

Prisons in Turmoil Over Attica

Censorship in Yugoslavia

**Brezhnev's Trip
to Belgrade**

**Fedayeen Debate
Response to Hussein**



BALAGUER: Terror is "counterproductive" when it causes publicity or threatens sugar quota. See p. 852.

Balaguer's Phony Attack on 'La Banda'

5,000,000 Strike in Argentina

The Lanusse government was rocked on September 28 and 29 by twenty-four-hour strikes involving nearly all of Argentina's 5,500,000 workers.

On September 28, more than 300,000 teachers shut down the bulk of Argentina's public elementary and secondary schools, as well as a sector of the private schools, after contract negotiations with the Ministry of Education became stalemated. A second, forty-eight-hour walkout was scheduled for October 6 and 7 unless the teachers' demands for educational reform and salary increases were met, according to an Associated Press report in the September 29 New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario*.

On September 29, nearly all of the country's industry and commerce was paralyzed by a general strike called by the Confederación General del Trabajo [CGT—General Confederation of Labor] to demand wage increases and the freeing of all political and trade-union prisoners, and to protest the government's inadequate economic measures against inflation.

The government labeled the strike "illegal" on September 28, twelve days after it had been called by CGT General Secretary José Rucci, who is a leader of the Peronist movement's "moderate" wing.

Labor Minister Rubens San Sebastián had previously (in a September 24 statement) attacked the strike for having "political" aims. When the CGT stoppage went off as scheduled, with 90 percent of all workers taking part, the Lanusse regime immediately announced reprisals against the labor federation. These consisted chiefly of confiscation of funds held by the CGT and individual unions.

Although the government ordered massive concentrations of police and troops onto the streets of Buenos Aires and other industrial centers on September 29, there were only "sporadic" incidents of violence, according to a United Press International dispatch published in the September 30 *El Diario*. In one instance, UPI reported, "Four passenger buses, which were operating despite the participation of transport workers in the strike, were burned." □

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Wide Protest of Attica Massacre

By David Withers

OCTOBER 3—In the aftermath of Attica, teach-ins, rallies, and demonstrations continue to be held throughout the country. On September 25, more than 5,000 Blacks in Brooklyn, New York, participated in a funeral service for six of the murdered prisoners. A similar number turned out in Detroit September 23 to protest both the Attica slayings and police attacks on Detroit's black community.

In Danbury, Connecticut, more than 2,000 persons rallied on October 2, while 300 inmates of the nearby federal prison held a memorial service for those slain at Attica.

The Attica events have had a deep impact in the prisons themselves. Actions by prisoners have occurred in areas as widely separated as Vermont, Texas, Illinois, and Virginia, as well as in other prisons in New York state. Two of the most important occurred at the Walpole and Norfolk prisons in Massachusetts, where prisoners staged four-day work strikes.

The strikes began on September 27 in protest over the state's parole laws and administrative procedures at the prisons. The prisoners refused to leave the yards and elected negotiating committees, which prison officials agreed to meet with in sessions open to the news media. In one such session at Walpole, held in the prison auditorium before several hundred enthusiastic inmates, prison leaders made appeals on television for "understanding from you people outside that we are human beings."

Prison officials, cognizant of the public outcry over the Attica massacre, granted several of the strikers' demands and offered to negotiate further if the strike were called off.

The prisoners finally agreed to end the strike. A spokesman for the inmates explained why:

"All we're saying by ending the strike is that we are giving the system a chance to demonstrate its honesty. We don't really trust you and you'll have to earn that trust by delivering on the promises you made to us."

On September 30, more than two

weeks after the police assault, the composition of a committee appointed by a panel of New York State judges to investigate the Attica events was finally announced. However, it was not clear just what powers this committee would have. In announcing its selection, the judges said that the burden was on Governor Rockefeller and Republican and Democratic leaders "to invest the committee with powers essential to its investigation and to enable it to function effectively," according to the October 1 *New York Times*.

The committee may have some difficulty in getting the prisoners' side of the story, to judge from the experiences of others who have tried to gain access to the prison.

Senator John Dunne, head of the state Senate Committee on Crime and Correction, who has a statutory right to enter all state prisons, was prevented from speaking to Attica inmates by State Correction Commissioner Russell Oswald. And a group of reporters are suing Oswald in an effort to gain the right to interview survivors of the September 13 assault.

More information on what actually took place during the storming of Attica and its aftermath is continuing to come to light, despite the obstacles created by the government. A letter from an Attica prisoner who didn't take part in the uprising but witnessed, from his cell, the retaking of the institution was published in the September 30 issue of the New York City weekly *Village Voice*. The prisoner described how some of the hostages died. Six of them had been brought up to the catwalk above the prisoners' courtyard, in an effort to prevent the imminent police charge:

"... there was a staccato of gunfire. In approximately five seconds the men on the catwalk were all down. One of the hostages started to crawl to the edge of the catwalk so he would be out of the gunfire—I watched him crawl and was hoping he would make it as he was wounded in the leg. He got about three feet and was shot

again which killed him."

The prisoner described how state troopers indiscriminately pumped shotgun fire from this catwalk into the prisoners below. He said he saw troopers, after they had gained control, make prisoners run barefoot in front of them while they beat them and shouted: "Gee, that's too bad—you fell down the stairs." "Run you motherfucker! Nigger!"

He told of widespread looting and destruction of the prisoners' belongings:

"Those involved or not lost all their legal materials, clothes, personal items and hobby materials. Nothing was saved for anybody. Legal books were destroyed. They didn't stop there—they continued to each block and even if the man wasn't involved they took everything. I saw guards taking musical instruments, electric shavers, and watches."

These charges were echoed by prisoners' relatives who visited the prison September 29. The *New York Times* reported September 30: "When they emerged [from the prison] many of the visitors told newsmen at the gate that their inmate relatives had said that guards had carried off prisoners' crucifixes and other possessions and had stomped and smashed their glasses and dentures. . . ."

"These charges elicited a written statement from Deputy Correction Commissioner Walter Dunbar in which he acknowledged that inmates' personal property had been pilfered and eyeglasses and false teeth had been taken away and broken."

On September 30, three alleged leaders of the rebellion—Frank Lott, Roger Champen, and Herbert X. Blyden—testified in court that guards had beaten them and repeatedly threatened their lives since the crushing of the revolt. Blyden added that one prison official had told him he was being saved for the electric chair.

Prisoners have also charged that at least one of their leaders, twenty-one-year-old Elliot Barkley, who went on national television to make an appeal for the inmates, was cold-bloodedly murdered after the troopers had regained control of the prison.

In the interests of "justice," the man who led the murderous assault on Attica, Captain Henry F. Williams, has been appointed head of the special police unit that is making the criminal investigations into the Attica

events. These investigations, wrote Eric Pace in the October 2 *New York Times*, "could theoretically lead to indictments of state troopers as well as prisoners." State Senator Samuel Greenburg described the appointment as "the investigated conducting the investigation."

A principal feature of the whole Attica affair has been the complete indifference of the state and prison au-

thorities to the families of the inmates. This was shown very clearly at the Brooklyn funeral for six of the slain prisoners. Frank Emerson reported in the September 30 *Village Voice* that the authorities had not even taken the trouble to identify the bodies properly. In fact only three of the bodies could be identified by relatives. He wrote: "The Attica inmates had been dehumanized in life, summarily exe-

cuted, and then dehumanized in death. Like a pound of soup bones, they were gathered and put into plastic bags and then carelessly mislabeled."

Emerson suggested a reason for the unidentified bodies: "By Sunday all of the unanswered questions had been neatly answered by the police. But even with all the careful explanations, black folks know that many more than 30 inmates died at Attica." □

Into Jail One Day and Out the Next

Balaguer Forced Into Token Action on 'La Banda'

By John Hanley

In response to exposures by the international press and growing protests from its own citizens, the government of the Dominican Republic has begun to take half-hearted steps to curb the previously unbridled wave of rightist terror afflicting the country.

In an unexpected address broadcast from the National Palace on the evening of September 10, President Joaquín Balaguer admitted for the first time the existence of the main terrorist group, known popularly as La Banda.*

Balaguer tacitly confirmed the close ties between the national police and La Banda. He announced the removal from the police force of a certain "Lieutenant Nuñez, a controversial figure whom the political opposition accuses of being the link between the police and La Banda," according to the version of the address printed September 11 in the Santo Domingo daily *El Caribe*.

Balaguer went on to proclaim that he was appointing a new attorney general to ensure a full-scale roundup and prosecution of those responsible for the killings and abductions perpetrated by La Banda.

* La Banda (literally "the band" or "the gang") is the label generally attached to the terrorist group headed by Rafael Pérez Martínez and known officially as the Democratic Reformist Anticommunist Youth (Juventud Democrática Reformista Anticomunista). The group's links to the government are even suggested by its name, as the Reformist party (Partido Reformista) is the party presently in power, headed by Balaguer.

In the days immediately following, several hundred alleged La Banda members were picked up by the police. Most were quietly released, however, within one to three days after their arrest.

Balaguer left no doubt as to the forces moving him to order these token measures. He referred early in his September 10 speech to articles appearing in the U.S. press, notably one written by A. Kent MacDougall that appeared in the September 7 *Wall Street Journal*. (See *Intercontinental Press*, September 20, p. 787, for a review of this and other U.S. press commentary published prior to Balaguer's "crackdown" against La Banda.)

While international correspondents were beginning to expose the political and economic crisis faced by the Balaguer regime, the U.S. Congress was in the midst of debate over the annual sugar import quota awarded to the Dominican Republic and other major producers. Balaguer referred directly to the quota debate early in his speech, and also to the Washington, D.C., demonstration called by the main opposition party, the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD—Dominican Revolutionary Party), for September 18. Balaguer was clearly upset at the prospect of a massive gathering of Dominicans at the U.S. Capitol protesting U.S. provision of advisers and equipment to the Dominican police.

The PRD demonstration was carried off as scheduled with some 2,000 re-

ported participants. But PRD leaders took pains to stress their support for Balaguer's efforts to gain renewal of the sugar quota. (The New York daily *El Diario* carried a United Press International dispatch on September 24 indicating that a joint Congressional committee was preparing to grant a slightly reduced quota of 634,874 tons for the following year.)

Public outrage over La Banda's terror campaign grew rapidly in July and August. Even the Catholic church denounced the atrocities and the failure of the government to halt them. In July, a military faction headed by General Neit Nivar Seijas had fourteen La Banda members rounded up in San Cristóbal, a town near Santo Domingo.

Balaguer immediately repudiated the arrests and transferred the local army commander, Colonel José Napoleón Pimentel Boves, to another garrison. The president declared on July 28 that "an army colonel" had no right "to exercise control over public order," according to the Santo Domingo weekly *Ahora!* of August 9.

Balaguer apparently preferred to leave token action against the terrorists to the head of the national police, Enrique Pérez y Pérez, who is widely believed to have been behind the organization of La Banda. The president lamented September 10 that the "tactic [of unleashing La Banda against the left] has been counterproductive."

The wave of terror has receded slightly, but its full force continues

to be felt by organizations of the far left. On the morning of September 22, uniformed police murdered Homero Hernández Peña, well-known leader of the Unión de Lucha por una Nueva Quisqueya (Union of Struggle for a New Quisqueya), after stopping the car in which he and his wife were riding.

Such acts contrast ironically with the reported treatment of La Banda members during their brief stay in police custody. According to an account in the September 27 *Ahora!*, "the judges presiding over hearings limited themselves to asking one or two questions like these:

"'Are you a member of La Banda?'

"'Have you committed any crime?'

"All that was needed was for them to deny it, and their arrest warrants would be declared suspended."

If Balaguer believed that public opinion would be pacified by such a farce, he was mistaken. As *Ahora!* observed, "The announced dissolution of La Banda is becoming . . . as scandalous as its creation." □

Yahya, Shah in 'Solidarity'

Yahya Khan has added the shah of Iran to his roster of allies in his genocidal war against Bangla Desh. The Pakistani military dictator spent September 14 in Teheran, where he conducted secret meetings with the shah.

A joint communique issued after the talks said that the shah had "expressed Iran's solidarity with Pakistan" and that the two countries would continue to support each other in matters of common interest.

The exact purpose of Yahya's trip was not disclosed, but Malcolm Browne reported in the September 16 *New York Times* that Pakistani newspapers cited "informed circles" as saying that Iran had become a "clearing house" for Yahya's diplomatic activity.

Browne wrote that it is believed in Pakistan that secret contacts between Yahya and the Indian government have been arranged in Teheran, with the aim of working out a deal to settle the conflict between them over the Bangla Desh refugees in India. □

But Try It as an Excuse for Not Paying . . .

The United States Internal Revenue Service has turned down a request that it provide a translation of income-tax rules for Spanish-speaking taxpayers. After English, Spanish is the most widely spoken language in the United States.

An official of the agency explained in a letter to a member of Congress that "practical difficulties" ruled out the idea.

New Zealand

Auckland Socialist in Mayoral Contest

The Socialist Action League has announced the candidacy of Mike Goodger for mayor of Auckland, New Zealand's largest city, in elections to be held this month. Goodger, a 22-year-old antiwar and socialist activist, is secretary of the Auckland Mobilization Committee, the broadly based coalition which organized the huge Auckland demonstrations in the New Zealand antiwar mobilizations April 30 and July 30 of this year. (See *Intercontinental Press*, May 24, p. 467; September 6, p. 744.)

The announcement of the socialist campaign gained national radio coverage, as well as coverage by local press and television.

Goodger's entry into the mayoralty race was prompted by the failure of the Labour party to put up its own candidate. Despite running for all other council positions, Labour is supporting the incumbent mayor, Sir Dove-Myer Robinson. Robinson, a

prominent Auckland businessman, is also supported by the Citizens and Ratepayers Association, a business group.

The September 10 issue of the revolutionary-socialist biweekly, *Socialist Action*, reported:

"'I think it is a great pity and a serious mistake that the Labour Party is not running a candidate,' said Goodger in an initial statement launching the campaign August 27. Labour's running for Mayor 'would complete the slate (for the City Council) and provide a focus for the Labour campaign,' he said, stressing that should Labour decide to put up a candidate, he would withdraw."

The Auckland University Young Socialist Club, a group of high school and university student activists, is supporting the campaign. With their help more than 15,000 leaflets and 5,000 posters will be distributed during the election campaign. □

Senate Votes to Cut Rhodesia Embargo

The United States Senate voted September 23 to permit the importation of chrome ore from Rhodesia in defiance of United Nations sanctions calling for an embargo on trade with Ian Smith's white minority government. The House of Representatives is expected to follow suit.

The Nixon administration, while nominally opposed to lifting the embargo, did not intervene, and the votes of Nixon supporters provided the majority.

Opponents of the embargo argued that it had made the United States dependent on the Soviet Union for its supplies of chrome, but other senators pointed out that the government's stockpile is 2,225,000 tons in excess of any conceivable demand. In fact, the Office of Emergency Planning is presently seeking authorization to sell 1,300,000 tons of chrome as surplus.

In the September 24 *New York Times*, John W. Finney described another factor in the Senate's decision: ". . . according to Congressional

sources, American companies with chrome interests in Rhodesia had been lobbying in Congress, particularly among the Southerners, for relief from the embargo.

"Among the most active companies, according to these sources, were the Union Carbide Corporation and the Foote Mineral Company of Exton, Pennsylvania. Both have chrome-producing affiliates or subsidiaries in Rhodesia." □

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Why Velasco Attacks Peruvian Peasant Movement

[The following interview took place September 21 in Mexico City between Agence France-Presse and the exiled Peruvian peasant leader Hugo Blanco. We have translated it from a transcript of the original Spanish.

* * *

Question. Trotsky determined that the revolutionary vanguard is to be made up of workers. Why, then, have you opted for the peasant struggle?

Answer. Leon Trotsky was in agreement with Lenin when Trotsky established in his theory of the permanent revolution that the peasant masses are the decisive force in the revolution in colonial and semicolonial countries. The role of the working class is to lead the revolutionary process.

Q. What objections do you have to the Peruvian agrarian reform? Don't you think it is the one best suited for your country? Why or why not?

A. The agrarian reform law was basically dictated by the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie and not by those of the peasantry. By impeding and repressing the mobilization of the peasant masses, the government leaves the bureaucracy under the exclusive pressure of the oligarchy, that is, the latifundists. As a result, not even this limited agrarian reform is being put into practice.

Q. Why do you call the present Peruvian regime "pseudo-anti-imperialist"?

A. To begin with I want to make it clear that this question relates to a portion of the interview I granted to *El Sol de México** in which, through either a printing error or misinterpretation of what I said, the journalist wrote, "To expose the pseudoimperialism of the government . . ." when it should have read, "To

expose the pseudo-anti-imperialism. . . ." By pseudo-anti-imperialism I mean that although General Velasco has had an impact on the interests of some U.S. monopolies, the present Peruvian military government is not fundamentally anti-imperialist.

Q. Are there conditions for armed struggle in Peru? If so, how do you assess them?

A. What do you mean by "armed struggle"? There is a wide range of actions considered to be armed struggle, and they go from tragic adventures of isolated groups all the way to mass insurrections such as in Russia in 1917. In Peru there are not yet conditions present for mass insurrection.

Q. You have spoken of repression of the peasants. Could you elaborate?

A. The military government has committed a terrible massacre of peasants in Huanta, Department of Ayacucho. There have been lesser killings. There are more than seventy peasant prisoners whose only crime is to have fought for their land, and to whom the amnesty law granted by the government is not being applied. The clause in the agrarian reform law that is being carried out most diligently is the one that characterizes any action by the peasants in defense of their rights as an offense of "sabotage against the agrarian reform."

Q. Do you have any qualifications to make concerning the interview published in El Sol de México? If so, what are they?

A. I mentioned one qualification in answer to your third question. I can also say that some of the statements contained in the interview published on September 21 might have been formulated better. But in general, what was published is a straightforward presentation of what was expressed in the interview involved.

Q. Is there repression in Peru against the left? Are there people in custody for this reason, and if so, how many?

A. There is repression against the mass movement and its leaders. There are many on the left who are supporting the government, thereby betraying the interests of the masses. Against this part of the left there is no repression. Hundreds are in prison due to the recent teachers' strike. There is also a group of missing persons who are said to have been deported at the same time that I was. Where are they? Are they dead or alive?

Q. Do you have any definite idea as to how long you will stay in Mexico?

A. You'll have to ask General Velasco.

Q. Does your exile signify the decapitation of Peru's peasant movement?

A. The growing and developing peasant movement cannot be decapitated by exiling one man. The movement is constantly producing its own leaders.

Q. Can't the stance of the Peruvian regime be viewed as a step towards the true liberation of Peru from imperialism? Why?

A. Peru won't be liberated by repressing the mass movement and its leaders, or by strengthening capitalism. Even if the Peruvian government were to secure a better position in relation to U.S. imperialism, this would not signify the liberation of the Peruvian masses.

Q. Wouldn't it have been more practical, from a political point of view, to have supported the Peruvian regime and to have forced it to take more radical positions?

A. To support the government would result in exactly the opposite

* For the text of this interview, see *Intercontinental Press*, October 4, p. 832.

of forcing it to take more radical positions. General Velasco understands this quite well, and this is what accounts for his giving posts to those who support his government.

Q. As you see it, to what extent does the military government have the true support of the people?

Troops? What Troops?

Bandaranaike to Continue Aiding Yahya

In a note issued September 17 by the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, the Ceylon "United Front" government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike admitted that Yahya Khan's planes have been using Ceylonese facilities for the past seven months. Ceylon's airports will continue to be open to West Pakistan, even though it has become clear that Ceylon stopovers have been essential for Yahya's pre-March military buildup and subsequent war against Bangla Desh.

The admission came in the form of an answer to an editorial appearing September 14 in the Calcutta *Hindustan Standard*. Commenting on the recent visit of Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh to Ceylon, the *Standard* accused the Ceylon government of having "a blind spot" on the question of Bangla Desh. It described Bandaranaike's policy of "noninterference" in the affairs of Pakistan as a "farce."

Although the editorial was not an official Indian government statement, Bandaranaike was apparently sufficiently disturbed by it to offer a ministry-level response.

The text of that response was published September 23 in the weekly *Ceylon News*. "It is Ceylon's view," the ministry said, "that the main constitutional issue with regard to East Pakistan is an internal matter of that country. . . . The Ministry does not need to stress that one of the norms of international life is that of noninterference in the internal affairs of States."

Defending itself against charges that it helped Yahya transport troops to Bangla Desh, the ministry wrote:

"The use of facilities in Ceylon by Pakistan aircraft for transit purposes started from the time of the ban of

A. At the beginning the Velasco government created illusions among the masses. These illusions are diminishing. The masses are finding out through their own experience about the regime's limitations and demagoguery. This is the only explanation for the government's feeling forced to repress the mass movements. □

overflights over India [in February] by the Government of India, which was long before the actual outbreak of disturbances in East Pakistan. This action flows logically from Ceylon's context of friendly relations with Pakistan. Such flights were allowed on the basis of a declaration by the Government of Pakistan in each case that they did not carry military personnel or equipment and besides independent measures were taken by the Government of Ceylon to satisfy itself about these facts. Statistics and facts regarding these flights are already known to the Indian authorities.

"Besides, the facilities extended to Pakistan flights were those which are granted to aircraft of friendly countries. If the flights had been disallowed by Ceylon, it would have been tantamount to contesting the right of Pakistan to communicate between parts of its own territory."

The statement is revealing on a number of counts. Despite the genocidal war conducted against an oppressed nationality, Pakistan remains a "friendly" country. Despite the heroic resistance of the Bengali people in their struggle for independence, Bangla Desh is still regarded by the Bandaranaike government as part of Pakistan.

But the claim that only civilians were aboard the Pakistani aircraft that utilized Ceylon transport facilities is the most incredible one in the ministry's pronouncement.

When the war started it was widely reported in the Western press that Pakistani troop-carrying aircraft were stopping in Ceylon to refuel while en route to Bangla Desh.

Yahya's occupying army was supplied almost exclusively by air trans-

port. The May 1 *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported that Yahya airfreighted an average of fifty tons of vital supplies per day to his troops in East Bengal. "Eight C-130 transport planes have done twice their maximum permissible flying hours in the early weeks of the fighting and will now have to be grounded for servicing. Nine commercial Boeings have also been engaged in the airlift."

Sydney Schanberg reported in the March 29 *New York Times*: "Another problem for the West Pakistanis is the fact that all flights must take the long 2,800-mile route by way of Ceylon."

In the April 4 *New York Times*, he wrote that without the transport assistance from Ceylon, troops and supplies would have to be brought by sea.

James P. Sterba wrote in the April 2 *New York Times*, "Despite Ceylonese denials, officials here [Calcutta] insist that American made C-130's from West Pakistan were flying troops and arms into East Pakistan at the rate of five or six planeloads a day, refueling in Ceylon."

The Ceylonese denials of these reports, it now appears, are justified by Yahya's "declaration" that all Pakistani planes using Ceylon's facilities were carrying only civilians. And in case anybody thinks that Yahya sometimes doesn't tell the truth, Bandaranaike's ministries conducted "independent" investigations to check his story.

Perhaps the results of the "independent" checks were influenced by the fact that Yahya was equally solicitous of Bandaranaike during the latter's military attack on rebel youth in her own country. The April 24 *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported that "military sources [in Colombo] claimed the nation's force of light aircraft had been bolstered by a clutch of Indian and Pakistani owned and manned helicopters for combat missions against the terrorists." □

For Health, Avoid Exercise

Athletes at a dozen different high schools in New Jersey became sick during practice drills September 16. Symptoms included dizziness, nausea, and chest pains. Health officials figured out that the illness was caused by polluted air. The state's top air pollution control officer said later that pollution levels that day had been "nowhere near those levels" that frequently cause cancellation of physical education programs in California.

Fedayeen Debate Response to Hussein's Attacks

By Jon Rothschild

"Arafat, we know neither your father nor your mother; you reveal nothing but your head and hidden eyes. . . . You have the nose and ears of a Jew."

Printed in *Al-Aksa*, one of Jordan's army newspapers, that sentence is a sample of the ideological level of the campaign King Hussein has been waging against the Palestinian resistance movement.

The monarchy's propaganda machine, backed by its U.S.-supplied military apparatus, hopes through this offensive to finalize the elimination of the resistance from Jordanian soil.

In the September 20-October 3 issue of the radical biweekly *AfricAsia*, Anwar Khaled described some aspects of that offensive.

The regime has distributed 100,000 copies of the Koran; special government propaganda papers have been launched; each night, on television, "fedayeen" repent their opposition to the Hashemite king ("Our [commando] leaders asked us to act against nature . . ."); fantastic lies about the fedayeen are propagated—that the commandos killed Jordanian soldiers and carved their bodies into pieces, that forty Chinese women, "pleasure servants" of the Palestinian leaders, were found in the forest near Jerash.

Hussein has created a civilian militia, called "popular resistance." Recruited mostly from Bedouin tribes and well paid by Jordanian standards, its job is to denounce, or summarily execute, fedayeen.

Commandos are killed regularly by the army. Prime Minister Wasfi Tal boasted that even during a pan-Arab meeting to discuss Hussein's anti-Palestinian campaign, four fedayeen were hanged—to show that the regime could not be influenced by outside pressure.

The Hashemite offensive coincided with Hussein's creation of the "Jordanian National Union," a political party patterned after Nasser's Arab Socialist Union. The JNU is now the sole legal political formation in the country.

According to Khaled, small groups of fedayeen still function, apparently without central coordination, in the mountains northwest of Amman. Many commandos have returned to their families, hiding their arms and waiting for the situation to improve.

On August 13, in the midst of Hussein's campaign, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt proposed that representatives of the Palestinian organizations and the Jordanian government meet in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, to negotiate a "reconciliation."

King Faisal and President Anwar el-Sadat produced a position paper explaining their ideas on the terms of a settlement. A "mediating committee" composed of Omar Saqqaf, Arabian minister of foreign affairs, and Hassan Sabri Kholy of Egypt was created.

These regimes, neither of which did anything to aid the fedayeen during the 1970 Jordanian civil war or during the July 1971 Jordanian military offensive, had become embarrassed by the openness of Hussein's most recent assaults. Through the conference they hoped to pressure the fedayeen into definitively accepting Hussein's rule so that the Palestinians could be contained and a "peaceful" settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict could be negotiated.

The Jidda conference proposal precipitated the most serious public disagreement to date in the Palestinian revolutionary movement.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPF), organizations that call for the overthrow of Hussein, denounced the proposal.

Fateh, still the largest of the resistance groups, was initially noncommittal.

Finally, a September 7 meeting of the executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO—a united front of the major groups) voted seven to three to send a delegation to Jidda "to discuss, with the

parties concerned, means of implementing the Saudi-Egyptian working paper based on the Cairo and Amman agreements, with no concession on anything the resistance has gained from those agreements."

(The Cairo-Amman accords ended the 1970 civil war. They accorded the commandos freedom of action in certain areas of Jordan, called upon Hussein to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, and stipulated that the fedayeen withdraw from all cities, acknowledging the legitimacy of Hussein's government. The agreements were soon violated by Hussein.)

Three Fateh representatives, two from Saiqa (the Syrian-supported group), the delegate of the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front, and one independent voted in favor of sending a delegation to Jidda. Two representatives of the PFLP and one independent opposed the resolution. The DPF delegate was absent from the meeting, as were two independents.

The day after the vote the divisions in the movement became public when the PFLP held a Beirut press conference denouncing the decision of the executive committee.

In an official statement, the PFLP characterized the attitude of the committee as "vacillating" and "cowardly." The statement said, in part:

"The mediation has no logical aim except to subject the resistance to the authority of the regimes which are collaborating for surrender, and thus to associate it with the extinction of the Palestinian people's cause and obtain, directly or indirectly, 'a Palestinian justification' for the humiliating surrender which these regimes are jointly preparing. . . .

"We consider the contradiction between ourselves and this regime to be vital, requiring decisiveness rather than mediation and compromise. If the resistance is unable to overthrow this regime now, this does not mean, or justify, compromise and negotiation with it. In this context

there is a strong fear that compromise with this regime, which we all agree is a main enemy, will be the thin end of the wedge for negotiating with America and Israel through similar mediation. . . .

"In this very serious manner, the Popular Front announces its definite rejection of this mediation on principle, condemns the acceptance of it and holds those who accept it responsible before the resistance's rank and file and the masses for the consequences of this dangerous step."

On September 16 the Democratic Popular Front distributed an official statement also denouncing the conference.

According to the September 17 Beirut *Daily Star*, the DPF reiterated its call for the overthrow of Hussein:

"In order to be able to mobilize its forces against the enemy, the revolution must first use Jordan as its main base, and this calls for expelling the reactionary regime from the East Bank of the Jordan through armed resistance. . . ."

The DPF said it was a "terrible coincidence today when a resistance delegation in Jidda sits with those who shed the blood of our people—King Hussein's envoys—while the blood of the people and the resistance is still being shed in Jordan and thousands are held in the Jordanian regime's prisons and detention camps."

The statement pointed out that on the eve of the conference Hussein executed two commandos as a "gift" to the conference. It also noted that the PLO executive committee itself had passed a motion August 14, 1971, "rejecting negotiations with the government of Wasfi Tal [Hussein's prime minister]."

The powerful Federation of Palestinian Students, thought to be under the leadership of Fateh, also opposed attending the conference.

On September 15, according to the September 16 Beirut daily *L'Orient-Le Jour*, several hundred Palestinians participated in demonstrations organized by the PFLP in refugee camps in Lebanon. The demonstrators chanted slogans denouncing both the Hussein regime and the Jidda negotiations.

The actual convening of the conference was repeatedly delayed. On September 9, Arafat objected to the composition of the Jordanian delegation, which included three military

men, one of whom masterminded the 1970 assault on the Palestinians. The Jordanians, objecting to two recent fedayeen guerrilla actions, threatened to withdraw from the conference.

Finally, on September 14, after much prodding by the Arabian and Egyptian governments, the commando delegation arrived in Jidda.

Composed of two Fateh representatives, one from Saiqa, one from the Palestine Liberation Army, and one independent, it was headed by Khaled Hassan, the leader of the seemingly dominant pro-Saudi Arabian wing of Fateh.

The convening of the conference was again postponed, while each delegation met separately with the mediating committee. On September 21 the first actual session took place.

After all the hue and cry surrounding it, the conference apparently produced virtually no agreement. The fedayeen insisted that the Cairo-Amman accords be implemented. The Jordanians wanted to negotiate a new settlement.

The delegations met only three times, and on September 24 the Jordanians returned to Amman. Each side accused the other of bad faith.

The October 1 *New York Times* reported that King Faisal met with Arafat in Beirut on September 30 to discuss further efforts at "reconciliation."

It seems highly unlikely that negotiations between the fedayeen and Hussein can produce any agreement. Because of his current position of dominance, the king has refused to grant any concessions.

His attitude increases the importance of the question of the movement's attitude toward the Hashemite regime.

Those forces who supported the conference favor continuance of the old policy of "noninterference" in the affairs of the Jordanian government, as long as Hussein allows them to conduct raids against Israel.

Those who opposed the conference did so on the basis that a central goal of the Palestinian struggle must be the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy. The division over whether or not to attend the Jidda conference was a reflection of this deeper difference.

L'Orient-Le Jour reported September 20 that a meeting had been held September 18 in Baghdad, Iraq, for the purpose of creating a new Jordanian-

Palestinian front aimed at overthrowing Hussein and continuing the armed struggle against Israel. The meeting denounced the attitude of the PLO executive committee toward the Jidda talks.

Attending were representatives of the PFLP, the DPF, Fateh, and the Arab Liberation Front.

Since the latter two groups officially supported participation in the Jidda conference, it appears that the political disagreements among the fedayeen cross organizational lines.

L'Orient-Le Jour's report did not make clear whether the groups represented in Baghdad intended to set up another united front in competition with the PLO. □

Exiled Peruvians Reported in Madrid

Five leaders of striking Peruvian teachers, who were included with the revolutionist Hugo Blanco on a list of "subversives" deported from their native country, arrived in Madrid on September 17, according to an Agence France-Presse dispatch in the September 21 issue of the Lima daily *El Comercio*. The student leader Rolando Breña Pantoja was on the same plane.

Professor Julio Pedro Armacanqui Flores, general secretary of the FENEP [Federación Nacional de Educadores del Perú—Peruvian National Federation of Teachers], told the AFP reporter that he expected his stay in Spain to be "temporary."

Armacanqui said also that he had met the student leader Breña Pantoja for the first time in the plane on which the Peruvian authorities put him, together with his four union associates: Arturo Sánchez Vicente (representative of the second Lima region of FENEP), Ugo Lipa Kina (seventh Puno region), Arnaldo Paredes Arce (fourth Arequipa region), and Ulises Riva Oyarce (sixth Iquitos region).

The AFP dispatch did not say whether Armacanqui offered any opinion about why Hugo Blanco alone was sent to Mexico. Nor did it report the union leader's opinion of the way in which he and his colleagues were sent into indefinite exile at the whim of the "revolutionary" military dictatorship. □

Shift to Left in Danish Election

Copenhagen

The elections to the Danish parliament, the Folketing, on September 22 showed a leftward trend. The Social Democratic party got 37.4% of the vote as against 34.2% in the 1968 elections. The Socialistisk Folkeparti [Socialist People's party, an originally left Social Democratic party moving further and further to the right] got 9.1% as against 6.1% in the previous elections. These gains for the reformist workers' parties marked the voters' reaction to the more frankly antiworking-class policies of the bourgeois coalition government in administering a declining capitalist system. The three big bourgeois parties received only 46.7% of the vote as against 54% in the previous elections.

The large gains for the Socialistisk Folkeparti, which was the first of a long series of "new left" parties established in many European countries in the late fifties and early sixties, was not due to any exceptional program. To the contrary, under the leadership of the veteran Stalinist Aksel Larsen, this party degenerated very rapidly into pure reformism, becoming scarcely indistinguishable from the Social Democracy.

The only exception to the party's drab opportunism has been its position on the very timely question of Denmark joining the Common Market. Although the majority of rank-and-file workers strongly oppose Common Market membership, the leadership of the Social Democratic party advocates it. Thus, the Socialistisk Folkeparti's position on this question was probably the reason for its gains, although it produced only nationalist arguments to support its stand.

The pro-Moscow Stalinist Communist party increased its vote slightly from 1% in 1968 to 1.4%. This gain, however, was not sufficient to secure any seats in parliament. A minimum of 2% of the vote is required for parliamentary representation. Thus, the CP had to give up the one seat it had, which was held by Hanne Reintoft, originally elected on the ticket of VS [Venstresocialisterne—the Left Socialists].

This last party is the most interest-

ing among the Danish workers' parties. It represents something unique in Europe, an arena for the left run by the left, which has a certain influence primarily among students and other youth. The Venstresocialisterne arose out of a split from the Socialistisk Folkeparti in 1967 and soon broke up into a series of antagonistic factions—centrists, anarchists, Maoists, old Stalinists, and Trotskyists. After a short period in the party, the Maoists left to found their own organization, which is completely without influence. A smaller group went back to the DKP [Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti—The Communist party of Denmark], while a third sought for a time to maintain a group around another of the party's representatives in parliament, the ex-Stalinist Kai Moltke. In 1971, the Trotskyists left, taking with them the party's youth organization, the SUF [Socialistisk Ungdoms Forum—Socialist Youth Forum], which today is associated with the Fourth International. Remaining in the Venstresocialisterne are a group around the old leaders from the SF days, a rather confused group of anarchists, and a Leninist wing, which has not yet gone over completely to Trotskyism.

Despite everything, the Venstresocialisterne's election campaign had many positive aspects. Time after time, they stressed that they were not participating in the elections because they harbored any illusions about achieving socialism by parliamentary means. They were taking part in the elections, they said, in order to take advantage of this opportunity also to present their views. And that is what they did in their campaign. On television, they exposed the mechanisms of capitalist exploitation in an incisive and hard-hitting way, arguing effectively also for the right to strike and for extraparliamentary actions in general.

The VS's campaign showed clearly how far the party as a whole has moved away from its centrist origins. On the decisive question of its attitude to the capitalist state, it demonstrated in practice that it is entitled to call itself revolutionary. But the VS's cri-

tique of capitalism was not followed up by any proposals on how to go about abolishing it. The party's fatal lack is that its heterogeneous composition prevents it from developing a program, based on relevant transitional demands, which can show the workers the way out of their difficulties.

Many workers may have felt that the VS was correct in its criticism of capitalism and parliamentary cretinism. But at the same time, they did not see the party offering any realistic solution. So, the VS did not manage to top the 2% minimum for representation in parliament. Its total vote fell from 2% to 1.6%, and it lost the two seats it originally had.

The VS's loss of its seats in parliament probably means the beginning of the end of the party in its present form. Its influence, which was largely based on having two effective debaters in the Folketing, will decline decisively, making the VS less attractive to centrists. In the discussions over the organization's failure, the Leninist wing seems likely to increase its strength, because it is the only current that can offer a reasonable explanation of this development. And such an evolution in the VS should improve the opportunities for the Trotskyists in their campaign to create an authentically revolutionary party in Denmark.

The Danish Trotskyists, organized in the SUF, did not participate in the elections. They took advantage of the extensive discussion on the Common Market to propagandize for the revolutionary solution to the European problem, for a Socialist United States of Europe. To make perfectly clear what they meant by this, they held collections at many polling places on behalf of the striking workers in Upper Clyde in Scotland. □

Shell Oil to Ceylon

The S.S. *Hycromia*, a tanker owned by the Shell Oil Company, arrived in Ceylon September 14 with 20,000 tons of petroleum products for the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, whose major refinery has been closed since August 31 by a strike of operators. (See *Intercontinental Press*, September 27, p. 815.)

The tanker, en route from Kuwait to Singapore, was diverted to Colombo at the request of the Ceylon corporation.

National Front Lists Arrests in Iran

In a communiqué issued in Beirut September 19, the Middle East section of the Iranian National Front reported the names of some of its members who have been arrested and tortured in the shah's latest wave of repression. (See *Intercontinental Press*, October 4, p. 831.)

The communiqué provided the following list of those arrested:

Saeed Mohsen, engineer, class of 1962, Teheran University; systems analyst in the Ministry of the Interior.

Parviz Yagoubi, director, Aramgah branch of the Export Bank.

Mehdi Firouzian, engineer, class of 1963, Sanati College of Teheran; city planner of Teheran municipality.

Ali Bakeri, engineer, class of 1966, Teheran University; assistant at the Technical College of Aria Mehr.

Reza Bakeri, engineering student, Teheran University.

Bahman Bazergani, engineer, graduate of the School of Architecture, Teheran University; employee of the Ministry of Finance.

Mohammad Bazergani, graduate of the School of Business Administration; brother of Bahman Bazergani.

Mansur Bazargan, graduate of Mashhad University; teacher at Saveh high school.

Mahmoud Asgari, graduate of the School of Business Administration; former employee of Mashin-sazi factory in Tabriz.

Naser Sadeg, engineer, class of 1966, Teheran University; employed in the electrical industry in the Farse region.

Masoud Rajavi, graduate in political science from Teheran University.

Fathollah Arzhange-khamnei, architectural student, School of Fine Arts.

Houshang Arzhange-khamnei, student in the College of Economics, Teheran University; brother of Fathollah.

Samad Sajedian, engineer, graduated from the Technical College of Teheran University in 1966.

Reza Rezai, student in the School of Dentistry, Teheran University.

Ibrahim Johari, engineer, graduate of the Technical College of Teheran University.

Ahmad Heifnejad, student in the College of Literature, Tabriz University.

Musa Amir-oglu Khiabani, student of physics in the College of Sciences, Teheran University.

Kazem Shafieeha, student of geology in the College of Sciences, Teheran University.

Mohammad Akbari, engineer, graduate of the Technical College, Teheran University.

Ali Rahi, engineer, Teheran.

Mohammad Ali Rahmani, graduate of the School of Agriculture, Teheran University.

Ibrahim Davar, student in the College of Economics, Teheran University.

Mohammad-Tagi Shahram, graduate in mathematics, College of Sci-

ences, Teheran University.

Mohammad Sadeg, student of physics, Arya Mehr University, Teheran.

Hussein Khosroshahi, graduate in physics from the College of Sciences, Teheran University.

Mostafa Malaieri, student at Arya Mehr University.

Mohammad-Reza Khonsari, student at Arya Mehr University.

Habib Mokrem-douste-delkha, engineer, graduate of the Technical College of Teheran University.

In addition, the communiqué said that several persons not members of the front had been arrested because of their friendship with members of the group. They included Mohammad Milani and Ahmad Tabatabai, both doctors at Pahlavi Hospital. □

As Nixon Plans 'Prestige Boost' for Colonels

Amalia Fleming Sentenced to Greek Prison

A Greek military court on September 28 sentenced Amalia Fleming to sixteen months in prison for allegedly conspiring to free Alexander Panagoulis, who is serving a life sentence after being convicted in 1968 of attempting to assassinate Premier George Papadopoulos.

Fleming, who suffers from diabetes, was arrested with other alleged conspirators on September 1. (See *Intercontinental Press*, September 13, p. 771.)

The other defendants and their sentences were: Constantine Androutsopoulos, a lawyer, fifteen months; Athina Psychoghiou, reported to hold dual U.S.-Greek citizenship, fourteen months; Constantine Bekakos, a soldier who once guarded Panagoulis, thirteen months; and John Skelton, an American theology student, whose seven-month sentence was suspended.

The *New York Times* of September 28 reported that Fleming had admitted helping to plan an attempt to free Panagoulis because of concern that he was being tortured in prison. However, the September 30 issue of *Le Monde* quoted her as saying:

"I did not plead guilty. I simply affirmed that I would have liked to see Panagoulis set free because of all he has suffered. . . ."

Skelton was reported to be planning to leave Greece as soon as possible, and it was expected that Fleming, and perhaps Psychoghiou, would have their sentences suspended on condition that they too leave the country.

Fleming, however, told reporters, "I will not accept deportation. . . . If I leave, they will take away my Greek citizenship. I am a Greek and I intend to stay."

If the arrest and sentencing of Amalia Fleming were something of an embarrassment to the military dictatorship, they did not bother the Nixon administration at all. The same day that the sentences were handed down, it was announced in Washington that Vice President Spiro Agnew would visit Greece near the end of October.

This move, the *New York Times* observed in an October 1 editorial, ". . . will give the military dictatorship there the biggest prestige boost it has enjoyed since it seized power in 1967."

Commenting on the alleged escape plan, the editorial concluded:

"Before embracing the colonels, Mr. Agnew might wish to consider what kind of conditions in Greece would drive a 62-year-old woman suffering from acute diabetes to participate in such a desperate venture." □

Nine Youths Accused of Guerrilla Activities

"An American Organizes Guerrilla Groups Here," the Mexico City daily *El Universal* wrote in scare headlines September 18, announcing the discovery of a new "subversive plot." Featured with the sensationalistic news were photographs of three young women and six young men, all obviously Mexican and looking anything but sinister.

The nine were listed as Juan Francisco Ramírez Estrada, alias "Iván"; Auroro González Meza, alias "Ruth"; Jerónimo Martínez Díaz, alias "David"; Macrina Cárdenas Montaña, "Cristina"; Enrique Téllez Pacheco, "Jorge"; María de Jesús Méndez Alvarado, "Rita"; Gladys Guadalupe López Hernández, "Marta Pérez López"; Roque Reyes García, "Ramiro"; and Antonio García González, "Juan." Seven reportedly confessed to being members of a group called Comandos Armados del Pueblo [CAP—Armed Commandos of the People]. One, Enrique Téllez Pacheco, allegedly declared himself a member of the MAR [Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria—Revolutionary Action Movement]. And Guadalupe López denied being a member of either group.

The inside pages of the September 18 *El Universal* showed the type of pictures that have become customary in such cases, photographs of captured "guerrilla equipment." But this time there was no imposing display of weapons, only a few pistols.

An innovation in this type of photographic art was a picture of an attractive young woman wearing dark glasses and a cap set at a rakish angle. The caption said: "'This is how I disguised myself for the robberies,' María de Jesús declared."

The September 18 issue of *El Sol de México*, another daily published in the Mexican capital, offered a color photograph of the "guerrilla equipment," showing very clearly several gunny sacks, caps, and a Halloween-type mask, which looked rather like the American television marionette Howdy Doody.

The American behind the guerrilla plot, *El Universal* wrote, was a reporter for an unspecified Los Angeles publication and his name was "Dick

Haillan." The moderate progovernment daily *El Día* gave the name of the man in question, rather more probably, as "Hayland." *El Día* quoted one of the captured "guerrillas," María de Jesús, as saying that "she also never trusted Pablo Alvarado, as well as a Peruvian, and the American Dick Hayland, believing him to be a CIA agent."

The captured youths stressed the loose organization of their group, as well as the "incipient" character of their operations. The September 20 issue of *El Universal* quoted Jerónimo Martínez Díaz as saying: "It was in February and March of this year when we got together because we thought that the people were oppressed by terrible poverty. We believe that the only road is armed struggle. When the people have tried to exercise their rights, those in power have responded with violence. The people must take that into account in organizing. They must confront the armed force of the oppressors with the armed force of the people."

Martínez said that they had hoped eventually to combine their struggle with that of the other guerrilla groups, the MAR and the guerrillas in the state of Guerrero, allegedly led by Genaro Vázquez Rojas. "The norm governing the organization," he said, "was that all members of the CAP had full rights to participate actively in decision-making. Power was in the hands of all together and we had no leader."

He went on: "We are a group of beginners who are just starting to apply revolutionary tactics. As regards General Genaro Vázquez Rojas, we had nothing in common with him but our ideological objectives."

Martínez said that the police "wanted at all cost to link us with Genaro Vázquez Rojas, despite the fact that we expressed our opposition to him in a document. We do not favor building a mass organization but autonomous commando groups of seven to ten persons, which can maintain full freedom of movement and stand up better against the regime."

El Universal's reporter Eduardo Téllez Vargas tried in his September 18

article to discredit the young revolutionists as elitists: "Roque Reyes García tried to give a lecture on the need for establishing a Communist regime in Mexico. He went on and on, talking for five minutes. At the end, he was asked:

"'Did the Mexican people authorize you to represent them?'

"'Obviously not, but we are the people and we did the right thing.'

"'Did the people in general approve of your criminal acts in raiding banks, shops, drugstores, etc.?'"

"'We don't think so, but that is because they didn't know what we are aiming at. The people have been deceived and we want to wake them up.'"

The youths said that they had not attempted any large-scale actions, according to the September 18 *El Sol de México*, which quoted them as saying: "Our techniques were in an early stage of development and we did not dare take on anything like that."

Most of the Mexico City papers reported at great length on allegations of guerrilla "networks," collection of arms, etc. But few details were given on the violent acts for which the youths had allegedly been arrested. The September 18 *El Sol* did give some concrete information on this. It quoted María de Jesús Méndez Alvarado as saying: "We [she and "Ivan"] have just gotten married—on August 28. I participated in three actions. The raid on the shoe store, the drugstore, and the bakery."

The testimony of the nine youths on their "contacts," etc., varied. But they all agreed about the treatment they had received from the police. "Both men and women, frightened by the prospect of the long prison terms awaiting them, have begun to talk about 'brutal tortures,'" the conservative paper *El Universal* wrote September 18.

Despite such sneers, it seemed clear from the report in *El Día* of September 18 that the youths faced their questioners with considerable courage. "If only we were like the Tupamaros," one was quoted as saying. "They are well organized and strong." Another said: "In prison we will have time to think about new tactics of armed struggle." □

He Expects to Star in It

One of Nguyen Van Thieu's favorite entertainments, according to the October 3 *New York Times*, is watching an American television program called "Mission Impossible."

Brezhnev Denies 'Brezhnev Doctrine'

Four days of talks between Soviet Communist party boss Leonid Brezhnev and President Tito of Yugoslavia concluded September 25 with a communiqué acknowledging—at least in words—the right of the Yugoslav party to choose its own method of "building socialism."

"The methods of building socialism," the declaration said, "which express the experiences and characteristics of development in various countries, are the affair of the people and working class of these countries and should not conflict with each other."

The communiqué also reaffirmed the "principles expressed in the Belgrade Declaration of 1955." That document, signed by Tito and Nikita Khrushchev, stated that "questions of internal reorganization or differences of social systems and of different forms of Socialist development are solely the concern of the individual countries."

These verbal concessions represented the price the Kremlin bureaucracy was willing to pay in order to accomplish two goals—the calling of a "European security conference" and the undercutting of expanded Chinese diplomatic influence in the Balkans.

On the first point, a Yugoslav observer quoted by Alfred Friendly Jr. in



David, in Direct From Cuba

BREZHNEV: Undisturbed by "slanderous publications" produced in Moscow.

the September 23 *New York Times* commented: "You cannot have détente in Europe and war in the Balkans." The second was symbolized by the absence of Chinese diplomats at the September 22 reception for Brezhnev.

Brezhnev chose the latter occasion to attempt to quiet Yugoslav fears that "normalization" of relations between the two countries might be accomplished in a manner similar to that used in Czechoslovakia. The Kremlin's top bureaucrat did not renounce the infamous "Brezhnev doctrine," which was the Soviet bureaucracy's ideological defense of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Instead, Brezhnev denied that his sole contribution to socialist theory even existed.

"We both know well," he said, "that in the world different forces exist which want to hinder such [improved] development of our relations and which strive to deepen all the differences and endeavor in this or that way to divide us.

"They let circulate a so-called new doctrine of limited sovereignty, spread rumors of Soviet armies which alleg-

edly are prepared to move into the Balkans and many other fairy tales. They assert that Yugoslavia is allegedly a gray zone, and that she allegedly goes to the West and so on. I think we should not take time to deny all these slanderous publications. . . ."

If one had nothing to judge from except Brezhnev's speech, the invasion of Czechoslovakia would have to be dismissed as the invention of provocateurs. As for those "slanderous publications," Brezhnev did well not to list any by name. In the dispatch quoted above, Friendly described a publication that it could have been quite embarrassing to mention.

This was a book published in Moscow this summer, written by Sergei Trapeznikov, head of the Soviet Communist party Central Committee's department of science and higher education.


"Writing about Yugoslavia, the author called it 'a right-revisionist bridgehead established by world imperialism within the Socialist camp.' He also blamed Yugoslavia for 'disruptive activity' in Hungary and Czechoslovakia."

A polite host, Tito appears not to have mentioned Trapeznikov's book, which presumably falls outside the communiqué's pledge that press, radio, and television in the two countries will devote themselves to "strengthening mutual respect and friendship" by means of "objective and well-intentioned" reporting.

This point alone may have made the declaration an overall gain for the Kremlin bureaucrats. While their vaguely worded promise to respect Yugoslav independence is as reliable as Brezhnev's public memory of the Czechoslovakia invasion, Tito has already moved to comply with the pledge on the press. Even before Brezhnev's arrival in Belgrade, the Tito government had banned several publications for taking too hostile an attitude toward the Soviet bureaucrats.

War Is Hell, But Peace Is Expensive

A September 15 bombing of a Saigon nightclub was described by cops as a National Liberation Front "terrorist" attack. But the *New York Times* reported that many people said the bomb was set by South Vietnamese soldiers because the joint's proprietor missed his protection payment.



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A 'Hot Autumn' in Store for Tito?

By C. Malagnou

On Monday, August 23, the issue dated August 24 of the Belgrade university paper *Student* was banned by a court in the Yugoslav capital. Tanjug [the Yugoslav press agency] announced that the ban was imposed in response to the "dissemination of false reports and statements apt to provoke unrest among citizens."

Customarily, *Student* is not published during the vacation period. Its editorial board decided to put out a special issue as a result of a series of administrative measures taken against several publications and a film. Published in advance of the official date, August 24, the paper got a fairly broad circulation. Since precensorship does not exist in Yugoslavia, the judicial authorities as a general rule cannot move against a publication until it has come off the presses.

Since its editors were certain that such a measure would be taken, they had the words "Banned Special Issue" superimposed over the title.

The context of the issue explains the dramatic title. It is in fact entirely

devoted to publications recently banned; the editorial, moreover, was headed "Facing a Prolonged Period of Censorship."

Among the publications banned was first of all issue number 3/4 of the magazine *Praxis*, published in Zagreb by dissident philosophers.¹ This issue contained an article by Milan Kangrga on what the author called the ideology of the new "Yugoslav middle class," as well as articles by N. Popov (the author of a notable study of the strikes in Yugoslavia, which was published in the January and September 1971 issues of *Quatrième Internationale*), and by Rudi Supek and Zagorka Pesic-Golubovic.

The August 24 issue of *Student* carried an article by Professor Gajo Petrovic, editor in chief of *Praxis*, on this subject.

Second on the list was the book *Jun-Lipanj 1968 — Dokumenti* [Documents of the June-July 1968 Movement], which dealt with the strike that occurred in the universities in these two

months—a strike that shook all of Yugoslavia because of the radical nature of its demands.* (These demands were reprinted in the banned issue of *Student*.)

Third was the *Anali Pravnog Fakulteta Beogradu* [Chronicle of the Belgrade Law School], a more austere journal that nevertheless published a special issue containing a profound, critical study of the amendments to the Yugoslav constitution adopted last June.

Student also noted the ban on the Belgrade magazine *Kultura* after it published an essay on the religion of the Russian *émigré* philosopher Berdyaev. The court that issued the ban referred to the possibility that this publication could affect relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR (at the time Tito was preparing to welcome Brezhnev to Belgrade).

Finally, several pages of *Student* were devoted to the film of the Yugoslav avant-garde producer Dusan Makavejov, "W. R., or the Mystery of the Orga(n)ism," a film inspired by the life of the psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich. One of the scenes in the movie showed a nude actor under a picture of Lenin. Rather paradoxically, the charge was made that this film was harmful to public morals, when frankly pornographic publications are flourishing in Yugoslavia.

It is likely that these bans will not fail to produce reactions, and reactions within the bureaucracy itself. Thus, shortly after the ban against *Student*, the Serbian Central Committee of the League of Yugoslav Communists issued a statement opposing these administrative measures. And on September 14, the Supreme Court of Serbia lifted the ban against *Kultura*.

Furthermore, there is increasing talk that the Croat nationalists, who have won a majority in the student union at the University of Zagreb, will initiate a strike at this school when classes resume. This action will be resorted to, it is said, unless the decrees are rescinded which expelled Sime Djodan and Marko Veselica from the League of Communists for a nationalist right deviation.

It seems possible now that Yugoslavia may be in for a "hot autumn." □

* See "40,000 Belgrade University Students Win Demands After Eight-Day Sit-in," in *Intercontinental Press*, June 24, 1968, p. 586. — IP

Right Wing Escalates Terror

Three Reported Kidnapped in Argentina

Three Argentinian leftists were apparently kidnapped by right-wing terrorists on September 24, according to an Associated Press dispatch from Buenos Aires printed in the New York daily *El Diario* of September 26.

One of those kidnapped was reportedly Luis Enrique Pujals, a twenty-nine-year-old law student said to be wanted by the police because of his alleged membership in the People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—ERP). The other two victims have not yet been identified.

"Pujals's wife said she feared the same thing would happen to her husband as befell the student Pablo Maestre, his wife Nidia Nisetich de

Maestre, attorney Néstor Martins, and the latter's client, Nildo Zenteno," AP reported.

"All of them were apparently kidnapped by armed individuals. Maestre's body turned up two months ago, but there has been no sign of the others, who are feared dead. Various sources charged that they had been captured by ultrarightist organizations cooperating with the police in the antiterrorist [sic] struggle, although this could not be confirmed."

Pujals's wife told the press she had been phoned by an anonymous caller who said her husband was in the custody of the Federal Police. The police, however, denied any knowledge of the victim's whereabouts. □

Two Articles From Banned Yugoslav Journal

The two articles below appeared in the August 24 issue of the banned Belgrade University publication *Student*. The first, by the journal's editors, explains the reasons for the "banned special issue."

The author of the second article, Gajo Petrovic, is the editor of *Praxis*, a philosophical magazine widely circu-

lated in academic circles both in Yugoslavia and abroad. He is also one of the most well known left philosophers in the country.

The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*. Emphasis in the articles is reproduced as it occurred in the originals.

Facing a Prolonged Period of Censorship

Our intention was to compile in this issue all the material on the banned papers, periodicals, films, etc. In recent months, at least, we have seen that this job must be done quickly, because the number of banned publications is increasing day by day.

There is, of course, the possibility that this series of bans cannot be halted in the foreseeable future. This censorship may last for the whole period ahead. But even if this does not prove to be the case, the bans will put their mark on these times. Such censorship is the principal and best achievement of our "democratic and self-managing" bureaucracy.¹ It is a greater accomplishment, after all, than producing the economic crisis that is beginning to become a normal way of life for our country, a greater accomplishment than sending what will soon be millions of workers abroad, than the at-

tempt to divide the working class and the Savez Komunista² into an infinite number of fragments.

There is no system to the application of these bans. Everything is being prohibited—from left-oriented Marxist works to nationalism. There is a difference, however, in that Marxist thought has long since come under attack. It is almost impossible to penetrate the logic involved in the bans decreed by the state attorneys and the courts, as well as the threats made daily against us "long-winded ideologues." These statements brand all kinds of people as foes of our system—pro-Soviets and the "New Left," followers of Rankovic³ and separatists, Djilasites and the *Praxis* group, na-

tionalists, pseudoradicals, extremists, liberals, etc.

While not fully agreeing necessarily with all of these specific articles or the orientation of the journals in which they have been published, we must raise our voice in protest. We are against censorship in principle.

We must, of course, say something more about those articles (and works) based on clearly Marxist historical positions which have been banned and judged (who knows by what means) to be in essence "hostile" to our system.

Finally, must we not ask ourselves if those who raise these accusations may not be right? Perhaps these writings do represent hostile activity. But hostile to whom and to what? Don't we have to speak out frankly and express our hostility to all those who think that they are "assuring" revolutionary socialist continuity by these constant bans?

Aren't these bureaucrats and their "long-winded ideologues" of progress right? Aren't we really their enemies?

1. "Self-management," which is supposed to mean self-government of the producers, is the official program of the Yugoslav party and state. — *IP*

2. Savez Komunista, or League of Communists, was the name given to the Yugoslav Communist party to distinguish it from the other Stalinist parties in Eastern Europe. — *IP*

3. The ultra-Stalinist former head of the secret police. — *IP*

A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Ban on 'Praxis'

By Gajo Petrovic

The questions you have put to me are very interesting. But it would require an extensive discussion, if not an entire book to answer them adequately. To do this job properly I would need plenty of time. And, as you know, I have only part of a day at my disposal.

Leaving aside all the questions about censorship in general, I want to say a few things about the August

10, 1971, ruling of the Sisak district prosecutor's office. This decision placed a preliminary ban on the distribution of some issues of *Praxis*. As for the ruling of the district court in Sisak, which was announced orally yesterday [August 16, 1971], I would not like to comment on it this evening because I do not know whether this verdict has since been formulated in writing. In any case, I have not

seen this document. I am all the more reluctant to comment on the resolution of this case because, on the basis of possible objections, it might be appealed to the Vrhovni Sud [Supreme Court].

Since this "ruling" of the Sisak District Prosecutor's Office fills twenty-two pages, I cannot study its basic principles or undertake an analysis of the document as a whole. I just

want to examine the arguments the prosecutor used to substantiate the charge that some collaborators of *Praxis* spread "false, distorted, and provocative statements inciting unrest among citizens and the public order and peace." I would like to point out by the way that the prosecutor meant to say that these writers "endangered the public order and peace" because, as can be gathered from Article 52 of the law on the press and other mass media, what is prohibited is not "inciting the public order and peace" but endangering them.

The Sisak prosecutor concluded his case this way:

"We can see how grossly he has distorted the prevailing situation in Yugoslavia (the prosecutor was referring to Milan Kangrga—G. P. [Gajo Petrovic]) in his attempt to create confusion and unrest among the workers, as well as among all the citizens of Yugoslavia, by looking at the assertion he makes in footnote 11 at the bottom of page 440." The prosecutor quoted this passage:

"Since we 'can no longer' speak of a Yugoslav working class (because that is a 'unitary' or 'unity-class' position!), or of a working class of Yugoslavia (as a whole), but only of 'national classes of Yugoslavia' (in the plural), inasmuch as the immediate, actual, and historical interest of these classes (of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, etc.) are not in essence identical (in comparison to the Yugoslav middle classes, the bureaucracies and technocracies, which cooperate very nicely), then, according to this theory, by the political criterion of the existing six national republics and other administrative divisions, we would of course have 6 (six) working classes and 2 (two) working 'classlets' (in the autonomous provinces of Kosova and Vojvodine). For every new republic or autonomous province there would be one more working class or 'classlet.' This question, moreover, would be decided on a political basis (that is, of course, by the 'free agreement of self-managing units' or among the middle classes and bureaucracies).

"Moreover, here also we must be consistent. If in fact we have not one but six or eight working classes in Yugoslavia, then, according to this theory there must be six or eight Leagues of Communists [Savez Komunisti], which would mean that we have, or should have, a multiparty system!?! Mightn't this paradox be re-

solvable only if what were meant were six or eight middle (bourgeois) classes? Then this concept would have some historical basis. Perhaps we should change the name."

Then the prosecutor went on to say:

"By these statements in the banned issue of *Praxis*, this author meant to attack our entire policy of socialist development and to do so by means of false and unsupported assertions, which thus promoted confusion and



JOSIP BROZ TITO

unrest on the part of the citizens and even inspiration to definite actions which would disturb the public order and peace.

"The number of falsehoods and half-truths in issue 3/4 of *Praxis* make the entire magazine suspect.

"Therefore, the provisions of the law require banning the distribution of the aforesaid issues of *Praxis*."

The statement was signed: "Okruzni Javni Tuzilac [District Prosecutor] Viniko Copkovic." (See "Decisions of the Sisak District Prosecutor's office," *KTR* 247/1971, August 19, 1971, pp. 21-22.)

The quoted section, as will be seen, contains (1) one of the points the prosecutor's argument should have

proved, and (2) his categorical and final judgment.

The point noted here is not just one among many. There are many grounds for concluding that the district prosecutor attributed special significance and importance to this point as evidence in his case. The speech I quoted begins with the words "how grossly he distorts" ["Koliko neistinito izvrc"] and these words indicate that the following is not just an ordinary "distortion" but a *particularly great distortion*. On the other hand, after introducing this quote from Kangrga, the prosecutor does not make any attempt to demonstrate and prove the extent of the distortion in the cited footnote but immediately proceeds to a general conclusion about all the places cited: "These statements in the aforesaid issues of *Praxis* . . ." etc. Therefore, we must conclude that the exceptional falsity of the passages quoted from Kangrga and their intent "to create confusion and unrest among the workers as well as all the citizens of Yugoslavia" are so evident as not to require any specific proof.

I myself do not find the falseness of Kangrga's statements very frightening, nor is his megalomaniac intent (to create confusion and unrest among all the citizens of Yugoslavia) evident to me. But my subjective doubt does not prove anything. Perhaps the prosecutor had a clear insight into the matter and we who are not so sharp-eyed should try a little harder to find in the text what was so easily perceived by Copkovic. Since the prosecutor in no way indicated where we should look for the falseness and dangerous intent in Kangrga's article, we must try to understand and evaluate what this author says.

What is Kangrga discussing in the quoted passage? What thesis is he putting forth? What view is he arguing against?

In the quoted section Kangrga takes up the question of whether we can speak of a Yugoslav working class, that is, of a working class of Yugoslavia (as a whole) or whether we can only speak of working classes of Yugoslavia (in the plural). In this, it is clear that Kangrga is defending the view that we can speak of a working class of Yugoslavia, or a Yugoslav working class as a whole, and that he rejects the judgment that such a view can be considered a "unitary" or "unitary-class" position.

Kangrga's main argument for the

view he is defending is evident from the part of the above text where he condemns the supporters of the contrary thesis for holding that "the direct, actual, and historical interest of these classes (of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, etc.) are not in essence identical." Kangrga therefore considers that the immediate, actual, and historical interest of the working class of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, etc. *is* "in essence identical." And in this he sees an argument for the existence of one Yugoslav working class.

Defending his view firmly, Kangrga does not fall into any extreme, crude version which would exclude differences within the Yugoslav working class. By the way he employs the terms "Yugoslav working class" and "working class of Yugoslavia," we can conclude that he accepts both and does not insist on one as opposed to the other. And from the fact that he polemicalizes sharply against the idea that we can speak "only" of national working classes of Yugoslavia in the plural, we can say that he would be opposed to speaking in the plural about working classes of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, etc., on the grounds that he recognizes the "in essence identical" interest of these classes, which in spite of specific differences, makes them one working class of Yugoslavia, one social class which is not just the mechanical aggregate of the working classes of separate nations or republics but a whole bound together by an essentially identical interest.

Trying to present his position on the existence of a working class of Yugoslavia more effectively, Kangrga indicated precisely the implications of the opposing view that there are only national working classes in Yugoslavia. One of these implications is that we would "have 6 (six) working classes and 2 (two) working 'classlets' (in the autonomous provinces of Kosova and Vojvodine)." A second is that we would have "six or eight Leagues of Communists." A third is that there could not be real working classes or real Leagues of Communists but "six or eight middle (bourgeois) classes and their parties." A fourth implication would be that this terminology would not be adequate and that "the name" would have to be changed.

Is there any validity to Kangrga's arguments? Is there any truth in his thesis? In my opinion his arguments are convincing, and his view essentially correct. By this I do not claim that

he said everything about this question that could be said, that his position could not be made more explicit, or his arguments more complete and precise. But, of course, Kangrga himself did not propose to solve the whole question in a footnote. In my opinion we should not be surprised that in one footnote of exactly twenty lines Kangrga did not definitively solve the whole complex national-class question in Yugoslavia. Rather we should wonder at the fact that in so little space he managed to say so much, going right to the heart of one of the most immediate problems in our theoretical discussions.

The prosecutor's appreciation of this footnote was, nonetheless, fundamentally different. He introduced it because he considered that this text in some way proved at least something of his basic thesis—of the charge that he raised in his ruling and in his presentation of the case. It would be very interesting to know which charge the prosecutor thought Kangrga proved or illustrated in this text. Since the prosecutor offered us no hint, perhaps we will be permitted to ask the following questions.

Why and how does the argument for the existence of a working class of Yugoslavia "present in an incorrect way the role of the proletariat and the KPJ [Komunisticka Partija Jugoslavije—Communist party of Yugoslavia] and its leadership in organizing and directing the national liberation struggle of the Yugoslav peoples in the period 1941-45"?

How and why does the view that there is a working class of Yugoslavia "negate in a grossly false way the existence of socialist relations in society—in particular the development of workers' self-management, the existence, position and role of the working class in Yugoslavia and of the Savez Komunističke Jugoslavije and its leadership, as well as of other social and political organizations active in the postwar development"?

Why and how does the view that there is one Yugoslav working class assert "that riots, strikes by workers, and strikes and demonstrations by students and left intellectuals are the only actions possible in our country that can have a Communist character and thus—in violation of the constitution of the Yugoslav Federation and the program of the SKJ—incite citizens to commit such acts"?

Why and how does the view that there is one working class in Yugo-

slavia belittle "the positive social changes in the Yugoslav Federation which in particular were incorporated into the constitutional amendments"?

Why and how does the view that there is one working class in Yugoslavia "make false, distorted, and provocative assertions inciting unrest among citizens and (endangering—G.P.) the public peace and order as defined by Article 52, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Law on the Press and Other Media of Information"?

And finally why and how can the claim that there is one working class in Yugoslavia be characterized as one of those theses which "seek to attack our entire policy of socialist development and to do so by means of false and unsupported assertions, and thus promoted confusion and unrest on the part of citizens and even inspiration to definite actions which would disturb the public order and peace"?

The prosecutor did not deem it necessary to answer any of these questions. It did not seem necessary to him to try to show the connection between the thesis put forward by Kangrga and his accusations. But if the prosecutor did not try to show this connection, that does not mean that it doesn't exist.

It may be that Kangrga's thesis only seems to disprove the prosecutor's accusations but in reality confirms them. Perhaps if we made a certain effort we might discover the link that the prosecutor stated firmly exists but for which he failed to produce any arguments. Let us consider the question in the following way:

Kangrga's argument for the existence of one Yugoslav working class is not in itself false, or distorted, or provocative. To the contrary, it is true, correct, and progressive. However, this correct thesis is generally accepted in our country and not under attack from anyone. Thus, the very fact that Kangrga gives special emphasis to it and defends it in his own peculiar way (with abundant use of quotation marks, parentheses, question marks, and exclamation points) suggests an untruth about our reality. His aggressive presentation of this view suggests that it is either completely unaccepted or at least much disputed. So, that is the deceitful distortion and provocative claim indirectly suggested and even partly directly stated by Kangrga! Doesn't Kangrga say outright that "we 'can no longer' speak of a Yugoslav working class"?

If the prosecutor wanted to follow

this line of reasoning, then, obviously there would be some logic to his case. The only thing is that this argument contains some "small" illusions. Kangrga did not write simply that we *can no longer speak* about a Yugoslav working class. He put the words "can no longer" in quotes. Thus, what he is saying is not that we cannot talk about a Yugoslav working class any more (Kangrga himself is able to discuss such a category), but that there are concepts or theories according to which "we can no longer" speak of a Yugoslav working class. What Kangrga is referring to are theories or ideas striving to win acceptance, and not an accomplished fact. This is shown by the quotation marks setting off the clause. Kangrga does not say: "Since we can no longer . . . we have six working classes and two 'classlets' in Yugoslavia." He says: "Since we 'can no longer' speak of a Yugoslav working class . . . then, according to this theory, we would have . . ."

In the footnote in question, both in the phrase quoted above and in others, Kangrga makes extensive use of conditional and future constructions. Let me cite a few: "For every new . . . there would be . . ."; "this question, moreover, would be . . ."; "if in fact we do not have one . . ."; "only if"; "it would then be still as if," etc. These conditional constructions clearly show that what Kangrga is doing is drawing the implications of positions he is refuting. He is not presenting his own theses or describing a social system. It would be "stretching things a little" if Kangrga's polemic against theses he finds unacceptable were interpreted to mean that these views had won out and that in accordance with them national working classes had formed and national parties which had become bourgeois under another name!

But, on the other hand, someone might say that if, in stressing the thesis that there is one Yugoslav working class, Kangrga does not say that this view is definitively rejected and dismissed, he suggests that it is disputed. And in this way, such a person might hold that the author is spreading false and distorted claims and inciting unrest among citizens.

Such an argument for banning Kangrga's article might seem almost acceptable to some. But before we accept it, we must ask two more questions.

First: Was it Kangrga who started the discussion about the existence of

a Yugoslav working class? Hadn't others begun to question the existence of one working class of Yugoslavia rather loudly and aggressively at the very time he was preparing and writing his article? Have our memories really become so short that I need to note these noisy and aggressive attacks specifically?

Second: Was Kangrga the only one who reacted temperamentally to these attempts to deny the existence of a Yugoslav working class? Was Kangrga the only one who felt a need for the working class to fight for its rights? If some memories have really failed so badly, let me offer one quotation. At the very time the issue in question of *Praxis* was being distributed, on July 7, 1971, the Zagreb daily *Vjesnik* published the following speech: "In general, I think that the question of self-management is not given enough attention in Yugoslav plants and that much remains to be done. In some places, moreover, self-management is stagnating. Here you should have been among those who have achieved concrete results. I do not say this only on the basis of what I have heard about you here but because technocracy assumes a great scope in our country and represents a danger to self-management. We must all strive to get the working class to exercise its rights in fact and fight hard to attain them." And a little further on: "I would like to say here, not about you but to you, that in some republics nationalist deviations have spread gradually to the working class. Censuses of national origin have been carried out and some have been told that they cannot work in this or that place. This sort of thing threatens the unity of our working class. I am firmly opposed to this and we must all work together and struggle against such harmful and dangerous phenomena. Workers must stand together in the entire country, regardless of whether they belong to the larger or smaller nationalities. No matter what nationality he belongs to, a worker is a worker. He belongs to the working class."*

The concept of working-class unity is expressed in a more radical way here than in Kangrga's article. The failings of self-management and the dangers that threaten it are expressed

* Petrovic is apparently citing a speech by Joseph Broz Tito, the president of the Yugoslav Federation. — IP

more dramatically than in Kangrga's article. However, the Zagreb prosecutor did not issue a preliminary ban on the distribution of *Vjesnik*. The same speech was also published in *Borba*, *Politika*, and many other daily newspapers. No public prosecutor demanded that it be banned. Nor did the Sisak public prosecutor.

Maybe the prosecutor reasoned more or less this way (I am not saying that he must have thought this way but, baffled as I am by his silence on the decisive question, I am only guessing, testing various hypotheses in the hope that I can come near the mark). When the president of the republic warned of "dangers to self-management" and stressed the unity of the working class, that was positive, that mobilized the people for struggle. When Kangrga denounced these dangers, when he stressed that there is one working class in Yugoslavia, it was incitement to unrest among citizens and inspiration to "definite actions which would disturb the public order and peace."

In any case, I am far from this line of thinking and I am not inclined to attribute it to the prosecutor. But what line of reasoning should I attribute to him? The prosecutor is simply silent as to how Kangrga's footnote supports his accusation, and all my attempts to discover this connection or nexus have been unsuccessful. In connection with this, there are two possibilities. Either we are faced with a very complicated and hard to comprehend line of thought, or the prosecutor erred in this case. I hope that the second hypothesis, which I myself incline towards, will not incite unrest among citizens! No one after all is infallible, and even the public prosecutor in Sisak may make an occasional mistake. Taken by itself, one mistake need not mean very much. Is the case with Kangrga's footnote one of these minor errors, or has the prosecutor produced less evidence against Kangrga than he has against himself as an officer of the law?

Distribution of the double issue of *Praxis* with the incriminating article by Kangrga was completed on July 6, 1971, and the required copies were supplied to the prosecutor's office on June 25, 1971. The head of the printshop that did this work testified to this in the public trial in Sisak. He said, further, that he had the necessary documentation on the dates. The public prosecutor did not ask to see this evidence nor did he try to chal-

lenge it. This would mean that the prosecutor was able to ban the double issue containing "the false, distorted, and provocative statements inciting unrest among citizens" immediately after the printshop began distributing it. Why didn't he do this? Why was this double number banned only five weeks after it had been distributed and almost seven weeks after copies of it had been sent to the prosecutor for inspection?

One theoretical possibility (I stress, a purely theoretical one) would be that the prosecutor wanted "unrest among citizens" and "definite acts," in order to participate in them himself. A second theoretical possibility is that the prosecutor wanted such results so that there would be grounds for taking measures against the editors and the citizens incited to unrest. We must firmly reject both hypotheses — out of simple human trust in the prosecutor and those who named him to his post. But in this case, how can we explain the prosecutor's action?

Perhaps the prosecutor did not firmly believe that the texts could incite unrest among citizens and wanted to test his supposition in practice. But if this was the reason for the delay in applying a preliminary ban, would it not be natural to expect that after a five-week test the judge would definitively abandon his original intention? For all practical purposes the double issue was sold out and read without causing any unrest among citizens. Or our press whitewashed some incidents of such unrest. Or the prosecutor in the trial at Sisak could have produced some example of such unrest from some other source. According to the information available to the editors of *Praxis*, the readers received this issue with interest, satisfaction, and tranquility, to some extent, even with relief. Wasn't it, in fact, only the decision to impose a preliminary ban on the double issue that created unrest among the public?

The prosecutor in any case was not guided by a desire to arouse unrest among citizens. *But what then led the prosecutor to place such a belated preliminary ban on the distribution of a double issue which in the meantime had been sold out and thoroughly read?*

I do not consider our society's laws providing for preliminary or permanent bans on periodical publications either perfect or unassailable. Like everything else, they are subject to anal-

ysis, criticism, and change. But on this occasion, I did not want to take up these laws, or the philosophical and sociological problem of censorship in general. I only wanted to make a partial examination of the justness of one act of preliminary censorship from the standpoint of the existing provisions of the law. The philosophical and sociological meaning of this act remains unexplained. But it seemed to me that at this time it is not an

unimportant question. Can the preliminary ban on *Praxis* be defended from the standpoint of law and justice? *Is there anyone who could explain this ban somewhat more successfully than the district public prosecutor in Sisak?*

P. S. In this article I said nothing about the preliminary ban on the collection *Jun-Lipanj 1968*. I hope to say something about this in another article.

Annasoltan Kekilova a Recent Victim

More Soviet Prisoners in Mental Hospitals

The internment of Soviet dissidents in psychiatric institutions has increased markedly over the past two years, the Ninth World Congress of Amnesty International was told September 26.

According to the September 27 *Los Angeles Times*, "Peter Reddaway, lecturer in political science at the London School of Economics, told a conference working group on Eastern Europe that the number of known detainees was now nearly 40, while the true figure was probably nearer 200. This compared with only one or two such cases known in 1969.

"Most of these people have been arrested for political offenses like distributing political pamphlets or organizing protests against political trials, and all the evidence we have suggests that they are not ill," he said.

The article continued: "Reddaway said dissenters feared internment in a psychiatric hospital much more than being sent to a labor camp, since inmates were put among genuinely deranged and sometimes violent patients, and often subjected to forced injections."

The most recent case of a dissident being interned reported in the Western press is that of Annasoltan Kekilova, a young woman poet from the Turkmen Republic in Central Soviet Asia. Theodore Shabad, in a September 27 Moscow dispatch to the *New York Times*, cited reports that the poet was forcibly taken by ambulance from her home in a suburb of the Turkmen capital of Ashkabad on August 26.

The internment became known after a petition from her mother to the Com-

munist party's Central Committee in Moscow, vouching for her daughter's sanity, was made available to Western reporters.

In her petition, the mother said that Kekilova, "unable to reconcile herself to the shortcomings in our republic, criticized them directly and openly in a letter to the Central Committee and in a second letter to the party's 24th Congress," which met in April.

Following these protests to the Moscow bureaucrats, the poet began to be persecuted by local party officials: "She was forced to quit her job," the mother wrote, "even though she had me, her old mother, and a young child as her dependents. She then devoted herself entirely to her poetry. But another blow struck. The Turkmen Central Committee's propaganda department ordered her latest collection of verse removed from the printer."

It was at this point, having been hounded out of her job and prevented from earning anything from her poems, that Kekilova applied for permission to leave the Soviet Union. This was considered proof of insanity by the authorities, who then dispatched an ambulance to take her to Ashkabad's psychiatric hospital. □

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Growing Movement for Surinam Independence

[Recent developments in the Dutch Latin-American colony of Surinam were reported in the September 11 issue of the Amsterdam liberal weekly *Vrij Nederland*, developments which passed apparently unnoticed by the international press. The author of the story was Eric Paërl, who was sent to the area by the Dutch Surinam Committee. Because of the lack of news about Surinam, we have translated the article for the sake of the information it contains.]

* * *

This past week Surinam presented a picture of turbulent development, culminating in a call for a general strike. Long before this, tensions had been perceptible beneath the surface. They were manifested in a number of ways—by the rule-book strike in the customs offices; by the arrest of Keerveld, the editor of the Marxist-Leninist paper *De Rode Surinamer* [The Red Surinamese], and by the irritation arising out of the visit of a group of Dutch members of parliament.

This is the kind of response the Dutch MPs got: A local paper wrote cynically—"The Dutch are coming to liberate Surinam."

The threat of a general strike somewhat overshadowed the tenth congress of the PNR [Partij voor de Nationalistische Republiek—Party for a Nationalist Republic]. But this event was also extremely important. It demonstrated that it is really the Surinamese themselves who are best able to liberate their country. Conversely, it also pointed up the fact that there are conservative forces in Surinam itself that are fighting tooth and nail against the inevitable approach of independence.

On this point, the August 28 issue of *De Ware Tijd* wrote:

"Every liberated person might expect that the last bulwark of resistance to decolonization would be in the metropolitan power. But in fact, it seems to be found in the colony itself. Has this been arranged by an all-powerful, divine jokester?"

On Wednesday, September 1, the tenth congress of the PNR was opened in Paramaribo by Robin Ravles. The PNR is an opposition party in Surinam. It has one seat in the provincial assembly. Its chief objective is winning immediate independence for Surinam. Thus, the PNR is the only revolutionary political party that has for years pursued a consistently anti-colonialist policy. Besides the PNR, there are some extraparliamentary groups whose presence is visible. They take a clear left stand and their importance in the long run should not be underestimated. The characteristic thing is that several of these groups have popped up in the recent period. Their appearance indicates an increasing polarization of political life in Surinam.

First of all there is the SSU [Surinaamse Socialistische Unie—Surinamese Socialist Union] led by Herrenberg. This is a small socialist group consisting of a few intellectuals who split off from the PNR. It is said that the SSU has slowly lost momentum until it now has only four members, who also make up its presidium.

Secondly there is the MLCS [Marxistisch-Leninistisch Centrum Suriname—Surinamese Marxist-Leninist Center], a rapidly growing group. Among other things, this organization publishes the paper *De Rode Surinamer*. It has also drawn attention to itself by some spectacular actions (making an accusation of fraud against a minister—an accusation that proved to be true).

Other actions of the MLCS have been the occupation of some ministries in Paramaribo [the capital of Surinam] and the taking over of a radio station, from which the organization broadcast its own program for an hour and a half. In contrast to occupations of radio stations in other underdeveloped countries, this action received remarkably little attention in the Dutch press.

Finally, there is the SSF [Surinaams Studenten Front—Surinam Student Front], which includes the militant students at the (still small) University of Paramaribo, together with teach-

ers and maintenance personnel at the school.

One of the things the SSF has done was to throw cold water on a pompous ceremony this spring installing professors at the University of Paramaribo. A student broke into the festivities saying that Surinam had a greater need for creative leadership in developing the country in the service of the poverty-stricken Surinamese people than it had for vain professors imitating European pomp and circumstance and seeking status.

The tenth congress of the PNR was to give an evaluation of the party's work over the past decade, with special emphasis on analyzing the progress made in the Surinamese struggle for independence. Of interest in this connection was the statement that a number of Dutch organizations sent to the PNR congress.

In particular, the statement noted that the fight for Surinamese independence had to be waged primarily within the country and that the support of Dutch organizations (such as the Suriname Comité—Surinam Committee) could only play a modest role by comparison with the mass struggle of the Surinamese trade unions. However, the statement said that the organizations in the "motherland" had their own special task to perform, to expose Dutch colonialism and combat it in the Netherlands itself (this statement was signed by ASVA, BWA, FJG, Sjaloom, and the Suriname Comité).

At first glance the situation in Surinam resembles the one in 1969 when an extensive strike-wave in Surinam finally led to the fall of Pengel [the strong-man premier at the time]. But there are some new factors. For the first time there is unity among all four trade-union federations, the C-47 led by Bruma, the PWO [Progressieve Werknemers Organizatie—Progressive Workers Organization]; the Moederbond [Mother Union—the name given the leadership of the AVV, the Algemeen Verbond van Vakverenigen, or General Federation of Trade Unions], which was Pengel's union; and the CLO [Centrale van Lands-

dienaren Organizatie—Federation of Agricultural Workers]. Also, a new emphasis is being placed on the solidarity of all workers, regardless of race, standing, or union affiliation.

The following are the main complaints of the unions in their conflict with the government:

1. The unions want a new minister of labor chosen from the ranks of labor. The old minister, Biswamitree, was dumped by the present government. This post is now one of those held by Premier Sedney, a new Pengel in the making. At present Sedney holds the position of chairman of the Council of Ministers, as well as the portfolios for public affairs and labor.

2. The contract recently concluded with the U.S. Reynolds Aluminum Company has aroused great unrest. In tense meetings in the union ABO building, Bruma denounced the contract as a fraud against the people. As in previous contracts with American aluminum concerns, Bruma said, Surinamese interests were disregarded.

3. The unions complain that employers make a practice of firing workers and then rehiring them at much lower wages. Moreover, they say, the government's price control measures have had little or no effect.

4. The last straw was when the courts issued an injunction against the rule-book strike of customs workers.

The most impressive of the unions' complaints are found in reports by agricultural workers about bad conditions on the plantations owned by Dutch and American companies. In particular, a representative of the banana plantation laborers (who work for the United Fruit Company) pointed out that the pay for lifting a forty-kilo cluster of bananas onto a cable car is a quarter of a cent. In order to earn five florins [3.62 florins equal US\$1], a worker has to lift 2,000 clusters of bananas.

When the banana plantations, which were originally state-owned although delivering their produce to the United Fruit Company, were turned over to private enterprise, the workers lost the social benefits they had enjoyed as state agricultural employees (among other things, pensions). Although the agricultural workers' claim to maintain their rights was upheld by the courts, the government has so far done nothing to enforce this decision.

Despite the provisions of the law, the employers' associations and the

Trade Council stated in a letter to the unions that they would not make up the wages lost in strike action.

The impression that you get is that the real pressure for a strike is coming from the rank and file, and that the union leaderships have been more or less swept along by this sentiment. In a clamorous meeting in the ABO building, the fact that the strike was only for three days came in for criticism. The critics thought there should be an all-out strike to bring down the Sedney government. In particular, you could hear objections being raised that Bruma wanted to keep too tight a reign on the aspirations of the rank and file, to restrict their demands to realistic ones that could be accepted by the government, a warning to the

regime that it must finally take the unions seriously.

So, one could not help but feel that a part of the crowd felt frustrated as they left the meeting where the strike resolution was voted on. At this writing it would still be premature to assess what the real result of this three-day warning-strike, scheduled to begin on Sunday at midnight, will be.

One thing, however, is clear. The claim we once heard that Surinam did not want independence and that no real social struggle was going on there has been exploded by the facts. To the contrary, Surinam has been drawn into a turbulent development which must inevitably lead to independence and the fall of the present conservative regime. □

At Zurich 'Unity' Celebration

Pro-Irish Demonstrators Greet Heath

Zurich

On September 17, British Prime Minister Edward Heath, French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann, and high-ranking officials of the German, Italian, and Swiss governments gathered here to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of a speech by Winston Churchill. On that date in 1946, and in this city, Churchill called for the unification of Europe against a "new tyranny"—i.e., he called for unity of the bourgeoisie against the threat of anticapitalist revolution.

The recently formed Zurich branch of the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire [LMR—Revolutionary Marxist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International] decided to challenge this celebration of the beginning of capitalist Europe's cold war against the Soviet Union.

The LMR issued a leaflet counterposing a "United Socialist Europe of all workers in the West and East" to "Churchill's Western Europe of the capitalists" and the "Eastern Europe of the bureaucrats." The leaflet pointed out that on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Churchill's speech, capitalist Europe had entered a money crisis and the beginning of a trade war of "everybody against everybody."

During the night of September 16, the city was covered with a thousand

posters showing the whole of Europe in red. The posters carried the slogans mentioned above and were signed by the LMR and the Young Socialists.

It was also decided to use the occasion to protest the repression in Northern Ireland. A peaceful picket action, with banners and a distribution of leaflets, was planned. Slogans adopted for the action were: "British Troops Out of Ireland," "End Internment," "Self-Determination for Ireland," and "With the IRA for a Socialist Ireland."

The city council, anxious to defend the "image" of the fortress of the gnomes, prohibited the picketing and sent hundreds of plainclothesmen to mingle with the 3,000 bourgeois citizens who stood in the square to hear Heath and the other speakers.

When the picketers arrived, their banners were snatched away, they were roughed up by the cops, and several were arrested. But the cops were unable to prevent the demonstrators from punctuating Heath's speech with shouts of "Free Ireland."

The action helped to bring the Irish question to the attention of the Swiss left and the wider public, and another demonstration against the repression in Northern Ireland is now being planned. □

Pyotr Yakir on the Fight for Socialist Democracy

[For three full years now, and going well into the fourth, the most broadly representative publication of the movement for socialist democracy in the Soviet Union, the *Chronicle of Current Events*, has continued to come out every second month. The nineteenth issue, dated April 30, 1971, has only now become available to us: unfortunately, clandestine conditions seem to make the four-month delay a not unusual occurrence. The appearance of a twentieth issue, dated June 30, 1971, has also been reported, but we have not yet seen copies of it.

[The regularity and continuity of this *samizdat* publication, the continued appearance of oppositional organizations of various hues, the ongoing struggles of oppressed national minorities (a *Chronicle* is now coming out in the Ukraine, and another one dealing solely with the struggle of Soviet Jews for the right to emigrate to Israel—a reaction to the denial of national and cultural rights by the Great Russian Kremlin bureaucracy)—all these are a sure sign that the protest movement in the USSR continues to rise.

[The Kremlin bosses and their police apparatus do not feel it is safe now to resort to the kind of mass arrests used under Stalin. Thus they are unable to root out and expunge the movement as a whole. Instead they pick off outstanding individuals and particular groups. Such victimizations, however, tend in turn to arouse further protests, while admittedly having an intimidating effect on weaker or more timid elements around the oppositional movement.

[The hardened caste of officials and administrators who have usurped power and privilege in the Soviet workers state are obviously unsure of themselves in the face of the growing politicalization of important sections of the population. They display a peculiar inconsistency, a half-surlly hesitancy. It is as though they sense a growing resentment over their bullying tactics but are determined to brazen through nevertheless.

[An interesting assessment of the current stage of the movement for social-

ist democracy is given in the following excerpts from Pyotr Yakir's Open Letter of March 27, 1971, to the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Soviet Communist party. These excerpts appeared in the listing of "New Samizdat Works" in the recently received issue No. 19 of the *Chronicle*. The translation, by *Intercontinental Press*, has omitted only the last excerpt—a paragraph in which Yakir lists eighteen prominent political prisoners (including many in psychiatric prison-hospitals) and refers to "the many, many others." His own freedom of the moment he describes as a "drop of good fortune" in this sea of unhappy cases.

[The reason the KGB has not acted against him in more decisive fashion is, of course, that he is the son of General Ion Yakir, one of the top Red Army generals secretly tried and shot by Stalin on the eve of World War II. Steps against another Yakir in 1971 might revive too many memories of the 1937 purge to be useful to the heirs of Stalin.]

* * *

... In recent years a dangerous tendency has made itself felt in the internal life of our country—toward a revival of Stalinist methods of rule and, in art and literature and in the writing of history and personal memoirs, toward a rehabilitation of Stalin himself, one of the greatest criminals of the twentieth century. It is understandable that such a development suits the revenge-seeking Stalinists perfectly well. But isn't it also understandable and natural that it arouses the protests of those who warmly welcomed the "liquidation of the consequences of the personality cult"? Isn't the alarm understandable that is felt by the many thousands over whom the shadow of that gloomy and cruel fanatic rears itself once again? Such alarm is felt by a very large part, if not the overwhelming majority, of our creative, scientific, and technical intelligentsia, by thousands of members of national minorities whose rights were trampled upon under Stalin and

who still have not had them restored, and by many other citizens of the Soviet Union for whom the fate of the nation is not a matter of indifference.

In the second half of the 1960s a flood of letters, appeals, and declarations—individual and collective, on particular questions and on matters in general—poured into the offices of various party and government bodies. The critical content of these documents was in the great majority of cases absolutely loyal. One would naturally have expected that the leadership, which has proclaimed to all the world the complete and total "liquidation of the consequences" [of Stalin's cult], would explain reasonably and politely to its fellow citizens in what respects their criticisms were justified or unjustified.

Why, then, has the reply to criticism been, in the best of cases, silence; and at the worst—legal prosecution and extrajudicial repression?

... Political prisoners have reappeared in the camps. In psychiatric prison-hospitals once again we find the "mentally incompetent," for whom the chief proof of "being cured" is the abandonment of their beliefs and convictions. Public confessions are once again demanded, and those who refuse to recant (and sometimes even those who do recant) are reduced in rank, or discharged from their work, or expelled from educational institutions.

The selectiveness, the "discrimination" employed, in exercising repression (for one and the same "crime," one person is given a reprimand at work, another is not bothered at all, and a third gets several years in a prison camp) only underscores the arbitrariness and illegality of the repressive measures.

What kind of method is it to reply to criticism with persecution? Whom does it serve? Is this the way to demonstrate your correctness to your fellow citizens and to the world? *Will a monolithic ideological unity in our society really be achieved in this way?* Why, this will only enlarge the number of the discontented, with no re-

gard to *how* that discontent is to express itself.

Samizdat has appeared and stubbornly persists. Is this not a sign that the spiritual needs of the society are not being properly met? And is imprisonment for possession or production of *samizdat* materials really going to quench this intellectual thirst?

Why is it that the Soviet film *Andreï Rublyov* can be shown in France but not in the Soviet Union? Why is it that foreign Communists can read and

admire Solzhenitsyn, while in the Soviet Union one can read only vicious articles about him?

. . . Who would think of writing to the UN or appealing to world public opinion if our own leadership had offered convincing answers to serious questions bothering serious people?

One is forced to conclude that *political and philosophical dissent, even if it is loyal, is regarded as a crime in our country, though it is not so stated.* □

Brazil

Former Prisoner Tells of Police Torture

Marcos Penna Sattamini de Arruda's left leg is an inch thinner than his right, he requires medical treatment to prevent convulsions, and his shoulders still show the scars of cigarette burns. Even so, he is in considerably better health than he was in February, when he was released by the Brazilian military police.

Sattamini was arrested in May 1970 because he happened to know a woman who had once been active in a leftist political group. The woman, who had ceased political activity, was named by a member of the group under torture. When she herself was arrested and tortured, she mentioned Sattamini's name. Sattamini himself had never belonged to any political organization.

His treatment by the Brazilian army police was described by Dan Griffin in the September 19 *Washington Post*.

When he was arrested, Sattamini was taken to the headquarters of "Operation Bandeirantes"—the military's political police—in Sao Paulo. He was ordered to undress and his hands were tied.

"One of the six or seven policemen who were there stepped on my hands so the rope could be pulled as tight as possible," Sattamini told Griffin. "They put my knees up between my arms until my wrists were down at my ankles, with my knees up under my chin.

"Then they stuck a metal pipe . . . in the space between my knees and my elbows, and suspended the pipe from two wooden horses so that I was hanging there about three feet off the floor.

"They hit me with their fists and with wooden clubs, and then they wrapped a wire around the little toe of my left foot and put another wire between my testicles and my leg. . . .

"So they began to give me violent shocks while still continuing to hit me . . . and while continuing to ask me for names. . . .

"When I started to faint, they poured water all over my body to increase the flow of electricity. Then they took the wire away from my testicles and began

to run it all over my face and my head, giving me terrible shocks on the face, in the ears, in the eyes, mouth and nose.

"One of the torturers said, 'Look, it even sparks. Now stick it in his ear.'"

Sattamini nearly died from this torture. His captors in fact took him to a hospital the next day, and the doctors there gave him two hours to live. Sattamini described his condition:

"I could tell that I was still shaking, my eyes wouldn't open, my tongue was still knotted against the roof of my mouth, and I could feel that the muscles on the right side of my face were twisted up.

"My left leg was rigid, like a stick of wood, and the foot was twisted downward with my toes curled up and immovable. The little toe was like a small lump of charcoal."

Sattamini's torturers continued to question him while he was in the hospital, and two of them even beat him as he lay in his bed.

For the rest of his captivity, he was alternately held in prison or in a military hospital, depending upon the police evaluation of his health and ability to survive further torture. At one point he lapsed into a coma for several days and was brought out of it only by injections and electric shock treatment.

His experience seemed to be typical of the treatment meted out to prisoners of the regime: the woman who had given the police his name was tortured in his presence to persuade him to "confess."

Sattamini was saved from his captors only by a fortunate accident. His mother, a naturalized American citizen and an employee of the U.S. State Department, threatened to publicize his case, and this persuaded the regime to let him go. He was later permitted to go to the United States, where he related his experience to the *Washington Post* reporter.

"Marcos does not intend to become a naturalized American," Griffin wrote. "He wants, some day, to return to Brazil, as a free Brazilian." □

Rice Is a Weapon

Blackmailing Lao Villagers

The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) has been forced to resume supplying rice to tribal villagers at Long Pot, eighty miles north of Vientiane, after withholding the food for six months.

The change in policy was made after publication of charges by Alfred W. McCoy, a writer, that AID officials were using the rice in an attempt to blackmail the villagers into cooperating with the CIA-controlled Meo army commanded by General Vang Pao.

McCoy, who spent five days at Long Pot researching his second book on Laos, said that AID stopped supplying rice to the villagers after they refused to allow any more of their youths to be pressed into Pao's army.

According to D. E. Ronk, reporting from Vientiane in the September 6 *Washington Post*, "Village leaders told McCoy their relations with the Meo headquarters at Long Cheng fell off when the villagers refused to allow 14-year-old boys to be pressed into military service with the Meos. The 15-year-olds they had turned over to Gen. Vang Pao had been wiped out, they said.

"They simply decided they had lost too many killed already, that they could not afford more," McCoy said."

McCoy reported that the villagers were then asked to shift into the Cheng-Sam Thong military complex. When they declined, the rice supplies were cut off.

AID officials sought to cover up by explaining that Long Pot was listed as having been controlled by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces since a February battle in that area, and "U.S. AID does not drop rice into high-risk areas."

Delivery of rice was now to be resumed, the officials further explained, because the village is now "secure." It was only "coincidental" that the area became "secure" a few days after McCoy's allegations were published, one official added.

McCoy, however, pointed out that there had been no fighting in the area since February, and that a detachment of Meo soldiers equipped with a radio had been stationed in Long Pot since then.

"Village leaders and the Meo troops themselves reportedly told McCoy they had been in constant radio communication with the base at Long Cheng and had frequently requested rice drops," said Ronk. □

Bounced for Playing Ping-Pong

Dr. John Jackson, who led the Australian table-tennis team that toured China, liked what he saw there and even published a book about the trip. He was subsequently defeated when he ran for reelection as president of the Australian table-tennis association.

Ex-General Had Private Spy Network

The U. S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has obtained files on 125,000 alleged "subversives" and doesn't quite know what to do with the material.

The files were compiled over a twenty-three-year period by a private individual who had an obsession about leftists and remarkably good connections with federal government agencies.

Major General Ralph H. Van Deman began collecting the witch-hunt material in 1929, when he retired as chief of the army's intelligence division. At his death in 1952, most of Van Deman's files were given to the army. Another part went to a library in San Diego, where California officials used them to "screen" applicants for state jobs.

Although he held no official position, Van Deman was able to draw on government resources to carry out his hobby. In the September 7 *New York Times*, Richard Halloran reported:

"When he began his private operation in 1929, he was supported by the Army, which gave him two civilian employes, filing cabinets and working materials."

Even more useful to the amateur witch-hunter was the cooperation of the professionals. An army memorandum on the files, written last winter, noted:

"He regularly received classified domestic intelligence reports from the Army and the Navy. The number of F. B. I. summaries, reports and photographs indicates that he could upon request obtain information from the bureau."

Van Deman also maintained an unknown number of spies scattered across the country.

". . . the general ran a nationwide network of informants," Halloran wrote, "each identified only by a coded number, who reported great volumes of raw information to him. The files show that some information could have come only from agents who infiltrated the Communist party, labor unions, church groups and other organizations."

Indicative of the type of dossiers

maintained by Van Deman is an entry on Democratic party Representative Emanuel Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. Celler is described as a "Jew playing the Reds."

The ex-general's interests were not confined solely to the domestic scene, Halloran noted:

"The Van Deman files also contain a letter, dated in May 1951, from an agent in Saudi Arabia. It went into detail on the Middle East situation at the time, then asked for a man experienced in operating a wireless and in using small arms. The man requested was also to have been knowledgeable on the latest movements within the Communist world."

Presumably as an exchange for the aid he received from federal agencies, Van Deman frequently loaned his "information" to the army and the FBI. The interests of these organizations were as all-embracing as Van Deman's:

Five Death Sentences in Marrakesh Trial

On September 17 the verdict was announced in the Marrakesh witch-hunt trial of 193 opponents of King Hassan II's Moroccan regime. The accused were charged with conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy. (See *Intercontinental Press*, September 20, p. 790.)

The sentences, although severe, revealed the fraudulence of the government's case. Five of the accused were condemned to death (the prosecutor had asked for forty-eight death penalties); 6 were sentenced to life imprisonment (the prosecutor had requested 122 such sentences); 2 were given thirty years in jail; 5, twenty years; 24, ten years; 7, five years; and 84 received jail terms ranging from six months to two years.

Of the major defendants, Mohammed Ajar and Mohammed Basri were sentenced to death; Habib el-Forkani and Mohammed Benjelloun each got ten years.

"Among the reports signed out to the Fifth Army and the F. B. I. in 1961 were those on a Communist meeting, a meeting of the adult discussion class at the First Unitarian Church in San Diego, a union meeting of Lodge K of the Aircraft Lodge 1125, and a Democratic rally at Roosevelt Junior High School, all in California in 1944."

There are, however, other aspects to the Van Deman files that could be even more embarrassing to prominent individuals and that could explain why the Internal Security Subcommittee is keeping the material under lock and key:

"California Democrats allege that information from the Van Deman files was used by supporters of Richard M. Nixon in his campaigns against Jerry Voorhis for the House in 1946 and against Helen Gahagan Douglas for the Senate in 1950.

"Judge Hugo Fisher of the San Diego Superior Court, who has been active in Democratic party politics since 1946, said that material from the files appeared in the so-called 'pink sheets' distributed at rallies for Mr. Nixon and other Republicans in the 1950 campaign." □

About fifty defendants were acquitted, among them Abdel Rahman Youssefi, a leader of the National Union of Popular Forces (NUPF), and a key target of the prosecutor.

The fact that the sentences fell far short of the prosecution's demands indicates that Hassan himself must have intervened behind the scenes in response to the international defense campaign that has been waged for the prisoners.

When the verdict was returned, the huge "plot" to replace Hassan's regime with a democratic republic suddenly was reduced to a much smaller affair. That several leaders of the NUPF were spared death was a tacit admission by Hassan that in reality there was no plot at all.

According to the September 19-20 *Le Monde*, when the verdict was read, the defendants rose and said in unison, "We are all with the NUPF and we will never renounce our party." □