

# Intercontinental Press

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Wide World Photos

## The Attica Rebellion

## Pollution Offers Patriotic Challenge

Residents of the Japanese fishing town of Minamata are still being killed and crippled by the no-longer-mysterious "Minamata disease." It has been known for some time that the disease, which has so far killed forty-six persons, is mercury poisoning resulting from the dumping of wastes by the Japan Nitrogen Company. [See *Intercontinental Press*, April 6, 1970, p. 290.]

The company, Jonathan Unger reported in the August 14 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, has nevertheless continued pouring mercury wastes into Minamata's bay.

Residents of the town decided to buy shares in Japan Nitrogen and then, as stockholders, demand an end to the mercury pollution. The tactic proved ineffective:

"At the May stockholders' meeting in Osaka, company-hired thugs beat up the attending Minamata residents and their sympathisers, injuring a dozen of the new shareholders."

The townspeople have found the government less than helpful in their attempts to avoid poisoning. For twelve years, Unger wrote, the government suppressed a report showing that wastes from the company's factory were lethal.

Some officials in the Sato government have set out to convince the public that being poisoned is a patriotic duty. Cadmium poisoning, which has killed more than 100 persons in Toyama prefecture [see *Intercontinental Press*, December 14, 1970, p. 1074], is spreading rapidly, according to a government survey. Araki Masuo, chairman of the national public safety commission, responded by urging residents of Kyushu to "have the spirit to eat contaminated rice."

Even if their food is not contaminated, many Japanese have no choice about breathing contaminated air. Air pollution in more than half of the country's sixty-six largest cities has passed what the government considers maximum tolerance levels.

In 1971, Tokyo has had twelve days of photochemical smog, resulting in more than 12,000 persons suffering skin, eye, and respiratory irritation. The governor of Tokyo formerly had the power to order factories to close when photochemical smog reached a level of 0.3 parts per million. On June 24, a new national law empowered him to act only when the level reaches 0.5 parts per million. In July 1970, a level of 0.3 resulted in the hospitalization of 4,000 persons. □

### Pound Foolish

In a report released by the U. S. Senate Armed Services Committee September 8, the cost of control and communications equipment in some military aircraft is estimated at more than \$1,000 per pound. By comparison, at \$35 an ounce, gold would sell for \$560 per pound.

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# Attica Rebellion Drowned in Blood

SEPTEMBER 13—At 9:48 o'clock this morning, state police and prison guards armed with automatic weapons and tear gas shot their way into cellblock D of the maximum-security prison in Attica, New York. Five hours later, two small groups of prisoners were reported still holding out, but it was clear that the rebellion that had begun the morning of September 9 was effectively crushed.

State officials had clearly decided that the revolt must be snuffed out even if it meant a bloodbath. In the hail of gunfire, at least thirty-seven persons — twenty-eight prisoners and nine hostages — were killed.

The rebellion began at 8:30 a.m. on September 9, when a group of prisoners refused to line up for a work detail. This apparently spontaneous defiance quickly mushroomed throughout the prison, involving more than half of the 2,254 inmates.

The rebelling prisoners, without means to defend themselves against the attack they knew would come, seized thirty-four guards as hostages. (One, who became ill, was released.) It was this act and the mass solidarity of the rebels that forced the prison administration to restrain itself temporarily and provided the rebels with an opportunity to make their demands known.

During the negotiations in cellblock D, which was under control of the prisoners, the rebels insisted on the presence of reporters in an effort to reach the public. The demands they presented and the statements they read to the press proved that not even concrete walls could keep out the influence of the current radicalization.

Fred Ferretti, one of the reporters who attended the first negotiations on the afternoon of September 9, wrote in the September 10 *New York Times*:

"One inmate, a tall black man, read the first group of demands. He was followed by another black inmate, who called himself L. D. and who read a statement asserting that 'the entire incident that has erupted here at Attica is a result . . . of the unmitigated op-

pression wrought by the racist administration network of this prison.'

"'We are men,' the statement went on. 'We are not beasts, and we do not intend to be beaten or driven as such. . . . What has happened here is but the sound before the fury of those who are oppressed. We will not compromise on any terms except those that are agreeable to us.

"'We call upon all the conscientious citizens of America to assist us in putting an end to this situation that threatens the life of not only us but of each and every person in the United States as well.'"

Some 85 percent of the prisoners at Attica are Black and Puerto Rican, and the demands of the rebels showed their determination to fight against the racist oppression they face. In addition to better food and a minimum wage for work, the prisoners asked for religious freedom [prisons notoriously refuse to grant equal treatment to the Black Muslim religion], Spanish-speaking doctors and a Spanish-language library, no censorship of reading materials, and the right to be politically active.

At one point on September 11, some of the prisoners, who, in the words of lawyer William Kunstler, "considered themselves political prisoners and revolutionaries," demanded "speedy and safe transportation out of confinement to a nonimperialistic country."

Newspaper accounts gave at least some indication of the openly racist attitude of the guards and prison officials. In the September 12 *New York Times*, Ferretti wrote:

"Attica [the town] began getting disturbed, its citizens admit, when the prison population began turning black 'about five years ago.' People who made neat livings taking in as boarders those who came to visit inmates, closed their doors when the visitors turned out to be black.

"Such attitudes go from the town outside the walls inside the walls when the correction officers go to work. It is that attitude which precipitates a response of 'the hell with them, what about the guards?' when one talks

about the conditions under which prisoners contend they live."

This attitude was equally visible in the armament of the police who surrounded the prison as negotiations were under way between the rebels and George Oswald, the New York State Commissioner of Correctional Services. Ferretti reported in the September 10 *Times*:

"Approximately 500 law-enforcement officers, including state troopers from 14 counties, as well as deputy sheriffs and their staffs from surrounding counties and towns, began filing into the prison's main gate yesterday morning [September 9]. . . .

"Marksmen with .270-caliber rifles and sniperscopes were posted atop the highest building within the prison compound. . . .

"The state troopers carried 12-gauge shotguns, with special loads of heavy slugs."

"The sheriff's deputies," Ferretti added, "carried Thompson submachine guns and new AR-15 Army rifles, currently being used in Vietnam."

A committee of observers asked for by the rebels soon took over the task of negotiating. Although the committee's attitude often appeared to be neutral on the side of the administration, Oswald agreed to a list of twenty-eight demands. Many of them were a clear reflection of similar struggles being waged in the Black community. They included:

"Provide adequate food, water and shelter for all inmates. . . .

"Recommend the application of the New York State Minimum Wage Law standards to all work done by inmates. Every effort will be made to make the records of payments available to inmates. . . .

"Allow all New York State prisoners to be politically active without intimidation or reprisal. . . .

"Institute realistic, effective rehabilitation programs for all inmates according to their offense and personal needs.

"Modernize the inmate education system, including the establishment of a [Spanish-language] library. . . .

"Provide a healthy diet, reduce the number of pork dishes, increase fresh fruit daily.

"Provide adequate medical treatment for every inmate. Engage either a Spanish-speaking doctor or interpreters who will accompany Spanish-

speaking inmates to medical interviews.

"Institute a program for the recruitment and employment of a significant number of black and Spanish-speaking officers. . . ."

"Recommend necessary legislation and more adequate funds to expand work relief programs. . . ."

In a September 11 editorial, the *New York Times* acknowledged that "their basic demands are no more radical than decent food, good medical care, adequate recreational opportunities, better rehabilitation programs. These are things that ought to have been provided long ago."

Such demands, however, have a way of being quite radical when the ruling class is unwilling or unable to grant them. In addition, two other demands were refused outright. These were for the dismissal of the warden and amnesty from criminal prosecution for those involved in the rebellion. The latter demand became indispensable to the prisoners on September 12 when a guard who had been injured during earlier fighting died in a hospital.

The prison administration even attempted to use Black Panther party chairman Bobby Seale, who had been brought to Attica at the prisoners' request, to persuade the rebels to surrender. After a brief visit to the prison on September 12, Seale told the press:

"This morning the Commissioner and his aides would not let me in, saying that if I was not going inside to encourage the prisoners to accept the so-called demands made by the [negotiating] committee, they did not want me. I'm not going to do that.

"In addition the Commissioner said that full amnesty was nonnegotiable and removal of the warden at Attica Prison was nonnegotiable. The Black Panther party position is this: The prisoners have to make their own decision. I will not encourage them to compromise their position. . . ."

New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, unwilling to risk tarnishing his liberal image before the public, refused a request from both the prisoners and the negotiating committee that he come to Attica. His responsibility for the outcome was indicated by the September 13 *New York Times*:

"Also at the scene are the Governor's two top aides. . . . A Rockefeller aide said that *no major moves had been*

*made by the state officials without the approval of Mr. Rockefeller.*" (Emphasis added.)

It was the multimillionaire Rockefeller who turned down the rebels' demand for amnesty, explaining piously that granting it "would undermine the very essence of our free society—the

fair and impartial application of the law."

The rebel prisoners, all too familiar with the way capitalist law is really applied, turned down a final ultimatum this morning, and Rockefeller ordered the forces of his society to attack. □

## Uruguay

### 106 Tupamaros Tunnel Out of Prison

"Not a single one of the revolutionists remains in prison whom the president repeatedly and solemnly refused to exchange for diplomats and businessmen kidnapped by members of the National Liberation Movement [the Tupamaros]," the Paris daily *Le Monde* reported in its September 8 issue. In a well-executed operation September 6, 106 members of the Tupamaros made good their escape from the Punta Carretas jail in Montevideo.

Five weeks before that, thirty-eight Tupamaros escaped from a women's prison in the Uruguayan capital. Only forty members of the urban guerrilla organization are still being held, according to a September 7 Reuters dispatch.

Within a few hours of the Punta Carretas escape, the Tupamaros announced that British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson would be released. The guerrillas had kidnapped Jackson January 8 and had held him as a hostage. The announcement, whose authenticity the government denied, said there was no longer any reason to keep the British diplomat.

On September 9, the guerrillas released their prisoner. At 8:00 p.m. Jackson rang the bell of a parish church in one of the northern suburbs of Montevideo and asked to see the priest. The British diplomat waited an agreed time before calling his superiors. He refused to talk to the police who came to question him. After being taken to his embassy in a diplomatic car, Jackson was kept in seclusion for more than a day.

The ambassador's release ended a long, futile manhunt in which Uruguayan President Pacheco Areco had deployed 12,000 soldiers and policemen. The president, a former boxer, had made repeated declarations that he "would not give in to blackmail."



PACHECO: Considers "rules of democratic institutions" a nuisance.

The successful escape of most of the Tupamaro political prisoners caused an uproar. The case had many curious aspects. The revolutionists had made their way out of the prison through a 120-foot tunnel leading into a house on the other side of the wall.

"The operation was coordinated by walkie-talkies which the prisoners and their accomplices on the outside had," the September 8 issue of *Le Monde* noted. Moreover: "The police found drills, shovels, and picks.

"It is hard to imagine how the Tupamaros could have gotten such material and how they could have gotten rid of the earth removed from the tunnel without accomplices inside the prison."

The escape was carried out with precision. A demonstration on the oth-

er side of town drew away the police. The escaping guerrillas emerged in the department of a journalist working for a progovernment paper. They were given civilian clothes and false identity papers. They left the area in waiting buses.

The day after the escape Pacheco Areco accepted the resignation of the Punta Carretas warden, Colonel Pascual Cirilo. In a speech to the country September 11, the president "accused prison security forces of having been corrupted or scared into permitting the Tupamaros to escape," according to a dispatch from Joseph Novitski in the September 12 *New York Times*.

Pacheco Areco said that the government had been handicapped in dealing with the Tupamaros by "the rules of democratic institutions." He announced: "The struggle against subversion will now be turned over to the armed forces."

Following the escape of the Tupamaros, the government made vague accusations against opposition political forces. "In the Ministry of the Interior and in the Government Palace in Montevideo Monday evening [September 6], officials charged 'certain sectors' with supporting the Tupamaros in an attempt to prevent the general elections scheduled for November," the September 8 *Le Monde* reported. The Paris paper speculated that the "sectors" referred to were on the ultraright, since most of the left has joined the Frente Amplio [Broad Front] which expects to make gains in the upcoming elections.

In the September 12 *New York Times*, Joseph Novitski offered his own interpretation of the political objectives involved in the escape:

"Then what did the Tupamaros do? Seek to topple the discredited Government by revolution? No, they publicly endorsed the nationwide elections for President and Congress that are scheduled for Nov. 28.

"The apparent paradox is a good summation of Uruguay. The Tupamaros get headlines but it takes votes to change the government.

"Last week's action thus was a sample of a Tupamaro specialty: controlled use of illegal armed force for long-range political goals. The escape demonstrated minute planning, technical skill, a pool of loyal activists and either complicity or fear within the Government security forces. The

Tupamaros' decision to stop there demonstrated their awareness that they can count on a degree of popular

## France

# Wide Support for 'Rouge' in Battling Censorship by Police

The second stage of the trial of Charles Michaloux, executive editor of the Paris revolutionary-socialist weekly *Rouge*, is due to open September 28.

Michaloux is charged with five counts of libel in connection with articles published between October 12, 1970, and March 15, 1971, attacking repressive actions by the French police. The revolutionary journalist made an initial court appearance on July 6, and his case has won wide support since then from prominent personalities, the bourgeois press, and a number of political groups in addition to the Ligue Communiste (Communist League), French section of the Fourth International, which publishes *Rouge*. (See *Intercontinental Press*, July 12, p. 662, and July 26, p. 705, for earlier developments in the *Rouge* case.)

Protest telegrams have been sent from various countries to the Seventeenth Court of Summary Jurisdiction, where the trial is taking place.

The libel indictments were initiated by Minister of Interior Raymond Marcellin, who previously had been unsuccessful in attempting to suppress another left-wing journal, *La Cause du Peuple*.

"Through heavy use of trials, Marcellin seeks to choke off the revolutionary press," *Rouge* commented in its September 6 issue. "The method of systematic suppressions, tried out on *La Cause du Peuple*, proved ultimately ineffective. Far from 'sinking' the anarcho-Maoist journal, he won for it the sympathy and, in fact, the support of broad layers of democratic opinion, particularly sensitive to any assault upon freedom of the press. Contributions and sustaining subscriptions flowed massively into the *Cause du Peuple's* offices.

"The Minister of Interior was finally forced to abandon his war of attrition against *La Cause du Peuple*. Learning from this mishap, Marcellin

support only for well-executed, bloodless challenges to a Government widely regarded as inept." □

is shifting tactics. He intends henceforward to gag the press of the far left without formally attacking the sacrosanct 'democratic principles' to which too many journalists and workers are still attached. He will strike from now on at the pocketbook, and quite directly. Libel trials, with their attendant heavy fines, are aimed at achieving what the repeated suppressions failed to do: by bankrupting the revolutionary newspapers, the Minister of Interior hopes to smother completely the growth of the far-left groups."

*Rouge* noted that French workers are becoming increasingly disturbed by Marcellin's attacks against the left, as evidenced by the support the newspaper has been winning.

"The Ligue Communiste has waged since July a political campaign in defense of *Rouge*. More than 150 personalities have signed a declaration of solidarity with the indicted articles. One million [old] francs [approximately US\$2,000] have come in to the emergency fund from its readers. At our request, most of the large newspapers (*Combat*, *Le Monde*, *l'Observateur*) have by and large reported on Marcellin's foul blow; they have published excerpts from the indicted articles. Only the management of *l'Express* felt this would be too risky." □

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# The Duel Between the Dollar and the Yen

By Allen Myers

At a September 10 news conference following two days of meetings between Japanese and U. S. cabinet members in Washington, Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda remarked that both sides had expressed their opinions in "loud voices."

The loudest words, presumably, were "no"—in Japanese and English. The Nixon administration refused to lift the 10 percent import surcharge imposed August 15 and the Sato regime turned down the U. S. demand for a revaluation of the yen.

The conference, which the Nixon government had hoped would be the occasion for a Japanese surrender, thus ended in a standoff, and a widening trade war may be in the offing.

In announcing his unilateral economic measures August 15, Nixon declared that the tax surcharge was not intended to launch such a trade war: "This import tax is a temporary action. It isn't directed against any other country. It's an action to make certain that American products will not be at a disadvantage because of unfair exchange rates."

Nixon's expressed desire for commercial peace rang with all the sincerity of his often-expressed hopes for peace in Indochina. In both cases, his idea of peace is that the other side should not respond to his attacks.

While the U. S. economy stands to benefit from devaluation of the dollar relative to European currencies, Washington has made no secret of the fact that the main target of U. S. attacks is the yen. Writing from Washington in the August 18 *New York Times*, Edwin L. Dale Jr. reported:

"High officials make unmistakably clear that the chief focus of the United States policy is the Japanese yen. One stated freely today his view that the yen was 'undervalued' by as much as 20 or even 25 per cent."

U. S. capitalism hopes by such a revaluation to regain some of its competitive position, which has slipped severely over the last decade. Statistics published by the Commerce Department

in the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* indicate the magnitude of the shift that has taken place.

In 1960, U. S. exports to Japan totalled \$1,447,000,000 and imports were \$1,149,000,000, giving the U. S. a trade surplus of \$298,000,000. By 1965, U. S. exports had risen to \$2,080,000,000 while imports had increased to \$2,414,000,000, a surplus of \$334,000,000 for Japanese industry.

In 1968, the Japanese surplus rose to \$1,100,000,000, and in 1969, when Japanese industry exported \$4,888,000,000 in goods to the U. S., the margin was \$1,398,000,000.

In 1970, according to figures published in the September 9 *New York Times*, Japanese exports to the American market jumped 21 percent, to \$5,940,000,000. In the first seven months of this year the rate of increase was 30 percent.

In the last six years, Koji Nakamura reported in the September 4 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Japanese capitalism has accumulated a surplus of \$6,120,000,000 in trade with the United States.

The 10 percent import surcharge, even if it does not succeed in forcing a Japanese revaluation, is expected to have a severe effect on the Japanese economy. Junnosuke Ofusa reported from Tokyo in the September 9 *New York Times* that the Japanese Trade Ministry expected the surcharge to cost Japanese business \$1,670,000,000 a year in exports to the United States and another \$710,000,000 in sales to other countries whose foreign exchange holdings will be affected by the tax.

Wall Street could scarcely conceal its joy at the prospective damage to its competitor. The August 28 issue of *Business Week* quoted a manager of Nippon Steel Corporation as saying, "We're in a depression, you know."

The magazine added, without even a pretense of sympathy:

"The recession started last year when

signs of market saturation began appearing in major industries such as autos. The government tightened credit to combat inflation, and companies began cutting back on capital investments. Now signs of excess industrial capacity are appearing everywhere. The steel companies, for example, produced 94-million tons last year. The estimate for 1971 is now down to 88-million tons. . . .

"In previous recessions, the Japanese took up the slack at home by redoubling their export drive. Now the 10% U. S. import surcharge is expected to cut sales to the U. S., currently running at an annual rate of around \$7-billion, by anywhere from \$1-billion to \$2-billion. If Japanese companies try to offset the loss by an aggressive sales push in Western Europe, governments there may react with restrictions of their own. The Japanese are looking at Eastern Europe as one potential area of export growth. . . . But if President Nixon succeeds in forcing a general realignment of major foreign currencies, Japanese exporters would be hit harder than their competitors in markets all over the world."

According to *Business Week*, many Japanese capitalists regard revaluation of the yen as preferable to the continuation of the surcharge. Nevertheless, for twelve days after Nixon's opening salvo, the Japanese government intervened in the currency market to maintain the exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar.

The result was a massive influx of dollars despite rigid exchange controls maintained by the government. The September 6 issue of *Newsweek* estimated that between August 15 and August 27 the Japanese central bank had purchased at least \$4,000,000,000. This brought Japanese holdings to over \$12,000,000,000—more than the value of all the gold in Fort Knox.

The attempt to maintain the old parity was milked for all it was worth by Japanese capitalists. Anyone who could obtain dollars—often on credit—rushed to convert them into yen. Selig S. Harrison reported from Tokyo in the August 24 *Washington Post*:

"Informed sources indicate that a significant portion of the dollars purchased since the Nixon announcement has been in the form of advance payments sought from U. S. importers for

Japanese goods to be supplied during the next year."

"Newspaper and TV commentators," Harrison wrote, "are suggesting with increasing bluntness that the government has continued to buy dollars mainly to help politically powerful trading combines at the expense of the man in the street."

What is at stake is not only the future competitive position of Japanese industry, but hundreds of millions of dollars in existing contracts. Because of the dollar's role as an international currency, nearly all Japanese export contracts are in dollars. The shipbuilding industry, for example, has long-term foreign contracts worth \$7,000,000,000, and would thus stand to lose \$140,000,000 from a 20 percent revaluation of the yen.

With sums like this at stake, it is not surprising that Nixon found it necessary to use his most powerful weapon—the ability to restrict access to the world's largest market—to force revaluation on the Japanese ruling class. Nor is it surprising that the latter shows signs of fighting him every inch of the way.

When the Sato government finally announced that it would allow the yen to float upward relative to the dollar, the measure was not a surrender so much as it was a tactical retreat. The move was described as temporary, and the central bank again intervened to keep the yen at 338 to the dollar—an effective revaluation of a little more than 6 percent.

This appeared to be as far as Sato was prepared to go at present. His government let it be known that it expected any further changes in parity to come from a devaluation of the dollar relative to gold—a measure also recommended by the European Common Market's executive commission at its September 10 meeting in Brussels.

Nixon, however, has ruled out a change in the price of gold for two reasons.

First, a devaluation of the dollar sufficient to bring it into line with European currencies would not, in the view of U. S. capitalists, erase the advantage of the yen, which is considered to be more undervalued than the currency of any Common Market country.

Second, devaluing the dollar would provide a giant windfall for those countries holding gold—including

leading competitors of the U. S. such as France.

The battle shaping up between Japanese and American capital is far from decided. Japanese capitalism, while it will be hurt by the import surcharge, is far from defenseless. Takashi Oka reported from Tokyo in the August 21 *New York Times*:

"Exporters estimate that the 10 percent American surcharge could reduce their total sales to the United States by \$1.3-billion to \$2-billion. But it is becoming clearer that if the surcharge is applied to all countries, Japan's principal exports, such as automobiles and television sets, will still be more competitive than those of any other country."

Even with the expected decline in exports to the United States, Junnosuke Ofusa pointed out in the September 9 issue of the *Times*, the figure for 1971 is still likely to be higher than for 1970. And the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, in an editorial in its September 4 issue, added that the limited effective revaluation that has so far occurred could result in an increase in the value of Japanese exports:

"Behind all the smoke screens put up from Tokyo over the last few weeks, authoritative Japanese estimates indicate that revaluation could bring Japan an even bigger trade surplus. Before Nixon's measures, Tokyo was expecting a balance of payments surplus in the current financial year of \$5,640 million—and \$6,950 million next year. With the yen revalued by something under 6%, this year's surplus could be well over \$6,000 million and next year's about \$8,000 million. This seeming paradox arises from Japan's need to buy essential supplies from abroad (whose prices fall with revaluation), while the volume of goods exported at the new higher prices could slip only marginally, despite America's import surcharge."

The Japanese government also has a certain amount of political leverage and has shown that it is willing to use it. During a press conference in Washington, Fukuda announced that it was unlikely that Sato would co-sponsor Nixon's resolution on seating China in the United Nations, which is designed to maintain a seat for the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Tad Szulc wrote in the September 12 *New York Times*:

"This step—some diplomats bluntly called it Tokyo's 'revenge'—knocked the props from under the American diplomatic strategy. Japan's hesitation, and in all likelihood refusal, to act as a co-sponsor was immediately seen as a signal to other potential sponsors, such as Australia and New Zealand, to stay away, too."

The longer the Japanese are able to resist Nixon's pressure for revaluation, the more will Nixon feel pressure from European capital, particularly the Common Market, for repeal of the import surcharge. A report submitted to the council of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) September 11 held that the surcharge is contrary to GATT regulations and justifies counteractions against the U. S. by other countries.

While no such counteractions have yet been taken, they clearly become more and more of a possibility the longer the surcharge is in effect. Nixon will not be allowed to forget the fact that the United States last year exported \$16,000,000,000 worth of goods to the Common Market, nor the fact that American capitalism averages a \$2,000,000,000 yearly trade surplus with those countries.

The generally restrained initial reaction to Nixon's moves on the part of U. S. capitalism's European competitors was in part occasioned by ignorance of how big a sacrifice they were being asked to make. In the September 12 *New York Times*, Robert Kleiman reported that Nixon is asking them to absorb "a far greater increase in American exports than they had dreamed would be sought."

"The new estimates," Kleiman wrote, "suggested that Treasury Secretary John B. Connally . . . is setting a high price for ending the world monetary and trade crisis. The improvement he seeks of up to \$12-billion in the United States balance of payments must be achieved, in his view, mainly by revaluing upward the currencies of America's major commercial partners abroad to restore a large American trade surplus."

Since all major European curren-

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cies except the French franc have been permitted to float freely, these "partners" have already made major concessions. They will therefore be all the more unwilling to accept an indefinite continuation of the surcharge.

In a September 12 editorial, the *New York Times* warned that a prolonged

deadlock between the U. S. and Japan could lead to a full-scale trade war.

"The 10 per cent surcharge," the editors wrote, "has served as a lever to start movement toward a needed realignment of exchange rates and a major reform of the international monetary system. But any hint of Ameri-

can intention to freeze in the import surcharge and the discriminatory features of the proposed 10 per cent investment tax credit will push other nations to a conviction that the Nixon doctrine in the economic area is protectionist—a conviction that would bring worldwide retaliation." □

## On Trial Under Terrorism Act

# Appeal for South African Political Prisoners

[The following letter, dated July 9, is reprinted from the August issue of *APDUSA*, which is published by the London Committee of the Unity Movement of South Africa.

[The fourteen defendants described in the letter were among thirty members of the Unity Movement arrested last February in nationwide police raids. For further information about the case, see the articles in the July 19 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, pp. 682 and 683.]

\* \* \*

Dear Friends,

As a friend of the people of South Africa, we are addressing this letter to you.

On August the 2nd, two major political trials will begin—one in Pretoria and the other in Pietermaritzburg.

The Dean of Johannesburg, the Very Reverend French-Beytagh, will appear in the Pretoria Supreme Court, on a number of counts under the *Terrorism Act*.

Fourteen members of the Unity Movement of South Africa and the African People's Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA) will appear in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court on four counts *under the same Act*.

We, Devi Venkatrathnam, Toni Wilcox and Christina Vusani, who are wives of three of the Accused in the Pietermaritzburg trial, have formed a committee to appeal for funds for the defence of all fourteen of those Accused.

There will be two or three months' protracted trial (intensive preparations for which have already started), requiring defence teams of attorneys and advocates at an estimated cost of Fifty Thousand Rand (R50,000) [0.714 rand equals US\$1] (equivalent to about £28,500 sterling). Neither the

accused nor their families are in a position to finance the case.

Since February this year (when the Accused were held in detention—in solitary confinement and incommunicado) the families have scarcely been able to make ends meet and the position has not improved since the middle of June (when the Accused were formally charged, allowed out of solitary confinement and permitted to interview their legal advisers and have visits from their families) as the Attorney-General (who has sole discretion in such matters in Terrorist Trials) has refused bail and the Accused are still in custody. The families, deprived of their bread-winners are scarcely able to make ends meet; and have had a harassing time in the first stages, not knowing the fate of the Accused and now fearful of the results of the pending trial.

The allegations against our men are:—

(i) that they conspired with various APDUSA and Unity Movement members now in Zambia, to receive, collect, solicit and hold funds available to finance a campaign to recruit people in South Africa to undergo political and military training, and to persuade and assist people to leave the country secretly, and also to assist people to evade the police.

(ii) that they endangered the maintenance of law and order, and, with APDUSA and the Unity Movement of South Africa, sought to overthrow the Government by force of arms and with foreign assistance.

(iii) that certain of our men have incited, instigated or procured at least 32 people to undergo military training.

Despite the burdens we are now facing, of caring for our children, providing economically for our families, attending to the needs of the Accused,

we feel we cannot let them down with their defence requirements and we have decided to appeal to you and to other good friends of the people of South Africa, to assist us in raising the necessary funds to ensure an adequate defence for the Accused, particularly bearing in mind the drastic clauses of the Terrorism Act (a new law passed in 1967) amongst which are the following:

(a) For a convicted person the *minimum* sentence is 5 years and the *maximum* is the death sentence; and while the death sentence is out of the question here, the maximum penalty is an indication of the seriousness of the consequences of a conviction for the Accused.

(b) Despite such serious consequences to the Accused, the burden of proof is to a considerable extent removed from the prosecution. Once the State has proved *prima facie* (the lowest burden of proof in a court) that the Accused have committed any of the specified acts against the State (or conspired or enticed or in any way procured the commission of such act) the burden of proof moves to the defence.

(c) *The defence must then prove innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the greatest burden of proof in a court.*

(d) The definition of 'terrorist' is so wide that onus falls on the Accused, if it is proved that he committed or attempted to commit, or conspired to commit Acts which had or were likely to have any (amongst others) of the following results in the South African Republic: (i) to hamper or deter any person from assisting in the maintenance of law and order; (ii) to promote, by intimidation, the achievement of any object; (iii) to cripple or prejudice any industry or un-

dertaking generally or the production or distribution of commodities of food-stuffs at any place. (There are altogether 12 such provisions, but we give you the first three, to enable you to have some idea of how much easier it has been made for the State to prove charges against the Accused.)

(e) Prospective witnesses can be (and a number of key witnesses for the State are being) held incommunicado and in solitary confinement, until they give evidence against the Accused. Should they fail to give evidence, such witnesses can be sentenced to up to a year's imprisonment.

To give you some idea of the Accused and their families, we enclose a list of the Accused and general particulars of each of them.

There are 10 Africans, 2 Coloureds and 2 Indians. Their occupations vary: 3 building workers, 2 peasants, 1 schoolteacher, 1 bookkeeper, 4 clerks, 2 attorneys and 1 student (an articulated clerk). Their ages vary from 31 to 65 years.

The Unity Movement of South Africa and APDUSA have amongst their aims, the following:

(i) The Franchise for all, regardless of race, creed, colour or sex.

(ii) Compulsory education for all children.

(iii) Freedom of speech and movement.

(iv) Full equality of rights for all citizens.

It is difficult to collect money in South Africa, because of the general fear of victimisation. It is for this reason that we are sending appeals of this nature overseas.

While our men come from different racial groups, they are non-racial in their outlook.

As the Accused are all pleading not guilty, in our desperation, we appeal to you to set up a Fund in your country to collect money for our defence. . . .\*

Thanking you, Yours truly,

(Mrs) Devi Venkatrathnam

(Mrs) Toni Wilcox

(Mrs) Christina Vusani

\* A sentence here, which we have omitted, gave the address of an attorney in South Africa to whom funds could be sent. However, the editors of APDUSA note that the attorney has himself since been arrested under the Terrorism Act. Information on how to communicate with the Committee of the Wives of the Accused can be obtained from: London Committee of the Unity Movement, 120 Grandison Road, London SW11, England. — IP

## 'Vote of Confidence' Will Satisfy Thieu

In officially opening his campaign in the one-candidate Saigon presidential elections, President Thieu announced September 11 how South Vietnamese voters could cast their ballots. He would consider, he said in a television speech, all regular ballots to be votes of confidence, and all irregular ones to be votes of non-confidence.

And what would a vote of non-confidence mean? If he didn't receive 50 percent of the votes cast in the October 3 elections, Thieu said, he would resign. However, he urged voters not to "oppose the great cause of the nation."

Thieu did not explain how voters could render their ballots "irregular." "Other [Saigon] officials have said, however," reports the September 12 *New York Times*, "that a voter could do so only by mutilating the ballot or by throwing it away and putting an empty envelope in the ballot box."

"Accordingly," continues the report, "most observers and diplomats expect Mr. Thieu to have no trouble in meeting his percentage goal and gaining re-election to another four-year term, barring unforeseen events, such as a coup d'état, between now and election day."

Vice President Ky, who was ruled out of the presidential elections by Thieu, has himself threatened to lead a coup against the president. In an informal news conference on September 3, Ky was reported to have said:

"I am going to destroy Thieu and all his clique. . . . I told [American Ambassador] Bunker in 1967 and 1968 that I was the only man in Vietnam who could make a coup. . . ."

Most foreign observers, however, regarded Ky's threats as an attempt to bluff Thieu into stepping down and doubted that he "is capable of mounting a serious coup d'état against President Thieu," according to the September 6 *New York Times*.

All the same, Thieu appeared to be taking no chances with the military. In an obvious attempt to undercut any possible opposition to his maneuvers to stay in power, he promoted twenty-eight generals. He also put one of his henchmen at the head of the 120,000-strong police force.

Among those promoted was Gener-

al Ngo Dzu, commander of Military Region II. Jack Anderson, writing in the September 9 *Washington Post*, asserts that intelligence reports, which have reached Washington from Saigon, confirm U. S. Congressman Robert Steele's charges that Dzu is one of the leading heroin-traffickers in Southeast Asia.

The transparent manner in which Thieu has gone about eliminating any possibility of his losing the October elections has caused considerable embarrassment to his supporters in the U. S. government. For instance, Senator Henry M. Jackson, a notorious hawk, threatened September 11 to withdraw his support for U. S. military and economic aid to the Saigon government unless Thieu's one-man election farce is replaced by a "meaningful political contest."

While the election farce continues, a new escalation of the war appears under way. Some 10,000 Saigon troops are driving toward the Laotian border. The drive is being backed by massive U. S. air and artillery power, and American ground troops have occupied support bases in the area. □

## ERP in Prison Break

Commandos of the People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo — ERP) freed fourteen of their comrades from prison in Tucumán, Argentina, September 6, according to Reuters.

"Five prison guards were killed and three were wounded in the escape," reported Reuters. The same source said that four of the prisoners were recaptured the following day.

Press accounts vary on details. The Paris daily *Le Monde* reported September 8 that only five prisoners were freed.

The commandos entered the prison in a panel truck ordinarily used to haul bottled gas, according to *Le Monde*. The guard permitted the truck to pass.

"Once inside, the guerrillas machine-gunned the guards, killing five and wounding three. Despite roadblocks around the city, none of those who escaped have been recaptured." □

# Expose Government Lies in Jackson Killing

Protest against the murder of Soledad Brother George Jackson by San Quentin prison guards has begun to mount.

At an August 25 press conference in Los Angeles, representatives of a group of Third World and Black organizations charged the California Department of Corrections with responsibility for "the cowardly murder of George Jackson."

The official government version of the incident is that Jackson had received a pistol, smuggled in by a visitor, and had then slipped it past guards back to his cell, where he later used it in an escape attempt.

*The Militant* of September 10 reported a description of the San Quentin security arrangements given at the press conference by former inmate James Standifer:

"You strip off all your clothes. First you bend over and spread the cheeks of your behind. You turn around again and raise your testicles. The officers examine all these areas. Then you turn around again and raise your feet one at a time and he looks under your feet. Then you turn around, you open your mouth, you turn your head, show him the inside of both your ears. You lower your head and run your fingers through your hair. You show him the top and bottom of your hands. You raise both arms and show him your armpits. You do this four times when you go from the Adjustment Center—or any other disciplinary area—to the visiting center."

Rella Brown, coordinator of the press conference, described the procedure undergone by visitors:

"When you go in, any letters in your possession are taken from you. A thorough check is made of your luggage. You go through a metal detector. On a couple of occasions, I had on a metal buckle or metal earrings and was asked to take them off. If you have any metal on you, it registers with a beep. Then you have to come back through again, continuously, until you pass."

Those are the security checks Jack-

son and his visitor are supposed to have eluded.

John Cluchette and Fleeta Drumgo, the two surviving Soledad Brothers, described the August 21 murder in discussions with their lawyers. The September 3 *Los Angeles Free Press* reported their account. The guards had begun moving certain people from the second and third tiers of cells to the first—an unusual transfer that took place with no explanation. After the guards had moved everyone they wanted to the first tier, the prisoners were ordered out of their cells.

The guards then opened fire. Jackson ran out into the courtyard to draw fire away from the other prisoners. Normally, the yard is sealed shut by a heavy door that can be opened only from the outside. This time it was open. The courtyard itself is surrounded by a twenty-foot wall guarded with expert marksmen in watchtowers. There is no way out of the courtyard, and no spot in it is hidden from the watchtowers. As Jackson ran across the yard, he was shot dead by the guards.

On August 26 Richard Silver, defense attorney for Drumgo and Cluchette, introduced a motion that his clients be transferred to the San Francisco County Jail. Drumgo had testified that his life has been repeatedly threatened by guards and that he and Cluchette are regularly beaten.

Judge Carl Allen, claiming that he could see no evidence of beatings, denied the motion.

At that point, Drumgo rose to his feet and stripped to the waist, revealing welts from a recent beating. "Kill me now! You're going to kill me anyway!" he shouted.

Doris Maxwell, Cluchette's mother, cried out when she saw Drumgo's condition, and Allen ordered her removed from the courtroom.

When several spectators tried to defend her right to remain, the notorious San Francisco Tactical Squad cops charged into the courtroom and began clubbing and kicking spectators.

A report of the incident by Karen

Wald, published in the September 3 *Los Angeles Free Press*, described the beating of one of the spectators, Phil Price, as "the most bloody" ever seen even in a riot situation, let alone a courtroom.

When the cops were finished, according to Wald's account, "an officer said, 'We need some injured men,' and several officers wiped their hands in Phil's blood, rubbed it on their own faces, and went off to have their pictures taken."

The victims were charged with assaulting a police officer.

About 300 people gathered for an emergency rally after the cops' attack. Picketing of San Quentin prison was organized by the San Francisco United Committee to Defend Angela Davis.

On August 27, Congressman Ron Dellums arrived to investigate conditions in San Quentin and urged the demonstrators to disperse and leave everything to him. Although this statement was ill-received, it managed to demoralize a certain number of the picketers, and the demonstration gradually trickled to an end.

In the wake of the Jackson killing, Howard Moore Jr., chief attorney for Angela Davis, announced that he would seek a change of venue for the Davis trial. He told newsmen on September 7 that "events at San Quentin make it impossible to get a fair trial," since the courtroom is only five miles from the prison.

Another defense attorney, Sheldon Otis, has already challenged the constitutionality of the procedure whereby the grand jurors who indicted Angela Davis were selected, arguing that the grand jurors had been chosen "intentionally, with premeditation, and with malice aforethought" to exclude the "young, the poor or members of minority groups."

Linda Jenness and Andrew Pulley, the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of the Socialist Workers party, issued a statement denouncing the murder of Jackson and two other prisoners. "We condemn the systematic and brutal violence which goes on daily in the prisons—the real cause of 'unrest' among prisoners. . . . We call for an independent public investigation of the San Quentin murders, to be controlled by the Black community, including Black prisoners and former prisoners." □

## Wall Street Journal' Describes Terror

Joaquin Balaguer's reign of terror in the Dominican Republic is even more severe than that of the Trujillo era, according to a lengthy article by A. Kent MacDougall in the September 7 *Wall Street Journal*. Writing from Santo Domingo, MacDougall reported:

"The terrorism, corruption and misery that marked Rafael Trujillo's 31-year dictatorship of the Dominican Republic are even more widespread today under constitutionally elected President Joaquin Balaguer."

One "long-time resident" told MacDougall the difference between Trujillo's rule and Balaguer's:

"The generalissimo [Trujillo] ruled with an iron fist, and nobody did anything without his okay. Those who stepped out of line usually just disappeared. Today the killing is less controlled and more open."

MacDougall also confirmed the persistent reports that Balaguer stands behind the terrorist gang known as La Banda, whose existence the U.S.-backed dictator continues to deny. An army colonel in San Cristobal who made the mistake of arresting several of the terrorists was quickly removed from his command at Balaguer's order.

"In 1970," MacDougall wrote, ". . . the newspaper *El Nacional* counted 190 political murders. This year's body count totaled 83 through June, and the murder rate has increased since then. While the victims have included a handful of policemen and soldiers, most have been leftist opponents of the Balaguer government."

MacDougall presented some economic statistics that explain why the terror has been most intense in the slums of Santo Domingo:

"Mr. Balaguer recently put unemployment at 400,000, or about 33% of the estimated job force of 1.2 million. Unemployment is thought to approach 50% in some neighborhoods of Santo Domingo, whose population, swollen by the influx from the countryside, has doubled to more than 700,000 in the last decade."

MacDougall also threw some light on a more optimistic report by Alan Riding that was printed in the finan-

cial section of the September 6 *New York Times*. According to Riding, the country is experiencing a certain economic recovery:

"The Dominican Republic's economy, apparently recovered from the disastrous effects of the 1965 civil war, is now adjusting to a reduction of direct assistance from the United States."

Riding cited certain public projects as evidence:

"Large hydroelectric dams are being built at Valdesia and Tavera, which should improve the agricultural sector's irrigation capacity, while new road-building and housing projects are constantly being announced."

MacDougall's article evaluated these projects a bit more critically:

## Kremlin Offers Guns to Suharto

## Soviet Aid for Indonesian Dictatorship

The first contingent of a Soviet technical mission arrived in Jakarta August 24 to study the feasibility of resuming aid projects that were discontinued in 1965 following the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Communists by the Suharto dictatorship.

For more than a year, the Kremlin bureaucracy has shown increasing willingness to help out the Indonesian military regime. In August 1970, Moscow generously agreed to reschedule over a thirty-year period the repayment of some \$800,000,000 loaned to the Sukarno government prior to the military take-over.

The projects to be surveyed by the Soviet technicians include a fertilizer plant and a steel mill. At least two other projects will be skipped for the time being, however. James P. Sterba reported from Jakarta in the August 25 *New York Times*:

"An atomic reactor near Jakarta and an oceanographic institute on the eastern island of Ambon were also among the major projects left uncompleted when Soviet aid was halted,

"The irrigation water provided by dams frequently goes to waste because of poorly maintained canals and gates; some big land owners pay little or nothing for irrigation water while small farmers can't buy it at any price. New schools often lack desks, forcing children to carry chairs from home. Few teachers have more than an eighth-grade education. . . .

"Life is dismal for most Dominicans in both city and country. Houses are typically one-room shacks, with a dirt floor, a palm-leaf or flattened-metal roof, and no running water. Overcrowding is severe. Only 30% of city dwellers have bacteriologically acceptable drinking water."

And McDougall noted that the "reduction of direct assistance" from the Nixon administration does not apply to at least one area. The U.S. government continues to provide "substantial aid, including training, equipment and arms," to Balaguer's army and police. □

but these projects are not included in the team's survey. Indonesian officials contend that the reactor would cost too much to complete and say privately that they do not want the Soviet specialists on Ambon, which is near a large detention camp for Communist political prisoners on the island of Buru."

Moscow proffered more than economic aid to the dictatorship.

"The Soviet Union has also offered to sell badly needed military spare parts on credit to Indonesia," Sterba reported, "but air force and navy officers are reluctant to accept, asserting that much of their Soviet-built equipment is now beyond repair." □

### Man of Principle

Senator Edmund Muskie, a leading contender for the Democratic party presidential nomination in 1972, told a group of Black community leaders in Los Angeles September 7 that if he wins the nomination, he will not choose a Black politician as his vice-presidential candidate.

The reason, he said, is that he doesn't believe such a ticket could win.

# Deepening Crisis in Ireland Worries U.S. Rulers

In two editorials during the week of September 5-12, the most authoritative voice of the American bourgeoisie, the *New York Times*, expressed worry about the deepening crisis in Ireland. In its September 5 issue, the *Times* had some advice for the second "Anglo-Saxon" imperialist power:

"Under these circumstances, the British Government has to make a broader, bolder effort to find a political settlement. The road to that settlement inevitably leads to Dublin. Only if there is a political arrangement which the Dublin Government is prepared to endorse and, in effect, to guarantee are the Catholics in the North going to calm down and permit a new status quo to evolve."

The *Times* warned: "In Mr. Lynch, Prime Minister Heath has the most reasonable partner he can hope to have in finding his way out of the Irish maze. Unless negotiations on fundamental issues are begun now, violent events may erode Mr. Lynch's political position in Dublin as violence has already destroyed the viability of Catholic and Protestant moderates in the North."

When the September 5-7 talks between Heath and Lynch ended in a new apparent collision, with Heath refusing to concede to the Dublin premier any right to participate in discussions on changes in the Northern Irish structure, the *Times* became still more worried. On September 9, its editors wrote:

"On the face of it, only one conclusion is possible from the futile London conference of British and Irish Prime Ministers on the crisis in Northern Ireland: Neither Edward Heath nor John Lynch has yet realized how rapidly Ulster is drifting toward civil war, with all the terrible consequences that could bring for everyone. . . ."

"The whole British pace and attitude show an appalling lack of understanding of how completely the situation in Ulster has polarized in recent weeks. . . ."

New talks were scheduled, involving Heath, Lynch, and the Northern Irish premier Brian Faulkner. But it remained unclear if any of them were prepared to make concessions.

More importantly, there has not yet been any indication in the press wheth-



STREET IN BELFAST during protests that followed imposition of internment without

trial. Force of nationalist movement now alarms U.S. ruling class.

er either Dublin or London has made any progress in achieving its fundamental objective in negotiations. As defined by Bernard Weinraub in the September 7 *New York Times*, Heath's main objective is to convince Lynch to suppress all nationalist activity in the Twenty-Six County area ruled by Dublin, despite the danger of political unrest this would involve.

On the other hand, Lynch needs concessions from the London government that will restore his credibility as well as that of the moderate Catholic leaders in arbitrating for the nationalist minority in the North. The extent to which one or the other side is able to concede on these questions may well determine the next phase of the crisis. □

## Four Trotskyists Killed in Combat Against Coup

The Bolivian Trotskyists fought valiantly in the struggle against Colonel Banzer's coup d'etat. Four were killed, among them Tomás Chambi, a revolutionary peasant leader who was a member of the Central Committee of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Bolivian section of the Fourth International).

Apparently expecting that he might not survive the combat, Chambi wrote on a piece of paper which was found in his pocket: "Yo soy un militante del Partido Obrero Revolucionario, que me enseñó a

ser valiente y combatiente por una causa justa. Pro la liberación nacional y siempre hasta la victoria final." [I am a member of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, which taught me to fight valiantly and militantly for a just cause. For national liberation until the final victory is won.]

From sources in La Paz, it has been learned that 500 persons have been arrested. According to *The Nation* (September 13), the liberal New York weekly, 110 persons were killed and 600 wounded in the coup d'etat. □

## New Measures Against Socialist Youth

Despite its Draconian, repressive measures, Sirimavo Bandaranaike's "United Front" government in Ceylon has apparently failed in its attempts completely to smash the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna [JVP—People's Liberation Front]. New measures announced by the government indicate its continued fear of the rebel youth organization.

"Fifteen thousand arrests and many killings later," B. H. S. Jayewardene wrote from Colombo in the September 4 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "Ceylon still is gripped by fears of insurrection. Last week a dusk to dawn curfew was reintroduced in four north-central districts following reports of isolated terrorist activities. The curfew in the capital itself continues.

"The government reportedly has received confidential security reports that rebellious elements continue to be active in some parts of the country. This may have contributed to its decision to disarm the nation. All gun licences have been withdrawn by special gazette notification and all licence holders asked to surrender their weapons immediately. New licences will be issued on a very selective basis."

Another indication of the government's fears was provided by the pro-Moscow Communist party, a junior partner in the governing coalition. The CP, Jayewardene reported, recently felt the need to adopt a long resolution attacking the JVP.

In the time-tested Stalinist fashion, the CP resolution slandered the JVP's armed resistance to the government's attacks as "reactionary and potentially counter-revolutionary." The CP went to the lengths of criticizing the former government of the reactionary United National party (UNP) *from the right*. The UNP, the CP complained, had not done enough to suppress the socialist youth of the JVP:

"It has now been disclosed that Dudley Senanayake's UNP government, although fully aware of the existence, nature and personnel of these ultra-leftist groups, did nothing of any consequence to combat their activities which it regarded as directed mainly

against the United Front parties."

One sentence of their resolution betrays the reason for the CP chiefs' hysterical attacks on the JVP:

"Simultaneously attempts were

## Philippines

### Senator Diokno Resigns Over Bombing

On August 31, a leading figure in President Marcos's government, Senator Jose W. Diokno, resigned in protest against the Philippine army's complicity in the August 21\* bombing attack on an election rally of the opposition Liberal party. Nine persons were killed outright in the attack, and ninety-six were wounded, including many leaders of the Liberal party.

Marcos reacted to the bombing by suspending the constitutional right to writs of habeas corpus for those arrested on charges of "insurrection." He claimed that a full-scale Maoist-led rebellion was under way throughout the Philippines.

Liberal party leaders condemned the breach of the constitution and accused Marcos of being responsible for the bombing.

Senator Diokno ridiculed the charge that the bombing had been carried out by the Communists. He said that fragments from one grenade found at the site of the rally indicated that it had come from an army armory. This meant, said Diokno, that either the military, or men trained by the military, were responsible for throwing the hand grenades.

However, a presidential spokesman said that while the military origin of the grenades was not disputed, the president remained convinced, on the basis of intelligence reports, that the bombing had been committed by subversives.

Apparently these intelligence reports were not made available to a Senate committee set up to investigate Mar-

\* Last week's *Intercontinental Press* mistakenly gave the date as August 20.

made, with varying degrees of success, to penetrate, confuse and disorientate the youth and the student movements of the three United Front parties."

It is easy to believe that CP youth, tired of their party's role of preserving capitalism in Ceylon, would have been attracted to the JVP. The Stalinist hacks know no better way to stop such "disorientation" than the physical liquidation of the rebel youth it considers responsible. □

cos's charges. On September 6 this committee reported that "no clear and present danger of a Communist-inspired insurrection or rebellion" exists, as Marcos had claimed.

On the contrary, the report found that the immediate concerns of the public in the northern Philippines, where the rebellion was supposed to be centered, were lawlessness, poverty, government corruption, a lack of justice, and oppression by the rich and powerful.

Diokno also said that despite Marcos's denunciation, the student activists were not going underground but were demonstrating openly in the streets. Rather than committing violence, the students were victims of acts of violence.

This view is backed up by Cesar Aguila, writing in the August 26 *Christian Science Monitor*. Aguila notes "that not a single government soldier has been killed in the anti-Marcos demonstrations, that more than 20 student demonstrators have been killed, and that not a single military man has been convicted for any of the killings." □

### Iranians Held in Bombing

The Iranian government announced September 2 that seven factory workers have been arrested by the political police on charges of having planted a bomb.

The same announcement, according to the September 3 *Le Monde*, claimed that a bomb had exploded September 1 in the ministry of finance men's room. There were no injuries. □

# Death Penalty Demanded in Moroccan Political Trial

By Jon Rothschild

The trial of 193 opponents of the Hassan regime in Morocco ended on September 1, with the chief prosecutor demanding the maximum possible sentences in all cases.

The accused, most of them leaders of the supposedly legal National Union of Popular Forces (NUPF), were charged with hatching an elaborate plot to overthrow the government by military means.

The July 5-18 issue of the biweekly *AfricaAsia* listed the social composition of the defendants: 45 workers, 37 agricultural workers and poor peasants, 7 craftsmen, 19 small merchants, 22 functionaries and public servants, 26 intellectuals (students, teachers, lawyers, etc.), and 5 without definite occupations. Besides these 161, who have been present in the Marrakesh courtroom, 32 others were tried *in absentia*.

On the last day of the trial, the prosecutor demanded the death penalty for all 32 absentees and for 16 of the others. He asked for life sentences against 122, and five-year jail terms for the rest.

The sheer number indicted, as well as their social composition, indicates that the regime intended the trial as a means of decimating its major political opposition.

Included among the defendants are some of the best-known leaders of the Moroccan fight for independence against French colonialism — Abdel Rahman Youssefi, Mohammed Basri, Mohammed Ajar Saïd Bouneilat. Among the judges one finds former collaborators with the old colonial power.

The Marrakesh trial was not the result of the abortive July 10 coup, although in his summation the prosecutor alluded to the coup as one of the consequences of the climate supposedly created by the defendants' activities. Preparations for the trial actually began in December of 1969.

At that time, the Hassan regime was in a state of severe crisis — the public debt had grown to one-third the size of the national revenue, unemploy-

ment was rampant, peasant uprisings were endemic, strikes of high-school and college students had triggered actions on the part of workers. The Istiqlaal (independence) party, which the regime tended to rely on politically, had drawn away from Hassan and was moving toward an alliance with the NUPF.

Under these conditions, Hassan moved to deal with the opposition in the classical manner: accuse it of preparing an armed insurrection, bring it to trial, and destroy it.

On December 16, 1969, Brahim Monadi, an informer, presented himself to the police, declaring that he was a member of a subversive organization and that he wished to repent.

He claimed that this secret organization, under the leadership of Mohammed Basri and Habib el-Forkani, had been organizing clandestine armed-struggle cells in the Marrakesh area. The police released Monadi and arrested Basri and Forkani.

During the next several months, waves of arrests took place in Marrakesh and Casablanca. Caches of old arms, rotten with rust, leftovers from the struggle for independence, were "discovered" by the police.

Many of those arrested "confessed," only to repudiate their statements at the trial, charging that they were extorted under torture.

The regime then cynically used the fact that many Moroccan political figures had been active in supporting the Palestinian liberation struggle as evidence that they were preparing a military take-over of the Moroccan government.

Some of the defendants had fought with the fedayeen; others had helped obtain arms for the Palestinians; still others had acted as intermediaries for the Palestinians in buying arms; and many had participated in forming support committees for the fedayeen.

Hassan's prosecutors charged that the defendants had "received training" in Palestinian camps to organize guerrilla warfare in Morocco; that those

who had purchased arms had planned to send those arms to Marrakesh, and not to Palestine; and that those who had gone abroad to organize support committees had "conspired" with foreign agents.

Two of the leaders of the NUPF (Ajar and Benjelloun) who had been in Spain negotiating an arms deal for the fedayeen were arrested by the Spanish police for carrying on "Communist propaganda" and turned over to the Moroccan police.

The trial finally opened, despite massive opposition in Morocco itself, on July 15. All the defendants pleaded not guilty to the charges. Those who had "confessed" repudiated their confessions. During their examinations, they described their activities in defense of the Palestinian revolution.

At the opening of the trial the defense, which was conducted by several leading Arab lawyers, charged that the tribunal was illegitimate, that its president was an old collaborator of the colonial regime. Medical evidence was introduced substantiating the defendants' charges of torture.

The defense was prevented from calling several of their key witnesses, including the Moroccan ambassador to Spain and the Spanish ambassador to Morocco. (This was an attempt by the defense to expose the collusion of the two governments in returning Ajar and Benjelloun to Morocco.)

The government's evidence consisted of an old duplicating machine, some "incriminating literature," and about a dozen rusty pistols.

In his summation, the prosecutor, Larbi Mejboud, described the damning crimes of the accused: "The criminal schemes of this secret organization . . . were to overthrow the country's present monarchist institutions and to replace them with an extremist regime."

In reply to certain doubts about whether any collusion among all 193 defendants had been established, Mejboud proclaimed that ". . . the common points of all the accused are, on the one hand, their revolutionary

political ideas, and on the other, their desire to see an economic and social change in Morocco. . . ."

He demanded "severe and exemplary" punishments. (*Le Monde*, August 29-30.)

On their part, the defendants, in view of the trumped-up nature of the charges and the fact that the tribunal had made it virtually impossible for them to plead their case, refused to speak. Bouabid, head of the defense committee, declared, according to the September 3 *Le Monde*, "We cannot take the floor unless the charges are reconsidered. . . . Our silence is full of

significance and clearly replies to the summary speech of the king's prosecutor."

On May 17, before the recent attempted coup and before the opening of the trial, several thousand students from the University of Rabat (the capital city) demonstrated against the repression. They marched through the streets under the slogan, "We are all Marrakesh defendants!"

It remains to be seen whether Hassan will be able to crush that opposition, despite the executions conducted after the attempted coup of July 10 and the Marrakesh trial. □

An American political officer in Vietnam was quoted in the September 7 *New York Times* report as attributing the rise in crime to an improvement in the morale of the troops.

"They've beaten the V. C. a couple of times and that's helped their morale," he said. "It made them bolder, but at the same time it made them meaner toward their own people."

But this boldness towards the Vietnamese freedom fighters has not been observed by the civilians. According to the September 7 *New York Times*, the refugees "all agree that South Vietnamese soldiers are attacking them and not the Vietcong, whom they are supposed to fight."

The peasants take a realistic view of the situation: "In a village in an area where South Vietnamese troops had been operating for two weeks, peasants asked for and were given 100 weapons for self-defense.

"When asked why it was necessary to issue weapons to the villagers, Cambodia's Premier, Lon Nol, said that the South Vietnamese troops had not neutralized the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, and that at least one enemy base area in the vicinity of Trapang Krasang had been pointedly avoided. . . ."

Is it correct to ascribe the rise in crime to a rise in morale? A different and more probable reason was suggested to Iver Peterson by an American provincial adviser in Vietnam's Quangngai Province.

"It's the ordinary soldier who sees the local official doing well, or sees an army officer getting rich from U. S. supplies, and he says, 'I've never gotten my chance,' so he grabs his rifle and takes it." □

## Sudanese Refugees Seized

The Paris daily *Le Monde* reported September 3 that eight Sudanese Communist party members, who had fled to Ethiopia during the recent witch-hunt in their own country, had been arrested by Ethiopian police.

They were charged with "having illegally entered Ethiopian territory." Among the eight were Mohammed Suliman, a CP intellectual, and Abu Gidiri, former counselor in the Sudanese ministry of justice.

The report originated from the Egyptian Middle East News Agency, which quoted a spokesman of the Sudanese ministry of the interior as its source. This would suggest that the prisoners will be, or already have been, turned over to the Nimeiry regime. □

## A Rise in Morale?

# Saigon's Troops on the Prowl

By David Withers

"South Vietnamese infantrymen, underpaid and underused, are turning increasingly to murder, looting and highway robbery of other South Vietnamese, according to American pacification workers in all parts of the country," Iver Peterson reports in a dispatch from Saigon that appeared in the September 7 *New York Times*.

"Two weeks ago," he continues, "in the southern delta province of Bac Lieu, a bus was stopped by a group of militiamen. They took the passengers' watches, wallets and rings—and one television set—then sprayed the bus with automatic fire from their American M-16's. Five persons were killed and five wounded, according to American officials.

"In Danang last month, a group of South Vietnamese paratroopers stopped a United States Army bus carrying a troupe of South Korean entertainers and robbed them of their valuables, an American official in that city said.

An American development officer in Quangngai Province thought that security on the highway north to Danang would worsen with U. S. troop withdrawal from the area, not through increased guerrilla activity, but because the Saigon army would be taking over:

"A guy will start out for Danang with 20 pigs, and hell, he'd make 10

stops on the way, and get there with 10 pigs left."

But the Saigon army's conduct in Cambodia has been even worse, reports Peterson.

"They're just looting that country—just looting it," said Peter E. Brownback, the second highest ranking pacification official in Military Region II. "When they've loaded up their A. P. C.'s [armored personnel carriers], they head for home and unload, and turn round and go back."

A report from Cambodia in the September 9 *New York Times* verified the accounts of atrocities and looting by South Vietnamese soldiers. Refugees told of rape, murder, kidnap, and robbery.

"A 21-year-old mother named Ngeth from the vicinity of Kompong Rau, a small town 10 miles from here [Pursat], spoke quietly, sobbing as she held her 2-year-old son to her side. She described how Vietnamese soldiers entered her village on Aug. 27, beat her parents and her eight brothers and sisters to death with their rifles and then robbed and assaulted her.

"I begged them to leave us alone," she said. "But they said we were Vietcong. I told them no Vietcong had been in our village for many months." The woman said that nearly a hundred other Cambodians were beaten, tied together and led away by the Vietnamese soldiers."

# The Struggle for Women's Rights in Europe

By Ross Dowson

[The following article, written after a four-and-a-half-month stay in Europe, is reprinted from the August 9 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist biweekly published in Toronto.]

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In those European countries where there is a developing struggle for the liberation of the oppressed majority, the main thrust of the movement is for the repeal of the antiabortion laws. The right to abortion on demand is the focal point in the conflict between the forces of the status quo and the rising forces for women's liberation in Europe, as it is on the North American continent.

The status of women varies widely across the European continent. The legal status of women in Spain is abysmal, even lower than it was in Québec when the Catholic hierarchy was riding high and being vigorously utilized by the capitalist class to keep women occupied with children, church and kitchen. Spanish women are deprived of the most elementary democratic rights—they remain under the legal control of the family until twenty-five years of age, unless they marry—or join a religious order.

Before opening a bank account, obtaining a driver's license or a passport, holding a political office, or even taking a job—a married Spanish woman needs her husband's written consent. A man may put his wife's children up for adoption without her permission and take a child born out of wedlock away from its mother.

But even where women have achieved some democratic rights—even in some of the most advanced capitalist countries of Europe where there is a powerful labor and socialist movement—women have little or no control over their own bodies. The law bars women from access to abortion except under exceptional circumstances laid down by the state and implemented by the medical hierarchy.

This fact of the oppression of over

half the population of the continent has been most dramatically brought to world attention by the actions of a group of Frenchwomen and a group of West German women this spring.

Early in April, 343 Frenchwomen, most of them prominent writers, actresses and TV personalities, as well as members of the Women's Liberation Movement of France and the Movement for Freedom of Abortion, made a sensational demand for free access to contraceptive methods and freedom of abortion—by signing a statement confessing to having had an abortion.

By this simple declaration, under the French abortion law, which has its origins in the Napoleonic Code, they were subject to two years in prison. Several hundred women have been convicted every year under this law. Between 1924 and 1940 there were on an average 300 to 400 abortion convictions yearly. During the Vichy period this rose to 3,000 to 4,000 convictions, but today the number has fallen back to its prewar level. The overwhelming majority of those convicted are of course from lower income groups—too poor to take the abortion trains or planes to Geneva or London.

The French government has attempted to blunt the protest with concessions that sustain its main position. It has now conceded the sale of contraceptive devices in French pharmacies for the first time. It has also authorized abortions—but only under special conditions—where the mother's life is endangered, where there is a certainty the future child would be abnormal, and where pregnancy is the result of a proven act of rape. Thus Frenchwomen still have no real control over their own bodies.

Even so the French Roman Catholic church hierarchy, aided by the National Council of the Order of Physicians, mobilized strong opposition to any liberalization of the laws. They were aided in this by the powerfully

based and influential Communist party of France. A statement by the political bureau of the Communist party not only accepted the restrictions contained in the new government regulations, but explicitly rejected "theories which make the right of abortion one of the essential means of women's liberation. . . ." But the statement of the 343 Frenchwomen reads: "Free abortion on demand is not the ultimate goal of the struggle of women. On the contrary, it is only the most elementary demand, the demand without which the political struggle cannot even begin. . . ."

A campaign is well under way to force the repeal of antiabortion laws in West Germany where an estimated 400,000 illegal abortions are performed annually. These result in at least fifty deaths because of the conditions under which they are often performed. Thousands of German women who have the means now travel to London for the operation.

By the first week in June, 374 women had signed a public statement that they have had an illegal abortion and are therefore liable to imprisonment up to five years under Paragraph 218 of the Criminal Code. The campaign was given a special boost when twenty-four well-known West German women, among them actresses, journalists, singers, film stars and fashion models, had their pictures published on the front page of the June 2 issue of the weekly news magazine *Stern*, along with the confession: "We have had an abortion."

Legal proceedings have been opened against fourteen signers, including movie stars Romy Schneider and Vera Tschechova. In German jurisprudence, state attorneys have no choice but to open legal proceedings against suspected lawbreakers, even if they accuse themselves.

In 1969 there were 276 prosecutions under the law. A town councillor in Hanau has filed charges against Tschechova on the grounds that West German democracy will be discredited

if "ordinary" women are prosecuted, "while prominent film stars are able to provocatively publish the details of their own abortions."

The movement to repeal Paragraph 218 encompasses such women's groups as Women's Action '70 in Frankfurt and the Socialist Women's League in West Berlin. According to *Der Spiegel* younger women members of the Social Democratic party and the Free Democratic party are joining the campaign.

The first action of the Movement for the Liberation of the Italian Woman, which held its initial national meeting this spring, is the promotion of a bill which would legalize abortions. Members are now trying to collect 50,000 signatures required to present a "vox populi" bill to the Italian parliament. Abortion is severely punished by laws supported by the Roman Catholic church but framed by the former fascist and openly racist regime. They appear under a section of the Criminal Code entitled "crimes against the integrity and health of the race." The Vatican's newspaper *L'Osservatore Romano* has denounced the movement.

A recent congress of Italian gynecologists stated that there were probably "between one and three million clandestine abortions" in Italy each year—others estimate four million. At least 20,000 Italian women die each year as the result of illegal abortions performed under outrageous conditions. This clandestine abortion racket is said to net its operators at least \$82,000,000 a year.

Since the initiation of the signature campaign, three senators of the Socialist party have tabled a bill to legalize abortions. However their proposal would place the decision in the hands of the authorities to decide if the mother's health is endangered, if the fetus is likely to be abnormal, or in case of proven rape or incest—rather than in the hands of the woman herself who is defined by the women's liberation movement as "the manager of her maternity."

One might think that the Netherlands, despite the fact that it has the lowest percentage of working married women in Europe, is well along the road towards the elimination of anti-abortion laws. It is sometimes depicted, along with the Scandinavian countries, to be in the vanguard, with its

legalization of homosexuality, and its very colorful and active Dolle Mina movement.

Not so. Abortions are illegal in the Netherlands. The 175,000-strong Association for Sexual Reform has as one of its major activities the obtaining of abortions—in England. The association says that it is sending twenty to forty women a day on cut-rate abortion flights to England. Up to 3,000 women have gone through its services for an abortion there—at an inclusive price of \$335.

With women of sufficient means going from all over the continent to England for abortions, it might appear that this question so crucial to women's liberation has been solved there by the legalization of abortion.

The four-year-old abortion act does not by any means grant a woman the right to make her own decision as to whether to have an abortion or not. The act evasively placed this crucial decision in the hands of the doctor, not the woman.

The 1967 law extended the right to abortion, allowing it upon the approval of two doctors for eugenic reasons (because of a deformed fetus), or if done to preserve the physical or mental health of the woman and her family.

The medical profession is against abortion on demand. Ninety-two percent of the consultants who answered the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists survey, voted against it. Like the 47 percent of the RCOG consultants who want to exclude abortion on socioeconomic grounds, the British Medical Association from the outset has opposed the social clause which permits abortion on the grounds that the health of "existing children" of the family might be affected.

Many of the doctors opposing abortion on demand are consultants on the National Health Service and deprive women of the use of its facilities, which should be completely available to them.

As a director of the Birmingham Pregnancy Advisory Service, a charitable abortion agency, noted, hospital consultants form a self-appointed bottleneck to abortion. "They often impose their own morality on patients." In 1970, she noted, 12,000 women turned to the BPAS for help, nearly 55 percent referred by their family

doctors who had either tried or recognized the futility of trying to obtain Health Service abortions on other than strong clinical grounds.

The result is that of the 90,000 abortions performed in England and Wales a year, only about 55 percent were obtained on the National Health Service.

The other 45 percent are carried out in the small number of tiny nursing homes that are approved by the Department of Health—the fifty-four private clinics that exist solely to make a profit. Since they cost from \$200,000 to \$300,000 to construct to the department's standards, and doctors are prevented by the General Medical Council's strictures on advertising from getting the necessary clients, business interests operate them. The London Park View Clinic charges from \$335 to \$375 for an abortion, with doctor participants raking in fabulous incomes. The Langham Street Clinic made a gross income of almost \$4,000,000 a year.

This vicious exploitation of women seeking abortion serves to embolden traditionalists, religious bigots and obscurantists who oppose abortion in principle. They have been mounting a campaign designed to (1) intimidate those doctors who defend abortion on demand and are prepared to sign in good faith that a woman needs an abortion, and (2) to cut out of the abortion act those sections that imply the legality of abortion on socioeconomic grounds.

June 20 saw some 8,000 persons march through the streets of Birmingham carrying placards enscribed "Abortion Kills," to protest the abortion act. Speakers at the rally included Anglican and Roman Catholic church leaders and Muslim priests. Other organizations, including the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children and Life, are carrying on intensive activity against the right to abortion. This campaign is having considerable effect. According to the *London Times*, the Heath government is not licensing any more clinics because of the pressures of the antiabortion lobby.

Even in England, where despite the dollar sign that has been placed around them, there is greater availability of abortions than anywhere else in Europe, abortion on demand remains a challenging issue before the women's liberation movement. □

# Nikita Khrushchev Unwept by Fellow Bureaucrats

The death of Khrushchev (of a heart attack September 11 at the age of seventy-seven) caused scarcely a ripple among his fellow bureaucrats, who deposed him in 1964 from his exalted posts of premier and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party.

Khrushchev joined the Bolshevik party in 1918. He remained unknown until Stalin began his rise to power. Then he made his mark as a factional hoodlum in the Ukraine, where he was born. Stalin put this faithful henchman on the Political Bureau in 1938.


Throughout the blood purges of the 1930s, Khrushchev sat as a member of the Central Committee. He took an active part in the bloody work of liquidating the entire old leadership of Lenin's party. As first party secretary in the Ukraine, he was in charge of the purge there in 1938.

After Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev participated in the "collective" leadership formed of the bureaucrats closest to the late dictator. He clinched a leading position at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union with a secret speech admitting the truth about Stalin's bloody rule.

This speech, which was "leaked" to the world press, began the process of "de-Stalinization." Concessions to the masses, already initiated by the top bureaucrats, were extended by Khrushchev.

The concessions and the "de-Stalinization" were intended to restore confidence in the bureaucracy, which had become dangerously isolated from the masses during the years of Stalin's rule. What Khrushchev sought to block by these measures was a political revolution that would have ended special privileges for the bureaucracy and restored proletarian democracy. His political game was exposed by the ruthless way in which he crushed the uprising of the workers in Hungary in 1956.

The combination of concessions and "de-Stalinization" that became known as "Khrushchevism" aroused illusions among many observers, including such a figure as Isaac Deutscher. They projected the possibility of the Soviet



NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

bureaucracy engaging in "self-reform."

Khrushchev's policies gained time for the Soviet bureaucracy, but in the end frightened the bureaucrats, who viewed them as giving encouragement to the masses to demand more.

The Kremlin began to limit the concessions and to engage in "re-Stalinization." Today in the Soviet Union, discontent among the youth and the intellectuals is on the rise. The under-

ground *Samizdat* publications show this very clearly.

Khrushchev would probably gain a higher rating in a poll among the Soviet masses than his successors. Yet the masses have no doubt drawn at least one major lesson from Khrushchevism. It can be summed up by paraphrasing Stalin's lieutenant himself: "The bureaucracy will reform itself when shrimps learn to whistle." □

# The Credibility Gap—The Politics of the SLL

By Joseph Hansen

*The Credibility Gap, The Politics of the S. L. L.*, by Tony Whelan. An I.M.G. Publication, London. 84 pp. \$1. 1970.

This is a study of the theory and practice of the Socialist Labour League based on the author's firsthand experience during a five-year period.<sup>1</sup> As a newly won convert, Whelan accepted without question the claim of the leadership that the organization represented Trotskyism in Britain and the world as a whole. He dutifully parroted the attacks leveled by such figures as Gerry Healy and Cliff Slaughter against the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.<sup>2</sup>

Bothersome political questions soon disturbed Whelan. A primary one was the refusal of the SLL leadership to respond to the radicalization of the campus youth that followed escalation of the Vietnam war in 1965 by U.S. imperialism. This refusal was especially puzzling in view of the success of the SLL in the preceding period in winning the best of the youth in the Labour party. Why should the SLL permit other currents to recruit on the campus without challenge?

Looking back, Whelan thinks that the very success of the SLL in recruiting from the Labour party may have blocked the indicated turn toward the campus. The "triumvirate" (Gerry Healy, Cliff Slaughter, and Mike Banda) thought they had it made. Whelan cites evidence to show that they judged Britain to be entering a prerevolutionary situation in which the SLL—its recruitment proceeding at a geometric rate—could presently emerge as a mass party with a clear perspective of being able to bypass the Labour party and much else on the road to power. Whelan states that he is not satisfied that this is the entire explanation and that perhaps reasons that have escaped him were involved.<sup>3</sup>

1. He was expelled from the SLL's youth organization, the Young Socialists, in November 1969 for "trying to demoralize" members and "disagreeing with the leadership of the Socialist Labour League."

2. Whelan does not refer to this in his study. However, convincing evidence is provided by Cliff Slaughter in an angry review of *The Credibility Gap* published in three lengthy installments in the *Workers Press*, the "daily organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist Labour League" (September 10, 11, 12, 1970). Slaughter quotes from two letters to the editor, written by Whelan in 1965, that might well have been written by the editor himself so well do they conform to the style favored by the leaders of the SLL in fulminating against the "Pabloites."

3. The "principles" to which the SLL leaders adhere should not be overlooked in seeking to understand why they follow courses that sometimes seem irrational. From the ultraleft sectarian viewpoint of the SLL, students bear an original taint—they are "petty bourgeois," not "proletarian." An influx of students would confront the SLL with the danger of having the class composition of the membership "watered down." The un-

Other questions arose. Forecasts made by the leadership proved to be badly mistaken. Yet no assessment of the errors was made. Was this in the tradition of Trotskyism?

Whelan thought otherwise. ". . . it is vitally necessary for revolutionaries to have a precise, accurate analysis of the situation in which they are working . . . it ought to be clear that *when they make mistakes, as they will, they should recognise them, discuss them honestly and objectively, and learn from them.*"

But in the "enormous volume of material published by the SLL" nothing can be found that can be regarded as serious analysis. ". . . what the SLL does publish is couched in a strange jargon: 'pabloite' revisionists, 'political' everything in sight (all strikes are political, say the SLL), permanent crisis (economic, social, 'world', of every other political tendency, etc.), self-contradictory pseudo-dialectics of the worst sort; and all this reduces what they do produce to the level of semi-illiteracy and incomprehensibility." Moreover, "the SLL *never* produces *balance-sheets* of past experiences, evaluating successes and drawing lessons from mistakes. Consequently, any one statement of theirs is so a-historical as to be, for a Marxist, virtually useless."

Whelan does not ask us to accept his word for it. He provides detailed documentary evidence and a number of instructive instances.

In view of these eye-openers, Whelan lost confidence in the objectivity of the leadership of the SLL. Among other things, in relation to opponent currents in the radical movement, it became incumbent to study their positions in the original to verify the accuracy of what was said about them in the SLL press. (The SLL leadership does not encourage such research—in fact regards it as a highly suspicious deviation.) However unpalatable, the truth had to be faced. The "triumvirate" systematically lied about their opponents, grossly falsifying and misrepresenting their positions.

Of the examples cited by Whelan, here is a typical case: "One of the issues used by the leadership of the SLL to convince its rank-and-file of the hideous nature of the 'so-called "United Secretariat of the Fourth International"' and of the American SWP is the treatment of the majority

evenness of the process of radicalization (allies of the working class may become radicalized in advance of the workers, particularly the key sectors) is a closed book to the leaders of the SLL. From this, naturally, follows their incapacity to utilize transitional measures to meet the contingencies that arise in the difficult process of constructing a revolutionary leadership from the human material actually at hand. In accordance with their principled position, the SLL leaders were prepared in 1965 and subsequently to wait it out until better material came along.

of the French section by M. Pablo and the SWP during the 1953 split.

"Thus Tim Wohlforth, an American sympathiser of the SLL, gives in *The Newsletter* of 22nd July 1969 a long account of the split, accusing the SWP of supporting Pablo's allegedly bureaucratic measures against the French majority, etc. Now in due course the sections and sympathisers of the Fourth International will have to go over again the experience of that split, and see what can be learned from it. What we want to do now is not to comment on it, but to indicate the perfidy by which the SLL leadership keeps its members, most of whom joined during the 1960's and have no independent knowledge of the split, in a political ghetto.

"For Wohlforth's account of the split is, shall we say, incomplete. While the SWP is denounced at great length, the actions of the European Trotskyists, who were on the scene and could be expected to know much better than the SWP what was going on in the French section, are unmentioned. With good reason! For the facts of the matter are that many European Trotskyist leaders, including the damnable Ernest Mandel, opposed Pablo's suspension of the leadership of the PCI, but the SLL supported, voted for it, and a prominent leader of the SLL even spoke at the PCI's congress *against* the majority."

Whelan came inevitably to a key question in the evolution of the SLL. Why did Healy refuse to participate in the 1963 reunification congress that brought the split of 1953-54 to an end and reassembled the main forces of the world Trotskyist movement? It will be recalled that the majority of the International Committee, the faction to which the SLL belonged, favored the reunification. Rather than go along, Healy—alleging that the differences in the Fourth International had deepened over the years rather than lessened—deliberately split (along with Pierre Lambert, the leader of the French sector).

The persistent pattern followed by the SLL leadership of misrepresenting the positions held by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International on a series of issues testifies sufficiently to the unprincipled character of this split.<sup>4</sup> Having discovered the misrepresentations advanced and maintained by Healy and his cothinkers, Whelan was impelled to consider what the real motivations of the SLL "triumvirate" might be. He indicates his conclusions:

"As we have said, the SLL leadership was hypnotized by its recruitment in 1960-64. They believed that this had taken place 'on the basis of the radicalisation of working class youth', which was hardly true. During a four-week campaign in 1963 over the Profumo affair they had recruited 250 members on top of their previous recruitment targets. They had won the majority on the YS NC.

"Drinking deep of this heady wine, and unrestrained either by the S.W.P.—long their closest allies in the world Trotskyist movement—or by the Fourth International (they broke with both of them in 1963, when the Reunification of the Fourth International took place), they developed the belief that their proportionately large, but absolutely small, numerical gains, had occurred because

of the serious crisis of British capitalism, *which was worse than that of any other advanced capitalist country.*

"Thus the resolution of the Nov. 28th 1964 Conference of the SLL has a long section explaining that 'Britain constitutes "the weakest link in the chain" at the latest stage of development of capitalism'. This invocation of Lenin's analogy about the Russian Revolution can have only one meaning! And indeed it did mean to the SLL leadership precisely that they were going forward to the overthrow of British capitalism. So the same conference adopted an unpublished resolution which concluded:

"'We shall, therefore, work for a fusion between the Young Socialists and the Socialist Labour League which will enable us to change the name of the League to that of a Party and to maintain the Young Socialists as that of its youth section.'

"We ourselves have heard Gerry Healy say—in 1967, not recently—that 'Britain Will Be Next!'

"The main effect of this nationalism has been to reinforce their sectarianism, in relation to the solidarity movements with the colonial revolution in particular. Another effect has been to render them totally incapable of understanding the dialectics of world revolution today; the interaction of struggles in different countries or of different sections of the oppressed masses, the interrelation of the world economy and its national sections, all these are completely misunderstood by the SLL."

Whelan has put his finger on one of the chief weaknesses of the SLL leadership—an outlook limited basically to Britain. Thus the Fourth International is attacked at each stage for "not doing *what the SLL imagines itself to be doing successfully in Britain.*" Further, in the documents of the SLL of the early 1960s, "we are struck by the fact that, larded though they are with denunciations of 'impressionism' and pragmatism, they usually indicate that the SLL believed that what it was, at that moment, doing in Britain, *which was working*, was the only thing Trotskyists might do at any point in space or time."

The parochial outlook of the SLL leaders is glaringly apparent in many of their policy decisions. Two telling examples could be added to Whelan's study:

1. Participation in the 1963 reunification would have assured the SLL an influential position in the Fourth International. After taking a substantial step toward reunification (initiating a parity commission in 1962), the leaders of the SLL backed off. The reason? They were afraid of the reaction in the SLL when the rank and file learned that the stifling atmosphere maintained by the "triumvirate" had nothing in common with the democratic centralist norms of the Fourth International.

2. In battling within the world Trotskyist movement against the retrogressive current headed by N.M. Perera in Ceylon, the SLL, if it had joined forces with the United Secretariat, the Socialist Workers party, and the left wing of the Lanka Sama Samaja party, might have added sufficient weight to block Perera from obtaining a majority in the LSSP for his sellout proposal in 1964 to accept posts in the Bandaranaike government. The SLL leaders rejected joining in common battle. The reason? Very simple—the colonial world was outside of their bailiwick.

The parochialism of the SLL leaders also helps explain why they have persisted in a policy of deliberately misrepresenting in the most brazen way the positions of the

4. The main falsifications have been considered at length by Ernest Germain in *Marxism Vs. Ultraleftism, Key Issues in Healy's Challenge to the Fourth International.*

United Secretariat and of the Socialist Workers party. Intended originally to seal off the membership of the SLL from dangerous ideas, the "triumvirate"—coming to believe their own propaganda—sealed themselves off, not only from the reality outside of Britain, but the reality within Britain. Persistence in falsification has its own deadly logic.

Whelan sums up his critique of the SLL as follows:

"1. To judge from their press, they do not know what is going on;

"2. The demands which they pose are total demands, which are not going to be accepted by the masses, and which obstruct the building of a movement through which the consciousness of the masses could move forward;

"3. Their press and spokesmen lie about the Fourth International, about their own history, and about other revolutionaries;

"4. They drag Marxist theory through the mud in the name of developing it;

"5. They stand back from the mass movement, while purveying ultra-left nonsense in their press;

"6. They have, by their own criteria, scabbed on the Vietnamese revolution;

"7. Consequently, they are a disgrace to the name of Trotskyism.

"Trotsky, however, disowned antics like theirs in advance."

(The quotation from Trotsky's 1935 article "Sectarianism, Centrism and the Fourth International,"<sup>5</sup> which Whelan offers here, does sound as if it had been written with the SLL in mind!)

*The Credibility Gap* represents the effort of a young political thinker to find his way out of a group whose primary principle is dead-end factionalism. The first draft, he says, was written "mainly so that I could sort out for myself my disagreements with the SLL." Such a document is bound to have defects, since the author has not yet completed the revolution in his outlook. The document is part of a process. It registers the break from the specious positions of the SLL and development toward genuine Trotskyism. This is what gives it its freshness and its obvious honesty and determination to achieve objectivity. In this context the defects are minor.

On two items, a point of difference should perhaps be registered, particularly since Cliff Slaughter of the SLL has sought to make something of them in attacking the study.

The first is in connection with the October 30, 1969, parliamentary by-election in which the Young Socialists ran Frank Willis. The SLL, Whelan shows convincingly, was stunned by the fact that Willis received only 446 votes—about 1 percent of the total. Whelan calls attention to the hypocrisy of the SLL leaders in refusing to make the same judgment of the Willis candidacy that they had made a few months before in relation to the presidential candidacy of Alain Krivine of the Ligue Communiste in France:

"For all his six hours of radio and TV propaganda Krivine was only able to obtain a fraction over 1 per

cent of the votes. On this showing, his impact was practically negligible.

"With a surer class instinct the striking workers of May-June, 1968, preferred Duclos." (*The Newsletter*, June 14, 1969.)

Whelan holds that this judgment of the results of Krivine's campaign is utterly wrong but that it would be just as wrong to make such a judgment of the campaign of the Young Socialists in the Swindon by-election. He agrees that engaging in electoral campaigns can be a valuable experience. Just the same, in concrete instances like the Swindon by-election, he reaches the conclusion that "it is most probably incorrect and a waste of time to engage in such candidatures." This is a dubious conclusion, in my opinion.

In behalf of the editors of *The Newsletter*, it should be noted that they used criteria other than the size of the vote to condemn the Krivine campaign. They, in fact, stated:

"The 'Ligue Communiste' was not, of course, surprised by this vote.

"The question of such a candidate is not to be judged by its total of votes."

They maintained that the campaign was "only an empty gesture" because of the nature of Krivine's program. "Krivine did nothing to expose the emptiness of parliamentary methods to the mass of the working class."

This was deliberate misrepresentation, since one of the main points of Krivine's election platform was denunciation of the bourgeois "electoral farce."

It is, of course, naïve for a small grouping to expect a sizeable vote upon first entering the electoral arena on a very radical platform. The class struggle is projected on the parliamentary screen only after some delay and then only in greatly attenuated and inverted form. In beginning electoral activities, revolutionary socialists must expect that the vote for their candidates will be miniscule. Whatever they receive must be viewed as largely accidental.

Revolutionary socialists can realistically count on gains at first only in the accumulation of experience and the utilization of *otherwise unavailable* propaganda openings. Nonetheless in countries where parliamentary illusions are still strong in the working class, they have no choice but to enter the field (precisely to expose the illusions), and the sooner the better. Such beginnings are not "a waste of time."

The other point of difference concerns the radicalization of the youth. Whelan is of the opinion that since the October 27, 1968, mass demonstration in London against the war in Vietnam, "the youth movement has waned rapidly throughout Europe." Accepting this assessment as a fact, he continues: "The reasons for this are unclear: one can seek them in the turn, by most left organisations, away from defence of the Vietnamese revolution, and in the various peace manoeuvres, but one cannot be sure one has found them; moreover, even if one had it would not give one a magic key to solving the problem of how to reactivate it."

The unsatisfactory nature of these conclusions about the youth radicalization is indicated by Whelan's observation that "the 75,000 to 100,000 who marched fifteen months ago against the war in Vietnam must still be around somewhere, probably with much the same sentiments, and . . . it ought to be possible, perhaps on a

5. The article has been reprinted in *Writings of Leon Trotsky (1935-36)*, available from Pathfinder Press, 410 West St., New York, N.Y. 10014.

local rather than a national level, to find a road to them."

Several comments can be made. First of all, the youth radicalization, like any comparable social phenomenon, has not proceeded in a straight line but in ups and downs. A lull has often preceded a new advance. Secondly, the youth radicalization has served to inspire other layers of the masses, a most notable one at present being the women. These consequences restimulate the radicalization of the youth. And, in fact, the radicalization is now visible among the youth in the secondary schools. Thirdly, the movement against the war in Vietnam is subject to its own peculiar rhythms.

The latter point is especially important in weighing the politics of the SLL. The role of leadership has been shown to have been absolutely decisive in maintaining a course of mass mobilizations in opposition to the war in Vietnam and in defense of the Vietnamese revolution.

In the United States, for instance, each major mobilization was followed by a natural letdown. Petty-bourgeois groupings were affected to such a degree as to become prostrate. (We didn't win an all-out victory!) The firmest and most resolute kind of leadership was required to

overcome this "lull" and to set things again in motion.

But the SLL leaders not only opposed mass mobilizations, they openly worked against them. Against mass mobilizations they pitted mini-marches and mini-rallies behind the banners of the SLL. This course constitutes one of the clearest examples of the sectarianism of the SLL and its default in leadership in defending the Vietnamese revolution.

The role of the SLL must thus be regarded as one of the key elements in accounting for any waning of the youth radicalization in Britain (if mobilizations against the war in Vietnam are to be taken as a gauge of this).

For the past fourteen years, the objective possibilities for constructing a mass revolutionary-socialist party in Britain have remained among the most promising in all of Europe. That these possibilities have not as yet been realized can be ascribed in large measure to the limitations of the leadership of the SLL.

Whelan's study is a valuable contribution to the necessary task of determining the exact nature of these limitations and thus making it possible to clear the way for a politically competent leadership. □

## Documents

# On the Reactionary Coup d'Etat in Bolivia

[The following statement was issued August 26 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

\* \* \*

The triumph of the proimperialist coup d'etat—initiated by remote control and coordinated by direct representatives of American imperialism, and led by its principal local agents—represents a tactical defeat for the working masses in Bolivia. But this is not the end of the civil war; rather, it is only the open beginning. Out of a nascent and intermittent civil war, Bolivia now passes over to open and permanent civil war.

The Fourth International salutes the Bolivian workers and students who have fallen in combat against Colonel Banzer's coup d'etat. Their memory will henceforth be associated with that of all the revolutionists who have fallen on Bolivian soil for the cause of socialism, and particularly with the memory of the most illustrious among them, Ernesto "Che" Guevara.

Bolivia is one of the most sensitive spots on the Latin American continent, where the class struggle is taking on ever more violent forms. Al-

though it has some of the greatest mineral wealth, Bolivia's masses are among the poorest of the poor in Latin America. Bolivia throughout its history has known nothing but a nearly uninterrupted succession of governmental overturns. The Barrientos military dictatorship, and then that of Ovando, were toppled by the action of the masses. But with the struggle lacking any consistent political leadership, another military officer took power. General Torres readily employed a leftist vocabulary, but he took not a single decisive measure. He obviously left the army intact and in particular retained, as chief of the Military College, Colonel Banzer, who used that position above all to organize coups d'etat.\*

Under mass pressure a "People's Assembly" was created, without any real power at its disposal. To be sure, a large sector of this assembly leaned

to the left and sought a socialist Bolivia. But it lacked a strong revolutionary leadership enjoying mass recognition. This assembly displayed more indecisiveness than capacity to inspire and lead the Bolivian masses. Thus when it demanded equal workers' representation in the management of the nationalized tin industry, when it demanded that the Torres government recognize Cuba, when the first attempts at revolutionary organization appeared inside the army itself, the reactionary forces supported by Yankee imperialism precipitated the coup d'etat before a revolutionary leadership could begin to emerge.

Today we find united under the baton of Colonel Banzer the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—Revolutionary Nationalist Movement] of Paz Estenssoro, which, as the beneficiary of the 1952 revolution, used

\* Colonel Hugo Banzer Suarez was appointed director of the Military College in 1969, following the death of General Barrientos and General Ovando's seizure of power. Banzer backed Ovando as against Torres in the latter's struggle for power. After Torres won, he left Banzer in his prestigious post as head of the Mili-

tary College. It was not until after the attempted coup against Torres on January 10 and 11, 1971, that Banzer was sent into exile in Argentina. According to a *New York Times* account published August 25, Banzer "returned secretly to Bolivia several times" between his forced departure and his successful coup d'etat.—IP

its power to liquidate the gains of that revolution; and the FSB [Falange Socialista Boliviana — Bolivian Socialist Phalanx], an organization avowedly fascist in character. During the coup d'etat, the Brazilian army kept the Bolivian frontier under "surveillance," thereby offering proof of its role of principal stand-in for imperialist counterrevolution on the South American continent.

The Bolivian experience confirms the correctness of the analysis stressed time and again by the Fourth International, according to which explosive social tensions and the restricted economic resources of capitalism provide no durable base for a regime of reformist type in most Latin American countries. Such a regime is only compatible, for a certain period, with passivity on the part of the masses. As soon as the latter go into motion and step beyond their conciliatory leaderships, both old and new, there is only one basic choice. Either the revolutionary process moves forward to the seizure of power by the proletariat in alliance with the poor peasantry, above all through the destruction of the bourgeois army and the bourgeoisie's entire repressive state apparatus, or else the latter will establish a repressive military dictatorship, with the army remaining more than ever as the ultimate stable bourgeois "party" in Latin America.

The Bolivian experience bears out the illusory character of all conceptions that hope a vigorous mass upsurge might, solely through its breadth and strength, hold in check the appetites of the "gorillas" in Latin America. If such a mass movement doesn't understand the imperious need to prepare itself for armed confrontation with the bourgeoisie, for arming itself and disarming reaction, it will be driven back and wiped out in a moment by violence, as happened once again to the mass movement in Bolivia.

History will record the merits of our comrades in the POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario — Revolutionary Workers party], Bolivian section of the Fourth International, who insisted, in opposition to the Lechín-style opportunists, to the pro-Moscow CP, and to the Lora centrists who took part in leading the labor movement and thereby share the blame for the swift defeat, on the immediate need to arm the workers, poor peasants, and

students, pointing out that a military coup d'etat was inevitable and imminent. In opposition to this clear line borne out completely by events, the official labor movement leaders counterposed illusions in General Torres who, when the time was ripe, would surely arm the workers; they counterposed spontanéist notions to the effect that the workers would surely be able to obtain arms when they were ready for armed struggle; and they counterposed Platonic resolutions demanding . . . that the army arm the workers! All this led up to the August massacre in which makeshift militias, armed with old rifles and lacking any preparation or training whatsoever, stood heroically against the tanks and planes of the counterrevolutionary officers.

Again this time, Bolivian reaction will quickly prove incapable of solving a single one of the problems afflicting Bolivia. And already the revolutionary vanguard, especially our comrades of the POR (Bolivian section of the Fourth International), the ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional — National Liberation Army], the Zamora wing of the pro-Chinese CP, and others, are continuing the struggle by organizing guerrilla war. This trial has been costly to the Bolivian masses, but it cannot help but raise future battles to a higher military and political level.

Colonel Banzer's coup d'etat will serve not only as a lesson to Bolivia's exploited masses. It should also serve henceforth as a lesson to the masses of Peru, where we also find supposedly "reformist" left-wing officers at the head of the government. It should serve as a lesson to the masses

of Chile, where plots are undoubtedly being hatched in the barracks to put an end to Allende's so very legalist experiment. It should serve as a lesson to the militants and masses of Uruguay, who are in danger of being taken in by parliamentarist illusions in the "Frente Amplio" [Broad Front], to the militants and masses of Argentina, whom the Peronist reformists seek to dazzle with the promise of "liberating" elections in 1973. Within the context of the social and political convulsions shaking the Latin American continent, the most dangerous political force Yankee imperialism and the indigenous bourgeoisies have at their disposal is the army, which is insensitive to democratic notions and parliamentarism and which carries out its politics with planes and tanks, even against the universities — as just happened in La Paz.

Against this power, the masses of the Latin American continent can only guarantee their liberation and the victory of socialism by relying solely on their own class forces, by organizing for long-term struggles involving confrontations with the repressive forces aimed at destroying them, by forging the instrument of victory, the revolutionary proletarian party.

The Fourth International calls on the workers of the entire world to show their solidarity with the Bolivian workers, peasants, and students against the repression of Colonel Banzer's government, to help them prepare for their coming battles aimed at overthrowing the new military dictatorship and establishing a socialist Bolivia, springboard to a Socialist United States of Latin America. □

## German Trotskyists Protest Assault by Ultralefts

[The following open letter was sent by the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (GIM — International Marxist Group — German section of the Fourth International) and the Revolutionär-Kommunistische Jugend (RKJ — Revolutionary Communist Youth) to the Socialist Labour League (SLL) in England, the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI — International Communist Organization) in France, and the Workers League in the United States.

[The three last-named groups, all supporters of the tendency led by Gerry Healy, which claims to be "reconstructing" the Fourth International, participated in a conference in Essen July 3-4. The proclaimed goal of this conference was to found a "revolutionary youth international."

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

Comrades:  
A serious incident occurred during

the "international youth conference" that you organized in Essen July 3-4. Monitors from your organizations attempted by force to stop comrades of our organization from distributing a leaflet to the conference participants. One comrade was beaten and kicked. Several others were forcibly driven away. Representatives of a split-off German Trotskyist grouping, the IKD [Internationalist Communists of Germany], had the same experience. One of their leaders, Jochen Ebmeier, was beaten, and their bookstand was destroyed.

Such behavior contradicts the entire tradition of Trotskyism and its determined struggle for workers' democracy. It is a shameful adoption of practices introduced into the workers' movement first by the reformist union bureaucracy and then by the Stalinist

bureaucracy. It stains the name of Trotskyism and plays into the hands of all those petty-bourgeois revisionists who maintain that "basically" Leninism and Trotskyism are the same as Stalinism, and that Trotskyists, "if they had the chance," would behave in the workers' movement exactly as the Stalinists have done and still do.

It is instructive to compare this behavior of your goon squads with the complete freedom to distribute leaflets and sell literature that our International maintained during the large conferences in Brussels (November 1970 — 3,500 participants) and Paris (May 1971 — 10,000 participants) and during the international demonstration on the hundredth anniversary of the Paris Commune (30,000 participants).

The difference proves that: (1) in

our organization respect for workers' democracy is not a propaganda phrase but a principle that we observe in practice; (2) we have confidence in our programmatic and political views and do not fear to confront other positions; (3) we trust the political judgment of our members and sympathizers and are not forced to "protect" them from other views to keep them from running away.

After the similar behavior by SLL thugs against our comrade Ernie Tate in London several years ago,<sup>1</sup> the actions of your goon squads in Essen weaken your own current political campaigns. The Workers League in the United States raises a great cry that its members have been beaten up by a Puerto Rican organization, the Young Lords.<sup>2</sup> The OCI loudly denounces the violent attacks on its members by Stalinists in the Paris suburb of La Courneuve.

But how can the masses of workers take your protests seriously when they see that you use exactly the same methods against your opponents in the workers' movement?

It is time to put a definitive end to this unprincipled and unworthy behavior. We urge you publicly to dissociate yourselves from the Essen goon squads and to take a clear, principled position on one of the basic questions of revolutionary Marxism: the acceptance of democracy within the workers' movement.

With revolutionary greetings,

*Political Bureau of the GIM, German section of the Fourth International*

*Central Committee of the RKJ, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International*

1. On November 17, 1966, Ernest Tate was beaten by SLL goons as he was selling literature outside an SLL meeting in London. When two working-class newspapers published accounts of the incident, Healy appealed to the bourgeois courts. Healy did not deny that Tate had been beaten, but claimed that he had ordered his thugs to "clear the pavement" rather than to attack Tate — the sort of distinction that appeals to bourgeois lawyers, metaphysicians, and Healyites. — *IP*

2. The organization involved was the Movimiento Pro Independencia de Puerto Rico [MPI—Movement for Puerto Rican Independence]. The Workers League claims, and the MPI has not denied, that its members were attacked on April 8 of this year as they were selling literature outside MPI headquarters in New York City. — *IP*

## Aimed at Syria and Iraq

# Hussein Gets U.S. Heavy Armor

The U. S. Defense Department acknowledged September 2 that it is supplying King Hussein of Jordan with modern heavy tanks. Unnamed "sources" quoted in the September 2 *Washington Post* said that Hussein had been receiving the M-60 tanks for several weeks. The article continued:

"The Israeli evening paper Maariv, in a dispatch from Jerusalem, reported yesterday [September 1] that a large consignment of American tanks and ammunition had recently arrived in the Jordanian port of Aqaba in U. S. cargo ships. . . .

"This year the United States has already committed a \$30,000,000 military assistance grant . . . to Jordan."

Writing from Ramtha, Jordan, in the September 8 *New York Times*, William Beecher reported that the weapons being provided to Hussein

include "nearly 90 M-60 tanks, about 200 M-113 armored personnel carriers and about 40,000 M-16 automatic rifles, together with considerable radar and other equipment."

"A year ago," Beecher added, "the 60,000-man Jordanian Army had nine infantry brigades and two armored brigades. It is reportedly being reorganized into one armored division, one mechanized division and two infantry divisions."

The arms shipments to Hussein amount to an indirect arming of Israel. Now that the Hashemite Nero has destroyed the Palestinian fedayeen bases in Jordan, his new armored forces are turned against other Arab countries. Apparently little more than token forces have been left on the "front" with Israel. Beecher reported: "A sizable part of the tank force is in the northwest, in the rolling hills along the Syrian border, and the northeast, and in the flat desert along the Iraqi border. Both areas are considered ideal country for tank operations.

"The Israeli front on the west, it is said, is guarded principally by infantry, with artillery and antitank weapons, posted along the mountain roads leading from the Jordan River toward Amman." □

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