



LON NOL: Nixon's man in Pnompenh requires U.S. helicopters, "advisers," "observers," and maybe South Koreans to shore up shaky military position.

U.S. Aircraft, 'Advisers' in Cambodia Invasion

Fidel Castro's Trip to Chile

**Belfast Students Fight
the Special Powers Act**

Mukti Bahini Forces Make New Gains

Mandel Visit to U.S. Awaits Court Ruling

Ernest Mandel, invited to speak at leading Eastern universities in the United States in December, has again been prevented from fulfilling these engagements by the U. S. Justice Department.

The Belgian Marxist scholar requested permission on July 13 to visit the United States from October 13 to December 16. The American consulate in Brussels informed him on August 9 that it was withholding favorable action on his visa application because the government was appealing the lower court decision in his favor to the Supreme Court. "The Embassy has been notified by the authorities in Washington that no action will be taken on your current visa until final judgment has been rendered on this appeal," the consul wrote.

This makes the third time since 1969 that Mandel has been barred from lecturing in the U.S. Constitutional lawyers Leonard Boudin and David Rosenberg, retained by the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee to handle the suit filed by Mandel and eight distinguished American professors, are asking the Supreme Court to grant a temporary visit while the merits of the case are being considered, but there is no assurance that this will be done.

Mandel will therefore be unable to come to the United States until and unless the high court upholds the majority opinion of the lower court. It is uncertain how long it will take the justices to hear the arguments and render their decision on this important civil-liberties case testing the constitutional right to hear.

Meanwhile Mandel is on a speaking tour of Canada. He will be in Hamilton, December 6; Brandon, December 7; Winnipeg, December 8; Saskatoon, December 9; Vancouver, December 10; Montréal, December 11-13; Toronto and southern Ontario, December 14-16. The Canadian tour is sponsored by the Young Socialists-Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes. □

They Wanted to Continue Eating

Federal employees in Washington were pressured into buying tickets for a \$500-a-plate, Republican fund-raising dinner.

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EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Mai-tan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

MANAGING EDITOR: Allen Myers.

COPY EDITOR: Ruth Schein.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Gerry Foley, J.V. Hanley, Jon Rothschild, George Saunders.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

ASSISTANT BUSINESS MANAGER: Steven Warshell.

TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Lawrence Rand.

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PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Gueme-nee, Paris 4, France.

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U.S. Aircraft, 'Advisers' Join Cambodia Invasion

Supported by U.S. aircraft and "advisers," some 25,000 Saigon troops launched another invasion of Cambodia November 22. Although apparently intended to shore up the military position of Lon Nol, the action seemed likely to increase the popular opposition to Richard Nixon's puppet in Pnompenh.

"The possibility of a new South Vietnamese incursion," Reuters reported November 22, "has raised a storm of anger in the Cambodian press and among civilians and officers, who regard the Vietnamese as Cambodia's traditional enemy. . . ."

"Anti-Vietnamese feeling has been mounting recently with regular press accusations of rape and looting by the South Vietnamese Army. The Minister [Koun Wick, Lon Nol's foreign minister] said troops in the field did commit excesses although relations at higher levels were good."

The new invasion came at a time when 20,000 of Lon Nol's troops were virtually surrounded fifty miles to the northeast of Pnompenh, and fighting had extended to the outskirts of the capital itself. U.S. helicopters were involved in the fighting around Pnompenh. A November 17 Associated Press dispatch described attacks by the helicopters "only ten miles from the heart of the capital."

In the Cambodian fighting, Nixon and his puppets are using the same tactics that have devastated South Vietnam. In a November 21 dispatch from Prey Khieu, fifteen miles from Pnompenh, Peter Osnos of the *Washington Post* wrote:

". . . in the villages on the outskirts [of Pnompenh] to the southwest, there is considerable fear. The Communists are massed in the fields and bushes, attracting Cambodian artillery, South Vietnamese bombers and American helicopter gunships."

Osnos went on to give the following account of the destruction of a nearby town:

"Last weekend the Communists seized the railroad station town of Toul Leap, about three miles from here, wiping out a whole Cambodian battalion in the process. The bomb-

ers and gunships went to work and the enemy has been run out. But there is no more town."

The new invasion brought the total of Saigon troops in Cambodia to nearly 30,000. Despite attempts by the U.S. military command to deny the obvious, it was clear that American aircraft and "advisers" were heavily involved in the offensive. Craig R. Whitney reported in the November 25 *New York Times*:

"Both American and the South Vietnamese military spokesmen said that the troops were being taken into Cambodia in South Vietnamese helicopters. Reports from observers in the field, however, disputed this, and scores of American trooplift helicopters were seen carrying the South Vietnamese from their bases in the rear toward the area of operation inside Cambodia."

"American ground troops or military advisers have been prohibited by act of Congress from operating in Cambodia, but the Administration has interpreted the strictures as permitting continued air support of South Vietnamese operations."

"A communiqué from the American command in Saigon said yesterday, as it has said for most of the past months, that on Wednesday [November 24] United States aircraft, including United States Air Force B-52's, continued air operations against enemy forces and their lines of supply and communications in Cambodia."

Nixon is also "interpreting" the Congressional ban on U.S. troops in Cambodia as permitting — U.S. troops in Cambodia. The *New York Times* reported November 24:

"While United States military advisers are not permitted to cross over into Cambodia, the United States did have some observers at Krek for the current campaign, The Associated Press reported."

A day earlier, Fox Butterfield of the *Times* described the attempts of Saigon's officers and their observer-advisers to conceal the extent of U.S. involvement in the invasion:

"South Vietnamese officers refused

to allow newsmen into the forward headquarters of Military Region III or the headquarters of the 25th Division in Tay Ninh, from which the operation into Cambodia is being directed.

"All requests by newsmen for transportation to the scene of the operation were also denied, and American advisers with the South Vietnamese troops refused to comment on the campaign."

The shaky position of Lon Nol has caused the Nixon administration to begin floating trial balloons about even deeper U.S. involvement in Cambodia. One of these balloons popped up in the November 27 *New York Times*, in a dispatch from Pnompenh written by Iver Peterson.

"Last winter," Peterson wrote, "when the new American mission was still in temporary quarters and antiwar Congressmen in Washington were warning against enlarging America's commitment in Indochina, the talk in official circles here was about 'not repeating the mistakes we made in Vietnam' by jumping in too fast with too much, and about the strictly limited nature of America's interest in Cambodia. . . ."

"In recent conversations here, however, some officials have begun to cite a commonly held Cambodian view that the invasion of the Communists' Cambodian border sanctuaries by the United States and the South Vietnamese armies in May 1970 precipitated the Cambodian war, and that the United States must share the responsibility of seeing Cambodia through it."

Among the expanded activities being suggested, Peterson wrote, is "inspection" in the field of weapons delivered to Lon Nol. Another, apparently rejected for the time being, involved the use of still another puppet army:

"The United States military and the Cambodian Army's chief of staff last summer explored the possibility of bringing in South Korean advisers for Cambodian troops in the field, but dropped the idea when the language problem became apparent and when the Koreans asked for too much

money in subsistence allowances."

Nixon's new escalation of the Indo-China war came at a time when the largest antiwar coalition in the U.S., the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), was preparing its December

3-5 convention in Cleveland, Ohio. The actions to be decided on at that meeting can provide the movement with a focus for mobilizing massive numbers in the streets against Nixon's continued aggression. □

Indians, Pakistanis in Border Clashes

Mukti Bahini Forces Make New Gains

By Jon Rothschild

"When the Pakistanis started creating trouble on the borders, I told my generals to take action. When it became worse, I told them to cross the borders to silence the guns. Now they've been told that if it becomes necessary, they can advance as many miles into Pakistani territory as the range of the Pakistani guns."

Indian Foreign Minister Jagjivan Ram, speaking to a Calcutta rally of 50,000 on November 28, thus provided the first public announcement that official Indian policy on the Pakistan border conflict had changed. The escalation in the war of words (other speakers at the rally spoke of the army's determination to "break Pakistan into pieces") followed the most intense week of fighting to date along the India-East Bengal border.

India acknowledged November 24 that its troops had crossed the frontier on November 21, but insisted that the incursion was an isolated incident directed against a particular Pakistan army artillery encampment. Since then, two similar incursions have been announced.

But Ram's speech would suggest that border crossings will now become the rule. The maximum range of Pakistan's artillery is estimated to be about fifteen miles. If this is the figure Ram intended as a guide (he was deliberately vague), the towns of Comilla, Jessore, and Dinajpur, three of East Bengal's largest cities and already scenes of heavy fighting between the Bengali Mukti Bahini (Liberation Forces) and Yahya's occupation army, would be within the Indian army's recognized field of operations. Sylhet, a major city in northeast Bangla Desh, would be only four miles out of range. (The cross-hatched area of the map indicates the fifteen-mile limit.)

The new escalation in the fighting began on November 21. On that day, according to Pakistani army officers, a major Indian offensive was launched on four fronts. The concentration point was Jessore, only about sixty miles northeast of Calcutta. The



INDIRA GANDHI

other thrusts were in the areas of Sylhet, Comilla, and the Chittagong hills near the Burmese border.

It appears that there was intensive combat in these areas, but the Pakistani estimate of the number of Indian troops involved was almost certainly a serious exaggeration. Yahya's military commanders claimed that twelve

divisions of Indians had invaded, including at least two tank regiments and an undisclosed number of warplanes. The regular troops, they said, were backed up by thirty-eight battalions of border security forces.

An Indian division usually comprises about 30,000 soldiers. It is doubtful that the 70,000 to 80,000 Pakistani troops in Bangla Desh could have repelled an attack of more than 300,000 Indian soldiers.

According to the Indian government, the major fighting was being conducted by the Mukti Bahini. One Mukti Bahini commander, Major Jill-Ed, said November 22 that a Mukti Bahini force of between 8,000 to 12,000 was encircling Jessore. He denied that Indian soldiers were involved. *New York Times* correspondent Sydney Schanberg wrote in the November 23 issue that "there were indications that the Bengali forces fighting for the independence of East Pakistan were pushing Pakistani troops back for the first time" since the March invasion.

On November 23 Yahya declared a state of emergency in Pakistan, a move that seemed largely a diplomatic ploy, since his spokesmen could not explain what additional powers the declaration would grant to an army that is already the sole ruling power in the country.

On November 24, apparently the day the most serious fighting occurred, Pakistan called up its reserves. Indian officers at the border town of Bagda (near Jessore) conceded that their forces had penetrated to within a few miles of Jessore, but denied that they had any intention of taking the city.

By the end of the day, Indian troops had occupied pieces of East Bengal near Jessore and Sylhet. At the same time, Pakistan charged that a new Indian offensive had been launched in the Dinajpur district.

The following day, Pakistan claimed that another Indian attack, this time involving two battalions southeast of Comilla, had seized some territory in eastern Bangla Desh.

By November 27 Pakistan claimed that full-scale fighting was under way on five fronts—Jessore, Dinajpur, Sylhet, Comilla, and the Chittagong hills. In all these areas except Dinajpur, Indian forces were said to be in control of previously Pakistani-held territory.

According to the November 27 *New York Times*, spirits were high in the



The New York Times

Bengali refugee camps. The Mukti Bahini had apparently surrounded Jessore, and some refugees had already begun returning to their homes. Most, however, would not move until Jessore itself was taken. Although the Mukti Bahini control most of the territory around the city, it is doubtful that they could actually take it unless they received Indian artillery support. The fact that such aid was not forthcoming indicated that Yahya had again overstated the real extent of Indian involvement.

Yahya's butchers are notorious for bravado. An example was provided by A. A. K. Niazi, who is killer-in-charge of the occupation army. In a November 26 Dacca news conference he said that the Indians "threw everything against me [!] and they failed." He claimed that at least 300 Indians had been killed at Comilla and said that he could display as many dead Indian bodies near Sylhet. Twenty tanks, he said, had been knocked out at Jessore.

But Niazi produced no destroyed tanks and no bodies (or even photographs) of Indian soldiers. Yahya, he said, has nothing to worry about: "The Pakistani soldier is second to none. We have never lost. Look in the history books. I challenge you to find in history anything but our victories. We have never lost, and the Indians have never won. I can easily take them on three to one."

One day later, Niazi claimed that 1,000 Indians and only 30 Pakistanis had been killed in a week of what he called "total war."

A ban on foreign newsmen in the border areas makes information on the real military situation difficult to come by. But some journalists have

succeeded in getting to Indian border towns, and this, combined with information from the Mukti Bahini, provides at least the broad outlines.

Yahya's assertion, made first on November 22 and restated on several occasions since then, that India had embarked on all-out war is almost certainly false. It appears that India is successfully carrying out its semi-officially stated objective: to give military support to offensives of the Mukti Bahini, gradually capturing enough land in East Bengal to return the refugees and establish an independent East Bengal under Indian tutelage. The decision to escalate to total war is thus left to Yahya.

The offensive that began November 21 seems to have been initiated by the Mukti Bahini, and not the Indian army.

If General Niazi's rhetoric and casualty statistics sound like Westmoreland's and Abrams's, it is because his army is facing the same sort of enemy as the U. S. troops in Indochina: the entire population of the occupied country. In the November 20 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* Dacca correspondent Werner Adam quoted an "American diplomat" in that city as saying that East Bengal looks "exactly like Vietnam." The difference, according to Adam, is that popular support for the Mukti Bahini even exceeds that for the Vietnam National Liberation Front.

In its training and organization, its effective control of the countryside, and its ability to penetrate the major cities, the Mukti Bahini have attained in several months a level of activity that took the Vietnamese several years to achieve. The major problem for the Bengalis today, according to a BBC

film crew that toured liberated zones in Bangla Desh, is lack of arms, a fact demonstrating that Indian aid has taken the form of use of its own troops rather than massive material assistance to the guerrillas.

The military clashes of the week of November 21 to 28 clearly weakened Yahya's position. If one of the major cities were taken by the Mukti Bahini, the proclamation of a Bangla Desh government centered in East Bengal would almost certainly follow. In that event Yahya, who considers the Mukti Bahini an adjunct of the Indian army, might well declare war.

In East Bengal, according to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Yahya's army is suffering from serious morale problems. When his troops invaded Bangla Desh in March, they expected to stay only several weeks. This increases the likelihood that an eruption of all-out war would be accompanied by a Pakistani attack along the India-West Pakistan border, where Yahya's position is stronger.

On November 22 the Bangla Desh government-in-exile in Calcutta dropped out of sight. "Unconfirmed but widely believed reports indicate that the Cabinet flew to New Delhi" to confer with Indira Gandhi's government, according to Sydney Schanberg.

Gandhi is scheduled to address a rally in Calcutta on December 4.

Although she rarely announces major shifts in policy at such gatherings, there is increasing speculation in Calcutta that she may officially recognize the Bangla Desh government at that time. But whether she does or not, new escalations in the border conflict are almost certain. □

Campuses in U.S. Remain Explosive

A 177-page report on the student protest that followed Nixon's 1970 invasion of Cambodia, prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, has concluded that the "tinder of discontent on the campus remains dry."

All that is needed to set the tinder aflame is "a calculated governmental action, or more tragically, an unintended consequence of an action."

The study, called "May 1970: The Campus Aftermath of Cambodia and

Kent State," said that any new outbreak of similar student actions could "escalate into a conflict that could leave both university and society in extremely serious disarray."

The report found that one-fourth of the country's colleges canceled some classes during May and June 1970, while one-fifth closed down completely for at least one day. Fifty-seven percent experienced some form of protest. □

A War Between Pakistan and India?

By Tariq Ali

[The following is an advance copy of an article scheduled to appear in a coming issue of *The Red Mole*, a revolutionary-socialist newspaper published in London.]

* * *

Ever since General Yahya Khan's armies invaded Eastern Bengal in March 1971, *The Red Mole* has constantly and consistently argued that the shortsightedness of the West Pakistani oligarchy had opened up the road to the liberation of the entire subcontinent. We suggested that the repercussions of the invasion of Eastern Bengal could not be confined to that single province and that the reverberations would be felt throughout India and Pakistan. Events have not contradicted our analyses. The war fever which is building up in both countries, the sabre-rattling by the newly discovered folk heroine of international liberalism, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and the realization by both Yahya and Bhutto of what is in store for them, give us a clear indication of the serious dilemmas which confront both ruling classes in the Indian subcontinent today.

From the very beginnings, small though they were, of the armed struggle in East Bengal, it was obvious that the Indian ruling class would engage itself in a desperate attempt to try and contain the struggle. The most immediate reason being to prevent the struggle from spilling over into West Bengal.

Mrs. Gandhi's government therefore decided on a two-pronged strategy: politically they would contain the struggle by smothering the leading political force (i.e., the Awami League) with an ideological bear hug; by doing this they would also attempt to gain control of the military side of the struggle by controlling the supply of arms and stationing the Indian army on the West Bengali side of the border. This strategy has been partially successful. The Awami League leadership in Calcutta has be-

come a tail of the Indian bourgeoisie, but precisely because of this and because of its failure to project any concrete program for the social emancipation of the Bengali masses, the League has begun to lose credibility, and within its own ranks dissensions are beginning to appear at a fairly rapid pace. In particular the divisions between some of the fighting units of the Mukti Bahini (the Awami League's army) and the "Provisional Government" in Calcutta have reached such a stage that an open split seems unavoidable in the immediate future.

Another important factor in the struggle is that the revolutionary currents are making more and more gains. Their military activities in Chittagong harbor as well as in the heart of Dacca itself have won them considerable sympathy and support. Also the fact that they are attempting to change the social nature of the Bengali countryside opens up a wide field of potential support. All these pressures have their effect on the fighting units of the Mukti Bahini.

The increasing strength of the left groups places the different Communist parties in West Bengal in an untenable situation because what is required of them is not so much empty demagoguery in support of Bangla Desh (which everyone and anyone in India can indulge in today), but concrete military and political help, which will have to include at some stage the extension of the struggle to Western Bengal. Given the internal dynamic of the CPI(M) [Communist party of India (Marxist)], the most powerful force in West Bengal, this seems unlikely, but what cannot be excluded is divisions and splits within its ranks, especially if it refuses both to abandon and discard its parliamentarist illusions and prepare its cadres and the Bengali masses for a clash with the Indian bourgeoisie.

Despite the weaknesses at the subjective level, the situation in West Bengal continues to become increasingly unstable, and the credibility of the Indian ruling class is at its lowest.

This confronts the Indian government with the task of providing a solution. The nine million refugees from the East are potential dynamite, and while their effects on the Indian economy have, despite the sensationalism of the bourgeois press, been marginal, their political potential could well provide the fuse to detonate the struggle in West Bengal and have a devastating effect in India as a whole. In that sense the problems they pose are not dissimilar to those which were posed by the Palestinian refugees in Jordan in 1970. Mrs. Gandhi understands this fact well and the last thing she wants is to be forced into a Hussein-type offensive against Bengal.

All these factors push the Indian bourgeoisie into one of two directions: either to pressurize the Big Powers to force a political settlement down Yahya's throat, or to wage a limited war to "liberate" East Bengal militarily and install the "Provisional Government" in Dacca. But what the Indian government does not understand is that even the immediate success of either of these options will not represent a medium-term solution. The situation is far too advanced to allow compromises, and somewhat shoddy compromises at that, to prevent the unfolding of a revolutionary process. The "Provisional Government" would remain exactly that, even in Dacca! Thus the Indian government has no way out of the present impasse that could guarantee a period of unlimited stability for the ruling class it represents. Its problems are very real, but its solutions are false. The Indian masses will not allow it to govern in the same old way for long, and since it knows none better, it will resort more and more to repression and the establishment of a strong state.

The most blatant failure of the military regime in West Pakistan has been its inability to crush the Bengali national movement. This failure has had disastrous consequences on the morale of the West Pakistani army and police units, who are involved in the fighting and repression, but more important it has led to a grave deterioration of the economic situation in West Pakistan itself. When one understands that East Bengal both supplied a bulk of the country's foreign exchange earnings and served as a market for the sale of West Pakistani manufactured goods, this is hardly surprising.

The unemployment levels in West Pakistan have risen phenomenally, and when one also takes into account the fact that in colonial and semicolonial countries a reserve army of the unemployed is a permanent feature of their economies, one begins to grasp the seriousness of the situation. There have been a great many industrial strikes in the West; in some cases these have been accompanied by peasant struggles (particularly in the North West Frontier Province and Sind), which have developed as a result of the increasing entry of capitalist property relations into the countryside in the shape of the "green revolution" and other similar devices.

Thus the external failures of the regime are directly interrelated to the mess which it has created internally and for which it has no cure. In this situation a war would not have the effect of providing a pretext for national cohesion (as it did in 1965), but would lead rapidly to the disintegration of West Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto, who remains the ablest bourgeois politician in the country, has understood this fact well.

Also it must be remembered that as far as the army is concerned, they are already "at war"—against the Bengali masses. This war has up till now cost the Pakistan army more casualties than did the entire Indo-Pak war of 1965. To fight a war on two other fronts today would destroy the Pakistani army. A defeat for the army would remove the most stable prop of the West Pakistani state. The only meaningful option open to the Yahya regime therefore seems to be a negotiated settlement with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, who somewhat conveniently at the moment, happens to be held prisoner in West Pakistan. Already several bourgeois political leaders have openly called for Rehman's release, and Yahya himself has declared that if the "people" demand his release, he (Yahya) is not going to stand in their way. If Yahya can pull off even a limited political compromise with Mujib, it will preserve the status quo for another six months at best.

It cannot even be excluded that dissensions will appear within the army as many of the younger officers will not appreciate the subtlety involved in invading Bengal, losing hundreds of West Pakistani lives and then negotiating a settlement several months later. There are also, of course, the

problems which Sheikh Mujib will confront if *he* accepts a compromise: the strength and size of the leftist groups and currents would develop overnight and there would be an open split inside the Awami League. Thus the future of the Pakistani bourgeoisie does not seem to be too happy.

Internationally both the United States and the Soviet Union attach, understandably from their points of view, more importance to India than to Pakistan. The recent right turn of the Chinese has meant that Pakistan is not the only bourgeois state with which they have friendly relations and which they, as a result, have to cultivate. New vistas of class collaboration have been opened up for the Chinese bureaucracy, and there are some indications that they would be prepared to eschew their previous differences with the ruling clique in India. The fact that Bhutto, who recently visited Peking as Yahya's personal envoy, was sent back without any concrete promises lends further support to the above thesis.

It is of course possible that finding themselves isolated both internally and externally, some elements in the Pakistan army would be prepared to take the risk in a lunatic "do or die" war against India. If they do so, they sign the death warrant of West Pakistan as a state and lay open the path to growing instability in the subcontinent. From every possible angle the outlook for the generals in Pakistan is extremely bleak.

The way in which both Yahya Khan and Indira Gandhi went to the aid of Mrs. Bandaranaike's reactionary

regime in Ceylon against the JVP [Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna—People's Liberation Front] gives us one indication of what they could do if they faced similar threats in other parts of the subcontinent.

If a rebellion started in West Bengal, we could easily see the Indian army moving in to crush this resistance by employing the same tactics and the same language as that used by the Pakistan army; but at the time of writing, the aim of the Indian bourgeoisie is to prevent that from happening as its effect on the rest of the subcontinent would be electric. In order to prevent this, it is even prepared to go to war against the Pakistani army.

If it does, the task of revolutionary Marxists will be absolutely clear, both in Bengal and the rest of the subcontinent. They must fight against national chauvinism. They must declare that this war is opposed to the interests of the toiling masses throughout the subcontinent. In Bengal, the supporters of the "Provisional Government" could, of course, fight on the side of the Indian bourgeoisie against the Pakistani army. Revolutionary Marxists must criticize this course in unequivocal terms and project a viable alternative. The situation in both parts of Bengal makes that alternative much more concrete and real today than it could have been in 1965. All revolutionaries must struggle to turn the interbourgeois war into a war *against* the bourgeoisie. If this were done the idea of a united Red Bengal would begin to turn into a reality.

November 20, 1971

Argentine Meat-Packing Firm Is Bankrupt

It has been a bad year for Swift de la Plata, the Argentine meat-packing firm. In May the company, a subsidiary of Deltec International, was forced to cough up \$62,500 in food and clothing for the poor in Rosario, where the plant is located, in order to obtain the release of the company's manager, Stanley M. F. Sylvester.

Sylvester had been kidnapped and held for a week by the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo [ERP—Revolutionary Army of the People].

Less than six months later, on November 8, Swift de la Plata was de-

clared bankrupt by a judge in Buenos Aires. He ordered the appointment of a trustee to liquidate the company. The trustee was instructed to maintain production and the jobs of the 12,000 workers at the plant.

The West German and American owners of Deltec International will not be able to blame the ERP for the financial collapse of their subsidiary. The ransom paid for Sylvester accounts for only a fraction of Swift de la Plata's accumulated debt of some \$21,000,000. □

Attica Officials Continue Harassment

Two months after at least thirty-one prisoners and eleven guards were massacred by New York State police at Attica prison, conditions in the jail have become even worse, according to six survivors of the September rebellion.

The six were designated as spokesmen by forty-six men who have been kept in solitary confinement since the September 13 police attack. They spoke with reporters November 16, after Corrections Commissioner Russell Oswald finally bowed to public pressure and allowed journalists into the prison.

"All said that their diets had not improved, that medical treatment had been perfunctory, that they had been harassed and threatened, that they had been beaten," wrote *New York Times* correspondent Fred Ferretti, one of those allowed into the prison. Roger Champen and Richard Clark, two of the spokesmen, said they expected to be killed by guards.

Clark said that HBZ (the solitary confinement block) inmates get one set of coveralls a week and one set of underwear. They are allowed one bath a week, with a lye-based soap.

Champen said that conditions in the jail had "retrogressed," and denied that the grand jury investigation now going on would result in justice: "You have a right to a grand jury of your peers, right? How many Blacks and Puerto Ricans live in Wyoming County?"

Racism continues to be the rule among the guards. Gary Haynes, one of the two whites among the forty-six HBZ prisoners, said he was called "nigger lover" and constantly harassed by guards for "getting too friendly with Blacks."

Prison superintendent Vincent Mancusi denied the prisoners' allegations in a statement that sounded a bit too pat: "They will always say those things. I will deny them." Mancusi, it should be recalled, is notorious for his callous treatment of prisoners. One of the demands of the September rebellion was his immediate dismissal.

The same day the prisoners were interviewed, a state panel established

by Governor Nelson Rockefeller, the man who ordered the police attack on the prisoners, released a report tending to confirm the inmates' charges.

The five-member panel said that "the resumption of normal routine . . . for over 80 per cent of the present population marks an end to the transitional period contemplated when the panel was appointed." Since "normal" functioning had been restored, the panel considered its work done. This itself was a tacit acknowledgment of prisoner charges, since "normal routine" is exactly what led to the revolt in the first place. For the other twenty percent of the prison population, one

Force State to Back Down

New Jersey Prisoners Seize Cellblock

By Jon Rothschild

On the night of November 24, about 500 of the 1,143 inmates of Rahway prison in New Jersey occupied two of the prison's four cellblocks, seized seven hostages, including the warden, and demanded to see Governor William Cahill. And another prison rebellion against oppression—the largest since Attica—was under way.

Twenty-seven hours later it was over. The hostages were released and the state agreed to negotiate with a prisoners' committee. Public revulsion at the police assault on Attica prevented a similar attack on Rahway, although such action had been planned by the New Jersey state police.

The rebellion apparently began in the prison auditorium, toward the end of the movie that was being shown. The extent of prior organization is unclear, but after the seizure of the auditorium and the hostages, Attica-type prisoners' committees quickly emerged. Organizational forms were not the only similarity. The demands raised by the rebels closely paralleled those of Attica. They centered on the

can only assume that something more than the usual conditions of oppression exist.

The panel as a whole conceded that "the danger of harassment of inmates continues." One panel member, who refused to be identified, went further: "We think there's harassment going on still," he said. "The guards have control of the food. A nasty guard can spit in the food. He can lose a man's mail. Things like that."

Another facet of denial of prisoners' rights was revealed by the disclosure that Deputy State Attorney General Robert E. Fischer intends to try to question prisoners without granting them the right to legal counsel. The panel urged that Fischer advise all prisoners of their right to the presence of a lawyer during interrogations, but Fischer said that if a prisoner did not specifically ask for legal representation, he would not be informed of his rights. □

racism and corruption among the guards, the denial of religious freedom to Black Muslims in the prison, the atrocious medical care, the rotten food, the brutal disciplinary action, the denial of parole rights, and the general animal-like treatment to which inmates are subjected.

Most of the prisoners are nonwhite; 75 percent are Black, 15 percent Puerto Rican. Nearly all the guards are white.

The prisoners demanded that there be no reprisals against them, a demand that Cahill agreed to, although reports indicate that prisoners have good reason to question the state's willingness to carry out its promises.

Prisoners who talked to a select group of three newsmen allowed into the jail during the rebellion described some extracurricular activities of the guards in this center of "rehabilitation."

"You get it [heroin] from the police," said Leroy Bunting. "It's \$10 and five cartons of cigarettes for a bag of heroin." It was just one exam-

ple of the wrong people being inside. One of the prisoners, Miguel Soto, is serving a two-to-five-year sentence in Rahway for possessing seventy-five-cents worth of marijuana.

The prisoners receive \$13.50 a month for working six days a week, while the prison commissary charges twice the usual retail rates for things like toothpaste and razor blades.

Carl Zeitz, one of the three newsmen allowed into the prison, was surprised by the inmate solidarity he found:

"Most were Black. Nearly all were young. But every one of them, including several middle-aged white men, were united in their hate of the prison and its masters, the correction guards.

"They denied that racial tensions existed among themselves, but accused guards of racism and provocation of prisoners.

"One after another described beatings, arbitrary confinement in solitary, even the alleged drowning of pet cats kept by the inmates.

"To my surprise, the prisoners were articulate. Some were eloquent."

If the demands, slogans, and organization of the Rahway prisoners were similar to those of their brothers at Attica, the outcome of the rebellion was totally different. This can in no way be attributed to humanitarianism on the part of Governor Cahill. A police assault was arranged; cops had gathered around the prison, and Cahill made clear after the revolt that the first decision was to assault the prison.

But after protest by a member of the State Assembly, Cahill apparently decided that he could not risk the political consequences of an Attica-type, murderous assault. The prisoners moved Warden Samuel Vukceвич in front of a window to prove that he had not been killed. Vukceвич signed an affidavit saying that he had been well treated. (He suffered two stab wounds in the back during the first fight in the auditorium. Prisoners said that the warden was wounded by a guard who panicked and pulled out a switchblade knife.)

With the demonstration that the hostages were in good condition, the potential excuse for an attack was removed. Two hostages were released as a gesture of good faith by the prisoners. Then newsmen and state officials entered the prison to begin ne-

gotiations. At the start of the meeting, another hostage was released.

After the state agreed to bar physical reprisals and to permit a prison-wide election to select a negotiating team, the warden and the last three hostages were turned loose.

The concessions won by the rebellion were significant. Members of the community will be allowed into the prison to make sure the promise of no reprisals is kept. The election of the prisoner committee will take place. Cahill has been forced to publicly admit that the conditions of New Jersey's prisons are miserable. The light of glaring publicity has been played on Rahway prison itself, the scene of a number of rebellions in the last twenty years.

Siqueiros Denounces Trotsky Film

The promoters of "The Assassination of Leon Trotsky," which is now being filmed in Italy and Mexico, have gained considerable advance publicity for the motion picture, particularly through press releases playing up the name of Richard Burton, who has been cast to play the role of Trotsky.

However, according to reports by several persons who knew Trotsky and who have read the script, the film departs widely from the historic truth, particularly in its portrayal of the character of Leon Trotsky.

He is presented as a rather vulgar figure personally, and his great struggle in behalf of the true heritage of Leninism against the Stalinist degeneration in the Soviet Union and the world Communist movement is depicted as a personal battle between him and Stalin.

Moreover, a basic theme in the drama — something that goes against everything Trotsky stood for — is anti-Communism.

In their publicity efforts, the promoters have gone so far as to submit the script to the appraisal of David Alfaro Siqueiros, the Mexican painter who headed a gang that attempted to assassinate Leon Trotsky and his companion, Natalia Sedova, in a machine-gun assault on their home in Coyoacán on May 24, 1940.

The gang, composed of well-known Mexican Stalinists directed by Moscow's secret political police, kidnapped

Whether the state will keep its promises remains to be seen. Seven participants in the revolt were punitively transferred to a ward at the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital, away from public scrutiny at Rahway.

But if the promises are broken, the state can expect new organization and new struggle by the prisoners. On November 26 Rahway prisoners made public a petition saying that they had "tried every other possibility to bring about changes."

"To be treated as human beings is all we ask of this administration," they said.

Attica prisoners pointed the way. And the massive protest against Rockefeller's massacre has prevented, at least this time, a repetition. □

one of Trotsky's guards, Robert Sheldon Harte, and murdered him in a cabin in the mountains.

Siqueiros fled Mexico after the identity of the assailants became known, returning quietly after several years. He was never tried for his complicity in the assault and murder. He has never revealed what he knows about the assassination of Trotsky on August 20, 1940.

Siqueiros took full advantage of the film's gross departures from historic truth. He called a press conference at which he denounced the production for this.

According to the November 3 issue of the Mexico City newspaper *El Mercurio*, Siqueiros told the reporters:

"My refusal to participate in the film is due to the fact that its plot has been worked up in a way that departs from the truth with regard to the life of the Russian leader. They gave me the script to read and the truth is that, in the guise of a commercial movie, it seeks only to follow a political line, but with everything very badly done. I am completely willing to collaborate with the director, Joseph Losey, provided he makes a film that shows in reality what happened during my connections with this great man whose life they are seeking to portray on the screen without the least respect. But, I repeat, this is only a political show supported who knows by whom. . . ." □

How the National Liberation Front Wins Support

"Very probably," Lawrence Newberry predicted, "this report will be suppressed, stamped secret, and made accessible to only a few people. Nevertheless, it was necessary to see and speak about these things clearly for once."

Newberry, a psychologist, was referring to the report of a study he had conducted in Vietnam between 1967 and 1971 for the Rand Corporation on behalf of the U.S. military. His prediction of its reception proved quite accurate. The U.S. command in Saigon decided that the report could not even be used internally, and it was ordered destroyed.

At least one copy survived, however, and fell into the hands of the West German weekly *Spiegel*, which printed extensive excerpts in its November 15 issue.*

Newberry's assignment was to analyze the "indoctrination techniques" and the political and military organization of the National Liberation Front forces in South Vietnam. His study was based on computerized summaries of the statements given by 2,500 prisoners and deserters from the NLF and the North Vietnamese army, and on detailed interviews with forty-nine deserters. His conclusions gave the lie to the U.S. government's propaganda claim that the political strength of the NLF is based on "Vietcong terror."

"Newberry's analysis," *Der Spiegel* said, "showed that the strengths of the Vietcong were not terror, but motivation and political education. He stated openly that the actions of the American army in the Vietnam war 'doubtlessly often do more good for the Vietcong than for the South Vietnamese people.' He demonstrated that the Vietcong is the only intact political organization worth mentioning in Vietnam—and that 'Vietnamization' is therefore meaningless. He attached all the more importance to the statements of the forty-nine persons interviewed because all of them were deserters,

who must have had an interest in putting their organization in a bad light."

Newberry's attempt to draw a distinction between the interests of the NLF and of the Vietnamese people is sufficient indication of his own bias in favor of the U.S. government. Despite this bias, Newberry drew an eloquent contrast between the actions of the NLF and the American army.

"The Vietcong," he wrote, "adapt to the people. . . . They are quite clear that they can accomplish nothing without the support of the people. Their behavior toward villagers, especially toward the elderly and women, is commonly above reproach.

"They borrow nothing without returning it, and take nothing without paying. They constantly stress the flagrant contrast between their behavior and that of the government troops. Arrogance is scorned and condemned; they are modest and eager to help. . . ."

This is compared to the behavior of American troops:

"Almost all Vietnamese who have come in contact with Americans have had bad experiences. They have seen Vietnamese humiliated, injured, or killed, often merely for the amusement of the foreign invaders."

One deserter told Newberry: "I myself have seen how they [Americans] raped, robbed, and beat old people. If you want to fight the Americans, there is no other way but to join the Vietcong."

The reality of how the NLF treats prisoners is also quite different from the U.S. propaganda stories. An NLF lieutenant described this:

"Prisoners or deserters are treated decently. We were not permitted to beat them or kill them, because that would have had bad political consequences. If South Vietnamese soldiers learned that we treated prisoners badly, then they would not surrender, but would fight to the last. That would cost us more losses and would rob us of the information and the recruits that we obtain by treating prisoners in a friendly manner. If prisoners are

wounded, we care for them. Likewise we were not permitted to touch the property of the people because we did not want to dishonor the people's army and turn the people against the revolutionary cause."

Newberry found that this way of handling captives also had its effect on American prisoners:

"Americans are usually held for an indefinite period and used for propaganda purposes. While the prisoners are being politically schooled by the National Liberation Front, their well-being is assured. They usually receive the same rations as the Vietcong soldiers. In their school courses they are praised or rewarded when they produce ideas or actions that agree with the politics of the Liberation Front.

"Many prisoners are won for the cause of the Liberation Front through such treatment. Many are released in order to work as agents in their own units. Others simply remain with the Vietcong and fight alongside them. Other soldiers are advised to desert rather than return to their units.

"It seems that any army in the world, even the most modern, could learn much from the leaders of the Vietcong, especially from their political cadres. . . ."

What the modern American army would have to learn, however, is simply that an army of the people wins more support than one fighting to oppress them. That is a conclusion that will always be stamped "secret" by the U.S. government. □

Correction

In Pierre Frank's article "The Split Between Healy and Lambert" in our last issue, the date of the Essen conference organized by the "International Committee" was incorrectly given as July 1970. The conference occurred in July 1971.

When You Move...

Don't count on the post office forwarding your Intercontinental Press! It's against their rules.

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* All the quotations here have been retranslated from *Spiegel's* German translation.

Anthropologists or Secret Agents of the Pentagon?

By Allen Myers

After stormy debate, the seventieth annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) on November 20 voted to reject a report that denied that members of the organization had carried out counterinsurgency research for the U.S. government in Thailand.

The issue first came to the fore in April 1970, when the Student Mobilization Committee (SMC) published documents exposing the involvement of American universities and anthropologists in such research. In addition to printing this information in its publication, the *Student Mobilizer*, the SMC provided copies of the documents to Professors Eric R. Wolf and Joseph G. Jorgensen, members of the AAA's ethics committee.

When the full committee condemned counterinsurgency research by anthropologists, the group's executive board came to the defense of the researchers and reprimanded the ethics committee for exceeding its proper functions!

Wolf and Jorgensen then resigned from the committee, issuing the statement:

"The board averts its eyes from the real source of a danger which threatens not only the integrity of the association, but the fate and welfare of the people among whom we work."

Last November, in the *New York Review of Books*, Wolf and Jorgensen published an article summarizing the material provided by the SMC, and supplying additional information that they had been able to uncover.

In this situation, the executive board set up an "Ad Hoc Committee to Evaluate the Controversy Concerning Anthropological Activities in Relation to Thailand." The committee was chaired by Margaret Mead, probably the best-known anthropologist in the United States.

The committee's report appeared to have been an attempt to whitewash the affair while satisfying both sides in the dispute. On the one hand it acknowledged the need to prevent the misuse of anthropological research, and on the other it denied that an-

thropologists were doing anything improper. The committee evidently hoped that some of the heat occasioned by the issue could be directed against the SMC. The latter group, it seemed, was to be condemned for bringing up the matter in the first place.

"From the beginning," the ad hoc committee wrote, "the Thailand controversy was enveloped in an unwarranted conspiratorial atmosphere. The documents which were used by the Student Mobilization Committee in their so-called exposé and published in their issue of *The Student Mobilizer* of April 2, 1970, were referred to as if they were secret. This suggested that copies could only be obtained by stealth. In fact, none of these documents was classified as secret. They were stolen from unlocked files in a university office, then reproduced and distributed in a manner which set the furtive tone for the subsequent accusations."

In its eagerness to divert attention from counterinsurgency researchers to the SMC, the committee was trying to have its cake and eat it too. On the one hand, the documents are not secret. On the other, if someone has a copy of them, they must be stolen.

In the process of preparing the summary that appeared in the *Student Mobilizer*, I examined all the documents available to the SMC. None of them, it is true, had been stamped "secret" by any government agency. But it is more relevant that none of them were available in any library or other public source, despite the fact that they included contracts with the government and records of allegedly academic research being carried out in the name of various universities.

The "furtive tone" was not set by the SMC, which made the documents available to the public, but by the researchers who attempted to cover up the material.

The real controversy, however, was not over whether this or that item was "secret," but over whether anthropologists ought to be aiding the U.S.

government in its plans to suppress revolutionary movements in Thailand. On this issue, the committee's attempt to whitewash the whole affair bordered on the absurd.

After explaining that for some time public funds have been difficult to obtain for research "unless the project could be made to appear directly pertinent to some 'practical' end of high value to those holding the public purse strings," the report went on to say that "much social science, including anthropological research, was supported because it was described as related to health, in particular 'mental health.' . . . It happened that, during the Kennedy administration, the nation's military policy was changed from one of nuclear-confrontation-or-nothing to one including an alternative labeled 'limited wars' or 'counterinsurgency operations.' The latter term—counterinsurgency—soon became the label under which funds were given, just as 'communication' and 'mental health' had been previously."

The report goes on to argue that such areas as "village security and mapping of trails" are legitimate fields for scholarly work because they may formerly have been called "community development" instead of "counterinsurgency."

From whichever end one picks up this argument, it would seem to require immediate intervention by the AAA's ethics committee. Have anthropologists really been defrauding the U.S. government by accepting funds for counterinsurgency research and then not fulfilling their end of the bargain? Or have they been carrying out counterinsurgency under such euphemisms as "mental health" and "community development"? (While the U.S. government has been known to accept shoddy products when the seller was a large corporation, it does seem probable that in dealing with individuals Washington insists on receiving a return on its investment.)

The meeting of the AAA voted by an overwhelming majority of 231 to

14 to reject such specious reasoning and the report itself. The group then went on to adopt a resolution incorporating the sense of one paragraph from the report:

"A new ethical imperative has emerged, the obligation to protect data on communities which might expose them to wholesale destruction."

This was a reference to the use that the Pentagon can make of even seemingly harmless material:

"It is clear that anthropologists now have to face the possibility that a publication of routine socio-cultural data about identified village communities,

or the assemblage of unpublished data in centralized files . . . might be used for the annihilation by bombing or other forms of warfare of whole communities, as such data lend themselves to computerization and mass depersonalization of communities marked for destruction."

It is a tribute to the depth of the radicalization on U. S. campuses that the AAA felt called upon to take such a position against counterinsurgency research for the U. S. government. As the mass movement against the Indochina war continues to grow, further such victories can be expected. □

After Ten Years of Blockade

Fidel Castro's Trip to Chile

By J. P. Beauvais

[We have translated the following article from the November 20 issue of *Rouge*, the organ of the Ligue Communiste (Communist League, the French section of the Fourth International).]

* * *

For the first time since 1959, Fidel Castro is paying a visit to a country on the Latin American continent. His last trip had been a triumph. From Caracas to Buenos Aires, the Latin American masses acclaimed the man who had just overthrown one of the most discredited dictatorships on the continent. The epic of the *Barbudos* passed into legend.

But from a political standpoint, the trip in 1959 was marked by the same ambiguities as distinguished the first months of the Cuban regime. Fidel was welcomed as a friend by the "liberal" regimes; he appealed to the masses to struggle for their dignity and national independence. There was no talk of socialism yet in Cuba.

Today the Cuban leader's trip to Chile has a completely different significance.

After ten years of being blockaded and kept in isolation by a multitude of imperialist pressures and threats, Fidel's visit to Chile represents an undeniable political victory and a set-

back for American policy. A breach has been opened that imperialism can no longer repair.

Already the Peruvian government has agreed to receive Fidel on his way back from Chile, under the pretext that his flight is scheduled to lay over in Lima. Without going this "far," several other countries in Latin America are talking today about restoring diplomatic or trade relations with Cuba. Last but not least in this regard is the president of Argentina, General Lanusse.

Over a period of time, the results for Cuba can only be positive, at least in the economic sphere. An expansion of its trade with other Latin American countries, for example, can make possible some lessening of Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union, especially in the field of raw materials.

The political consequences of this development, however, are still far from clear. Not that it is dangerous in and of itself to expand relations with other countries regardless of their political systems. Quite the contrary. The danger lies in the political basis on which these relations are established.

For example, the increased relations with Peru, the establishment of a veritable, tacit *entente cordiale* between Lima and Havana, is based on an opportunistic attitude of the Cuban

leadership. All the official communiqués and articles in *Granma* describe the Peruvian government as consistently anti-imperialist. Nothing is said about its harsh repressive policy toward the trade unions and revolutionary groups, or about its constant concessions to imperialism.

Much more seriously, the Peruvian political course as it is today was officially commended and approved in the context of a joint Soviet-Cuban communiqué issued following Kosygin's recent visit to Havana.

At the time of the nationwide teachers' strike in Peru a few weeks ago, which the government used as a pretext for expelling our comrade Hugo Blanco, the Cuban press supported General Velasco. It even repeated the description Velasco gave of the union leaders as "ultrarightist provocateurs." Not a word has been said about the repression that followed, a repression whose savagery can be gauged by the recent massacre of eight miners.

The case of Cuban relations with Chile is more complex. Up till now, paradoxically, the Cuban position toward the Allende regime has been much less opportunist than toward Peru. The Cubans properly hailed the victory of Unidad Popular [People's Unity] last year, pointing out very correctly the new perspectives it opened for the Chilean masses. Since then, they have taken every opportunity to point up the positive measures taken by the new regime — nationalization of the copper industry, wage raises, a desire for independence from imperialism, etc. — but without offering any real analysis of these measures.

But, unlike Peru where the revolutionary movement was crushed after the defeats of 1965-66 and where there is no real organization linked in one way or another to Cuba, in Chile today the revolutionary left is a very vital reality. The MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario — Movement of the Revolutionary Left], at once the principal contingent and symbol of this current, has long had very real ties with Cuba, whose political example it has always followed.

Thus, the Cubans have taken this into account. Without taking any stand, they have faithfully reported the MIR activities in their press, notably the land occupations in southern Chile.

Castro's visit to Santiago comes in a significantly new context. For a year

the MIR kept to a position of constrained neutrality toward Allende. Then, it raised a series of specific criticisms, in particular concerning the actions of the police following some land expropriations carried out by poor peasants led by the MIR.

Finally, a few weeks ago, the general secretary of the MIR, Miguel Enriquez, launched a severe criticism of Allende's present political course, pointing out the rightist logic of the president's systematic repression of the "unauthorized" land occupations, his repeated admonitions to striking workers, and his thinly veiled threats against the Chilean revolutionary left.

In this specific context, Castro's visit takes on an "explosive" character and is marked by many ambiguities.

For Allende, the visit of the "lider maximo" of the Cuban revolution has an obvious value. Of course, this visit is a sign of very real independence in the face of imperialist pressures. But, besides this, and most importantly, it represents a very impressive revolutionary stamp of approval in the

eyes of the Latin American masses in general and the Chilean masses in particular, a very useful stamp of approval coming three weeks after Lanusse's visit to Chile and the kind of Argentinian-Chilean friendship pact that resulted from it. This revolutionary sanction has great usefulness also for dealing with the MIR and the revolutionary left, with the repressed Chilean peasants and the miners striking for wage adjustments.

In this situation, Castro's position is extremely delicate. He is caught between his need to expand his relations with the Unidad Popular government and the risk of disavowing his most fervent supporters, in this case the MIR.

From reading his initial statements, it seems that the "Comandante en Jefe" has made a decision. His declarations about "superrevolutionary impatience," his appeals to the workers in the Maria Elena saltpeter mine to "moderate" their wage demands, his statements in the Chuquicamata copper mine, calling on the workers to put the national interest first and not

block expanding production by untimely work stoppages, are quite clear. They are appeals for discipline and unity behind the Allende government and for the demobilization of economic movements outside the framework of the Unidad Popular organizations.

There are grounds for fearing that in the second part of his itinerary, his trip to the south of the country, Fidel will make the same appeals to the peasants organized by the MIR and mobilized to recover the land from the big estates. If this proves to be the case, Fidel's disavowal of their objectives would be very revealing as to the choice he has made.

The biggest beneficiary of the trip would then be Allende, who would get aid and comfort for his equivocating policy.

In any case, the meaning of the enthusiastic welcome the Chilean masses gave Fidel Castro was clear. It was a salute to the leader of the first victorious socialist revolution on the continent much more than for another one of the Unidad Popular government's many friends. □

NDP Failed to Project Alternative Leadership

Labor's Missed Opportunities in Ontario Election

By Kate Alderdice

[The following article is reprinted from the November 8 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist biweekly published in Toronto.]

* * *

In the wake of the Tory sweep in the Ontario elections a discussion has opened up among NDP [New Democratic party—Canada's labor party] members and supporters on the election results, which failed to bear out the high expectations among campaign workers and supporters for substantial NDP gains at the polls.

When the final results were in, the Conservative government of William Davis had been returned with 78 seats, while the Liberals had been cut down to 20 from 27, and the NDP to 19. In the previous legislature, the NDP had 21 seats. However, the NDP's share of the popular vote increased very slightly over the previous election in 1967, going up to 27 percent.

Why did the NDP not do better? Why did we not see a sizeable increase in the number of NDP seats, or even an NDP

government coming out of this election? Party leader Stephen Lewis blames the big business money and media exposure of the Davis campaign. "We will never," he lamented, "be able to compete with the \$3,000,000-\$5,000,000 on the media. Never."

Undoubtedly the resources and demagoguery of the Tory campaign were an important factor in the election results. Millions of dollars were spent on TV, radio, brochures, and newspaper ads to outflank the NDP by presenting Davis as a young, progressive leader, "doing things for people." At the same time the Tory campaign played on the need for confident "leadership" to deal with the problems facing Ontario.

In spite of this high-powered campaign, the NDP had every reason to expect some substantial gains in this election. The campaign took place in a context of growing economic crisis and unemployment, and increasing protests against the sellout of our natural resources to the U.S. war machine, pollution, rising prices, and cutbacks in educational spending. All these questions point to big business and its

parties, the Tories and Liberals, as the culprits.

The NDP campaign reflected the radicalization among youth. Many of the canvassers and campaign workers were high school students, something that no other party can claim. And trade union participation in the NDP campaign was greater than ever before. About \$70,000 of the NDP's total campaign fund of \$216,000 came from union donations. A number of full-time organizers and plenty of volunteer part-time canvassers were donated by several unions.

In spite of this the NDP did not substantially increase its vote among trade unionists. In fact, it lost some important working class seats like Oshawa and Brantford.

Even though the NDP did not make spectacular gains in this campaign, it's important to realize that its vote at least held firm, and in fact increased somewhat in most cases.

The election results reveal clearly the illusions that the working people of this province still have about the ability of what are parties of big business to solve

their problems. The overwhelming majority of workers still have only rudimentary elements of class consciousness, although a growing minority recognize the NDP, the party of labor, as *their* party.

Would a more "left" program have increased the NDP vote in this election? Mel Watkins, a leader of the left-wing "Waffle" caucus in the NDP, says that the near-win of Waffle candidate Steve Penner in Toronto's Dovercourt riding proves just that. "The Waffle helped this party," he said. "If they had run a more radical program, maybe we would have been better off in many ridings."

What crippled the NDP campaign was not just the lack of a radical program, although that was part of it. It was its failure to project itself as a clear and decisive alternative to the big business Tory and Liberal parties, to sharply differentiate itself from them. It did not show itself to be a leadership fully committed to the interests of working people, confident of its own ability to lead, and therefore able to inspire confidence among the voters.

Interestingly, a Liberal party survey of voters taken last May revealed that most voters felt the NDP could give Ontario its "most honest, able, sincere and responsive" government. Yet these same voters failed to cast their ballots for the NDP on October 21. Why? Because the NDP has not won their confidence, has not convinced them that an NDP government could really take hold of the situation, could move out aggressively and solve the problems that they face as working people and students. The NDP did not establish itself during the campaign as a different kind of party, as a real alternative to big business rule.

This was made evident on several major issues leading up to the election. One was the large number of plant closures—138 plants in the last year, involving over 16,000 workers, more than in any *decade* since the crash of 1929. Not one closure has been successfully resisted by the labor movement and the NDP. In most cases they have failed even to launch a serious campaign to stop a closure.

The NDP's campaign proposal for a government fund to channel private investment priorities into less vulnerable industries was thoroughly inadequate—and not much removed from what the Tories and Liberals would say. Instead of posing public ownership of shut-down plants and their operation by the workers themselves, Lewis attacked public ownership, and lashed out at the Waffle for its support of nationalization.

The NDP also lost considerable support on the separate school issue. Pollster Peter Reigenstreif found that an important factor in building the "forward-looking" image of the Davis government was its refusal to extend public tax aid to the Catholic separate school system beyond Grade Ten, in spite of the massive campaign conducted by the Catholic hierarchy. His poll finding indicated that many people who opposed such aid considered the issue important enough to seriously influence their choice of political party. Most Catholics, on the other hand,

were relatively indifferent on the issue.

The widespread opposition to any extension of funds to Catholic schools not only helped the Tories, the only party to oppose such aid—it also did much to blur the NDP's reform image. In any case, whatever staunch Catholic votes it may have hoped to pick up through this crassly opportunist position were lost by the party's correct and principled position in favor of the right of women to abortion.

Several NDP leaders have responded to the elections by laying the blame for the "defeat" at the doorstep of Stephen Lewis. MPP Morton Shulman made a public statement to the effect that Ontario had "rejected" Stephen Lewis, and posed the need for another leader. This is merely a reflection of the shallow concept of politics held by the entire NDP leadership—that success at the polls depends on a single charismatic leader who can capture the imagination of the voters.

What the NDP lacked in this campaign was not the right leader, but a *leadership* with a clearly delineated strategy for bringing labor to power in Ontario. The campaign lacked any clear focus. "Labor to Power, Elect the NDP" should have been the theme of the campaign, hammered home in speeches and party literature.

Instead the campaign was largely conducted on an atomized constituency basis, with lots of energetic door-knocking by canvassers, but no major campaign rallies, no attempt to mobilize workers in large numbers, to build confidence and a feeling of the power that lies within the working class.

This kind of leadership was missing because in general the NDP has not responded to the challenge it faces in this period—the challenge to lead the working people against the attacks of big business, not just during election campaigns, but all the time.

Where were the NDP and labor leaderships while thousands of workers have been thrown out of work through plant closures? Stephen Lewis complains that the big-business mass media were against the NDP in the campaign. Of course this is true, but where was the NDP leadership when the *Toronto Telegram* folded, and the possibility of establishing a labor daily was posed?

The Ontario election campaign shows that it isn't enough for the NDP to make an appearance during election campaigns every few years. It must be there all the time, providing leadership for the working people in their day-to-day struggles. □

Zimbabwe

Heath Sells 5,000,000 Africans to Smith

"Our worst fears have been confirmed," said Edson Sithole, a former member of the Zimbabwe African National Union, according to a United Press International dispatch from Salisbury. Sithole, who was released last March after six years in detention as a political prisoner, described the effect of the agreement signed November 24 by British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home and "Rhodesian" Prime Minister Ian Smith:

"Majority rule—which we want—has been postponed for decades—thirty to fifty years."

The agreement brought to an end six years of verbal disagreement between the British government and the white minority government of Smith over the conditions under which the colony of Rhodesia [Zimbabwe] would be granted legal independence. In 1965, Smith unilaterally declared independence rather than make even token concessions to the principle that the country's African majority should *ever* rule. (Zimbabwe has a population of 5,000,000 Blacks and fewer than 250,000 whites.)

Under both Labor and Conservative cabinets, the British government had proclaimed that five points must be satisfied before Rhodesian independence could be recognized. These five points were, in the words of the British ambassador's speech to the United Nations Security Council November 25:

"(i) the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule would have to be maintained and guaranteed; (ii) there would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution; (iii) there would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; (iv) there would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination; (v) the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole."

The actual agreement signed by Smith and Douglas-Home made no more than the most token and superficial concessions to these demands. On the question of "progress to major-

ity rule" in particular, the agreement makes Sithole's prediction look optimistic.

At present, parliament under Smith consists of fifty whites and sixteen Blacks. No additional Black representation is permitted until Africans pay more than 24 percent of the country's income-tax receipts. (The present figure is less than 1 percent.)

Under the agreement with Douglas-Home, Smith promised to abolish the income-tax qualification and to replace it with one based on—income. A new "African Higher Roll" is to be created with the same voting requirements as the European Roll: an income of Rhodesian \$1,800 [about US \$2,520] annually for the two years preceding enrollment, or ownership of immovable property worth at least Rhodesian \$3,600. Prospective voters may also be enrolled with incomes of Rhodesian \$1,200 or property of \$2,400 if they have four years of secondary education—a rarity among Blacks since the Smith regime spends half its educational budget on whites and half on the twenty-times larger number of Africans.

These requirements should be compared with income figures. In 1967, white workers received an average of Rhodesian \$2,720 annually. Black workers—if they were employed—got an average of less than Rhodesian \$276—about one-tenth the income of white workers.

The November 24 agreement specifies that Africans are to receive two additional seats in parliament every time the African Higher Roll increases by a figure equal to 6 percent of the European Roll. This would mean that Black representation could equal white only when there is a section of the African labor force equal in size to the white labor force and paid at approximately the same rate.

Even were that never-never land to be achieved, twenty-four of the fifty Black representatives would be indirectly elected by rural chiefs representing the most conservative layers of the African population.

Finally, once such "parity" was achieved, an election of ten additional members of parliament in joint African-European elections is promised—provided that an "independent Commission" appointed by the white government decides that such an election is "acceptable to the people of Rhodesia."

In short, Smith gave up nothing in exchange for the Heath government's promise to grant formal independence and thus open the way for the lifting of the trade embargo against Rhodesia declared by the United Nations.

"The tiny white minority," Anthony Lewis wrote from Salisbury in the November 28 *New York Times*, "is going to hold onto political power in Rhodesia after this settlement: that much is clear."

In an editorial the same day, the paper argued that while the terms of the agreement were unsatisfactory, there was little choice open to Heath:

"Once Britain had ruled out force—and neither of its major parties would have supported the sending of troops—it was clear that any negotiated settlement would be close to the terms insisted on by Mr. Smith's Rhodesian Front."

This was a rather peculiar argument on behalf of the two parties, both of which have supported the sending of thousands of troops into Northern Ireland to suppress the nationalist population there.

Another important omission from most press commentary was the role of the United States government. On November 17—while Douglas-Home was in Salisbury—Nixon signed Congressional legislation that breached the trade embargo by ordering the

importation of Rhodesian chrome. This open violation of the sanctions decreed by the United Nations provided the Tory government with the convenient rationale that there were no longer any effective ways to coerce the Smith regime into making concessions.

Predictably, news of the agreement aroused elation in one sector of the British population. John M. Lee reported from London in the November 25 *New York Times*:

"The stock market . . . cheered. Share prices rose for tobacco companies and other concerns that have been shut out of Rhodesia by the economic embargo."

Lee noted that another dispute is expected to be settled once the November 24 agreement has been ratified:

"A further outstanding issue is the settlement of financial claims between Britain and Rhodesia, which are said to leave Rhodesia the debtor by some £100-million (\$240-million). These claims represent the dividends and profits of British companies frozen in Rhodesia and Rhodesian Government bonds and other assets frozen in London."

It is quite a coup for British capital—selling 5,000,000 Africans for \$240,000,000. A deal like that hasn't been consummated since the days of the slave trade. □

Trotskyist Youth Convention in Cologne

The second national convention of the Revolutionär-Kommunistische Jugend [RKJ—Revolutionary Communist Youth], held in Cologne October 30-November 1, reflected the rapid growth of the West German Trotskyist movement. Twenty branches of the organization, from all the states of West Germany, were represented by a total of eighty delegates, according to the November issue of the RKJ magazine *Was Tun*.

In addition, the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten [GIM—International Marxist Group, the German section of the Fourth International] was represented by a fraternal delegation.

Livio Maitan brought greetings on behalf of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. Representatives of the Trotskyist movement in Belgium, Ceylon, France, Italy, Japan,

and the United States also spoke to the convention.

The discussion focused on how best to build the German section of the Fourth International during the present period of radicalization.

The delegates voted to propose to the GIM that it merge with the RKJ. The resolution suggested that the unification of the two organizations be carried out within the next six months to one year, following joint discussion of the political, programmatic, and organizational aspects of the move.

Noting that the fusion could prove successful only on the basis of continued political work among the masses, the convention voted to intensify the RKJ's activities in the unions and factories, in the movement against the Indochina war, and in the layers of youth faced with conscription. □

How Belfast Students Are Fighting Special Powers Act

By Gerry Foley

Dublin

On October 19 I was getting ready to leave Derry city, where I saw a British soldier shot and where bombs had been going off regularly since my arrival three days before. The barricades were still up, and the army and the police were effectively barred from the Catholic ghettos, although the people in these communities were waiting nervously for renewed attempts by the repressive forces to break in. But the biggest news in Derry that day was a student action in Belfast.

At Queen's University, the police and the army tried to arrest Tomas Mac Giolla, president of the militant nationalist party Sinn Fein. The students blocked this attempt and forced the authorities to allow Mr. Mac Giolla to return to the formally independent part of the country. He was speaking on the Common Market, which, ironically, both Sinn Fein and the pro-imperialist right-wing Unionists oppose, although for different reasons. Mac Giolla did not discuss the present situation in Northern Ireland. But the events that followed his speech seemed to give his closing words to the students added political significance. He said:

"There is a country lying at your feet waiting to be reconquered, and an oppressed and exploited people waiting to be delivered from the conqueror. It is time you raised the siege and came out to claim your country."

On the morning of October 21, I went to Queen's University to try to get some picture of the way the application of legis-

lation permitting arbitrary arrest and imprisonment in a concentration camp of suspected political oppositionists had affected the student movement. I was especially interested, because only four days or so before, I had heard students from the North saying in Dublin that Queen's was a hopelessly "stagnant" place.

The University looked very much like any middle-sized university in the United States, although most of the students were dressed fairly formally. Of course, the chilly Irish climate rules out certain "youth culture" styles followed in the United States. A Gaelic League poster, I noticed, carried the slogan "Dean Do Rud Fein" [Do Your Own Thing]. I noticed a poster from the United States Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Southeast Asia. It called on students to demonstrate against the war on November 6.

I was able to talk to the student leaders who had organized both the meeting at which Mr. Mac Giolla spoke and the successful resistance to the security forces trying to arrest him. I spoke first to Mr. Kevin Finnegan, president of the Student Union; then to Tony Rosato, a Northern Irish student activist of Italian extraction who was arrested and tortured under the Special Powers Act; and to Eilis McDermott, president of the Union Debating Society.

The transcript of these interviews follows.

* * *

The Student Movement in the Fight Against Internment

Question. How have the students at Queen's University been affected by the introduction of arbitrary imprisonment of suspected political opponents of the regime in Northern Ireland?

Finnegan. The issue of internment has drawn the student movement back into the struggle in the North of Ireland. In the early stages in 1968 and 1969, the organized student movement took a very full and active role in the Civil Rights struggle, and in the general fight to achieve some minimal standards of democracy. However, when it became clear that there were some sectarian aspects developing in the struggle, the student movement to some extent withdrew from

it. But the internment question is such a basic one that the student movement has come back in full strength to fight the final resort of the Unionist government in what I believe to be its death agony. There seems to be a fairly united front of the student movement. Most of the colleges in Northern Ireland have taken an anti-internment stance, including normally Loyalist colleges, which have at least said that they are opposed to the Special Powers Act. The students both in an organized way and as individuals are fighting this law, both by bringing political pressure to bear and by acting directly to block the harsher aspects of the law.

Q. How, concretely, has the student

movement resisted the application of the Special Powers Act?

Finnegan. The student movement has stood by its belief in freedom of political expression in at least one concrete example. The law says that Republican clubs as such are illegal. Indeed, the House of Lords has confirmed this by a three-to-two majority. But the Student Union continues to recognize the right to existence of a Republican Club, gives its full support and facilities to the operation of this club. It is also operating a branch of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association. And in the case of individual speakers who have seemed likely to be interned, as in the events of the last thirty-six hours, the students have in fact rallied round and prevented the security forces from arresting the persons in question. They have also stood by the various lecturers and others who have been interned and made it clear that they are ready to fight all such victimizations, in the first stages at least by passive resistance and after that by some kind of militant action.

Q. What was the response of the student body as a whole to the action taken to defend Mr. Mac Giolla from arrest?

Finnegan. Well, we called a Union general [meeting] after the defense of the Union and the barricades, and the meeting voiced support, by a very clear majority, of the action that was taken by the particular students involved that night.

Q. Are there any signs that the repression is being aimed against the University as well as the rest of society?

Finnegan. We have very concrete evidence that both the army and the Special Branch have been keeping a large number of students under surveillance, in particular individuals of the Union executive or just ordinary

students on the basis of what they might have said at a meeting in opposition to the present government here. We've had in fact specific experience of the army coming in and interviewing university officials about the activities of students. And there have been several students "lifted" [arrested], interrogated, and sometimes interned. And this is also applied to lecturers in the university.

Q. Has the Student Union helped to provide legal defense for interned students?

Finnegan. Well, the fact of the matter is that you can't very well offer legal help to people in defending themselves against an act of parliament that does not allow legal defense. We have tried to bring political pressure to bear in all sorts of ways and on all sorts of levels to bring the issue before the public. News has now gotten into the [London] *Sunday Times*. The English press are now realizing what's going on. We've also got the final resort of the International Court on Human Rights in Europe. At the moment we are considering bringing an action in this court against the Northern Ireland government and also the British government.

Q. Can you give specific examples of what the Student Union has done to defend the student body and teaching staff from political repression?

Finnegan. In particular instances, the united stance of the student body has enabled us to bring pressure on the university officials. And they in turn, many of whom are men of international standing, have brought pressure to bear on the English government. And through all sorts of things like this we have tried to ensure the release of at least some of the internees. The unfortunate thing is that this cannot be done for all the internees. It's in some ways regrettable that those men who have access to areas of influence have a much better chance of being released.

Q. Is the Protestant-Catholic division that exists in the society as a whole reflected in the student body here, and if so how?

Finnegan. There is in fact a sectarian split in the student body. But it is

much less pronounced and perhaps more sophisticated in some ways than in the community as a whole. It manifests itself in the fact that the branch of the Unionist party here at the university is in fact the most right-wing and reactionary in the whole of Northern Ireland. This is unfortunate. But it is something you must expect. There were fascists in the German universities in the Hitler period and there have been fascists at the highest levels in the universities of South Africa. And so, it would have to be expected that such would exist here also.

Q. What is the relationship of forces between the right and left in the university?

Finnegan. The Union as a whole is a progressive Union and offers complete support for civil rights and things like that. The right is fighting a losing battle, as I see it. They don't seem to be as committed as the left and progressive groups within the Student Union.

Q. Have Protestant students joined in the activities of the left groups?

Finnegan. Certainly there has been quite a lot of Protestant involvement with the progressive and left-wing groups and the republican movement. I wouldn't overestimate their numbers. But there is certainly a more significant breakthrough at this level than there is in the community as a whole. This is something we try to foster.

Q. What kind of impact has the international student movement had here?

Finnegan. Well, I wouldn't say there is a connection. But the same kind of movements that have existed in Europe, South America, the United States, have been in evidence here. The student movement here has taken the same kind of stance for civil rights and racial equality and then progressively for economic reforms and things like this. The mood of student protest, sit-ins, passive resistance, etc. has appeared here as in other universities throughout the world.

Q. What effect has the Vietnam war question had here?

Finnegan. This issue isn't as im-

portant here as it is in America, of course, since it's an American problem. The problem of Northern Ireland tends to preoccupy us to the exclusion of many other problems that deserve attention. But the mood is certainly one of support for the fight against the Vietnam war. We have had some contact with the various student organizations in the United States on this problem.

Q. Are there incidences of sectarian discrimination on the campus itself?

Finnegan. No, not in the student body and I think that the academics also avoid opening themselves to this kind of accusation. The university is a kind of oasis in Northern Irish society. But this is not to say that in some cases political pressure is not brought to bear to prevent confrontations with the sectarian system in the society at large. For example, the university has refused to recognize the Republican Club because they say they are legally bound not to do so. But by and large they have respected the right of the Student Union to run its own affairs and this has been of great assistance to us. But as far as I can gather, there has been no discrimination as far as entry or examinations go.

Q. Do you expect any repercussions from your defense of Mac Giolla's right to speak here?

Finnegan. Well, there already have been. Last night the university was attacked by a crowd throwing stones. This seemed to be a direct result of the Student Union's action in defending Mr. Mac Giolla's political rights.

Q. What role did you play personally in organizing the defense of Mr. Mac Giolla?

Finnegan. I was involved in all stages of the struggle from the time it became obvious that the army and the police were attempting to intercept Mr. Mac Giolla.

Q. What were the tactical problems in defending Mr. Mac Giolla and how did you solve them?

Finnegan. Well, the first problem was that we had to cooperate with Mr. Mac Giolla. At first he wanted to try to leave when it was fairly clear that

that wasn't possible. However, we followed his wishes, but when it became clear to him that he was going to be detained, he then came round to our way of thinking. We managed to get him out of the clutches of one of the Special Branch men and get him back into the Union. And we sat in until the pressure of publicity had mounted to the point of ensuring that he would be given free passage back to Dublin.

Q. What effect do you think this incident will have on political life on this campus?

Finnegan. It seems to have sparked off a fair amount of discussion and lifted a lot of the apathy that has been evident in some affairs of the Union for a long time and brought about a much greater involvement, much greater thinking on the part of the students about these kinds of issues. Nationally, of course, it will be an excuse for the Unionist government and indeed the Westminster government to move against students generally, and student unions in particular, to limit their independence of thought, action, and finance.

Q. What kind of response do you expect to these attacks?

Finnegan. Well, there will be a mood of resistance. There already is, on the level of the National Union of Students. On an individual level, it is very difficult to protest effectively against a cutoff of resources. But if there is a political attack on the student movement, I expect it would spark off massive protests of the type that usually mark the first stages of student action, marches, rallies, passive resistance, etc.

Q. What specific problems does the student movement have in Northern Ireland which you think may not be properly understood abroad?

Finnegan. The general problem is that for left-wing groups to operate effectively in Northern Ireland, they have to operate in a sectarian sort of setup. It is hard to work with other organizations that are potentially sectarian in their theory and in their actions. It is important to fill the vacuum on the left. In many ways the in-

itiative has been taken by the Provisional IRA, or the "Green fascists," as I think somebody described them last night. But it cannot be ignored that they have a potential basis of support. We have to work against that on the one hand and against the Orange fascists on the other hand. It is very hard to make a left-wing movement relevant in the present struggle. We are gaining on the left in Northern Ireland, I think, because a lot of people are coming around to the point of realizing that there's no point in having action without theory, as is represented by the Provisional IRA. The theory has been provided. Now all that remains, and it is quite a lot, is to move into action, if and when we get sufficient support.

Tortured by Police and Army in Palace Barracks

Q. Tony Rosato, have many other students like you been picked up since the introduction of internment?

Rosato. When internment came in, several students thought that they were automatically going to be put on the list. In fact two students from Queens University and one from St. Joseph's Training College were interned. One of these students was subsequently released and has had to leave the country because of threats from the authorities. But I must stress that several students are now on the run and have not come back to complete their studies in the university. The university have helped in this situation by saying that when the trouble is over, these students will be welcomed back to continue with their degrees. But several people, including myself, thought that we were safe—that because of our position in student politics, the authorities would have the sense to leave us alone. We felt sure that if they did touch us, they would produce some form of student reaction.

I was taken in under section 10 of the Special Powers Act. I was in detention for thirty-nine hours and interrogated for approximately twenty to twenty-five hours. I must also point out that when I say "interrogated" I also mean that I experienced torture. I don't mean such things as pulling out fingernails but psychological,

Q. Do you defend all those who are faced with internment, regardless of whether or not you consider their views progressive?

Finnegan. It's not a question of defending the political stance of anyone who's being interned. The issue of internment is this: If the police or the army have any evidence, it should be presented in court. And if the persons accused are then convicted, that is at least some due process of law. But internment is the negation of the courts, the negation of democracy, and the negation of due process. It's not a matter of defending the Provisionals, or anyone else who is in. It is a matter of defending anybody in that situation.

psychophysical, and also clear-cut physical torture.

The army and the police which were interrogating me and abusing me inquired into the activities of the Queen's University Republican Club, to which I had admitted being a member. There was little point in denying this, since I had appeared on television on a few occasions as a spokesman for this organization. But after about twenty or twenty-four hours of my detention last week, there was a clear change in policy by my interrogators. They stopped questioning me about the activities of the IRA, about subversive organizations, and about republicans. They then switched all their questions to the campus. This surprised me because up until that time all inquiries about activities in the university had been done quite openly both by Special Branch men and military intelligence, who were spotted several times in the Student Union and who identified themselves. During their questioning, I thought that they were actually overestimating the involvement of students. They said that the Student Union had become a "seedbed of corruption," that it had been infiltrated by the republican movement, the IRA, and was being used against the state.

I quickly refuted all of this and they could not prove anything. However, there came a point when the interrogators started making specific inquiries into political societies in the

Student Union, and also debating societies, for example, the New Ireland Society, which is a very loose-knit cultural and debating club. The Union Debating Society, the official debating society of the Student Union, was also mentioned. The Socialist society was also brought up, along with several other organizations. They were very interested indeed in the activities of left-wing students, English, foreign, and Irish.

I was able to analyze the techniques of my interrogators and the people who were torturing me. Once I explained to them that I knew what they were doing, they more or less dropped it. I was then moved into a special interrogation room where there was just one Special Branch man. I should stress that this officer surprised me by his intelligence. There was no doubt that this man was an intellectual. During the first hour of this interrogation, he spent the entire time talking about international politics. He spoke of Greece, South Africa, Czechoslovakia, and Vietnam, and the Black Power movement in the States. I thought at first that this was an attempt to get me to relax. But I later realized that this fellow had the intelligence to understand that the struggle in Ireland would eventually be linked with the fight in these other situations.

After this casual talk, he changed his tactics and started attacking all of my republican and socialist ideals, as well as any ideals or ideas I had regarding international issues. He tried to defeat me not physically or through the abuse of psychology but he tried to defeat me intellectually. But this was like arguing with a student with different political views. You come to a point where you can go no further because you have different political premises.

I am convinced, then, that the British forces in Northern Ireland are not just trying to defeat gunmen and bombers. They intend to confuse or smash the thinking that is linking up the whole people's movement in the country.

It was also said that the army had its eye on the Student Union and that it would take some kind of action against it. On Monday they said that they were going to raid a debate at the Student Union where Eamon McCann, Kevin Boland, and several others were supposed to speak. They said

that they were going to intern Eamon McCann. I took this as a simple threat and did not believe it. And when I was released I found that they had in fact not bothered. However, this week the army did take action against the Student Union when Tomás Mac Giolla, the president of the official Sinn Féin, was speaking there at a debate on the Common Market. The security forces, including Special Branch men and soldiers, turned up here. Guns were displayed at several points, not just the rifles of the army but the guns of the Special Branch plain-clothes men. I would say that this was a clear attempt to suppress political free speech at this university. And it is a classical example of how the university stands in contradiction to the state.

The chancellor of this university, an Englishman, has said on many occasions that he will always defend the right of anyone in this university to listen or speak on any question. He defends free speech. Yet the authorities will not permit this. This week's incident in which the Student Union was surrounded and put under siege by the security forces proved it.

I will now refer to my interrogation in Palace Barracks, County Down, Northern Ireland. Palace Barracks is a military camp. However, there is one compound in the center of the camp which is isolated by barbed-wire fences and corrugated iron. The authorities claim that this compound is used only by the RUC [Royal Ulster Constabulary]. But my experience convinced me that it is used by the paratroop regiment, the military police, army intelligence, the Special Branch RUC and the uniformed RUC. These are the people who on different occasions interrogated me and physically abused me.

After my arrival at the reception center, I was led into a room where I was photographed by a soldier. I was then taken to a detention room. At this point, I noticed that there were several people in the room already. What horrified me was that a man much older than me was hysterical. He was crying. And I knew that this was probably the result of his interrogation, the psychological wearing down that I was to go through.

I immediately started to analyze every detail of their technique. And it was only by doing this, I think, that

I survived and am now in a state to relate these experiences. I would like to break down their technique in three categories. First there is a physical technique, the psychophysical technique, and the psychological.

An example of the physical method is that when they put you against a wall to search you, they will kick the legs out from under you, trying even to break a leg. On one occasion I and several other prisoners were told to stand with our finger tips against the wall. It was the policy of the soldier or policeman in charge to come along and kick the feet from underneath you. This would bring you down into the gravel. On another occasion, a policeman came into the detention room, accused me of whispering, grabbed my hair, and threw my face into a wall. This was bad enough for me, but I came almost to the breaking point when they did the same thing to my brother. When they smashed his face into the wall, he broke down weeping. These are just a couple of examples of their physical technique.

I will give two clear examples of the psychophysical technique. I was sitting in the detention room with my face against the wall. There was a prisoner on the right of me. By straining my eyes, I could see this prisoner sitting in his chair. A soldier came in. I could tell he was a soldier by his footsteps. In this situation one's hearing becomes very acute. The soldier cocked his rifle, and out of the corner of my eye I would see the barrel of this gun coming up against the other prisoner's head. I had read about such techniques. When the rifle clicked, this young fellow, possibly eighteen or nineteen years old, fell screaming off his chair. And he was then dragged back onto the seat and abused physically and verbally by the soldier.

Some time later — I am not sure of the sequence — someone marched in behind me. I felt pretty sure it was a policeman because his footsteps were lighter; he did not seem to be wearing the boots that the soldiers wore. I felt the barrel of a gun coming up against my hair and then touching my skull. I was expecting the same sort of thing that happened with the other prisoner. Instead I heard an explosion, which I think now must have been a blank cartridge fired just behind my head. I felt a violent shock. My body seemed

to remain in one place and my head go flying towards the wall. For a half an hour or an hour after that I just couldn't think at all. I think that if the army had worked on me at that time, they could have gotten me to admit anything.

Finally, as regards psychological torture, this is done quite cleverly. If, for instance, you are sitting in a corner, a policeman will come up to you and ask for your address. Immediately after that another policeman will come up and do the same thing. And in the space of half an hour you can be asked your name and address forty or fifty times. The same technique is also used as regards food. On the first morning of my detention, I was asked if I would like breakfast. I quickly said yes. But I was asked forty or fifty times by different soldiers and policemen: "Are you hungry? Would you like breakfast?" And when you said yes, in a minute or two the same person would appear again and ask: "Did you say you were hungry?"

Another technique they use is when you are going to the toilet, someone will run up and scream in your ear: "You're trying to escape, you bloody bastard!" They keep screaming names at you. They screamed right into my ear again and again "Who's this fellow Web?"

Another example is this. I was told to fold about forty or fifty blankets that were in the room. A policeman showed me how to do this. He was playing the role of the "soft cop," giving me plenty of advice. When I was just about finished, the "hard cop" came into the room and kicked the blankets all over and called me a silly bastard, and told me to start folding the blankets all over again. He made me turn round, and I could see into the barracks room. I could see a young fellow being forced to polish the floor. Underneath his hands were what looked like old sandbags. He had the same thing under his knees and under his feet. He was being shouted at continually to "move all six dusters at once." I think that this was physically impossible. Every time he tried and failed to do this, a policeman would come along and kick him. And each time they did kick him, he ended up on his back and tried to curl up into a defensive position. The policeman used a flexible black rod. I don't know what it was made

of; I just know it was flexible. This young man, who was younger than me, I think he was about twenty, was

continually hysterical. If any doctor had come along then I think he would have certified him for an asylum.

How Students Prevented Arrest of Tomas Mac Giolla

Eilis McDermott. I'm president of the Queen's University Debating Society. Approximately three months ago I wrote to Mr. Mac Giolla in Dublin, inviting him to come here and debate on the subject of the Common Market, on which he is very knowledgeable. Mr. Mac Giolla is the president of Sinn Féin, which is a legally registered political party in Dublin. It is not an illegal organization. Mr. Mac Giolla and his organization are not gunmen.

I was in Dublin over the weekend and I phoned Mr. Mac Giolla to ask him how I should bring him up to the Students Union. He told me that he would be at the G and R railway station at 8:00. I didn't tell anybody else, except the person who was going down to pick him up in a car, and I didn't tell that person until fifteen minutes before the debate was scheduled to start. This man went down to collect Mr. Mac Giolla and he found that the G and R railway station was absolutely crawling with policemen. Eventually, however, he found Mr. Mac Giolla and brought him to the Union for the debate. At about 9:30 a girl came up to me and told me that she had been working in her room, which overlooks the Union carpark, and that she had happened to glance out of her window and had seen a man crouching down beside a car and letting down the tire.

She felt that this was very suspicious so she came along to the Union and told one of the porters of what she had seen. Herself and the porter then went round to the back of the Union to the carpark and saw this same man standing in the corner along with five soldiers. The girl and the porter were both very surprised about this and one of the soldiers muttered something about there having been a bomb scare. The girl came into the Union to tell me anyhow. And about an hour later another student came along and told me that there were more soldiers around the other side of the Union. Mr. Mac Giolla was informed of this fact, but all along he thought that the soldiers

were out in the carpark in order to guard his car.

However, at about 11:00 Mr. Finnegan, the president of the Union, got up and proposed that standing orders be suspended, and that everyone in the house (at that time there were about 200) should gather round Mr. Mac Giolla and take him out safely to his car, and put him on the road to Dublin. The reaction of the house was very surprising to me. I think it was totally unanimous. There may have been one or two people who didn't get up and go out with him, but everyone I saw did. And everyone got round him and took him out the back door and into the carpark and to his car.

Mr. Mac Giolla at this time still didn't seem to realize that he was in any particular danger. He couldn't understand why the security forces in the North should want to question him, and at one point he insisted on getting out of his car and speaking to a Special Branch man. When he got out, there were about two rows of people between him and the Special Branch man. The Branch man reached over to touch Mr. Mac Giolla on the shoulder. Mr. Mac Giolla was heard asking the policeman what his problem was. At that some students heard a military intelligence officer saying: "O. K., men, let's move in to get him now." Mr. Mac Giolla was informed of this and he quickly got back into his car. By this time more students had arrived. I would say there might have been something in the region of 400 or 500. They crowded round Mr. Mac Giolla's car and pushed it back to the Union. He was taken out. By this stage the soldiers had surrounded the students, and some had gotten into the crowd.

Mr. Mac Giolla was taken up the steps. A Special Branch man who was behind him leapt on top of him and brought him to the ground. A soldier tried to drag him down the steps. His glasses were broken. He was kicked in the face. But eventually, by sheer force of numbers, the students

got him safely inside the Union and the doors were locked. I then went round to the front of the building and walked down the stairs to the place where a meeting had been called, in the main debating hall, of all the students who had been at the debate and who had been outside, to decide what we should do about this situation. It was very quickly decided that there should be an occupation of the building, and any student who did not wish to take part in this occupation was advised that he or she should leave within the next three minutes. Some students did leave, but not very many at all. Mr. Mac Giolla was taken up the stairs and put away safely. Barricades were erected at all the doors and at any windows which we thought might be vulnerable. This happened spontaneously. No decision was taken. It just seemed that there were enough people there who knew that this was the right thing to do. All the office furniture and a portable bar from the basement were taken and rammed up against the front door, so that the army and the police would not be able to gain access.

At this stage, there were two Sarcacs, or two armored personnel carriers, full of soldiers outside the Union. And there were police jeeps on the other side of the road. After about half an hour, a meeting of the students was called, and we decided on three things. First of all we decided that any action that we would take would be done in defense of Mr. Mac Giolla and that we would not take any action he might not agree with, that we would not use him as some kind of political pawn. We decided that we would stay with Mr. Mac Giolla in the Union until such time as he was given safe passage to the border and from there to his home in Dublin. At this stage also we thought that two students had been arrested in the scuffling outside the Union. We decided that we would all stay here, and Mr. Mac Giolla said he would stay too, until these students were released. The last demand was that there should be no intimidation of any students who had taken part in this action.

After that a committee was delegated to defend every single point in the Union and they got volunteers from the main body of students to go and guard the doors so that the army would not be able to get in.

At about 3:00 a.m. we received information that a Father Brady from St. Joseph's Training College had been in contact with the army, who had told him that at that stage they had no further interest in the case and that it was now all in the hands of the RUC. At about 4:10 I was standing in the porter's office, which is in the very front of the Union, when a knock came to the window. Somebody looked out and found it was a man called Sergeant Anderson, who had been with the police forces on the other side of the road. Our demands had been communicated to the police by a Belfast solicitor who had come at about 1:00 a.m. to see what he could do.

This policeman said that the action was all over, that the police had no further interest in the case and that everyone in the Union, including Mr. Mac Giolla, was free to go. A member of the committee informed the other members of this. The committee decided that these statements by the police did not change the situation in the slightest, because we still had received no written guarantee from the police and the army that Mr. Mac Giolla would get safe passage home. At this stage Mr. Mac Giolla was resting, along with his wife and Miss Mairin de Burca, who is the secretary of the Sinn Féin organization. Another meeting of students was called at about 7:30 in the morning. They were told of what had occurred. They agreed that we should not accept this verbal assurance from the police and that we should wait until all the demands had been fully satisfied.

At about 8:30, Mr. Mac Giolla got up and said that he wanted to meet the committee. When he came to talk to us, it was clear that he wanted to leave the Union as soon as he could. He wanted to do this for various reasons. First of all he had several very important engagements, which he had to fulfill within the next few days. Secondly, he felt that it might be a bit dangerous for him to stay there when the rest of the students, about 5,500 students, would be arriving at the Union very soon. He thought that the students in the Union might not be able to deal with them, that many of them would be irate since the Union was barricaded, services were cut off and they couldn't get their usual morning cup of coffee. He thought therefore that it would be in everybody's

best interest if he could leave. He felt that he could believe the RUC assurances that he could get back across the border. I myself was very sceptical that he would. I felt that he might be picked up at Lurgan, which is a town about fifteen miles away, or at Newry, a town about forty miles away, which is very near the border. However, it turned out that he wasn't.

At that time too I was very much afraid of the right-wing backlash, which has occurred and is still going on. Several men from Sandy Row, which is a Protestant pocket just down here near the university, came up last night and threw stones through the windows at the front of the Union building.

However, that is another point entirely. Mr. Mac Giolla decided that he wanted to go. And we were acting on his instructions and agreed to let him leave. So he was smuggled out the side door. And he decided that he wanted to drive his own car. He, his wife, and Miss de Burca got into his car. And three students got into another car to escort him to the border. After about five minutes a jeep proceeded to follow them, and followed them until they arrived at Newry. They were also followed by two helicopters all the way down. This entourage left them as soon as they approached the Irish Republic.

But the fact that they had left did not mean that all the action had stopped here. In fact, it was just beginning. Students were arriving at the university demanding to know the details of what had happened and MPs were arriving at Stormont and things looked very difficult indeed. At about 10:00 we decided that we had better call a meeting to explain to the students exactly what had happened. Many of them were very irate and very unsympathetic to Mr. Mac Giolla's views. So, we called a meeting at about 11:00, which was attended by about 600 students. I was surprised and gratified to find that the response to our explanation was very good indeed, that they were quite prepared to agree that a guest of the university should not have been treated as Mr. Mac Giolla was while he was on the university campus. They seemed to think that the action that 250 students had taken the night before in defense of Mr. Mac Giolla had been justified. However, we also had to call a Union general meeting

at 1:30. There were about 2,000 students at that, that is about a third of the university population. That meeting was not quite so easy to deal with as the one in the morning had been. Lots of students in the university seemed to think that the Union Debating Society is some kind of republican plot. Other students thought that the whole incident had been staged for the benefit of some political people in the Union.

I got up to try to explain to the students exactly what had happened. And for the first time in my life, I was booed and hissed. At first it was quite hard to get the story over. But it was got over in the end. I made the point that the debating society exists to provide good debates and to obtain good speakers. Mr. Mac Giolla is someone who is very knowledgeable on the subject of the Common Market, and that was why we got him along to represent the left-wing point of view. In answer to some who argued that I should not have invited him because it was perfectly clear that he was going to be "lifted," I said that he still had a perfect right to be here. And if a person has such a right, the duty of others is to defend it. The students seemed to accept this. Of the 2,000 who were there, only about twenty people thought that Mac Giolla had no right to come to the Union. But some others said that although Mac Giolla had a right to free speech, he then had to suffer the consequences. They thought that he could speak at the Union but that afterward the police and the army ought to be able to come in and arrest him and interrogate him for forty-eight hours, or detain him for several weeks, or intern him for several years. And the likelihood is that Mr. Mac Giolla would have been interned. Also, Mr. Foley, you've just been talking to Tony Rosato, who was interrogated last week, and it seems to me that anyone must try to ensure that no one has to undergo that type of treatment.

Some people said to me yesterday that the police and the army couldn't have wanted to interrogate Mr. Mac Giolla if they let him go.

But it seems to me that the security forces were in a real quandary. They were very reluctant to break into university premises. In fact, I think it was illegal for them to come onto the grounds of the Union, into the

Union carpark, without first having gotten the permission of the Union, which I certainly know that they did not have. However, at 11:00 the security forces thought that Mr. Mac Giolla was such a threat that they had to send along about ten soldiers and twenty Special Branch men, and four cars full of police, and two personnel carriers in order to apprehend him and take him away for questioning. They said that they "wanted to have a talk in private with him." Well, we all know what those are like! At 3:30 they decided that they had no further interest in him whatever. Obviously they were in a very embarrassing situation. The only thing they could do at that stage was just to withdraw and pretend that it never happened.

A former chancellor of this university once wrote a book about how to deal with a student sit-in. And he said that what you do with a student sit-in is remove the issue, and make the students look like fools. And that is what the security forces tried to do in this case. They tried to say that no one wanted to talk to Mac Giolla and what are you doing there all barri-

caded in the Student Union and denying access to the other 5,500 students. In fact, General Tuzo, head of the army here in Northern Ireland, put a statement in the paper that morning saying that there was nothing to worry about, that we were just acting in the way that students always do. They tried to make us look foolish in the eyes of the public but I think that in the last analysis, after we got Mac Giolla safely back across the border, the security forces were in fact made fools of themselves.

I myself am a member of Mr. Mac Giolla's party, the official republican movement. So I was very sympathetic to him. But what surprised me was the fact that some people at this university, who are not revolutionaries, members of liberal groups like the Alliance party [Catholic and liberal Unionists], also stayed behind to defend Mr. Mac Giolla's right to speak in the university. John D. Taylor, who is the minister of state for home affairs, and the chiefs of the police and the army have certainly been made terrible fools of, as our friend Ian Paisley said in Stormont yesterday. □

Great Britain

Women Stage Abortion Solidarity Actions

London

Demonstrations, teach-ins, and meetings were held in London and some provincial cities including Bristol, Nottingham, Oxford, Cambridge, Birmingham, Liverpool, and Glasgow on November 20 in solidarity with the international actions to make abortion a woman's right.

The Nottingham teach-in was initiated by local women's liberation activists who formed an abortion group. The teach-in was endorsed by representatives of the local branch of the National Council of Civil Liberties, the Humanist Society, Consumers Association, Conservation Society, Marriage Guidance Councillors, Family Planning Association, Labour councillors, and the chairman of the Black People's Freedom party.

Speakers included women's liberation activists and representatives of the Claimants Union Brook Advisory

Clinic for birth control.

Linda Sheppard, on a British speaking tour for the U.S. Women's National Abortion Action Coalition, addressed the meeting and later, together with women's liberationists Valerie Mollen and Antonia Gorton, spoke from the Nottingham Trades Council platform at an open-air meeting in the centre of the city.

In London demonstrators marched down Oxford Street in London's busy West End shopping area, handing out leaflets to women shoppers. The leaflets attacked the inadequacies of the 1967 Abortion Act and demanded "free, safe abortion and a woman's right to choose."

A letter was also delivered to the Family Planning Association asking it to support the campaign being launched for free safe contraception and abortion in Britain, to make abortion a woman's right. □

N.M. Perera in Political Trouble

Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike's coalition government is headed for disaster so far as its base of popular support is concerned.

The brutal suppression of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front) last spring and summer alienated the youth, whose votes were decisive in giving the coalition its majority at the polls. (More than 14,000 political prisoners are still being held in jails and concentration camps.)

Now the regime has projected an "austerity" program that is aimed squarely at the poor, who thought they were voting for socialism when they voted for a coalition that included the pro-Moscow Communist party, the one-time Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja party (Ceylon Equal Society party), and Bandaranaike's own demagogic Sri Lanka Freedom party (Holy Ceylon Freedom party).

Chosen to present the austerity program to the public was Finance Minister N.M. Perera, the main leader of the LSSP. He did it in the form of his projected 1971-72 budget.

"For a people long accustomed to free food, free health services and free education, Perera had a new catchword: sacrifice," B. H. S. Jayewardene wrote in a dispatch from Colombo published in the November 20 *Far Eastern Economic Review*.

"In some ways," continued Jayewardene, "it was a paradoxical climax to the Trotskyite Perera's 35-year agitation to give the masses a better deal. 'This has been a hard budget for me,' he groaned last week. 'It has not been a pleasant or easy task for me. Poignant memories of the past keep crowding around me. All my life I have fought to ease the burdens of the poor and humble.'"

Perera's budget called, among other things, for "a 25-cent [Ceylonese cents] increase (to one rupee) [one rupee equals US\$0.17] on the second measure of rice issued on the ration; a 15-cent rise (to 48 cents) in flour; a price boost for bread—from 35 cents to 48 cents—and sugar rationing at 2 lbs per month for 72 cents per pound. In addition, the Finance

Minister introduced a five-cent increase in postal rates and told Ceylonese they would have to pay 25 cents every time they visited at governmental hospitals."

The budget extended the country's compulsory savings scheme for another two years. The business turnover tax was "broadened to cover auctioneers, brokers, financial institutions, moneylenders and commission



PERERA: In "gloom and darkness."

agents." In addition Perera "proposed to take over all private distilleries and to slap a registration fee of Rs600 on social clubs. All new permanent appointees to government services, he declared, would contribute to a provident fund or pension scheme."

According to the correspondent of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, these "hopeful efforts to bridge Ceylon's huge (Rs2,220 million) budget deficit were accompanied by further breast-beating by Perera, seemingly penitent even as he gave out the bad news. Some examples: 'I am now the instrument not of easing but of heaping additional burdens on them. Even with a heavy heart I have to act with a vision of the future. Even as we

travel in the midst of gloom and the darkness of the present, I can see a light of distant dawn.'"

Came the dawn sooner than he had anticipated. Two days after Perera's agonized hand-wringing, "Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike decided to defuse such budgetary bombshells as flour and bread price increases following angry protests from both the public and her own backbenchers. Ceylon's lady premier didn't back down without a fight, however. At a special meeting of the government's Parliamentary Group, Mrs Bandaranaike threatened to dissolve Parliament if her rank and file refused to toe the line. They wouldn't and she didn't."

Perera "had expected to net Rs125 million and Rs131 million respectively from his flour and sugar proposals. After they were dropped, he told government backbenchers: 'I will make the changes if you insist, but do not cry out later for jobs for the people.'"

The head of the LSSP paid a heavy price for his political loyalty to the bourgeois coalition regime. He was exposed as standing to the *right* of Bandaranaike. The main blame for the budget proposals fell on his head while the prime minister gained whatever credit was retrievable by withdrawing the worst proposals for the time being.

Jayewardene commented: "Traditionally, finance ministers pressured into withdrawing monetary proposals here have resigned. In 1963, Mrs Bandaranaike's then finance minister (and nephew), Felix Dias Bandaranaike, quit after his idea to cut the rice subsidy was rejected. Although Perera's partymen insist that he need not resign since the budget was not entirely his brainchild, there was every indication last week that the Finance Minister—a strict conformist to Parliamentary ways—would throw in the towel after the offending measures were officially vetoed." □

Memo: Keep Your Mouth Shut

The director general of the U.S. Foreign Service has warned diplomats and their subordinates that any dissenting views they may have on U.S. policy must be kept in State Department channels and not leaked to the press.

"Rogers [Secretary of State William Rogers] hits the ceiling whenever there's bad publicity about the department," explained one official quoted in the November 22 *New York Times*.

REVIEWS

Communist Pioneer of Women's Liberation

The Autobiography of a Sexually Emancipated Communist Woman by Alexandra Kollontai. Herder and Herder, New York, N. Y. 137 pp. \$5.95. 1971.

Two writings of Alexandra Kollontai, hitherto unpublished in English, are brought together under this unfortunate title. With the addition of a largely unnecessary foreword by Germaine Greer and a twenty-eight-page afterword by the book's editor, Irving Fetscher, the two items have been expanded into a \$5.95 hard-cover volume.

Unfortunately, both Greer and Fetscher do little to set Kollontai's ideas and experience into wider historical perspective. While they make much of her participation in the Workers' Opposition and her chafing against the discipline of the Bolsheviks, neither deals with the question of how such an "anti-authoritarian" was later able to adapt to Stalinism.

The autobiographical sketch gives only a tantalizing glimpse of Kollontai's life, and merely hints at her ideas. It is only forty-five pages long and concludes in 1926, some twenty-six years before her death.

The autobiography is translated from the German edition, which was published for the first time in its complete and original form only last year. The editor intended to show, through the use of footnotes and different type styles, Kollontai's changes and frequent deletions from the original text. The result, however, is extremely hard to read and is complicated by apparently independent translations of the text and the footnotes—so that the two together are frequently meaningless in English.

But in spite of these limitations, the autobiography retains its fascination. Kollontai relates her childhood as the daughter of a Russian landowner, her education as "a young society woman," her brief marriage, and the process by which "the happy life of a housewife and spouse became for me a 'cage.' More and more my sympathies, my interests turned to the rev-

olutionary working class of Russia."

Active in the Russian Social Democratic party from 1899, she was finally drawn to the Bolshevik faction by her opposition to the first world war. She returned to Russia from nine years of exile to be a Bolshevik agitator and member of the party Central Committee from February to December 1917 and People's Commissar of Social Welfare in the first Bolshevik government.

The years of her participation in the Workers' Opposition are alluded to briefly when Kollontai describes her resignation from her post because of disagreement with party policy. The sketch concludes with a section on her appointment as the first woman ambassador, assigned to Oslo. It thus omits entirely her later years as an apologist for, and functionary of, the Stalin regime. The extensive deletions from the original text are a painful testament to this compromise with Stalinism. The final text is only a shadow of the original.

A constant theme throughout the autobiography is Kollontai's commitment to the liberation of women. She concludes the autobiography: ". . . it is perfectly clear to me that the complete liberation of the working woman and the creation of the foundation of a new sexual morality will always remain the highest aim of my activity, and of my life."

This total dedication to women's liberation and sexual emancipation cost Kollontai a great deal of pain. The personal struggle to maintain her integrity and to live according to the new morality is shown in such frequently recurring remarks as "I had to break with the man of my choice, otherwise . . . I would have exposed myself to the danger of losing my selfhood," and "So repeatedly the moment inevitably arrived in which I had to shake off the chains of community with an aching heart but with a sovereign, uninfluenced will."

The second part of this book is entitled "The New Woman," and consists of a chapter from her work *The New Morality and the Working Class*,

which was published in German in 1920. It is an exciting description of the emergence of the new woman as reflected in literature celebrating "heroines with independent demands on life, heroines who assert their personality, heroines who protest against the universal servitude of woman in the State, the family, society, who fight for their rights as representatives of their sex."

Reading this section is like running a race, speeding excitedly from one summary to the next as Kollontai describes the bold lives of the new women in contemporary novels—most of them written by women "now bravely baring the secrets of the feminine soul, which up to now were hidden even from artistic insight, and since women writers have begun to speak their own idiom—a wholly feminine idiom—their works, even though at times lacking in artistic beauty, will assume a special value and significance."

It is now fifty years since Kollontai wrote with such unflinching optimism:

"Before us stands woman as personality, before us stands a human being possessing a characteristic value, with her own individuality, who asserts herself—in short, the woman who has broken the rusted fetters of her sex."

Her words stand both as inspiration and as bitter testimony to how little progress toward women's liberation has been made in the last half-century.

—Helen Jarvis

Inside Stalin's Prison Camps

Nothing But the Truth by Joseph Berger. John Day Company, New York, N. Y. 286 pp. \$8.95. 1971.

Joseph Berger, at one time general secretary of the Communist party of Palestine and head of the Stalinized Comintern's Near East Department in 1932-33, was only one of the thousands of Soviet and foreign Stalinists caught up in the purges of the 1930s. Arrested in January 1935 for allegedly making remarks critical of Stalin, he spent twenty-one years in concentration camps and was twice sentenced to death.

While he appears to have learned

remarkably little from his experiences, Berger's accounts of the prisoners he met and the operations of Stalin's insatiable secret-police apparatus are often fascinating and occasionally contain useful insights.

Concerning the seemingly senseless arrests of writers, for example, he observes:

"If, for instance, [Vladimir M.] Kirshon was arrested for specific words which he had actually written, and this was made known to other writers, the aim would not in fact be achieved, for the event would merely be a proof of an added need for caution. For the required 'fear of God' to exist, writers—especially important writers who could not be accused of anything—had to vanish for no known reason; later it was said that they had been shot as spies, diversionists and so forth. It was precisely this incomprehensible element, the fact that punishment fell at unexpected times and on unexpected victims, that created the general sense of insecurity and fear which was an incomparably stronger deterrent than any concrete accusation."

Some of the situations created by the Stalinist repression would be considered too improbable to make good fiction. Berger describes the career of Lev Ilyich Inzhir, a Menshevik who found a place in the state apparatus even though he still disapproved of the Bolsheviks taking power in 1917. Arrested in 1930 and forced to confess to "crimes" he had not committed, Inzhir was offered his release in exchange for becoming an informer. For eight years he was able to revenge himself on the Communist party by secretly accusing party members who were loyal to Stalin but who were nevertheless shipped off to the prison camps.

More remarkable is the fact that so many of the prisoners Berger met remained unbroken by their torments. He provides a particularly moving account of a three-month hunger strike conducted in the winter of 1936-37 by men, women, and children in the camp at Vorkuta, where most of the prisoners were Trotskyists.

After the strike had been broken—by first granting the concessions demanded and then retracting them a few weeks later—Stalin decided on the physical elimination of these prisoners.

"One day in the autumn [of 1937]

the brick factory was cordoned off by special guards. The prisoners were given two days' rations and their transfer to another camp was announced. This was astonishing news as by then the weather had virtually cut off all links with the rest of the world.

"All that was known at Vorkuta for some time was that the Trotskyists—in their rags and with their two days' rations—were marched off into the forest at night, and that two days later the guards returned with only a few prisoners who had been included by mistake. But from them the news gradually leaked out.

"A day's march away, the convoy came on a set of temporary shacks. There the prisoners were locked up. Their names were checked against a list and then, group by group, they were called out and machine-gunned. Some struggled, shouted slogans and fought the guards to the last. The guards, as usual on such occasions, were half drunk.

"When it was over, the guards poured paraffin over the bodies and the rags and set them alight. For a long time the bonfire burned deep in the forest."

Despite the countless crimes he witnessed or personally experienced, Berger displays a remarkable inclination to forgive those responsible. The last chapter of the book, in which he attempts to assess the question of blame,

is by far the least adequate in dealing with his subject.

Berger shows no understanding of the social forces that Stalinism represents, and he is consequently reduced to asking what can be done by individuals.

"My belief," he writes, "is that neither Bulganin, nor Mikoyan, nor Khrushchev, nor Molotov, nor Kaganovich could have altered the course of events. Any attempt to disagree would have ended in disaster for themselves and all their circle without any good having been achieved."

In another passage, he says of Stalin's accomplices and successors:

"... the fact that once they ceased to be slaves [i.e., with Stalin's death] some of them did what they could to undo the injustices, seemed to me, and to others, to make it more constructive to assist these leaders in their present task than to blame them for their past misdeeds."

Berger ignores the fact that the tactical changes introduced after Stalin's death were in no way a change in the nature of the bureaucracy whose interests were served by Stalin's terror. The parasitic caste responsible for Berger's twenty-one years in prison camps is today still in command, defending its special interests by confining dissident intellectuals in the notorious psychiatric prison-hospitals.

—David Burton

The Fight Against Nixon's Wage Freeze

The Wage Price Freeze Swindle by Les Evans and Linda Jenness. Pathfinder Press, New York, N. Y. 23 pp. \$0.35, £0.15. 1971.

This new pamphlet analyzes the meaning of Nixon's economic measures over the last three-and-a-half months, and suggests measures that will have to be adopted by the American workers if they are to defend their standard of living against Nixon's assault.

In an article originally published in somewhat longer form in the October 1971 *International Socialist Review*, Les Evans debunks the myth that wages are responsible for inflation. He shows how Nixon was forced to introduce the wage freeze by the

need to protect U. S. capitalism against the advances of foreign competitors and the expenses of its war in Indochina. In the process, he demonstrates on the basis of previous history and Nixon's current moves why the "price freeze" is a fraud.

Linda Jenness, the 1972 presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers party, responds to Nixon's "Phase Two" program with a call for a congress of labor "to begin working out labor's alternative program to combat inflation and unemployment."

The fight for such a program, she points out, would lead in the direction of a labor party to defend the interests of the working class against Republicans and Democrats alike. □

For Unity in Action Against the Franco Dictatorship!

[A pitched battle between striking Spanish workers at the Seat automobile factory in Barcelona made the front page of *Le Monde* October 20. "Some four thousand workers . . . held out for four hours on Monday October 18 against the forces of order trying to expel them from the factory," the Paris daily wrote.

"According to witnesses, a violent battle took place. While the police charged on horseback, launching tear-gas bombs and firing their guns, the workers threw cans of burning gasoline, iron bars, hammers, etc., at the forces of order. At 5:00 p.m., all resistance ceased and the workers were expelled by force. A large number were arrested. While their comrades were fighting inside the factory, several thousand Seat workers were demonstrating in the center of Barcelona, trying to 'lay siege' to the provincial headquarters of the official trade unions."

[*Le Monde's* correspondent, José-Antonio Novais, noted: "These incidents are among the most violent that have taken place between police and workers under the present regime."

[The conflict began last summer, according to *Le Monde*, when the Seat management dismissed about twenty workers who complained about working conditions on the night shift. Despite continuing protests by the workers and a court order for reinstatement, the company refused to allow the dismissed workers to return to their jobs.

[On October 18 nine of the ousted workers managed to get into the plant and occupy their old posts. When the management ordered them to leave, 7,000 workers downed tools. Some 4,000 of them stayed to fight when the police were called in.

"These violent incidents illustrate the extremely tough attitude the authorities have taken in recent months toward labor conflicts," Novais wrote.

[The following statement on the new rise of workers' struggles in Spain was issued October 27 by the Political Bureau of the Liga Comunista

Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Communist League, a group adhering to the Fourth International). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The struggle of the workers in Asturias, Pamplona, and Barcelona is the advance wave of a general political struggle rising from one end of the country to the other and trying to burst through the Francoist dikes.

Incapable of meeting the most acutely felt needs of the workers and the popular masses, the dictatorship has sought to contain them by stepping up the repression. But this has only forced the mass movement to take a leap forward in its forms of struggle. The nature of this leap was indicated by the mobilizations against the military trials in Burgos. The workers went on the offensive, attempting a mass political strike and clashing at some points with the repressive forces. Now all major workers' struggles tend to take on a political and general character, forcing the proletariat to develop forms of self-defense against the dictatorship's immediate resort to criminal, repressive attacks.

The recent building-workers' strike in Madrid clearly indicated the methods the Francoists are ready to use to block the extension of the movement, thus also indicating the difficulties the workers must be prepared to overcome in order to win their demands. Fearing the spread of the strike, the Grises [Grays, the Civil Guard] militarily occupied the work sites and did not hesitate to shoot Pedro Patiño in the back.

In Asturias, the major employer is the state itself. It was the cabinet that gave the ultimatum to the miners, threatening to close more shafts. In order to wage an effective struggle, unity of all the miners, both those working for HUNOSA and private companies, was necessary. In order to defend themselves against the in-

creased repression, all the workers, all those oppressed by the dictatorship, will have to unite, and the beginnings of such unity have already appeared in the solidarity actions of the construction workers and the Asturian small shopkeepers.

In Pamplona the struggle of the workers at Imenasa and Kaplan started originally over a demand for a general wage increase of 2,000 pesetas a month [one peseta equals US-\$0.0143]. But facing a bourgeoisie trapped by the economic crisis, the workers clashed directly with the state in the person of an "arbitrator," who tried to impose the bosses' conditions on them.

The state is also one of the main shareholders in Seat. The dictatorship's laws (a decision by the courts calling for reinstatement of dismissed workers) are being mocked by the state itself in its role as employer, thus forcing the workers to compel the reinstatement of their comrades by their own strength. The initial non-violent character of the action, carefully fostered by the PCE [Partido Comunista de España—Communist party of Spain], was shattered when the state authorities ordered a violent police charge against the workers. Was there anything strange then about the fact that a few hours later the workers were demonstrating with clenched fists held high?

Should we be surprised at the struggles that developed in many provincial factories in support of the Seat workers and the feeling of solidarity spreading throughout Spain? No. All the oppressed and exploited identify the repression menacing Asturias and Barcelona with what they themselves have had to face. They see the Seat workers' fight as part of their own, of the battle that must be waged to overthrow the dictatorship.

The struggles against the Burgos trials and the boycott of the official union elections has shown that it is possible to undertake such a battle. The murders in Erandio, Granada and Eibar, the murder of Pedro Pa-

tiño, the shooting in Pamplona and at Seat show that such a battle must be waged to end the dictatorship's criminal course. These crimes were not accidental; they are the only recourse left to a bourgeoisie incapable of making any concession even though it sees its instruments of repression crumbling under the pressure of the mass movement.

Every time the movement threatens to become general, the dictatorship has to step up the repression—occupy the work sites in Madrid, fire on the Seat workers gathered in an assembly. But the only effect of this repression is to force the workers to adopt more advanced forms of struggle—demonstrations and barricades in Pamplona, defense of the occupation at Seat. Then, the bourgeoisie's only answer is to start shooting, to start shooting and close ranks in preparation to defend their domination, arms in hand if necessary. The panic that spread through the bourgeoisie in the first days of the struggle at Seat, the appeals to the holy alliance of all pigs in society to defend their privileges, have left no doubt about the intentions and the methods of the ruling class.

Once the bourgeoisie's first moment of fright was over, it returned to its tactic of isolating, compartmentalizing, and severely repressing local struggles, trying to prevent them from spreading and at the same time trying to avoid provoking outbreaks in other places. It has begun an operation aimed at disorganizing the vanguard. Virtually all news about the struggles in Asturias, Pamplona, and Barcelona has been blacked out, while the repressive apparatus is concentrating on these points. In each of these localities, individual centers have been singled out. The government is trying to crack them by offering insignificant concessions (returning the work-books the police took from the Seat workers) and by opening a new repression (sanctions, firings, arrests).

There can be no doubt that if these measures prove insufficient to contain the movement, the escalation of the repression will continue. Even at the cost of painful temporary reverses, the workers will draw the required lessons and step up their fight, consolidating forms of struggle such as those advanced with the barricades in Hernani, Eibar, and Pamplona, as well as with the defense of the Seat

occupation, and developing other, new forms of struggle.

At present the problem is to extend the movement in Asturias, Pamplona, and Barcelona to the entire country. We must combine all the experience of these and past struggles in order to advance toward a general political struggle capable of blocking the bourgeoisie's repression against these points, breaking the encirclement and forcing the dictatorship to retreat.

In order to prepare the way for such a struggle, we must go outside the bourgeoisie's legal channels from the start. The example of Asturias, Pamplona, and Barcelona must be spread throughout the country. In the first place, the struggle has been developing outside the legal channels practically since 1962. In Pamplona the workers at Imenasa boycotted the official union elections, and the bourgeoisie is concentrating on trying to get them to choose a legal representative and sign a contract. In Barcelona, the Seat workers—with the exception of those in Workshop No. 5—voted in the official elections. They had to go through this whole experience in a few days, seeing how the intermediaries and representatives they chose got fired, seeing the uselessness of the courts.

Outside the legal channels of the dictatorship, the direct struggle of the masses can develop in forms doing the greatest possible damage to the bourgeoisie, such as work stoppages, strikes, as well as factory assemblies and militant mass walkouts. Actions can be developed like the one carried out by the night-shift workers at Seat. When they learned that their comrades on the day shift had occupied the factory and when they found their way into the plant barred, they demonstrated in the streets of Barcelona. Another example is the Lamparas Z workers. They stopped production in solidarity and went out onto the lawn and into the street to harass the police.

The lessons can be applied from the experiences of other struggles, such as those of the building workers in Seville and Tarrasa during the Burgos trials and in Barcelona during the recent strike in the construction industry. In these cases, pickets spread the strike through the work sites and factories.


These determined forms of struggle can spread a strike, extending it from the vanguard factories that begin the

movement (like MTA, Cispalsa, Siemens, Pirelli, Clausor, and Bellaterra, for example, in Barcelona) to other sectors of workers which have not yet mobilized. The problem is to unify the movement, not just in time, with simultaneous strikes and work stoppages, but in action, moving from demonstrations at the plant gates to centralized demonstrations. Thus, the Imenasa workers, joined by the workers from the other factories in this industrial area and by the students and others, confronted the police as a united force.

The movement must be spread not only among workers but among students, doctors, professors, etc., in an attempt to win the active support of the majority of the population. In the struggles against the Burgos trials, this was achieved in many towns like Guipuzcoa. It has begun to happen in Asturias, with the small merchants joining in the struggle. It has begun also in Barcelona, with the students and some doctors who have expressed their support for the Seat workers; and in Valencia, Madrid, and Bilbao, where the students have started a movement of solidarity with the Seat and Asturias workers.

This solidarity must be focused by means of political slogans against the dictatorship, slogans that can give expression to the masses' discontent and determination to struggle and help them achieve unity for a concerted attack on the common enemy.

To organize and lead this broad



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movement, united and democratic organizations must be set up, directly linked to the masses in struggle. These organizations can only take the form of committees elected in assemblies and subject to recall. They must take charge of organizing and defending struggles. They must create picket squads composed of militant workers and prepare them from the start, so that when the inevitable confrontation with the police occurs, these groups will be as numerous as possible, be perfectly organized, and have a plan for defending assemblies, demonstrations, etc.

The Seat workers had to improvise their defense on the run, without any plan, using automobile parts, oil, water hoses, etc., as weapons. Experience shows the effectiveness of defending mass actions. In the AEG strike the police did not dare arrest anyone when the workers left the plant in a compact formation, protecting the leaders. Demonstrations defended by pickets have offered a hundred times fewer victims to the repression than the nonviolent strolls so much appreciated by the PCE bureaucrats.

The way to make the dictatorship retreat, as it did in the case of the Burgos trials, is through a direct struggle of the masses in the plants and in the streets developing outside of the legal channels. This struggle must be organized by committees elected in assemblies and subject to recall; it must be defended by pickets and combat squads; it must be spread throughout the country. This is the way to unite and organize the workers, who can lead all the exploited and oppressed strata of the people toward overthrowing the dictatorship. And it is impossible to meet the needs of the workers and the oppressed and exploited layers without overthrowing the dictatorship.

Only a government truly representing the interests of the working masses, based on the armed and mobilized masses of working people, can assure that the dictatorship will be effectively destroyed. Only a government of the workers, elected in a congress of delegates from workers' committees and assemblies, can ensure lasting democratic liberties and demolish the repressive apparatus of the dictatorship. Only such a government can establish workers' control of production and expropriate the main capitalist groups without compensation,

thus laying the basis for a dictatorship of the proletariat and opening up the way toward socialism.

The only way that the working class and the exploited masses can be defended effectively today against the attacks of the Francoist dictatorship, the only way the conditions can be prepared for the overthrow of this regime and its replacement by a socialist republic based on the democracy of workers' councils, is through the direct action of the masses.

Advance along this road requires at the same time redoubling our struggles against the decayed capitalist system and combating all reformist illusions in the working class. These illusions are spread not only by the bourgeoisie but also by some working-class leaderships. The most prominent of these is the PCE, which is tied to the Soviet bureaucracy and its policy of "peaceful coexistence." These illusions represent an important brake on the mass struggle and have the effect of liquidating it. The struggle of the Seat workers is rich in examples of this.

For instance, the respect for legal channels advocated by the PCE contained and dissipated the militancy of the workers in the CNS, in negotiating through intermediaries and representatives, in dialogues with the company and relying on the courts.

In recent months the failure of this policy has been clear. It has won nothing more than crumbs from the company and led to many firings, including all the militant intermediaries and representatives. The dismissed workers forcing their way into the plant with pickets was a belated reaction against all this legalism. However, the facts showed that when the PCE moves back two inches from legalism, it is only to jump a few feet further into it.

Thus, the Seat assembly tried to become a school for teaching good manners in dealing with the bourgeoisie (it said that its only objective was to get the court decision respected by having a dialogue with the company and the cops of the Brigada Social). It tried to offer a course, too, in fighting the revolutionists who, with the police at the gates, were proposing the organization of defense for the assembly. The police charge provoked a reaction from the Seat workers, whose class instinct was much more

powerful than Carrillista¹ speeches. The next morning the PCE decided to take a half step to the left, supporting the workers who marched down the Via Layetana holding up clenched fists. But this was only a feint so that the PCE could then take a dozen steps to the right, trying to get the workers to lock themselves up in the cathedral or the episcopal palace.

After being outrun by events time after time, with Seat workers suspended and fined and some arrested, the PCE seemed to take up the tasks of extending the strike as a simple mechanical operation. To judge by the kind of agitation and activity that were carried on, the militancy of the workers and the independent action of the revolutionists carried things much further than the PCE wanted. Finally, on Saturday October 23, the PCE decided to call a demonstration in the Plaza Cataluña, but it made no provision for pickets or any kind of defense. Those who tried to have an organized demonstration had to contend with the PCE pacifists before police intervention broke the march up. Later a general day of struggle was called for October 29. Once again there were attempts to divert the actions toward the class collaboration required by the PCE's Pacto de la Libertad [Freedom Pact] with the bourgeoisie.²

Many members of the PCE, like those from Rubi and Sabadell, joined with the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria [Revolutionary Communist League, a group adhering to the Fourth International] in putting out a joint leaflet that said "the party has learned its lesson now." But learning its lesson did not mean making a temporary concession in order to take it all, and then some, back later on.

A policy calling consistently for direct mass struggle of the working class as a whole against the bourgeoisie as a whole can only be developed on the basis of revolutionary Marxism. It can be developed only by using Marxist tools to formulate a strategy for a revolutionary seizure of power and to build the party capable of taking charge of elaborating and im-

1. Santiago Carrillo is the general secretary of the PCE. — *IP*

2. The PCE has collaborated with various bourgeois groupings opposed to the Franco regime, at least in its present form. — *IP*

plementing this strategy. A party of this type becomes a more urgent need every day because of the rise of the class struggle and Francoist repression. This has reached the point where the spread of the struggle throughout the country can now be effectively promoted only by a revolutionary Marxist organization striving tenaciously to become the embryo of such a party. These demands of the class struggle condemn to impotence all those organizations that claim to have broken with the class-collaborationist policy of the PCE but have not dedicated themselves consistently to building the revolutionary party.

We revolutionary Marxists do not think that we can eliminate all petty-bourgeois illusions from the vanguard with a stroke of the pen. We do not think that we can convince the militant activists in the PCE, the unions, and the various centrist groups immediately. But we do believe that, no matter

what our differences, this is the time to unite all forces in order to extend the struggle begun in Asturias, Pamplona, and Barcelona, to widen the fight in those areas and to start it up in the rest of the country.

The need of the moment is the unity in action of all fighters who support direct mass struggle and class struggle, who want to transform the present battles into a nationwide assault on the dictatorship. To this end, the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria proposes the following:

1. Forming committees to extend the struggles in Asturias, Pamplona, and Barcelona—to prepare the way for solidarity actions and for widening the struggle against the dictatorship.

2. Calling work stoppages, strikes, assemblies, and organized walkouts in the factories, universities, high schools, etc. Extending the struggle by sending pickets out from these as-

semblies. Holding central street demonstrations.

3. Organizing assemblies that can elect and recall committees taking the leadership of the struggle.

4. Defending all actions against Francoist repression with pickets and combat groups.

5. Extending the struggle for:

*A 3,000-peseta raise for all workers.
A forty-hour week.*

Reinstatement of all dismissed workers.

*Release of the political prisoners.
Police out of the factories, neighborhoods, and universities.*

Abolition of the armed police, the Guardia Civil and the Brigada Social, and the special tribunals.

*The right to strike and demonstrate,
the right of assembly and association.*

Down with the murderous dictatorship! □

Manifesto of Bolivian Front Against the Dictatorship

[We have translated the following statement from the November 14 issue of *Siglo*, an organ of the Chilean Communist party.]

* * *

La Paz

People of Bolivia:

The August 21 coup imposed a fascist government on Bolivia, a government in the service of Yankee imperialism and the antinational forces.

The coup was aimed both at blocking the achievement of national liberation—as the consequence of the popular mobilization—and at ousting a democratic and antifascist regime. The Banzer-Selich government is the product of a coordinated action by the CIA and the Brazilian "gorillas." In this operation, they used reactionary and venal military officers, who relied on the complicity of the FSB [Falange Socialista Boliviana — Bolivian Socialist Falange] and the corrupt right wing of the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario — Revolutionary Nationalist Movement].

The fascist coup was staged because Bolivia had become a danger point for Yankee imperialism, an advanced

position in the revolutionary rise in Latin America. The coup could not be carried out bloodlessly. The murderous assault was met with heroic popular resistance in La Paz, Oruro, and Santa Cruz, in which workers, students, revolutionary officers, progressive priests, and peasants gave their lives.

The dictatorship is the executioner of the Bolivian people. In order to maintain itself in power against the will of the people, the regime is using methods like slaughtering defenseless blue- and white-collar workers and teachers; massive arrests and detention in concentration camps, as well as exile; suppressing the freedom of the press and other civil liberties; repressing the progressive religious movement; shutting down the universities and denying Bolivian youth the right to study; eliminating university autonomy; bombing dormitories; returning the lands of the peasants to the big landowners; and violating the legal rights of trade unions. Political terror has been elevated into a method of government. Stories are being invented about guerrillas as an excuse for shooting the political prisoners.

These bloody methods are being

used to consummate the sellout of the country to imperialism. From the first day, before the bodies of the fighters were even buried, the fascists and their hangers-on have been paying the price of the aid they got from imperialism and the Brazilian "gorilla" regime. Thus, they announced and are carrying out the following measures—denationalizing the petroleum industry as well as the commercial exploitation of mining by-products; the sellout of the Mutún iron to imperialism; capitulation in the case of the Matilde mine; the sellout of our antimony and the foundries; and the return of the Pujre mine to its former owners.

When we think of the people murdered, shot, and tortured, we must understand that Banzer and Selich are only the executors of a plan for which the responsibility falls directly on the United States.

This government is not a government of Bolivians; it is a puppet regime of the Yankees. Before the coup, those who now hold power threatened to dismember the national territory by seditious means. Today they are parceling it out to the international consortia. Foreign hands prepared the

coup, and the power is now in the hands of foreigners.

It is evident that the August coup was directed against national independence and sovereignty, against the liberty and fundamental rights of the Bolivian people. It is also clear that the coup could not be consummated without eliminating the progressive sectors of the Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación [Armed Forces of the Nation], which were beginning to take their place in the process of liberating the country. And, finally, it is obvious that the coup was directed against the popular will to achieve national liberation. Therefore, the need is undeniable to build a fighting unity of all the revolutionary, democratic, and progressive forces so that the great battle can be begun in conditions offering a real perspective for a popular and national government.

This is not a struggle that can be carried through to victory with the support of only one part of the oppressed people. This is not a battle that concerns only one sector of the exploited people, or one class, institution, or party. This is a struggle between the majority of the now oppressed Bolivian people and the reactionary dictatorship of Banzer. Any form of sectarianism is counterrevolutionary. Let us be worthy of the sacrifice of those who fell August 21 defending Bolivia.

Our unshirkable task is to close ranks around the FRA [Frente Revolucionario Antiimperialista—Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Front], organized by the forces that fought in the battle of August, to win political power for the people. Every factory, every mine, every village, every former ranch and latifundium will become a front line in the people's struggle for liberation. The people have not been defeated; to the contrary, they are on their feet.


We warn the imperialists and the native reactionaries that the weapons in this struggle will be those they themselves force us to take up. All-out repressive violence reigns today in Bolivia. We put them on warning that they cannot use such methods with impunity, that the people will respond with the same force that is used against them.

Our goal is not just to eject the dictatorship from the Palacio Quemado. We propose to establish a government of Bolivians under the leadership of

the proletariat, the ruling class of the revolutionary process.

From the underground we declare that we have formed the Frente Revolucionario Antiimperialista, which today assumes the leadership of the struggle that will end in the crushing of the fascist beast and in the final victory.

All acts of resistance must be directed in accordance with the tactics



Ahora

HUGO BANZER SUAREZ

of struggle adopted by the Frente. Every measure in defense of a persecuted patriot, prisoner, or exile; every action to rescue the natural resources and political sovereignty of Bolivia; every step in defense of university autonomy, of freedom of the press and the code of trade-union rights, in short the entire battle, must be directed with the following in mind. The Frente Revolucionario Antiimperialista (FRA) is not only the instrument for ousting the dictatorship but the power by which the people will win their rights and Bolivia will consolidate its independent existence.

We call for a mobilization of all Bolivians to snatch the patriots suffering in the concentration camps and jails from the claws of the "gorillas,"

to save those who are in imminent danger of being shot.

We appeal to all Bolivians, we ask the international solidarity of the revolutionary parties and movements, of the trade-union and people's organizations throughout the world, we urge all to unite in the defense of the mining towns facing an imminent threat of military invasion. The fascists are getting ready for a new "Noche de San Juan."¹ We must unite to block this massacre!

Our struggle has begun. We warn the imperialists and their satellites that no concession wrested from the puppet regime—a regime they themselves have created—will be recognized by the People's Government. The Bolivian people—who have never been terrified by tyrants or the rigors of battle—are determined to face any kind of struggle against the dictatorship.

We call upon the workers, the peasants, the university and high-school students, the revolutionaries in the armed forces and the police, noncommissioned officers and cadets, on the men and women of Bolivia, to join us and struggle in the ranks of the Frente Revolucionario Antiimperialista (FRA).

*War to the death against fascism.
Stop another "Noche de San Juan."
Reopen the universities and restore
their autonomy.
Defend our oil, agriculture, and
mines.
Forge the unity of workers, peasants,
students and revolutionary
officers.*

November 1971

Signed: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Mayor Rubén Sánchez Valdivia); Partido Comunista de Bolivia [Communist party of Bolivia]; Partido Revolucionario de Izquierda Nacional [Revolutionary party of the Nationalist Left]; Partido Obrero Revolucionario Masas [Revolutionary Workers party—Masas];² Partido

1. On St. John's day in June 1965, the government of Rene Barrientos sent the army into the mining towns to crush the trade-union organizations. — IP

2. There are two POR's in Bolivia, usually distinguished by the names of their respective leaders, Guillermo Lora and Hugo Gonzalez Moscoso. The Lora group's paper is *Masas*; the Gonzalez group's is *Combate*. — IP

Obrero Revolucionario Combate [Revolutionary Workers party — *Combate*]; Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario [Movement of the Revolutionary Left]; Partido Comunista de Bolivia Marxista-Leninista [Marxist-Leninist

Communist party of Bolivia]; Ejército de Liberación Nacional [National Liberation Army]; Partido Socialista de Bolivia [Socialist party of Bolivia]; General Juan José Torres González, ex-president of Bolivia.

to Loncoche.

After that, more and more vehicles began arriving filled with armed landlords. They began to encircle the group of peasants.

The attack by the landlords lasted more than three hours, until our compañero Moisés Huentelaf fell fighting in the front line, and two other compañeros were wounded.

At the conclusion of the barrage, three more policemen arrived from Loncoche and started shooting along with the landlords.

Afterward, all the peasants who took part in the seizure of the ranch were arrested. They are still being held incommunicado. This included the vice-chairman of the Agrupación de Asentamiento¹ de Loncoche [Loncoche Community Group], Villarrica y Pucón, and compañero Félix Huentelaf. The chairman of the Michimalonco Asentamiento, compañero Armando Cayufllo, has also been jailed and is being held incommunicado.

Day and night more than 100 policemen from Valdivia and Loncoche have been persecuting the peasants, raiding their houses, beating them, and killing their livestock. The judge has not jailed Muñoz Millán, the one member of the armed group of landlords who was wounded, who must have been shot by one of his own companions. But at the same time, the judge is holding the peasant compañeros, some of them wounded, in jail and incommunicado.

More than twenty landlords participated in the attack, and only four have been arrested.

The judge and the Loncoche captain of police ordered us to limit the viewing for our compañero Moisés Huentelaf. We were told that we could keep his body for only one night at the headquarters of the Arturo Prat union local, which is affiliated to the Confederación Ránquil. He had to be buried early the next morning.

As for the Comité Político de la Unidad Popular de Loncoche, it has washed its hands of the affair and blames the death of our compañero Moisés on the compañeros of the MIR. But none of the peasants and none of the workers have been fooled; they

1. "Asentamientos" are communities established on expropriated land in accordance with the agrarian reform law. They are supposed to provide training in cooperative management of the land. — IP

Huentelaf—Chilean Peasant Militant

[We have translated the following speech by Alejandro Manque, a national leader of the Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario (Revolutionary Peasant Movement), from the November 1-15 issue of *El Rebelde*, the organ of the Chilean MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left.)]

* * *

Compañeras y compañeros, workers, peasants, ill-housed, and students.

In the name of the Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario we pay revolutionary homage in this great assembly to our compañero Moisés Huentelaf, who gave his life fighting for the cause of the peasants in the Loncoche region, on the Chesque ranch, where more than 850 hectares of land lie completely abandoned.

Martin Doyharcabal shamelessly exploited the six laborers working on this ranch. He paid neither their social security nor their family allotments; he made them work more than eight hours a day.

Together with the Jiménez family, the Grunnels, and the Barrientos, Martín Doyharcabal devoted himself to training the armed groups of landlords in Loncoche. Seeing all this injustice, the workers in the area decided to join with the pensioners and

organize themselves in a Comité de Vigilancia de la Producción [Vigilance Committee to Maintain Production]. This committee was named the *Cicalal*, a word that means "fearless."

For more than eight months this committee pressed the need for the government to expropriate the Chesque ranch. The question was getting bogged down in the official channels of government functionaries and local authorities, and the situation of the compañeros in the Comité *Cicalal* was growing daily more intolerable. The compañeros sent appeals to the Department of the Interior, to the Consejo Communal Campesinos [Peasant Communal Council], the Regional Bureau of CORA [Corporación de Reforma Agraria—Agrarian Reform Corporation], etc., etc.

At one point the Comité Político [Political Committee] of the Loncoche Unidad Popular [Popular Unity, the ruling coalition, which has organized local support groups] promised to help the peasants solve their problems. But nothing positive came from this either.

Finally, the Chesque ranch was occupied.

The MCR's Comité de Lucha por la Tierra [Struggle Committee to Win the Land] carried out the seizure on Friday, October 22, at 4:00 in the afternoon. It succeeded, taking advantage of the absence of the landlord.

As soon as a barricade was built on the border of the estate, Martín Doyharcabal arrived, opening fire without warning from outside the ranch. He broke the placards and seized, tore up, and burned the banners. Then he returned to the town in search of reinforcements. He reappeared with four more latifundistas, armed with high-powered rifles and lots of ammunition. At the same time four police arrived to investigate the seizure. These four policemen saw the landlords' weapons and heard their shooting. They escorted the latifundistas to their houses and then returned

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know perfectly well that it was armed groups of landlords that attacked and killed our compañero Moisés Huentelaf and that these same groups are attacking the government.

We agricultural workers and peasants organized in the MCR will continue struggling determinedly against the landlords and against the agrarian bourgeoisie to win bread, land, and a socialist revolution.

The best tribute we can give to our compañero Moisés Huentelaf will be to achieve the ideals for which he gave his life. Compañero Moisés Huentelaf's example shows us the road of struggle against injustice, against poverty, against hunger. At the same time, it shows us the path of revolutionary solidarity among the exploited of our country. Compañero Moisés was already recognized as a homesteader; through the struggle he had won land and work. But that was not enough for him. He continued fighting alongside his compañeros who still had no bread and no land.

We agricultural workers and peasants of the MCR will continue fighting to take all the land in the hands of the ranchers, in the hands of the agrarian bourgeoisie. We will not pay one peso for this land, because it belongs to all the workers. Paying for the land would be like paying for water, air, sunlight.

Nor will we pay for livestock and machinery, because everything that is produced in this country is the product of our labor, of the working class. We refuse also to leave the reserva-

tion, because what we want is a Chile without exploitation, without bosses, a socialist Chile.

We are fighting and will keep on fighting the enemies of the agricultural workers and peasants—the landlords, the agrarian bourgeoisie. Because it is the bourgeoisie that prevents the land from being worked. It lets it lie idle, without producing the food that Chile needs. That is why the agrarian bourgeoisie is responsible for the hunger and exploitation of the rural workers.

Therefore, we have never attacked and will never attack the owners of middle-sized farms. To the contrary, we know that they are also exploited, that the agrarian bourgeoisie deprives them of credit and technical assistance, and prevents them from selling their produce.

Then, the middle-sized farmers will understand that they must support the rural poor and that the workers on the land will assure their future.

The Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario is made up of agricultural workers and peasants. Fighting in its ranks are tenants, small farmers, day laborers, landless peasants, and pensioners. That is, our Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario is an organization of the rural poor.

And because of this, the small owners will not let themselves be hoodwinked by the politicians of the Partido Nacional [National party, the right-wing bourgeois party] and the Democracia Cristiana [Christian Democracy], who never cared anything about them before. During the Alessandri government, the small farmers continued to be exploited, and under the Frei government they were totally ignored.

Our organization has arisen out of the struggle of the Mapuche² small farmers fighting for the land stolen from their communities by the landlords.

And we have continued this fight because we have been joined by the Chilean small farmers, along with the tenants, day laborers, and pensioners. And this great united force of agricultural workers and peasants has given impetus to seizures of landed estates and the development of Consejos Comunales [Community Councils] and the agrarian reform.

Our entire struggle has the objective of winning a new agrarian reform law. We want a revolutionary law that will expropriate all the land, livestock, and machinery of the agrarian bourgeoisie and give it to the rural workers so that these tenants, day laborers, pensioners, landless peasants, and small farmers can use it productively without landlords exploiting them.

We want a revolutionary law guaranteeing the middle-sized farmers credit, technical assistance, and a fair price for their products.

We want a revolutionary law guaranteeing the right of the small farmers to their land and to an increase in acreage where necessary. At the same time such a law should guarantee the small farmers credit, technical assistance, and an adequate market for their produce.

But we know that we can only win a new agrarian reform law through struggle, through action, and not by talking to the deputies and senators holed up in the parliament.

Moreover, we will destroy the laws made by the bourgeoisie and the legal system that favors them; we will struggle for a system of real justice in the hands of the workers.

We are fighting to get the laws made and enforced by the workers and to end the crimes and stalling of the bureaucracy and the functionaries allied with the landlords.

So, then, the Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario has been uniting all the agricultural workers and peasants. In this way we are building a better organization and becoming more aware of our interests and our future.

Through our struggle we are forging a strong alliance of workers and peasants with the homeless and the students, an alliance that represents a devastating force capable of smashing any barrier the landlords and factory owners put in the way of the people.

We are fighting and will keep on fighting for bread, land, and a socialist revolution until we win all power for the workers. Comandante Guevara has shown us the way, the example of our compañero Luciano Cruz has shown us the way, as well as the example of the latest of our compañeros struck down by the bullets of the bourgeoisie. Nothing will stop us, compañero Moisés. Ever onward to the victory!

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2. An Indian tribe in southern Chile. — IP