

# Tension Mounts in Bolivia



**Nixon Continues Aid  
to Pakistan Butcher**

TORRES: Bolivian General-President finds less and less room for maneuver as People's Assembly occupies parliament building. See p. 675.

Pentagon Papers:

## ***Study Shows Impact of Antiwar Actions***

# Firing Squads at Work in Iran

In an apparent attempt to keep international protests from marring his celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the "Persian monarchy," Shah Reza Pahlevi decided to condemn and execute opponents of his regime in secret.

The Comité de défense des prisonniers politiques iraniens [Committee to Defend the Iranian Political Prisoners] learned that seven alleged guerrillas were sentenced in secret to speedy executions, according to *Le Monde* of July 3. Not even the names of the condemned were made public.

In response to this report, the International Association of Democratic Jurists called on the Iranian regime to reveal the names of the twelve "guerrillas" supposedly captured in an unsuccessful raid on the Siakhel police headquarters in the north of the country. It asked in particular for the names of the seven sentenced to death. The organization demanded that the twelve be given public trials with respect for the rights of the defense.

Despite this appeal, two of the seven were executed July 5, according to the July 7 issue of *Le Monde*. However, Iranian officials explained that the sentences of four had been commuted to life imprisonment because they had "expressed regret" for their action. The sentence of the seventh was reduced to ten years in prison.

The article did not explain by what authority the sentences of these five prisoners had been changed. Nor did it report whether the shah's government had yet revealed the names of any of the "guerrillas," even of the two executed.

In its protest, the Paris defense committee asked if the Teheran government intended to commemorate two and a half millennia of autocratic rule in Iran by "sacrificing several human lives to a divinity symbolized by the shah." □

## How Profound Can You Get?

"They [guerrilla forces, at various times, in Greece, Malaya, and Philippines] failed to win because all the possible routes to guerrilla victory were closed and, in failing to win, they lost."—Rostow's memorandum on "Victory and Defeat in Guerrilla Wars," May 20, 1965, as cited in Pentagon's secret study of U.S. involvement in Vietnam war.

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# Workers Seek to Strengthen 'People's Assembly'

By Gerry Foley

"Now the people have a parliament. In La Paz on June 22, some 221 deputies took their seats in the precincts of the solemn Palacio Legislativo. These men did not look like the stereotype of a legislator molded by the Western democracies. They were the shirtless ones of Bolivia—Indian features, small dark heads, calloused hands, work clothes, no ties.

"To make up for this lack of elegance, these legislators had a quality few of their foreign counterparts could boast of. They represented their constituencies directly and in a distinct spirit of class solidarity. In short, they combined all the characteristics anyone could ask for to frighten the meager bourgeoisie that exists in the Andean highlands."

An Argentinian correspondent recorded this impression in the June 29-July 5 issue of the Buenos Aires weekly *Panorama*. He was reporting on the formal installation in the Bolivian parliament building of the Asamblea Popular [People's Assembly], the outgrowth of a united-front leadership that sprang up to head mass resistance to an attempted rightist military coup October 4, 1970. Born out of the mass mobilization that brought General Juan José Torres to power as a "left" representative of the army, the Asamblea Popular has continued as a center of authority parallel to the military government.

In its June 22 issue, the influential Paris daily *Le Monde* also took note of the invasion of the bourgeois parliament building, closed for years under the military regime, by an organization leading the masses in the streets, factories, and mines. In an editorial entitled "A 'Workers' Government' in Bolivia?," *Le Monde* wrote: "Generals hostile to a policy of trying to reduce U. S. influence in Bolivia, and representatives of the middle classes worried by the perspective of nationalizations are not concealing their dismay at seeing the new 'People's Parliament' take the place of the old legislative assembly.

"Composed of delegates from all of

the country's working-class sectors and members of all of the left parties, this 'People's Assembly' met for the first time in May. It was accepted—without great enthusiasm, it seems—by General Torres. The president, of course, cannot cut himself off from the miners' unions and the most 'committed' student leaders without running the risk of falling victim to a new rightist plot."

The editorial concluded: "This is an explosive situation, which of course is nothing new on the roof of the Andes. But the United States, already upset by the 'overtures to the East' of Juan José Torres's government, is watching the developments with growing concern."

This concern was expressed openly two weeks later in an article in the July 8 *New York Times* by the influential capitalist paper's main Latin American expert, Juan de Onis:

"Gen. Juan José Torres, the black-mustached army chief who seized the presidency on Oct. 7, has been forced to share political authority with an improvised Popular Assembly of left-wing union leaders, Marxist politicians and radical students."

In face of the mass mobilization touched off by the October 4 coup of pro-American rightist General Rogelio Miranda, the Bolivian military and its U. S. backers were forced to accept the left bonapartist government of Torres. It seemed to be the only alternative to full-scale civil war and direct intervention by Washington. The Bolivian military establishment, including its commander in chief General Reque Terán, however, has not concealed its fears that Torres would be forced to make dangerous and perhaps fatal concessions to the mass movement.

De Onis's article was entitled "Bolivia Yields to Left-Wing Pressure." He wrote: "The radicals have already succeeded in forcing the expulsion from Bolivia, after nearly 10 years, of the United States Peace Corps, and the nationalization, without compensation

as yet, of major United States private mining investments.

"During this period, which began after the death of President René Barrientos Ortuño in a helicopter crash in 1969, nearly all the goals of United States policy in Bolivia have been destroyed or put aside."

In its first ten days in the Palacio Legislativo, de Onis pointed out, the Asamblea Popular passed resolutions calling for the expulsion of U. S. military and intelligence forces and for workers' self-management of the state-owned tin mines.

"Judging from the record of the past seven months, the Government will be under constant pressure, including the threat of a general strike, to comply with these demands," de Onis pointed out.

In particular, the *Times* expert continued, ". . . American diplomats, as well as Bolivian businessmen, are deeply concerned over the economic crisis that has accompanied the political radicalization here."

By "economic crisis," de Onis meant that the state company managing the tin mines has been forced, under mass pressure, to rehire many of the workers fired after the government "restored order" in the mines exactly six years ago in the St. John's Day massacre of June 23, 1965.

The reduction in "economic discipline" (that is, in the exploitation of the workers) had led, the *Times* expert argued, to rising production costs, which blocked exports. And on top of this: "The Popular Assembly adopted the demand of the State Mine Workers Federation that worker representatives assume majority control of the mine administration to 'save' the state mining corporation, Comibol [Corporación Minera de Bolivia—Mining Corporation of Bolivia], and to 'begin the socialist organization of the economy.'

"Meanwhile, left-wing extremists have been pushing measures such as the seizure of private mines, large farms and even Government offices."

The Torres government grants the

Asamblea Popular only a consultative role. It has the potential, as de Onis recognized however, of taking command of the fundamental areas of the Bolivian economy. The June 29-July 5 *Panorama* pointed this out with special clarity:

"Its resolutions are obeyed by its members, who represent almost all the organized workers. In equipping themselves with this assembly, the workers have emerged from the sphere of purely trade-union activity. They have entered fully into the political arena, and with a socialist program.

"In this assembly the workers co-exist with politicians and students, but they are a majority, with 60 percent of the seats. This is why the right is sounding an alarm, blowing up the proportions of the scandal, calling the Asamblea Popular a soviet and proclaiming that dual power has been established in Bolivia."

Judging from the reports in the international press, the move of the Asamblea Popular into the parliament building assumed the characteristics of a revolutionary crisis.

"The workers' subcommandos of this city have been recruiting armed fighters since yesterday in keeping with the instructions they have received from the Central Organization of Bolivian Trade Unions (COB) regarding the formation of an armed militia," a *Prensa Latina* correspondent cabled from La Paz June 21.

"The La Paz regional office of COB made public a document maintaining the organization on a state of alert in view of the coup plots aimed at blocking the opening of the Popular Assembly which is scheduled to get under way tomorrow. . . .

"Recruitment is being carried out at the office of the trade union. The armed workers were ordered to do guard duty there and at the factories."

Arming to defend the democratic rights of the workers, the unions apparently gave critical support to the Torres regime—a "support" that perfectly suited Lenin's definition: "as the rope supports a hanged man."

"Trade union leaders said they would hold the Torres Administration responsible for anything that happened as a result of the Government's lack of action against the coup plotters," the *Prensa Latina* dispatch continued. "They said that the coup was aimed at blocking the work of the

Popular Assembly scheduled to open tomorrow.

"Tension mounts in La Paz, as small arms fire is heard in different parts of the city.

"The first of the armed militia groups have appeared at the trade union halls ready to go out into the streets. It was reported that 300 miners from the Matilde Mine, which was recently taken over by the State, are in La Paz."

The June 29-July 5 *Panorama* reported the same buildup of tensions: "Alarming reports spread from the comfortable neighborhood of Sopocachi and its surrounding areas. While the delegations from the interior of the country crowded the accesses to the capital and roused a tumult in the steeply sloping streets of La Paz with their enthusiasm, the well-to-do citizens spread shocking rumors: 'After they take over the Palacio Legislativo, the workers will storm the state offices and there will be a bloodbath.' That is, they were prodding the discontented officers to stage a preventive coup before the red peril plunges Bolivia into the abyss.

"The nerves of the military officers surrounding General-President Juan José Torres were also strained to the breaking point. . . .

"Military seniority was respected reluctantly, and the plotters let the zero hour go by without coming out of their barracks. Of course, at least as far as their intentions go, they were only postponing the coup. But the fact that the rebels had to defer their strike is quite indicative. It means that a good part of the officers, 'touched' by fears of the Asamblea, hesitated. They knew that the extent of popular mobilization, along with the existence of a nationalist sector in the armed forces committed to supporting Torres, meant that a coup would probably ignite a civil war of unpredictable consequences."

In its opening session in the Palacio Legislativo, the Asamblea Popular adopted a resolution declaring it would not avoid any confrontation necessary to defend the democratic rights of the Bolivian working people:

"In the likelihood of a coup, the Asamblea Popular, as the expression of workers' power, will take the political and military leadership of the masses in struggle and will carry on the fight until the rightists, fascists, and imperialists are driven definitively

out of the country . . . If a coup d'état takes place, the Asamblea Popular will call for a general strike and occupation of the factories and mines as the first response of the working masses."

In defending the democratic right of the workers' representatives to meet, and in "supporting" the Torres government against a rightist coup, the unions seem to have succeeded in creating an armed force of their own. "The COB is a paramilitary institution, and so the situation is interesting and must be studied," General Reque Terán, the rightist commander of the armed forces, commented.

However, the union delegates seemed to have little interest in discussing the question of armed action in a general way, that is, in isolation from immediate and clearly understood needs.

According to reports in the international press, these delegates gave a cold response to a demand raised by the trade-union local in Tarifa, a town near the Argentinian border, that the assembly take a position of advocating armed struggle as the only road to power, as well as express its support for the Maoist leader Oscar Zamora. The latter was reportedly forced to flee to Chile after calling for the peasants to "seize the agricultural enterprises in Santa Cruz and transform them into cooperatives." He returned to the country secretly in late June.

"The 'People's Assembly,' already considered by many as the first 'soviet' on the American continent, ran into its first difficulties June 26," *Le Monde* reported in its June 30 issue. "The delegates of the most important workers' organizations (the mine, oil, and building workers) walked out of the hall, while the representatives of the left political parties were continuing an interminable debate on the 'correctness of the pro-Chinese CP's theses.'"

By and large, the program of the Asamblea seemed confined to demanding that the Torres government carry out its promises to the working people of the country. The measures it recommended flowed clearly and logically from this position.

As a result, the forces willingly or unwillingly supporting the Torres government have had little apparent basis for objection. "The deputies of this embryonic organ of workers' democracy were careful not to offer

their antagonists any provocation," the June 29-July 5 *Panorama* noted. "And now that this body has been installed in the parliament building, it is growing stronger and stronger."

In calling for the ouster of imperialist military and intelligence personnel, the Asamblea Popular was only drawing the logical conclusion from Torres's promises to safeguard the independence of the country.

Moreover, since it was the workers who blocked the right-wing coup of October 4, thus enabling Torres to set up a reformist regime, and since there is still a continual threat of a new rightist coup backed by imperialism, it is only reasonable that the workers should be armed.

It is reasonable also that the workers should assume control of their factories and mines, since the agents of the imperialist companies and the managers linked to the previous military regimes cannot be trusted not to sabotage the economic basis of Bolivian independence. Furthermore, the production centers are the natural fortresses of any resistance to a rightist takeover.

Despite this reasonableness, the government has not been spared discomfiture. It was eminently reasonable for the workers to demand that the ruling faction of the army—since it claims to be an ally of the workers and can hold power only with their support—purge the officer corps of men responsible for crimes against the working people.

So, in its session June 23, the sixth anniversary of the St. John's Day massacre, the Asamblea Popular passed the following resolution: "As just homage to the workers machine-gunned down on the night of June 23, 1965, the Asamblea Popular calls on the government to bring to trial all the officers involved in that monstrous mass murder."

General Reque Terán, one of the men who has been accused of ordering the murder of Che Guevara, in particular seemed upset by the demand: "We must exonerate those officers who ordered the massacre of the miners. We cannot build our country on hatreds."

However, *Panorama* pointed out, "The question of how to build a new country is being hotly debated in the barracks and the union halls." And the workers of Bolivia represented in the Asamblea Popular seem to think

that they cannot build a new Bolivia without a thorough investigation of the crimes and national betrayals of the established power structures—especially the army, which continues to rule the country.

It will be interesting to see how much of the officer corps is implicated in

## Mexico

### Seven Political Prisoners Released

In the wake of the scandal provoked by the murderous attack of government-paid goons on a mass student demonstration June 10, the Echeverría regime has released seven more of the political prisoners jailed in the repression of the 1968 student and popular movement.

The latest group of prisoners released left Lecumberri preventive jail July 6. As in the cases of other witch-hunt victims previously let go, they were freed on parole and remain in jeopardy of reimprisonment at the convenience of the authorities.

The group included Servando José Dávila Jiménez, Raimundo Aranda Velázquez, Nicolás López Martínez, José León Pámanes González, Carlos Sevilla González, and Martín Dosal Jottar.

"The prisoners released by Judge Ferrer Mac Gregor had been sentenced by the same judge to terms that ranged from three to sixteen years in prison on charges of inciting to rebellion, stockpiling arms, assault with a deadly weapon, resistance to arrest, robbery, and homicide," the Mexico City daily *Excelsior* reported July 7.

Another group of twenty-three prisoners jailed in the witch-hunt that followed the massacre of Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968, were released a little less than two months ago. This group included the following: Heberto Castillo Martínez, José Revueltas Sánchez, Jessái Díaz Cabrera, Mariano Zamorano Becerril, Miguel Bejarano Garcés, Félix Goded Andreu, Carlos Cabagné Mendoza, Cayetano Horta Villa, Salvador Zarco Flores, Juan Robles Armenta, Antulio Fernández Maldonado, Jorge Abaroa Corona, Taurino Urías Jiménez, José Piñeiro Guzmán, Rafael Servín Auspuru, Prisciliano Pérez Anguiano, Germán

such crimes, if the Asamblea Popular succeeds in forcing an investigation. Few are likely to be completely exonerated. At the very least, moreover, this course seems certain to bring powerful pressures to bear on Torres. It can, in fact, make his position untenable. □

Alvarez Diaz de León, Carlos Andrade Ruiz, Angel Juan Heredia Espinosa, José Luis Martínez Castillo, Antonio Morales Romero, Roberto Vázquez Camarena, and Bernard Phillip Ames.

Even after the release of these prisoners, as well as other groups, the following twenty-one persons, jailed in the 1968 repression, remain in Lecumberri: Agustín Montiel Montiel, Arturo Ortiz Marban, Gerardo Unzueta Lorenzana, Roberto Miñón Corro, Mario H. Hernández, Fernando Cortés Granados, Gilberto Rincón Gallardo, Américo Saldivar, Joel Arriaga, Arturo Martínez Nateras, Rodolfo Echeverría Martínez, Ramón Danzós Palomino, Eduardo Montes Manzano, Francisco Comenares César, Rafael Jacobo García, José M. Irene Téllez, Ernesto Olvera Sotres, Ignacio Plata Díaz, Alejandro Ortiz Camacho, Pedro Estrada Vega, and Carlos Medina Sevilla.

In addition, the victims of smaller witch-hunts that preceded the 1968 roundups are continuing to serve long sentences. This category includes Adolfo Gilly and Víctor Rico Galán, who have been in prison since 1966. Moreover, nineteen persons were jailed in another case of an alleged guerrilla plot in March 1971.

The prisoners released July 6 have served two and a half years under brutal conditions. Among other things, they were subjected to a savage attack by the common prisoners directed by the prison administration on January 1, 1970. Their comrades still in prison continue to face these pressures. Now that the Echeverría regime has been forced to widen its concessions, it is important to keep up the international campaign for the release of all political prisoners in Mexico. □

# Pentagon Study Shows Impact of Antiwar Actions

By Allen Myers

Writing on "The Lessons of Vietnam" in the July 6 *New York Times*, Max Frankel described one of the conclusions to be drawn from the secret Pentagon study of the Indochina war:

"The American objective in Vietnam, although variously defined over the years, remained . . . fixed. Disengagement, no matter how artfully it might have been arranged or managed, was never seriously considered so long as a separate, pro-American and non-Communist government was not safely installed in Saigon."

Given this "fixed" goal of U. S. imperialism, it remains to be asked why the most powerful military machine in the history of the world has been unable to accomplish the task.

Foremost, of course, has been the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people themselves, who refused to buckle under the most massive bombing campaign in history, who matched each U. S. escalation with greater determination, and who constantly frustrated the plans of the warmakers in Washington.

A second factor, and one that is clearly demonstrated in the portions of the Pentagon study that have been published, is the growth of the worldwide antiwar movement. Although the Pentagon study and the newspapers that have printed excerpts from it prefer to express the fears of the U. S. government in vague phrases about "public opinion," it is sufficiently clear that they were concerned by the concrete manifestation of that opinion in a massive, independent movement.

From as early as the fall of 1966 until his abdication in March 1968, the study shows, Lyndon Johnson resisted his military chiefs' recommendations for a full-scale mobilization, involving the calling up of the reserves. This decision was based on political rather than military considerations.

## The 'Political Sound-Barrier'

On October 14, 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sent Johnson a pessimistic report of his con-

clusions following a trip to South Vietnam.

"Enemy morale," he wrote, "has not broken—he apparently has adjusted to our stopping his drive for military victory and has adopted a strategy of keeping us busy and waiting us out (a strategy of attriting our national will). He knows that we have not been, and he believes we probably will not be, able to translate our military successes into the 'end products'—broken enemy morale and political achievements by the GVN [Government of (South) Vietnam]. . . ."

"Pacification has if anything gone backward. As compared with two, or four, years ago, enemy full-time regional forces and part-time guerrilla forces are larger; attacks, terrorism and sabotage have increased in scope and intensity; more railroads are closed and highways cut; the rice crop expected to come to market is smaller; we control little, if any, more of the population; the VC [Viet Cong] political infrastructure thrives in most of the country, continuing to give the enemy his enormous intelligence advantage; full security exists nowhere (not even behind the US Marines' lines and in Saigon); in the countryside, the enemy almost completely controls the night."

McNamara's evaluation was shared by top U. S. military commanders. In his summary of a portion of the study, Hedrick Smith wrote in the July 3 *New York Times*:

"In September, 1966, Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, commander in chief of [U. S.] forces in the Pacific, had pressed on behalf of General Westmoreland [then U. S. commander in South Vietnam] for an increase in the projected strength of American forces in South Vietnam from 445,000 to 570,000 by the end of 1967. Actual strength was 325,000 men, and still rising.

"On Oct. 7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged what the Pentagon study calls 'full-blown' mobilization of 688,500 Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine reservists to help provide more troops for Vietnam and also to build up the armed forces around the world."

Smith wrote that the Joint Chiefs had significant congressional support:

"In Congress, the study also notes, the military received support from Senator John C. Stennis, chairman of the influential Senate Preparedness Subcommittee. On Jan. 18 [1967], the Mississippi Democrat declared that General Westmoreland's troop requests should be met, 'even if it should require mobilization or partial mobilization.'"

According to the authors of the Pentagon study, however, Johnson had already come to regard mobilization as a "political sound-barrier" that he could not cross. Instead, he chose a public-relations gimmick designed to appease antiwar sentiment.

"The time for decision," Smith wrote, "came virtually on the eve of the Nov. 8 Congressional election. Although the war was not a central issue in most districts, the Pentagon account says, President Johnson had obtained at the Manila meeting [of the U. S. government and its allies in the war] a statement on ultimate allied withdrawal that would favorably impress American voters."

## The Air War

In his October 14, 1966, memorandum, McNamara had proposed either a reduction or a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam in an effort to obtain by diplomatic means what the American government had not been able to accomplish militarily. Among the reasons for his recommendation, he cited the ineffectiveness of the bombing, the danger it created of a confrontation with the Soviet Union or China, and the widespread public revulsion at the U. S. aggression.

". . . it is clear that," McNamara wrote, "to bomb the North sufficiently to make a radical impact upon Hanoi's political, economic and social structure, would require an effort which we *could* make but which *would not be stomachable either by our own people or by world opinion*; and it would involve a serious risk of draw-

ing us into open war with China." (Emphasis added.)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff answered McNamara in a memorandum also dated October 14. They argued that political considerations had already damaged the war effort.

They called attention to a November 1964 memorandum in which ". . . the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided their views as to the military pressures which should be brought to bear on NVN [North Vietnam]. In summary, they recommended a 'sharp knock' on NVN military assets and war-supporting facilities rather than the campaign of slowly increasing pressure which was adopted. Whatever the political merits of the latter course, we deprived ourselves of the military effects of early weight of effort and shock, and gave to the enemy time to adjust to our slow quantitative and qualitative increase of pressure. . . ."

Trying to balance between military needs and the rising public opposition to the war, Johnson refused to mobilize the reserves but approved an expansion of the air war, the effects of which he hoped could be concealed.

This hope was frustrated in part by the *New York Times* sending its assistant managing editor, Harrison Salisbury, to North Vietnam at the end of 1966.

Salisbury's reports, which mentioned widespread civilian casualties, did much to discredit Johnson's claim that the bombing raids were carried out with "surgical precision." His dispatches helped to fuel what the Pentagon papers call an "explosive debate about the bombing."

### 'Rising Domestic Dissent'

In March 1967, General Westmoreland presented Johnson with new requests for reinforcements. He needed, he said, 100,000 additional troops "as soon as possible but not later than 1 July 1968." The "optimum force," he continued, would be four and two-thirds divisions—more than 200,000 men.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an April 29 memorandum, recommended to McNamara that the reserves be mobilized to meet Westmoreland's request. They pointed out that short of such a mobilization, the army was unable to provide more than one and one-third of the four and two-thirds divisions Westmoreland needed.

"What they proposed," the Pentagon study says, "was the mobilization of the reserves, a major new troop commitment in the South, an extension of the war into the VC/NVA [Viet Cong/ North Vietnamese Army] sanctuaries (Laos, Cambodia and possibly North Vietnam), the mining of North Vietnamese ports and a solid commitment in manpower and resources to a military victory."

These recommendations were opposed by most civilian officials in the administration, with a chief reason being the growing opposition to the war both in the United States and internationally. Smith wrote, for example, of the reaction of Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy:

"The mobilization required to provide large troop reinforcements for the ground war, Mr. Bundy contended, would entail 'a truly major debate in Congress.' With signs of rising domestic dissent over the war, he advised that 'we should not get into such a debate this summer.'"

Bundy's views, it should be noted, were expressed on May 1, 1967, just over two weeks after massive antiwar demonstrations (in New York and San Francisco on April 15) had made the "rising domestic dissent" clearly visible.

At about the same time, presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy prepared a memorandum for Johnson that called requests for additional troops "inevitable, in the framework of strictly military analysis."

"It is the thesis of this paper," he continued, "that in the main they should be rejected, and that as a matter of high national policy there should be a publicly stated ceiling to the level of American participation in Vietnam. . . ."

"There are two major reasons for this recommendation: the situation in Vietnam and the situation in the United States. As to Vietnam, it seems very doubtful that further intensifications of bombing in the North or major increases in U. S. troops in the South are really a good way of bringing the war to a satisfactory conclusion. As to the United States, it seems clear that the uncertainty about the future size of the war is now having destructive effects on the national will."

Bundy went on to recommend a curtailment of the bombing, which he said was only marginally effective militarily:

"And against this distinctly marginal impact we have to weigh the fact that

strategic bombing does tend to divide the U. S., to distract us all from the real struggle in the South, and to accentuate the unease and distemper which surround the war in Vietnam, both at home and abroad. It is true that careful polls show majority support for the bombing, but I believe this support rests upon an erroneous belief in its effectiveness as a means to end the war. Moreover, I think those against extension of the bombing are more passionate on balance than those who favor it. . . ."

Bundy concluded with "one further argument against major escalation in 1967 and 1968 which is worth stating separately, because on the surface it seems cynically political."

". . . escalation will not bring visible victory over Hanoi," he wrote, "before the [1968 presidential] election. Therefore the election will have to be fought by the Administration on other grounds. I think those other grounds . . . will be obscured if our policy is thought to be one of increasing—and ineffective—military pressure."

Other top figures in the government were equally alert to the political dangers created by the growing antiwar mood of the country. On May 6, 1967, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton sent McNamara a note that read in part:

"A feeling is widely and strongly held that 'the Establishment' is out of its mind. The feeling is that we are trying to impose some U. S. image on distant peoples we cannot understand (any more than we can the younger generation here at home), and that we are carrying the thing to absurd lengths.

"Related to this feeling is the increased polarization that is taking place in the United States with seeds of the worst split in our people in more than a century. . . ."

### McNamara's Retreat

Shortly thereafter, McNamara prepared a Draft Presidential Memo (DPM) dated May 19, 1967, that argued once again for greater efforts to open negotiations. McNamara was willing to take this step even though the prospect of North Vietnamese concessions no longer seemed as promising as it once had:

"The North Vietnamese believe they are right; they consider the Ky regime to be puppets; they believe the world is with them and that the American

public will not have staying power against them. Thus, although they may have factions in the regime favoring different approaches, they believe that, in the long run, they are stronger than we are for the purpose."

The authors of the Pentagon study commented:

"When added to the continuing difficulties in bringing the war in the South under control, the unchecked erosion of U.S. public support for the war, and the smoldering international disquiet about the need and purpose of such U.S. intervention, it is not hard to understand the DPM's statement that, 'This memorandum is written at a time when there appears to be no attractive course of action.'"

McNamara went on to discuss the U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam:

"We cannot ignore that a limitation on bombing will cause serious psychological problems among the men, officers and commanders, who will not be able to understand why we should withhold punishment from the enemy. General Westmoreland said that he is 'frankly dismayed at even the thought of stopping the bombing program.' But this reason for attacking North Vietnam must be scrutinized carefully. We should not bomb for punitive reasons if it serves no other purpose—especially if analysis shows that the actions may be counter-productive. It costs American lives; it creates a backfire of revulsion and opposition by killing civilians; it creates serious risks; it may harden the enemy."

"Why not escalate the bombing and mine the harbors (and perhaps occupy southern North Vietnam) . . . ?" McNamara asked rhetorically. "The answer is that the costs and risks of the actions must be considered."

"The primary costs of course are US lives: The air campaign against heavily defended areas costs us one pilot in every 40 sorties. In addition, an important but hard-to-measure cost is domestic and world opinion: *There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go.* The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 non-combatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly distortion in the Ameri-

can national consciousness and in the world image of the United States—especially if the damage to North Vietnam is complete enough to be 'successful.'" (Emphasis added.)

McNamara's position was a dramatic illustration of the fears aroused by the growth of the antiwar movement. A year and a half earlier, he had recommended a temporary bombing halt on the basis that this would permit U.S. imperialism to escalate its aggression:

"It is my belief that there should be a three- or four-week pause . . . in the program of bombing the North before we either greatly increase our troop deployments to Vietnam or intensify our strikes against the North."

"The reasons for this belief are, first, that we must lay a foundation in the mind of the American public and in world opinion for such an enlarged phase of the war and, second, we should give North Vietnam a face-saving chance to stop the aggression."

Now, the "defense" secretary had come to the conclusion that even a North Vietnamese surrender would not compensate imperialism for the political damage the war was costing.

### After Tet

The continuing contradiction between the military requirements and the political limitations imposed by public opposition to the war was sharpened to a razor's edge by the Vietnamese Tet offensive of February 1968.

General Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported the situation to Johnson on February 27. His memorandum included descriptions of "the enemy . . . operating with relative freedom in the countryside," "a psychological blow, particularly in the urban areas," "a severe setback" for the "pacification" program, and "rapid [National Liberation Front] inroads in the formerly pacified countryside."

He went on to warn of possible further losses:

"If the enemy synchronizes an attack against Khe Sanh/Hue-Quang Tri with an offensive in the Highlands and around Saigon while keeping the pressure on throughout the remainder of the country, MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] will be hard pressed to meet adequately all threats. Under these circumstances, we must be prepared to accept some reverses."

One-half of the U. S. maneuver battalions had been rushed to the northern part of the country, Wheeler said, "stripping the rest of the country of adequate reserves."

Wheeler concluded with Westmoreland's new "force requirements"—an additional 206,000 troops, which would have brought the total to more than 731,000.

Westmoreland's plans for these reinforcements, E. W. Kenworthy wrote in the July 4 *New York Times*, included "an amphibious assault by the marines into North Vietnam as a diversionary move."

In a February 12 memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the deployment of Westmoreland's emergency reinforcements "be deferred at this time" because it would leave U. S. forces around the world spread too thin. The Pentagon study explains the motive behind this recommendation:

"The tactic the Chiefs were using was clear: by refusing to scrape the bottom of the barrel any further for Vietnam, they hoped to force the President to 'bite the bullet' on the call-up of the reserves—a step they had long thought essential, and that they were determined would not now be avoided."

In a classic understatement, the Pentagon analysts noted that Johnson was faced with this demand "at a time of great domestic dissent, dissatisfaction and disillusionment about both the purposes and the conduct of the war."

On February 28, Johnson asked Clark Clifford, who was sworn in as Secretary of Defense two days later, to head a study group to review U. S. policy in Vietnam. The "Clifford Group" included McNamara, General Maxwell Taylor, CIA director Richard Helms, and other top government officials.

At its first meeting on February 29, the group drew up a draft memorandum that warned:

"Even with the 200,000 additional troops, we will not be in a position to drive the enemy from SVN or to destroy his forces. . . ."

With further escalation, the draft said, ". . . it will be difficult to convince critics that we are not simply destroying South Vietnam in order to 'save' it and that we genuinely want peace talks. . . . This growing disaffection accompanied, as it certainly will be, by increased defiance of the draft and growing unrest in the cities because of the belief that we are neglecting domestic problems, runs great



risks of provoking a domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions."

However, objections of Johnson's more hawkish advisers produced a retreat from this position. A new draft memorandum prepared March 4 recommended the immediate deployment of 22,000 additional troops and the postponement of a decision on the balance of Westmoreland's request; the call-up of 262,000 reserves, larger draft calls, and extension of terms of service; no "peace" initiative; and either a "substantial extension" or a "seasonal step-up" of bombing.

The Pentagon study says:

"The memorandum had recommended 'a little bit more of the same' to stabilize the military situation, plus a level of mobilization in order to be prepared to meet any further deterioration in the ground situation. . . .

"But many political events in the first few weeks of March, 1968, gave strong indications that the country was becoming increasingly divided over and disenchanted with the current Vietnam strategy, and would no longer settle for 'more of the same.'"

### 'Unacceptable' Cost

On March 10, the *New York Times* broke the story of Westmoreland's request for an additional 206,000 troops. Johnson was "furious at this leak," according to the Pentagon papers, because it intensified the "sense of dissatisfaction" with the war.

"The President was troubled," the study remarks in another understatement. "In public he continued to indicate firmness and resoluteness, but press leaks and continued public criticism continued to compound his problem."

When one leak said, accurately, that Johnson was planning to approve an additional 35,000 to 50,000 troops over a six-month period, 139 members of the House of Representatives sponsored a resolution calling for congressional review of U. S. policy in Southeast Asia.

The study demonstrates, however, that Johnson did not rely on these "elected representatives" for his reading of the public mood. On March 25 and 26, he convened a meeting of the "Senior Informal Advisory Group."

The composition of this policy body should be interesting reading for any Americans under the illusion that they are ruled by an elective democracy. Those present were:

Dean Acheson, secretary of state un-

der the Truman administration; George Ball, a businessman who was an undersecretary of state for Kennedy and Johnson; General Omar Bradley; McGeorge Bundy; lawyer Arthur H. Dean; banker Douglas Dillon, secretary of the treasury for Kennedy and Johnson; Abe Fortas, a justice of the Supreme Court; Arthur Goldberg, at that time U. S. representative to the United Nations; Henry Cabot Lodge; John J. McCloy, who had been Truman's high commissioner in West Germany; businessman and career diplomat Robert D. Murphy; General Maxwell Taylor; General Matthew B. Ridgway; and Cyrus R. Vance, former deputy secretary of defense.

The Pentagon papers present no new information about this meeting, but simply reprint a *Los Angeles Times* account from May 1968 that reported Johnson being "deeply shaken" by the "advice" of the group.

It appears that even after hearing the verdict of these hawks turned "dove," Johnson retained some hope that the bombing limitation announced March 31 would serve as a pretext for "more of the same."

A cable from the State Department to U. S. ambassadors in Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Laos, the Philippines, and South Korea, sent a few hours before Johnson's speech, predicted:

"You should make clear that Hanoi is most likely to denounce the project and thus free our hand after a short period. Nonetheless, we might wish to continue the limitation even after a formal denunciation, in order to reinforce its sincerity and put the monkey firmly on Hanoi's back for whatever follows. . . ."

That hope was, of course, also denied by events. In an epilogue to its description of the period, the Pentagon study makes clear, despite its euphemistic language, the importance of the international antiwar movement in forcing U. S. imperialism to abandon the course Johnson favored:

"In March of 1968, the choice had become clear cut. The price for military victory had increased vastly, and there was no assurance that it would not grow again in the future. There were also strong indications that large and growing elements of the American public had begun to believe the cost had already reached unacceptable levels and would strongly protest a large increase in that cost.

"The political reality which faced President Johnson was that 'more of

the same' in South Vietnam, with an increased commitment of American lives and money and its consequent impact on the country, accompanied by no guarantee of military victory in the near future, had become unacceptable to these elements of the American public. The optimistic military reports of progress in the war no longer rang true after the shock of the Tet offensive.

"Thus, the President's decision to seek a new strategy and a new road to peace was based upon two major considerations:

"(1) The conviction of his principal civilian advisers, particularly Secretary of Defense Clifford, that the troops requested by General Westmoreland would not make a military victory any more likely; and

"(2) A deeply felt conviction of the need to restore unity to the American nation."

The majority of the American ruling class had decided that its goals in Southeast Asia required a new representative and a strategy that would undercut the mass antiwar sentiment.

The fact that the antiwar movement has remained in the streets, constantly drawing in new layers of the population, means that U. S. imperialism has still not resolved its dilemma. □

### Sex Is Subversive

The latest Pentagon secret to appear in the press may not be as sensational as the forty-seven-volume study of the Vietnam war, but it is likely to cause some red faces nevertheless. On July 4, the *New York Times* printed excerpts from a computerized army intelligence summary compiled shortly before the October 15, 1969, antiwar moratorium.

Among the threats to national security foreseen by the army was the possibility that "girl students from Vassar College and the State University of New York at New Paltz will offer sex to [United States Military Academy] cadets who sign an antiwar petition."

### There May Still Be Exceptions

The Justice Department has decided not to prosecute a Brooklyn congressman accused of conspiring to defraud the post office, John Hanrahan reported in the July 5 *Washington Post*.

Hanrahan said the Justice Department had told the local prosecutor ". . . it was concerned about unfavorable publicity it had been receiving for its use of conspiracy indictments against social and political militants and was reluctant to prosecute any further conspiracy cases."

## Vorster Turns to Political Trials

By I. B. Tabata

Lusaka, Zambia

We have received information that fourteen of the thirty members of the Unity Movement of South Africa who were detained last February in a nationwide security police swoop [see "Unity Movement Is Target of Countrywide Raids," *Intercontinental Press*, March 22, 1971, p. 254] are appearing on four charges under the Terrorism Act. The fourteen men are charged with seeking to overthrow Vorster's regime by force of arms and with foreign assistance. Some of the accused are also alleged to have incited at least thirty-two people to undergo military training and to have conspired with their organisation in Zambia to collect funds to finance the recruitment of volunteers in South Africa. It is also alleged that they assisted people to leave South Africa secretly and to evade the police. The men appeared briefly June 16 in the Pietermaritzburg Magistrate's Court, and the case was remanded to August 2, 1971.

At about the same time that they were preparing to charge these detainees, Mr. Benedict Nyakeni was forcibly removed from Lesotho to South Africa on the ground that he is a member of the Unity Movement. He is suspected of having vital information concerning the charges against the detainees. To our knowledge Mr. Nyakeni is a Lesotho citizen. Their action reveals the extent to which the South African racist regime will go to collect evidence against the detainees.

At the time of the arrests of the leadership of the Unity Movement, the racist regime did its best to keep the arrests secret. It was fully a fortnight after the detainees had disappeared before the world got to know about it. International publicity mounted by the Unity Movement forced the security police to acknowledge these arrests and to promise early trials. Five months later the trials were to open without any warning. During this whole period the detainees were kept in solitary confinement and subjected to all the refinements of terror and torture that the South African police had



VORSTER: Keeps Nazi tradition alive.

learnt from the OAS [Organisation de l'Armée Secrète] in Algeria.

It is known that at the time of the arrests the fear that haunted the hangmen of South Africa was that the impending trial could turn out to be a second Rivonia, with all the adverse international publicity that went with it. As things are now, the interest of the world is focused on the coming trials. The International Commission of Jurists, for instance, had planned to send observers to what is expected to be a major political trial. It is to avoid this full glare of the world that no advance notice was given of the trial date.

Meanwhile the struggle goes on in South Africa despite the pessimists and opportunists on the one hand and the fascists on the other. The former have convinced themselves that the racists' military machine is so powerful that it is impossible to challenge it. They maintain that international pressures on the South African government must be substituted for the strug-

gle of the oppressed, while the fascists shriek at the top of their voices in an attempt to convince the world that they have crushed all opposition to their regime and that life is tranquil.

As if to give the lie to all this spurious propaganda, the resistance of the oppressed Black masses in South Africa continues to stiffen. Reports reach us of the constant harassment of the members of the Unity Movement in both town and country, particularly those in the Pondoland area as well as those in exile in the adjacent states. More important are the persistent reports of clashes between the peasantry and the police in different parts of the country. These are most embarrassing to the establishment and its propagandists, who are forever at pains to dub them as tribal clashes or faction fights over cattle stealing or over land claims.

Every Black man in South Africa knows that it is the government that has expropriated and continues to expropriate the land from the peasantry all over the "reserves" as part of their campaign to drive people off the land onto the white farms, the mines and industry as migrant labourers. For a long time now it has been known that cattle stealing was *officially* organised as part and parcel of stock limitation, which is itself designed to facilitate labour recruitment. When the Blacks take up arms to defend their land and cattle, they do so in the full knowledge that their fight is against the government, irrespective of who the immediate agents are, whether white or Black. Everywhere throughout the country the people have reached the stage where there is a determination to meet violence with violence.

It is in the light of such a milieu that the persecution and the trials of the leadership and members of the Unity Movement must be seen. □

### Or President Attila

After reading documents from the Pentagon's secret study of the Vietnam war, *Washington Post* columnist Nicholas von Hoffman wrote his opinion of the government leaders involved:

"These men must have thought they were suprahuman. You get it from the code names they picked for their military operations. Hardnose, Pierce Arrow, Flaming Dart and Rolling Thunder. Like President Thor, Secretary of Defense Jupiter and General Wodin."

## 14 Charged With 'Terrorist Activities'

[The following report appeared in the June 16 issue of the Durban, South Africa, *Daily News*.]

\* \* \*

FOURTEEN MEN—10 Pondos, two Coloureds and two Indians—were formally remanded in the Magistrate's Court here today for summary trial in the Supreme Court, Pietermaritzburg, on four charges under the Terrorism Act.

The men, who were remanded in custody by Mr. P. Rossouw, are: Kader Hassim, Joseph Bransby Vusani, Mogami Josiah Moeng, Mfolwane Mbele, Pindiso Zimambane, Dan Gideon Mahanjana, Ncikwa Nagi Vimba, Max Bantwini Tabata, Frank Anthony, Robert Cedric Wilcox, Albert Kwenzi Tshangana, Montford Mzoli Mabuto, Joseph Tshukudu Maleka, Surinarayan Kala Venkatrathnam.

When the men appeared in court, Mr. M. Naidoo, a Pietermaritzburg attorney, who sat at the prosecutor's table, told the magistrate that he did not want to go on record as defending the accused. Sitting in the public gallery was Mrs. N. Pillay, a Durban attorney.

The 14 men appeared, therefore, in person. They were not asked to plead but said they had been presented with the indictment.

Mr. F. P. van der Merwe, the Senior Public Prosecutor, told the Court that the case had been postponed to August 2, this year, for summary trial in the Supreme Court.

All the accused men said they did not require pro deo counsel, that they would make their own arrangements for their defence and also for the calling of defence witnesses.

The charges relate to four counts alleging that the men participated in terrorist activities on various occasions dating from 1963 to last year.

COUNT ONE deals with the period from April to June, 1970, and places in South Africa and Zambia. It is alleged that the 14 men were members or active supporters of the African Peoples Democratic Union of South Africa (Apdusa) and of the Non-European Unity Movement (Neum), known also as the Unity

Movement. As members or active supporters, they endangered the maintenance of law and order in South Africa and, in furtherance of a common purpose, with Apdusa and Neum, sought to overthrow the Government by force of arms and with foreign assistance.

It is also alleged that they conspired with Isaac Begani Tabata, Dr. Ahmed Ismail Limbada, Dr. Norman Traub, Wycliffe Mlungisi Tsotsi, Edward Ncalu, Davidson Nggeleni, Lennox Diliza Lande, Leonard Nikane, Jane Gool, Blanche Tsotsi and Ernest Jama to receive, collect, solicit and hold funds available to finance a campaign to recruit people in South Africa to undergo political and military training, and to persuade and assist people to leave the country secretly; and also, to assist people to evade the police.

COUNT TWO refers again to Apdusa and Neum and that the accused conspired with Edward Ncalu, Lennox Diliza Lande, Leonard Nikane and Ernest Jama to recruit people in South Africa to undergo military and political training. The offences were alleged to have been committed at Pietermaritzburg by Hassim in receiving, holding, collecting, soliciting, donating and paying out of various sums of money amounting to about R4,000 [0.714 rands equal US\$1] to L. Nikane, L. Lande, E. Jama and E. Ncalu.

Various other accused are alleged to have committed similar offences at Johannesburg and include the conveyance of L. Nikane to Waterbranch Compound, Johannesburg, obtaining the services of a guide for E. Ncalu and also obtaining a train ticket for him.

Of the accused, six more are alleged to have made their kraals or homes available for secret meetings at Bizana, Zeerust and Cape Town and in Botswana; and of attending secret meetings at Cape Town. Some of them are also alleged to have addressed these secret meetings.

Allegations concern also the collection and distribution of money and the receiving and forwarding of code messages from Cape Town.

Count Three: Eight of the accused

are alleged to have incited, instigated, commanded, aided, advised, encouraged or procured at least 32 people to undergo military training which could have been of use to anybody intending to endanger the maintenance of law and order, namely: Apdusa and Neum and the members and active supporters of these organisations. Places mentioned where the offences are alleged to have been committed are Johannesburg, Mateking, Bizana, Cape Town and Zeerust. Named in this count are Vusani, Moeng, Mbele, Zimambane, Mahanjana, Vimba, Anthony and Maleka.

Count Four: Allegations in this count refer to unlawfully harbouring, concealing, or directly or indirectly rendering assistance to people who the accused had reason to believe to be terrorists.

Nine of the accused are mentioned. They are Hassim, Vusani, Moeng, Mbele, Zimambane, Tabata, Anthony, Wilcox and Tshangana. The offences are alleged to have been committed last year at Johannesburg, Bizana and Cape Town. It is alleged that four people named in the indictment were provided with board and lodging, that they were provided with transport and escort. □

## Nine Soviet Jews Sentenced

Nine Soviet Jews in Kishinev, Moldavia, were sentenced June 30 to labor-camp terms ranging from one to five years. The nine had been convicted by the Moldavian supreme court under Article 70 of the criminal code, which prohibits "agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening Soviet authority."

The trial was the fourth in a series that has so far resulted in the imprisonment of thirty-four persons—all but two of them Jews. All of the defendants have been accused of some form of complicity in a plot to hijack an airplane. (See *Intercontinental Press*, June 14, p. 552.)

The judge who read the verdict also mentioned an offense presumably considered equally serious by the Soviet bureaucracy. The defendants, he said, had stolen a duplicating machine and had "distributed anti-Soviet writings."

"The principal charge against the nine," the July 1 *New York Times* reported in a dispatch from Moscow, "seemed to be their involvement in a group that coordinated information about Jewish life with other groups in Leningrad and Riga. These groups distributed material pointing up what they regarded as difficulties encountered by Jews trying to live a Jewish life in the Soviet Union or seeking to emigrate to Israel." □

## Political Murders in Santo Domingo

The June 27 issue of the Santo Domingo daily *El Nacional* carried three separate reports of terrorist attacks on avowed or suspected opponents of the Balaguer regime.

The attacks were carried out by the police and the semiofficial commando group called La Banda [The Gang], sometimes working together, sometimes separately. "The Gang" is the popular name for the Juventud Anticomunista y Antiterrorista [Anticomunist and Antiterrorist Youth].

In the most violent of the attacks, rightist commandos murdered a young high-school student. "The death of seventeen-year-old Héctor Rafael de la Rosa occurred after four mercenaries belonging to The Gang chased him down Calle 10 in the suburban development of Espailat," Rafael Reyes Jerez wrote. "They pursued him into a house.

"Don't kill me, don't kill me,' De la Rosa begged his assailants as he ran to take refuge in the home of a friend. The neighbors watched the chase but could do nothing. . . .

"The student was shot down inside his friend's home. . . .

"From No. 202 Calle 10 the body of the youth, who was found covered with blood and in his underwear, was taken to his home by a Red Cross ambulance team.

"De la Rosa lived at No. 3 Calle San Rafael, about thirty meters from the house where four bullets ended his life, one of them striking him in the head.

"When his body was taken into his home, his family began to shout desperately, 'Murderers, murderers.'"

The dead youth had been arrested twice on political charges. His attackers were seen driving away in a white car with official license plates.

The *El Nacional* reporter noted that De la Rosa was the sixth person gunned down in terrorist attacks in a five-day period.

"The police and The Gang raided six houses in Villa Juana yesterday," Freddy Antonio Cruz wrote in another article in the same issue. "They dragged a youth from under a bed

and beat him until he bled from the mouth, nose, and head. . . .

"Moments after being beaten, the youth was taken away by the police to an unknown destination.

"In the house from which the gangsters and the police dragged the youth, no one wanted to give any information. The residents chorused that they had seen 'nothing.'"

A journalist who tried to approach the police while they were beating the youth—Héctor Amparo of Radio Comercial—was threatened with death by a police corporal, Cruz wrote.

"Moments later," the *El Nacional* reporter continued, "Carabina and other members of The Gang accused the press of being 'biased.' They said that

## 100,000 Antiwar Marchers in Melbourne

Tens of thousands of persons demonstrated across Australia June 30 in opposition to the Indochina war. In every state, the actions were the largest since the May 1970 nationwide protests.

In Melbourne, Dr. Jim Cairns, chairman of the moratorium committee, estimated the huge crowd at 100,000. At the rally that followed, Cairns told the marchers that "Vietnamization" was increasing the number of casualties.

"Probably no war in history has been based on such deceit," he said. ". . . this war is more than genocide. . . . Scientists estimate it will take decades, possibly centuries, for the environment to recover."

The July 1 Melbourne *Age* noted that popular chants were "U. S. out of Indochina" and "U. S. out of Australia."

In Sydney, Tom Uren, a Labor party member of Parliament who was one of the speakers, estimated that 15,000 joined in the protest. Two marches from different parts of the city converged at Town Hall for a rally. At Newcastle, 100 miles north-east of Sydney, 1,000 persons demonstrated.

the reporters only wrote what 'suited' them. . . .

"After the police took the youth away, more than fifty gangsters gathered at the main door of the República Dominicana school, where members of The Gang habitually hang out.

"Before concluding the operation, the police and The Gang halted traffic on the Calle Marcos Adón. . . .

"Although many members of The Gang said that they were not carrying weapons, revolvers were visible under the shirts of some."

In another incident, two members of the JRD [Juventud Revolucionaria Dominicana—Dominican Revolutionary Youth, the youth group of former President Juan Bosch's party] were seized on the corner of Calle 11 and Avenida Duarte by a team of goons belonging to The Gang. The two were beaten, but the anger of the people in the neighborhood reportedly forced the goons to release their victims. □

In Perth, some 5,000 to 6,000 participated in what the Melbourne *Sun* called the city's "biggest and most peaceful Moratorium march." The demonstration was led by the premier of Western Australia and union officials.

Another 5,000 marched in Brisbane. There were no disorders other than a minor scuffle with a small group of Nazis who tried to disrupt the protest, but the police minister later announced that the entire march had been filmed "for reference purposes."

Police in Adelaide attempted to block the route of 3,500 demonstrators and several clashes ensued. Thirty-eight persons were arrested.

Five arrests were reported in Hobart, the scene of the smallest of the moratorium protests. The arrests occurred after 600 marchers sat down in the street when police blocked their way.

As in Brisbane, police in Canberra, the federal capital, attempted to intimidate the 2,500 demonstrators by filming the protest, which included street theater performances outside government buildings and in public squares. □

## Right-Wing Terror Directed by Dominican Police

With the exception of the "reign of terror" in 1959, the Dominican Republic has seen more political murders under the rule of Joaquin Balaguer than in any comparable period of the Trujillo dictatorship, according to Norman Gall, writing in the July 22 issue of *New York Review of Books*.

"The Dominican terror," according to Gall, "resembles the current wave of political killings in Guatemala . . . in that the paramilitary death squads are organized by the armed forces and police, which in both cases over the years have been given heavy US material and advisory support. The death squads themselves are partly composed of defectors from revolutionary political factions."

Gall, who recently returned from the Dominican Republic, reported that Balaguer's political terrorism is in many cases directed almost randomly at the inhabitants of Santo Domingo's slum quarters. The effect has been to create a *de facto* all-night curfew.

Balaguer and his police seem to be haunted by the 1965 uprising of the barrios:

"In 1965, thousands of the slum dwellers, using Molotov cocktails and small arms captured from the police, defeated elite tank and infantry units at this [Duarte] bridge in one of the episodes that demoralized the Dominican military and led to the US intervention. This humiliation has generated in the Dominican armed forces and police an obsessive hatred and fear of the shack settlements and the dense, fetid warrens . . . in the interior of each city block in the *parte alta* of Santo Domingo."

The 1965 revolt, Gall believes, deserves to be placed ". . . alongside the Paris Commune of 1871 in the world's revolutionary traditions. Both were urban, popular uprisings that were sustained by civilian militia units until they were crushed by foreign troops. Both were involved in the turbulent process of peasant migration to the cities that made Paris in the nineteenth century and Santo Domingo since Trujillo's assassination in 1961 into centers of social revolution."

The attempt to control this center



David in Direct From Cuba

BALAGUER: Owes office to U.S. troops.

of social revolution has been a protracted one:

"Political assassinations continued steadily for four years after 1966, when, with US occupation forces still in the country, Balaguer was elected to his first four-year term. In 1970, during Balaguer's campaign for reelection, the terror sharply increased. A great many voters abstained from this election after the Dominican constitution had been changed to allow Balaguer to run for a second consecutive term. Then, in the last six months of 1970, after Balaguer had begun his second term of office, new plans for police action were circulated among the intelligence and security agencies of the Dominican government, which are honeycombed with officers of Trujillo's old secret police, the SIM (*Servicio de Inteligencia Militar*). These plans were the basis for the most sustained and enveloping system of terror since the fall of the Trujillo dictatorship."

During 1970 alone, at least 190 persons were murdered and another thirty disappeared.

Some of the terrorists are Cuban

counterrevolutionaries. Gall obtained copies of secret government documents, including one that said:

"... you are informed that you should have ready a group of five men, since on the 25th of this month it was agreed to stage a simulated attack on the Royal Bank of Canada to discredit the movements of the left, which have been gaining strength in recent months. J.1 says that the personnel selected for this purpose should be Cubans. The uniforms that will be used will be supplied by Lieutenant Cedano."

Balaguer's police have also used torture and threats to recruit terrorists from leftist groups, Gall wrote.

". . . many MPD [Movimiento Popular Dominicano—Dominican People's Movement, a Maoist organization] youths have been arrested and pressured into joining the police terrorist bands. On April 20, 1971, six youths who said they were members of a terrorist organization called *Juventud Democratica Reformista Anticomunista* [Democratic Reformist Anticommunist Youth] were granted political asylum in the Mexican embassy in Santo Domingo. All but one of them were age eighteen or younger. Before taking refuge in the embassy they issued a statement to the press saying that they had been recruited by the police after they were arrested and accused of 'a series of deeds that we did not commit' . . . They said the police told them that 'this is a declared war against the Communists. The bands will be organized in all the barrios of the capital and what has been done so far is an experiment to acclimatize public opinion.'"

A member of the terrorist group known as La Banda who sought asylum in the Mexican embassy on June 7 ". . . said in an interview that he had been jailed several times after fighting on the constitutionalist side in the 1965 revolution, and had been beaten up in jail so many times that he finally agreed to become a trustee at La Victoria prison, where, he said, he beat and tortured other inmates. . . .

"He explained that he had joined *La Banda* after his release from jail,

May 19, and had sought diplomatic asylum because he had been ordered by Police Lt. Nuñez Peña to kill Felix Alburquerque, the PRD [Partido Revolucionario Dominicano — Dominican Revolutionary party, led by Juan Bosch] Secretary-General of the taxi drivers' union UNACHOSIN, and Radhames Gomez, the managing editor of *El Nacional*."

The U. S. government is heavily involved in supporting Balaguer's police, Gall reported. The Agency for International Development (AID) "Public Safety"—i.e., police assistance — program in 1967-68 in the Dominican Republic was the largest of any

country except South Vietnam. (Gall noted the hardly coincidental fact that there were also large AID Public Safety programs in Brazil and Guatemala, both countries where right-wing terrorists receive the backing of their governments.)

The 1965 U. S. invasion has thus returned the Dominican Republic to the worst days of the Trujillo dictatorship:

"... the political regime that is the creature of the intervention has proved to be a revival of the era of Trujillo, with the apprentices sitting in the sorcerer's chair and practicing his brutal powers." □

the Mukti Foj [Liberation Army] that the exodus from Bangla Desh might have been reduced had there been a political programme capable of engaging the masses of workers, students and peasants in action around their immediate economic issues like land, control of factories, etc. Even now, some argue, it should be possible for the Bangla Desh Government to decree free distribution of land among the actual tillers.

A similar programme can be advanced in relation to industrial and other workers. A large section of workers seem to have stayed back even after the Army action, although thousands of them were killed in combat.

Mr. Mohamed Shah Jahan, Acting President of the Bangla Desh National Workers' League, told me that the strength of the organised industrial workers in Bangla Desh would be around four million and most of them had been "unionised" in spite of the Army Rule. According to him, at least one Lakh [100,000] workers were killed in industrial centres like Dacca, Chittagong, Jessore and Pabna.

His contention was that the Awami League had given the slogan "*Langar Jar Jami Tar*" (He who uses the plough has the land.) as far back as 1967. He said that Sheikh Mujib, in a message sent to the May Day rally held in Dacca, in 1970, had said that soon a stage would come "when workers would be the owners of the means of production."

The Sheikh had called for the nationalisation of all banks, insurance companies, jute exports, basic industries and public utilities "as a step towards socialisation of the means of production."

It would also appear that Mujib issued a general directive, on March 7, 1971, that in the event of the Awami League leadership being either arrested or liquidated, the people should organise "Action Committees," refuse to co-operate with the Army, destroy rail and road links, immobilise the transport system and convert every village hamlet into a fortress of resistance.

These directives of Banglabandhu Mujib have been followed by his people, but his economic programme is not yet reflected in the proclamations of the Bangla Desh Government, operating from the liberation territory. Perhaps, there had not been enough time for the Government to work out a detailed programme of this kind.

The Bangla Desh revolutionaries are

## 'Extreme Bitterness' at Chinese Role

# Bengali Left Seeks Program for Action

By S. B. Kolpe

[The following article originally appeared in the Bombay daily *Blitz* on June 12.]

\* \* \*

GAUHATI: From the pronouncements made by the Prime Minister and other Central Ministers, it appears as if New Delhi expects the sordid debacle of the people of Bangla Desh to be resolved within the next six months.

By that time, the five million refugees flooding the border states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura would also return to their homeland of their own volition, it is hoped.

Indeed, there is a general feeling that the Yahya Khan regime in West Pakistan is under heavy pressure from the Big Powers—and also of serious internal economic difficulties—to seek a political settlement with the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, although it is well known that any settlement short of total independence would not be acceptable to the liberation forces now engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the West Pakistani occupation forces.

It is suggested that Yahya Khan might avert a further catastrophe to his military junta in West Pakistan by settling with a moderate leader like Sheikh Mujib before the Leftist "extremists" take over the leadership.

A top Awami League leader close to the Bangla Desh Government told

me, in Mujibnagar, that, with its sagging morale, the occupation Army would not be able to withstand the pressure built up by the liberation forces adding to the fact that it is surrounded by a totally hostile population.

Maulana Bhashani, leader of the National Awami Party, however, told newsmen recently that he had advised his party men and all Leftist forces in Bangla Desh to form all-party "Action Committees" in villages to mobilise the people for "a protracted struggle against Pakistan."

Asked whether he felt that a protracted struggle for freedom would give the Leftists an opportunity to seize the leadership, the Maulana significantly commented: "A tiger never forgets the taste of human blood. There are 1.3 million educated unemployed in Bangla Desh. Possession of arms transforms a man's attitude and behaviour."

Leaders of the NAP led by Professor Muzaffar Ahmed, CPEB [Communist party of East Bengal] and other Leftist groups whom I met also expected the revolution to be an arduous and protracted affair. They stressed the need for evolving a serious strategy of armed confrontation, coupled with a programme of mass resistance inside Bangla Desh. They do not pin any hopes on the so-called "international pressure" on the Yahya regime.

There is a view among sections of

disappointed that the Socialist countries have not come to their support. About the Chinese role there is extreme bitterness even among one-time pro-Peking Left groups; but they have not lost their perspective as a result of these developments.

Meanwhile, the massive influx of refugees into the neighbouring States is placing a heavy strain on the Indian economy. A leading political figure of Assam, whom I met here, said with an element of sarcasm:

"If the Yahya regime is spending Rs. 1 crore [10,000,000—7.5 rupees equal US\$1] daily to conduct a war of genocide against the Bangla Desh people, we are spending an equal amount to feed five million refugees."

West Bengal has so far received 3.5 million refugees (or evacuees as they are called), exceeding the number of all refugees that came into the state after partition.

Tripura had a population of only three lakhs immediately after partition, but it swelled to 16 lakhs, mostly by evacuees from East Bengal over the years. Another nine lakhs have entered since March this year.

The border districts of Assam, particularly Cachar and Goalpara, received an influx of nearly three lakhs. Meghalaya, with a population of less than one million, has to play host to two lakh refugees.

The Assamese do not like Bengalis, and the Khasia and Garo tribes in Meghalaya fear that they might soon be swamped by the flood of refugees.

Even in West Bengal, local sentiments are sought to be roused. There have been clashes between local residents and refugees in some border districts.

This is probably due to the failure of the political leadership at the State level to prepare the people for the exceptional situation. None of the major political parties in West Bengal appears to have worked out a clear policy in relation to the problems created by the Bangla Desh revolution. All of them seem to have left the gigantic problem to be tackled administratively by the Centre.

New Delhi has owned the entire responsibility of sheltering and feeding the refugees and has decided to move about one million refugees from West Bengal to Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. But there are serious physical limitations to such a project. Even if ten special trains are to be pressed into service to carry 8,000 refugees daily, it would take more than four

months to clear one million refugees. Besides, there are problems like providing adequate shelter and food for them.

Such a massive operation calls for mobilisation of a large contingent of Army personnel to assist the civil administrators.

Political opinion inside the country, which was unanimous in its support to the people of Bangla Desh initially, is undergoing a modification as the magnitude of the refugee problem is becoming clearer.

Already, the bogey of separatism and secessionism is being raised by interested parties. Typical is the reaction, in the West Bengal Press, to statements by the West Pakistani Marxist, Tariq Ali, suggesting that Bangla Desh might eventually unleash a movement for a "United Socialist Bengal." The

tendency is to be less objective and more hysterical.

In a multi-lingual (or multi-national?) nation like India, with different linguistic regions unevenly developed and linguistic animosities prevailing everywhere, these tendencies emerge because of a sense of political oppression and economic exploitation.

It is, therefore, necessary to tackle the basic social and economic problems that give rise to these separatist tendencies.

The real implications of the Bangla Desh revolution are surfacing now. Reactionary parties in India are already trying to give a communal twist to the whole affair. They are playing the game of Yahya Khan.

We can serve the cause of the Bangla Desh revolution better if we make an intelligent assessment of the social forces unleashed by it. □

## \$35,000,000 'In the Pipeline'

### Nixon Continues Aid to Pakistan Butcher

The Nixon administration has made it clear that the U. S. has no intention, despite earlier statements to the contrary, of cutting off aid to the Yahya regime in Pakistan.

Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees on June 27, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Christopher Van Hollen claimed that the purpose of continued economic aid was to provide the U. S. with "leverage" in convincing Yahya Khan to seek a political settlement with the Bengalis.

When it was brought to Van Hollen's attention that there is no evidence that there has been any such "leverage," he agreed, but pointed out that the Nixon administration opposes using withholding of aid as a means of political pressure.

To withhold aid, Van Hollen said, would "be seen as sanctions and intrusion in internal problems."

Van Hollen was, in general, a good representative of Nixonian logic—"we" do not cut off aid, because that would be seen as interference; instead "we" give aid in order to gain "leverage" for interference. He also translated Nixon's earlier pronouncements that there would be no more U. S. military aid to Pakistan into clear English: he

told the subcommittee that it was "likely that additional military equipment will be shipped to Pakistan." Van Hollen conceded, on this question, that administration statements had been "confusing" and "misleading."

On June 28 the State Department announced that four or five more ships would sail for Pakistan—with arms—before the middle of August.

Nixon's Pakistan aid policy has further divided the U. S. ruling class, already badly split over the Indochina war and the *New York Times* disclosure of the Pentagon Vietnam report. Senator Edward Kennedy, the head of the refugee subcommittee, said after the hearings that he had asked the Nixon administration to "stop the policy of shipping arms to Pakistan."

Senator Frank Church of Idaho charged in a July 7 Senate speech that \$35,000,000 in military aid was still "in the pipeline" for delivery to Pakistan.

The *New York Times* of July 8 reported "qualified sources" as saying that the State and Defense departments had urged cancellation of licenses to ship munitions to Yahya, but that Nixon had personally ruled that the shipments be continued.

After detailing administration duplicity, the July 5 *Washington Post* com-

plained editorially: "Here we have a classic example of how the System really works; hidden from public scrutiny, administration officials have been supplying arms to Pakistan while plainly and persistently telling the public that such supplies were cut off."

Despite the opposition of some senators, the aid, both political and military, is continuing. The Nixon regime, according to Van Hollen, wants to discourage Yahya from increasingly turning to China, his other major supplier. □

a tour in Bangla Desh. The mission, headed by Peter Cargill, doubted that the aid could restore stability to Bangla Desh.

Under pressure from public opinion in their own countries, ten of the eleven member-nations of the Pakistan aid consortium (the United States was the sole exception) have decided to withhold aid to Yahya until the military situation is resolved.

According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, if Yahya does not receive the foreign aid, the exchange assets of West Pakistan will be exhausted by early August, despite the fact that his regime has deferred about \$55,000,000 of debt service payments.

The Pakistan State Bank has estimated that its convertible reserves will be down to \$20,000,000 by the end of September.

The government has also tripled its original projection of the amount of money it will need from the banking system to finance the 1970-71 budget deficit, because of the worst inflation in the history of Pakistan.

Unless Yahya can definitively crush Bengali resistance, it seems unlikely that he will be able to obtain the foreign aid necessary to keep his economy from total collapse. So the heroic resistance to Yahya's bloodbath threatens to trigger not only nationalist upsurges throughout the subcontinent, but also resistance in West Pakistan, as Yahya's policies increasingly lead to economic and social chaos. □

## As Bengali Resistance Goes On

# Yahya Faces Economic Crisis

By Jon Rothschild

Although the Pakistan army has occupied most of Bangla Desh, Bengali resistance is still continuing. On July 5, according to *New York Times* correspondent Sydney Schanberg, Bengali guerrillas knocked out the Dacca power station, throwing East Bengal's largest city into a blackout.

Comilla, a key transportation junction about 50 miles southeast of Dacca, had been without power for more than a week as of July 5. Schanberg wrote that the resistance "seems to be widening and growing more effective."

In a July 4 cable from Dacca, Schanberg said that there is "a new spirit" among the Bengalis, who "realize now that no other country is going to save them, that they will have to do it all themselves and that it will take a long time."

According to the July 6 *Christian Science Monitor*, some factories in Bangla Desh are barely functioning; production in Dacca is estimated to be at about 40 percent, and Chittagong and Khulna are operating at below 50 percent capacity. Transportation in the East is still virtually immobilized, and the ports are only partially operating.

On June 28, Yahya announced that martial law would continue throughout Pakistan indefinitely and that a new constitution would be drafted, not by the National Assembly, but by a special committee that he himself would appoint.

The Bengali resistance has placed Yahya in an increasingly difficult position. Without political and economic domination of Bangla Desh, Yahya cannot maintain his rule in West Pakistan. But his genocidal attempt to "pacify" the Bengalis entails the most serious consequences for West Pakistan itself.

The *Far Eastern Economic Review* of July 3 outlined the crisis Yahya is facing in this respect. The World Bank estimates that foreign aid on the order of US\$500,000,000 is needed by Yahya for the fiscal year July 1971 to June 1972. The bank claims that the Pakistani regime is short \$175,000,000 in terms equivalent to cash and \$200,000,000 in food-grain imports to meet a shortage of 500,000 tons of rice and wheat in West Pakistan and at least 2,000,000 tons in Bangla Desh. In addition it needs \$125,000,000 in commodity aid.

A World Bank and International Monetary Fund mission recommended against providing \$250,000,000 in foreign exchange to Yahya, which it had been considering before making

## Dutch Maoists Whitewash Yahya's Crimes

"Just as the American imperialists have found a good ally in Trotsky [Tariq] Ali, the Indian reactionaries have found a good tool for their dirty work in Sheik Mujibur Rahman. This agent operating in East Pakistan helped the Indian troops to infiltrate East Pakistan and started the racist slaughter of March 25-26 with the racist cry 'Purify Bangla Desh. Kill the Punjabis.'

"The United States and the Soviet Union are supporting Indian expansionism. Only the People's Republic of China, which was itself attacked by India in 1962, has taken the side of Pakistan against India."

These passages are from a leaflet distributed in Amsterdam June 18 by the Dutch Maoist group Rode Jeugd [Red Youth]. It was entitled as follows: "Anyone Who Dares Spread Slander About the People's Republic of China, the Shining Red Bastion of World Revolution, Is a Friend of U.S. Imperialism and an Enemy of the Dutch People."

The occasion was a meeting at which the British Trotskyist leader Tariq Ali spoke on the liberation struggle in Bangla Desh. Ali was in Bengal recently. He was able to talk with participants in the Bengali resistance and see some of the areas where more than 6,000,000 refugees have fled to escape systematic slaughter at the hands of the Peking-supported Pakistani dictatorship.

The Maoist leaflet offered no evidence for its claim that the independence forces started the slaughter March 25-26. Since not even the Peking press has made such an assertion, the Maoists seemed to be following the logic of their Stalinist method, rewriting history as the need arises.

They backed up their arguments by starting a chant of "Bangla Desh Is a CIA Conspiracy," and throwing tomatoes at the speaker, who is a native of West Pakistan barred by the dictatorship from returning to his country. □



## South African Rugby Team Given Hot Reception

A July 3 police attack on antiapartheid demonstrators resulted in what the Canberra *Sunday Australian* called "the wildest clashes between police and civilians ever seen in Melbourne."

The attack came as cops tried to prevent about 5,000 antiapartheid activists from getting inside a stadium where the South African Springbok Rugby Union was holding a match with an Australian team.

The July 4 *Sunday Australian* described how the melee began:

"The demonstrators who had congregated in the city at 11 am, and marched peacefully through the streets, met the police head-on as they milled around the main gates.

"Most of the 5,000 demonstrators were students.

"Police, some without their numbers and badges, charged into the demonstrators."

Despite the police attempt to exclude the antiapartheid movement from the match, about 2,000 protesters managed to slip through checkpoints and get inside. There, they were again attacked as they tried to move onto the playing field.

The brutality of the cops has triggered protest from wide sectors of the Australian political spectrum. The Victoria State Opposition Leader Holding called for a Royal Commission to investigate police conduct. G. R. Crawford, president of the Victoria branch of the Labor party, said that the police had "excelled themselves by establishing a new high peak in brutality in handling demonstrators."

One of those beaten by the cops was W. Hartley, a Labor party federal executive member and former secretary of the party. Hartley stated that he intends to bring charges against the cops.

The July 3 demonstration was part of a general campaign against the Australian tour of the South African team, which began in late June.

Although most of the participants in the antitour actions have been students, support for the antiapartheid movement has spread well beyond the campuses. In fact, the "Springboks" have had a difficult time even getting waited on by the tourist industry, because of trade-union opposition to the

racist South African regime.

The June 30 *Sun* of Melbourne listed some of the problems that the visiting "sportsmen" have run into.

"The union threats . . . banned them from nearly every club and hotel in Adelaide.

"So the team was forced to drive to Elizabeth, 20 miles outside the city, to hold a reception.

"The only place they could find there was the Rugby Union Club.

"When they left more demonstrators were waiting.

"For fifteen minutes the players sat in their bus as 50 protestors shouted insults at them."

Hotel workers forced cancellation of the South Africans' reservations in Victoria. To make matters worse for the "tourists," they cannot receive any words of encouragement from home—Australian postal workers have refused to deliver mail from South Africa during the tour.

Besides making the players' reception off the field less than cordial, the antiapartheid movement had mobilized several mass actions, in addition to

the one in Melbourne, to disrupt their matches.

The June 30 match at Adelaide was halted five times by demonstrators. According to the July 1 Canberra *Australian*, eighty-eight people were arrested at the match. The demonstrators blew whistles, threw smoke bombs, ran on to the field, and chanted slogans such as "Go Home Racists" and "Sharpeville, Sharpeville." (Sixty-nine Africans were killed when police fired on a peaceful demonstration in Sharpeville, South Africa, in March 1960.)

The Melbourne *Age* of July 1 reported that "at times the oval looked like a battle field under a haze from smoke bombs thrown on the field."

Tim Dare, the Canberra *Australian* reporter covering the tour, summed up the situation in the July 1 issue of that newspaper:

"If the South Africans left Australia tonight, their chief memories would be of protests, motel rooms and security precautions hardly less stringent than those imposed on their black compatriots back home." □

## Those Hecklers at NPAC Convention

The July 16 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York, contains a detailed account by Harry Ring of the unsuccessful efforts of small groups of ultraleftists to disrupt the July 2-4 National Peace Action Coalition conference.

Most of the disrupters were members of the Progressive Labor party, a formerly Maoist formation that recently broke with Mao largely because of Chinese support to the Yahya regime in Pakistan.

Members of PL, along with their supporters in the nearly defunct Students for a Democratic Society, tried to shout down several of the speakers at the opening rally of the conference. They concentrated on Senator Vance Hartke and Victor Reuther, an official of the United Automobile Workers, but did not spare others. They heckled

virtually every speaker that did not express their ultraleft outlook.

One of the more revealing demonstrations of the disrupters' political level came during the reading of a message of solidarity to the conference from the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. (See p. 695 for full text of message.)

Jerry Gordon, chairman of the session, began reading the message without identifying its author. After the first paragraph, one disrupter screamed, "That must be from Nixon!"

After the phrase referring to the hope that GIs could "go home with their family and friends," the ultraleftists shouted, "Racist! Racist! What about the Vietnamese?"

As Gordon concluded with the words "Yours sincerely, P. R. G. Information Bureau," the screamers suddenly froze into a stony, shocked silence. □

# The Case of Ivan Yakhimovich

By George Saunders

Ivan Yakhimovich, the former collective farm chairman and leading dissident Communist, was reported freed on May 3 after more than two years imprisonment in a "special" Soviet psychiatric hospital.

The reasons why, and conditions under which, he was freed have still not been made known more than two months after his release.

But the fact that he was freed revives hope that former Major General Pyotr Grigorenko may also win release from this form of incarceration. Redoubled efforts by the democratic movement in the Soviet Union are called for to achieve the freeing of Grigorenko, with whom the name of Yakhimovich has been so closely linked.

Both Grigorenko and Yakhimovich first came to prominence at the time of the widespread protests in the Soviet Union in early 1968 over the trial of four young dissidents—Aleksandr Ginzburg, Yuri Galanskov, Aleksei Dobrovolsky, and Vera Lashkova.

Grigorenko was a central figure among the Moscow oppositionists who gathered to protest outside the court building where the trial was held. These protests met with a response throughout the country.

In Latvia, a young collective-farm chairman, Yakhimovich, whose agricultural work had been praised a few years earlier in no less than *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, central organ of the Soviet Young Communist League, — a man of the generation that had been reawakened to political thought by the Twentieth Congress and the halfhearted, Khrushchevian "reform from above"—responded to this trial by sending an open letter to Politburo member Mikhail Suslov.

In it he said in part:

"I believe that the persecution of young dissenters in a country where more than fifty percent of the population are under thirty is an extremely dangerous line—adventurism. It is not the toadies, not a public of yes-men (Lord, how they have multiplied!) not mama's boys who will determine



PYOTR GRIGORENKO

our future, but rather those very rebels, the most energetic, brave, and high-principled members of our young generation.

"It is stupid to see them as enemies of Soviet power and more than stupid to let them rot in prison and to mock them. For the party, such a line is equivalent to self-strangulation. Too bad for us if we are not capable of reaching an understanding with these young people. They will create, inevitably they will create, a new party. . . ."

In retaliation for this letter, which quickly circulated in *samizdat* and won international attention, Yakhimovich was fired from his job.

This did not deter him from continuing along the course he had chosen. He went to Moscow, found other oppositionists, and entered the circle of Grigorenko and the late Aleksei Kosterin — an old Bolshevik (since 1916) and a survivor of Stalin's prison camps.

Grigorenko has given a moving and politically very interesting picture of this group of dissident Communists. It appeared in his statement on the

arrest of Ivan Yakhimovich on March 24, 1969. [See "My Friend and Comrade Ivan Yakhimovich," *Intercontinental Press*, October 20, 1969, p. 934.]

It is worth quoting at length:

"I came to know Yakhimovich in March 1968. He had traveled to Moscow in order to find Pavel Litvinov and Larisa Bogoraz-Daniel [wife of the writer Yuli Daniel, imprisoned from 1965 to 1970]. Their appeal 'To World Public Opinion' [on the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial] he had heard on the foreign radio. Under the immediate impact of it, he wrote a comradely letter—as one Communist to another—to one of the secretaries of the Central Committee, Suslov. . . .

". . . After [his letter] was broadcast [in turn] by the foreign radio, Yakhimovich was called in to the KGB. During a long interview it was made known to him, in particular, that Litvinov and Bogoraz had not signed any appeal, that this was a fabrication made up by the BBC. In order to clear up who was right—the KGB or the BBC—he came to Moscow.

"From our first conversation I knew that I had to do with a convinced Communist, a highly developed Marxist-Leninist. This brought him close not only to me but to my fellow Communists as well—the seventy-two-year-old writer Aleksei Kosterin; . . . the sixty-four-year-old scientific worker Sergei Pisarev, a member of the party since 1920 . . . and the theoretical physicist Valery Pavlinchuk, a talented young scientist . . . who was secretary of the party organization at one of the scientific research institutes in Obninsk. Many questions were discussed by this group of five people devoted to the ideas of communism. And when, in the summer of 1968, clouds gathered over Czechoslovakia, we decided to express openly what we thought about the events in that country. The delivery of our collective letter to the embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was entrusted by our friends to Yakhimovich and me. On July 28, 1968, we fulfilled this mission.

"The last time Ivan Antonovich and I saw one another was at the end of February this year [1969]. During his very short trip here (two days in all) the two of us probably discussed more than we had in all the time that had gone before. It was very hard to part. Perhaps because

at that time the investigation involving Yakhimovich was already under way and his arrest was to be expected; and perhaps because by that time, of our group of five, only we two remained. Aleksei Kosterin and Valery Pavlinchuk, hounded by the savage bureaucratic machine, had passed away; subjected to harsh persecution, Sergei Pisarev had fallen seriously ill.

"The deepgoing analysis of the internal and international political situation of the USSR and of the contradictions within the international Communist movement which I heard from my companion at that time showed that during the time we had been apart he had studied these questions intently, had done a great deal of thinking, and experienced a lot. The anguish and alarm with which he spoke about the ill-considered actions that had gotten our party and country into an exceptionally unfavorable position, weakening and undermining their international authority, are something that would have to be heard. The culmination of these discussions was our joint appeal 'To the Citizens of the USSR' concerning the self-immolations in Czechoslovakia." [For the text of that joint appeal, see *Intercontinental Press*, March 31, 1969, p. 312.]

Grigorenko himself was arrested on May 7, 1969, long after protesting the arrest of Yakhimovich. Both men were eventually confined to psychiatric prison-hospitals in different parts of the country, and protests demanding their release have been a part of the Soviet "human rights" movement ever since. The regime used this brutal form of reprisal rather than put them on trial on political charges in order to avoid the stir that such trials would make.

The Kremlin bureaucracy crudely tries to imply that political opposition to its policies must be "madness." Grigorenko in his prison diaries has replied:

"Obviously if the only 'normal' Soviet citizen is one who bows his head to every bureaucrat who exceeds his power, then I am certainly 'abnormal.'"

The following excerpt is from Ivan Yakhimovich's open letter, "A Specter Is Haunting Europe"—one of his last statements before being arrested, written at a time when, as Grigorenko said, he "was doing a great deal of

thinking." It refers to the arrest and trial of those who demonstrated on Red Square against the Kremlin's invasion of Czechoslovakia. The reader can judge whether the thinking of this devoted Communist was "abnormal."

"One has to reach a state of horror and panic to attack one's allies, to attack Soviet people. And indeed, did not these people—Pavel Litvinov, Larisa Bogoraz-Daniel, and others—support the Soviet state? Did they not support the Communist party of Czechoslovakia? Perhaps they supported Franco, Salazar, or the military junta in Greece?"

"No! The Stalinists feel the ground slipping out from under them; they know the fatal hour proclaimed by history is nigh. This is the panic of the doomed. This is the panic of living corpses. But be vigilant. They have

powerful modern weapons in their hands. They have the reins of authority in their hands. These are unreliable hands. These are the hands of criminals. Communists throughout the world, stop them before it is too late! . . .

". . . Whether they wish it or not, those Communist parties that support the CPSU in its gross errors are doing it a disservice. They are, in fact, weakening our country, since they are strengthening the adventurist elements in the leadership and weakening the healthy, progressive elements.

"We repeat: Come to your senses!

"We repeat: Hands off the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic!

"We repeat: Freedom for political prisoners!

"We repeat: Leninism—Yes! Stalinism—No!" □

## Soviet Union

# Political Prisoners in Mental Hospitals

[We have translated the following article from the May issue of *Wiener Tagebuch*, the journal of the Franz Marek grouping, which was expelled from the Austrian Communist party in May 1970 because of its opposition to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The subheads have been added.]

\* \* \*

This is documentation. As that excellent phrase puts it, any commentary would be superfluous. Where other sources are not indicated, the information comes from the samizdat (self-publication) *Chronicle of Current Events*, an information bulletin in the Soviet Union exclusively devoted to publicizing factual material on cases of violations of human rights by state and judicial bodies.

J. S. Gorbanevskaia, the mother of Natalia Gorbanevskaia, testifying before the court:

"If my daughter has committed a crime,

then sentence her to any punishment, no matter how strict. But don't send a completely healthy person into a psychiatric institution."

Natalia Gorbanevskaia wrote a letter to *Rude Pravo* on August 29, 1968, that is, four days after the demonstration in Red Square [protesting the invasion of Czechoslovakia]. (The following excerpt from the letter was read to the court by the prosecutor because it was considered especially incriminating.)

"My comrades and I are happy that we were able to take part in this demonstration, that it was possible, at least for a moment, to break through the flood of unrestrained lies and the cowardly silence and to show that not all the citizens of our country approve of the force that was used in the name of the Soviet people. We hope that the Czechoslovak people will hear of the demonstration, and we gain strength and perseverance from the belief that when the Czechs and the Slovaks think of Soviet citizens, they will think not only of the occupiers, but of us also."

## The Sentencing of Natalia Gorbanevskaia

After summing up all the crimes charged against Gorbanevskaia—such as participation in the Red Square demonstration against the occupation of Czechoslovakia, writing the letter just quoted, helping to edit the *Chronicle of Current Events*, and writing a report entitled "Free Medical

Care" (about her first forced psychiatric treatment)—after citing Section 190-1 of the criminal code of the Russian republic and the defendant's opposition to the state authority (see below), after citing Section 191 of the criminal code, the prosecutor came to the following conclusion:

Of course, the opinion of a juridical medical commission of experts is attached to the court record. The expert, Professor Lunz, a recognized psychiatrist, explained to the court in great detail that Gorbanevskaia suffered from a mental illness and needed treatment in a psychiatric special clinic. We must heed such a weighty medical diagnosis and release Gorbanevskaia from any legal punishment, in accordance with Article II of the criminal code. However, mandatory medical treatment must be ordered as prescribed by Section 53 of the Russian republic's penal code, and Gorbanevskaia committed to a psychiatric institution "of a special type," in accordance with the recommendation of the commission of experts.

Number 8 of the *Chronicle of Current Events* in June 1969 reported exhaustively on the nature and practical workings of these "psychiatric special clinics." Amnesty International also circulated this report.

The special psychiatric hospitals take persons who have committed serious crimes (murder, rape, robbery) but cannot be held legally responsible for their actions. In addition, it often happens that when they want to exclude persons from society they declare them mentally ill if the authorities are convinced of their guilt and the investigation has not been able to prove anything.

The length of internment in a hospital is not set by the court and can be drawn out indefinitely. Together with those who are really sick, completely healthy persons are taken to these hospitals because of their opinions. In this manner, they lose the right to defend themselves before a court, and they live in considerably worse conditions than in the prisons or camps.

The first so-called hospital of this kind existed even before the war, in Kazan. It still has a special section for political inmates, which originated in that period.

After the war a special colony was established at Sytskhovka in the Smolensk region. Even now chronic cases are sent there, including politicals who are con-

sidered the most dangerous by the state security service and the directors of the special hospitals. The persons in this colony are driven into a state of complete mental collapse.

A special hospital was opened in Leningrad in 1952; another in 1965 in Chernyakhovsk in Kaliningradsk region, in a former prison for Germans; still another in Minsk in 1966; and another in Dnepropetrovsk in 1968.

All these institutions have the following characteristics in common:

Although mentally normal, political prisoners are held in the same cells as patients with severe mental illnesses. If they refuse to renounce their opinions, they are tortured under the pretext of treatment, receiving large doses of Aminazin and Sulfazin, which cause depressive shock reactions and severe physical harm. The rules are the same as in a prison. One hour of exercise a day is permitted.

Often patients are injected with Natriumaminat, a strong narcotic, in order to weaken them. After the injection they are questioned.

The personnel consist of employees of the state security service, whose uniforms are hidden under white coats; male attendants (thieves and incorrigible murderers) selected from the penal camps, also in white coats; and finally, higher and

lower medical personnel, many with officers' stripes under their coats.

The brick walls that surround these prison hospitals are even more imposing than those around other prisons.

The most horrible despotism exists in the hospitals, from Sytskhovka to Chernyakhovsk, where the really sick and the politicals are equally victims of daily beatings and sadistic humiliation by the supervisory personnel and the attendants, who possess unrestricted power. The patient Popov, for example, was beaten to death in the spring of 1969 in the hospital of Chernyakhovsk. In his medical record, the cause of death was given as cerebral hemorrhage.

Prisoners in the strict regime camps who feel that they can no longer bear the terrible conditions often try to feign madness, and many are successful. But when they are transferred to a psychiatric prison hospital, they recognize immediately that they are worse off now than in the most dreadful camps. Many even beg the doctors — on their knees — to send them "back to the camp."

Like ex-convicts, persons who manage to be released from these hospitals receive a special passport. Those who refuse to confess their illness generally have no hope of ever winning freedom.

## General Pyotr Grigorenko's Hunger Strike

Pyotr Grigorevich Grigorenko was arrested in Tashkent in May 1969 for helping in the defense of Crimean Tatars who were demanding to return to their home. He was sent to the mental institution there. A court that met nine months later, in February 1970, sentenced him, without his being present at the hearing, to forced confinement in a special clinic. He was also not permitted to consult with his attorney. The following passages from his diary were sent abroad by his wife, with the aid of the Norwegian SMOG Committee.

June 11, 1969: I inform Rusmetov (prosecuting attorney of the Uzbek Republic) that I am entering the thirteenth day of my hunger strike.

June 15: I refuse food.

June 15: Beginning of the forced feeding. . . . As they were putting me in the straitjacket, I was beaten and choked. Then began the painful procedure of putting an apparatus in my mouth, locking my jaws open.

June 16-19: The procedure of forced feeding was repeated daily. I defend myself as best I can. I am always beaten and choked, my hands are sprained, they deliberately strike me on my injured leg. [Grigorenko suffered a leg wound, from which he never fully recovered, in the second world war. — IP] They treated me with exceptional bestiality on June 17, the day on which the documents of the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties were signed in Mos-

cow. The officials of the Lefortovo prison, who were sent here specially from Moscow, distinguish themselves in the use of force against me. After each session of forced feeding, I described the brutal methods in petitions.

June 17: I wrote in my deposition that the continuation of my hunger strike indicates my protest against the brutal manner in which I am treated.

June 18: I have recorded who must be held responsible for my death. After my two depositions, the brutalities stopped. They have contented themselves with forcing me into a straitjacket. The number of persons who hold me during this process has increased from the original five to twelve. The battle lasted a longer time and I usually collapsed with frightful heart pains. I continued to defend myself with increasing perseverance in the hope that my heart would not be able to endure it. In my torment, I wished for death and calculated that it would help to expose this despotic treatment.

June 20: The prosecuting attorney Naumova came into my cell and let me understand that they are waiting and hoping for my death. Like lightning the thought hit me: "Then why am I helping them? Why should I fulfill your wish?" When she was gone, the conversation they had had with me before the hunger strike appeared in an entirely different light. The head of the solitary confinement section, Majc M.V. Lyssenko, had said then: "Don't imagine that you will earn a magnificent funeral. Your corpse will not be given

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## Testimony of the Government 'Experts'

From the court proceedings against Natalia Gorbanevskaia, Moscow, July 7, 1970:

The proceedings concern the deposition of the legal psychiatric expert commission. The chairman of the court asks the lawyers to put questions to the experts. The defense attorney proposes eleven questions, six of which are permitted by the court. The last question by the defense concerns the methods of treatment proposed by the commission of experts when it recommended commitment to a special hospital. The defense wanted to know if this treatment could not be carried out in a hospital of the usual sort.

The witness, Professor Lunz, explained that in Gorbanevskaia a stealthily progressing form of schizophrenia had been diagnosed in which "definite symptoms are absent." In this illness, the only changes that can be established are in the emotional sphere, in the thinking and critical faculties, while there is no loss of memory, earlier acquired knowledge, or acquired abilities. The commission of experts is of the opinion that slowly increasing changes are occurring in Gorbanevskaia's psyche, which "from the theoretical standpoint cannot be classified as a remission (that is, a weakening of the symptoms), although they have superficial similarities with it."

To the defense's question about the need for a special institution, Professor Lunz answered that in these hospitals, in addition to the direct treatment, a regimen was maintained suited to achieving adaptation by the patients to the conditions that they would find on leaving the hospital. The combination of pathological changes in the psyche with certain unimpaired faculties, Professor Lunz continued, increased the dangerousness to society of patients, as long as they lacked a critical insight into their own behavior and were not conscious of their illness.

Thus the defense was unable to obtain concrete answers to its questions.

From the court proceedings against N. Gorbanevskaia, Moscow, July 7, 1970:

The attorney for the accused, Mrs. S. V. Kalistratova, proposed a second medical examination, because on November 19, 1969, the accused Gorbanevskaia had been presented to a medical expert commission chaired by the psychiatrist I. K. Yanushevski. After studying the course of the illness and the ten-year-long psychiatric history, and on the basis of its investigation, this commission came to the conclusion that Gorbanevskaia did not suffer from a mental illness and that confinement in a psychiatric institute was not indicated. On the other hand, the commission of experts from the Serbski Institute came to the opposite conclusion, in that it confirmed that Gorbanevskaia had

and we won't tell them the place where you are buried." After I had considered all this, I decided to give up my pursuit of death.

a chronic mental illness, namely schizophrenia, declared her incompetent, and prescribed compulsory treatment in a psychiatric institute of special type.

In the opinion of the defense, the presence of two mutually contradictory medical diagnoses of Gorbanevskaia's psychic state demanded an especially thorough study of the question of whether the defendant was mentally competent.

This was all the more true since the record of the institute's examination aroused legitimate doubts as to the accuracy of the experts' conclusions. It did not name the form of schizophrenia nor present a single symptom of psychic dis-

## The Expert Qualifications of Doctor Lunz

In Stalin's time, Professor D. R. Lunz directed the division for political prisoners in the Serbski Institute. Today this division is distinguished as a ward for special examinations.

Professor Lunz is simultaneously a collaborator of the KGB. As a witness, Professor Lunz in 1963 confirmed the mental incompetence of Bukovsky and in 1967 his competence; the incompetence of Dobrovolsky in 1964 and his competence in 1967. On the basis of Lunz's testimony, General Grigorenko was declared incompetent in 1964 and spent fifteen months in the psychiatric prison-clinic in Leningrad. The forced hospitalization of the participants in the August 25, 1968, demonstration, Gorbanevskaia and Fainberg, as well as Victor Kuznetsov, who was arrested in March 1969, also rest on Lunz's testimony.

From the interrogation of the witness Shilov, examining magistrate of the Moscow bar, at the trial of N. Gorbanevskaia:

The witness states that on December 24, 1969, he had to carry out a search of Gorbanevskaia's home. The action was almost at its end, he was about to complete a list of confiscated documents, while Gorbanevskaia sat nearby and sharpened

## Olga Jofe's 'Progressive Schizophrenia'

On August 20, 1970, the trial of Olga Jofe (born in 1951) took place in the Moscow city court. Olga Jofe was accused under Section 70 of the criminal code of the Russian republic for taking an active part in producing anti-Soviet leaflets, to the number of 245 (the leaflets were later destroyed by the group itself and were not distributed), and for possessing and disseminating anti-Soviet documents.

turbance. All this was basis for asserting that the experts' deposition was a criminal falsification. From this followed the demand for a detailed examination of the deposition of the institute's experts.

The indictment indicates the view of the experts concerning testimony by Gorbanevskaia and her presence at the trial. The witness, Professor Lunz, explains that the commission of experts as a rule pleads against bringing the mentally ill into court, because the latter must be regarded not only as the object of an investigation but also as patients whom the doctors are obligated to care for.

The indictment declares pointless the request of the defense for an additional psychiatric examination. The commission of experts had at its disposal all the judicial records and knew which actions could be held against Gorbanevskaia. The commission of experts was aware that she had spread slanderous material and provided it to "our opponents" (in the West).

a pencil for her small son with a razor blade. In order to hasten the completion of the list, he suggested to her that she number the pages of a manuscript he was going to confiscate—it was the "Requiem" of Akhmatova.

Suddenly Gorbanevskaia leaped up and tried to tear the manuscript away from him. In the course of the "struggle lasting several seconds" he suffered a number of cuts on his fingers. . . .

Under questioning, the witness states that after the incident, Gorbanevskaia had apologized and assured him that the cuts had been unintentional.

The defense wanted to know on what basis the poems of the well-known and recognized Soviet poet Anna Akhmatova were supposed to be confiscated. The witness answers that the examining authorities need all the information about the philosophy, tastes, and habits of accused persons in order to make a complete study of their personalities. To the question of the defense whether he, the witness, was aware why Gorbanevskaia had been so excited about the confiscation of this manuscript, he answered that the title page bore a personal dedication by Akhmatova and therefore the manuscript possibly had a special value for Gorbanevskaia.

An examination carried out in the Serbski Institute (by Professor Morosov, doctor of medical science; Professor Lunz; the doctors Felinskaia and Martynenko) established the mental incompetence of Jofe with the diagnosis: gradually progressive schizophrenia, simple form.

At the beginning of the trial, the defense motion that the accused be allowed to be present was denied.

On being called to the stand, the witness Kaplun explained that her activities and those of her comrades were in no way intended to undermine the Soviet state but, on the contrary, to strengthen it. They were guided by the Leninist principle that said one must tell the truth to the people.

Concerning Olga Jofe's personality, all the witnesses questioned on that score testified to the effect that she was a strong-willed, consistent, logical person, accustomed to carrying every matter through to its conclusion. She was friendly toward others and had a good sense of humor. In addition, at the request of defense attorney Posdeyev, opinions of Olga Jofe from her workplace and school, in which she received the best recommendation, were read to the court.

Her mother explained that Olga had developed in a completely normal manner and that her parents had noticed no deviations from normality either in her childhood or youth. She had been a tender, calm, composed, and sociable child.

From the defense questioning of Martynenko, chairman of the commission of experts at the trial of Olga Jofe:

*Question:* What physiological examination was made to confirm the illness?

*Answer:* Such physiological examinations are employed with all patients. One cannot conclude the absence of illness from the absence of symptoms of the illness.

*Question:* What observations by the expert commission were the basis for the diagnosis of schizophrenia? Please explain at least one of the tests by which such severe mental derangements are established. Produce at least one statement that indicates these disturbances.

*Answer:* I can't answer that concretely. If the court is interested, the case history would have to be brought from the Serbski Institute. As an example of her behavior, one could cite her reaction to being sent to the Serbski Institute. She knew where they had brought her and understood what it meant, but she showed no strong emotion. Not even her tone of voice changed.

(Note by the editor of the *Chronicle*: V. Novodvorskaia showed such emotion, which was diagnosed as excessive. The result of the examination was the same!)

*Question:* Can you not explain this behavior of Olga Jofe on the basis of the strong will and composure of which the witnesses spoke?

*Answer:* Such self-control is impossible.

*Question:* How do you explain the fact that the illness, which the commission of experts says began to develop when Olga Jofe was fourteen years old (note by the *Chronicle* editor: Apparently that meant that the illness began in 1966, when Olga Jofe and her friends distributed leaflets in school), did not hinder her from completing successfully her mathematical high school and taking up studies at the university?

*Answer:* This form of schizophrenia does not lead to personality changes that would be conspicuous to those around her.

The defense attorney read from a mono-

graph by Professor Morosov the symptoms of the illness diagnosed on Olga by the commission of experts: hostility toward her environment, inability to concentrate, apathy, sluggishness. He then asked the expert to explain which of these symptoms had been observed in Olga Jofe, or at least to name one of them. The attorney pointed out that the presence of the symptoms mentioned had been denied by the statements of witnesses and by the official characterization of Olga.

*Answer:* All these symptoms cannot be taken individually, but only as a whole.

The defense attorney stated that the answers of the representative of the commission of experts did not satisfy him because they had not been specific.

The motion of the lawyer for a repeat examination by different experts was denied.

The ruling of the court completely sustained the indictment: Olga Jofe is to be sent for compulsory treatment in a psychiatric special hospital and until her arrival there is to be kept under guard.

In connection with the preventive arrest and confinement in mental hospitals of oppositionists because of the Twenty-

fourth Congress of the Communist party, Andrei Sakharov, a member of the Academy [of Sciences], sent a protest letter to the interior minister. Among other things, it said:

"The heroic hunger strike of Fainberg and Borissov, political prisoners in the psychiatric prison of Leningrad, has already lasted seventeen days. They oppose the forcible application of treatment endangering mental capacity . . . and demand the opening of their trial. They are defending the intellectual freedom of humanity and its future. I support their demand and offer to serve as a mediator for them.

"I am disquieted by the illegal arrests of representatives of public opinion during their visit to the state attorney of the USSR. I am especially upset by the arrest of the great scholar Michael Zand, who is seriously ill, and by the forcible hospitalization of Stoliyeva and Titov in a psychiatric clinic. They violated no official rules as they waited in the state attorney's building for their legal petition to be examined, as had been promised to them. I demand the release of all those arrested. . . ."

(*Le Monde*, April 4-5, 1971)

## An Incident in a Prison Psychiatric Hospital

From the *Chronicle of Current Events*, Number 15, August 1970:

On May 3, 1970, around 1:00 p.m., the patient Baranov attempted to escape from the twelfth (psychiatric) hospital ward of Dubrovlag labor camp. He succeeded in getting out of the hospital and ran into the prohibited area around the camp.

He was fired on from a watchtower. Eleven shots from a machine pistol were fired, of which at least five struck home. The last two shots were fired as he already lay wounded.

This incident was observed from the hospital and the camp. The next day fifteen prisoners announced a three-day strike to protest this arbitrary act against a mentally sick person. They refused to go to work.

Three of the strikers were then transferred to the dreaded prison of Vladimir. Two others were locked up for seven days each. The strike was broken.

After the incident, two Armenian soldiers, Ruben Davidian and Gensel Derbinian, refused to serve their watch on the guard towers.

Pyotr Grigorevich Grigorenko is still in the prison mental hospital of Chernyakhovsk (formerly Tilsit).

On July 3, Grigorenko's wife, Zinaida, his son Andrei, and the latter's bride came from Moscow to visit him. Without any explanation, the director of the institution, Major Belokopytov, refused visiting permission, although Doctor Bobylev had no reason to object on the basis of Grigorenko's condition.

Grigorenko's wife then asked for at least a five-minute visit, so that Grigorenko could give the young couple his blessing.

Major Belokopytov answered, "Don't ask me. On duty I have no feelings, only instructions."

Only on August 3 were the son and his young wife granted a visit. Grigorenko is in a solitary cell, and is denied the right to pencil and paper.

In July 1970, Revolt Pimenov, a collaborator of the mathematical institute, was arrested in Leningrad. He was later sentenced for allegedly distributing samizdat publications. From his biography:

R. I. Pimenov, born 1931. Graduate of the Leningrad University school of mathematics. 1949—Forcible confinement in a psychiatric clinic after filing a request to leave the Komsomol. Diagnosis: schizophrenia. After a second hearing under the chairmanship of Professor Holand, he was declared healthy; the only thing on which the professor insisted was the retraction of his resignation.

In 1950, after threats of additional forced psychiatric treatment, Pimenov declared himself ready to remain in the Komsomol. In 1951 he was expelled but readmitted on the decision of the district committee, was expelled from the university and readmitted, and in 1954 completed his studies.

In 1957 he was sentenced to six years' forced labor for writing an article on, among other things, the Hungarian revolution. On appeal the sentence was increased to ten years. Released on probation in 1963.

1969—Doctoral dissertation. Member of the gravitation department of the Academy of Sciences. Author of *Kinematic Spaces* (on mathematical space-time theory), which has been published in the Soviet Union and in England. □

## Messages of Solidarity to U.S. Antiwar Fighters

[In our last issue we reported the important conference held by the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) in New York City July 2-4. The delegates, it will be recalled, decided on a series of antiwar actions leading up to massive demonstrations in U.S. cities from coast to coast on November 6.

[At the conference, a number of messages of solidarity were read. The following three are of special interest.]

### **From the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America**

Havana  
July 2, 1971

National Peace Action Coalition

On behalf peoples Africa, Asia, Latin America, and member groups Tri-continental organization, we wish you resounding success in just pledge [to] stop U.S. imperialist war of aggression against Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia. United States people are demonstrating repudiation this brutal adventure against Indochinese peoples which has darkened homes of this Asian region. Workers, students, intellectuals, honest North Americans, all people united will achieve the legitimate aspiration of restoring peace to Indochina, victim of a criminal war condemned by all humanity. To fulfill this pledge North American people can count on the decided support of peoples of the world.

OSPAAAL

### **From the Viet Nam Union of Students**

Hanoi  
June 29, 1971

NPAC

Please accept our warmest friendly greetings occasion your national antiwar convention. Believe that U.S. peace movement's persevering actions against Nixon's policy of prolonging war will actively contribute ending U.S. aggression, bringing home all U.S. troops without condition. Vietnamese people determined

preserve their rights, aspirations for genuine independence, freedom, peace; urge USA to stop backing warlike Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration which is trying [to] legalize its tyranny in Saigon through fraudulent elections. Sincere thanks for your solidarity.

VNUS

### **From the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam**

Paris  
June 25, 1971

Dear friends,

Please convey our warmest congratulations to all the participants of the National Anti-war Convention held on July 2-4 in New York and sponsored by the NATIONAL PEACE ACTION COALITION.

Your last Spring Campaign 71 was

a great success and had a resounding sound in the whole world, particularly in the South Vietnam. Your struggle and the struggle of the South Vietnamese people are the two faces of the same fight against U.S. imperialism, for peace, independence, justice and democracy.

Our best wishes for your Summer and Fall anti-war actions to get your aims: a date for the withdrawal of all the U.S. forces from the South Vietnam so the GI's could go home with their family and friends, and the end to the support to the dictatorial Thiệu-Ky-Khiêm administration in order that the South Vietnamese people build their own country in peace, independence, neutrality, social progress and without foreign interference.

Yours sincerely,  
P. R. G. Information Bureau  
The director,  
PHAM VAN BA

### **West Germany**

## National Convention of Trotskyist Youth

Delegates from nearly all the states of West Germany met in Frankfurt May 29-31 to establish the Revolutionär-Kommunistische Jugend [RKJ — Revolutionary Communist Youth] as a nationwide organization.

The fifty-seven delegates, representing sixteen locals and eight organizing committees, voted unanimously to become a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

This decision, the convention declared, "... is the logical conclusion of the fact:

"— that the socialist revolution can win final victory only on an international scale,

"— that in both theory and practice the class struggle must be led internationally,

"— that the revolution requires an internationally centralized leadership."

"The RKJ," the declaration continued, "sees itself as a strategic factor

in the creation of the revolutionary communist party as the German section of the Fourth International.

"In a period of West German capitalism in which a large part of the worker youth, college students, and high-school students are approaching revolutionary positions, the RKJ will intervene among the radicalizing youth to hasten the organization of the vanguard for consistent anticapitalist struggle. In doing this, the RKJ will make an essential contribution to the anchoring of the revolutionary organization in the class struggles of the West German proletariat."

The convention adopted an action program for the coming months involving work in the factories, in the apprentice movement, and on university and high-school campuses.

The delegates voted that the RKJ will function as a democratic-centralist

organization. Its official organ will be the monthly journal *Was Tun*.

A central committee was elected, which in turn elected a seven-member central bureau. The national headquarters will be established in Mannheim.

## Ethiopia

### Thousands of Students Arrested

Some 2,000 to 4,000 Ethiopian high-school students have been jailed in recent weeks, Colin Legum of the London *Observer* reported from Addis Ababa in a dispatch reprinted in the July 7 *New York Post*. Most of the arrests were made immediately before the opening of the conference of the Organization of African Unity in June.

The students, who are confined in four detention camps, had been striking and demonstrating to protest a 20-percent increase in bus fares and a sharp rise in food prices. They also demanded land reforms to benefit the peasantry and an end to arrests of "vagrants" in the capital.

"They roamed the streets," Legum wrote, "attacking buses (76 were damaged). They attacked the cars of a minister and of a princess. They attacked all the Mercedes cars they came across and the Mercedes showroom—the Mercedes is the status symbol of the successful elite—and they attacked the homes of less popular ministers, who include Ras Misfin, one of the country's richest men, who has been singled out as the symbol of 'the man who steals the poor man's cow.'"

The students proved highly adept at winning support from the subjects of Haile Selassie—"Might of the Trinity," "King of Kings," and "Conquering Lion of Judah."

... it was the children's guerrilla sorties into the capital's market that

It was decided to hold the second national convention in the fall of this year. In the intervening period, the organization plans to engage in detailed programmatic discussion as the basis for adopting a declaration of the RKJ's position on current issues. □



HAILE SELASSIE: "Conquering Lion" calls in the troops.

gained them public sympathy. They would go up to a trader and ask him how much he charged for his butter, which has gone up almost 100 percent. Faced by intimidating numbers, the trader would quote a figure much below the going price; the children would then call to the people to come and buy at the lower price."

This tactic succeeded in creating disaffection even among the Conquering Lion's cops: Legum reported that they refused to intervene against the students. The emperor was forced to call in the army to arrest the demonstrators. □

### Tucuman Workers Pay Tribute to Lezcano

#### Brussels

Three militants of the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo], comrades Lescano, Polti, and Daborda, fell in action at the beginning of the month of May 1971.\* Caught by surprise by the police during an operation, they were hunted down. They resisted until their ammunition was finally exhausted. The mercenaries of the military dictatorship then murdered them in cold blood.

Comrade Marcelo Lescano was a leader of the workers in the San José sugar mill, a Trotskyist militant well-known for years among the workers of Tucumán. At his funeral the sugar-mill workers left the plant to form a

cortege behind the coffin of the murdered militant.

At the cemetery, the main trade-union leader of the left among the sugar workers in the north of Argentina, Leandro Fote, gave a speech in which he hailed the revolutionary example set by Comrade Lescano and solidarized himself publicly with the ERP. The military dictatorship arrested Comrade Fote. A powerful workers' demonstration took place in Tucumán to demand his release.

In another case, Comrade Clarissa Lea Place, a militant of the PRT [Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—Revolutionary Workers party, the Argentine section of the Fourth International], wounded during an operation, is still being held prisoner in Tucumán.

The Fourth International appeals to all workers and revolutionary organizations, all anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist militants, to unleash a powerful campaign for the liberation of Comrade Clarissa. □

### Summer Schedule

This is a reminder that we will soon change to our summer schedule.

During August no issues will be published.

We will resume our regular weekly schedule in September.

\*In a leaflet circulated in Argentina, the ERP gave the date of the murder as April 17 and listed the names of the three guerrillas as follows: Marcelo Lezcano, Jose Alberto Polti, and Juan del Valle Taborda. For a full account of the action, see "The ERP Mourns Death of Three" in *Intercontinental Press*, June 14, p. 542.