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
the Americas

Vol. 9, No. 42

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November 29, 1971

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The New York Times

HOW MUCH LONGER?

Opposition Meeting in Catalonia

Perhaps the largest anti-Franco meeting successfully held in Spain since the civil war, took place in or around Barcelona on November 7. Coming in the wake of the massive workers' struggles in Catalonia and Asturias, the gathering left the government "noticeably shaken," according to a *New York Times* report. Five participants were later arrested.

In preparation for one year, the "first assembly of the democratic forces of Catalonia" was attended by about 300 persons, including representatives of more than twenty clandestine political parties, trade unions, student and professional groups, and Catholic rank-and-file organizations. The participants, ranging in political views from monarchist to far left, were able to agree on an action program of democratic demands, according to the November 11 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*. These included amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, freedom to exercise democratic liberties, reinstatement of a 1932 statute providing for Catalanian autonomy, and the establishment of commissions to develop ways of fighting to implement the program.

A statement issued by the assembly described its aims as "the overthrow of the regime of General Franco and the thwarting of the maneuvers to maintain the present regime through the reign of Prince Juan Carlos, and finally, the opening of democratic options for the country."

A "permanent commission" was established by the assembly to work toward arranging a second meeting some time in the future. Many of the speeches and motions put forward at the five-hour-long assembly came from workers' organizations. One representative of the workers' commission described the Barcelona strikes as the "contribution of the working class to the struggle against the dictatorship." A telegram of solidarity was even received from a Catalanian bishop.

Last May an attempt to hold a similar assembly was broken up by police. Smaller underground meetings have occurred before, but the November 7 conference was the first one at which a common democratic program was formulated. □

In This Issue

		SPAIN	
	1026	Opposition Meeting in Catalonia	U. S. A.
Allen Myers	1027	Renewed Controversy Over Indochina War	
	1029	Women March for Legal Right to Abortion	
	1035	Newton, Soledad Brothers Go on Trial	
		CHINA	
	1028	Mystery Deepens Over Fate of Mao's Successor	
Mary-Alice Waters	1030	Chinese Delegates Take Seats in the United Nations	
		CANADA	
Carl Fleming	1031	Huge Antiwar Demonstrations Staged	
		DENMARK	
	1032	Anti-Market Rally Hears Mandel, Krivine	
	1042	Revolutionist Exposes Police Provocateurs	
		GREECE	
	1033	CP Members Arrested, Face Trial	
	1034	Amalia Fleming Deported	
		MIDDLE EAST	
Jon Rothschild	1034	Scandal in Israel Over Sinai Oilfields	
		ZAMBIA	
	1035	Economic Crisis Splits Ruling Party	
		INDONESIA	
	1036	Suharto Continues to Murder Political Prisoners	
		BANGLA DESH	
	1038	All-Out War Between India and Pakistan?	
		IRELAND	
	1039	No Cruelty or Brutality in Torture?	
	1040	London Meeting Mourns Peter Graham	
		INDIA	
	1040	Political Debates Stir Campuses	
		THAILAND	
	1041	Behind the Coup d'Etat	
		REVIEWS	
Gerry Foley	1043	Ireland's Blueshirt Fascist Movement	
		DOCUMENTS	
Pierre Frank	1045	The Split Between Healy and Lambert	
		DRAWINGS	
Copain	1028	Lin Piao; 1035, Kenneth Kaunda; 1037, Adam Malik; 1041, Thanom Kittikachorn	

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Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

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Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

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Renewed Controversy Over Indochina War

By Allen Myers

"The message from Congress," John W. Finney wrote in the November 21 *New York Times*, "was clear: Bring the troops home. But the White House did not seem to be listening."

On November 17, Richard Nixon signed a military procurement bill that contained a modified version of the "Mansfield amendment." As passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives, the amendment declared it "the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indochina and to provide for the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United States military forces at a date certain, subject to the release of all American prisoners of war."

As Nixon signed the bill, the White House press office released a statement asserting that the "policy of the United States" was in no way binding on Richard Nixon.

The amendment, he said, "does not represent the policies of this Administration." He described it as "without binding force or effect, and it does not reflect my judgment about the way in which the war should be brought to an end." He went on to inform the Congress that he would "not change the policies I have pursued and that I shall continue to pursue toward this end."

Nixon's sharp language and the even sharper replies of some members of Congress reflected a fresh cleavage in the American ruling class over how to bring the war to a conclusion that satisfies their interests.

In the House of Representatives, Edward P. Boland, Democrat from Massachusetts, declared that it was "incomprehensible and indefensible" for Nixon to say that he would "ignore a law passed by Congress."

Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho said that "the Mansfield amendment is now part of the law and, as such, is not subject to dismissal by the President." Church went on to treat Nixon's remarks to some heavy sarcasm:

"What is he going to do next? Dispatch Henry Kissinger, his foreign

policy adviser, to Capitol Hill to disband the Congress?"

"It is the height of fashion these days in Southeast Asia to establish one-man rule, one-man elections, and disband people's assemblies. It has happened in South Vietnam, in Cambodia and in Thailand today. But ours is a government of law."

The congressional indignation contained more than a little hypocrisy, since the various "end the war" resolutions passed by the legislators have always been careful to leave Nixon a loophole and to avoid a real confrontation between the White House and Congress. Only a few hours after Nixon's remarks, the House of Representatives defeated by a substantial majority an amendment that would have cut off funds for the war next June 1.

Behind the rhetoric, however, lies the real fear of part of the American ruling class that Nixon's Indochina strategy runs too many risks with too little hope of success. In this view, Nixon's plans for a "residual force" in Vietnam, and his hope of bombing the Indochinese peoples into submission while making a deal behind the scenes with the Chinese and Soviet bureaucracies, are more likely to prolong the war indefinitely, continue inflation, and possibly touch off social explosions in the United States.

Nixon is at a certain disadvantage since he cannot publicly proclaim that he expects Mao or Brezhnev to come to his rescue. Instead, he has to rely on "leaks" to the press to get his message across. Thus, for example, William Beecher quoted anonymous "Defense and State Department officials" in the November 16 *New York Times*:

"The officials hinted that there was increased optimism at the White House about the possibility of a negotiated settlement. They declined to discuss the basis for the feeling but pointed out that the President would hold talks early next year in Peking and later in Moscow and that Vietnam was likely to be on the agenda in both places."

The paper's editors, however, remained unconvinced that this strategy

would pay off. In a November 17 editorial they warned:

"It is to achieve . . . greater assurance of a non-Communist South Vietnam in the future that Mr. Nixon now for the first time has flatly and publicly committed himself to the concept of an American 'residual force.' In addition, as long as the war goes on, Mr. Nixon has committed himself to continued use of American airpower on a large scale. *The re-engagement of American ground forces in a crisis clearly would not be ruled out.*" (Emphasis added.)

Two days later, these influential capitalist spokesmen returned to the subject, lamenting Nixon's "intention to pursue the illusion of military victory in Indochina." Nixon, they complained, had missed a golden opportunity by attacking the Mansfield amendment:

"The President may be constitutionally correct in choosing to ignore what is essentially a nonbinding amendment. . . . But he has made a grievous political error in slapping down a responsible Congressional offer to share with him the heavy burden of extricating this nation from a costly and still perilous blunder by the best available means."

Not the least of the *Times'* concerns was the report of heavy involvement of U. S. helicopters in fighting only ten miles from the capital of Cambodia, which it called "a portent of things to come if the President persists on his present course."

Another ominous portent for the war-makers was provided November 17 by National Peace Action Coalition coordinator Jerry Gordon, who announced plans for NPAC's national convention in Cleveland December 3-5.

"The Administration," Gordon said, "is on an all-out campaign to convince Americans that the war is soon to be over; NPAC will step up our efforts to show the American people that Nixon is intensifying—not winding down—the war and that antiwar demonstrations larger than ever are necessary to bring all the troops home now and bring all the killing to a halt now." □

Next Week

In our next issue: An exclusive interview with three student leaders of the struggle for freedom in Northern Ireland. Don't miss it!

Mystery Deepens Over Fate of Mao's Successor

"The United States intelligence community," a dispatch from Washington in the November 17 *New York Times* stated, "is receiving a growing volume of reports on special meetings throughout mainland China in which leading Communist party groups are said to be advised by top party delegates that Lin Piao 'no longer holds power.'"

The world press did not require leaks from the U. S. spy network to sense that a shake-up inside the Chinese government was in process. Ever since the mid-September cancellation of traditional National Day observances, there has been widespread speculation on a power struggle in which Lin Piao, "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-in-arms and successor," as the Communist party constitution designates him, had lost out.

In the November 10 *Washington Post*, Stanley Karnow gave a more detailed account of the attacks on Lin that are said to be occurring:

"Unimpeachable informants report . . . that Communist Party officials inside China are currently being told that Lin and his comrades plotted to assassinate Mao on three different occasions. There is no proof that this allegation is true.

"Lin is also being accused in internal Communist documents as having been the head of the so-called 'May 16th Detachment,' a movement of radical extremists that emerged during the summer of 1967 and was later banned.

"Communist cadres are being told as well that Lin tried to escape to the Soviet Union aboard the Chinese aircraft that mysteriously crashed about 100 miles inside Mongolia on the night of Sept. 12."

Agence France-Presse, in a November 9 dispatch, described an article in the Communist party theoretical journal *Hung Chi* (Red Flag) that attacked unnamed "ranking leaders" of the party for hatching "criminal plots."

Further evidence indicating Lin's fall accumulated rapidly. The November 8 issue of *Newsweek* reported:

"For some years, the toast at Communist gatherings [in Peking] has been: 'Long live Chairman Mao and

his close comrade in arms, Vice Chairman Lin Piao.' Now, Lin is no longer being honored. And when Haile Selassie of Ethiopia proposed a toast to Mao and Lin at a recent Peking banquet, Communist officials neatly edited all mention of the Defense Minister from the transcript of the Emperor's remarks."

Karnow added in his *Washington Post* article that foreign embassies in Peking had been specifically requested to omit Lin's name at diplomatic gath-



LIN: Vice Chairman's name suddenly disappears from diplomatic toasts.

erings. At the United Nations November 15, it was observed that in speeches welcoming the newly arrived Chinese delegation, representatives of the workers states and underdeveloped countries that have close diplomatic ties with China carefully refrained from mentioning Lin while expressing greetings to Mao and to Chou En-lai.

Earlier, Reuters and other sources had reported that during the first week of November, the "little red book" of Mao's quotations had disappeared from bookstores in Peking. The book contains a preface by Lin.

A more subtle attack on Lin was seen in a lengthy article that appeared in the November issue of *Hung Chi*,

which was reprinted in the November 8 weekly English-language edition of *Hsinhua*. Ostensibly an attack on "Liu Shao-chi's reactionary theory of human nature," the article accuses Liu of having "denied that the masses have boundless creative power, and advocated the idealist conception that heroes decide everything." Liu, according to the article, believed in the historical role of a "superman" or "prophet."

Hung Chi attributed these theories not only to Liu, but also to "other political swindlers," and warned:

"But when the theory of human nature has gone bankrupt theoretically, this does not mean that it disappears from actual life. So long as classes and class struggle exist, the theory of human nature will be resurrected in a new guise and continue to poison people."

Ironically, the *Hung Chi* polemic appeared to be an attack on Lin for his sycophantic praise of Mao. During the "cultural revolution," for example, Lin was the author of such remarks as "Chairman Mao is the great genius of the present era," and "Mao Tse-tung Thought has not grown spontaneously from among the working people. It is rather the result of Chairman Mao's inheriting and developing Marxism-Leninism with genius on the basis of his great revolutionary practice." Such quotations from Vice Chairman Lin Piao are well known in China.

A number of top military officers appear to have lost their positions along with Lin. Those who have disappeared from public view at the same time as Lin include Huang Yung-sheng, chief of the general staff; Wu Fa-hsien, commander of the air force; Li Tso-peng, the navy political commissar; Chiu Hui-tso, director of logistics; Wen Yu-cheng, commander of the Peking garrison; Yen Chung-chuan, a deputy chief of staff; and Hsu Shih-yu, a deputy defense minister.

The disappearance of so many military figures naturally led to speculation that conflict within the governing bureaucracy centered on effort to bring the army under the control

of the party. In the November 17 *Christian Science Monitor*, Geoffrey Godsell wrote:

"In the great proletarian cultural revolution, which reached its peak in 1966, the three-million-strong Chinese Army was brought more than ever into the government of China. Now there is evidence that with the post cultural revolution reorganization of the party structure at last completed down to the provincial and city level, the party has sought to reassert its unquestioned control over the Army — or at least a section of the Army reluctant to submit to obedience to party directives."

With the Mao clique maintaining its tight control over all means of public expression in China, no honest description of whatever political differences may separate Mao and Lin

can be expected. When and if Mao announces Lin's fall from grace, the level of public polemics is not likely to rise above the sort of crude slander that was thrown at Liu Shao-chi.

It would be difficult, however, for Mao to attribute to Lin a more right-wing line in the field of foreign policy than the one Mao and Chou are actually following. Their betrayal of the revolutionary movements in Ceylon and Bangla Desh and their willingness to meet behind closed doors with Nixon while American planes are dropping tons of bombs on Indochina are not positions that can be attacked from the right. If the ruling clique decides to present its version of the differences to the Chinese people, it will presumably accuse Lin of some form of "ultraleftism," whatever his actual position may be. □

from women's liberation groups in Rome, Nottingham, and New Zealand. Grace MacInnis, member of the Canadian parliament from Vancouver-Kingsway; Congresswoman Bella Abzug; writer Gloria Steinem; and Florence Luscomb, one of the activists in the suffragist movement, who is more than eighty years old, all sent greetings to the rally, although they were unable to be present.

A much advertised counterdemonstration organized by the church-backed "Right to Life Committee" drew only about 150 people. After a brief rally on the opposite side of the Capitol, they handed out bibles to the WONAAC demonstrators.

The sentiments of the marchers were summed up by Linda Jenness, 1972 presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers party and one of the rally's speakers. "This march is just a first step. There are thousands here and in San Francisco. But think of the one out of four [the estimated percentage of U. S. women who have had illegal abortions] who are at home, but who know we are right and solidarize with this march. Think of the millions trapped by fears and prejudice who are whispering to themselves, 'Right On, Sisters!'

"That whisper will become a roar and these thousands will become hundreds of thousands, because this march is proving that women *can* organize, that we *can* fight, and that we *can* unite."

About 3,000 people marched in San Francisco, which was the concentration city for the West Coast and the Southwest. Since the demonstrators were denied the use of the city hall steps, the rally, one of the most spirited yet, was held in the civic center.

Speakers included Chulita Devis, a Chicana student leader, Dr. Saja Goldsmith of Planned Parenthood, Mirra Vidal representing the Linda Jenness presidential campaign, and three representatives of the National Organization of Women, a group whose membership was divided about whether or not to support the action.

More than 1,000 people signed petitions in support of Shirley Wheeler, and more than 300 women became coplaintiffs in the "Women versus California" class-action suit against the state's abortion law. □

Makes You Wonder What Nixon Smokes

An Australian doctor says smokers shouldn't drive because cigarettes impair vision and judgment.

In Washington and San Francisco

Women March for Legal Right to Abortion

Washington, D. C.

More than 6,000 people, most of them women, marched in Washington and San Francisco November 20 demanding the repeal of all antiabortion laws, an end to forced sterilization, and the repeal of restrictive contraception laws. It was the first nationwide women's demonstration in the United States since 1913, during the struggle for women's suffrage.

The action was planned last July, when more than 1,000 women met in New York City and founded the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC). Women from dozens of cities in every area of the country participated in the marches, some traveling as far as 1,500 miles to attend.

In Washington, more than 3,000 demonstrators marched from the White House to the Capitol, where a rally was held in front of the steps of the building. There were contingents of high-school women, third-world women, university students, churchwomen for legal abortions, and women in the medical professions.

The rally was opened by the New Haven Women's Liberation Rock Band. The introductory speaker was Barbara Roberts, one of the three WONAAC project coordinators and

an initiator of the "Women versus Connecticut" class-action suit challenging the constitutionality of that state's restrictive abortion law. Other speakers included Joyce Brown, international representative of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees from Atlanta, Georgia; Beulah Sanders, president of the National Welfare Rights Organization; Lana Clarke Phelan, vice president of the National Association for Repeal of Abortion Laws; Marsha Coleman of WONAAC's Black Task Force; and other women from various parts of the country.

One of the highlights of the rally was a speech by Shirley Wheeler, the twenty-three-year-old Florida woman convicted last July of abortion-manslaughter for having an abortion. As the first woman in U. S. history to be convicted and sentenced (to two years probation) for this "crime," she was given a standing ovation by the demonstrators. The state of Florida, and not she, was the criminal, she said. She announced that she was appealing her conviction and vowed to fight as long as necessary to overturn the court's decision. Nancy Stearns, Wheeler's appeal lawyer, also addressed the rally.

Messages of solidarity were received

Chinese Delegates Take Seats in the United Nations

By Mary-Alice Waters

[The following article is reprinted from the November 26 issue of the U. S. revolutionary-socialist weekly *The Militant*.]

* * *

On November 15 the representatives of the People's Republic of China took their seats in the General Assembly of the United Nations, and chief delegate Chiao Kuan-hua made his opening address to the Assembly.

The major theme of his remarks was that the revolutionary tide is on the rise around the world; that the people of China stand foursquare on the side of those struggling for independence, self-determination, and revolution; and that Peking will always oppose the two great nuclear superpowers and side with small nations struggling to take their destinies into their own hands.

Chiao stressed that the seating of the People's Republic of China represented a defeat for U. S. imperialism and its allies. This is true. Despite an intense diplomatic-pressure campaign by the U. S. government, the large majority of states voted October 25 to expel the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek government.

However, while that outcome was definitely not the one favored by the Nixon administration, it was a decision Washington was willing to accept as a modest price to be paid for the benefits anticipated from the new policy of rapprochement with Peking. Thus Nixon pushed on with his planned trip to China, even though it was almost inevitable that the logic of this course of action would bring defeat for the U. S. fight to keep the Chiang Kai-shek regime in the U. N.

In short, Washington had it both ways. Nixon will still pay his respects to Chairman Mao. Peking has been seated in the U. N. And Washington can protest it never wanted Chiang Kai-shek expelled.


Like Nixon's decision to visit Peking, the U. N. decision represents a qualitative break in the wall of isola-

tion surrounding the People's Republic of China since 1949. It reflects a new weakening of imperialism for which the Vietnamese people can take most of the credit.

But there is another side to China's new U. N. seat as well. Chiao Kuan-hua, in his opening address to the General Assembly, carefully listed the various liberation struggles his government supports and whose cause China will presumably champion in the U. N. He talked about Indochina,

Korea, Palestine, the 200-nautical-mile territorial claims of the Latin American governments, and added, "The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the people of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea (Bissau) in their struggle for national liberation, and resolutely support the people of Azania, Zimbabwe and Namibia in their struggle against the white colonialist rule and racial discrimination."

But, conspicuous by its absence was



Chairman Mao Is Alive and Well and Swimming Up the East River

Conrad, in the Los Angeles Times

Intercontinental Press

any mention of the liberation struggle of Bangla Desh. Nor was there any mention of the struggles against the dictatorships in Ethiopia, the Sudan, Iran—to name a few other omissions. And the reason is obvious. Despite the rhetoric, these are national liberation struggles Peking does not support because the Mao regime has subordinated the needs of the revolutionary struggles in those countries to its own narrow, national interests.

For the sake of its diplomatic ties to the Yahya Khan government, Peking denounces the Bangla Desh liberation struggle and provides economic and military aid to help crush the Mukti Bahini.

In its haste to improve diplomatic relations with Ceylon, Peking has praised the government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike for its brutal suppression of last spring's youth rebellion, which left an admitted 1,200 dead and over 14,000 still in jail. Chou En-lai labeled the uprising the work of reactionaries and foreign agents.

The shah of Iran recently became a great friend of "the Chinese people"—but nothing is said about his murderous dictatorship over the Iranian people.

There is nothing in principle wrong with China establishing diplomatic ties to even the most reactionary regimes. But the real nature of Peking's foreign policy is evident in the fact that the needs of the revolutionary struggles within those countries are sacrificed to the short-term interests of the Chinese bureaucracy.

Therein lies the dangerous side of Peking's entry into the United Nations. It adds a certain "left" prestige and cover to the organization, making it easier for the U. N. to play its counterrevolutionary role worldwide.

The danger is particularly real in relationship to the Bangla Desh struggle. Another U. N. "peace-keeping" mission in Bangla Desh—like the one in the Congo in the early 1960s—could only be directed against the liberation forces. And it is not at all far-fetched to picture Peking and the U. S. both ardently supporting such a course.

The foreign policy of the Mao regime at the U. N. can only be an extension of its general foreign policy, which is based on the practice of "peaceful coexistence" with imperialism. It is not a policy that reflects the needs of the Chinese revolution or the

Chinese people; it represents only the narrow, nationalistic interests of the bureaucratic caste that rules China.

And it is a policy that is increasingly coming into conflict with the Asian revolution. □

Amchitka Test Spurs Protest Movement

Huge Antiwar Demonstrations Staged in Canada

By Carl Fleming

[The following article is reprinted from the November issue of *Young Socialist*, published in Toronto.]

* * *

"They are going out in the streets to claim their world," said the *Toronto Star* in an editorial November 5, commenting on the mass demonstrations that swept Canada on November 3 and 6.

Well over 100,000 people took part in mass actions against the Amchitka nuclear test.

At least 10,000 students demonstrated at three border points in Ontario. Another 15,000 marched in the Prairies. Eight thousand people filled the streets of Toronto. Six thousand people stood for hours in the driving Vancouver rain. And there were dozens of other protests across Canada—at U. S. consulates, border points, in high schools, and on university campuses. One hundred and seventy-seven thousand people signed a telegram to Nixon in the week prior to the blast.

According to Canadian press estimates the demonstrators were supported by 50,000-60,000 unionists in British Columbia, who downed tools for one-half hour in response to a call from the B. C. Federation of Labour.

Twelve hundred delegates to the annual convention of the Ontario Federation of Labour set aside their debates and marched on the U. S. consulate to protest the blast.

They came in thousands—walking out of their high schools, shutting down their universities—to be joined in the streets by new layers of unionists, church people, women, Québécois, and others.

In Regina they marched to the leg-

islature to hear NDP Premier Alan Blakeney denounce the test.

The mayor of Fredericton, New Brunswick, named November 6 "Stop Amchitka Day."

At Macdonald-Cartier Secondary School in Sudbury [Ontario], a French-speaking high school, students took up a collection to send telegrams in English, French, and Vietnamese to Nixon.

In Brampton [Ontario], 2,000 high school students marched on the home of Premier William Davis.

In Toronto, demonstrators chanting "Stop Amchitka! Stop the War!" defied police and closed down main streets on both Wednesday [November 3] and Saturday [November 6]. They renamed City Hall Square "Peace Action Square," and stood in the rain in front of the U. S. consulate as the bomb was exploded at Amchitka.

These were mass demonstrations of youth—manifestations of the profound anti-U. S.-imperialist sentiment that is on the rise across Canada. The main enemy, the target of all the demonstrations, was President Richard Nixon—the man who ordered the Amchitka test and was responsible for the genocide in Indochina.

The war was a prominent issue in most of the protests. Speakers at the mass rallies challenged Trudeau to give substance to his government's token protests of Amchitka by breaking from the nuclear alliances NATO and NORAD, under whose auspices the test was made, and by ending its complicity in the Indochina war. Speaker after speaker called on Canada to break from the U. S. war machine.

The bulk of the demonstrators came from the high schools. Almost every major Canadian city saw high school walkouts, some of them with the offi-

cial approval of the boards of education. The Ontario Teachers Federation, representing 105,000 high-school and elementary-school teachers, supported the student actions. For many students on the west coast, November 3 was the third time they had walked out to protest Amchitka in the past two months.

The universities were the center of the action. The University of British Columbia became the main organizing center for the November 3 protests in Vancouver. York University student council sent bundles of November 3 leaflets to campuses across the country. Mass student meetings to decide on anti-Amchitka actions took place for the first time in many areas. Placards, banners, and leaflets were produced on the universities for high-school and college students.

Students took the initiative, using the facilities of the universities to build the protest actions. York University President David Slater provided administration funds to pay for buses to transport students to the Toronto consulate demonstration. Ryerson Polytechnic Institute became the meeting place for the student organizers of the Toronto protest.

George Addison, executive secretary of the Vietnam Mobilization Committee, told the demonstrators at the U. S. consulate on November 3: "There are thousands of us here today, and we're all organizers. We are going back to our schools and universities to turn them into organizing centers. Student power is in our numbers—let's consolidate that power to draw thousands more into the streets."

And everywhere new groups sprang up to join and build the protests. A leaflet appeared in Etobicoke schools, signed by the "Student Committee to Save our World," urging high-school students to "Fight Apathy, Join the November 6 Protest." VMC organizers handed out tens of thousands of leaflets, posters, and stickers to students for distribution on subways, streets, and in their schools. Students insisted that class time be turned over to discussion of Amchitka. The student movement was mobilized as never before.

The November 3 and 6 actions trained thousands of organizers for future antiwar and antibomb demonstrations. These new activists gravitated to the established anti-Indochina-war movement, which in most areas

became the leadership of the mass movement, turning the actions into demonstrations against both Amchitka and Canada's complicity in the war.

Members of the Young Socialists and the League for Socialist Action played key roles in building and leading the demonstrations. Joan Campana, YSer and Ombudswoman at the University of British Columbia, was coordinator of the Vancouver November 3 action, and chaired the mass rally. Time and time again it was YS campus activists who challenged student councils and university administrations to support the actions. Young Socialists initiated and led many of the high-school walk-outs and addressed most of the mass rallies.

As the November 6 demonstration ended in front of the U. S. consulate in Toronto, with the announcement that the bomb had gone off, a spontaneous chant arose from the crowd. "No more Amchitkas," they shouted over and over again.

The groundswell of protest that swept Canada November 3 and 6 presents the antiwar movement with the challenge of drawing thousands of new activists into high school and university movements—to challenge student councils and administrations to break their institutions from the war machine and create the antiwar university and high school.

There is an unprecedented opportunity to build large and dynamic university antiwar committees, and to

consolidate Students Against the War in Vietnam in high schools across Canada.

A movement is growing—a movement with the power to stop nuclear testing and stop Canada's complicity in the war.

Linda Meissenheimer, president of Simon Fraser University student council and a member of the Young Socialists, told the November 3 Vancouver rally: "We are challenging them. Here we are, thousands of us demanding that they stop the bomb. . . . We will build the movements which will allow us to decide on questions like Amchitka and on questions like the war in Indochina. We will win! We want to say 'STOP THE BOMB,' and force the North American governments to stop it. We want to say 'STOP THE WAR,' and force them to stop it. We want to show the tremendous power that we have when we come out into the streets like this. Just think. The people of Canada could close down the entire country if we want to. We could close down the schools, the businesses, the factories, the industries, the whole life of Canada if we acted together to change something. And we want Amchitka stopped and we want ALL Amchitkas stopped."

The next time Nixon tries to escalate the Indochina war or detonate a bomb test he will have this movement to confront him—only larger and with a better understanding of the tasks ahead of it—because of the experiences of the November 3 and 6 actions. □

Denmark

Anti-Market Rally Hears Mandel, Krivine

Copenhagen

Six hundred persons filled the University of Copenhagen auditorium Friday November 12 for a four-hour-long anti-Common Market rally organized by the SUF [Socialistisk Ungdoms Forbund—Young Socialist League, the Danish section of the Fourth International]. Among the speakers who addressed the meeting were the Belgian economist Ernest Mandel and Alain Krivine from the Ligue Communiste [Communist

League—the French section of the Fourth International].

Mandel stressed that the Common Market was a good example of a maneuver foreseen by Marx, namely that the capitalists would try to shift their own competition onto the backs of the workers. For example, the Common Market question has made the Belgian Communist party choose between "the devil and the deep blue sea," and it has chosen the EEC [European Economic Community, the Common Mar-

ket] in preference to American capitalism. Naturally the European capitalists are pleased by this, Mandel said.

Mandel pointed out that the capitalists have developed international collaboration in Europe to a higher degree than has the working class. If a strike is effective in one country, it only gets the work shifted to another one. The greatest problem today, even for moderate trade unionists, is international cooperation. As an example for the future, Mandel singled out a Belgian strike which ultimately involved workers in six countries.

"That is the way it will be done," Mandel said, but this sort of thing is still only developing. In the short run, the Common Market means taking money out of the workers' pockets, among other things, by the extension of value-added and indirect taxes, which shift the economic burden from the capitalists to the consumers.

On the question of the odd coalition that exists between right-wing nationalist forces and left-wing forces against the EEC, Mandel denied that the few rightist elements opposing the EEC represented very much. The strong social forces in opposition to the EEC came from the working class, he added.

In conclusion, Mandel criticized China's new foreign policy as a "clear right turn." The new slogans raised, Chinese participation in the farce commemorating two thousand years of monarchy in Persia, the support to counterrevolutionary movements in Ceylon and Bangla Desh, taken all together, are bound to be a hard blow, demoralizing and demobilizing not only the Maoists but, in the case of inviting Nixon to Peking, the American antiwar movement in particular.

Alain Krivine gave a brief summary of how the situation of the left in France has developed since he was last in Denmark. He pointed out that the ultraleft groups—the Maoists, anarchists, and spontanéists—have lost all real influence. He noted also that there has been a certain rapprochement on the left between Mitterrand and the Communist party, and that the French bourgeoisie is on the verge of a split.

The coming split in the capitalist class was shown, Krivine said, by the numerous resignations of Gaullist deputies, financial scandals, and an inability to make concessions in

strikes. For example, in the three big strikes, on the railroads, at Renault, and in the Paris subways, the capitalists have taken a hard line and cannot afford to give an inch.

After the anti-EEC rally, a press conference was held for the main speakers. On the heels of the recent scandal over the harassment of Danish Trotskyists by the secret police and charges that the Fourth International was involved in gun-running, the conference was attended by reporters from the big press. Mandel did not want to get involved in a discussion of this case, but he stressed that the Fourth International did not engage in illegal methods (for example, using explosives, as was charged by

Danish Minister of Justice Axel Nielsen in an attempt to justify trying to plant an informer in the Trotskyist organization) in countries where the workers' movement was able to exist legally.

Mandel was also interviewed over Danish radio and television. He said that in his opinion the working-class movement was experiencing a strong rise while capitalism was retreating on many fronts. In analyzing the international economic situation, he stressed that the basic question was not the continually worsening currency crisis; this crisis, he said, was only a manifestation of late capitalism's faltering ability to solve economic problems. □

Greek CP Members Arrested, Face Trial

Thirty-three members of a Greek Communist party faction critical of the Kremlin will be tried before a civil criminal court on charges of "attempting to overthrow the established social order," according to the November 10 *Le Monde*. Thirteen have been released on bail; the rest remain in jail.

They were arrested in police raids on the night of October 18, while U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew was visiting the country.

Among those held is Mitsos Partsalides, one of the original leaders of the "anti-Kremlin" grouping. *Le Monde's* report identifies him as a leader of the "Bureau of the Interior."

The Greek Communist party first openly split at a February 1968 conference held in Bucharest, Rumania. There, the pro-Kremlin faction headed by Kostas Koligiannis expelled Partsalides and a group around him from the Central Committee. Partsalides charged that the conference was invalid, since no member of the underground from Greece was present and the meeting lacked a quorum. His group refused to recognize the authority of the new Central Committee. After the conference, a group of party members living underground in Greece and calling themselves the Bureau of the Interior issued a statement claiming that neither of the factions in Bucharest represented the real leadership of the party, which could only be composed of members remaining in Greece.

The split deepened after the Soviet

invasion of Czechoslovakia. Partsalides's "United Central Committee" and the Bureau of the Interior both denounced the invasion, while Koligiannis, claiming to speak in the name of the entire party, slavishly supported the Soviet action.

In April 1969 a "special" plenum was held in Greece in which both the Bureau of the Interior and the Partsalides faction participated. In April 1970 the Koligiannis group held its own conference, formalizing the split.

Partsalides returned to Greece in 1969, and the organizational relationship between his group and the Bureau of the Interior remains unclear.

Also arrested during the October 18 police operation were four students, allegedly members of the resistance organization called the October 20 Movement. There has been no report of their fate. The exact date of the Partsalides trial is still unknown. □

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Amalia Fleming Deported From Greece

Amalia Fleming, an outspoken opponent of the Greek military government, was deported from Greece to England on November 14. Convicted in September of conspiring to help a political prisoner escape from jail, she had been sentenced to sixteen months in prison. On October 21 her sentence was suspended for eight months and she was released, because of poor health.

Fleming's housekeeper said that five plainclothes cops arrived at her apartment early in the morning, took Fleming to the airport, and placed her on a plane to London.

The government had previously

tried to convince Fleming to leave Greece, but she had refused.

Athens Police Chief Nikos Daskalopoulos told Fleming's lawyer, George Mangakis, that his client's citizenship had been revoked because she had engaged in "antinational activities." The deportation order described her as an "undesirable alien."

Upon arrival at London's airport, Fleming refused to get off the Olympic Airways plane, insisting that she be returned to Athens. After being persuaded that this gesture was futile, she disembarked and held a press conference at which she promised to initiate a "vigorous political campaign" against the junta. □

Making the Desert Bloom

Scandal in Israel Over Sinai Oilfields

By Jon Rothschild

When the Israeli army captured the Sinai peninsula during the June 1967 war against Egypt, Israeli rulers insisted that they had no intention of holding on to that territory, except for the fort at Sharm al-Sheikh, if a peace treaty with the Arab states could be negotiated. Of what value is a barren stretch of desert, when the lives of 2,500,000 people depend on peace, they asked rhetorically.

In recent weeks, however, charges of theft and corruption in an oil-boom town have disclosed that the government's apparent determination to occupy the Sinai indefinitely may be motivated by something other than humanitarian concern for lasting peace.

The scandal, news of which the regime tried to suppress, involves the activities of one Mordechai Friedman, enterprising general manager of the Netivei Neft oil company. Friedman was in the army doing his patriotic duty in 1967, when the Defense and Finance ministries asked him to investigate the condition of the Bilaiyim

oil fields.

Located along the eastern bank of the Gulf of Suez, south of the canal, these oil fields were opened by Egypt in cooperation with an Italian consortium during the 1960s. It had long been suspected that the Sinai was a potential source of mineral wealth, and the fields showed a certain promise. During the last year of Egyptian-run production, they produced 4,500,000 million barrels of high-grade crude oil.

Friedman described Netivei Neft "with pride" as "the most pioneering, the most important, and the most profitable oil company in Israel." The description seems apt, but some questions have been raised as to how this feat of entrepreneurship was accomplished.

As long ago as 1968 there were reports that large amounts of machinery had disappeared from Abu Rudeis, Umm Bugmah, and Abu Zenima, three of the fields' towns. Friedman, who had his own private company in 1967, allegedly sold a considerable

amount of said machinery at a profit (of 100 percent, according to former Israeli Attorney General Moshe Ben-Zeev) to foreign concessionaires providing capital for the Israeli effort to get the Bilaiyim fields running again. Then, Friedman became head of the new Netivei Neft company.

From then on he took the ball and ran with it. "Mr. Friedman ran Abu Rudeis like a feudal barony, or a Chinese empire," said David Neev, a government oil geologist who blew the whistle on the entrepreneur. "Mr. Friedman built a defensive wall around himself through contacts with top people in all the political parties, and he did it by handing out favors and benefits. He involved both the ruling and opposition parties in his plans."

Among the "benefits and favors" of the "empire" was the establishment of a summer camp for the teen-age children of influential Israelis, who were paid a stipend for attending. In addition, according to a report in the November 15 *New York Times*, "Testimony about these charges has included increasingly lurid tales of orgies, drunkenness, and corruption in the free-wheeling frontier atmosphere" of Abu Rudeis.

Apparently the government had received complaints about the functioning of the Bilaiyim fields several years ago but had suppressed the information. Now that the lid has been publicly lifted, some former employees have testified about specific cases of theft and financial manipulation running into the millions of dollars.

The reluctance of government officials to allow public disclosure of the Bilaiyim story may well be the result of political calculation, in addition to the obvious desire to avoid self-incrimination. Under Israeli occupation, output of the fields has risen to 6,000,000 barrels per year, half of which is marked for export. Israel has thus quietly become a significant oil-exporting country—an event with broad political implications.

Neev, in discussing the affair, referred to the "rot, corruption, and dishonesty spreading throughout our social and economic life." But Deputy Finance Minister Zvi Dinstein, coordinator of oil production in Israel, displayed a more philosophical attitude on Israeli television: "There are thefts everywhere, but that does not amount to corruption." □



KENNETH KAUNDA

Economic Crisis Splits Ruling Party

The deteriorating economic situation in Zambia has given rise to a new bourgeois party in opposition to the United National Independence party (UNIP) government of President Kenneth Kaunda. Simon Kapwepwe, a former vice president, member of the UNIP, and close associate of Kaunda's for many years, resigned his posts as minister of culture and minister of provincial and local affairs in August to found the United Progressive party (UPP). The UPP, claiming that Zambia's financial situation has become chaotic, that unemployment has reached alarming levels, and that the cost of living has been rising too quickly, has demanded general elections to form a new government.

The country's economic situation rapidly worsened after Kaunda's

April 1968 proclamation of the "economic revolution" aimed at "Zambianization" of economic life. The goal of the new policy, according to Kaunda, was to create "popular capitalism" which would lead to "humanist socialism." The first stage of the progression was the gradual nationalization, with compensation, of foreign private companies. In January 1970 the two largest copper corporations, Roan Selection Trust and Zambian Anglo-American (both controlled by British, U.S., and South African capital), were asked to sell 51 percent of their assets to the state.

There was not much resistance from the companies, since compensation on the order of \$209,000,000 was paid and management of the mines was left in the hands of the corporations. In addition, tax and export advan-

tages were gained, since the companies became classified as "Zambian" rather than "foreign."

But for the workers in the so-called copper belt, the "nationalization" held considerably greater impact. Kaunda declared a freeze on wages and announced that strikes would be prohibited, since to strike against a state corporation would be to strike against "the people."

The wage freeze and strike ban coincided with the beginnings of the world monetary crisis, a severe crisis of Zambian agriculture, and a fall in copper production. (Copper accounts for about 52 percent of Zambia's net domestic product and more than 90 percent of its exports.)

Consequently, the country's exchange reserves fell from 420,000,000 kwacha (one kwacha equals US\$1.40) to 248,000,000 in 1971. The cost of living rose 48 percent from 1962 to 1969.

Adding to the problems plaguing the Kaunda regime is the charge that the UNIP has given most official posts to members of the Bemba tribe, at the expense of numerous other tribes and ethnic groups.

The newly formed UPP has its main base among the tribes of the copper belt who have had enough of Kaunda's "humanist" austerity. □

U.S.A.

Newton, Soledad Brothers Go on Trial

On November 9 Black Panther party leader Huey P. Newton went on trial for the third time on charges of having killed an Oakland, California, policeman in 1967. His attorney, Charles Garry, protested the composition of the jury, which has no Black members, but was overruled by the judge.

After his first trial in 1968, Newton was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. But in 1970 the California Court of Appeals, bowing to a massive popular defense campaign, overturned the conviction.

The second trial ended last August when the jury, following six days of deliberations, became hopelessly deadlocked. Garry has questioned the motives of the Alameda County district attorney's office in ordering still another trial. "They're out to destroy us," he said. "They'll try this case over and over again."

Across the bay in San Francisco, the trial of the Soledad Brothers on

frame-up charges of having killed a prison guard in January 1970 was in the process of selecting a jury as the Newton trial began.

One of the Brothers, George Jackson, was assassinated by San Quentin prison guards August 21. Fleeta Drumgo and John Cluchette, the surviving defendants, have been beaten and threatened by guards on many occasions.

So-called security precautions at the trial have been described as "the strictest ever seen in an American courtroom." Spectators are divided from the judge, attorneys, jury, and defendants by a bulletproof screen. Cops, some with machine guns, patrol the outside corridors.

Besides all this, courtroom spectators are subjected to searches so thorough as to suggest that they themselves are prisoners. The defense has charged that the procedure is specifically designed to discourage people from attending the trial. □

Suharto Continues to Murder Political Prisoners

[We have translated the following article by Ernst Utrecht from the November 13 issue of *Vrij Nederland*, a liberal weekly published in Amsterdam.]

* * *

Queen Juliana and Prince Bernhard's state visit to Indonesia had one advantage for the great mass of the people in those islands. It brought the problem of the Indonesian political prisoners once again before the public eye.

On February 2 of this year, Amnesty International [an international organization defending the victims of political repression] sent a memorandum to President Suharto signed by its chairman Seán Macbride. The memorandum appealed to the Djakarta regime to respect the minimum rules laid down by the United Nations for the treatment of political prisoners. The findings of two missions sent to Djakarta by Amnesty International—the first in 1969 led by Professor Julius Stone, and another in 1970 led by Seán Macbride—showed that the Indonesian authorities failed to observe a number of established norms in their treatment of political prisoners.

These two commissions reported the following abuses: The Indonesian authorities failed to provide sufficient food to maintain health and vitality, failed to provide proper medical care and treatment, failed to abstain from the use of terror and humiliation, failed to permit prisoners to maintain regular contact with their close relatives, failed to inform prisoners' families of their deaths or to advise their families when they fell seriously ill, failed to observe the right of prisoners to inform their families of their arrest, failed to respect the right of prisoners to reading material, and failed to recognize their right to a trial and legal defense.

In particular, Amnesty International condemned the deportation of 10,000 political prisoners to concentration camps on the island of Buru in the Moluccas and the Suharto govern-

ment's plans to establish new concentration camps on small islands off the coasts of Sumatra and Kalimantan.

The continued detention of political prisoners without any kind of trial is a serious violation of internationally recognized standards of humanity and justice. Those who can be clearly shown to have taken part in the abortive military coup d'état—and the law is concerned only with persons who have actually done something or else failed to do something that it was their duty to do—should be tried without delay. All other prisoners should be released immediately.

The Amnesty memorandum also called for an immediate end to the requirement that all Indonesians possess testimonials that they "were not involved in the Communist-led September 30, 1965, movement" (that is, the unsuccessful military coup of October 1, 1965). Such papers have not been given to the small number of political prisoners released, to their numerous relatives, to the large group of relatives of prisoners still not released, or to the relatives of the roughly 500,000 peasants, workers, teachers, and left-wing youth who were slaughtered in late 1965 and early 1966.

This memorandum got no response. The Indonesian leaders apparently disregarded it. Amnesty International then correctly decided to make it public. Taking advantage of the public attention focused on Indonesia by the visit of Queen Juliana and Prince Bernhard, Amnesty did so on August 10. Two days later, on August 12, an abridged version of the memorandum could be read in almost all the Djakarta dailies. The Indonesian minister of foreign affairs (and since mid-September also the chairman of the General Assembly of the United Nations), Adam Malik, expressed sharp criticism of Amnesty International.

Malik told journalists: "We are humane enough to treat our people well, and in my opinion foreigners should not interfere in our business." Malik more or less defended the existence of the concentration and other prison

camps where more than 100,000 Indonesians are being held without any kind of trial. He said: "The problem of the political prisoners is very tragic for us also. But we must not forget that along with these prisoners there are 120,000,000 other Indonesians who would be in great difficulties if the Communists had achieved their aim. The claims of these numerically so disproportionate groups must be balanced off against each other. Naturally we want to bring the prisoners to trial. The question is what is the fastest way this can be done? This is more a problem of the judicial system than of the prisoners."

In conclusion, the minister juggled the figures a little: "It must not be forgotten that there were originally 500,000 to 600,000 prisoners and that less than 10 percent of these are still being held." (*Haarlems Dagblad*, August 19, 1971.)

When it came to light that Foreign Minister Schmelzer, who was accompanying Queen Juliana and Prince Bernhard, would raise the question of the political prisoners in discussions with his Indonesian counterpart, some Djakarta papers reacted by making threats. Such "interference in Indonesia's internal affairs," they said, might seriously upset the steadily improving relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

On August 30, 1971, the *Algemeen Dagblad* in this country reported: "The military chiefs were irritated by the concern the Dutch still felt they had to express about the fate of the political prisoners in Indonesia. They were so irritated that shortly before the arrival of the queen the idea was being considered at the highest level of sending a special envoy to the Hague to request that Heer Schmelzer omit the question of the political prisoners in his discussion with Adam Malik. The military chiefs thought that Schmelzer would be able to discuss this sensitive question informally and in private with Malik better than in the presence of two delegations. Tact won out in Djakarta over irritation. This plan was not carried out."

In the meantime, even before this

discussion had taken place between him and Schmelzer, Malik announced that 6,000 prisoners of the C category were to be released at the end of September and that by the end of 1971, of the 45,000 persons currently being held, only 23,000 charged with the gravest crimes would still be in prison. Malik repeated this declaration in his discussion with Schmelzer on August 28, 1971. He added that "in the long run, all the political prisoners will be released."

How many prisoners are there really? According to Malik, the number was originally 500,000 to 600,000. Malik may be confusing the number of prisoners with the number of victims of the massacres that took place in the period from November 1965 to the end of February 1966. But, it seems more likely that he was intentionally citing an exaggerated number of prisoners in order to stress that the Indonesian government has been trying hard to release as many prisoners as possible. It goes something like this. First there were 600,000 prisoners and now, after five years, there are 45,000. So every year we have released more than 100,000 prisoners.

These figures are completely wrong. According to a careful study that I was able to carry out with the help of some graduate students in March 1966, there must have been about 1,000 big and small prison camps in the whole of Indonesia (previously existing prisons, detention cells in police stations and military police headquarters, schools temporarily occupied by the military, etc.). The big prisons were filled with several thousand prisoners and normally not more than 150 to 200 prisoners were held in the small camps. If there was no room for prisoners, they were killed. Thus, the total number of persons imprisoned in March-April 1966 could not have exceeded 250,000.

In the recent history of the Indonesian camps for political prisoners, we can find two periods in which large-scale releases took place—the period from April to August 1966, and from October through December 1967. In the first period, about 70,000 persons were released; in the second, about 50,000. Some 30 to 35 percent of the prisoners released had to pay a sum of money to the authorities involved, which varied from 50 to 10,000 gulden [one Dutch gulden equals

US\$0.28], in order to get these authorities to sign the official record, which was a condition for release.

Some prisoners were released between and after these two periods. Every month small groups of prisoners, usually five or ten per camp (since September 1966 the number of camps has fallen to about 400), have been sent home. Larger groups of, say, 100 to 500 have been released sporadically.

Before the new wave of arrests, which gained momentum in February 1968 (the start of the Blitar incidents)



MALIK: Doesn't want Amnesty "interfering" with concentration camps.

and lasted to April 1969 (the end of the Purwodadi incident), the number of political prisoners in Indonesia stood at around 110,000.

The new arrests must have brought in about 50,000 persons. So, to judge from the official figures, 75,000 to 100,000 persons must have been murdered. Only 4,983 prisoners were released in the period from Blitar through Purwodadi. For the sake of so-called foreign economic aid, the Indonesian authorities were careful to

see that all releases were reported in the papers. Thus, it can be determined that the number of political prisoners in Indonesia in mid-1969 stood at 155,000. Assuming that in the two years from mid-1969 to mid-1971 the number of those who died of natural causes or were murdered—prisoners are still being killed—equaled the number of new prisoners, that the flood of new arrests stopped, and that the number of persons released was too small to weigh in the balance, we come to the conclusion that the total number of prisoners is between 150,000 and 160,000.

The Indonesian rulers naturally give different figures. On October 1, 1969, Indonesian Attorney General Sugih Arto said that there were 69,000 prisoners. The November 29 issue of the Djakarta edition of the daily *Berita Yudha* reported that according to Teperpu (the Central Investigation Commission), the total number of political prisoners at the end of 1969 in all of Indonesia was 73,542 (a figure about 4,500 higher than that given by the attorney general).

In an interview with the publisher of the German weekly *Der Spiegel* (published June 29, 1970), President Suharto cited the figure 58,000. In his initial response to the Amnesty memorandum, Adam Malik spoke of 70,000 prisoners. But only a few days later—without one single prisoner having been released in the meantime—he cited the figure 45,000. It is obvious that in their eagerness to play down the number of prisoners, the Indonesian authorities are arbitrarily giving the most unlikely totals, varying between 40,000 and 70,000.

In May of this year, the generals banned a group of Indonesian intellectuals in Djakarta from holding an open discussion of the problem of the political prisoners. The military regime asserted that nothing more need be said about the question of the political prisoners because this matter had long since been settled.

The estimates of the number of prisoners made by foreign observers are much more reliable. In a report published in the February 4, 1971, issue of *De Nieuwe Linie*, Dr. Finngeir Hiorth of the Institute of Philosophy in Oslo wrote that in 1970, when he visited Indonesia, there were 150,000 prisoners. That figure agrees with mine. The April 1971 issue of Am-

nesty International's newsletter speaks of 116,000 prisoners.

Since the number of persons released since December 1967 is quite small—up till 1970, for example, it did not yet total 5,000—the figures cited by Suharto and Malik indicate that prisoners are still being killed. I myself witnessed the following scene. The commandant of a small group of political prisoners in the neighborhood of the East Javan city of Kraksaan got the order to transfer the prisoners immediately to another area because "refugees from Blitar had infiltrated Kraksaan."

But the commandant could not find a safe place to take the prisoners. He decided to let some of them go "for a good price" and to take the twenty-six most obstinate ones in the evening to the village of Asembagus not far from Kraksaan. When they arrived in the village, the commandant had the prisoners dig two big pits in a place not far from the local cemetery. These pits were to become the prisoners' graves. Once these holes were dug, the prisoners were blindfolded. Their hands were tied behind their backs. They were mowed down from behind by a machine gun. Their bodies tumbled into the graves. The village chief was then ordered to take ten men from the locality and pack the dirt tightly into the pits filled with bodies.

When Attorney General Sugih Arto revealed October 1, 1969, that there were still 60,000 prisoners in Indonesia, he promised that "within two months, 26,000 will be released." (NRC, October 4, 1969.) But he did not keep his word, although he offered something to appease the outside world. In the period from October 1, 1969, to October 1, 1970, only 4,712 persons regained their freedom. In the meantime, 10,000 more were jailed.

Suharto made the same kind of shameless promises. In his interview in *Der Spiegel* of June 29, 1970, he pledged that "15,000 persons belonging to Group C are to be released this year." This promise also was not kept. In the period from July 1, 1970, to July 1, 1971, only 4,000 prisoners were sent home; while during the electoral campaign from the end of April to July 3 of this year, more than 5,000 persons were arrested.

Malik also seems to want to become as big a liar. During the visit of Queen

Juliana and Prince Bernhard he promised that "at the end of September 6,000 prisoners in the C category will be released." It is already November and not one single prisoner out of this 6,000 has been sent home.

Since the Dutch government cannot be expected to remind Malik of his promises, I must appeal to Amnesty International to watch closely that the

Indonesian officials keep their promises to release the prisoners. These officials continually make promises about the fate of the political prisoners but just as continually fail to carry them out. Another memorandum should be sent to President Suharto and this one too should be made public if the generals in Djakarta fail to respond. □

As Bangla Desh Struggle Gains Successes

All-Out War Between India and Pakistan?

"The border is hot. All around." The Indian official's comment to *New York Times* correspondent Sydney Schanberg was probably an understatement. According to Lt. Gen. A. A. K. Niazi, commander of the Pakistani army in Bangla Desh, about half of his troops are deployed along the Indian border. India has, he says, eight divisions facing the Pakistanis, including one armored brigade. He claims that an average of 1,400 to 1,500 Indian shells are fired across the frontier every twenty-four hours.

Pakistani military leaders are not known for their honesty, but in this case independent reports seem to confirm Niazi's estimates.

Schanberg reported in the November 21 *New York Times* that border clashes between the two armies have reached battalion size. He described the pattern: Troops of the Bengali Mukti Bahini (Liberation Forces) retreat toward India after engaging the occupying army. Yahya's troops pursue them, running into Indian soldiers, who open fire. The extent to which either army crosses the border is unclear.

The source of what many observers believe to be impending "all-out" war between India and Pakistan is the guerrilla conflict, which is continually broadening. As was pointed out by Sunanda K. Datta-Ray in the November issue of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, the Indian government has found itself confronted with a "Palestine problem" similar to that of Jordan's King Hussein: the presence on its territory of a large number of refugees, deprived of their homeland and waging an armed struggle to recover it.

The difference in the two situations

makes Gandhi's position even more precarious than Hussein's. The November 18 *Christian Science Monitor* reported that Bengali nationalism has begun to spread within the Indian province of West Bengal, where nearly all the refugees from East Bengal live. The article stressed the role of the West Bengal Communist party in attempting to utilize that sentiment, but conceded that "impressive statistics" supported the claim that West Bengal is a virtual colony of New Delhi.

This political threat to the Gandhi regime, combined with the immense cost of feeding the refugees, however poorly that is done, has prompted the government to undertake military action to find some way of removing the insurgent Bengalis from Indian territory.

India has not given much aid directly to the Mukti Bahini, but has massed troops on the border, threatening to move into East Bengal and secure enough territory for the more than 9,000,000 refugees to return to. But this tactic has helped the Mukti Bahini, at least temporarily. With half the occupying army tied down on the border, guerrilla forces have an easier time operating in the interior of Bangla Desh.

Railways, rivers, and communication networks have been paralyzed by the guerrillas. On November 17 a daylight curfew was imposed in Dacca. In the countryside, Yahya's army is operating like Nixon's forces in Indochina—a terror machine that randomly destroys villages but is unable to secure territory.

Perhaps the most significant achievement of the liberation fighters has been

their success in eliminating the razzakars as an effective instrument of Yahya's terror. This irregular force, composed of West Pakistanis and right-wing Bengali collaborators, was in large part responsible for driving several million Hindu Bengalis out of East Bengal. Now, according to the November 21 *New York Times*, the Mukti Bahini have stopped shooting at the razzakars.

A Mukti Bahini spokesman described them as a demoralized group, hundreds of whom have surrendered to the guerrillas and joined the revolutionary forces. Those who remain serve a dual role. They take pressure off the Mukti Bahini, because the Pakistan army does not bother invading areas where the razzakars function. They also give important military information to the guerrillas. The Mukti Bahini spokesman said that many recent successful actions in and around Dacca were due to intelligence provided by razzakars posing as loyalists to Yahya.

To add to Yahya's mounting problems, the Bengali struggle has reinforced nationalist sentiments even in West Pakistan. In the November *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Tariq Ali wrote that organized nationalist currents have appeared in Baluchistan and the Northeast Frontier, two of West Pakistan's four provinces.

Strikes, the workers' response to the economic crisis triggered by the war, have also developed. It seems clear that Yahya cannot sustain the military, economic, and social costs of trying to put down virtually the entire populace.

This fact has apparently prompted him to consider a war with India, in which he could count on U. S. and Chinese support to counterbalance Indian military superiority.

In the November 21 *New York Times* Schanberg wrote that the Indian government hopes to accomplish its objective, "a friendly, independent East Pakistan," in a few months and without full-scale war.

Yahya, however, does not seem willing to concede. And the Bengalis, who have suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties, are not likely to be amenable to exchanging Pakistani domination for Indian tutelage.

Fear of the revolutionary wave that could engulf the entire subcontinent has thus far persuaded both New Delhi and Islamabad to hesitate at full-scale war. But both capitals' unwillingness to allow their various nation-

alities to exercise the right of self-determination tends to propel them

further along a course that could end in mutual disaster. □

British Hypocrisy in Ireland

No Cruelty or Brutality in Torture?

"The Government reject any suggestion that the methods currently authorized for interrogation contain any element of cruelty or brutality," said Reginald Maulding, the Home Secretary. "The report of the committee confirms this view."

This statement, reported in the November 17 issue of the *New York Times*, was Maulding's response to the report of an official commission set up by the British government to investigate reports that alleged Irish nationalists, arbitrarily arrested and confined under the Northern Ireland Special Powers Act, were being systematically tortured.

Before this committee made its report, rather detailed accounts of the interrogation techniques in use had already been published in the big English papers.

For example, in its October 17 issue, the London *Sunday Times* discussed statements by eleven prisoners that had been smuggled out of the detention camps. The paper also reported the results of its own investigations.

"The technique was the same for all eleven men. They had been rounded up at various points in the province—mostly at Girdwood Barracks in the centre of Belfast. All were blindfolded by having a hood, two layers of fabric thick, placed over their heads. These hoods remained on their heads for up to six days.

"Each man was then flown by helicopter to an unknown destination—in fact, Palace Barracks. During the period of their interrogation, they were continuously hooded, barefoot, dressed only in an over-large boiler suit, and spread-eagled against a wall—leaning on their fingertips like the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle.

"The only sound that filled the room was a high-pitched throb, which the detainees usually liken to an air compressor. The noise literally drove them out of their minds. . . .

"The statements of the 11 after their experience are jumbled and often incoherent. (One, subsequently released,

is now under treatment for mental disorder.)"

The method of interrogation, the *Sunday Times* discovered, was not left up to the whim or imagination of the local police:

"The 'disorientation' technique of interrogation is among the most secret areas of the British armed services' training techniques. Using Russian brainwash techniques, it was refined for British service use by an RAF [Royal Air Force] wing-commander, who committed suicide later. It is taught to select military personnel at the Joint Services Interrogation Centre, whose location is an official secret.

"The interrogation at Palace Barracks was organised, so far as we have been able to ascertain, by men from the Joint Services Interrogation Centre."

The charges of systematic torture were all the more serious because 980 people have been arrested under the Special Powers Act since it was invoked August 9. Of these, 508 have already been released, according to the *New York Times* of November 17.

Some 472 persons are still being held, of whom only 278 have even been formally "interned" under the act, which permits indefinite imprisonment on the grounds of suspicion alone.

The size of these roundups—980 arrests is a large number since they have been directed exclusively at a nationalist community of only about half a million persons—indicates an attempt to intimidate a whole people.

In its report made public November 8, Amnesty International, a respected civil-liberties organization, noted that the testimony of many internees in Northern Ireland conjured up "a familiar picture of activities employed by an army of occupation against a hostile population."

Amnesty charged that a group of twelve internees "were subjected to calculated cruelties imposed on them solely for the entertainment of their captors." Another nine internees testified to "extremely brutal physical cruelties

coupled with psychologically disorienting techniques to break the will." Five "were beaten and forced to do exercises for many hours, including running around the camp and being forced to urinate while running in place."

The British commission report, as quoted by the November 17 *New York Times*, admitted: "Detainees were required to be kept fully hooded except when interrogated or in rooms by themselves" and "while detainees were held together pending interrogation or between interrogations, they were subjected to a continuous hissing noise, or electronic 'muuh,' loud enough to mask extraneous sounds and prevent effective oral communications."

The report also conceded: "We find ill-treatment in the diet of one round of bread and one pint of water every six hours for men who were being exhausted by other measures at the same time. It was confirmed that it was the general policy to deprive the

men of opportunity of sleep during the early days of the operation."

Regarding some means of "exhaustion," the official report said that compulsory exercise, for example, "must have caused hardship but we prefer to take the view that the exercises were devised to counteract the cold and stiffness of which some of the arrested persons complained."

The head of the commission, Sir Edmund Compton, summarized: "Where we have concluded that physical ill-treatment took place, we are not making a finding of brutality. We consider that brutality is an inhuman or savage form of cruelty. We do not think that happened here."

It remains to be seen if these reassuring conclusions will quiet the growing outcry over the methods of the British army in Ireland. When Home Secretary Maulding referred to them in his speech to parliament, the November 17 *New York Times* noted, he faced an "unruly House of Commons." □

Ireland

London Meeting Mourns Peter Graham

London

A memorial meeting was held at the Friends House here November 12 for Peter Graham, the Irish Trotskyist murdered in Dublin last month under mysterious circumstances.

Gery Lawless, editor of the *Irish Citizen*, the newspaper of the Irish Solidarity campaign in Britain, chaired the packed meeting.

Among the speakers was Frank "Butch" Roche, a member of the group in Dublin adhering to the Fourth International. Roche became famous a couple of years ago for dropping tear-gas cannisters in the House of Commons to demonstrate the effect of this gas, which is used by the repressive forces in the Bogside and other Catholic ghetto areas in Northern Ireland.

Bob Purdie, a Scottish Trotskyist leader now active in London, paid tribute to Graham.

Another speaker, D.R. O'Connor Lysaght, who arrived directly from Dublin, described the enthusiastic and pertinacious work of Peter Graham in organizing for Trotskyism. Lysaght praised Graham as an agitational revolutionary writer and said

the group of Irish Trotskyists would publish soon a selection of his articles in pamphlet form.

The final speaker was Tariq Ali, editor of *Red Mole* and a leader of the International Marxist Group (British section of the Fourth International) under whose auspices the memorial meeting was held.

Ali paid high tribute to Peter Graham, saying that he had worked for a long time with the IMG. Although only in his twenties, Graham showed many qualities of a veteran. Just a few months ago, to aid the struggle developing in Ireland, he had volunteered to return home to organize a group for the Fourth International.

Ali compared the assassination of Graham to the recent losses suffered by the Fourth International in Bolivia and Argentina. "Although we bow our heads in sadness," he concluded, "we should not be deterred. We shall say with Trotsky at his deathblow, 'Go forward, we are sure of the victory of the Fourth International.'"

The meeting ended with singing of "The Internationale." □

India

Political Debates Stir Campuses

Indian university administrators are finding it increasingly difficult to cope with a spreading student radicalization, according to an article by A. Hariharan in the November 6 *Far Eastern Economic Review*. Since the academic year began in mid-July, at least half a dozen universities have been closed down.

Hariharan reported that one reason for student dissatisfaction is the "entry fee," which makes it more difficult for poor students to get into schools.

"Admission to the top medical colleges, for example, is according to merit. . . . But the student who fails to make the top, and who is forced back on the middle-level institutions, may find a place which will cost him anything from Rs 10,000 to Rs 20,000 [one rupee equals US\$0.133] — a price only the very rich can afford. In New Delhi, scores of those who have gained first class status in the qualifying examinations taken after two years in another college cannot gain admission to the medical schools."

Another cause of unrest, Hariharan wrote, is the fear of unemployment. There are presently 60,000 engineering graduates who cannot find work.

Other issues are the examination system, inadequate hostel facilities, and poor public transport. In New Delhi, students have been particularly active around the transportation issue:

"Over the past months, there have been almost daily incidents involving college students and bus conductors and drivers. Half a dozen buses have been burnt, scores have been 'hijacked' into campuses."

Recognizing the students' interest in politics, various parties have become involved in elections to student unions. Some parties expend large sums of money in these campaigns. One candidate at Delhi University was reported to have spent Rs 10,000. □

Competing Bureaucrats

U. S. State Department aides are reportedly upset because the secretary of the U. S. Communist party learned of Nixon's plan to visit Moscow before they did.

Behind the Coup d'Etat in Thailand

The military chiefs of the Thai government declared martial law on November 17, dismissing the parliament and abolishing the meager constitutional guarantees supposedly in force since 1968. A "revolutionary council" of nine men, headed by Prime Minister Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, was set up to rule the country with full dictatorial powers.

This move was necessary, the generals claimed, since, because of the "dangers threatening national security and the throne," the "constitutional road was no longer adequate for solving urgent problems."

Referring to rebellions that have been going on in some areas of the country for several years, the communiqué stressed the subversive activity of "some groups" which, it claimed, had "misused their constitutional rights and incited the public and various institutions to oppose and resist the government, as well as inciting the students to demonstrate and the peasants to strike." The communiqué also mentioned the danger of 3,000,000 Thai Chinese aligning themselves with the Peking government. This danger, the statement seemed to suggest, had been increased by U. S. recognition of Peking.

The generals did not name the so-called subversive groups they were referring to, but the international press speculated that shifts in U. S. policy, with economic consequences in Southeast Asia, had produced a split in the Thai ruling class.

In the November 19 issue of *Le Monde*, correspondent Jean Claude Pomonti wrote:

"Thailand has profited from the 'Vietnamese boom' but in the last two years especially difficulties have begun to mount. Although it has not become a serious threat, the Communist insurrection has maintained its momentum. Bangkok has also had problems with the Moslem Malays in the South, who have been affected by separatist agitation, and with the ethnic minorities in the North.

"Besides this, the American military disengagement from Indochina has created a hole in the state finances and, of course, given broader scope to the debate over the U. S. alliance.

More recently, the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations has increased this unease. It has helped to strengthen a 'neutralist' current, or at least a group that has expressed a desire for returning to Thailand's traditional policy of balancing between the great powers. . . ."

The *New York Times* concurred in this analysis. In an editorial November 18, it wrote: ". . . the abrupt dis-



THANOM KITTIKACHORN

missal of a Parliament that never posed any serious threat to the ruling élite suggests that Bangkok has been severely shaken by the evolving Nixon Doctrine of self-sufficiency for Asian allies, gradual withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and United States overtures to Peking.

"In addition, the reduction of American personnel and military spending in the area and a threatened Congressional cutback in aid, coupled with a weakening in the markets for Thailand's principal exports of tin, rubber and rice have generated mounting economic problems for the regime. Economic stringencies have fed social unrest, especially in the cities where the impact of heavy American spending, and heavy-spending Amer-

ican troops, has upset traditional Thai values, including their customary acquiescence to authority."

The most upsetting factor was apparently the Nixon administration's attempt to find cheaper ways of maintaining U. S. dominance over Southeast Asia, through a smaller, more specialized military establishment and diplomatic deals with Peking. A cut in their income, along with fear of losing something in an accommodation between the U. S. and China, could be expected to "upset" the "customary acquiescence" of at least a part of the Thai ruling class to the authority of Washington.

This tendency, in fact, seems to have been one of the main things that worried the generals, who cannot have failed to be impressed by the results of Prince Sihanouk's attempts to maintain a certain maneuverability between Washington and Peking.

In the November 18 *Christian Science Monitor*, Geoffrey Godsell wrote: "Compounding the mood of dissatisfaction has been a growing questioning of what Thailand's policy should be toward China in the wake of the American withdrawal from Vietnam and of President Nixon's dramatic decision to visit Peking. In the vote on the all-important United Nations resolution last month, on the admission of mainland China and the expulsion of Taiwan, Thailand abstained when the United States voted 'no'—a sign of Thailand's at least pondering the issues rather than automatically keeping step with Washington.

"But in this weighing of the China issue and of Thailand's relations with the United States, any pull toward flexibility toward China and less close identification with Washington came more from forces within or close to the now dissolved Parliament than from Marshal Thanom and his No. 2 man, Gen. Prapas Charusathira. Thus Marshal Thanom's taking all of the reins into his hands makes less likely Bangkok's edging closer to Peking. Indeed, it could result in his striving even more earnestly than hitherto to identify himself with the United States."

A November 17 *New York Times* dispatch from Washington noted: "United States officials expressed confidence today that the changes in Thailand would not jeopardize American interests there."

But the *Times* editors thought that the return to open dictatorship might reveal pressures that in the long run

threatened the U.S. position in the area. In their November 18 editorial, they wrote:

"This abrupt upheaval in Bangkok should give the Administration second

thoughts about Thailand as a model for the Nixon Doctrine and a stable base for what is looking more and more like a policy of victory through air power in neighboring Indochina."

Denmark

Revolutionist Exposes Police Provocateurs

"Kasper Neergaard, thirty-two, a Danish revolutionist with international horizons, has gotten what he always dreamed of," the conservative Copenhagen daily *Berlingske Tidende* wrote November 1. "He has shaken up the police intelligence service.

"Neergaard turned over to *Sondags Politiken* pictures of two men from the intelligence branch, so that now they will probably have to be transferred to some more mundane department."

The two unfortunate cops, Detective Sergeant (*kriminalassistent*) L. Holst-Jensen and Detective Constable (*kriminalbetjent*) H. Winther-Hinger, approached Neergaard, claiming to be reporters for the Swedish magazine *Text & Bild*.

"The two intelligence officers met Kasper Neergaard several times in Copenhagen," *Berlingske Tidende* continued, and finally invited him to take a trip to Amsterdam so that he could talk to them about the activity of the far left.

"Neergaard flew to the meeting. At the same time, free-lance photographer Casper Thorsoe drove to Holland, where he photographed the spies at work."

In August of this year, the two cops began to offer Neergaard money. They asked him to open an account in a bank in Stroget.

"When the first 500 kroner [one kroner equals US\$0.13] were deposited," *Sondags Politiken* reported October 31, "one of the officers stood outside and waited for a receipt to take to Horhusvej, where the intelligence service has its offices. Later the police made the deposits themselves. There was an 'arrangement' that 1,500 kroner would be deposited every month."

Neergaard told reporters that there seemed to be no time limit on this financial arrangement, that he got the idea he could keep collecting it for years just for talking to the two cops.

In mid-September, in the elegant Globetrotter Hotel, the two officers suggested that it would be more convenient to hold their next chat in a hotel in Amsterdam. Neergaard had kept his organization, the SUF [Socialistisk Ungdomsforum—Young Socialist Forum, the Danish section of the Fourth International], informed of these operations. He took the opportunity now to expose the police.

"The humorous side of the affair," the Copenhagen daily *Extra Bladet* wrote in an editorial November 6, "was that Kasper Neergaard would have been satisfied with coming to Albord, but the intelligence officers thought that they had to go to Amsterdam to discuss matters. Besides this, the police paid for sumptuous lunches in exclusive Copenhagen hotels. Between lunches and trips, their whole project must have cost 10,000 kroner."

What were the cops willing to spend this kind of money to find out? "According to Kasper Neergaard," *Politiken* wrote November 1, "the two cops were collecting general information about the activity of the left, from the most extreme groups well over into the Social Democracy. And they were especially interested in the opposition to entry into the Common Market."

Politiken continued, quoting Neergaard: "Besides this, the two men were very interested in the Fourth International and SUF's international connections. They promised me 1,500 kroner for 'lifting' the correspondence between the SUF and the Fourth International in Brussels. They asked me to try to get elected as a delegate to the congress of the Fourth International next year."

The daily *Information* was surprised that the Danish authorities would be so concerned about a meeting of the Fourth International. In its Novem-

ber 1 issue, it wrote: "This move raises the question of what interest the local Danish intelligence could have in getting information about an international congress of this type. NATO and the CIA would be more interested in this sort of data."

In response to a formal question in parliament from the SF [Socialistisk Folkeparti—People's Socialist party], Minister of Justice K. Axel Nielsen denied all of Neergaard's charges about police incitement to commit illegal acts. Nielsen did not deny, however, that the intelligence officers had tried to get information from Neergaard on the activities of his organization. The cops, according to the minister of justice, were on the track of illegal explosives.

The same charges had been raised November 1 by the right-wing *Berlingske Tidende*, but in a more sensationalistic way: "The background for the police's unusual methods," the paper wrote, "is that the intelligence service thinks that large quantities of explosives are being produced in Denmark and distributed to groups of militant Trotskyist activists in many countries, including Greece, France, Germany, and Northern Ireland, where a terrorist group called the Provincials [Provisionals?] may be getting the explosives for their bombings from Denmark."

In an editorial November 6, *Information* ridiculed these charges: "The minister of justice's main defense of the police operations was 'information from abroad that arms were being transported over Danish territory' and that reports came in the winter of 1970-71 'from a foreign authority that an illegal bomb factory was operating here.'"

"This is the solidest thing in the story. The minister of justice's foolish remarks about weapons (what kind?) and 'explosives, especially Molotov cocktails' (were there others?) used in the World Bank disturbances cannot be taken seriously. This is just meant to give ammunition to reactionary editors." □

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REVIEWS

Ireland's Blueshirt Fascist Movement

By Gerry Foley

The Blueshirts by Maurice Manning. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Canada. 276 pp. \$8.50. 1971.

Professor Manning's book on the Irish fascist movement is very timely. With the development of a deep crisis in Ireland since the Northern ghetto uprisings of 1969, the question of the potential and sources of fascism in the country has again become a very acute one.

In a debate October 23 in the Aula Maxima of University College Dublin, the school where Manning lectures, the Irish Labour party's main intellectual spokesman and apologist, Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, offered a standard Social Democratic interpretation of fascism. "Totalitarianism," he said, arose from a failure to respect the rules of parliamentary democracy. But O'Brien was not trying to defend the policy of the Social Democratic parties in the 1930s. He was trying to dissuade young radicals and reformers from joining the revolutionary anti-imperialist movement of his opponent in the debate, Tomás Mac Giolla, the president of Sinn Féin, the political party associated with the Irish Republican Army.

O'Brien challenged Mac Giolla in these terms:

"But if you set out to bring the society you want [socialism] into existence through denying the validity of democratic process in the society you actually have, through a private army withdrawn from democratic control, by exploiting the latent forces of romantic nationalism and hatred of foreigners, and if you hope to control these forces by authoritarian methods in your Republic within a Republic — if you set out in this way, then I say to you that the forces you hope to use and control will use and control *you*. Your movement will *not* move in the direction of socialism, not if we accept the idea that socialism must have a democratic base and content. — certain conditions, a movement like yours could perhaps move in the di-

rection of authoritarian State socialism, a kind of Stalinism. But in a country like ours, with its great weight of social conservatism and profound distrust of Communism, it is not in that direction either that your movement can hope to succeed. It is not in the direction of any kind of socialism, even authoritarian socialism, that your movement will go. Where it is going is towards Fascism. It is going in that direction because Fascism is the natural destination of an anti-democratic, militarist, authoritarian, ultra-nationalist movement, whose ultimate appeal is a mystique inaccessible to reason. These elements are in fact among the principal distinguishing marks of Fascism, and all of them are abundantly present already in your movement."¹

This abstract and moralistic method, with its arbitrary selection of certain surface aspects of some fascist movements as characteristic of the phenomenon as a whole, has the advantage, from the Social Democratic or liberal-bourgeois point of view, of making it possible to condemn any militant challenge to the status quo as either "fascist" or conducive to fascism. In situations where oppressed nations are struggling against domination by imperialist powers and their local allies, the claim that since the main fascist movements of the 1930s used nationalist demagogy, then "ultranationalism" is a characteristic of fascism has an obvious utility for upholders of the status quo.

This argument, however, has an especially ironic ring coming from Conor Cruise O'Brien, whose party is orienting toward a coalition with the historic proimperialist party in the formally independent part of Ireland, Fine Gael [the United Ireland party], the party that was associated with the only serious fascist movement that

1. For long excerpts from this debate, see "Irish Republicanism and the Struggle for Socialism," *Intercontinental Press*, November 8, p. 966.

has ever arisen in the country, the Blueshirts of General Owen O'Duffy.

Despite O'Duffy's record in the war of independence (he later became the chief of police of the Free State government which suppressed the militant wing of the nationalist movement and liquidated the independence struggle), there was little enough "romantic nationalism" in the Blueshirt movement. In fact, the main base of support for this movement came from the larger farmers who were unwilling to pay the price of resisting British economic reprisals against the mildly nationalist De Valera government.

O'Brien's sanctimonious abstractions about "mystical" appeals to nationalist emotions completely obscure the difference between the effect of nationalism in a small, oppressed country like Ireland, where the main economic groups are intermeshed with the imperialist system dominating the island, and nationalism in imperialist countries like Germany and Italy. In the first case, nationalism means fighting against the ruling class. In the second, it means fighting in defense of the interests of the national ruling class.

So, we should not be surprised that it was not the heroes of the Irish war of independence, the intransigent soldiers of Ireland, who showed the greatest interest in fascism. It was the party that favored compromise with England, "patriotic realism," as the constitution of the blue-shirted "National Guard" put it, the party that Manning describes this way: "During its ten years in power, the policies of Cumann na nGaedheal [the predecessor of Fine Gael] were neither radical nor revolutionary. The Cosgrave administration sought to develop the institutions of the state on the basis already laid down. It attempted to restore the forces of law and order, to re-open the channels of trade and to develop the state constitutionally on the lines laid down in the Treaty settlement [which ended the war of independence]. As a result of this attempt to return to conditions of normality and stability, the party attracted the support of the entrenched and established elements in the community and was generally regarded, by both its own supporters and its opponents, as a conservative party. It drew its support mainly from the business and commercial classes, the professions and the bigger farmers, whose values

and attitudes it reflected. . . .

"Warner Moss, an American political scientist who spent part of the 1920s in Ireland studying the Irish parties, noted that the party drew upon the local business leaders, the priests and the prosperous farmers, and he perhaps unfairly characterised it as the 'party of age and complacency.'"

It was the shaky foundations of the new Irish establishment that impelled this stodgy rural reactionary party onto the road to fascism. A resurgence of militant nationalism, combined with a working-class radicalization produced by the great depression, seemed to pose a serious threat to the Treaty settlement. In 1932, in coalition with Labour, the Fianna Fáil party of Eamon De Valera, one of the representatives of the militant nationalist and losing side in the Irish civil war of 1922, rose to power.

This shift in the balance of political forces in the country frightened the Treatyite party, which had presided over the foundation of the Free State and controlled the government since 1922. "This first meeting of the new Dáil [in which the historic supporters of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922 were now a minority] took place against a background of rumour and speculation concerning the possibility of a *coup d'état*," Manning writes. "The possibility of the National Army refusing to serve under its former enemies was widely debated, and on 26 February, *The Irish Press* had spoken of 'a rumour to the effect that two Cumann na nGaedheal ministers and others are to attempt to obstruct the transfer of power to Fianna Fáil'. . . . And it is easy to see how such rumours could have originated and spread, for the memories of the Civil War were still very vivid; many of the leading officers in both army and police had fought under arms against the new government. And on a more mundane level, the great publicity which Fianna Fáil had given to the gratuities and pensions paid to ex-members of the Free State Army may easily have given the impression that such pensions would be terminated or reduced by the government and that a series of purges was imminent."

Despite the underlying social conservatism of De Valera, whose real role was to consolidate the situation created by the Treaty in a way that the Treatyites themselves probably

never could have done, the vested interests feared—and with some justification—that a new rise of nationalism would threaten the foundations of the economic order in the country.

Militant nationalism apparently equaled "Communism" for these Irish conservatives, since the dominant group even in the IRA at this time was still deeply influenced by conservative ways of thought. In 1933, the Treatyite "theoretician" Professor James Hogan wrote: "It was the growing menace of the Communist I. R. A. that called forth the Blueshirts as inevitably as Communist anarchy called forth the Blackshirts in Italy."

Specifically, the Blueshirts arose out of the Army Comrades Association. Originally a nonpolitical society of Treatyite veterans of the civil war, this formation became the organizing center for direct action against the IRA, the underground anti-Treatyite army, and the mildly nationalist economic policies of De Valera.

United Ireland, the organ of the Fine Gael party, preached the essential doctrines of fascism, although, naturally enough in Ireland, it cited the example of the clericalist fascism propagated mainly in Spain and Portugal rather than the agnostic or "pagan" types of fascism in Italy and Germany.

In October 1933, a contributor to *United Ireland* wrote: "The intelligent young men of today . . . want discipline and efficiency, not individualism run mad."

In his article "The Blueshirts,"² David Thornley noted: "At the lower strata of the movement a Hitlerian note was also sometimes to be heard. A correspondent named 'Oganach' [Youth], writing in *United Ireland* in December 1933, suggested that Blueshirt audiences, instead of greeting their leader with a 'confused din', should imitate the Nazis, who 'give three sudden staccato bursts of mass cheering, each burst consisting of one sharply-ejected syllable . . . The word may be "Heil!" (Hail!) pronounced sharply; or it may be "Hoch!" (Up!) . . . I can think of no single English word of one syllable to suggest for the purpose in mind', continued 'Oganach.' "'Hail!" would serve for receiving the Director-General and other dig-


2. In *The Years of the Great Test: 1926-39*, ed. Francis Mac Manus, The Mercier Press, Cork, Ireland, 1967.

nitaries, but would not suit as an interjection indicating approval during the course of a speech or address. There may be Irish words of one syllable, capable of filling the mouth and being shot out powerfully. The matter is worthy of consideration. In addition to its touch of discipline (mental), it gives you another symbol by which you will differ from the herd."

Thornley continued: "I have no evidence that 'Oganach's' suggestion was seriously considered, although the ensuing issue of *United Ireland* bore a frontpage picture of O'Duffy on his release from a sojourn in Arbour Hill, with the caption 'Hail! O'Duffy!'"

The Blueshirt movement, however, proved abortive; it lasted as a force in Irish politics for about two years. Various explanations have been given for its early demise. Both Thornley and Manning stress the Treatyites' "essential" commitment to parliamentary democracy. In any case, De Valera's conservatism and his determination to suppress the IRA and the remnants of the militant nationalist movement quickly became evident.

Also, Fine Gael made no progress in the 1934 elections, in which O'Duffy predicted spectacular gains. It may be that in a small country where the bulk of small farmers and small businessmen saw their only hope for advancement in the economic nationalism of De Valera, it was difficult for fascism to acquire a mass base. Because of the country's geographical



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position, moreover, no vested interest in Ireland had anything to hope for from military adventurism.

Thornley suggests that Professor Hogan, the movement's main ideologue, resigned when O'Duffy began making threatening gestures toward Northern Ireland and calling on farmers not to pay their land annuities and laborers not to pay the rent on their cottages.

The problem of why a section of the Irish bourgeoisie flirted with fascism and why this flirtation was so brief raises a whole series of questions about the composition, character, and aspirations of the Irish ruling class. No answers to these questions will be found in Manning's book.

Manning's analysis of fascism is as abstract and "theological" as the one O'Brien put forth in the *Aula Maxima* debate. For example, in his conclusion Manning writes: "It is possible to say that the Blueshirts had origins

similar to many Fascist movements, that this movement looked like and had many of the external trimmings of Fascism and that it exhibited such Fascist characteristics as a strong emphasis on the role of youth, attachment to some form of corporate policy and a fanatical opposition to Communism. On the other hand, it must be said that not all of these characteristics were the exclusive preserve of Fascist movements and that the Blueshirts lacked some of the basic features of Fascism—opposition to democracy [the Blueshirts claimed that they had organized to "defend free speech"], a commitment to violence almost as an end in itself, and a belief in dictatorship."

Manning has obviously chosen a few features common to the propaganda of several fascist movements as characteristic of the phenomenon as a whole. Even in applying this superficial comparative method, how-

ever, he seems slipshod. His bibliography does not reflect a very extensive study of European fascism.³ Moreover, the fact that Vidkun Quisling's *Nasjonal Samling* [National Unity] party is consistently referred to as "Najonal Sporling," which means nothing in Norwegian, does not say very much for Manning's knowledge of the field.

The main attraction of the book is that it is clearly written and offers information not easily accessible elsewhere. It would make a good popular paperback at a price much lower than the \$8.50 listed on the hardback edition. Such a work, however—insipid as it is—may not be very attractive to the market for Irish popular-history books. □

3. For a Marxist presentation of the rise of fascism, see *The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany*, by Leon Trotsky, Pathfinder Press, Inc., New York, 1971.

DOCUMENTS

The Split Between Healy and Lambert

By Pierre Frank

After the Reunification Congress of 1963, there were only two national organizations of any significant size or political influence claiming to be Trotskyist that stayed outside the Fourth International. One was the OCI [Organisation Communiste Internationaliste—Internationalist Communist Organization], linked to the AJS [Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme—Alliance of Youth for Socialism], led by Pierre Lambert in France. The other was the SLL [Socialist Labour League] in Great Britain led by Gerry Healy. These two organizations were linked together in an "International Committee," whose declared aim was to "reconstruct" the Fourth International, allegedly "destroyed" by the "Pabloites." A split has just occurred between these two formations.

On October 12 a statement was published, signed by Lambert, the Bolivian Guillermo Lora, and the Hungarian B. Nagy, in which the SLL was accused of capitulating to pressures of a Pabloite type.¹ In response, the SLL, in association with a few politically insignificant groups in various countries, published a statement October 24 declaring that the OCI had finally carried through to an open break a split that it had begun at the Essen

Conference in July 1970.² At this conference, the statement said, Lambert had voted, along with the POUM [Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista—Workers Party of Marxist Unity], among others, against a document proposed by Healy.

The OCI published its statement in the form of a leaflet distributed by the tens of thousands. In the November 5 issue of its organ *Workers Press*, the SLL devoted a two-page spread to an English translation of the OCI document along with a reply four times longer than the text itself.

Despite the attempt by the protagonists of the dispute to give their quarrel mass publicity, it is of no interest to the working class. This affair does hold a certain interest, however, for vanguard militants, in particular for members of the Fourth International dedicated to building their worldwide organization and its national sections. The polemic between Healy and Lambert (I will use the names of the leaders from here on for the sake of convenience) will probably not be limited to the October 12 and 24 documents. But these two texts, already published, make it possible to identify the differences clearly and raise some questions.

¹ See the November 1 issue of *Intercontinental Press* for the full text. — IP

² See the November 22 issue of *Intercontinental Press* for the full text. — IP

The Lambertist leaflet has very little political content in the true sense of the word. It is primarily a vociferous defense of the Lora POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario — Revolutionary Workers party], which it claimed assured the "class independence" of the People's Assembly in Bolivia by forcing the pro-Moscow Communist party to accept a united front. Those who criticized Lora were supposed to be the "hidden and open enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat." In attacking the POR, the statement said, the SLL had capitulated to "enormous pressures" (in particular from "Pabloites of all shadings").

Healy's document has much more political content, constituting a condemnation of Lambert's policy as a whole. This condemnation goes all the way back to the 1950s, because during the Algerian war, Lambert supported Messali Hadj. On the question of the Vietnam war, Healy reproaches Lambert for associating with the American National Student Association, a right-wing organization that put forward the slogan of "Sign a Peace Treaty With Vietnam" at the Lambertist conference in Essen. Likewise, he scores Lambert for refusing "to campaign in support of a victory for the National Liberation Front, because of its Stalinist leadership. . . . This led to a situation on the eve of the 1968 Tet offensive where comrade Berg openly stated an abstentionist position on Vietnam."

Healy also denounces Lambert for "years of refusal to support the struggle of the Palestinian people for self-determination, and inability to take the side of the Arab revolution against Zionism and US imperialism. . . ." After this, the statement continues, Lambert glorified the Irbid "Soviet." Healy concludes that this line represented "inability to fight against the Stalinists and petty-bourgeois nationalists in a real fight for independent leadership in the anti-imperialist struggle, and at the same time an abstract demagogy about the victory of the workers and peasants. . . ."

On the question of the Lora POR, Healy is unmerciful. He notes that it was Lambert himself who formulated the first *public* criticisms of Lora in 1970 for his collaboration with the pro-Moscow CP at the congress of the COB [Central Obrera Boliviana — Bolivian Labor Federation]. Healy also pointed out, citing Lora's own words as evidence, that the Bolivian leader himself admitted after Banzer's coup that he had thought General Torres's government would give arms to the masses in order "to neutralize" the right-wing officers.

But it is on Lambert's policies in France that Healy's attack is especially severe. It warrants being quoted at length because the whole story, or almost the whole story, is there.

In the first place, Healy accuses Lambert of having drawn such pessimistic conclusions from de Gaulle's rise to power that he was incapable of preparing for May 1968 and that as a result he tail-ended during the events themselves.

"May-June 1968, with the French workers on General Strike, themselves striving for an alternative government, was the greatest testing time for the OCI. But what did the strike reveal?

"It revealed the theoretical bankruptcy and political impotence of the OCI whose leadership—guided by a superficial impressionist analysis of de Gaulle's coup in 1958—had exaggerated the strength and viability of the Fifth Republic, abandoned its revolutionary perspective and written off the revolutionary capacities of the French working class.

"This defeatist conception, which extended even to the Vietnam war, was summed up in the rationalization of Lambert that the French working class was 'decisively defeated in 1958'. This pessimistic and essentially middle-class outlook expressed itself in all the organizational and agitational work of the OCI and the AJS before and after 1968. It is an undeniable fact that at no time during the General Strike did the OCI leadership advance a socialist programme. Nor did it attempt to undermine the political credibility of the Stalinist leadership by critically supporting the demand of the Renault workers for a 'popular government' by advancing the demand of a CP-CGT government. Instead, the OCI leaders tail-ended the working class and restricted the political scope of the strike by demanding a central strike committee. This was a complete evasion of the *political* [emphasis in the original] responsibilities of revolutionary leadership."

This same tail-ending tendency, Healy said, was shown in the 1969 presidential election. In practice the Lambertists split, some voting for Duclos, others for Deferre, and still others, like Lambert himself, abstaining.

"Even from this 1968 experience the lessons were not learned. In fact the abstentionist methods and omissions of the General Strike period were continued into the presidential elections of 1969.

"In the referendum in March of the same year, the OCI had correctly campaigned for a vote against de Gaulle, in contrast to the abstentionism of the Pabloites. However, the gains from this correct turn were lost in the presidential elections, the class character of which was ignored by the OCI. Basing themselves on their fraudulent theory of the 'United Class Front', the OCI leaders used the failure of the CP and Socialist Party to agree on a single candidate as a pretext for not supporting the CP candidate, Duclos, against Pompidou.

"The task of revolutionaries was to raise the consciousness of Stalinist rank and file by critically supporting Duclos and pointing out that the main enemy was Pompidou. The OCI should have campaigned throughout the labour movement to demand that the CP candidate be pledged to a socialist policy against the banks and monopolies. To carry forward this fight, while calling for a massive vote for Duclos, was the best way to exposing the Stalinists and their programme of 'advanced democracy' and fighting for alternative revolutionary leadership. Any other course leaves the Stalinist control undisturbed. It was also necessary to expose the SP candidate whose party refused to vote for Duclos in the second ballot and supported the bourgeois candidate, Poher.

"The OCI leaders did none of these things. Some members voted for Duclos, others for Deferre (SP) and others, including comrade Lambert, abstained. What was worse, the OCI attacked the Stalinists for having dared to stand a candidate in the elections despite the fact that the Stalinists in the previous presidential elections in 1965 did not do so and instead supported Mitterrand [Mitterrand], a bourgeois politician."

In Healy's opinion these were not accidental errors, because Lambert has oriented not toward the workers influenced by the Stalinists but toward the more backward ones following the Social Democrats: "At no time has the OCI been able consistently to put forward a policy and programme to bring it close to the mass of French workers who vote for the Stalinists and are or-

ganized around the Stalinist-led CGT. Instead they have orientated towards those sections still supporting the social-democrats, primarily in the older industries."

This orientation toward the Social Democracy has recently been intensified. After all, isn't it necessary to "save" Mitterrand's Socialist party?

After long denying all revolutionary perspectives, Lambert has now discovered "the imminence of revolution." This turn, which to my knowledge was made without any serious explanation, has not changed the Lambertist policy. As before, this policy still consists in calling for a "united class front." Healy denounces this as abandoning the perspective of building a revolutionary party:

"Now the OCI, using the formula, 'imminence of revolution', elaborating a schema of natural stages through which the working class passes on the road to power, distorting the tactic of united front of the working class, has taken the road of liquidationism laid down by these revisionists."

Earlier in the document, Healy says: "Within this framework the OCI's position on the 'united class front' becomes a complete liquidation of the party and its subordination to the Stalinist and social democratic parties and union apparatus. Lenin and Trotsky saw the united front as a *tactic* [emphasis in the original] and not a strategy as the OCI claim. They saw it as a relationship between mass workers' parties of a temporary character for the purpose of winning the masses to the Communist Party. The OCI has transformed this into an overall 'unity' of the class achieved on the basis of its present leadership, without the participation in the united front of our party. This 'united class front' more and more, in their theorizing and practice, takes over the role of the revolutionary party itself."

Finally, to mask this opportunist policy, Healy says, Lambert has been reduced to trying to pull off spectacular bluffs. This is what Healy writes about the Essen demonstration:

"The Essen rally itself was conceived and carried through by the OCI as a diversion from the unresolved problems of their work in the French working class. An artificial formula was constructed which made W Germany the focal point of the workers' struggle in Europe, and then the OCI led their youth movement to a rally where less than 200 German youth participated, and real political work to build sections of the FI was replaced by demagogy and showmanship."

A few days after these lines were written, the Lambertists were still bluffing, making a claim of 40,000 participants in the October 31 demonstration in Paris, a figure which their own press cut to 20,000 the week after. In fact, the actual number was far lower.³

All of the criticisms Healy raises—tail-ending in the class struggle in France, orienting toward the Social Democracy, opportunism in limiting their policy to a "united front" line, bluffing, refusing to struggle in support of Vietnam, etc.—are very similar, if not identical, to those long expressed by the Ligue Communiste. In particular, these criticisms have been formulated in Comrade Henri Weber's pamphlet *Qu'est-ce que l'A.J.S. — Contribution à l'analyse de l'extrême-gauche* [What Is the AJS—A Con-

tribution to the Analysis of the Extreme Left], which is to be published shortly.

It will be interesting to read what Lambert writes in reply to this very vigorous settling of accounts by Healy. But while a number of the SLL leader's criticisms are correct, this does not mean that all that he says in his attack is free from error, particularly where he mentions "Pabloism," which for him means the Fourth International.

Furthermore, in some cases Healy does more than commit errors! For instance, on the matter of the 1969 presidential election, he curiously forgets about Krivine's campaign, which redounded to the credit of Trotskyism. He is careful also to avoid saying anything about the position of the Fourth International and its adherents in May 1968, about their defense of Vietnam and the Arab revolution, or about their effective participation in mass mobilizations in France such as the "Guyot affair," the demonstrations against the Burgos trial, and the counter-demonstration against the Ordre Nouveau meeting, and others.⁴

On each of these occasions, the Ligue Communiste took a clear position and conducted a vigorous campaign. At the same time, the Lambertists followed an abstentionist line that was a pale reflection of the one taken by the PCF [Parti Communiste Français—French Communist party].

In the case of Bolivia, Healy falsifies the facts. It is not true that Lora was "the major supporter of Pablo in Latin America in 1952." At the time of the 1952-53 split in the Fourth International, Lora was in no way concerned with what was going on in the international movement (in which his interest was always only relative). At that time he was involved in a split from the Bolivian section of the Fourth International.

Lora did not expand his horizons beyond the Bolivian national scene until the 1960s, when he took a trip outside Latin America. At that time, he thought he saw the possibility of finding "allies" in the "International Committee," among other places, against the Bolivian section of the Fourth International and its leader, Comrade Hugo González Moscoso.

Moreover, and this is even graver, Healy chose to lie outright when he said that the "international Pabloites"—meaning by that what is called the POR-González⁵ in Bolivia—had the same policy toward the Torres gov-

4. The arrest and sentencing of a young high-school student, Gilles Guyot, in Paris in late February 1971 led to some of the largest mobilizations of youth against police repression since the spring of 1968. For the facts, see "Paris High-School Students Win in Huge Street Demonstrations," *Intercontinental Press*, March 8, p. 199. On the Burgos demonstrations in support of the Basque nationalists being tried before a Franco court, see "What the Basque Solidarity Demonstrations Showed," *Intercontinental Press*, February 1, p. 82. The counterdemonstrations against the Ordre Nouveau mass public meeting February 26, 1970, were aimed at preventing the rise of a new fascist movement in France. — IP

5. There are two organizations in Bolivia named "Partido Obrero Revolucionario." In Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America, they are commonly identified as the "POR de Lora" and the "POR de Gonzalez" or "POR-Lora" and "POR-Gonzalez" after the two main leaders, Guillermo Lora and Hugo Gonzalez Moscoso. In France and England, Gonzalez is often referred to as "Moscoso." In translating Pierre Frank's article, we have corrected his references to correspond with Hispanic-American usage. — IP

³The police estimate, according to the November 2 *Le Monde*, was 5,000. — IP

ernment that Lora had. In his own document, Healy cites a statement by Lora that, by condemning the "ultra-leftists and the Pabloites" for their policy toward Torres, proves exactly the opposite of this assertion. Healy cannot be unaware of the many statements by Comrade González that leave no doubt about the policy followed by the section of the Fourth International in Bolivia. He cannot be unaware that Lora allied himself with the pro-Moscow CP in order to block the admission of the POR-González to the People's Assembly, along with the peasant organization led and, insofar as possible, armed by the POR. Healy cannot be unaware of these facts. They were reported in English publications that he follows regularly.

While waiting for the development of the split now made public to give Healy and Lambert a chance to formulate their differences, and thus their respective political lines, still more clearly, I should like to raise two important points.

First: Healy has accused Lambert of capitulating to "Pabloism," and vice versa, Lambert has accused Healy of the same thing. Poor Pablo would certainly like to meet all these "Pabloites" haunting Healy and Lambert! In fact "Pabloism" is an invention dating from 1952-53, when it was used in an attempt to explain the split. This concept represented an incorrect extrapolation of the policy advocated by the Fourth International at the time. Lambert and Healy preserved this invention and tried to use it as a master key instead of striving to understand events as they are, to understand the analyses of these events made by the Fourth International, and to grasp the political line it deduced from them.

Anyone who claimed to be a Trotskyist and did not share the positions of the men of the "International Committee" was a "Pabloite," including the comrades of *Lutte Ouvrière*, who must certainly wonder what they ever did to deserve this charge. Today, even in breaking with each other, Healy and Lambert remain prisoners of their invention. Let us wager that if they are unable to free themselves from it, they will end up by finding "Pabloism" springing up everywhere in their own ranks.

The most important question, however, is not "Pabloism." Healy and Lambert claimed to be "reconstructing" the Fourth International, an international whose Trotskyist orthodoxy would be equal to any test. In this attempt, they have disregarded the real Fourth International, whose sections and supporters—like the Socialist Workers party in the United States—have been making notable progress for some years and becoming a factor in the political life of some countries.

For years Healy and Lambert together claimed to be "reconstructing" the Fourth International. The axis of their strategy for accomplishing this was a struggle against the "Pabloite International." All those who joined Healy and Lambert's organizations started out by going through a course of education that denounced "Pabloism" as enemy No. 1. It must be assumed that this education was defective, because now both Lambert and Healy are supposed to be infected with "Pabloism."

But the main question that arises now is: With whom does either of them contemplate "reconstructing" the Fourth International? As long as they were united, as illusory as their project was in reality, it might have deceived some people, helped to create insignificant groups here and

there. Now that Healy and Lambert are in conflict with each other, the unreality of this undertaking seems indisputable, save for incurable sectarians. The latter, of course, will prefer self-justifying formulas rather than an attempt to comprehend the reality and to search for a true explanation for this rupture between Healy and Lambert.

These two leaders opposed the reunification of 1962-63 under pretext that it was carried through without all of the problems of the past having been clarified. "Pabloism" had to be cauterized out before there could be any question of Trotskyist reunification. At the same time, they rejected the answers that the reunifying forces had reached on the new problems posed by postwar developments. They clung to every letter, every word, every comma of the *Transitional Program*.

But the letter of the texts was not enough. What held Healy and Lambert together was their sectarian, shop-keeper concept of organization. In terms of their political ideas, Healy leans toward ultraleftism (not the Maoist or spontanéist but the "Third Period" Stalinist type), while Lambert is by nature an opportunist.

For years Healy and Lambert managed to collaborate in opposing the "Pabloite International," although not without occasional friction. New events and the new perspectives opened up to Trotskyists since May 1968 have finally broken the agreement between these two antagonistic political currents that were united against "Pabloism."

In contrast to this, the Fourth International has not indulged in a mere repetition of formulas but has striven to carry the Trotskyist movement forward by offering appropriate answers to the new problems. In this it has succeeded, not by making big publicity campaigns around certain dates arbitrarily set for the convenience of some political propaganda shop, but through continuous internal discussion and through involvement in the class struggle. The Fourth International is not concerned with the declarations of sects hurling their excommunications to the four winds. It is indefatigably building new revolutionary leaderships and thus accomplishing the task it set itself at its foundation.

November 10, 1971

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