

Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 10, No. 1

© 1972 Intercontinental Press

January 10, 1972


50c

Ernest Mandel:

Monetary Crisis Continues

Venezuela's 'Nueva Fuerza'

Indian Occupation of Bangladesh



David, in Direct From Cuba

ROGERS: U. S. Secretary of State announces Nixon will escalate bombing whenever he feels he can get away with it.

Nixon Escalates the War

Mandel Speaks to Thousands in Canada

Ernest Mandel ended his cross-Canada lecture tour December 15 with meetings at Trent University in Peterborough and McMaster in Hamilton. There were many high points on the tour with large audience turn-outs indicating an intense interest on Canada campuses in the views and writings of Mandel, the most authoritative exponent of Marxist economic theory today and a leader of the Trotskyist Fourth International.

Over 4,000 people came to Mandel's lectures in Vancouver, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Brandon, Toronto, Hamilton, Montréal, and Peterborough. In Manitoba he spoke to almost 1,000 at three campus lectures; in Vancouver over 600 people heard him speak at three campus meetings and 200 at the Vanguard Forum. In Toronto, about 500 students and faculty attended his lecture at York and over 400 at a rally sponsored by the League for Socialist Action and the Young Socialists.

In Montréal Mandel spoke to about 500 at McGill, the Université du Québec, and at the national educational conference of the Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière-Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes.

The author of the well-known *Marxist Economic Theory, Europe Versus America*, and *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx*, Mandel spoke at campuses on the current capitalist monetary crisis. At the public rallies of the LSA and YS he gave an inspiring report of the resurgence of workers' struggles in Western Europe and the growing strength of the revolutionary-socialist vanguard in the workers' movement.

At the University of Toronto, Mandel was the guest lecturer of the School of Graduate Studies and the Department of Political Economy. He led a seminar discussion, chaired by Professor Mel Watkins, on "Marxist Perspectives on Economic Theory."

Mandel, banned from the United States by a State Department ruling, was able to reach through to certain American listeners within range of Toronto CBC Television. An interview was telecast by the program "Two-thirty Toronto Time," which is rated to have 300,000 viewers in southern Ontario and across Lake Ontario in the United States. □

In This Issue

	FEATURES
Ernest Mandel	7 Washington Monetary Conference Fails
	CANADA
	2 Mandel Speaks to Thousands
	8 Tariq Ali on Tour
	INDOCHINA WAR
	3 Most Massive Bombings Since 1968
	4 Henderson Acquittal Concludes Mylai Whitewash
	BANGLADESH
Jon Rothschild	5 The Indian Occupation
	GREAT BRITAIN
Joseph Hansen	6 Healyites in the Camp of Indira Gandhi
	AUSTRIA
	9 Kreisky Increases Tax Load on Workers
	ITALY
Francesco Marchi	10 Behind the Ebb in the Workers' Movement
	YUGOSLAVIA
C. Malagnou	12 Croat Students Stage Reactionary Strike
	U. S. A.
	13 Charges Against Huey Newton Dropped
	18 Trotskyist Youth Chart Strategy for 1972
	BOLIVIA
	14 The Executions Continue
	VENEZUELA
Alfonso Ramirez	15 The Draft Program of the "Nueva Fuerza"
	REVIEWS
	19 Another Volume of Trotsky's Writings
	19 How the Antiwar University Was Born
	DOCUMENTS
	20 MIR Call for Unity Against the Reactionary Offensive
	24 The Healyite Position on India-Pakistan War
	DRAWINGS
Copain	5 Indira Gandhi

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.
CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.
MANAGING EDITOR: Allen Myers.
COPY EDITOR: Ruth Schein.
EDITORIAL STAFF: Gerry Foley, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.
ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.
TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Lawrence Rand.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemenee, Paris 4, France.

TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright © 1972 by Intercontinental Press.

Nixon's Escalation of the War in Indochina

"We are going to continue the President's policy of supporting the South Vietnamese in Cambodia," U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers told a press conference December 23, "and we will continue to give air support in Laos to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and to give air support in northern Laos."

Three days later, Nixon demonstrated what this "support" consisted of by launching the heaviest air raids on North Vietnam since such attacks were supposedly ended by Lyndon Johnson in November 1968. For five days, up to 350 U.S. planes dropped bombs over wide areas of North Vietnam. Some fell within eighty miles of Hanoi.

A December 27 dispatch by United Press International describing the first day of raids gave an indication of their magnitude:

"Military sources said that the raids yesterday involved every aircraft the United States could spare in Indochina, the planes coming from South Vietnam, Thailand and the aircraft carriers Constellation and Coral Sea off the coast in the South China Sea."

When the raids concluded December 30, most press sources indicated that more than 1,000 sorties had been flown. Hanoi radio said that nineteen planes had been shot down. The U.S. military claimed that only three aircraft had been lost.

The raids constituted such a blatant escalation of the war that some capitalist spokesmen and sections of the U.S. press departed from the customary tone of at least polite consideration of the administration's propaganda. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird attempted to justify the bombing—and possible future raids—as "protection" of U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam and as retaliation for North Vietnamese violation of the "understanding" that Lyndon Johnson cited as a reason for halting the bombing—an "understanding" the North Vietnamese government has always denied.

Clark Clifford, who was secretary of defense under Johnson, remarked

of the latter argument, "That makes no sense whatsoever."

"It is ridiculous," he added, referring to past raids on North Vietnam, "to pretend that there could still be an understanding when the Nixon Administration has violated it on a wholesale basis."

Criticism came not only from the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, both of which in the past have appealed to Nixon to keep the war within certain bounds, but even from such a conservative voice as the *Christian Science Monitor*, which devoted two editorials to condemning the raids.

"The real concern which lies behind it all," the editors wrote in the December 29 issue, "is not for the safety of the departing Americans, who are in no serious danger, or concern over violations of the 1968 agreement, which has not in fact been violated, but concern for the survival of the Saigon regime after the bulk of the American troops have gone."

The raids appear to have been occasioned by Nixon's concern for his puppets in Phnompenh and Vientiane as well as for the one in Saigon. The collapse of Lon Nol's offensive along Route 6 in early December and Pathet Lao victories later in the month on the Plain of Jars and the Boloven Plateau constituted an abrupt worsening of the U.S. military position.

On December 21, the Pathet Lao drove the CIA-supported Meo army of Vang Pao from the Plain of Jars in a single day. One week later, the right-wing forces were driven from Paksong, their last stronghold on the Boloven Plateau in the country's southern panhandle.

(Accounts of these defeats in the U.S. press openly acknowledged that a major portion of the "allied" forces involved were troops from Thailand.)

The defeats occurred, moreover, despite massive U.S. air support, particularly on the Plain of Jars. The U.S. aircraft were reported to have met unusually heavy resistance, both from Pathet Lao anti-aircraft fire in Laos and from MIG fighters and surface-to-air missiles in North Viet-

nam, over which the carrier-based planes fly on their way to Laos. On December 19, four U.S. jets were shot down, as the U.S. command later admitted after first denying it.

Laird cited these "attacks" as an additional justification for the December 26-30 raids, causing the *Christian Science Monitor* to comment:

"To call an act of self-defense of that kind an 'attack' is a ridiculous distortion of language. To contend that it is a violation of the terms of any understanding is absurd. Not even Lyndon Johnson ever dreamed of expecting the North Vietnamese to sit still and do nothing in return while he bombed them."

The *New York Times*, in a December 29 editorial, characterized the escalation as more serious than any since Johnson left office:

"Revival of the air war—on the heels of crushing defeats for American-backed forces in Cambodia and Laos and in anticipation of fresh Communist assaults in South Vietnam—reflects an intensification and broadening of the Indochina conflict far beyond the levels that prevailed when Mr. Nixon took office three years ago."

The paper went on to warn that "promising overtures to China are being put in jeopardy."

Mao's overtures to Washington, however, were seen by Nixon as a sign that he could get away with the escalation, as C.L. Sulzberger observed in his January 2 column in the *New York Times*:

"The new United States Asian policy focuses directly upon relations with China and clearly expects that as a consequence of this emphasis settlement of the Vietnam war can ultimately be arranged. . . ."

"Two significant developments can be related to this policy. The first was expression of unqualified American support for Pakistan against India during their recent war. The second is resumption of bombing in North Vietnam and U.S. postponement of scheduled sessions of the Paris peace negotiations."

Peking in fact limited its response to the raids to still another statement expressing "utmost indignation." Even this statement—which did not mention Nixon by name—was not issued until the fifth day of the raids.

The December attacks served to underline once again the danger of renewed escalations as long as any U.S.

troops or weapons remain in Indochina. They make all the more im-

portant the April 22 mass demonstrations called by the National Peace

Action Coalition (NPAC) to demand total and immediate U. S. withdrawal.

A Verdict to Suit the Commander in Chief

Henderson Acquittal Concludes Mylai Whitewash

With the acquittal of Colonel Oran K. Henderson by an army jury December 17, the U.S. government's official verdict on the Mylai massacre has been completed. According to the results of the legal proceedings, on March 16, 1968, Lieutenant William Calley Jr. murdered "not less than" twenty-two civilians in Mylai. No one else was guilty of the same crime. No one concealed what had happened. All military regulations concerning the reporting of possible war crimes were scrupulously obeyed.

This incredible verdict on the massacre, in which as many as 500 persons may have died, reveals the extent of the refusal by the Nixon administration and the army to prosecute seriously those immediately responsible for the crime and its concealment.

Twenty-five officers and enlisted men were originally charged with crimes related to the massacre. Of these, only six were brought to trial. All the trials except that of Calley resulted in acquittals.

This record produced some sarcastic comments in the press. Tom Wicker wrote in the December 21 *New York Times*:

"... it is remarkable, even extraordinary, that with all its resources and manpower the Government could neither bring anyone else to trial nor make its case against any of those charged but Calley. . . .

"The Army displayed no such lack of zeal when it deployed its snoopers across the country to spy on politicians, students, newspapermen and anyone else its brass hats decided was subversive or suspect. The Justice Department did not hesitate to pounce on every newspaper that dared to print the Pentagon Papers, the First Amendment notwithstanding, and even now is pouring untold manpower and resources into an effort to bring criminal prosecutions for that publication. The F. B. I. wants subversives to think there is a G-man

behind every mailbox and the Government is wiretapping, bugging and beefing up the armaments of your local police, all in the name of law and order; but the best anybody can do about Mylai is to pin a murder rap on a lone lieutenant."

In his book *The Court-Martial of Lt. Calley*, Richard Hammer described a legal procedure that might have produced different results:

"There seemed at least two choices. It [the army] could try the men singly, one at a time. Or it could hold a mass trial at which all twenty-five charged . . . would be placed in a dock together. Such a mass trial . . . would be something of a board of inquiry in addition to a trial and during it all the facts surrounding the massacre might be made public—how and why it was planned and initiated, exactly what happened everywhere in the village during the action, and why and how it had been concealed afterward. . . .

"But for many high officers in the Army, a mass trial had an aura of horror. The Army and the President were maintaining that My Lai was an aberration, not common practice, and the sight of all those soldiers in the dock, including generals, would seem to give the lie to that contention. And the thought of such a spectacle, with two dozen or more American soldiers, including generals, lined up in the dock like a little Nuremberg, a real-life war crimes trial involving this time not Germans or Japanese but Americans, was just more than they could stomach. . . ."

By treating the case of each individual separately, the army was able to sweep the cases of nineteen under the rug with a minimum of publicity. And in the six trials, evidence that served the defense in one court-martial failed to turn up in others even when it would have aided the prosecution. Thus Captain Er-

nest Medina, who had earlier been acquitted of murder charges and had then resigned from the army, testified for the defense at the trial of Henderson, who was accused of covering up the massacre. Medina said he had lied to Henderson about what happened at Mylai—an admission that cost him nothing since he had been honorably discharged without ever being accused of participation in the cover-up.

Nixon himself of course played a major role in the acquittal of Medina and Henderson, and in the refusal of the army to prosecute where charges of other atrocities have been made. Colonel Anthony Herbert, who accused two high-ranking officers of war crimes, has been hounded out of the army as a reward for his efforts. Nixon's personal intervention in the Calley case has obviously given the army brass to understand that zealotness in the prosecution of war criminals is no way to win favor with the commander in chief—who is himself responsible every day for crimes against the peoples of Indochina. □

How to subscribe

If you'd rather not cut up this issue by using the subscription blank . . .

Put your name and address on any old piece of paper and send it with \$7.50 for a six-month subscription.

Intercontinental Press
P. O. Box 116
Village P. O. Station
New York, N. Y. 10014

[] Enclosed is \$7.50 for a six-month subscription.

Name _____

Street _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

The Indian Occupation of Bangladesh

By Jon Rothschild

On December 16 the Pakistan army of occupation in East Bengal surrendered under the attack of Bangladesh guerrillas and the Indian army. Six days later the leaders of the Bangladesh government-in-exile in Calcutta returned to Dacca (soon to be renamed Mujibnagar). More than 100,000 people, nearly one-fifth of the city's prewar population, turned out in massive demonstrations to greet the representatives of the provisional government.

The cheers, however, came as an anticlimax. Several days before the Dacca surrender, the Awami League-dominated provisional government entered Jessore, a major city in western Bangladesh that had just been retaken by the Mukti Bahini (Bengali liberation forces) and the Indian army. But then, instead of continuing to Dacca, the government officials returned to their Calcutta offices. Apparently they were afraid to advance to the former capital of East Pakistan, now the capital of Bangladesh.

Speculation about the reasons for the delay was rife. The two most commonly suggested explanations were that the Awami League bureaucrats did not want to be associated with the expected violent reaction of the Bengalis against Pakistan collaborators, or that they did not wish to appear in the capital while it was still under obvious, and formal, jurisdiction of the Indian army.

The usually reliable *Far Eastern Economic Review* suggested in its December 25 issue that political divisions had erupted between the Awami League, the pro-Moscow Communist party led by Muzaffar Ahmed, and Maulana Bashani's National Awami party, blocking the government's attempts to put together a cabinet.

Whatever the truth may be as to these rumors, it became increasingly obvious that the major concern of Bangladesh's first regime was the disarming of the Mukti Bahini rank and file.

"The bulk of the young guerrillas, mostly students and former students, hold Bangladesh officials in contempt,"

said a December 21 *New York Times* dispatch. "They feel the politicians, who formed the exile regime in April, should have been inside East Pakistan fighting for freedom instead of sitting comfortably and safely in Calcutta."

The job of bringing the Bengali fighters under control has been assumed by the Indian army. Even before the Pakistani defeat, Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora, commander of India's forces on its eastern front, announced that he had been appointed, nobody knows by whom, as "over-



GANDHI: Wants Rahman back in Bangladesh to keep things under control.

all commander" of the Mukti Bahini. The December 26 *New York Times* reported that "Indian officials say their Government feels it will have to keep its army in East Pakistan [sic] for many months before conditions there are stable enough to remove it.

"Perhaps after three or four months, we may be able to start thinning the army out," one high Indian official said."

Indira Gandhi's criterion for when conditions will be "stable enough" is a simple one: if and when a bourgeois government allied to India has been firmly established in Bangladesh, and

the armed power of the guerrillas has been broken.

Gandhi has insisted that her regime has no intention of annexing Bangladesh. The economic burden of a prolonged occupation would be immense, and it is unlikely that Indian troops would take kindly to replacing the Pakistanis in the unenviable position of trying to dominate the Bengali countryside. A compliant indigenous regime in Bangladesh is what the Indian bourgeoisie would prefer. Thus Gandhi has concentrated her efforts on bolstering the position of the Awami League provisional government.

Because this is no easy task—the five major leaders of the new regime are at best lackluster bourgeois politicians and at worst notorious Indian pawns—Gandhi has centered on the demand that Sheik Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Awami League and formal president of Bangladesh, now imprisoned in Pakistan, be released. Rahman, it is widely believed, is the only Bengali politician with sufficient authority to bring the guerrillas under control.

D.P. Dhar, India's special envoy to Bangladesh, hinted December 29 that his government was interested in a "package deal" that would exchange Rahman for Pakistani civilian prisoners held in Bangladesh. India's most important leverage in such dealings is the large number of Pakistani prisoners of war.

It remains to be seen whether Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the opportunist leader of the Pakistan People's party, who assumed control of Pakistan on December 20, will agree to an exchange. Bhutto reportedly began discussions with Rahman on December 27. But Bhutto still stubbornly regards Bangladesh as a province of Pakistan. He has shown no inclination to return Rahman as president of an independent Bangladesh. Instead he is trying to use Rahman as a bargaining piece in negotiations with Gandhi.

One of the excuses offered by New Delhi for continuing the Indian occupation of Bangladesh is to prevent a "bloodbath" against the Biharis, non-Bengalis who aided Yahya's army during the war. The western press has tried to sensationalize the few acts of vengeance that have occurred. (When four collaborators were killed in Dacca by the Mukti Bahini, the

New York Times felt it worth a two-column headline on page one.)

But the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of December 25 noted that "There is no evidence yet that the revenge killings have been numerous." And the *Times* itself has indicated (although not in headlines) that "the killings have been much fewer than had been widely predicted."

It would be amazing if the Bengalis, after suffering about 1,000,000 deaths in nine months, did not take some retaliatory measures against those responsible for the slaughter.

However much the Indian army poses as the guardian of law and order in Bangladesh, the passage of time will show that they are there to defend the provisional government, maintain capitalism, and block a socialist revolution.

Only a few days after the Pakistani surrender, young students in Dacca occupied the radio station. The government, at that time still sitting in Calcutta, demanded that the "unauthorized" broadcasts stop. Radio Bangladesh should originate, according to the "ministers," from Calcutta.

Such conflicts can be expected to continue. The Indian army has made clear that it intends to remain in Bangladesh until the reins of power can be turned over to the Bengali bourgeoisie.

But even if such a plan temporarily succeeds, with or without Rahman, it is not likely that the subcontinent can be stabilized. After nine months of war, Bangladesh lies in ruin. Last June, before the worst atrocities were committed by the Pakistani army, a World Bank-International Monetary Fund mission estimated that it would cost US\$70,000,000 just to restore transport and communication links in the country. The year's jute crop, the major source of foreign exchange, is nearly a total loss. Vast amounts of capital have been transferred out of the country. No capitalist government, especially one beholden to India, will be able to even begin to deal with such a crisis.

India has frequently used its army to put down mass struggles in its own states. To do the same in a country that has just seen months of revolutionary war will be a considerably more arduous task. In struggling against the Pakistani forces, the Bengalis made promising gains in form-

ing revolutionary cadres. This was a major reason for New Delhi's decision to intervene—Yahya's occupation was losing control and the struggle was moving toward a revolutionary-socialist outcome.

After the initial mood of welcom-

ing the Indian troops as liberators has passed, it can be expected that the Bengalis who stood in the forefront of the fight against the Pakistani occupation will continue their battle—this time against the new occupiers and their quislings. □

Shown Up by Scratch Test

Healyites in the Camp of Indira Gandhi

By Joseph Hansen

The position taken by the Healyites on the war between India and Pakistan will hardly come as a surprise to those familiar with the saying, "Scratch an ultraleft and you'll find an opportunist."

The Healyites, who have long been notorious in Britain for their ultraleft sectarianism, decided to offer their support to the bourgeois government of Indira Gandhi.

The official Healyite statement was published in the December 6, 1971, issue of *Workers Press*, the organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist Labour League. Listed as a "statement by the International Committee of the Fourth International," it was entitled "Defeat imperialist conspiracy against Bangla Desh." [See full text on page 24.]

"US imperialism," according to the authors, "is determined to utilize the Indo-Pakistan conflict to weaken the Indian economy, as its decision to cut off arms supplies shows.

"It wants to facilitate the unlimited penetration of US finance capital into India and the installation of a more docile regime in New Delhi."

In the opinion of the authors of the document, Indian entry into the struggle as a defensive move against the conspiracy of American imperialism was highly progressive:

"Bengali resistance to the barbaric Yahya Khan regime and the heritage of imperialist partition in India has entered a decisive stage with the intervention of Indian armed forces."

The authors are understandably responsive to the heartening action taken by the rulers of India at this decisive stage:

"We critically support the decision of the Indian bourgeois government

to give military and economic aid to Bangla Desh."

Bowing in the direction of Trotskyism, to which the Healyites profess to adhere, the authors include correct generalizations concerning the nature of the Bengali and Hindu bourgeoisie, their ulterior aims in the conflict, and the need to oppose them. But these generalizations all speak against supporting the New Delhi regime.

Why then did the Healyites decide to line up with Indira Gandhi ("critically," of course)?

The reason is to be found in Britain. Since last March when Yahya Khan turned his guns on the masses in East Pakistan, the Socialist Labour League has been seeking to make an impression on the Bengali immigrants and exiles who are fervent supporters of the Bangladesh liberation movement.

The news that India had intervened in the conflict with her armies was received with joy among the majority of these Bangladesh patriots. It was an unthinking reaction based on lack of knowledge of the real aims of the Gandhi regime. These, of course, were to take over from the failing Pakistani occupation the task of saving capitalism in Bangladesh.

The Healyites simply adapted in the most opportunistic way to this mood among the Bengalis in Britain.

The Lambertists, who up until recently formed a tight bloc with the Healyites in the "International Committee," felt constrained to publicly denounce the SLL betrayal. They did this in two articles in the December 15 and December 22 issues of *Informations Ouvrières*, the weekly newspaper they publish in Paris.

An editorial note introducing the

first article stated: "The SLL fraudulently attributes the position it has taken on the Indo-Pakistan war to the International Committee, whereas the latter has not met."

This "gross usurpation," as the editors put it, "cannot mask the real problems involved. The statement of the SLL . . . offers support to the government of Indira Gandhi whom it raises to the rank of defender of the interests of the Bengali people."

The unidentified authors of the two articles (the Central Committee of the Lambertist grouping, the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste?) do not explain how they happen to know that the "International Committee" has not met. Probably they have in mind their membership in the committee and the proviso that members must be notified in advance of meetings.

Skipping such details, they go to the heart of the matter, as they view it, and prove quite convincingly that the SLL position amounts to rejection of Trotsky's theory of the permanent revolution and adoption of Stalin's theory of "revolution by stages." In this instance, they add, "a 'stage' of the counterrevolution."

If the Indian bourgeoisie are capable of playing a progressive role in a "decisive stage" of the revolution in Bangladesh—which is the position taken by the Healyites—then it follows that Trotsky turned out to be wrong in maintaining that the bourgeoisie in the colonial world in general (as elsewhere) are incapable of playing such a role.

But the Indian bourgeoisie and their regime in New Delhi have no intention of playing a progressive role. On the contrary, their aims are completely reactionary. It is the leaders of the SLL who entertain illusions in the operation, certainly not the Indian bourgeois political strategists or the generals they placed in charge of carrying it out.

Thus Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution stands confirmed once again, while the leaders of the SLL stand condemned.

Curiously, the Lambertist authors never mention the pragmatic reasons for the SLL position. They argue as if the SLL leaders were simply of low theoretical level, do not really understand Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, and thereby stumbled inadvertently into their betrayal of rev-

olutionary Marxism after depriving themselves of the theoretical wisdom and capacities of the Lambertists.

Perhaps the oversight is intentional—the Lambertists are not invulnerable to finger-wagging from the Healyites on certain opportunistic sins and peccadilloes committed in France.

As for the moral outrage over Healy's usurpation of the name of the "International Committee," this is all for the innocents. Healy, the secretary of the SLL, is merely repeating what he did in 1963 when the majority of the original International Committee joined in a reunification

congress that ended a ten-year split in the world Trotskyist movement.

At that time Healy refused to participate in the reunification. Instead, he set up a rump "International Committee" of his own—with Lambert aiding and abetting in the fraud.

Healy is only asserting his property rights against the claims of Lambert to possession of this rump body.

Lambert, consequently, finds himself faced with the problem of deciding what to do about SLL betrayals bearing the official stamp of the "International Committee." An embarrassing situation! But then what did he expect?

The Monetary Crisis Continues

Washington Monetary Conference Fails

By Ernest Mandel

For the family photo, the finance ministers of the world's ten richest imperialist countries put on beaming smiles. After four months of confusion and uncertainty about the future of the international monetary system, the world capitalist economy had finally achieved new schedules of fixed rates of exchange between all the imperialist currencies.

The ministries and administrative councils must have been seized with a strong feeling of panic for the principal interests to appear so satisfied with the miserable compromise that was reached in Washington. If the rates of exchange were reorganized, none of the basic roots of the monetary crisis were eliminated.

On August 15 Nixon issued an edict. But on December 18 a compromise was reached, after arduous negotiations. "Neither victor nor vanquished," proclaimed this same Nixon. This compromise reflects the change in the interimperialist relation of forces that has evolved over the past decade.

American big capital achieved a general revaluation of all imperialist currencies in relation to the dollar. If some of these were significant (15.5% for the yen, 12.5% for the deutsche mark), they were in general less than those the Nixon administration had expected. They favor the export of American commodities, but will reduce the export of American capital. Above all, they will facilitate

the export of European and Japanese capital to the United States.

Nixon's promises and blustering to the contrary, the dollar was in fact devalued—in relation to gold and all currencies that will not themselves devalue. The devaluation will reduce the already shaken confidence of world bankers in the stability of the dollar. (Several East European countries will sustain a loss because they imprudently converted their reserves into dollars, as the Chinese government sustained a loss when it, also imprudently, placed its reserves in French francs before the franc's devaluation.) And—depending on the number of semi-colonial countries that likewise devalue their currencies—the devaluation of the dollar will raise prices, more or less, on imports of raw materials and the products of light industry coming from those countries.

The international monetary system remains in crisis. The two principal roots of this crisis have not at all been eliminated. The dollar is still not exchangeable for gold. If the capitalist central banks continue to turn their backs on the dollar as a reserve currency—and how could they do otherwise in the wake of such a devaluation!—the international capitalist economy will find itself deprived of an international exchange currency.

In addition, the American inflation continues worse than ever, as the Nixon administration tries at all costs to prevent the recession from being

transformed into a grave economic crisis. The American balance of payments deficit will thus also persist, even if it becomes partially attenuated.

In regard to the 10% surcharge on imports imposed by Nixon on August 15, it must be said that this had little weight in reducing imports, attracted by the abundance of liquidity. As a result, prices rose generally as a consequence of the increase in imports. Certain of these, especially in the area of machinery, could not be substituted moreover since the American machine industry does not produce (or no longer produces) some equipment made mostly in Germany and Japan.

From the capitalist point of view the most reasonable way out of the impasse would be to bolster gold by an international reserve currency completely detached from the national economy of any capitalist country—a central bank currency administered, according to strictly objective criteria, by a central bank of the central banks.

But that would be a complete utopia. The realization of such a program presupposes the existence of a world capitalist government independent of the great imperialist powers; that is, the disappearance of interimperialist competition. But it is precisely the exacerbation of that competition that has been manifested since the opening of the monetary crisis.

In the absence of an overall solution the most the imperialist powers can hope for is a gradual extension of the system of Special Drawing Rights (paper-gold, distributed according to the notion that the richest countries should get the lion's share). Moreover, the imperialist countries of the Common Market (reinforced by Great Britain, which has consistently aligned itself with the Six during the monetary crisis) will seek to create a common currency which, all things being equal, could be added to the dollar as an international reserve currency, aimed at supplanting the dollar. But this is not for tomorrow or the day after.

The European and Japanese capitalists did not dare cut the limb they were sitting on—to reply to Nixon's edict with massive retaliatory measures would have run the risk of touching off a chain reaction which, by contracting the world market and aggravating the American recession, could have ended by seriously striking at their own outlets.

Today, in face of the Washington compromise, they have decided to grin

and bear it, with the exception of the German industrialists. For them, this is their third revaluation in a short time. They fear a massive invasion of American products and a relative decline in German exports.

France-Soir ran a triumphant headline: "Crisis and unemployment averted." The demagogy is surprising, even coming from a daily of this type. Far from being averted, unemployment in France has reached its highest level in twenty years, and this is even before a recession. And recession (that is, a crisis) threatens France not because of the monetary crisis, but because of the mounting West German recession. There is not the slightest sign that the German recession disappeared after December 18. Everything indicates that it will extend through next winter and spring.

The deterioration of the international capitalist economic situation is not a result of the monetary crisis, but preceded it and in part accelerated its outbreak. The causes of the present recession are more profound—the slackening of technological innovation; the excess capacity in key sectors like steel, auto, petrochemicals, synthetic textiles, naval construction, and undoubtedly also electronics; the fall of the average rate of profit and the consequent decline in investment; the growing gap between the capacity of production and buying power, compounded by increasingly massive indebtedness of both families and companies.

In short, all the classic contradictions of capitalism have reappeared. Monetary and financial manipulations may, at the very most, moderate their immediate effects, but can neither eliminate nor render them harmless in the long run.

Under these conditions the two predictions we made immediately after the August 15 decree stand entirely confirmed:

First, that the international bourgeoisie would try to make the workers foot the bill for the damages. The offensive against levels of employment and real wages has now become general. The vigorous response of the West German metalworkers demonstrates that this offensive is not at all assured of success.

Second, that international competition would accelerate and undermine all agreements, including monetary ones. The Bretton Woods system lasted twenty-five years, the last five

in death agony. The system born in Washington will not survive a decade. The next recession or the next social explosion in an important imperialist country threatens to precipitate its decomposition.

December 20, 1971

Canada

Tariq Ali on Tour

[The following article is reprinted from the December 20 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist biweekly published in Toronto.]

* * *

Tariq Ali, well-known Pakistani revolutionist and a leader of the International Marxist Group in Britain, will tour Canada January 10-20 speaking on "The Struggle for Bangladesh and the Indo-Pakistan War."

Ali, who is presently an editor of the newspaper *Red Mole*, is best known in North America for his two books: *The New Revolutionaries*, an anthology of writings by revolutionaries of the new left, which he edited; and *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?* which was published in 1970 following his extended trip to Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Tariq Ali's tour is being arranged by an ad hoc committee, the Tariq Ali-Solidarity with Bangladesh Tour Committee, which has invited individuals and organizations who support the Bangladesh independence struggle to assist its work. Plans are being made for campus meetings across the country as well as citywide public meetings in several Canadian and Québec centers.

Address inquiries to Phil Courneyeur, Tariq Ali Tour Coordinator, 334 Queen Street West, Toronto 2B, 364-5908. □

Colonels in No Hurry

The Greek government is reportedly planning to rebuild the Colossus of Rhodes, one of the wonders of the ancient world. No interest, however, has yet been shown in reconstructing another ancient Greek achievement called democracy.

Kreisky Increases Tax Load on Workers

Vienna

The policy declaration delivered to parliament November 4 by Chancellor Bruno Kreisky clearly reveals the outlines of the politics that will be pursued by the first Austrian Socialist party government to hold an absolute majority.¹

During the election campaign, Kreisky made it clear that in case of victory the SPO [Sozialistische Partei Oesterreichs—Socialist party of Austria] would not carry out any basic social or political alterations. This was the sense of Kreisky's promise to Schleizer² and the public during a televised campaign debate that he would see to it that there were no more nationalizations in Austria during the next four years.

The policy declaration puts stress on a "welfare state for all." Austria is to be modernized in many areas. The declaration promises to abolish poverty.

But these goals of a policy strictly limited to reforms are to be achieved within the framework of the present capitalist social order. It is therefore only logical that after presenting his policy Kreisky offered to work with the two bourgeois parties.

Refusal to Pursue Socialist Goals

In order to calm the SPO's voters and precinct workers and to shield Kreisky's politics, the SPO ideologist Czernetz writes the following in the October issue of *Zukunft*:

"We have been assigned by the voters the task of modernizing Austria. We did not seek a mandate for further, more far-reaching measures toward the creation of socialist structures in the sense of our basic program, and we did not receive such a mandate."

The budget of Finance Minister Hannes Androsch is supposed to form

the financial basis for the SPO's program. A detailed analysis of the budget cannot be given here, but definite trends can be indicated in the framework of expenditures and income planned for 1972.

As presented by Androsch, the principles of the SPO's fiscal policies rest on the theories of Keynes and the tricks of the post-Keynesian economists.

In Keynes's teachings, the capitalist state is supposed to overcome economic crises by creating additional employment through the means of anti-cyclical budgetary policies. Keynes saw supplementary taxes, state loans, and the toleration of a limited inflation as the means to spur capital expansion. These policies first took effect in the forced measures of the second world war (armaments and restriction of personal consumption).

The post-Keynesians proceed from the assumption that economic growth can be maintained only by a policy of increased state expenditures for the development of the infrastructure, armaments, and the concentration and modernization of industry and agriculture. Such a policy implies a greater tax burden on the working class and petty bourgeoisie, increased monetary circulation (inflation), and a constantly increasing state debt. This is also the recipe of Androsch and Kreisky for maintaining economic growth and full employment.

But recent developments in Sweden (80,000 unemployed) and England (960,000 unemployed) prove that these economic policies are incapable of either assuring the "welfare state" promised by the Social Democrats or restraining rising unemployment. Capitalism's inherent laws of competition and class struggle prove stronger than such theories. As Marx showed, capital accumulation implies an industrial reserve army.

The budget, which is described as moderately expansive in terms of cyclical policy, proposes increased expenditures for education, science and research, and the republic's current ten-year investment program. Neither is agriculture neglected, with an increase of more than 1,500,000,000

schillings [approximately US\$58,000,000].

These increased expenses are to be met by higher taxes on wage earners (wage tax and sales tax) and by tariff increases that affect the broad masses.

The possessing classes are not subjected to higher taxes, although they can always, by various dodges, shift such increases onto the shoulders of others. It is thus not surprising that Androsch's budget speech received a friendly commentary from almost all the bourgeois papers, especially *Die Industrie*, the organ of the Vereinigung österreichischer Industrieller [Union of Austrian Industrialists].

The positive attitude of the Austrian big bourgeoisie is, of course, not a matter of chance. It rests on the recognition that there is no danger to their interests in the SPO government's economic goals, such as "modernization of the basic equipment of our economy." (The organ of the industrialists commented that this phrase means above all the strengthening of the productive apparatus, since the ruling party and especially the finance minister have for years argued for a modern industrial policy.)

Die Industrie became positively enthusiastic over one of the last paragraphs of the budget speech, in which Androsch expressly spoke of the social market-economy (in the context of the compatibility of a long-term fiscal policy with the conceptions of a market economy), although he later limited this somewhat, leaving more leeway for the workings of the pure market mechanism.

Androsch Opposes Lower Taxes on Wages

After these assurances to the bourgeoisie, the finance minister suddenly becomes very hard toward the working class and the union federation. He sets a tough policy for 1972 of no reform of the wage tax and therefore no reduction in the rapidly rising tax burden on workers. And that is not all.

As is known, at the special convention of the SPD [Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—Social Democratic party of Germany] a resolution was adopted against the will of the party executive committee. This called

1. Prior to the October election, Kreisky headed a minority government that ruled with the tacit support of the right-wing Freedom party. —IP

2. Karl Schleizer of the Oesterreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People's party), the main bourgeois party.

for the highest income tax to be raised to 60 percent and the tax on profits of corporations to be increased from 51 to 56 percent. These decisions of the SPD convention reflected the dissatisfaction of the ranks with the distribution of property in West Germany in recent years.

In a television interview, Androsch was questioned about the differences in the tax policies of the SPD and

SPO. When the interviewer referred to the SPO's refusal to enact a progressive tax and asked if this could lead to a flight of capital from West Germany to Austria (for example, the transfer of factories), Androsch answered that such a development would correspond to the goals of the regime's investment policies.

Without going into the problem of the strengthened influence of

foreign capital in Austria, even the Oesterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund [Austrian Union Federation] and the labor council have warned that these declarations mean that the finance minister takes a harsh stand toward the working class of his own country and an extremely accommodating one toward domestic and foreign capital. The technocratic finance minister thus displays his true face. □

After Three Years of Mounting Struggle

Behind the Ebb in the Italian Workers' Movement

By Francesco Marchi

Rome

After three years of great mass struggles, which have seen workers, students, and various sectors of the petty-bourgeoisie mobilize to fight for better living conditions, in recent months the trend has shifted in Italy. Forced onto the defensive for a longer period than anyone would have expected, compelled to accept a large measure of the demands advanced by the working class and the popular strata, the bourgeoisie has moved strongly onto the offensive to achieve a restabilization, even if only a partial one.

Extensive flashpoints, of course, remain. Although to a lesser extent than in the past years, student struggles are continuing to buffet the universities and high schools. Vast sectors of the working class are not only keeping up a furious resistance to all attempts at restoring "order" in the factories but in some cases taking up the fight for further gains. It was to be foreseen, moreover, that a movement as broad as the one in 1968-70 would not recede precipitously but would go into a downward trend, with struggles continuing to some extent.

However, although we have to take into consideration the diverse and contradictory aspects of the situation and remember that elements still exist that could provide the basis even for a resumption of the working-class and popular offensive, we still must make a definite assessment of the current period. And the only possible conclusion is that, on the whole, the workers' movement has entered a defensive phase.

The fundamental cause of this reversal of the trend lies in the fact that the traditional organizations of the workers' movement (the Communist and Socialist parties, together with the unions) have succeeded essentially in keeping the movement from garnering the fruits it was in strong enough position to take from the bourgeoisie. These organizations were able to prevent the economic movement, which was tending spontaneously to take on a political character, from developing into a more consciously political offensive that would have thrown the regime, if not the bourgeois system itself, into crisis.

In the moments of greatest tension, when the broad masses would have grasped the meaning of slogans calling for a workers' government, the left parties and the unions diverted the movement into demanding "reforms" from the center-left government, reforms already promised in the government's program when it was formed in 1962 and which it has failed to push. Under the impetus of the mass movement, the center-left government entered into a mortal crisis, which paralyzed it totally and prevented it once again from meeting the most elementary demands of the popular strata by giving at least a semblance of intent to carry out reforms.

Thus, the mass struggles of this three-year period have finally lost their momentum while awaiting a "qualitative leap" to the political level — which the left wing of the government was incapable of assuring and

the left opposition bloc was incapable of imposing.

The inability of the traditional left to give the movement the political outlet it required, on the other hand, led to a precipitous growth of the far left. The radicalization of young students and workers has not, of course, been an exclusively Italian phenomenon. But in Italy more than elsewhere the international forces producing this radicalization encountered a need arising from the ranks, a need for political expression that at times embraced very broad popular sectors.

To give an idea of the far left's potential, I need cite only a few episodes. For example, the winter 1969-70 demonstrations in Milan led by the extraparlimentary left drew more than 50,000 participants, more people than the PCI [Partito comunista italiano — Italian Communist party] had been able to mobilize in twenty years. Another example is the rise in the circulation of the far left press, leading finally to the emergence of a daily newspaper (*Il Manifesto*) which today sells 78,000 copies. There were also the December 1970 demonstrations in which the far left brought hundreds of thousands of activists onto the streets.

But while the far left as a whole was able to benefit from the widening gap between the mass movement and the traditional organizations of the left, it nonetheless proved itself at last incapable of drawing together the vanguard of the movement and offering the masses a real political alternative. In fact, the far left itself arose side by side with the mass movement, ab-

sorbing and magnifying all its characteristics of spontaneous rage and finally falling prey, in most cases, to the most frantic kind of ultraleftism. It split up into a thousand rival groupings incapable not only of undertaking a process of unification but even of establishing a minimum of unity in action.

Once again, the absence of a Leninist political leadership of the masses, the lack of a revolutionary party, led to the exertions and struggles of broad sectors largely coming to nothing and to a natural ebb. Caught between unbalanced ultraleftists and reformists incapable of getting reforms, the mass movement began slowly losing steam, showing signs of faltering confidence.

The first indications of a reversal in the trend could be seen after the big student demonstrations of December 1970, which I have already mentioned. After that date, no broader student mobilizations occurred. Moreover, the struggles that continued in various schools and universities began to take on a narrowly student character, began to assume an apolitical tone and to take up conservative slogans. The working class began to face a growing reserve army of the unemployed produced in the initial stage by an inadequate supply of jobs in proportion to the youth entering the job market and subsequently by layoffs.

Rising labor costs created a difficult situation in small, low-productivity industry. Some concerns began closing their doors, putting their employees out of work. The big industrial combines, which were capable of absorbing the higher labor costs through making new investments and raising productivity, faced difficulties on the world market because of sharpening interimperialist competition and were reluctant to go ahead with their previous investment plans. This has not yet led to massive layoffs in the big plants but it has brought about a hiring freeze and a lot of reductions in working hours. Industrial production, which was stagnating at the start of the year, has experienced successive major drops from the same months last year. The workers' principal weapon, the strike, is beginning to lose its effectiveness in a situation where the bosses want less production.

For the first time, a general strike called by the three major unions for April 7, while still winning mass sup-

port, got a clearly diminished response. Anyone who wanted to measure the difference between the movement in its ascendant phase and at the beginning of its decline could see it by comparing the result of the November 19, 1969, general strike with the one on April 7, 1971.

In November 1969 the workers' movement carried the petty bourgeoisie with it. In the big cities not only were all the factories closed but the shops, the cafes, the restaurants, and even the most minor service establishments participated in the strike. The day before the strike it was already clear that November 19 would be a critical turning point in which the masses would show their determination to wage a hard-fought struggle for better living conditions. The massive participation in the strike, moreover, revealed the general, that is political, character of the struggle. The result of the April 7 strike was quite different. The petty bourgeoisie was largely unaffected, especially outside the Milan-Turin-Genoa industrial triangle. A good percentage of the white-collar workers in the big factories went to work as usual. Even some workers, especially in the small and medium-sized industries but also in some big combines, punched in.

The reversal of the trend quickly resulted in a change in the political orientation of the petty bourgeoisie (which shifted to the right in the June 13 elections).¹ The fascist MSI [Movimento sociale italiano — Italian Social Movement] reinforced its own electoral positions, and its role in the country is no longer represented merely by scraggly bands of professional thugs.

In the context of this decline of the movement, the bourgeoisie has launched its counteroffensive. It has two principal objectives — to restore "order" in the factories and in the country and to form a government capable of governing.

In 1962, as I noted, a center-left government was formed in Italy. It was the result of a coalition of four parties — the Christian Democrats, the PSI [Partito socialista italiano — Italian Socialist party], the PSDI [Partito socialista democratico italiano — Italian Democratic Socialist party, the product of a split from the PSI in

1949], and the PRI [Partito repubblicano italiano — Italian Republican party]. This coalition was achieved after many years' effort and not without open clashes (in 1960 an attempt to form an extreme rightist government was blocked by street battles).

The new government proposed ambitious reforms. Italy had then overcome its relative underdevelopment and had become an advanced capitalist country. The projects of those who conceived the center-left were based on the idea that resources created by this high level of development made it possible to include part of the working-class bloc, the section influenced by the PSI, in running the bourgeois state. This could be done, they thought, by offering the popular masses better education, a policy of building cheap low-income housing, industrializing the south of Italy, tax reform, and ending the most crying conditions of poverty and inequality.

Very quickly all these projects proved illusory. Strong resistance from the more backward sectors of the bourgeoisie, economic difficulties and the recession of 1963-64, as well as the fact that the Communist party kept gaining strength despite the government's promises, prevented the regime from developing and putting over a coherent political program. The five-year plan that the government had drawn up, which was supposed to advance a solution to the gravest problems of Italian society, remained a dead letter. Thus, the working class and the popular strata very quickly realized that the reforms were not on the way, and they began to engage in struggles, which were given impetus also by the process of radicalization taking place on an international scale.

The resumption of struggles accentuated the contradictions within the government. The PSI and the left wing of the Christian Democrats maintained that what was happening demonstrated precisely the need for accelerating the reform program. They sought to compensate for the lack of support for their own political program from the PSDI, the PRI, and the right-wing Christian Democrats by overtures to the unions and the Communist party. The right-wing bloc in the government, on the other hand, held that a policy of making concessions to a rising mass movement was illusory, and oriented toward a repressive po-

1. See "Elections Show Increased Fascist Danger" in *Intercontinental Press*, July 5, 1971, p. 625.

litical line, seeking allies in the parties of the far right. Under the impetus of the mass movement, measures that no one wanted to risk had to be carried out. The result was that the government, buffeted between the opposing tendencies, remained paralyzed for all practical purposes throughout the three-year period from 1968 to 1971, surviving from day to day, incapable of taking the initiative. (And this fact increases the responsibility of the Italian left for its failure to provide the objectively possible political outlet for these struggles).

But the change in the political situation indicates that in the not too distant future the already well-advanced crisis of the center-left will break out into the open. The two nearest political tests that will measure the relationship of forces and whose result will influence the way the dilemma is resolved are the election of the president, who will be chosen for a term of seven years in a joint session of the legislature on December 9²; and the referendum to repeal the ban on divorce in Italy.

In preparation for these tests "grand maneuvers" have begun inside the parties. At the end of September, the Consiglio Nazionale [National Council] of the Christian Democratic party met. The secretary, Forlani, revealed the political line of the right wing, proposing an electoral system within the party that would have excluded the left current from the leadership. The present minister of foreign affairs, Moro, replied that an explicit statement had been made opposing the formation of a "law and order bloc" and a rightward shift of the government's political axis. A few days afterward, the Central Committee of the PSI met. It reaffirmed the policy of "more advanced equilibria," that is, the perspective of collaborating with the unions and, in the longer run, with the PCI. The purely Social Democratic current, which has declined, was pushed to the sidelines.

But the outcome of the struggle remains to be determined. Who is the new president to be and where will he get his votes? It seems unlikely, because of grave conflicts within the

2. The election has taken place since this article was written. A Christian Democrat, Giovanni Leone, was elected, apparently with the support of the far right, to replace the old Social Democrat Giuseppe Saragat. — IP

ruling bloc, that the government parties will manage to reach an accord on a common candidate. The right wing of the Christian Democrats is out to elect its own candidate with the support of the rightist parties, while the left wing of the government can count on the support of the Communist party for electing a left Catholic or a socialist. Wheeling and dealing over the candidates is going on behind the scenes among all the parties, both those in the government and in the opposition.

At the same time, the government crisis that will open up immediately after the president is elected will obviously be a difficult one to resolve, since any element in the present bloc elbowed out in the presidential vote is not likely to feel inclined to participate in the new government.

The Christian Democratic right is also playing the card of the referendum against divorce, which will see the breakup of the government bloc and an objective alliance between the Christian Democracy and the fascist party, which is also opposed to di-

vorce. The left wing of the government and the PCI have been trying everything to prevent the referendum from taking place but it seems more and more likely that they will be unable to find any way to avoid it. And if the referendum is held, the ruling coalition will suffer splits that will be hard to repair, no matter what the outcome of the vote.

For all these reasons, the most probable prediction is that the precarious equilibrium on which the center-left government has maintained itself in recent years is about to collapse definitively. A political crisis of major proportions, therefore, is opening in Italy. The gap in time between the outbreak of this crisis and the great struggles of the past three years indicates that it is not very likely the workers' movement will be able to take advantage of it, even if the persistent militancy of the masses enables the working class to play a not insignificant role on this occasion as well. Once again the lack of a revolutionary party has let even corpses hold their positions. □

Yugoslavia

Croat Students Stage Reactionary Strike

By C. Malagnou

Brussels

Since the upsurge of the student movement in 1968, the world had not seen a right-wing student strike. Now, Yugoslavia, a country which was the scene of great student struggles, has the dubious honor of a new "first"—a student action of a pronounced reactionary character.

Anyone visiting Yugoslavia last summer could have seen the advance sign of this movement. All along the Dalmatian coast (which is part of Croatia), you ran into students and youths wearing white T-shirts with the insignia "Croatian University of Zagreb." This was a superficial and outward (holiday-style) demonstration of Croat nationalism, a rising, aggressive, and reactionary movement. A few months before the summer vacations, the nationalists had won a majority in the Zagreb student organization.

We pointed last fall to the threat of a strike in this university.* On November 23, the strike occurred. The students at the University of Zagreb and the other institutions of higher learning launched a strike, which was approved unanimously by an assembly of more than 2,000 students. Despite the intervention of the police (who took a rather "soft" line, moreover, for fear of the repercussions of brutal measures—the lessons of June 1968 have not been forgotten!), this strike continued until December 2.

Last summer it was still possible to visualize the action shaping up as defensive in nature, that is, limited to demanding the reincorporation in the SKJ [Savez Komunista Jugoslavijske—League of Communists of Yugo-

* See "A 'Hot Autumn' in Store for Tito?" in *Intercontinental Press*, October 11, 1971, p. 862.

slavia] of right-wing nationalists expelled at the start of the vacation season.

However, the November-December strike was an offensive one. It was the first open mass action organized by the nationalist forces with the aim of winning definite objectives. The participants in this strike were afraid of nothing. They had important protectors reaching very high into the bureaucracy.

In most previous campus struggles the liberal arts and social science students took the lead; this time commercial science students were much in evidence. Among these, sons of factory managers and other plant administrators, as well as of officials in import-export firms were at the forefront. The strike was the first open political expression of the stratum that aspires to restore capitalism.

The objective of this action, in fact, was to destroy what remains of the state monopoly of foreign trade and, most of all, the control of currency by the workers state.

Using demagogic phrases, such as calling for a halt to "the economic pillage of Croatia" by the other republics of the Yugoslav federation, the striking students directed their attack against the system of exchange control.

Since the abandonment of the complete state monopoly on trade in 1952, various restrictions have continued to exist. In particular, some products—those in insufficient supply in the country—can be exported only on the basis of special licenses granted by the Federal Bureau of Foreign Trade. In the field of imports, the purchase of some products has been limited by quotas included in the foreign currency budgets established yearly for every plant. A licensing system was also used to protect the Yugoslav balance of payments. Besides this, there are protective tariffs.

Thus, although the state monopoly of trade aimed at protecting the nascent socialist economy against the high productivity of the capitalist countries was formally abolished as early as 1952, it still exists in practice in several sectors.

Another protective measure is the requirement that all Yugoslav exporting firms sell all of the foreign currency they obtain by their operations to the national bank, and this applies

to both uncontrolled exports and the controlled exports mentioned above. The exporting firms can repurchase some of this currency from the bank, but only a reduced amount.

It is these controls, which in part prevent fraud and promote a redistribution of foreign exchange in favor of the underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia, that are being challenged today by the Croatian nationalists.

As on every previous occasion when a major crisis has broken out, President Tito intervened dramatically. Symbolizing and expressing the cohesiveness of the workers state, he stepped into the strike situation, calling on the main leaders of the Croatian SKJ, Mika Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic, to face up to their responsibilities. It was their "negligence, light-mindedness, and rotten liberalism," he said at the December 1-2 meeting of the SKJ presiding committee at Karadjordjevo, that had allowed the situation to deteriorate to such an extent. But Tito's criticisms did not touch the root of the problem.

The Yugoslav president assailed a "plot" allegedly organized by the cultural nationalist organization Matica Hrvatska [Croat Motherland]. He denounced the intrigues of certain "foreign elements." But he could not go to the heart of the matter—the official

conception that workers' self-management means decentralization and thus the right of enterprises in the "rich" republics to dispose freely of the income they earn from "their" operations.

As the supreme leader of the central bureaucracy, Tito had no means of defense except repression against the consequences of the bureaucratic-technocratic conception he himself helped to establish—consequences now being felt by the section of the bureaucracy that identifies with the Yugoslav workers state as a whole. At the end of his life, the old marshal would find himself in an existentialist tragedy, "half victim and half accomplice," were it not that the gains of the Yugoslav revolution are also threatened.

Fortunately, everything indicates that the Yugoslav working class is not going to be taken in. When the vice-rector of the University of Zagreb, Yvan Cicack, a student, called on the workers to join in the strike, they refused to let themselves be recruited into a holy alliance with the nationalists, the petty-bourgeoisie, the local bureaucracy, and all those elements that aspire to become a new bourgeoisie.

The confrontations we have been predicting for several years are approaching with giant steps. □

Charges Against Huey Newton Dropped

On December 15, after four years of legal battles, Black Panther party leader Huey P. Newton was finally freed of charges that he killed an Oakland, California, policeman in 1967.

Four days earlier, his third trial on the trumped-up charges ended in a mistrial, as the jury deadlocked at six for acquittal, six for conviction. The jury reported that despite three days of deliberations it was "utterly impossible to reach a verdict."

Newton had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter in his first trial in 1968. But an appeals court bowed to mass popular pressure and overturned the conviction. Newton, who had served twenty-two months in jail, was released.

Last August, his second trial ended in a hung jury, but the county prosecutor insisted on a third trial. Following the second jury-deadlock,

Assistant District Attorney Donald P. Whyte was asked whether he would move for a fourth trial. "If it's up to me, hell yes," he replied. But it was not up to him.

District Attorney Lowell Jensen told Alameda County Superior Court Judge William J. Hayes that "I feel this is a frustration of justice and would prefer to retry the case. But I am compelled to ask at this time for a dismissal."

Newton's \$50,000 bail was released, and he was freed.

When You Move...

Don't count on the post office forwarding your Intercontinental Press! It's against their rules.

Send us your new address. And in plenty of time, please.

The Executions Continue in Bolivia

[Little news has come out of Bolivia since the military junta of General Banzer seized power on August 22. But scattered and fragmentary reports in the *New York Times* and *Le Monde* have referred to a savage campaign aimed at liquidating all elements opposed to the dictatorship.

[The following article by Bobi Sourander is the most extensive report on the situation in Bolivia to come to our attention since the coup. It was published in the November 14 issue of the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter* under the headline, "'Kill the Reds.' Bolivia's New 'Alibi' — the Guerrilla Hunt." The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

La Paz

Bolivia's minister of the interior, Andrés Selich (best known as the man who spit in Che Guevara's face), stormed into his office wearing a cap taken from the ELN* guerrillas. He hissed triumphantly at us journalists: "Gentlemen, this is war! We set out to destroy the Reds and we will finish the job no matter what our critics say.

Then Selich read a list of six "fallen guerrillas." Everybody wrote it down. They all wondered whether these men had been shot in the back, but nobody dared ask. It was a classically Bolivian scene.

Behind the well-tailored colonel who pronounced these chilling official platitudes in a hoarse voice stood at least three bodyguards, dressed like him in civilian clothes. But they looked as if they had slept with their trousers on. And off in a corner stood a CIA agent, a strong, deeply tanned American, a head taller than the others. He is listed in the La Paz telephone book as a "private detective." He ducked alertly every time a camera turned in his direction.

The minister of the interior leaned back in his chair, smiling, and posed

with a Cuban bank note in his hands. That was evidence that "Fidel Castro is operating in the country," that Guevara's old ELN guerrillas were "being led by foreigners trained in Cuba."

"It is completely clear," he stressed. "These mercenaries have not come here to cure but to kill. Therefore, we must deal with them in our way."

The guerrilla hunt is the two-month-old Bolivian military junta's alibi for "destroying the Reds." The minister of the interior is leading the fight. He was the first high officer to come to Higuera, where the wounded Che awaited his fate. Selich led the engineering corps troops that backed up the ambush in which Che was captured. He has filled his ministry with friends from that time.

The guerrilla-hunters celebrate their greatest triumphs when they succeed in "eliminating" foreigners. In mid-October, Selich reported that in an operation near the city of Santa Cruz, a Cuban officer who fought with Che had been killed, namely Captain Leonardo Tamayo, nicknamed "Urbano." Three days later Captain Tamayo turned up at a political demonstration in Havana.

There is, however, a hitch to the whole guerrilla hunt. It is very simple. There is no guerrilla force in Bolivia.

Even the bubblingly energetic Selich admits this. "What we are chasing are small, lost groups of mercenaries that can scarcely do us any harm."

But when you ask him how many of these mercenaries there are, he hesitates to quote a figure high enough to leave room for a "red hunt":

"There are about 250 or maybe 300 or so left."

Then Selich takes the whole group of journalists to a room where captured ELN material is on display.

Bright new uniforms. Bandages. Small tents. Camp cooking utensils of the usual type. . . . No weapons, except a few homemade hand grenades. The only thing that links all this to the guerrillas are the caps with the ELN insignia. All this stuff could have lain for months or years in the cellars of the ministry.

The minister of the interior does

not comment on this booty. All he will say is that "no women were killed and government troops suffered no casualties."

No one — least of all we foreign journalists who have seen colleagues' hotel rooms searched because they pointed cameras or questions in the wrong direction — wants even to mention the reports you hear from the few brave souls who still dare talk in La Paz or from the exiles in Santiago de Chile. These sources tell how unarmed oppositionists have been killed in their homes, or in the places where they have taken refuge, and then presented as "defeated guerrillas."

In La Paz details are told about individual cases. No one has, or can have, an overall view of the "hunt." But the few who dare talk all know examples.

"In a town outside Santa Cruz, a house was surrounded where three peasants from the UNICAPO (Poor Peasants' Union) were staying. They were taken to Santa Cruz. After being questioned, they were killed outside the city and exhibited as ELN guerrillas."

The exiles know fewer details but have a clearer overall view:

"We have listed seventy-three persons by name in Santa Cruz who were killed and in many cases declared to be guerrillas. We believe that at least a similar number, perhaps twice as many, have been murdered in the same way without it becoming known. In all of these incidents, the victims were radicals active in politics or trade-union work during the regime of ex-President Juan José Torres."

The exiles are convinced, moreover, that the new Bolivian government is cooperating with the Brazilian military regime:

"To the east of Concepción, near the Brazilian border, the military helicopters of the Rio de Janeiro regime have delivered bodies to the Bolivian troops. These bodies are purporting to be those of Brazilian members of the ELN guerrillas. We believe that they were Brazilian political refugees or Brazilian guerrillas, and that this was seen as a convenient way of getting rid of them."

At the press conference we asked Colonel Selich about the influence of "foreign powers" in Bolivia, since he had said that the six names on the list were Chileans and Brazilians. He

* The ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional — National Liberation Army] is the guerrilla force that was led by Che Guevara in 1967. — IP

waved the Cuban bank note playfully but became much more serious when the question of Chile came up.

"No, we have no evidence that President Allende's government is directly involved in the ELN's operations."

Earlier in the day his colleague, Minister of Information Hugo González Rioja, had been quite categorical.

"President Allende stands personally behind the guerrilla activity. Chile wants a war with us because we are demanding our natural right to the

sea. But this Communist government cannot afford an open conflict on the border. Therefore it supports the ELN guerrillas."

The press conference with Selich concluded on the same note. A Bolivian journalist asked a respectfully formulated question: "Mr. Minister, do you think that the press in Bolivia will continue to exercise its critical function, its task as the fourth estate?" (About a hundred journalists have fled the country. About a dozen are in prison.)

Selich: "Fourth estate? Hm? I wouldn't put it just like that . . . I would like to hold up the provincial press as an example. There the journalists are healthy . . . There you don't find a single article written with ill will. The provincial press works quite openly . . . (long pause) to inspire patriotism, for us—those who work for us have nothing to fear."

When we were leaving the office, Minister of the Interior Selich stuffed the Cuban bank note into his wallet. "Bank notes can come in handy." □

Another Popular Front

The Draft Program of Venezuela's 'Nueva Fuerza'

By Alfonso Ramirez

[Lines are already being drawn in Venezuela in anticipation of the presidential elections scheduled for December 1973.

[The two major contenders are Acción Democrática (AD—Democratic Action) and COPEI (the Christian Democratic party whose initials originally stood for "Committee for Independent Elections"). The two have alternated in governing the country since 1958. The former dictator Pérez Jiménez, today exiled in Spain, heads an amorphous and heterogeneous, but extensive, movement that also has possibilities of winning.

[To the left of these three formations and standing in opposition to the regime are the Unión Republicana Democrática (URD—Republican Democratic Union), whose main leader is Jovito Villalba; the Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEP—People's Electoral Movement) led by Luis Beltrán Prieto and Jesús Paz-Galarraga, which split from Acción Democrática in December 1967; and the Partido Comunista Venezolano (PCV—Venezuelan Communist party) headed by Jesús Faría. The PCV stands much weakened since the departure of the wing that founded the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS—Movement for Socialism) in January 1971.

[The PCV, URD, and MEP (the latter being the only one of the three having a mass base) recently decided to form a so-called Frente Nacio-

nalista Popular (Nationalist Popular Front), better known as the Nueva Fuerza (New Force). At the end of October, 1971, the Nueva Fuerza, amid considerable fanfare, announced its "Bases para la Elaboración del Programa de Gobierno del Frente Nacionalista Popular" (Essentials for Drawing Up the Governmental Program of the Nationalist Popular Front).

[Of the revolutionary organizations in Venezuela, only two have come out unequivocally against the program and aims of the Nueva Fuerza. The MAS did so in a prominently displayed article published in the December 1 issue of *Bravo Pueblo*. The Venezuelan Trotskyists made their stand public several weeks earlier.

[This was done through the article which we have translated below. It appeared in the November issue of *Voz Marxista*. A condensed version was published in the fortnightly *Punto Negro* (last half of November).

[The article drew a bristling response from the Stalinists. The main weight of their reply, however, fell on the author, Alfonso Ramirez, who was roundly abused personally in the November 18 issue of *Tribuna Popular*, the official organ of the PCV.]

* * *

Caracas

The parties of the New Force have

made public their "Essentials for Drawing Up the Governmental Program of the Nationalist Popular Front."

Their goals are, in the words of the introduction, "(1) to defeat imperialism and the oligarchy, as well as the parties that support them; (2) to achieve national liberation; (3) to lay the groundwork, via thorough transformation of the economic and social structure, for the development of a socialist democracy."

In clear and concise terms, the "Essentials" describes our situation of dependency and backwardness—a situation well-known to anyone who has read about Venezuelan economic and social problems, or has at least lived in this country without closing their eyes to its poverty, cultural deprivation, and insecurity.

The alliance of the MEP, URD, and PCV says these problems can be solved if a government under its leadership manages to take power in the 1973 elections. It advocates a system of "socialist democracy" or, to use a more traditional phrase, a *social-democratic* type of government.

We know that the "socialism" of social-democracy can be summed up in the slogan popularized thirteen years ago by Gaitskell in England: "public ownership." What is involved is not abolition of private ownership, but rather the nationalization of certain branches of the economy. Wilson, in-

deed, fulfilled the promises of the preceding head of the Labour party to nationalize those enterprises that had ceased to be profitable for the British bourgeoisie.

But the New Force's "Essentials" calls for the nationalization of oil, gas, banking, electricity, distribution of farm produce, and the most important transportation industries. These are unquestionably the sources of greatest profits for the capitalists, both outside Venezuela and within her borders.

Alongside the "public enterprises," the "Essentials" proposes to establish forms of mixed public-private ownership for "certain large industries and services, not absolutely essential but important to the well-being of the nation or of local communities."

In other words, "socialism" is to be spread fully throughout the upper regions of the economic stratosphere and only partially at the lower levels of the same atmosphere. When we get down to the air that we breathe daily, we are informed that "the medium and small enterprises will remain in private hands, generally under the capitalist form of ownership, although the voluntary formation of cooperatives will also be encouraged."

"The State Is an Organ of Class Domination"

"With this division into three areas, *private ownership of the means of production is maintained and protected* in the majority of cases." (Emphasis added.) Under the "socialism" of Prieto, Faria, and Villalba, "public ownership" of the large productive plants will coexist with private ownership of all other means of production. And who is to exercise the former type of ownership? The state, a state which by virtue of allowing private ownership to exist in other sectors cannot be a socialist state.

What social class would this state represent? The drafters of the "Essentials" have adorned their efforts with a Marxist veneer. They state in their introduction, for example, that "economic affairs" are "basic and key to overcoming dependence, backwardness, and injustice."

We are not attempting to wipe off this Marxist veneer, but rather to expose what lies underneath. We must therefore repeat the question: "What social class would this state repre-

sent?" The answer is implicit in the "Essentials": It would be the social class that held private property in the means of production that were not nationalized.

This class would control the state, both to defend its interests against those of the big capitalists in oil, electricity, gas, etc., who had been expropriated, and to ward off the assaults of that other class that would labor in those sectors where private ownership remained (as well as in the nationalized sector), that is, the working class. Thus the Golden Mean would have been achieved.

The fact that this "socialist democracy" is nothing but a label used to cover up capitalism is shown by the promise made in the "Essentials" to compensate the owners of the powerful industries and services whose nationalization is decreed. That is to say, the New Force is guaranteeing that they will continue to be big capitalists.

And what will they use to reimburse the owners of the banks, of the oil companies and the other expropriated firms? If they manage to do it, will they still have the resources to carry out the ambitious program of welfare, education, housing, and the like that they promise to achieve?

The New Force's nationalizations were not designed, at any rate, to frighten the big bourgeoisie. When they begin to get down to details, the "Essentials" specifies that the banks will be "nationalized" by purchasing the majority of their stocks—a revealing indication of the true intentions.

The Petty Bourgeoisie as Expropriator

But this is what they say. As we have noted, the class that would carry out the expropriation of the big capitalists would be that class which would own the non-nationalized enterprises and those only partially taken over by the state—i.e., it would be the class that would take control of the state.

Plainly speaking, the class that would do all this would be the petty bourgeoisie. Is it in a position to do so? Has it done so anywhere? And even if this were possible, wouldn't the new rulers, by virtue of playing the role of the formerly dominant capitalists in the government, be simply replacing the big bourgeoisie?

The fact is that nowhere in the world has the petty bourgeoisie managed to seize the property of the big bourgeoisie, without the latter rising up anew.

For such measures to be sustained, control over the situation would have to pass into the hands of the working class. The entire people would have to be mobilized, without seeking thereafter (as has been the case) to push the masses back into passivity. The first wave of expropriations would have to be constantly reinforced with new ones. The army would have to be destroyed, since it exists for the purpose of defending the status quo.

In a nutshell, this could not be done without carrying the socialist revolution to its conclusion. And this process cannot be confined within national boundaries.

The petty bourgeoisie is not prepared to fulfill any of these tasks, least of all to allow the transfer of power to the working class—certainly conspicuous by its absence in the "socialist" projections of the "Essentials." What the petty bourgeoisie hopes to accomplish is simply (to use Gaitán's famous formula) "that the rich be made less rich so that the poor might be less poor."¹

Gaitán was killed by the Colombian oligarchy, and all he bequeathed to us is a glorious legend. Yet what the New Force models itself upon are not Gaitán's utopias, but the Social Democracy of Mollet and Mitterrand in France and of Willy Brandt in Germany.

The Civil Code takes for granted the good faith of the citizenry. If we were to proceed from that premise, we would have to conclude that the "Essentials" we are discussing is purely and simply a fantasy conjured up by petty-bourgeois characters who still believe that capitalist society can be reformed by eliminating its worst features, the oligarchies and imperialism (although one can't imagine how, since they expect to return to them in cash everything they take away), and retaining its lesser evils, the small and medium businessmen.

1. Jorge Eliecer Gaitán led a left-leaning faction within Colombia's Liberal party during the 1940s. He attracted a tremendous mass following, and his assassination in April 1948 touched off a wave of violent demonstrations in Bogota and a sporadic but bloody civil war throughout the rest of the country. — IP

A New Force That Has a Past

But premises can be challenged when there is evidence to the contrary. The New Force is not so new—it dates back to 1928. How is it that politicians like Jovito Villalba and Luis Beltrán Prieto, who have always been liberals, became socialists overnight? When did the leaders of URD and MEP break their ties to the oligarchy and to imperialism? These ties are not so firm as those linking the latter to COPEI and Acción Democrática. But then again, those two parties were not so solidly committed to oligarchical and imperialist interests before they gained power.

Let us leave aside the treatment these "socialists" of today meted out to the left in earlier days. We are more interested in their current and previous policies towards the right. Anyway, Prieto wouldn't want us to remind him that he participated in the repression and anti-Communist campaign waged against the parliamentary representatives of the PCV and the MIR.² But we mustn't forget that the MEP leadership "held government responsibilities" during its sojourn in AD, and that URD had its own ministers in the Betancourt and Leoni administrations.

What have either of them done in the past to oppose big capital? The "Essentials" of a government program can be written on any old piece of paper to be thrown in the wastebasket on arrival to power. But there is a sheet of paper that cannot be so easily discarded, because on it is written the history of what various political leaders have said and done over the course of four decades.

A program can be cast aside when it is no longer necessary to get what was sought, which is power. But apart from this we have to consider the interval between publication of the program or its draft and the 1973 elections, and to assess the true relations between the authors and those the program singles out as enemies. It is not enough to face the big bourgeoisie and imperialism and wax indignant over their injustices; there are concrete

developments on which one has to take a stand.

Were the MEP, URD, and PCV consistent in opposing the bourgeoisie when they were called upon to take a definite position—either on the side of the workers or the bosses—in the case of the SIDOR strike³? And in the two years remaining before the elections there will be developments on which the New Force will have to demonstrate with deeds the sincerity of its verbal attacks on domestic and foreign big capital.

Old Loves of Old Politicians

The Venezuelan left is presently fragmented, but taken as a whole it could represent a considerable force. If there were a means for uniting it even for election day, we would have a chance for taking power.

It's very easy to take a trip to Chile, another to East Europe, and to give a television salute to socialism when Popular Unity,⁴ not guerrilla warfare, is in vogue as the gateway to a socialist society. But has Dr. Villalba, who is not yet the candidate even if this is his last chance to fulfill his presidential aspirations, given careful consideration to the big difference between the Chilean Popular Unity and the Venezuelan Nationalist Popular Front?

Chile's Socialist and Communist parties are mass working-class parties, while the Venezuelan Communist party (one leg of the tripod erected here), although working-class, has nothing in common with a mass party. The leading forces in our very own popular front are URD and MEP, which are liberal parties, or at best populist ones.

And if we cannot yet speak of socialism in Chile, which has at its disposal those two decisive working-class forces, because the bourgeois state apparatus has not been destroyed—in Venezuela there is not even the remotest hope that the New Force can lead us to the liquidation of capitalism. These speculations, however, are

3. Workers at the Venezuelan state-owned SIDOR metallurgical works conducted a militant strike in the summer of 1971. — *IP*

4. Popular Unity (Unidad Popular — UP) is the class-collaborationist Chilean front that placed Salvador Allende in the presidency in 1970. — *IP*

secondary in Dr. Villalba's calculations. He would like to be an Allende. But if this can't be so, he would be content to be an Alessandri.⁵

Revolutionists Will Not Fall Into the Trap

It is unnecessary to go into the details of the "Essentials," just as it is unnecessary to taste a dish to know it is spoiled. All the measures they propose fit perfectly within the capitalist system of production. No program can be socialist if it does not spell out the transition from capitalism to socialism. And even the bourgeois economists must laugh over the assurance that the "Essentials" program, if put into effect, would do away with unemployment.

The assurance about making Venezuelan citizens safe from assaults and crimes is reminiscent of similar proclamations by Betancourt, Leoni, and Caldera in their respective electoral campaigns. When they criticize the proliferation of the bureaucracy, we are led to suspect that the URD ministers, if they manage to govern once more, will not be content with modest shrubbery but will want an entire bureaucratic forest. This suspicion is borne out by two factors: the "Essentials" foresees more departments and functionaries than now exist, and a party without a following like the URD has no avenue for recruitment other than the lure of public office.

When the draft program implies the probability of reaching socialism by an evolutionary and peaceful path, and when it devotes a paragraph to the armed forces that is revealing in its emptiness, we have to conclude decisively that revolutionary groupings in Venezuela have absolutely nothing in common with the New Force, its leaders, or its programmatic "Essentials."

On television with Prieto and Faria to publicize the draft program, Dr. Villalba said most pertinently that they were seeking to avert a violent revolution. But they will not succeed in this either, even if they win the elections.

We would like, finally, to ask the PCV people what role their party is

2. The Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR — Movement of the Revolutionary Left) was one of the two main groups that engaged in guerrilla war in the early 1960s, along with the PCV. — *IP*

5. Arturo Alessandri Palma was a Chilean Liberal party reformist who served as president from 1920 to 1925 and from 1932 to 1938. — *IP*

playing within the New Force. Not because we consider the PCV to be a revolutionary party (after all, the "Essentials" goes along with the hackneyed Stalinist thesis of revolution by stages), but rather because we consider the PCV to be a working-class party. Or are the members of the Venezuelan Communist party expecting the gentlemen of URD and MEP to come out and defend the workers against the capitalists?

The New Force's programmatic "Essentials" is the most recent pollutant added to the Venezuelan environment. Those who have least faith in this program are its authors. The final fate of the "Essentials" will be that of so many phony programs that have been launched in Venezuela and throughout the world, with one small difference: instead of being carried off by the wind, they will be flushed down the sewer. □

party, and will propagandize for a similar party to build the Black nationalist movement.

A rally during the convention raised more than \$16,000 for the SWP campaign. The rally was broadcast live in Houston and was taped for later broadcasting in New York and Los Angeles.

The convention received extensive coverage in the mass media. Houston's two big newspapers carried at least one article a day, and one printed each day's convention schedule as a "public service."

A local radio featured hourly reports on the proceedings and all three local television stations presented long taped reports and interviews each night.

CBS national news covered the meeting and intends to syndicate its report to networks in Canada, Great Britain, France, and Germany.

A display of press clippings about the SWP electoral campaign covered an entire wall more than forty feet long.

The enthusiasm and optimism of the convention participants was summed up in the statement of YSA national chairman Frank Boehm, who was quoted in the December 29 *New York Times*:

"We don't think the student movement is dead, not at all. We think the campuses are tinderboxes, and when the campuses explode, we plan to be in the leadership of those revolts." □

U.S.A.

Trotskyist Youth Chart Strategy for 1972

Meeting in Houston, Texas, December 28-January 1, the eleventh national convention of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) demonstrated the growing influence of Trotskyism among the radicalizing youth of the United States.

Some 200 delegates, representing sixty YSA locals in thirty states, attended. One of their first acts was to charter a new local in Miami, Florida.

In addition to the delegates, more than 1,000 observers were present, half of whom were not yet members of the YSA. During the course of the convention, sixty applied to join.

This convention was the first the YSA has held in the Deep South. Houston was chosen as the site to demonstrate the organization's refusal to be intimidated by a series of attacks on left groups and individuals that have occurred there.

Nearly one-fourth of the delegates and observers were from Texas. They and representatives of locals in Knoxville and Nashville, Tennessee; Atlanta, Georgia; and Tampa, Tallahassee, and Gainesville, Florida, demonstrated that the South — the most conservative region of the country — is by no means immune to the radicalization.

Resolutions adopted by the convention outlined the YSA's work in the mass movements for social change during the next year. Major efforts will go into the antiwar movement, the feminist movement, the struggles of oppressed nationalities, and the election campaign.

The convention gave its support to the mass antiwar demonstrations


April 22 called by the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC).

"The key to our approach to the antiwar movement," the resolution stated, "and to all other movements for social change, is mass action independent of the ruling class. . . . we rely on the power of the masses of American people mobilized around democratic and transitional demands to change things, not on the good will or promises of liberal politicians or anybody else."

A major task set for the YSA in the women's liberation movement was to continue helping to build the national campaign, organized by the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), for the repeal of all laws restricting the right of abortion. The resolution noted that the feminist movement has already made a major impact, including one on sectors of the labor bureaucracy, as evidenced by the official positions of a number of unions calling for the repeal of antiabortion laws.

The delegates voted to organize support groups for the Socialist Workers party (SWP) candidates in the elections this year. The SWP is running Linda Jenness and Andrew Pulley for president and vice president respectively. In most states the main problem is to get on the ballot. A committee called Young Socialists for Jenness and Pulley has been set up to centralize this work. The group will also arrange debates and distribute campaign literature.

The YSA will also support campaigns of the Chicano independent political organization, La Raza Unida



COPIES MISSING?

Keep your files of Intercontinental Press complete and up-to-date. Missing issues for the current year may be ordered by sending 50c per copy. Write for information about previous years.

Intercontinental Press
P.O. Box 116
Village P.O. Station
New York, N. Y. 10014

REVIEWS

Another Volume of Trotsky's Writings

Writings of Leon Trotsky [1934-35] edited by George Breitman and Bev Scott. Pathfinder Press, New York, N. Y. 364 pp. \$3.45, £1.43. 1971.

Trotsky's second year of exile in France was a period of abrupt shifts on the international political scene. It included the assassination of Sergei Kirov in Leningrad, used by Stalin as a pretext for the purge of all potential opposition within the Communist party; the turn by the Stalinists from "third period" ultraleftism to "popular front" alliances with bourgeois parties; the assassination of Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss by pro-German fascists in a bid for power; and Mussolini's preparations for the invasion of Ethiopia.

Hounded by French Stalinists and fascists, ordered deported from France but remaining there because no other country would admit him, Trotsky was nevertheless able to analyze developing events and provide guidance for the forces attempting to construct a new revolutionary international.

A large portion of the writings in this volume are devoted to France and the French Socialist party, which, like many parties of the Second International, was developing a left wing under the impact of increasing struggles by the working class and the threat of fascism.

Determined to win this left wing to revolutionary Marxism, the French Trotskyists initiated what became known as the "French turn." They entered the Socialist party to fight within it for adherents to their program. In arguing for entry into the Socialist party, Trotsky provided still-timely distinctions between ideological intransigence and organizational sectarianism.

"Not the slightest reconciliation with Social Democracy as a system of ideas and actions is possible for us," he wrote. "But this system of ideas is represented in different ways in living bodies. In certain circumstances they begin to fall apart. The system as such collapses. It is replaced by a

struggle of different tendencies, and this struggle can create a situation that demands our immediate and direct intervention and even organizational entry into the Socialist Party."

Concerning the opponents of entry, Trotsky observed: ". . . they repeat the same general talk about 'independence.' For them the fundamental thing seems to be to remain independent of the working class, the masses, the changes in the state of affairs, of the whole reality. These comrades substitute a monologue for actual political work among the masses. . . ."

Of equal interest is Trotsky's initial analysis of the Kirov assassination and the opening of the infamous Moscow purge trials. Trotsky demonstrated that the trials of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and other old Bolsheviks were

an inevitable corollary to Stalin's right turn in foreign policy following the adventures of the "third period."

This turn produced sharp debate over the nature of the Soviet Union and the Stalinized Communist party. Trotsky took up the question once again, drawing on the analogy of Thermidor and Bonapartism in the French bourgeois revolution. Of special interest are his precisions on the parallels to be drawn from a class point of view and how these had led to his making more exact use of the analogy.

This volume, the fifth in Pathfinder's series that will eventually include all of Trotsky's work not otherwise available in English, contains many articles translated into English for the first time. In addition, it is more readable than earlier volumes, having been entirely reset to eliminate typographical errors, inconsistent spellings, etc. The editors have provided extensive footnotes giving bibliographical information and explaining references that time has made obscure.

— David Burton

How the Antiwar University Was Born

May 1970: Birth of the Antiwar University. Pathfinder Press, New York, N. Y. 62 pp. \$1.05, £0.44. 1971.

May 1970 saw the largest student strike in U. S. history. Student opposition to Nixon's invasion of Cambodia, already greatly in evidence on May 1, the day after the attack, exploded across the country when four students were shot down by Ohio national guardsmen at Kent State University on May 4. Within the next several days, more than half the campuses in the United States saw some form of protest, and at least one-fifth of them were shut down by strikes. In many cases students occupied campus facilities and utilized printing presses, phones, mimeograph machines, etc., to organize other sectors of the population in antiwar struggle.

Information sources available to activists were severely limited by the rapid pace of events and the reluctance of the capitalist media to print the truth. That vacuum was partially filled by *The Militant*, the only na-

tionally circulated revolutionary newspaper consistently supporting the antiwar movement.

Excerpts of that coverage have now been reproduced in pamphlet form. Eyewitness accounts of the Kent State massacre, the strike actions at several of the country's largest universities, the 100,000-strong May 9 march on Washington, and the beginnings of active trade-union support of the antiwar movement give a flavor of the scope, pace, and political searching that characterized the May events.

Analyses by leading members of the Socialist Workers party, the Young Socialist Alliance, and the Student Mobilization Committee (the only radical organizations not disoriented and isolated by the strikes) round out the pamphlet.

May 1970: Birth of the Antiwar University is, as YSA chairman Frank Boehm notes in his introduction, "required reading for today's generation of revolutionists."

— Jon Rothschild

MIR Call for Unity Against the Reactionary Offensive

[The following speech was given by Miguel Enríquez, general secretary of the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left), in Cautín, Chile, on November 1. Enríquez was one of a delegation from the MIR who came to pay tribute to the murdered peasant leader Moisés Huentelaf.¹ The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Peasant compañeros of Cautín and all Chile.

Compañeros of the Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario and the Frente de Trabajadores Revolucionarios [Revolutionary Workers Front].

Compañeros of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria.

Compañeros:

In the name of the national leadership of the MIR, we have come to pay tribute to Moisés Huentelaf—a peasant, a member of the Mapuche tribe, a revolutionist, and a member of our movement, who was murdered Friday, October 22, on the Chesque ranch by reactionary landlords.

The way Moisés Huentelaf met his death sums up much of the contradictory and confused character of the period through which our country is passing.

As is happening throughout rural Chile, the poor and landless peasants here have organized to win for themselves what the law has denied them—the land. Exploited for decades, shut out from the benefits of society, disarmed, united only by their poverty and determination, these peasants seized a ranch where the land was not being used.

The owners of the ranch, who had enriched themselves by exploiting the peasants and who enjoyed wealth and privilege, who let the land lie idle in order to create hunger in Chile, opposed this take-over. Well armed and organized, they attacked, shot, wounded, and murdered peasants with impunity. This is the way the right of some to wealth is defended and others are condemned to poverty.

The peasants were ousted. Moisés Huentelaf was murdered. Other peasants were wounded.

It was an episode in the struggle between the holders of wealth and power on one hand and the workers on the other, as this struggle is taking form today in Chile.

But this was not all. Three policemen helped the landlords drive out the peasants. The governor of Loncoche was called three times and asked to intervene. But he turned his back, letting the landlords keep up a barrage of gunfire against the peasants for three hours. However, the incident did not end there.

That night, when a peasant was murdered by the landlords, the authorities took action—not against the landlords but against the peasants. The police came after the peasants on the roads, into their huts. Dozens of them were arrested. At least one was tortured. Peasants' homes were raided in search of guns, which had not been used to kill anyone. The wives and children of peasants were beaten.

A peasant has been murdered by the landlords. And the reactionary press is telling the country that the peasants are guerrillas, that they are unleashing a reign of terror in the countryside, that they are armed.

A peasant has been killed by the landlords, and hours after his death the minister of the interior took the occasion to condemn the seizing of ranches by the peasants.

The death of Moisés Huentelaf, his murder on the Chesque ranch, gives us the quintessence of what is happening today in Chile, more clearly than hundreds of treatises on political theory. Today in Chile the workers are fighting for their interests. The ruling class is defending its wealth and power by fire and the sword. The institutions of the capitalist state apparatus, the law and the courts, are playing their historic role of defending the interests of the bosses against the workers. The Unidad Popular [People's Unity] government, which was elected by the peasants and workers of the entire country, is permitting the more conciliatory sections of the coalition to make concessions to the bosses.

This is how Moisés Huentelaf, a peasant, a Mapuche, and a revolutionist, lost his life. He was twenty-four years old and had been active in the MIR for three years. He left a wife and two children. He had land; he had won it shortly before. But he had dedicated his life to struggling to win the land for all the workers and to fighting the landlords.

The name of Moisés Huentelaf, hero of the peasant struggle, has been added to the names of those murdered in La Coruña, San Gregorio, Ranquil and Lonquimay, El Salvador and Puerto Montt.

This is the way peasants lose their lives today in Chile. The circumstances of Huentelaf's death sum up the confusion and contradictoriness of the period through which we are passing.

The best tribute we can pay to him is to use his death to explain to the peasants and to the people what is happening in Chile today, the nature of this process full of advances and retreats.

We will do this not by setting ourselves up as judges, not as observers standing outside the process, but as part of it, dependent as we are on its results and fate.

We will explain the process in the only way we can to the people, to the only judges, the workers and peasants. We will do so hiding nothing, exposing the reactionary policy of the ruling classes, hailing the gains that

1. For a full account of this crime, see "Huentelaf—Chilean Peasant Militant," *Intercontinental Press*, December 6, p. 1079. —IP

the government and the workers have achieved, but at the same time criticizing this government's errors, weaknesses, and concessions. We understand that this is the only way the advance of the workers and the left forces can be strengthened.

The Bolivian experience is too close to us. The price of errors is too high. And the left and the mass movement is not so weak that it cannot stand revolutionary criticism. Rather it is strengthened by such criticism. We make no mistake about who our enemies are; let those who do not like ideological debate among the people make no such mistake either.

Since this period began, we have said that the rise to power of the Unidad Popular was a positive development, because this movement incorporated large sectors of the masses struggling for socialism, because it opened up great opportunities for organizing and mobilizing the workers, and because it drew a clear line between the two great camps—the owners of the copper mines, the factories, and the ranches on one side; and the workers, on the other.

From the start, we said that many difficulties would arise in the path of the new government. We said that great obstacles were blocking the advance of the workers—among the fundamental ones, the economic, political, and military power of the ruling class, the laws created by the bosses, the reactionary parliament, and class justice.

From the start we pointed out that the workers and the government could only move forward by using the two great levers that would give them force—uniting the entire people and the left and mobilizing the masses on the basis of their demands against the bosses. From this position, we said, the working class and the government could accumulate the strength necessary to take real power in the country.

We thought this from the start, and today after a year of the Unidad Popular government, we still think basically the same thing.

On the one hand, the Unidad Popular government has nationalized the copper mines and almost all the banks. It has taken control of some industries. It has expropriated about a third of the ranches of over eighty hectares [one hectare equals 2.47 acres] of arable land. It has redistributed the national income in favor of the poorer strata of the population. It has begun to cut unemployment significantly. This is positive, this is what the workers in the countryside and the cities are supporting.

At the same time, it is these measures the Americans are opposing when they make aggressive statements against Chile, when they cut off all credits, and when they threaten Chile with sanctions. Faced with these measures by the government, the landlords are sabotaging agricultural production, trying to create scarcity. The industrialists are failing to increase production sufficiently. The Cámara Chilena de la Construcción [Chilean Construction Industry Association] is sabotaging the housing plans. The Partido Demócratacristiano [Christian Democratic party] and the Partido Nacional [National party] are attacking and conspiring against the government; they are arming and conspiring against the people.

All this is the form taken by the exploiters' struggle to defend their power and wealth against the advance of the workers; and this is how the people see it.

But not everything is so clear to the workers. There

are some acts and measures of the government that confuse them, that disconcert them, that they do not understand, that no one explains to them, and that only a few try to justify.

In the rural areas of Chile the police are being ordered to evict and repress peasants fighting for the land. In Santiago the students have been beaten when they protest against the aggressions of the North American government. The ill-housed people of the Campamento Nueva Habana [New Havana Camp] are repressed when they protest against the sabotage by the Cámara Chilena de la Construcción and the Contraloría's bureaucratic stalling.

In Concepción, an official ordered the police to evict a group of students and gave the go-ahead for repressing students and ill-housed people in the streets. In Arica, repression was used against the students protesting the visit to our country of the American navy, which massacres peasants in Vietnam. In Loncoche, the governor let an armed group of landlords fire on peasants for more than three hours.

These are the measures and attitudes that the people do not understand and that they reject. These are the contradictions of the period that we want to explain today to the workers of all Chile, and we can only do this if we take the process from the start.

The long struggle and the strength of the workers brought the Unidad Popular to power. The workers placed their confidence in this movement and accepted its leadership.

The government started off by taking some economic measures that opened up a breach in the areas of the big copper mines, banking, and industry. In this area there is obviously a long and difficult way to go. That is, the government must eradicate American investment in industry, redistribute credit effectively, make all of big industry the property of all the people, and so forth.

The government's agrarian policy was not so clear and, given the greater intensity of the peasant struggles, the consequences of the measures taken were graver. At the start the government accepted the Christian Democratic agrarian reform and did not introduce any other bill. Limiting its interventions in this area, the government could offer nothing more than the expropriation of holdings with more than eighty hectares of arable land, although smaller-scale ranches are big estates. In this way, the government found itself compelled to grant the reserve lands to the ranch-owners, to compensate owners for expropriations, and to set up an elaborate technical and bureaucratic procedure that peasants had to go through before they could get land. The situation was aggravated when the government limited its expropriations to 1,300 ranches having more than eighty hectares of arable land, when the total number of such ranches is 3,800.

This led the government into grave conflicts with the peasant movement, forcing the latter, despite the government's policy, to explore every avenue in order to find ways of maintaining their advance. Thus, a peasant mobilization developed, first in the south of Chile and later in the central part of the country. The government tried to resolve this contradiction by mounting a political and ideological campaign denouncing the ways the rural workers took to advance their struggle. Next, the government

resorted to making repressive attacks on peasant mobilizations, attacks which are becoming more and more frequent.

On the other hand, the landlords—some of whom had their property expropriated or were threatened with expropriation, but most of whom remained untouched—were allowed to sabotage agriculture to their hearts' content and take their estates out of production. In this way, they were able to create a scarcity of certain foodstuffs.

As a result of the government's weak policy in the agrarian sector and its failure to assume the leadership of the rising peasant movement, the peasants were forced to take matters into their own hands. Denied legal channels for their struggle, they had to resort to extralegal types of mobilization, including the seizures of ranches, which we have led. *The MIR did not invent the class struggle in the countryside. We have simply organized and led the only possible types of peasant mobilizations given the conditions imposed by the government's agrarian policy.*

However, with the exception of the agrarian sector, the source of the contradictions we are faced with in this period does not lie in the area of economic measures.

While the Unidad Popular has been taking economic steps opening up a way forward, it has not involved the masses in this in an adequate way or to a sufficient extent. Still worse, at times the Unidad Popular has done things directly opposed to the feelings of the workers, such as reinstating the saboteurs at Sumar who had been expelled by the people working in the plant, or firing the regional head of CORA [Corporación de Reforma Agraria—Agrarian Reform Corporation] in Linares, Gabriel Coll, a measure that was resisted by the peasants and the entire left in that area.

Nor has the Unidad Popular mobilized the workers behind their demands and against the bosses. To the contrary, after failing to mobilize them, it proceeded later on to carry out repressive operations against some actions by the workers. While it is true that the Unidad Popular has developed some forms of mobilizing the masses and involving them, these mobilizations have been either limited, or for objectives far removed from the concrete interests of the masses, or else remote from their present level of consciousness.

By proceeding in this way, the Unidad Popular government has not won the mass backing that it should have gotten from some of its measures. Thus, the government has not had enough strength to attack, transform, or replace institutions that we all once recognized as standing in the way of the process—the capitalist legal codes, the parliament with its Christian Democratic and National party majority, and class justice.

Since the government has not had the strength to attack these institutions, it has had many times to accept their dictates. Thus, by amending the law nationalizing the copper mines, the Christian Democratic and National majority forced Chile to pay the debts of the American companies, which amount to around \$700,000,000. Thus, the rule of class justice has left most of Schneider's² murderers unpunished, while peasants and students are jailed when they fight for their interests.

The legal system, the law of the bosses, is the worst enemy of the workers' advance, and the process has often been obstructed by it. It is these laws of the capitalists, like the Christian Democratic agrarian reform law, that are keeping the peasants from winning the land. It is capitalist legality through the Contraloría that is obstructing a rapid increase in the sector of industry owned by the entire people. It is this capitalist legality that, by favoring the builders in the Cámara Chilena de la Construcción, is making it difficult for the people to get housing. And finally it is this capitalist law that is now being used against the student movement today in the Chilean universities.

Thus, although the Unidad Popular government has struck at the interests of the ruling class, although it has begun to take positive steps in the economic field in general and to a much more limited extent in the agrarian sector, it has not gained strength and has been growing continually weaker. This is because it has not involved the masses in the process and has not attacked the state apparatus and its institutions. It is such mass involvement and such an assault on the state apparatus that establishes the revolutionary character of a process and makes it irreversible, if carried through all the way.

But by weakening itself, the government did not diminish the aggressiveness of the ruling class, whose interests have suffered or been threatened. This group stepped up its attack on the government and the workers. In this situation, the way was opened up for the government to make concessions to the pressures of those who hold the wealth and power.

However, at the same time, there are sectors and attitudes in the Unidad Popular government that open a way for the workers to move forward. The economic measures that we have described as positive are a result of this, as well as the stand recently taken for not paying compensation for the nationalized copper mines, a stand urged fundamentally by the Socialist party comrades. Another positive development is the government's decree pressing its take-over of the textile industry. The government also handled the landlords the right way at the opening of the FISA [a trade fair run by big business that was snubbed by Allende]. The workers are supporting and backing up these sectors and these attitudes of the government.

But it is not just such sectors and attitudes in the government that are moving the workers forward. The fundamental thing is that, although they have not been mobilized en masse by the government, the workers themselves, in the countryside and in the cities, are fighting harder than ever for their interests and against the bosses.

Never has there been a greater mobilization of the peasants in Chile. The struggle for the land is spreading like a dye through the southern and central parts of the country. Mapuche peasants, small farmers and landless peasants, agricultural workers and rural unemployed are organizing, mobilizing, and confronting the ranchers in their struggle to win the land.

In the cities, the workers in small, middle, and big industry; the unemployed; the ill-housed; and the students are also struggling for their interests and their demands and to support the advance of the workers.

Compañeros:

This is what has been happening in Chile. The coun-

2. The head of the Chilean army assassinated by right-wingers shortly before Allende was inaugurated president of Chile.—IP

try is divided today into two great camps. On one side are the workers; on the other, the bosses.

Every day, on every ranch, in every factory, in the countryside and the cities of Chile, a battle is being waged between the bosses and the workers, an implacable struggle between the exploited and the exploiters.

The bosses, those who own the ranches and the factories, the same men who a year ago were trembling at the advance of the workers, who could see just yesterday that the people were going to take back everything that belongs to them, these bosses are beginning to raise their heads again today. They are taking back the initiative and opening up a reactionary counteroffensive on all levels. They are moving about in armed groups through the countryside, evicting and murdering peasants. Their press is throwing insults. They are brazenly plotting. Entrenched in the parliament, hidden behind the banners of law and order, they are striking blows at the workers, advancing and retaking some positions. They are even succeeding in confusing some sectors of the popular masses.

From these positions, the possessing classes are striving to wear out the government's credit with the masses. And this tactic is promoted when they discover that their legalistic outcry and their press campaigns get concessions from the more vacillating sectors of the government. In this way, the bosses are trying to create grave conflicts between the government and the mass movement in order to undermine the regime's social base, to divide the masses, and from there move on to an attempt to overthrow the government and repress the mass movement.

Thus, those who make concessions believing that in this way they can quiet the most strident sectors of the ruling class, are only promoting the tactical moves of the plotters.

At the same time, the workers in the countryside and the cities are fighting daily for their interests and against the bosses. There has never been a greater mobilization of the peasants, workers, and ill-housed. Throughout the country the workers are seizing the land from the latifundistas, the workers are fighting in their factories, and the ill-housed people are battling against the Cámara Chilena de la Construcción and the legalistic and bureaucratic obstructions blocking their advance. But while the bosses are managing to unite and move onto the offensive, the workers do not always demonstrate the same decisiveness and unity. The contradictions of the period, the concessions made by others, the attacks of the bosses sometimes disconcert them.

The power and determination of the workers brought the Unidad Popular to power, forced its installation by overcoming the reactionary maneuvers, defended it and blocked repeated subversive plots against it. The workers even toned down their struggles and subordinated them when they were asked to.

The people gave full confidence to the Unidad Popular and followed its lead. They believed that in winning the government they were winning an instrument that would aid them in their struggle for their interests and against their enemies. Despite the positive measures of this government—despite the gains the Unidad Popular has made—the weakness and concessions of some sectors in it and their tendency to want to become arbiters in the class struggle have left the workers no other road than to take

back a portion of the confidence they had placed in the government. Supporting the regime's positive measures and combating its concessions, the workers must now chart their own course.

The workers are beginning to take back the initiative. They are starting an offensive on all fronts. They have stopped waiting for others to solve their problems. Acting on their own, they are fighting directly for their interests and using all forms of struggle.

In the struggle of the workers, in the power of their mobilizations, a great irresistible force is developing that nothing and nobody can stop, which is the only guarantee of a revolutionary and socialist course in Chile.

This is the fundamental task of the period. It is the duty of all the left and of the government to promote and press these mobilizations forward. This is the only way of defeating the ruling classes, of solving the problems of the workers, of leading the workers and peasants forward, of resolving the contradictions of the period. This is the only way of combating the vacillating tendencies in the government and reinforcing the more radicalized ones. This is the best way also to defend the stability of the government. It is through these mobilizations that the workers gain consciousness and organization, which are later translated into power.

Through the Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario, the Frente de Trabajadores Revolucionarios, the revolutionary organizations of the ill-housed, and the Frente de Estudiantes Revolucionarios [Revolutionary Student Front], we in the MIR will work to promote and lead these forms of mass mobilization.

By achieving this task, the workers will gain the necessary strength, the sufficient consciousness and organization to move on to tasks raising the question of power—that is, uniting all sectors of the people in the struggle against the common enemy of all strata of workers, the law of the bosses.

The workers, peasants, ill-housed, and the students realize, and they understand this more and more clearly, that what is blocking their advance on all levels is the legal setup created by the bosses. A primary task is to evict the parliament, to put an end to the Christian Democratic and National party majority sniping at the workers from behind the walls of the legislative chambers.

The parliament must be replaced by a People's Assembly representing the workers, peasants, ill-housed, students, and soldiers.

Forms of workers' self-government must be created in the local areas through which the rural and urban workers can assume the tasks of laying the bases of popular and revolutionary power. It will be the job of the peasants to carry forward these tasks at the level of the Consejos Comunales Campesinos [Peasant Communal Councils].

Only in this way can we accumulate enough strength to confront the great task of the period—the conquest of power by the workers.

In order to impel these mobilizations, to combat the legality of the bosses, unity of all sectors of the people is essential. And this requires unity of the major left forces.

The only alternative in Chile today is socialism or fascism. The fate of all of us depends on the outcome of this process. It is impermissible to have to lose control of student federations in Santiago, Temuco, and Nuble just because of the sectarianism of some forces in the

Unidad Popular, which, by blocking left unity, handed victories to the Christian Democrats.

The Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria maintains that although we do not agree with every move the Unidad Popular makes, although we have differences with some aspects of its policy, this does not mean that we have to head for a definitive break with it.

Wouldn't the ruling class like to see the people irrevocably split? Wouldn't *El Mercurio*, *La Prensa*, and *La Tribuna* like to see the left start a fratricidal struggle? Wouldn't the reactionaries like to see the kind of confrontation develop between the revolutionary left and the government that would lead inexorably to the collapse of the process?

The Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria seeks unity of the entire people and the entire left for a definitive

confrontation with the Chilean and foreign ruling classes:

To expropriate all North American investments in Chile!

To win all the big factories for the people!

For workers' control of production in small and medium-sized industry!

To expropriate all the big building companies!

To build a national construction trust!

To make all education in Chile public and to democratize the schools!

To win the right to vote and hold office for noncommissioned officers, privates, and cadets!

To have the Consejos Comunales Campesinos carry out an expropriation of all big landed estates without compensation and without leaving any reserves!

To win power for the workers, to establish a revolutionary workers' and peasants' government! □

The Healyite Position on India-Pakistan War

[The following "statement by the International Committee of the Fourth International," entitled "Defeat imperialist conspiracy against Bangla Desh," was published in the December 6, 1971, issue of *Workers Press*, the organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist Labour League. For further details about the statement, and some comments as to its meaning, see "Healyites in the Camp of Indira Gandhi" by Joseph Hansen which appears on page 6 of this issue.]

* * *

BENGALI resistance to the barbaric Yahya Khan regime and the heritage of imperialist partition in India has entered a decisive stage with the intervention of Indian armed forces.

It is now only a matter of time before the combined forces of the Mukti Bahini and the Indian army crush the Pakistan troops in Bangla Desh and occupy Dacca.

The International Committee of the Fourth International was the only organization to support in a principled manner the right of Bangla Desh to secede from Pakistan.

It now stands unreservedly for the defeat of the hated Pakistan army and the liberation of Bangla Desh—as a prelude to the voluntary and revolutionary unification of India on socialist foundations.

The ICFI supports completely the right of the E Bengali people to solicit the support of capitalist and workers' states in their struggle to eliminate Pakistani oppression.

We critically support the decision of the Indian bourgeois government to give military and economic aid to Bangla Desh. We condemn the attempt of US imperialism to stop the conflict through UN intervention and the threatened cessation of economic aid to India.

US imperialism is determined to utilize the Indo-Pakistan conflict to weaken the

Indian economy, as its decision to cut off arms supplies shows.

It wants to facilitate the unlimited penetration of US finance capital into India and the installation of a more docile regime in New Delhi.

This is part of US imperialism's global strategy to contain and push back the developing anti-imperialist struggles of the SE Asian workers and peasants.

At the same time the ICFI urge Indian and Bengali socialists to place no confidence whatever in the capacity of the Bengali and Hindu bourgeoisie to carry through any of the tasks of the Indian democratic revolution.

Behind Mrs Gandhi stand the Hindu fanatics of Jan Sangh and big-business interests who wish to annexe E Bengal, and take back the profitable jute and tea industries which they lost after partition.

Having co-opted a large proportion of the right-wing Awami League leadership in Calcutta, the Indian bourgeoisie and landlords will—after victory over Pakistan—seek to impose their rule through Awami League collaborators.

At the same time they will try to ruthlessly repress any revolutionary tendencies around the Mukti Bahini as well as preventing any movement towards the revolutionary unification of E and W Bengal.

That is why up to now the Congress movement has refused to recognize the Republic of Bangla Desh.

It also explains its manoeuvres with the National Awami Party of Maulana Bashani, in order to isolate and destroy those groups who are not prepared to subordinate themselves to the economic and strategic aims of the Hindu ruling class.

The ferocious repression of the Naxalites in W Bengal—with the intervention of the Indian government on the side of Mrs Bandaranaike against the Ceylonese rural uprising in April—is convincing

proof of the reactionary nature of the Indian bourgeoisie.

Another and even more fundamental reason for Indian intervention is the deadly fear of the mass uprising which the Pakistani occupation has provoked, and the threat that this uprising will spill over into W Bengal.

The ICFI warn the Bengali workers' and peasants' revolutionaries.

They must organize themselves separately and maintain their political independence from the Awami League bourgeoisie and the Stalinists.

These tendencies seek to undermine their struggle and place them at the mercy of Delhi—in the same way as they previously accepted Rawalpindi rule.

Revolutionaries must combine the national struggle with the fight for an uncompromising redivision of the land in the interests of the poor peasants, the nationalization of industry and the setting-up of a workers' and peasants' government.

The workers and peasants will be compelled to struggle against the plans of the Indian bourgeoisie and will need the support of the working class of India and the rest of the world.

Determined mobilization and action of the masses themselves in Bangla Desh, the building of an alternative revolutionary leadership of the working class; these are the immediate needs of the workers of Bangla Desh.

The ICFI condemns unequivocally the role of Peking and Moscow Stalinism, which have refused to recognize the Bangla Desh Republic and has [sic] betrayed the national aspirations of the Bengali people.

● *Long live the Bangla Desh Revolution!*

● *No compromise with the Hindu capitalists!*

● *Forward to the revolutionary and socialist unification of India!*