants' possession of these lands, but they did not dare take them away either. In this sense, the repression had to stay within certain limits. They crushed the peasant movement. They jailed many of us and murdered others. They broke up the unions for a time. But they did not dare drive the peasants off these lands. This would have led to a mass insurrection, since we had already initiated armed resistance.

In this respect, what the previous government did — and what, fundamentally, the present government is doing — was to leave the peasants in possession of these lands but demand that they pay the ranchers for them. This payment, of course, was to be channeled through the government. But, in the last analysis, it would go to the landlords. Therefore, the peasants in the La Convención and Lares region see the present agrarian reform law as a negative development. They already have the land, or at least a plot of it; they won it through their struggle. And now the government goes and says that it is going to recognize their title to this land but that they are going to have to pay for it. The peasants are not interested in pieces of paper; they are interested in land. So, they reject this agrarian reform law. I am referring here to the peasants in the areas of La Convención and Lares, which was the region where I worked, that is, the center of the region.

In other areas, the government has employed widely differing measures in dealing with the peasants, and the reactions of the peasants have also differed widely. There are areas where the peasants regard the agrarian reform law as negative; to others, it seems progressive. But in no case has it fully satisfied the aspirations of the peasantry. Therefore, no section of the peasants supports the government with enthusiasm. Some do support it, but half-heartedly. Others oppose the measures of this government but, in general, also not very energetically. The agricultural workers in the coastal region are an exception. The same is true of the peasants in Huanta, where the government has perpetrated a massacre. But most peasants are indifferent toward this government. If the peasants have not mobilized on a large scale to win their objectives, it is not because they believe in this government. They have been intimidated to some extent by the massive repression carried out all over Peru in the 1960s.

The present agrarian law, you must remember, has many limitations. In the first place, it was introduced not to satisfy the aspirations of the peasantry but to meet the needs of the government's policy of bourgeois industrial development. Fundamentally, this government is interested in having a layer of small and middle peasant proprietors who can provide a market for the products of industry. Secondly, it is interested in having a broad base of social support. These were reasons for introducing the agrarian reform law, as well, of course, as to check the revolutionary struggle the Peruvian peasants were moving toward.

But even this limited law is not being fully enforced. It is not being put into practice in the way the government originally wanted and, for the most part, would still like to see it put into practice. The reason is that the means of enforcement is a far-reaching bureaucratic

network which is under heavy pressure from oligarchical landholding elements throughout the country, and in some areas more than others. And since the law includes a clause against peasant mobilizations, which provides for jailing any peasant who tries to mobilize the masses, the pressure on the bureaucracy is coming from only one direction, from the landlords. Within the bourgeois system, bureaucrats are easily bribed. And this is a further check on the law, besides its inherent limitations.

Q. How would you describe the economic situation of the Indian population in Peru in comparison to the Peruvian population as a whole?

A. Their economic situation is much lower than that of the Peruvian people as a whole. In fact, the Indian people are generally peasants. But "Indian" is a relative term in Peru. Iago Isalves Prada, a Peruvian writer of the last century, said that it would be more proper to talk about people being Indians in social status rather than in blood, that is, Indian is a complex, cultural category, not a distinction of race. I say this because there are Indians who have blond hair and blue eyes, but socially they are Indians. They speak the native language, dress like natives, follow native customs, and are treated like natives. Some men who were racially Indians or mestizos with a strong percentage of Indian blood have even reached the presidency of the republic by serving the landlords and the imperialists.

So, when we speak of Indians in Peru, it is more of a social than a racial category. And this category is much lower than the other sectors of the Peruvian population. Indians generally go barefoot, or wear very poor sandals. They live in huts. Their diet is very poor, sometimes almost completely lacking in protein. They are forced to work very hard. The law on the eight-hour day is not enforced in the case of Indians. They live in places beyond the reach of most of the amenities of civilization, medical care, movies, and other cultural advantages.

As for the diet of the Indians, I repeat, they don't drink milk, they don't eat meat, they don't eat eggs. Their nutrition comes essentially from carbohydrates such as corn, potatoes, and dehydrated potatoes, which have less food value than regular ones. And this is true for all the native areas in Peru. The specific foods may differ, but the level of nutrition remains extremely low. The native population is in the worst situation all over Peru. There is a terribly high rate of infant mortality among the native population. Diseases such as tuberculosis, anemia, and parasitosis are endemic in the Peruvian peasantry, which is composed fundamentally of natives.

Another important aspect is illiteracy. Ninety percent or more of the indigenous population is illiterate. This means, moreover, that a large part of the population is not only illiterate but also cannot speak Spanish, the official language of Peru, in which all official transactions take place and in which all documents are written. In Peru, the native languages are very widely spoken. The primary ones are Quechua and Aymara but there are many other dialects.

Q. To what extent does this situation of the Indians

result from a policy of discrimination, economic, political, or cultural, by the rulers of Peru?

A. Unquestionably one of the devices of the Peruvian exploiting classes has been discrimination against the natives, discrimination that goes back to the Spanish conquest. Indians were regarded as animals. The priests argued over whether they had souls. Today, of course, we have reached the conclusion that the ones who said that they did not have immortal souls were right! But that is something else again. The conclusions the Spaniards reached served to justify their inhuman exploitation of the natives.

When the Spaniards came, the Indian population was 12,000,000. As a result of the massacres perpetrated by the conquerors, the population dropped to 4,000,000. These massacres were not carried out with weapons but by sending the Indians to work in remote mines, especially in the Potosí mines in Bolivia, where the working conditions were so inhuman that the mortality was massive. Against these gigantic crimes in the Potosí mines, in mines throughout Peru and on the estates of the Spaniards, there were many native uprisings. The most important of these was the one led by Tupac Amaru. And it is no accident that this insurrection originated in the Department of Cuzco, because this is the most heavily Indian area in Peru, the area where the Indians are most beaten down and discriminated against.

Later, under the republic, this discrimination, this oppression of the Indians, continued. The Indians did not get very much from Peruvian independence. In some cases, they even lost something. Bolivar, who is considered a hero, was from a family of landlords. He introduced a law dissolving the Indian tribal communities, with limited success. Today something of primitive communism is still practiced in the surviving communities. These communities were used to exploit the peasants first by the Incas and later by the Spaniards, but they were still respected. But Bolivar tried to break them up, break them up into small private holdings. There was no benefit in this for the Indians, but the big landlords swallowed up the individual peasants one by one, and the Indian population as a whole suffered.

There was so much resistance to this measure that the state was forced once again to recognize the validity and legality of the Indian communities. But, as I said, all through the history of the republic, this discrimination against the Indians has continued from the economic, social, political, and cultural standpoints. For example, on the pretext that they are illiterates, Indians are not allowed to vote. The schools are taught in Spanish, a foreign language for the Indians. When they cannot pronounce some Spanish letters, some Spanish sounds that do not exist in their language, they are called stupid, good-for-nothing, and worse. But none of our ministers of education have ever been required to pronounce Quechua. Because, if they were, there is no doubt that they would not be able to pronounce the sounds that Indian children learn when they are one year old.

Such discrimination extends to everything. For centuries an entire culture has been suppressed. But it refuses to die. Everywhere it struggles for survival. The degradation

of the Indians is, of course, fundamentally economic, but not only economic. Their language is regarded as a badge of shame. It is not unusual to find people who can speak Quechua or some other native language denying that they know it. That is, the idea has been taught that it is a sign of education to be ignorant of these languages.

Of course, when the Indians begin to gain self-awareness, they completely change their scale of values and begin to take pride in everything native. But while they have not gained this consciousness, the scale of values imposed by the European conquerors of Peru remains in force. That is, the feeling remains that the Indian style of singing, their songs, their style of dancing, their way of talking, of dressing are all inferior, all shameful. Besides this, the Indians have to walk in the road; they cannot walk on the sidewalks. They have to walk with the animals, even in some villages. I say even in some villages because this is the way it is in the cities. Often in buses Indian women are forced to give their seats to European women—after being given a few insults for daring to sit there in the first place, as if they were human beings.

Q. What demands are Indians putting forward to change their situation? And what demands do you think will be necessary in the future for the movement of the Indians to achieve their equality and liberation?

A. In fact, the Indian movement has not raised any cultural demands. It has raised only demands of an economic and general political character—such as demanding a general amnesty—that cannot be termed specifically Indian. But it is undeniable that as these struggles for economic or broadly political aims gain momentum, a cultural struggle is also taking root.

The Indians are forcing respect for their cultural heritage. Their music is played more, for example. And in the big demonstrations in the main square of Cuzco, an Indian got up on the platform in front of the cathedral dressed in native clothes and spoke his own language. This was never done before. The Indians were ashamed to speak Quechua. And in the marches through the city, every native aspect was stressed. On the other hand, a nativist movement has existed for some time. It gained a great deal of prominence as a reflection of the Mexican revolution.

Of course, all this must be done in a coherent way. That is, the demands raised by the nativists must be linked with the real native movement, with the peasant movement. And this must be done by the revolutionary party. It must study this problem and work out consistently what Indian demands must be raised. We, for our part, have already raised the slogan of votes for illiterates, and we placed great stress on it in the last elections. Actually this is a demand for the native peasantry, which in Peru is essentially illiterate. But this, I repeat, requires more systematic formulation of a program of national—that is, cultural, political, and social—demands, besides the economic and general political demands raised by the native movement as a peasant movement.

Q. What do you think will be the role of the Indian

people and the Indian problem in the coming Peruvian revolution?

A. I think that the Indian question and the Indian movement are going to play a very important role in the Peruvian revolution. It was not surprising that José Carlos Mariategui, a very important Marxist theoretician we had in Peru, singled out the Indian question as one of the fundamental problems of the Peruvian people. Although he came to the conclusion that the Indian question was one of land, Mariategui clearly already understood something of the complexity of this problem—which is not simply economic but national, that is cultural, social, and political.

I think that the Indian people will play a great role, and it was precisely for this reason that I said in my last answer that we must make a deeper study to see what concrete proposals we should make in the field of the cultural, social, and political demands of the Indian people *as such*—besides the economic and political demands of the Indians as *peasants* that have so far been raised. We must study this problem because the Indian people represent a large sector in Peru, in Ecuador, and in other Latin American countries.

Besides this, we are seeing the importance these kinds of struggle and this type of demands can have in the social revolution in general, such as the demands of the Black people or the Chicanos in the United States, or the Northern Irish, or the demands of the Bengalis in Pakistan, or the Québécois and the Indians in Canada. □

Luis Pujals Reported Murdered

Argentine Prisoners Tortured

Luis Enrique Pujals, an alleged member of the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Army of the People] who was kidnapped in September, was tortured to death by Argentine police, Philippe Labreveux reported in the December 31 issue of *Le Monde*.

At the time Pujals was kidnapped, it was unclear whether police or nongovernmental terrorists were responsible. According to Labreveux, the distinction between arrests and kidnappings is disappearing, since the police regularly operate without warrants and without informing their victims of the charges against them.

"Few escape torture," Labreveux wrote, "which is practiced with varying intensity, depending on the degree of suspicion against the prisoner. Sometimes death results, as in the case of Luis Pujals. . . ."

Shortly before Christmas, when sixteen prisoners were released, the minister of the interior admitted that the military government still held 208 political prisoners. Other sources estimate the number to be between 380 and 600.

After his disappearance, Pujals' wife was informed by an anonymous caller that her husband was in the hands of the federal police. However, the police claimed that they had no knowledge of Pujals' whereabouts. □

Voices of Protest at Tvardovsky's Funeral

By George Saunders

The funeral for Soviet poet and editor Aleksandr Tvardovsky on December 21, 1971, was imbued with the character of a virtual demonstration in behalf of creative freedom. Among the reported 350 mourners, many of them young people, were a number of prominent dissident writers and intellectuals.

The novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who has rarely appeared in public since the campaigns against him of recent years, stood with Tvardovsky's widow and took a leading role in an unofficial demonstration of affection for the deceased after the cold-blooded official eulogies. The bureaucrats of the Writers Union had intended to downplay the funeral, and all the official obituaries—both printed and spoken—ignored Tvardovsky's major contribution, as editor of *Novy Mir* in the late fifties and through most of the sixties, in publishing literary works that dealt with the realities of Soviet life and attempted to probe the hidden history of the Stalin era.

It was Tvardovsky who first published Solzhenitsyn—beginning with *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*—and who in 1967 unsuccessfully fought for the right to publish *Cancer Ward*. And Solzhenitsyn's stories, it should be noted, are only the most outstanding example of the kind of work Tvardovsky made available to Soviet readers.

After a long campaign by hard-line bureaucrats against Tvardovsky, he was forced in February 1970 to resign as editor of *Novy Mir*.

Besides Solzhenitsyn, prominent dissenters or writers at the funeral ceremonies were Jaurès Medvedev—whom Tvardovsky had helped to free from psychiatric confinement in June 1970; Viktor Nekrasov, an anti-Stalinist novelist and, like Solzhenitsyn, a veteran of the battles of World War II; and the sometimes controversial modernist poet Andrei Voznesensky.

The mood of the young people present at the ceremonies was expressed by one young woman who, after the

dry, formal speeches at the Soviet Writers Club, before the trip to the cemetery, shouted the following protest.

"Why don't we recall that he was our civic conscience? Why don't we remember that he was forced out of his job, that his last poem has not been published here and that his mouth was closed before he closed it himself?"

Tvardovsky's last poem, which has apparently been circulating in *samizdat*, is said to be about his father, who was liquidated as a "kulak" dur-



ALEKSANDR TVARDOVSKY

ing Stalin's forced collectivization drive (carried out from the top down by military-bureaucratic means). Tvardovsky, back in 1936, first gained favor by a poem which praised collectivization. His last, unpublished poem criticizes it, but in exactly what terms has not been reported.

Solzhenitsyn himself has subsequently given his own description of the funeral ceremony, in a bitter protest circulating in *samizdat* called a "lament" for Tvardovsky.

"There are many ways and means to kill a poet," he said in part, attributing Tvardovsky's death to the bureaucratic drive against him. "Those chosen for Tvardovsky were

to take away his favorite child, the journal for which he suffered."

Describing the funeral, Solzhenitsyn writes: "And now these mediocre men of the secretariat appeared on the scene. The guard of honor was mounted by those unhealthy fat ones who had noisily pursued him. This has gone on for a long time in our land—since Pushkin.

"Even dead, the poet was a tool in the hands of his foes. And they paid tributes over the corpse and dedicated skillful speeches to him. They stood around the bier in a solid group and thought now they had cornered him."

Solzhenitsyn's severest remarks were reserved for the last, and obviously referred to the stirring among the youth that has been more and more noticeable in recent years, including at this funeral itself. These remarks also showed Solzhenitsyn's awareness of the role of the liberal-left wing of the Soviet establishment as a moderating influence to channel protest, but which is more and more being removed by the advocates of the "strong state" among the bureaucracy.

"They destroyed our only magazine, and thought they were victorious. . . . Idiots! When the voices of youth sound out sharply, then you will regret that you do not have this patient critic [Tvardovsky] to whose soft exhorting voice everybody listened. You will want to grub up the earth with your hands to bring [him] back. But too late."

Continuing in its campaign to drive even the meekest voice of protest out of Soviet literature—and perhaps as a reprisal against the dissidents' quasi demonstration of December 21—the official apparatus of the Writers Union in late December expelled the poet Yevgeny F. Markin and in early January the playwright Aleksandr A. Galich, author of popular satirical songs that circulate only in *samizdat*.

Markin had managed to sneak two poems past the censor and have them published in the October issue of *Novy Mir* (appearing in early December). Some of the free-thinking spirit established by Tvardovsky has, it seems, stayed with *Novy Mir*. One poem, in Aesopian language, praised Solzhenitsyn. The other—in equally disguised fashion—expressed regret that the author, that is, Markin himself, had participated under pressure in "slander against a friend"—that is, against Solzhenitsyn. Markin had

been a member of the Ryazan branch of the Writers Union and, though protesting, had voted along with the rest

in favor of expelling Solzhenitsyn from that body in November 1969.

Because he dared to make a squeak

of protest at this late date about the incident, Markin too has now been ousted. □

Tito's Crackdown

The Political and Social Crisis in Yugoslavia

By C. Malagnou

[The following article has been translated by *Intercontinental Press* from the December 31 issue of *La Gauche*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs (Revolutionary Workers League, Belgian section of the Fourth International).]

* * *

The political crisis that has racked Yugoslavia since the beginning of December is the most serious the country has known since the break with Stalin and the Cominform in 1948. It comes on top of a social crisis of unusual intensity, of which it is but the expression on the level of the political institutions and social organizations.

The extraordinary character of the purge of the League of Communists of Croatia, initiated by the central political apparatus and President Tito himself, testifies to the severity of the political crisis.

● Miko Tripalo, principal leader of the League in Croatia and member of the Executive Bureau (fifteen members) and of the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (fifty-two members), resigned from these organizations at the twenty-third session of the Croat Central Committee. Former secretary of the League for Dalmatia, former president of the Yugoslav Union of Students and later of the Central Committee of the Popular Youth, Tripalo had systematically encouraged the Croatian nationalists, under cover of a "complete application of self-management" and the struggle against pan-Yugoslav "statism."

● Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, chairman of the League of Communists of Croatia, resigned from his post at the same (twenty-third) session of the Central Committee. Savka Dabcevic-Ku-

car, who also had been a member of the Presidium of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia], is known for his rightist positions, particularly for his encouragement of foreign investment in Yugoslavia.

● Srecko Bijelic, chairman of the Council of the League of Communists for the town of Zagreb, definitively



TITO: Shows no intention of becoming figurehead for Yugoslav "strong state."

resigned from this post. He had also been a member of the LCY Presidium.

● Pedro Pirker, secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, tendered his resignation at the session of the Central Committee. He had also been a member of the LCY Presidium.

● General Janko Bobetko, after having been relieved of all his duties by President Tito himself, also resign-

ed as a member of the Central Committee of the League in Croatia.

● Marko Koprtla, member of the Executive Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia and in charge of cadre assignments, also submitted his resignation to the Central Committee of the League in Croatia.

All these resignations were accepted by the Central Committee of Croatia at its twenty-third session, December 12-14.

To these can be added a long list of resignations of less important personalities: the president of the Council of the League of Communists for Dalmatia, Mirko Dragovic, and his alternate, Pero Kriste; the Zagreb prosecuting attorney, Slobodan Budak; the chairman of the Croatian Veterans Association, Ivan Sibl; the chairman of the Council of the League in Nova Gradiska, Ive Maricevic. There were also a number of expulsions, such as the expulsion of Ivan Jurkovic, political commentator, expelled from the Organization of Communist Cultural and Information Workers.

All these resignations and expulsions came in the wake of Tito's strong denunciation of the "rotten liberalism" of the leaders of the League in Croatia at the December 1 meeting of the Presidium. In the same manner, last July's expulsion of the right-wing nationalists Sime Djodan and Marko Veselica was arranged through Tito's personal intervention.

Since the December 1 decision, the entire central apparatus of the LCY has been set in motion. A campaign against Tripalo and Dabcevic-Kucar has been organized, under the direction of Vladimir Bakaric, member of the Executive Bureau of the LCY, and Jakov Blazevic, president of the Croat National Assembly. Supported by the central apparatus of the League, they mobilized, in the most classic style

of purge campaigns, the Communists of the "work organizations," and above all, those of the Sisak steelworks (one of the largest steelworks in Yugoslavia, located, moreover—an interesting fact—in a "mixed" region having a significant number of Serbs).

Marshal Tito's heavy-handed intervention and its immediate effects dealt a stinging rebuttal to all those, both in Yugoslavia and abroad, who thought that Tito had "shot his bolt" and become a figurehead. Yugoslavia remains, like all the bureaucratized workers states (except in periods of great turmoil, like Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968), a "strong state," directed by a bureaucracy that will not allow the socialized property forms to be put in question. More exactly, Tito, who is one of the few Yugoslav leaders not to have utilized nationalist sentiments to extend his popularity, intervened in this crisis like a real "Bonaparte."

"Bonapartism" must be understood in the sense defined by Trotsky—a regime in which the economically dominant class is compelled, in order to protect its possessions, to tolerate standing above it a crowned "savior," a charismatic personality, an individual made larger than life and independent of history. A similar situation occurs in periods when class contradictions are particularly acute. Then Bonapartism has the aim of preventing an explosion. With the aid of the bureaucratic apparatus and the police, the main function of the "supreme savior" is to protect the new property forms by usurping the political prerogatives of the dominant class.

Such is the real source of the strength, and at the same time the weakness, of Tito. For only the working class, by mobilizing itself, can definitively and truly defend the new property forms and the system of self-management.

But each time, Tito's intervention takes a form foreign to the working class and opposed to workers' democracy—a referendum. Everything is reduced to the question, "to be for or against Tito," which means, "to be or not to be." Only traitors can be against. That is why the very mechanism of Bonapartism leads Miko Tripalo, when he is attacked by Tito, to write to the latter: "Be assured that I will actively support your policies

and those of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Croatia."

There is no doubt that the profound social import of the Croatian crisis is the revival of reactionary nationalism, led by the factory bureaucracy, the petty bourgeoisie, all the elements aspiring to become a new bourgeoisie, as well as the remnants of the old bourgeoisie. Five years ago, in 1966, the first leaflets of the "ustashi" (Croat nationalists of fascist inclination) began to appear at the University of Zagreb. Since then, nationalism in all its varieties—fascist, "communist," and others—has continued to exert pressure.

The roots of this nationalism lie in the uneven economic development of the Yugoslav republics. A feeling has developed in Croatia that this nation is "exploited" by the Federation when it sends a portion of Croatian social surplus to be invested elsewhere, or when it retains a part of the currency obtained through the exports of Croatian factories.

Such sentiment is completely unfounded. The exchanges between the advanced regions (like Croatia) and the underdeveloped ones is unequal, but in the opposite direction. A small amount of Croatian labor is exchanged for a large amount of Macedonian labor, for example, Macedonian productivity being much lower.

It is only fair, therefore, that the Federation should try to restore to the underdeveloped regions what they lose through unequal exchange. The correct criticism to make here is that the Federation is operating less and less according to the above corrective mechanism.

Self-management became viewed increasingly as requiring decentralization, its degree of success being measured by the amount of revenue that could be kept. The partisans of the Croatia republic simply held to the same principal; "realized value" in Croatia should profit Croatia, and Croatia alone.

Behind this selfish logic obviously lurks the outlook of the petty proprietor. Sociologically, he acts like a person for whom there is no longer social property (of the whole), but only the properties of the local group.

Sociologically, this is the outlook of bourgeois nationalism. It is typically bourgeois to demand an equality that engenders inequality, and to

want everyone to be free to retain the full equivalent of whatever he sells (while forgetting that further down the line of production lie the factories and crystallized labor of other regions). Consequently, it is natural for these demands to be directed *against* what remains of the state monopoly of foreign trade.

The crisis is far from over. Very deep differentiations and very divergent interests "peacefully" coexist in Yugoslavia right now. But in our opinion, the crisis demonstrates something very important. Contrary to what is said by "leftist" ignoramuses, the struggle for or against the restoration of capitalism in Yugoslavia does not lie in the past, but rather right before us.

What we are seeing now is a clear manifestation of the tendencies toward restoration of capitalism. All those whose special cup of tea was harping on this danger have suddenly become silent. China itself is now seeking a rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and in the past months *Peking Information* has shown what has come of these ardent embraces. There, madam, is why your daughter stands mute!

On the other hand, one must denounce the eclectics of journals like *Politique-Hebdo* (December 2 and 9 issues), who, on the next to last page, include little salutes to their "autonomous" student pals of Zagreb, who are fighting for a "real federalism" and "against the Belgrade bureaucracy."

The task of the Marxist revolutionary movement must be to mercilessly fight all existing confusion in the far left about Yugoslavia. We, for our part, intend to occupy ourselves with this. In the areas where we fight, this is the best service we can render the real communists in Yugoslavia. □

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REVIEWS

The New Soviet Mental Illness — Political Opposition

By Michel Lequenne

[The following article has been translated by *Intercontinental Press* from the December 31, 1971, issue of *Rouge*, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

"For a man of sound mind there is no fate more appalling than an unlimited stay in a psychiatric asylum," wrote Vladimir Bukovsky in a January 21, 1971, letter to the World Mental Health Society and eminent psychiatrists of various countries. The letter serves as preface for an anthology he has compiled, published by Le Seuil under the title *Une nouvelle maladie mentale en URSS: l'opposition* (A New Mental Illness in the USSR: Opposition).

The letter was, to be sure, an act of insanity for a man who just finished serving three years in a concentration camp (for a silent demonstration, with banners, against the arrests of Ginzburg-Galanskov, dispersed almost without resistance from the demonstrators, despite the brutality of the militia dressed in civilian clothing).¹ It was an act of insanity for a man who earlier (1963-65) had already undergone incarceration in a special psychiatric asylum for organizing an exposition of abstract art and the distribution of Djilas's book *The New Class*. At least, that's what the "special" psychiatrists (members, or flunkies, of the KGB, the all-powerful political police) judged such an unreasonable affront to domestic tranquility to be. So Bukovsky was thrown back into a psychiatric asylum.

These internments have already been denounced, but it is only with

Bukovsky's story that their appalling reality has been exposed to the full light of day. The book includes both the psychiatrists' "expert evaluations" and the testimony of those interned.

If the "expert evaluations" truly suggest insanity, it is on the part of the doctors. Off and on, while reading them, one has the impression of having been transported to some science-fiction universe, a counterutopia inspired by Kafka, where reason is derangement, and the subject's conviction that he is right, his desire to reform the state, his voluntary sacrifice of personal and family life to political duty are interpreted as schizophrenia and paranoia. (Such logic would place Marx, and all the great revolutionists, among the mentally ill.)

These "analyses" lead to conclusions like: "conduct outwardly normal"; "... correctly oriented. He manifestly overestimates his own personality, addresses the doctors in a condescending and mocking tone. Declares that nothing can shake his political beliefs, but is unable to define what they consist of. Has not the slightest critical attitude toward the anti-Soviet declarations of the mental patients with whom he finds himself in forced treatment; he is convinced that he is under police surveillance because of his association with them, but carries this idea of persecution no further. . . . Considering his active and repeated inclination to spread anti-Soviet allegations, as well as his lack of critical attitude toward his state of illness, Borisov must be subjected to forced treatment at a special psychiatric hospital."

But the impression of strangeness ebbs away under the repeated examinations and "expert evaluations," for in every respect they smell of crass trickery and the system — pathological interpretation of every shortcoming, no matter how harmless; negation of

positive evidence with the formula "appreciation formally positive"; ruthless determination to make the patient say that he considers his role important, that his convictions contain the solution to all social problems (if a patient's opposition is religious, that he considers himself, or is considered, a saint, etc.).

Victims of this kind of repression come to know the game and take care not to fall into the traps: "You have to be on the alert with them . . . or else you let out one or two secrets and boom! They get you . . . Ah! Ah! You've had it! It is noted on a piece of paper. They will paint such a picture of you that your own mother wouldn't recognize you." (Shimanov, p. 194.)

But the coolest ones are even able to turn the interrogation against their persecutors. For example, the examination of Soldatov:

"Don't you feel yourself capable of transforming the Soviet political regime?"

"The masses make history."

"Why are we sitting here talking?"

"Because the KGB is concerned about my health."

"Why should the KGB be interested in you?"

"Because of my undesirable opinions and the bad company I keep."

"Doesn't your present situation bother you?"

"At the moment I am ashamed for the science of medicine."

"Have you ever had any head injuries?"

"Sure, lots of them."

"Why your constant ironic smile?"

"Because this whole ceremony delights me. It's the product of your impotence."

Faced with such patients, the doctors must resort to the basest cynicism, like the one who declared, "He [a "patient"] took the hospital for a concentration camp, and the doctors for sadists."

What is the truth of the matter? Let's look at the evidence, basing ourselves only on the facts.

Although the alleged irresponsibility of the "patients" would suggest that they should not be punished for their "crimes," and although psychiatric hospitals are supposed to treat people, not punish them, the regimen in these clinics is even harsher than in the prisons. If the food is better, there is no tobacco; "exercise periods" and

visits are much shorter, the latter restricted to close relatives; correspondence is more limited; one is only allowed to write in pencil. (Sometimes not even that; a pencil, you see, could be used as a weapon.)²

Even worse: the healthy inmates are mixed in with those who are really insane. (Politicals are placed with the dangerously insane who have already committed murder; thus they are threatened with death.) Most frightening is the fear of really going mad. Naritsa (deported in 1935, rehabilitated by the "de-Stalinization") writes: "Sleep! It is here above all, on this bed, that I must win the battle."

But it's not so easy to sleep. Cellmates can sleep all day and scream all night, or assault you. It's the fourth circle of hell: the attendants are worse than the lunatics. Transferring the well-known methods of the concentration camps, the attendants are chosen from among the criminal inmates. Their sadism is tolerated, even encouraged, by the guards, nurses, and equally sadistic doctors. ("To work here you have to be a monster," said one normal supervisor. But such people must hold their tongues, or they might be thrown into concentration camps, or themselves become "crazy.")

For committing an act of mutilation or a murder, an attendant is transferred to another section. If he does it again, he risks—being sent back to the scene of his first exploits.

Running the gauntlet (mostly for the purpose of pilfering the inmates' property) is still not the deepest circle. There are injections of medicine whose side effects may be torture, especially if the doses are forced or multiplied. And then there is the ultimate: putting an inmate in a wet straitjacket that shrinks when it dries, inflicting excruciating pain.

In a prison or a camp, there is some recourse, some limit on punishment. Nothing of the kind for the "politically sick." No possible appeal from the "medical" decision (in general wives cannot be guardians of the politicals, because they consider their husbands sane; they themselves can be threatened with internment, for the wife of a madman who does not

2. This information is not in Bukovsky's book, but in Volpin-Yessinin's letter to Solzhenitsyn, another document in *Russie contestataire*.

recognize his madness is herself mad); and no fixed term of imprisonment. Forced treatment can last indefinitely; the uncertainty of the fate reserved for the inmate is in itself a daily torture.

There is only one way out: humble yourself, admit your illness, and seriously break with your convictions. You must abandon all dignity, kneel under the yoke. And then, if you have a "relapse," it will be that much easier to reintern you, because you have explicitly admitted to having already been mentally ill.

Such is the regime that does not hesitate to persecute Bukovsky for denouncing it;³ the regime that for the last three years has imprisoned Grigorenko, a sixty-five-year-old man, the most distinguished living Russian Leninist, whose essential characteristic is his lucidity, as is easy to see by reading his works (unfortunately scattered among too many books⁴), among them his open letter to the head of the KGB, published by Bukovsky and held—what sinister nonsense!—as proof of his insanity.

3. Five beautiful, short pieces by Bukovsky can be found in the collection *Littérature russe clandestine*, ed. Albin Michel.

4. Documents by Grigorenko are included in *Samizdat I* (Le Seuil); in *Russie con-*

Of all those interned in the "special clinics" (the total number is unknown), Grigorenko is in the most danger. The Stalinist bureaucrats want this indomitable fighter dead, because he is a *communist*. The only thing that may save him is a huge worldwide campaign in his behalf against the agony to which he is being subjected; a campaign waged particularly among the medical profession, and in the first place among psychiatrists, who must boycott Soviet psychiatry as long as it does not say "no" to this abuse of science.

A doctor told one of the "patients": "We will hold you until the advent of the second communism." Perhaps he meant by this, in the spirit of Stalinist dogmatism, another stage of the present Soviet regime. But the readers of *samizdat* can only take this statement as a recognition of defeat. You are perhaps much closer than you imagine, you executioners in white coats who should be in brown shirts (Naritsa), to the days of the second, or more exactly the real, communism! □

testataire (Fayard), where some of the documents that complete the Bukovsky collection can be found; and, of course, in his book on Stalin and the Second World War, published by editions de l'Herne.

A White Liberal's View of Black Liberals

Together by L.H. Whittemore. William Morrow & Company, New York, N. Y. 316 pp. \$6.95. 1971.

Subtitled "A Reporter's Journey into the New Black Politics," *Together* consists of a white liberal's impressions of the electoral campaigns of selected Black liberal politicians between mid-1969 and the end of 1970.

None of these impressions is new, profound, or even interesting. Whittemore never gets closer to drama than in such passages as the following description of Richard Austin's campaign for mayor of Detroit:

"It was a classic dilemma for a black politician—should he support the needs of his own people and risk losing white votes, or should he cater to the whites and risk being labeled an Uncle Tom?"

Had Whittemore pursued all the implications about the American electoral system contained in that question, he might conceivably have written an interesting book. Unfortunately, for him the outcome of this or that election is really the central question, and reading *Together* is sheer tedium.

Worse, when he sometimes finds Black voters less than enthusiastic about his liberal subjects, he is unable to explain this "apathy" other than by condescending references to their supposed fears, lack of education, etc.

The jacket flap describes *Together* as "one of the finest books yet written about the American political system." It's almost enough to make one wish for an "honest label" law in the publishing industry.

—David Burton

Lambertist 'Reply to a Splitting Act'

The November 5, 1971, issue of *Workers Press*, the daily paper of the Socialist Labour League, and the November 8 issue of the *Bulletin*, the weekly of the "Workers League" in the USA, published a document entitled "Declaration of the International Committee of the Fourth International (Majority)."

This document was adopted on October 24 as the result of a meeting which, going by the signatures, was attended by representatives of the following organizations: the Socialist Labour League (Great Britain); Workers League (USA); the League for a Workers Vanguard (Ireland); the Internationalist Workers League (Greece); and a German group, the "Sozialistische Arbeiter Bund," made up of elements expelled from the German Trotskyist organization, the IAK, for their refusal to observe, in action, the discipline of the organization.¹

The title of this document already was in itself a flagrant political falsification. There cannot be any "majority" in the International Committee, any more than there can be a "minority," because there has been no meeting of the International Committee.

Who Is It That Wants to Break Up the International Committee?

The first section of the document adopted October 24 has as its title "A New Period for the Trotskyist Movement."

That is a grandiloquent designation for an attempt, by contemptible means, to break up the International Committee founded in 1953 to defend Trotskyism and the program of the Fourth International against the liquidators.

The whole argument of this first section is dictated by its conclusion:

"There is the International Committee of the Fourth International, resting on the foundation laid down by Trotsky in 1938, the first four Congresses of the Third International, and all the work of the IC since 1953, particularly the decisions of the 1966 Conference. And there is the bogus 'IC for the reconstruction of the Fourth International', represented by the OCI and the Hungarian section, who want to regroup with centrists *against* the Fourth International. This split, and not the Bolivian revolution and the Bolivian POR, is the basic issue."

To believe the authors of this document, the OCI and the LSRH precipitated the split by joining with Lora (whose organization is not supposed to be affiliated to the IC) in publicly attacking the SLL and the Workers League, by holding a meeting where Comrade Stephane Just wrongfully appropriated the title of secretary of the IC, and so forth. All this is alleged to have been done to avoid discussing the "fundamental question." What crimes!

Let us suppose for an instant that there were a basis for the formal pretexts raised by the signers of the October 24 statement, that the OCI and the LSRH committed splitting acts against the International Committee. What, then, was the duty of the other sections, especially the largest, such as the SLL? Their duty was to propose that a plenum of the International Committee meet as soon as possible, to demand that those endangering the unity of the International Committee face up to their responsibilities, to force them to retreat, or else to break on the basis of a clear difference. The line to follow was certainly not to hold a meeting kept secret from four sections of

The factional meeting October 24 was held in fact without the OCI, the LSRH [Ligue des Revolutionnaires Socialistes Hongrois—Hungarian Revolutionary Socialist League], the Bolivian POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario—Revolutionary Workers party], or the Mexican LOM [Liga Obrera Marxista—Marxist Workers League] being informed of it. The document that came out of this meeting was not sent to the sections of the IC before being made public.

The aim of the document is to break the framework of the International Committee in order to forestall discussion; it was not intended to provide a basis for serious discussion. As such, consequently, it does not require a reply but a correction. And that is the objective of the present statement.

The fact remains that this document in itself is an element in the debate it was designed to prevent. In any case, the Central Committee of the OCI will shortly publish a document taking up all the questions posed by the present stage for the reconstruction of the Fourth International.

* * *

the International Committee in order to try to claim later that it was these four sections that initiated the split.

But this illogic is only apparent. The curious method used by the leadership of the SLL, which prompted the October 24 meeting, is explained by the inanity of the pretexts raised and a helter-skelter flight from the "fundamental discussion."

Let us get the facts straight. This is the best way to bring out the political questions.

For close to two years—and in particular since the preconference of the International Committee in July 1970—the leadership of the Socialist Labour League has tried repeatedly to block all discussion on the "fundamental question," that is, a discussion on the concrete content of the present stage in the struggle to reconstruct the Fourth International.

In September 1969, the OCI presented for discussion a political document entitled "Pour la reconstruction de la IVe Internationale" [For the Reconstruction of the Fourth International].² In July 1970 the sections of the IC and the groups associated with it met in a preconference, which was a stage in preparing an international conference to bring together the organizations, groups, and militants standing on the ground of the Transitional Program.

The OCI document was the only one submitted for discussion. The SLL delegation began by stating that the nub of the question was "Marxist philosophy." Next it said that the OCI document was correct in its general line but that it required amending. Then it declared that the document was unacceptable. Finally it asked, "because of a lack of preparation" (although the document before it had been in its hands for nine months!), that the vote be postponed to a second session of the preconference. It proposed that this session take place in October.

Fighting to preserve and strengthen the International Committee, the OCI delegation made allowances for the political difficulties of the sections and accepted this report. But—on a joint proposal of the OCI and the SLL—a document was voted defining the framework for continuing the discussion. This resolution characterized the document presented by the

1. It should be noted that this German group is listed among the signers only in the *Bulletin*. It is omitted in *Workers Press*.

2. Published in *La Verite*, No. 545 of October 1967.

Editorial Note —

The split in the "International Committee" would now appear to be irreparable, judging from the organizational moves being taken by each side. Yet the issues in dispute continue to remain rather obscure, despite increasingly bitter polemics. It is not yet possible to determine even the point of origin of the conflict.

The Healyites took the initiative in deciding to wash the dirty linen of the International Committee in public. This was done in an article in the August 30, 1971, issue of the *Bulletin*, the newspaper of the Workers League, an American grouping that shares the viewpoint of the Socialist Labour League in Britain. (See "Disaster in Bolivia for Healy-Lambert-Wohlforth" in the September 27, 1971, issue of *Intercontinental Press*, p. 816.)

The Organisation Communiste Internationaliste, the French-based component of the International Committee headed by Pierre Lambert, replied in the September 29 issue of their paper, *Informations Ouvrières*. (For a translation of this document, see "The Lambertist View of the Bolivian Events" in the October 18 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, p. 894.)

The OCI followed this up with a more detailed reply entitled "Declaration," which was distributed in thousands of copies in Paris. This called for a plenary meeting of the International Committee. (For a translation see "Lambertist 'Declaration' on Socialist Labour League" in the November 1 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, p. 942.)

To this the SLL responded with a statement, purportedly signed October 24 by the "International Committee of the Fourth International (Majority)." The statement appeared in the November 5 issue of *Workers Press*, the newspaper of the Central Committee of the SLL. (The full text was republished under the title "The Healyite Case Against the Lambertists" in the November 22 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, p. 1015.)

The response of the OCI, which we are publishing in an English translation here, appeared in a special issue of *Informations Ouvrières* dated November 24. The original title runs as follows: "Declaration of the Central Committee of the Internationalist Communist Organization (for the reconstruction of the Fourth International). Reply to a splitting act: For the defense of the International Committee! For the reconstruction of the Fourth International! (Concerning the document published November 5 by 'Workers Press,' organ of the SLL.)"

The special issue included a French translation of the November 5 document.

For revolutionary Marxists, the main interest in this dispute comes from the fact that the SLL and the OCI were the largest organizations claiming to be Trotskyist that refused to join in the reunification of the overwhelming majority of the world Trotskyist movement in 1963.

In opposing the reunification and remaining outside of the reunited Fourth International, the SLL and OCI leaders declared that they and they alone represented Trotskyism.

Although the "International Committee" was only a rump formation, the majority of the original International Committee having partici-

pated in the reunification of the Fourth International, the SLL leaders held that the rump "International Committee" (more particularly the SLL) represented the living continuity of the Fourth International. The somewhat different OCI view was that the Fourth International had to be completely "reconstructed."

As to the real nature of the "International Committee," this should become much clearer as the polemic develops. Already the disputants have revealed a number of interesting facts on how the bloc functioned, and, more importantly, on how it evolved in face of the challenge of creating a world organization in a revolutionary epoch.

To understand the OCI document better, it must be remembered that the authors—like their Healyite opponents—use the term Trotskyist to refer to only their own ideas and allies. For instance, when the OCI document mentions the Bolivian POR, it means the POR led by Guillermo Lora, and not the POR led by Hugo González, which is a section of the Fourth International.

In the same way, the authors refuse to recognize the existence of the Fourth International, holding that it was shattered long ago.

Again, in speaking of the French presidential elections of 1969, the authors do not once mention the Trotskyist candidate, Alain Krivine of the Ligue Communiste, the French section of the Fourth International.

We have not commented on inconsistencies and errors in the text, partly because of its length and partly because a good deal would be repetition of comments already made in previous issues of *Intercontinental Press* in connection with the Healyite-Lambertist polemic. — IP

OCI as a basis for discussion in conformity with the principles of the Fourth International.

Since July 1970 the SLL leadership has opposed convening a second session of the preconference. On the other hand, it turned to the leading center of the liquidators of the Fourth International, to the "United Secretariat" of Mandel and Co., to propose a joint conference in terms not only contradicting the decisions of the preconference but contrary to the meaning of the entire struggle of the International Committee. This overture was testified to by an article by the general secretary of the SLL, Gerry Healy, in *Workers Press* of September 8, 1970.

A clear and quick response from the Central Committee of the OCI at the time stopped this dangerous tendency from going any further. But the fact that such a tendency could take

hold to this degree indicated the gravity of the SLL leadership's oscillations and opened the way to the turn now taken by the SLL, in its October 24 document, to make itself the spokesman for conceptions so close to those of the Pabloites that the latter have been quick to disseminate them as widely as possible.

Following this episode, the SLL leadership took a hardened obstructive attitude, from which it has shifted only to launch a deliberate offensive against the unity of the International Committee in the form of a dishonorable and slanderous attack against the Bolivian POR. This assault took place as early as August 30 in the form of an article by Tim Wohlforth published in the *Bulletin* of that date. The article was reprinted in the September 8 *Workers Press*. In the October 24 document it has become "Our Statement on Bolivia."

To this public offensive, the OCI responded publicly, giving its assessment of the revolutionary struggle in Bolivia (in a statement by the CC of the OCI dated September 17), without mentioning the SLL or the Workers League.

Then, after Comrade Lora had written to the sections of the IC asking that a meeting of this body be held as soon as possible to discuss the report prepared by the POR leadership, Comrades Lambert (OCI), Nagy (LSRH), and Lora (POR) signed a statement later made public, which said, notably:

"What is more natural than that all the difficult problems of the whole international class struggle should be reflected and concentrated within it [the IC]? What is more natural than that the stake in a gigantic world combat should be translated into the crises of the Fourth International as it is translated into the crisis of all the organizations of the working class?

"Today, the leadership of certain organizations of the International Committee, like the Socialist Labour League and the Workers League, lacking the necessary clarity with regard to the strategy for the conquest of power and the reconstruction of the Fourth International, have given way to the enormous pressures by attacking the POR.

"The three delegations, meeting in Paris, while holding that a discussion is legitimate, both between the sections adhering to the IC as well as within each of the sections, condemn the method utilized by the Workers League and the SLL which, without even having studied the reports issued by the leadership of the POR, have undertaken to publicly condemn the Bolivian section of the IC.

"That is why the delegations of the OCI and of the Committee for the Organization of the Countries of the East approve the demand made by Comrade G. Lora, insisting that the IC be convened in a plenary session in the shortest possible time in order to take a stand on the report on the Bolivian revolution and the tasks of reconstructing the Fourth International which the leadership of the POR has prepared."

No political reaction to the political problems raised, no response to the proposals advanced, no attempt to set a framework for discussion came from the SLL. But suddenly on October 24 a split was declared by a factional meeting kept secret from four sections of the IC, by a grouping that illegitimately baptized itself the "majority of the IC."

In fact, aside from the fact that we cannot see how a majority could be formed in the International Committee without this body meeting, we must point out the curious way the SLL went about constructing its "majority."

As is known, the work of the IC, the work of reconstructing the Fourth International, led it to form new groups that did not automatically become members of the IC. On this question as on the others, the rule of unanimity prevailed. Thus, for example, the German Trotskyist organization, the IAK, is a

sympathizing group but not a member of the IC. The International Committee is thus presently composed of the following eight sections: the OCI (France), the SLL (Great Britain), the LSRH (Hungary), the POR (Bolivia), the Revolutionary Communist Party (Ceylon), the Marxist Workers League (Mexico), the League for a Workers Vanguard (Ireland), and the Workers League (USA).³

There is at present no Greek section because the organization that participated in the 1966 conference broke up into two groups on the eve of the 1967 coup d'etat and conditions have not permitted a clarification of the reasons for this split or an assessment of the policy of either group. As a result, on the proposal of Comrade Slaughter, the IC decided to treat both groups as sympathizing organizations.

As regards the Revolutionary Workers party of Bolivia, the facts are clear. This is an old Trotskyist organization, a section of the Fourth International before the 1951-52 split. It was on the basis of its experience and its struggle against Pabloism in Bolivia itself that the POR joined the International Committee in 1970. Its adherence to the IC following an IC meeting in which Comrade Lora participated personally was, moreover, officially announced in *La Verite* (No. 547, March 1970, page 14) and was not denied.

The legitimate membership of the POR in the International Committee was so little questioned by the SLL itself that issue No. 545 of its daily paper *Workers Press*, dated August 28, 1971, in reporting the death of a Trotskyist student leader in La Paz during the fight against Banzer's troops, noted that "the P.O.R. is the Bolivian section of the International Committee." It would be inconceivable to think that the POR is a member of the International Committee when its militants are being struck down by fascist bullets but stops being one when it comes to discussing the balance sheet of its policies. In any case, these are procedures alien to Trotskyism.

Thus, the SLL's efforts to manufacture a "majority" in the IC by rejecting some and adding others do not change the facts one whit. Only four member organizations appear among the signers of the October 24 document.

Moreover, on the question of "reconstructing the Fourth International," since the October 24 document alludes to the decisions of the 1966 conference, let us recall that the basic documents of this meeting (the draft political resolution, manifesto, and resolution on tasks) were drawn up primarily by the OCI and that politically they justify the use of the term "reconstruction."

The resolution on tasks (approved unanimously) was, moreover, entitled "Resolution on the Reconstruction of the Fourth International." Among other things, it specified:

"The international conference considers that through the fight to reconstruct the Fourth International, the Trotskyist movement must construct the centralized leadership of the world party of the socialist revolution in a struggle organically linked to the battle to build centralized revolutionary parties in every country that can provide leadership to the revolutionary combat of the masses. The construction of these parties and of the International must be conducted on the basis of the experience and pursuit of a constant battle against revisionism. . . .

"The IC is made up of delegates chosen by the sections to represent them. At the present stage, decisions by the IC must be made on the basis of the rule of unanimity. The IC is not at this point claiming to be the centralized leadership of the Fourth International, which is still to be constructed."

Finally, regarding the post of secretary of the IC, let us note that in view of the SLL's difficulties in filling this role (which was entrusted to Comrade Slaughter), it was agreed to establish a cosecretariat consisting of comrades Slaughter and Just.

If we have dwelt at length on aspects that may seem secondary or legalistic, it was to clear the ground for the political questions. We have tried also to show that the formal pretexts invoked have no reality but were only feeble sophisms designed to cover up an organizational split carried through without political discussion.

3. This organization is in political solidarity with the International Committee and has the political status of a section. But it is not organizationally affiliated to the IC because of reactionary legislation in the United States.

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The essential thing is, of course, this "fundamental discussion" referred to, which naturally incorporates the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the Bolivian proletariat and the policy of the POR, since these subjects lie at the heart of the debate. This involves the meaning of "imminent revolution," the question of the struggle for power and, thus, the ways the working class may perceive this problem (the question of the united front, of a workers and peasants' government, of the

institutions of dual power and the dictatorship of the proletariat).

For Trotskyists this discussion takes on meaning only from the standpoint of the problems of reconstructing the Fourth International, the problems the SLL leadership is trying to avoid by an attempt to break the framework of the IC. This is the debate that is involved in a criticism of the October 24 document, over and above maneuvers, untruths, and amalgams.

Split at Essen?

"Split at Essen" was the dramatic title of the second section of the October 24 document. This split was supposed to have been shown by the fact the "representatives of the OCI, the Hungarian section and the Mexican LOM, voted along with centrists and even right-wing organizations [this refers to the National Student Association of the United States] against the amendment to the main resolution put by the representative of the SLL and supported by representatives of a majority of the IC sections (Ceylon, Ireland, Canada, Greece, SLL)." We have already explained about this "majority." But what did happen at Essen? First of all, let us think back on this meeting, since some people seem to have forgotten it. It was an international assembly of revolutionary youth including 5,000 participants and representatives of thirty-two countries. This rally was convened on the basis of a call drawn up by the Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme [Alliance of Youth for Socialism] and adopted by the Young Socialists at their January 1971 congress in Scarborough. This appeal, which was initiated by the youth organizations working in liaison with the International Committee, was also signed from the start by youth organizations that did not claim to be Trotskyist, such as the JCI, the POUM's youth organization.

The unquestionable success of the Essen rally was a political achievement that only the International Committee and its organizations could have built through waging a political fight in the framework of the struggle for the construction of a Revolutionary Youth International. It was in this sense that Comrade Slaughter, speaking in the name of the SLL Central Committee, could justly hail the rally as "a step forward for proletarian internationalism."

The international meeting was preceded by a conference of delegates in the course of which a resolution was presented and unanimously adopted (including by the Young Socialist delegation) and ratified the next day by the 5,000 youth present.

In Essen itself, the International Committee met to set the framework of its political activity. Amendments were proposed—several introduced by the SLL were accepted.

During the conference, the SLL and Young Socialist delegates broke the agreement passed at the IC by presenting a new amendment, which the OCI delegates considered to be profoundly wrong.

In order to prevent the YS and SLL delegation from suffering an overwhelming political defeat, Comrade Berg, the reporter, proposed that this amendment be referred to the Liaison Committee elected by the Essen rally. This solution made it possible to take up the question again inside the IC sections before making the final decision, thus avoiding a public fight. The YS delegation refused. The majority of the conference accepted the motion of referral made by the AJS. It should be noted for the sake of historical truth that the NSA delegates had only the status of observers and did not take part in the vote.

But this is not the essential thing. There was not the hint of a political concession by the OCI, the LSRH, the LOM, or the POR to centrist elements. The fact remains that for the OCI the amendment was unacceptable. It read:

"There can be no revolutionary party without revolutionary theory. Behind every opportunist development in the history of the workers' movement, and Stalinism in particular, lies revisionism.

"The continuity of the struggle for revolutionary Marxist theory in the past, the struggle of the Fourth International and the In-

ternational Committee, were the sole basis for the initiatives that led to this rally and for the fight to construct an international revolutionary youth movement.

"Everywhere revolutionary youth must devote itself first of all to the task of developing Marxist theory through a struggle against bourgeois ideology in all the forms it takes in the workers' movement. This is the only basis for fighting the dangers of adventurism, the superactivism and 'pure' militancy by which the revisionists and Maoists disoriented the youth and which can only lead to historic defeats for the working class."

Why did the OCI oppose this amendment? Primarily because it represented going over to idealist positions, abandoning Marxism for the sake of an ideology dubbed "Marxist philosophy."

"When the French delegation at Essen opposed the SLL amendment on the struggle for Marxist theory, they set the seal on an opposition to dialectical materialism which was not at all new," the October 24 document tells us. "One year earlier, in June 1970, at the international preconference of the IC, these differences became explicit."

At the 1970 preconference, the OCI and LSRH delegations warned the SLL comrades about the grave political dangers involved in any tendency to transform dialectical materialism into an ideology (philosophy), a self-contained system of ideas breaking with the very essence of dialectical materialism—the unity of method, form, and content. These delegations stressed that a discussion on the Marxist method was a serious and vital one because it concerned the foundations of our program and that therefore such a discussion should be approached with due deliberation.

The correctness of these warnings was shown by the Essen amendment. This chatter about "Marxist philosophy" has ended, we repeat, in falling into ideology.

No, "behind" every development of opportunism in the workers' movement lies not "ideology" in the form of a revision (abandonment) of Marxism, but the reality of contending social forces, the class struggle expressing itself within the workers' movement itself, the battleground and stake in this struggle. It is these pressures that give rise to arguments to justify capitulations, taking the form of revisions of Marxism.

It was not Bernstein's "lack of understanding" of Marxism that was behind reformism; it was the practice of class collaboration, based on the position of the workers' aristocracy in the epoch of expanding imperialism, that brought with it the need for an ideological justification of this practice. This does not mean that Bernstein was only a "reflection." By his political activity he was both an expression and a factor of the battle waged within the workers' movement. At the same time, defending the class interests of the proletariat involves a "defense of Marxism" through implacable theoretical criticism of revisionist ideology, criticism which itself has been a constituent element in the class consciousness of the proletariat over the course of its organized struggle to emancipate itself.

Marx explained that it was necessary to move from the weapon of criticism to the criticism of weapons. But the weapon of criticism is itself a stage in the development of the class struggle and, in this sense, of the criticism of weapons. Thus, the theoretical struggle is always an expression of the class struggle; it does not stand outside it.

Nor was it Stalin's narrow-mindedness that lay "behind" the theory of "socialism in one country." This concept expressed the interests of the bureaucratic caste that seized political power. Is this to say that the theoretical struggle is "secondary"? No, to the contrary! Marxist theory is the distillation and generaliza-

tion of all the determining factors in the struggle of the proletariat, in the historical working-class movement. And in this sense, the class struggle "does not excuse a single theoretical error." But the theory, the method of Marxism, is not a system of ideas detached from social reality; it is not a self-contained system that need only be "applied." The Marxist method exists only through its content, which incorporates all stages of the workers' struggle to emancipate themselves. In this sense, the program of the socialist revolution represents the quintessence of Marxism, and defending Marxist theory can only mean defending this program, that is, struggling to resolve the crisis of revolutionary leadership.

It is not by struggling against "bourgeois ideology" in itself,

on an ideological battleground, that the international, revolutionary parties, and, of course, a revolutionary youth organization can be built. It is by organizing youth on a battleground of political struggle for the benefit of the proletarian revolution and under the political leadership of the proletariat.

The formulation of the astonishing Essen amendment signifies that a youth organization is a substitute for a party and not part of the struggle to construct one. Theoretical elaboration proceeds from the program, and thus from the party. And the necessary link between theory and constructing a youth organization is training young communist cadres, a task that combines learning the program with political struggle.

Program, Consciousness, Revolutionary Party

But the Essen amendment goes further. By smuggling in the issue, since only youth organizations were being discussed, it makes ideological struggle the basis for constructing revolutionary parties.

"Revolutionary youth," we learn, "must devote themselves first of all to the task of developing Marxist theory."

At this point we are entitled to ask ourselves the following question. Is, or is not, the Transitional Program of the Fourth International the highest expression of Marxism, i.e., the theoretical generalization based on the Marxist method of the experiences, struggles, and acquisitions of the world proletariat, of the working-class movement as a whole?

On this point at least, the October 24 document is absolutely clear. The answer is No, and the content of the Essen amendment is thus fully illuminated.

Let us quote:

"What was most essential in the preparation of the sections was to develop dialectical materialism in a struggle to understand and to transform the consciousness of the working class in the changing objective conditions. This means the understanding and development of dialectical materialism as the theory of knowledge of Marxism.

"Reflecting the attacks on dialectical materialism by the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia of the advanced capitalist countries, especially France and Germany, and of E Europe, the OCI and Hungarian delegations declared that dialectical materialism was not a theory of knowledge and took up the position that only programme was the basis of the building of parties. Here is the very essence of revisionism which prepares the way for liquidating the party into centrism."

You say so!

Innocents that we were, we thought that the method of the Transitional Program was to mobilize the working class on a revolutionary basis, starting from their present level of consciousness, against the bourgeois state, a task indissolubly linked to organizing the workers. We thought that the advance of

the workers toward fulfilling their historical tasks depended on their consciousness, or as Marx and Engels said in *The German Ideology*:

"Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a *revolution*; this revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class *overthrowing* it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew."

But, this is not so, the SLL says—"transforming" the consciousness of the working class is a specific task which becomes possible once you have "understood" this consciousness. And such understanding can be gained on the condition that you "develop" dialectical materialism. (What does that mean exactly? While we can understand how you can develop a muscle by special exercises, it is hard to conceive of "developing" dialectical materialism.)

What it means, in any case, is that the program is not enough. There is also supposed to be something higher, up in the sky, to tell the truth. This is supposed to exist as an independent force, whose "development" doubtless depends on the intellectual gymnastics of the SLL's thinkers—Marxist philosophy as "the theory of knowledge of Marxism." But what then is the program, if it is not the fullest expression of dialectical materialism in our epoch? A list of recipes?

This discussion must indeed be carried through to a conclusion, and preemptive "ruptures" justified by phony majorities are not going to stop it.

Deep disagreements appeared at Essen. Did they by themselves constitute a "split"? The proof that they did not was provided by the SLL leadership, who, after Essen, invited Comrade Lambert to give the concluding lecture at the SLL educational camp—a lecture on dialectical materialism!

Form and Content—The Revolutionary Struggle of the Bolivian Proletariat, the Policy of the POR, and the Determination to Break Up the International Committee

It was not a sudden ideological vertigo that caused the SLL leadership's backsliding into ideology and putting forward fundamentally idealist positions.

The fog of this bogus Marxist "philosophy" descended over the SLL's political landscape at a precise moment and in response to precise political problems.

It is on the central question of reconstructing the Fourth International that the SLL leadership has oscillated most dangerously. It proclaims its disagreement with the decisions of the 1966 conference, which it had nonetheless accepted. The Fourth International does not have to be "reconstructed"; it is immutable, immobile, and incarnate in the International Committee.

In other words, the SLL leadership confounds preserving the continuity of the Fourth International and defending its program

against an attempt at liquidation—as has been accomplished by the activity of the IC and its organizations—with the existence of political conditions, of relations between the Trotskyist organizations and the class, of conditions for selecting out an international leadership on the road toward forming a centralized international leadership.

This attitude is reinforced by a refusal to go all the way in analyzing the crisis of the Fourth International, by the tendency to see this crisis as merely an episode. But the Fourth International, reconstituted after the war, was shattered as an organization centralized on the basis of the Transitional Program—by the capitulation of the overwhelming majority of its leaders. And the origins of this capitulation must be traced if we are to conduct an effective struggle against revisionism.

There is no reason to reconstruct the Fourth International; it suffices to build the revolutionary party in every country. This in fact means constructing the Fourth International in every country. Thus, we find the correct assertion that the struggle for building the revolutionary party in every country is an international task reduced to a hollow formula, inasmuch as there is no longer any international dimension to this struggle in practice, that is, to the concrete work of reconstructing the Fourth International.

This is not a mere academic position. It has led the leadership of the SLL first to ignore and then, for all practical purposes, to oppose any initiatives taken in the process of reconstructing the Fourth International.

No Trotskyist organization can be built outside of the struggle for reconstructing the Fourth International. To the extent that this false orientation is pursued, the SLL's activity as a whole cannot fail to be affected. The ever expanding place occupied by "ideology" corresponds to the tightening impasse in which the SLL leadership is trapped.

From this standpoint, Essen marked an important stage. The oscillations of the SLL leadership were reflected in their refusal to participate in the Essen rally and then by their letting themselves be dragged into it without mobilizing their organization. They thus found themselves in an awkward position at this rally, and their "ideological" offensive was the expression of their political hostility toward this advance on the road of reconstructing the Fourth International which forced the SLL, as all the organizations of the IC, to face up to its responsibilities.

Unless you start off from the political contradictions in which the SLL leadership finds itself and its refusal to see them unraveled by discussion within the ranks of its organization, you cannot understand the astonishing bad faith and criminal light-mindedness with which it has approached the problems of the revolution in Bolivia and the policy of the POR. These are not moral failings but the results of an orientation that is leading the SLL down the road of abandoning the program of the Fourth International.

In all seriousness, the SLL leadership explains that Bolivia was only a pretext seized on by the OCI to precipitate a rupture and thus avoid a discussion.

The same relationship exists between the actual political developments in the IC and the SLL's claims as between the negative and positive of a photograph. You have to reverse their claims to find out the truth.

It was the SLL leadership and its spokesman in New York who seized on the problems of the Bolivian revolution, not as an occasion for political clarification, but as a pretext for presenting the other organizations of the IC with the accomplished fact of a brutal public offensive against the POR. It is the SLL leadership that is running away from a general discussion under cover of a public rupture on the Bolivian question and which, at the same time, is running away from a discussion on Bolivia.

But the form cannot be separated from the content. The pretext chosen is at the same time a question of crucial importance, since it touches directly on the proletarian revolution.

The revolutionary process in Bolivia marked the political high-point of the working-class upsurge throughout all of Latin America, and it was distinguished by the role played in the struggle by a Trotskyist party, a section of the IC.

What in fact deserves serious discussion is making a thorough account of the results of the POR's policy, learning the lessons of the struggle. To this extent, discussing the line followed at each stage by the POR is legitimate. For its part, the OCI did not wait for its hand to be forced by the events. Within the framework of the IC, among the organizations basing their activity on the same program, it already conducted a discussion with the POR. (See *La Verite*, No. 550, October 1970.)

What is criminal on the part of the Workers League and the SLL is that their deliberate attempt to take advantage of the victory of the August 1971 fascist coup to break the unity of the International Committee has led them to reject such serious discussion, to repeat the grossest slanders hurled against the POR by the enemies of Trotskyism and the proletarian revolution, without even trying to learn the facts. The coup d'etat took place on August 20. On August 30, while communications were cut off, Tim Wohlforth published an article singling

out the POR as the section of the workers' movement mainly responsible for the victory of the fascist coup. In this article, on which the SLL quickly put its official stamp by publishing it in *Workers Press*, and in which there is not the slightest reference to solidarity in the fight against the class enemy or the least allusion to the role of American imperialism, Wohlforth went still further. He equated the POR's position with that of the LSSP in Ceylon. That is an amalgam comparable to the kind forged by the Stalinists. Even if you considered Wohlforth's attacks against the POR's policy to be correct, what relation is there between the LSSP renegades, sitting in a bourgeois government and covering up a bloody repression, and the POR fighters who rose with their class against the counter-revolution?

The attempt to treat the Bolivian question without any regard for the real positions of the POR but as a "ready-made weapon" against the unity of the IC is apparent again in the October 24 document.

"The POR and Lora repeat the policies of the POUM in Spain in 1935-1938 and are in no fundamental way different from them. Their relations with Torres and the COB parallel those of the POUM with the Republican Government and the CNT. The OCI's support for the POR now makes clear the political meaning of their bloc with the POUM at Essen."

This little paragraph is a concentration of untruths and a good example of an amalgam. Pages could be written on it alone. Let us limit ourselves to two observations. The first and crucial one "clarifies" the political crookedness of this false argument. One of the characteristic features of the POUM's policy was entering the Catalonian Generalidad (a bourgeois government). What characterized the policy of the POR was its refusal to collaborate with the Torres government, its preserving the political independence of the proletariat.

The second observation concerns the light-mindedness with which the SLL treats the problems of the history of the workers' movement. On the parallel between the CNT and the COB—the CNT was in the hands of a political faction, the anarchists. The POUM activists had been expelled and Trotsky chided them precisely for accepting this situation and founding their own trade-union organizations. The COB was an all-inclusive federation embracing all currents in the Bolivian working class. And, although the POR comrades were not in the leadership of it, they did play a considerable role, including at the level of the central leading bodies. Where is the parallel?

But there is better to come. In his interview with *Informations Ouvrieres*, Comrade Lora explained:

"The ultralefts and the Pabloites forget the teachings of Lenin and Trotsky: they draw up their 'documents' in a simple-minded way and place Torres and Ovando-Banzer on the same level. These people refuse to understand the various shades that bourgeois nationalism can take in underdeveloped countries.

"Since they are removed from the class struggle, they do not understand the difference between the bourgeois-democratic methods of the Torres government and the methods of the fascists; that is, the difference between going to prison legally or getting killed by a bullet in the back of the neck.

"Revolutionary tactics must begin with this difference. It is not a question of supporting Torres, but of crushing fascism in order to impose a workers' government."

This passage gets the following comment in the October 24 document:

"Revolutionary strategy does not begin with the differences between left and right wings of the military, but from the perspective of the overthrow of the whole bourgeois order."

Where Lora spoke of tactics, the authors of the October 24 document substitute the term strategy. But the SLL has habitually made a practically absolute distinction between tactics and strategy. In discussing the united class front (we will come to this question), strategy and tactics are presented as totally distinct categories leading parallel existences in a metaphysical firmament. When it comes to attacking the policy of the POR, on the other hand, strategy and tactics become interchangeable terms.

When we read, moreover, that the SLL's critique of the POR's line was founded on the need for building "the Fourth International on the basis of political principle and complete hon-

esty," we seem to find an unintentionally comic note in an otherwise sinister enough document.

But once again we must go to the root of the matter. The October 24 document, which proclaims Wohlforth's article "our public statement," has no more than this article itself to say about the Popular Assembly.

This, however, is the most important question, the basis on which the OCI first determined its position, the basis on which it made its assessment of the POR's line.

Therefore, it is this question that must be discussed first. But from reading the October 24 document, you will learn only that the OCI talks about an "overall process" embodied in "something" like the Popular Assembly.

In its September 17 statement, the CC of the OCI stressed that the POR had been "the inspirer and driving force of the People's Assembly, i.e., the organ that incarnated the struggle of the Bolivian people to create their own government and which was opening the way toward a dictatorship of the proletariat in Bolivia."

Yes or no, was the Popular Assembly, whose origins lay in the united response of the Bolivian masses and their organizations to the October 1970 coup d'etat, an organ in which proletarian hegemony asserted itself from top to bottom?

Yes or no, did the Popular Assembly become, through the intervention of the POR, an organ of dual power opening up the way concretely for a workers' government? Did it, or did it not, deserve the label, pinned on it by its enemies, of the first soviet in Latin America?

Was it or was it not the correct strategy to take this reality created by the struggle of the masses themselves as a starting point? Was it or was it not correct to pose the question of power by linking an attempt to rally the masses around the Popular

Assembly, as the organization expressing their will, to a struggle inside the assembly itself to open up the way concretely for the slogan "All Power to the Popular Assembly"?

Could such a struggle have been conducted without regard for the dangers of isolating the vanguard in Bolivia from the revolutionary development of the masses themselves, without regard for the position of the Bolivian revolution with respect to revolutionary developments in Latin America as a whole?

The OCI gave an answer to these questions. The anti-Trotskyist center of Mandel and Co., in the midst of confusion, gave its own. What is the answer of the SLL and the other groups that signed the October 24 statement?

This is also a discussion that cannot be avoided by any organizational maneuver, because it lies at the heart of the problems posed by the present stage of the class struggle. The period of the "imminence of revolution"—and thus also of imminent counterrevolution—is one of class confrontations raising the question of power. How can the masses perceive, grasp the question of power concretely?

This is a problem of institutions of dual power, of the working-class united front, of slogans dealing with the form of political rule. These are, of course, concrete questions, as the October 24 document notes. But this concreteness would only be a dead abstraction were it not the expression of a "general" principle, which is that the period we are living in is one when the march of the international working class toward power is taking form.

This is not, as we see it, an abstraction of which the revolutionary party should be a passive expression. This way of understanding the problems posed shows clearly the SLL's profound misconception of the dialectic. To the contrary, this advance is a concrete reality in which the revolutionary party, the fight to build the revolutionary party nationally and internationally, is the decisive element.

On Some Attacks Against the OCI

There is an implacable logic to political conflicts. The SLL's evolution could only lead it to attack the line of the OCI and to attack what is central to it—the very method of building the revolutionary party, the question of the working-class united front as the means and expression of mass mobilization, the essential factor in building the party.

But politics does not take place in a void. If you attack the OCI's line, you have to propose another. And for this purpose the SLL has had to go to the arsenal of Pabloism. Thus, its attacks against the OCI's line culminate in this conclusion:

"... the OCI's position on the 'united class front' becomes a complete liquidation of the party and its subordination to the Stalinist and social democratic parties and union apparatus."

But to come to this result, the SLL leadership thought itself obliged to attribute a "spontaneist" position to the OCI, which it made up of whole cloth with the help of vague terms. The SLL leadership felt it necessary to launch a flurry of attacks so exaggerated as to be meaningless to anyone who has observed the policy of the OCI and which—if they contained a grain of truth—would make it impossible to understand how the OCI and the SLL could have collaborated in the International Committee.

For our part, we seek political clarity, not to create an effect that can only fool those who want to be fooled. The SLL has not gone from good to bad overnight. We will confine ourselves to pointing out the contradictions in which its leadership is entangling it and to showing that, if continued, the present orientation would lead to abandoning the program of the Fourth International and thus to the breakup of the SLL.

We want to draw attention to just two of the SLL's attacks.

First of all, the October 24 document dares claim that on the eve of 1968, Comrade Charles Berg had taken an openly *abstentionist* position on Vietnam. What this means in plain language is that he equated the actions of the imperialists and the revolutionary war of the Vietnamese people, in other words, that he had an openly counterrevolutionary position. This is an infamous lie. Not even the Stalinists have dared go to such lengths. So far only the illustrious Weber of the Ligue Communiste has talked about the OCI having a "defeatist" position.

Never in any way has any activist or any publication reflecting the views of the OCI equivocated on this question. To the contrary, and in contrast to some others (such as Comrade Banda who has seen in the party of Ho Chi Minh, the party that murdered the Indochinese Trotskyists, a reincarnation of the Bolsheviks), we have never confused unconditional support for the Vietnamese revolution with political support for the petty-bourgeois and Stalinist leaderships.

Having said this, if we dwell on this contemptible accusation, it is because at this time, owing to the growth of the AJS, Comrade Berg is the target of concentrated attacks from the bourgeoisie, the Stalinists, and the Pabloites. The fact that the SLL leadership has chosen this time to add its voice to the chorus is worthy of being noted.

The second attack that merits comment by us is the following. In its eagerness to find reasons for a rupture, the SLL leadership has gone digging into the past, as is its right. It has vehemently denounced the French Trotskyist organization's line toward the Algerian revolution. It has said that the Pabloites supported one petty-bourgeois nationalist faction and the French Trotskyists another. This is a bit oversimplified; it would be convincing only if the SLL were making its own self-criticism on this matter. In fact, if there was no difference between the FLN and the MNA, why did it, as it explains, give its support to the MNA? This support, we learn, was "critical," which doubtless makes everything all right.

The fact remains that the policy of the Trotskyist organization was wrong because it abandoned "the fight to select out a Trotskyist vanguard." There is no revelation in this. The above quotation is taken from the pamphlet *Quelques enseignements de notre histoire* ["Some Lessons From Our History"], published in May 1970.

We would express only one wish, and all the more so since the SLL thinks it useful to accuse the Lora POR of having been a pillar of Pabloism in Latin America—which is untrue—while failing to note, on the other hand, that in the early stage its own general secretary was the Pabloites' hatchetman in Western Europe. Our wish is that the SLL would condescend, for the edification of the vanguard in Great Britain and throughout the world, to draw some lessons from its own history.

The Offensive Against the United Class Front and Its Meaning

The SLL's trumped-up charges against the OCI's line culminate in a general offensive against the united class front.

The question of the united class front has already occasioned differences between the OCI and the SLL in the IC. But for the SLL these differences seem to boil down to one point (which is raised again in the October 24 document), that is, the united front is a "tactic" and the OCI is making it a "strategy."

Counterposing strategy and tactics as absolutes means ignoring the dialectic involved. Of course, these terms are not identical; they refer to different levels of revolutionary politics. But strategy exists only through tactics, which express it, and at the same time every tactical operation has meaning only as it enters into a general strategy.

When we speak, in Marxist terms, of a strategic slogan, we are describing a slogan that in various forms (tactics) is a constant in revolutionary struggle. One example is the need for defending the social gains of the proletariat won by the October revolution and its extensions, which are today controlled and threatened by the bureaucracy. But strategy and tactics are relative terms for Marxists. Inasmuch as we can say that the strategic line of the Fourth International comes down to struggling for the proletarian revolution, the defense of the USSR is only a tactic flowing from this objective. Thus Trotsky could say the following about the defense of the USSR (while pointing out at the same time that this task was a major expression of the program of the Fourth International and a matter of principle):

"The defense of the USSR coincides for us with the preparation of world revolution. Only those methods are permissible which do not conflict with the interests of the revolution. The defense of the USSR is related to the world socialist revolution as a tactical task is related to a strategic one. A tactic is subordinated to a strategic goal and in no case can be in contradiction to the latter."

In this sense, in relation to the socialist revolution for which, as a means of mobilizing the proletariat, it prepares the way, the united class front is a tactic. It is a strategic line insofar as it is always (that is, without regard to the circumstances, the relationship of forces, or tactical factors in the strict sense of the term) *present* in a revolutionary policy. It is present, to be sure, in various tactical forms. Otherwise, it would be only an illusion. (The forms it takes are the slogan for "a government by the united working-class organizations" in France today; the battle for "a labor party based on the unions" in the United States; the slogan of "a Labour government on a program of defending the workers" in Great Britain; the slogan of "end the coalition and establish a purely Social Democratic government" in Germany.)

It will be seen, then, that it was not quarreling over definitions that brought the OCI into conflict with the implicit line now made explicit by the SLL in its October 24 document.

No, the united front is not, as the SLL says, only "a relationship between mass workers' parties of a temporary character for the purpose of winning the masses to the Communist Party." Reducing the united class front to this is not, as the SLL leadership falsely claims, the conception of Lenin and Trotsky. At best it was the one held by Zinoviev, or rather the current caricature of it based on the weaknesses in the way Zinoviev explained the policy of the Communist International.

The axis of the Transitional Program is to mobilize the workers to overthrow the bourgeoisie. It is in this sense that the united front, a "slogan" raised by this program, also lies at its center because it involves rallying the entire class and uniting it on the basis of political independence, against the common enemy. This is the translation into the concrete of the primary principle of every revolutionary policy since the *Communist Manifesto* in 1847—class against class. And where the working class is under the leadership and control of separate organizations, this policy takes the form of a united front of all the organizations of the class.

This is the way the document advanced by the OCI in September 1969 put it:

"The policy of class struggling against class represents the strategic line of the united class front of workers' parties and

organizations. It is alien to 'peaceful coexistence' between the traditional working-class parties and organizations and the revolutionary vanguard building the revolutionary party. Unless a policy is defined concretely, at every stage, counterposing the working class as a class to the bourgeoisie, its state, and its government, it is impossible to build the revolutionary party. Unless you build the revolutionary party, it is impossible to fight for a united class front, for a workers and peasants' government, for the destruction of the bourgeois state and for workers' power."

This conclusion recapitulates perfectly the conception of the united front brought to the fore by Trotsky in dealing with Germany, fascism, and France at the time of the working-class upsurge initiated by the united demonstration of February 12, 1934:

"First of all they [the usual formal definitions of soviets] do not explain why, in the struggle for power, precisely the soviets are necessary. The answer to this question is: just as the trade union is the rudimentary form of united front in the economic struggle, *the soviet is the highest form of the united front under the conditions in which the proletariat enters the epoch of fighting for power.*"

And again: "The natural mechanism of the united front in the days of combat is working-class representation, delegates from the factories and workshops, from working-class neighborhoods and unions—soviets."

It is this conception the SLL leadership is objecting to when it criticizes the OCI's line at the time of the 1968 general strike.

The October 24 document includes this sentence, which deserves being passed on to posterity.

". . . the OCI leaders tail-ended the working class and restricted the political scope of the strike by demanding a central strike committee. This was a complete evasion of the *political* responsibilities of revolutionary leadership."

Thus, for the "deep-thinking" dialecticians of the SLL, the question of a national central strike committee was not a political one. This is an admission that points up the meaning of several things, such as: their hostile indifference toward the Popular Assembly in Bolivia; the absence, in a document purporting to be based on international developments in the class struggle, of any reference to the formation of workers' councils in Gdansk in December 1970; as well as the significance of the disparaging quotation marks placed around *Irbid soviet*.

Were the strike committees, thus, "economic" bodies? If so, then the general strike itself was an "economic strike," inasmuch as no "formula" was injected into it calling for a change in the government. No, a general strike, "one of the most acute forms of class struggle," as Leon Trotsky said, shows precisely the "impossibility of divorcing the economic element from the political one," as anyone knows who has taken the time to study Marxism since Rosa Luxemburg set down this precept in 1905. The general strike immediately assumed a *political* character both because the demands advanced led directly into struggling against the capitalist government and because the extent and form of the mass mobilization posed the question of working-class power. As a political struggle, the general strike was destined to prove incapable of achieving its objectives unless the illusion was outgrown that the economic action in itself could be victorious—unless an outlet could be opened leading into a struggle for power, a means of pushing for an alternative form of government.

It was such an outlet that was blocked by all the apparatuses linked to the bourgeoisie. The struggle for a national central strike committee was at the heart of the general strike. It was a political struggle par excellence because its objective was to open this outlet by centralizing the power of the working class *in struggle* against the bourgeois state.

This was to take place "in struggle," it must not be forgotten. This was why giving a centralized structure to the strike committees born out of this struggle—which was a stage on the road leading to workers' councils as the constituent elements of a united class front—was the concrete form that shaped up

for projecting the perspective of a workers' government, a government of united workers' organizations.

But the SLL leadership, not satisfied with showing its utter ignorance of the dialectic of mobilizing the masses in general strikes, offers another formula for an alternative government, a CP-CGT [Confederation Generale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor, the CP-controlled union federation], and not a workers' government. Or rather, if the formula of a CP-CGT government could be considered synonymous with a "workers' government," it would mean that the Socialist party, the CGT-FO [Force Ouvriere—Labor Power, the federation produced by a Social Democratic-led split after the CP gained control of the CGT as a whole], and FEN [Federation de l'Education Nationale—National Teachers' Federation] were not working-class organizations. So far the SLL has never said this in writing. But what then is the meaning of this preference for the Stalinist bureaucracy over the reformist bureaucracy? Haven't both gone over to the side of the bourgeois order? Or is this a new analysis of Stalinism? Not such a new one, because it has already been set forth in the theory and practice of the Pablos and the Mandels. This attitude holds that—no matter what its crimes and its counterrevolutionary aspects—the Stalinist movement is the only political "representation" the workers have on an international scale.

This question also must be discussed. It is linked to a number of the SLL's political oscillations, such as the following: Its idealization of the North Vietnamese Communist party leadership and the NLF; its grave doubts about the political revolution in Czechoslovakia, apprehensions which led it, in assessing the situation just after the country was invaded by the tanks of the bureaucracy, to give equal weight to the need for struggling against capitalist restoration and to the demand for the withdrawal of Warsaw Pact troops; its discretion about the developments in the political revolution in Poland; and its refusal to comprehend the unity of the workers' struggle in the USSR, China, and East Europe against the bureaucracy and the struggle in the countries under the capitalist yoke.

Such a discussion will also clarify the meaning of the SLL's criticism—which may seem minor and tactical in nature—of the slogan of "one candidate representing the working-class organizations" at the time of the presidential elections. Once again, the form of this criticism shows the SLL's lack of concern for the facts. Thus, the OCI is scolded for failing to denounce the Social Democracy which refused to vote for Duclos in the second

round. The French working class has enough well-founded accusations to raise against this reformist leadership. It does not need to invent any. Duclos was eliminated in the first round. This said, and so that things will be clear—because this again involves a tactical application of the strategic line of the united front—here is the position the Trotskyists took at the time of the presidential elections:

"In the wake of de Gaulle's fall, the perspective of a working-class alternative to the government and to the regime dominated the development of the great struggles of the proletariat. Such an alternative could arise only from a united front of the trade-union and political organizations that called for a No vote in the referendum. A single candidate representing the workers' organizations meant that these organizations were posing the alternative of a government of united workers' organizations against the bourgeois parties. Immediately, all the leaderships of the workers' organizations, especially the Socialist party and PCF leaders, maneuvered furiously to break the unity of the front brought together by the No vote in the referendum. Deferre's candidacy—supported by Mendes-France—was produced like a rabbit out of a hat. Before putting forward Duclos as a candidate, the PCF demanded the 'formulation of a common program,' as a condition for agreeing on a joint 'left' candidate. This worrying about program by the PCF, which in 1965 supported the bourgeois candidate Mitterrand without requiring any 'common program,' was designed to prevent one candidate from being put up by the workers' organizations and not by the 'left.' Developing a political campaign on the theme of running one candidate of the workers' organizations against the candidates of the bourgeoisie meant fighting for a united class front, a working-class front, against the divisions in the proletariat willfully and deliberately imposed by the Socialist party and the PCF. . . .

"But what about program? Didn't a single candidate put up by the workers' organizations need a program? What was it developing into? In these specific circumstances, the development of a program for a government of the united workers' organizations derived from this joint campaign. By fighting for the defeat of the candidates of the bourgeoisie, the working class would have given a class content to the united campaign of the workers' organizations. And it was the job of the revolutionary organizations to develop this campaign." (Stephane Just, *Defense du Trotskysme* ["In Defense of Trotskyism"].)

In Conclusion

We are coming to the end of this correction. Its objective has been to clarify—over and above the petty maneuvers, outrageous untruths, and verbal terrorism of the SLL—the real differences that divide us from this organization.

These differences are grave ones, deep ones. They demand a discussion out in the open. And the OCI has no fear of conducting such a debate publicly, in full view of the international workers' vanguard.

As one of the concluding points in its indictment of the OCI, the SLL leadership claims that the capitulation to spontaneism reached such a point in this organization that—it didn't even have a general secretary!

What should we say about the shamelessness and the depth of capitulation to spontaneism reached by a party like the Bolsheviks, who dared to lead the proletarian revolution to victory without a general secretary and without even a political bureau?

This seems merely ridiculous. It is obvious that, while democratic centralism is part of the revolutionary program, the ways in which a leadership is organized are not a matter of principle, and the existence or nonexistence of general secretaries is no guarantee. But this charge is related to something deeper. For in the same paragraph the OCI is reproached for its erroneous notion "that the Fourth International does not really exist." This is a tendentious way of attacking the position held by the OCI, which is that we must fight to reconstruct the Fourth International, which was shattered as a politically centralized

force on an international scale by the Pabloite liquidators.

There is, then, on the one hand, the revolutionary party, sufficient unto itself, an immutable metaphysical category awaiting its encounter with the class struggle. Its existence as a party depends on whether or not it is proclaimed to be so, on whether or not it has attributes arbitrarily determined to belong to it (such as a general secretary, for example).

On the other hand, there is the proletariat, its "objective" struggle, its general strikes which are not supposed to be "political." In its defense of the Essen amendment, the October 24 document pinpoints that "only a basic struggle for dialectical materialism against all enemies of Marxism and carried forward in struggle *against* the spontaneous consciousness of the working class, can equip the youth for building of the Fourth International."

The dialectic has been decidedly mishandled here. Independently of the fact that the concept of a spontaneous "pure" working-class consciousness is strictly an arbitrary abstraction—proletarian class consciousness always being a product of history—this sentence sums up an entire, profoundly false, conception of the relationship between the revolutionary party (because this is what the struggle for dialectical materialism is!) and the movement of the class.

The revolutionary party is not parallel to or in opposition to the working-class movement. The construction of the revolutionary party proceeds from the overall development of the class struggle. It is based on the class struggle although not

automatically produced by it. It can only exist and grow as conscious activity.

Marxism is "the conscious expression of an unconscious process." The revolutionary party is the organized form this conscious expression takes in the class struggle, but the conditions themselves of the proletarian revolution assign it a decisive role in accomplishing the historic tasks of the class.

Marxism, the method of the proletarian revolution, taking form as the unity of theory and practice in the construction of the revolutionary party and thus expressing the historic interests of the proletariat, stands in opposition to every limited stage in the formation of the class consciousness of the proletariat as a class in bourgeois society. But it rises above these limited stages by unifying the overall process of the formation of proletarian consciousness in which it is the ultimate determinant. This truth has been known since the *Communist Manifesto*; except on this basis Trotsky's phrase about "the proletariat's instinctive tendency to reconstruct society on communist foundations" would be only a utopian formula.

As S. Just noted in his *Defense du Trotskysme*: "Considered as a historic and organic process, the development of the proletariat's class consciousness arises, then, out of an analysis of the progress of the class struggle. So let us have an end to these metaphysical discussions about whether or not class consciousness is brought in from the outside, as well as the ones about whether or not a vanguard is self-appointed."

The dualism the SLL leadership introduces between the party and the class lies at the root of its failure to understand the period in which we are living, the dynamic of the march of the world proletariat toward the socialist revolution, which was revealed concretely in the May-June 1968 general strike, in the political revolution in Czechoslovakia, in the formation of the Irbid soviet, in the formation of the Baltic workers' councils, and in the formation of the Popular Assembly.

The SLL's extreme subjectivism is thus inevitably accompanied by a mechanical objectivism. Thus, we learn that the years of the "postwar boom" were unfavorable to the development of Marxist theory (we wonder how the Transitional Program could have been formulated in years marked by profound setbacks and about the meaning of Trotsky's statement that the Fourth International was born out of the deepest defeats!), but that the "new conditions" are favorable to us.

Subjectivism and objectivism indissolubly linked were the methodological roots of the development of Pabloism within the Fourth International. The SLL leadership is paying the price today for its refusal to make a real accounting of Pabloism and its origins, which could not be done without analyzing its own history, without linking the problems of reconstructing the Fourth International with those of constructing the revolutionary party in Great Britain.

But there is nothing automatic about this. It is in connection with the specific political problems pushed to the fore by the struggle of the working class, the problems of the struggle for power itself, the precise timing of the struggle to reconstruct the Fourth International, that these features of the SLL are developing today into a policy whose logic, through the SLL's rup-

ture with the International Committee, is leading to the abandonment of the program of the Fourth International.

In a responsible way, we appeal to all organizations and militants affiliated to the International Committee. In particular, we appeal to the SLL, its leadership and its ranks, because of this organization's special place in the formation of the International Committee.

We say in a responsible way that the SLL is at a crossroads. The role of an organization and its political character do not depend on subjective intentions. No organization can exist without a definite political character. The SLL has won the place that it occupies in the class struggle in Great Britain as a Trotskyist organization. By setting out on the dangerous road of a rupture with the International Committee, the SLL is proceeding toward a break with Trotskyism—which has no existence outside the Fourth International, that is, in today's terms, outside the struggle to reconstruct the Fourth International. The SLL is thus setting out on the road that leads to its own destruction.

In any case, because the struggle for the reconstruction of the Fourth International is an international process organically linked to the world struggle of the proletariat, the conscious struggle for the construction of the revolutionary party will find expression in Great Britain in the resistance within the SLL's own ranks to its liquidation as a Trotskyist organization. But, we firmly declare, the path indicated by the interests of the Fourth International, by the need for defending its program, is one of political clarification.

A plenum of the International Committee must be convened as soon as possible, with the participation of all the member organizations. This is necessary, in particular, in response to Comrade G. Lora's legitimate request.

False pretexts for evading the political problems and genuine flight from them, amalgams, crass maneuvers—all this cannot go very far. We must end the false idolization of leaders, who, while doing positive work, have, like everybody else, made political mistakes. No section of the International Committee can run away from discussing the whole range of questions that the Trotskyist movement is compelled by the class struggle to settle.

We say, in any case, that this discussion will take place. No one has the power to prevent it.

In any case, the achievement represented by the International Committee, the continuity of the Fourth International and of its program will be preserved through the struggle for the reconstruction of the Fourth International and through the preparation of the fourth international conference initiated by the International Committee, which, on the basis of the decisions of the 1966 conference, will bring together all the organizations and groups fighting for the program of the socialist revolution.

We repeat. For all those who want to defend the program of the Fourth International, there is one demand. The International Committee must meet at the earliest possible date.

The Central Committee of the OCI
(for the reconstruction of the Fourth International)

November 21, 1971

Rights Group Opposes Ceylon Emergency Rule

[The document reprinted below is the "Statement on Aims and Objects" of the Human and Democratic Rights Organization, formed in Ceylon in November.]

* * *

Today there is increasing awareness amongst all sections of the people that rule by regulations under a State of Emergency only serves to suppress the democratic rights of the people and to render them subject to arbitrary deprivation of

liberty and even of life itself, if they act in any manner that is unacceptable to the Government or to the authorities who have been given arbitrary powers over them under the regulations.

Never since direct British rule ended in Ceylon, on 4th February 1948, has arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty and suppression of democratic freedoms occurred on such a scale or to such an extent as under the prevailing State of Emergency.

The Prime Minister herself has admit-

ted that over a thousand persons have been killed by the Police and the Armed Services, according to figures made available to her, but public belief is that many thousands more have been killed, without any admission of the killings by the so-called security forces.

From the very day that the Emergency was declared, on 16th March 1971, the Police and the Military were given powers of arrest without warrant, and all the safeguards provided under the normal law against arbitrary arrest, torture,

and even murder and disposal of the dead bodies of persons taken into custody were deliberately removed by emergency regulations.

About 10,000 persons are admitted by the Prime Minister to have been taken into custody in the exercise of these arbitrary powers by the Police and Military, whilst thousands of others are said to have surrendered, most of them for fear of torture or death if they didn't, either for themselves or for members of their families. About 14,000 of these persons are being held indefinitely in custody without trial, even though it has been admitted that large numbers of them have not committed any offence.

In the meantime, shootings have taken place in prisons and prison camps; whilst the statutory right of access of members of parliament to prisons has been denied, and whilst no means of investigation of complaints of brutalities against or shootings of prisoners is available to their relatives or to legal representatives, and visits to prisoners by their relatives are being arbitrarily restricted or even totally denied. Furthermore, large numbers of persons taken into custody under the Emergency have not yet been traced by their relatives, and even the fact of their having been taken into custody has been denied by the authorities in several cases.

Apart from the mass deprivation of life and liberty that has taken place under the Emergency, there has been continuing and arbitrary suppression of the fundamental and democratic freedoms of speech, assembly and publication, as well as the fundamental right of workers to strike.

All normal political, trade union and other forms of mass activity have thus been suppressed. Parliamentary by-elections and local government elections have been indefinitely postponed, and elected local authorities are being suspended arbitrarily. All forms of public criticism of the Government or of state authorities have also been stifled. Even publication of court proceedings has been restricted. The very existence of the mass movement itself is thus endangered.

In this context, hundreds of millions of rupees [one rupee equals US\$0.168] and vast sums of foreign exchange have been expended and are to be expended by the Government for military purposes and for the expansion of the Police, the Armed Services and the Prisons, whilst the masses of the people have been and are being subjected to a series of attacks on their already inadequate living standards.

A grave threat also exists of permanent legislation being introduced during the Emergency to remove safeguards of life and liberty that have existed hitherto under the normal law.

It is to end this dangerous and reactionary state of affairs that the Human and Democratic Rights Organisation was formed on 5th November 1971, with the primary objective of the defence of the human rights and civil liberties and the fundamental democratic freedoms of the people of Ceylon, and with a view to mobilising public opinion and action to

secure the ending of the Emergency, in order to free the people from all the bonds with which they have been bound under it, and to safeguard the people against any future inroads upon their rights and liberties.

Amongst the tasks that the Organisation has set itself in pursuance of its objectives is to secure the release of the thousands of persons who are now being held in custody without trial, and without the right of habeas corpus, who could not have been deprived of their liberty in this way but for the use of emergency powers. Another task is to investigate all cases of persons who have been seized by the Army or by the Police under the Emergency, but whose whereabouts are not known to their relatives, or who are missing in circumstances which suggest that they have been seized and killed or kept in secret confinement.

An immediate task is to secure all possible information concerning the conditions under which persons are being kept

in custody under the Emergency regulations, with a view to protecting them against brutality and even murder whilst in custody, on one pretext or another, and to ensure humane treatment for them.

Another task is to secure a proper public investigation of all "excesses" and atrocities that have been committed by the Police, the Armed Services and Prison officials against the people, under cover of the Emergency.

Compensation or other aid must also be obtained for persons who have been left destitute by the killing or detention of their breadwinners, and for those who have suffered personal injury or damage to their homes or property.

Membership of the Association is open to those who subscribe to its objectives and are willing to act in pursuance of them, despite whatever obstacles may have to be overcome or repressive action that may have to be faced by those engaged in such activity. The membership fee is 5 rupees per annum. □

Bengal Trotskyists Call for Red Bangladesh

[The following declaration was issued by the West Bengal State Committee of the Socialist Workers party (Indian section of the Fourth International) on December 18.]

* * *

We congratulate and extend our unconditional support to the Mukti Bahini [Liberation Forces] on their heroic struggle in Bangladesh. We fervently hope that they will not cease fighting simply because of the defeat of the Pakistan Army, but will continue uninterrupted the struggle for a Socialist or Red Bangladesh. The real emancipation of the people cannot be achieved by substituting one capitalist regime for another.

The fascist-like repression which the Indian bourgeoisie carries out in many parts of India and especially West Bengal exposes her new pose as the champion of Bangladesh's "liberation". Here it is also necessary to point out that this year (1971) in the month of April (after the Pakistani invasion of Eastern Bengal) when revolutionists rose in revolt against the Bandaranaike regime in Ceylon, India sent her navy, infantry and air force within eight hours to help save the skin of Mrs. Bandaranaike. Thus both India and Pakistan were among the saviours of capitalism in Ceylon.

Now that Bangladesh is a *fait accompli*, the Indian rulers will not allow any other government than a capitalist one to exist in Dacca. In these circumstances a new government in Bangladesh will have to serve Marwari-Bhatia or Bengali capitalists instead of West Pakistani capital. She will gradually side with the Anglo-American blocs.

The left parties in India have played a frustrating and disappointing role. They have been totally swept away by the current of cheap nationalism and chauvinism. They failed to seize the opportunities offered by the two capitalist powers in conflict. They completely forgot that mass slaughters of political workers are continuing unabated before and after 25th March 1971 in West Bengal. The recent mass murder of political workers in Alipore central jail in Calcutta is only one such example. We urge all left parties to abandon their chauvinism and return to the road of revolutionary socialism.

We hope that the Mukti Bahini, remembering the mirth and jubilation of the people during 14th August 1947 (partitioned independence of the sub-continent) and the grim aftermath, will march forward to a Red Bangladesh. This will immediately pave the way for a United Socialist Bengal culminating into a Socialist Revolution in the entire Indian sub-continent. □