

# Intercontinental Press

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
November 22, 1971

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Indefinite Occupation:

## Nixon's Plan in Vietnam

65%  
in U.S.  
Think  
War  
Immoral



The Healyite Case Against the Lambertists

# Five Striking Miners Killed in Peru

Five strikers at the Cerro de Pasco copper mines in the central Andes were murdered November 10 by police who opened fire on orders from the Peruvian military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado.

According to an Associated Press dispatch in the November 14 Spanish-language daily *El Tiempo*, the government claimed that the shooting was made necessary by the strikers' refusal to release two company officials they had seized as hostages six days earlier. The strikers had occupied one of the mines, which are American-owned.

In addition to the five miners killed, ten miners and eight police were injured in the attack, according to a government announcement.

Velasco preceded the assault with a decree suspending constitutional guarantees in the region. A communiqué signed by the minister of the interior claimed that the strike by 16,000 miners had created an "anarchical situation," which it blamed on "ultraleft counterrevolutionary elements." □

## How Sweet It Is

If a twenty-centime piece is put into the water of the Somme canal at Eterpigny, north of Paris, it turns black overnight. In fact, for a seven-mile stretch, the water itself is nearly black. All the fish are dead, the plants on the banks of the river are dead, sulfur ruins the paint on buildings in the area. Thousands of dead fish periodically float to the surface and have to be scooped up quickly, before the stench becomes overpowering.

These attractions exist thanks to the friendly neighborhood sugar refinery, which takes water from the canal to cool its machinery, subsequently pollutes it, and then redeposits it in the canal.

The local proprietors have promised to rectify the situation sometime in 1972. In the meantime, the tedium of gradual pollution is occasionally relieved by major accidents. On September 29 caramel got stuck in the factory's pipes and was ejected, all at once, into the canal.

On October 4 syrup from the company's storage tanks emptied into the canal. There it fermented, absorbing all the free oxygen and suffocating nearly all aquatic life in the area. □

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# Nixon Planning Indefinite Occupation of Vietnam

By Allen Myers

"Even at the risk of a Communist takeover, a sizable majority of the public want out completely from Vietnam," wrote Louis Harris in describing the results of a poll his organization conducted during the last week of October. "The option of leaving 50,000 non-combat troops in South Vietnam is unacceptable to a majority. An even larger majority would be opposed to continued use of American bombers and helicopters to support the South Vietnamese army. And by a thumping 70-16 per cent, Americans stand opposed to 'continuing to send over \$1 billion a year in military aid to the South Vietnamese.'"

The poll was released in two parts, on November 8 and November 11. It revealed clearly that the mass demonstrations in seventeen cities November 6 expressed the demands of the overwhelming majority of the American public.

Asked if they believed it "morally right or morally wrong for the U. S. to be fighting in Vietnam," 65 percent of those questioned said it was wrong, only 21 percent said it was right, and 14 percent were undecided.

Last January, the respective figures on the same question were 47%, 36%, and 17%.

By nearly the same margin, 62% to 21%, the sampling favored "getting completely out of Vietnam by May, including all combat and non-combat troops."

The Harris poll did not include a question on immediate withdrawal, but it did ask, "Do you feel the pace of withdrawal of U. S. troops from Vietnam is too slow, too fast, or at about the right pace?"

The answers indicated that Nixon's "Vietnamization" program is losing its ability to conceal his real intentions from the public. Only 3% said the withdrawal rate is too fast; 38% believed it about right; and a majority of 53% said it is too slow. In the two years that Harris has been asking the question, this was the first

time a majority thought the withdrawal rate too slow.

"The clue to public thinking on the Vietnam issue," Harris commented, "is that the people are no longer willing to tolerate a 'winding down' of the war, with gradual U. S. withdrawal from the conflict. The dominant public mood is to 'get out' and to do it as soon as possible."

In the face of this overwhelming sentiment, Nixon's promise at a news conference November 12 that he would withdraw another 45,000 troops before February 1 was probably the least he could get away with. As always, the announcement was calculated to appear to offer more concessions to antiwar sentiment than it really did.

Nixon called the move "a substantially increased troop withdrawal." The increase, however, was only in the rate of withdrawal—to 22,500 a month from the average of 14,300 during the preceding seven months. But since the new phase covers only two months, at the end of it there will still be 139,000 U. S. troops in Vietnam, in addition to those stationed offshore or in neighboring countries involved in the naval and air war against the people of Indochina.

Of far more significance than Nixon's juggling of figures was his admission that he plans to keep a "residual force" in Vietnam indefinitely. Coupled with this was a threat not only to continue, but even to escalate the air war if the Vietnamese refused a "negotiated settlement" on terms agreeable to him.

"First," he said, "if the situation is such that we have a negotiated settlement, naturally that means a total withdrawal of all American forces. It also not only means a total withdrawal of American forces in South Vietnam, it means a discontinuation of our air strikes and also withdrawal of forces stationed in other places in Southeast Asia or in the Asian theater that are directly related to the support of our forces in Vietnam.

"... If we do not get a negotiated settlement, then it is necessary to maintain a residual force for not only the reason—and this is, of course, a very primary reason—of having something to negotiate with, with regard to our prisoners, but it is also essential to do so in order to continue our role of leaving South Vietnam in a position where it will be able to defend itself from a Communist take-over.

"Both objectives can be fulfilled, we believe, through a negotiated settlement. We would prefer that. If they are not fulfilled through a negotiated settlement, then we will have to go another route and we are prepared to do so."

With the lying verbiage stripped away, this amounted to a threat to keep as many as 139,000 American troops in Vietnam until the Vietnamese people agreed to leave Thieu in power in Saigon. In the meantime, Nixon would feel free to escalate the air war, as he indicated in response to another question:

"As we reduce the number of our forces, it is particularly important for us to continue our air strikes on the infiltration routes. If we see any substantial step-up in infiltration in the passes, for example, which lead from North Vietnam into Laos and, of course, the Laotian trail which comes down through Cambodia into South Vietnam—if we see that, we will have to step them up."

It should be kept in mind that this was a threat to escalate an air war that already involves dropping bombs totaling 70,000 tons per month on Indochina. So far this year, the Nixon administration has admitted seventy-five raids on North Vietnam, compared with twenty-one during all of 1970.

"By the end of this year," James M. Naughton wrote in the November 14 *New York Times*, "the United States will have dropped over an area no larger than Texas three times the

tonnage of all the aerial munitions used in World War II."

Nixon's pretense of tying this escalation to the rate of "infiltration" from North Vietnam was particularly cynical since this figure is notorious for being whatever his political needs dictate. Only one day after Nixon spoke, U.S. military sources in Saigon dutifully reported "that the enemy was massing supplies in North Vietnam in preparation for a major push down the Ho Chi Minh Trail network and into Cambodia and Laos," in the words of Alvin Shuster, writing in the November 14 *New York Times*.

In face of his plans for further aggression, Nixon apparently felt the need to offer the American public a meaningless semantic sop. U.S. "offensive activity," he proclaimed, is now at an end. "American troops are now in a defensive position."

In a dispatch from Saigon in the November 13 *New York Times*, Alvin Shuster did his best to explain this distinction without a difference:

"Military sources said today that President Nixon's statement that American ground combat offensive operations had ended in Vietnam did not mean that American troops would stop fighting or dying.

"... there are still 19 American combat-maneuver battalions in the country, operating mostly from positions surrounding major cities and bases and engaging in limited patrolling. They no longer embark on major search-and-clear [the latest euphemism for "search-and-destroy"] operations, but American soldiers still find themselves in combat situations."

Shuster found that American GIs, who can see firsthand that Nixon is lying, tended to resent his propaganda.

"Right after I heard [Secretary of

## Correction

In last week's issue, our report on the November 6 demonstrations, "Marches in 17 Cities Cap Fall Antiwar Offensive," erroneously reported that Houston police had estimated the demonstration there at 15,000. Actually, the police conformed to the long-standing practice of belittling antiwar actions and estimated the crowd at only 1,500. The real size of the demonstration, according to the Houston Peace Action Council, was more than 5,000 persons.

Defense Melvin] Laird say we were out of combat, the next day we got on a chopper and lost five killed," said Lieut. Pat Ruggle, of Mountain Juliet, Tenn.

"Others on that patrol and on missions in the countryside around Saigon reacted with anger recently when told that their combat role was supposed to be over. The general reaction was that Americans were being misled because, as one soldier put it, 'Nobody has told me I am not supposed to fight.'"

But if nobody has told the GIs that they are not supposed to fight, the idea has occurred anyway to not a few of them. In the November 12 *New York Times*, Fox Butterfield described a "routine patrol" of American troops in Quangnam province:

"One afternoon an observation plane spotted five Vietcong guerrillas two miles ahead. But when the men moved too slowly to catch them, no one was disappointed. 'What's the point in getting shot at when the war doesn't mean anything anymore?' Private

Roddie said, sweating under his 80-pound radio pack."

Butterfield also noted that low morale was not confined to enlisted men:

"Nobody in the brigade gives a damn about this war anymore, including me," a senior brigade officer remarked. 'We will be happy to go home, and when we do the enemy will march down out of the hills and take over.'"

This growing war-weariness of American troops and the increasing involvement of organized labor in the antiwar movement promise anything but a smooth road for Nixon's plans. In response to Nixon's news conference, the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) said it intends to sponsor further mass protests. Plans will be discussed at the national convention scheduled December 3-5 in Cleveland. U.S. imperialism's plans for a "residual force" in Vietnam are likely to make NPAC's demand "Out Now!" increasingly popular in the streets of American cities. □

## Nixon Surpassing Johnson's War Record

### Cornell Report on Bombing of Indochina

Richard Nixon is about to surpass a record set by his predecessor, according to a study sponsored by the Cornell University Center for International Studies. By the end of this year, Nixon will have topped the total of 3,000,000 tons of bombs dropped on Indochina during Lyndon Johnson's administration.

The study, conducted by a team of nineteen professors and students, said that the level of bombing is virtually the same as it was in 1967, although the areas being hit hardest have changed. Southern Laos is now being destroyed by 400,000 tons of bombs a year. The figure for South Vietnam is 300,000 tons.

Bombing in Cambodia, which the researchers said causes extensive civilian casualties, is going on at the rate of 90,000 tons a year, a figure comparable to the 124,000 tons dropped on North Vietnam during 1966.

The Cornell group also reported that Nixon plans to continue this air

war into the future, well beyond 1972. They estimated the annual cost as ranging from \$1,200,000,000 to \$4,000,000,000.

The targets of Nixon's war are indicated by the types of planes involved. While the number of small fighter-bombers in use has been reduced, giant B-52 bombers, which conduct "area-obliteration raids," have become the mainstay of the air war. □

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### Class Demonstrations in France, Canada

Among the largest of the November international antiwar actions were those held in France and in Canada. In Paris on November 6, a demonstration called by the Front de Solidarité Indochine (FSI—Indochinese Solidarity Front) drew some 20,000 participants.

The FSI, a united-front-type organization formed in October, built the demonstration in response to an international appeal issued by the National Peace Action Coalition in the United States.

The large turnout for the demonstration was achieved in spite of the abstention of the Communist party, which refused to participate. This was the first major united-front action against the war since before May 1968.

The demonstrators marched two miles through Paris, carrying banners with such slogans as "Long live the U.S. antiwar movement," "Thieu is a puppet—the Saigon elections are a fake," "Nixon, murderer—Pompidou, accomplice," and "Washington, Paris—everyone into the streets with the Front de Solidarité Indochine."

"Outside of Paris," reported the November 9 issue of *Le Monde*, "similar demonstrations took place in most university towns, notably Marseille, Lyon, Bordeaux, Strasbourg, Clermont-Ferrand, Brest, and Rennes."

In addition, there was a march of 500 in Perpignan and of more than 1,200 in Rouen.

In Canada, the largest demonstrations took place on November 3 in protest against the Amchitka nuclear test. Walkouts of high-school students took place all across the country.

Demonstrations of 8,000 took place in Edmonton and Toronto. In the latter city, 1,200 delegates to the Ontario Federation of Labor convention interrupted their discussions to march on the U.S. consulate.

Important labor support for the demonstrations also came from the British Columbia Federation of Labor, which called a half-hour strike in which 50,000 to 60,000 workers owned their tools.

A popular slogan on the marches

was "Stop Amchitka; Stop the War!" The demonstrators, mostly students, turned out by the thousands in a number of cities.

Two border crossings in Ontario, at Sarnia and Niagara Falls, were closed by demonstrations of 4,000 and 3,000-4,000 respectively. Other protests included Victoria, 4,000; Van-

### Antiwar Rallies Held in Italy November 6

Rome

A campaign to build the November 6 actions against the war in Vietnam was launched by the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari [Revolutionary Communist Groups—the Italian section of the Fourth International]. A news bulletin was distributed several times a week, particularly in Rome.

A rally was organized November 6 in Turin by the Trotskyist group in the city (other political organizations were invited to participate in a joint effort but they refused). The meeting was held on the university campus and was attended by several hundred political activists and students. Two members of the Trotskyist organization explained the need to continue campaigning for active support for the struggle of the Vietnamese people.

In the morning of November 6 a demonstration was held in Cesena, a city in the Bologna region, as had been proposed by the local Trotskyist organization. More than a thousand students participated, marching through the center of the city for about an hour. At the end of the march, several hundred demonstrators took part in a rally, where representatives of the Fourth International and Lotta Continua spoke. The *Manifesto* group also called on its members to attend. As for the Communist party youth, they distributed a leaflet criticizing the demonstration but participated in the concluding rally.

In Taranto in the south, a meeting of about a hundred persons was held on November 7. The Fourth Inter-

couper, 2,000 in a pouring rain; Saskatoon, 3,000; Regina, 2,000; Winnipeg, 2,000; Montréal, 400-500; and Ottawa, 1,000.

These actions were followed only three days later by another round of antiwar demonstrations, sponsored by the Vietnam Mobilization Committee. The largest, in Toronto, drew 7,000 persons. Students in Victoria organized a mass teach-in, and marches of 1,000 took place in Vancouver and in Moncton (New Brunswick). Montréal had a demonstration of 700 to 800. Smaller actions occurred in Fredericton and Saskatoon. □

national group in Taranto, the *Manifesto* group, and the Catholic workers organization participated. Two metalworkers unions, the FIM and UILM, also sent representatives. Leaders and members of the FIOM [Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici—Federation of Metal Workers], which is affiliated to the CGIL [Confederazione Generale Italiano del Lavoro—Italian General Federation of Labor], were also present. The meeting concluded with a decision to consider organizing a broad demonstration.

In Rome, the local Trotskyist group distributed leaflets in the high schools and university on November 6.

Other demonstrations and meetings are planned in the coming days, in Naples and Livorno, among other places. □

### News Is a Spectator Sport

A reporter for the Underground Press Syndicate, a news service headquartered in New York, has been denied a White House press pass. The Secret Service public relations director refused to disclose the reason for the refusal, saying only, "It was thought best to deny him admission to the White House. It was simply a case of what's best in the interest of our protective mission."

The reporter, Tom Forcade, is said to have once thrown a pie into the face of a member of the United States Commission on Obscenity and Pornography during a public hearing.

White House reporters, on the other hand, are expected to confine their editorial comments to the printed word.

## Call for Aid to Latin American Political Prisoners

[The following appeal has been translated from the October 27 issue of *La Verdad*, a Buenos Aires revolutionary-socialist weekly.]

\* \* \*

The present phase of the class struggle in Latin America poses urgently once more the need for all of our revolutionary organizations to work towards the formation of a region-wide, revolutionary united front. We should not hesitate to take up this task, regardless of the setbacks being suffered at the national level, above all in our own country. Coordinating our tasks and exchanging experiences will accelerate the construction of revolutionary parties in each of the countries of our region.

Perhaps one of the most compelling arguments for revolutionary unity can be seen in the behavior of the bourgeoisies themselves. The foreign ministries, to be sure, make their plans in unison in order to dicker more effectively with the imperialist master, not to boot him off the continent. The foreign ministries, armies, and police join forces not to "foster social change," but to safeguard the system of bourgeois exploitation.

The governments of Lanusse, Allende, and Velasco Alvarado differ in their constitutional forms and their relations with various classes, but not even this, and even less their ideological differences, have stood in the way of the "bourgeois united front" in defense of their basic interests.

This united bourgeoisie is showing us that we revolutionaries cannot afford to give them the tremendous advantage of our own division.

There is one area in which our isolation must be ended promptly. This is the area of unconditional defense of all the comrades filling the jails of Latin America or being subjected to a thousand different forms of persecution, such as:

The savage actions of the Balaguer regime in the Dominican Republic, which have already cost hundreds of lives of activists murdered by "La Banda," the fascist arm of the police;

the tortures and mistreatment to which prisoners in Balaguer's jails are subjected.

The victims of the Guatemalan oligarchy; the murders, tortures, and death sentences meted out by the semi-fascist regime in Brazil; and, finally, the offensive of the Hugo Banzer government in Bolivia, which each week is taking dozens of lives of revolutionary activists and leaders.

These are examples that point most urgently to the need for a continental solidarity movement.

We believe that the best way in our own country to spur the formation of this sort of Latin American movement is to wage a struggle in common against repression and for the freedom of the Argentinian political prisoners. Within this struggle we must include a campaign for the defense of all Latin American political prisoners. The key thing is to get the student and worker vanguard to realize the importance of this issue, and to thereby put important sectors into motion.

Once having mustered these forces, we can move on to further objectives, such as constant denunciations of the repressive regimes, discrediting their diplomatic representatives, and all measures that effectively increase the pressure.

The Argentinian labor movement has a magnificent, albeit forgotten, tradition of internationalist solidarity, including general strikes against the repression of workers in other countries.

The reformists, Peronists, and agents of "national socialism" succeeded in debasing this revolutionary tradition. The leaderships arising out of the current upsurge must recapture this tradition; the needs of the Latin American revolution call for its reactivation at the grass-roots level.

We call on all tendencies of the left to cast aside the combination of opportunism and sectarianism that has thus far prevented us from launching, in an organized and ongoing form, the struggle on behalf of all our prisoners and against repression.

Superrevolutionary verbiage is of little use to the victims of torture and assassination. We must strike hard if we are to save them and prevent new atrocities. Who can be opposed to combining our efforts?

Let us do more than count bodies to expose the true nature of the bourgeoisie.

*Let us arise, revolutionists, to defeat the class enemy!*

### OSPAAAL Appeals for Their Release

## Puerto Rican Political Prisoners in U.S.

The Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAAL) has issued a call to "revolutionary, anti-imperialist and progressive forces of the world" to demand the immediate release of five Puerto Rican nationalists imprisoned in the United States.

The five prisoners are: Cesar Collazo, Lolita Lebrón, Andrés Figueroa Cordero, Irving Flores Rodríguez, and Rafael Cancel Miranda.

Collazo was arrested for attempting to shoot President Harry Truman on

November 1, 1950, two days after the U.S. government had launched a brutal repression against the Puerto Rican independence movement. In that action, nationalist Griselio Torresola was killed.

Collazo was sentenced to death, but worldwide protest forced Truman to commute his sentence to life imprisonment. For twenty-one years Collazo has been held in conditions of "humiliation, discrimination, and isolation."

The other four prisoners, shouting "Viva Puerto Rico Libre," wounded

five members seated in the U. S. House of Representatives on March 1, 1954. They were sentenced to eighty-seven-year prison terms.

COSPAAL charged that all four are in poor health and are being denied proper medical care. Cancel, in par-

ticular, is suffering from an eye disease that can result in blindness. In addition, he has been separated from his comrades and transferred to a prison in Marion, Illinois, where his life was endangered when guards fired on protesting prisoners, killing one. □

## Alain Krivine Faces New Prosecution

### 'Rouge' Fined in Frame-Up Trial

On November 9 Charles Michaloux, executive editor of *Rouge*, weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste [Communist League—French section of the Fourth International], was found guilty on four counts of defaming the French police. He was acquitted on one count.

The charges, which were clearly exposed as fraudulent during the trial, stemmed from five separate articles published in *Rouge* over a five-month period.

The verdict was an indication of Pompidou's unflinching efforts to stifle the far-left press. But the relatively small fines imposed (totaling about \$1,300) represented a victory for the mass defense campaign that had been waged by the Ligue.

The court's decisions on the various articles were as follows:

For an October 12, 1970, review of the antipolice movie "Un condé," both Michaloux and Patrick Rotman, author of the article, were fined 1,500 francs [one franc equals US\$0.18].

For a December 14 piece entitled "La police, la justice et le pouvoir" [The police, justice, and the regime], both were fined 1,200 francs.

For a January 4, 1971, article charging Minister of the Interior Raymond Marcellin with complicity in deporting Spanish refugees back to Spain, Michaloux was fined 800 francs.

For a March 15 report on a meeting of the neofascist Ordre Nouveau charging that police had cooperated with the fascists in assaulting anti-fascist demonstrators, Michaloux was ordered to pay a 1,000-franc fine.

The court's statement explaining its decision to acquit Michaloux on one charge was, probably unintentionally, a tacit confirmation of what *Rouge* (and many others) have consistently

said about the cops. The article in question dealt with the so-called Thévenin affair—the case of a young



ALAIN KRIVINE

worker who died under mysterious circumstances while in police custody.

*Rouge* had questioned the police claim that Thévenin had killed himself. The court ruling said:

"The press in general widely echoed the uneasiness raised by the death of this young man in the Chambéry police station. This uneasiness was born of certain elements that could have appeared contradictory to anyone who posed questions in an area where public opinion is always, and justifiably, on the alert.

"It appeared that the article was written in a sincere manner to inform readers of these confusing elements, of certain peculiarities, in a moderate style in comparison with the paper's general tone.

"Because of this, and since the ar-

ticle did not clearly demonstrate a desire to defame the police, the court admits the good faith of the accused."

Five days before the *Rouge* verdict was announced, as if to show that no truce had been declared, the French government arrested Alain Krivine, one of the leaders of the Ligue Communiste, under the notorious "anti-wrecker law."

The charges stem from an October 5 demonstration against the Vietnam election farce. Allegedly, some damage was done to the U.S. embassy in Paris during the action, of which Krivine was one of the organizers.

Thirteen other members of the Ligue had been seized by the police on October 21 in connection with an investigation of the incident, but were released without being charged.

Krivine was released shortly after his arrest and will be interrogated later, in the presence of his lawyer, Yves Jouffa.

The November 6 *Rouge* published a statement on the arrest which said, in part:

"The government has thus confirmed its solidarity with U.S. imperialism. It acts on a few broken windows, but stands mute on the genocide against the Indochinese people. This provocation will receive the response it deserves. From this moment on, all those who support the Indochinese revolution will unite and mobilize to force the regime to withdraw the charge. Eventually, if it dares bring our comrade to trial, that trial will be transformed into a trial of U.S. imperialism and its French accomplices." □

### Easy to Be a 'Criminal'

A South African court has sentenced the Very Reverend Gonville French-Beytagh, Anglican dean of Johannesburg, to five years in prison for the "crime" of aiding the families of political prisoners. But had he been an African instead of a white church official, he could have received a similar penalty for such crimes as going on strike; failing to be in possession of his papers at any time, day or night; doing skilled work in the building industry; having two or more friends to dinner, which constitutes a "gathering"; and other such outrages against democracy.

Other criminal offenses in the apartheid-ruled country include residing with one's parents without permission and having someone visit you more than seventy-two hours. □

# Why Washington Intends to Keep Up 'Foreign Aid'

By Dick Roberts

On October 29, the United States Senate defeated the Nixon administration's "foreign aid" bill. "Foreign aid" legislation covers military grants to governments abroad and subsidies of U.S. exports, primarily to "underdeveloped" nations. Washington has supplied over \$143,000,000,000 in various foreign aid programs since World War II. This is the first time in its twenty-six-year history that the aid bill has been voted down.

How could such an important pillar of imperialist policy be knocked over—especially in the U.S. Senate? The Senate is a notorious lobbying ground for precisely those monopolistic interests whose worldwide investments are largely supported and defended by aid from the U.S. Treasury.

The answer is that the Senate did not and could not end the U.S. foreign aid program. Despite many grandiose statements, moves were under way to restore the aid program almost as soon as the votes were counted. One of the quickest responses came from Democratic party 1972 presidential hopeful Senator George McGovern, who announced he would sponsor emergency legislation to provide money for Israel. By November 5, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had prepared new foreign aid legislation to take the place of the defeated proposals.

Nevertheless, the initial upset of the foreign aid bill in the Senate has significance. It reflects the contradictory character of the new stage of U.S. domestic and foreign policies signaled by Nixon's launching of the "New Economic Policy" August 15.

In Nixon's announcement of the wage-freeze attack on American workers, and steps to protect the dollar in world finance, he also called on other capitalist powers to "bear their share of the burden of defending freedom around the world."

But the war in Southeast Asia remains the dominant consideration in Washington's foreign policy. Publicly pretending to be continuing the "Viet-

namization" program he first proclaimed over two years ago, Nixon is actually stepping up the war, especially in Cambodia and Laos. The foreign aid bill rejected by the Senate included funding for the expanded war. Nixon requested *three times as much* money for military expenditures in this year's foreign aid bill as in the one which passed the Senate last year (December 16, 1970).

The senators who refuse to support Nixon's war-escalation policies, although they have previously supported foreign aid policies generally, tipped the voting balance against the foreign aid bill October 29. Their vote was mainly a vote against reescalating the war.

Other and more far-reaching criticisms of the U.S. foreign aid program are also beginning to be voiced in the Senate. Idaho Democrat Frank Church, one of the leading senatorial "doves," delivered a scathing attack on U.S. aid strategy. Church declared, "There is abundant evidence that our foreign aid program is much less philanthropic than we have cared to portray. Indeed, the figures suggest that it is patently self-serving. . . . No less than military aid, our economic assistance creates and perpetuates relationships of dependency."

The defeat of Washington's "two China" policy in the United Nations also played a role in bringing down the foreign aid bill. Senator John McClellan, an Arkansas Democrat, complained that \$43,000,000,000 had been "given away" to nations who "insulted America's good will" in the UN votes on China, October 25.

But it is more the changing balance of world power, symbolized by China's victory in the UN, than the vote on China itself that explains the conflicting currents in the U.S. Congress over foreign military and economic appropriations.

## Escalating U. S. Aggression

Washington's plans to escalate the war in Cambodia were underlined by

a series of debates and votes on amendments to the foreign aid bill.

As initially presented to the Senate by the Foreign Relations Committee, the bill included an amendment sponsored by Senators John Sherman Cooper (Republican, Kentucky) and Frank Church, which stated that the appropriated funds "be used only for the purpose of withdrawal of all [U.S.] forces from Indochina and may not be used for the purpose of engaging such forces in hostilities in North or South Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos, except for action necessary to protect those forces against imminent danger as they are withdrawn."

At first reading, the amendment would appear to be entirely within the framework of Nixon's purported withdrawal policies. Senator Church himself stated, "It is a serious mistake to regard this amendment as a vote of no confidence in the President. . . . There is nothing in the amendment that imposes a time frame within which the withdrawal must be completed."

But the administration adamantly opposed this Cooper-Church amendment and succeeded in defeating it by a narrow margin of 47 to 44 in a Senate vote October 28. White House objections to the amendment were hinted at by Church himself: "There are great pressures in this city, pressures being brought to bear upon the President to leave an American residual force in Vietnam indefinitely. This is no secret. There is talk about a force of 50,000 men, to continue giving air support, logistical support, artillery support, and naval support to the South Vietnamese policy."

In addition to this perspective of permanent U.S. occupation of South Vietnam in considerable force, the Pentagon hopes to build up the U.S. puppet armies in Cambodia and Laos. The question of Cambodia was paramount in the Senate debate. The Foreign Relations Committee had attempted to cut U.S. financing of the Pnompenh regime below the amounts



requested by the White House. The committee explained, "It was felt by many members . . . that a reduction of the funds available for United States operations in Cambodia would serve to restrain what they perceive to be a tendency to duplicate in Cambodia an entire range of United States supported programs of the type which have resulted in ever deeper and seemingly endless involvement in other countries of Southeast Asia."

But this attempt to reduce administration war-financing in Cambodia was also defeated. By a critical vote of 52 to 35, October 28, the Senate granted Nixon the full financing of the Cambodia war he had requested.

Senator Edward Kennedy, the Massachusetts Democrat, estimated that the total military aid programs requested by Nixon for East Asia in fiscal year 1972 (beginning last July 1) would come to over \$3,000,000,000. The Senate's approval of the foreign aid bill would be a blanket endorsement of this military spending. Kennedy offered the following figures:

Cambodia . . . . .	\$211,000,000
Indonesia . . . . .	27,900,000
South Korea . . . . .	642,300,000
Laos . . . . .	125,800,000
Taiwan . . . . .	112,500,000
Thailand . . . . .	77,200,000
South Vietnam . . . . .	1,789,100,000

These sums by no means cover the entire U. S. expenditures on the Southeast Asia war. "Military appropriations"—which are the bulk of financial grants to the Pentagon—were considered and approved by the Senate in a completely different piece of legislation October 6. "Military construction," a still separate piece of military legislation, is yet to be considered by the Senate. This process of subdividing military grants serves to obscure the whole process of financing Washington's global war machine.

Nevertheless the vote on the aid bill was *politically understood* to be a vote for Nixon's escalation policies. This a number of senators refused to do. Having lost the direct vote on Nixon's request for Cambodia funds, they were still able to temporarily postpone the Cambodia appropriations by siding with forces in the Senate who traditionally oppose foreign aid, to defeat the total aid bill.

## Funds for the Greek Regime

Certain Southern Democrats and Midwestern Republicans, constituting the so-called conservative bloc in the U. S. Senate, traditionally oppose foreign aid, and they have usually voted against it over the last two decades.

The producers of U. S. agricultural goods are often direct competitors with



CHURCH: Admits Washington's "aid" program is less than philanthropic.

Latin American and other foreign nations that receive U. S. economic and military support. These U. S. groups join together with the domestic U. S. oil interests to favor high tariff barriers and the imposition of import quotas in order to protect the American market from lower-priced foreign commodities.

They also oppose foreign aid. Why should billions of dollars from American taxpayers go into aid programs solely for the benefit of U. S. multinational corporations and the Eastern bankers who own them? Especially when the expenditures of dollars abroad is weakening the dollar and causing inflation? A typical argument along these lines was mouthed by a Democratic party senator from Alabama, James B. Allen.

"It may help to bring a little reason and reality into the never-never land of Washington," Allen declared on November 1, explaining why he had helped to defeat the foreign aid bill. "It may not signal an end of all foreign aid, but it does show that after dumping \$143 billion overseas in foreign aid while so many domestic needs of this country go unmet, the American people are fed up and want to see an end put to foreign giveaways.

"Mr. President [a formal address to the seated chairman of the Senate], our national debt of over \$400 billion is more than the national debts of all the other countries of the world combined.

"It costs more than \$21 billion a year just to pay the interest on this tremendous national debt. . . . So why should we borrow money to give to unappreciative people who say, in response to our generosity, 'Yankee go home.'"

But these objections to foreign aid are not very strong. When a crucial aspect of U. S. foreign policy is up for a vote in Congress, the "conservatives" of both houses come down solidly behind "Yankee imperialism." An example was the consideration of U. S. funding for the Greek military regime, on October 29, a few hours before the final foreign aid vote.

An amendment was before the Senate to ensure that Washington would continue to finance the Greek government over the rising objections of peoples throughout the world. The amendment was sponsored by the just-quoted Senator Allen from Alabama. In this case, however, Allen spoke as a global military strategist of U. S. imperialism.

"Mr. President," he said, "let us remember Greece no longer receives economic aid from us such as might be expected under terms of the [NATO] treaty. Now we are urged to take an additional step and deprive our ally of military hardware and military support to enable that nation to fulfill its military obligations under the treaty. I had thought that only Communist nations wanted to weaken and destroy the NATO alliance."

Allen considered the question of the character of the Greek government:

"Mr. President, there are four pages of names of countries who are to be the recipients of military and economic assistance under the bill. I dare say we could not find a dozen governments in the whole list on the four

pages of the names of the countries that have a democracy as we would define or term it here in the United States.

"What about the Government of Portugal, which is the recipient of aid?

"What about the Government of Spain? When did they last have an election in Spain?

"I should like to inquire, what about Jordan, which is a large recipient of our aid?

"What about Saudi Arabia, that immensely wealthy country with all the oil wells that it has?

"What about Syria, a recipient listed here?

"What about Turkey, a beneficiary to the extent of \$328 million last year? When did they have last an election in Turkey?

"Yet we single out Greece."

Allen's amendment favoring continuation of military aid to Greece was passed 49 to 31. The fact that many of the same senators who voted for it also voted against the foreign aid bill shows that a majority is certain to favor a new bill to restore what was already planned in the aid program.

The following table lists the proposed U.S. economic and military support for selected countries in the fiscal year 1972. This is in addition to the sums for East Asia indicated above:

India . . . . .	\$419,700,000
Pakistan . . . . .	225,500,000
Portugal . . . . .	5,000,000
Spain . . . . .	80,600,000
Turkey . . . . .	242,500,000
Greece . . . . .	117,800,000
Brazil . . . . .	153,500,000
Argentina . . . . .	15,900,000
Israel . . . . .	56,100,000*
Morocco . . . . .	45,100,000*
Tunisia . . . . .	32,700,000*
Jordan . . . . .	33,800,000*

Senator Edward Kennedy, one of the minority of senators who voted in favor of continuing the foreign aid bill, nevertheless admitted, "We find ourselves supporting counterinsurgency efforts that result in the preservation of authoritarian regimes. I would mention only Greece, Pakistan, Brazil and Cambodia to indicate the

\* The full amount of U.S. military aid to these nations is classified.

kinds of regimes we are supporting with military assistance."

### The Golden Rain

In order to explain why the capitalist government in Washington will never put an end to the foreign aid program, it is necessary to take a closer look at it. Two features stand out: (1) a substantial portion of the funds go for military purposes; (2) much of what is called "economic aid" is a subsidy of U. S. exports.

Senator Church estimated total U. S. military and economic aid in the fiscal year 1972 as more than \$10,000,000,000, with over half of that—\$5,000,000,000—being military aid. He declared: ". . . our bilateral aid program is, in effect, the soft-loan window of the Export-Import Bank; it is the source from which foreign governments borrow money on easy terms with which to buy goods and services from within the United States. . . .

"In addition to financing American exports, our foreign aid, both economic and military, has encouraged relationships of sustained dependency on the United States. In many underdeveloped countries, repressive governments draw reassurance from the arms we furnish and the military training we supply. As the source of money and weapons for their armies and police forces, the U. S. Government acquires a certain leverage over these regimes, while they last. Enticed by attractive credit terms, by growing familiarity with American equipment, reliance on American replacement parts, by bargain prices on obsolete equipment, training programs for their soldiers and police, and the sales promotion techniques of our military advisory missions, these governments soon enough learn to think American."

Church showed that he was aware that there is more to "soft loans" from the Export-Import Bank than simply "easy credit" for the purchase of U. S. arms. The ever increasing debts of the underdeveloped nations tie them more and more to U. S. banks. Church stated, "Dependency on the United States grows steadily, too, with the mounting burden of servicing past debts. . . . As grace periods end on loans falling due in the 1970's the poor countries find themselves paying out ever greater amounts to finance past debts, new loans will be effectively neutralized and the poor

countries will be threatened with economic paralysis."

Church made an interesting comparison. "Indeed, in the course of recent hearings on Brazil in the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the fact came out that, relative to population, we have twice as many American officials administering our aid program in Brazil today as the British had in India governing that country before independence."

The liberal Democrat from Idaho touched on the extent of "aid" subsidization of U. S. exports. "Former AID [Agency for International Development] Director William Gaud discloses that, as a result of tied loans [loans requiring the recipient to "buy American"]—'Ninety-three percent of AID funds are spent directly in the United States. . . . Just last year some 4,000 American firms in fifty states received \$1.3 billion in AID funds for products supplied as part of the foreign aid program.'"

More precise figures than these were provided by the *Wall Street Journal*, November 3. ". . . AID bureaucrats are especially irritated by the perennial 'giveaway' charges made about their programs," the *Wall Street Journal* stated. "During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1970, they say, AID loans and grants financed \$995.1 million of American products for shipment overseas to underdeveloped countries; only \$19.4 million was used to finance foreign products." Thus the proportion of foreign "economic aid" spent on U. S. products was *fifty times* more than that spent on foreign products!

This, of course, is a crucial component of imperialist impoverishment of the "underdeveloped" world. Far from encouraging the development of an infrastructure of manufacturing industry in the underdeveloped nations, the imperialists attempt to bind these nations to the purchase of manufactured goods from the advanced capitalist nations. "Tied loans" of the foreign aid program help to implement this policy.

Liberal critics of foreign aid like Senator Church pretend to be unaware of the corresponding dependency of the advanced capitalist countries on the export sales thus subsidized by the foreign aid program. But the November 3 *Wall Street Journal* points out the extent of this de-

pendency in particular industries: ". . . AID payments to shipping lines have totaled \$2.1 billion since the program began in 1948; they now provide about 25% of the annual revenues from outbound cargoes for American-flag carriers. . . . Foreign-aid legislation generally requires at least 50% of AID-financed cargo be carried abroad by U.S.-flag lines, rather than by cheaper foreign companies."

"Military aid" is also military exports. The *Wall Street Journal* continued: "The negative vote [in the Senate] wiped out—at least temporarily—Defense Department plans to award the following contracts during coming months: \$175 million to McDonnell Douglas Corp. for aircraft and airframes; \$116 million to General Electric Co. for aircraft engines; \$61 million to Lockheed Aircraft Corp. for aircraft and maintenance services; \$89 million to Bell Helicopter division of Textron Inc. for helicopters; \$10 million to Chrysler Corp. for tanks; \$17 million to Colt Industries Inc. for rifles; \$50 million to American Motors Corp.'s Jeep Corp. subsidiary for vehicles; and \$24 million to United Aircraft Co. for engines. . . . The military goods involved would be sent to such aid recipients as South Korea, Cambodia and Turkey."

Harry Magdoff shows the dependency of other U.S. industries on AID subsidies of their exports in *The Age of Imperialism* (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969). AID financed the following percentages of exports in the commodity groups named in 1965: machinery and equipment, 5.3%; iron and steel mill products, 24.4%; chemicals, 5.5%; motor vehicles, engines and parts, 4.6%; fertilizer, 30.4%; nonferrous metals, 11.5%; rubber and products, 9.6%; petroleum and products, excluding gas, 7.5%; basic textiles, 5.4%; railroad transportation and equipment, 29.5%.

Magdoff added, "The importance of even the lower percentage, say 5 or 6 percent, should not be underestimated. A business firm fights hard for that extra 5 percent of its business, and it usually means much more than 5 percent of the profits counted at the end of the year."

At a time when international competition between the advanced capitalist nations is increasing, it is all the less likely that U.S. industry can forgo the concealed boost of "foreign aid"

for its world exports. Church stated, "Events of the past few weeks on Capitol Hill have finally dispelled my illusions. Instead of cutting back on the foreign aid package, Congress is about to enlarge on it. We are in the process of doing the same with the gigantic military budget, approving more money for the Pentagon this year than we spent at the height of our involvement in Vietnam in 1967-68."

### U. S. Military Expenditure.

The trends of U.S. and world arms expenditures underline the error of believing that Washington has any intentions of significantly reducing its global military apparatus. The most recent complete figures available, for 1968, show that during the war in Southeast Asia the United States increased military spending at a faster rate than the world as a whole and that it increased its percentage of world-military spending. U.S. arms expenditures, including foreign military aid, stood at \$52,000,000,000—37 percent of the world total—in 1964; by 1968 they had risen to \$81,000,000,000—42 percent of the world total.

In a survey of "World Military Expenditures: 1970," from which the previous figures were taken, the U.S. "Arms Control and Disarmament Agency" also emphasizes the *rapid rate of weapons increase for the underdeveloped nations*. "In developing countries as a group," states the U.S. agency, "military expenditures again moved higher. Thus, developing countries continued, as they had in the years preceding, to increase their share of world military outlays, devoting to military programs funds that could have been allocated to economic development.

"More public funds continued to flow into military programs than into public education or public health programs for the world's population of 3.6 billion. . . . In developing countries, for example, the *increase* in military spending in the period since 1964 represented the equivalent of 3 years' expenditures on public education for the billion school-age children in those countries." (Emphasis in the original.)

The world increase in arms spending in the period 1964-68 was 36.6 percent; for the underdeveloped na-

tions it was 44.9 percent; and for the United States, 57.0 percent. Washington's commanding position in arms expenditures is vividly shown by comparison to the 12 next-ranking nations:

#### Percent of World Military Expenditures (1968)

1. United States	42.0
2. Soviet Union	29.0
3. China	3.9
4. France	3.2
5. United Kingdom	2.9
6. West Germany	2.8
7. Italy	1.2
8. Poland	1.0
9. Canada	0.9
10. India	0.8
11. East Germany	0.8
12. Czechoslovakia	0.7
13. Japan	0.6

It is in this light that Nixon's talk about "shifting the burden" of policing world imperialism must be viewed. The 1968 U.S. military budget was seventy times that of Japan, for example. Even doubling and tripling the financing of Tokyo's armies, which is being hotly pressed in Japanese ruling-class circles, can absorb only a tiny fraction of the costs of the imperialists' world military apparatus, and this is not even to speak of the opposition among the Japanese masses to remilitarization.

The Nixon administration undertook a slight reduction in U.S. military spending in 1969 and 1970. But this was entirely for economic reasons, in order to help precipitate the recession of the last two years. (More than 1,400,000 jobs were wiped out in the American war industry alone.) This temporary cutback is already coming to an end. As Senator Church indicated, the next military budget proposed by the Nixon administration is expected to be higher than the one in 1968, at the peak of spending for the war in Southeast Asia. It could be the highest in U.S. history, since the 1968 military budget was almost as high as the highest levels of World War II.

The declining position of U.S. imperialism in world trade and finance is not matched by a corresponding decline in Washington's world military power. On the contrary, Washington's insistence upon maintaining its global

arsenals, and particularly on continuing its decade-long pursuit of military victory in Indochina, which means massive budgetary deficits for the government, is a prime cause of the inflated and weakened U.S. dollar.

Nixon's August 15 strategy foresees

bettering the U.S. position in world trade *while continuing the war and even increasing the total military budget.* The contradictions implicit in this process account for the U.S. Senate's sideshow on "foreign aid," October 29. □

## Peter Graham Shot in Dublin

# Irish Revolutionist Murdered

By Gerry Foley

Peter Graham, a well-known figure among the Irish young left, was shot to death October 25 in his apartment in Dublin. His comrades among the Young Socialists, a broad radical grouping, could offer no definite opinions about who the killer or killers might be. The twenty-four-year-old revolutionist was believed to have no personal enemies. All sections of the left deplored his tragic death.

Graham's funeral October 30 was attended by a considerable number of radical youth, including Bernadette Devlin, member of parliament for mid-Tyrone. Tariq Ali, a leader of the International Marxist Group, the British section of the Fourth International, gave the oration.

Graham's killing created a stir in Dublin, where murders are rare. The sensationalistic evening papers in particular speculated that political motives were involved and that the young leftist had been involved in the bank expropriations carried out by Saor Eire, an adventurist commando organization, and in running guns to the North.

The murder was featured in the November 12 issue of *This Week*, Ireland's best known news magazine. The writer of the story, Seán Boyne, noted that there was no evidence to link Graham to any illegal activity, but Boyne himself was not above making this type of insinuation.

"When trouble came to a climax in August 1969 [in Northern Ireland], Graham played an active part in giving support to the nationalist population. It is not known what form this support took, or if Graham actually travelled to the North. After Graham's funeral the Provisional IRA

issued a statement which spoke of him in eulogistic terms, and said that his death had come as 'a severe blow to the national resurgence.' The statement recalled that he was 'instrumental in providing aid of all forms to the besieged people of the North.'

"One can only speculate if guns were included in the term 'aid of all forms'. The IRA statement came as a surprise to many of Graham's long-standing colleagues in the Young Socialists, who were not aware of these activities in relation to the North. Obviously the Young Socialists were kept in the dark as regards certain areas of Graham's political activities."

Boyne noted that Graham had recently returned from England, where he allegedly stayed in the apartment of Gery Lawless, a well-known figure on the Irish far left, and "helped in the printing of Red Mole, Tariq Ali's 'underground' newspaper. He was active in working for the Frank Keane Defence Fund and also took a minor part in Gerry [sic] Lawless' tour of universities to engender pressure for the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland."

Boyne claimed: "The Fourth International sent him back to Ireland a few months ago as its Irish representative. The Fourth International has branches in over 40 countries and is said to have funds in the region of £250,000 [approximately \$600,000]."

Boyne, a bourgeois journalist with some knowledge of the young Irish left, described Graham's political background.

"Graham was a leading figure in the small extreme left-wing world which forms a distinct sub-culture in

Dublin. His life story in recent years reflects the remarkable growth of this sub-culture in the sixties."

In the absence of a Marxist tradition in this traditionally conservative country, a section of the young left with differing political views have found Trotskyism a convenient label for their radical rejection of the traditional social structures and for their disillusionment with the old political theories. Peter Graham was one of the few members of this milieu to show a serious interest in the Trotskyist movement.

"After primary education he [Graham] went to Technical School and became an electrician with C.I.E. [Coras Iompair na h-Eireann—the Transportation Company of Ireland]," Boyne wrote. In the mid-sixties there was a sudden upsurge in left-wing activity among young people, especially in Dublin. . . .

"He was a member of the Labour Party for a few weeks but left in disillusionment. There followed a brief flirtation with the Irish Workers Party, subsequently to be re-named the Communist Party of Ireland. The I.W.P. was making good progress at this time through its youth group, the Connolly Youth Movement. The C.Y.M. was formed about 1966 and was considerably helped by the boost which the Connolly mystique got from the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Rising [of Easter 1916].

"Graham came under the influence of a young Tipperary man teaching in Dublin and the result was that he broke with the pro-Soviet policies of the I.W.P., which was the party of the older Dublin working-class orthodox Communist. It had been formed in Dublin in 1933 by Seán Murray, an IRA Commandant interned during the Civil War.

"In 1967 Graham joined the semi-Trotskyist Irish Workers Group which had as one of its most prominent members the young Tipperary teacher. And it was then that Peter Graham first met the men who were shortly afterwards to form the nucleus of Saor Eire. . . .

"It is interesting to examine the origins of the I.W.G. In the early sixties Irishmen of radical or Republican views and people associated with the Connolly Association, began to meet in London. Among them were men who had been interned in the Curragh [during the 1956-1962 IRA

campaign] such as Gerry Lawless, who brought the Irish Government to the Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg; Irish students working temporarily in London; and Republicans who were disillusioned with the failure of the IRA Border campaign.

"The result was the formation of the Irish Communist Group about 1963. It did not last long. After a few months a number of people with Maoist or Stalinist views were expelled and they formed the Irish Communist Organisation which now exists in Dublin, London and Belfast. . . .

"The remnants of the I. C. G. formed the semi-Trotskyist Irish Workers Group, which Peter Graham joined about 1967. . . .

"Graham, the Tipperary teacher, and a number of others became dissatisfied with the ideological deficiencies of the I. W. G. and they formed the League for a Workers Republic, a highly disciplined group completely dedicated to Trotskyist principles [now a tiny and declining sect]. The I. W. G. dissolved and some of the Northern members formed Peoples Democracy, and some of those in Dublin formed Saor Eire.

"There is no evidence that Peter Graham was ever a member of Saor Eire or that he ever engaged in any military-style activity."

In the period leading up to his death, Graham's main field of activity had been in the Young Socialists, a loose-

ly knit youth group which has been vaguely associated with the Irish Labour party. He had left the LWR. The Young Socialists have served as a center for left-wing groups trying to promote radical policies in the Labour party.

The brutal murder of a promising and almost universally respected young revolutionist like Peter Graham cannot help but be a heavy blow for the Irish left. And it is to be hoped that the humanitarianism and sense of justice of all enlightened sections of Irish public opinion will force the police to carry out an honest investigation and not use this tragic case as an excuse for harassing the left movements. □

## State Department Again 'Cancels' Aid to Yahya Khan

# Bangla Desh Freedom Forces Growing Stronger

By Jon Rothschild

The U.S. State Department announced November 8 that \$3,600,000 worth of military aid to Yahya Khan would be immediately halted. In the day's routine news briefing, Charles W. Bray III said that the sale of \$1,500,000 in equipment held in Defense Department depots would be canceled, and \$2,100,000 worth of export licenses granted before last March 25 would be revoked. The \$160,000 worth of spare parts already passed by U.S. Customs but held up in New York because of a longshoremen's strike will not be affected. Bray said the U.S. action had been taken with the "mutual consent" of the Pakistan government.

The history of State Department pronouncements on Pakistan aid compels one to view Bray's announcement with a certain skepticism. When Yahya launched the war against Bangla Desh last March, the U.S. government proclaimed an embargo on military shipments to Pakistan. But it soon became known that the embargo was a fraud. In late June, the State Department conceded that ammunition was being sent, but insisted that this was a "nonlethal" item. When asked when shells and bullets became lethal, a department spokesman replied: "This is a theological question."

On June 28 Christopher Van Hollen, a State Department representative testifying before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, conceded that earlier department statements on Pakistan aid had been "confusing" and "misleading." In fact, he said, the United States planned to continue military aid to Yahya.

The magnitude of that aid has been estimated at between \$9,000,000 (according to Senator Edward Kennedy) and \$35,000,000 (according to Senator Frank Church).

Besides direct U.S. shipments, Nixon has also used international agencies such as the United Nations to channel military hardware into East Bengal. For example, the first project of a so-called rehabilitation team sent during the summer was to help "Pakistan restore communications and remobilize the province's [East Bengal] private fleet of 40,000 river boats and 10,000 trucks."

As Washington bowed, at least verbally, to massive pressure against continuing to aid Yahya's genocidal war, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, head of the [West] Pakistan People's party, was in Peking discussing "mutual political problems" with Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders. On November 7 Bhutto announced that the three days of talks

had ended "in complete agreement" on every issue.

Speaking at a November 7 banquet, Chinese Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei said, "Our Pakistan friends may rest assured that should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese government and people will as always resolutely support the Pakistan government and people in their just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence."

But the reiteration of Mao's support for Yahya's campaign against the Bengali people seemed to be somewhat tempered this time. In the same speech, Chi strongly urged the Pakistan regime to find some solution to the current civil war and stressed that China would like to see a negotiated settlement between India and Pakistan.

As the border situation continued to deteriorate, Mao seemed to be hedging his bets. An Indian ping-pong team was unexpectedly invited to participate in the "Afro-Asian table-tennis friendship invitational tournament" in China. (News accounts of the tournament dominated official Hsinhua releases from November 5 to 8: ". . . players of various countries exchanged experience and further deepened their friendship through the me-

dium of the small snow-white ball," said one story November 4.)

Border incidents between India and East Bengal escalated sharply during the second week of November.

In the November 8 *New York Times*, Sydney Schanberg reported that "unimpeachable Indian sources" told him that Indian forces had twice crossed the border to retaliate against Pakistani shellings of Indian towns. This was the first Indian acknowledgment that this step had been taken.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi denies that such crossings have occurred, but upon returning from a three-week foreign tour, she said that Pakistani provocations were becoming "less and less tolerable."

According to the November 12 *New York Times*, U.S. military intelligence claimed November 11 that three Soviet merchant ships left the Soviet Union the previous week loaded with 5,000 tons of India-bound military equipment. In addition, the last of ten heavy Soviet transport planes carrying spare parts for earlier equipment landed at New Delhi November 3.

U.S.-China support for Yahya and the apparent Soviet commitment to help India threaten to transform any war between India and Pakistan into a tripolar confrontation of great powers. This may be one reason that Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, summoned the Indian and Pakistani ambassadors to the United States to a special meeting in Washington November 11.

A State Department spokesman told reporters: "Our reports indicate a very sharp deterioration of the military situation in the last four to five days." The prospects of an India-Pakistan full-scale war were "measurably more pessimistic" than the week before, he added.

Secretary of State William Rogers, speaking November 12 to the journalistic society Sigma Delta Chi, said that the U. S. government had "urgently counseled both sides to follow maximum restraint" and was "quietly trying to defuse the situation."

Behind the military-diplomatic machinations of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, India, and Pakistan lies the continuing struggle of the Bengali people for self-determination. In the November 13 *New York Times* Kasturi Rangan described his

visit to one of the liberated zones in East Bengal.

"Talking to the commandant and other leaders of the force known as Mukti Bahini, the Bengal liberation army, one gets the impression that their group, generally regarded by outsiders as loose and undisciplined, is now fairly well organized along the lines of the Indian or Pakistani armies," Rangan wrote. The Mukti Bahini is divided into sectors, each being responsible for activity in a specific region of East Bengal. Bengali leaders told Rangan that they were getting "some support" from India, "but not as much as we need."

Malcolm Browne, another *Times* reporter, wrote November 6 from "a guerrilla hamlet in East Pakistan" that "foreign diplomats and military observers consider that about a quarter of the region [East Bengal] is controlled by the guerrillas, who claim a force of at least 100,000 men. But even in the heart of army-occupied territory, Pakistan control is tenuous.

"When traveling with guerrilla agents in Dacca or elsewhere, an elaborate system of signals and clandestine arrangements smoothes the way past any potential military obstacles. Seemingly, the entire population other than the troops from West Pakistan are in on the conspiracy."

Communication between the various guerrilla zones is said to be "rapid and reliable."

One guerrilla demonstrated the Mukti Bahini's will to fight to the end regardless of whatever compromises might be worked out behind the backs of the Bengalis. "As far as we are concerned," he said, "Sheik Mujib is dead. Once he fell into the hands of the enemy he died as leader of Bengali independence. If he were released as the result of some deal with the Islamabad Government, he would want us to kill him and we would kill him."

Such is the "powder keg" that Nixon, Mao, Brezhnev, and Gandhi aim to defuse. □

## Italy

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### Fascists Raid Trotskyist Local in Cesena

Rome

On October 29 the Trotskyist headquarters in Cesena was raided for the third time by fascists. Although the office was closed, the fascist toughs managed to break in and start a fire, which caused considerable damage.

Immediately after the attack, several left organizations, including Lotta Continua, *Manifesto*, and the Unione dei Comunisti, participated in a joint meeting with the Fourth International group and decided to form a self-defense committee. Groups of monitors patrolled the city during the night.

On November 7 two Trotskyist militants were attacked by a fascist gang in Bardonecchia in the Turin region while the police looked the other way. The two were wounded and had to be hospitalized, the one for six days, the other for twelve.

The fascists were staging an automobile parade publicizing a rally. The two Trotskyists aroused their anger by singing "Bandiera Rossa." A gang of fascists attacked them. After the assault, the fascists announced over the loudspeaker that they had repelled an attack by "red shock groups." □

### Hunger Strike Protests Executions in Iran

Twenty Iranian students began a hunger strike in Paris November 6, the Paris daily *Le Monde* reported in its November 10 issue. The action is in protest against the "execution one after the other" of political

oppositionists secretly condemned to death by the regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi.

The Union of Iranian Students, the French daily noted, has presented a list of thirty-seven persons sentenced


to death. The organization has demanded "publication of the date of the appeals, news about the hearings, and the presence of a delegation of international jurists."

Other civil liberties organizations have expressed concern over the fate of the political prisoners in Iran. Sent to Teheran by the Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme [International Human Rights Federation], Etienne Jaudel, a leading French jurist, found out that five oppositionists had been secretly executed. On November 9, the Iranian press confirmed that five persons had been shot for "constituting armed bands, sabotage, murder, armed robbery, and resisting officers of the law."

An official communiqué claimed that the verdict of the tribunal had been "in accordance with the law." But the statement did not specify the date the sentences were handed down or when the executions were carried out.

According to a correspondent of the British daily *Financial Times*, several other persons have already been executed.

Amnesty International has expressed worry about persons tried by "streamlined" courts in Teheran. This organization has estimated the number of political prisoners in the country at a thousand. One of these, Hossein Rezayi, was sentenced to eight years in prison after serving as interpreter for a legal observer sent to Iran by Amnesty. □



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## Thousands Still Held After Six Years

### Some Indonesian Prisoners to Be Released

The Indonesian government claims that it is releasing some of the thousands of political prisoners it has held in concentration camps since General Suharto seized power in the 1965 military coup. In the months following the coup, hundreds of thousands of members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist party were slaughtered and tens of thousands of persons were arrested.

"Government officials," James P. Sterba wrote from Djakarta in the November 10 *New York Times*, "say that by the end of December, they will have released this year about 50,000 people suspected of having been Communist sympathizers, leaving 35,000 suspected Communist leaders and activists still jailed."

These 35,000 are divided into two categories—A and B. Those in category A, about 5,000 persons accord-

ing to the government, are considered "prime suspects" in a plot by the Communist party to seize power. This alleged "plot" served the army as a pretext for its coup.

In the last six years, the military government has been putting category-A prisoners on trial at a rate of about thirty a year. If this average is continued, the last of the 5,000 should go on trial in the year 2137.

The 30,000 prisoners in category B are classified by the government as "hard-core activists." No pretense is made that they will ever be tried. About one-third of them have been exiled to the remote island of Buru in the eastern region of Indonesia. According to Sterba, "Government officials say the rest will be screened and either moved to Buru or gradually released." Very gradually, to judge from past performance. □

### London March Against Repression of Irish

Twenty thousand demonstrators marched in London October 31 to protest against the repression in Northern Ireland, according to *Morning Star*, the paper of the British Communist party.

*Morning Star* stressed the breadth of the demonstration: "Organised by the Anti-Internment League, which brings together all Irish political groups in London and progressive British groups who demand release of internees and withdrawal of British troops, this great demonstration represented almost the entire spectrum of the left."

John Gray, organizer of the Anti-Internment League, told the crowd: "We need every man and woman, Irish or British, who is prepared to oppose the injustice and brutality occurring in Northern Ireland."

The CP paper listed the following groups as participating in the demonstration: "The Communist Party, International Socialists, International Marxists [the International Marxist Group, the British section of the Fourth International], Connolly Asso-

ciation, University Socialist groups, trade unionists—electricians, plumbers, engineers, transport workers—were all there with their banners.

"Many Irish organisations were there in force—the Irish Solidarity Campaign, the Provisional Republican Movement, the Official Republican Movement, and many others. 'Victory to the IRA,' they chanted as they marched.

"Some mothers with babies had painted slogans on the prams they pushed. 'Remember the children,' said one."

Gery Lawless of the Irish Solidarity Campaign chaired the rally. He told the crowd that the British Army were the real terrorists and appealed to the demonstrators to "launch a great campaign on behalf of your friends in Northern Ireland." □

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## The New Phase of the Palestinian Resistance

[The following interview with Abu Omar, an official representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was granted in New York City on October 22. Abu Omar has not corrected the text, which we have shortened somewhat for reasons of space.]

\* \* \*

*Question. What do you feel is the current stage of the resistance movement after the defeats in July?*

*Answer.* There is no doubt that the Palestinian resistance movement has undergone a number of defeats. The phase of having a seeming preponderance of power in Jordan is over. The phase of the honeymoon with the Arab regimes is over. When we began we were fully aware that the line of the resistance was contradictory to the line of the neighboring regimes. But somehow we didn't act as if this contradiction were real, and we minimized the power of the Jordanian regime. Because of the enthusiasm of the masses vis-a-vis the revolution and the resistance movement, our evaluation of our own power was overblown.

I think we are now in a phase where the evaluation of the situation is more realistic, where the enemies are much clearer, where the forces of imperialism and reaction in the area are much clearer than they have been, where we are called upon to find different ways of operating and dealing with the neighboring Arab regimes.

One could say that there is maybe increasing clandestinity, more emphasis on secret cover rather than public activities. But this is easier said than done. It is not easy to shift from one type of operation to another overnight.

There is greater maturity, [the movement] having suffered a defeat and taken a great number of steps backward. I think we have the opportunity to learn from this experience of the last couple of years. Whether we have learned enough or not, it is still too early to say.

The coming phase involves better organization than we've had in the past, more clarity of thinking. Attempting to create a revolutionary organization is really the main task at this stage.

*Q. You spoke about the difficulties with the neighboring Arab states. In this country there's more information about the difficulties the resistance has faced in Jordan, but there's not much consciousness or knowledge about the problems the resistance has faced in Lebanon also. Could you comment on that?*

A. The contradiction in Jordan is much greater, much more acute than it is in

Syria and Lebanon, because most of the population is Palestinian; and when we go about mobilizing, organizing, and arming the masses, we are competing essentially for the population with the Jordanian regime.

In this phase, we are not competing directly for the masses of Syria and Lebanon, although in the long run the revolutionary movement has to compete for the masses as a whole rather than for any limited group. Therefore the regime in Lebanon does not feel as threatened as the regime in Jordan has felt.

In spite of that, though, there have been contradictions and conflicts between the Lebanese government and the resistance, a number of outbreaks in 1968, '69, '70. This last year has been a bit more quiet. We have learned some lessons from our experience in Jordan and have not adopted too defiant a stance vis-a-vis the Lebanese government that might lead to confrontations that we might not be able to handle.

The Lebanese government and system do not tolerate any effective existence of guerrillas on their territory. The more effective we become, the more attempts there will be at putting an end to our presence.

Syria traditionally has been very supportive. The guerrilla movement had its first base essentially in Syria with the blessings of the old regime. The present regime is not as enthusiastic about the people's war slogan as the previous one.

The Syrian regime, like many other progressive regimes in the area, does not have an organized mass-base that would enable it to take defiant positions in the conflict. Therefore to me the change in position did not come as a surprise. I think it is quite natural given the type of regime, which is based mostly on the bureaucracy and the military, with a very weak mass party.

Most of our forces are in Syria at the present time, not secretly but at open bases. This means that we cannot but take Syrian attitudes and policy into account. We are quite vulnerable in our presence in Syria.

*Q. Do you think that the current situation of the resistance movement as a whole makes it easier for the United States, Israel, and other powers to impose a so-called peaceful solution to the problems of the Middle East?*

A. First, there can't be a peaceful solution. Nobody can impose a peaceful solution from the United Nations or from any capital.

Peace is not a piece of paper that the big powers sign. Conflicts exist because there are contradictions there, and if these are not resolved there can't be peace.

There might be changes of borders, there might be redeployment of forces, but there can't be peace in the area.

Now, whether the big powers at the United Nations can arrive at a rearrangement without solving any of the problems, could change the backdrop of the game—definitely the weakness of the resistance would help this process. But what has stopped this settlement is not only the strength of the resistance, but contradictions between the big powers.

The American view of a settlement is a Pax Americana in the area, a settlement that would exclude the Soviet Union completely from any influence or would minimize the presence and influence of Soviet power in that region. Naturally the Soviet Union is not going to be very happy with that kind of arrangement and envisages a different kind of settlement.

Of course there is a slight contradiction between the Israeli and American position, but the difference is not too important at this stage. Israel would like to maintain all the territory, get rid of as much of the population as possible. Its view of the kind of peace it wants is peace with the territory won and the opening of the whole area to its economic activity and possibilities of exploitation—to exploit the resources and have access to the markets of the region.

*Q. There was much discussion, and some differences, in the resistance movement on the attitude taken by the Palestine Liberation Organization to the negotiations last month in Jidda. Would you like to comment on that?*

A. There were no negotiations really in Jidda. There were attempts by Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to be mediators in the Jordanian-resistance conflict.

There are powers that exist around us, influence us. We cannot define them out of existence. We have to take them into account, even though our main dependence is on our internal resources and the mass support that we might have. During the most recent conflict in Jerash, we accepted the mediation of Egypt and Saudi Arabia without having any illusions about the designs or the interests of these regimes. We accepted the mediation. It was probably a mistake to continue in it when it did not amount to anything in the case of Jerash.

There was insistence by Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia that we should try further to talk, that they should mediate further because they were signatories—Saudi Arabia and Egypt—to the Cairo agreement, which defined the relationship between the resistance and the Jordanian regime. We know realistically that it's not possible to get the Cairo agreement implemented. However, the Arab govern-



ments said, "You say you are willing and thus expose the Jordanian regime." This was one of the views in the PLO, although there was some disagreement from those who said, "Why bother to go if you know there will be no result?" Some said we shouldn't bother at all.

The delegation did go. There were discussions, mostly not with the Jordanian delegation, but for a large number of days with the Egyptians or Arabians. Then there were one or two meetings that showed the divergence of positions, and the delegation went back. There has been no resumption of talks.

*Q. My impression was that the disagreement was not so much whether to negotiate at this conference, but what tactic the resistance should take toward the Jordanian regime. The statements that we saw from both the Democratic Front and the Popular Front stressed that in their opinion the liberation of Palestine entailed first the elimination of the reactionary regime in Jordan, and that there was no way the struggle against Zionism could be carried through to the end as long as there existed a regime like Hussein's in Jordan. Do you think that's true?*

A. I think there is really no disagreement in the resistance movement about the nature of the Jordanian regime. There is disagreement about how things are put forth—the kind of slogans. Let's take Fateh, the way it views Jordan.

Fateh said our main direction is to fight the imperialist Zionist base in Israel. We will not interfere in the affairs of neighboring regimes, with a big condition: as long as they do not interfere with progress of the revolution. This is obviously a tactical kind of slogan. Obviously when it comes to actual interference, Fateh interfered more in the Jordanian regime than it should have, in my opinion. It acted beyond its power.

When we say we will not interfere as long as others do not interfere in the path of the revolution, we know very well that others cannot but interfere in the revolution. This uncovers the various enemies that are against you, and you can deal with them one at a time.

Obviously, the Jordanian regime is now the primary obstacle in the path of liberation, and Fateh and all the others agree that this regime has to go. The question is not whether one wants it or not, but what slogans to use; what public pronouncements do you make—the PLO and Fateh, for example, have tended to emphasize moderate slogans, rather than big slogans.

We want freedom of action. We know very well we cannot have freedom of action, except if we get a democratic national government.

The problem is the level of activity that we need to bring down the regime and to create a political organization among the Jordanian masses and establish some sort of Jordanian-Palestinian framework for a national front.

So when you judge the various groups of the Palestinian resistance from this per-

spective, not by their verbiage, their rhetoric, but by the relationship of their rhetoric to their activity, you will find that we are all in the same boat—fairly deficient in our actions, and we have a lot to learn about what to do as far as building a mass organization and fighting the Jordanian regime as well as Zionism.

*Q. Could you give us an idea of what specific tasks the PLO sees in Jordan? What are the immediate steps it is taking to build up its organization?*

A. The step to be taken is an attempt at building secret organizations in Jordan. Everybody is involved in this task to one extent or another. We have not seen results yet.

There are activities; there are acts of violence against the regime; there is resistance within Jordan, but it is not very advanced. You cannot build a secret organization overnight.

A successful organization will have to come from the cadres who are under the repression in Jordan, from the cadres inside the occupied territories. These, with the help of the guerrillas and political cadres from outside, are in a better situation for building the revolutionary organization than in the '67 atmosphere.

There has been a Jordanian national front created by Jordanian and Palestinian elements. This is the framework being used to create a mass organization. Again, one should not exaggerate the capacity of this front. It is rather weak and the task is great.

*Q. What specific conditions do the militants in Jordanian prisons face?*

A. You all heard in July about the encirclement of the areas that were bases for the fedayeen, where heavy shelling was used to comb the whole area; napalm was used. The air force was used against the fedayeen. Some were even forced across the river Jordan after finding no food for a number of days. Some were able to cross the river and go into hiding and are now fighting in the occupied territories. Some gave up to the Israeli army. Many were imprisoned by the Jordanian regime. There are now thousands of fighters in Jordanian prisons.

Great emphasis is placed on getting as much information as possible from the cadres, torturing them, trying to break their morale. Some have lost their minds, some have died under torture; some have been executed for the fighting they did in September. Some have been killed after they surrendered, captured but just mowed down.

*Q. What is the situation on the other side of the border, in Gaza and the rest of the territories occupied since 1967?*

A. Despite the repression there has been a continued high level of activity in Gaza. In the West Bank the resistance is at a much lower level. There are many reasons for this. The occupation of Palestine is

rather different from occupations in other parts of the world. France, for example, had a population of about 40,000,000 and an occupation army of about 1,000,000. The ratio of population to occupier was forty to one. In Palestine we have a society of about 1,300,000 under occupation by a garrison state that can mobilize a third of a million soldiers in twenty-four hours. The ratio of the population to the occupier is different.

Second, this society has not only a majority of the population outside the occupation, but the people inside are fragmented into separate population centers. They are isolated from each other.

There have been no common institutions that would join the Palestinians of the three areas [Gaza, the West Bank, and the territory taken by Israel in 1948] together. There was no defeated Palestinian army that could take up the resistance. There were no parties; there were no trade unions that could have been the framework for activity.

Why is the resistance in Gaza much higher? Historically, the Gaza area was administered by Egypt, which since 1952 had a somewhat patriotic government. The West Bank was under the Jordanian regime, which tried to crush everything Palestinian, which had no military training (in Gaza there was military training). Education and political orientation were somewhat different in the West Bank than they were in Gaza. Gaza had already experienced one occupation in 1956, while for the West Bank this is its first time.

More important than this, though, is the socioeconomic constitution of the two segments. Demographically, Gaza provides more of a sea in which the fish can be lost than does the West Bank. The population size is not very different in the two segments. The area is different—the West Bank is much larger, Gaza is a very narrow strip. So you have a sea of population in which it's much easier to disappear.

The constitution economically: more dispossessed in Gaza, the majority of the population of the Gaza strip is refugee; it is dispossessed from other areas. In the West Bank it is a minority, a much smaller percentage. I can't remember the exact figures, but I think it's something like 30 percent in the West Bank and maybe 60 in Gaza. The economic level is therefore different, and it's natural in a resistance that the oppressed masses, the poorer masses, are more willing to take chances and play an important part in the resistance.

This is one difference between the two areas. Also, I suspect, and this is only an impression, that in Gaza you have a higher level of leadership, of entrepreneurial-type political leadership. The West Bank was more open to the outside world in the last twenty years than Gaza. There was an emptying of young men from the West Bank, who had opportunities to work all sorts of places.

Possibly the distance of Gaza from the main bases made it more self-sufficient and independent. In the West Bank there was a degree of dependence on the East

Bank, which had the main bases of the resistance.

*Q. What role do you think the development of divisions in Israeli society can play in the struggle for a democratic Palestine?*

A. The internal contradictions in Israeli society will increase and become more acute as the Palestinian resistance gathers force. At the present time there are some signs of this, but we should not exaggerate these contradictions.

The conflict between the poor Arab Jews and the Western European Jews who were the leaders of the colonial enterprise, the ones who started the whole game and created the problem for the Arab Jews, is potentially a very fruitful contradiction, even though at this stage the Arab Jews are not necessarily more sympathetic to the Arabs.

In spite of this fact, there will be possibilities of integration and joint fate with the Arab Jews.

This is not to say that there are not possibilities with the other groups. It is well known that many defect from their class to join movements of change. It all depends on the options that the people in Israel see ahead of them.

These options cannot be changed or be seen purely as intellectual options, because the problem is not an intellectual one.

As long as the people in Israel, who mostly came under the aegis of Zionist world organizations, find that they're going about their way and building their society, and disregarding the people that they dispossessed and things are working out, there is no pressing need to think of alternatives. As this Zionist idea is challenged, not by talks and discussions, but challenged by armed struggle, people start thinking, "Well, is it worth it all? Is the path we are on the correct path; are there possibly other paths?" This is when the articulation of other options could be very relevant for Israeli society. To the extent that the revolutionary force is greater, the more likelihood of change within Israeli society.

*Q. You spoke of a Jordanian-Palestinian alliance, which might take an organizational form, like a Jordanian-Palestinian front. If you are successful in establishing such a front, what kind of movements would that front intervene in?*

A. The reason we are making a distinction between the Palestinian resistance and a Jordanian national front is that we want the direction of the Palestinian resistance to be towards the occupied territory and resistance there. But the national front involved includes the resistance plus other forces.

The duties of the Jordanian national front cannot be only defending and supporting the resistance and its freedom of action within Jordan. It has to address itself to the political, social, and economic problems within Transjordan.

So the platform of the national front would be quite different from the resis-

tance. This distinction may be a little artificial and tactical.

The Palestinian resistance will be playing a dual role. On the one hand, as the Palestinian resistance, it is for directing itself to the occupied territories, but as part of the Jordanian national movement, it will be addressing itself to political, social, and economic change within Jordan.

The population is so integrated that any separation between Jordan and Palestine at this stage is extremely difficult. The Palestinian masses are the majority even in Transjordan.

*Q. Does this represent a change in the attitude of the resistance? That would seem to imply an alteration in the policy of noninterference.*

A. No, because we always were cooperating with the Jordanian national front, and Palestinians were part of the national front as Jordanians, because the Palestinians in Jordan are Jordanian citizens. The strategy has not changed at all. The situation has changed and therefore the slogans and the practices would be different, but they are still within the strategy that we envisaged.

*Q. What is the situation of the militia?*

A. The militia is not existent as it was before. The militia before consisted of most people in the political organizations, who were armed, carried their arms publicly, patrolled the streets and the quarters at night, prevented the army and the police from intervening.

There is no public militia now. Arms are plentiful and every week or so one hears of caches of arms being uncovered in Amman or other places. There is no lack of arms; in fact, arms are still being sent into Jordan from outside. If we can get them into Israeli-occupied territory, we can get them into Jordan.

People have access to them. Many gave up arms when the government asserted its authority and power in the area, but many others, the most confident and committed, have hidden their arms. This is a good sort of screening.

*Q. We've heard here that there is a tremendous propaganda campaign in Jordan against the resistance. What measures have the different resistance groups been able to take to continue to get out the ideas of the Palestinian revolution? Is there underground literary and propaganda activity?*

A. Most of our population depends more on word of mouth and radios than on reading for political work. Written materials are there, but I don't think they're very significant at the present time.

Written materials are brought in from Syria and Lebanon, but very clandestinely. The major contact, other than word of mouth, is radio transmission. We have our own station in Syria, and transmission from other areas that can play a role in maintaining contacts with the population.

*Q. There's been much discussion in all the national liberation movements on the relation between the struggle for national liberation and the struggle against capitalism; whether the struggle for national liberation implies a different stage from the struggle for socialism. Would you comment on this?*

A. Again I think we must make a distinction between analysis and tactics and slogans. As far as analysis, I do not think that there is a great deal of difference. The main contradiction in our part of the world as we see it is between imperialism, and Zionism as an aspect of it, and the peoples of the third world. This imperialism is not a phenomenon unrelated to capitalism; it is the highest stage of capitalism. If one is to resolve this contradiction between imperialism and the people of the third world, this can hardly result in a capitalist system. It cannot but result in the antithesis of capitalism.

What slogans one would use at a given stage of the struggle, on this there is disagreement. For example, the NLF [National Liberation Front] in Vietnam does not call for socialism in its program at the present stage. It has very moderate slogans, but works hard as hell to make these slogans meaningful.

We should have a dynamic view of forces, not a static one. A dynamic view means you cannot judge friends and enemies statically. These relationships change with the passage of time and the progress of the revolution. It would be wrong to treat the enemies of tomorrow as the enemies of today.

You might cooperate with them today, without being deluded about the fact that they will be enemies tomorrow. It means knowing how to make alliances at any given stage, how to set priorities as far as your enemies are concerned, where to choose your battles. The final goal is essential, but how to go step by step to that goal is much more important.

Therefore, at this stage, the National Charter of the PLO, which is accepted by all the organizations, even those that talk quite differently, has defined this stage of our struggle as a national liberation struggle. It does not have the socialist context of conflict between classes, even though, analytically, it can't but have this aspect. When we say we are fighting imperialism and the agents of imperialism, these agents in the area are not indiscriminately there regardless of class. They are agents of foreign capital, the bourgeoisie, the landlords, etc. Therefore there are class ramifications, but this is not the primary problem at this stage. The primary problem is to gather as many forces as possible, each giving what he can to meet the main contradiction. As the revolution progresses, inevitably the participation of the different classes will be quite different and the conflict will become more acute.

You cannot feel that somehow first you do the national liberation, and when this is finished you start with the other. I think it would be very wrong to view

the two stages as separate, to view the difference as a mechanical one, do one then the other.

The two are interrelated, but it is important at this stage to emphasize the national liberation aspect.

*Q. Do you think that the development of active opposition to the Vietnam war has a significance in regard to the Palestinian revolution and its relation to U. S. imperialism?*

A. I think so. I think the peace movement and the Vietnamese experience would make the U. S. a bit more reluctant to use its force directly in Palestine. It doesn't have to for quite a while, because they have a very good client that can do their bidding for them. Many clients, but one that is very confident.

The effectiveness of the antiwar movement became much more concrete with the loss of many Americans. I suspect that before loss of American lives in the Middle East it would be hard for the movement to gather as much force and reach the same level.

*Q. Some of the trials and repressions in other Arab countries have been directed as much against the Palestinians as against domestic opposition—Egypt, the Sudan, Morocco. Have these repressions resulted in a significant decline in the ability of the Arab masses to support the Palestinian revolution?*

A. What is taking place in the Arab world today is a rightist tide, the repression of mass movements, and the strengthening of reactionary and American-connected forces in the region.

The more the movement of the masses is weakened around us, the more vulnerable we are. In most Arab countries, mass feeling in support of the revolution is there, but the building has not gone very far yet. Just as in Palestine, we are only in the beginning stages. In other parts of the Arab world the problem is just as difficult. Many who have made some steps in the direction of building a mass organization have suffered setbacks. This is not to our advantage.

*Q. What is your opinion of the efforts of the so-called U. S. or Israeli doves to set up a Palestinian mini-state to "solve" the Palestinian-Israeli question?*

A. The resistance is definitely against this type of "solution." It wouldn't be much different from occupation, just a euphemism for it: get a few Palestinian collaborators and make an arrangement with them. I don't think this is very significant. The Israelis cannot possibly do it.

The surprising thing, which shows the attitude of our Palestinian masses and their commitment to the struggle, is that despite the preponderance of the power of the occupier for four years now, there has been no collaborationist type of setup formed. There are individuals who collaborate, but there is no Vichy government. □

## As Fight Sharpens Over Psychiatric Abuses

### Kremlin Shifts Ground in Bukovsky Case

By George Saunders

Vladimir Bukovsky has been ruled "sane" and fit to stand trial "shortly" for alleged anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation. (Conviction could mean up to seven years imprisonment.) Thus the Soviet bureaucrats have retreated for the moment from their previously indicated tactic of holding the dynamic 28-year-old rights-fighter indefinitely in a psychiatric prison-hospital.

This retreat was unquestionably the result of embarrassment over the growing publicity and protests around his case.

The news came only in the second week of November, well over a month after it became known that Bukovsky had been placed in a psychiatric institute for an "examination" of his mental health. (See "The Case of Vladimir Bukovsky" and "Nina Bukovskaya's Appeal for Her Son" in *Intercontinental Press*, October 18, p. 889, and November 15, p. 977, respectively.)

This new turn in the Bukovsky case could be of great importance for the Soviet democratic movement. The Brezhnev regime has since 1969 increasingly resorted to the confinement of political opponents in psychiatric prison-hospitals. This is mainly to avoid the formalities and publicity imposed by public trials.

But through a determined and courageous effort, not least by Bukovsky himself, the Soviet democratic fighters have managed to stigmatize this exceptionally cruel form of repression. The Kremlin can no longer resort to it without creating ever greater opprobrium and difficulties for itself.

Still the trial tactic is no better for Brezhnev and Company than before. Thus the regime is stalling as it searches for an option in the Bukovsky case. Captain Korkach, the KGB [Soviet secret police] investigator in the case, reportedly informed Nina Bukovskaya that the investigation was "expected" to be completed by the end of November and that her son would be placed on trial "shortly" thereafter.

The Kremlin feels under considerable pressure from the publicity at home and abroad concerning its re-

pressive use of psychiatric techniques, the central issue in the Bukovsky case. This showed clearly when *Izvestia* ran a lengthy article on the subject in its October 24 issue (not the October 23 issue, as erroneously stated by the *New York Times*).

The *Izvestia* article appeared in the wake of protests in early October over Bukovsky's confinement for psychiatric "examination." It also came at a time when, according to Amnesty International, the congress of the World Psychiatric Association, scheduled for November 28-December 4 in Mexico City, had placed on its agenda the question of the misuse of psychiatric medicine for political purposes.

That this will be an issue at the psychiatric congress is a direct result of Bukovsky's efforts. Last January 28, two months before his arrest, he sent an appeal to psychiatrists outside the Soviet Union along with 150 pages of documentation on the cases of six prominent dissidents who were confined in "special" psychiatric hospitals.

In Moscow, *New York Times* correspondent Hedrick Smith reported, Bukovsky's case has become a "minor cause célèbre." The November 11 *Le Monde* reported an appeal circulating in *samizdat* in his behalf, signed by fifty-two Soviet citizens and endorsed by two spokesmen of the Committee for Human Rights, Academician Sakharov and Igor Shafarevich, a Lenin Prize-winning member of the Academy of Sciences.

The appeal protested Bukovsky's being placed in the Serbsky Institute without any basis and his being held there incommunicado. It called for him to be provided with defense counsel of his choice and for immediate termination of his so-called examination.

Sakharov endorsed the appeal with a separate short statement, quoted by *Le Monde* as follows:

"I share the concern expressed in this appeal concerning Vladimir Bukovsky's situation, and I reaffirm my solidarity with his actions, aimed at averting the possibility of psychiatry being used to combat those who dissent." □

## Socialist Candidate on Prospects for Revolution

[The interview below first appeared in the October issue of the West German magazine *Was Tun*, published by the Revolutionär-Kommunistische Jugend (Revolutionary Communist Youth). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

The following interview was obtained from our comrade Andrew Pulley during his visit to Europe. Pulley is the vice-presidential candidate of the SWP [Socialist Workers Party] in next year's presidential election in the United States. He came to Germany primarily to discuss their problems with Black GIs. In Frankfurt he spoke to approximately 300 Black American soldiers at a meeting protesting the murder of George Jackson. In Heidelberg he reported to a meeting of the Revolutionär-Kommunistische Jugend on the struggle of Blacks and the antiwar movement in the U.S.A.

As a GI, Pulley was active in one of the first antiwar organizations of soldiers: "GIs United Against the War." When the army attempted to smash this growing organization, he was a defendant in the case of the "Fort Jackson Eight." He spent sixty days in prison, until a massive campaign of solidarity forced his release from the army.

Andrew Pulley is an activist in the antiwar movement. He was a coordinator of the Black Task Force to End the War in Vietnam. As a representative of the Socialist Workers party, he was a speaker at the powerful mass demonstration against the Indochina war on April 24 in Washington, D. C., in which 500,000 persons participated.

*Question.* You are the vice-presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers party in next year's election. Can you tell us something about the purpose of the campaign?

*Answer.* The chief issue of this campaign is the war in Southeast Asia and the American involvement there. The SWP fights for the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of all U.S.

troops. Further, our campaign is directed against the oppression of women and against Nixon's wage freeze, which is a direct attack on the living standard of the working class. As for the liberation struggle of Blacks and Chicanos, our demands are that they must have their own organizations under their own control.

*Q. What is the effect of the wage freeze decreed by Nixon on the consciousness of the working class?*

*A.* The wage freeze is the capitalists' reaction to inflation, which is a consequence of the Vietnam war. The workers see this quite clearly. The wage freeze is an attempt by the bourgeoisie to make the working class bear the consequences of the Indochina war. The result of this is a further politicalization of the workers. I would really like to know what Nixon thinks he is doing: his actions open the door for revolutionary socialists. He gives us a good opportunity to approach the workers, both inside and outside the unions.

Opposition to the war in Southeast Asia has seized broad layers of the population: over 70 percent demand the immediate withdrawal of all the troops. They see very well the connection between the war in Indochina and inflation in the United States. Of course Nixon maintains that the wage freeze is going to make possible a return to a "peacetime economy," but the masses see that the war continues. Our task is to show that war and inflation are two sides of the same coin. Then when the workers think of the wage freeze, they will think immediately of the war in Vietnam also.

*Q. The Indochina war will be in the center of the election campaign. Is there at present in the antiwar movement a dispute over demands, for example, between "immediate, unconditional withdrawal" and the demand "set the date" (for withdrawal)?*

*A.* By far the largest part of the antiwar movement demands immedi-

ate withdrawal. However, the Communist party and some groups near it raise the demand that the administration should set a date. This amounts to sabotage both of the antiwar movement and of the liberation struggle of the Vietnamese. This demand means putting confidence in the imperialists and granting them the right to remain in Vietnam for a time. The only right that we grant them is the right to get out. To give the government the right to set the date for troop withdrawals means tolerating the war, at least for the time being. Those who do not demand the immediate withdrawal of all American troops are opposing the self-determination of the Vietnamese people.

*Q. Both the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) play an important role in the antiwar movement. What do you intend to do in the future?*

*A.* We intend to mobilize thousands for the immediate withdrawal of all American troops. On November 6, mass demonstrations will take place in numerous cities. Because of the wage freeze, for the first time a large number of unions will participate.

The Pentagon papers have exposed the real background of American involvement in Southeast Asia and the lies of the politicians, Kennedy included. The result will be that still more unionists, students, young people, Blacks, and so on will participate in the demonstrations.

*Q. What are the conditions in American prisons, against which so many prisoners are rebelling?*

*A.* The revolts in the prisons are closely related to the general radicalization. The prisoners refuse to let themselves be treated like animals any longer. Among their demands is the right to be politically active. The murder of George Jackson and the massacre at Attica show to what lengths the capitalists will go when it is a matter of wiping out revolutionists.

It is important for the masses to

understand the meaning of the prison uprisings. Just recently, inmates were seen, so to speak, as subhumans, but today this is changing. And the prisoners are offering resistance and are struggling against this. In the case of Attica, the task was to call solidarity demonstrations and demand the granting of the prisoners' demands. If there is no mass mobilization, the government can always beat down revolts in the prisons.


*Q. What is the situation in the Black liberation movement and in the Black Panther party?*

A. A developing consciousness is evident among Blacks; this process must be hastened. It is necessary to break the Black population away from the Democratic party—because a large number of Blacks still vote for it. At the moment there is a crisis of leadership in the liberation movement. The government has increased its attacks on important organizations like the Black Panthers. In the last two years the government has had 200 fighters murdered. The murder of Jackson and the massacre at Attica are examples. But because of the leadership crisis there was no united resistance and no mass actions against these attacks.

What Blacks need is an independent organization that can react to the situation and defend itself against the attacks of the racist government. In this connection, the struggle against the war is very important, because Blacks are especially oppressed in the army and are used as cannon fodder in Vietnam. Many Blacks were mobilized for the April 24 demonstration, and on November 6 there will be still more.

As for the Black Panther party, it has committed serious strategic errors. It has not grasped the character of the present period. It evidently took the present radicalization as a sign of a prerevolutionary situation. It proclaimed that the time had come to "pick up the gun" and conquer power. And this at a time when many Blacks and workers still vote for the Democratic Party.

The question of power has not yet been posed. Not to understand this amounts to suicide. This is precisely the error made by the Black Panthers. They have lost many of their followers. A split developed between Huey Newton and Eldridge Cleaver, the



ANDREW PULLEY, representing Socialist Workers party, speaking from steps of Capitol during April 24 mass antiwar rally of more than 500,000 persons in Washington.

cause of which was less political differences than a sort of clique rivalry. Newton himself has since then turned to the church and to Black capitalists. All this shows the degeneration of the Black Panther party. It was never a real mass organization and it has ceased to play a progressive role for the Black population.

Meanwhile, however, there has developed in Cairo (Illinois) a kind of united front of the Black community. It carries out two kinds of defense activities: mass actions and armed self-defense.

I would like to repeat one thing: What Blacks need is an independent political mass organization that can organize mass actions in our communities around demands like the return of our brothers from Vietnam or in response to specific political events such as what happened at Attica.

*Q. In conclusion, what are the pros-*

*pects for revolution in America?*

A. In view of the depth of the radicalization, there is no doubt what will come. The revolutionists are forming their ranks, just as they are all over the world. In the revolutionary process, the struggles of the working class will unite with the struggle of the oppressed minorities—because only a socialist revolution can solve the problems of the oppressed minorities and realize the self-determination of Blacks, Chicanos, etc.

In the USA some obstacles have already been cleared away. The women's liberation movement is developing prior to the socialist revolution. That is new, compared with China, Cuba, and Russia. It is obvious that this movement is an integral part of the rise of revolution in the USA. The greatest necessity remains the creation of the revolutionary party as a component of the world party of the proletariat. □

# REVIEWS

## The Politics of Ecology

*The Politics of Ecology* by James Ridgeway. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, N. Y. 222 pp. \$5.95. 1970.

The author's thesis is that pollution does not originate from a "population explosion," as is averred by the neo-Malthusians, but from an expanding industrial system that puts profits above all other considerations.

In the case of the United States (to which the book is confined), the great increase in pollution began at the end of the second world war. "During that period," Ridgeway points out, "there was tremendous growth in per capita production of pollutants. Between 1946 and 1966, total utilization of fertilizer increased by 700 percent, electric power by 400 percent, and pesticides by more than 500 percent. Yet in that period US population increased by only 43 percent. This suggests that technology and industry, not the increased numbers of people, increased pollution. To look at it another way, the most severe population explosion exists in India. But India contributes little or nothing to environmental pollution."

The greatest single source of pollution of the air is the automobile: "Nearly half of all crude oil is used for gasoline, which, of course, explains why both the oil companies as well as the auto industry are so attached to the internal combustion engine. The automobile accounts for 60 percent of all air pollution, and in congested urban centers, autos contribute as much as 85 percent."

The author includes many telling examples to prove that profit considerations govern the capitalist approach.

In nineteenth century England, the reform movement wanted improved sanitation because this would further the interest of the manufacturers. (Production would be increased by lengthening the lives of the workers.)

The manufacturers who resisted in those days were short-sighted. Some of the shrewder ones converted the construction of sewage systems into

a highly profitable enterprise; and they had their men in government to give them a helping hand in this.

It is the same today. The bulk of Ridgeway's book deals with the political machinations of the giant corporations, whether to block the most primitive of pollution controls, to make a fast buck out of building outmoded sewer systems, or to develop new devices (antipollution contraptions on automobiles, chemicals to mix with drinking water or sewage, or to counteract oil spills).

Behind the sudden rise of the ecology movement Ridgeway sees the new pollution-control industry. This industry, which includes some very big corporations, now receives a quarter of U. S.

## Soldiers Who Died for Their Enemy

*The Black Soldier: From the American Revolution to Vietnam* edited by Jay David and Elaine Crane. William Morrow & Co., New York, N. Y. 248 pp. \$5.95. 1971.

*The Black Soldier* is not a narrative history, but a selection of nineteen sources illustrating the concrete experiences of Blacks in the American military. While all of the excerpts have appeared in print elsewhere, their inclusion under one cover does provide a concise record of two centuries of discrimination and betrayal of Black soldiers by a white society that urged them to defend a "freedom and democracy" they never shared.

From James Roberts, a slave who fought in the French and Indian Wars, the Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812, and who was promised his freedom only to be betrayed when the fighting was over, to Dwight Johnson, who won the Congressional Medal of Honor in Vietnam and died during a robbery in Detroit, most of the stories seem stamped from the same mold, with only unimportant details altered. Time and again, the

federal research funds for water-pollution control.

The author does not prove his contention that big business is behind the ecology movement, although he does show how it hopes to turn the movement to profitable account if it can be contained within narrow channels. Even Nixon came in on ecology, hoping that it could help divert attention away from continuation of the Vietnam war.

Ridgeway really ought to have distinguished between the effort to co-opt the ecology movement and the true source of that movement in the broadening realization that capitalism is wrecking the food chain on our planet.

The book is not well organized. It is repetitious, unevenly written. Worst of all is the disappointing program offered at the end—a few weak suggestions for improving the functioning of the federal government in the field of pollution. As if the "masters of waste," who are also the masters of the government, would engage in self-reform!

—Paul Dunlop

hope that courageous service under arms would win Blacks equal treatment results only in the contradiction of Blacks dying in defense of the system that oppresses them.

"I . . . helped to scalp and kill many Indians," James Roberts wrote, "which I now exceedingly regret, as they were innocent and defenceless, and were fast tending to a condition not much better than my own."

Fortunately, the editors of this book have not fallen into the trap of defining soldiers as only those fighters enrolled in the armed forces of the United States. The volume contains two selections from the centuries-long history of Black armed resistance to oppression: excerpts from the 1822 trial of participants in the slave insurrection organized by Denmark Vesey; and an interview with Charles R. Sims, president of the Bogalusa, Louisiana, Deacons for Defense and Justice, an armed self-defense group of the Black community.

A more balanced selection would have included more documents from this tradition.

—David Burton

## The Healyite Case Against the Lambertists

[In our November 1 issue, we published a translation of an open declaration, dated October 12 and signed by Guillermo Lora of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR—Revolutionary Workers party, a Bolivian grouping), Pierre Lambert of the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI—Internationalist Communist Organization, the French section of the "International Committee"), and Balazs Nagy, a Hungarian leader of the International Committee. The open declaration, which was widely distributed in Paris by the OCI, attacked other members of the International Committee, namely, the Socialist Labour League (SLL) of Great Britain and the Workers League (WL) of the United States.

[The SLL and the WL have responded in kind. In a release entitled "Statement by the International Committee of the Fourth International (Majority) October 24, 1971," they announce that the International Committee has split wide open. By way of explanation, the authors have made public for the first time some of the issues over which the two sides have been warring.

[The statement is of considerable interest to those who follow developments among the groupings claiming adherence to Trotskyism. We are therefore reproducing it in its entirety, including the subheads, utilizing the text published in the November 5 issue of the *Workers Press*, the newspaper of the Central Committee of the SLL. We have sought to follow copy exactly as published in the *Workers Press* except for obvious typographical errors.

[Since the document is not without obscure references, we have provided footnotes to help clarify various points. These have been prepared by Joseph Hansen, the editor of *Intercontinental Press*. For further material on the background and immediate issues that precipitated the split, see the September 27, October 18, and November 1 issues of *Intercontinental Press*.

[We would suggest that our readers suspend judgment on the merits of the arguments until both sides have had full opportunity to explain their points of view. No doubt Lambert, Lora, and Nagy will soon reply to the claims and assertions of their factional opponents. As the polemical developments, new facts can be expected to be revealed that should be taken into account in drawing a final balance sheet on the dispute.]

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### 1. A new period for the Trotskyist movement

● The Fourth International, founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938, now faces the greatest change and the greatest challenge in its history. Capitalism's international economic crisis entered a completely new stage on August 15, 1971, when President Nixon administered the death blow to all the economic and political relations imposed

by the ruling class, assisted by the Stalinist bureaucracy, in 1944-1945.

In the new conditions, the working class is everywhere driven into struggles for power, and the Trotskyist movement has now unprecedented opportunities for assembling and training the revolutionary working-class leadership. The conditions of defeat in which the movement was founded, the war which followed, and then the long years of post-war boom, means that the fight for the continuity of revolutionary Marxism was a fight against Stalinist repression, against isolation and under conditions unfavourable for the development of Marxist theory.

Trotskyism suffered from revisionist attempts to liquidate the Fourth International, and since 1953, when Pablo and his group split from the Fourth International only the International Committee of the Fourth International has fought for the continuity of Trotskyism.<sup>1</sup> Now the

1. This statement is inaccurate. In 1953 a sharp factional struggle broke out in the world Trotskyist movement. Michel Pablo, the secretary of the Fourth International at the time, headed one faction. The other was led by James P. Cannon, the present national chairman of the Socialist Workers party. At Cannon's suggestion, this faction set up a coordinating body, the International Committee. The other side was led by the International Secretariat. Prominent among those adhering to the International Committee were Gerry Healy, currently the secretary of the Socialist Labour League, and Pierre Lambert, the present main leader of the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste.

By 1957, the main political differences separating the International Committee and the International Secretariat had been overcome; but a reunification was deliberately blocked by both Healy and Pablo. The continuation of the split, however, became more and more difficult to justify, and the two sides finally united on a principled basis at a reunification congress held in 1963. (For the statement of principles on which the two sides agreed, see the May 11, 1970, issue of *Intercontinental Press*.)

A minority of the International Committee headed by Healy and Lambert refused to participate in the reunification. They set up the rump "International Committee" which has now ended in an irretrievable split. On the side of the International Secretariat, a group headed by Juan Posadas likewise refused to participate.

Pablo at first greeted the reunification of the world Trotskyist movement. However, maintaining a faction of his own, he soon took a split course that brought him and his group outside of the Fourth International by 1965. This group is still in existence.

While proclaiming adherence to Trotskyism, Pablo today stands on such concepts as "centuries of degenerated workers states" and the possibility of Communist parties "reforming" themselves, which he advanced some two decades ago and which helped precipitate the factional struggle and split of that time. From about 1955 until 1965, he retreated publicly from these positions. Upon setting up shop as an independent formation, he proclaimed them publicly.

The United Secretariat of the Fourth International, formed by the fusion of the International Secretariat and the International Committee, does not agree with Pablo's views and has attacked them at various times. Healy and Lambert have dis-

International Committee has the task of building parties in every country capable of leading the struggle for power.

The leap in consciousness, the development of revolutionary theory and practice, necessary to meet this responsibility, involves an ideological struggle within the IC itself.

On October 12, 1971, a minority of the IC, i.e., two sections: The Hungarian LSH<sup>2</sup> and the French OCI, published a declaration denouncing the Socialist Labour League, the British section, and the Workers League USA (in political solidarity with the IC) for their criticisms of the Bolivian POR.

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One of the signatories of the declaration is Guillermo Lora, Secretary of the POR, which is not a section of the International Committee. Its application for affiliation was to be considered at the next IC Conference (Fourth). The IC consists of British, Greek, Ceylonese, Hungarian, French and Canadian sections, together with the Irish and Mexican (LOM)<sup>3</sup> sections admitted at the 1970 pre-Conference of the IC.

Lambert (OCI) and Nagy (Hungary) do not speak for the IC, and this present document is the reply to their minority statement by the IC majority.<sup>4</sup>

The calling of a meeting in Paris advertising as Chairman, Stephen Just, 'Secretary of the IC for the reconstruction of the Fourth International', shows that the OCI has arrogated to itself the functions of the IC, rejected the IC, and nominated its own 'secretary' as opposed to the elected secretary.<sup>5</sup>

This is a split from the IC and its politics. It is a split by a minority.

On September 22, the OCI issued a public declaration denouncing as 'enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat, agents of counter-revolution and enemies, conscious or unconscious, of the Fourth International, all

regarded all this and have continued to argue as if Pablo were still the secretary of the Fourth International and as if his special views had been adopted by all the Trotskyists outside of their own "International Committee." Hence their use of the label "Pabloite" as an epithet that has nothing to do with current realities in the international Trotskyist movement. — J. H.

2. "Hungarian LSH." In the open declaration issued October 12, 1971, by the Lambertists, the group is listed as "Ligue des Revolutionnaires Socialistes de Hongrie" (League of Socialist Revolutionaries of Hungary). The correct initials would thus seem to be LSRH. Perhaps the Healyites are not too familiar with the organization and its activities. — J. H.

3. "LOM." The reference is to the Liga Obrera Marxista, a small group in Mexico whose main activity has been to supply occasional articles for the *Workers Press*. — J. H.

4. The authors of the statement fail to indicate whether their claim to represent the "majority" of the International Committee is based on the division of the membership as a whole or on the division among the component organizations, some of which consist of only a handful of individuals. — J. H.

5. The name of the "elected secretary" is not given. Thus the implications of advertising Stephen Just as "Secretary of the IC for the reconstruction of the Fourth International" remain unclear. Was the post regarded as a low-level job not requiring a publicly identifiable figure? Apparently so. At least the "elected secretary," presumably a member of the "majority," has not come forward as yet to denounce the usurper. — J. H.

those who attack the POR (Bolivian)<sup>6</sup>. They refer to the SLL and the Workers League.

There is the International Committee of the Fourth International, resting on the foundation laid down by Trotsky in 1938, the first four Congresses of the Third International, and all the work of the IC since 1953, particularly the decisions of the 1966 Conference. And there is the bogus 'IC for the reconstruction of the Fourth International', represented by the OCI and the Hungarian section, who want to regroup with centrists *against* the Fourth International. This split, and not the Bolivian revolution and the Bolivian POR is the basic issue.<sup>7</sup>

## 2. The split at Essen

● This became crystal-clear at the Essen Youth Rally in July 1971.<sup>8</sup> There, representatives of the OCI, the Hungarian section and the Mexican LOM, voted along with centrists and even right-wing organizations against the amendment to the main resolution put by the representative of the SLL and supported by representatives of a majority of the IC sections (Ceylon, Ireland, Canada, Greece, SLL).<sup>9</sup>

The issue was clear: the OCI and its associates voted against amendments stating that the only revolutionary international and revolutionary parties are the *Fourth International*. In their opposition they naturally received the support of the POUM (Spain)<sup>10</sup> and other centrists, as well as of the right-wing American National Students'

6. For the text of the OCI public declaration, see the October 18, 1971, issue of *Intercontinental Press*. — J. H.

7. The International Committee headed by Lambert, Lora, Nagy, and Stephen Just is "bogus"? What about the rump "International Committee" set up by Healy and Lambert in 1963? It was just as bogus. The original International Committee was dissolved as a faction in the Fourth International following its participation in the 1963 Reunification Congress. — J. H.

8. This was a conference held in Essen, West Germany, July 3-4, 1971. According to the Lambertist paper *Informations Ouvrieres*, some 5,000 youth attended, including representatives or observers from nineteen organizations on five continents.

One ugly incident went unreported by *Informations Ouvrieres*. Members of the Fourth International sought to pass out leaflets to the gathering. Monitors of the OCI used physical force against the leafleters. One was beaten and kicked. Others were driven away. (See "German Trotskyists Protest Assault by Ultralefts" in the September 20, 1971, issue of *Intercontinental Press*.) — J. H.

9. "Ceylon, Ireland, Canada, Greece, SLL." What country does "SLL" stand for? No country. The authors merely wanted to emphasize the very special position of the Healyite group in the "International Committee." — J. H.

10. The July 7, 1971, issue of *Informations Ouvrieres*, which offers considerable reportage on the Essen conference, does not list the POUM among the participating organizations.

During the Spanish Civil War, Leon Trotsky was of the opinion that the Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista (Workers Party of Marxist Unification) held the key to a socialist victory but threw it away because of centrist policies.

In the third of a century that has passed since then, both the leadership and membership of the POUM have changed. The Trotskyists of today, while bearing in mind the record of the previous generation, must be guided by an analysis of the current composition, program, and direction of movement of the POUM in determining their attitude toward it. Is it on this concrete analysis that the Healyites and Lambertists disagree? The statement is silent on the subject. — J. H.



Association. NSA is a right-wing student organization directly tied to the bourgeois establishment, even to the extent, under a previous leadership, of admittedly receiving funds from the CIA.<sup>11</sup> Its spokesman used the Essen rally as a platform for the Stalinist-supported 'People's Peace Treaty in Vietnam' campaign. Such are the dangers involved in the OCI's movement to centrism and centrist methods.

The OCI and its associates opposed and voted down the following amendment (presented by the SLL and supported by the majority of the IC sections: Greece, Canada, Ceylon, Ireland):

'There can be no revolutionary party without revolutionary theory. Behind every opportunist development in the history of the workers' movement, and especially of Stalinism, has been the revision of Marxist theory. The continuity of the struggle for revolutionary Marxist theory in the past, the struggle of the Fourth International and the International Committee, was the only basis for the initiatives which led to this rally and for the struggle to build the international revolutionary youth movement. Revolutionary youth everywhere must devote themselves above all to the task of developing Marxist theory through the struggle against bourgeois ideology in all the forms it takes in the workers' movement. This is the only basis for combating the dangers of adventurism, activism and "pure" militancy with which revisionists and Maoists mislead the youth, and which can only lead to historic defeats for the working class.'<sup>12</sup>

11. According to *Informations Ouvrieres* (July 7, 1971), one observer from the NSA was present at the Essen conference. This was sufficient, however, for the authors of the statement to drag in the CIA. The saving phrase "under a previous leadership" should be noted. This presumably enables the authors to deny a deliberate attempt to smear the present leadership of the NSA (and their own Lambertist comrades) with the tarbrush of the CIA.

The NSA was only one of hundreds of organizations infiltrated by the CIA. In most instances the leaderships of the organizations caught up in the web did not know of the CIA involvement, since the CIA converted only selected individual leaders into pawns and undercover agents.

The highly secret campus activities of the spy agency were exposed by *Ramparts* magazine in February 1967. The scandal rocked public opinion in the United States and gave new impetus to the radicalization of the campus.

The press picked up the leads revealed by *Ramparts* and soon showed that the CIA had similarly penetrated any number of other organizations, including some very prominent trade unions in the United States, among them the United Automobile Workers (Walter Reuther himself was accused of taking funds from the CIA). The scandal went right up to the top bureaucrat of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, and his international lieutenant, Irving Brown.

Magazines, book publishers, radio and TV stations, cultural institutions, churches, youth groups, literally hundreds of different kinds of bodies were involved.

Among institutions in other countries, the French trade-union federation Force Ouvriere was named.

(For more about the revelations, see the March 3, March 17, and May 26, 1967, issues of *World Outlook*—the former name of *Intercontinental Press*.)

Out of the broad array of organizations victimized by the CIA, why did the authors of the statement single out the NSA? One imagines that the Lambertists will have something to say on this. Their comments should make instructive reading.—*J. H.*

12. This is typical of the abstract generalizations the leaders of the SLL are fond of. Why they insisted on its being put to a vote at the Essen conference—they in fact made it a splitting

*This was already a split*, the real split. They do not want the FI built on the foundations of dialectical materialism and the politics of Lenin and Trotsky, but they want a centrist amalgam of all those who want to disarm the masses by talk about 'revolutionary united fronts' and 'expressing the will of the masses'. Their 'IC for the reconstruction of the FI' is their fraudulent attempt to use the revolutionary name of the IC of the FI for their own opportunist aims. They will never succeed in doing this.

The majority of the IC rejected their unprincipled manoeuvre at Essen. Now they have chosen to stake everything on the issue of Bolivia, as a smokescreen for the real issues which they will not discuss.

Running away from the real theoretical and practical questions of building the FI, they propose to intimidate the movement with shouting about solidarity with the POR of Bolivia. This was the old trick used by the SWP on Cuba in 1963: no theoretical discussion and no criticism of Cuba; they are involved in a revolution.<sup>13</sup> Similarly Pablo excluded political discussion with his theory of the imminent Third World War.<sup>14</sup> And it must never be forgotten that the suppression of discussion on Cuba and Ceylon, used to effect the 'unification' of 1963, had as its direct consequence the entry of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), while still a section of the Pabloite Secretariat, into the bourgeois coalition of Mrs Bandaranaike.<sup>15</sup>

issue—and why, in face of the ultimatum, the Lambertists decided to vote it down, still remain to be explained concretely.—*J. H.*

13. The authors depart from the truth. The Socialist Workers party conducted a thoroughgoing internal discussion on the meaning of the Cuban revolution and its relation to the Chinese revolution and the overturn of capitalist property relations in Eastern Europe. The sharpest point of difference with Healy and his followers in the SWP came over his view that no revolution had occurred in Cuba and that Fidel Castro was another "Batista." Such a view, revealing absolute blindness to reality, would have made it impossible to defend the Cuban revolution had it been adopted.

For an analysis of Healy's position, see the chapter "SLL Revision of the Theory of the Permanent Revolution—the Case of Cuba" in Ernest Germain's booklet *Marxism vs. Ultraleftism—Key Issues in Healy's Challenge to the Fourth International*.—*J. H.*

14. At the beginning of the 1950s, Pablo held that World War III could break out within several years. He did not exclude discussion on this question. The fact was that few were of an opposing opinion at the time. If Healy was among them, he certainly did not put it on record in a clear way.

On the basis of this wrong premise, Pablo drew a number of conclusions: (1) that there would not be sufficient time to build *mass* revolutionary parties; (2) that the labor bureaucracies, particularly those linked to Moscow or subject to the pressure of Moscow, would be impelled to engage in far-reaching actions against the war involving the masses; (3) that to exercise effective influence in these coming events, the cadres of the Fourth International had to engage wherever possible in the tactic of "entryism sui generis." (That is, enter the Communist and Social Democratic parties as rank-and-filers and seek to build a revolutionary wing within them while still maintaining a public Trotskyist organization and press.)—*J. H.*

15. The entry of the LSSP into the Bandaranaike coalition did not come as a "direct consequence" of the 1963 reunification of the world Trotskyist movement but *in spite of it*. See footnote No. 28 for more on this.—*J. H.*

The vote of the OCI and the Hungarian section at Essen against the IC majority was carried out in front of an observer of the American Spartacist group of Robertson. This has an historical significance which cannot be overstated.

At the Third Conference of the IC in 1966, the French and Hungarian sections voted with the rest of the IC delegations for resolutions affirming the revolutionary continuity of the Fourth International. Opposing this were two groups invited as observers to the Conference, Robertson's Spartacists and the French 'Voix Ouvrière' (now 'Lutte Ouvrière'). As opportunists and pragmatists they denounced the IC's struggle for continuity against revisionism.

After the Conference, Robertson collaborated with Hansen and the revisionist Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in wholesale slander of the SLL and the IC.<sup>16</sup> In its resolution at the 1966 Conference, the IC, including the OCI, unanimously stated:

'... The IC not only dissociates itself from the activities and publications of the Spartacists (Robertson) group but insists that a Marxist party can be built only in opposition to it.' Robertson's politics since then have been opportunist on every question, and his group has worked in complete opposition to the International Committee. To admit Robertson's group as observers at Essen at this stage is in effect to junk the whole struggle for principles upon which the IC is based.

The OCI will reply that the invitation was issued on individual initiative by Comrade Berg, secretary of the AJS,<sup>17</sup> and that they have condemned it. On July 9, after Essen, the OCI Political Bureau carried unanimously the following resolution:

'The Political Bureau regrets that the Robertson "Spartacist" group was invited as observer to Essen, without this decision being taken responsibly. The PB considers this individual initiative to be wrong and condemns it.'

This leaves unanswered the point that the OCI leadership is itself politically responsible for the opportunist politics of Berg.

16. The reference is to the pamphlet *Healy "Reconstructs" the Fourth International—Documents and Comments by Participants in a Fiasco*. The "fiasco" was the 1966 conference of the "International Committee" that ended with some of the participants being ejected, including the unfortunate Robertson, who is prone to such mishaps. Aside from an introduction by me, the pamphlet consists mostly of letters, including three signed by Healy, that were circulated internally in the Robertson group. To obtain copies, the Socialist Workers party did not require the "collaboration" of Robertson.

The pamphlet created such a furor in the SLL that a well-known Trotskyist militant, Ernie Tate, was set upon and beaten by a squad of SLL stewards for attempting to sell it in front of an SLL meeting. When Tate, in an open letter, protested the beating, Healy immediately went to the bourgeois courts to lodge a complaint of "slander." He compelled two publications to pay up for having printed the letter. Tate had committed the crime of mentioning in an unlegalistic way that it was his impression that the squad had acted on a signal from Healy, while Healy contended that his intention was to intervene in Tate's behalf.

The documents included in *Healy "Reconstructs" the Fourth International* offer incontrovertible evidence on the undemocratic practices of the Healyite leadership.—J. H.

17. "AJS." Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme (Youth Alliance for Socialism), the Lambertist youth organization.—J. H.

Is it accidental that the OCI at Essen returned to an alliance, against Trotskyism, with a tendency such as the POUM, hostile to the very foundation of the Fourth International, and prepared to collaborate with the OCI only on the basis of *abandoning* the struggle for its foundation and continuity? Precisely at the point in the world crisis where everything depends on the conscious creation, on the basis of Marxist theory and programme, of revolutionary parties, where the struggle against liquidationism and against the revision of dialectical materialism comes to a head, at this point comes the split! The OCI runs clean away from this historic struggle and, in the name of 'expressing' spontaneous movements of the masses, joins sworn opponents of the FI, collaborates with the centrist riffraff against the IC.

### 3. The fight for dialectical materialism

● When the French delegation at Essen opposed the SLL amendment on the struggle for Marxist theory, they set the seal on an opposition to dialectical materialism which was not at all new. One year earlier, in June 1970, at the international pre-Conference of the IC, these differences became explicit. And for very good reasons objectively founded in the struggle. Anticipating the profound worsening of the economic crisis and the struggle provoked by it, the SLL delegates stressed the urgency of the basic training of the youth in dialectical thinking.

What was most essential in the preparation of the sections was to develop dialectical materialism in a struggle to understand and to transform the consciousness of the working class in the changing objective conditions. This means the understanding and development of dialectical materialism as the theory of knowledge of Marxism.<sup>18</sup>

Reflecting the attacks on dialectical materialism by the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia of the advanced capitalist countries, especially France and Germany, and of Europe, the OCI and Hungarian delegations declared that dialectical materialism was not a theory of knowledge and took up the position that only programme was the basis of the building of parties. Here is the very essence of revisionism which prepares the way for liquidating the party into centrism.

We insist once more, with all our force: only a basic struggle for dialectical materialism against all enemies of Marxism and carried forward in struggle *against* the spontaneous consciousness of the working class, can equip the youth for the building of the Fourth International.

In the polemic with Burnham and Shachtman (1939-1940), Trotsky wrote:

18. For an organization that talks so incessantly about dialectical materialism, the SLL has produced singularly little in the way of theoretical contributions to Marxism. This is because the leaders of the SLL are not really interested in the subject. They appeal to dialectical materialism as a dogma for the precise purpose of stifling critical thinking, particularly thinking that is critical of the SLL leadership.

A striking proof of this is the incapacity of the Lambertists to understand the Healyite position on dialectical materialism. On the other hand, they may understand it only too well.

Of interest would be an explanation from both sides as to why they could remain in such a tight bloc for such a long time in view of their profound differences all these years over the most important issue of all—a correct grasp of dialectical materialism.—J. H.

'In the United States . . . where the bourgeoisie systematically instills vulgar empiricism in the workers, more than anywhere else, it is necessary to speed the elevation of the movement to a proper theoretical level.'

The theoretical struggle at this basic level is essential for every section of the Fourth International. And against those who refuse to 'acquire and develop dialectical materialism', Trotsky wrote: 'This is nothing else than a renunciation of Marxism, of scientific method in general, a wretched capitulation to empiricism.'

#### 4. The OCI and the French working class

● This opposition to the basic theoretical struggle for the revolutionary youth has roots in the orientation of the OCI towards the French proletariat. At no time has the OCI been able consistently to put forward a policy and programme to bring it close to the mass of the French workers who vote for the Stalinists and are organized around the Stalinist-led CGT. Instead they have orientated towards those sections still supporting the social-democrats, primarily in the older industries.

They sought support outside of the orbit of the Stalinists instead of fighting for policies which would break the main body of workers from their mass party. One of the consequences is that the rapidly accumulating effects of the world crisis find the OCI paralysed in its political work in the French working class. Their hysterical outbursts on Bolivia, their frantic desire to find an issue to separate from the SLL and the IC—these are the reactions to the deepening crisis of a petty-bourgeois group which falls back on revolutionary shouting, not of a party which goes deeper into the masses to fight for a development of theory. This characteristic resort to radical phrasemongering is, again, connected with the failure of the OCI to struggle on every level for dialectical materialism against the dominant forms of bourgeois philosophy, in this case French rationalism and its twin, pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric.

The Essen rally itself was conceived and carried through by the OCI as a diversion from the unresolved problems of their work in the French working class. An artificial formula was constructed which made W Germany the focal point of the workers' struggle in Europe, and then the OCI led their youth movement to a rally where less than 200 German youth participated, and real political work to build sections of the FI was replaced by demagoguery and showmanship.

It could not and did not have the slightest effect on the workers of France or of Germany. The SLL participated reluctantly, and only on the understanding that we received the preparatory document in time. It was received untranslated, only a few hours before our delegation left for Essen. The SLL and the majority of the IC sections, having moved their amendment, voted for the general resolution despite differences, only in order to preserve public unity of the IC during the period of preparation of the International Fourth Conference, at which the disputed questions would be discussed.

May-June 1968, with the French workers on General Strike, themselves striving for an alternative government, was the greatest testing time for the OCI. But what did the strike reveal?

It revealed the theoretical bankruptcy and political im-

potence of the OCI whose leadership—guided by a superficial impressionist analysis of de Gaulle's coup in 1958—had exaggerated the strength and viability of the Fifth Republic, abandoned its revolutionary perspective and written off the revolutionary capacities of the French working class.

This defeatist conception, which extended even to the Vietnam war, was summed up in the rationalization of Lambert that the French working class was 'decisively defeated in 1958'. This pessimistic and essentially middle-class outlook expressed itself in all the organizational and agitational work of the OCI and the AJS before and after 1968. It is an undeniable fact that at no time during the General Strike did the OCI leadership advance a socialist programme. Nor did it attempt to undermine the political credibility of the Stalinist leadership by critically supporting the demand of the Renault workers for a 'popular government' by advancing the demand of a CP-CGT government.<sup>19</sup> Instead, the OCI leaders tail-ended the working class and restricted the political scope of the strike by demanding a central strike committee. This was a complete evasion of the *political* responsibilities of revolutionary leadership.

Is it necessary to remind the OCI leaders that one of the chief reasons for the definitive split with the Pabloites was their refusal to address political demands to the trade union bureaucracy and fight for a CP-CGT government in the French General Strike of 1953? Revolutionists do not abstain on basic political questions—only centrists and syndicalists do.

The Socialist Labour League had warned the French section of the dangers *before* 1968:

May 15, 1967: 'Now the radicalization of the workers in W Europe is proceeding rapidly, particularly in France. The election results there, the threat of a return to the political instability of the ruling class in the Fourth Republic, the mounting strike struggles, the taking of emergency powers—all these place a premium on revolutionary preparation. There is *always* a danger at such a stage of development that a revolutionary party responds to the situation in the working class not in a revolutionary way, but by adaptation to the level of struggle to which the workers are restricted by their own experience under the old leaderships, i.e., to the inevitable initial confusion. Such revisions of the fight for the independent party and the Transitional Programme are usually dressed up in the disguise of getting closer to the working class, unity with all those in struggle, not posing ultimatums, abandoning dogmatism, etc.' (Reply to the OCI.)<sup>20</sup>

Even from this 1968 experience the lessons were not

19. "CP-CGT government." The proposal was to advocate that the leaderships of the Communist party and the Confederation Generale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor) oust the bourgeois government and take power. Refusal to follow such a course, in face of broad sentiment favoring it, would expose these leaderships in the eyes of the workers and thereby help remove them as obstacles to the building of a mass revolutionary party.—*J. H.*

20. Where can the document from which this paragraph has been taken be obtained? Both it and the document it answers have been circulated only internally by the Healyites and Lambertists. It is to be hoped that they will now be made public so that this intriguing extract can be studied in the proper context.—*J. H.*

learned. In fact the abstentionist methods and omissions of the General Strike period were continued into the presidential elections of 1969.

In the referendum in March of the same year, the OCI had correctly campaigned for a vote against de Gaulle, in contrast to the abstentionism of the Pabloites. However, the gains from this correct turn were lost in the presidential elections, the class character of which was ignored by the OCI. Basing themselves on their fraudulent theory of the 'United Class Front', the OCI leaders used the failure of the CP and Socialist Party to agree on a single candidate as a pretext for not supporting the CP candidate, Duclos, against Pompidou.

The task of revolutionaries was to raise the consciousness of Stalinist rank and file by critically supporting Duclos and pointing out that the main enemy was Pompidou. The OCI should have campaigned throughout the labour movement to demand that the CP candidate be pledged to a socialist policy against the banks and monopolies. To carry forward this fight, while calling for a massive vote for Duclos, was the best way to exposing the Stalinists and their programme of 'advanced democracy' and fighting for alternative revolutionary leadership. Any other course leaves the Stalinist control undisturbed. It was also necessary to expose the SP candidate whose party refused to vote for Duclos in the second ballot and supported the bourgeois candidate, Poher.<sup>21</sup>

The OCI leaders did none of these things. Some members voted for Duclos, others for Deferre (SP) and others, including comrade Lambert, abstained. What was worse, the OCI attacked the Stalinists for having dared to stand a candidate in the elections despite the fact that the Stalinists in the previous presidential elections in 1965 did not do so and instead supported Mitterand,<sup>22</sup> a bourgeois politician.

In 1965, the OCI did not even intervene: thus in France, as in Bolivia, the policy of the 'united class front' and the 'united workers' front' has become a means for disorienting the workers and strengthening the grip of the Stalinists and petty-bourgeois nationalists over the mass movement. The sectarian absence of any policy towards the Stalinists in France easily turns into opportunism, so

21. Another alternative would have been to run a candidate of the OCI. Why was this alternative rejected? The lack of explanation makes quite a gap in the statement.

If the OCI was too weak to participate in the presidential elections, as may well have been the case, a practical solution would have been to support—however critically—the presidential candidacy of Alain Krivine, who was nominated by the Ligue Communiste, the French section of the Fourth International. Krivine's campaign drew a favorable response not only in France but in other countries. It did much to publicize the program of revolutionary socialism. Support from the OCI would have strengthened Krivine's campaign. And, among other benefits, it would have brought a certain credit to the OCI by demonstrating its capacity to place principles above factional considerations.

But this alternative was likewise rejected by the OCI—and with the full approval of the SLL. (See "The SLL Abstains on Krivine" in the June 23, 1969, issue of *Intercontinental Press*.)—J. H.

22. Francois Mitterand (not Mitterand) is meant. For a good analysis of Mitterand's candidacy in 1965, see the article by Pierre Frank, "Mitterand—the New Miracle Man of French Politics," in the October 1, 1965, issue of *World Outlook*.—J. H.

that the OCI now writes in 'Informations Ouvrières' about the Clyde struggle in Britain without any criticism of its Stalinist shop steward leaders—in the same issue as their denunciation of the Socialist Labour League and Workers League as agents of counter-revolution!

## 5. The capitulation to spontaneity

● Just as the difference over dialectical materialism at the IC's pre-Conference was the necessary and conscious anticipation of the essential theoretical problems to be overcome in the impending revolutionary crisis, so Essen was the anticipation of the open split which these problems would produce on the International Committee.

The real split was already effected at Essen, when the OCI lined up with anti-Trotskyists in a public vote against the majority of the IC. They ran away from the principled questions raised at Essen. They raise the question of Bolivia in a totally unprincipled way in order to keep around them their middle-class allies. We will never accept this running to the centrists, and we will oppose to the end the OCI and anyone else who does it. As the Secretary of the SLL wrote to comrade Lambert of the OCI on July 14, 1971, in reference to Essen:

'We have not spent all our lives fighting centrism to suddenly decide to capitulate to it on the eve of the greatest class struggles in history.'<sup>23</sup>

It is necessary to make one other major point on the split pronounced by the OCI. They carry out this split while a Congress of the IC is in preparation and due to be held before the end of 1971. Even though the events at Essen created conditions where day-to-day collaboration with the OCI became impossible, nevertheless it was agreed to proceed with the preparation of documents and arrange the Conference, as the only way of dealing with the differences. These documents are now prepared. But the OCI and the Hungarian sections have chosen to split before the Conference. They act in the same tradition as the SWP, which in 1963 avoided the Conference of the IC and effected its 'unification' with the Pabloites.<sup>24</sup>

23. The name of the author of such a memorable quotation ought really to be preserved for posterity. The indication that it was written by the Secretary of the SLL gives us a clue. Have we guessed right that it is Gerry Healy? Perhaps there are other memorable quotations in the same letter. Let us hope that we do not have to wait for posthumous publication of a correspondence that contains such gems.—J. H.

24. "Same tradition as the SWP." The authors display admirable skill at compressing the record and drawing false analogies. The process of unifying with the "Pabloites" was actually initiated by Healy with his proposal for a Parity Commission in which both sides participated for more than a year before the Reunification Congress of 1963.

The question of reunification was thoroughly discussed among the members of the International Committee, which was a loose factional formation, and each organization belonging to the committee reached its own decision—as was proper—on whether to participate in the reunification. After the successful experience of the Parity Commission, the proposal of the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers party for early reunification of the world Trotskyist movement on a principled basis was ratified by an overwhelming majority, the only holdouts being the Healyites and Lambertists. To this day neither Healy nor Lambert have explained what they considered to be unprincipled in the statement of the basis for reunification. A silence of nine years!—J. H.

At the very heart of the attacks of revisionism has been the attempt to liquidate the party into spontaneous and so-called 'objective' processes. This is the expression of an anti-dialectical method which denies the role of revolutionary consciousness in changing the material struggle itself under specific conditions. Thus Pablo held that given a changed world balance of forces in the post-war period a 'new reality' existed whereby the 'revolutionary process' would force the Stalinist Parties, the social democratic bureaucracies and the petty-bourgeois nationalists in a 'rough way' to make the revolution.<sup>25</sup>

We now find this method developed once again by the OCI. We are told we are in a period of 'imminent revolution'. Within this period there is a 'revolutionary process'. Parties and leaderships then 'correspond' to this 'process'. We are even told of an overall process occasionally 'concretized' in something like the Popular Assembly in Bolivia, which proceeds 'through different stages and different forms towards the Universal Republic of Soviets'. The revolutionary party's task is to 'express these processes'.

This is nothing more than idealism in the form of French rationalism gone mad. We repeat what Lenin said: 'The truth is always concrete.' Only through a detailed and specific analysis of the actual development of the class struggle under the specific conditions of the capitalist crisis can we begin to relate our strategy to the actual changes in the consciousness and life of workers. This requires of us a conscious development of dialectical materialism as we struggle within the workers' movement. This struggle is at all times the struggle to construct Trotskyist parties independent of centrism and Stalinism. Such parties and only such parties can lead the revolution. They can only lead the revolution in the bitterest of struggles against the counter-revolutionary Stalinist and social democratic betrayers.

Within this framework the OCI's position on the 'united class front' becomes a complete liquidation of the party and its subordination to the Stalinist and social democratic parties and union apparatus. Lenin and Trotsky

25. This is a gross simplification of Pablo's views. More importantly, the authors evade the very real problem that faced the world Trotskyist movement in accounting theoretically for the emergence of a series of workers states following World War II without the direct leadership of revolutionary socialist parties.

Not a single leader in either the Healyite or Lambertist camps played any positive role in the search for a solution to the problem. They agreed with the analyses made by others—including Pablo—that workers states had been formed in Eastern Europe, whether under the sponsorship of Tito or Stalin. They likewise agreed that a similar outcome was to be seen in China under Mao. They boggled only when it came to the revolution led by the Castro team in Cuba. How could a *non-Stalinist* group lead a revolution!

Upon deciding that Cuba remained capitalist, they were necessarily required in view of their declared adherence to the dialectical method to review the stands they had taken on the Chinese and East European workers states. They refused to do this. Thereby they proved that they did not really follow the dialectical method.

The consequence of their rejection in practice of dialectical materialism is the combination displayed here of pious incantations to dialectical materialism in the abstract coupled with absolute sterility of thought and outright misrepresentation of the most difficult theoretical problem the Fourth International has had to face since the death of Trotsky. — J. H.

saw the united front as a *tactic* and not a strategy as the OCI claim. They saw it as a relationship between mass workers' parties of a temporary character for the purpose of winning the masses to the Communist Party. The OCI has transformed this into an overall 'unity' of the class achieved on the basis of its present leadership, without the participation in the united front of our party. This 'united class front' more and more, in their theorizing and practice, takes over the role of the revolutionary party itself.

In the October 12 statement we find reference to 'the achievement of the unity of the class through the workers' United Front, motive force of the anti-imperialist United Front . . .'. This carries the liquidation one step further dissolving even the *workers'* united front into a broader 'anti-imperialist' one—broad enough, no doubt, to include the bourgeoisie or at least its petty-bourgeois representatives.

In the 1950s, the OCI made an identical mistake in their policy in Algeria. The bourgeois-nationalist MNA of Messali Hadj was elevated to a revolutionary party not only in Algeria, but in France itself. The Pabloites supported one wing of the nationalist bourgeoisie, the FLN, and the OCI supported the other, the MNA. In Britain, the SLL had given critical support to the MNA, but broke off all relations with their representatives in Britain when the MNA approached the United Nations for intervention in Algeria.<sup>26</sup>

The OCI continued its relations with Messali Hadj even until the open collaboration of Messali with de Gaulle. The OCI's position today on the 'united class front' and 'anti-imperialist' front, even after the defeat in Bolivia, shows that their 'correction' of the Algerian adventure has been purely formal, and that its theoretical roots remain firmly implanted in the OCI.

Related to this has been the OCI's position that it is not a party, and that the Fourth International does not really exist.<sup>27</sup> It sees the national and international party in quantitative terms rather than from the point of view of the development of Marxist theory. This in turn led it, on the eve of the May-June 1968 events, to not even

26. Messali Hadj was one of the founders of the Algerian liberation movement. On paper the program of his Mouvement National Algerien was more radical than that of the Front de Liberation Nationale. It was this radical program that attracted Lambert and Healy and caused them to downgrade the FLN.

The Algerian masses, however, went with the FLN, and this should have proved decisive for revolutionary Marxists.

The correct course was to become involved in the mass movement regardless of the program under which it was marching at the moment. This did not mean that the revolutionary Marxists should give up their own program. On the contrary it was their duty to advance it, doing it in such a way (through transitional slogans and democratic demands in the beginning) as to make it attractive to the masses and bring them ultimately to accept it as a whole.

Pablo understood this and won considerable recognition among the Algerian vanguard. Where he failed was in building a cadre organization, and for this he was severely criticized by the Fourth International. — J. H.

27. "The Fourth International does not exist." The Healyite meaning is that the OCI does not recognize that the Fourth International really exists in the form of the SLL and the thought of its secretary, Gerry Healy. — J. H.

have the post of secretary of its organization, so far had the capitulation to spontaneity developed.

On the question of the struggle in the colonial and ex-colonial countries, the anti-Marxist method of the OCI has had the obvious results, and not only on Algeria.

The OCI refused to campaign in support of a victory for the National Liberation Front, because of its Stalinist leadership, and called instead for the 'victory of the Vietnamese workers and peasants'. This led to a situation on the eve of the 1968 Tet offensive where comrade Berg openly stated an abstentionist position on Vietnam.

And now, after years of refusal to support the struggle of the Palestinian people for self-determination, and inability to take the side of the Arab revolution against Zionism and US imperialism, the OCI welcomes the Irbid 'Soviet' as some manifestation of a world process towards the Universal Republic of Workers' Councils! Inability to fight against the Stalinists and petty-bourgeois nationalists in a real fight for independent leadership in the anti-imperialist struggle, and at the same time an abstract demagogy about the victory of the workers and peasants and the international striving for Soviets.

## 6. The Bolivian revolution

● Bolivia is being used as a smokescreen to cover up the bloc with centrism against the International Committee. As if this were not criminal enough, in proceeding in this fashion, the OCI turns against the most fundamental lessons of our movement on the question of political principle and at the same time covers up for the worst sort of opportunism in Latin America.

We take back nothing from our criticisms of Lora and his role in the defeat of the Bolivian working class. How could we have proceeded otherwise than with an open attack? The road to coalition government in Ceylon was paved by such cover-ups time and again on the part of the Pabloite leadership. How could we draw the lessons we do from their betrayal in Ceylon and practise the same politics in relation to someone on the periphery of the International Committee? We cover over nothing. We build the Fourth International on the basis of political principle and complete honesty.<sup>28</sup>

28. The authors protest too much. A sharp public criticism of the LSSP's turn toward opportunism was voiced by *The Militant* in an editorial "LSSP Policy in Ceylon" in the October 3, 1960, issue. This expressed the views of the SWP. A similar criticism was publicly stated in a resolution passed at the Sixth World Congress in December 1960, when Pablo was still secretary of the Fourth International. These statements were made almost three years before the Reunification Congress. What were Healy and Lambert doing at the time? Covering up the LSSP by their silence? Or agreeing with the criticism made by the SWP?

The International Secretariat engaged, in addition, in extensive correspondence with the Ceylonese, seeking to convince them of the incorrectness of their course and the need to change it. This is reported in the chapter "The Ceylon Example" in Germain's *Marxism vs. Ultraleftism*.

The truth of the matter is that the deterioration of the Trotskyist movement in Ceylon was taken by most responsible leaders of the world Trotskyist movement as a grave warning that extraordinary measures would be required to rectify the situation, and that these could be undertaken only if a principled reunification could be achieved.

By blocking and slowing down the reunification, both Healy and Pablo were responsible for a bad, and, as it turned out,

It was in fact the OCI which first publicly criticized the politics of Lora and the POR. The October 1970 issue of 'La Vérité' carried a lengthy criticism of the thesis passed at the April 1970 Congress of the COB (Bolivian trade union federation).<sup>29</sup> This thesis was the product of the joint collaboration of the POR and the Stalinist Bolivian CP. It was voted for by both parties and the Popular Assembly was later to base itself politically on this document. The OCI wrote:

'... We are dealing with a text which after having made certain concessions to the idea of constructing socialism in Bolivia alone, takes on the one hand, a Stalinist type view of the Ovando regime, and introduces in the chapter on proletarian internationalism, a Stalinist analysis. We have found in the COB thesis on the one hand passages of direct Stalinist inspiration, and on the other a serious omission concerning Czechoslovakia.'

The OCI concludes:

'Comrades, we tell you without evasion, moved by a profound and even anguished conviction, that if this really became the charter of the Bolivian workers' movement and represented its orientation and if the POR was to adopt it (or even for a long time keep silent on the fact that it is the result of a compromise and only has a very circumstantial value) then the thesis of the COB can constitute a noose around the neck of the Bolivian proletariat for it encloses it within the framework of Bolivia.'

Was the OCI at that time giving in 'to enormous pressures' as the OCI now says of the SLL and the Workers League? Was the OCI in making those criticisms identifying itself 'as enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat' and placing itself 'on the side of imperialism and Stalinism'?

The truth is that in 1967 the OCI held the position that revolutions could not be made in the underdeveloped countries until such time as mass revolutionary parties were created in the advanced countries. So distant was the struggle in the underdeveloped countries from the thinking and perspectives of the OCI leadership until very recently that the basic resolution around which it wished the Fourth Conference to be organized 'For the Reconstruction of the Fourth International' hardly mentions Latin America and does not mention Bolivia at all. And yet the Bolivian question is now made the pretext for a split from the International Committee.

We cannot educate a new generation of cadres as revolutionaries with such factional and dishonest methods. We cannot allow the question of Bolivia to be *used* rather than *assessed* for the purpose of actually developing the

fatal delay in effectively countering the rot that had been spreading in the Ceylon section.

As for what happened in Bolivia, the authors draw a false analogy. All of the leaders of the rump "International Committee" bear heavy responsibility if what they say about Lora is true.

They not only made an unprincipled bloc with Lora, they remained silent until after the coup and then they sought to make a scapegoat out of Lora without acknowledging their own political responsibility. — J. H.

29. "COB." Central Obrera Boliviana. The theses (not thesis) were adopted by the mine workers' convention in April 1970 and by the COB in May 1970. For a translation of the text see the July 13, 1970, issue of *Intercontinental Press*. — J. H.

oretically a new leadership in the underdeveloped countries.

We restate what we said about the history of the Lora group. Lora was the major supporter of Pablo in Latin America in 1952. With Pablo's help he gave critical support to the bourgeois MNR<sup>30</sup> Paz government. Here is how a member of his party reported the POR's position in the Fourth International at the time.

'The POR began by justifiably granting critical support to the MNR government. That is, it desisted from issuing the slogan "down with the government"; it gave the government critical support against attacks of imperialism and reaction, and it supported all progressive measures.'

This is just the way the LSSP began its move towards openly joining the Ceylonese coalition government.

The POR broke with Pablo, but it turned its back on the International Committee, refusing to take up a fight for the IC in Latin America though urged to do so. Lora from then on played only a national role. This is the history as we printed it in the Workers Press and 'Bulletin'. The OCI does not deny this.

We can add to this some more. Understanding the past background of Lora, a background of Pabloism, nationalism and opportunism, the Socialist Labour League refused to put up any money towards his fare and collaboration in bringing him to the 1966 International Conference as the OCI had proposed. When he appeared in Europe in 1970, the Socialist Labour League made it quite plain it would not favour his admission into the IC unless a full discussion was held on his whole history and an understanding reached on this basis. We do not have one policy for the LSSP and the Pabloites and another for Lora.

In our public statement we made this fundamental assessment of Lora's role in the Bolivian events:

'Lora, in collaboration with the Bolivian Stalinists and with the agreement of the Bolivian and international Pabloites, failed to fight at any point for the overthrow of the Torres military regime. Thus he, along with the rest of the Popular Assembly, acted as a left cover for Torres while the right-wing elements in Torres' own army prepared and finally executed their coup.'

Then, after writing this, we received Lora's own account

30. "MNR." Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement). The argument developed against Lora is a telling one. The OCI reply will be read with attention.

Perhaps answers will also be provided to the following questions raised by Gerry Foley in the December 15, 1969, issue of *Intercontinental Press*:

"It is to be hoped that the nature of the relationship between the Lora group and the Lambertists will be clarified. Does this alliance rest on a principled agreement? Does Lora, like the Socialist Labour League and Lambert, believe that the Cuban revolution was not socialist, giving rise only to state capitalism? Does he hold with them that Fidel Castro is another 'Batista'? Does he approve of the slanders that appeared in the Socialist Labour League press (before it became known that Che Guevara was in Bolivia) that Castro had liquidated his comrade-in-arms?"

If the leaders of the OCI are reluctant to take up these questions, perhaps they will at least give us their opinion on why Healy and Wohlforth maintained such a discreet silence for almost two years after Gerry Foley drew attention to the unprincipled nature of the bloc with Lora. — J. H.

of the Bolivian events which we published in the Workers Press and in the 'Bulletin'. The OCI has yet to publish this account. Lora himself in this account states:

'At the same time everybody thought—including we Marxists—that the arms would be given by the governing military team, which would consider that only through resting on the masses and giving them adequate fire-power could they at least neutralize the *gorila* right.'

Lora thus admits to what we had accused him of. Never really fighting to overthrow Torres, he had, along with the Stalinists, counted on one section of the bourgeoisie to arm the working class for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie as a whole! Lora thus was carrying out the very same policy he carried out with Pablo in 1952. At no point did he raise the slogan 'Down with Torres'. This was, of course, Lenin's policy in the 'April Theses', while Lora stands with Stalin and the 'old Bolsheviks'.

Even after the defeat, Lora is unable to draw any lessons at all. He openly defends his reformist position in the pages of the OCI's 'Informations Ouvrières':

'The ultra-lefts and the Pabloites forget the teachings of Lenin and Trotsky: they draw up their "documents" in a simple-minded way and place Torres and Ovando-Banzer on the same level. These people refuse to understand the various shades that bourgeois nationalism can take in underdeveloped countries.

'Since they are removed from the class struggle they do not understand the difference between bourgeois-democratic demands of Torres and the methods of the fascists; that is the difference between going to prison legally or getting killed by a bullet in the back of the neck.

'Revolutionary tactics must begin with this difference. It is not a question of supporting Torres, but of crushing fascism to impose a workers' government.'

Revolutionary strategy does not begin with the differences between left and right wings of the military, but from the perspective of the overthrow of the whole bourgeois order. It does not base its policy on a bloc with the left bourgeoisie against the fascist threat, but on the understanding that there is no way to stop fascism without taking up the independent struggle for socialism.

Thus lessons which Trotsky repeated thousands of times, particularly in regard to Spain, are once again borne out in the paralysis and complicity of Torres in the right-wing military takeover and in the prostration of the working class before this takeover because of the misleadership of all the workers' parties, but especially the POR which claimed to be Trotskyist.<sup>31</sup> In the end the workers of

31. Attention should be called to the fact that there are two PORs in Bolivia. They are so well known there that they are continually referred to in the press as the "POR of Lora" and the "POR of Gonzalez." The two organizations have gone through unifications and splits. The POR led by Hugo Gonzalez Moscoso is the Bolivian section of the Fourth International. During the Ovando and Torres regimes, when the political atmosphere in Bolivia was relatively relaxed, the POR of Gonzalez repeatedly called for arming of the workers and placing no confidence in the government, no matter how radical its demagoguery.

For a recent summary of the situation in Bolivia, see "Our Role in Battling Against the Military Coup" by Hugo Gonzalez M. in the November 1, 1971, issue of *Intercontinental Press*.

Gonzalez has been vilely slandered by Lora. The November 19, 1969, issue of *Informations Ouvrières* published a letter from Lora stating that "serious suspicions exist today" that

Bolivia got both the bullet in the head and the jail.

The policy of the POR was consistently opportunist from beginning to end. Under conditions of a mass revolutionary situation it acted as the left cover for Stalinism and bourgeois-nationalism. Nowhere did it decisively break from the CP. In fact it put forward a common candidate for the presidency of the Popular Assembly with the CP.

The policy of Lora had nothing whatsoever to do with the policy of Bolshevism, or Trotskyism. The construction of the Trotskyist movement in Latin America; as elsewhere, requires a decisive break with the narrow national outlook and a return to internationalism and the struggle to develop Marxist theory. The POR and Lora repeat the policies of the POUM in Spain in 1935-1938 and are in no fundamental way different from them. Their relations with Torres and the COB parallels those of the POUM with the Republican Government and the CNT.<sup>32</sup> The OCI's support for the POR now makes clear the political meaning of their bloc with the POUM at Essen.

## 7. The way forward

● The essence of the struggle of the International Committee since 1953, has been the conscious construction of independent revolutionary parties of the Fourth International. Revisionists have always attacked this fundamental conception. Pablo with his 'new reality', 'mass pressure' and 'the revolution in all its forms', the LSSP with its 'united left front'.

Now the OCI, using the formula, 'imminence of revolution', elaborating a schema of natural stages through which the working class passes on the road to power, distorting the tactic of united front of the working class, has taken the road of liquidationism laid down by these revisionists.

The split comes now, when the [they?] stand at the point of transition from one phase of the class struggle to a higher one, the stage in which Trotskyist parties are called upon to win leadership in the struggle for working-class power. In this transition it is inevitable that a decisive clash, and a split, becomes necessary with all those like the OCI who rejected the struggle for dialectical materialism and refused to break from the old propagandist con-

Gonzalez "is working in the pay of the Bolivian government."

This slander—in a slightly modified form—was repeated in the January 17, 1970, issue of *Workers Press*. (See "Healyites and Lambertists in Strange Company," in the March 2, 1970, issue of *Intercontinental Press*.)

To this day, neither the Healyites nor the Lambertists have retracted the slander, although the Healyites now profess to have known since 1952 that Lora was not to be trusted.—*J. H.*

32. "CNT." Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation of Labor). The rank and file of the CNT were exceptionally militant. However, the Anarchists were in control. Despite their opposition "in principle" to all forms of the state, the Anarchists ended up taking posts in the bourgeois government and thus helped pave the way for the triumph of Franco.

The POUM, seeking to avoid conflicts with the Anarchists, did not carry on any serious revolutionary work in the CNT. A fatal consequence of the policy of the POUM was the isolation of the revolutionary vanguard from the working class.—*J. H.*

ceptions. This hostility to theory always leads to centrism and opportunism.

The record shows clearly that on all the disputed questions, and above all on the importance of theoretical development and training, the Socialist Labour League and the IC majority tried patiently to correct the course of the OCI, and never proceeded precipitately or in such way as to provoke a split. The decision of the OCI to join the centrists at Essen against the International Committee and their manoeuvring and demagogy on Bolivia, constitute a decision to reject and oppose the struggle to build independent revolutionary parties of the Fourth International. We call upon all Trotskyists in every country to reject completely the OCI line and to fight on the principled positions of the International Committee.

The Fourth Conference of the International Committee will meet in the first weeks of 1972. There it will be necessary to make a balance-sheet of the struggle against revisionism and the fight to establish the Trotskyist cadre throughout the period since 1938. A new period opens up, a period in which the Fourth International is called upon to lead struggles for workers' power. The perspectives of this struggle in the advanced capitalist countries, in the colonial countries, and in the fight for the political revolution in E Europe, the Soviet Union and China, will be discussed and decided.

The draft resolution for this Conference is now complete, and the discussion now begins in all sections of the International Committee.

*WORKERS' LEAGUE, USA (sympathetic to the IC of the FI).*

*REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST LEAGUE OF CEYLON.*

*WORKERS INTERNATIONALIST LEAGUE OF GREECE.*

*LEAGUE FOR A WORKERS' VANGUARD OF IRELAND.*

*SOCIALIST LABOUR LEAGUE, BRITAIN.*

October 24, 1971.

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